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Aristoteles - Collected Works (dir. W. D. Ross)

Aristoteles - Collected Works (dir. W. D. Ross)

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Aristotle - Works [Translated under the editorship of W. D.

Ross]

Organon I – Categories Organon II - On Interpretation Organon III - Prior Analytics Organon IV - Posterior Analytics Organon V – Topics Organon VI - On Sophistical Refutations Physics On the Heavens On Generation and Corruption Meteorology On the Soul Parva Naturalia History of Animals On the Parts of Animals On the Motion of Animals On the Gait of Animals On the Generation of Animals Metaphysics Nicomachean Ethics Politics Athenian Constitution Rhetoric Poetics

2 47 81 221 326 533 602 852 952 1 033 1 159 1 256 1 389 1 791 1 966 1 984 2 009 2 205 2 536 2 788 3 050 3 132 3 308

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Aristotle – Categories [Translated by E. M. Edghill]

1 Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from the word ‘courage’.

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2 Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’. Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject. By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar. There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

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3 When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus ‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’, ‘two-footed’, ‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘animal’; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being ‘two-footed’. But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.

4 Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’, under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’,

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are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized’, affection. No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, cannot be either true or false.

5 Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore – that is to say, the species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal, – are termed secondary substances. It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man’ is applied to the individual, for we use the term ‘man’ in describing the individual; and the definition of ‘man’ will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.

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With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, ‘white’ being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white’ is never predicable of the body. Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. ‘Animal’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by

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mentioning the species ‘tree’ than by mentioning the genus ‘plant’. Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox. It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name ‘secondary substance’, for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances.

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Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man ‘skilled in grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all cases. It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated of the species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic ‘terrestrial’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, the

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definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species ‘man’: for ‘man’ is terrestrial. The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase ‘being present in a subject’, we stated’ that we meant ‘otherwise than as parts in a whole’. It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word ‘univocal’ was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally. All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of ‘man’ or ‘animal’, our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a

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secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words ‘man’, ‘animal’, are predicable of more than one subject. Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term ‘white’; ‘white’ indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word ‘animal’ is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word ‘man’. Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of ‘ten’, or of any such term. A man may contend that ‘much’ is the contrary of ‘little’, or ‘great’ of ‘small’, but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists. Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated’ that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular substance, ‘man’, cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to

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subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement ‘he is sitting’ is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and
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opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’ remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does so. If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.

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6 Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place. In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest. A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.

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Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, ‘one’ is prior to ‘two’, and ‘two’ to ‘three’, and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not.

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Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that ‘much’ was the contrary of ‘little’, and ‘great’ of ‘small’. But these are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The terms ‘two cubits long,
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"three cubits long,’ and so on indicate quantity, the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ indicate relation, for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative. Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external? Again, if ‘great’ and ‘small’ are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves. For if ‘great’ is the contrary of ‘small’, and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then ‘small’ or ‘great’ is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term ‘great’, therefore, is not the contrary of the term ‘small’, nor ‘much’ of ‘little’. And even though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries.

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It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a contrary. For men define the term ‘above’ as the contrary of ‘below’, when it is the region at the centre they mean by ‘below’; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly with regard to number: what is ‘three’ is not more truly three than what is ‘five’ is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree. The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned. That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.

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7 Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word ‘superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression ‘double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition ‘of’ or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; ‘double’ and ‘triple’ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

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It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For ‘like’ and ‘unlike’, ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’, have the modifications ‘more’ and ‘less’ applied to them, and each of these is relative in character: for the terms ‘like’ and ‘unequal’ bear ‘unequal’ bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as ‘double’ admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the term ‘slave’ we mean the slave of a master, by the term ‘master’, the master of a slave; by ‘double’, the double of its hall; by ‘half’, the half of its double; by ‘greater’, greater than that which is less; by ‘less,’ less than that which is greater. So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception. Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.

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Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word ‘boat’ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ‘rudder’. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like ‘ruddered’ as the correlative of ‘rudder’. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ‘ruddered’ thing is ‘ruddered’ in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is ‘headed’, than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head. Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word ‘winged’ from ‘wing’ and from ‘rudder’. All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term ‘slave,’ if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact.

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Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative of ‘the slave’ is said to be ‘the master’, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said ‘master’, such as ‘biped’, ‘receptive of knowledge’, ‘human’, should be removed, and the attribute ‘master’ alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. For suppose the correlative of ‘the slave’ should be said to be ‘the man’, or the correlative of ‘the wing"the bird’; if the attribute ‘master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’, the correlation between ‘the man’ and ‘the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute ‘winged’ be withdrawn from ‘the bird’, ‘the wing’ will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that ‘the wing’ has no correlative. Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master

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necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object. Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge. This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to

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exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception. But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances; the species ‘man’ and the species ‘ox’ are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one’s property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as ‘head’ and ‘hand’ are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed, if

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our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is ‘double’, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.

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Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.

8 By ‘quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let us call ‘habit’ or ‘disposition’. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, selfrestraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice. By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through
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lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a ‘habit’ as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter. Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit. Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity.

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A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities. Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but – because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by

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certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these. Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such. Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a badtempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.

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The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others. There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms ‘whiteness’, ‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the adjectives ‘white’, ‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on. There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science,

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with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘boxing’ or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does not occur often. We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries. If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality. Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is

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also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on. The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and ‘quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree. Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with

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reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality. We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something. Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.

9 Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they
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admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories. We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as ‘shod’, ‘armed’, in that of place ‘in the Lyceum’ and so on, as was explained before.

10 The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must next explain the various senses in which the term ‘opposite’ is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word ‘opposite’ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions ‘double’ and ‘half’; with reference to contraries by ‘bad’ and ‘good’. Opposites in the sense of ‘privatives’ and ‘positives’ are’ blindness’ and ‘sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’.

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(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition ‘of’ or by some other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. (ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated
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of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other. Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust. (iii) ‘privatives’ and ‘Positives’ have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular ‘positive’ is natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind. To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding ‘privative’ or ‘positive’. ‘Sight’ is a ‘positive’, ‘blindness’ a ‘privative’, but ‘to possess sight’ is not equivalent to ‘sight’, ‘to be blind’ is not equivalent to ‘blindness’. Blindness is a ‘privative’, to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is

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not a ‘privative’. Moreover, if ‘blindness’ were equivalent to ‘being blind’, both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. To be in a state of ‘possession’ is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of ‘privation’, just as ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. By ‘affirmation’ we mean an affirmative proposition, by ‘denial’ a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’, so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting. It is evident that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness. That those terms which fall under the heads of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that

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they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,’ in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the
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stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, however, change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow his grow a new set.
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(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false. Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. ‘Double’ and ‘half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ such as ‘sight’ and ‘blindness’. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. ‘Socrates is ill’ is the contrary of ‘Socrates is well’, but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither ‘Socrates is ill’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of ‘Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ‘opposite’ which applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.

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But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions ‘Socrates is ill’, ‘Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.

11 That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good. In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.

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It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul. Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.

12 There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be ‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply greater length of time. Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense ‘one’ is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows directly that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does not follow necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is called ‘prior’ to that other. In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences

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which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as ‘coming first’ with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched. Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ‘prior’ is used. Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being. Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses.

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13 The term ‘simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are ‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other’s being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other. Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the ‘winged’ species is simultaneous with the ‘terrestrial’ and the ‘water’ species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus ‘animal’ has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the ‘water’ species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’ point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation. But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water-animal’, there will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the being of the genus

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‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species ‘water-animal’. Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are ‘simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.

14 There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some
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things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct. Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here also either as ‘rest in its quality’ or as ‘change in the direction of the contrary quality’, just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.

15 The term ‘to have’ is used in various senses. In the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for we are said to ‘have’ a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the
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case of a man’s height; for he is said to ‘have’ a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to ‘have’ a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to ‘have’ wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we are said to ‘have’ a house or a field. A man is also said to ‘have’ a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife. Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.

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Aristotle - On Interpretation [Translated by E. M. Edghill]

1 First we must define the terms ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, then the terms ‘denial’ and ‘affirmation’, then ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’ Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us. As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech. For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation; ‘man’ and ‘white’, as isolated terms, are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the word ‘goat-stag.’ It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added, either in the present or in some other tense.

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2 By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the noun ‘Fairsteed,’ the part ‘steed’ has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase ‘fair steed.’ Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word ‘pirate-boat’ the word ‘boat’ has no meaning except as part of the whole word. The limitation ‘by convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name – it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun. The expression ‘not-man’ is not a noun. There is indeed no recognized term by which we may denote such an expression, for it is not a sentence or a denial. Let it then be called an indefinite noun. The expressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with ‘is’, ‘was’, or will be’, they do not, as they are, form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these conditions. Take the words ‘of Philo is’ or ‘of or ‘of Philo is not’; these words do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.

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3 A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. ‘Health’ is a noun, but ‘is healthy’ is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other thing. Such expressions as ‘is not-healthy’, ‘is not, ill’, I do not describe as verbs; for though they carry the additional note of time, and always form a predicate, there is no specified name for this variety; but let them be called indefinite verbs, since they apply equally well to that which exists and to that which does not. Similarly ‘he was healthy’, ‘he will be healthy’, are not verbs, but tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that the verb indicates present time, while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lie outside the present. Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer’s mind, and fixes his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ the participle ‘being’ significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.

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4 A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word ‘human’ has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word ‘human’ from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word ‘mouse’, the part ‘ouse’ has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. In composite words, indeed, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been pointed out, they have not an independent meaning. Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a physical faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false. Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.

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5 The first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, the next, the simple denial; all others are only one by conjunction. Every proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. The phrase which defines the species ‘man’, if no verb in present, past, or future time be added, is not a proposition. It may be asked how the expression ‘a footed animal with two feet’ can be called single; for it is not the circumstance that the words follow in unbroken succession that effects the unity. This inquiry, however, finds its place in an investigation foreign to that before us. We call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, or the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity: those propositions, on the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many facts, or whose parts have no conjunction. Let us, moreover, consent to call a noun or a verb an expression only, and not a proposition, since it is not possible for a man to speak in this way when he is expressing something, in such a way as to make a statement, whether his utterance is an answer to a question or an act of his own initiation. To return: of propositions one kind is simple, i.e. that which asserts or denies something of something, the other composite, i.e. that which is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of time.

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6 An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial a negative assertion. Now it is possible both to affirm and to deny the presence of something which is present or of something which is not, and since these same affirmations and denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside the present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial. Thus it is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation. We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be ‘equivocal’. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.

7 Some things are universal, others individual. By the term ‘universal’ I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by ‘individual’ that which is not thus predicated. Thus ‘man’ is a universal, ‘Callias’ an individual. Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual. If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are ‘contrary’. By the expression ‘a proposition of
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universal character with regard to a universal’, such propositions as ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’ are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the ‘propositions ‘man is white’, ‘man is not white’. ‘Man’ is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word ‘every’ does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character. If, however, both predicate and subject are distributed, the proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, under such circumstances, be true. The proposition ‘every man is every animal’ is an example of this type. An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term ‘contradictory’, when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation ‘every man is white’ is the contradictory of the denial ‘not every man is white’, or again, the proposition ‘no man is white’ is the contradictory of the proposition ‘some men are white’. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’, ‘every man is just’, ‘no man is just’. We see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be true, but the contradictories of a pair of contraries can sometimes both be true with reference to the same subject; for instance ‘not every man is white’ and some men are white’ are both true. Of such corresponding positive and negative propositions as refer to universals and have a universal character, one must be true and the other false. This is the case

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also when the reference is to individuals, as in the propositions ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Socrates is not white’. When, on the other hand, the reference is to universals, but the propositions are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false, for it is possible to state truly that man is white and that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful. This statement might seem at first sight to carry with it a contradiction, owing to the fact that the proposition ‘man is not white’ appears to be equivalent to the proposition ‘no man is white’. This, however, is not the case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or false. It is evident also that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation is itself single; for the denial must deny just that which the affirmation affirms concerning the same subject, and must correspond with the affirmation both in the universal or particular character of the subject and in the distributed or undistributed sense in which it is understood. For instance, the affirmation ‘Socrates is white’ has its proper denial in the proposition ‘Socrates is not white’. If anything else be negatively predicated of the subject or if anything else be the subject though the predicate remain the same, the denial will not be the denial proper to that affirmation, but on that is distinct. The denial proper to the affirmation ‘every man is white’ is ‘not every man is white’; that proper to the affirmation ‘some men are white’ is ‘no man is white’, while that proper to the affirmation ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’.

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We have shown further that a single denial is contradictorily opposite to a single affirmation and we have explained which these are; we have also stated that contrary are distinct from contradictory propositions and which the contrary are; also that with regard to a pair of opposite propositions it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. We have pointed out, moreover, what the reason of this is and under what circumstances the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other.

8 An affirmation or denial is single, if it indicates some one fact about some one subject; it matters not whether the subject is universal and whether the statement has a universal character, or whether this is not so. Such single propositions are: ‘every man is white’, ‘not every man is white’;’man is white’,’man is not white’; ‘no man is white’, ‘some men are white’; provided the word ‘white’ has one meaning. If, on the other hand, one word has two meanings which do not combine to form one, the affirmation is not single. For instance, if a man should establish the symbol ‘garment’ as significant both of a horse and of a man, the proposition ‘garment is white’ would not be a single affirmation, nor its opposite a single denial. For it is equivalent to the proposition ‘horse and man are white’, which, again, is equivalent to the two propositions ‘horse is white’, ‘man is white’. If, then, these two propositions have more than a single significance, and do not form a single proposition, it is plain that the first proposition either has more than one significance or else has none; for a particular man is not a horse.

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This, then, is another instance of those propositions of which both the positive and the negative forms may be true or false simultaneously.

9 In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case of a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has been said,’ one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas when the subject is universal, but the propositions are not of a universal character, there is no such necessity. We have discussed this type also in a previous chapter. When the subject, however, is individual, and that which is predicated of it relates to the future, the case is altered. For if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate must either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that it is white was true; if it is not white, the proposition to the opposite effect was true. And if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false statement; and if the man who
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states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or false. Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. For either he that affirms that it will take place or he that denies this is in correspondence with fact, whereas if things did not take place of necessity, an event might just as easily not happen as happen; for the meaning of the word ‘fortuitous’ with regard to present or future events is that reality is so constituted that it may issue in either of two opposite directions. Again, if a thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so that of anything that has taken place it was always true to say ‘it is’ or ‘it will be’. But if it was always true to say that a thing is or will be, it is not possible that it should not be or not be about to be, and when a thing cannot not come to be, it is impossible that it should not come to be, and when it is impossible that it should not come to be, it must come to be. All, then, that is about to be must of necessity take place. It results from this that nothing is uncertain or fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous it would not be necessary. Again, to say that neither the affirmation nor the denial is true, maintaining, let us say, that an event neither will take place nor will not take place, is to take up a position impossible to defend. In the first place, though facts should prove the one proposition false, the opposite would still be untrue. Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was both white and large, both these qualities must necessarily belong to it; and if they will belong to it the next day, they must necessarily belong to it the next day. But if an event is neither to take place nor not to take place the next day, the element of chance will be eliminated. For

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example, it would be necessary that a sea-fight should neither take place nor fail to take place on the next day. These awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it is an irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, whether they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other false, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time. Further, it makes no difference whether people have or have not actually made the contradictory statements. For it is manifest that the circumstances are not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial on the part of anyone. For events will not take place or fail to take place because it was stated that they would or would not take place, nor is this any more the case if the prediction dates back ten thousand years or any other space of time. Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things was so constituted that a prediction about an event was true, then through all time it was necessary that that should find fulfillment; and with regard to all events, circumstances have always been such that their occurrence is a matter of necessity. For that of which someone has said truly that it will be, cannot fail to take place; and of that which takes place, it was always true to say that it would be. Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both deliberation and action are causative with regard to the

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future, and that, to speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there is potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be or not be; events also therefore may either take place or not take place. There are many obvious instances of this. It is possible that this coat may be cut in half, and yet it may not be cut in half, but wear out first. In the same way, it is possible that it should not be cut in half; unless this were so, it would not be possible that it should wear out first. So it is therefore with all other events which possess this kind of potentiality. It is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in which case the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in one direction or the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by exception. Now that which is must needs be when it is, and that which is not must needs not be when it is not. Yet it cannot be said without qualification that all existence and non-existence is the outcome of necessity. For there is a difference between saying that that which is, when it is, must needs be, and simply saying that all that is must needs be, and similarly in the case of that which is not. In the case, also, of two contradictory propositions this holds good. Everything must either be or not be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is not always possible to distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives must necessarily come about. Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place tomorrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place tomorrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a

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potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character. This is the case with regard to that which is not always existent or not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather as we have indicated.

10 An affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, and this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject and predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing. I have already explained’ what is meant by a noun and by that which has no name; for I stated that the expression ‘not-man’ was not a noun, in the proper sense of the word, but an indefinite noun, denoting as it does in a certain sense a single thing. Similarly the expression ‘does not enjoy health’ is not a verb proper, but an indefinite verb. Every affirmation, then, and every denial, will consist of a noun and a verb, either definite or indefinite. There can be no affirmation or denial without a verb; for the expressions ‘is’, ‘will be’, ‘was’, ‘is coming to be’, and the like are verbs according to our definition, since besides their specific meaning they convey the notion of time. Thus the primary
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affirmation and denial are ‘as follows: ‘man is’, ‘man is not’. Next to these, there are the propositions: ‘not-man is’, ‘not-man is not’. Again we have the propositions: ‘every man is, ‘every man is not’, ‘all that is not-man is’, ‘all that is not-man is not’. The same classification holds good with regard to such periods of time as lie outside the present. When the verb ‘is’ is used as a third element in the sentence, there can be positive and negative propositions of two sorts. Thus in the sentence ‘man is just’ the verb ‘is’ is used as a third element, call it verb or noun, which you will. Four propositions, therefore, instead of two can be formed with these materials. Two of the four, as regards their affirmation and denial, correspond in their logical sequence with the propositions which deal with a condition of privation; the other two do not correspond with these. I mean that the verb ‘is’ is added either to the term ‘just’ or to the term ‘not-just’, and two negative propositions are formed in the same way. Thus we have the four propositions. Reference to the subjoined table will make matters clear:

A. Affirmation Man is just

B. Denial Man is not just

D. Denial Man is not not-just

C. Affirmation Man is not-just

Here 'is' and 'is not' are added either to 'just' or to 'not-just'.

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This then is the proper scheme for these propositions, as has been said in the Analytics. The same rule holds good, if the subject is distributed. Thus we have the table:

A’. Affirmation Every man is just

B’. Denial Not every man is just

D’. Denial Not every man is not-just

C’. Affirmation Every man not-just is

Yet here it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that the propositions joined in the table by a diagonal line should both be true; though under certain circumstances this is the case. We have thus set out two pairs of opposite propositions; there are moreover two other pairs, if a term be conjoined with 'notman', the latter forming a kind of subject. Thus:

A”. Not-man is just

B”. Not-man is not just

D”. Not-man is not not-just

C”. Not-man is notjust

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This is an exhaustive enumeration of all the pairs of opposite propositions that can possibly be framed. This last group should remain distinct from those which preceded it, since it employs as its subject the expression ‘not-man’. When the verb ‘is’ does not fit the structure of the sentence (for instance, when the verbs ‘walks’, ‘enjoys health’ are used), that scheme applies, which applied when the word ‘is’ was added. Thus we have the propositions: ‘every man enjoys health’, ‘every man does-not-enjoy-health’, ‘all that is not-man enjoys health’, ‘all that is not-man does-not-enjoy-health’. We must not in these propositions use the expression ‘not every man’. The negative must be attached to the word ‘man’, for the word ‘every’ does not give to the subject a universal significance, but implies that, as a subject, it is distributed. This is plain from the following pairs: ‘man enjoys health’, ‘man does not enjoy health’; ‘not-man enjoys health’, ‘not man does not enjoy health’. These propositions differ from the former in being indefinite and not universal in character. Thus the adjectives ‘every’ and no additional significance except that the subject, whether in a positive or in a negative sentence, is distributed. The rest of the sentence, therefore, will in each case be the same. Since the contrary of the proposition ‘every animal is just’ is ‘no animal is just’, it is plain that these two propositions will never both be true at the same time or with reference to the same subject. Sometimes, however, the contradictories of these contraries will both be true, as in the instance before us: the propositions ‘not every animal is just’ and ‘some animals are just’ are both true.

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Further, the proposition ‘no man is just’ follows from the proposition ‘every man is not just’ and the proposition ‘not every man is not just’, which is the opposite of ‘every man is not-just’, follows from the proposition ‘some men are just’; for if this be true, there must be some just men. It is evident, also, that when the subject is individual, if a question is asked and the negative answer is the true one, a certain positive proposition is also true. Thus, if the question were asked Socrates wise?’ and the negative answer were the true one, the positive inference ‘Then Socrates is unwise’ is correct. But no such inference is correct in the case of universals, but rather a negative proposition. For instance, if to the question ‘Is every man wise?’ the answer is ‘no’, the inference ‘Then every man is unwise’ is false. But under these circumstances the inference ‘Not every man is wise’ is correct. This last is the contradictory, the former the contrary. Negative expressions, which consist of an indefinite noun or predicate, such as ‘not-man’ or ‘not-just’, may seem to be denials containing neither noun nor verb in the proper sense of the words. But they are not. For a denial must always be either true or false, and he that uses the expression ‘not man’, if nothing more be added, is not nearer but rather further from making a true or a false statement than he who uses the expression ‘man’. The propositions ‘everything that is not man is just’, and the contradictory of this, are not equivalent to any of the other propositions; on the other hand, the proposition ‘everything that is not man is not just’ is equivalent to the proposition ‘nothing that is not man is just’. The conversion of the position of subject and predicate in a sentence involves no difference in its meaning. Thus we say ‘man is white’ and ‘white is man’. If these were not equivalent,

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there would be more than one contradictory to the same proposition, whereas it has been demonstrated’ that each proposition has one proper contradictory and one only. For of the proposition ‘man is white’ the appropriate contradictory is ‘man is not white’, and of the proposition ‘white is man’, if its meaning be different, the contradictory will either be ‘white is not not-man’ or ‘white is not man’. Now the former of these is the contradictory of the proposition ‘white is not-man’, and the latter of these is the contradictory of the proposition ‘man is white’; thus there will be two contradictories to one proposition. It is evident, therefore, that the inversion of the relative position of subject and predicate does not affect the sense of affirmations and denials.

11 There is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively or negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of the same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really some one thing. do not apply this word ‘one’ to those things which, though they have a single recognized name, yet do not combine to form a unity. Thus, man may be an animal, and biped, and domesticated, but these three predicates combine to form a unity. On the other hand, the predicates ‘white’, ‘man’, and ‘walking’ do not thus combine. Neither, therefore, if these three form the subject of an affirmation, nor if they form its predicate, is there any unity about that affirmation. In both cases the unity is linguistic, but not real.

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If therefore the dialectical question is a request for an answer, i.e. either for the admission of a premiss or for the admission of one of two contradictories – and the premiss is itself always one of two contradictories – the answer to such a question as contains the above predicates cannot be a single proposition. For as I have explained in the Topics, question is not a single one, even if the answer asked for is true. At the same time it is plain that a question of the form ‘what is it?’ is not a dialectical question, for a dialectical questioner must by the form of his question give his opponent the chance of announcing one of two alternatives, whichever he wishes. He must therefore put the question into a more definite form, and inquire, e.g.. whether man has such and such a characteristic or not. Some combinations of predicates are such that the separate predicates unite to form a single predicate. Let us consider under what conditions this is and is not possible. We may either state in two separate propositions that man is an animal and that man is a biped, or we may combine the two, and state that man is an animal with two feet. Similarly we may use ‘man’ and ‘white’ as separate predicates, or unite them into one. Yet if a man is a shoemaker and is also good, we cannot construct a composite proposition and say that he is a good shoemaker. For if, whenever two separate predicates truly belong to a subject, it follows that the predicate resulting from their combination also truly belongs to the subject, many absurd results ensue. For instance, a man is man and white. Therefore, if predicates may always be combined, he is a white man. Again, if the predicate ‘white’ belongs to him, then the combination of that predicate with the former composite predicate will be permissible. Thus it will be right to say that he is a white man so on indefinitely. Or, again, we may combine the predicates ‘musical’, ‘white’, and ‘walking’, and these may

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be combined many times. Similarly we may say that Socrates is Socrates and a man, and that therefore he is the man Socrates, or that Socrates is a man and a biped, and that therefore he is a two-footed man. Thus it is manifest that if man states unconditionally that predicates can always be combined, many absurd consequences ensue. We will now explain what ought to be laid down. Those predicates, and terms forming the subject of predication, which are accidental either to the same subject or to one another, do not combine to form a unity. Take the proposition ‘man is white of complexion and musical’. Whiteness and being musical do not coalesce to form a unity, for they belong only accidentally to the same subject. Nor yet, if it were true to say that that which is white is musical, would the terms ‘musical’ and ‘white’ form a unity, for it is only incidentally that that which is musical is white; the combination of the two will, therefore, not form a unity. Thus, again, whereas, if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we cannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker, we are, at the same time, able to combine the predicates ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ and say that a man is an animal with two feet, for these predicates are not accidental. Those predicates, again, cannot form a unity, of which the one is implicit in the other: thus we cannot combine the predicate ‘white’ again and again with that which already contains the notion ‘white’, nor is it right to call a man an animal-man or a two-footed man; for the notions ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ are implicit in the word ‘man’. On the other hand, it is possible to predicate a term simply of any one instance, and to say that some one particular man is a man or that some one white man is a white man.

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We admit that of composite expressions those are contradictory each to each which have the verb ‘to be’ its positive and 68 . resolution is nevertheless not always possible. we must consider the mutual relation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny possibility or contingency. resolution is never possible. however. for the opinion held about it is that it is not. Yet the facts of the case might rather be stated thus: when some such opposite elements are present. this is not the case. say ‘a poet’. and wherein the predicates belong to the subject in their own proper sense and not in any indirect way. in the case of those predications which have within them no contradiction when the nouns are expanded into definitions. it is not true to say that because it is the object of opinion. it is not impossible. Thus it is not right to call a dead man a man. or does it not? The verb ‘is’ is here used of Homer only incidentally. in the independent sense of the word. when in the adjunct there is some opposite which involves a contradiction. not that he is. 12 As these distinctions have been made. Take the proposition ‘Homer is so-and-so’.Yet this is not always possible: indeed. the individual may be the subject of the simple propositions as well as of the composite. does it follow that Homer is. But in the case of that which is not. When. Thus. impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without difficulty. the predication of the simple term is impossible. but when they are not present. the proposition being that Homer is a poet. it is. not that it is.

Thus the contradictory of the proposition ‘man is’ is ‘man is not’.negative form respectively. not ‘not-man walks’. Now it appears that the same thing both may and may not be. The contradictory. everything that may be cut or may walk may also escape cutting and refrain from walking. it will turn out true to say that a piece of wood is a man that is not white. for instance. for that which is capable of walking or of being seen has also a potentiality in the opposite direction. not ‘it cannot be’. If then this rule is universal. The same rule applies to the proposition ‘it is contingent that it 69 . For it is a logical consequence of what we have said. that positive and negative propositions are formed. If the former of these alternatives must be rejected. Now if this is the case. either that the same predicate can be both applicable and inapplicable to one and the same subject at the same time. then. or that it is not by the addition of the verbs ‘be’ and ‘not be’. it follows that’ it may not be’ is not the contradictory of ‘it may be’. in those propositions which do not contain the verb ‘to be’ the verb which takes its place will exercise the same function. for to say ‘man walks’ merely equivalent to saying ‘man is walking’. and the reason is that those things that have potentiality in this sense are not always actual. and the contradictory of ‘man is white’ is ‘man is not white’. both the positive and the negative propositions will be true. not ‘not-man is’. not ‘man is not-white’. Thus the contradictory of ‘man walks’ is ‘man does not walk’. For otherwise. the contradictory of ‘it may be’ is may not be’. we must choose the latter. respectively. In such cases. of ‘it may be’ is ‘it cannot be’. since either the positive or the negative proposition is true of any subject. But since it is impossible that contradictory propositions should both be true of the same subject.

and the contradictory of ‘it may be’ is not ‘it may not be’. For it comes about that just as in the former instances the verbs ‘is’ and ‘is not’ were added to the subject-matter of the sentence ‘white’ and ‘man’. is not ‘it is necessary that it should not be. the same thing both may and may not be. may be dealt with in the same manner. of ‘it may not be’ is not ‘it cannot be’. and the contradictory of ‘it is impossible that it should not be’ is ‘it is not impossible that it should not be’. just as in the former instances ‘is’ and ‘is not’ indicated that certain things were or were not the case. for they are contradictory. These indicate that a certain thing is or is not possible. then. so here ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ are the subject-matter and ‘is possible’. 70 . The contradictory of ‘it is necessary that it should be’. but ‘it cannot not be’. the contradictory of this is ‘it is not contingent that it should be’. The propositions which have to do with necessity are governed by the same principle. and the contradictory of ‘it is necessary that it should not be’ is ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’. such as ‘it is necessary’ and ‘it is impossible’.should be’. The contradictory. ‘is contingent’. The similar propositions. Again. since these two propositions are not contradictory. But the propositions ‘it may be’ and ‘it cannot be’ can never be true of the same subject at the same time. the contradictory of ‘it is impossible that it should be’ is not ‘it is impossible that it should not be’ but ‘it is not impossible that it should be’. Thus the propositions ‘it may be’ and ‘it may not be’ appear each to imply the other: for. Nor can the propositions ‘it may not be’ and ‘it cannot not be’ be at once true of the same subject.’ but ‘it is not necessary that it should be’. are added. but cannot be’.

To generalize. as has been stated. It is necessary. It is contingent. We must consider the following pairs as contradictory propositions: It may be.It cannot be. From the proposition ‘it cannot not be’ or ‘it is not contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it 71 . It follows also that it is not impossible and not necessary.It is not true.It is not necessary. 13 Logical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the propositions thus. It is true.It is not contingent. and in making these terms into affirmations and denials we must combine them with ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ respectively. From the proposition ‘it may not be’ or ‘it is contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it is not necessary that it should not be and that it is not impossible that it should not be. define the clauses ‘that it should be’ and ‘that it should not be’ as the subjectmatter of the propositions. It is impossible. From the proposition ‘it may be’ it follows that it is contingent.It is not impossible. From the proposition ‘it cannot be’ or ‘it is not contingent’ it follows that it is necessary that it should not be and that it is impossible that it should be. and the relation is reciprocal. we must.

It is not necessary that it It is necessary that it should should not be. Now the propositions ‘it is impossible that it should be’ and ‘it is not impossible that it should be’ are consequent upon the propositions ‘it may be’. It may be. C. ‘it is not contingent’. should not be. Let us consider these statements by the help of a table: A. and ‘it cannot be’. It is not impossible that it It is impossible that it should should not be. It may not be. It is contingent. It is not necessary that it It is necessary that it should should be. It is not impossible that it It is impossible that it should should be. be. D. B. 72 . ‘it is contingent’.is necessary that it should be and that it is impossible that it should not be. the contradictories upon the contradictories. not be. It is not contingent. not be. be. It is contingent that it should It is not contingent that it not be. It cannot be. It cannot not be.

For when it is necessary that a thing should be. not that it should be. if it is not possible. the opposite follows. Yet perhaps it is impossible that the contradictory propositions predicating necessity should be thus arranged. That there is a distinction is clear. as has been said. for when it is necessary that a thing should not be. contrary propositions follow respectively from contradictory propositions. Thus. it is possible that it should be. it is not necessary that it should be. when used with a contrary subject. The reason why the propositions predicating necessity do not follow in the same kind of sequence as the rest. but that it should not be. and the contradictory propositions belong to separate sequences. We must investigate the relation subsisting between these propositions and those which predicate necessity. (For if not. it is necessary that it should be. if the propositions predicating impossibility or non-impossibility follow without change of subject from those predicating possibility or nonpossibility. for both these propositions may be true of the same subject. so. inversely connected. and it is thus 73 . it is necessary.But there is inversion. but. In this case. to the proposition ‘it is necessary’. The negative of the proposition ‘it is impossible’ is consequent upon the proposition ‘it may be’ and the corresponding positive in the first case upon the negative in the second. For the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should be’ is not the negative of ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. and when it is impossible that a thing should not be. For when it is impossible that a thing should be. for the propositions ‘it is impossible’ and ‘it is necessary’ are not equivalent. it is impossible. lies in the fact that the proposition ‘it is impossible’ is equivalent. since one or the other must follow. those predicating necessity must follow with the contrary subject. For ‘it is impossible’ is a positive proposition and ‘it is not impossible’ is negative.

but if it is necessary that it should be or that it should not be. if either of the two former propositions is true. For if a thing may be.impossible that a thing should be. Moreover the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ is the contradictory of that which follows from the proposition ‘it cannot be’. It remains. one of the two alternatives will be excluded.) Yet from the proposition ‘it may be’ it follows that it is not impossible. for ‘it cannot be’ is followed by ‘it is impossible that it should be’ and by ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. Thus in this case also contradictory propositions follow contradictory in the way indicated. nor does the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should not be’. For this is true also of that which must necessarily be. or. and from that it follows that it is not necessary. the contradictory must follow. It may be questioned whether the proposition ‘it may be’ follows from the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should be’. which must necessarily be. while. if a man should maintain that this is not the contradictory. therefore. the proposition ‘it is necessary that it should be’ does not follow from the proposition ‘it may be’. 74 . For the proposition ‘it may be’ implies a twofold possibility. that the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ follows from the proposition ‘it may be’. which is absurd. it comes about therefore that the thing which must necessarily be need not be. then the proposition ‘it may not be’. namely that it cannot be. the twofold possibility vanishes. it may also not be. and no logical impossibilities occur when they are thus arranged. which is absurd. But again. and the contradictory of this is the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’. If not.

as when a man is said to find walking possible because under certain conditions he would walk. that is. an irrational capacity. thus much has been said to emphasize the truth that it is not every potentiality which admits of opposite results. and generally when a capacity is predicated because it is actually realized. to that which is actualized. with reference to a state in which realization is conditionally practicable. being used in the one case with reference to facts. There are exceptions. which is false. fire cannot both heat and not heat. that is.Now both of these are false of that which necessarily is. However. even where the word is used always in the same sense. neither has anything that is always actual any twofold potentiality. but 75 . in the other case. and thus it would follow that a thing which must necessarily be may possibly not be. as fire possesses the potentiality of giving out heat. as when a man is said to find walking possible because he is actually walking. and of that which has the capacity though not necessarily realized. it is true to say that it is not impossible that it should walk (or. of contrary results. This last sort of potentiality belongs only to that which can be in motion. It is evident. it is thought that if a thing may be cut it may also not be cut. in the other case. But in some cases the word is used equivocally. that it is not always the case that that which may be or may walk possesses also a potentiality in the other direction. Those potentialities which involve a rational principle are potentialities of more than one result. that it should be). if a thing may be it may also not be. Yet some even of those potentialities which are irrational admit of opposite results. For the term ‘possible’ is ambiguous. then. At the same time. the former can exist also in the case of that which has not this power. those that are irrational are not always thus constituted. In the first place we must except those things which possess a potentiality not in accordance with a rational principle. Both of that which is walking and is actual. As I have said.

Take the propositions ‘Callias is just’. or in the proposition ‘every man is unjust’. Thus. but are pure potentialities. and if. We may perhaps state that necessity and its absence are the initial principles of existence and non-existence. is this: that since the universal is consequent upon the particular. Now if the spoken word corresponds with the judgement of the mind. that judgement is the contrary of 76 . a second class consists of those things which are actual but also potential. whose actuality is in nature prior to their potentiality. though posterior in time. the primary substances. 14 The question arises whether an affirmation finds its contrary in a denial or in another affirmation. whether the proposition ‘every man is just’ finds its contrary in the proposition ‘no man is just’. we have to discover which of these form contraries. ‘Callias is not just’. a third class comprises those things which are never actualized. we can predicate the former. that which is necessary is also possible. in thought. though not in every sense in which the word may be used. Our conclusion. actuality also is prior to potentiality. Some things are actualities without potentiality. ‘Callias is unjust’. if that which is eternal is prior. namely. and that all else must be regarded as posterior to these.while we cannot predicate this latter kind of potentiality of that which is necessary in the unqualified sense of the word. It is plain from what has been said that that which is of necessity is actual. then.

in thought. for the judgement concerning a good thing. Now if we take the judgement that that which is good is good. but because they are to the contrary effect. a false judgement. which pronounces a contrary fact. but rather in the corresponding denial. that it is good. Yet the subjects here are contrary. the same must needs hold good with regard to spoken affirmations. and another that it is not good. that it is bad. and if there are at the same time other attributes. then one affirmation will not find its contrary in another. and a third. But if. which mode of expression forms the contrary? It is an error to suppose that judgements are to be defined as contrary in virtue of the fact that they have contrary subjects. as also those that opine that 77 . they both represent the truth. Which of these two is contrary to the true? And if they are one and the same. which do not and cannot belong to the good. Let me illustrate. We must therefore consider which true judgement is the contrary of the false. that it is bad. and whether they are so or not. and that concerning a bad thing. There is a true judgement concerning that which is good. that which forms the denial of the false judgement or that which affirms the contrary fact. another. it is not the judgement which pronounces a contrary fact that is the contrary of another. for instance. which is distinct. we must nevertheless refuse to treat as the contraries of the true judgement those which opine that some other attribute subsists which does not subsist. But judgements are not contrary because they have contrary subjects. that it is not good. that it is good.another. in the way. in which the judgement ‘every man is just’ pronounces a contrary to that pronounced by the judgement ‘every man is unjust’. may be one and the same.

the second accidental. which concerns its intrinsic nature. in which error is present. the judgement that it is bad is one concerning that which is accidental. The first quality is part of its essence. therefore. for both these classes of judgement are of unlimited content.some other attribute does not subsist which does subsist. Thus the judgement which denies the true judgement is more really false than that which positively asserts the presence of the contrary quality. which concerns the subject’s intrinsic nature. Now these judgements are those which are concerned with the starting points of generation. then the latter. the contradictory is either always the contrary or never. then that false judgement likewise is most really false. Now the judgement that that is good is not good is a false judgement concerning its intrinsic nature. that judgement is false. For presumably the man who forms that judgement must at the same time understand that that which is good is not good. but that which is contradictory is the more truly contrary. our conclusion in the case just dealt with would seem to be correct. Those judgements must rather be termed contrary to the true judgements. Now where terms have no contrary. it seems. Now that which is good is both good and not bad. for it is by accident that it is not bad. if it must necessarily be so in all other cases. for instance. Further. The judgement that that which is good is bad is composite. which forms the negative of the true. But if that true judgement is most really true. If then of the two judgements one is contrary to the true judgement. and generation is the passing from one extreme to its opposite. is the real contrary. he who 78 . for contraries are among the things which differ most widely within the same class. therefore error is a like transition. But it is the man who forms that judgement which is contrary to the true who is most thoroughly deceived.

that it is not good. that it is not good. parallel with the judgement that that that is not good is good. It remains. For since some things which are not good are bad. Besides these there is the judgement that that which is good is not good. Nor is the judgement that it is not bad the contrary. for this is false. therefore. that of the judgement concerning that which is not good. Let us consider. Again. is the contrary of the judgement that it is good. of course. If then in these cases the negative is the contrary. if the subject be understood in a universal sense. moreover. fail to meet the case. since both qualities might be predicated of the same subject. the judgement concerning that which is good. then the principle is universal in its application. It is evident that it will make no difference if we universalize the positive judgement. 79 . We may deal similarly with judgements concerning that which is not good. the contrary of the judgement that everything that is good is good is that nothing that is good is good. In the same way. since two true judgements are never contrary and this judgement might be true at the same time as that with which it is connected. is equivalent to the judgement that whatever is good is good. for the universal negative judgement will form the contrary. The judgement that it is bad would. what would form the contrary of the true judgement that that which is not good is not good. and this is identical with the judgement that everything that is good is good. the judgement that that which is not good is not good is parallel with the judgement that that which is good is good. therefore. For the judgement that that which is good is good. For instance. for this too might be true. both judgements may be true.thinks a man is not a man forms a false judgement. the contrary judgement is that it is good.

on the other hand. also. Thus the propositions ‘everything good is good’.If therefore this is the rule with judgements. ‘not every man is good’. For whereas. when two propositions are true. a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency. that neither true judgements nor true propositions can be contrary the one to the other. and if spoken affirmations and denials are judgements expressed in words. contrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions. ‘no man is good’. have for their contraries the propositions ‘nothing good is good’. it is plain that the universal denial is the contrary of the affirmation about the same subject. are ‘not everything good is good’. It is evident. 80 . and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same subject. The contradictory propositions. ‘every man is good’.

and what we mean by predicating one term of all. A premiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. J. e. and a syllogism. the inclusion or noninclusion of one term in another as in a whole. and the nature of a perfect and of an imperfect syllogism. ‘contraries are subjects of the same science’.g. for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to 81 . or none.Prior Analytics [Translated by A. We must next define a premiss. whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary’s choice between two contradictories. of another. or ‘pleasure is not good’. Jenkinson] Book I 1 We must first state the subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. a term. without any mark to show whether it is universal or particular. By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else. but lays it down). and after that. by indefinite that it does or does not belong.Aristotle . The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical. This is either universal or particular or indefinite. But this will make no difference to the production of a syllogism in either case. by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all. because the demonstrative premiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his premiss.

but have not been expressly stated as premisses. but will be stated accurately in the sequel. demonstrative. A syllogism is discourse in which. may be taken as sufficiently defined by us in relation to our present need. or vice versa. something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. if it is true and obtained through the first principles of its science. as has been said in the Topics. while a dialectical premiss is the giving of a choice between two contradictories. i. and dialectical premisses. That one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. The nature then of a premiss and the difference between syllogistic. ‘being’ being added and ‘not being’ removed. it will be demonstrative. whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term 82 . certain things being stated. Therefore a syllogistic premiss without qualification will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way we have described. I mean by the last phrase that they produce the consequence. I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make plain what necessarily follows. I call that a term into which the premiss is resolved. both the predicate and that of which it is predicated.something else. And we say that one term is predicated of all of another. but when he is syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted. which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down. and by this. if it needs either one or more propositions.e. a syllogism is imperfect. when a man is proceeding by question. that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary.

g. e. others indefinite. others negative. Similarly too. If no B is A. for if some animal is not man. But we assumed that every B is A. then no good will be pleasure.cannot be asserted: ‘to be predicated of none’ must be understood in the same way. if no pleasure is good. but the particular negative need not convert. For if some A (say C) were B. of premisses of these three kinds some are affirmative.is good. but every man is an animal. universally. neither can any A be B. then some good will be pleasure). For if some B is A. then no B could be A. 2 Every premiss states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else. not however. First then take a universal negative with the terms A and B. For if no A were B. again some affirmative and negative premisses are universal. e. Not every animal is a man. e. it does not follow that some man is not animal.g. others particular. if the premiss is particular. the particular affirmative must convert in part (for if some pleasure is good. let B stand for animal and A for man. for C is a B. in respect of each of the three modes of attribution. 83 . then no B would be A.g. then some of the As must be B. there is no necessity that some of the As should not be B. it would not be true that no B is A. But if every B is A then some A is B. the terms of the affirmative must be convertible. if every pleasure. But if some B is not A. but in part. some good must be pleasure. For if none were. It is necessary then that in universal attribution the terms of the negative premiss should be convertible.

For if it is possible for no man to be a horse. Whatever is said to be possible. The universal negative converts universally. admits of conversion like other negative statements. then some garment will necessarily be white. For in the former case the one term necessarily does not belong to the other. it is also admissible for no horse to be a man. it is possible that man is not horse. it is necessary also that some A is B: for if there were no necessity. For if it is possible that all or some B is A. If it is necessary that no B is A. affirmative statements will all convert in a manner similar to those described. it will be possible that some A is B. But in negative statements the case is different. it is also admissible for nothing white to be a garment. it is necessary also that no A is B. For if it is possible that some A is B. in the latter there is no necessity that it should: and the premiss converts like other negative statements. The particular negative also must be 84 . But the particular negative does not convert. each of the affirmatives converts into a particular. for the same reason which we have already stated. it would be possible also that some B is A. then no B could possibly be A. In respect of possible premisses.g. For if any white thing must be a garment. If all or some B is A of necessity.3 The same manner of conversion will hold good also in respect of necessary premisses. since possibility is used in several senses (for we say that what is necessary and what is not necessary and what is potential is possible). or that no garment is white. This has been already proved. either because B necessarily is A. or because B is not necessarily A. For if that were not possible. neither would some of the Bs be A necessarily. e. This has been already proved. if one should say. and if it is admissible for no garment to be white.

g. But this also will be proved in the sequel.treated like those dealt with above. By extremes I mean both that term which is itself 85 . and how every syllogism is produced. But if anything is said to be possible because it is the general rule and natural (and it is in this way we define the possible). and the particular does. subsequently we must speak of demonstration. This will be plain when we speak about the possible. the negative premisses can no longer be converted like the simple negatives. but not every syllogism is a demonstration. whatever the terms to which it is added. 4 After these distinctions we now state by what means. and ‘is’ makes an affirmation always and in every case. Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a whole. and the middle is either contained in. e. I call that term middle which is itself contained in another and contains another in itself: in position also this comes in the middle. Syllogism should be discussed before demonstration because syllogism is the general: the demonstration is a sort of syllogism. the first as in or from a whole. the extremes must be related by a perfect syllogism. In conversion these premisses will behave like the other affirmative propositions. when. or excluded from. in predication. ‘it is not-good’ or ‘it is not-white’ or in a word ‘it is not-this’. the universal negative premiss does not convert. At present we may take this much as clear in addition to what has been said: the statement that it is possible that no B is A or some B is not A is affirmative in form: for the expression ‘is possible’ ranks along with ‘is’.

or the terms are related in any other way. if A is predicated of no B. and B of all C. there will be no syllogism in respect of the extremes. unit. medicine: of a negative relation science. it is clear in this figure when a syllogism will be possible and when not. for it is possible that the first should belong either to all or to none of the last. there cannot be a syllogism by means of these premisses. But if the first term belongs to all the middle. but the middle to none of the last term. horse. for nothing necessary follows from the terms being so related. to its subject. nor the middle to any of the last. of a universal negative relation. I call that term the major in which the middle is contained and that term the 86 . and if they are so related there will be a syllogism. A must be predicated of all C: we have already explained what we mean by ‘predicated of all’. a syllogism is impossible. there must be a perfect syllogism whenever universality is posited with reference to the major term either affirmatively or negatively. and B of all C. line. As an example of a positive relation between the extremes take the terms science. line. and that if a syllogism is possible the terms must be related as described. so that neither a particular nor a universal conclusion is necessary. If A is predicated of all B. As an example of a universal affirmative relation between the extremes we may take the terms animal. it is necessary that no C will be A. If then the terms are universally related. Similarly also. But if one term is related universally. But if there is no necessary consequence.contained in another and that in which another is contained. man. man. stone. Nor again can syllogism be formed when neither the first term belongs to any of the middle. and particularity with reference to the minor term affirmatively: but whenever the universality is posited in relation to the minor term. the terms animal. the other in part only.

Again let no B be A. if all B is A and some C is not B. Take the terms inanimate.g. Nor when the major premiss is universal. Consequently there cannot be a syllogism. Then if ‘predicated of all’ means what was said above. a syllogism will not be possible. Let all B be A and some C be B. whether the minor premiss be indefinite or particular: e. wisdom: of a negative relation. good. horse. indefinite or particular: e. swan: white. The meaning of ‘predicated of none’ has also been defined. 87 . of none of the other. horse.minor which comes under the middle. provided that it is affirmative: for we shall have the same syllogism whether the premiss is indefinite or particular. As an example of a positive relation between the extremes take the terms good. white: next take some of the white things of which man is not predicated – swan and snow: animal is predicated of all of the one. if some B is or is not A. For the major term may be predicable both of all and of none of the minor. can there be a syllogism. and the minor premiss is negative and particular. Again if no C is B. man. white: then take some white things of which man is not predicated – swan and snow: the term inanimate is predicated of all of the one. but let some C not be B. whether affirmative or negative.g. and all C is B. or if not all C is B. ignorance. whether the major premiss is positive or negative. it is necessary that some C is A. raven. But if the universality is posited with respect to the minor term either affirmatively or negatively. This holds good also if the premiss BC should be indefinite. state. but of none of the other. there cannot be a syllogism. but some B is or is not A or not every B is A. And if no B is A but some C is B. man. state. The same terms may be taken also if the premiss BA is indefinite. So there will be a perfect syllogism. to some of which the middle term cannot be attributed. Take the terms white. Suppose the terms are animal. it is necessary that some C is not A.

and it is true that some C is not B. universal and particular. whether no C is B. 5 Whenever the same thing belongs to all of one subject. or to all of each subject or to none of either. or one indefinite and the other definite. It is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are perfect (for they are all completed by means of the premisses originally taken) and that all conclusions are proved by this figure. by major extreme that which lies near the middle. It is clear then from what has been said that if there is a syllogism in this figure with a particular conclusion. horse: animal. either positively or negatively.Further since it is indefinite to say some C is not B. by extremes the terms of which this is said. or both indefinite. the terms must be related as we have stated: if they are related otherwise. affirmative and negative. stone. no syllogism is possible anyhow. Such a figure I call the first. Terms common to all the above are animal. or the one negative and the other affirmative. or not all C is B. viz. A similar proof may also be given if the universal premiss is negative. 88 . white. I call such a figure the second. by middle term in it I mean that which is predicated of both subjects. and to none of another. white. no syllogism follows (this has already been stated) it is clear that this arrangement of terms will not afford a syllogism: otherwise one would have been possible with a universal negative minor premiss. Nor can there in any way be a syllogism if both the relations of subject and predicate are particular. by minor that which is further away from the middle. and since if terms are assumed such that no C is B.

But since the negative relation is convertible. but to no O. but not a perfect syllogism. But if M is predicated of every N and O. but in no other way. 89 . whenever the middle belongs to all of one subject and to none of another (it does not matter which has the negative relation). It is clear then that a syllogism is formed when the terms are so related.The middle term stands outside the extremes. stone. Thus it will be the same syllogism that proves both conclusions. animal. Since. then. man: a negative relation. N will belong to no M: but M was assumed to belong to all O: consequently N will belong to no O. Again if M belongs to all N. others also are needed. If then the terms are related universally a syllogism will be possible. number – substance being the middle term. animal. but it may be valid whether the terms are related universally or not. the negative relation is convertible. but of all O. then N will belong to no O. For if M belongs to no O. line. O belongs to no M: but M (as was said) belongs to all N: O then will belong to no N: for the first figure has again been formed. This has already been proved. animal. and is first in position. A syllogism cannot be perfect anyhow in this figure. N will belong to no O. man. a negative relation. animal. for necessity is not perfectly established merely from the original premisses. there cannot be a syllogism. Terms to illustrate a positive relation are line. It is possible to prove these results also by reductio ad impossibile. Nor is a syllogism possible when M is predicated neither of any N nor of any O. Let M be predicated of no N. substance. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are substance.

it is necessary that N does not belong to some O. raven. but of some N. the terms must be related as we stated at the outset: for if they are otherwise related no necessary consequence follows. Nor will there be a conclusion when M is predicated of no O. Take the terms animal. but not to some O. I mean both negative or both affirmative. science. there will be no syllogism. raven. substance. If the middle term is related universally to one of the extremes. If then the universal statement is opposed to the particular. we have stated when a syllogism will be possible and when not: but if the premisses are similar in form. unit: a negative relation. it is necessary that N does not belong to some O: for if N belongs to all O. N will belong to no M: but M was admitted to belong to some O: therefore N will not belong to some O: for the result is reached by means of the first figure. if the universal statement is negative. and M is predicated also of all N. the particular is negative.g. the particular is affirmative: if the universal is affirmative. And if M belongs to all N but not to all O.It is clear then that if a syllogism is formed when the terms are universally related. substance. Terms to illustrate a positive relation between the extremes are animal. and particularly to the minor and in a manner opposite to that of the universal statement: by ‘an opposite manner’ I mean. we shall conclude that N does not belong to all O: the proof is the same as the above. a syllogism will not be possible anyhow. animal. But if M is predicated of all O. First let them be negative. substance. but not of all N. white. Again if M belongs to all N. and let the major premiss be universal. M must belong to all O: but we assumed that M does not belong to some O. animal. For since the negative statement is convertible. For if M belongs to no N. 90 . but to some O. e. a particular negative syllogism must result whenever the middle term is related universally to the major whether positively or negatively.

swan. animal. even if it belongs to no O. terms for the negative relation are white. animal. stone.g. Common terms for all the above are white. If the premisses are affirmative. Terms to illustrate the negative relation are black. and not to some N. it is possible for N to belong either to all O or to no O. white. not be formed anyhow. the other particular. It is possible then for N to belong to all O or to no O. Nor is one possible if the middle term belongs to some of each of the extremes. clearly it will not be possible now either. But it is not possible to take terms to illustrate the universal affirmative relation. or is related to them indefinitely. if M belongs to some O. and not to some O. animal. snow. raven.let M belong to no N. stone. Terms for the positive relation are white. white. not to some of the other. For if N belonged to all O. animal. or belongs to some of the one. animal. snow. Again let the premisses be affirmative. e. and M belongs to no O. inanimate. and since if it belongs to no O a syllogism is (as we have seen) not possible. For since it is true that M does not belong to some O. or does not belong to some of either. then M would belong to no O: but we assumed that it belongs to some O. But if the minor premiss is universal. and let the major premiss as before be universal. and does not belong to some O. for the reason already stated: the point must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. Terms to illustrate the negative relation are white. but M to no N. man: white. In this way then it is not admissible to take terms: our point must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. let M belong to all N and to some O. Evidently then. It is clear then from what has 91 . a syllogism can. whenever the premisses are similar in form. It is possible then for N to belong either to all O or to no O. swan. and one is universal. raven: for the negative relation. or belongs to neither universally. animal. for the positive relation. But it is not possible to find terms of which the extremes are related positively and universally.

of it. should one of the Ss. whether universal or particular. or to none. For if both P and R belong to all S. but all are negative. by middle term in it I mean that of which both the predicates are predicated. or if both belong to all. S will belong to some R: consequently since P belongs to all S.g. by the minor that which is nearer to it. but it may be valid whether the terms are related universally or not to the middle term. And it is evident that an affirmative conclusion is not attained by means of this figure. when we prove per impossibile. N. 92 . and thus P will belong to some R. For. both P and R will belong to this. by extremes I mean the predicates. P must belong to some R: for a syllogism in the first figure is produced. be taken. and S to some R. I call such a figure the third. A syllogism cannot be perfect in this figure either. the terms must be so related. If they are universal. by the major extreme that which is further from the middle. i. a syllogism results of necessity. But it is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect: for all are made perfect by certain supplementary statements. e. whenever both P and R belong to S. and is last in position. 6 But if one term belongs to all. which either are contained in the terms of necessity or are assumed as hypotheses. and if there is a syllogism.e. and another to none. it follows that P will necessarily belong to some R. of a third. The middle term stands outside the extremes. It is possible to demonstrate this also per impossibile and by exposition. since the affirmative statement is convertible.been said that if the terms are related to one another in the way stated.

inanimate. if the major is negative.If R belongs to all S. Terms for the positive relation are animal. the other affirmative. there will be no syllogism. P must belong to some R. R must also belong to some P: therefore P must belong to some R. and P to all S. and if the affirmative is 93 . the other negative. no syllogism will be possible. no matter which of the premisses is universal. It might be proved also per impossibile. no syllogism will be possible. inanimate. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be possible and when not. For since the affirmative statement is convertible S will belong to some P: consequently since R belongs to all S. and S to some P. But if one term is affirmative. there will be a syllogism to prove that P will necessarily not belong to some R. horse. Again if R belongs to some S. P to some S. and P to no S. man. as in the former cases. there will be a syllogism to prove that the one extreme does not belong to some of the other: but if the relation is reversed. as in the former cases. the other in part only. For if R belongs to all S. for the negative relation man. This may be demonstrated in the same way as before by converting the premiss RS. inanimate – inanimate being the middle term. But if R belongs to no S. but when they are negative. the minor affirmative. horse. if the terms are related universally. For whenever both the terms are affirmative. P to all S. If one term is related universally to the middle. P must belong to some R. Terms for the positive relation are animal. there will be a syllogism to prove that one extreme belongs to some of the other. And it is possible to demonstrate it also per impossibile and by exposition. This may be demonstrated in the same way as the preceding. when both are affirmative there must be a syllogism. horse. man: for the negative relation animal. But when one is negative. Nor can there be a syllogism when both terms are asserted of no S.

science. man. Proof is possible also without reduction ad impossibile. then P will belong to all S: but we assumed that it did not. But when the minor is negative. For if P belongs to all R. Terms for the positive relation are animal. it is necessary that P does not belong to some R. For if R belongs to all S. wild. and R belongs to some S. it may be used truly of that also which belongs to none.g. no syllogism is possible. no syllogism will be possible. Nor is a syllogism possible when both are stated in the negative. We must put the matter as before. take the terms animal. wild – the middle in both being the term wild. animal. science. But if R belongs to no S. wild: for the negative relation. if R belongs to some S. the other particular. whenever the major is negative and the minor affirmative there will be a syllogism. Terms for the universal affirmative relation are animate. For the universal negative relation it is not possible to get terms. But if the negative term is universal. and does not belong to some S. P will not belong to some R: for we shall have the first figure again. But whenever the major is affirmative. and R belongs to all S. When the minor is related universally to the middle. if P belongs to all S and R does not belong to some S. animal.’ Since the expression ‘it does not belong to some’ is indefinite. if the premiss RS is converted. wild. but P does not belong to some S. then P will belong to some R: but we assumed that it belongs to no R. but one is universal.universal. e. as has been shown. there will be no syllogism. When the major is related 94 . For if P belongs to no S. man. a syllogism will be possible whenever the minor term is affirmative. if one of the Ss be taken to which P does not belong. animal. For if P belongs to all S. and R to some S. man. Clearly then no syllogism will be possible here.

man. For a positive relation terms cannot be found. if R belongs to some S. snow. white: animal. and when not. then P belongs to some S: but we assumed that it belongs to no S. It is clear also that all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect (for all are made perfect by certain supplementary assumptions). 7 It is evident also that in all the figures. but if one is affirmative. For if P belongs to all R. Our point. and does not belong to some S. white. a syllogism always results relating the minor to the major term. if A belongs to all or some B. and if there is a syllogism. must be proved from the indefinite nature of the particular statement. and R to some S. or if the premisses are indefinite. and if the negative is stated universally. take as terms for a negative relation raven. and that it will not be possible to reach a universal conclusion by means of this figure. the terms must be so related. the other not to all. or one belongs to some of the middle. and B belongs to no C: for if the premisses are converted it is necessary that C 95 .g. then. if both the terms are affirmative or negative nothing necessary follows at all. Nor is a syllogism possible anyhow. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be possible. a syllogism results of necessity. whenever a proper syllogism does not result. e. inanimate.universally to the middle. or one belongs and the other does not to some of the middle. if each of the extremes belongs to some of the middle or does not belong. and that if the terms are as stated. Common terms for all are animal. white. the other negative. whether negative or affirmative.

g. in the last figure. Similarly also with the rest. though not all in the same way. and conversion produces the first figure: if they are proved per impossibile. because on the assumption of the false statement the syllogism comes about by means of the first figure. In both ways the first figure is formed: if they are made perfect ostensively. and belongs to no B. and B belongs to all C. and B belongs to some C. and B to some C. e. e. It is possible also to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. then B will belong to no C: this we know by means of the second figure. In the first figure particular syllogisms are indeed made perfect by themselves. A will not belong to some C: for if it belonged to all C. then B will belong to no C: and this (as we saw) is the middle figure. the universal syllogisms are made perfect by converting the negative premiss. and belongs to all B. Similarly also demonstration will be possible in the case of the negative. Consequently. For if it belonged to no C. For all are brought to a conclusion either ostensively or per impossibile. but it is possible also to prove them by means of the second figure. if A belongs to all B. It is evident also that the substitution of an indefinite for a particular affirmative will effect the same syllogism in all the figures. Those in the second figure are clearly made perfect by these. if A and B belong to all C.g.does not belong to some A. because (as we saw) all are brought to a conclusion by means of conversion. it follows that A belongs to some B: for if A belonged to no B. For if A belongs to no B. since all syllogisms in the middle figure can be reduced to universal 96 . It is clear too that all the imperfect syllogisms are made perfect by means of the first figure. reducing them ad impossibile. Similarly also in the other figures: a syllogism always results by means of conversion. each of the particular syllogisms by reductio ad impossibile. it follows that A belongs to some C. A would belong to no C: but (as we stated) it belongs to all C.

others neither necessarily nor indeed at all. by means of the particular syllogisms in the first figure: and these (we have seen) may be reduced to the universal syllogisms in the first figure: consequently also the particular syllogisms in the third figure may be so reduced. if the terms are universal. 97 .syllogisms in the first figure. 8 Since there is a difference according as something belongs. but not necessarily. it is clear that there will be different syllogisms to prove each of these relations. necessarily belongs. it is clear that particular syllogisms can be reduced to universal syllogisms in the first figure. There is hardly any difference between syllogisms from necessary premisses and syllogisms from premisses which merely assert. one syllogism concluding from what is necessary. but it is possible for them to belong). are directly made perfect by means of those syllogisms. both how syllogisms of the same figure are constituted in themselves. another from what is. and how syllogisms of different figures are related to one another. Syllogisms in the third figure. and syllogisms with differently related terms. but. When the terms are put in the same way. a third from what is possible. It is clear then that all syllogisms may be reduced to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. We have stated then how syllogisms which prove that something belongs or does not belong to something else are constituted. and since particular syllogisms in the first figure can be reduced to syllogisms in the middle figure. when one of the premisses is particular. or may belong to something else (for many things belong indeed. then.

the demonstration will not take the same form. But in the middle figure when the universal statement is affirmative. to every B. the conclusion will be proved to be necessary by means of conversion. but only when the major is. to make the syllogism in reference to this: with terms so chosen the conclusion will necessarily follow. in the same manner as in the case of simple predication. if A is taken as necessarily belonging or not belonging to B. not however when either premiss is necessary. but B is taken as simply belonging to C: for if the premisses are taken in this way. And each of the resulting syllogisms is in the appropriate figure. For since necessarily belongs. and the particular negative. it is clear that for C also the positive or the 98 . e. But if the relation is necessary in respect of the part taken. a syllogism will or will not result alike in both cases. For the negative statement is convertible alike in both cases. and again in the third figure when the universal is affirmative and the particular negative. but it is necessary by the ‘exposition’ of a part of the subject of the particular negative proposition.whether something belongs or necessarily belongs (or does not belong) to something else. the only difference being the addition of the expression ‘necessarily’ to the terms. A will necessarily belong or not belong to C.g. With the exceptions to be made below. to which the predicate does not belong. it must hold of some of that term in which this part is included: for the part taken is just some of that. and since C is one of the Bs. and we should give the same account of the expressions ‘to be contained in something as in a whole’ and ‘to be predicated of all of something’. 9 It happens sometimes also that when one premiss is necessary the conclusion is necessary. or does not belong.

Try the terms movement. let A be possible of no B. if the negative premiss is necessary. but an animal does not move necessarily. First let the universal be necessary. Similarly also if the major premiss is negative. but if the affirmative. and simply belong to C. Further. but let B simply belong to some C: it is necessary then that A belongs to some C necessarily: for C falls under B. For if it were. But if the particular premiss is necessary.g. but the minor is necessary. 10 In the second figure. First let the negative be necessary. an example also makes it clear that the conclusion not be necessary. if the universal premiss is necessary. the conclusion will not be necessary.negative relation to A will hold necessarily. The same is true of negative syllogisms. not necessary. B animal. animal. for the proof is the same. but if the particular. But if the major premiss is not necessary. nor does man. for B may be such that it is possible that A should belong to none of it. if A were movement. it would result both through the first figure and through the third that A belongs necessarily to some B. white. and let A belong to all B necessarily. and A was assumed to belong necessarily to all B. the conclusion will not be necessary: for from the denial of such a conclusion nothing impossible results. then the conclusion will be necessary. In particular syllogisms. then the conclusion will be necessary. C man: man is an animal necessarily. Similarly also if the syllogism should be negative: for the proof will be the same. Since then the negative 99 . e. whether the universal premiss is negative or affirmative. just as it does not in the universal syllogisms. But this is false. the conclusion will not be necessary.

it follows that C necessarily does not belong to some A. The same result would be obtained if the minor premiss were negative: for if A is possible be of no C. C is possible of no A: but A belongs to all B. Therefore the same result will obtain here. But B at any rate must belong to some A. though it is a necessary conclusion from the premisses. For example let A be animal. but it is not necessary without qualification. But if the affirmative premiss is necessary. if the conclusion is necessary. not however so long as animal belongs to nothing white. If then the negative premiss is converted. but to no C simply. Let A belong to all B necessarily. C white. For C falls under A. Man then will not belong to anything white. Further one might show by an exposition of terms that the conclusion is not necessary without qualification. consequently C is possible of none of the Bs: for again we have obtained the first figure. Further. if it is true (as was assumed) that A necessarily belongs to all B. but not necessarily: for it is possible for man to be born white. B man. Neither then is B possible of C: for conversion is possible without modifying the relation. and let the premisses be assumed to correspond to what we had before: it is possible that animal should belong to nothing white. But it has been proved in the case of the first figure that if the negative major premiss is not necessary the conclusion will not be necessary either. But nothing prevents such an A being taken that it is possible for C to belong to all of it. 100 .statement is convertible. For if B necessarily belongs to no C. C will necessarily belong to no B. the first figure results. B is possible of no A. the conclusion will not be necessary. But A belongs to all C. Consequently it is necessary that C does not belong to some A. consequently B is possible of no C. Consequently under these conditions the conclusion will be necessary.

But if one is negative. First let both the premisses be affirmative. First then let the negative premiss be both universal and necessary: let it be possible for no B that A should belong to it. because the universal is convertible into the particular: consequently if A 101 . whenever the negative is necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. C also will belong to some B. Again let the affirmative premiss be both universal and necessary. For whenever the negative premiss is both universal and necessary. If then A necessarily belongs to all B. but whenever the affirmative is necessary the conclusion will not be necessary. the other affirmative. it will be possible for no A that B should belong to it: but A belongs to some C. and let A and B belong to all C.Similar results will obtain also in particular syllogisms. the negative particular. 11 In the last figure when the terms are related universally to the middle. will the conclusion be necessary. if the negative statement is necessary but particular. which were used in the universal syllogisms. then the conclusion will be necessary. but not necessarily. Since then B belongs to all C. and let AC be necessary. but does not belong to some C. The point can be demonstrated by means of the same terms. if one of the two is necessary. and both premisses are affirmative. Since the negative statement is convertible. the conclusion will not be necessary. consequently B necessarily does not belong to some of the Cs. then the conclusion will be necessary: but whenever the affirmative premiss is universal. and let the major premiss be affirmative. For the same terms can be used to demonstrate the point. Nor again. and let A simply belong to some C. it is clear that B will not belong to some C.

If then it is necessary that B should belong to all C. The demonstration is the same as before.belongs necessarily to all C. Since then the affirmative is convertible. and C belongs to some B. C also will belong to some B necessarily: consequently if A belongs to none of the Cs. A will not belong to some of the Bs – but not of necessity. and it is necessary that the term animal should belong to every horse: but it is not necessary that some animal should not be good. the premisses are universal. for it has been proved. let the term C be ‘horse’. Or if that is not possible. take as the term ‘awake’ or ‘asleep’: for every animal can accept these. neither will the conclusion be necessary. Since then C is convertible with some B. For B is under C. Further. whenever the universal is necessary the conclusion also must be necessary. If. we have stated when the conclusion will be necessary. the point may be made clear by considering the terms. The first figure then is formed. then. Let the term A be ‘good’. and let the negative premiss be necessary. A will necessarily not belong to some B either: for B is under C. For suppose BC is affirmative and necessary. and if both are affirmative. and A falls under C. while AC is negative and not necessary. let that which B signifies be ‘animal’. But if one premiss is universal. since it is possible for every animal to be good. It is possible then that the term good should belong to no horse. it is necessary that A should belong to some B also. A similar proof will be given also if BC is necessary. it is necessary that B 102 . Again let AC be negative. But if the affirmative is necessary. the other particular. while C belongs to some of the Bs. it will belong necessarily also to some A. BC affirmative. for the particular affirmative also is convertible. but A necessarily belongs to no C. For C is convertible with some A: consequently if B belongs necessarily to all C. the conclusion will not be necessary. that if the negative premiss is not necessary. in the case of the first figure.

and when the affirmative is particular and necessary. or the negative is particular. The proof of this by reduction will be the same as before. But if one premiss is affirmative. but if terms are wanted. But if the particular premiss is necessary. the point is clear if we look at the terms. but it is possible for A to belong to C. the conclusion will not be necessary. take the terms ‘waking’ – ‘animal’ – ‘man’. and it is not necessary that waking should not belong to some animal. but B belongs to some C. the other negative. it is necessary that A should not belong to some B. But whenever the affirmative proposition is necessary. ‘moving’. take the terms ‘waking’ – ‘animal’ – ‘white’: for it is necessary that animal should belong to some white thing. when the universal affirmative is necessary. ‘man’ being middle. not however necessarily. For if it is not possible that A should belong to any C. should the proposition AC be both particular and necessary. But when the negative proposition being particular is necessary. For there is no necessity that some biped should be asleep or awake. But when the premisses were thus. Let the premiss BC be both particular and necessary. and let A belong to all C. Further. ‘animal’. and the universal premiss is not necessary. B biped. but it is possible that waking should belong to none. If the proposition BC is converted the first figure is formed. Similarly also if AC should be necessary and universal: for B falls under C. and C animal.should belong to some A. the conclusion will not be necessary. but the particular is necessary. the conclusion (as we proved was not necessary: consequently it is not here either. whenever the universal is both negative and necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. and that A should belong to B is not necessary. But if B must belong to some A. Similarly and by means of the same terms proof can be made. whether universal or particular. 103 . then A must belong to some B: for conversion is possible. take the terms ‘biped’. ‘animal’ being middle. It is necessary that B should belong to some C. Let A be waking.

that the conclusion will be neither necessary nor simple unless a necessary or simple premiss is assumed. if the conclusion is necessary. We say indeed ambiguously of the necessary that it is possible. and ‘it is not 104 . 13 Perhaps enough has been said about the proof of necessity. ‘it is possible to belong’. I use the terms ‘to be possible’ and ‘the possible’ of that which is not necessary but. how it comes about and how it differs from the proof of a simple statement. consequently their opposites also. I mean by ‘similar’. But in both cases. but a necessary conclusion is possible although one only of the premisses is necessary. For the expressions ‘it is not possible to belong’. ‘it is impossible to belong’. when and how and by what means it can be proved. Consequently this also is clear. But that my definition of the possible is correct is clear from the phrases by which we deny or on the contrary affirm possibility. and ‘it is necessary not to belong’ are either identical or follow from one another. the premiss must be simple.12 It is clear then that a simple conclusion is not reached unless both premisses are simple assertions. whether the syllogisms are affirmative or negative. We proceed to discuss that which is possible. if the conclusion is a simple assertion. being assumed. ‘it is not impossible to belong’. results in nothing impossible. the premiss must be necessary. it is necessary that one premiss should be similar to the conclusion.

The same holds good in the case of particular affirmations: for the proof is identical. which can be both thus and not thus. it is also possible that it should not belong to all. And similarly the other propositions in this mode can be converted. And such premisses are affirmative and not negative. For of everything the affirmation or the denial holds good. it is possible also that it should not belong to B: and if it is possible that it should belong to all. as was said above. In another sense the expression means the indefinite. for ‘to be possible’ is in the same rank as ‘to be’. Having made these distinctions we next point out that the expression ‘to be possible’ is used in two ways. or generally what happens by chance: for none of these inclines by nature in the one way more than in the opposite. e. ‘it is possible to belong’ may be converted into ‘it is possible not to belong’. although if a man does exist. e. or generally what naturally belongs to a thing (for this has not its necessity unbroken. and ‘it is possible for A to belong to some B’ into ‘it is possible for A not to belong to some B’. man’s turning grey or growing or decaying. and ‘it is possible for A to belong to all B’ into ‘it is possible for A to belong to no B’ or ‘not to all B’. That which is possible then will be not necessary and that which is not necessary will be possible. e.g. an animal’s walking or an earthquake’s taking place while it is walking. it comes about either necessarily or generally). since man’s existence is not continuous for ever. In one it means to happen generally and fall short of necessity. it is clear that if it is possible that A should belong to B. It results that all premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible into one another. will either be identical or follow from one another. I mean not that the affirmative are convertible into the negative. and that which is not necessary may possibly not belong. For since that which is possible is not necessary.necessary not to belong’. but that those which are affirmative in form admit of conversion by opposition.g. 105 .g.

It is clear then that the expression ‘A may possibly belong to all B’ might be used in two senses. and A is possible of the subject of B. It makes no difference whether we say. These matters will be treated more definitely in the sequel. First then we must state the nature and characteristics of the syllogism which arises if B is possible of the subject of C.That which is possible in each of its two senses is convertible into its opposite. and as a rule arguments and inquiries are made about things which are possible in this sense. Syllogisms indeed can be made about the former. for the expression ‘A is possible of the subject of B’ means that it is possible either of that of which B is stated or of that of which B may possibly be stated. 106 . but they are concerned with things that are natural. For thus both premisses are assumed in the mode of possibility. or all B admits of A. as in the other cases. not however in the same way: but what is natural is convertible because it does not necessarily belong (for in this sense it is possible that a man should not grow grey) and what is indefinite is convertible because it inclines this way no more than that. but whenever A is possible of that of which B is true. our business at present is to state the moods and nature of the syllogism made from possible premisses. The expression ‘it is possible for this to belong to that’ may be understood in two senses: ‘that’ may mean either that to which ‘that’ belongs or that to which it may belong. A is possible of the subject of B. but it is unusual at any rate to inquire about them. one premiss is a simple assertion. the other a problematic. because the middle term is uncertain. Consequently we must start from premisses which are similar in form. Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with things which are indefinite.

and B may belong to no C. and B to all C. But if one of the premisses is universal. Consequently if B is possible for all C. Similarly if it is possible for A to belong no B. and A is possible for all B. or if both premisses are negative. but if the premiss BC is converted after the manner of problematic propositions. there will be a perfect syllogism to prove that A may possibly belong to all C. and B for some C. 107 .14 Whenever A may possibly belong to all B. then indeed no syllogism results from the premisses assumed. No syllogism results from the assumed premisses. or if one it is not perfect. This is clear from the definition: for it was in this way that we explained ‘to be possible for one term to belong to all of another’. it is necessary that A may possibly not belong to some of the Cs.g. the other particular. if A may belong to none of the Bs. It is clear then that if the minor premiss is negative. when the major premiss is universal there will be a perfect syllogism. This has been stated above. it is possible also that it should belong to all C. but if they are converted we shall have the same syllogism as before. For if A is possible for all B. then it is possible for A to belong to no C. either no syllogism results. But whenever A may belong to all B. the same syllogism again results. For since it is possible that B should belong to no C. and B may belong to some of the Cs. and the universal is affirmative. This is clear from the definition of being possible. and B to none of the Cs. Again if A may belong to no B. The proof is the same as above. the same syllogism results as before. and for B to belong to all C. For the necessity results from the conversion. then A is possible for some C. For the statement that it is possible for A not to belong to that of which B may be true means (as we saw) that none of those things which can possibly fall under the term B is left out of account. Similarly if in both the premisses the negative is joined with ‘it is possible’: e. But if the particular premiss is negative.

since premisses in the mode of possibility are convertible and it is possible for B to belong to more things than A can. and the negative by the affirmative. but if the particular premiss is converted and it is laid down that B possibly may belong to some C. whether both are affirmative. or different in quality. Take as terms common to all the cases under consideration ‘animal’ – ‘white’ – ‘man’. for the necessary (as we stated) is not possible. But this is impossible. There remains the proof of possibility. Let C be that by which B extends beyond A. so that as predicates cover unequal areas. But if the major premiss is the minor universal. or if both are indefinite or particular. as in the cases given at the beginning. It is clear then that if the terms are related in this manner. for if the premisses are as assumed. 108 . Consequently there cannot be a syllogism to prove the possibility. For nothing prevents B from reaching beyond A.g. A is possible for all B. ‘animal’ – ‘white’ – ‘garment’. in no way will a syllogism be possible. B may possibly not belong to some C. For the affirmative is destroyed by the negative. where the major belongs necessarily to the minor.the major still being universal and the minor particular. no syllogism results. It is clear that there is no proof of the first or of the second. e. For every syllogism proves that something belongs either simply or necessarily or possibly. the major term is both possible for none of the minor and must belong to all of it. To C it is not possible that A should belong – either to all or to none or to some or not to some. then a clear syllogism does not result from the assumed premisses. or negative. we shall have the same conclusion as before. For it has been proved that if the terms are related in this manner it is both necessary that the major should belong to all the minor and not possible that it should belong to any. Further. where it is not possible that the major should belong to the minor. this is obvious if we take terms.

whenever the major premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms will be perfect and establish possibility in the sense defined. or to all. the former stating possible. and those which are negative will establish not possibility according to the definition.It is clear that if the terms are universal in possible premisses a syllogism always results in the first figure. Since C falls under B. For if this is so. So a perfect syllogism results. First we must state that if B’s being follows necessarily from A’s being. Likewise if the premiss AB is negative. 15 If one premiss is a simple proposition. we say it is possible that it should belong to none or not to all. a perfect syllogism results proving that A possibly belongs to no C. and the premiss BC is affirmative. B’s possibility will follow necessarily 109 . the other a problematic. only a perfect syllogism results in the first case. whether they are affirmative or negative. clearly it is possible for all C also. This is sometimes forgotten. not as covering necessity. At the same time it will be evident that they are imperfect: for the proof proceeds not from the premisses assumed. Let A be possible for all B. but that the major does not necessarily belong to any. must be proved per impossibile. and A is possible for all B. and let B belong to all C. an imperfect in the second. of the minor. but whenever the minor premiss indicates possibility all the syllogisms will be imperfect. But possibility must be understood according to the definition laid down. the latter simple attribution. It is clear that perfect syllogisms result if the minor premiss states simple belonging: but that syllogisms will result if the modality of the premisses is reversed.

g. and if that which is impossible. B is possible. If then that which is possible. is. it would not only result that if A is necessary B is necessary. and B is impossible. and the various other spheres in which we speak of the possible: for it will be alike in all. B also will be false but not impossible. and the conclusion by B. If then. the terms being so related. but also that if A is possible. let A belong to all B. when it is possible for it to be. consequently B will be possible: for if it were impossible. but from two at least. But we must take the impossible and the possible not only in the sphere of becoming. B will be: for nothing follows of necessity from the being of some one thing. when it has happened. For since it has been proved that if B’s being is the consequence of A’s being. for example. Since this is proved it is evident that if a false and not impossible assumption is made. then B’s possibility will follow from A’s possibility (and A is assumed to be possible). might happen. Further we must understand the statement that B’s being depends on A’s being. when the premisses are related in the manner stated to be that of the syllogism. For if C is predicated of D. and D of F. For that which has happened. and if at the same time A is possible and B impossible. the conclusion also is possible.from A’s possibility. Suppose. the same thing would at the same time be possible and impossible. when it is impossible. but also in the spheres of truth and predicability. and if B is the consequence of A. And if each is possible. the consequence of the assumption will also be false and not impossible: e. could not happen. not as meaning that if some single thing A is. one should indicate the premisses by A. and B be possible for all C: it is necessary then that should be a 110 . if A is false. i. that A is possible.e. and if to happen. then to be. but not impossible. then C is necessarily predicated of F. it would be possible for A to happen without B. Since we have defined these points.

but the conclusion necessary. the the minor ‘man’. for if 111 . then A is not possible for all B: for a syllogism is formed in the third degree. It is clear then that the universal must be understood simply. It is necessary then that A is possible for all C. and assume that A belongs to no B. then A would be possible for all C. without limitation in respect of time. If then A is not possible for C but B belongs to all C. e. It is possible also in the first figure to bring about the impossibility. For if B belongs to all C. since if the premiss is understood with reference to the present moment. Thus it will be possible for A to belong to no C. the conclusion is impossible. yet ‘man’ is possible for no horse. Again let the premiss AB be universal and negative. there cannot be a syllogism. For man is necessarily animal. not possible. it is necessary that A possibly belongs to no C. if nothing else were moving: but ‘moving’ is possible for every horse. It is necessary then that A belongs to some B: for we have a syllogism in the third figure: but this is impossible. as above. but assume that B belongs to all C: this is false but not impossible. but B possibly belongs to all C. Suppose that it cannot belong. But it was assumed that A is a possible attribute for all B. i. but simply without qualification.g.possible attribute for all C.e. For though the assumption we made is false and not impossible. For nothing perhaps prevents ‘man’ belonging at a particular time to everything that is moving. to the present or to a particular period. The premisses then will be as before. Suppose that it is not possible. These propositions being laid down. by assuming that B belongs to C. and that B belongs to C. and A is possible for all B. For it is by the help of such premisses that we make syllogisms. But the assumption was made that A is not possible for all C. the middle ‘moving’. Further let the major term be ‘animal’. We must understand ‘that which belongs to all’ with no limitation in respect of time.

nothing necessarily follows: but if the proposition BC is converted and it is assumed that B is possible for all C. Through these comes nothing 112 . A then belongs to no B: for no intelligent thing is a raven. A then will belong to no B. but if the problematic premiss is converted.at is supposed false. Likewise if both the relations are negative. Let A belong to all B. Clearly then the conclusion establishes that one term does not necessarily belong to any instance of another term. but B is possible for all C. a syllogism results as before: for the terms are in the same relative positions. B ‘science’. and B may possibly belong to no C. But we must take our terms better. rather it is not necessary that any man should move. But neither is it always necessary. Through the premisses actually taken nothing necessary results in any way. and the minor premiss indicates that B may possibly belong to no C. And the conclusion will not be necessary. it is clear also from an example that the conclusion will not establish possibility. If the minor premiss is negative and indicates possibility. if the major premiss states that A does not belong to B. but the syllogism per impossibile establishes the contradictory which is opposed to this). This syllogism then does not establish that which is possible according to the definition. C ‘man’. Suppose that A belongs to no B. and let B possibly belong to no C. Let A be ‘moving’. a syllogism will be possible. the consequence is an impossible one. as before. and C ‘man’. B ‘intelligent’. But B is possible for all C: for every man may possibly be intelligent. But A necessarily belongs to no C: so the conclusion does not establish possibility. If the terms are arranged thus. Further. but if the problematic premiss is converted. Let A be ‘raven’. we shall have a syllogism. but that which does not necessarily belong to any part of the subject (for this is the contradictory of the assumption which was made: for it was supposed that A necessarily belongs to some C. from the actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism. For it is not necessary that no man should move.

whether positive or negative. and problematic. As common instances of a necessary and positive relation we may take the terms white – animal – snow: of a necessary and negative relation. we shall again have the same syllogism. if A belongs to all B or to no B. there cannot be a syllogism anyhow. the other problematic. e. just as when the terms are universal. not problematic. 113 . and B may possibly not belong to some C. in all cases there will be an imperfect syllogism. white – animal – pitch. For if the premiss BC is converted in respect of possibility. there will be a perfect syllogism. there cannot be a syllogism. then whenever the major premiss is universal and problematic. And a syllogism will be possible by means of conversion when the major premiss is universal and assertoric. But if B is assumed to be possible for all C (and this is true) and if the premiss AB remains as before. As instances of the positive relation we may take the terms white – animal – snow. or one is negative. the other affirmative.g. Clearly then if the terms are universal. and the minor is particular and problematic.necessary. whether both premisses are negative or affirmative. instead of possibly not belonging. But whenever the major premiss is universal. whether the premiss AB is negative or affirmative. whenever the minor premiss is problematic a syllogism always results. as has been shown above. of the negative. only sometimes it results from the premisses that are taken. But whenever the particular premiss is assertoric and negative. Only some of them will be proved per impossibile. sometimes it requires the conversion of one premiss. But if one of the relations is universal. But if it be assumed that B does not belong to any C. We have stated when each of these happens and the reason why. others by the conversion of the problematic premiss. The demonstration is the same as before. a syllogism results. but assertoric. and the particular is affirmative and assertoric. negative. whether affirmative or negative. the other particular. and the minor particular. and one of the premisses is assertoric.

the other negative. nohow is a syllogism possible. but if the minor is universal nothing at all can ever be proved. the other problematic. whether either premiss is negative or affirmative. Possibility in the conclusion must be understood in the same manner as before. and a perfect syllogism when the minor premiss is necessary. there will be a syllogism when the terms are related as before. animal – white – garment. There cannot be an inference to the necessary negative proposition: for ‘not necessarily to belong’ is different from ‘necessarily not to belong’. the other assertoric. not negative assertoric. not assertoric. It is evident then that if the major premiss is universal. whether the premisses are universal or not. of the necessary and negative relation. or the one problematic. whether the premisses are universal or not: but if one is affirmative.white – animal – pitch. But if the minor premiss is universal. The demonstration is the same as above. If the premisses are affirmative the conclusion will be problematic. For the demonstration must be made through the indefinite nature of the particular premiss. problematic or assertoric. Nor is a syllogism possible when the premisses are particular or indefinite. 16 Whenever one premiss is necessary. 114 . and assertoric negative. and the major particular. but when the negative is necessary the conclusion will be problematic negative. whether problematic or assertoric. when the affirmative is necessary the conclusion will be problematic. As instances of the necessary and positive relation we may take the terms animal – white – man. a syllogism always results.

For if it were supposed that A belongs to some C. For suppose A to belong to all C or to some C. not that A does belong to all C: and it is perfect.If the premisses are affirmative. But if the premisses are not similar in quality. let the affirmative premiss be necessary. and let A possibly not belong to any B. and let B necessarily belong to all C. and further it is not possible to prove the assertoric conclusion per impossibile. B is not possible for any A. and the minor is necessary. And it is clear that the possibility of belonging can be inferred. We shall have an imperfect syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C. But A is supposed to belong to all C or to some C. and let necessarily A not be possible for any B. clearly the conclusion which follows is not necessary. let A be possible for all B. We shall then have a syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C. and let B necessarily belong to all C. but it will establish a problematic negative. Now we assumed that A is not possible for any B. but when it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. not an assertoric negative. and it is laid down that A possibly does not belong to any B. no impossible relation between B and C follows from these premisses. The same terms as before serve both for the positive relation – 115 . and let B be possible for all C. The syllogism will be perfect. That it is imperfect is clear from the proof: for it will be proved in the same manner as above. Since then the negative proposition is convertible. But if the minor premiss is negative. as above. Consequently B will not be possible for any C or for all C. suppose first that the negative premiss is necessary. when it is problematic a syllogism is possible by conversion. It is necessary then that A belongs to no C. since the fact of not belonging is inferred. For the major premiss was problematic. Nor again when both premisses are negative. But it was originally laid down that B is possible for all C. not imperfect: for it is completed directly through the original premisses. Suppose A necessarily belongs to all B. Again. but let B be possible for all C. Again.

neither can B belong to any A. but B may belong to some of the Cs. Nor again is a syllogism possible when the premisses are indefinite. and problematic. But it was laid down that B may belong to some C. The demonstration is the same as before. animal-white-man. and where it is necessary and negative.white-animal-snow.g. if the universal is negative we may take the terms animal-whiteraven to illustrate the positive relation. animal-white-garment. So if A belongs to all C. or the universal proposition in the affirmative syllogism. there will not be an assertoric conclusion. The same relation will obtain in particular syllogisms. to none of the Cs can B belong. e. BC the minor premiss.g. and for the negative relation – whiteanimal-pitch.g. AB the major premiss. and the major premiss is particular and necessary. if it is not possible that A should belong to any B. But when the universal is necessary. Whenever the negative proposition is necessary. there cannot be a syllogism. e. or both particular. is necessary. e. is both necessary and positive and necessary and negative. and if the universal is affirmative we may take the terms animal-white-swan to illustrate the positive relation. or animal-white-pitch to illustrate the negative.g. and animal-white-snow to illustrate the negative and necessary relation. the particular problematic. But when the particular affirmative in the negative syllogism. and of white to some inanimate. it is necessary that A should not belong to some of the Cs. For the relation of animal to some white. Similarly if the relation is problematic: so the terms may be used for all cases. e. For if A belongs to all C. animal-white-inanimate. Premisses of this kind are possible both where the relation is positive and necessary. the conclusion will be negative assertoric: e. but cannot belong to any B. 116 . But if the minor premiss is universal.g. whether affirmative or negative. Terms applicable in either case to illustrate the positive relation are animal-whiteman: to illustrate the negative.

these propositions are not incompatible. ‘B necessarily does not belong to some of 117 . universal or particular. But this is false: for if all this can be that. [It is clear also that all the syllogisms are imperfect and are perfected by means of the figures above mentioned. it does not follow that all that can be this: consequently the negative proposition is not convertible. if A may belong to no B. no syllogism is possible.] 17 In the second figure whenever both premisses are problematic. the other problematic. but if the negative premiss is necessary the conclusion is both problematic and negative assertoric. but if the universal negative is assertoric a conclusion can always be drawn. But when one premiss is assertoric. and since B may belong to no A. the other problematic. if the affirmative is assertoric no syllogism is possible. Here also we must understand the term ‘possible’ in the conclusion. in the same sense as before. it does not follow that B may belong to no A.Clearly then from what has been said a syllogism results or not from similar relations of the terms whether we are dealing with simple existence or necessity. that if the negative premiss is assertoric the conclusion is problematic. First we must point out that the negative problematic proposition is not convertible. e. it is clear that B may belong to all A. For suppose it to follow and assume that B may belong to no A. whether the premisses are affirmative or negative. whether they are contraries or contradictories. Further. with this exception.g. ‘A may belong to no B’. Similarly when one premiss is necessary. Since then problematic affirmations are convertible with negations.

Similarly also they are opposed to the proposition ‘A may belong to no B’. for it does not follow that some A is necessarily B. it necessarily does not belong to some D. 118 . in the sense originally defined. therefore we say that it is not possible for it to belong to all. just as it is not true to say that what necessarily belongs to some A may possibly belong to all A. we must assume. It is clear from what has been said that the negative proposition is not convertible. it is true that it cannot belong to no A. If any one then should claim that because it is not possible for C to belong to all D. it is possible that no man should be white (for it is also possible that every man should be white). i. For it is not true to say that that which necessarily does not belong to some of the As may possibly not belong to any A. But if this is so. he would make a false assumption: for it does belong to all D. but that A necessarily does not belong to some B. Hence both the propositions ‘A necessarily belongs to some B’ and ‘A necessarily does not belong to some B’ are opposed to the proposition ‘A belongs to all B’.g. For the latter expression is used in two senses. But this is impossible. but it is not true to say that it is possible that no white thing should be a man: for many white things are necessarily not men. it is true that B necessarily belongs to some of the As: consequently A necessarily belongs to some of the Bs. but because in some cases it belongs necessarily. if it is not possible that no A should be B.’ The argument cannot be admitted.e. e. Moreover it is not possible to prove the convertibility of these propositions by a reductio ad absurdum. one if A some is necessarily B. for the one statement is the contradictory of the other. another if some A is necessarily not B. It is clear then that in relation to what is possible and not possible. and the necessary (as we saw) other than the possible.the As’. not that A necessarily belongs to some B. by claiming assent to the following argument: ‘since it is false that B may belong to no A. But if this is assumed. no absurdity results: consequently no syllogism.

it is clear that its conclusion will be problematic because neither of the premisses is assertoric. if there is a syllogism. or if both are affirmative or negative. 18 But if one premiss is assertoric. if the affirmative is assertoric and the negative problematic no 119 . For it is necessary that no horse should be a man. no false consequence results: for A may belong both to all C and to no C. if both the premisses are problematic. or both are particular or indefinite. Let A be white. but the necessary we found to be different from the possible. But neither is possible. In general. Nor can a proof be obtained by a reductio ad absurdum: for if it is assumed that B can belong to all C. as has been said. suppose it possible that A may belong to no B and to all C. Suppose the conclusion is negative: it will be proved that it is not problematic but necessary. or in whatever other way the premisses can be altered. B man. the proof will always proceed through the same terms. is not convertible. No syllogism then results. Suppose the conclusion is affirmative: it will be proved by an example that the predicate cannot belong to the subject. The demonstration can be made by means of the same terms. the other particular. and this must be either affirmative or negative. And whenever one premiss is universal. is clear. For no horse is a man.This being proved. C horse. Clearly then. But it is not possible for B to belong nor not to belong to C. the other problematic. By means of conversion no syllogism will result: for the major premiss. the minor affirmative. It is possible then for A to belong to all of the one and to none of the other. A similar proof can be given if the major premiss is negative. Neither is it possible for it not to belong. no syllogism results. That it is not possible for it to belong.

g. Similarly also if the minor premiss is negative. and the negative assertoric. whether the other premiss is affirmative or negative. and by means of the same terms. animal. But if both premisses are affirmative. although no conclusion follows from the actual premisses. whether universal or particular. Nor can a conclusion be drawn when both premisses are indefinite.g. no syllogism is possible. and when it is negative. The proof is the same as above. whether the premisses are universal or particular. Whenever the affirmative proposition is assertoric. The same will hold good if the syllogisms are particular. one being assertoric. horse. and the assertoric proposition is universal. But when the affirmative premiss is problematic. 120 . B will belong to no A. no syllogism is possible (this is proved similarly and by the same examples as above). whether affirmative or negative. But ex hypothesi can belong to all C: so a syllogism is made. but when the negative proposition is assertoric. man. no syllogism will be possible. as before: for we shall again have the first figure. The proof is the same and by the same terms. This arrangement of terms is possible both when the relation is positive. but if the problematic premiss is converted into its complementary affirmative a syllogism is formed to prove that B may belong to no C.syllogism will be possible. But if the negative proposition is assertoric. or particular. e. a syllogism can be obtained by converting the problematic premiss into its complementary affirmative as before. health. but can belong to all C. If the negative proposition is converted. a conclusion can be drawn by means of conversion. proving by means of the first figure that B may belong to no C. but particular. we shall have a syllogism. e. health. man. Again if both the relations are negative. But if both premisses are negative. the other problematic. Suppose A belongs to no B. as before. nothing follows necessarily from these premisses as they stand.

suppose that A may belong to no B. no conclusion is possible. (2) Nor again can we draw a necessary conclusion: for that presupposes that both premisses are necessary. For assume that it does: then if A cannot belong to any B.e.g. (3) Further it is possible also. Again let the affirmative proposition be necessary. for that which is necessary is admittedly distinct from that which is possible. and B belongs to some of the Cs. Suppose that A necessarily belongs to no B. but may belong to all C. A for ‘motion’. A cannot belong to some of the Cs: but ex hypothesi it may belong to all. and necessarily belonging to C. White then necessarily belongs to swan.19 If one of the premisses is necessary. and man necessarily belongs to no swan. A similar proof can be given if the minor premiss is negative. e. A being possible for all B. Clearly then we cannot draw a problematic conclusion. that B should belong to C: for nothing prevents C falling under B. the other problematic. but necessarily belongs to all C. But at the same time it is clear that B will not belong to any C. or at any rate the negative premiss. no syllogism is possible. but if the affirmative premiss is necessary. if C stands for ‘awake’. When the terms are arranged in this way. Let A be white. then if the negative is necessary a syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. C swan. and the other problematic. For (1) it sometimes turns out that B necessarily does not belong to C. If the negative premiss is converted B will belong to no A: but A ex hypothesi is capable of belonging to all C: so once more a conclusion is drawn by the first figure that B may belong to no C. B for ‘animal’. i. when the terms are so arranged. but may belong to no man. For motion necessarily belongs to what 121 . not merely a negative problematic but also a negative assertoric conclusion. B man.

Similarly if the minor premiss is negative. Clearly the conclusion cannot be a negative assertoric or a negative necessary proposition because no negative premiss has been laid down either in the assertoric or in the necessary mode. But if the premisses are similar in quality. no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. For whenever the negative proposition is universal and necessary. e. But if the premisses are affirmative there cannot be a syllogism. when they are negative a syllogism can always be formed by converting the problematic premiss into its complementary affirmative as before. A similar proof is possible if the major premiss is affirmative. since we have shown a case in which B necessarily does not belong to C. For if the terms are so related. B swan. and A may possibly belong to all C: thus we have the first figure. Similar relations will obtain in particular syllogisms. and by the same terms. and the premiss 122 . Suppose A necessarily does not belong to B. and possibly may not belong to C: if the premisses are converted B belongs to no A. Nor can the opposite affirmations be established: consequently no syllogism is possible. suppose that A is white.is awake.g. Nor is a syllogistic conclusion possible when both premisses are affirmative: this also may be proved as above. C man. A syllogism then is not possible at all. This can be proved in the same way as for universal propositions. Clearly then the conclusion cannot be the negative assertion. but when the affirmative proposition is universal and necessary. Nor can the conclusion be a problematic negative proposition. a syllogism will always be possible to prove both a problematic and a negative assertoric proposition (the proof proceeds by conversion). there are cases in which B necessarily will not belong to C. and is possible for every animal: and everything that is awake is animal. Nor can the opposite affirmations be established. if the relation must be positive when the terms are related as above. But when both premisses are negative.

20 In the last figure a syllogism is possible whether both or only one of the premisses is problematic. a syllogism is always possible. but if it is negative the syllogism will result in a negative assertoric proposition. But when the other premiss is necessary. but also a negative assertoric proposition. the other assertoric.that definitely disconnects two terms is universal and necessary. and the same terms. The same proof will serve. no syllogism can be formed. It is clear too that a syllogism is possible or not under the same conditions whether the mode of the premisses is assertoric or necessary. a conclusion can be drawn as above if the problematic premiss is converted into its complementary affirmative. if it is affirmative the conclusion will be neither necessary or assertoric. as above. but if the affirmative premiss is necessary no conclusion can be drawn. though nothing follows necessarily from the premisses as they are stated. and are completed by means of the figures mentioned. It is clear then from what has been said that if the universal and negative premiss is necessary. proving not merely a negative problematic. First let the premisses be problematic and suppose that both A and B may possibly belong to every C. Since then the affirmative proposition is convertible into a particular. But if both are indefinite or particular. When the premisses are problematic the conclusion will be problematic. And it is clear that all the syllogisms are imperfect. and also when one premiss is problematic. and B may possibly 123 . In these also we must understand the expression ‘possible’ in the conclusion in the same way as before.

Suppose that A may possibly belong to all C. and B to some C. it follows that A may possibly not belong to some B: for we shall have the first figure again by conversion. For we have got the first figure. as above. For if A and B may possibly not belong to C. to illustrate the negative. then A is possible for some of the Bs. Likewise also if the proposition AC is negative. but if the premisses are converted into their corresponding affirmatives there will be a syllogism as before. And A if may possibly belong to no C. So. if ‘may possibly belong’ is substituted we shall again have the first figure by means of conversion. if A is possible for every C.belong to every C. For if A is possible for all C. and the proposition BC affirmative: for we shall again have the first figure by conversion. or not. But if one of the premisses is universal. but B may possibly belong to all C. We shall have the first figure again if the particular premiss is converted. But when both premisses are indefinite or particular. it follows that C may possibly belong to some B. and C for some of the Bs. then A is possible for some of the Bs. it will follow if they are converted. no syllogism can be formed: for A must belong sometimes to all B and sometimes to no B. and C is possible for some of the Bs. 124 . But if both premisses should be negative – the one universal and the other particular – although no syllogistic conclusion will follow from the premisses as they are put. the other particular. under the arrangement of the terms as in the case of assertoric propositions. a syllogism will be possible. take the terms horse-man-white – white being the middle term. Similarly if the proposition BC is universal. To illustrate the affirmative relation take the terms animal-man-white. But if both premisses should be negative no necessary consequence will follow from them as they are stated.

the proof will proceed by a reductio ad impossibile. and B may possibly belong to all C. First let the premisses be affirmative: suppose that A belongs to all C. or when the universal is negative. or if AC is negative.21 If one premiss is pure. the conclusion also (as we saw) is problematic. and B (as has been assumed) belongs to all C. AC problematic. But if the affirmative premiss is universal. and it has been proved that if one premiss is problematic in that figure the conclusion also will be problematic. we shall have the first figure. Similarly if the proposition BC is pure. For when one of the premisses in the first figure is problematic. the other particular. we shall have the same sort of syllogisms: for all are completed by means of the first figure. or if both premisses are negative. But if the minor premiss BC is negative. So it is clear that we shall have not a pure but a problematic syllogistic conclusion. If the proposition BC is converted. and the conclusion that A may possibly belong to some of the Bs. the other problematic. but if they are converted a syllogism is obtained as before. Suppose that B belongs to all C. BC affirmative. But it was assumed at the outset that A may possibly not belong to some C. A will necessarily belong to all C: for this has been proved before. and a syllogism will be possible under the same arrangement of the terms as before. and A may possibly not belong to some C: it follows that may possibly not belong to some B. the negative particular. no matter which of the two is pure. For if A necessarily belongs to all B. then when both are affirmative. If one of the premisses is universal. 125 . the conclusion will be problematic. in both cases the conclusion will be problematic: for the first figure is obtained once more. not pure. the particular affirmative. no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn from the premisses as they stand.

If the affirmative proposition BC is converted. if the affirmative is necessary a problematic negative can be inferred. The demonstration is the same as was given in the case of universal premisses. when one proposition is affirmative. suppose A may possibly belong to no C. A similar proof may be given if the proposition BC is necessary. Since then A must belong to all C. that A necessarily belongs to all C. it follows that A may (not does) belong to some B: for so it resulted in the first figure. But if the negative premiss is necessary. and proceeds by means of the same terms. but if the negative proposition is necessary both a problematic and a pure negative conclusion are possible. we 126 . but B may belong to all C. and B may possibly belong to all C. the other problematic. For suppose that A necessarily does not belong to C. the other negative. when the premisses are affirmative a problematic affirmative conclusion can always be drawn. and AC is problematic. i. Again suppose one proposition is affirmative. 22 If one of the premisses is necessary.e.e. no syllogism will be possible. but B necessarily belongs to all C. the conclusion will be not only that A may possibly not belong to some B but also that it does not belong to some B. and C may belong to some B. But a necessary negative conclusion will not be possible. We shall have the first figure once more: and – since the negative premiss is problematic – it is clear that the conclusion will be problematic: for when the premisses stand thus in the first figure. any more than in the other figures. Suppose first that the premisses are affirmative. the conclusion (as we found) is problematic.Whenever both premisses are indefinite or particular. the affirmative being necessary: i. the other negative.

the conclusion will be problematic. If both premisses are affirmative. as before. consequently here it follows that A does not belong to some B. To illustrate the former take the terms sleepsleeping horse-man. and that it did not belong to some C. the latter being necessary. not pure. Similar results will obtain if one of the terms is related universally to the middle. and the same terms may be used. For the syllogisms must be made perfect by means of the first figure. if it is problematic a syllogism can be formed by means of conversion. But when the minor premiss is negative. the other in part. and when it is pure. It is evident also that all syllogisms in this figure are imperfect. and also when one premiss is negative. The proof will follow the same course as where the premisses are universal. But when the premisses stood thus. for the same kind of proof can be given whether the terms are universal or not. it resulted that A might possibly not belong to some C. But when the minor premiss is negative and universal. the other affirmative. and that they are made perfect by means of the first figure. But when the negative premiss is necessary. if it is problematic we shall have a syllogism by altering the premiss into its complementary affirmative. It is clear then in this figure also when and how a syllogism can be formed.shall have the first figure. For A sometimes necessarily belongs to all B. and the negative premiss is necessary. and when the conclusion is problematic. and sometimes cannot possibly belong to any B. 127 . but if it is necessary a syllogism is not possible. to illustrate the latter take the terms sleepwaking horse-man. the conclusion also will be a pure negative proposition. so that a result which follows in the first figure follows also in the third. but if it is necessary no syllogism can be formed.

no syllogism will be possible. nor anything of it. and in general hypothetically.23 It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made perfect by means of universal syllogisms in the first figure and are reduced to them. If then A be asserted of something else. will be clear presently. If now A should be asserted of B. no connexion however being made 128 . when it has been proved that every syllogism is formed through one or other of these figures. nor anything else of A. the proposition originally in question will have been assumed. That every syllogism without qualification can be so treated. It is necessary that every demonstration and every syllogism should prove either that something belongs or that it does not. and that to something else and so on. either as an attribute of it or as not an attribute of it. If then one wants to prove syllogistically A of B. one must assert something of something else. Thus we must take another premiss as well. Let us speak first of ostensive syllogisms: for after these have been pointed out the truth of our contention will be clear with regard to those which are proved per impossibile. but it will not be in relation to B through the premisses taken. nothing prevents a syllogism being formed. or something different of C. and further either ostensively or hypothetically. and this either universally or in part. For nothing necessarily follows from the assertion of some one thing concerning some other single thing. One sort of hypothetical proof is the reductio ad impossibile. or something else of A. But if A should be asserted of C. Nor when C belongs to something else. but C should not be asserted of anything.

proving 129 . if we neither affirm nor deny anything of it. and a syllogism referring to this out of premisses with the same reference. If then we must take something common in relation to both. and prove the original conclusion hypothetically when something impossible results from the assumption of its contradictory. if we are to have a syllogism relating this to that.with B. and these are the figures of which we have spoken. but affirm or deny peculiar attributes of each. For all who effect an argument per impossibile infer syllogistically what is false. or C of both. and this is possible in three ways (either by predicating A of C. because odd numbers are equal to evens if it is supposed to be commensurate. and one proves hypothetically the incommensurability of the diagonal. which will connect the predications. since a falsehood results through contradicting this. unless some middle term is taken. For the syllogism in general is made out of premisses. viz. it is clear that every syllogism must be made in one or other of these figures. For in general we stated that no syllogism can establish the attribution of one thing to another. For this we found to be reasoning per impossibile. for the figure will be the same whether there is one middle term or many. or again to take a premiss relating A to B. that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side. e. So we must take something midway between the two. or both of C). if we take nothing common.g. these considerations will show that reductiones ad also are effected in the same way. will a syllogism be possible concerning A in its relation to B. One infers syllogistically that odd numbers come out equal to evens. and C of B. and a syllogism relating this to that proceeds through premisses which relate this to that. But it is impossible to take a premiss in reference to B. It is clear then that the ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of the aforesaid figures. The argument is the same if several middle terms should be necessary to establish the relation to B. which is somehow related to each by way of predication.

or it will not refer to the subject proposed. and universality must be present: unless one of the premisses is universal either a syllogism will not be possible. Consequently. it is not relevant to the subject proposed. if one should claim that some pleasure is good. that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. it is evident that syllogisms per impossibile also will be made through these figures.something impossible by means of an hypothesis conceded at the beginning. if it is this very pleasure. or the original position will be begged. This is more obvious in geometrical proofs. since the falsehood is established in reductions ad impossibile by an ostensive syllogism. every demonstration and every syllogism must be formed by means of the three figures mentioned above. no syllogism will be possible. Suppose we have to prove that pleasure in music is good.g. but the original thesis is reached by means of a concession or some other hypothesis. Likewise all the other hypothetical syllogisms: for in every case the syllogism leads up to the proposition that is substituted for the original thesis. If then one should assume that the angle AC is equal to 130 . and the original conclusion is proved hypothetically. and we have already stated that ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of these figures. Suppose the lines A and B have been drawn to the centre. then if it is different from pleasure in music. e. But if this is true. But when this has been shown it is clear that every syllogism is perfected by means of the first figure and is reducible to the universal syllogisms in this figure. If one should claim as a premiss that pleasure is good without adding ‘all’. one is assuming that which was proposed at the outset to be proved. 24 Further in every syllogism one of the premisses must be affirmative.

when a perfect syllogism can be formed. problematic. but if the premisses are universal it is possible that the conclusion may not be universal. and when a valid. and that a universal statement is proved only when all the premisses are universal.the angle BD. and again if one should assume that the angle C is equal to the angle D. unless he also states that when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal. without claiming generally that angles of semicircles are equal. the remainders E and F are equal. It is clear also when a syllogism in general can be made and when it cannot. pure. unless the same conclusion is 131 . I mean not only in being affirmative or negative. the premisses also must be universal. And it is clear also that in every syllogism either both or one of the premisses must be like the conclusion. and further if one should assume that when equal angles are taken from the whole angles. We must consider also the other forms of predication. without the additional assumption that every angle of a segment is equal to every other angle of the same segment. while a particular statement is proved both from two universal premisses and from one only: consequently if the conclusion is universal. which are themselves equal. and that if a syllogism is formed the terms must be arranged in one of the ways that have been mentioned. 25 It is clear too that every demonstration will proceed through three terms and no more. he will beg the thing to be proved. It is clear then that in every syllogism there must be a universal premiss. but also in being necessary.

or B and C. And if it is (i) E. It must either be E or one or other of C and D. and D. by means of D and E. and it must be either E. and unconnected with one another. B. unless for the sake of induction or of obscuring the argument or something of the sort. the other part.established by different pairs of propositions. or something other than these. or something other than these. But if C and D are so related that one is whole. or one or other of the propositions A and B. and again B by means of F and G. It is necessary then that of these one should be related to another as whole to part: for it has already been proved that if a syllogism is formed some of its terms must be related in this way. Some conclusion then follows from them. the conclusion E may be established through the propositions A and B. But if this can be called one syllogism. but it cannot be reached as C is established by means of A and B.g. (1) If it is E the syllogism will have A and B for its sole premisses. or (ii) the same thing happens to be inferred by means of several terms only in the sense which we saw to be possible. e. A and B and C. e. But in that case there is not one but several syllogisms. Or one may be obtained by syllogistic. the other by inductive inference. C. not many. e. Or again when each of the propositions A and B is obtained by syllogistic inference. the same conclusion may be reached by more than three terms in this way. or (ii) A or B. the propositions will have been assumed to no purpose. Suppose then that A stands in this relation to B. But if C is not so related to D as to make a syllogism.g. or A and C. and through the propositions C and D. But if (iii) the conclusion is other than E or A or B.g. some conclusion will follow from them also. Suppose that the proposition E is inferred from the premisses A. But thus also the syllogisms are many. For nothing prevents there being several middles for the same terms. 132 . for the conclusions are many. either (i) the syllogisms will be more than one. the syllogisms will be many. or through the propositions A and B.

the number of the terms will similarly exceed that of the premisses by one (for the extra term must either be added outside or inserted: but in either case it follows that the relations of predication are one fewer than the terms related). So it is clear that every demonstration and every syllogism will proceed through three terms only. as was said at the beginning. This being evident. and the conclusions will be half the number of the premisses. It is clear therefore that in whatever syllogistic argument the premisses through which the main conclusion follows (for some of the preceding conclusions must be premisses) are not even in number. unless a new premiss is assumed. to perfect the syllogisms. But whenever a conclusion is reached by means of prosyllogisms or by means of several continuous middle terms. For the three terms make two premisses. it is clear that a syllogistic conclusion follows from two premisses and not from more than two. the proposition AB by means of the middle terms C and D. it turns out that these propositions have been assumed to no purpose. and if from C and D either A or B follows or something else. every syllogism will consist of an even number of premisses and an odd number of terms (for the terms exceed the premisses by one). and the syllogism does not prove the original proposition. If then syllogisms are taken with respect to their main premisses. then there are several syllogisms. e. and the premisses will be equal in number to the relations of 133 . and they do not establish the conclusion proposed: for we assumed that the syllogism proved E.g. And if no conclusion follows from C and D.(2) But if from the propositions A and B there follows not E but some other conclusion. this argument either has not been drawn syllogistically or it has assumed more than was necessary to establish its thesis.

26 Since we understand the subjects with which syllogisms are concerned. For if one term is added. the terms must be odd. But the conclusions will not follow the same arrangement either in respect to the terms or to the premisses. if to ABC the term D is added. The universal affirmative is proved by means of the first figure only and by this in only one mood. The particular 134 . the premisses must be odd: for along with one term one premiss is added. the terms odd. but they will alternate – when the premisses are even. through the second in two. Consequently the conclusions will be much more numerous than the terms or the premisses. For that which is concluded in many figures and through many moods is easier. through the first in one mood. if a term is added from any quarter. it is evident to us both what sort of problem is difficult and what sort is easy to prove. conclusions will be added less by one than the preexisting terms: for the conclusion is drawn not in relation to the single term last added. two conclusions are thereby added. Similarly with any further additions. we must make them alternately even and odd at each addition. one in relation to A. and the terms odd. what sort of conclusion is established in each figure. e. And similarly too if the term is inserted in the middle: for in relation to one term only. the universal negative is proved both through the first figure and through the second. the other in relation to B. Consequently since the premisses were (as we saw) even. and in how many moods this is done.predication. a syllogism will not be constructed. The premisses however will not always be even.g. that which is concluded in few figures and through few moods is more difficult to attempt. but in relation to all the rest. when the terms are even.

universals are easier game for the destroyer than particulars: for whether the predicate belongs to none or not to some. Similarly with universal negatives: the original statement is destroyed. In general. in three moods in the third. whether the predicate belongs to all or to some: and this we found possible in two figures. I mean. they are destroyed: and the particular negative is proved in all the figures. the number of the terms and premisses through which it proceeds. the relation of the premisses to one another.affirmative is proved through the first and through the last figure. But particular statements can be refuted in one way only – by proving that the predicate belongs either to all or to none. The manner in which every syllogism is produced. The particular negative is proved in all the figures. though it is possible to establish particular statements by means of universal. most easy to overthrow. all these matters are clear from what has been said. At the same time it is evident that it is easier to refute than to establish. But particular statements are easier to establish: for proof is possible in more figures and through more moods. and particular statements by means of universal: but it is not possible to establish universal statements by means of particular. universal statements by means of particular. in two moods in the second. the universal negative in two. and the number of the figures appropriate to each problem. the character of the problem proved in each figure. And in general we must not forget that it is possible to refute statements by means of one another. but once in the first. It is clear then that the universal affirmative is most difficult to establish. in three moods through the last. 135 . in one mood through the first.

but these may be predicated of other things.27 We must now state how we may ourselves always have a supply of syllogisms in reference to the problem proposed and by what road we may reach the principles relative to the problem: for perhaps we ought not only to investigate the construction of syllogisms. We must select the premisses suitable to each problem in this manner: first we must lay down the subject and the definitions and the properties of the thing. Cleon and Callias. Of all the things which exist some are such that they cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally. and those which cannot belong to it. and some are predicated of others. We shall explain in another place that there is an upward limit also to the process of predicating: for the present we must assume this. though other things can be predicated of them.g. but also to have the power of making them. or that that which approaches is Callias. Whatever lies between these limits can be spoken of in both ways: they may be stated of others. Neither can individuals be predicated of other things. save incidentally: for we sometimes say that that white object is Socrates. It is clear then that some things are naturally not stated of anything: for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be predicated of anything. and others stated of them. Of these ultimate predicates it is not possible to demonstrate another predicate. save as a matter of opinion. i. man of Callias and animal of man. and yet others of them. and some things are themselves predicated of others. but nothing prior is predicated of them. And as a rule arguments and inquiries are concerned with these things. because the negative 136 . but other things may be predicated of them (for each of these is both man and animal). and again those which the thing follows. e. next we must lay down those attributes which follow the thing.e. the individual and sensible. But those to which it cannot belong need not be selected.g. e.

for which we must obtain the attributes that follow. e. without qualification. not what follows a particular man but what follows every man: for the syllogism proceeds through universal premisses. those which are predicated as properties. and in proportion as he apprehends those which are truer. For some things are peculiar to the species as distinct from the genus. The larger the supply a man has of these. Nor must we take as things which the superior term follows. for what follows animal also follows man. If the statement is indefinite. it is uncertain whether the premiss is universal. what follows or does not follow the highest term universally must not be selected in dealing with the subordinate term (for these attributes have been taken in dealing with the superior term. the more cogently will he demonstrate.g. But he must select not those which follow some particular but those which follow the thing as a whole. Similarly one must select those attributes which the subject follows as wholes. e. for the reason given.g. take as subjects of the predicate ‘animal’ what are really subjects of the 137 .g. and of the latter those which apparently and those which really belong. and what does not belong to animal does not belong to man). the more quickly will he reach a conclusion. for species being distinct there must be attributes peculiar to each. and indeed we state it in a proposition: for the other statement is useless and impossible. but if the statement is definite. and those which are predicated as accidents.statement implied above is convertible. that every animal follows man or every science music. is contained by something else. Whenever the subject.g. but only that it follows. those things which the inferior term follows. but we must choose those attributes which are peculiar to each subject. e. that every man is every animal or justice is all good. the matter is clear. But that which follows one must not suppose to follow as a whole. e. But that which something follows receives the mark ‘every’. Of the attributes which follow we must distinguish those which fall within the definition.

the attribute originally in question must belong to the subject originally in question. if animal follows man. One must apprehend also normal consequents and normal antecedents – for propositions which obtain normally are established syllogistically from premisses which obtain normally.predicate ‘man’. and to those attributes which cannot possibly be present in the predicate in question: or conversely to the attributes which cannot possibly be present in the subject. one must look to the consequents of the subject. Whenever the one term has to belong to none of the other. If any members of these groups are identical. and the attributes which follow that of which it is to be predicated. The reason why this is so will be clear in the sequel. and to the consequents of the predicate. For sometimes a syllogism 138 . It is necessary indeed. they must look for the terms of which the terms in question are predicable: for if any of these are identical. We must not however choose attributes which are consequent upon all the terms: for no syllogism can be made out of such premisses. For the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles. they must look to the subjects of that which is being established (the subjects of which it happens to be asserted). one of the terms in question cannot possibly belong to any of the other. But these belong more properly to the choice of what concerns man. 28 If men wish to establish something about some whole. some if not all of them having this character of normality. For if any of these subjects is the same as any of these attributes. that it should follow all these also. the attribute in question must belong to some of the subject in question. But if the purpose is to establish not a universal but a particular proposition.

but it must belong to some E because it is possible to convert the universal statement into a particular. we must find antecedents of the subject in question and attributes which cannot possibly belong to the predicate in question. but to no E: for it was assumed to be identical with H. the antecedents of A by C. and E follows all G. Suppose again that the attributes of E are designated by F. A will belong to none of the Es by a prosyllogism: for since the negative proposition is convertible. If C and G are identical.in the first figure results. sometimes a syllogism in the second. but F belongs to all E. it follows that one of the terms in question does not belong to some of the other. and attributes which cannot belong to E by H. If then one of the Cs should be identical with one of the Fs. But if the object is to establish a particular negative proposition. Suppose the consequents of A are designated by B. the antecedents of E by G. if B and H are identical. because it does not belong to D: but G falls under E: consequently A will not belong to some of the Es. A will belong to none of the Fs. A will not belong to some of the Es: for it will not belong to G. It is clear then that in every proposition which requires proof we must look to the aforesaid relations of the subject and predicate in question: for all syllogisms proceed through these. If F and D are identical. consequently A belongs to all E. and F is identical with D. A must belong to some of the Es: for A follows C. there will be a converted syllogism: for E will belong to all A since B belongs to A and E to B (for B was found to be identical with G): but that A should belong to all E is not necessary. attributes which cannot possibly belong to A by D. and H belonged to none of the Es. But if we are seeking consequents and antecedents we must 139 . If D and G are identical. Again. If any members of these two groups are identical. A will belong to none of the Es: for B will belong to all A. Perhaps each of these statements will become clearer in the following way. and A to all C. A must belong to all E: for F belongs to all E. If B is identical with G.

It is clear too that the inquiry proceeds through the three terms and the two premisses. in reference to E we must look to KF rather than to F alone. Thus we have both the first figure and the middle figure. And A will not belong to some E. because A belongs to no F. the first. For (as we saw) it is not possible at all to establish a proposition from consequents. This will be the middle term. and E will belong to all G. whenever D and G are identical. A and E will be the extremes. since the negative statement is convertible. This is the last figure: for G becomes the middle term. and we must not select consequents of all the terms. it will follow those also which are subordinate.g.g.look for those which are primary and most universal. it belongs both to F and to E: but if it does not follow KF. and it is not possible to refute by means of a consequent of both the terms in question: for the middle term must belong to the one. because no syllogism is produced from them. but if it does not follow the former. and in reference to A we must look to KC rather than to C alone. it may yet follow F. For it is proved that A belongs to all E. and F belongs to all E: the middle figure because D belongs to no A. or if the antecedents of A are identical with those attributes which 140 . e. And A will belong to some E. when D and F are identical. whenever an identical term is found among the Cs and Fs. if the consequents of the terms in question are identical. And A will belong to no E. and that all the syllogisms proceed through the aforesaid figures. So the first figure is formed. and to all E. It is clear too that other methods of inquiry by selection of middle terms are useless to produce a syllogism. and not belong to the other. it may yet follow the latter. This is the last figure: for A will belong to no G. e. Similarly we must consider the antecedents of A itself: for if a term follows the primary antecedents. Clearly then all syllogisms proceed through the aforesaid figures. For if A belongs to KF. whenever C and G are apprehended to be the same.

not however from the premisses taken but in the aforesaid mood. we have the first figure with its minor premiss negative. Secondly.g. Consequently B must be identical with some of the Hs. either in the first or in the middle figure. If attributes which cannot belong to either term are identical. both premisses are negative. For if the consequents are identical. not which are different or contrary. and the syllogism results through these terms. C with H. e. if B and F are contraries or cannot belong to the same thing. but if B and F are contraries B must be identical with one of the Hs.g. It is evident too that we must find out which terms in this inquiry are identical. all arguments can be reduced to the aforesaid moods. e. or if those attributes are identical which cannot belong to either term: for no syllogism is produced by means of these. a syllogism will be formed to prove that A belongs to none of the Es. It turns out then that those who inquire in this 141 . Again. first because the object of our investigation is the middle term. it follows that A will not belong to some of the Es: for then too we shall have the middle figure: for B will belong to all A and to no G. For the fact that B and G cannot belong to the same thing differs in no way from the fact that B is identical with some of the Hs: for that includes everything which cannot belong to E. For if these are taken. Consequently B must be identical with one of the Hs.g. It is clear then that from the inquiries taken by themselves no syllogism results. B and F. and the middle term must be not diverse but identical. But no syllogism is possible in this way. wherever it happens that a syllogism results from taking contraries or terms which cannot belong to the same thing. if B and G cannot belong to the same thing. For B will belong to all A and to no E.cannot possibly belong to E. C and H. we have the middle figure with both premisses affirmative: if the antecedents of A are identical with attributes which cannot belong to E. e.g. e.

and what is proved per impossibile may also be proved ostensively. In both cases the same inquiry is involved. A will belong to none of the Gs: but it was assumed to belong to all. Whatever the problem the same inquiry is necessary whether one wishes to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. B will belong to some of the Es: but it was assumed that it belongs to none. they also are formed by means of the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. Again if it has been proved by an ostensive syllogism that A belongs to no E. For both the demonstrations start from the same terms. assume that A belongs to some E and it will be proved per impossibile to belong to no E. In all cases 142 . and E belongs to all G. e. Similarly with the rest. For suppose A to belong to some E: then since B belongs to all A and A to some of the Es.g. 29 Syllogisms which lead to impossible conclusions are similar to ostensive syllogisms. The proof per impossibile will always and in all cases be from the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. that A belongs to none of the Es.g. e. suppose it has been proved that A belongs to no E. because it turns out that otherwise B belongs to some of the Es and this is impossible – if now it is assumed that B belongs to no E and to all A. it is clear that A will belong to no E. Again we may prove that A belongs to some E: for if A belonged to none of the Es. For what is proved ostensively may also be concluded syllogistically per impossibile by means of the same terms. Similarly with the other propositions requiring proof.manner are looking gratuitously for some other way than the necessary way because they have failed to observe the identity of the Bs with the Hs.

then A would belong to every E: and again if the Ds and the Gs should be identical.it is necessary to find some common term other than the subjects of inquiry. when we discuss the reduction to impossibility: at present this much must be clear. the inquiry will be directed to the terms of the problem to be proved – not the terms of the original problem. Each of the problems then can be proved in the manner described. But we must consider and determine in how many ways hypothetical syllogisms are possible. so that if this premiss is converted. For if the Cs and the Gs should be identical. These points will be made clearer by the sequel. For the ostensive syllogism differs from the reductio ad impossibile in this: in the ostensive syllogism both remisses are laid down in accordance with the truth. to which the syllogism establishing the false conclusion may relate.g. or by positing a certain quality. it follows that A will belong to none of the Es. the syllogism will be ostensive by means of the same terms. and the other remains as it is. and the syllogism will proceed through terms arranged in the same order whether a possible or a pure 143 . that we must look to terms of the kinds mentioned whether we wish to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. but it is possible to establish some of them syllogistically in another way. universal problems by the inquiry which leads up to a particular conclusion. and the method of the inquiry will be the same as before. Clearly then we must consider the matter in this way also. with the addition of an hypothesis. in the reductio ad impossibile one of the premisses is assumed falsely. but E should be assumed to belong to the Gs only. but E should be predicated of the Gs only. For the inquiry will be the same. but the new terms introduced. I mean those which proceed by substitution. In the other hypothetical syllogisms. e. The method is the same whether the relation is necessary or possible.

confirming them in another. The principles of syllogisms have been stated in general terms. and we must supply ourselves with as many of these as possible. refuting statements in one way. Similarly also with the other modes of predication. while if we look for dialectical syllogisms we must start from probable premisses. Consequently a syllogism cannot be formed by means of other terms. and these cannot be composed through other terms than the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question: for from these we obtain the premisses and find the middle term. or again whether we are 144 . in philosophy. and consider them by means of the three terms. 30 The method is the same in all cases.proposition is proved. For every syllogism has been proved to be formed through one of the aforementioned figures. We must look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms. It is clear then from what has been said not only that all syllogisms can be formed in this way. both how they are characterized and how we must hunt for them. so as not to look to everything that is said about the terms of the problem or to the same points whether we are confirming or refuting. terms which can belong though they actually do not: for we have proved that the syllogism which establishes a possible relation proceeds through these terms as well. but also that they cannot be formed in any other. We must find in the case of possible relations. as well as terms that belong. in the pursuit of truth starting from premisses in which the arrangement of the terms is in accordance with truth. in any art or study.

confirming of all or of some.g. about good or knowledge. it begs. and it always establishes something more general than the attribute in question. and to make that clear. the demonstrations of astronomy were discovered. and whether we are refuting of all or some. 31 It is easy to see that division into classes is a small part of the method we have described: for division is. and they attempted to persuade men that it was possible to make a demonstration of substance and essence. this very point had escaped all those who used the method of division. for what it ought to prove. so to speak. we should be able to discover the proof and demonstrate everything which admitted of proof. our business will then be to exhibit readily the demonstrations. In general then we have explained fairly well how we must select premisses: we have discussed the matter accurately in the treatise concerning dialectic. Consequently. Similarly with any other art or science. But in each science the principles which are peculiar are the most numerous. e. a weak syllogism. We have also stated how we must select with reference to everything that is. whose nature does not admit of proof. we must look to fewer points and they must be definite. I mean for example that astronomical experience supplies the principles of astronomical science: for once the phenomena were adequately apprehended. For if none of the true attributes of things had been omitted in the historical survey. Consequently they did not understand what it is 145 . if the attributes of the thing are apprehended. First. Consequently it is the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject.

The man who divides assumes that every animal is either mortal or immortal: i. the middle term through which the syllogism is formed must always be inferior to and not comprehend the first of the extremes. so he assumes A of D as belonging to it.e. he lays it down that man is an animal. but it is not necessary that man should be a mortal animal – this is begged: and this is what ought to have been proved syllogistically. they do not make it clear.possible to prove syllogistically by division. taking A as mortal animal. to be a mortal animal). be signified by D. mortal by B. C as footless. and as extremes that which ought to have been the subject of demonstration and the differentiae. Always dividing then in this way it turns out that these logicians assume as middle the universal term. but it is not necessary that man should be footed: this he assumes: and it is just this again which he ought to have demonstrated. But division has a contrary intention: for it takes the universal as middle. when there is a need to prove a positive statement. he assumes in the same way that A inheres either in B or in C (for every mortal animal is either footed or footless). and D as man. never even suspecting the presence of the rich supply of evidence which might be used. that this is man or whatever the subject of inquiry may be: for they pursue the other method altogether. always dividing. And again. In demonstrations. and he assumes A of D (for he assumed man. consequently it is necessary that man should be either a footed or a footless animal. nor to draw a conclusion about an accident or property 146 . Let animal be the term signified by A. whose definition is to be got. and immortal by C. B as footed. consequently man must be either mortal or immortal. In conclusion. It is clear that it is neither possible to refute a statement by this method of division. nor did they understand that it was possible to prove syllogistically in the manner we have described. whatever is A is all either B or C. Again. and let man. Now the true conclusion is that every D is either B or C. as we saw. and show it to be necessary.

It will happen at the same time that what has been already said will be confirmed and its truth made clearer by what we are about to say. C for ‘diagonal’. and the diagonal is a length. our original problem would be brought to a conclusion. nor is it useful in those cases in which it is thought to be most suitable. For if he assumes that every length is either commensurate or incommensurate. and to what points we must look in each problem.g. But if he should assume that it is incommensurate. and further if we could resolve the syllogisms produced into the aforementioned figures. From what has been said it is clear from what elements demonstrations are formed and in what manner. he will have assumed what he ought to have proved.of a thing. 32 Our next business is to state how we can reduce syllogisms to the aforementioned figures: for this part of the inquiry still remains. nor about its genus. It is clear then that this method of investigation is not suitable for every inquiry. and the composite parts 147 . For everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself First then we must attempt to select the two premisses of the syllogism (for it is easier to divide into large parts than into small. nor in cases in which it is unknown whether it is thus or thus. he has proved that the diagonal is either incommensurate or commensurate. Let A stand for ‘incommensurate or commensurate’. If we should investigate the production of the syllogisms and had the power of discovering them. whether the diagonal is incommensurate. B for ‘length’. e. but proof is not possible by this method. He cannot then prove it: for this is his method.

we must ourselves assume the one which is missing. and that if the elements out of which a thing is made are annihilated. but omit those through which they are inferred. or anything necessary has been omitted. since the syllogism also is necessary. In some arguments it is easy to see what is wanting. because something necessary results from what has been laid down. We are deceived in such cases because something necessary results from what is assumed. and if both premisses have not been stated. and that substance should exist. if animal does. then that which is made out of them is destroyed: these propositions being laid down. if man does. and invite the concession of others to no purpose. but premisses are wanting. we cannot reduce arguments put forward in the way described. Consequently. and appear to be syllogisms. but some escape us. next we must inquire which are universal and which particular. e. For sometimes men put forward the universal premiss.are larger than the elements out of which they are made). either in writing or in discussion: or men put forward the premisses of the principal syllogism. but not everything which is necessary is a syllogism.g. until we have reached the two premisses: for unless we have these. and we must posit the one and take away the other. but do not posit the premiss which is contained in it. it is necessary that any part of substance is substance. this has not however been drawn by syllogism from the propositions assumed. Again if it is necessary that animal should exist. it is necessary that substance should exist if man does: but as yet the conclusion has not been drawn syllogistically: for the premisses are not in the shape we required. if the assumptions were made that substance is not annihilated by the annihilation of what is not substance. We must inquire then whether anything unnecessary has been assumed. we 148 . But that which is necessary is wider than the syllogism: for every syllogism is necessary. though something results when certain propositions are assumed.

E.g. or one is denied. but for that which is appropriate to the thesis in hand. and this ought not to escape our notice. and B of C: it would seem that a syllogism is possible since the terms stand thus: but nothing necessary results. and in which the universal. 33 Men are frequently deceived about syllogisms because the inference is necessary. Since we know what sort of thesis is established in each figure. or if it is a predicate. the other predicated. If the thesis is established in more figures than one. If then the middle term is a predicate and a subject of predication. but must first state the two premisses. and something else is denied of it. then divide them into their terms. we shall recognize the figure by the position of the middle term. 149 . clearly we must not look for all the figures. For it was thus that we found the middle term placed in each figure. in what sort the particular is described. we shall have the first figure: if it both is a predicate and is denied of something.must not try to reduce it directly. the middle figure: if other things are predicated of it. as has been said above. Clearly then. We must take that term as middle which is stated in both the remisses: for it is necessary that the middle should be found in both premisses in all the figures. if the same term is not stated more than once in the course of an argument. the last figure. sometimes they are deceived by the similarity in the positing of the terms. a syllogism cannot be made: for a middle term has not been taken. nor does a syllogism. if A is stated of B. It is placed similarly too if the premisses are not universal: for the middle term is determined in the same way.

no syllogism (as we have shown) is possible. B disease. B for ‘musical Miccalus’. suppose A to be health. since 150 . C man. It is true to say that A cannot belong to any B (for health belongs to no disease) and again that B belongs to every C (for every man is capable of disease). But to state A of C is false at any rate. This deception then arises through ignoring a small distinction. But A does not belong to C: for Aristomenes is perishable. The reason for this is that the terms are not set out well in the statement. It is true then that A belongs to B. It is true to predicate B of C: for Miccalus is musical Miccalus. e. But this is false.Let A represent the term ‘being eternal’. Again let C stand for ‘Miccalus’. For Aristomenes as an object of thought is eternal. B ‘Aristomenes as an object of thought’. 34 Men will frequently fall into fallacies through not setting out the terms of the premiss well. since Aristomenes is perishable. For if we accept the conclusion as though it made no difference whether we said ‘This belong to that’ or ‘This belongs to all of that’. It would seem to follow that health cannot belong to any man. that every Aristomenes who is an object of thought is eternal. C ‘Aristomenes’. A for ‘perishing to-morrow’. But B also belongs to C: for Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an object of thought. for it is not true universally that musical Miccalus perishes tomorrow: but unless this is assumed.g. This argument then is identical with the former. Also A can be predicated of B: for musical Miccalus might perish to-morrow. For no syllogism was made although the terms stood thus: that required that the premiss AB should be stated universally.

It is clear then that in such premisses what possesses the condition ought always to be substituted for the condition and taken as the term. Hence it is difficult to reduce syllogisms with such terms. For health and diseae and knowledge and ignorance.if the things which are in the conditions are substituted. C for 151 . and in general contraries. It is evident then that in all these cases the fallacy arises from the setting out of the terms: for if the things that are in the conditions are substituted. 35 We must not always seek to set out the terms a single word: for we shall often have complexes of words to which a single name is not given. For it is not true to say that being healthy cannot belong to one who is diseased. save in respect of possibility: but such a conclusion is not impossible: for it is possible that health should belong to no man.g. B for triangle. e. Let A stand for two right angles. but cannot belong to one another. This is not in agreement with what was said before: for we stated that when several things could belong to the same thing. may possibly belong to the same thing. But unless this is assumed no conclusion results. but it is possible that health should belong to every man. consequently it is not possible that disease should belong to any man’. Again the fallacy may occur in a similar way in the middle figure: ‘it is not possible that health should belong to any disease. In the third figure the fallacy results in reference to possibility. if ‘healthy’ is substituted for ‘health’ and ‘diseased’ for ‘disease’. the belief that syllogism can establish that which has no mean. no fallacy arises. they could belong to one another. e. no syllogism can be made.g. Sometimes too fallacies will result from such a search.

Then A belongs to B. A then belongs to C because of B: but A belongs to B without the mediation of another term: for the triangle in virtue of its own nature contains two right angles. but in the sense that it is true to say of the contraries that there is a single science of them. the conclusion is that there is knowledge of the good. must not be understood in the sense that they can always be predicated of one another or that the first term will be predicated of the middle in the same way as the middle is predicated of the last term. and wisdom is of the good. But we must suppose the verb ‘to belong’ to have as many meanings as the senses in which the verb ‘to be’ is used. but sometimes a complex of words. if wisdom is knowledge. and the middle to the extreme.isosceles triangle. as happens in the case mentioned. 36 That the first term belongs to the middle.g. Let A stand for ‘there being a single science’. though wisdom is knowledge. The good then is not knowledge. not in the sense that contraries are the fact of there being a single science of them. It happens sometimes that the first term is stated of the middle. The same holds if the premisses are negative. and in which the assertion that a thing ‘is’ may be said to be true. and B for things which are contrary to one another. e. Sometimes the middle term is 152 . For it is clear that the middle must not always be assumed to be an individual thing. Take for example the statement that there is a single science of contraries. but the middle is not stated of the third term. although it is demonstrable. consequently there will be no middle term for the proposition AB.

while the first is sometimes stated of the third. man.g. of a good. the conclusion is that there is a science of the good. we conclude that there is a genus of the good. in which the thesis is refuted because the genus is asserted in a particular way. nor is that which has a quality or is a contrary. if there is a genus of that of which there is a science.’ Or again it may be said that there is a sign of laughter.g.g. good. and if there is a science of the good. For ‘that does not belong to this’ does not always mean that ‘this is not that’. and sometimes not: e. e. if there is a science of everything that has a quality.g. e. For we state this universally without qualification. The same holds good where the relation is negative. 153 . but the first is not stated of the middle. Sometimes neither the first term is stated of the middle.stated of the third. we conclude that the good is a genus. We must take as terms opportunity-right timeGod: but the premiss must be understood according to the case of the noun. in relation to the terms of the thesis. and the good both is a contrary and has a quality. Again take the inference ‘opportunity is not the right time: for opportunity belongs to God. ‘there is not a motion of a motion or a becoming of a becoming. but the right time does not. This holds in the other cases too. since nothing is useful to God’. and if there is a science of the good. though the good is both of these. but in the premisses one thing is not stated of another.g. But nothing is predicated of anything. not in oblique cases.g. e. nor the middle of the third. e. but there is not a sign of a sign. consequently laughter is not a sign. e. but the good is not science. that the terms ought always to be stated in the nominative. of contraries. of man. but the premisses ought to be understood with reference to the cases of each term –either the dative. but sometimes that ‘this is not of that’ or ‘for that’. but there is a becoming of pleasure: so pleasure is not a becoming. And if that of which there is a science is a genus. or is a contrary. contraries. The first term then is predicated of the extreme.

Similarly if it should be proved 154 . C for justice. and these categories must be taken either with or without qualification. or in whatever other way the word falls in the premiss. Also it is true to predicate B of C. For of the good there is knowledge that it is good. B for good. We must consider these points and define them better. but B will not be true of C. ‘man is an animal’. ‘that which strikes or sees this’. But if the expression ‘that it is good’ were added to B. ‘double of this’. e. the expression ‘that it is good’ (or ‘qua good’) should be joined to the first term. For to predicate of justice the term ‘good that it is good’ is false and not intelligible. 38 A term which is repeated in the premisses ought to be joined to the first extreme.g. or the genitive.‘equal to this’. or the accusative. e. I mean for example that if a syllogism should be made proving that there is knowledge of justice. that it is good. and further as simple or compound: the same holds good of the corresponding negative expressions. or the nominative. For justice is identical with a good. It is true to predicate A of B. not to the middle. In this way an analysis of the argument can be made.g.g. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is good’. e. 37 The expressions ‘this belongs to that’ and ‘this holds true of that’ must be understood in as many ways as there are different categories. the conclusion will not follow: for A will be true of B.

word for word. The position of the terms is not the same when something is established without qualification and when it is qualified by some attribute or condition. e. and 155 .g. that it is good. the middle term must be ‘that which is something’. but if we add the qualification ‘that it is good’. or man perishable qua an object of sense: in every case in which an addition is made to the predicate. that it is something. we must put as middle term ‘that which is’. and C stand for ‘good’. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is something’. and phrase for phrase. not ‘being something’. we should not have had a syllogism proving that there is knowledge of the good. that it is good: for ex hypothesi the term ‘something’ indicates the thing’s special nature. but that it is. It is true to predicate A of B: for ex hypothesi there is a science of that which is something. But if ‘being’ were taken as middle and ‘being’ simply were joined to the extreme. of goatstag an object of knowledge qua not existing. the addition must be joined to the extreme. C for good. B too is true of C: for that which C represents is something.that the healthy is an object of knowledge qua good.g. B for being. e. If it has been proved to be an object of knowledge without qualification. Clearly then in syllogisms which are thus limited we must take the terms in the way stated. Consequently A is true of C: there will then be knowledge of the good. when the good is proved to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved to be an object of knowledge that it is good. 39 We ought also to exchange terms which have the same value. and word and phrase. let A stand for knowledge that it is. B stand for ‘something’.

the term will be ‘good’.always take a word in preference to a phrase: for thus the setting out of the terms will be easier. it is not necessary that A should 156 . that A belongs to all of that to which B belongs.g. we must not set out the terms in the same way. but not perhaps to everything that is white. If beauty belongs to something white. then whether B belongs to all C or merely belongs to C. Similarly in all other cases. 41 It is not the same. but not to everything of which B is predicated. If then A belongs to B. but if the object is to prove that pleasure is good. let B stand for beautiful. and C for white. it is better to take as the terms the supposable and the opinable in preference to the phrase suggested. For example if it makes no difference whether we say that the supposable is not the genus of the opinable or that the opinable is not identical with a particular kind of supposable (for what is meant is the same in both statements). though not to all C: e. the term must be ‘the good’. 40 Since the expressions ‘pleasure is good’ and ‘pleasure is the good’ are not identical. either in fact or in speech. it is true to say that beauty belongs to that which is white. and that A belongs to all of that to all of which B belongs: for nothing prevents B from belonging to C. but if the syllogism is to prove that pleasure is the good.

If however A is said of that of all of which B may be said. But if A belongs to everything of which B is truly stated.belong. but does not use the diagrams in the sense that he reasons from them. We must not suppose that something absurd results through setting out the terms: for we do not use the existence of this particular thing. the prover does not prove from them. if two things are not related as whole to part and part to whole. but even to C at all. Clearly then we must analyse arguments in accordance with this. not as though it were impossible to demonstrate without these illustrative terms. but one through one figure. and so no syllogism a is formed. another through another. as it is to demonstrate without the premisses of the syllogism. and yet A not belonging to all C or to any C at all. 42 We should not forget that in the same syllogism not all conclusions are reached through one figure. nothing prevents B belonging to C. it will follow that A can be said of all of that of all of which B is said. And if B is said of all of a third term. For in general. so also is A: but if B is not said of all of the third term. there is no necessity that A should be said of all of it. We (I mean the learner) use the process of setting out terms like perception by sense. Since not every problem is proved in every figure. I do not say to all C. but certain problems in each 157 . ‘A is said of all the things of which B is said’. but imitate the geometrician who says that ‘this line a foot long’ or ‘this straight line’ or ‘this line without breadth’ exists although it does not. If then we take three terms it is clear that the expression ‘A is said of all of which B is said’ means this.

For instance if a man should suppose that unless there is one faculty of contraries. 43 In reference to those arguments aiming at a definition which have been directed to prove some part of the definition.g. if a man proves that water is a drinkable liquid. e. but from an hypothesis. He has shown that there is not one faculty of all contraries. The latter argument perhaps was a syllogism: but the former was an hypothesis. but assented to by agreement. But the agreement does not come from a syllogism.figure. 158 . there cannot be one science. it is clear from the conclusion in what figure the premisses should be sought. and should then argue that not every faculty is of contraries. This argument cannot be reduced: but the proof that there is not a single faculty can. we must take as a term the point to which the argument has been directed. not the whole definition: for so we shall be less likely to be disturbed by the length of the term: e. but he has not proved that there is not a science. 44 Further we must not try to reduce hypothetical syllogisms. we must take as terms drinkable and water. for with the given premisses it is not possible to reduce them.g. of what is healthy and what is sickly: for the same thing will then be at the same time healthy and sickly. For they have not been proved by syllogism. And yet one must agree.

then contraries fall under the same science. and a syllogism in the middle figure to the first. If A belongs to no B. but if the 159 . and the various ways in which hypothetical arguments are formed: but at present this much must be clear. but the reduction to what is impossible can be analysed since it is proved by syllogism. though the rest of the argument cannot.The same holds good of arguments which are brought to a conclusion per impossibile. viz. can be reduced to another figure. 45 Whatever problems are proved in more than one figure. whereas in the latter. These cannot be analysed either. We shall describe in the sequel their differences. Thus the first figure. these we ought to consider and mark out clearly. and B to all C. a negative syllogism in the first figure can be reduced to the second. that it is not possible to resolve such arguments into the figures. But these differ from the previous arguments: for in the former a preliminary agreement must be reached if one is to accept the conclusion.g. then A belongs to no C. e. The point will be clear in the sequel. not all however but some only. an agreement that if there is proved to be one faculty of contraries. because the falsity is patent.g. And we have explained the reason. that then odd numbers are equal to evens. Many other arguments are brought to a conclusion by the help of an hypothesis. if they have been established in one figure by syllogism.g. e. e. men still accept the reasoning. even if no preliminary agreement has been made. the falsity of what follows from the assumption that the diagonal is commensurate. because the conclusion is reached from an hypothesis.

But if the affirmative statement concerns B.g. B then belongs to no C: for the negative statement is convertible.g. C will belong to some B: but A belonged to all B: so that the third figure is formed. if A belongs to no B and to some C: convert the negative statement and you will have the first figure.g. though all syllogisms in the first figure can be resolved into the third. Again syllogisms in the third figure cannot all be resolved into the first. But when the affirmative statement concerns the major extreme. e. nor would there be a syllogism if it did. and A to all B: therefore C belongs to no B. C must be made first term. and the negative C. The universal syllogisms in the second figure can be reduced to the first. For B will belong to no A and A to some C. when the negative statement is not universal: all the rest can be resolved. if A belongs to all B. Let A and B be affirmed of all C: 160 . For B will belong to no A and A to all C. and to all C. we shall have the middle figure. whenever the negative statement concerns the major extreme. Convert the negative statement and you will have the middle figure. e. but only one of the two particular syllogisms. For C belongs to no A. But if the syllogism is particular. and B to some C. and to some C. viz.negative statement is converted. no resolution will be possible. reduction to the first figure will be possible. Let A belong to all B and B to some C. Since the particular affirmative is convertible. Of the syllogisms in the last figure one only cannot be resolved into the first. Convert the negative statement. and you will have the first figure. For B belongs to no A. if A belongs to no B. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for the particular affirmative is convertible: therefore A will belong to no B. but not to all C: for the statement AB does not admit of conversion. Similarly if the syllogism is not universal but particular. e. Let A belong to no B and to all C.

the other cannot. therefore B belongs to some A. For if A belongs to no B and to some C. both B and C alike are convertible in relation to A. if A belongs to all C. and not to some C. resolution is possible. One of the syllogisms in the middle figure can. resolution will not be possible: for neither of the premisses is universal after conversion. It is clear that in order to resolve the figures into one another the premiss which concerns the minor extreme must be converted in both the figures: for when this premiss is altered. For C then will belong to 161 . and A to no C. Syllogisms in the third figure can be resolved into the middle figure. and A to no C: then C will belong to some B. e. no resolution will be possible. But if B belongs to all C and A to some C.g. Similarly if the negative statement is universal. A therefore is middle term. If the syllogism is negative. the transition to the other figure is made. But when A belongs to all B. so that B belongs to no A and C to some A. But if the negative statement is particular. if A belongs to no C. If A belongs to all C and B to some C. and so C will be middle term. and C to some A. But since the particular statement is convertible. Let B belong to all C. A will belong to some B. the argument is the same: for B is convertible in reference to C. and C to some of the Bs. be resolved into the third figure. and B to some or all C. and C to some of the Bs. the affirmative particular: for A will belong to no C. if B belongs to all C.g.then C can be converted partially with either A or B: C then belongs to some B. e. Consequently we shall get the first figure. whenever the negative statement is universal. Whenever the universal statement is negative. the first term must be B: for B belongs to all C. and A not belong to some C: convert the statement BC and both premisses will be particular. when the terms are universal we must take them in a similar way.

e. and is possessed of knowledge of what is good and of what is not-good).g. The relation of ‘he can walk’ to ‘he can not-walk’ is similar to the relation of ‘it is white’ to ‘it is not-white’. nor is ‘to be not-white’ the negation of ‘to be white’. but ‘not to be white’. capacity to walk and incapacity to walk will belong at the same time to the same person (for the same man can both walk and not-walk. It is clear then that the same syllogisms cannot be resolved in these figures which could not be resolved into the first figure. ‘not to be white’ and ‘to be not-white’. and that when syllogisms are reduced to the first figure these alone are confirmed by reduction to what is impossible. no resolution will be possible: for the particular negative does not admit of conversion. and that the figures may be resolved into one another. For there is no difference between the expressions ‘he knows what is good’ and ‘he is knowing what is good’. but an affirmation and a denial which are opposed to 162 .no A and to some B. If then ‘he is not able to walk’ means the same as ‘he is able not to walk’. it makes some difference whether we suppose the expressions ‘not to be this’ and ‘to be not-this’ are identical or different in meaning. But if the negative statement is particular. It is clear from what we have said how we ought to reduce syllogisms. so is that of ‘he knows what is good’ to ‘he knows what is not-good’. For they do not mean the same thing. The reason for this is as follows. or ‘he can walk’ and ‘he is able to walk’: therefore there is no difference between their contraries ‘he cannot walk’-’he is not able to walk’. 46 In establishing or refuting.

On the other hand D belongs to everything to which A belongs. Then either A or B will belong to everything. so ‘to be not-good’ is not the same as ‘not to be good’. and this is the unequal. that which is not-equal. For when two pairs correspond. But every affirmation has a corresponding negation. If then every single statement may truly be said to be either an affirmation or a negation. but there is nothing underlying the other. For either C or D belongs to everything to which A belongs. if it is not a negation clearly it must in a sense be an affirmation. Wherefore not everything is either equal or unequal. As then ‘not to know what is good’ is not the same as ‘to know what is not good’. But C does not always belong to B: for what is not a log at all. Nor is ‘to be not-equal’ the same as ‘not to be equal’: for there is something underlying the one. but they will never belong to the same thing. the denial must belong. or be a not-white log and be a white log. But since a thing 163 . The relation of these statements to one another is as follows. cannot be a not-white log either. For if ‘it is a not-white log’. Let A stand for ‘to be good’. but they will never belong to the same thing. and let D stand for not to be not-good’ and be placed under A. consequently if the affirmation does not belong. The negation then of ‘it is not-good’ is ‘it is not not-good’. Further the expressions ‘it is a not-white log’ and ‘it is not a white log’ do not imply one another’s truth. the other pair also must be different. it is true also to say ‘it is not white’: for it is impossible that a thing should simultaneously be white and be not-white. B for ‘not to be good’. but everything is equal or is not equal. And B must belong to everything to which C belongs. Therefore it is clear that ‘it is not-good’ is not the denial of ‘it is good’. if the one pair are different from one another. let C stand for ‘to be not-good’ and be placed under B.one another do not belong at the same time to the same thing. viz. For if it is true to say ‘it is a not-white’. and either C or D will belong to everything. it must be a log: but that which is not a white log need not be a log at all.

Privative terms are similarly related positive ter terms respect of this arrangement. In many things also. and the proof has been made. while that each is not-white or all are not-white is false. the negation may be true in a similar way. If then it is to be true to say that whatever is a man is musical or is not-musical.e. For the expression ‘it is true’ stands on a similar footing to ‘it is’. and that it is true to call it not-white. C for ‘unequal’. Since it is clear that ‘it is not-white’ and ‘it is not white’ mean different things. B for ‘not equal’. the other a denial. to some of which something belongs which does not belong to others. D must belong to everything to which A belongs. we must assume that whatever is an animal either is musical or is notmusical. that it is a white log. That whatever is a man is not musical is proved destructively in the three ways mentioned. viz.g. for this means that it is not-white. that it is a white log. For of that which is not a log at all it is not true to say A. that whatever is an animal is not white or may not be white. But we may prove that it is true to call it white or not-white in the same way for both are proved constructively by means of the first figure.cannot be simultaneously not-white and white. i. Similarly also ‘every animal is not-white’ is not the negation of ‘every animal is white’ (for both are false): the proper negation is ‘every animal is not white’. 164 . it is evident that the method of proving each cannot be the same. But A is not true of all D. e. but A is not true. that all are not white or that each is not white. For the negation of ‘it is true to call it white’ is not ‘it is true to call it not-white’ but ‘it is not true to call it white’. and one is an affirmation. For of that which is white it is true to say that it is not not-white. It is clear also that A and C cannot together belong to the same thing. Consequently D is true. viz. D for ‘not unequal’. and that B and D may possibly belong to the same thing. Let A stand for ‘equal’.

First it is clear from the following consideration that D follows B. But B and C cannot belong to the same thing. Again since C does not reciprocate with but A. Again since either F or B belongs to everything.In general whenever A and B are such that they cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. And ex hypothesi A belongs to everything ever thing to which C belongs. it is possible that A and D should belong to the same thing. but it is necessary that one of them should belong to whatever the other does not belong to: and again C and D are related in the same way. but B and C cannot. and follows everything which C follows: it will result that B belongs necessarily to everything to which D belongs’: but this is false. and again C and D are related in the same way. and so something impossible results. because A follows C. And again either C or H must belong to everything: for they are related as affirmation and denial. it is clear that D must follow B. and since C cannot belong to that to which B belongs. It results sometimes even in such an arrangement of terms that one is deceived through not apprehending the opposites rightly. and similarly either H or D. we may reason that ‘if A and B cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. ‘Assume that F stands for the negation of A and B. and A follows C but the relation cannot be reversed. one of which must belong to everything. and again that H stands for the negation of C and D. and since H 165 . but C or D belongs to everything. because it carries A along with it and A and B cannot belong to the same thing. and one of the two necessarily belongs to everything.g. For since either C or D necessarily belongs to everything. And A and D may belong to the same thing. It is clear then that B does not reciprocate with D either. e. then D must follow B and the relation cannot be reversed. It is necessary then that either A or F should belong to everything: for either the affirmation or the denial must belong. since it is possible that D and A should belong at the same time to the same thing. Therefore H belongs to everything to which F belongs.

For all propositions are convertible save only the particular negative: and the conclusion states one definite thing about another definite thing. also by what means we shall obtain principles appropriate to each subject. others particular. For not good is the negation of good: and not-good is not identical with ‘neither good nor not-good’. Book II 1 We have already explained the number of the figures. all the universal syllogisms give more than one result. B must follow D: for we know this. and how we should investigate a given problem in any branch of inquiry. when and how a syllogism is formed. further what we must look for when a refuting and establishing propositions. and of particular syllogisms the affirmative yield more than one.follows F. B must follow D’. But this is false: for as we proved the sequence is reversed in terms so constituted. Since some syllogisms are universal. the character and number of the premisses. For two negations have been assumed in respect to one term. Consequently all syllogisms save the particular negative 166 . The fallacy arises because perhaps it is not necessary that A or F should belong to everything. If then A follows C. Similarly also with C and D. the negative yield only the stated conclusion. or that F or B should belong to everything: for F is not the denial of A.

For all the things that are subordinate to the middle term or to the conclusion may be proved by the same syllogism. it has been assumed without proof that B does not belong to A. and B is included in A.g. This is a different conclusion from the former. not however through the syllogism. if A belongs to all B and B to some C. clearly B does not belong to it. it is not necessary that B should not belong to some A: for it may possibly belong to all A. But that B does not belong to what is subordinate to A is not clear by means of the syllogism. But while it has been proved through the syllogism that B belongs to no C. This then is the reason common to all syllogisms whether universal or particular. But in particular syllogisms there will be no necessity of inferring what is subordinate to the conclusion (for a syllogism does not result when this premiss is particular). 167 . but whatever is subordinate to the middle term may be inferred. And yet B does not belong to E. if A has been proved to to all or to some B. consequently it does not result through the syllogism that B does not belong to E.g. Again if E is included in C as in a whole. e. then D will be included in A.g. In the second figure it will be possible to infer only that which is subordinate to the conclusion. if the conclusion AB is proved through C. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. e. But it is possible to give another reason concerning those which are universal. whatever is subordinate to B or C must accept the predicate A: for if D is included in B as in a whole. e. we conclude that B belongs to no C. e. if the former are placed in the middle. But if A does not belong to some B. then B belongs to no A.g. then E will be included in A. and C is included in A.yield more than one conclusion. If then D is subordinate to C. if E is subordinate to A. if A belongs to no B and to all C. then B must belong to some A: and if A has been proved to belong to no B. the latter in the conclusion. Nothing can be inferred about that which is subordinate to C.

is made clear by this consideration. the other subordinate can be proved. or to be the one true. For what results necessarily is the conclusion. B must be true: otherwise it will turn out that the same thing both is and is not at the same time. it is necessary that A should not be when B is not. and two relations of subject and predicate or 168 . that something should necessarily result. If it is necessary that B should be when A is. just as in the universal syllogisms what is subordinate to the middle term is proved (as we saw) from a premiss which is not demonstrated: consequently either a conclusion is not possible in the case of universal syllogisms or else it is possible also in the case of particular syllogisms. but not through the preceding syllogism. when a single fact is given. true however only in respect to the fact. That which is subordinate to the conclusion cannot be proved. The conclusion is either true or false necessarily. only not through the syllogism. be supposed that it is possible. because A is laid down as a single term. First then that it is not possible to draw a false conclusion from true premisses. From true premisses it is not possible to draw a false conclusion. The reason cannot be established from false premisses: why this is so will be explained in the sequel. or to be false. and the means by which this comes about are at the least three terms. Similarly in the other figures. not to the reason. For that is not possible. 2 It is possible for the premisses of the syllogism to be true.something can be inferred about that which is subordinate to B. but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses. If then A is true. Let it not. the other false. But this is impossible.

if what belongs to none is assumed to belong to all. nor stone to any man. This is possible. So A is posited as one thing. neither let B belong to C. if it is taken as wholly false: but if the premiss is not taken as wholly false. But from what is false a true conclusion may be drawn. being two premisses taken together. Let A belong to no 169 . e. I mean by ‘wholly false’ the contrary of the truth. it does not matter which of the two is false. or if what belongs to all is assumed to belong to none. e. If then A is taken to belong to all B and B to all C. the conclusion will not be true.g. (3) But if one only of the premisses is false.premisses. (2) A similar proof may be given if each premiss is partially false. but if the premiss BC is wholly false. provided that this is not either of the premisses indifferently. e. whether both the premisses are false or only one. Similarly with the negative. but animal belongs to every man. The same holds good of negative syllogisms: it is not possible to prove a false conclusion from true premisses. and the other term is taken to belong to all of that to which it does not belong. though both the premisses are false the conclusion will be true. although A belongs to all B. consequently though both the premisses are false the conclusion is true: for every man is an animal.g. (1) Let A belong to the whole of C. and that B belongs to all that to which C belongs. if the same terms are taken and man is put as middle: for neither animal nor man belongs to any stone. AB. but to none of the Bs. animal belongs to no stone.g. If then it is true that A belongs to all that to which B belongs. For it is possible that neither A nor B should belong to any C.g. and this cannot be false: for then the same thing will belong and not belong at the same time. e. A will belong to all C. when the first premiss is wholly false. it is necessary that A should belong to all that to which C belongs. Consequently if one term is taken to belong to none of that to which it does belong. a true conclusion will be possible.

the wholly false premiss AB is also assumed. these being species of the same genus which are not subordinate one to the other: for animal belongs both to horse and to man. and B to all C. animal to some white thing. since A belongs to everything to which B belongs. the conclusion will be true. animal to every swan and to some white thing.B. If then one should assume that A belongs to no B. a true conclusion is possible. the conclusion cannot be true. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. Similarly there cannot be a true conclusion if A belongs to all B. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all C. but horse to no man. it is impossible that the conclusion should be true: for A belonged to none of the Cs. and B belonged to all C. For it is possible that A should 170 . Similarly if the statement AB is negative. that A belongs to nothing to which B belongs: here the conclusion must be false. e. that A belongs to all B.g. and the other premiss is true. For if A belongs to all C and to some B. and B to all C. whether affirmative or negative. then will belong to no C. It is clear then that when the first premiss is wholly false. and white to all snow. (5) But if the premiss AB. and if B belongs to all C. though B belongs to no C.g. and B to all C. but to no snow. since A belonged to nothing to which B belonged. is wholly true.g. which is assumed. but while the true premiss BC is assumed. viz. then if we take as premisses that A belongs to all B. e. a true syllogism will be possible: for nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to all C. viz. and the premiss AB is wholly false. For A will belong to all C. and B to all C. and B to all C. and white to every swan. e. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to no C. and the premiss BC is wholly false. (4) But if the premiss is not wholly false. If then the premiss BC which I take is true. and that B should belong to all C. although the premiss BC is wholly false. A will belong to all C truly: for every swan is an animal.

and the particular is false. and the other true.g. then the premiss BC is wholly false.g. but wisdom belongs to some instance of ‘speculative’. even so the conclusion may be true. (6) And if the premiss BC is not wholly false but in part only. animal belongs to every 171 . but not to some C. For it is possible that A should neither belong to any B nor to any C. and B to all C. and man to some footed things though not to all. the premiss BC true. but to some white thing. a genus to the species of another genus and its difference: for animal neither belongs to any wisdom nor to any instance of ‘speculative’. and it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. the conclusion will be true. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B and of C. and animal as first term. also when the first premiss is false in part.g. If then snow is taken as middle.g. and B to some C. and the conclusion true. and the other true. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B. nor does music belong to the art of healing. e. and when the first is true. A will belong to all C: and this ex hypothesi is true. and B to all C. and B to all C. e. e. and that B should not belong to any C. e. though B belongs to some C. In particular syllogisms it is possible when the first premiss is wholly false. (7) For nothing prevents A belonging to no B. that the conclusion should be true. and snow to some white thing. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative.g. but to some C. will belong to no C: and this ex hypothesi is true. and when both are false. while B belongs to some C. although B belongs to some C.belong neither to any B nor to any C. e. a genus to its species and difference: for animal belongs to every man and to every footed thing. and B to some C. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no B. animal belongs to no snow. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative: for it is possible that A should belong to the whole of B. a genus to species of another genus: for animal belongs neither to music nor to the art of healing.

g.g. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative.g. the a premiss AB will be partially false. consequently if man be taken as middle term and it is assumed that A belongs to no B but B belongs to some C. the conclusion may be true. Consequently if it should be assumed that A belongs to all B.man. then A will not belong to some C. (9) Again if the premiss AB is true. e. to prove the point. For it is possible that A should belong to no B. and B to some C. though swan belongs to no black thing. and the premiss BC is false. which ex hypothesi is true. e. and the conclusion true. and both are accidents of the same genus: for animal belongs to some white things and to some 172 . For the same terms will serve. and the premiss BC is false too. though B belongs to no C. and B to some C. although the statement BC is false. if B is the contrary of C. and in the same positions. and it is assumed that A belongs to no B. the conclusion will be true. If then A is assumed to belong to all B. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B and to some C. and beautiful belonging to something great.g. the conclusion will be true although the premiss AB is wholly false. and B belonging to some C. a genus to the species of another genus and to the accident of its own species: for animal belongs to no number and not to some white things. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative. And the premiss AB is true. the conclusion may be true. but does not follow some white. the premiss BC false. For nothing prevents A belonging to some B and to some C. but man belongs to some white. e. and number belongs to nothing white. animal to something beautiful and to something great. For nothing prevents A belonging both to B and to some C. e. (10) Also if the premiss AB is partially false. (If the premiss AB is false in part. and B to some C. while B belongs to no C. the conclusion may be true. If then number is taken as middle. while B belongs to no C. the premiss BC will be true. animal to every swan and to some black things. and not to some C.

black things. if both premisses are partially false. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B. e. a genus in relation to the species of another genus. though both premisses are false. but to some white things. and not to some C. For (1) if A belongs to no B and to all C. For it is possible that A may belong to no B and to some C. the conclusion will be true. For nothing prevents A belonging to the whole of B. the other wholly false (it does not matter which of the two premisses is false). then A does not belong to some C. e. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no B. and B to some C. when each is partially false. and B to some C. 3 In the middle figure it is possible in every way to reach a true conclusion through false premisses. animal to no stone and to every horse. and to the accident of its own species: for animal belongs to no number. e. the other partially true. then if the premisses are stated contrariwise and it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no 173 . Similarly also if the premiss AB is negative. if one is wholly false. (11) Also though both premisses are false the conclusion may be true. viz. while B belongs to no C. but white belongs to no black thing. whether the syllogisms are universal or particular. animal belongs to every swan. Similarly if the premiss AB is negative: for the same terms arranged in the same way will serve for the proof. when one is true. and number to nothing white. the conclusion will be true.g. but the premisses arc false. if one is quite true. and not to some black things. while B belongs to no C. and swan belongs to nothing black. the other partially false.g. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to some C.g. when both premisses are wholly false. The conclusion then is true.

For animal belongs to every horse and man. 174 . and white belongs to no pitch. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to all C. and the conclusion will be true whichever term the negative statement concerns. e. a genus to its co-ordinate species. e. the premiss AB is partially false. and the conclusion true. If then it is assumed that animal belongs to all of the one. while B belongs to no C. Similarly if A belongs to all B and to no C: for we shall have the same syllogism. and B to no C. the other wholly true. e. though white belongs to no raven. e. (3) Also if one premiss is partially false. but to no pitch. a true conclusion is possible.g. though white belongs to nothing black. and no man is a horse. Similarly if the negative statement is transposed: the proof can be made by means of the same terms. animal to some white things and to some black things. the other wholly true. For it is possible that A should belong to some B and to some C. the premiss AC wholly true. the one premiss will be wholly false. For nothing prevents A belonging to some B.g. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no C.g. though B belongs to no C. animal to some white things and to every raven. (2) Again if one premiss is wholly false.g. but not to C as a whole. but to no C. the negative wholly true. though B belongs to no C. though the premisses are wholly false they will yield a true conclusion. (4) And if both the premisses are partially false. but to the whole of C. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. and the conclusion is true. the premiss AB is partially false. Also if the affirmative premiss is partially false. animal belongs to some white things. the conclusion may be true.C. the other wholly true: for nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to all C. and none of the other. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B. the premiss AC is wholly true.

the particular premiss is true. the universal premiss is wholly false. It is clear also that our thesis holds in particular syllogisms. while B does not belong to some C. the premiss AB which is universal is wholly false. but man does not follow every footed thing. but does not belong to some C. but the particular false. e. animal to every man and to some white things. and does not belong to some white things. the particular false.g. e.g. Similarly if the premiss AB is affirmative: for it is possible that A should belong to no B. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some C. and lifeless will not belong to some white things. e. a genus in relation to its species and difference: for animal follows every man and footed things as a whole. e. but the conclusion is true. the premiss AC is true.g. For it is possible that should A belong both to B and to C as wholes. though B does not follow some C. Similarly. Similarly if the premiss which is stated universally is affirmative. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some C. Also a true conclusion is possible when the universal premiss is true. and the conclusion true. the proof can be made by means of the same terms. For nothing prevents A following neither B nor C at all. and the particular is false. though man will not belong to some white things. though B does not belong to some C. and the conclusion is true. 175 . Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B. and the conclusion is true. For (5) nothing prevents A belonging to all B and to some C. and number does not follow some lifeless things. and the universal premiss true. animal belongs to nothing lifeless. animal belongs to no number nor to anything lifeless. though B does not belong to some C.g. If then it is stated that A belongs to all B and not to some C. the universal premiss is true. and not to some C. the conclusion will be true. if the negative premiss is transposed.both premisses are partially false.

e. when one premiss is partly false. For (1) nothing prevents neither A nor B from belonging to any C.g.g. since it is possible that A should belong both to B and to C as wholes. e. and in every other way in which it is possible to alter the premisses. For it is possible that B should belong to no C. neither man nor footed follows anything lifeless. Consequently if it is assumed that B belongs to all C. though B does not follow some C. Similarly if one premiss is negative. when each is partly false. If then A is assumed to belong to the whole of B.g. while A belongs to some B. though science does not follow every man. alike when both premisses are wholly false. and A to no C. though B does not belong to some C. when one premiss is wholly true. For it is possible that A should follow no B and all C. but the conclusion is true. the other false. animal to every swan. the other wholly true.(6) It is clear too that though both premisses are false they may yield a true conclusion. the premisses will be wholly false. animal follows no science but every man. Similarly if the universal premiss is affirmative and the particular negative. and that should not belong to some B. the other affirmative. If then it is assumed that A and B belong to all C. A will not belong to some B: and the conclusion is true. black belongs to no swan. 176 . and not to follow some C. though the premisses are false. e. though man belongs to some footed things. and animal not to everything black. and vice versa. the premisses are both false. but the conclusion true. the premisses are false but the conclusion is true. 4 In the last figure a true conclusion may come through what is false. but A to all C. For if it is assumed that A belongs to no B and to some C.

white and beautiful belong to some animals. but A does not belong to C at all. and white does not belong to everything beautiful. e. the conclusion may be true. but the conclusion is true. For it is possible that both A and B should follow all C. Consequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no C. and the conclusion true. 177 . Similarly if the premiss AC is stated as negative. (3) Similarly if one of the premisses assumed is wholly false. and A from not belonging to C at all. the premiss BC will be wholly true. Consequently if it is assumed that A and B belong to every C. the premisses are partially false. the conclusion may be true. animal and white follow every swan. The same terms will serve for the proof. the conclusion may be true. If then it is stated that A and B belong to all C. For nothing prevents B from following all C. if one assumes that B belongs to the whole of C.g. and B from belonging. and white to some beautiful things. but the conclusion is true. e. while A does not belong to all B. and black to some animals. animal belongs to every swan. and the conclusion is true. though A does not belong to some B.g.g. to some C. the premiss AC is wholly false. the statement AC true. the premiss AC wholly false. white does not belong to some animals. beautiful belongs to some animals. Similarly if the statement BC is false.(2) Also if each premiss is partly false. though animal does not belong to everything white. Also if both the premisses assumed are affirmative. the premiss BC is wholly true. For nothing prevents both A and B from belonging to some C while A belongs to some B. e. For nothing prevents A from not belonging. the other wholly true. though A belongs to some B. Taking these then as terms. and B to all C. both premisses are partly false.g. Similarly if the premiss AC which is assumed is true: the proof can be made through the same terms. e. black to no swan.

and B to all C. biped belongs to every man. the premisses of the argument must be false. the other partly false. the premiss AC partly false.g. negative terms in negative. while A belongs to some B. it is possible that the conclusion should be true. and the premiss BC partly false. For it is possible that B should belong to all C. For the same terms must be taken as have been taken when the premisses are universal. whether one assumes that what belongs to none belongs to all or that what belongs to some belongs to all. For it makes no difference to the setting out of the terms. when they are so. that A should not belong to all B. but when the conclusion is true. beautiful not to every man. a true conclusion is possible: this can be proved. and A to some C. in every possible way. either all or some of them. if the same terms as before are transposed. the other premiss wholly true. Also the conclusion may be true if one premiss is negative. therefore it is assumed that B belongs to the whole of C. e. If then it is assumed that both A and B belong to the whole of C. and A to no C. and the conclusion is true. For if it is assumed that A belongs to no C. (5) It is clear also in the case of particular syllogisms that a true conclusion may come through what is false. Again since it has been proved that if A belongs to no C and B to some C. it is possible that A should not belong to some C. it is not necessary that the 178 . the premiss AC is wholly true. and beautiful to some bipeds. and the premiss BC is partly false. positive terms in positive syllogisms. it is clear that if the premiss AC is wholly true. the conclusion true. the conclusion may be true. It is clear then that if the conclusion is false. the other affirmative. The same applies to negative statements. For since it is possible that B should belong to the whole of C. and A to some C. Similarly if of the premisses assumed AC is true and BC partly false. the premiss BC is wholly true. the negative premiss is partly false. and.(4) Again if one premiss is wholly true.

i. should be great. the former will not be either. then if the latter is not. it is not necessary that the former should be. The reason is that when two things are so related to one another. when A is not white.g. that the conclusion may none the less be true. A) should not be.premisses should be true. that the former (viz. If then when this is not white B must be great. though no part of the syllogism is true. either one or all. For whenever since this. And whenever it is necessary. by converting one of the premisses simply and inferring the premiss which was assumed in the original syllogism: e. it is necessary that B should be great. that it is impossible that B should necessarily be great since A is white and that B should necessarily be great since A is not white.) For if B is not great. suppose it has been necessary to prove that A belongs to all C. it necessarily results that if B is not great. A. just as if it were proved through three terms. 5 Circular and reciprocal proof means proof by means of the conclusion. I mean. since one of two things is. If then B is not great A cannot be white. B. it is necessary. But it is impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by the being and by the not-being of the same thing. it results that if B is not great. and it has been proved through B. but if the latter is. that if the one is. for example. But if.e. (But this is impossible. yet it is possible. the other necessarily is. that the other should be. is white it is necessary that that. then it is necessary if is white that C should not be white. but it is not necessitated. it is great. suppose that A should now be proved to belong to B by assuming that A 179 . and since B is great that C should not be white. B itself is great. A will necessarily not be white. if the latter is not.

the proof is not circular: for neither of the propositions assumed is the same as before: if one of the accepted terms is taken as middle. if A and B and C are convertible with one another. In no other way is reciprocal proof possible. But it is necessary to prove both the premiss CB. one of the premisses from which the syllogism results must be undemonstrated: for it is not possible to demonstrate through these terms that the third belongs to the middle or the middle to the first. viz. and A to all B. If then it is assumed that C belongs to all B. If another term is taken as middle. and A is assumed to belong to C. it is possible to demonstrate everything reciprocally. viz. and C must belong to A. and similarly the proposition BC through the conclusion and the premiss AB converted. If the terms are not convertible. and again the proposition AB through the conclusion and the premiss BC converted. In both these syllogisms the premiss CA has been assumed without being demonstrated: the other premisses had ex hypothesi been proved. both the premisses assumed have been proved. Again if it is assumed that C belongs to all A. and B to all A. all the premisses will have been proved reciprocally. which was the conclusion of the first syllogism. Consequently if we succeed in demonstrating this premiss. and C to B – so A belongs to B: but in the first syllogism the converse was assumed. that A belongs to B. Suppose the proposition AC has been demonstrated through B as middle term. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all C. Or suppose it is necessary to prove that B belongs to C. e.belongs to C. C must belong to all B. that B belongs to C. we shall have a syllogism relating B to A.g. only one of the premisses of the first syllogism can be assumed in the second: for if both of them are taken the same conclusion as before will result: but it must be different. and B to belong to A but the converse was assumed in the earlier syllogism. and the premiss BA: for we have used these alone without demonstrating them. If the terms are convertible. It is clear then that only if the terms are convertible is 180 . and C to all A.

Clearly it is impossible to demonstrate the universal premiss: for what is universal is proved through propositions which are universal. In particular syllogisms it is not possible to demonstrate the universal premiss through the other propositions. But it turns out in these also that we use for the demonstration the very thing that is being proved: for C is proved of B. Suppose that A has been proved of some C through B. If again it is necessary to prove that A belongs to none of the Bs (which was previously assumed) A must belong to no C. But we must assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which longs. but the conclusion is not universal. Let B belong to all C.circular and reciprocal demonstration possible (if the terms are not convertible. so that we use the conclusion for the demonstration. Consequently each of the three propositions has been made a conclusion. but the particular premiss can be demonstrated. and deduce the remaining premiss. Further a syllogism cannot be made at all if the other premiss is converted: for the result is that both premisses are particular. and C to all B: thus the previous premiss is reversed. the matter stands as we said above). the proposition AB must no longer be converted as before: for the premiss ‘B belongs to no A’ is identical with the premiss ‘A belongs to no B’. In negative syllogisms reciprocal proof is as follows. and this is circular demonstration. Let A belong to none of the Cs (which was the previous conclusion) and assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which A belongs. and B of by assuming that C is said of and C is proved of A through these premisses. If it is necessary to prove that B belongs to C. It is necessary then that B should belong to all C. to assume the conclusion and the converse of one of the premisses. But the particular premiss may be proved. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A and the 181 . and the proof must start from the conclusion and the other premiss. and A to none of the Bs: we conclude that A belongs to none of the Cs.

e ‘B belongs to some of that to some of which A does not belong’: otherwise no syllogism results because the particular premiss is negative. it is not possible to prove the universal premiss. but if another premiss is assumed in addition. it is necessary that A should belong to no C: for we get the second figure. but a negative proposition may be proved. But if the premiss AB was negative. But if the syllogism not universal. we shall have the first figure. Let A belong to all B. and the other affirmative. Let A belong to all B. Through the conclusion. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A. and not to all C: the conclusion is BC. if the proposition AB is converted as in the universal syllogism. But if the syllogism is negative. B will belong to some C: for we obtain the first figure and A is middle. 6 In the second figure it is not possible to prove an affirmative proposition in this way. and to no C: we conclude that B belongs to no C. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A. with B as middle. a syllogism will be possible. An affirmative proposition is not proved because both premisses of the new syllogism are not affirmative (for the conclusion is negative) but an affirmative proposition is (as we saw) proved from premisses which are both affirmative.conclusion is retained. For C belongs to all A and B to no C. i. for the reason given above. therefore. but the particular premiss can be proved whenever the universal statement is affirmative. But it is possible to prove the particular premiss. A will not belong to some C. we get no syllogism. the universal premiss cannot be proved. The negative is proved as follows. B 182 . but not to all C. and one premiss. consequently B belongs to no A: neither then does A belong to B. for the same reason as we gave above.

And yet it is necessary. But the proof will proceed as in the universal syllogisms. and A to some B. it is not possible to prove them reciprocally: for that which is universal is proved through statements which are universal. the other particular. But if B belongs to all C. when both premisses are taken universally. it will be possible to prove the proposition AC. that B should belong to some C. But if one premiss is universal. the premiss AC will not be demonstrated by the conversion of AB: for it turns out that either both or one of the premisses is negative. but that B belongs to some C has not been proved. But it is not the same that this should belong to that. and that to this: but we must assume besides that if this belongs to some of that. that belongs to some of this. consequently a syllogism will not be possible. But if the universal premiss is negative. if it is assumed that A belongs to some of that to some of which B does not belong. so that it is clear that it is not possible at all to prove through this figure the universal premiss. impossible. if C belongs to some B. but the conclusion in this figure is always particular. when it is assumed that C belongs to all B. But if this is assumed the syllogism no longer results from the conclusion and the other premiss. and the universal concerns the minor extreme. When both the premisses assumed are affirmative. proof of the latter will sometimes be possible. and A to some C. Let A belong to all C and B to some C: the conclusion is the statement AB. sometimes not. 7 In the third figure. it has been proved that C belongs to some B. For if C belongs to all B and A 183 . but when it concerns the other extreme.being middle. proof will be possible. If then it is assumed that C belongs to all A.

In no other way is it possible by converting the universal premiss to prove the other: for in no other way can a syllogism be formed.to some B. B being middle. In the middle figure. viz. and A not to some C: the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. If then it is assumed further that C belongs to all B.g. 184 . Let B belong to all C. the other premiss can be proved. if it is assumed that that belongs to some of that. B being middle. and B to some C: the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. the other premiss is not except as before. if the conclusion is negative through the last. It is clear then that in the first figure reciprocal proof is made both through the third and through the first figure – if the conclusion is affirmative through the first. to some of which this does not belong. but when particular through the second and the last. it is necessary that C should belong to some of the Bs. And whenever one premiss is affirmative the other negative. If then it is assumed that C belongs to some of that to some of which does not belong. But when the negative premiss is universal. it is necessary that A should belong to some C. proof is possible through the second figure and through the first. and the affirmative is universal. it is necessary that A should not belong to some C. In the third figure all proofs are made through itself. For it is assumed that that belongs to all of that to none of which this belongs. e. when the syllogism is universal. It is clear also that in the third figure and in the middle figure those syllogisms which are not made through those figures themselves either are not of the nature of circular proof or are imperfect. if A belongs to no C.

and of ‘to some’ to ‘to none’. that the other premiss should be destroyed. It makes a difference whether the conclusion is converted into its contradictory or into its contrary. the conclusion also must stand. For one premiss is particular. Let the syllogism be affirmative. not to no B at all. Then if A belongs not to all C. the syllogisms will be contradictory and not universal. but to all B. Then if it is assumed that A belongs to all C. For the same syllogism does not result whichever form the conversion takes. but not to all B. so that the conclusion also will be particular. and B to all C. And if A belongs to no C. This will be made clear by the sequel. B will belong to none of the Cs. and let it be converted as stated. by contrary opposition I mean the opposition of ‘to all’ to ‘to none’. A will belong. B will belong to no C. and to no B. By contradictory opposition I mean the opposition of ‘to all’ to ‘not to all’. Suppose it has been proved that A belongs to no C through B. In a word it is not possible to refute universally by conversion the premiss which concerns the major extreme: for the refutation always proceeds through the third since it is necessary to take both premisses in reference to the minor extreme.8 To convert a syllogism means to alter the conclusion and make another syllogism to prove that either the extreme cannot belong to the middle or the middle to the last term. For if it should stand. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. but to all B. And if A and B belong to all C. if the conclusion has been changed into its opposite and one of the premisses stands. Suppose that A been proved of C. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no C. A will belong to some B: but in the original premiss it belonged to no B. and of ‘to some’ to ‘not to some’. If the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. For (as we saw) the universal is not proved through the last figure. B 185 . For it is necessary. through B as middle term.

as was originally assumed. and B to some C. but B belongs to some of the Cs. But the original premiss is not yet refuted: for it is possible that B should belong to some C. but to all B. For if A does not belong to some C. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for if it should be assumed that A belongs to all C. A will belong not to all B. Suppose that A has been proved of some C. but when it is converted into its contrary. and to no B. then B will not belong to some C. The proof is the same as before. conversion lacks universality. but – not to some C. But neither can be refuted if the conclusion is converted into its contrary. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. but no refutation at all. And if A belongs to some C. In particular syllogisms when the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. 9 In the second figure it is not possible to refute the premiss which concerns the major extreme by establishing something 186 . The universal premiss AB cannot be affected by a syllogism at all: for if A does not belong to some of the Cs. but B belongs to all C. B will belong. A will belong to some B. as in the universal syllogisms. And if A belongs not to all C. neither of the premisses is universal.will belong not to all C. For if A belongs to some C. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no C. not to no C at all. For the result is no longer. both premisses may be refuted. and should not belong to some C. Thus both premisses are refuted. both premisses are refuted: but if the assumption is that A belongs to some C. neither. B will belong to no C. refutation in which the conclusion reached by O. and B to all C. neither premiss is refuted. A will not belong to some B: and if A belongs to no C. but to all B.

whichever form the conversion of the conclusion may take. and A to no B. and A to no C. Consequently the proposition AB is not refuted.contrary to it. The other premiss can be refuted in a manner similar to the conversion: I mean. If B belongs to all C. A similar proof can be given if the premisses are transposed in respect of their quality. For if B belongs to some C. Let A belong to all B and to no C: conclusion BC. if the conclusion of the first syllogism is converted into its contrary. Suppose that A belongs to no B. and the statement AB stands. If then it is assumed that B belongs to some C. Again if 187 . when the conclusion is converted into its contrary neither premiss can be refuted. But if the conclusion BC is converted into its contradictory. as also happened in the first figure. A will belong to all C. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all C. and A to all B. the premiss AB will be refuted as before. the contradictory. so that the syllogism results in the contradictory of the minor premiss. then A will not belong to some B. But if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. For if B belongs to all C. Again if B belongs to some C. both premisses can be refuted. the conclusion of the refutation will be the contrary of the minor premiss of the first. Again if B belongs to some C and A to some C. if into its contradictory. since the first figure is produced. and the proposition AB stands. For the conclusion of the refutation will always be in the third figure. But the original statement has not been refuted: for it is possible that A should belong to some C and also not to some C. A will belong to some C. A will belong to no C: but it was assumed to belong to some C. and A to no C. no syllogism will be possible: for neither of the premisses taken is universal. If the syllogism is particular. and in this figure (as we saw) there is no universal syllogism. then A belongs not to all B: the figure is the last. AC by its contradictory. both premisses can be refuted. and to some C: the conclusion is BC. the premiss.’ if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. the conclusion will be that A does not belong to some C.

neither of the premisses can be refuted in any of the syllogisms. and to all C. and the premisses being universal. but when the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. B will belong to no C. If then it is assumed that A does not belong to some B. A will not belong to some C: if A belongs to no B. Similarly if the original syllogism is negative. For either both premisses arrived at by the conversion must be particular. and to C. C being taken as middle. Suppose it has been proved that A belongs to some B. no syllogism is formed about A and C. and B to some C. but B belongs to all C. Whenever then the contrary of the 188 . as we saw. But if the conclusion is converted into its contradictory. both the premisses can be refuted.B belongs to all C and A to some C. Nor if A does not belong to some B. For if A belongs to no B. will a syllogism be possible about B and C. or the universal premiss must refer to the minor extreme. then A belongs to no C: again if A belongs to no B. AC being negative: for it was thus that. B belongs to no C. A will belong to some B. But we found that no syllogism is possible thus either in the first or in the middle figure. A similar proof can be given if the premisses are not universal. The same proof can be given if the universal statement is affirmative. For if A belongs to no B. BC being affirmative. but belongs to all C. a syllogism could be made. both premisses may be refuted and in all the moods. and B to all C. Suppose it has been proved that A does not belong to some B. And similarly if one of the premisses is not universal. 10 In the third figure when the conclusion is converted into its contrary.

it results that A belongs to some C: but it was supposed to belong to no C. and to no C. the premiss which concerns the major is always refuted through the first figure. In the second figure syllogisms proceed through the first and the last figures.conclusion is assumed a syllogism will not be possible. But when the contradictory of the conclusion is assumed. and B to all C. was a syllogism possible concerning B and C. then B belongs to no C: but it was supposed to belong to all C. Therefore the premisses are not refuted. If A belongs to some B and B to some C. no syllogism results: nor yet if A belongs to some B. is obtained. A similar proof is possible if the premisses are not universal. when a result contrary to the premiss. A belongs to all C: but A was supposed originally to belong to no C. and to no C. Again if A belongs to all B. Nor. From what has been said it is clear how a syllogism results in each figure when the conclusion is converted. For if A belongs to all B. 189 . then B belongs to no C: but it was assumed to belong to some C. they are refuted. If then A belongs to all B. and when a result contradictory to the premiss. and to no C. if A belongs to some B. and the premiss which concerns the minor extreme is alway refuted through the middle figure. Again if A belongs to all B. the other premiss particular and affirmative. and B to C. It is clear that in the first figure the syllogisms are formed through the middle and the last figures. in the other way they are not. the premiss which concerns the major extreme through the last. and B to some C. the premiss which concerns the major through the last figure. and to no C. and the premiss which concerns the minor extreme is always refuted through the first figure. In the third figure the refutation proceeds through the first and the middle figures. For if A belongs to some B. no syllogism is possible (as we saw) about A and C. For AC becomes universal and negative. the premiss which concerns the minor through the middle figure. Thus in one way the premisses are refuted.

but to all C (which was admitted to be true). The terms are alike in both. then if it is supposed that A does not belong to all B or belongs to no B.11 It is clear then what conversion is. but because it is clear that it is true. when the premiss BD is assumed as well we shall prove syllogistically what is false. For it resembles conversion. A belongs to no D. no syllogism results whichever term the assumed premiss concerns. or that B belongs to all D. how it is effected in each figure. viz. it can be made in all the figures. but a reduction to the impossible takes place not because the contradictory has been agreed to already. excepting the universal affirmative. For if A belongs to no B. that C belongs to all A. and B belongs to all D. If then it is supposed that A does not belong to all B. it follows that C belongs to no B or not to all B. but not in the first. and the premisses of both are taken in the same way. but not the problem proposed. but if it is supposed that A belongs to no B. The syllogism per impossibile is proved when the contradictory of the conclusion stated and another premiss is assumed. and what syllogism results. Similarly in the other figures: for whatever moods admit of conversion admit also of the reduction per impossibile. Suppose that A belongs not to all B. C being middle. For example if A belongs to all B. differing only in this: conversion takes place after a syllogism has been formed and both the premisses have been taken. thus we get the first figure. Let this be impossible: it is 190 . which is proved in the middle and third figures. All the problems can be proved per impossibile in all the figures. or to no B. and take besides another premiss concerning either of the terms. But this is impossible: consequently the supposition is false: its contradictory then is true.

Suppose that A belongs to all B. But if the premiss CA is assumed as well. no syllogism will be possible. we shall have a syllogism and an impossible conclusion. e. and let it have been assumed that B belongs to all or to some C. But if the other premiss assumed relates to A. It is necessary then that C should belong to some B.g. But the particular affirmative and the universal and particular negatives can all be proved. But this is impossible. so that the supposition is false: in that case it is true that A belongs to no B. It is necessary then that C should belong to all B. we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is impossible. but the problem in hand is not proved. so that it is false that A belongs to all B. But this is impossible (for let it be true and clear that A belongs to all C): consequently if this is false. Suppose that A belongs to no B. But the universal affirmative is not necessarily true if the universal negative is false. it is necessary that A should belong to some B. But let this be impossible. But if the premiss assumed concerns B. We may proceed in the same way if the proposition CA has been taken as negative. nor does it do so when it is supposed that A does not belong to all B. no syllogism will be possible. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all A. no syllogism results. Then it is necessary that A should belong to no C or not to all C. Again suppose that A belongs to some B. But we have not yet shown it to be necessary that A belongs to no B. but the 191 . and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all A. if it does not belong to all B. Consequently it is clear that the universal affirmative cannot be proved in the first figure per impossibile.false then A belongs to no B. Clearly then we must suppose the contradictory. Nor can a conclusion be drawn when the contrary of the conclusion is supposed. Similarly if the other premiss taken concerns B. that A does not belong to some B. If the contrary is supposed.

but that it belongs to no B. It is clear then that not the contrary but the contradictory ought to be supposed in all the syllogisms. for the original conclusion was that A belongs to some B. If the hypothesis is that A belongs not to all but to some B. then C will belong to some B. the affirmation must be true. since it is impossible to draw a false conclusion from true premisses: but in fact it is true: for A belongs to some B. and does not belong to some B. But in neither way does it suit to maintain the contrary: for it is not necessary 192 . consequently it is true that A belongs to no B. then if it is proved that the negation does not hold. the claim that the negation is true will be generally accepted. For if A belongs to some B. it is false that A belongs to some B. nothing is proved. and C to all A. the hypothesis is false. Further the impossible does not result from the hypothesis: for then the hypothesis would be false. Again if it is not admitted that the affirmation is true. The same results if the original proposition CA was negative: for thus also we get a syllogism. but that it belongs to all B. the demonstration of both will be identical. so that if this is impossible. Similarly if the other premiss assumed concerns B. then C belongs to all B. But if this is proved. it is not proved that A belongs not to all B. But if the negative proposition concerns B. we must suppose that it belongs to all B: for if A belongs to all B. Similarly if we should be proving that A does not belong to some B: for if ‘not to belong to some’ and ‘to belong not to all’ have the same meaning. For if of everything one or other of two contradictory statements holds good. and the claim we make is one that will be generally accepted. To prove that A does not belong to all B. If then this is impossible. For thus we shall have necessity of inference. Therefore it is the contradictory that we must suppose.hypothesis is not refuted. Consequently we must not suppose that A belongs to some B. and C to all A. the truth is refuted as well.

that if the universal negative is false. It is true then that A belongs to all B. It is necessary then that C should not belong to some B. the universal affirmative should be true. it does not follow that it is true that A belongs to all B. suppose that A belongs to no B. 193 . C will belong to no B. and let A belong to no C. For if A belongs to no B. A must belong to some B. but to all C. Again suppose that A belongs to some B. and let A belong to all C. This is impossible. Suppose that A does not belong to all B. 12 It is clear then that in the first figure all problems except the universal affirmative are proved per impossibile. But though this is false. we shall have the same results as in the first figure. so that it is false that A belongs to no B. When A belongs to some B. C will not belong to all B. But originally it belonged to all B. But if the contrary is supposed. If then A belongs not to all B. nor is it generally accepted that if the one is false the other is true. and to all C. Consequently. But this is impossible (for suppose it to be clear that C belongs to all B): consequently the hypothesis is false. But in the middle and the last figures this also is proved. It is necessary then that C should belong to no B. if this is impossible. and let it have been assumed that A belongs to all C. But if it is supposed that A does not belong to some B. we shall have a syllogism and a result which is impossible: but the problem in hand is not proved. consequently the hypothesis is false: A then will belong to no B.

and C to some B. suppose it does belong to all B. Suppose that A does not belong to some B. But this we assumed not to be so. But this hypothesis must be made if we are prove that A belongs not to all B. It is necessary then that C should belong to no B. But if it is supposed that A belongs to no B. But ex hypothesi it belongs to no C. so that it is false that A belongs to some B. suppose A belongs to some B. it is false that A does not belong to some B. this hypothesis must be made. the problem is not proved. so that it is true that A belongs to all B. Then it is necessary that A should belong to some C. A will belong not to all C. But this is impossible: so that it is true that A does not belong to all B. then A belongs to some C. it is true that A belongs to some B. 13 Similarly they can all be formed in the last figure. 194 . we shall have the same results as before. For if A belongs to all B and C to some B. But to prove that A belongs to some B. It is clear then that all the syllogisms can be formed in the middle figure. we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is impossible: but the problem in hand is not proved: for if the contrary is supposed. When A belongs to no B. and to no C.When A does not belong to an B. we shall have the same result as before. but C belongs to all B: then A does not belong to some C. If A belongs to no B. If then this is impossible. But if it is supposed that A belongs to all B. so it is false that A belongs to all B. If then this is false. and let it have been assumed that C belongs to all B. If however it is assumed that A belongs to some B. But in that case it is true that A belongs not to all B.

Both. are proved in a way. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the last figure. Also in the ostensive proof it is not necessary that the conclusion should be known. along with the contradictory of the original conclusion. if affirmative in the last. but the latter takes the premisses from which the syllogism starts. whatever the problem may be. the truth will be found in the first. the former takes one of these. or not to all B. Suppose that A has been proved to belong to no B. if affirmative in first. take two premisses that are admitted.It is clear then that in all the syllogisms which proceed per impossibile the contradictory must be assumed. whereas ostensive proof starts from admitted positions. if negative in the middle. the truth will be found in the first and middle figures. if negative in the middle. the method is the same in both cases. And it is plain that in the middle figure an affirmative conclusion. through the first figure. nor that one should suppose beforehand that it is true or not: in the other it is necessary to suppose beforehand that it is not true. the truth will be found in the middle or the last figure. and in the last figure a universal conclusion. It makes no difference whether the conclusion is affirmative or negative. Everything which is concluded ostensively can be proved per impossibile. through the same terms. 14 Demonstration per impossibile differs from ostensive proof in that it posits what it wishes to refute by reduction to a statement admitted to be false. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. indeed. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the first figure. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the middle figure. and the original premisses that C belongs to all A and to 195 . and that which is proved per impossibile can be proved ostensively.

If the syllogism is negative. but proof has been given that A does not belong to some B. and the original premisses that A belongs to all C. Similarly too. But this is the middle figure. and the original premisses are that C belongs to all A but not to all B. Then the hypothesis must have been that A 196 . The hypothesis here is that is that A belongs to no B. and C belongs to some B: for thus we get the first figure. and the original premisses that B belongs to all C. For thus the syllogism was made and the impossible conclusion reached. the original premisses that A belongs to no C. Again suppose it has been proved in the middle figure that A belongs to all B. we may infer in the same way. we have the first figure. But if A belongs to all C. The hypothesis is that A belongs to all B.no B. Again suppose it has been proved in the third figure that A belongs to all B. so that the first figure results. But if A and B belong to all C. Similarly if it has been proved that A belongs to some B: for the hypothesis then must have been that A belongs to no B. and the original premisses that A belongs to no C. the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. Again suppose it has been proved that A belongs to some B. if C belongs to all A and to no B. For the hypothesis is that A belongs to all B. and C to all B. and C to some B. Then the hypothesis must have been that A belongs not to all B. and the original premisses that A belongs to all C. If the syllogism is not universal. we have the last figure. and A either to all or to some C: for in this way we shall get what is impossible. And it is clear from these premisses that A belongs to no B. Similarly if has been proved not to belong to all B. and C to all B: for thus we shall get what is impossible. Similarly if B or A should be assumed to belong to some C. and C to all B. And it is clear from these premisses that A must belong to some B. if the premiss CA should be negative: for thus also we have the middle figure.

the hypothesis must have been that A belongs to some B. so that we obtain immediately the figures through which each problem will be solved. The hypothesis will then be that A belongs to all B. and the original premisses that C belongs to no A and to all B. If the syllogism is negative. per impossibile and ostensively. and A to all C. and the original premisses that C belongs to all B. and in what figure this is not possible. For the syllogisms become identical with those which are obtained by means of conversion. and the original premisses that C belongs to some B. Similarly if the demonstration is not universal. and it is not possible to separate one method from the other. will be made clear in this way. whenever the contradictory of the conclusion of the ostensive syllogism is taken as a premiss. and A belongs to all C.belongs not to all B. universal affirmative to universal negative. It is clear then that it is possible through the same terms to prove each of the problems ostensively as well. And the original premisses form the first figure. Similarly if the demonstration establishes a particular proposition: the hypothesis then must have been that A belongs to no B. i. 15 In what figure it is possible to draw a conclusion from premisses which are opposed. It is clear then that every thesis can be proved in both ways. Verbally four kinds of opposition are possible. the premisses that C belongs to no A and to some B: and this is the middle figure. Similarly it will be possible if the syllogisms are ostensive to reduce them ad impossibile in the terms which have been taken. particular 197 .e. and this is the middle figure. for thus we shall get what is impossible. viz. universal affirmative to particular negative.

and affirmatively of the other. Again. and B is science. Let A stand for good. In the first figure no syllogism whether affirmative or negative can be made out of opposed premisses: no affirmative syllogism is possible because both premisses must be affirmative. ‘no science is good’. This syllogism differs from the preceding because the relations between the terms are reversed: before. Similarly if one premiss is not universal: for the middle term is always that which is stated negatively of one extreme. one has assumed that a particular science is supposition. and no science is good. ‘every science is good’. the other negative: no negative syllogism is possible because opposites affirm and deny the same predicate of the same subject. now it concerns C. and it is affirmed of something else: but such premisses are not opposed. e. the others I call contradictories. Of the genuine opposites I call those which are universal contraries. the affirmative statement concerned B. the universal affirmative and the universal negative. A belongs to all B and to no C. If then one assumes that every science is good. C medicine. let B and C stand for science. for A belongs to all B but to no C. In the middle figure a syllogism can be made both oLcontradictories and of contraries. so that a particular science will not be a science.g. but opposites are. so that B belongs to no C: no science then is a science. a particular science will not be a science if A belongs to all C but to no B. Similarly if after taking ‘every science is good’ one took ‘the science of medicine is not good’. Consequently it is possible that 198 .affirmative to universal negative. and particular affirmative to particular negative: but really there are only three: for the particular affirmative is only verbally opposed to the particular negative. and the middle term in the first figure is not predicated of both extremes. but one thing is denied of it. the one affirmative. and A supposition: for after taking ‘no science is supposition’.

For if some medicine is science and again no medicine is science. Let B and C stand for science. or to assume it in the way suggested in the Topics. Similarly if the premiss BA is not assumed universally. This does not usually escape notice.contradictories may lead to a conclusion. We must recognize that it is possible to take opposites in the way we said. or particular affirmative and universal negative. it results that some science is not science. or to all C and to no B. not to all of the other. Otherwise it is impossible: for the premisses cannot anyhow be either contraries or contradictories. The premisses are contrary if the terms are taken universally. it follows that opposite statements may be assumed as premisses in six ways. or universal affirmative and particular negative. So it is clear in how many ways and in what figures a 199 . e. for the reason given in reference to the first figure. so that a particular science will not be a science. viz. In the third figure an affirmative syllogism can never be made out of opposite premisses. Similarly in the third figure. we may have either universal affirmative and negative. here too the relation between the terms may be reversed. A may belong to all B and to no C. though not always or in every mood. ‘all science is good’ and ‘no science is good’ or ‘some science is not good’. If then one should assume that all medicine is science and that no medicine is science. but a negative syllogism is possible whether the terms are universal or not. Since there are three oppositions to affirmative statements. or to all of the one. if one is particular. they are contradictory. and the relations between the terms may be reversed. But it is possible to establish one part of a contradiction through other premisses. he has assumed that B belongs to all A and C to no A. but only if the terms subordinate to the middle are such that they are either identical or related as whole to part.g. A for medicine.

or we must argue from two syllogisms. is it possible that the premisses should be really contrary. e. or anything of that sort unless a self-contradictory premiss is at once assumed.g. A man may not reason syllogistically at all..syllogism can be made by means of premisses which are opposed. e. It is evident also that in fallacious reasonings nothing prevents a contradiction to the hypothesis from resulting. as was said before. Either we must introduce the contradiction by an additional assumption. or he 200 . that every science is supposition. it is not odd. assuming. and then assuming ‘Medicine is a science. if we assume such premisses we shall get a result that contradicts our hypothesis. and we proceed ‘man is an animal’. but this happens in many ways.g. if something is odd. e. as has been said before. For the syllogism is always contrary to the fact. In no other way than this. but none of it is supposition’ (which is the mode in which refutations are made).g. if a thing is good. that it is not an animal because the syllogism springs out of a contradiction and the terms presupposed are either identical or related as whole and part. it is proved that it is not good. For the syllogism owed its contrariety to its contradictory premisses.g. But we must recognize that contraries cannot be inferred from a single syllogism in such a way that we conclude that what is not good is good. ‘every animal is white and not white’. 16 To beg and assume the original question is a species of failure to demonstrate the problem proposed. if an animal. but it is not possible if the premisses are opposed. It is clear too that from false premisses it is possible to draw a true conclusion. e.

Now begging the question is none of these: but since we get to know some things naturally through themselves. For one might equally well prove that A belongs to B through those terms if they are convertible. not the method of demonstrating. it is the fact that they are not that prevents such a demonstration. for demonstration proceeds from what is more certain and is prior. So it turns out that those who reason thus merely say a particular thing is. if A should be proved through B. and if one should assume that A does belong to B. This is what those persons do who suppose that they are constructing parallel straight lines: for they fail to see that they are assuming facts which it is impossible to demonstrate unless the parallels exist. then he 201 . or he may establish the antecedent by means of its consequents. and also whether A belongs to B. it is also possible to make a transition to other things which would naturally be proved through the thesis proposed. what is subordinate to them through something else). then he begs the original question. But if they are not convertible. and other things by means of something else (the first principles through themselves. But if one were to make the conversion. and B through C.g.may argue from premisses which are less known or equally unknown. If then it is uncertain whether A belongs to C. If however B is so related to C that they are identical. if it is: in this way everything will be selfevident. e. or the one belongs to the other. though it was natural that C should be proved through A: for it turns out that those who reason thus are proving A by means of itself. But that is impossible. or if they are plainly convertible. but it is evident that he is not demonstrating: for what is as uncertain as the question to be answered cannot be a principle of a demonstration. whenever a man tries to prove what is not self-evident by means of itself. it is not yet clear whether he begs the original question. and demonstrate it through them. This may be done by assuming what is in question at once. the original question is begged.

this being as uncertain as the question whether A belongs to C. if the syllogism is affirmative. though. If however A and B are identical either because they are convertible or because A follows B. either because predicates which are identical belong to the same subject. If the syllogism is negative. proving that which is not self-evident by means of itself. the question may be begged in the middle and third figures in both ways. viz. and both premisses do not beg the question indifferently (in a similar way the question may be begged in the middle figure). the question is begged when identical predicates are denied of the same subject. but no demonstration is made. only in the third and first figures. If then begging the question is proving what is not self-evident by means of itself. Similarly if he should assume that B belongs to C. In scientific demonstrations the question is begged when the terms are really related in the manner described. then the question is begged for the same reason as before.would be doing what we have described and effecting a reciprocal proof with three propositions. because the terms in negative syllogisms are not convertible. in other words failing to prove when the failure is due to the thesis to be proved and the premiss through which it is proved being equally uncertain. the question is not yet begged. For we have explained the meaning of begging the question. or because the same predicate belongs to subjects which are identical. in dialectical arguments when they are according to common opinion so related. 202 .

when the syllogism is concluded in spite of the refutation of this position. but that is not possible in ostensive proofs: since if an assumption is refuted. It is clear then that the expression ‘false cause’ can only be used in the case of a reductio ad impossibile. it cannot be objected that the syllogism does not depend on the assumption laid down. B to C. for here what one denies is not assumed as a premiss. and it should be false that B 203 . as we have explained in the Topics. and C to D. but urge that something false has been assumed in the earlier parts of the argument.g. if it is laid down that A belongs to B. Another case is where the impossible conclusion is connected with the hypothesis. and so establish a reductio ad impossibile: for Zeno’s false theorem has no connexion at all with the original assumption. if a man. but does not result from it. to rebut the proposition which was being proved by the reduction. For to put that which is not the cause as the cause.g. that the conclusion results indifferently whether the hypothesis is made or not. is made primarily in the case of a reductio ad impossibile.17 The objection that ‘this is not the reason why the result is false’. wishing to prove that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side. The most obvious case of the irrelevance of an assumption to a conclusion which is false is when a syllogism drawn from middle terms to an impossible conclusion is independent of the hypothesis. and when the original hypothesis is so related to the impossible conclusion. For we use the expression ‘false cause’. a syllogism can no longer be drawn in reference to it. should try to prove Zeno’s theorem that motion is impossible. is just this: e. nor will he use the formula in the case of an ostensive proof. which we frequently make in argument. Further when anything is refuted ostensively by the terms ABC. e. For unless a man has contradicted this proposition he will not say. ‘False cause’. This may happen whether one traces the connexion upwards or downwards.

when one traces the connexion downwards. the impossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is predicate in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that A should belong to D. in the sense that if something else were supposed the impossibility would result. since it is not perhaps absurd that the same false result should follow from several 204 . the false conclusion does not result on account of the assumption.g. the same impossibility results through the remaining premisses. the impossible conclusion would still stand. and that K belongs to C and C to D. the impossible conclusion will disappear if B is eliminated. It is clear then that when the impossibility is not related to the original terms. Or perhaps even so it may sometimes be independent. suppose that A belongs to B. though the original hypothesis were eliminated.belongs to D: for if we eliminated A and assumed all the same that B belongs to C and C to D. E to A and F to E. But the impossible conclusion ought to be connected with the original terms: in this way it will depend on the hypothesis. In this way too the impossible conclusion would result. the false conclusion would not depend on the original hypothesis. e. it would appear to be independent of that assumption. Consequently since the impossibility results whether the first assumption is suppressed or not. Or again trace the connexion upwards. Or perhaps we ought not to understand the statement that the false conclusion results independently of the assumption. If one traces the connexion upwards. Similarly if one takes the terms in an ascending series. the impossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is subject in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that F should belong to B. it being false that F belongs to A.g. e. For if it were laid down that A belongs not to B but to K. Similarly when the syllogisms are negative. the false conclusion will no longer result after A has been eliminated. but rather we mean that when the first assumption is eliminated.

If then the false conclusion is drawn from two premisses. since we know that a syllogism cannot be drawn without a middle term. e. 19 In order to avoid having a syllogism drawn against us we must take care. and on this the argument depends: for A and B are inferred by means of D. 205 . F. E. both on the assumption that the interior angle is greater than the exterior and on the assumption that a triangle contains more than two right angles. and G. E. one or both of them must be false: for (as we proved) a false syllogism cannot be drawn from two premisses.hypotheses. not to grant him the same term twice over in his premisses. This will not escape us since we know how we are maintaining the argument. and that term which is stated more than once is the middle. one of these higher propositions must be false. F.g.g. 18 A false argument depends on the first false statement in it. But if the premisses are more than two. and these through D. whenever an opponent asks us to admit the reason without the conclusions. Every syllogism is made out of two or more premisses. and G. Therefore the conclusion and the error results from one of them. if C is established through A and B. How we ought to watch the middle in reference to each conclusion. is evident from our knowing what kind of thesis is proved in each figure. that parallels meet. e.

But if nothing is conceded. or the answers alternate (one. C. a refutation is impossible: for no syllogism is possible (as we saw) when all the terms are negative: therefore no refutation is possible. 20 Since we know when a syllogism can be formed and how its terms must be related. he ought to begin with that: in this way he will most likely deceive his opponent. instead of drawing the conclusions of preliminary syllogisms. and so on. being affirmative. the other negative: consequently. instead of asking whether B belongs to C. they ought in attack to try to conceal. For if a refutation were possible. and E being middle terms. Similarly refutation 206 .That which we urge men to beware of in their admissions. after that he may ask whether B belongs to C. although if a syllogism is possible it does not follow that a refutation is possible. For example suppose that A is to be inferred to be true of F. and next whether D belongs to E. One ought then to ask whether A belongs to B. This will be possible first. a refutation must take place: for a refutation is a syllogism which establishes the contradictory. For as has been shown a syllogism is possible whether the terms are related in affirmative propositions or one proposition is affirmative. secondly if instead of inviting assent to propositions which are closely connected they take as far as possible those that are not connected by middle terms. if. B. the other negative). it is clear when refutation will be possible and when impossible. D. If the syllogism is drawn through one middle term. if what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion. I mean. they take the necessary premisses and leave the conclusions in the dark. A refutation is possible whether everything is conceded. a syllogism must be possible.

but to no C: he will both know that A belongs to D. e. that A belongs to all B. suppose A belongs to B. In the former case. this he maintains he does not think at all: but that is impossible. and think that it does not. and both B and C belong to all D. Again if a man were to make a mistake about the members of a single series.g. Suppose that A belongs to B and to C in virtue of their nature. and C to all D. he does not think? For he knows in a way that A belongs to C through B. since the part is included in the whole.g. then he knows that 207 . Does he then maintain after this simply that what he knows. B to C. it is not possible to think both the premisses with reference to each of the two middle terms: e. but A to no C. so error may arise in our thought about them. he will both know and not know the same thing in respect of the same thing. and B to D. but although knowing the one. and he knows that B belongs to D. but some one thinks that A belongs to all B. a man may forget the other and think the opposite true.g.is not possible if nothing is conceded universally: since the fields of refutation and syllogism are defined in the same way. For if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs. where the middle term does not belong to the same series. but to no C. if it is possible that the same predicate should belong to more than one subject immediately. For it turns out that the first premiss of the one syllogism is either wholly or partially contrary to the first premiss of the other. 21 It sometimes happens that just as we are deceived in the arrangement of the terms. and that B and C belong to all D in the same way. If then a man thinks that A belongs to all B. and C to D. so that what he knows in a way. e.

but if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs. For the expression ‘to know that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’ is ambiguous. but not with a knowledge of the particulars. that the angles are equal to two right angles.g. and again A belongs to no C. Thus then he knows that C contains two right angles with a knowledge of the universal. if A belongs to all B. and again thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs. and B to D. e. but we do not know them by the kind of knowledge which is proper 208 . A belongs to all B. these beliefs are wholly or partially contrary. In this way then it is not possible to think. Similarly in all other cases. A will belong to all C. By a knowledge of the universal then we see the particulars. though he knew that every triangle contains two right angles. if we know that the figure is a triangle. he knows that A belongs to C. let A stand for two right angles. For we know some things directly.g. he thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs. Consequently if again he thinks that A belongs to nothing to which C belongs. consequently he will know and not know the same thing at the same time. e. and B to all C. meaning to have the knowledge either of the universal or of the particulars. For it never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the particular.g. by an act (as it were) of recognition. A man might think that C did not exist.A belongs to D. The argument in the Meno that learning is recollection may be criticized in a similar way. consequently his knowledge will not be contrary to his ignorance. C for a particular diagram of a triangle. but nothing prevents a man thinking one premiss of each syllogism of both premisses of one of the two syllogisms: e. But nothing prevents his being ignorant that C exists. B for triangle. An error of this kind is similar to the error into which we fall concerning particulars: e.g. but along with the process of being led to see the general principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars. If then a man knows that A belongs to everything to which B belongs.

The error in respect of the middle term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism. nor on the other hand has his thought caused an error contrary to his knowledge: for the error contrary to the knowledge of the universal would be a syllogism. consequently it is possible that we may make mistakes about them. Similarly in the cases stated above. and thinking that this animal is with foal: for he does not know that A belongs to C. Nothing then prevents a man both knowing and being mistaken about the same thing. e. Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B. knowing that every mule is sterile and that this is a mule. unless he considers the two propositions together. And this happens also to the man whose knowledge is limited to each of the premisses and who has not previously considered the particular question. 209 . thinking that A does not belong to C. So it is evident that if he knows the one and does not know the other. And this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular. he will fall into error. but without the actual exercise of that knowledge. but not that we should have the knowledge and error that are contrary to one another: rather we have the knowledge of the universal but make a mistake in apprehending the particular. nor is the thought in respect of one middle term contrary to that in respect of the other. even if we happen to have perceived it.g. For when he thinks that the mule is with foal he has not the knowledge in the sense of its actual exercise. For we know no sensible thing. and that B again belongs to C. once it has passed beyond the range of our senses. provided that his knowledge and his error are not contrary. For to know is used in three senses: it may mean either to have knowledge of the universal or to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand or to exercise such knowledge: consequently three kinds of error also are possible. except by means of the universal and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular.to them.

B also is convertible in relation to A. C will be convertible with A. Let A stand for the essence of good and B for the essence of bad. And if C is convertible with B. Similarly therefore with ‘opine’. 22 Whenever the extremes are convertible it is necessary that the middle should be convertible with both. For if A belongs to C through B. and again C for the essence of good. if B belongs to C. save incidentally.g. and B as A. And if C is convertible in relation to A and to B. similarly with the word ‘think’. For just as we saw that if B is true of all of which C is true. and C is convertible with B through A as middle. Since then he thinks B and C identical.But he who thinks the essence of good is the essence of bad will think the same thing to be the essence of good and the essence of bad. for C is said of that of all of which B is said. but A does not belong to B. Suppose B does not belong to A. and similarly that B is A. e. that any one could suppose the essence of good to be the essence of bad. for we saw that if C is the same as B. through C as middle. Similarly if the conclusion is negative. A is true of C. then if A and C are convertible and C belongs everything to which A belongs. neither then will C: for ex hypothesi B belonged to all C. But we must consider this matter better. But presumably that is false. Similarly also with the word ‘is’. B is convertible with A. consequently that C is A. Perhaps then this is necessary if a man will grant the first point. B is convertible also with A. If then B is convertible with A. C is the same as A. and B belongs to everything to which A belongs. he will think that C is B. and A is true of all of which B is true. For it is possible to think this in many different ways. neither will A belong to C. For C belongs to that to which B belongs: but C does not belong to 210 .

then if A and C together are preferable to B and D together. B is an object of aversion to the same 211 . since they also are opposites. For two syllogisms have been put together. it is necessary that what is created should be corruptible and what is corruptible should have been created. For A is an object of desire to the same extent as B is an object of aversion. But if A then C: for they are convertible. If then A is an object of desire to the same extent as D. A is preferable to B. it is necessary that A should belong to all B: for since A belongs to all C. it is clear that B will be said of everything of which A is said. it is clear that A belongs to it. and D belongs to that to which C belongs. since they are opposites: and C is similarly related to D. and similarly D is preferable to C. it is necessary that A and B should be convertible: for since A is said of B and C only. and B is affirmed both of itself and of C.that to which A belongs. of two opposites A and B. but not together. But this is impossible. and C to B by conversion. and since A or C belongs to everything. For example if that which is uncreated is incorruptible and that which is incorruptible is uncreated. For since B belongs to that to which A belongs. and similarly C and D. and B also belongs to all C. Again if A and B are convertible. and if A or C must belong to anything whatever. and C is convertible with B. but they cannot belong together. When. For if B does not belong to something to which D belongs. And this alone starts from the conclusion. except A itself. then when A and C are convertible B and D are convertible. A will belong to all B. A must be preferable to D. the preceding moods do not do so as in the affirmative syllogism. When A belongs to the whole of B and to C and is affirmed of nothing else. Again if A or B belongs to everything and if C or D belongs to everything. Again when A and B belong to the whole of C. but not together. then B and D will be such that one or other belongs to anything whatever. it is clear that B or D belongs to everything. Therefore C and D belong together.

Therefore both A and C together. will be equally objects of desire or aversion. that the beloved should be such as to grant a favour. We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures. If then every lover in virtue of his love would prefer A. A then is preferable to D. and B and D together. But if D is preferable to A. and C consequently is less an object of aversion than B. the other an object of desire). the receiving of affection. And if it is most dependent on receiving affection. Love then is more dependent on friendship than on intercourse. then B must be less an object of aversion than C: for the less is opposed to the less. And indeed the same is true of the other desires and arts. 23 It is clear then how the terms are related in conversion. then this is its end. Intercourse then either is not an end at all or is an end relative to the further end. To receive affection then is preferable in love to sexual intercourse. and yet should not grant it (for which C stands). But since A and C are preferable to B and D. and in respect of being in a higher degree objects of aversion or of desire. But ex hypothesi this is not so. to the beloved’s granting the favour (represented by D) without being such as to grant it (represented by B). it is clear that A (being of such a nature) is preferable to granting the favour. But the greater good and lesser evil are preferable to the lesser good and greater evil: the whole BD then is preferable to the whole AC. but also rhetorical syllogisms and in general any form of 212 .extent as C (since each is to the same extent as each – the one an object of aversion. viz. A cannot be equally desirable with D. for then B along with D would be equally desirable with A along with C.

For this is the manner in which we make inductions. but syllogism through induction is clearer to us. it is necessary that A should belong to B. when there is no middle term. e. then the other predicate will belong to the predicate that is converted. consists in establishing syllogistically a relation between one extreme and the middle by means of the other extreme. If then C is convertible with B. In the order of nature. horse. if B is the middle term between A and C. For every belief comes either through syllogism or from induction. Now induction. it consists in proving through C that A belongs to B. mule. and the extreme is convertible with one of them. A then belongs to the whole of C: for whatever is bileless is long-lived.g.persuasion. And in a way induction is opposed to syllogism: for the latter proves the major term to belong to the third term by means of the middle. For example let A stand for longlived. B for bileless. however it may be presented. For induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases. But we must apprehend C as made up of all the particulars. 213 . syllogism through the middle term is prior and better known. e. through induction. the former proves the major to belong to the middle by means of the third. and C for the particular long-lived animals. For it has already been proved that if two things belong to the same thing. man.g. But B also (‘not possessing bile’) belongs to all C. and the middle term is not wider in extension. Such is the syllogism which establishes the first and immediate premiss: for where there is a middle term the syllogism proceeds through the middle term. or rather the syllogism which springs out of induction.

but rather reasoning from part to part. e. it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. D Thebans against Phocians. Evidence of this is obtained from similar cases. and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third. For example let A be evil. and one of them is known. It differs from induction. whereas argument by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular cases. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil. we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil.24 We have an ‘example’ when the major term is proved to belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term. and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours. nor like reasoning from whole to part. when both particulars are subordinate to the same term. B making war against neighbours. that the war against the Phocians was an evil to the Thebans. Now it is clear that B belongs to C and to D (for both are cases of making war upon one’s neighbours) and that A belongs to D (for the war against the Phocians did not turn out well for the Thebans): but that A belongs to B will be proved through D. Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil. Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole. because induction starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw) that the major term belongs to the middle. C Athenians against Thebans. Similarly if the belief in the relation of the middle term to the extreme should be produced by several similar cases. It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term. 214 .g.

we have a reduction: for we are nearer to knowledge. Now it is clear that knowledge can be taught: but it is uncertain whether virtue is knowledge. that the circle is made equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules). because it may be particular. For example let D stand for squaring. and the intermediate terms are not few. E for rectilinear figure. since we have taken a new term. but the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more probable than the conclusion. C for justice. If there were only one term intermediate between E and F (viz. we should be near to knowledge. or again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term and the middle are few. It differs from a premiss. Or again suppose that the terms intermediate between B and C are few: for thus too we are nearer knowledge. 26 An objection is a premiss contrary to a premiss. For example let A stand for what can be taught. But when BC is not more probable than AC. An objection is brought in two ways and through two figures. B for knowledge. by two figures because objections are brought in 215 . F for circle. being so far without knowledge that A belongs to C. in two ways because every objection is either universal or particular.25 By reduction we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle. but a premiss either cannot be particular at all or not in universal syllogisms. I do not call this reduction: nor again when the statement BC is immediate: for such a statement is knowledge. For in any of these cases it turns out that we approach more nearly to knowledge. If now the statement BC is equally or more probable than AC.

B for contraries. his opponent must reply that there is a single science of all opposites. e. if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of the same science. and opposites can be proved only in the first and third figures. we reply either that all opposites or that certain contraries. the latter from the third.g. the latter from the third figure. In general if a man urges a universal objection he must frame his contradiction with reference to the universal of the terms taken by his opponent. or that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of a single science: this proof is in the third figure: for it is true of C (the knowable and the unknowable) that they are contraries. e. we reply with a universal or a particular negative. If the objection is particular. Thus we must have the first figure: for the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term. and it is false that they are the subjects of a single science. If a man premises that contraries are subjects of a single science. e. And we have the third figure: for the particular term assumed is 216 .opposition to the premiss. For example let stand for there being a single science. the objection may be either that opposites are never subjects of a single science. For if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science. Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative. are subjects of the same science: the former argument issues from the first.g. and contraries are opposites. the former is proved from the first figure. If a man maintains a universal affirmative.g. what is healthy and what is sickly. he will point out that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same science: ‘contraries’ is universal relatively to these. so that we get the first figure. the objector must frame his contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the subject of his opponent’s premiss is universal.

e. but a probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen. namely the objection from contraries. and a sign may be taken in three 217 . is a probability.g. ‘the beloved show affection’. because C does not follow B.g.g. but have its new premiss quite clear immediately. to be or not to be. and from common opinion. or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after. But an objection ought not to turn off into other things. A sign means a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is. We must consider later the other kinds of objection. e.middle. This can be made clear only by other premisses. and inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited from the first figure or a negative objection from the second. For this reason also this is the only figure from which proof by signs cannot be obtained. for the most part thus and thus. Consequently we bring objections in these figures only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms possible. an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller argument. Besides. 27 A probability and a sign are not identical. is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being. Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B. since the second figure cannot produce an affirmative conclusion. ‘the envious hate’. e. Premisses from which it is possible to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try to make objections. the knowable and the unknowable. from similars.

since the syllogism is not universal nor correlative to the matter in question: for though Pittacus is good. since Pittacus is good. The proof that wise men are good. since Pittacus is not only good but wise. For it may be taken as in the first figure or the second or the third. Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind. we have only a sign. Now if the one proposition is stated.ways. We must either divide signs in the way stated. Let A stand for paleness. Let A stand for good. it is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good. B for being with child. though they state the former. and this woman also is pale. B for wise men. but they have the differences we have stated. e. C woman. it is not necessary that she should be with child. The proof that a woman is with child because she is pale is meant to come through the middle figure: for since paleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this woman.’ In this way then syllogisms are formed. corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures.’ Or again ‘Wise men are good. C for woman. a syllogism. and among them designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the 218 . that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the conclusion is true. since ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious. Let A represent to be with child. only that which proceeds through the first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal). people suppose it has been proved that she is with child.g. comes through the last figure. It is true then to affirm both A and B of C: only men do not say the latter. but if the other is stated as well. But the syllogism which proceeds through the middle figure is always refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when the terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is pale. because they know it. For example the proof that a woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure: for to have milk is the middle term. B to have milk. ‘Pittacus is generous. C for Pittacus.

rather I refer to passions and desires when I speak of natural emotions. courage to lions. Suppose this sign is the possession of large extremities: this may belong to other kinds also though not universally. They will then have the sign: for ex hypothesi there is one sign corresponding to each affection.g. how shall we know which of the signs which are its proper concomitants is the sign of a particular affection? Perhaps if both belong to some other kind though not to the 219 . if the lion is both brave and generous.index which makes us know. for though perhaps by learning music a man has made some change in his soul. because the affection is proper to the whole kind. and some other kinds of animal as well. we shall be able to infer character from features. or else we must call the arguments derived from the extremes signs. For if there is an affection which belongs properly to an individual kind. and man may be brave. according to our usual manner of speaking. If then this were granted and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign. The same thing then will be found in another kind. But if the kind as a whole has two properties. if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections: I say ‘natural’. and we can collect signs of this sort in these animals which have only one affection proper to them – but each affection has its sign. and the middle term above all has this character). It is possible to infer character from features. For the sign is proper in the sense stated. this is not one of those affections which are natural to us. and we could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal. If then this is so. e. it is necessary that there should be a sign of it: for ex hypothesi body and soul are affected together. since it is necessary that it should have a single sign – we shall then be able to infer character from features. e. that derived from the middle term the index: for that which is proved through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true. though not proper to it alone.g.

but possesses. of the two signs. B for large extremities. and C for lion. but is wider than the third term and not convertible with it: e. To judge character from features. large extremities. B then belongs to everything to which C belongs. it is clear that this is the sign of courage in the lion also. and to nothing besides.g. some members possess one of the affections and not the other: e. and if. is possible in the first figure if the middle term is convertible with the first extreme. 220 . but is convertible with B: otherwise. but also to others. But A belongs to everything to which B belongs. in those kinds in which each is found though not in the whole of their members. then. let A stand for courage.whole of it.g. there would not be a single sign correlative with each affection. if a man is brave but not generous.

and that ‘triangle’ means so and so. Mure] Book I 1 All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.Posterior Analytics [Translated by G. or enthymeme. the persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same. in others comprehension of the meaning of the term used. a form of syllogism. Recognition of a truth may in some cases contain as factors both previous knowledge and also knowledge acquired simultaneously with 221 . a kind of induction. the syllogism assuming an audience that accepts its premisses. The pre-existent knowledge required is of two kinds.Aristotle . we assume that every predicate can be either truly affirmed or truly denied of any subject. Thus. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the species of such instruction. induction exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular. In some cases admission of the fact must be assumed. R. for each of these latter make use of old knowledge to impart new. The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us. since they use either example. and sometimes both assumptions are essential. Again. syllogistic and inductive. G. as regards ‘unit’ we have to make the double assumption of the meaning of the word and the existence of the thing. The mathematical sciences and all other speculative disciplines are acquired in this way. and so are the two forms of dialectical reasoning.

of the particulars actually falling under the universal and therein already virtually known. viz. in a manner not.e. For some things (viz. For example. the singulars finally reached which are not predicable of anything else as subject) are only learnt in this way. For no premiss is ever couched in the form ‘every number which you know to be such’. Before he was led on to recognition or before he actually drew a conclusion. not merely every triangle or number which they know to be such. i. i. A man is asked. of which he was unaware. this latter.that recognition – knowledge. or do you not. what they made the subject of their premiss. but only that everything which they know to be a pair is even: yet what they know to be even is that of which they have demonstrated evenness. how could he know without qualification that its angles were equal to two right angles? No: clearly he knows not without qualification but only in the sense that he knows universally. or ‘every rectilinear figure which you know to be such’: the predicate is always construed as applicable to any and every 222 . The questioner then produces a particular pair.e. The solution which some people offer is to assert that they do not know that every pair is even. of the existence. we are faced with the dilemma in the Meno: either a man will learn nothing or what he already knows. and so a fortiori of the evenness. but it was only at the actual moment at which he was being led on to recognize this as true in the instance before him that he came to know ‘this figure inscribed in the semicircle’ to be a triangle. there is here no recognition through a middle of a minor term as subject to a major. If this distinction is not drawn. If he did not in an unqualified sense of the term know the existence of this triangle. the student knew beforehand that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. know that every pair is even?’ He says he does know it. but any and every number or triangle without reservation. ‘Do you. we should perhaps say that in a manner he knew. for we cannot accept the solution which some people offer.

What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends. Unless these conditions are satisfied. a syllogism. The strange thing would be. the basic truths will not be 223 . On the other hand. that is. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is. better known than and prior to the conclusion. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge. while the latter are also actually. further. in another not knowing it. immediate. as the cause of that fact and of no other. primary. but if he were to know it in that precise sense and manner in which he was learning it. There may be another manner of knowing as well – that will be discussed later. in the condition described. as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows. 2 We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing. the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. which is further related to them as effect to cause. and.instance of the thing. not if in some sense he knew what he was learning. I imagine there is nothing to prevent a man in one sense knowing what he is learning. that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident – witness both those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it. since the former merely imagine themselves to be. the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct.

A proposition is either part of an enunciation. will not be demonstration. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side. An immediate proposition is one which has no other proposition prior to it. it lays down one part to the definite exclusion of the other because that part is true. e. for I identify primary premiss and basic truth.g. objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense. but knowledge of the fact as well. of things which are demonstrable. in order to be causes. and prior to it. otherwise they will require demonstration in order to be known. Now ‘prior’ and ‘better known’ are ambiguous terms. its causes. for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. better known than it. not being productive of scientific knowledge. this antecedent knowledge being not our mere understanding of the meaning. means precisely to have a demonstration of them. if it is demonstrative. it assumes either part indifferently. since to have knowledge. antecedently known. but such syllogism. I mean that they must be the ‘appropriate’ basic truths. The term ‘enunciation’ denotes either part of a 224 . i. it predicates a single attribute of a single subject. since we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause.e. Syllogism there may indeed be without these conditions. The premisses must be the causes of the conclusion. I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man. The premisses must be primary and indemonstrable.‘appropriate’ to the conclusion. The premisses must be true: for that which is non-existent cannot be known – we cannot know. and they are thus exactly opposed to one another. If a proposition is dialectical. A ‘basic truth’ in a demonstration is an immediate proposition. In saying that the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be primary. Now the most universal causes are furthest from sense and particular causes are nearest to sense. if it be not accidental knowledge. prior.

since the arithmetician lays it down that to be a unit is to be quantitatively indivisible.e. i. the cause of our loving anything is dearer to us than the object of our love. Definition is a ‘thesis’ or a ‘laying something down’. Now since the required ground of our knowledge – i.e. I call an immediate basic truth of syllogism a ‘thesis’ when. the part disjoining them is a negation. if it does not so assert. but know them better than the conclusion: for the cause of an attribute’s inherence in a subject always itself inheres in the subject more firmly than that attribute. If a thesis assumes one part or the other of an enunciation. precisely because of our knowledge of the latter is the effect of our knowledge of the premisses. unless he has either actual knowledge of it or something better than actual knowledge. The part of a contradiction which conjoins a predicate with a subject is an affirmation. asserts either the existence or the non-existence of a subject. of our conviction – it follows that we know them better – that is.contradiction indifferently. But we are faced with this paradox if a student whose belief rests 225 . and the ground of the syllogism is the facts constituting its premisses.e. A contradiction is an opposition which of its own nature excludes a middle. it is a hypothesis. of our conviction – of a fact is the possession of such a syllogism as we call demonstration. it is a definition. I call it an axiom because there are such truths and we give them the name of axioms par excellence. but it is not a hypothesis. yet ignorance of it does not constitute a total bar to progress on the part of the pupil: one which the pupil must know if he is to learn anything whatever is an axiom. are more convinced of them – than their consequences. for to define what a unit is is not the same as to affirm its existence. e. Now a man cannot believe in anything more than in the things he knows.g. we must not only know the primary premisses – some if not all of them – beforehand. though it is not susceptible of proof by the teacher. So since the primary premisses are the cause of our knowledge – i.

he must not only have a better knowledge of the basic truths and a firmer conviction of them than of the connexion which is being demonstrated: more than this. assuming that there is no way of knowing other than by demonstration. The other party agree with them as regards knowing. The first school. 3 Some hold that. which according to them is the only form of knowledge. we could not know the posterior through the prior (wherein they are right. on the ground that if behind the prior stands no primary. nothing must be more certain or better known to him than these basic truths in their character as contradicting the fundamental premisses which lead to the opposed and erroneous conclusion. maintain that an infinite regress is involved. a man must believe in some.on demonstration has not prior knowledge. knowledge of the conclusions which follow from them is not pure scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at all. Moreover. for one cannot traverse an infinite series): if on the other hand – they say – the series terminates and there are primary premisses. For indeed the conviction of pure science must be unshakable. but that all truths are demonstrable. but 226 . if not in all. Neither doctrine is either true or a necessary deduction from the premisses. but rests on the mere supposition that the premisses are true. owing to the necessity of knowing the primary premisses. holding that it is only possible by demonstration. Others think there is. there is no scientific knowledge. And since thus one cannot know the primary premisses. if a man sets out to acquire the scientific knowledge that comes through demonstration. of the basic truths more than in the conclusion. yet these are unknowable because incapable of demonstration.

our definition of unqualified knowledge will prove faulty. Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary. (The necessity of this is obvious. for since we must know the prior premisses from which the demonstration is drawn. then it does exist – an easy way of proving anything. But if we accept this extension of its meaning. and the same things cannot simultaneously be both prior and posterior to one another: so circular demonstration is clearly not possible in the unqualified sense of ‘demonstration’. the method by which induction produces knowledge. on the ground that demonstration may be circular and reciprocal. B must be. knowledge of the immediate premisses is independent of demonstration. That this is so can be clearly shown by taking three terms. i.they see no difficulty in holding that all truths are demonstrated. those truths must be indemonstrable. Perhaps. Now demonstration must be based on premisses prior to and better known than the conclusion. for to constitute the circle it makes no difference whether many terms or few or even only two are taken. however. but only possible if ‘demonstration’ be extended to include that other method of argument which rests on a distinction between truths prior to us and truths without qualification prior. for there seem to be two kinds of it.e. Thus by direct proof. if B is. that which proceeds from truths better known to us. then. C 227 . and since the regress must end in immediate truths. The advocates of circular demonstration are not only faced with the difficulty we have just stated: in addition their theory reduces to the mere statement that if a thing exists. is not demonstration in the unqualified sense of the term.) Such. is our doctrine. the second form of demonstration. if A is. and in addition we maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative source which enables us to recognize the definitions.

Propositions the terms of which are not convertible cannot be circularly demonstrated at all. or at least none which proves both the original premisses. A may be substituted for C above. it is possible. it is clearly frivolous and impossible to say that demonstration is reciprocal and that therefore everything can be demonstrated. 4 Since the object of pure scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is. Since then – by the circular proof – if A is. therefore if A is. C must be. it has been shown that the positing of one thing – be it one term or one premiss – never involves a necessary consequent: two premisses constitute the first and smallest foundation for drawing a conclusion at all and therefore a fortiori for the demonstrative syllogism of science. which above gave the conclusion ‘if A is. and if B is. Then ‘if B is. A must be – a simple way of proving anything. as has been shown in my writings on the syllogism. by circular demonstration in the first figure. the truth obtained by demonstrative knowledge will be necessary. A is implied in B and C. to prove all the assumptions on which the original conclusion rested. Moreover. Now. A must be’=‘if B is. And since demonstrative knowledge is only 228 . C must be’: but C and A have been identified. Consequently the upholders of circular demonstration are in the position of saying that if A is. C must be’.must be. If. ‘peculiar’ properties. and since convertible terms occur rarely in actual demonstrations. then. even such circular demonstration is impossible except in the case of attributes that imply one another. But it has also been shown that in the other figures either no conclusion is possible. B must be. and B and C are reciprocally implied in one another and in A. viz. A must be.

an ‘essential’ attribute. musical or white is a ‘coincident’ of animal. it is not true. not at this or that time only. Essential attributes are (1) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature (e.g. line thus belongs to triangle.g. So we must consider what are the premisses of demonstration – i. Extending this classification to all other attributes. to number. it follows that demonstration is an inference from necessary premisses. prime and compound. ‘this is an animal’ is also true.present when we have a demonstration. the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula. square and oblong. odd and even. while they belong to certain subjects. e.g. Thus straight and curved belong to line. and a ‘commensurate and universal’ attribute. line or number as the case may be. what is their character: and as a preliminary. 229 . then if it be true to say ‘this is a man’.g. A corresponding account holds if point is in every instance predicable as contained in line. and if the one be true now the other is true now. point to line. and also the formula defining any one of these attributes contains its subject – e. e.e. let us define what we mean by an attribute ‘true in every instance of its subject’. if animal is truly predicable of every instance of man. or an occasion on which. I call ‘true in every instance’ what is truly predicable of all instances – not of one to the exclusion of others – and at all times. There is evidence for this in the fact that the objection we raise against a proposition put to us as true in every instance is either an instance in which. whereas attributes related in neither of these two ways to their subjects I call accidents or ‘coincidents’. for the very being or ‘substance’ of triangle and line is composed of these elements. which are contained in the formulae defining triangle and line): (2) such that. I distinguish those that answer the above description as belonging essentially to their respective subjects.

in the sense of whatever signifies a ‘this somewhat’. If.g. then. whereas substance. So.g. e. because the cutting was the cause of death. it was. things predicated of a subject I call accidental or ‘coincidental’. Things.g. e. we should say. So far then as concerns the sphere of connexions scientifically known in the unqualified sense of that term. one not so connected is ‘coincidental’. In another sense again (b) a thing consequentially connected with anything is essential.g. then its death is also essentially connected with the cutting. on the other hand. if a beast dies when its throat is being cut. in number either oddness or evenness. in line must be either straightness or curvature. is not what it is in virtue of being something else besides. e. inasmuch as within this sphere even is a necessary consequent of not-odd. all attributes which (within that sphere) are essential either in the sense that their subjects are contained in them. the predication is essential. not predicated of a subject I call essential. not death a ‘coincident’ of the cutting. ‘the walking [thing]’ walks and is white in virtue of being something else besides. there is a consequential connexion. For it is impossible for them not to inhere in their subjects either simply or in the qualified sense that one or other of a pair of opposites must inhere in the subject. For within a single identical genus the contrary of a given attribute is either its privative or its contradictory. since any given predicate must be either affirmed or denied of any subject. a coincidence. within number what is not odd is even. An example of the latter is ‘While he was walking it lightened’: the lightning was not due to his walking. are necessary as well as consequentially connected with their subjects.Further (a) that is essential which is not predicated of a subject other than itself: e. 230 . or in the sense that they are contained in their subjects. essential attributes must inhere in their subjects of necessity.

for they belong to line as such. in the essential sense. Thus. or to possess any other attribute. for it is essentially equal to two right angles. yet isosceles triangle is not the primary subject of this attribute but triangle is prior. and to every instance essentially and as such.g. we have established the distinction between the attribute which is ‘true in every instance’ and the ‘essential’ attribute. of any predicate is the proof of it as belonging to this first subject commensurately and universally: while the proof of it as belonging to the other subjects to which it attaches is demonstration only in a secondary and unessential 231 . e. are identical. (1) the equality of its angles to two right angles is not a commensurately universal attribute of figure. So whatever can be shown to have its angles equal to two right angles. from which it clearly follows that all commensurate universals inhere necessarily in their subjects.Thus. this attribute cannot be demonstrated of any figure selected at haphazard. and the demonstration. then. E. point and straight belong to line essentially. and the attribute that belongs to its subject as such. I term ‘commensurately universal’ an attribute which belongs to every instance of its subject. For though it is possible to show that a figure has its angles equal to two right angles. and triangle as such has two right angles. any isosceles triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. The essential attribute.g. An attribute belongs commensurately and universally to a subject when it can be shown to belong to any random instance of that subject and when the subject is the first thing to which it can be shown to belong. nor in demonstrating does one take a figure at random – a square is a figure but its angles are not equal to two right angles. On the other hand. in any random instance of itself and primarily – that is the first subject to which the predicate in question belongs commensurately and universally.

for then the demonstration will be true of the individual instances within the part and will hold in every instance of it. but simply on their being equal to one another. We make this mistake (1) when the subject is an individual or individuals above which there is no universal to be found: (2) when the subjects belong to different species and there is a higher universal. yet the demonstration will not be true of this subject primarily and commensurately and universally. it might be supposed that lines thus perpendicular were the proper subject of the demonstration because being parallel is true of every instance of them. When a demonstration is true of a subject primarily and commensurately and universally. Alternation used to be 232 . but it has no name: (3) when the subject which the demonstrator takes as a whole is really only a part of a larger whole. But it is not so. that is to be taken to mean that it is true of a given subject primarily and as such. it is of wider application. Nor again (2) is equality to two right angles a commensurately universal attribute of isosceles. 5 We must not fail to observe that we often fall into error because our conclusion is not in fact primary and commensurately universal in the sense in which we think we prove it so. If a proof were given that perpendiculars to the same line are parallel. for the parallelism depends not on these angles being equal to one another because each is a right angle.sense. An example of (1) would be as follows: if isosceles were the only triangle. Case (3) may be thus exemplified. it would be thought to have its angles equal to two right angles qua isosceles. An instance of (2) would be the law that proportionals alternate.

and the attribute belongs to equilateral qua triangle. nor even that ‘all’ triangles have it – unless ‘all’ means ‘each taken singly’: if ‘all’ means ‘as a whole class’. ‘But’. then clearly we have unqualified knowledge: if on the other hand it be not. as long as one treats separately equilateral. to which it belongs is primary? (i. When. Hence. even if there is no other species of triangle but these. though it could have been proved of them all by a single demonstration. with each or all equilaterals. For one does not know that triangle as such has this property. does our knowledge fail of commensurate universality. scalene. this property was proved of each of them separately. except sophistically. durations. though there be none in which one does not recognize this property. i. one does not yet know. lines. and because they differed specifically from one another. whether by means of the same or different proofs. one does not know it of ‘all triangles’. Because there was no single name to denote that in which numbers. still. and durations. then. and solids are identical.e. but qua manifesting this generic character which they are postulated as possessing universally. for they do not possess this attribute qua lines or qua numbers. solids. even if one prove of each kind of triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles. to what subject can it be demonstrated as belonging commensurately and universally?)’ Clearly this point is the first term in which it is found to inhere 233 . then our knowledge fails of commensurate universality. To-day. the proof is commensurately universal. nor does one yet know that triangle has this property commensurately and universally. that triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. then. however.e. lengths.demonstrated separately of numbers. and isosceles. it will be asked. and when it is unqualified knowledge? If triangle be identical in essence with equilateral. ‘does this attribute belong to the subject of which it has been demonstrated qua triangle or qua isosceles? What is the point at which the subject.

‘Then what is the first?’ If it is triangle. (The pairs of opposites which the latter class includes are necessary because one member or the other necessarily inheres. 6 Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary basic truths. or contain their subjects as elements in their own essential nature.’ True. or else premise that the conclusion of demonstration is necessary and that a demonstrated conclusion cannot be other than it is. and the attribute vanishes. For though you may reason from true premisses without demonstrating. and accidental attributes are not necessary to their subjects. and then infer that the conclusion must be developed from necessary premisses. Now attributes attaching essentially to their subjects attach necessarily to them: for essential attributes are either elements in the essential nature of their subjects.as the elimination of inferior differentiae proceeds. ‘But’ – you may say – ’eliminate figure or limit. but figure and limit are not the first differentiae whose elimination destroys the attribute.) It follows from this that premisses of the demonstrative syllogism must be connexions essential in the sense explained: for all attributes must inhere essentially or else be accidental. and triangle is the subject to which it can be demonstrated as belonging commensurately and universally. We must either state the case thus. Thus the angles of a brazen isosceles triangle are equal to two right angles: but eliminate brazen and isosceles and the attribute remains. yet if your premisses are necessary you 234 . it will be in virtue of triangle that the attribute belongs to all the other subjects of which it is predicable. for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is.

That demonstration proceeds from necessary premisses is also indicated by the fact that the objection we raise against a professed demonstration is that a premiss of it is not a necessary truth – whether we think it altogether devoid of necessity. then the man who argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion. which can only be the primary law of the genus constituting the subject matter of the demonstration. though there be no change in him nor in the fact. yet B. 235 . and if so. then neither had he knowledge previously. though he still retains the steps of the argument. Or again. This shows how naive it is to suppose one’s basic truths rightly chosen if one starts with a proposition which is (1) popularly accepted and (2) true. or at any rate so far as our opponent’s previous argument goes. such as the sophists’ assumption that to know is the same as to possess knowledge. the middle term of the demonstration. though A necessarily inheres in C. A further proof that the conclusion must be the development of necessary premisses is as follows. this situation is possible and might occur. But such a condition cannot be knowledge. not being necessary. If. is not necessarily connected with A and C.will assuredly demonstrate – in such necessity you have at once a distinctive character of demonstration. Even if the link has not actually perished but is liable to perish. we suppose a syllogism in which. and (2) not all truth is ‘appropriate’. But the mediating link. may have perished in the interval. one who can give no account which includes the cause has no scientific knowledge. For (1) popular acceptance or rejection is no criterion of a basic truth. yet he has not knowledge. though there is no change in himself or in the fact and no lapse of memory on his part. if a man is without knowledge now. and therefore had not knowledge before. the mediating link is a contingent fact. since this conclusion does not owe its necessity to the middle term. then. Where demonstration is possible. for though the conclusion is necessary. and though he will still retain the steps of the argument.

Of accidents that are not essential according to our definition of essential there is no demonstrative knowledge. for since an accident. which by hypothesis it is not. whether he actually infers the mere fact through middle terms or the reasoned fact and from immediate premisses. just as true premisses always give a true conclusion. then A is necessarily predicated of C. then A too will be a necessary predicate of C. however. Would not the result be the same if one asked any questions whatever and then merely stated one’s conclusion? The solution is that determinate questions have to be put. just as you can infer the true from the not true. But when the conclusion is nonnecessary the middle cannot be necessary either. On the other hand. Either he will mistake the non-necessary for the necessary and believe the necessity of the conclusion without knowing it. such and such determinate premisses should be proposed in order to deal with such and such determinate problems. To sum up. and let B be a necessary predicate of C. and therefore must clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term. when the middle is necessary the conclusion must be necessary. A difficulty. the middle through which it was proved may yet quite easily be non-necessary. if A is necessarily predicated of B and B of C. may also not inhere. You can in fact infer the necessary even from a non-necessary premiss.When the conclusion is necessary. not because the replies to 236 . Thus: let A be predicated non-necessarily of C but necessarily of B. otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connexion. it is impossible to prove its inherence as a necessary conclusion. then: demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus. Thus. if the conclusion is not a necessary connexion. or else he will not even believe it – in which case he will be equally ignorant. might be raised as to why in dialectic. in the sense in which I here speak of it.

axioms which are premisses of demonstration. essential properties. 7 It follows that we cannot in demonstrating pass from one genus to another. as in proofs through signs. Since it is just those attributes within every genus which are essential and possessed by their respective subjects as such that are necessary it is clear that both the conclusions and the premisses of demonstrations which produce scientific knowledge are essential. i. for instance. the conclusion – an attribute inhering essentially in a genus. (2) the axioms. (3) the subject – genus whose attributes.them affirm facts which necessitate facts affirmed by the conclusion. i. he must affirm the conclusion and affirm it with truth if they are true. but to have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion is to know it through its cause.e. We cannot. We may conclude that the middle must be consequentially connected with the minor. prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. for though the conclusion be actually essential. The axioms which are premisses of demonstration may be identical in two or more sciences: but in the case of two different genera such as arithmetic and 237 . For there are three elements in demonstration: (1) what is proved. but because these answers are propositions which if the answerer affirm. since accidents are not necessary one does not necessarily have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion drawn from them (this is so even if the accidental premisses are invariable but not essential. are revealed by the demonstration.e. and the major with the middle. one will not know it as essential nor know its reason). further. For accidents are not necessary: and.

in virtue of the fundamental truths of their peculiar genus: it cannot show. Arithmetical demonstration and the other sciences likewise possess. their own genera. the conclusion of such i. for example. That is why it cannot be proved by geometry that opposites fall under one science.g. the genus must be either absolutely or to some extent the same. transference is clearly impossible.e. but through some property which it shares with other genera. because the extreme and the middle terms must be drawn from the same genus: otherwise. 8 It is also clear that if the premisses from which the syllogism proceeds are commensurately universal. Geometry again cannot prove of lines any property which they do not possess qua lines.e. for these qualities do not belong to lines in virtue of their peculiar genus. How in certain cases transference is possible I will explain later. so that if the demonstration is to pass from one sphere to another. that the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or the contrary of the circle. i. unless these theorems are related as subordinate to superior (e. in the unqualified sense – must also be eternal. Nor can the theorem of any one science be demonstrated by means of another science. Therefore no attribute can be demonstrated nor known by strictly scientific 238 . they will not be essential and will thus be accidents.geometry you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless the magnitudes in question are numbers. as predicated. If this is not so. nor even that the product of two cubes is a cube. as optical theorems to geometry or harmonic theorems to arithmetic). each of them.

not commensurately universal. indemonstrable. not as belonging to its 239 . 9 It is clear that if the conclusion is to show an attribute inhering as such. nothing can be demonstrated except from its ‘appropriate’ basic truths. Other subjects too have properties attaching to them in the same way as eclipse attaches to the moon. Demonstration and science of merely frequent occurrences – e. or else only differs from a demonstration in the order of its terms. clearly eternal: whereas so far as they are not eternal they are not fully commensurate. Such proofs are like Bryson’s method of squaring the circle. and immediate premisses does not constitute knowledge. as such. therefore. They therefore afford knowledge of an attribute only as inhering accidentally. because the predicate will be predicable of some instances of the subject and not of others). because the attribute’s connexion with its perishable subject is not commensurately universal but temporary and special. since a definition is either a primary premiss or a conclusion of a demonstration. so that the conclusion can only be that a fact is true at the moment – not commensurately and universally. Consequently a proof even from true. which the subject may share with another – and consequently they apply equally to subjects different in kind. The proof can only be accidental. The same is true of definitions.g. of eclipse as happening to the moon – are. for they operate by taking as their middle a common character – a character. If such a demonstration is made. one premiss must be perishable and not commensurately universal (perishable because only if it is perishable will the conclusion be perishable.knowledge to inhere in perishable things.

even these apparent exceptions show that no attribute is strictly demonstrable except from its ‘appropriate’ basic truths. which.subject as such: otherwise they would not have been applicable to another genus. if he knows better than others or best of all. his knowledge would be science in a higher or the highest degree. the property of possessing angles equal to two right angles as belonging to that subject in which it inheres essentially. Thus. Such theorems are proved by the same middle terms as arithmetical properties. This is so because he knows better whose knowledge is deduced from higher causes. to which the attributes essentially belong. in the case of these sciences have the requisite identity of character. and the science to which they belonged would possess universal sovereignty. It is no less evident that the peculiar basic truths of each inhering attribute are indemonstrable. and as an inference from basic premisses essential and ‘appropriate’ to the subject – unless we know. and as inferred from basic premisses essential and ‘appropriate’ to that subject: so that if that middle term also belongs essentially to the minor. but with a qualification – the fact falls under a separate science (for the subject genus is separate). demonstration is not transferable to another genus. for his knowledge is from prior premisses when it derives from causes themselves uncaused: hence. but the reasoned fact concerns the superior science. with such exceptions as we have mentioned of 240 . Our knowledge of any attribute’s connexion with a subject is accidental unless we know that connexion through the middle term in virtue of which it inheres. e. But. The only exceptions to this rule are such cases as theorems in harmonics which are demonstrable by arithmetic.g. as things are. however. for basic truths from which they might be deduced would be basic truths of all that is. the middle must belong to the same kind as the major and minor terms.

Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences some are peculiar to each science. for it is hard to be sure whether one’s knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute – the differentia of true knowledge. and some are common. It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not. e. being of use only in so far as they fall within the genus constituting the province of the science in question. or of arithmetical demonstrations to those of harmonics. the definitions of line and straight. The fact of their existence as regards the primary truths must be assumed. Only so much of these common truths is required as 241 . straight.g. in the case of the remainder proof is required. But that is not so: the conclusion must be homogeneous with the basic facts of the science. but while as regards unity and magnitude we assume also the fact of their existence. Peculiar truths are. but common only in the sense of analogous. As regards both these primary truths and the attributes dependent on them the meaning of the name is assumed. but it has to be proved of the remainder. the attributes.the application of geometrical demonstrations to theorems in mechanics or optics. 10 I call the basic truths of every genus those clements in it the existence of which cannot be proved. Thus we assume the meaning alike of unity. We think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from true and primary premisses. common truths are such as ‘take equals from equals and equals remain’. and triangular.

or of deflection or verging of lines. such as ‘Take equals from equals and equals remain’. in geometry points and lines. e. Both the existence and the meaning of the subjects are assumed by these sciences. Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of demonstration are three: the subject.g. in arithmetic units. the attributes. or by the arithmetician only to numbers. the existence of hot and cold is more evident than that of number). and which we must necessarily believe. For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: (1) that which it posits. but to the 242 . and therefore a fortiori demonstration. because all syllogism. Yet some sciences may very well pass over some of these elements. we might not expressly posit the existence of the genus if its existence were obvious (for instance. Also peculiar to a science are the subjects the existence as well as the meaning of which it assumes. That which expresses necessary self-grounded fact. the meaning of which it assumes. but of their essential attributes only the meaning is assumed. whereas the existence of these attributes is demonstrated by means of the axioms and from previous conclusions as premisses. and the essential attributes of which it investigates.g. or we might omit to assume expressly the meaning of the attributes if it were well understood. is well known and so not expressly assumed. Astronomy too proceeds in the same way.falls within the genus in question: for a truth of this kind will have the same force even if not used generally but applied by the geometer only to magnitudes. is distinct both from the hypotheses of a science and from illegitimate postulate – I say ‘must believe’. (2) the so-called axioms. which are primary premisses of its demonstration. is addressed not to the spoken word. geometry that of incommensurable. square and cube. (3) the attributes. e. and the basic premisses. In the way the meaning of axioms. For example arithmetic assumes the meaning of odd and even. the subject genus whose essential attributes it examines.

but assumed and used without demonstration. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion. and this is not hypothesis – unless it be contended that the pupil’s hearing is also an hypothesis required by the teacher. relatively to the pupil. to the inward discourse we cannot always object. as some have held. those which are not expressed as statements that anything is or is not – are not hypotheses: but it is in the premisses of a science that its hypotheses are contained. A further distinction is that all hypotheses and illegitimate postulates are either universal or particular. The definition – viz. postulate facts on the being of which depends the being of the fact inferred. on the contrary. Definitions require only to be understood. 243 . demonstrable. Nor are the geometer’s hypotheses false. and though we can always raise objections to the spoken word.discourse within the soul. whereas a definition is neither. That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof is. Hypotheses. hypothesis. urging that one must not employ falsehood and that the geometer is uttering falsehood in stating that the line which he draws is a foot long or straight. The truth is that the geometer does not draw any conclusion from the being of the particular line of which he speaks. if the pupil believes and accepts it. when it is actually neither. but from what his diagrams symbolize. the same assumption is an illegitimate postulate. if the pupil has no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter. though only in a limited sense hypothesis – that is.

the middle term goes witb. since without this possibility we cannot save the universal. We conclude. in which case the proof lays down as its major premiss that the major is truly affirmed of the middle but falsely denied. and so demonstration becomes impossible. The law that it is impossible to affirm and deny simultaneously the same predicate of the same subject is not expressly posited by any demonstration except when the conclusion also has to be expressed in that form. and then not always universally. then. if we add to the middle. that there must be a single identical term unequivocally predicable of a number of individuals. but it does necessarily imply the possibility of truly predicating one of many. that is. to which the man of science applies his demonstrations. but so far as it is requisite. I mean (as I have already explained). the corresponding negative. It makes no difference. In virtue 244 . The reason is that the major term is predicable not only of the middle.11 So demonstration does not necessarily imply the being of Forms nor a One beside a Many. of the genus – the genus. it. The law that every predicate can be either truly affirmed or truly denied of every subject is posited by such demonstration as uses reductio ad impossibile. For grant a minor term of which it is true to predicate man – even if it be also true to predicate not-man of it – still grant simply that man is animal and not not-animal. however. but of something other than the middle as well. and the conclusion follows: for it will still be true to say that Callias – even if it be also true to say that not-Callias – is animal and not not-animal. within the limits. and if the universal goes. or again to the minor term. so that the conclusion is not affected even if the middle is extended to cover the original middle term and also what is not the original middle term. being of wider application.

of the common elements of demonstration – I mean the common axioms which are used as premisses of demonstration, not the subjects nor the attributes demonstrated as belonging to them – all the sciences have communion with one another, and in communion with them all is dialectic and any science which might attempt a universal proof of axioms such as the law of excluded middle, the law that the subtraction of equals from equals leaves equal remainders, or other axioms of the same kind. Dialectic has no definite sphere of this kind, not being confined to a single genus. Otherwise its method would not be interrogative; for the interrogative method is barred to the demonstrator, who cannot use the opposite facts to prove the same nexus. This was shown in my work on the syllogism.

12 If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction, and if each science has its peculiar propositions from which its peculiar conclusion is developed, then there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses from which the ‘appropriate’ conclusion of each science is developed. Hence it is clear that not every question will be relevant to geometry, nor to medicine, nor to any other science: only those questions will be geometrical which form premisses for the proof of the theorems of geometry or of any other science, such as optics, which uses the same basic truths as geometry. Of the other sciences the like is true. Of these questions the geometer is bound to give his account, using the basic truths of geometry in conjunction with his previous conclusions; of the basic truths the geometer, as

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such, is not bound to give any account. The like is true of the other sciences. There is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only such as fall within the defined field of his own science. If, then, in controversy with a geometer qua geometer the disputant confines himself to geometry and proves anything from geometrical premisses, he is clearly to be applauded; if he goes outside these he will be at fault, and obviously cannot even refute the geometer except accidentally. One should therefore not discuss geometry among those who are not geometers, for in such a company an unsound argument will pass unnoticed. This is correspondingly true in the other sciences. Since there are ‘geometrical’ questions, does it follow that there are also distinctively ‘ungeometrical’ questions? Further, in each special science – geometry for instance – what kind of error is it that may vitiate questions, and yet not exclude them from that science? Again, is the erroneous conclusion one constructed from premisses opposite to the true premisses, or is it formal fallacy though drawn from geometrical premisses? Or, perhaps, the erroneous conclusion is due to the drawing of premisses from another science; e.g. in a geometrical controversy a musical question is distinctively ungeometrical, whereas the notion that parallels meet is in one sense geometrical, being ungeometrical in a different fashion: the reason being that ‘ungeometrical’, like ‘unrhythmical’, is equivocal, meaning in the one case not geometry at all, in the other bad geometry? It is this error, i.e. error based on premisses of this kind – ‘of’ the science but false – that is the contrary of science. In mathematics the formal fallacy is not so common, because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies, since the major is predicated of the whole of the middle and the middle of the whole of the minor (the predicate of course never has the prefix ‘all’); and in mathematics one can, so to speak, see these middle
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terms with an intellectual vision, while in dialectic the ambiguity may escape detection. E.g. ‘Is every circle a figure?’ A diagram shows that this is so, but the minor premiss ‘Are epics circles?’ is shown by the diagram to be false. If a proof has an inductive minor premiss, one should not bring an ‘objection’ against it. For since every premiss must be applicable to a number of cases (otherwise it will not be true in every instance, which, since the syllogism proceeds from universals, it must be), then assuredly the same is true of an ‘objection’; since premisses and ‘objections’ are so far the same that anything which can be validly advanced as an ‘objection’ must be such that it could take the form of a premiss, either demonstrative or dialectical. On the other hand, arguments formally illogical do sometimes occur through taking as middles mere attributes of the major and minor terms. An instance of this is Caeneus’ proof that fire increases in geometrical proportion: ‘Fire’, he argues, ‘increases rapidly, and so does geometrical proportion’. There is no syllogism so, but there is a syllogism if the most rapidly increasing proportion is geometrical and the most rapidly increasing proportion is attributable to fire in its motion. Sometimes, no doubt, it is impossible to reason from premisses predicating mere attributes: but sometimes it is possible, though the possibility is overlooked. If false premisses could never give true conclusions ‘resolution’ would be easy, for premisses and conclusion would in that case inevitably reciprocate. I might then argue thus: let A be an existing fact; let the existence of A imply such and such facts actually known to me to exist, which we may call B. I can now, since they reciprocate, infer A from B. Reciprocation of premisses and conclusion is more frequent in mathematics, because mathematics takes definitions, but never an accident, for its premisses – a second characteristic

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distinguishing disputations.

mathematical

reasoning

from

dialectical

A science expands not by the interposition of fresh middle terms, but by the apposition of fresh extreme terms. E.g. A is predicated of B, B of C, C of D, and so indefinitely. Or the expansion may be lateral: e.g. one major A, may be proved of two minors, C and E. Thus let A represent number – a number or number taken indeterminately; B determinate odd number; C any particular odd number. We can then predicate A of C. Next let D represent determinate even number, and E even number. Then A is predicable of E.

13 Knowledge of the fact differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact. To begin with, they differ within the same science and in two ways: (1) when the premisses of the syllogism are not immediate (for then the proximate cause is not contained in them – a necessary condition of knowledge of the reasoned fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate, but instead of the cause the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle; for of two reciprocally predicable terms the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstration. Thus (2) (a) you might prove as follows that the planets are near because they do not twinkle: let C be the planets, B not twinkling, A proximity. Then B is predicable of C; for the planets do not twinkle. But A is also predicable of B, since that which does not twinkle is near – we must take this truth as having been reached by induction or sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C; so that we have demonstrated that the

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planets are near. This syllogism, then, proves not the reasoned fact but only the fact; since they are not near because they do not twinkle, but, because they are near, do not twinkle. The major and middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the demonstration will be of the reasoned fact. Thus: let C be the planets, B proximity, A not twinkling. Then B is an attribute of C, and A – not twinkling – of B. Consequently A is predicable of C, and the syllogism proves the reasoned fact, since its middle term is the proximate cause. Another example is the inference that the moon is spherical from its manner of waxing. Thus: since that which so waxes is spherical, and since the moon so waxes, clearly the moon is spherical. Put in this form, the syllogism turns out to be proof of the fact, but if the middle and major be reversed it is proof of the reasoned fact; since the moon is not spherical because it waxes in a certain manner, but waxes in such a manner because it is spherical. (Let C be the moon, B spherical, and A waxing.) Again (b), in cases where the cause and the effect are not reciprocal and the effect is the better known, the fact is demonstrated but not the reasoned fact. This also occurs (1) when the middle falls outside the major and minor, for here too the strict cause is not given, and so the demonstration is of the fact, not of the reasoned fact. For example, the question ‘Why does not a wall breathe?’ might be answered, ‘Because it is not an animal’; but that answer would not give the strict cause, because if not being an animal causes the absence of respiration, then being an animal should be the cause of respiration, according to the rule that if the negation of causes the non-inherence of y, the affirmation of x causes the inherence of y; e.g. if the disproportion of the hot and cold elements is the cause of ill health, their proportion is the cause of health; and conversely, if the assertion of x causes the inherence of y, the negation of x must cause y’s noninherence. But in the case given this consequence does not result; for not every animal breathes. A syllogism with this kind

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of cause takes place in the second figure. Thus: let A be animal, B respiration, C wall. Then A is predicable of all B (for all that breathes is animal), but of no C; and consequently B is predicable of no C; that is, the wall does not breathe. Such causes are like far-fetched explanations, which precisely consist in making the cause too remote, as in Anacharsis’ account of why the Scythians have no flute-players; namely because they have no vines. Thus, then, do the syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned fact differ within one science and according to the position of the middle terms. But there is another way too in which the fact and the reasoned fact differ, and that is when they are investigated respectively by different sciences. This occurs in the case of problems related to one another as subordinate and superior, as when optical problems are subordinated to geometry, mechanical problems to stereometry, harmonic problems to arithmetic, the data of observation to astronomy. (Some of these sciences bear almost the same name; e.g. mathematical and nautical astronomy, mathematical and acoustical harmonics.) Here it is the business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of the mathematicians to know the reasoned fact; for the latter are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes, and are often ignorant of the fact: just as we have often a clear insight into a universal, but through lack of observation are ignorant of some of its particular instances. These connexions have a perceptible existence though they are manifestations of forms. For the mathematical sciences concern forms: they do not demonstrate properties of a substratum, since, even though the geometrical subjects are predicable as properties of a perceptible substratum, it is not as thus predicable that the mathematician demonstrates properties of them. As optics is related to geometry, so another science is related to optics, namely the theory of the rainbow. Here knowledge of the fact is within the
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province of the natural philosopher, knowledge of the reasoned fact within that of the optician, either qua optician or qua mathematical optician. Many sciences not standing in this mutual relation enter into it at points; e.g. medicine and geometry: it is the physician’s business to know that circular wounds heal more slowly, the geometer’s to know the reason why.

14 Of all the figures the most scientific is the first. Thus, it is the vehicle of the demonstrations of all the mathematical sciences, such as arithmetic, geometry, and optics, and practically all of all sciences that investigate causes: for the syllogism of the reasoned fact is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases in this figure – a second proof that this figure is the most scientific; for grasp of a reasoned conclusion is the primary condition of knowledge. Thirdly, the first is the only figure which enables us to pursue knowledge of the essence of a thing. In the second figure no affirmative conclusion is possible, and knowledge of a thing’s essence must be affirmative; while in the third figure the conclusion can be affirmative, but cannot be universal, and essence must have a universal character: e.g. man is not two-footed animal in any qualified sense, but universally. Finally, the first figure has no need of the others, while it is by means of the first that the other two figures are developed, and have their intervals closepacked until immediate premisses are reached. Clearly, therefore, the first figure is the primary condition of knowledge.

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15 Just as an attribute A may (as we saw) be atomically connected with a subject B, so its disconnexion may be atomic. I call ‘atomic’ connexions or disconnexions which involve no intermediate term; since in that case the connexion or disconnexion will not be mediated by something other than the terms themselves. It follows that if either A or B, or both A and B, have a genus, their disconnexion cannot be primary. Thus: let C be the genus of A. Then, if C is not the genus of B – for A may well have a genus which is not the genus of B – there will be a syllogism proving A’s disconnexion from B thus: all A is C, no B is C, therefore no B is A. Or if it is B which has a genus D, we have all B is D, no D is A, therefore no B is A, by syllogism; and the proof will be similar if both A and B have a genus. That the genus of A need not be the genus of B and vice versa, is shown by the existence of mutually exclusive coordinate series of predication. If no term in the series ACD... is predicable of any term in the series BEF..., and if G – a term in the former series – is the genus of A, clearly G will not be the genus of B; since, if it were, the series would not be mutually exclusive. So also if B has a genus, it will not be the genus of A. If, on the other hand, neither A nor B has a genus and A does not inhere in B, this

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disconnexion must be atomic. If there be a middle term, one or other of them is bound to have a genus, for the syllogism will be either in the first or the second figure. If it is in the first, B will have a genus – for the premiss containing it must be affirmative: if in the second, either A or B indifferently, since syllogism is possible if either is contained in a negative premiss, but not if both premisses are negative. Hence it is clear that one thing may be atomically disconnected from another, and we have stated when and how this is possible.

16 Ignorance – defined not as the negation of knowledge but as a positive state of mind – is error produced by inference. (1) Let us first consider propositions asserting a predicate’s immediate connexion with or disconnexion from a subject. Here, it is true, positive error may befall one in alternative ways; for it may arise where one directly believes a connexion or disconnexion as well as where one’s belief is acquired by inference. The error, however, that consists in a direct belief is without complication; but the error resulting from inference – which here concerns us – takes many forms. Thus, let A be atomically disconnected from all B: then the conclusion inferred through a middle term C, that all B is A, will be a case of error produced by syllogism. Now, two cases are possible. Either (a) both premisses, or (b) one premiss only, may be false. (a) If neither A is an attribute of any C nor C of any B, whereas the contrary was posited in both cases, both premisses will be false. (C may quite well be so related to A and B that C is neither subordinate to A nor a universal attribute of B: for B, since A was
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said to be primarily disconnected from B, cannot have a genus, and A need not necessarily be a universal attribute of all things. Consequently both premisses may be false.) On the other hand, (b) one of the premisses may be true, though not either indifferently but only the major A-C since, B having no genus, the premiss C-B will always be false, while A-C may be true. This is the case if, for example, A is related atomically to both C and B; because when the same term is related atomically to more terms than one, neither of those terms will belong to the other. It is, of course, equally the case if A-C is not atomic. Error of attribution, then, occurs through these causes and in this form only – for we found that no syllogism of universal attribution was possible in any figure but the first. On the other hand, an error of non-attribution may occur either in the first or in the second figure. Let us therefore first explain the various forms it takes in the first figure and the character of the premisses in each case. (c) It may occur when both premisses are false; e.g. supposing A atomically connected with both C and B, if it be then assumed that no C is and all B is C, both premisses are false. (d) It is also possible when one is false. This may be either premiss indifferently. A-C may be true, C-B false – A-C true because A is not an attribute of all things, C-B false because C, which never has the attribute A, cannot be an attribute of B; for if C-B were true, the premiss A-C would no longer be true, and besides if both premisses were true, the conclusion would be true. Or again, C-B may be true and A-C false; e.g. if both C and A contain B as genera, one of them must be subordinate to the other, so that if the premiss takes the form No C is A, it will be false. This makes it clear that whether either or both premisses are false, the conclusion will equally be false.

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In the second figure the premisses cannot both be wholly false; for if all B is A, no middle term can be with truth universally affirmed of one extreme and universally denied of the other: but premisses in which the middle is affirmed of one extreme and denied of the other are the necessary condition if one is to get a valid inference at all. Therefore if, taken in this way, they are wholly false, their contraries conversely should be wholly true. But this is impossible. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent both premisses being partially false; e.g. if actually some A is C and some B is C, then if it is premised that all A is C and no B is C, both premisses are false, yet partially, not wholly, false. The same is true if the major is made negative instead of the minor. Or one premiss may be wholly false, and it may be either of them. Thus, supposing that actually an attribute of all A must also be an attribute of all B, then if C is yet taken to be a universal attribute of all but universally non-attributable to B, CA will be true but C-B false. Again, actually that which is an attribute of no B will not be an attribute of all A either; for if it be an attribute of all A, it will also be an attribute of all B, which is contrary to supposition; but if C be nevertheless assumed to be a universal attribute of A, but an attribute of no B, then the premiss C-B is true but the major is false. The case is similar if the major is made the negative premiss. For in fact what is an attribute of no A will not be an attribute of any B either; and if it be yet assumed that C is universally non-attributable to A, but a universal attribute of B, the premiss C-A is true but the minor wholly false. Again, in fact it is false to assume that that which is an attribute of all B is an attribute of no A, for if it be an attribute of all B, it must be an attribute of some A. If then C is nevertheless assumed to be an attribute of all B but of no A, C-B will be true but C-A false. It is thus clear that in the case of atomic propositions erroneous inference will be possible not only when both premisses are false but also when only one is false.
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17 In the case of attributes not atomically connected with or disconnected from their subjects, (a) (i) as long as the false conclusion is inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle, only the major and not both premisses can be false. By ‘appropriate middle’ I mean the middle term through which the contradictory – i.e. the true-conclusion is inferrible. Thus, let A be attributable to B through a middle term C: then, since to produce a conclusion the premiss C-B must be taken affirmatively, it is clear that this premiss must always be true, for its quality is not changed. But the major A-C is false, for it is by a change in the quality of A-C that the conclusion becomes its contradictory – i.e. true. Similarly (ii) if the middle is taken from another series of predication; e.g. suppose D to be not only contained within A as a part within its whole but also predicable of all B. Then the premiss D-B must remain unchanged, but the quality of A-D must be changed; so that D-B is always true, A-D always false. Such error is practically identical with that which is inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle. On the other hand, (b) if the conclusion is not inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle – (i) when the middle is subordinate to A but is predicable of no B, both premisses must be false, because if there is to be a conclusion both must be posited as asserting the contrary of what is actually the fact, and so posited both become false: e.g. suppose that actually all D is A but no B is D; then if these premisses are changed in quality, a conclusion will follow and both of the new premisses will be false. When, however, (ii) the middle D is not subordinate to A, A-D will be true, D-B false – A-D true because A was not subordinate to D, D-B false because if it had been true, the

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conclusion too would have been true; but it is ex hypothesi false. When the erroneous inference is in the second figure, both premisses cannot be entirely false; since if B is subordinate to A, there can be no middle predicable of all of one extreme and of none of the other, as was stated before. One premiss, however, may be false, and it may be either of them. Thus, if C is actually an attribute of both A and B, but is assumed to be an attribute of A only and not of B, C-A will be true, C-B false: or again if C be assumed to be attributable to B but to no A, C-B will be true, C-A false. We have stated when and through what kinds of premisses error will result in cases where the erroneous conclusion is negative. If the conclusion is affirmative, (a) (i) it may be inferred through the ‘appropriate’ middle term. In this case both premisses cannot be false since, as we said before, C-B must remain unchanged if there is to be a conclusion, and consequently A-C, the quality of which is changed, will always be false. This is equally true if (ii) the middle is taken from another series of predication, as was stated to be the case also with regard to negative error; for D-B must remain unchanged, while the quality of A-D must be converted, and the type of error is the same as before. (b) The middle may be inappropriate. Then (i) if D is subordinate to A, A-D will be true, but D-B false; since A may quite well be predicable of several terms no one of which can be subordinated to another. If, however, (ii) D is not subordinate to A, obviously A-D, since it is affirmed, will always be false, while D-B may be either true or false; for A may very well be an attribute of no D, whereas all B is D, e.g. no science is animal, all music is science. Equally well A may be an attribute of no D, and D of no B. It emerges, then, that if the middle term is not

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subordinate to the major, not only both premisses but either singly may be false. Thus we have made it clear how many varieties of erroneous inference are liable to happen and through what kinds of premisses they occur, in the case both of immediate and of demonstrable truths.

18 It is also clear that the loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge, and that, since we learn either by induction or by demonstration, this knowledge cannot be acquired. Thus demonstration develops from universals, induction from particulars; but since it is possible to familiarize the pupil with even the so-called mathematical abstractions only through induction – i.e. only because each subject genus possesses, in virtue of a determinate mathematical character, certain properties which can be treated as separate even though they do not exist in isolation – it is consequently impossible to come to grasp universals except through induction. But induction is impossible for those who have not sense-perception. For it is sense-perception alone which is adequate for grasping the particulars: they cannot be objects of scientific knowledge, because neither can universals give us knowledge of them without induction, nor can we get it through induction without sense-perception.

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19 Every syllogism is effected by means of three terms. One kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing that A inheres in B and B in C; the other is negative and one of its premisses asserts one term of another, while the other denies one term of another. It is clear, then, that these are the fundamentals and so-called hypotheses of syllogism. Assume them as they have been stated, and proof is bound to follow – proof that A inheres in C through B, and again that A inheres in B through some other middle term, and similarly that B inheres in C. If our reasoning aims at gaining credence and so is merely dialectical, it is obvious that we have only to see that our inference is based on premisses as credible as possible: so that if a middle term between A and B is credible though not real, one can reason through it and complete a dialectical syllogism. If, however, one is aiming at truth, one must be guided by the real connexions of subjects and attributes. Thus: since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially or naturally and not coincidentally – not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man’, which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one substratum – therefore there are terms such as are naturally subjects of predicates. Suppose, then, C such a term not itself attributable to anything else as to a subject, but the proximate subject of the attribute B – i.e. so that B-C is immediate; suppose further E related immediately to F, and F to B. The first question is, must this series terminate, or can it proceed to infinity? The second question is as follows: Suppose nothing is essentially predicated of A, but A is predicated primarily of H and of no intermediate prior term, and suppose H similarly related to G and G to B; then must this series also terminate, or can it too proceed to infinity? There is
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this much difference between the questions: the first is, is it possible to start from that which is not itself attributable to anything else but is the subject of attributes, and ascend to infinity? The second is the problem whether one can start from that which is a predicate but not itself a subject of predicates, and descend to infinity? A third question is, if the extreme terms are fixed, can there be an infinity of middles? I mean this: suppose for example that A inheres in C and B is intermediate between them, but between B and A there are other middles, and between these again fresh middles; can these proceed to infinity or can they not? This is the equivalent of inquiring, do demonstrations proceed to infinity, i.e. is everything demonstrable? Or do ultimate subject and primary attribute limit one another? I hold that the same questions arise with regard to negative conclusions and premisses: viz. if A is attributable to no B, then either this predication will be primary, or there will be an intermediate term prior to B to which a is not attributable – G, let us say, which is attributable to all B – and there may still be another term H prior to G, which is attributable to all G. The same questions arise, I say, because in these cases too either the series of prior terms to which a is not attributable is infinite or it terminates. One cannot ask the same questions in the case of reciprocating terms, since when subject and predicate are convertible there is neither primary nor ultimate subject, seeing that all the reciprocals qua subjects stand in the same relation to one another, whether we say that the subject has an infinity of attributes or that both subjects and attributes – and we raised the question in both cases – are infinite in number. These questions then cannot be asked – unless, indeed, the terms can reciprocate by two different modes, by accidental predication in one relation and natural predication in the other.

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20 Now, it is clear that if the predications terminate in both the upward and the downward direction (by ‘upward’ I mean the ascent to the more universal, by ‘downward’ the descent to the more particular), the middle terms cannot be infinite in number. For suppose that A is predicated of F, and that the intermediates – call them B B’ B”... – are infinite, then clearly you might descend from and find one term predicated of another ad infinitum, since you have an infinity of terms between you and F; and equally, if you ascend from F, there are infinite terms between you and A. It follows that if these processes are impossible there cannot be an infinity of intermediates between A and F. Nor is it of any effect to urge that some terms of the series AB...F are contiguous so as to exclude intermediates, while others cannot be taken into the argument at all: whichever terms of the series B...I take, the number of intermediates in the direction either of A or of F must be finite or infinite: where the infinite series starts, whether from the first term or from a later one, is of no moment, for the succeeding terms in any case are infinite in number.

21 Further, if in affirmative demonstration the series terminates in both directions, clearly it will terminate too in negative demonstration. Let us assume that we cannot proceed to infinity either by ascending from the ultimate term (by ‘ultimate term’ I mean a term such as was, not itself attributable to a

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subject but itself the subject of attributes), or by descending towards an ultimate from the primary term (by ‘primary term’ I mean a term predicable of a subject but not itself a subject). If this assumption is justified, the series will also terminate in the case of negation. For a negative conclusion can be proved in all three figures. In the first figure it is proved thus: no B is A, all C is B. In packing the interval B-C we must reach immediate propositions – as is always the case with the minor premiss – since B-C is affirmative. As regards the other premiss it is plain that if the major term is denied of a term D prior to B, D will have to be predicable of all B, and if the major is denied of yet another term prior to D, this term must be predicable of all D. Consequently, since the ascending series is finite, the descent will also terminate and there will be a subject of which A is primarily non-predicable. In the second figure the syllogism is, all A is B, no C is B,..no C is A. If proof of this is required, plainly it may be shown either in the first figure as above, in the second as here, or in the third. The first figure has been discussed, and we will proceed to display the second, proof by which will be as follows: all B is D, no C is D..., since it is required that B should be a subject of which a predicate is affirmed. Next, since D is to be proved not to belong to C, then D has a further predicate which is denied of C. Therefore, since the succession of predicates affirmed of an ever higher universal terminates, the succession of predicates denied terminates too. The third figure shows it as follows: all B is A, some B is not C. Therefore some A is not C. This premiss, i.e. C-B, will be proved either in the same figure or in one of the two figures discussed above. In the first and second figures the series terminates. If we use the third figure, we shall take as premisses, all E is B, some E is not C, and this premiss again will be proved by a similar prosyllogism. But since it is assumed that the series of descending subjects also terminates, plainly the series of more universal non-predicables will terminate also. Even supposing
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that the proof is not confined to one method, but employs them all and is now in the first figure, now in the second or third – even so the regress will terminate, for the methods are finite in number, and if finite things are combined in a finite number of ways, the result must be finite. Thus it is plain that the regress of middles terminates in the case of negative demonstration, if it does so also in the case of affirmative demonstration. That in fact the regress terminates in both these cases may be made clear by the following dialectical considerations.

22 In the case of predicates constituting the essential nature of a thing, it clearly terminates, seeing that if definition is possible, or in other words, if essential form is knowable, and an infinite series cannot be traversed, predicates constituting a thing’s essential nature must be finite in number. But as regards predicates generally we have the following prefatory remarks to make. (1) We can affirm without falsehood ‘the white (thing) is walking’, and that big (thing) is a log’; or again, ‘the log is big’, and ‘the man walks’. But the affirmation differs in the two cases. When I affirm ‘the white is a log’, I mean that something which happens to be white is a log – not that white is the substratum in which log inheres, for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log, and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally. On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white’, I do not mean that something else, which happens also to be a log, is white (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘the man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on

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the contrary, log is here the substratum – the substratum which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else. If we must lay down a rule, let us entitle the latter kind of statement predication, and the former not predication at all, or not strict but accidental predication. ‘White’ and ‘log’ will thus serve as types respectively of predicate and subject. We shall assume, then, that the predicate is invariably predicated strictly and not accidentally of the subject, for on such predication demonstrations depend for their force. It follows from this that when a single attribute is predicated of a single subject, the predicate must affirm of the subject either some element constituting its essential nature, or that it is in some way qualified, quantified, essentially related, active, passive, placed, or dated. (2) Predicates which signify substance signify that the subject is identical with the predicate or with a species of the predicate. Predicates not signifying substance which are predicated of a subject not identical with themselves or with a species of themselves are accidental or coincidental; e.g. white is a coincident of man, seeing that man is not identical with white or a species of white, but rather with animal, since man is identical with a species of animal. These predicates which do not signify substance must be predicates of some other subject, and nothing can be white which is not also other than white. The Forms we can dispense with, for they are mere sound without sense; and even if there are such things, they are not relevant to our discussion, since demonstrations are concerned with predicates such as we have defined. (3) If A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A – a quality of a quality. Therefore A and B cannot be predicated reciprocally of one another in strict predication: they can be affirmed without

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falsehood of one another, but not genuinely predicated of each other. For one alternative is that they should be substantially predicated of one another, i.e. B would become the genus or differentia of A – the predicate now become subject. But it has been shown that in these substantial predications neither the ascending predicates nor the descending subjects form an infinite series; e.g. neither the series, man is biped, biped is animal, &c., nor the series predicating animal of man, man of Callias, Callias of a further. subject as an element of its essential nature, is infinite. For all such substance is definable, and an infinite series cannot be traversed in thought: consequently neither the ascent nor the descent is infinite, since a substance whose predicates were infinite would not be definable. Hence they will not be predicated each as the genus of the other; for this would equate a genus with one of its own species. Nor (the other alternative) can a quale be reciprocally predicated of a quale, nor any term belonging to an adjectival category of another such term, except by accidental predication; for all such predicates are coincidents and are predicated of substances. On the other hand – in proof of the impossibility of an infinite ascending series – every predication displays the subject as somehow qualified or quantified or as characterized under one of the other adjectival categories, or else is an element in its substantial nature: these latter are limited in number, and the number of the widest kinds under which predications fall is also limited, for every predication must exhibit its subject as somehow qualified, quantified, essentially related, acting or suffering, or in some place or at some time. I assume first that predication implies a single subject and a single attribute, and secondly that predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another. We assume this because such predicates are all coincidents, and though some are essential coincidents, others of a different type, yet we maintain that all of them alike are predicated of some
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substratum and that a coincident is never a substratum – since we do not class as a coincident anything which does not owe its designation to its being something other than itself, but always hold that any coincident is predicated of some substratum other than itself, and that another group of coincidents may have a different substratum. Subject to these assumptions then, neither the ascending nor the descending series of predication in which a single attribute is predicated of a single subject is infinite. For the subjects of which coincidents are predicated are as many as the constitutive elements of each individual substance, and these we have seen are not infinite in number, while in the ascending series are contained those constitutive elements with their coincidents – both of which are finite. We conclude that there is a given subject (D) of which some attribute (C) is primarily predicable; that there must be an attribute (B) primarily predicable of the first attribute, and that the series must end with a term (A) not predicable of any term prior to the last subject of which it was predicated (B), and of which no term prior to it is predicable. The argument we have given is one of the so-called proofs; an alternative proof follows. Predicates so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of those subjects are demonstrable; but of demonstrable propositions one cannot have something better than knowledge, nor can one know them without demonstration. Secondly, if a consequent is only known through an antecedent (viz. premisses prior to it) and we neither know this antecedent nor have something better than knowledge of it, then we shall not have scientific knowledge of the consequent. Therefore, if it is possible through demonstration to know anything without qualification and not merely as dependent on the acceptance of certain premisses – i.e. hypothetically – the series of intermediate predications must terminate. If it does not terminate, and beyond any predicate taken as higher than another there remains another still higher,
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then every predicate is demonstrable. Consequently, since these demonstrable predicates are infinite in number and therefore cannot be traversed, we shall not know them by demonstration. If, therefore, we have not something better than knowledge of them, we cannot through demonstration have unqualified but only hypothetical science of anything. As dialectical proofs of our contention these may carry conviction, but an analytic process will show more briefly that neither the ascent nor the descent of predication can be infinite in the demonstrative sciences which are the object of our investigation. Demonstration proves the inherence of essential attributes in things. Now attributes may be essential for two reasons: either because they are elements in the essential nature of their subjects, or because their subjects are elements in their essential nature. An example of the latter is odd as an attribute of number – though it is number’s attribute, yet number itself is an element in the definition of odd; of the former, multiplicity or the indivisible, which are elements in the definition of number. In neither kind of attribution can the terms be infinite. They are not infinite where each is related to the term below it as odd is to number, for this would mean the inherence in odd of another attribute of odd in whose nature odd was an essential element: but then number will be an ultimate subject of the whole infinite chain of attributes, and be an element in the definition of each of them. Hence, since an infinity of attributes such as contain their subject in their definition cannot inhere in a single thing, the ascending series is equally finite. Note, moreover, that all such attributes must so inhere in the ultimate subject – e.g. its attributes in number and number in them – as to be commensurate with the subject and not of wider extent. Attributes which are essential elements in the nature of their subjects are equally finite: otherwise definition would be impossible. Hence, if all the attributes predicated are essential and these cannot be infinite, the
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ascending series will descending series too.

terminate,

and

consequently

the

If this is so, it follows that the intermediates between any two terms are also always limited in number. An immediately obvious consequence of this is that demonstrations necessarily involve basic truths, and that the contention of some – referred to at the outset – that all truths are demonstrable is mistaken. For if there are basic truths, (a) not all truths are demonstrable, and (b) an infinite regress is impossible; since if either (a) or (b) were not a fact, it would mean that no interval was immediate and indivisible, but that all intervals were divisible. This is true because a conclusion is demonstrated by the interposition, not the apposition, of a fresh term. If such interposition could continue to infinity there might be an infinite number of terms between any two terms; but this is impossible if both the ascending and descending series of predication terminate; and of this fact, which before was shown dialectically, analytic proof has now been given.

23 It is an evident corollary of these conclusions that if the same attribute A inheres in two terms C and D predicable either not at all, or not of all instances, of one another, it does not always belong to them in virtue of a common middle term. Isosceles and scalene possess the attribute of having their angles equal to two right angles in virtue of a common middle; for they possess it in so far as they are both a certain kind of figure, and not in so far as they differ from one another. But this is not always the case: for, were it so, if we take B as the common middle in virtue of which A inheres in C and D, clearly B would inhere in C and D

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through a second common middle, and this in turn would inhere in C and D through a third, so that between two terms an infinity of intermediates would fall – an impossibility. Thus it need not always be in virtue of a common middle term that a single attribute inheres in several subjects, since there must be immediate intervals. Yet if the attribute to be proved common to two subjects is to be one of their essential attributes, the middle terms involved must be within one subject genus and be derived from the same group of immediate premisses; for we have seen that processes of proof cannot pass from one genus to another. It is also clear that when A inheres in B, this can be demonstrated if there is a middle term. Further, the ‘elements’ of such a conclusion are the premisses containing the middle in question, and they are identical in number with the middle terms, seeing that the immediate propositions – or at least such immediate propositions as are universal – are the ‘elements’. If, on the other hand, there is no middle term, demonstration ceases to be possible: we are on the way to the basic truths. Similarly if A does not inhere in B, this can be demonstrated if there is a middle term or a term prior to B in which A does not inhere: otherwise there is no demonstration and a basic truth is reached. There are, moreover, as many ‘elements’ of the demonstrated conclusion as there are middle terms, since it is propositions containing these middle terms that are the basic premisses on which the demonstration rests; and as there are some indemonstrable basic truths asserting that ‘this is that’ or that ‘this inheres in that’, so there are others denying that ‘this is that’ or that ‘this inheres in that’ – in fact some basic truths will affirm and some will deny being. When we are to prove a conclusion, we must take a primary essential predicate – suppose it C – of the subject B, and then suppose A similarly predicable of C. If we proceed in this

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manner, no proposition or attribute which falls beyond A is admitted in the proof: the interval is constantly condensed until subject and predicate become indivisible, i.e. one. We have our unit when the premiss becomes immediate, since the immediate premiss alone is a single premiss in the unqualified sense of ‘single’. And as in other spheres the basic element is simple but not identical in all – in a system of weight it is the mina, in music the quarter-tone, and so on – so in syllogism the unit is an immediate premiss, and in the knowledge that demonstration gives it is an intuition. In syllogisms, then, which prove the inherence of an attribute, nothing falls outside the major term. In the case of negative syllogisms on the other hand, (1) in the first figure nothing falls outside the major term whose inherence is in question; e.g. to prove through a middle C that A does not inhere in B the premisses required are, all B is C, no C is A. Then if it has to be proved that no C is A, a middle must be found between and C; and this procedure will never vary. (2) If we have to show that E is not D by means of the premisses, all D is C; no E, or not all E, is C; then the middle will never fall beyond E, and E is the subject of which D is to be denied in the conclusion. (3) In the third figure the middle will never fall beyond the limits of the subject and the attribute denied of it.

24 Since demonstrations may be either commensurately universal or particular, and either affirmative or negative; the question arises, which form is the better? And the same question may be put in regard to so-called ‘direct’ demonstration and reductio ad
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impossibile. Let us first examine the commensurately universal and the particular forms, and when we have cleared up this problem proceed to discuss ‘direct’ demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. The following considerations might lead some minds to prefer particular demonstration. (1) The superior demonstration is the demonstration which gives us greater knowledge (for this is the ideal of demonstration), and we have greater knowledge of a particular individual when we know it in itself than when we know it through something else; e.g. we know Coriscus the musician better when we know that Coriscus is musical than when we know only that man is musical, and a like argument holds in all other cases. But commensurately universal demonstration, instead of proving that the subject itself actually is x, proves only that something else is x – e.g. in attempting to prove that isosceles is x, it proves not that isosceles but only that triangle is x – whereas particular demonstration proves that the subject itself is x. The demonstration, then, that a subject, as such, possesses an attribute is superior. If this is so, and if the particular rather than the commensurately universal forms demonstrates, particular demonstration is superior. (2) The universal has not a separate being over against groups of singulars. Demonstration nevertheless creates the opinion that its function is conditioned by something like this – some separate entity belonging to the real world; that, for instance, of triangle or of figure or number, over against particular triangles, figures, and numbers. But demonstration which touches the real and will not mislead is superior to that which moves among unrealities and is delusory. Now commensurately universal demonstration is of the latter kind: if we engage in it we find ourselves reasoning after a fashion well illustrated by

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the argument that the proportionate is what answers to the definition of some entity which is neither line, number, solid, nor plane, but a proportionate apart from all these. Since, then, such a proof is characteristically commensurate and universal, and less touches reality than does particular demonstration, and creates a false opinion, it will follow that commensurate and universal is inferior to particular demonstration. We may retort thus. (1) The first argument applies no more to commensurate and universal than to particular demonstration. If equality to two right angles is attributable to its subject not qua isosceles but qua triangle, he who knows that isosceles possesses that attribute knows the subject as qua itself possessing the attribute, to a less degree than he who knows that triangle has that attribute. To sum up the whole matter: if a subject is proved to possess qua triangle an attribute which it does not in fact possess qua triangle, that is not demonstration: but if it does possess it qua triangle the rule applies that the greater knowledge is his who knows the subject as possessing its attribute qua that in virtue of which it actually does possess it. Since, then, triangle is the wider term, and there is one identical definition of triangle – i.e. the term is not equivocal – and since equality to two right angles belongs to all triangles, it is isosceles qua triangle and not triangle qua isosceles which has its angles so related. It follows that he who knows a connexion universally has greater knowledge of it as it in fact is than he who knows the particular; and the inference is that commensurate and universal is superior to particular demonstration. (2) If there is a single identical definition i.e. if the commensurate universal is unequivocal – then the universal will possess being not less but more than some of the particulars, inasmuch as it is universals which comprise the imperishable, particulars that tend to perish.

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(3) Because the universal has a single meaning, we are not therefore compelled to suppose that in these examples it has being as a substance apart from its particulars – any more than we need make a similar supposition in the other cases of unequivocal universal predication, viz. where the predicate signifies not substance but quality, essential relatedness, or action. If such a supposition is entertained, the blame rests not with the demonstration but with the hearer. (4) Demonstration is syllogism that proves the cause, i.e. the reasoned fact, and it is rather the commensurate universal than the particular which is causative (as may be shown thus: that which possesses an attribute through its own essential nature is itself the cause of the inherence, and the commensurate universal is primary; hence the commensurate universal is the cause). Consequently commensurately universal demonstration is superior as more especially proving the cause, that is the reasoned fact. (5) Our search for the reason ceases, and we think that we know, when the coming to be or existence of the fact before us is not due to the coming to be or existence of some other fact, for the last step of a search thus conducted is eo ipso the end and limit of the problem. Thus: ‘Why did he come?’ ‘To get the money – wherewith to pay a debt – that he might thereby do what was right.’ When in this regress we can no longer find an efficient or final cause, we regard the last step of it as the end of the coming – or being or coming to be – and we regard ourselves as then only having full knowledge of the reason why he came. If, then, all causes and reasons are alike in this respect, and if this is the means to full knowledge in the case of final causes such as we have exemplified, it follows that in the case of the other causes also full knowledge is attained when an attribute no longer inheres because of something else. Thus, when we

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learn that exterior angles are equal to four right angles because they are the exterior angles of an isosceles, there still remains the question ‘Why has isosceles this attribute?’ and its answer ‘Because it is a triangle, and a triangle has it because a triangle is a rectilinear figure.’ If rectilinear figure possesses the property for no further reason, at this point we have full knowledge – but at this point our knowledge has become commensurately universal, and so we conclude that commensurately universal demonstration is superior. (6) The more demonstration becomes particular the more it sinks into an indeterminate manifold, while universal demonstration tends to the simple and determinate. But objects so far as they are an indeterminate manifold are unintelligible, so far as they are determinate, intelligible: they are therefore intelligible rather in so far as they are universal than in so far as they are particular. From this it follows that universals are more demonstrable: but since relative and correlative increase concomitantly, of the more demonstrable there will be fuller demonstration. Hence the commensurate and universal form, being more truly demonstration, is the superior. (7) Demonstration which teaches two things is preferable to demonstration which teaches only one. He who possesses commensurately universal demonstration knows the particular as well, but he who possesses particular demonstration does not know the universal. So that this is an additional reason for preferring commensurately universal demonstration. And there is yet this further argument: (8) Proof becomes more and more proof of the commensurate universal as its middle term approaches nearer to the basic truth, and nothing is so near as the immediate premiss which is itself the basic truth. If, then, proof from the basic truth is more accurate than proof not so derived, demonstration which

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depends more closely on it is more accurate than demonstration which is less closely dependent. But commensurately universal demonstration is characterized by this closer dependence, and is therefore superior. Thus, if A had to be proved to inhere in D, and the middles were B and C, B being the higher term would render the demonstration which it mediated the more universal. Some of these arguments, however, are dialectical. The clearest indication of the precedence of commensurately universal demonstration is as follows: if of two propositions, a prior and a posterior, we have a grasp of the prior, we have a kind of knowledge – a potential grasp – of the posterior as well. For example, if one knows that the angles of all triangles are equal to two right angles, one knows in a sense – potentially – that the isosceles’ angles also are equal to two right angles, even if one does not know that the isosceles is a triangle; but to grasp this posterior proposition is by no means to know the commensurate universal either potentially or actually. Moreover, commensurately universal demonstration is through and through intelligible; particular demonstration issues in sense-perception.

25 The preceding arguments constitute our defence of the superiority of commensurately universal to particular demonstration. That affirmative demonstration excels negative may be shown as follows. (1) We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses – in short from fewer premisses; for, given that all
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these are equally well known, where they are fewer knowledge will be more speedily acquired, and that is a desideratum. The argument implied in our contention that demonstration from fewer assumptions is superior may be set out in universal form as follows. Assuming that in both cases alike the middle terms are known, and that middles which are prior are better known than such as are posterior, we may suppose two demonstrations of the inherence of A in E, the one proving it through the middles B, C and D, the other through F and G. Then A-D is known to the same degree as A-E (in the second proof), but A-D is better known than and prior to A-E (in the first proof); since A-E is proved through A-D, and the ground is more certain than the conclusion. Hence demonstration by fewer premisses is ceteris paribus superior. Now both affirmative and negative demonstration operate through three terms and two premisses, but whereas the former assumes only that something is, the latter assumes both that something is and that something else is not, and thus operating through more kinds of premiss is inferior. (2) It has been proved that no conclusion follows if both premisses are negative, but that one must be negative, the other affirmative. So we are compelled to lay down the following additional rule: as the demonstration expands, the affirmative premisses must increase in number, but there cannot be more than one negative premiss in each complete proof. Thus, suppose no B is A, and all C is B. Then if both the premisses are to be again expanded, a middle must be interposed. Let us interpose D between A and B, and E between B and C. Then clearly E is affirmatively related to B and C, while D is affirmatively related to B but negatively to A; for all B is D, but there must be no D which is A. Thus there proves to be a single negative premiss, A-D. In the further prosyllogisms too it is the same, because in the terms of an affirmative syllogism the

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middle is always related affirmatively to both extremes; in a negative syllogism it must be negatively related only to one of them, and so this negation comes to be a single negative premiss, the other premisses being affirmative. If, then, that through which a truth is proved is a better known and more certain truth, and if the negative proposition is proved through the affirmative and not vice versa, affirmative demonstration, being prior and better known and more certain, will be superior. (3) The basic truth of demonstrative syllogism is the universal immediate premiss, and the universal premiss asserts in affirmative demonstration and in negative denies: and the affirmative proposition is prior to and better known than the negative (since affirmation explains denial and is prior to denial, just as being is prior to not-being). It follows that the basic premiss of affirmative demonstration is superior to that of negative demonstration, and the demonstration which uses superior basic premisses is superior. (4) Affirmative demonstration is more of the nature of a basic form of proof, because it is a sine qua non of negative demonstration.

26 Since affirmative demonstration is superior to negative, it is clearly superior also to reductio ad impossibile. We must first make certain what is the difference between negative demonstration and reductio ad impossibile. Let us suppose that no B is A, and that all C is B: the conclusion necessarily follows that no C is A. If these premisses are assumed, therefore, the negative demonstration that no C is A is direct. Reductio ad impossibile, on the other hand, proceeds as follows. Supposing
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we are to prove that does not inhere in B, we have to assume that it does inhere, and further that B inheres in C, with the resulting inference that A inheres in C. This we have to suppose a known and admitted impossibility; and we then infer that A cannot inhere in B. Thus if the inherence of B in C is not questioned, A’s inherence in B is impossible. The order of the terms is the same in both proofs: they differ according to which of the negative propositions is the better known, the one denying A of B or the one denying A of C. When the falsity of the conclusion is the better known, we use reductio ad impossible; when the major premiss of the syllogism is the more obvious, we use direct demonstration. All the same the proposition denying A of B is, in the order of being, prior to that denying A of C; for premisses are prior to the conclusion which follows from them, and ‘no C is A’ is the conclusion, ‘no B is A’ one of its premisses. For the destructive result of reductio ad impossibile is not a proper conclusion, nor are its antecedents proper premisses. On the contrary: the constituents of syllogism are premisses related to one another as whole to part or part to whole, whereas the premisses A-C and A-B are not thus related to one another. Now the superior demonstration is that which proceeds from better known and prior premisses, and while both these forms depend for credence on the not-being of something, yet the source of the one is prior to that of the other. Therefore negative demonstration will have an unqualified superiority to reductio ad impossibile, and affirmative demonstration, being superior to negative, will consequently be superior also to reductio ad impossibile.

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27 The science which is knowledge at once of the fact and of the reasoned fact, not of the fact by itself without the reasoned fact, is the more exact and the prior science. A science such as arithmetic, which is not a science of properties qua inhering in a substratum, is more exact than and prior to a science like harmonics, which is a science of pr,operties inhering in a substratum; and similarly a science like arithmetic, which is constituted of fewer basic elements, is more exact than and prior to geometry, which requires additional elements. What I mean by ‘additional elements’ is this: a unit is substance without position, while a point is substance with position; the latter contains an additional element.

28 A single science is one whose domain is a single genus, viz. all the subjects constituted out of the primary entities of the genus – i.e. the parts of this total subject – and their essential properties. One science differs from another when their basic truths have neither a common source nor are derived those of the one science from those the other. This is verified when we reach the indemonstrable premisses of a science, for they must be within one genus with its conclusions: and this again is verified if the conclusions proved by means of them fall within one genus – i.e. are homogeneous.

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29 One can have several demonstrations of the same connexion not only by taking from the same series of predication middles which are other than the immediately cohering term e.g. by taking C, D, and F severally to prove A-B – but also by taking a middle from another series. Thus let A be change, D alteration of a property, B feeling pleasure, and G relaxation. We can then without falsehood predicate D of B and A of D, for he who is pleased suffers alteration of a property, and that which alters a property changes. Again, we can predicate A of G without falsehood, and G of B; for to feel pleasure is to relax, and to relax is to change. So the conclusion can be drawn through middles which are different, i.e. not in the same series – yet not so that neither of these middles is predicable of the other, for they must both be attributable to some one subject. A further point worth investigating is how many ways of proving the same conclusion can be obtained by varying the figure.

30 There is no knowledge by demonstration of chance conjunctions; for chance conjunctions exist neither by necessity nor as general connexions but comprise what comes to be as something distinct from these. Now demonstration is concerned only with one or other of these two; for all reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premisses, the conclusion being necessary if the premisses are necessary and general if

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the premisses are general. Consequently, if chance conjunctions are neither general nor necessary, they are not demonstrable.

31 Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception. Even if perception as a faculty is of ‘the such’ and not merely of a ‘this somewhat’, yet one must at any rate actually perceive a ‘this somewhat’, and at a definite present place and time: but that which is commensurately universal and true in all cases one cannot perceive, since it is not ‘this’ and it is not ‘now’; if it were, it would not be commensurately universal – the term we apply to what is always and everywhere. Seeing, therefore, that demonstrations are commensurately universal and universals imperceptible, we clearly cannot obtain scientific knowledge by the act of perception: nay, it is obvious that even if it were possible to perceive that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, we should still be looking for a demonstration – we should not (as some say) possess knowledge of it; for perception must be of a particular, whereas scientific knowledge involves the recognition of the commensurate universal. So if we were on the moon, and saw the earth shutting out the sun’s light, we should not know the cause of the eclipse: we should perceive the present fact of the eclipse, but not the reasoned fact at all, since the act of perception is not of the commensurate universal. I do not, of course, deny that by watching the frequent recurrence of this event we might, after tracking the commensurate universal, possess a demonstration, for the commensurate universal is elicited from the several groups of singulars.

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The commensurate universal is precious because it makes clear the cause; so that in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves universal knowledge is more precious than sense-perceptions and than intuition. (As regards primary truths there is of course a different account to be given.) Hence it is clear that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot be acquired by perception, unless the term perception is applied to the possession of scientific knowledge through demonstration. Nevertheless certain points do arise with regard to connexions to be proved which are referred for their explanation to a failure in sense-perception: there are cases when an act of vision would terminate our inquiry, not because in seeing we should be knowing, but because we should have elicited the universal from seeing; if, for example, we saw the pores in the glass and the light passing through, the reason of the kindling would be clear to us because we should at the same time see it in each instance and intuit that it must be so in all instances.

32 All syllogisms cannot have the same basic truths. This may be shown first of all by the following dialectical considerations. (1) Some syllogisms are true and some false: for though a true inference is possible from false premisses, yet this occurs once only – I mean if A for instance, is truly predicable of C, but B, the middle, is false, both A-B and B-C being false; nevertheless, if middles are taken to prove these premisses, they will be false because every conclusion which is a falsehood has false premisses, while true conclusions have true premisses, and false and true differ in kind. Then again, (2) falsehoods are not all derived from a single identical set of principles: there are

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falsehoods which are the contraries of one another and cannot coexist, e.g. ‘justice is injustice’, and ‘justice is cowardice’; ‘man is horse’, and ‘man is ox’; ‘the equal is greater’, and ‘the equal is less.’ From established principles we may argue the case as follows, confining ourselves therefore to true conclusions. Not even all these are inferred from the same basic truths; many of them in fact have basic truths which differ generically and are not transferable; units, for instance, which are without position, cannot take the place of points, which have position. The transferred terms could only fit in as middle terms or as major or minor terms, or else have some of the other terms between them, others outside them. Nor can any of the common axioms – such, I mean, as the law of excluded middle – serve as premisses for the proof of all conclusions. For the kinds of being are different, and some attributes attach to quanta and some to qualia only; and proof is achieved by means of the common axioms taken in conjunction with these several kinds and their attributes. Again, it is not true that the basic truths are much fewer than the conclusions, for the basic truths are the premisses, and the premisses are formed by the apposition of a fresh extreme term or the interposition of a fresh middle. Moreover, the number of conclusions is indefinite, though the number of middle terms is finite; and lastly some of the basic truths are necessary, others variable. Looking at it in this way we see that, since the number of conclusions is indefinite, the basic truths cannot be identical or limited in number. If, on the other hand, identity is used in another sense, and it is said, e.g. ‘these and no other are the fundamental truths of geometry, these the fundamentals of calculation, these again of medicine’; would the statement mean anything except that the sciences have basic truths? To

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call them identical because they are self-identical is absurd, since everything can be identified with everything in that sense of identity. Nor again can the contention that all conclusions have the same basic truths mean that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be drawn. That would be exceedingly naive, for it is not the case in the clearly evident mathematical sciences, nor is it possible in analysis, since it is the immediate premisses which are the basic truths, and a fresh conclusion is only formed by the addition of a new immediate premiss: but if it be admitted that it is these primary immediate premisses which are basic truths, each subjectgenus will provide one basic truth. If, however, it is not argued that from the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be proved, nor yet admitted that basic truths differ so as to be generically different for each science, it remains to consider the possibility that, while the basic truths of all knowledge are within one genus, special premisses are required to prove special conclusions. But that this cannot be the case has been shown by our proof that the basic truths of things generically different themselves differ generically. For fundamental truths are of two kinds, those which are premisses of demonstration and the subject-genus; and though the former are common, the latter – number, for instance, and magnitude – are peculiar.

33 Scientific knowledge and its object differ from opinion and the object of opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connexions, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise. So though there are things which are true and real and yet can be otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly does not concern

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them: if it did, things which can be otherwise would be incapable of being otherwise. Nor are they any concern of rational intuition – by rational intuition I mean an originative source of scientific knowledge – nor of indemonstrable knowledge, which is the grasping of the immediate premiss. Since then rational intuition, science, and opinion, and what is revealed by these terms, are the only things that can be ‘true’, it follows that it is opinion that is concerned with that which may be true or false, and can be otherwise: opinion in fact is the grasp of a premiss which is immediate but not necessary. This view also fits the observed facts, for opinion is unstable, and so is the kind of being we have described as its object. Besides, when a man thinks a truth incapable of being otherwise he always thinks that he knows it, never that he opines it. He thinks that he opines when he thinks that a connexion, though actually so, may quite easily be otherwise; for he believes that such is the proper object of opinion, while the necessary is the object of knowledge. In what sense, then, can the same thing be the object of both opinion and knowledge? And if any one chooses to maintain that all that he knows he can also opine, why should not opinion be knowledge? For he that knows and he that opines will follow the same train of thought through the same middle terms until the immediate premisses are reached; because it is possible to opine not only the fact but also the reasoned fact, and the reason is the middle term; so that, since the former knows, he that opines also has knowledge. The truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot be other than they are, in the way in which he grasps the definitions through which demonstrations take place, he will have not opinion but knowledge: if on the other hand he apprehends these attributes as inhering in their subjects, but not in virtue of the subjects’ substance and essential nature

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possesses opinion and not genuine knowledge; and his opinion, if obtained through immediate premisses, will be both of the fact and of the reasoned fact; if not so obtained, of the fact alone. The object of opinion and knowledge is not quite identical; it is only in a sense identical, just as the object of true and false opinion is in a sense identical. The sense in which some maintain that true and false opinion can have the same object leads them to embrace many strange doctrines, particularly the doctrine that what a man opines falsely he does not opine at all. There are really many senses of ‘identical’, and in one sense the object of true and false opinion can be the same, in another it cannot. Thus, to have a true opinion that the diagonal is commensurate with the side would be absurd: but because the diagonal with which they are both concerned is the same, the two opinions have objects so far the same: on the other hand, as regards their essential definable nature these objects differ. The identity of the objects of knowledge and opinion is similar. Knowledge is the apprehension of, e.g. the attribute ‘animal’ as incapable of being otherwise, opinion the apprehension of ‘animal’ as capable of being otherwise – e.g. the apprehension that animal is an element in the essential nature of man is knowledge; the apprehension of animal as predicable of man but not as an element in man’s essential nature is opinion: man is the subject in both judgements, but the mode of inherence differs. This also shows that one cannot opine and know the same thing simultaneously; for then one would apprehend the same thing as both capable and incapable of being otherwise – an impossibility. Knowledge and opinion of the same thing can coexist in two different people in the sense we have explained, but not simultaneously in the same person. That would involve a man’s simultaneously apprehending, e.g. (1) that man is essentially animal – i.e. cannot be other than animal – and (2)

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that man is not essentially animal, that is, we may assume, may be other than animal. Further consideration of modes of thinking and their distribution under the heads of discursive thought, intuition, science, art, practical wisdom, and metaphysical thinking, belongs rather partly to natural science, partly to moral philosophy.

34 Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously. It would be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has her bright side always turned towards the sun, and quickly grasped the cause of this, namely that she borrows her light from him; or observed somebody in conversation with a man of wealth and divined that he was borrowing money, or that the friendship of these people sprang from a common enmity. In all these instances he has seen the major and minor terms and then grasped the causes, the middle terms. Let A represent ‘bright side turned sunward’, B ‘lighted from the sun’, C the moon. Then B, ‘lighted from the sun’ is predicable of C, the moon, and A, ‘having her bright side towards the source of her light’, is predicable of B. So A is predicable of C through B.

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Book II

1 The kinds of question we ask are as many as the kinds of things which we know. They are in fact four: – (1) whether the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact, (2) what is the reason of the connexion, (3) whether a thing exists, (4) What is the nature of the thing. Thus, when our question concerns a complex of thing and attribute and we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise qualified – whether, e.g. the sun suffers eclipse or not – then we are asking as to the fact of a connexion. That our inquiry ceases with the discovery that the sun does suffer eclipse is an indication of this; and if we know from the start that the sun suffers eclipse, we do not inquire whether it does so or not. On the other hand, when we know the fact we ask the reason; as, for example, when we know that the sun is being eclipsed and that an earthquake is in progress, it is the reason of eclipse or earthquake into which we inquire. Where a complex is concerned, then, those are the two questions we ask; but for some objects of inquiry we have a different kind of question to ask, such as whether there is or is not a centaur or a God. (By ‘is or is not’ I mean ‘is or is not, without further qualification’; as opposed to ‘is or is not [e.g.] white’.) On the other hand, when we have ascertained the thing’s existence, we inquire as to its nature, asking, for instance, ‘what, then, is God?’ or ‘what is man?’.

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2 These, then, are the four kinds of question we ask, and it is in the answers to these questions that our knowledge consists. Now when we ask whether a connexion is a fact, or whether a thing without qualification is, we are really asking whether the connexion or the thing has a ‘middle’; and when we have ascertained either that the connexion is a fact or that the thing is – i.e. ascertained either the partial or the unqualified being of the thing-and are proceeding to ask the reason of the connexion or the nature of the thing, then we are asking what the ‘middle’ is. (By distinguishing the fact of the connexion and the existence of the thing as respectively the partial and the unqualified being of the thing, I mean that if we ask ‘does the moon suffer eclipse?’, or ‘does the moon wax?’, the question concerns a part of the thing’s being; for what we are asking in such questions is whether a thing is this or that, i.e. has or has not this or that attribute: whereas, if we ask whether the moon or night exists, the question concerns the unqualified being of a thing.) We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a ‘middle’ or what the ‘middle’ is: for the ‘middle’ here is precisely the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our inquiries. Thus, ‘Does the moon suffer eclipse?’ means ‘Is there or is there not a cause producing eclipse of the moon?’, and when we have learnt that there is, our next question is, ‘What, then, is this cause? for the cause through which a thing is – not is this or that, i.e. has this or that attribute, but without qualification is – and the cause through which it is – not is without qualification, but is this or that as having some essential attribute or some accident – are both alike the middle’. By that which is without qualification I mean the subject, e.g. moon or earth or sun or triangle; by that which

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a subject is (in the partial sense) I mean a property, e.g. eclipse, equality or inequality, interposition or non-interposition. For in all these examples it is clear that the nature of the thing and the reason of the fact are identical: the question ‘What is eclipse?’ and its answer ‘The privation of the moon’s light by the interposition of the earth’ are identical with the question ‘What is the reason of eclipse?’ or ‘Why does the moon suffer eclipse?’ and the reply ‘Because of the failure of light through the earth’s shutting it out’. Again, for ‘What is a concord? A commensurate numerical ratio of a high and a low note’, we may substitute ‘What ratio makes a high and a low note concordant? Their relation according to a commensurate numerical ratio.’ ‘Are the high and the low note concordant?’ is equivalent to ‘Is their ratio commensurate?’; and when we find that it is commensurate, we ask ‘What, then, is their ratio?’. Cases in which the ‘middle’ is sensible show that the object of our inquiry is always the ‘middle’: we inquire, because we have not perceived it, whether there is or is not a ‘middle’ causing, e.g. an eclipse. On the other hand, if we were on the moon we should not be inquiring either as to the fact or the reason, but both fact and reason would be obvious simultaneously. For the act of perception would have enabled us to know the universal too; since, the present fact of an eclipse being evident, perception would then at the same time give us the present fact of the earth’s screening the sun’s light, and from this would arise the universal. Thus, as we maintain, to know a thing’s nature is to know the reason why it is; and this is equally true of things in so far as they are said without qualification to he as opposed to being possessed of some attribute, and in so far as they are said to be possessed of some attribute such as equal to right angles, or greater or less.

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3 It is clear, then, that all questions are a search for a ‘middle’. Let us now state how essential nature is revealed and in what way it can be reduced to demonstration; what definition is, and what things are definable. And let us first discuss certain difficulties which these questions raise, beginning what we have to say with a point most intimately connected with our immediately preceding remarks, namely the doubt that might be felt as to whether or not it is possible to know the same thing in the same relation, both by definition and by demonstration. It might, I mean, be urged that definition is held to concern essential nature and is in every case universal and affirmative; whereas, on the other hand, some conclusions are negative and some are not universal; e.g. all in the second figure are negative, none in the third are universal. And again, not even all affirmative conclusions in the first figure are definable, e.g. ‘every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’. An argument proving this difference between demonstration and definition is that to have scientific knowledge of the demonstrable is identical with possessing a demonstration of it: hence if demonstration of such conclusions as these is possible, there clearly cannot also be definition of them. If there could, one might know such a conclusion also in virtue of its definition without possessing the demonstration of it; for there is nothing to stop our having the one without the other. Induction too will sufficiently convince us of this difference; for never yet by defining anything – essential attribute or accident – did we get knowledge of it. Again, if to define is to acquire knowledge of a substance, at any rate such attributes are not substances.

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It is evident, then, that not everything demonstrable can be defined. What then? Can everything definable be demonstrated, or not? There is one of our previous arguments which covers this too. Of a single thing qua single there is a single scientific knowledge. Hence, since to know the demonstrable scientifically is to possess the demonstration of it, an impossible consequence will follow: – possession of its definition without its demonstration will give knowledge of the demonstrable. Moreover, the basic premisses definitions, and it has already been found indemonstrable; either the demonstrable and will depend on regress will be endless; or the indemonstrable definitions. of demonstrations are shown that these will be basic premisses will be prior premisses, and the primary truths will be

But if the definable and the demonstrable are not wholly the same, may they yet be partially the same? Or is that impossible, because there can be no demonstration of the definable? There can be none, because definition is of the essential nature or being of something, and all demonstrations evidently posit and assume the essential nature – mathematical demonstrations, for example, the nature of unity and the odd, and all the other sciences likewise. Moreover, every demonstration proves a predicate of a subject as attaching or as not attaching to it, but in definition one thing is not predicated of another; we do not, e.g. predicate animal of biped nor biped of animal, nor yet figure of plane – plane not being figure nor figure plane. Again, to prove essential nature is not the same as to prove the fact of a connexion. Now definition reveals essential nature, demonstration reveals that a given attribute attaches or does not attach to a given subject; but different things require different demonstrations – unless the one demonstration is related to the other as part to whole. I add this because if all

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triangles have been proved to possess angles equal to two right angles, then this attribute has been proved to attach to isosceles; for isosceles is a part of which all triangles constitute the whole. But in the case before us the fact and the essential nature are not so related to one another, since the one is not a part of the other. So it emerges that not all the definable is demonstrable nor all the demonstrable definable; and we may draw the general conclusion that there is no identical object of which it is possible to possess both a definition and a demonstration. It follows obviously that definition and demonstration are neither identical nor contained either within the other: if they were, their objects would be related either as identical or as whole and part.

4 So much, then, for the first stage of our problem. The next step is to raise the question whether syllogism – i.e. demonstration – of the definable nature is possible or, as our recent argument assumed, impossible. We might argue it impossible on the following grounds: – (a) syllogism proves an attribute of a subject through the middle term; on the other hand (b) its definable nature is both ‘peculiar’ to a subject and predicated of it as belonging to its essence. But in that case (1) the subject, its definition, and the middle term connecting them must be reciprocally predicable of one another; for if A is to C, obviously A is ‘peculiar’ to B and B to C – in fact all three terms are ‘peculiar’ to one another: and further (2) if A inheres in the essence of all B and B is predicated

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universally of all C as belonging to C’s essence, A also must be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. If one does not take this relation as thus duplicated – if, that is, A is predicated as being of the essence of B, but B is not of the essence of the subjects of which it is predicated – A will not necessarily be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. So both premisses will predicate essence, and consequently B also will be predicated of C as its essence. Since, therefore, both premisses do predicate essence – i.e. definable form – C’s definable form will appear in the middle term before the conclusion is drawn. We may generalize by supposing that it is possible to prove the essential nature of man. Let C be man, A man’s essential nature – two-footed animal, or aught else it may be. Then, if we are to syllogize, A must be predicated of all B. But this premiss will be mediated by a fresh definition, which consequently will also be the essential nature of man. Therefore the argument assumes what it has to prove, since B too is the essential nature of man. It is, however, the case in which there are only the two premisses – i.e. in which the premisses are primary and immediate – which we ought to investigate, because it best illustrates the point under discussion. Thus they who prove the essential nature of soul or man or anything else through reciprocating terms beg the question. It would be begging the question, for example, to contend that the soul is that which causes its own life, and that what causes its own life is a self-moving number; for one would have to postulate that the soul is a self-moving number in the sense of being identical with it. For if A is predicable as a mere consequent of B and B of C, A will not on that account be the definable form of C: A will merely be what it was true to say of C. Even if A is predicated of all B inasmuch as B is identical with

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a species of A, still it will not follow: being an animal is predicated of being a man – since it is true that in all instances to be human is to be animal, just as it is also true that every man is an animal – but not as identical with being man. We conclude, then, that unless one takes both the premisses as predicating essence, one cannot infer that A is the definable form and essence of C: but if one does so take them, in assuming B one will have assumed, before drawing the conclusion, what the definable form of C is; so that there has been no inference, for one has begged the question.

5 Nor, as was said in my formal logic, is the method of division a process of inference at all, since at no point does the characterization of the subject follow necessarily from the premising of certain other facts: division demonstrates as little as does induction. For in a genuine demonstration the conclusion must not be put as a question nor depend on a concession, but must follow necessarily from its premisses, even if the respondent deny it. The definer asks ‘Is man animal or inanimate?’ and then assumes – he has not inferred – that man is animal. Next, when presented with an exhaustive division of animal into terrestrial and aquatic, he assumes that man is terrestrial. Moreover, that man is the complete formula, terrestrial-animal, does not follow necessarily from the premisses: this too is an assumption, and equally an assumption whether the division comprises many differentiae or few. (Indeed as this method of division is used by those who proceed by it, even truths that can be inferred actually fail to appear as such.) For why should not the whole of this formula

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be true of man, and yet not exhibit his essential nature or definable form? Again, what guarantee is there against an unessential addition, or against the omission of the final or of an intermediate determinant of the substantial being? The champion of division might here urge that though these lapses do occur, yet we can solve that difficulty if all the attributes we assume are constituents of the definable form, and if, postulating the genus, we produce by division the requisite uninterrupted sequence of terms, and omit nothing; and that indeed we cannot fail to fulfil these conditions if what is to be divided falls whole into the division at each stage, and none of it is omitted; and that this – the dividendum – must without further question be (ultimately) incapable of fresh specific division. Nevertheless, we reply, division does not involve inference; if it gives knowledge, it gives it in another way. Nor is there any absurdity in this: induction, perhaps, is not demonstration any more than is division, et it does make evident some truth. Yet to state a definition reached by division is not to state a conclusion: as, when conclusions are drawn without their appropriate middles, the alleged necessity by which the inference follows from the premisses is open to a question as to the reason for it, so definitions reached by division invite the same question. Thus to the question ‘What is the essential nature of man?’ the divider replies ‘Animal, mortal, footed, biped, wingless’; and when at each step he is asked ‘Why?’, he will say, and, as he thinks, proves by division, that all animal is mortal or immortal: but such a formula taken in its entirety is not definition; so that even if division does demonstrate its formula, definition at any rate does not turn out to be a conclusion of inference.

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6 Can we nevertheless actually demonstrate what a thing essentially and substantially is, but hypothetically, i.e. by premising (1) that its definable form is constituted by the ‘peculiar’ attributes of its essential nature; (2) that such and such are the only attributes of its essential nature, and that the complete synthesis of them is peculiar to the thing; and thus – since in this synthesis consists the being of the thing – obtaining our conclusion? Or is the truth that, since proof must be through the middle term, the definable form is once more assumed in this minor premiss too? Further, just as in syllogizing we do not premise what syllogistic inference is (since the premisses from which we conclude must be related as whole and part), so the definable form must not fall within the syllogism but remain outside the premisses posited. It is only against a doubt as to its having been a syllogistic inference at all that we have to defend our argument as conforming to the definition of syllogism. It is only when some one doubts whether the conclusion proved is the definable form that we have to defend it as conforming to the definition of definable form which we assumed. Hence syllogistic inference must be possible even without the express statement of what syllogism is or what definable form is. The following type of hypothetical proof also begs the question. If evil is definable as the divisible, and the definition of a thing’s contrary – if it has one the contrary of the thing’s definition; then, if good is the contrary of evil and the indivisible of the divisible, we conclude that to be good is essentially to be indivisible. The question is begged because definable form is assumed as a premiss, and as a premiss which is to prove definable form. ‘But not the same definable form’, you may object. That I admit, for in demonstrations also we premise that

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‘this’ is predicable of ‘that’; but in this premiss the term we assert of the minor is neither the major itself nor a term identical in definition, or convertible, with the major. Again, both proof by division and the syllogism just described are open to the question why man should be animal-bipedterrestrial and not merely animal and terrestrial, since what they premise does not ensure that the predicates shall constitute a genuine unity and not merely belong to a single subject as do musical and grammatical when predicated of the same man.

7 How then by definition shall we prove substance or essential nature? We cannot show it as a fresh fact necessarily following from the assumption of premisses admitted to be facts – the method of demonstration: we may not proceed as by induction to establish a universal on the evidence of groups of particulars which offer no exception, because induction proves not what the essential nature of a thing is but that it has or has not some attribute. Therefore, since presumably one cannot prove essential nature by an appeal to sense perception or by pointing with the finger, what other method remains? To put it another way: how shall we by definition prove essential nature? He who knows what human – or any other – nature is, must know also that man exists; for no one knows the nature of what does not exist – one can know the meaning of the phrase or name ‘goat-stag’ but not what the essential nature of a goat-stag is. But further, if definition can prove what is the essential nature of a thing, can it also prove that it exists? And how will it prove them both by the same process, since
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definition exhibits one single thing and demonstration another single thing, and what human nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same thing? Then too we hold that it is by demonstration that the being of everything must be proved – unless indeed to be were its essence; and, since being is not a genus, it is not the essence of anything. Hence the being of anything as fact is matter for demonstration; and this is the actual procedure of the sciences, for the geometer assumes the meaning of the word triangle, but that it is possessed of some attribute he proves. What is it, then, that we shall prove in defining essential nature? Triangle? In that case a man will know by definition what a thing’s nature is without knowing whether it exists. But that is impossible. Moreover it is clear, if we consider the methods of defining actually in use, that definition does not prove that the thing defined exists: since even if there does actually exist something which is equidistant from a centre, yet why should the thing named in the definition exist? Why, in other words, should this be the formula defining circle? One might equally well call it the definition of mountain copper. For definitions do not carry a further guarantee that the thing defined can exist or that it is what they claim to define: one can always ask why. Since, therefore, to define is to prove either a thing’s essential nature or the meaning of its name, we may conclude that definition, if it in no sense proves essential nature, is a set of words signifying precisely what a name signifies. But that were a strange consequence; for (1) both what is not substance and what does not exist at all would be definable, since even nonexistents can be signified by a name: (2) all sets of words or sentences would be definitions, since any kind of sentence could be given a name; so that we should all be talking in definitions, and even the Iliad would be a definition: (3) no demonstration can prove that any particular name means any

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particular thing: neither, therefore, do definitions, in addition to revealing the meaning of a name, also reveal that the name has this meaning. It appears then from these considerations that neither definition and syllogism nor their objects are identical, and further that definition neither demonstrates nor proves anything, and that knowledge of essential nature is not to be obtained either by definition or by demonstration.

8 We must now start afresh and consider which of these conclusions are sound and which are not, and what is the nature of definition, and whether essential nature is in any sense demonstrable and definable or in none. Now to know its essential nature is, as we said, the same as to know the cause of a thing’s existence, and the proof of this depends on the fact that a thing must have a cause. Moreover, this cause is either identical with the essential nature of the thing or distinct from it; and if its cause is distinct from it, the essential nature of the thing is either demonstrable or indemonstrable. Consequently, if the cause is distinct from the thing’s essential nature and demonstration is possible, the cause must be the middle term, and, the conclusion proved being universal and affirmative, the proof is in the first figure. So the method just examined of proving it through another essential nature would be one way of proving essential nature, because a conclusion containing essential nature must be inferred through a middle which is an essential nature just as a ‘peculiar’ property must be inferred through a middle which is a ‘peculiar’ property; so that of the two definable natures of a single thing this method will prove one and not the other.

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Now it was said before that this method could not amount to demonstration of essential nature – it is actually a dialectical proof of it – so let us begin again and explain by what method it can be demonstrated. When we are aware of a fact we seek its reason, and though sometimes the fact and the reason dawn on us simultaneously, yet we cannot apprehend the reason a moment sooner than the fact; and clearly in just the same way we cannot apprehend a thing’s definable form without apprehending that it exists, since while we are ignorant whether it exists we cannot know its essential nature. Moreover we are aware whether a thing exists or not sometimes through apprehending an element in its character, and sometimes accidentally, as, for example, when we are aware of thunder as a noise in the clouds, of eclipse as a privation of light, or of man as some species of animal, or of the soul as a self-moving thing. As often as we have accidental knowledge that the thing exists, we must be in a wholly negative state as regards awareness of its essential nature; for we have not got genuine knowledge even of its existence, and to search for a thing’s essential nature when we are unaware that it exists is to search for nothing. On the other hand, whenever we apprehend an element in the thing’s character there is less difficulty. Thus it follows that the degree of our knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is determined by the sense in which we are aware that it exists. Let us then take the following as our first instance of being aware of an element in the essential nature. Let A be eclipse, C the moon, B the earth’s acting as a screen. Now to ask whether the moon is eclipsed or not is to ask whether or not B has occurred. But that is precisely the same as asking whether A has a defining condition; and if this condition actually exists, we assert that A also actually exists. Or again we may ask which side of a contradiction the defining condition necessitates: does it make the angles of a triangle equal or not equal to two right angles? When we have found the answer, if the premisses are

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immediate, we know fact and reason together; if they are not immediate, we know the fact without the reason, as in the following example: let C be the moon, A eclipse, B the fact that the moon fails to produce shadows though she is full and though no visible body intervenes between us and her. Then if B, failure to produce shadows in spite of the absence of an intervening body, is attributable A to C, and eclipse, is attributable to B, it is clear that the moon is eclipsed, but the reason why is not yet clear, and we know that eclipse exists, but we do not know what its essential nature is. But when it is clear that A is attributable to C and we proceed to ask the reason of this fact, we are inquiring what is the nature of B: is it the earth’s acting as a screen, or the moon’s rotation or her extinction? But B is the definition of the other term, viz. in these examples, of the major term A; for eclipse is constituted by the earth acting as a screen. Thus, (1) ‘What is thunder?’ ‘The quenching of fire in cloud’, and (2) ‘Why does it thunder?’ ‘Because fire is quenched in the cloud’, are equivalent. Let C be cloud, A thunder, B the quenching of fire. Then B is attributable to C, cloud, since fire is quenched in it; and A, noise, is attributable to B; and B is assuredly the definition of the major term A. If there be a further mediating cause of B, it will be one of the remaining partial definitions of A. We have stated then how essential nature is discovered and becomes known, and we see that, while there is no syllogism – i.e. no demonstrative syllogism – of essential nature, yet it is through syllogism, viz. demonstrative syllogism, that essential nature is exhibited. So we conclude that neither can the essential nature of anything which has a cause distinct from itself be known without demonstration, nor can it be demonstrated; and this is what we contended in our preliminary discussions.

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9 Now while some things have a cause distinct from themselves, others have not. Hence it is evident that there are essential natures which are immediate, that is are basic premisses; and of these not only that they are but also what they are must be assumed or revealed in some other way. This too is the actual procedure of the arithmetician, who assumes both the nature and the existence of unit. On the other hand, it is possible (in the manner explained) to exhibit through demonstration the essential nature of things which have a ‘middle’, i.e. a cause of their substantial being other than that being itself; but we do not thereby demonstrate it.

10 Since definition is said to be the statement of a thing’s nature, obviously one kind of definition will be a statement of the meaning of the name, or of an equivalent nominal formula. A definition in this sense tells you, e.g. the meaning of the phrase ‘triangular character’. When we are aware that triangle exists, we inquire the reason why it exists. But it is difficult thus to learn the definition of things the existence of which we do not genuinely know – the cause of this difficulty being, as we said before, that we only know accidentally whether or not the thing exists. Moreover, a statement may be a unity in either of two ways, by conjunction, like the Iliad, or because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject. That then is one way of defining definition. Another kind of definition is a formula exhibiting the cause of a thing’s

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existence. Thus the former signifies without proving, but the latter will clearly be a quasi-demonstration of essential nature, differing from demonstration in the arrangement of its terms. For there is a difference between stating why it thunders, and stating what is the essential nature of thunder; since the first statement will be ‘Because fire is quenched in the clouds’, while the statement of what the nature of thunder is will be ‘The noise of fire being quenched in the clouds’. Thus the same statement takes a different form: in one form it is continuous demonstration, in the other definition. Again, thunder can be defined as noise in the clouds, which is the conclusion of the demonstration embodying essential nature. On the other hand the definition of immediates is an indemonstrable positing of essential nature. We conclude then that definition is (a) an indemonstrable statement of essential nature, or (b) a syllogism of essential nature differing from demonstration in grammatical form, or (c) the conclusion of a demonstration giving essential nature. Our discussion has therefore made plain (1) in what sense and of what things the essential nature is demonstrable, and in what sense and of what things it is not; (2) what are the various meanings of the term definition, and in what sense and of what things it proves the essential nature, and in what sense and of what things it does not; (3) what is the relation of definition to demonstration, and how far the same thing is both definable and demonstrable and how far it is not.

11 We think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and there are four causes: (1) the definable form, (2) an
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antecedent which necessitates a consequent, (3) the efficient cause, (4) the final cause. Hence each of these can be the middle term of a proof, for (a) though the inference from antecedent to necessary consequent does not hold if only one premiss is assumed – two is the minimum – still when there are two it holds on condition that they have a single common middle term. So it is from the assumption of this single middle term that the conclusion follows necessarily. The following example will also show this. Why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? – or from what assumption does it follow that it is a right angle? Thus, let A be right angle, B the half of two right angles, C the angle in a semicircle. Then B is the cause in virtue of which A, right angle, is attributable to C, the angle in a semicircle, since B=A and the other, viz. C,=B, for C is half of two right angles. Therefore it is the assumption of B, the half of two right angles, from which it follows that A is attributable to C, i.e. that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Moreover, B is identical with (b) the defining form of A, since it is what A’s definition signifies. Moreover, the formal cause has already been shown to be the middle. (c) ‘Why did the Athenians become involved in the Persian war?’ means ‘What cause originated the waging of war against the Athenians?’ and the answer is, ‘Because they raided Sardis with the Eretrians’, since this originated the war. Let A be war, B unprovoked raiding, C the Athenians. Then B, unprovoked raiding, is true of C, the Athenians, and A is true of B, since men make war on the unjust aggressor. So A, having war waged upon them, is true of B, the initial aggressors, and B is true of C, the Athenians, who were the aggressors. Hence here too the cause – in this case the efficient cause – is the middle term. (d) This is no less true where the cause is the final cause. E.g. why does one take a walk after supper? For the sake of one’s health. Why does a house exist? For the preservation of one’s goods. The end in view is in the one case health, in the other preservation. To ask the reason why one must walk after supper

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is precisely to ask to what end one must do it. Let C be walking after supper, B the non-regurgitation of food, A health. Then let walking after supper possess the property of preventing food from rising to the orifice of the stomach, and let this condition be healthy; since it seems that B, the non-regurgitation of food, is attributable to C, taking a walk, and that A, health, is attributable to B. What, then, is the cause through which A, the final cause, inheres in C? It is B, the non-regurgitation of food; but B is a kind of definition of A, for A will be explained by it. Why is B the cause of A’s belonging to C? Because to be in a condition such as B is to be in health. The definitions must be transposed, and then the detail will become clearer. Incidentally, here the order of coming to be is the reverse of what it is in proof through the efficient cause: in the efficient order the middle term must come to be first, whereas in the teleological order the minor, C, must first take place, and the end in view comes last in time. The same thing may exist for an end and be necessitated as well. For example, light shines through a lantern (1) because that which consists of relatively small particles necessarily passes through pores larger than those particles – assuming that light does issue by penetration – and (2) for an end, namely to save us from stumbling. If then, a thing can exist through two causes, can it come to be through two causes – as for instance if thunder be a hiss and a roar necessarily produced by the quenching of fire, and also designed, as the Pythagoreans say, for a threat to terrify those that lie in Tartarus? Indeed, there are very many such cases, mostly among the processes and products of the natural world; for nature, in different senses of the term ‘nature’, produces now for an end, now by necessity. Necessity too is of two kinds. It may work in accordance with a thing’s natural tendency, or by constraint and in opposition to it;

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as, for instance, by necessity a stone is borne both upwards and downwards, but not by the same necessity. Of the products of man’s intelligence some are never due to chance or necessity but always to an end, as for example a house or a statue; others, such as health or safety, may result from chance as well. It is mostly in cases where the issue is indeterminate (though only where the production does not originate in chance, and the end is consequently good), that a result is due to an end, and this is true alike in nature or in art. By chance, on the other hand, nothing comes to be for an end.

12 The effect may be still coming to be, or its occurrence may be past or future, yet the cause will be the same as when it is actually existent – for it is the middle which is the cause – except that if the effect actually exists the cause is actually existent, if it is coming to be so is the cause, if its occurrence is past the cause is past, if future the cause is future. For example, the moon was eclipsed because the earth intervened, is becoming eclipsed because the earth is in process of intervening, will be eclipsed because the earth will intervene, is eclipsed because the earth intervenes. To take a second example: assuming that the definition of ice is solidified water, let C be water, A solidified, B the middle, which is the cause, namely total failure of heat. Then B is attributed to C, and A, solidification, to B: ice when B is occurring, has formed when B has occurred, and will form when B shall occur.

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This sort of cause, then, and its effect come to be simultaneously when they are in process of becoming, and exist simultaneously when they actually exist; and the same holds good when they are past and when they are future. But what of cases where they are not simultaneous? Can causes and effects different from one another form, as they seem to us to form, a continuous succession, a past effect resulting from a past cause different from itself, a future effect from a future cause different from it, and an effect which is coming-to-be from a cause different from and prior to it? Now on this theory it is from the posterior event that we reason (and this though these later events actually have their source of origin in previous events – a fact which shows that also when the effect is coming-to-be we still reason from the posterior event), and from the event we cannot reason (we cannot argue that because an event A has occurred, therefore an event B has occurred subsequently to A but still in the past – and the same holds good if the occurrence is future) – cannot reason because, be the time interval definite or indefinite, it will never be possible to infer that because it is true to say that A occurred, therefore it is true to say that B, the subsequent event, occurred; for in the interval between the events, though A has already occurred, the latter statement will be false. And the same argument applies also to future events; i.e. one cannot infer from an event which occurred in the past that a future event will occur. The reason of this is that the middle must be homogeneous, past when the extremes are past, future when they are future, coming to be when they are coming-to-be, actually existent when they are actually existent; and there cannot be a middle term homogeneous with extremes respectively past and future. And it is a further difficulty in this theory that the time interval can be neither indefinite nor definite, since during it the inference will be false. We have also to inquire what it is that holds events together so that the coming-to-be now occurring in actual things follows

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upon a past event. It is evident, we may suggest, that a past event and a present process cannot be ‘contiguous’, for not even two past events can be ‘contiguous’. For past events are limits and atomic; so just as points are not ‘contiguous’ neither are past events, since both are indivisible. For the same reason a past event and a present process cannot be ‘contiguous’, for the process is divisible, the event indivisible. Thus the relation of present process to past event is analogous to that of line to point, since a process contains an infinity of past events. These questions, however, must receive a more explicit treatment in our general theory of change. The following must suffice as an account of the manner in which the middle would be identical with the cause on the supposition that coming-to-be is a series of consecutive events: for in the terms of such a series too the middle and major terms must form an immediate premiss; e.g. we argue that, since C has occurred, therefore A occurred: and C’s occurrence was posterior, A’s prior; but C is the source of the inference because it is nearer to the present moment, and the starting-point of time is the present. We next argue that, since D has occurred, therefore C occurred. Then we conclude that, since D has occurred, therefore A must have occurred; and the cause is C, for since D has occurred C must have occurred, and since C has occurred A must previously have occurred. If we get our middle term in this way, will the series terminate in an immediate premiss, or since, as we said, no two events are ‘contiguous’, will a fresh middle term always intervene because there is an infinity of middles? No: though no two events are ‘contiguous’, yet we must start from a premiss consisting of a middle and the present event as major. The like is true of future events too, since if it is true to say that D will exist, it must be a prior truth to say that A will exist, and the cause of this conclusion is C; for if D will exist, C will exist prior to D, and if C

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will exist, A will exist prior to it. And here too the same infinite divisibility might be urged, since future events are not ‘contiguous’. But here too an immediate basic premiss must be assumed. And in the world of fact this is so: if a house has been built, then blocks must have been quarried and shaped. The reason is that a house having been built necessitates a foundation having been laid, and if a foundation has been laid blocks must have been shaped beforehand. Again, if a house will be built, blocks will similarly be shaped beforehand; and proof is through the middle in the same way, for the foundation will exist before the house. Now we observe in Nature a certain kind of circular process of coming-to-be; and this is possible only if the middle and extreme terms are reciprocal, since conversion is conditioned by reciprocity in the terms of the proof. This – the convertibility of conclusions and premisses – has been proved in our early chapters, and the circular process is an instance of this. In actual fact it is exemplified thus: when the earth had been moistened an exhalation was bound to rise, and when an exhalation had risen cloud was bound to form, and from the formation of cloud rain necessarily resulted and by the fall of rain the earth was necessarily moistened: but this was the starting-point, so that a circle is completed; for posit any one of the terms and another follows from it, and from that another, and from that again the first. Some occurrences are universal (for they are, or come-to-be what they are, always and in ever case); others again are not always what they are but only as a general rule: for instance, not every man can grow a beard, but it is the general rule. In the case of such connexions the middle term too must be a general rule. For if A is predicated universally of B and B of C, A too must be predicated always and in every instance of C, since to hold in every instance and always is of the nature of the universal. But

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we have assumed a connexion which is a general rule; consequently the middle term B must also be a general rule. So connexions which embody a general rule – i.e. which exist or come to be as a general rule – will also derive from immediate basic premisses.

13 We have already explained how essential nature is set out in the terms of a demonstration, and the sense in which it is or is not demonstrable or definable; so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements predicated as constituting the definable form. Now of the attributes which inhere always in each several thing there are some which are wider in extent than it but not wider than its genus (by attributes of wider extent mean all such as are universal attributes of each several subject, but in their application are not confined to that subject). while an attribute may inhere in every triad, yet also in a subject not a triad – as being inheres in triad but also in subjects not numbers at all – odd on the other hand is an attribute inhering in every triad and of wider application (inhering as it does also in pentad), but which does not extend beyond the genus of triad; for pentad is a number, but nothing outside number is odd. It is such attributes which we have to select, up to the exact point at which they are severally of wider extent than the subject but collectively coextensive with it; for this synthesis must be the substance of the thing. For example every triad possesses the attributes number, odd, and prime in both senses, i.e. not only as possessing no divisors, but also as not being a sum of numbers. This, then, is precisely what triad is, viz. a number, odd, and

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g. it will be identical with the being of triad. and since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad. The author of a hand-book on a subject that is a generic whole should divide the genus into its first infimae species – number e. Now since we have shown above’ that attributes predicated as belonging to the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary. If it is not identical with the being of triad. to no other subject. that the synthesis of them constitutes the substance of triad is shown by the following argument. It will then be of wider extent than triad – assuming that wider potential extent is the character of a genus. taken collectively. having established what the category is to which the subaltern genus belongs – quantity or quality. It follows that any other synthesis thus exhibited will likewise be identical with the being of the subject. working through the proximate common differentiae. After that. for instance – he should examine the properties ‘peculiar’ to the species. of straight line or circle or right angle.prime in the former and also the latter sense of the term: for these attributes taken severally apply. it must be related to triad as a genus named or nameless. i. because we make the further assumption that the substance of each subject is the predication of elements in its essential nature down to the last differentia characterizing the individuals. but. since the basic element of them all is the definition. for example. Further. are predicated as belonging to its essential nature. the last to the dyad also as well as to the triad. He should proceed thus because the attributes of the genera compounded of the infimae species will be clearly given by the definitions of the species. or in any other subject whose attributes we select in this way. 312 .e. into triad and dyad – and then endeavour to seize their definitions by the method we have described – the definition. the first two to all odd numbers. If on the other hand this synthesis is applicable to no subject other than the individual triads. triad will thus possess these attributes necessarily.

What force they have as proofs we did. in fact. indeed. and the attributes inhere essentially in the simple infimae species. if we proceed in this way. of fish that within which falls every fish. we can be sure that nothing has been omitted: by any other method one is bound to omit something without knowing it. Yet some hold it impossible to know the differentiae 313 . in the genera only in virtue of these. then the elements we assume have necessarily been reached by division. the dividendum will not fall whole into this division: e. the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a difference – it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped. To define and divide one need not know the whole of existence.g. or biped-animal-tame. The primary differentiation of animal is that within which all animal falls. The like is true of every other genus. They might. for it is winged animal to which this differentiation belongs. and again out of this and the further differentia man (or whatever else is the unity under construction) is constituted. seem to be of no use at all. indeed.the simple infirma species. whether outside animal or a subaltern genus of animal. For if every definable thing consists of two elements and ‘animal-tame’ forms a unity. Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method. it is not all animal which is either whole-winged or split-winged but all winged animal. But.g. Again. the primary differentiation of bird is that within which falls every bird. So. Thus. if the primary genus is assumed and we then take one of the lower divisions. division is the only possible method of avoiding the omission of any element of the essential nature. but that merely towards collecting the essential nature they may be of use we will proceed to show. but rather to assume everything at the start and to be no better than an initial assumption made without division. e. explain above.

since there must be one such term. The first is feasible because one can establish genus and differentia through the topic of the genus. since many differentiae inhere in things specifically identical. they say. then it does not matter whether or not one knows all the other subjects of which the differentiae are also predicated. and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the others but not all they of it. and other than that from which it differs. and that the subject one seeks to define is present in one or other of them. our third the first of those which follow the second in a ‘contiguous’ series. to postulate that the division exhausts the genus is not illegitimate if the opposites exclude a middle. just as one can conclude the inherence of an accident through the topic of the accident. Having assumed this we at once proceed in the same way with the lower terms. when one has taken one’s differing pair of opposites and assumed that the two sides exhaust the genus. Moreover. 314 . (3) the omission of no such elements. Secondly. and one has further verified its presence in one of them. since everything is identical with that from which it does not differ. The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary. Now first of all this is a fallacy: not every differentia precludes identity. anything contained in the genus must lie on one of the two sides. For it is obvious that when by this process one reaches subjects incapable of further differentiation one will possess the formula defining the substance. though not in the substance of these nor essentially. (2) the arrangement of these in the right order. In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in view: (1) the admission only of elements in the definable form. since if it is the differentia of that genus. know each thing without knowing its differentiae. and one cannot. for our second term will be the first of the remainder. since when the higher term is excluded.distinguishing each thing from every single other thing without knowing every single other thing.

and consider what element they have in common. since all these terms we have selected are elements in the definable form. we said.that term of the remainder which is ‘contiguous’ to it will be primary. which. specifically identical – individuals. we should again consider whether the results established possess any identity. since this will be the definition of the thing.g. this totality admits of no division into species. if there were. because there is now no further differentia. since any omission would have to be a genus or a differentia. I may illustrate my meaning as follows. and that the subject accepts one of the two as its predicate. But if we reach not one formula but two or more. we should examine instances of proud men 315 . To resume our account of the right method of investigation: We must start by observing a set of similar – i. e. and shown that the whole we finally reach is not further divisible – i. and likewise in members of further species. We must then apply the same process to another set of individuals which belong to one species and are generically but not specifically identical with the former set. Now the primary term is a genus. evidently the definiendum cannot be one thing but must be more than one. When we have established what the common element is in all members of this second species. and so on. pointing out that animal.e. and this term taken in conjunction with its differentiae is a genus: moreover the differentiae are all included. that as soon as we have taken the last differentia to form the concrete totality. Next we have taken the differentia of the whole thus reached. is divisible exhaustively into A and B. If we were inquiring what the essential nature of pride is. and persevere until we reach a single formula. is not the case. For it is clear that there is no superfluous addition.e. and nothing lacking. Our procedure makes it clear that no elements in the definable form have been omitted: we have taken the differentia that comes first in the order of division. the final concrete would admit of division into species.

clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are precluded in definition: otherwise dialectic would involve metaphors. We should next examine other cases. but only of sound – and so proceed to the common universal with a careful avoidance of equivocation. I take these two results and inquire what common element have equanimity amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonour. just as inferential movement is the minimum required in demonstrations. every definition is always universal and commensurate: the physician does not prescribe what is healthy for a single eye. for example. If they have none. they have in common. the definition of similarity not unqualified but restricted to colours and to figures. and then if these have in common indifference alike to good and ill fortune. and that is why our procedure should be from the several species to the universal genera – this for the further reason too that equivocation is less readily detected in genera than in infimae species. It is also easier by this method to define the single species than the universal. perspicuity is essential in definitions. Besides. there will be two genera of pride. e. Achilles wrath. Lysander. We may add that if dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors. Indeed.g. we should find on inquiring what they all had in common. as such. that it was intolerance of insult. but for all eyes or for a determinate species of eye. and we shall attain perspicuity if we can collect separately the definition of each species through the group of singulars which we have established e. the definition of acuteness. it was this which drove Alcibiades to war. or Achilles and Ajax were proud. if Alcibiades was proud. and Ajax to suicide. 316 .g. or Socrates.we know of to see what.

and an animal’s bone.14 In order to formulate the connexions we wish to prove we have to select our analyses and divisions. we lay down what the properties are which inhere in every animal. we next lay down the properties essentially connected with the first of the remaining classes – e. These established.g. to what species does the possession of horns attach? Yet a further method of selection is by analogy: for we cannot find a single identical name to give to a squid’s pounce. as the common properties of horned animals we collect the possession of a third stomach and only one row of teeth. Let A be animal.g. e. a fish’s spine. The method of selection consists in laying down the common genus of all our subjects of investigation – if e.properties belong to it. if this first subgenus is bird. the essential properties of every bird – and so on. We are now taking our examples from the traditional classnames. Then since it is clear in virtue of what character they possess these attributes – namely their horned character – the next question is. B the properties of every animal.g. but we must not confine ourselves to considering these. or horse – possess their properties. always characterizing the proximate subgenus. Then it is clear in virtue of what character B inheres in D – namely A – and that it inheres in C and E for the same reason: and throughout the remaining subgenera always the same rule applies. although these too possess common properties as if there were a single osseous nature. This will clearly at once enable us to say in virtue of what character the subgenera – man. and then consider with what species it is connected and what. For example. they are animals. We must collect any other common character which we observe. 317 . C D E various species of animal.

This latter class may be exemplified by the questions as to the causes respectively of echo. there is present also the cause of the eclipse or of the fall of the leaves – the possession of broad leaves. 16 The question might be raised with regard to cause and effect whether when the effect is present the cause also is present. let us say. For example: Why does the Nile rise towards the end of the month? Because towards its close the month is more stormy.15 Some connexions that require proof are identical in that they possess an identical ‘middle’ e. but specifically they are different. Here the one cause is subordinate to the other. Other connexions that require proof only differ in that the ‘middle’ of the one is subordinate to the ‘middle’ of the other. namely all those whose difference consists in their concerning different subjects or in their mode of manifestation. if this cause is not present. For. in the latter case. of reflection. one might argue. if a plant sheds its leaves or the moon is eclipsed. whether. and of the rainbow: the connexions to be proved which these questions embody are identical generically. the fall of 318 . in the former the earth’s interposition. Why is the month more stormy towards its close? Because the moon is waning.g. because all three are forms of repercussion. for instance. its effect will be at once implied by it – the eclipse by the earth’s interposition. these phenomena will have some other cause: if it is present. a whole group might be proved through ‘reciprocal replacement’ – and of these one class are identical in genus.

can a single effect have more than one cause? One might argue as follows: if the same attribute is predicable of more than one thing as its primary subject. A will then inhere in D and E. which shows that the eclipse is known through the interposition and not vice versa. On the other hand. and the cause is its deciduous character. but if so. But we can also demonstrate that the vine has broad leaves because it is deciduous. suggest that if the connexion to 319 . Then E inheres in F (since every vine is deciduous). but the interposition of the eclipse. they will be logically coincident and each capable of proof through the other. and C another primary subject of A. is obvious because the interposition is an element in the definition of eclipse. one who knows it through the eclipse knows the fact of the earth’s interposition but not the reasoned fact. but the presence of the effect necessitates the presence not of all that may cause it but only of a cause which yet need not be the whole cause.the leaves by the possession of broad leaves. demonstration through the cause is of the reasoned fact and demonstration not through the cause is of the bare fact. and the earth’s interposition is the cause of the moon’s eclipse and not the eclipse of the interposition) – if. F vine. The presence of the cause thus necessitates that of the effect. E deciduous. then A inheres in C (every vine is deciduous). Moreover. then. and B will be the cause of A’s inherence in D. Now if A inheres in B (for every broad-leaved plant is deciduous). C of A’s inherence in E. and the middle term B is the cause. C vine. let D be broad-leaved. that the eclipse is not the cause of the interposition. We may. and D and E primary subjects of B and C respectively. and D in E (for every deciduous plant has broad leaves): therefore every vine has broad leaves. and B in C (every vine possessing broad leaves). If. let B be a primary subject in which A inheres. Let me illustrate: Let A be deciduous character. however. Thus. however. B the possession of broad leaves. they cannot each be the cause of the other (for cause is prior to effect.

e. be convertible. not only will the cause be a whole but also the effect will be universal and commensurate. though such conjunctions would not be regarded as connexions demanding scientific proof. For instance. i. for example. Supposing. and. Again. identical as involving a given determinate increment.be proved is always universal and commensurate. if this whole has species. generically one if they are generically one. then if a tree is deciduous. different in so far as lines are lines and not numbers. So in these universal and commensurate connexions the ‘middle’ and its effect must reciprocate. and if coagulation is present – not in any subject but in a tree – then that tree must be deciduous. the middle will correspond to the extremes. the cause of likeness between colour and colour is other than that 320 . deciduous character will belong exclusively to a subject which is a whole. universally and commensurately to those species – i. Take the question why proportionals alternate. that the reason why trees are deciduous is the coagulation of sap. But if they are accepted as such. coagulation must be present. and be equivocal if they are equivocal. and when they are numbers. is both different and identical. Now it is possible to consider the effect and its subject as an accidental conjunction. In all proportionals this is so. either to all species of plant or to a single species. The cause when they are lines. 17 Can the cause of an identical effect be not identical in every instance of the effect but different? Or is that impossible? Perhaps it is impossible if the effect is demonstrated as essential and not as inhering in virtue of a symptom or an accident – because the middle is then the definition of the major term – though possible if the demonstration is not essential.e.

between figure and figure. because you will first reach a middle next the subject. but so that both A and B are wider than their respective subjects.g. effect. the possession of external angles equal to four right angles is an attribute wider than triangle or are). Let A be an attribute of all B. and subject are reciprocally predicable in the following way. Again. Then B will be a universal attribute of each species of D (since I call such an 321 . and B of every species of D. I say that. but it is coextensive with the species taken collectively (in this instance with all figures whose external angles are equal to four right angles). If an explanation in formal terms of the inter-relation of cause and effect is demanded. the effect is wider than the subject (e. Then if you take the middle which is proximate. and of fig. meaning perhaps in the latter case equality of the ratios of the sides and equality of the angles. We may illustrate as follows. and a premiss asserting it of the whole subject. for likeness here is equivocal. connexions requiring proof which are identical by analogy middles also analogous. and after that a middle – the coagulation of sap or something of the sort – proving the connexion of the first middle with the major: but it is the coagulation of sap at the junction of leaf-stalk and stem which defines deciduous. in the case of colours identity of the act of perceiving them. for the middle is a definition of the major. and is of wider extent than fig: but it is not wider than but coextensive with the totality of the species. And the middle likewise reciprocates. it is a definition of deciduous. The truth is that cause. or something else of the sort. we shall offer the following. which is incidentally the reason why all the sciences are built up through definition. If the species are taken severally. Deciduous is a universal attribute of vine. and is at the same time of wider extent than vine.

hence 322 . i. several causes. that the same effect may have more than one cause. For instance. or the middle which is proximate to the species? Clearly the cause is that nearest to each species severally in which it is manifested. Thus. and there is not merely one middle but several middles. then. otherwise why should B be the cause of A’s inherence in D any more than A the cause of B’s inherence in D? Now if A is an attribute of all the species of E. and it extends beyond each of them taken separately. We conclude. Let us call it C. too. is the cause of the property’s inherence in the several species the middle which is proximate to the primary universal.attribute universal even if it is not commensurate. as there was of A’s inherence in all the species of D? Then are the species of E. while E is not predicable of all of which A can be predicated? I mean how can there fail to be some special cause of A’s inherence in E. united by possessing some common cause? This cause we must look for. all the species of E will be united by possessing some common cause other than B: otherwise how shall we be able to say that A is predicable of all of which E is predicable. To illustrate formally: C is the cause of B’s inherence in D.e. B is the cause of A’s inherence in the species of D: consequently A must be of wider extent than B. the cause of longevity in quadrupeds is lack of bile. not with each species severally but with their totality). but not in subjects specifically identical. for that is the cause of the subject’s falling under the universal. and I call an attribute primary universal if it is commensurate. in birds a dry constitution – or certainly something different. 18 If immediate premisses are not reached at once.

whether the developed states of knowledge are not innate but come to be in us. and of the former a different kind of knowledge. or are innate but at first unnoticed. We have already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration is impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses. Now it is strange if we possess them from birth. and the conditions required to produce each of them. and the conditions required to produce. But there are questions which might be raised in respect of the apprehension of these immediate premisses: one might not only ask whether it is of the same kind as the apprehension of the conclusions. but also whether there is or is not scientific knowledge of both. the definition of. how could we apprehend and learn without a basis of pre-existent knowledge? For that is impossible.C is the cause of A’s inherence in D. since it is the same as demonstration. and. demonstrative knowledge. while the cause of A’s inherence in B is B itself. If on the other hand we acquire them and do not previously possess them. and with that also the definition of. As to the basic premisses. for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice them. are now clear. or scientific knowledge of the latter. nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of having no 323 . So it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth. B of A’s inherence in C. how they become known and what is the developed state of knowledge of them is made clear by raising some preliminary problems. further. as we used to find in the case of demonstration. 19 As regards syllogism and demonstration.

for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception. Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand. the earliest 324 . animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul: and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory. though with insufficient clearness. We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form. the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all – originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science. or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving. skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being. but from sense-perception. but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul. nor developed from other higher states of knowledge.e. and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals. From experience again – i.such developed state at all. for a number of memories constitute a single experience. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another. in some the sense-impression comes to persist. Let us now restate the account given already. in others it does not. until the original formation has been restored.

325 . scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing. consequently. intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals.universal is present in the soul: for though the act of senseperception is of the particular. Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premisses by induction. others admit of error – opinion. From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses. and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge. nor. whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further. not the man Callias. its content is universal – is man. the true universals. it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premisses – a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration. therefore.If. are established: e. some are unfailingly true. for example. Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth. and calculation. no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge.g. whereas primary premisses are more knowable than demonstrations. which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization. for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact. for instance. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premiss. and all scientific knowledge is discursive. and the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts. such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal.

Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them. each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand. (a) It is a ‘demonstration’. First. in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us. those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers – i. avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary. we must say what reasoning is. is ‘dialectical’. certain things being laid down.e. A. and what its varieties are. Pickard-Cambridge] Book I 1 Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us. Now reasoning is an argument in which. or by the majority. then.Aristotle – Topics [Translated by W. by all. on the other hand. something other than these necessarily comes about through them. when standing up to an argument. or by the most notable and 326 . if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning. and also shall ourselves.

he does not assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority or by philosophers – that is to say. but does not really do so. For he does not fall within the definition. or by most. besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences. are not true. reasoning is ‘contentious’ if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above. In general. The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. of the contentious reasonings mentioned. Further (d). since it appears to reason. as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments. but the other should be called ‘contentious reasoning’. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface. and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. or by the most illustrious of them – but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions which. for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately. but are not really such. though appropriate to the science in question. Again (c). For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn. or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve. because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition 327 . by all. the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary. the former really deserves to be called ‘reasoning’ as well. So then. in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we shall discuss later. nor yet generally accepted.illustrious of them. but not ‘reasoning’.

That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand. we merely want to describe them in outline. or most appropriately. we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way. 328 . to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries. For purposes of casual encounters. we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. 2 Next in order after the foregoing. and this task belongs properly. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is useful. we shall meet them on the ground not of other people’s convictions but of their own. casual encounters. It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences.of any of them. because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. and the philosophical sciences. while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. They are three – intellectual training. seeing that the principles are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed. it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed.

while part does not. What we have said. or the doctor to heal. Since. makes it clear that according to our present division. and (b) how we are to become well supplied with these. applying as it does to a class (or genus). if he omits none of the available means. let us divide the ‘peculiar’ into both the aforesaid parts. and with what materials they start. For arguments start with ‘propositions’. For it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade. we shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate. while the subjects on which reasonings take place are ‘problems’. should be ranked together with the genus. Now if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many. and speak of it as a ‘property’. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number.3 We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available. however. with the subjects on which reasonings take place. we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. and what kind of. the 329 . then. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident – for the differentia too. then. we should have sufficiently won our goal. and are identical. 4 First. while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things. and call that part which indicates the essence a ‘definition’. still. things arguments take place. of what is peculiar to anything part signifies its essence.

and ‘accident’. ‘genus’. is it not?’ or ‘«Animal» is the genus of man. because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind. clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question. for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions of sameness and difference. Do not let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem. then. 5 We must now say what are ‘definition’. Naturally. namely either property or definition or genus or accident. In a word we may call ‘definitory’ everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions. A ‘definition’ is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence. Similarly too in other cases. however. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term. ‘Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?’. but only that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. For if it be put in this way. try it as they may. all told. use the word ‘definitory’ also of such a remark as ‘The «becoming» is «beautiful»‘. One may.elements turn out to be four. «‘An animal that walks on two feet» is the definition of man. or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase. The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. and that all the above-mentioned 330 . and likewise also of the question. ‘property’. ‘Is «an animal that walks on two feet» a definition of man or no?’ [or ‘Is «animal» his genus or no?’] the result is a problem. People whose rendering consists of a term only. for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well. problems and propositions are equal in number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of the phrase. is it not?’ the result is a proposition: but if thus.

We should treat as predicates in the category of essence all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question. Observe. e. A ‘genus’ is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. for example. but a ‘temporary’ or a ‘relative’ property: for ‘being on the right hand side’ is a temporary property. in the case of man. For no one calls anything a ‘property’ which may possibly belong to something else. as. he is a man. That is to say. while ‘two-footed’ is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations. if asked that question. ‘Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a 331 . that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow it. it is a property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. however. The question. and if he be capable of learning grammar. To show. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar: for if A be a man. ‘sleep’ in the case of man. e. For if we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different. we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. it will be called not a ‘property’ absolutely. if any such thing were actually to be called a property. please. A ‘property’ is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of a thing. it is appropriate to say ‘He is an animal’. and is predicated convertibly of it. That nothing which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep it is a man. then he is capable of learning grammar. ‘What is the object before you?’. but yet belongs to that thing alone. that the converse of this last statement does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition.g.examples are of this character is clear on the face of them. even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone.g.

whenever a man is the only person sitting. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better: for if he adopts the first. for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white. and likewise also of ox.different one?’ is also a ‘generic’ question. such as. ‘Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?’ and ‘Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?’. For in all such cases the question is ‘to which of the two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong more closely?’ It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or relative property. when expressed in language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them. any one is bound. whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other. whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term in question.g. there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming both a 332 . An ‘accident’ is (i) something which. the question. it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. though it is none of the foregoing – i. as (e. we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus. for example. if he is to understand it. we shall have argued that they are in the same genus. So then. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing. Thus the sitting posture is an accident. for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus: for having argued that ‘animal’ is the genus of man. to know already what ‘definition’ and ‘genus’ and ‘property’ are. while if he be not the only one sitting. and at another not white.e.) the ‘sitting posture’ may belong or not belong to some selfsame thing. Likewise also ‘whiteness’. and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. but will be a temporary property. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons of things together.

it would be very obscure indeed. So then. and then.’ we must outline a division of our subject. and of little service for the treatise before us. but a property absolutely it will never be. so that. But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally to them all: for this is not an easy thing to find. and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch to which it most naturally belongs. it will probably be easier to make our way right through the task before us.’ all the points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called ‘definitory’. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to the term defined.relative and a temporary property. as we do also in the case of a property. starting from the rules that are appropriate in each case. and. a special plan of inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished. 6 We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of a ‘property’ and ‘genus’ and ‘accident’ will be applicable to ‘definitions’ as well. to use the phrase previously employed. even were one found. or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus. as was said before. as would be remarked also in the case of an accident. we shall have demolished the definition. or that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong. Rather. The questions I mean have practically been already assigned to their several branches. speaking of them as ‘definitory’ and ‘generic’ questions. 333 .

into three divisions. that the likeness is more emphatic: that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way or another are called ‘the same’ in view of unity of species. such as a horse and a man. ‘doublet’ and ‘cloak’. For the reaon why all water is said to be specifically the same as all other water is because of a certain likeness it bears to it. too. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling. and the only difference in the case of water drawn from the same spring is this.g. roughly speaking. its most literal and primary use is found whenever the sameness is rendered in reference to an alternative name or definition. as when what can acquire knowledge is called the 334 . It is generally supposed that the term ‘the same’ is most used in a sense agreed on by every one when applied to what is numerically one. those things are called generically the same which fall under the same genus. or one horse and another: for things like this that fall under the same species are said to be ‘specifically the same’. specifically. It might appear that the sense in which water from the same spring is called ‘the same water’ is somehow different and unlike the senses mentioned above: but really such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the things that in one way or another are called ‘the same’ in view of unity of species. it is apt to be rendered in more than one sense. Similarly. but they present no differences in respect of their species.7 First of all we must define the number of senses borne by the term ‘Sameness’. as when a cloak is said to be the same as a doublet. But even so. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generically – numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing. e. or an animal that walks on two feet is said to be the same as a man: a second sense is when it is rendered in reference to a property. where there is more than one thing. as one man and another. For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another.

what is predicated convertibly. If. indicating him by name. For all these uses mean to signify numerical unity. if not. viz. For often when we give the order to call one of the people who are sitting down. it either is or is not one of the terms 335 . it would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. for if it signifies the essence. and what naturally travels upward the same as fire: while a third use is found when it is rendered in reference to some term drawn from Accident.’ three senses are to be distinguished. is called the same as Socrates.same as a man. he will. we think. it would be its definition or property. Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are those out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed. as when the creature who is sitting. it is a property: for this was what a property is. Another way to confirm it is through reasoning. 8 Of ‘sameness’ then. as has been said. is by induction: for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one. or who is musical. but does not signify the essence. understand better from some accidental feature. it is not predicated convertibly of the thing. on the other hand. whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not to understand us. so we bid him call to us ‘the man who is sitting’ or ‘who is conversing over there’ – clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same object by its name and by its accident. That what I have just said is true may be best seen where one form of appellation is substituted for another. it is the definition. For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible. we change our description.

contained in the definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms. if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit. Likewise. but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what is set there is ‘white’ or is ‘a colour’. It is clear. then. State. sometimes a quality. he states its essence and signifies a substance. These are ten in number: Essence. if it be not one of those terms. in the other cases: for each of these kinds of predicate. 9 Next. Place. Passivity. Likewise. sometimes some one of the other types of predicate. he states its essence and signifies a quality. on the face of it that the man who signifies something’s essence signifies sometimes a substance. one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind. Activity. whereas. on the other hand. he will be describing its essence and signifying a quantity. clearly it would be an accident. also. if either it be asserted of itself. it does 336 . then it will be the genus or the differentia. For when man is set before him and he says that what is set there is ‘a man’ or ‘an animal’. for accident was said’ to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition or its genus or a property. Relation. Quantity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these categories: for all the propositions found through these signify either something’s essence or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types of predicate. also. Quality. we must distinguish between the classes of predicates in which the four orders in question are found. signifies an essence: if. or its genus be asserted of it. Time. Position. too. inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae.

but a quantity or a quality or one of the other kinds of predicate. if it be a general opinion that there is 337 . a definition must be given of a ‘dialectical proposition’ and a ‘dialectical problem’. it might probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception of contraries is the same: also. Thus. and the materials with which they start. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers. for a man would probably assent to the view of the philosophers. i. and so many. also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted. and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. 10 First. or by the most notable of these. supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar. it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science of fluteplaying as well. whereas. if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. falls next to be told. are the subjects on which arguments take place.not signify an essence. then. and by what means we are to become well supplied with them.e. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted. while to the former no one would assent. For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds. nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of no doubt. supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same. either by all. or by most. How we are to acquire them. then. Such. provided it be not contrary to the general opinion.

11 A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance.g. all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions. it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do them harm. propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good to one’s friends. on comparison. and that either by itself. and that one ought not to do them harm is the contradictory of that contrary. and on a question of geometry with the geometrician. Likewise. one ought not to do good to one’s enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view. Also. in other cases. that one ought to do harm to one’s friends is contrary to the general view. for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made a study of these things. it might appear also as if doing good to one’s friends were a contrary to doing evil to one’s enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries. if one ought to do good to one’s friends. Clearly also.more than one science of grammar. Here.g. the contrary being that one ought to do good to one’s enemies. and likewise also in other cases. it will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e. or as a help to the solution of some other 338 . e. Likewise also. also. one ought also to do evil to one’s enemies. also. Likewise. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor. or to truth and knowledge. if one ought to do good to one’s friends. it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin.

For even if a man does not accept this view. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian ‘is’ so without ever having ‘come to be’ so.g. A ‘thesis’ is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion. as Antisthenes said. but for the sake of other things. 339 . or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers. or each of them among themselves. e. or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion.g. be something on which either people hold no opinion either way. e.g. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then being whether so – and so is so or not. again. he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable. Problems. as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly. and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. then. or that Being is one. It must. and we find it difficult to give our reasons. while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge. e. in order that through them we may come to know something else. Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned theory contrary to men’s usual opinions. others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast. moreover. are not useful in and by themselves for either of these purposes. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not.g. but yet help us in regard to some such problems.g.such problem. there being convincing arguments for both views). the view that contradiction is impossible. whether the universe is eternal or not: others. For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance. e. or being so eternally. for there are many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves. or the philosophers to the masses. e.

inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way. we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer. is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis. Not every problem. but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument. nor every thesis. also forms a problem. 12 Having drawn these definitions. not punishment or perception.g.Now a ‘thesis’ also is a problem. Now what reasoning is has been said before: induction is a passage from individuals to universals. though a problem is not always a thesis. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is 340 . There is on the one hand Induction. That a thesis. e. nor yet be too far removed from it: for the former cases admit of no doubt. should be examined. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called ‘theses’. however. or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves. but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them. seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment. But it should make no difference whichever description is used. for our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology. while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration. on the other Reasoning.

and likewise the skilled charioteer. and of things out of which. (2) the power to distinguish in how many senses particular expression is used. of things about which. are to be distinguished in the way we have said before. while the former cannot’. then. arguments are constructed. (1) ‘The desirable may mean either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient’. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions. and (2) Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered again after it has been lost.the most effective. the second upon the differences of things. (4) the investigation of likeness. are in a certain sense propositions: for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of them. The last three. and is applicable generally to the mass of men. as well. the third upon their likenesses.g. 13 The classes. e. (3) the discovery of the differences of things. The first proposition depends upon the use of one term in several senses. then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. and (3) The relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour’. though reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictious people. Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses. 341 .

‘Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four’: for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted authority. and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind of subject. all opinions that are in accordance with the arts. or the most notable of them. while some are logical. Likewise also in the other cases. e. for in hearing we admit something into ourselves. again. We should select also from the written handbooks of argument. all statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases. Propositions such as the following are ethical. i.g. In the margin.g. e.g. putting them down under separate headings. some are on natural philosophy. or most. e. Moreover. ‘The perception of contraries is the same’ – the knowledge of them being so – and ‘we see by admission of something into ourselves. for so it is. for they are posited by those who do not also see what exception there may be. beginning with the category of essence. 342 . We must make propositions also of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held. we do not emit. Of propositions and problems there are – to comprehend the matter in outline – three divisions: for some are ethical propositions. in the case of the other senses. It is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted.g.14 Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers. or ‘On Life’ – and that ‘On Good’ should deal with every form of good. too. and. should be taken as a principle or accepted position. one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers. not by an emission’. e. or opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held. ‘On Good’. by all. too.e. but also those that are like these. as was laid down before. and we taste in the same way.

of ‘white and black’.g. while such as this are on natural philosophy. e. ‘The knowledge of opposites is the same’. In the same way these two should again be divided. and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another. ‘Is the knowledge of opposites the same or not?’. the above remarks are enough. As regards the number of senses a term bears. next. but we must also try to render their definitions. For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth. E. the knowledge of ‘good and evil’. e.g.g. or ‘cold and hot’. then. 15 On the formation. Likewise also in other cases. as long as division is possible. e. we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses. ‘Is the universe eternal or not?’ Likewise also with problems. examining them in the light of the illustrations given above. but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have. All propositions should be taken in their most universal form. The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in a definition. e. ‘The knowledge of contraries is the same’. if they disagree?’. but we have to try to recognize each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction. and that ‘of relative terms’. but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion. the one should be made into many.‘Ought one rather to obey one’s parents or the laws. such as this are logical.g. then.g. we must not merely say that justice and courage are called ‘good’ in one sense. the latter because they are productive of a certain result 343 . of propositions.

‘fine’ as applied to a picture has ‘ugly’ as its contrary. as applied to a house.and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. ‘heavy’) in the case of a note has ‘sharp’ as its contrary. in the former by hearing. inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour. look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings. though ‘sharp’ is the contrary of each. the contrary of ‘sharp’ in the case of a note is ‘flat’. so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names. just as ‘colour’ is too. whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names. then. in the case of ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’: for sound is called ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’. then. In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used. for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. there is no discrepancy. but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious: e. but in the former by taste. but in the latter case we judge by sight. the contrary of ‘sharp’ bears several meanings. e. For here again there is no discrepancy in the names used. Similarly also in other cases. Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only. but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called ‘clear’ in a like sense to sound. but in the case of a solid mass ‘light’. so that ‘fine’ is an ambiguous term. and if so.g. in the 344 . Likewise also with ‘sharp’ and ‘dull’ in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch. First. For ‘sharp’ will not be the same when contrary to ‘dull’ and to ‘flat’. also.g. Clearly. ‘ramshackle’. Likewise. may be considered by the following means. As regards the names. but. Again Barhu (‘flat’. while in the case of a solid edge it is ‘dull’. also does ‘sharp’. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same in kind we have the same sensation.

as is the case with ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’. it is ‘harsh’. Again. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight. then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning. Moreover. it follows necessarily that ‘to see’ also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of ‘to fail to see’. ‘to fail to see’ a phrase with more than one meaning.case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is ‘dull’. viz.g. ‘Clear’. used of the frame of mind. see if one sense of a term has a contrary. then. viz. e. and likewise also ‘obscure’. if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate. whereas in regard to sound there is but one. if some of them have more than one intermediate. whereas in the case of sound they have none. while others have but one. 345 .g. But if this has more than one meaning.g. is an ambiguous term. (2) to fail to put that power to active use.g. has to ‘hate’ as its contrary. if they have. the opposite is to put it to active use. Further. moreover. To ‘love’ also. whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none. see in regard to their intermediates. to ‘love’ is an ambiguous term. as some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. or if both have one but not the same one. while of ‘not to put the power of sight to active use’. therefore. e. in the case of the contradictory opposite. look and see if it bears more than one meaning. while another has absolutely none. For if this bears more than one meaning. ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’ in the case of colours have ‘grey’ as an intermediate. e. while as used of the physical activity (kissing) it has none: clearly. so that ‘pleasure’ is used in more than one sense. the opposite of ‘not to possess the power of sight’ is to possess it. or. others have none. e. ‘harsh’. for in the case of colours there are numbers of intermediates. See.

whereas as applied to the soul it means to be of a certain quality. examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning. since animals naturally possess each kind of ‘sense’. Likewise also in other cases.Moreover. and see if they are the same in all cases.g.g. For if they are not the same. Moreover. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also.g. Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term. For if ‘justly’ has more than one meaning. then so will the remaining term: e. and vice versa. then clearly the term is ambiguous: e. whenever the original term bears more than one meaning. e. then ‘healthily’ also will be used with more than one meaning: e. as applied to the soul and to the body. then ‘to be wanting in sense’ too will be used with more than one meaning. the inflexion also that is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning.) the good that 346 . also. if ‘healthy’ describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health. if ‘to have sense’ be used with more than one meaning. e. That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a certain state is clear.g. In the same way also. will be used with more than one meaning. for there will be a meaning of ‘just’ to each of the meanings of ‘justly’. if ‘healthy’ has more than one meaning. then ‘just’.g. as applied to ‘man’.g. ‘good’ in the case of food means ‘productive of pleasure’. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time. both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body. then ‘just’ also will be used in like manner. examine the inflected forms. if the word ‘justly’ be used of judging according to one’s own opinion. and in the case of medicine ‘productive of health’. as applied to the soul and to the body. then ‘healthily’ also will be used to mean ‘in such a way as to produce’ or ‘preserve’ or ‘betoken’ health. as (e. and also of judging as one ought.

as (e. so that both the genera are predicated of it. but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses. Thus (e. signifies a colour. then. as well. for whenever we call a thing an ‘engine’. we declare it to be a bird: in this way. however. whereas a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a right angle. too.) ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘raven’. is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note. both the genera are predicated of raven. which denotes both the animal and the engine. ‘Sharp’. Often it signifies what is of certain quantity. the genera be subaltern. and so is ‘bird’.happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. we do not call it an animal. as applied to a body. and see if they are different without being subaltern.g. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen. and also their definition.g. 347 . as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us. Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you are different without being subaltern. e. while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point). Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird.) ‘donkey’. Likewise also whenever we call the raven a ‘flying biped animal’. So then the term ‘good’ is ambiguous. In the same way also ‘clear’. Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term. nor vice versa. we also say that it is a certain kind of animal. If.g. but in regard to a note it denotes what is ‘easy to hear’. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be an animal of a certain kind. clearly the term before you does so as well. there is no necessity for the definitions to be different.

It should. and ‘sharp’ are ambiguous. e. nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other.g. For the former will be body possessing such and such a colour’. then. and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e. ‘Clear’. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted. white) sound and a ‘clear’ garment. as is the case (e. Abstract. then. whereas in the for it means that ‘it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails’.g.g. e. Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind. those of ‘animal’ and ‘knowledge’ (for the differentiae of these are different). have been had the meaning of ‘clear’ in each case been synonymous. and the remainder in each case is not the same. ‘a body ‘and’ a note’. in the cases just mentioned. Moreover. This does not happen in the case of ambiguous terms.) with a ‘clear’ (lit.g. for they will always be used either in like manner. For synonyms are always comparable.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as ‘related commensurably to health’. while the latter will be ‘a note easy to hear’. see if the terms cannot be compared as ‘more or less’ or as ‘in like manner’. however.It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination. look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are 348 . and a ‘sharp’ flavour and a ‘sharp’ note. e. Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares. e. For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp ‘in a like degree’. if in the latter case it means that ‘it is of the right amount to produce health’. white) body’ of a ‘clear note’.g. or else in a greater degree in one case. we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term ‘commensurably’ in each case. of a ‘clear (lit. the same expression ought to remain over.g.

) clear’ (lit. for things that are the same have the same differentiae. whereas ‘colour’ in melodies has not the same differentiae. and wisdom from temperance?’ – for all these belong to the same genus. e.g. ‘Wherein does justice differ from courage. as (e. ‘sharp’ is of a ‘note’ and a ‘solid’. ‘Wherein does sensation differ from knowledge?: for in the case of genera that are very far apart. then. since the species is never the differentia of anything. e. and also from one genus to another. ‘colour’ in bodies and ‘colour’ in tunes: for the differentiae of ‘colour’ in bodies are ‘sight-piercing’ and ‘sight compressing’. the differences are entirely obvious. for one note is differentiated from another by being ‘clear’. Moreover. see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves have different differentiae.differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern. Again.g. ‘Sharp’. For being ‘sharp’ differentiates note from note. as e. The differences which things present to each other should be examined within the same genera.g. is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern.g.g. Colour. white) as applied to a body is a species of colour. is an ambiguous term. of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated by these and like means. e. look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and another a differentia. then. provided they be not very much too far apart. then. and likewise also one solid from another. 349 . 16 The presence. whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia.

so is reason in the soul.g. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used. and also upon which of them the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion. We should also look at things which belong to the same genus. for in the case of the rest. so is sensation related to the object of sensation). first. if it bas been made clear to him how many meanings it may have). as sight is in the eye. to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all. and as is a calm in the sea. and also with a view to ensuring that our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. so is C in D’ (e. the 350 . in so far they are alike.17 Likeness should be studied. for in so far as they have any identical attribute.g.g. it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings there are. as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge. e. and ‘As A is in B. we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness. to a man and a horse and a dog. 18 It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for clearness’ sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts. in the case of things belonging to different genera. the formulae being ‘A:B = C:D’ (e. so is windlessness in the air). Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart.

then. however. but shall know if the questioner fails to address his argument to the same point. and also with a view to the rendering of definitions. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. if our answerer happens not to know the number of meanings of our terms. because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. however. is not possible in all cases. It helps us also both to avoid being misled and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number of meanings of a term. and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be able to mislead him. we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning. That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between the objects before us. The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings. unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss the subject before him in any other way.questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address his argument to this. and also in recognizing what any particular thing is. does not belong properly to dialectic. with regard 351 . It is useful for inductive arguments. because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to it. This manner of argument. This. we shall already have shown that they are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is. The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference. dialecticians should therefore by all means beware of this kind of verbal discussion. but only when of the many senses some are true and others are false. If.

so it is also in the case before us: then when we have shown the former we shall have shown. the matter before us as well: for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases. and windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest). and the point the startingpoint of a line. we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. whereby reasonings are effected. then. the sameness of a calm at sea. The means. Likewise. we shall be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. then. on the strength of the hypothesis. that they place them in that which is common to both as their genus. for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful. then. if we are able to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it. we render as the genus what is common to all the cases. in the case of objects widely divergent. It is useful for the rendering of definitions because. also. If. are these: the commonplace rules. and have then proved the point as regards these cases. so it is also in the case before us. e. and of a point on a line and the unit in number – each being a starting point. It is clear.to any of them we are well supplied with matter for a discussion. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: they declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number. the examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition. are as follows. 352 .g. we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in these cases.

we must speak of the methods of overthrowing a view universally. because such are common to both universal and particular problems. also. if we show that it does not belong in any case. if drawn from the genus. e. for in the case of accidents and in no other it is possible for something to be true conditionally and not universally. First. then ‘S will be capable of learning grammar’. then.Book II 1 Of problems some are universal.g. 353 . also. In the case of accidents. particular problems are such as ‘Some pleasure is good’ and ‘Some pleasure is not good’. then ‘S is an animal’. while those who argue with them overthrow it. then it will be true by conversion to say that ‘S is an animal that walks on two feet’. for if ‘to be capable of learning grammar is an attribute of S’. The conversion of an appropriate name which is drawn from the element ‘accident’ is an extremely precarious thing. Names drawn from the elements ‘definition’ and ‘property’ and ‘genus’ are bound to be convertible. and because people more usually introduce theses asserting a predicate than denying it. if ‘to be an animal that walks on two feet is an attribute of S’. Likewise. for if ‘to be an animal is an attribute of S’. The methods of establishing and overthrowing a view universally are common to both kinds of problems. we shall also have shown that it does not belong in every case. they must either belong or not belong absolutely. Universal problems are such as ‘Every pleasure is good’ and ‘No pleasure is good’. The same is true also in the case of a property. for when we have shown that a predicate belongs in every case. Likewise. we shall also have shown that it belongs in some cases. For none of these attributes can possibly belong or not belong in part. others particular.

g. but often even without such definition it is obvious that he has rendered the genus as an accident.) that ‘Justice happens (accidit) to be a virtue’. They are of two kinds.g. for it is open to dispute it and say that he is white or just in part only.g. The assertor may of course define it so in so many words.g. suppose that one were to say that whiteness is coloured or that walking is in motion. commit error. and those who call objects by the names of other objects (e. then. but colour is its genus. caused either by false statement or by transgression of the established diction. whiteness or justice) belonging in part. but always the genera are predicated of their species literally. 2 Now one commonplace rule is to look and see if a man has ascribed as an accident what belongs in some other way. For a predicate drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form. This mistake is most commonly made in regard to the genera of things. Conversion. and say that an attribute belongs to thing which does not belong to it. e. calling a planetree a ‘man’) transgress the established terminology. is not a necessary process in the case of accidents. there is nothing to prevent an attribute (e.on the other hand. if one were to say that white happens (accidit) to be a colour – for being a colour does not happen by accident to white. A man therefore who says that white is ‘coloured’ has 354 . For those who make false statements. saying (e.g. e. so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute of a man in order to show that he is white or just. for the species take on both the name and the definition of their genera. We must also define the errors that occur in problems.

and then proceed in order down to those that are not further divisible: e. e. or of being and not-being: for if in any case it be shown that the knowledge of them is not the same we shall have demolished the problem. nor yet as its property or as its definition: for the definition and property of a thing belong to it and to nothing else. when we have suggested a division.g.g.not rendered ‘coloured’ as its genus. a log.g. Clearly then he renders it as an accident.) whether it be so of just deeds and unjust. the predicate appears to hold in all or in a large number of cases. if a man has said that the knowledge of opposites is the same. whereas many things besides white are coloured. Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and of its subject. You should look and begin with the most primary groups. and a horse. Another rule is to examine all cases where a predicate has been either asserted or denied universally to belong to something. and not in their infinite multitude: for then the inquiry will proceed more directly and in fewer steps. a refusal to assert it will make him look absurd. This rule is convertible for both destructive and constructive purposes: for if. we may then claim that the other should actually assert it universally. and then look and see if anything untrue has been assumed as true 355 . either of both separately or else of one of them. and see (e. if no clear result be reached so far in these cases. and of contradictory terms. seeing that he has used an inflected form. Likewise. you should look and see whether it be so of relative opposites and of contraries and of terms signifying the privation or presence of certain states. a stone. Look at them species by species. or else bring a negative instance to show in what case it is not so: for if he does neither of these things. if the predicate belongs in no case. or of the double and the half. also. you should again divide these until you come to those that are not further divisible. Then. or of blindness and sight. a man.

g. Moreover. a man should make the problem into a proposition for himself.g. to see if the good man is jealous. Moreover. and then bring a negative instance against it: for the negative instance will be a ground of attack upon the assertion. we should not here go with the multitude: e. Again. clearly it is not possible for a god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured. ask who is the ‘jealous’ man and what is ‘jealousy’. A man should substitute definitions also for the terms contained in his definitions. Thus (e. Again. and he is ‘indignant’ who grieves at the successes of the evil. it becomes obvious. you should say that we ought to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean by them. the point at issue is not cleared up. This rule is very nearly the same as the rule to look into cases where a predicate has been attributed or denied universally: but it differs in the turn of the argument. then clearly the indignant man would not be jealous. ask who each of them is: for then it will be obvious whether the statement is true or false. to see if the indignant man is jealous. you should define what kind of things should be called as most men call them. as do most men: but in saying whether the object before us tends to produce 356 . e.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god. and what should not. For if ‘jealousy’ is pain at the apparent success of some well-behaved person. ask what is ‘to wrong’? For if it be ‘to injure deliberately’. and not stop until he comes to a familiar term: for often if the definition be rendered whole. whereas if for one of the terms used in the definition a definition be stated.in the definitions.g. it is right to call ‘healthy’ whatever tends to produce health. clearly the good man is not jealous: for then he would be bad. For this is useful both for establishing and for overthrowing a view: e. if he is ‘jealous’ who grieves at the successes of the good.g. but when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such and such a kind.

we shall have demolished the universal assertion of it.g. and likewise also if we show that it belongs in a single case. for supposing this to be obvious. then every soul is immortal. This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning is undetected. to argue that if the soul of man be immortal. we shall show that in one sense the attribute belongs. you should show your case of one of its several senses. if we cannot show it of both senses. if we cannot show it of both senses: whereas if we are overthrowing a statement. This commonplace rule is convertible for purposes both of establishing and of overthrowing a view. in overthrowing a statement there is no need to start the discussion by securing any admission. then the other man will object that the point which he himself questioned has not been discussed. 3 Moreover. we should adopt the language no longer of the multitude but of the doctor.health or not. we shall show that in one sense the attribute does not belong. For if we want to establish a statement. Of course. so that a previous admission must be secured that if any soul whatever 357 . and it has been laid down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S. e. For it is not enough to discuss a single instance in order to show that an attribute belongs universally. if you cannot show it of both. but only the other point. we shall demolish the universal denial of it. it belongs universally. Whereas in establishing a statement we ought to secure a preliminary admission that if it belongs in any case whatever. if a term be used in several senses. either when the statement asserts or when it denies the attribute universally: for if we show that in any case whatever the attribute does not belong. supposing this claim to be a plausible one.

g.be immortal. as the science of contraries is said to be the same (for of contraries the one is no more an end than the other). supposing ‘the right’ to mean ‘the expedient’ or ‘the honourable’.g.g. If. ‘The science of many things is one’: here ‘many things’ may mean the end and the means to that end. or again they may be an essential and an accidental attribute. Distinguish as many meanings as are 358 . but in some other way: e. distinguish how many meanings it has before proceeding either to demolish or to establish it: e. if it is possible in some sense. and the accidental fact that the equilateral figure has them so: for it is because of the accident of the equilateral triangle happening to be a triangle that we know that it has its angles equal to two right angles. the variety of meanings of a term be obvious. e. it clearly is altogether impossible that it should be so. again.) the essential fact that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. Again. but differ not by way of ambiguity of a term. as (e. then every soul is immortal.g. that it is impossible to show both.) medicine is the science both of producing health and of dieting. as (e. as (e. or. but only whenever we are not easily able to quote any single argument applying to all cases in common.) the geometrician can argue that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles. you should show the one.g. or they may be both of them ends. consider those expressions whose meanings are many. you should try either to establish or to demolish both descriptions of the subject in question. then. This is not to be done in every case. Supposing. by showing that it is honourable and expedient. The same rule applies also when the number of senses into which it is divided is more than two. If. adding an indication that it is true in the one sense and not in the other. then clearly it is possible. or that it is neither honourable nor expedient. it is not possible in any sense of the term that the science of many things should be the same.g. however.

and leave the rest aside. For the ‘desire of X’ may mean the desire of it as an end (e. if we want to establish a view. 359 . we should bring forward all that do not admit that view. We must deal also in these cases as well with any uncertainty about the number of meanings involved.g. we should bring forward all such meanings as admit that view and should divide them only into those meanings which also are required for the establishment of our case: whereas if we want to overthrow a view. His desire for it is therefore accidental. This rule is useful in dealing with relative terms: for cases of this kind are generally cases of relative terms. e. the thesis becomes easier to attack. or as a thing desired accidentally. that a particular science is of a particular thing.g. 4 Moreover. treated either as an end or as a means to its end. or again that it is not ‘of’ it in any of the aforesaid ways. For essentially he desires the sweet. and ‘being fussy’ for ‘being busy’: for when the expression is made more familiar.g. Further. both for establishing and for overthrowing a view.g. the desire of health) or as a means to an end (e. to substitute ‘clear’ for ‘exact’ in describing a conception. the desire of being doctored). e. he no longer desires it.required: e. This commonplace rule also is available for both purposes alike. it is well to alter a term into one more familiar. The same rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that have more than one object. and only accidentally the wine: for if it be dry. the sweet-toothed person desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet.g. or as accidentally connected with it. as. or is not. in the case of wine. ‘of’ another should be established by means of the same commonplace rules. that one thing is.

e. then also there will be applied to it the term ‘grammatical’ or ‘musical’ knowledge. then in regard to perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. Since those things of which the genus is predicated must also of necessity have one of its species predicated of them. if to anything the term ‘scientific knowledge’ be applied. for purposes of overthrowing a view. if we want to show that rightness and wrongness are possible in regard to perception.g.g. e. for the man who perceives judges in a certain way. while the second is true. On the other hand. for ‘animal’ is flying and quadruped. For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species. and to perceive is to judge. whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus. then animal also is good. the former argument is true while the latter is fallacious. In the present instance the proof proceeds from the genus and relates to the species: for ‘to judge’ is the genus of ‘to perceive’.g. Now the former commonplace argument is fallacious for purposes of establishing a view. that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus. or are described by terms derived from that genus. while it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly. But per contra it may proceed from the species to the genus: for all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well. look at its genus. must also of necessity be possessed of one of its species or be described by terms derived from one of its species (e. on the other hand. for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either.In order to show that contrary attributes belong to the same thing. and if any one 360 . All the attributes. but not so ‘man’. for if ‘man’ is good. and since those things that are possessed of the genus in question. or knowledge of one of the other sciences. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition: for ‘disposition’ is the genus of knowledge.

whether (e.g. clearly it does move. that the soul is in motion). clearly it does not move. real or apparent. while if it does not move with any of the species of motion. 361 . then the thing in question will also have been shown to be real). while if you want to overthrow a view. for if we show that what follows from the thing in question is unreal. Moreover. or what it is whose reality necessarily follows if the thing in question be real: if you wish to establish a view inquire what there is on whose reality the reality of the thing in question will follow (for if the former be shown to be real.) it can grow or be destroyed or come to be.g. we shall have demolished the thing in question. e. as a ‘grammarian’ or a ‘musician’) – therefore if any expression be asserted that is in any way derived from the genus (e. For it will be easier to attack people when committed to a definition: for an attack is always more easily made on definitions. draw upon several. If you are not well equipped with an argument against the assertion.possesses scientific knowledge or is described by a term derived from ‘science’. then he will also possess grammatical or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the other sciences. This commonplace rule is common for both purposes. look and see whether it be possible for the soul to be moved with any of the species of motion. ask what it is that is real if the thing in question be real. clearly it does not move at all. both for overthrowing and for establishing a view: for if the soul moves with one of the species of motion. and so forth with all the other species of motion. what it is whose reality conditions the reality of the thing in question. look among the definitions. or will be described by a term derived from one of them. look and see in regard to the thing in question. For if it be not moved in any of these ways.g. of the thing before you. and if one is not enough.

sometimes an apparent necessity. also. sometimes neither an apparent nor a real necessity. whereas the other has to do also with the present and the future. by an induction made by means of the view laid down. also. if he has said that knowing is remembering: for the one is concerned with past time. 5 Moreover. and when moreover the view in question happens to be one of a kind on which he has a good stock of lines of argument. there is the sophistic turn of argument.g. to see if there be any discrepancy anywhere: e. For we are said to know things present and future (e. Likewise. the view originally laid down is demolished as well. It is an apparent necessity.g. when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed appears to be useful. and relevant to the thesis. suppose a man to have stated that what is being nourished of necessity grows: for animals are always of necessity being nourished. but they do not always grow.Moreover. Likewise. without being really so. whereas it is impossible to remember anything save what is in the past. that there will be an eclipse). This process is sometimes a real necessity. it is really necessary whenever he (the questioner) first. look at the time involved. whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument. and the questioner thereupon addresses his arguments to the support of this view. It is really necessary whenever the answerer has denied any view that would be useful in attacking the thesis. arrives at a certain statement and then tries to demolish that statement: for when once this has been demolished. whether it be that the man who is standing up to the argument has refused to 362 .

the original statement is demolished as well.g. after all propositions of this kind have been granted them. adding an indication whenever he assents although he does not agree with the view. and sometimes the original thesis. 6 In regard to subjects which must have one and one only of two predicates. as a rule. is the easier to demolish. moreover. it increases the confusion of questioners if. and foreign to. Moreover.g. supposing we are well supplied as regards the one for arguing 363 . But you should beware here too of making a change to a more difficult subject: for sometimes the consequence. The remaining case is when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed is neither really nor apparently necessary.concede something. For this reason. so that by the demolition of any single one of these consequences.) a man must have either a disease or health. the answerer should not lose his temper. or whether he (the questioner) has first reached it by a plausible induction based upon the thesis and then tries to demolish it. for it appears to be wholly disconnected from. the man who said ‘X is a man’ has also said that it is an animal and that it is animate and a biped and capable of acquiring reason and knowledge. For. and it is the answerer’s luck to be confuted on a mere side issue You should beware of the last of the aforesaid methods. they can then draw no conclusion. of whatever kind. as (e. inasmuch as each statement has a number of necessary consequences: e. any one who has made any statement whatever has in a certain sense made several statements. the art of dialectic. but assent to those statements that are of no use in attacking the thesis.

and so has made a mistake: and so he has if he has declared the usual attribute to be necessary: for then he declares it to belong universally when it does not so belong. Likewise also ‘well-starred’ may be taken to mean the man whose star is good. Likewise also if he has declared the contrary of what is usual to be necessary. it always gives an opportunity for attack. while if we show that the one does not belong. we shall be well equipped as regards the remaining one as well. This rule is convertible for both purposes: for when we have shown that the one attribute belongs. we shall have shown that the remaining one does belong. they are comparatively seldom good. if men are usually bad. others however it may chance. but the man the state of whose heart is strong. with the implication that it is most fitting so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e. you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term in its literal meaning. so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them to be good of necessity. failing such an event itself. For the contrary of a usual attribute is always a comparatively rare attribute: e.’ For a man’s star is his soul. the expression ‘strong at heart’ will suggest not the courageous man. Some things occur of necessity. just as also the expression ‘of a good hope’ may be taken to mean the man who hopes for good things. or if a usual event (or. as Xenocrates says ‘well-starred is he who has a noble soul’.g. For if a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually. The same is true also if he has declared a mere matter of chance to happen of necessity or usually. we shall have shown that the remaining one does not belong.g. if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually. clearly the speaker has denied an attribute to be universal which is universal.its presence or absence. others usually. Moreover. according to the use now established. for a 364 . its contrary) has been stated to occur of necessity. Clearly then the rule is useful for both purposes.

that the modes of conjunction are six is clear: for either (1) each of the contrary verbs will be conjoined to each of the contrary objects. taking it to be a different thing because it has a different name. or per contra to do evil to friends and to do good to enemies. look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself. if he has stated without any distinction that disinherited persons are bad. to do good to friends and to do evil to friends. Well then.g. you may assume in discussing it that he means that they are so necessarily. as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and delight and good cheer: for all these are names of the same thing. e. it is open to you to discuss it on the assumption that he meant that it happens necessarily: e.g. If the thing happens usually. e. and this too gives two modes. to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies. we must grasp the subject of contraries. and this gives two modes: e. Pleasure. or to do good to enemies and to do evil to enemies.g. If then any one says that joyfulness is an accidental attribute of cheerfulness.chance event happens neither of necessity nor usually. he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute of itself.g. Moreover. in order that it may help us both in demolishing and in establishing a view. to wit. and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety. 7 Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six ways. Or (3) a single verb may be attached to both objects: and this also gives two modes. to 365 . Or else (2) both verbs may be attached to one object. then even supposing his statement does not distinguish whether he meant that it happens usually or that it happens necessarily.

we shall find that the contraries of each of the others also are two in number. But the other four all constitute a contrariety. and the one is desirable. The case is the same also in regard to the other conjunctions: for in each combination the one course is desirable. unless the one be an expression denoting an excess. the same course has more than one contrary. and the other objectionable. and likewise also a defect. and the one belongs to a reasonable disposition and the other to a bad. Moreover. 366 . For to do good to friends is contrary to the doing of evil to friends: for it proceeds from the contrary disposition. and the other objectionable. then. if the accident of a thing have a contrary. if we examine them in the same way. For the doing of good to friends has as its contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the doing of evil to friends. for it is impossible that contrary predicates should belong at the same time to the same thing. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to the doing of good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable and belong to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is not generally thought to be the contrary of another. for the doing of good to friends is not contrary to the doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and belong to the same disposition. or to do evil to friends and evil to enemies. and the other an expression denoting a defect: for an excess is generally thought to belong to the class of objectionable things. from what has been said. The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute any contrariety. Clearly. see whether it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been declared to belong: for if the latter belongs the former could not belong. Likewise. Select therefore whichever of the two contraries is useful in attacking the thesis.do good to friends and to do good to enemies.

be also in the ‘spirited faculty’: for if not – if friendship is in the faculty of desire – then hatred could not follow anger. Thus (e. friendship. For if it were capable of ignorance. though the rule will not help you to assert that the accident actually belongs. we shall not 367 . of such a kind that if it be true.g. look and see if that which admits of the accident will admit of its contrary as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. For according to the views of those who posit the existence of Ideas. or that the thing is capable of the contrary. Clearly also they are objects of sensation.Or again. it would be capable of knowledge as well: and this is not generally held – I mean that the faculty of desire is capable of knowledge. if they exist in us: for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize the Form present in each individual. it will help you to assert that it may possibly belong. Again. For then the result will be that they are both in motion and at rest. we shall have shown that the accident neither belongs nor can possibly belong. For having shown that the thing in question will not admit of the contrary of the accident asserted. while if they exist in us. while on the other hand. then. contrary predicates must necessarily belong to the thing: e. if he has said that the ‘Ideas’ exist in us. to wit. You should therefore look and see if its contrary. this rule should be observed: but for purposes of establishing one. look and see if anything has been said about something.) if he has asserted that hatred follows anger. hatred would in that case be in the ‘spirited faculty’: for that is where anger is. Likewise also if he has asserted that the faculty of desire is ignorant. if there be posited an accident which has a contrary. and moreover that they are objects both of sensation and of thought. it is impossible that they should be unmoved: for when we move. those Ideas are at rest and are objects of thought. For purposes.g. it follows necessarily that all that is in us moves with us as well. as has been said. of overthrowing a view. if we show that the contrary belongs.

both when you are demolishing and when you are establishing a view: secure arguments of this kind as well by means of induction.) that ‘If the honourable is pleasant. Clearly. and upon the one 368 . but conversely ‘not-man’ upon ‘not-animal’. our proof will merely have gone to this point. 8 Seeing that the modes of opposition are four in number. ‘If what is not pleasant be not honourable. and see if the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of the other. Then look also at the case of the contraries of S and P in the thesis. In all cases. converting the order of their sequence. so is the former’. Now the sequence is direct in a case such as that of courage and cowardice: for upon the one of them virtue follows. while if the latter be untrue. Likewise.indeed as yet have shown that the accident asserted does belong as well.g. (e.) as that man be an animal. therefore. so far as may be required. the conversion of the sequence formed by contradiction of the terms of the thesis is a method convertible for both purposes. and vice upon the other. you should look for arguments among the contradictories of your terms. and you should secure them by means of induction – such arguments (e. For in those cases the sequence is converse: for ‘animal’ follows upon ‘man but ‘not-animal’ does not follow upon ‘not-man’. also. then what is honourable is pleasant’. both when demolishing and when establishing a view. what is not an animal is not a man’: and likewise also in other instances of contradictories. then. a postulate of this sort should be made. what is not pleasant is not honourable. that it is possible for it to belong.g. either directly or conversely.

Converse sequence is. then also the object of knowledge is an object of conception. An objection may be made that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place. in the case of such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence is always bound to be direct: e. You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a state in like manner to the case of contraries. if knowledge be a conceiving. it must of necessity do so as well in the original statement. and if sight be a sensation. and so is a multiple to a fraction. e. converse in such a case as this: Health follows upon vigour. rather debility follows upon disease. on the other hand. in the way described: for the object of sensation is an object of knowledge. clearly the sequence is converse. therefore. if 3/1 is a multiple. however. then. then also the object of sight is an object of sensation. for the desirable is the contrary of the objectionable. but disease does not follow upon debility. while upon the other it follows that it is objectionable. For the opposition of sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence to the privation of a state: for the one of them is a state. and the other the privation of it. If. The sequence. Again. the contrary of the one term does not follow upon the contrary of the other either directly or conversely.g. clearly neither does the one term follow upon the other in the statement made: whereas if the one followed the other in the case of the contraries. in the latter case also is direct. usually the sequence is direct. then 1/3 is a fraction: for 3/1 is relative to 1/3. while absence of sensation follows blindness. in the case of relative terms. Only. rare in the case of contraries. as sensation follows sight. Likewise also in other cases. The sequence is. therefore.it follows that it is desirable. In this case.g. whereas sensation is not 369 . The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner to that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as well is direct.

‘healthily’. and then ‘co-ordinate’ describes all the members of the same kindred series. ‘just’. then. ‘healthy habits’ are coordinates of ‘health’ and a ‘vigorous constitutional’ of a ‘vigorous constitution’ and so forth also in other cases. It is usually held that words when used in their inflected forms as well are co-ordinates. The objection is. both in demolishing and in establishing it.g. 370 . whatever its kind. e. as (e. and ‘courageously’ to courage. whereas ‘inflected forms’ are such as the following: ‘justly’.g. of a man or an act. ‘justly’.knowledge. of a man or thing. and such as are formed in this way. then so will ‘just’. By co-ordinates’ are meant terms such as the following: ‘Just deeds’ and the ‘just man’ are coordinates of ‘justice’. Moreover. not generally received as really true. however.g. 9 Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of the terms in the thesis.g. then. ‘courageously’. and ‘courageous deeds’ and the ‘courageous man’ are co-ordinates of courage. on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.) ‘justly’ in relation to justice. the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary purpose. ‘Coordinate’. e. if ‘justice’ be something praiseworthy. usually describes cases such as these. then all the rest as well come to be shown to be so: e. ‘justice’. to show that the object of sensation is not an object of knowledge. and ‘justly’ connote something praiseworthy. as e. Likewise also things that tend to produce and to preserve anything are called co-ordinates of that which they tend to produce and to preserve. Clearly. Then ‘justly’ will be rendered also ‘praiseworthily’.g. when any one member. of the same kindred series is shown to be good or praiseworthy. for many people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation.

so also are their modes of generation. then they themselves also are evil. they themselves rank as evil. their modes of generation be evil. if justice be knowledge.derived will by the same inflexion from ‘the praiseworthy’ whereby ‘justly’ is derived from ‘justice’. for the contrary predicate: e. whereas if causes destructive of them are good. whereas if the modes of destruction count as evil. Also. 371 . and if they themselves be good. are themselves also good. then injustice is ignorance: and if ‘justly’ means ‘knowingly’ and ‘skilfully’.g. Moreover. both in demolishing and in establishing a view. look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing. then they themselves rank as evil things. For those things whose modes of generation rank among good things. This commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence of contraries. argue that good is not necessarily pleasant. for neither is evil painful: or that. and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it. themselves also rank as good. for all we are claiming now is that the contrary of P shall follow the contrary of S. so is the former. If. if the latter be the case. then ‘unjustly’ means ‘ignorantly’ and ‘unskilfully’: whereas if the latter be not true. they themselves count as good. In regard to modes of destruction the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank as good things. as in the instance given just now: for ‘unjustly’ is more likely to seem equivalent to ‘skilfully’ than to ‘unskilfully’. The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and destroy: for things whose productive causes are good. neither is the former. but also in the case of its contrary. on the other hand. Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned.

Thus. see whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. look at things which are like the subject in question. then. e. Now this rule is of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows an increase of the subject. One is: See whether a greater degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the subject: e. so also will one opinion. The rule in question is useful for both purposes.g. Moreover.10 Again. see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil. viz. neither was the former that dealt with a single thing. as we have said. it is so with the other like things as well. then also to possess hearing will be to hear. while if it does not follow. then supposing it does not belong to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong. that to ‘know’ a thing is to ‘think of’ it.g. if pleasure be good. then also to ‘know many things’ is to ‘be thinking of many things’. If. whereas if it be not so in the case of some one of them. Another rule is: If one predicate be attributed to two subjects. and see if they are in like case. if to ‘know’ a thing be to ‘think of’ it. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a discrepancy. Likewise also in the case of other things. whereas this is not true. if one branch of knowledge has more than one object. In regard to greater degrees there are four commonplace rules. the latter proposition be not true. both those which are and those which are generally held to be like. for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them. neither is it so in the case of the others. the accident does not belong. You should establish this by induction. and if to possess sight be to see. for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing. neither does it belong where it is less likely to belong. clearly the accident belongs. while if it does belong where it 372 . argue from greater and less degrees.

then if the one which is more generally thought to belong does not belong. if the one which is less usually thought to belong to the one subject does belong. if the one does not belong. Or. supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree to the same subject. viz. neither does the one that is less generally thought to belong. or. Moreover: If two predicates be attributed to two subjects. or is generally supposed to belong.’ For supposing that one predicate belongs. so also does the other. Again: If two predicates be attributed to one subject. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in a like degree to two subjects. in three ways. if the one that is less generally thought to belong does belong. to two subjects in a like degree. while if the one does belong. the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining subject as well. you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs. neither does it belong to the other.is less likely to belong. those described in the last three rules given in regard to a greater degree. neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject. then it belongs as well where it is more likely. while if the one predicate does belong to the one subject. neither does the remaining one. then if it does not belong to the one. in a like degree. neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject. then if the one which is more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong. Moreover. while if it belongs to the one. then. for if the one predicate does not belong to the one subject. it belongs to the remaining one as well. 373 . the remaining one belongs as well. or is supposed to belong. or. so too does the remaining predicate to the remaining subject.

not convertible for overthrowing a view. it is possible also absolutely. The above rule is. If the addition of one thing to another makes that other good or white. This rule is not convertible. either. Again. it is not thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for the addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good. then the thing added will be white or good – it will possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. if an addition of something to a given object intensifies the character which it had as given. but always of badness. You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a given respect. Moreover. whereas formerly it was not white or good. Likewise. but a man is a man for all that. you should argue from the addition of one thing to another. also. The rule is not applicable in all cases. for the purpose of overthrowing a predication: for several predicates of which we cannot speak of a greater degree belong absolutely: for the term ‘man’ is not attributed in greater and less degrees. Moreover. from greater or less or like degrees of truth in the aforesaid number of ways. and at a given time and place: for if the predicate be possible in some respect. in the case of other attributes. however. then the thing added will itself as well be of that character.11 You can argue. then. any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good or of white will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of goodness than another. but only in those in which the excess described as an ‘increased intensity’ is found to take place. any more than the addition of white to black makes the whole white. 374 . For if the thing added does not make the other good.

but it is not so absolutely. So that whatever without any addition is generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or anything else of that kind. Moreover. but to a certain state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs.g. Likewise. Thus (e. among the Triballi. it is not honourable. An objection may be raised that in a given respect people may be good by nature. at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines. whereas. because no one is prudent by nature. whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. e. 375 . also. e.Likewise. Again. absolutely. In the same way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a diet. they may be generous or temperately inclined. to honour the gods you will declare to be honourable without adding anything. A thing is ‘absolutely’ so which without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the contrary. Or possibly this again may indicate a relativity not to a certain time. it is possible for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time. because that is honourable absolutely.g. e. but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly and alone.) you will deny that to sacrifice one’s father is honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore honourable absolutely. is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect or at any place or time. while absolutely they are not good by nature. will be said to be so ‘absolutely’. also. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one’s father. On the other hand. e.g. in certain places it is possible to live singly and alone. though it is not a good thing absolutely.g. just because they are Triballi. when one is ill. Or possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves.g. in infected areas. if only one be in that state.

i. in such cases if we can show a single advantage. First. doctors would choose. the good: for everything aims at the good. or. or more than one.Book III 1 The question which is the more desirable.g. in general. but things that are nearly related and about which we commonly discuss for which of the two we ought rather to vote.g. of two or more things. or by men who are good in any particular line. then. whatever most men or all men or all things would choose. in medicine or in carpentry those things are more desirable which most.e. that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so: and so is that which is more likely to be chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law. or the better. when they make their choice as such. You should direct the argument you intend to 376 . Clearly. or by the experts in regard to any particular class of things. either whatever most of them or what all of them would choose. because we do not see any advantage on either side as compared with the other. e. e. our judgement will record our assent that whichever side happens to have the advantage is the more desirable. or all. should be examined upon the following lines: only first of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making concerns not things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great differences from one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether happiness or wealth is more desirable).

virtue than luck (for the former in itself. e. e.g. in order that they may do us no harm. e. Likewise also in the case of the contrary. a ‘white man’ is not ‘a colour’. Likewise also in other cases. justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in itself. a different turn of expression. the cause of good things). in order that they may do us no harm. and even though they be in India. whereas the other does not. that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable than what is so per accidens. health is more desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself. justice than a just man. For we desire justice in our friends for itself. though relatively to a given individual the standard may be his own particular science. the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should be just per accidens. that which is known as ‘an x’ is more desirable than that which does not come within the genus ‘x’ – e. and so in other cases of the same kind. e.g. for what is in itself the cause of evil is more objectionable than what is so per accidens. even though it will make no difference to us. e. Also. whereas in our enemies we desire it for something else. Also.g. for the former falls within the genus ‘good’. Also. the latter for something else. This last principle is the same as the one that precedes it. Of what is ‘better’ or ‘more desirable’ the absolute standard is the verdict of the better science. whereas the latter is not: for nothing which does not happen to belong to the genus in question is called by the generic name.g.employ to whatever purpose you require. and the former is called ‘a good’. vice and 377 .g.g. with. that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for something else. and the latter per accidens. that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens. In the second place. however.

and of two means. for the one is good by nature. in respect of their properties the one surpasses the other. justice than the just man. Also the competent is more desirable than the incompetent. e. the latter only for a particular person. for the former is good absolutely. what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good for a particular person. viz.g. In general. whereas the others are inherent in what is secondary.g. Also that is better which is inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e. Also the end is generally supposed to be more desirable than the means.g. Also the attribute is more desirable which belongs to the better and more honourable subject. the man who needs an operation.g. the property of God than the property of man: for whereas in respect of what is common in both of them they do not differ at all from each other.) health is better than strength and beauty: for the former is inherent in the moist and the dry. while beauty is generally supposed to consist in a certain symmetry of the limbs.g. e. that which lies nearer the end. a means directed towards the end of life is more desirable than a means to anything else. So too what is good by nature is more desirable than the good that is not so by nature. strength being a feature of the sinews and bones. Also. e. Moreover. to a god rather than to a man. So too the property of the better thing is better than the property of the worse.chance: for the one is bad in itself. too. e. that which contributes to happiness than that which contributes to prudence. and to the soul rather than to the body. e.g. of two productive agents that one is more desirable whose end is better. while between a productive agent and an end we can decide by a proportional sum whenever the excess of the one end over the other is greater than that of the latter over its own 378 . in fact in all the primary constituents of an animal. and the hot and the cold. recovery of health than a surgical operation. whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired. whereas chance is so per accidens.

therefore. For what produces happiness exceeds what produces health just as much as happiness exceeds health. the excess of what produces happiness over what produces health is greater than that of health over what produces health. yet there may possibly be some unpleasant consequence involved to turn the scale. and we cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them. if the consequences be evil. For the former belong in themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy. Moreover. that is more desirable which is followed by the less evil. ergo. and justice than strength. For the one which is followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or. whereas we prize friendship for itself.g.g. then what produces happiness is better than health. what is in itself nobler and more precious and praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so. Clearly. For though both may be desirable. what produces happiness is more desirable than health: for it exceeds the same standard by a greater amount. supposing the excess of happiness over health to be greater than that of health over what produces health. whenever two things are very much like one another. for there are prior consequences and later consequences: e. But health exceeds what produces health by a smaller amount.productive means: e. while the latter do so not in themselves but for something else: for no one prizes wealth for itself but always for something else. even though nothing else is likely to come to us from it. if a man learns. Our survey from the point of view of consequences lies in two directions. it follows that he was ignorant before and knows 379 . we should look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. e. 2 Moreover.g. friendship than wealth.

justice and temperance rather than courage: for they are always useful. whichever of the consequences suits your purpose. Also. e. e. Moreover. viz. recovery of health and health. that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or at most seasons. Also it is quite possible for what is not good. the same things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied by pleasure. than health alone. e. You should take. for then the two together are not more desirable than the one. for no man chooses the young to guide him. Also. prudence is more desirable in old age.g. Also.g. freedom from pain in old age more than in youth: for it is of greater consequence in old age. An objection may be raised suppose in some particular case the one is valued for the sake of the other. a greater number of good things is more desirable than a smaller. for it is in youth that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively required. together with what is. the later consequence is the better to consider. Likewise also with temperance. the combination of happiness and something else which is not good may be more desirable than the combination of justice and courage. therefore. With courage. we do not need the other thing. that one of two things which if all possess. either absolutely or when the one is included in the other. On the same principle also. the smaller number in the greater. while courage is only useful at times. everything is more desirable at the season when it is of greater consequence.afterwards. inasmuch as we desire recovery of health for the sake of health. because he does not expect them to be prudent. is more desirable than that 380 .g. to be more desirable than a greater number of good things. As a rule. for the young are more troubled by their passions than are their elders. the converse is the case. e.g. Also. and likewise when free from pain than when attended with pain.

in the case of two things. whereas a horse bears none: for the monkey is not the more handsome creature. judge by the destructions and losses and generations and acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction is more objectionable are themselves more desirable. while the other strongly resembles the worse. what more nearly resembles the good: thus justice is better than a just man. for a thing whose loss or whose contrary is more objectionable is itself more desirable.e. supposing the resemblance of Ajax to Achilles to be slight. Also. though unlike Achilles.g. and that Odysseus was a good man. there would be no use for courage. Look also to see whether the resemblance be that of a caricature. whereas the one which is like the worse 381 . that which is more like than another thing to something better than itself. however. while that of Odysseus to Nestor is strong. whereas all might be courageous. Another commonplace rule is that what is nearer to the good is better and more desirable. i. like the resemblance of a monkey to a man. and still justice would be of use. e. Moreover. admits of an objection: for quite possibly the one only slightly resembles the better. This too. if everybody were just.g. if one is more like the better thing while another is more like the worse. An objection may be raised to this that it is not true: for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble Achilles more nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles the best of them. Take the case of justice and courage. Again. despite its nearer resemblance to a man. With the generations or acquisitions of things the opposite is the case: for things whose acquisition or generation is more desirable are themselves also desirable. then that is likely to be better which is more like the better. Likewise also with the losses and contraries of things. as e.which all may possess and still we want the other one as well. Also it may be that the one which is like the better type shows a degrading likeness. some say that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus because he was more like Achilles.

e. and that of a monkey to a man. then also the best man is better than the best horse. if A be without qualification better than B.g. whereas mere life itself is a necessity. Also. then also A is better than B without qualification. and good life is a superfluity.g. if the best man be better than the best horse. Also. whereas towards the man in the street the converse is the case. Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable than the less conspicuous. e. things which we like rather to do to our friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man in the street. Moreover. e. what is better is not also more desirable: for there is no necessity that because it is better it should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is better than to make money. Sometimes. Also. Also. though. if the best in A be better than the best in B.g.type improves upon it: witness the likeness of a horse to a donkey. and are sometimes more desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life. but it is not more desirable for a man who lacks the necessities of life. if Man be better than Horse. The expression ‘superfluity’ applies whenever a man possesses the 382 . Moreover. superfluities are better than necessities. Also the more personal possession is more desirable than the more widely shared. then also the best of the members of A is better than the best of the members of B. things which our friends can share are more desirable than those they cannot. that which is more free from connexion with evil: for what is not attended by any unpleasantness is more desirable than what is so attended. then also Man is better than Horse without qualification. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the semblance of them: for we would rather really do good to our friends than seem to do so. and the more difficult than the easier: for we appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily acquired.

) is the case of justice compared with courage. Also. or if it render good the better and more important object – if (e.g. Moreover. but prudence is desirable without power. as (e.) is not desirable without prudence.necessities of life and sets to work to secure as well other noble acquisitions.g. if one thing makes good whatever it touches.). Also.g. then that one is more desirable which does so in a greater degree. and the other the body. Moreover. If both do so. what cannot be got from another is more desirable than what can be got from another as well. and that is more desirable in whose absence it is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed. then the one which possesses it in a greater degree is more desirable. 3 Moreover. necessities are more desirable. thus (e. if of two things we repudiate the one in order to be thought to possess the other. A is more desirable if A is desirable without B. while superfluities are better. then that one is more desirable which we wish to be thought to possess. 383 .g. that is more desirable in whose absence it is less blameworthy for people to be vexed.) we repudiate the love of hard work in order that people may think us geniuses. If both possess it. perhaps. the one makes good the soul. Also. of things that belong to the same species one which possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than one which does not. but not B without A: power (e. while another does not. just as also what makes things warm is warmer than what does not. the former is more desirable. Roughly speaking.

then also justice means something more desirable than courage.g. Moreover. and if justice be more desirable than courage. as (e. as (e. the one which is more highly preferable to it is more desirable than the less highly preferable. also. or if the one exceeds an even higher standard.g. when added to a lesser good.g. but it is not a more desirable thing without qualification. if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of the same standard of good. Likewise. then also ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’. that thing is itself also more desirable than the other. Nay more. one of the things added to it. and judge these by them: for they go with each other: e. friends than money. Similarly also in the other cases. 384 .) friendship than money: for an excess of friendship is more desirable than an excess of money. it makes the whole greater good. judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions and works. beware of adducing a case in which the common term uses. however. Again. You must. and see if the addition of A to the same thing as B makes the whole more desirable than does the addition of B. but not the other.Moreover. whichever it be whose subtraction makes the remainder a lesser good. you should judge by means of subtraction: for the thing upon whose subtraction the remainder is a lesser good may be taken to be a greater good. or in some other way helps the case of.g. Moreover.) if you took a saw and a sickle in combination with the art of carpentry: for in the combination the saw is a more desirable thing. the one which exceeds is the more desirable. if ‘justly’ means something more desirable than ‘courageously’. when the excess of a thing is more desirable than the excess of something else. Moreover. a thing is more desirable if. if there be two things both preferable to something. e. judge by means of an addition. So also that of which a man would rather that it were his by his own doing is more desirable than what he would rather get by another’s doing.

you would not care to have it. i. which of the two is the more pleasant or more honourable or more expedient. and with a view to what ends. argue by showing that the thing in question is in like measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character that a man might well desire and object to it alike is less desirable than the other which is desirable only.g. if one thing be desirable for itself.) health than beauty. A thing may be taken to be more precious in itself which we choose rather for itself. Again. Likewise also in the case of objectionable things. expediency or honour or pleasure. you should distinguish in how many senses ‘desirable’ is used. For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken to be more desirable than what is not useful in like manner. A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if.g. If the same characters belong to both things you should look and see which possesses them more markedly.g. e. supposing no one knew of it. whichever is the more precious for itself. Moreover. Also. as (e. disease more than ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance both to pleasure and to being good. for that is more objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable. Moreover. without anything else being likely to come of it. that is more desirable which serves the better purpose. e. and the other for the look of it. e. while the other thing is desirable on the one ground alone.g. 385 .Also. is also better and more desirable. the former is more desirable. Also.e. it is more desirable both for itself and for the look of it. that which serves to promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure.

4 Comparisons of things together should therefore be conducted in the manner prescribed. The same commonplace rules are useful also for showing that anything is simply desirable or objectionable: for we have only to subtract the excess of one thing over another. For if what is more precious be more desirable, then also what is precious is desirable; and if what is more useful be more desirable, then also what is useful is desirable. Likewise, also, in the case of other things which admit of comparisons of that kind. For in some cases in the very course of comparing the things together we at once assert also that each of them, or the one of them, is desirable, e.g. whenever we call the one good ‘by nature’ and the other ‘not by nature’: for dearly what is good by nature is desirable.

5 The commonplace rules relating to comparative degrees and amounts ought to be taken in the most general possible form: for when so taken they are likely to be useful in a larger number of instances. It is possible to render some of the actual rules given above more universal by a slight alteration of the expression, e.g. that what by nature exhibits such and such a quality exhibits that quality in a greater degree than what exhibits it not by nature. Also, if one thing does, and another does not, impart such and such a quality to that which possesses it, or to which it belongs, then whichever does impart it is of that quality in greater degree than the one which does not impart it; and if both impart it, then that one exhibits it in a greater degree which imparts it in a greater degree.

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Moreover, if in any character one thing exceeds and another falls short of the same standard; also, if the one exceeds something which exceeds a given standard, while the other does not reach that standard, then clearly the first-named thing exhibits that character in a greater degree. Moreover, you should judge by means of addition, and see if A when added to the same thing as B imparts to the whole such and such a character in a more marked degree than B, or if, when added to a thing which exhibits that character in a less degree, it imparts that character to the whole in a greater degree. Likewise, also, you may judge by means of subtraction: for a thing upon whose subtraction the remainder exhibits such and such a character in a less degree, itself exhibits that character in a greater degree. Also, things exhibit such and such a character in a greater degree if more free from admixture with their contraries; e.g. that is whiter which is more free from admixture with black. Moreover, apart from the rules given above, that has such and such a character in greater degree which admits in a greater degree of the definition proper to the given character; e.g. if the definition of ‘white’ be ‘a colour which pierces the vision’, then that is whiter which is in a greater degree a colour that pierces the vision.

6 If the question be put in a particular and not in a universal form, in the first place the universal constructive or destructive commonplace rules that have been given may all be brought into use. For in demolishing or establishing a thing universally we also show it in particular: for if it be true of all, it is true also of some, and if untrue of all, it is untrue of some. Especially handy and of general application are the commonplace rules

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that are drawn from the opposites and co-ordinates and inflexions of a thing: for public opinion grants alike the claim that if all pleasure be good, then also all pain is evil, and the claim that if some pleasure be good, then also some pain is evil. Moreover, if some form of sensation be not a capacity, then also some form of failure of sensation is not a failure of capacity. Also, if the object of conception is in some cases an object of knowledge, then also some form of conceiving is knowledge. Again, if what is unjust be in some cases good, then also what is just is in some cases evil; and if what happens justly is in some cases evil, then also what happens unjustly is in some cases good. Also, if what is pleasant is in some cases objectionable, then pleasure is in some cases an objectionable thing. On the same principle, also, if what is pleasant is in some cases beneficial, then pleasure is in some cases a beneficial thing. The case is the same also as regards the things that destroy, and the processes of generation and destruction. For if anything that destroys pleasure or knowledge be in some cases good, then we may take it that pleasure or knowledge is in some cases an evil thing. Likewise, also, if the destruction of knowledge be in some cases a good thing or its production an evil thing, then knowledge will be in some cases an evil thing; e.g. if for a man to forget his disgraceful conduct be a good thing, and to remember it be an evil thing, then the knowledge of his disgraceful conduct may be taken to be an evil thing. The same holds also in other cases: in all such cases the premiss and the conclusion are equally likely to be accepted. Moreover you should judge by means of greater or smaller or like degrees: for if some member of another genus exhibit such and such a character in a more marked degree than your object, while no member of that genus exhibits that character at all, then you may take it that neither does the object in question exhibit it; e.g. if some form of knowledge be good in a greater degree than pleasure, while no form of knowledge is good, then
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you may take it that pleasure is not good either. Also, you should judge by a smaller or like degree in the same way: for so you will find it possible both to demolish and to establish a view, except that whereas both are possible by means of like degrees, by means of a smaller degree it is possible only to establish, not to overthrow. For if a certain form of capacity be good in a like degree to knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good, then so also is knowledge; while if no form of capacity be good, then neither is knowledge. If, too, a certain form of capacity be good in a less degree than knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good, then so also is knowledge; but if no form of capacity be good, there is no necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good. Clearly, then, it is only possible to establish a view by means of a less degree. Not only by means of another genus can you overthrow a view, but also by means of the same, if you take the most marked instance of the character in question; e.g. if it be maintained that some form of knowledge is good, then, suppose it to be shown that prudence is not good, neither will any other kind be good, seeing that not even the kind upon which there is most general agreement is so. Moreover, you should go to work by means of an hypothesis; you should claim that the attribute, if it belongs or does not belong in one case, does so in a like degree in all, e.g. that if the soul of man be immortal, so are other souls as well, while if this one be not so, neither are the others. If, then, it be maintained that in some instance the attribute belongs, you must show that in some instance it does not belong: for then it will follow, by reason of the hypothesis, that it does not belong to any instance at all. If, on the other hand, it be maintained that it does not belong in some instance, you must show that it does belong in some instance, for in this way it will follow that it belongs to all instances. It is clear that the maker of the hypothesis universalizes the question, whereas it was stated in a particular form: for he claims that the maker of
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a particular admission should make a universal admission, inasmuch as he claims that if the attribute belongs in one instance, it belongs also in all instances alike. If the problem be indefinite, it is possible to overthrow a statement in only one way; e.g. if a man has asserted that pleasure is good or is not good, without any further definition. For if he meant that a particular pleasure is good, you must show universally that no pleasure is good, if the proposition in question is to be demolished. And likewise, also, if he meant that some particular pleasure is not good you must show universally that all pleasure is good: it is impossible to demolish it in any other way. For if we show that some particular pleasure is not good or is good, the proposition in question is not yet demolished. It is clear, then, that it is possible to demolish an indefinite statement in one way only, whereas it can be established in two ways: for whether we show universally that all pleasure is good, or whether we show that a particular pleasure is good, the proposition in question will have been proved. Likewise, also, supposing we are required to argue that some particular pleasure is not good, if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure is not good, we shall have produced an argument in both ways, both universally and in particular, to show that some particular pleasure is not good. If, on the other hand, the statement made be definite, it will be possible to demolish it in two ways; e.g. if it be maintained that it is an attribute of some particular pleasure to be good, while of some it is not: for whether it be shown that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, is good, the proposition in question will have been demolished. If, however, he has stated that only one single pleasure is good, it is possible to demolish it in three ways: for by showing that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, or that more than one pleasure, is good, we shall have demolished the statement in question. If the statement be made still more definite, e.g. that prudence alone of the virtues
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is knowledge, there are four ways of demolishing it: for if it be shown that all virtue is knowledge, or that no virtue is so, or that some other virtue (e.g. justice) is so, or that prudence itself is not knowledge, the proposition in question will have been demolished. It is useful also to take a look at individual instances, in cases where some attribute has been said to belong or not to belong, as in the case of universal questions. Moreover, you should take a glance among genera, dividing them by their species until you come to those that are not further divisible, as has been said before:’ for whether the attribute is found to belong in all cases or in none, you should, after adducing several instances, claim that he should either admit your point universally, or else bring an objection showing in what case it does not hold. Moreover, in cases where it is possible to make the accident definite either specifically or numerically, you should look and see whether perhaps none of them belongs, showing e.g. that time is not moved, nor yet a movement, by enumerating how many species there are of movement: for if none of these belong to time, clearly it does not move, nor yet is a movement. Likewise, also, you can show that the soul is not a number, by dividing all numbers into either odd or even: for then, if the soul be neither odd nor even, clearly it is not a number. In regard then to Accident, you should set to work by means like these, and in this manner.

Book IV

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1 Next we must go on to examine questions relating to Genus and Property. These are elements in the questions that relate to definitions, but dialecticians seldom address their inquiries to these by themselves. If, then, a genus be suggested for something that is, first take a look at all objects which belong to the same genus as the thing mentioned, and see whether the genus suggested is not predicated of one of them, as happens in the case of an accident: e.g. if ‘good’ be laid down to be the genus of ‘pleasure’, see whether some particular pleasure be not good: for, if so, clearly good’ is not the genus of pleasure: for the genus is predicated of all the members of the same species. Secondly, see whether it be predicated not in the category of essence, but as an accident, as ‘white’ is predicated of ‘snow’, or ‘self-moved’ of the soul. For ‘snow’ is not a kind of ‘white’, and therefore ‘white’ is not the genus of snow, nor is the soul a kind of ‘moving object’: its motion is an accident of it, as it often is of an animal to walk or to be walking. Moreover, ‘moving’ does not seem to indicate the essence, but rather a state of doing or of having something done to it. Likewise, also, ‘white’: for it indicates not the essence of snow, but a certain quality of it. So that neither of them is predicated in the category of ‘essence’. Especially you should take a look at the definition of Accident, and see whether it fits the genus mentioned, as (e.g.) is also the case in the instances just given. For it is possible for a thing to be and not to be self-moved, and likewise, also, for it to be and not to be white. So that neither of these attributes is the genus but an accident, since we were saying that an accident is an attribute which can belong to a thing and also not belong. Moreover, see whether the genus and the species be not found in the same division, but the one be a substance while the other

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is a quality, or the one be a relative while the other is a quality, as (e.g.) ‘slow’ and ‘swan’ are each a substance, while ‘white’ is not a substance but a quality, so that ‘white’ is not the genus either of ‘snow’ or of ‘swan’. Again, knowledge’ is a relative, while ‘good’ and ‘noble’ are each a quality, so that good, or noble, is not the genus of knowledge. For the genera of relatives ought themselves also to be relatives, as is the case with ‘double’: for multiple’, which is the genus of ‘double’, is itself also a relative. To speak generally, the genus ought to fall under the same division as the species: for if the species be a substance, so too should be the genus, and if the species be a quality, so too the genus should be a quality; e.g. if white be a quality, so too should colour be. Likewise, also, in other cases. Again, see whether it be necessary or possible for the genus to partake of the object which has been placed in the genus. ‘To partake’ is defined as ‘to admit the definition of that which is partaken. Clearly, therefore, the species partake of the genera, but not the genera of the species: for the species admits the definition of the genus, whereas the genus does not admit that of the species. You must look, therefore, and see whether the genus rendered partakes or can possibly partake of the species, e.g. if any one were to render anything as genus of ‘being’ or of ‘unity’: for then the result will be that the genus partakes of the species: for of everything that is, ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are predicated, and therefore their definition as well. Moreover, see if there be anything of which the species rendered is true, while the genus is not so, e.g. supposing ‘being’ or ‘object of knowledge’ were stated to be the genus of ‘object of opinion’. For ‘object of opinion’ will be a predicate of what does not exist; for many things which do not exist are objects of opinion; whereas that ‘being’ or ‘object of knowledge’ is not predicated of what does not exist is clear. So that neither ‘being’ nor ‘object of knowledge’ is the genus of ‘object of opinion’: for of the

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objects of which the species is predicated, the genus ought to be predicated as well. Again, see whether the object placed in the genus be quite unable to partake of any of its species: for it is impossible that it should partake of the genus if it do not partake of any of its species, except it be one of the species reached by the first division: these do partake of the genus alone. If, therefore, ‘Motion’ be stated as the genus of pleasure, you should look and see if pleasure be neither locomotion nor alteration, nor any of the rest of the given modes of motion: for clearly you may then take it that it does not partake of any of the species, and therefore not of the genus either, since what partakes of the genus must necessarily partake of one of the species as well: so that pleasure could not be a species of Motion, nor yet be one of the individual phenomena comprised under the term ‘motion’. For individuals as well partake in the genus and the species, as (e.g.) an individual man partakes of both ‘man’ and ‘animal’. Moreover, see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation than the genus, as (e.g.) ‘object of opinion’ has, as compared with ‘being’: for both what is and what is not are objects of opinion, so that ‘object of opinion’ could not be a species of being: for the genus is always of wider denotation than the species. Again, see if the species and its genus have an equal denotation; suppose, for instance, that of the attributes which go with everything, one were to be stated as a species and the other as its genus, as for example Being and Unity: for everything has being and unity, so that neither is the genus of the other, since their denotation is equal. Likewise, also, if the ‘first’ of a series and the ‘beginning’ were to be placed one under the other: for the beginning is first and the first is the beginning, so that either both expressions are identical or at any rate neither is the genus of the other. The elementary principle in regard to all such cases is that the genus has a

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wider denotation than the species and its differentia: for the differentia as well has a narrower denotation than the genus. See also whether the genus mentioned fails, or might be generally thought to fail, to apply to some object which is not specifically different from the thing in question; or, if your argument be constructive, whether it does so apply. For all things that are not specifically different have the same genus. If, therefore, it be shown to apply to one, then clearly it applies to all, and if it fails to apply to one, clearly it fails to apply to any; e.g. if any one who assumes ‘indivisible lines’ were to say that the ‘indivisible’ is their genus. For the aforesaid term is not the genus of divisible lines, and these do not differ as regards their species from indivisible: for straight lines are never different from each other as regards their species.

2 Look and see, also, if there be any other genus of the given species which neither embraces the genus rendered nor yet falls under it, e.g. suppose any one were to lay down that ‘knowledge’ is the genus of justice. For virtue is its genus as well, and neither of these genera embraces the remaining one, so that knowledge could not be the genus of justice: for it is generally accepted that whenever one species falls under two genera, the one is embraced by the other. Yet a principle of this kind gives rise to a difficulty in some cases. For some people hold that prudence is both virtue and knowledge, and that neither of its genera is embraced by the other: although certainly not everybody admits that prudence is knowledge. If, however, any one were to admit the truth of this assertion, yet it would still be generally agreed to be necessary that the genera

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of the same object must at any rate be subordinate either the one to the other or both to the same, as actually is the case with virtue and knowledge. For both fall under the same genus; for each of them is a state and a disposition. You should look, therefore, and see whether neither of these things is true of the genus rendered; for if the genera be subordinate neither the one to the other nor both to the same, then what is rendered could not be the true genus. Look, also, at the genus of the genus rendered, and so continually at the next higher genus, and see whether all are predicated of the species, and predicated in the category of essence: for all the higher genera should be predicated of the species in the category of essence. If, then, there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what is rendered is not the true genus. [Again, see whether either the genus itself, or one of its higher genera, partakes of the species: for the higher genus does not partake of any of the lower.] If, then, you are overthrowing a view, follow the rule as given: if establishing one, then – suppose that what has been named as genus be admitted to belong to the species, only it be disputed whether it belongs as genus – it is enough to show that one of its higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence. For if one of them be predicated in the category of essence, all of them, both higher and lower than this one, if predicated at all of the species, will be predicated of it in the category of essence: so that what has been rendered as genus is also predicated in the category of essence. The premiss that when one genus is predicated in the category of essence, all the rest, if predicated at all, will be predicated in the category of essence, should be secured by induction. Supposing, however, that it be disputed whether what has been rendered as genus belongs at all, it is not enough to show that one of the higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence: e.g. if any one has rendered ‘locomotion’ as the genus of walking, it is not enough to show
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that walking is ‘motion’ in order to show that it is ‘locomotion’, seeing that there are other forms of motion as well; but one must show in addition that walking does not partake of any of the species of motion produced by the same division except locomotion. For of necessity what partakes of the genus partakes also of one of the species produced by the first division of the genus. If, therefore, walking does not partake either of increase or decrease or of the other kinds of motion, clearly it would partake of locomotion, so that locomotion would be the genus of walking. Again, look among the things of which the given species is predicated as genus, and see if what is rendered as its genus be also predicated in the category of essence of the very things of which the species is so predicated, and likewise if all the genera higher than this genus are so predicated as well. For if there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what has been rendered is not the true genus: for had it been the genus, then both the genera higher than it, and it itself, would all have been predicated in the category of essence of those objects of which the species too is predicated in the category of essence. If, then, you are overthrowing a view, it is useful to see whether the genus fails to be predicated in the category of essence of those things of which the species too is predicated. If establishing a view, it is useful to see whether it is predicated in the category of essence: for if so, the result will be that the genus and the species will be predicated of the same object in the category of essence, so that the same object falls under two genera: the genera must therefore of necessity be subordinate one to the other, and therefore if it be shown that the one we wish to establish as genus is not subordinate to the species, clearly the species would be subordinate to it, so that you may take it as shown that it is the genus.

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Look, also, at the definitions of the genera, and see whether they apply both to the given species and to the objects which partake of the species. For of necessity the definitions of its genera must be predicated of the species and of the objects which partake of the species: if, then, there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. Again, see if he has rendered the differentia as the genus, e.g. ‘immortal’ as the genus of ‘God’. For ‘immortal’ is a differentia of ‘living being’, seeing that of living beings some are mortal and others immortal. Clearly, then, a bad mistake has been made; for the differentia of a thing is never its genus. And that this is true is clear: for a thing’s differentia never signifies its essence, but rather some quality, as do ‘walking’ and ‘biped’. Also, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the genus, e.g. by taking ‘odd’ as a number’. For ‘odd’ is a differentia of number, not a species. Nor is the differentia generally thought to partake of the genus: for what partakes of the genus is always either a species or an individual, whereas the differentia is neither a species nor an individual. Clearly, therefore, the differentia does not partake of the genus, so that ‘odd’ too is no species but a differentia, seeing that it does not partake of the genus. Moreover, see whether he has placed the genus inside the species, e.g. by taking ‘contact’ to be a ‘juncture’, or ‘mixture’ a ‘fusion’, or, as in Plato’s definition,’ ‘locomotion’ to be the same as ‘carriage’. For there is no necessity that contact should be juncture: rather, conversely, juncture must be contact: for what is in contact is not always joined, though what is joined is always in contact. Likewise, also, in the remaining instances: for mixture is not always a ‘fusion’ (for to mix dry things does not fuse them), nor is locomotion always ‘carriage’. For walking is not generally thought to be carriage: for ‘carriage’ is mostly used

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of things that change one place for another involuntarily, as happens in the case of inanimate things. Clearly, also, the species, in the instances given, has a wider denotation than the genus, whereas it ought to be vice versa. Again, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the species, by taking (e.g.) ‘immortal’ to be ‘a god’. For the result will be that the species has an equal or wider denotation: and this cannot be, for always the differentia has an equal or a wider denotation than the species. Moreover, see whether he has placed the genus inside the differentia, by making ‘colour’ (e.g.) to be a thing that ‘pierces’, or ‘number’ a thing that is ‘odd’. Also, see if he has mentioned the genus as differentia: for it is possible for a man to bring forward a statement of this kind as well, e.g. that ‘mixture’ is the differentia of ‘fusion’, or that change of place’ is the differentia of ‘carriage’. All such cases should be examined by means of the same principles: for they depend upon common rules: for the genus should have a wider denotation that its differentia, and also should not partake of its differentia; whereas, if it be rendered in this manner, neither of the aforesaid requirements can be satisfied: for the genus will both have a narrower denotation than its differentia, and will partake of it. Again, if no differentia belonging to the genus be predicated of the given species, neither will the genus be predicated of it; e.g. of ‘soul’ neither ‘odd’ nor ‘even’ is predicated: neither therefore is ‘number’. Moreover, see whether the species is naturally prior and abolishes the genus along with itself: for the contrary is the general view. Moreover, if it be possible for the genus stated, or for its differentia, to be absent from the alleged species, e.g. for ‘movement’ to be absent from the ‘soul’, or ‘truth and falsehood’ from ‘opinion’, then neither of the terms stated could be its genus or its differentia: for the general view is that the genus and the differentia accompany the species, as long as it exists.

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3 Look and see, also, if what is placed in the genus partakes or could possibly partake of any contrary of the genus: for in that case the same thing will at the same time partake of contrary things, seeing that the genus is never absent from it, while it partakes, or can possibly partake, of the contrary genus as well. Moreover, see whether the species shares in any character which it is utterly impossible for any member of the genus to have. Thus (e.g.) if the soul has a share in life, while it is impossible for any number to live, then the soul could not be a species of number. You should look and see, also, if the species be a homonym of the genus, and employ as your elementary principles those already stated for dealing with homonymity: for the genus and the species are synonymous. Seeing that of every genus there is more than one species, look and see if it be impossible that there should be another species than the given one belonging to the genus stated: for if there should be none, then clearly what has been stated could not be a genus at all. Look and see, also, if he has rendered as genus a metaphorical expression, describing (e.g. ‘temperance’ as a ‘harmony’: a ‘harmony’: for a genus is always predicated of its species in its literal sense, whereas ‘harmony’ is predicated of temperance not in a literal sense but metaphorically: for a harmony always consists in notes. Moreover, if there be any contrary of the species, examine it. The examination may take different forms; first of all see if the

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contrary as well be found in the same genus as the species, supposing the genus to have no contrary; for contraries ought to be found in the same genus, if there be no contrary to the genus. Supposing, on the other hand, that there is a contrary to the genus, see if the contrary of the species be found in the contrary genus: for of necessity the contrary species must be in the contrary genus, if there be any contrary to the genus. Each of these points is made plain by means of induction. Again, see whether the contrary of the species be not found in any genus at all, but be itself a genus, e.g. ‘good’: for if this be not found in any genus, neither will its contrary be found in any genus, but will itself be a genus, as happens in the case of ‘good’ and ‘evil’: for neither of these is found in a genus, but each of them is a genus. Moreover, see if both genus and species be contrary to something, and one pair of contraries have an intermediary, but not the other. For if the genera have an intermediary, so should their species as well, and if the species have, so should their genera as well, as is the case with (1) virtue and vice and (2) justice and injustice: for each pair has an intermediary. An objection to this is that there is no intermediary between health and disease, although there is one between evil and good. Or see whether, though there be indeed an intermediary between both pairs, i.e. both between the species and between the genera, yet it be not similarly related, but in one case be a mere negation of the extremes, whereas in the other case it is a subject. For the general view is that the relation should be similar in both cases, as it is in the cases of virtue and vice and of justice and injustice: for the intermediaries between both are mere negations. Moreover, whenever the genus has no contrary, look and see not merely whether the contrary of the species be found in the same genus, but the intermediate as well: for the genus containing the extremes contains the intermediates as well, as (e.g.) in the case of white and black: for ‘colour’ is the genus both of these and of all the intermediate colours as well.

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An objection may be raised that ‘defect’ and ‘excess’ are found in the same genus (for both are in the genus ‘evil’), whereas moderate amount’, the intermediate between them, is found not in ‘evil’ but in ‘good’. Look and see also whether, while the genus has a contrary, the species has none; for if the genus be contrary to anything, so too is the species, as virtue to vice and justice to injustice. Likewise. also, if one were to look at other instances, one would come to see clearly a fact like this. An objection may be raised in the case of health and disease: for health in general is the contrary of disease, whereas a particular disease, being a species of disease, e.g. fever and ophthalmia and any other particular disease, has no contrary. If, therefore, you are demolishing a view, there are all these ways in which you should make your examination: for if the aforesaid characters do not belong to it, clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. If, on the other hand, you are establishing a view, there are three ways: in the first place, see whether the contrary of the species be found in the genus stated, suppose the genus have no contrary: for if the contrary be found in it, clearly the species in question is found in it as well. Moreover, see if the intermediate species is found in the genus stated: for whatever genus contains the intermediate contains the extremes as well. Again, if the genus have a contrary, look and see whether also the contrary species is found in the contrary genus: for if so, clearly also the species in question is found in the genus in question. Again, consider in the case of the inflexions and the coordinates of species and genus, and see whether they follow likewise, both in demolishing and in establishing a view. For whatever attribute belongs or does not belong to one belongs or does not belong at the same time to all; e.g. if justice be a

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particular form of knowledge, then also ‘justly’ is ‘knowingly’ and the just man is a man of knowledge: whereas if any of these things be not so, then neither is any of the rest of them.

4 Again, consider the case of things that bear a like relation to one another. Thus (e.g.) the relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like that of the useful to the good: for in each case the one produces the other. If therefore pleasure be a kind of ‘good’, then also the pleasant will be a kind of ‘useful’: for clearly it may be taken to be productive of good, seeing that pleasure is good. In the same way also consider the case of processes of generation and destruction; if (e.g.) to build be to be active, then to have built is to have been active, and if to learn be to recollect, then also to have learnt is to have recollected, and if to be decomposed be to be destroyed, then to have been decomposed is to have been destroyed, and decomposition is a kind of destruction. Consider also in the same way the case of things that generate or destroy, and of the capacities and uses of things; and in general, both in demolishing and in establishing an argument, you should examine things in the light of any resemblance of whatever description, as we were saying in the case of generation and destruction. For if what tends to destroy tends to decompose, then also to be destroyed is to be decomposed: and if what tends to generate tends to produce, then to be generated is to be produced, and generation is production. Likewise, also, in the case of the capacities and uses of things: for if a capacity be a disposition, then also to be capable of something is to be disposed to it, and if the use of anything be an activity, then to use it is to be active, and to have used it is to have been active.

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If the opposite of the species be a privation, there are two ways of demolishing an argument, first of all by looking to see if the opposite be found in the genus rendered: for either the privation is to be found absolutely nowhere in the same genus, or at least not in the same ultimate genus: e.g. if the ultimate genus containing sight be sensation, then blindness will not be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a privation opposed to both genus and species, but the opposite of the species be not found in the opposite of the genus, then neither could the species rendered be in the genus rendered. If, then, you are demolishing a view, you should follow the rule as stated; but if establishing one there is but one way: for if the opposite species be found in the opposite genus, then also the species in question would be found in the genus in question: e.g. if ‘blindness’ be a form of ‘insensibility’, then ‘sight’ is a form of ‘sensation’. Again, look at the negations of the genus and species and convert the order of terms, according to the method described in the case of Accident: e.g. if the pleasant be a kind of good, what is not good is not pleasant. For were this no something not good as well would then be pleasant. That, however, cannot be, for it is impossible, if ‘good’ be the genus of pleasant, that anything not good should be pleasant: for of things of which the genus is not predicated, none of the species is predicated either. Also, in establishing a view, you should adopt the same method of examination: for if what is not good be not pleasant, then what is pleasant is good, so that ‘good’ is the genus of ‘pleasant’. If the species be a relative term, see whether the genus be a relative term as well: for if the species be a relative term, so too is the genus, as is the case with ‘double’ and ‘multiple’: for each is a relative term. If, on the other hand, the genus be a relative term, there is no necessity that the species should be so as well:

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for ‘knowledge’is a relative term, but not so ‘grammar’. Or possibly not even the first statement would be generally considered true: for virtue is a kind of ‘noble’ and a kind of ‘good’ thing, and yet, while ‘virtue’ is a relative term, ‘good’ and ‘noble’ are not relatives but qualities. Again, see whether the species fails to be used in the same relation when called by its own name, and when called by the name of its genus: e.g. if the term ‘double’ be used to mean the double of a ‘half’, then also the term ‘multiple’ ought to be used to mean multiple of a ‘half’. Otherwise ‘multiple’ could not be the genus of ‘double’. Moreover, see whether the term fail to be used in the same relation both when called by the name of its genus, and also when called by those of all the genera of its genus. For if the double be a multiple of a half, then ‘in excess of ‘will also be used in relation to a ‘half’: and, in general, the double will be called by the names of all the higher genera in relation to a ‘half’. An objection may be raised that there is no necessity for a term to be used in the same relation when called by its own name and when called by that of its genus: for ‘knowledge’ is called knowledge ‘of an object’, whereas it is called a ‘state’ and ‘disposition’ not of an ‘object’ but of the ‘soul’. Again, see whether the genus and the species be used in the same way in respect of the inflexions they take, e.g. datives and genitives and all the rest. For as the species is used, so should the genus be as well, as in the case of ‘double’ and its higher genera: for we say both ‘double of’ and ‘multiple of’ a thing. Likewise, also, in the case of ‘knowledge’: for both knowledge’ itself and its genera, e.g. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’, are said to be ‘of’ something. An objection may be raised that in some cases it is not so: for we say ‘superior to’ and ‘contrary to’ so and so, whereas ‘other’, which is the genus of these terms, demands not ‘to’ but ‘than’: for the expression is ‘other than’ so and so.

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Again, see whether terms used in like case relationships fail to yield a like construction when converted, as do ‘double’ and ‘multiple’. For each of these terms takes a genitive both in itself and in its converted form: for we say both a half of’ and ‘a fraction of’ something. The case is the same also as regards both ‘knowledge’ and ‘conception’: for these take a genitive, and by conversion an ‘object of knowledge’ and an ‘object of conception’ are both alike used with a dative. If, then, in any cases the constructions after conversion be not alike, clearly the one term is not the genus of the other. Again, see whether the species and the genus fail to be used in relation to an equal number of things: for the general view is that the uses of both are alike and equal in number, as is the case with ‘present’ and ‘grant’. For a present’ is of something or to some one, and also a ‘grant’ is of something and to some one: and ‘grant’ is the genus of ‘present’, for a ‘present’ is a ‘grant that need not be returned’. In some cases, however, the number of relations in which the terms are used happens not to be equal, for while ‘double’ is double of something, we speak of ‘in excess’ or ‘greater’ in something, as well as of or than something: for what is in excess or greater is always in excess in something, as well as in excess of something. Hence the terms in question are not the genera of ‘double’, inasmuch as they are not used in relation to an equal number of things with the species. Or possibly it is not universally true that species and genus are used in relation to an equal number of things. See, also, if the opposite of the species have the opposite of the genus as its genus, e.g. whether, if ‘multiple’ be the genus of ‘double’, ‘fraction’ be also the genus of ‘half’. For the opposite of the genus should always be the genus of the opposite species. If, then, any one were to assert that knowledge is a kind of sensation, then also the object of knowledge will have to be a kind of object of sensation, whereas it is not: for an object of

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knowledge is not always an object of sensation: for objects of knowledge include some of the objects of intuition as well. Hence ‘object of sensation’ is not the genus of ‘object of knowledge’: and if this be so, neither is ‘sensation’ the genus of ‘knowledge’. Seeing that of relative terms some are of necessity found in, or used of, the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be used (e.g. ‘disposition’ and ‘state’ and ‘balance’; for in nothing else can the aforesaid terms possibly be found except in the things in relation to which they are used), while others need not be found in the things in relation to which they are used at any time, though they still may be (e.g. if the term ‘object of knowledge’ be applied to the soul: for it is quite possible that the knowledge of itself should be possessed by the soul itself, but it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same knowledge to be found in some one else), while for others, again, it is absolutely impossible that they should be found in the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be used (as e.g. that the contrary should be found in the contrary or knowledge in the object of knowledge, unless the object of knowledge happen to be a soul or a man) – you should look, therefore, and see whether he places a term of one kind inside a genus that is not of that kind, e.g. suppose he has said that ‘memory’ is the ‘abiding of knowledge’. For ‘abiding’ is always found in that which abides, and is used of that, so that the abiding of knowledge also will be found in knowledge. Memory, then, is found in knowledge, seeing that it is the abiding of knowledge. But this is impossible, for memory is always found in the soul. The aforesaid commonplace rule is common to the subject of Accident as well: for it is all the same to say that ‘abiding’ is the genus of memory, or to allege that it is an accident of it. For if in any way whatever memory be the abiding of knowledge, the same argument in regard to it will apply.

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5 Again, see if he has placed what is a ‘state’ inside the genus ‘activity’, or an activity inside the genus ‘state’, e.g. by defining ‘sensation’ as ‘movement communicated through the body’: for sensation is a ‘state’, whereas movement is an ‘activity’. Likewise, also, if he has said that memory is a ‘state that is retentive of a conception’, for memory is never a state, but rather an activity. They also make a bad mistake who rank a ‘state’ within the ‘capacity’ that attends it, e.g. by defining ‘good temper’ as the ‘control of anger’, and ‘courage’ and ‘justice’ as ‘control of fears’ and of ‘gains’: for the terms ‘courageous’ and ‘good-tempered’ are applied to a man who is immune from passion, whereas ‘self-controlled’ describes the man who is exposed to passion and not led by it. Quite possibly, indeed, each of the former is attended by a capacity such that, if he were exposed to passion, he would control it and not be led by it: but, for all that, this is not what is meant by being ‘courageous’ in the one case, and ‘good tempered’ in the other; what is meant is an absolute immunity from any passions of that kind at all. Sometimes, also, people state any kind of attendant feature as the genus, e.g. ‘pain’ as the genus of ‘anger’ and ‘conception’ as that of conviction’. For both of the things in question follow in a certain sense upon the given species, but neither of them is genus to it. For when the angry man feels pain, the pain bas appeared in him earlier than the anger: for his anger is not the cause of his pain, but his pain of his anger, so that anger emphatically is not pain. By the same reasoning, neither is conviction conception: for it is possible to have the same

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conception even without being convinced of it, whereas this is impossible if conviction be a species of conception: for it is impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it be entirely transferred out of its species, just as neither could the same animal at one time be, and at another not be, a man. If, on the other hand, any one says that a man who has a conception must of necessity be also convinced of it, then ‘conception’ and ‘conviction’ will be used with an equal denotation, so that not even so could the former be the genus of the latter: for the denotation of the genus should be wider. See, also, whether both naturally come to be anywhere in the same thing: for what contains the species contains the genus as well: e.g. what contains ‘white’ contains ‘colour’ as well, and what contains ‘knowledge of grammar’ contains ‘knowledge’ as well. If, therefore, any one says that ‘shame’ is ‘fear’, or that ‘anger’ is ‘pain’, the result will be that genus and species are not found in the same thing: for shame is found in the ‘reasoning’ faculty, whereas fear is in the ‘spirited’ faculty, and ‘pain’ is found in the faculty of ‘desires’. (for in this pleasure also is found), whereas ‘anger’ is found in the ‘spirited’ faculty. Hence the terms rendered are not the genera, seeing that they do not naturally come to be in the same faculty as the species. Likewise, also, if ‘friendship’ be found in the faculty of desires, you may take it that it is not a form of ‘wishing’: for wishing is always found in the ‘reasoning’ faculty. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the accident and that of which it is an accident are both found in the same thing, so that if they do not appear in the same thing, clearly it is not an accident. Again, see if the species partakes of the genus attributed only in some particular respect: for it is the general view that the genus is not thus imparted only in some particular respect: for a man is not an animal in a particular respect, nor is grammar

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knowledge in a particular respect only. Likewise also in other instances. Look, therefore, and see if in the case of any of its species the genus be imparted only in a certain respect; e.g. if ‘animal’ has been described as an ‘object of perception’ or of ‘sight’. For an animal is an object of perception or of sight in a particular respect only; for it is in respect of its body that it is perceived and seen, not in respect of its soul, so that – ‘object of sight’ and ‘object of perception’ could not be the genus of ‘animal’. Sometimes also people place the whole inside the part without detection, defining (e.g.) ‘animal’ as an ‘animate body’; whereas the part is not predicated in any sense of the whole, so that ‘body’ could not be the genus of animal, seeing that it is a part. See also if he has put anything that is blameworthy or objectionable into the class ‘capacity’ or ‘capable’, e.g. by defining a ‘sophist’ or a ‘slanderer’, or a ‘thief’ as ‘one who is capable of secretly thieving other people’s property’. For none of the aforesaid characters is so called because he is ‘capable’ in one of these respects: for even God and the good man are capable of doing bad things, but that is not their character: for it is always in respect of their choice that bad men are so called. Moreover, a capacity is always a desirable thing: for even the capacities for doing bad things are desirable, and therefore it is we say that even God and the good man possess them; for they are capable (we say) of doing evil. So then ‘capacity’ can never be the genus of anything blameworthy. Else, the result will be that what is blameworthy is sometimes desirable: for there will be a certain form of capacity that is blameworthy. Also, see if he has put anything that is precious or desirable for its own sake into the class ‘capacity’ or ‘capable’ or ‘productive’ of anything. For capacity, and what is capable or productive of anything, is always desirable for the sake of something else.

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Or see if he has put anything that exists in two genera or more into one of them only. For some things it is impossible to place in a single genus, e.g. the ‘cheat’ and the ‘slanderer’: for neither he who has the will without the capacity, nor he who has the capacity without the will, is a slanderer or cheat, but he who has both of them. Hence he must be put not into one genus, but into both the aforesaid genera. Moreover, people sometimes in converse order render genus as differentia, and differentia as genus, defining (e.g.) astonishment as ‘excess of wonderment’ and conviction as ‘vehemence of conception’. For neither ‘excess’ nor ‘vehemence’ is the genus, but the differentia: for astonishment is usually taken to be an ‘excessive wonderment’, and conviction to be a ‘vehement conception’, so that ‘wonderment’ and ‘conception’ are the genus, while ‘excess’ and ‘vehemence’ are the differentia. Moreover, if any one renders ‘excess’ and ‘vehemence’ as genera, then inanimate things will be convinced and astonished. For ‘vehemence’ and ‘excess’ of a thing are found in a thing which is thus vehement and in excess. If, therefore, astonishment be excess of wonderment the astonishment will be found in the wonderment, so that ‘wonderment’ will be astonished! Likewise, also, conviction will be found in the conception, if it be ‘vehemence of conception’, so that the conception will be convinced. Moreover, a man who renders an answer in this style will in consequence find himself calling vehemence vehement and excess excessive: for there is such a thing as a vehement conviction: if then conviction be ‘vehemence’, there would be a ‘vehement vehemence’. Likewise, also, there is such a thing as excessive astonishment: if then astonishment be an excess, there would be an ‘excessive excess’. Whereas neither of these things is generally believed, any more than that knowledge is a knower or motion a moving thing.

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Sometimes, too, people make the bad mistake of putting an affection into that which is affected, as its genus, e.g. those who say that immortality is everlasting life: for immortality seems to be a certain affection or accidental feature of life. That this saying is true would appear clear if any one were to admit that a man can pass from being mortal and become immortal: for no one will assert that he takes another life, but that a certain accidental feature or affection enters into this one as it is. So then ‘life’ is not the genus of immortality. Again, see if to an affection he has ascribed as genus the object of which it is an affection, by defining (e.g.) wind as ‘air in motion’. Rather, wind is ‘a movement of air’: for the same air persists both when it is in motion and when it is still. Hence wind is not ‘air’ at all: for then there would also have been wind when the air was not in motion, seeing that the same air which formed the wind persists. Likewise, also, in other cases of the kind. Even, then, if we ought in this instance to admit the point that wind is ‘air in motion’, yet we should accept a definition of the kind, not about all those things of which the genus is not true, but only in cases where the genus rendered is a true predicate. For in some cases, e.g. ‘mud’ or ‘snow’, it is not generally held to be true. For people tell you that snow is ‘frozen water’ and mud is earth mixed with moisture’, whereas snow is not water, nor mud earth, so that neither of the terms rendered could be the genus: for the genus should be true of all its species. Likewise neither is wine ‘fermented water’, as Empedocles speaks of ‘water fermented in wood’;’ for it simply is not water at all.

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6 Moreover, see whether the term rendered fail to be the genus of anything at all; for then clearly it also fails to be the genus of the species mentioned. Examine the point by seeing whether the objects that partake of the genus fail to be specifically different from one another, e.g. white objects: for these do not differ specifically from one another, whereas of a genus the species are always different, so that ‘white’ could not be the genus of anything. Again, see whether he has named as genus or differentia some feature that goes with everything: for the number of attributes that follow everything is comparatively large: thus (e.g.) ‘Being’ and ‘Unity’ are among the number of attributes that follow everything. If, therefore, he has rendered ‘Being’ as a genus, clearly it would be the genus of everything, seeing that it is predicated of everything; for the genus is never predicated of anything except of its species. Hence Unity, inter alia, will be a species of Being. The result, therefore, is that of all things of which the genus is predicated, the species is predicated as well, seeing that Being and Unity are predicates of absolutely everything, whereas the predication of the species ought to be of narrower range. If, on the other hand, he has named as differentia some attribute that follows everything, clearly the denotation of the differentia will be equal to, or wider than, that of the genus. For if the genus, too, be some attribute that follows everything, the denotation of the differentia will be equal to its denotation, while if the genus do not follow everything, it will be still wider. Moreover, see if the description ‘inherent in S’ be used of the genus rendered in relation to its species, as it is used of ‘white’ in the case of snow, thus showing clearly that it could not be the genus: for ‘true of S’ is the only description used of the genus in

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relation to its species. Look and see also if the genus fails to be synonymous with its species. For the genus is always predicated of its species synonymously. Moreover, beware, whenever both species and genus have a contrary, and he places the better of the contraries inside the worse genus: for the result will be that the remaining species will be found in the remaining genus, seeing that contraries are found in contrary genera, so that the better species will be found in the worse genus and the worse in the better: whereas the usual view is that of the better species the genus too is better. Also see if he has placed the species inside the worse and not inside the better genus, when it is at the same time related in like manner to both, as (e.g.) if he has defined the ‘soul’ as a ‘form of motion’ or ‘a form of moving thing’. For the same soul is usually thought to be a principle alike of rest and of motion, so that, if rest is the better of the two, this is the genus into which the soul should have been put. Moreover, judge by means of greater and less degrees: if overthrowing a view, see whether the genus admits of a greater degree, whereas neither the species itself does so, nor any term that is called after it: e.g. if virtue admits of a greater degree, so too does justice and the just man: for one man is called ‘more just than another’. If, therefore, the genus rendered admits of a greater degree, whereas neither the species does so itself nor yet any term called after it, then what has been rendered could not be the genus. Again, if what is more generally, or as generally, thought to be the genus be not so, clearly neither is the genus rendered. The commonplace rule in question is useful especially in cases where the species appears to have several predicates in the category of essence, and where no distinction has been drawn between them, and we cannot say which of them is genus; e.g.

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both ‘pain’ and the ‘conception of a slight’ are usually thought to be predicates of ‘anger in the category of essence: for the angry man is both in pain and also conceives that he is slighted. The same mode of inquiry may be applied also to the case of the species, by comparing it with some other species: for if the one which is more generally, or as generally, thought to be found in the genus rendered be not found therein, then clearly neither could the species rendered be found therein. In demolishing a view, therefore, you should follow the rule as stated. In establishing one, on the other hand, the commonplace rule that you should see if both the genus rendered and the species admit of a greater degree will not serve: for even though both admit it, it is still possible for one not to be the genus of the other. For both ‘beautiful’ and ‘white’ admit of a greater degree, and neither is the genus of the other. On the other hand, the comparison of the genera and of the species one with another is of use: e.g. supposing A and B to have a like claim to be genus, then if one be a genus, so also is the other. Likewise, also, if what has less claim be a genus, so also is what has more claim: e.g. if ‘capacity’ have more claim than ‘virtue’ to be the genus of self-control, and virtue be the genus, so also is capacity. The same observations will apply also in the case of the species. For instance, supposing A and B to have a like claim to be a species of the genus in question, then if the one be a species, so also is the other: and if that which is less generally thought to be so be a species, so also is that which is more generally thought to be so. Moreover, to establish a view, you should look and see if the genus is predicated in the category of essence of those things of which it has been rendered as the genus, supposing the species rendered to be not one single species but several different ones: for then clearly it will be the genus. If, on the other, the species rendered be single, look and see whether the genus be

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predicated in the category of essence of other species as well: for then, again, the result will be that it is predicated of several different species. Since some people think that the differentia, too, is a predicate of the various species in the category of essence, you should distinguish the genus from the differentia by employing the aforesaid elementary principles – (a) that the genus has a wider denotation than the differentia; (b) that in rendering the essence of a thing it is more fitting to state the genus than the differentia: for any one who says that ‘man’ is an ‘animal’ shows what man is better than he who describes him as ‘walking’; also (c) that the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus, whereas the genus does not do this of the differentia: for he who says ‘walking’ describes an animal of a certain quality, whereas he who says ‘animal’ describes an animal of a certain quality, whereas he who says ‘animal’ does not describe a walking thing of a certain quality. The differentia, then, should be distinguished from the genus in this manner. Now seeing it is generally held that if what is musical, in being musical, possesses knowledge in some respect, then also ‘music’ is a particular kind of ‘knowledge’; and also that if what walks is moved in walking, then ‘walking’ is a particular kind of ‘movement’; you should therefore examine in the aforesaid manner any genus in which you want to establish the existence of something; e.g. if you wish to prove that ‘knowledge’ is a form of ‘conviction’, see whether the knower in knowing is convinced: for then clearly knowledge would be a particular kind of conviction. You should proceed in the same way also in regard to the other cases of this kind. Moreover, seeing that it is difficult to distinguish whatever always follows along with a thing, and is not convertible with it, from its genus, if A follows B universally, whereas B does not

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follow A universally – as e.g. ‘rest’ always follows a ‘calm’ and ‘divisibility’ follows ‘number’, but not conversely (for the divisible is not always a number, nor rest a calm) – you may yourself assume in your treatment of them that the one which always follows is the genus, whenever the other is not convertible with it: if, on the other hand, some one else puts forward the proposition, do not accept it universally. An objection to it is that ‘not-being’ always follows what is ‘coming to be’ (for what is coming to be is not) and is not convertible with it (for what is not is not always coming to be), and that still ‘not-being’ is not the genus of ‘coming to be’: for ‘not-being’ has not any species at all. Questions, then, in regard to Genus should be investigated in the ways described.

Book V

1 The question whether the attribute stated is or is not a property, should be examined by the following methods: Any ‘property’ rendered is always either essential and permanent or relative and temporary: e.g. it is an ‘essential property’ of man to be ‘by nature a civilized animal’: a ‘relative property’ is one like that of the soul in relation to the body, viz. that the one is fitted to command, and the other to obey: a ‘permanent property’ is one like the property which belongs to God, of being an ‘immortal living being’: a ‘temporary property’
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is one like the property which belongs to any particular man of walking in the gymnasium. [The rendering of a property ‘relatively’ gives rise either to two problems or to four. For if he at the same time render this property of one thing and deny it of another, only two problems arise, as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man, in relation to a horse, to be a biped. For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped, and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset. If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of two things, and deny it in each case of the other, there will then be four problems; as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man in relation to a horse for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped. For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally a biped, and that he is a quadruped, and also that the horse both is a biped, and is not a quadruped. If you show any of these at all, the intended attribute is demolished.] An ‘essential’ property is one which is rendered of a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes the said thing from everything else, as does ‘a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge’ in the case of man. A ‘relative’ property is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing, as does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison with knowledge, viz. that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty, whereas the latter is produced in that of reason alone, and in those who have a reasoning faculty. A ‘permanent’ property is one which is true at every time, and never fails, like being’ compounded of soul and body’, in the case of a living creature. A ‘temporary’ property is one which is true at some particular time, and does not of necessity always

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follow; as, of some particular man, that he walks in the marketplace. To render a property ‘relatively’ to something else means to state the difference between them as it is found either universally and always, or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally and always, is one such as man possesses in comparison with a horse, viz. being a biped: for a man is always and in every case a biped, whereas a horse is never a biped at any time. On the other hand, a difference that is found generally and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the former commands, while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and spirit always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command, whenever the soul of a man is vicious. Of ‘properties’ the most ‘arguable’ are the essential and permanent and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as we said before, to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either two or four, or that arguments in regard to these are several. An essential and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things, or can observe in relation to many periods of time: if essential’, discuss it in comparison with many things: for the property ought to belong to its subject in comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the subject be not distinguished by it in comparison with everything else, the property could not have been rendered correctly. So a permanent property you should observe in relation to many periods of time; for if it does not or did not, or is not going to, belong, it will not be a property. On the other hand, about a temporary property we do not inquire further than in regard to the time called ‘the present’; and so arguments in regard to it are not many; whereas an arguable’

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question is one in regard to which it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to arise. The so-called ‘relative’ property, then, should be examined by means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand, permanent and essential properties should be considered by the following methods.

2 First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered correctly. Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to see whether the terms in which the property is stated are not or are more intelligible – for destructive purposes, whether they are not so, and for constructive purposes, whether they are so. Of the terms not being more intelligible, one test is to see whether the property which he renders is altogether more unintelligible than the subject whose property he has stated: for, if so, the property will not have been stated correctly. For the object of getting a property constituted is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to conceive it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated that it is a property of ‘fire’ to ‘bear a very close resemblance to the soul’, uses the term ‘soul’, which is less intelligible than ‘fire’ – for we know better what fire is than what soul is –, and therefore a ‘very close resemblance to the soul’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of fire. Another test is to see whether the attribution of A (property) to B (subject) fails to be more intelligible. For not only should the property be more intelligible than its subject, but also it should be something whose

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attribution to the particular subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does not know whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of these results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be ‘the primary element wherein the soul is naturally found’, has introduced a subject which is less intelligible than ‘fire’, viz. whether the soul is found in it, and whether it is found there primarily; and therefore to be ‘the primary element in which the soul is naturally found’ could not be correctly stated to be a property of ‘fire’. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more intelligible, and if they are more intelligible in each of the aforesaid ways. For then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect: for of constructive arguments, showing the correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness merely in this respect, while others will show it without qualification. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that the ‘possession of sensation’ is a property of ‘animal’ has both used more intelligible terms and has rendered the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid senses; so that to ‘possess sensation’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered as a property of ‘animal’. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms rendered in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether the whole expression too signifies more than one thing. For then the property will not have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) seeing that to ‘being natural sentient’ signifies more than one thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, (2) to use one’s sensation, being naturally sentient’ could not be a correct statement of a property of ‘animal’. The reason why the term you use, or the whole expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one meaning is this, that an expression bearing more than one meaning makes the object described
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obscure, because the man who is about to attempt an argument is in doubt which of the various senses the expression bears: and this will not do, for the object of rendering the property is that he may understand. Moreover, in addition to this, it is inevitable that those who render a property after this fashion should be somehow refuted whenever any one addresses his syllogism to that one of the term’s several meanings which does not agree. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether both all the terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more than one sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘body’ does not bear several meanings, nor quickest to move upwards in space’, nor yet the whole expression made by putting them together, it would be correct in this respect to say that it is a property of fire to be the ‘body quickest to move upwards in space’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he renders the property is used in more than one sense, and no distinction has been drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then the property will not have been correctly rendered. The reasons why this is so are quite clear from what has been said above: for the same results are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘the knowledge of this’ signifies many things for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of knowledge about it – no property of the ‘knowledge of this’ could be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a man should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids bearing many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that ‘man’ is used in a single sense, ‘naturally civilized animal’ would be correctly stated as a property of man.
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Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in rendering ‘properties’ also, just as they do in their ‘definitions’ as well: but a property to which this has happened will not have been correctly stated: for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning becomes obscure, and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition of the same term is likely to happen in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of fire, ‘the body which is the most rarefied of bodies’ (for he has repeated the word ‘body’); the second is, if a man replaces words by their definitions, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of earth, ‘the substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards in space’, and were then to substitute ‘substances of such and such a kind’ for the word ‘bodies’: for ‘body’ and ‘a substance of such and such a kind’ mean one and the same thing. For he will have repeated the word ‘substance’, and accordingly neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever repeating the same term; for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has stated ‘animal capable of acquiring knowledge’ as a property of man has avoided repeating the same term several times, the property would in this respect have been correctly rendered of man. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is the business of the language Of ‘properties’, as also of the language of definitions, to distinguish. In the case contemplated, therefore, the property will not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a
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property of knowledge to be a ‘conception incontrovertible by argument, because of its unity’, has used in the property a term of that kind, viz. ‘unity’, which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property of knowledge could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’ has used no term that is common to everything, it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of a ‘living creature’ to ‘have a soul’. Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he is stating more than one: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition beside the expression which shows the essence, so too in the case of properties nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that constitutes the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’ has rendered more than one property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could not be a correctly stated property of fire to be ‘the most rarefied and lightest body’. On the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether he has avoided rendering more than one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a ‘body adaptable to every shape’ has rendered as its property a single character and not several, and so the property of ‘liquid’ would in this respect have been correctly stated.
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3 Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its species: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For the object of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with, while any one of its species is posterior to it, and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is property of ‘animal’ to be ‘the substance to which «man» belongs as a species’ has employed one of its species, and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be ‘compounded of soul and body’ has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject itself or any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property of a ‘living creature’ would have been correctly rendered. You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject or, in general, anything simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible. Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it

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is a property of good to be ‘the most direct opposite of evil’, has employed the opposite of good, and so the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject, or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of knowledge to be ‘the most convincing conception’ has avoided employing anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior to, the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have been correctly stated. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly described. For there is no necessity either that the name of the subject must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging; nor yet that the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which such an attribute is found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this, even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it belongs, seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so the property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of animal ‘sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still’ rendered the kind of property which sometimes is not a property, and so the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something that of necessity must always be a property: for then the property will have been in this respect correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of virtue to be ‘what makes its possessor good’ has rendered as property something that always follows, and so the property of virtue would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
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Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the property of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property will not have been correctly stated. For in the first place, any unusual procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure for everybody to render as property some attribute that always follows. In the second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was the property of the present time which he intended to state, is obscure: and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man ‘to be sitting with a particular man’, states the property of the present time, and so he cannot have rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described it without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, in rendering the property of the present time, he has, in stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of a particular man ‘to be walking now’, has made this distinction in his statement, and so the property would have been correctly stated. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a property of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For every sensible attribute, once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For it is not clear whether it still belongs, because it is evidenced only by sensation. This principle will be true in the case of any attributes that do not always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be ‘the brightest star that moves over the earth’, has used in describing the property an expression of that kind, viz. ‘to move over the
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earth’, which is evidenced by sensation; and so the sun’s property could not have been correctly rendered: for it will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether it continues to move over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has rendered the property of a kind that is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface to be ‘the primary thing that is coloured’, has introduced amongst the rest a sensible quality, ‘to be coloured’, but still a quality such as manifestly always belongs, and so the property of ‘surface’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of man to be ‘a walking, biped animal’ has rendered a property of man so as to signify his essence, and so the property of man could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property which he has rendered forms a predicate convertible with its subject, without, however, signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it is a property of man to be a ‘naturally civilized animal’ has rendered the property so as to be convertible with its subject, without, however, showing its essence, and so the property of man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered. Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the property without having placed the subject within its essence. For of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered should be the genus, and then the rest of it should be

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appended immediately afterwards, and should distinguish its subject from other things. Hence a property which is not stated in this way could not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to ‘have a soul’ has not placed ‘living creature’ within its essence, and so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first places within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering, and then appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that is a property of man to be an ‘animal capable of receiving knowledge’, has rendered the property after placing the subject within its essence, and so the property of ‘man’ would in this respect have been correctly rendered.

4 The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly rendered or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the other hand, whether what is stated is or is not a property at all, you should examine from the following points of view. For the commonplace arguments which establish absolutely that the property is accurately stated will be the same as those that constitute it a property at all: accordingly they will be described in the course of them. Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to belong to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular respect, or to be a property of each of them in respect of that character of which he has rendered the property: for

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then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that he ‘cannot be deceived by an argument’ (for a geometrician is deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true of every instance, and true in that particular respect: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus, for example, in as much as the description ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ is true of every man, and true of him qua man, it would be a property of man to be ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’. commonplace rule means – for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to be true of that of which the name is true; and if the name fails to be true of that of which the description is true: for constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the description too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and if the name too is predicated of that of which the description is predicated.] Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to apply to that to which the description applies: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the description ‘a living being that partakes of knowledge’ is true of God, while ‘man’ is not predicated of God, to be a living being that partakes of knowledge’ could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and if the description as well be predicated of that of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate ‘living creature’ is true of that of which ‘having a soul’ is true, and ‘having a soul’ is true of that of which the

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predicate ‘living creature’ is true; and so ‘having a soul would be a property of ‘living creature’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject as a property of that which is described as ‘in the subject’: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered ‘fire’ as the property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’, has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate, ‘fire’ could not be a property of ‘the body with the most rarefied particles’. The reason why the subject will not be a property of that which is found in the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if any one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in the subject as a property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of ‘earth’ to be ‘specifically the heaviest body’ has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner in which a property is predicated, and so the property of earth would have been rightly stated. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the property as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For an attribute of which the subject partakes is a constituent part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g. inasmuch as he who has said that ‘walking on two feet’ is property of man has rendered the property as partaken of, ‘walking on two feet’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For

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constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property as partaken of, or as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that to be ‘naturally sentient’ is a property of ‘animal’ has rendered the property neither as partaken of nor as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it; and so to be ‘naturally sentient’ would be a property of ‘animal’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot possibly belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or as prior to the attribute described in the name: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute ‘walking through the market-place’ to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute ‘man’, ‘walking through the market-place’ could not be a property of ‘man’ either never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute ‘man’, and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would be a property of ‘man’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as they are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a ‘proper object of pursuit’ to ‘appear good to certain persons’, it could not be a property of the ‘desirable’ either to ‘appear good to certain persons’: for ‘proper object of pursuit’

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and ‘desirable’ mean the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is called a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, ‘to have a tripartite soul’, it would also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the same. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind as the alleged property: for then neither will what is stated to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to move by his own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an ‘animal’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man to be a ‘walking biped,’ it would also be a property of a bird to be a ‘flying biped’: for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under the same genus, being under the genus ‘animal’, while the other pair have that of differentiae of the genus, viz. of ‘animal’. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does ‘walking quadruped’.

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Inasmuch as ‘same’ and ‘different’ are terms used in several senses, it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to ‘man’ will belong also to ‘white man’, if there be a white man, and one that belongs to ‘white man’ will belong also to ‘man’. One might, then, bring captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that ‘man’ is one thing, and white man’ another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e.g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science, it could not be a property of ‘science’ that it is ‘incontrovertible by argument’; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called ‘another’ thing because the mode of being of the two is different: for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man. Moreover, you should take a look along at the inflections, and say that the description of the man of science is wrong: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘he is incontrovertible by argument’; while the description of Science is wrong too: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘she is incontrovertible by argument’. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at nothing.

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5 Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that ‘biped’ is a property of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression actually indicates one that invariably belongs: accordingly, ‘biped’ could not be a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a property of ‘man’ the phrase ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ both intends, and by his language indicates, the property that belongs by nature, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man. Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such things. For if you render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders , coloured’ as the property of ‘surface’, ‘coloured’ will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of ‘body’, it will be predicated also of ‘surface’. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true.

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In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as ‘biped’ belongs to ‘man’, or actually, as ‘having four fingers’ belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ belongs to ‘fire’, or absolutely, as ‘life’ to ‘living being’, or one that belongs to a thing only as called after something else, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘soul’, or on the other hand primarily, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘rational faculty’, or because the thing is in a certain state, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to a ‘scientist’ (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be ‘incontrovertible by argument’), or because it is the state possessed by something, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to ‘science’, or because it is partaken of, as ‘sensation’ belongs to ‘animal’ (for other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but they have it because they already partake of ‘animal’), or because it partakes of something else, as ‘life’ belongs to a particular kind of ‘living being’. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word ‘naturally’, because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what it now is, e.g. the man’s possession of four fingers. So he errs if he has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will not be true of that of which the description is true, as is the case with ‘coloured’, whether rendered as a property of ‘surface’ or of ‘body’. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because then it will not be a

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property. For, supposing he renders the property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses that state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did ‘incontrovertible by argument’ when stated as a property of ‘science’ or of the ‘scientist’. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by, something; because then the property will belong to certain other things as well. For if he renders it because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken of, as (e.g.) if he were to state ‘life’ to be a property of a ‘particular kind of living being’, or just of ‘living being. So he errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one of them, e.g. ‘lightest’ as applied to ‘fire’. Sometimes, too, a man may even add the word ‘specifically’, and still make a mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever the word ‘specifically’ is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them ‘fire’, but are of different species. The reason why, whenever ‘specifically’ is added, there should not be any species other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree, as happens with ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of fire: for ‘light’ consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame. And this should not happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer; otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the name

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too should be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein which has it in the highest degree, as is the condition of the property ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of ‘fire’: for this same attribute will be the property of ‘light’ as well: for it is ‘light’ that ‘consists of the most rarefied particles’. If, then, any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one states the property at the actual time of making the statement. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘becoming’ is a property of ‘beautiful’ has rendered the term as a property of itself (for ‘beautiful’ and ‘becoming’ are the same); and so ‘becoming’ could not be a property of ‘beautiful’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has stated ‘animate substance’ as a property of ‘living-creature’ has not stated ‘living-creature’ as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible predicate, so that ‘animate substance’ would be a property of ‘living-creature’. Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole be not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole: for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a property in the case of

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things that consist of like parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the ‘sea’ to be ‘the largest volume of salt water’, has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not ‘the largest volume of salt water’); and so the largest volume of salt water’ could not be a property of the ‘sea’. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of ‘air’ to be ‘breathable’ has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of the air is not breathable); and so ‘breathable’ could not be a property of ‘air’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it naturally falls downwards, it is a property of the various particular pieces of earth taken as ‘the Earth’, so that it would be a property of ‘earth’ ‘naturally to fall downwards’.

6 Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites, and first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property of the contrary of the second.

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Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary to justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but ‘to be the highest good’ is not a property of ‘justice’, therefore ‘to be the lowest evil’ could not be a property of ‘injustice’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for then also the contrary of the first will be the property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and objectionable to desirable, and ‘desirable’ is a property of ‘good’, ‘objectionable’ would be a property of ‘evil’. Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the term rendered fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and ‘in excess’ to ‘exceeded’, while ‘in excess’ is not a property of ‘double’, exceeded’ could not be a property of ‘half’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the correlative of the alleged property is a property of the subject’s correlative: for then also the correlative of the first will be a property of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch as ‘double’ is relative to ‘half’, and the proportion 1:2 is relative to the proportion 2:1, while it is a property of ‘double’ to be ‘in the proportion of 2 to 1’, it would be a property of ‘half’ to be ‘in the proportion of 1 to 2’. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y): for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). Also if, on the other hand, an attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property of the given privation (of Y), neither will the attribute described in terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of ‘deafness’ to be a ‘lack of sensation’, neither

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could it be a property of ‘hearing’ to be a ‘sensation’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute described in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then also the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will be a property of the privation (of Y). Also, if an attribute described in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y), then also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be a property of the state (Y). Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to see’ is a property of ‘sight’, inasmuch as we have sight, ‘failure to see’ would be a property of ‘blindness’, inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally have. Next, look from the point of view of positive and negative terms; and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves. This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive purpose. Thus (e.g.) see if the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject: for then the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject. Also if, on the other hand, the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it is a property of the subject, then the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it will not be a property of the subject: e.g. inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’, ‘inanimate’ could not be a property of ‘living creature’. Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, positive or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for destructive purposes, if the positive term falls to be a property of the positive subject: for then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject. Also, if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the positive term be a property of the positive subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘animal’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could ‘not-animal’ be a property of ‘not-man’. Also if ‘not-animal’

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seems not to be a property of ‘not-man’, neither will ‘animal’ be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term is a property of the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of the negative subject as well. Also if the negative term be a property of the negative subject, the positive will be a property of the positive as well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘notliving being’ ‘not to live’, it would be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’: also if it seems to be a property of ‘living being’ ‘to live’, it will also seem to be a property of ‘not-living being’ ‘not to live’. Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property rendered is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the term rendered be a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘animate’ is a property of ‘living creature’, ‘animate’ could not be a property of ‘not-living creature’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property of the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative. This commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not belong at all to a negative, while a negative term, though it belongs to a positive, does not belong as a property. Next, look from the point of view of the coordinate members of a division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the coordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the remaining set of co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible living being’ is not a property of any

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of the other living beings, ‘intelligible living being’ could not be a property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of ‘wisdom’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the rational faculty’, then, taking each of the other virtues as well in this way, it would be a property of ‘temperance’ to be essentially ‘the natural virtue of the faculty of desire’. Next, look from the point of view of the inflexions, and see, for destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘beautifully’ is not a property of ‘justly’, neither could ‘beautiful’ be a property of ‘just’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the property rendered is a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘walking biped’ is a property of man, it would also be any one’s property ‘as a man’ to be described ‘as a walking biped’. Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned should one look at the inflexions, but also in the case of its opposites, just as has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules as well.’ Thus, for destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property rendered fails to be the property of the inflexion of the opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the other opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘well’ is not a property of ‘justly’, neither could ‘badly’ be a property of ‘unjustly’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property originally suggested is a property of
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the inflexion of the opposite of the original subject: for then also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘best’ is a property of ‘the good’, ‘worst’ also will be a property of ‘the evil’.

7 Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered fails to be a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then neither will what is in a relation like that of the first be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the production of a house is like that of the doctor towards the production of health, and it is not a property of a doctor to produce health, it could not be a property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that of the property rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject: for then also what is in a relation like that of the first will be a property of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of ability to produce health is like that of a trainer towards the possession of ability to produce vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce vigour, it would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce health. Next look from the point of view of things that are identically related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is identically related towards two subjects fails to be a property of

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the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question; for then neither will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property of the subject which is identically related to it as the first. If, on the other hand, the predicate which is identically related to two subjects is the property of the subject which is identically related to it as the subject in question, then it will not be a property of that of which it has been stated to be a property. (e.g.) inasmuch as prudence is identically related to both the noble and the base, since it is knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If, on the other hand, it is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble, it could not be a property of it to be the knowledge of the base.] For it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one subject. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use: for what is ‘identically related’ is a single predicate in process of comparison with more than one subject. Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified by the verb ‘to be’ fails to be a property of the subject qualified by the verb ‘to be’: for then neither will the destruction of the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to be destroyed’, nor will the ‘becoming’the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb ‘to become’. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property of ‘man’ to be an animal, neither could it be a property of becoming a man to become an animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ to ‘being’ and ‘being destroyed’, and from ‘being destroyed’ to ‘being’ and to ‘becoming’ exactly as they have just been given from ‘being’ to ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb ‘to be’ has the predicate set down
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as so qualified, as its property: for then also the subject qualified by the very ‘to become’ will have the predicate qualified by ‘to become’ as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb to be destroyed’ will have as its property the predicate rendered with this qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is a property of man to be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal, and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from ‘becoming’ and ‘being destroyed’ both to ‘being’ and to the conclusions that follow from them, exactly as was directed also for the purpose of destruction. Next take a look at the ‘idea’ of the subject stated, and see, for destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong to the ‘idea’ in question, or fails to belong to it in virtue of that character which causes it to bear the description of which the property was rendered: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘being motionless’ does not belong to ‘man-himself’ qua ‘man’, but qua ‘idea’, it could not be a property of ‘man’ to be motionless. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in question belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in virtue of which there is predicated of it that character of which the predicate in question has been stated not to be a property: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belongs to ‘livingcreature-itself’ to be compounded of soul and body, and further this belongs to it qua ‘living-creature’, it would be a property of ‘living-creature’ to be compounded of soul and body.

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8 Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is more-P fails to be a property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is less-P be a property of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as being more highly coloured is not a property of what is more a body, neither could being less highly coloured be a property of what is less a body, nor being coloured be a property of body at all. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what is less-P will be a property of what is less S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life, a lower degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree of life, and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of life simply. Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive purposes, if P simply fails to be a property of S simply; for then neither will more-P be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘virtuous’ is not a property of ‘man’, neither could ‘more virtuous’ be a property of what is ‘more human’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P simply is a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a property of more-S, and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus (e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and so also a greater tendency to move upwards by nature would be a property of what is more fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these matters from the point of view of the others as well.

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Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if the more likely property fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for then neither will the less likely property be a property of the less likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘perceiving’ is more likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than ‘knowing’ of ‘man’, and ‘perceiving’ is not a property of ‘animal’, ‘knowing’ could not be a property of ‘man’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the less likely property is a property of the less likely subject; for then too the more likely property will be a property of the more likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to be naturally civilized’ is less likely to be a property of man than ‘to live’ of an animal, and it is a property of man to be naturally civilized, it would be a property of animal to live. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to be a property: while if it is a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to be coloured’ is more likely to be a property of a ‘surface’ than of a ‘body’, and it is not a property of a surface, ‘to be coloured’ could not be a property of ‘body’; while if it is a property of a ‘surface’, it could not be a property of a ‘body’. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing. Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely to be a property of a given subject fails to be its property: for then neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘sensible’ is more likely than ‘divisible’ to be a property of ‘animal’, and ‘sensible’ is not a property of animal, ‘divisible’ could not be a property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property; for then what is more

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likely to be a property of it will be a property as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as ‘sensation’ is less likely to be a property of ‘animal’ than life’, and ‘sensation’ is a property of animal, ‘life’ would be a property of animal. Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘desiring’ is as much a property of the faculty of desire as reasoning’ is a property of the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is as much a property of ‘the faculty of reason’ to be ‘the primary seat of wisdom’ as it is of ‘the faculty of desire’ to be ‘the primary seat of temperance’, and it is a property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of wisdom, it would be a property of the faculty of desire to be the primary seat of temperance. Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘seeing’ is as much a property of man as ‘hearing’, and ‘seeing’ is not a property of man, ‘hearing’ could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property of it is its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will be its property as well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part

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that reasons, and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that desires, and so it be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part that reasons. Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a property of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former, while if it be a property of the former, it will not be a property of the other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as ‘to burn’ is as much a property of ‘flame’ as of ‘live coals’, and ‘to burn’ is not a property of flame, ‘to burn’ could not be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame, it could not be a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use. The rule based on things that are in a like relation’ differs from the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,’ because the former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection on the belonging of any attribute, while the latter is judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribute belongs. Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the property relatively to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question cannot belong to what does not exist: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that ‘breathable’ is a property of ‘air’ has, on the one hand, rendered the property potentially (for that is ‘breathable’ which is such as can be breathed), and on the other hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not exist: – for while air may exist, even though there exist no animal so constituted as to breathe the air, it is not possible to breathe it if no animal exist: so that it will not, either, be a property of air to be such as can be breathed at a time when

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there exists no animal such as to breathe it and so it follows that ‘breathable’ could not be a property of air. For constructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially he renders the property either relatively to something that exists, or to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question can belong to what does not exist: for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus e.g.) he who renders it as a property of ‘being’ to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’, in rendering the property potentially, has rendered the property relatively to something that exists: for when ‘being’ exists, it will also be capable of being acted upon or of acting in a certain way: so that to be ‘capable of being acted upon or of acting’ would be a property of ‘being’. Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated the property in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For people who render the property in that way find that of the object of which the description is true, the name is not true as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in being none the less; for it belongs most nearly to something that is in being. An example would be supposing any one were to render ‘the lightest body’ as a property of ‘fire’: for, though fire perish, there eh re will still be some form of body that is the lightest, so that ‘the lightest body’ could not be a property of fire. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative: for then the property will in this respect have been property of man has not rendered the property correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he in the superlative, the property would in who states ‘a naturally civilized animal’ as a this respect have been correctly stated.

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Book VI

1 The discussion of Definitions falls into five parts. For you have to show either (1) that it is not true at all to apply the expression as well to that to which the term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be true of every man); or (2) that though the object has a genus, he has failed to put the object defined into the genus, or to put it into the appropriate genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object in its genus, and then append its differences: for of all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed to be the principal mark of the essence of what is defined): or (3) that the expression is not peculiar to the object (for, as we said above as well, a definition ought to be peculiar): or else (4) see if, though he has observed all the aforesaid cautions, he has yet failed to define the object, that is, to express its essence. (5) It remains, apart from the foregoing, to see if he has defined it, but defined it incorrectly. Whether, then, the expression be not also true of that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace rules that relate to Accident. For there too the question is always ‘Is so and so true or untrue?’: for whenever we argue that an accident belongs, we declare it to be true, while whenever we argue that it does not belong, we declare it to be untrue. If, again, he has failed to place the object in the appropriate genus, or if the expression be not peculiar to the

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Here ‘passage’ and ‘balance’ are ambiguous terms: it is accordingly not clear which of the several possible senses of the term he intends to convey. if the term defined be used in different senses and he has spoken without distinguishing between them: for then it is not clear to which of them the definition rendered applies. Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the former. e.object. and one can then bring a captious objection on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this kind of thing is 453 . then. we must go on to examine the case according to the commonplace rules that relate to genus and property. then. Incorrectness falls into two branches: (1) first. if the expression used be longer than is necessary: for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. each of the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others. 2 One commonplace rule. we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for with anything it is easier to do it than to do it correctly. Again. then. It remains. Clearly. in regard to obscurity is. Likewise also. more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty. ‘Becoming is a passage into being’. or else defined incorrectly. First.g. (secondly. or ‘Health is the balance of hot and cold elements’. the use of obscure language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest possible. then. See if the meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with any other. to prescribe how to investigate whether the object has been either not defined at all. seeing that the whole purpose of rendering it is to make something known).

Another rule is. and then institute his argument against each: for if the expression used be not adequate to the subject in any of its senses. For an unusual phrase is always obscure. nor yet metaphorically. for the latter does make its meaning to some extent clear because of the likeness involved. for those who use metaphors do so always in view of some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear. for instance. he speaks falsely: for an 454 . nor yet literally. if he has defined knowledge as ‘unsupplantable’. if a man says that the law is literally a ‘measure’ or an ‘image’. Moreover. if harmony be the genus of temperance. It is possible. or the earth as a ‘nurse’. or a certain spider as poison-fanged’. nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. as when the law is said to be the ‘measure’ or ‘image’ of the things that are by nature just. for there is no likeness to justify the description ‘measure’ or ‘image’. then the same object will occur in two genera of which neither contains the other: for harmony does not contain virtue. also. See if he has used a metaphorical expression. Again. the questioner may himself distinguish the various senses of the term rendered in the definition. So then. nor virtue harmony. as when Plato describes the eye as ‘brow-shaded’. Such phrases are worse than metaphor. e. again. Or. Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously. as applied to the law.g. For a metaphorical expression is always obscure. or the marrow as ‘boneformed’. it is clear that he cannot have defined it in any sense aright. or temperance as a ‘harmony’. to argue sophistically against the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined. as.particularly easy in the case where the definer does not see the ambiguity of his terms. see if he uses terms that are unfamiliar. in the case of temperance: for harmony is always found between notes.

unless there were an inscription. first of all look and see whether he has used any attribute that belongs universally. then. when it is merely stated by itself.image is something produced by imitation. see if from the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear. the figures used to be unrecognizable. Now any term that belongs to everything separates off the given object from absolutely nothing. and the differentia from any of the things contained in the same genus. yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too is peculiar and makes clear the essence of the 455 . see if. while any that belongs to all the things that fall under the same genus does not separate it off from the things contained in the same genus. then. though the additional matter may be peculiar to the given term. he has phrased the definition redundantly. and this is not found in the case of the law. of that kind will be pointless. again. on the other hand. it is clear that he has used an unclear expression. you should proceed to examine on lines such as these. Any addition. the definition be not clear. If. Or see if. and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical expression. For the genus ought to divide the object from things in general. Moreover. he does not mean the term literally. either to real objects in general. 3 If. on the other hand. If. Or. it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works of the old painters. for definitions that have been correctly rendered also indicate their contraries as well. or to all that fall under the same genus as the object defined: for the mention of this is sure to be redundant.

for the soul is just ‘the self-moving’. if the remainder of the expression be peculiar. seeing that ‘the first’ is one and not many. Speaking generally. it is impossible that the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not 456 . for strike it out. the addition ‘capable of receiving knowledge’ is superfluous. yet does not declare the essence. Thus (e. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply to everything that falls under the same species.g. Which of the two is the real state of the case it is difficult to determine clearly: the right way to treat the matter in all cases is to be guided by convenience.term. would also be the definition of the soul. and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear his essence. for instance. Or perhaps the phlegm is not absolutely the first thing to come off the food. so that even when undigested’ is left out the definition will still be peculiar to the subject: for it is impossible that both phlegm and also something else should both be the first to arise from the food. if to something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added. but only the first of the undigested matters. Moreover. so that the addition ‘undigested’ is required. Or perhaps the expression used. For in that case. though appropriate. for stated the other way the definition would not be true unless the phlegm comes first of all. see if anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to all things universally. assuming it to be stated as a ‘self-moving number’. Such. Here the addition of the word ‘undigested’ is superfluous. the whole too becomes peculiar.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the ‘undigested moisture that comes first off food’. in the definition of man. if the word ‘number’ be eliminated. everything is superfluous upon whose removal the remainder still makes the term that is being defined clear. the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always. as Plato defined it. Thus.

that wisdom defines and contemplates reality:’ for definition is a certain type of contemplation. Likewise also in the case of ‘desire’ as well: for it is not ‘conation’ that is said to be ‘for the pleasant’. e. saying (e.) ‘desire’ is a ‘conation for the pleasant’. too. for the word ‘privation’ shows of itself that the heat meant is natural heat. so that both alike will be ‘for the pleasant’. like Xenocrates.g. For all privation is a privation of some natural attribute. Absurdity results. but rather the whole idea. But this involves no real absurdity.g. and therefore walking biped animal is a biped’.be predicated convertibly with the object. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes ‘conation-for-the-pleasant’: for the word ‘desire’ is the exact equivalent of the words ‘conation-for-the-pleasant’. if he says. For ‘biped’ is not a predicate of ‘walking animal’: if it were. what is the same as man is a biped: but ‘a walking biped animal’ is the same as man. those fail who say that ‘cooling’ is ‘the privation of natural heat’. Or perhaps there is no absurdity in this. For ‘desire’ is always ‘for the pleasant’. Likewise. 457 . see if he has said the same thing more than once. so that the addition of the word ‘natural’ is superfluous: it would have been enough to say ‘privation of heat’. then we should certainly have ‘biped’ predicated twice of the same thing. ‘a walking biped animal six feet high’: for an expression of that kind is not predicated convertibly with the term.g. because the attribute ‘six feet high’ does not belong to everything that falls under the same species. e. Again. so that by adding the words ‘and contemplates’ over again he says the same thing twice over. but when the same thing is more than once predicated of a subject. so that the word ‘biped’ is only used as a predicate once. not when the same word is uttered twice. so that there too the predication is only made once. but as a matter of fact the subject said to be a biped is’a walking biped animal’. for consider this instance: ‘Man is a biped’: therefore. so that what is the same as desire will also be ‘for the pleasant’.

and we make things known by taking not any random terms. or ‘the law’ as ‘the image of what is by nature noble and just’. however. then. so that he says the same thing more than once. as is done in demonstrations (for so it is with all teaching and learning). an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. for what is just is a branch of what is noble. 4 Whether. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated. see if he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible.Again. So also.g. then. there will be more than one definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms that are prior and more intelligible has also framed a definition. the essence of the object will be the same as it is represented to be 458 . there are to be a number of definitions of the same thing. for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant. a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly you should proceed to examine on these and similar lines. ‘Equity is a remission of what is expedient and just’. but such as are prior and more intelligible. see if a universal have been mentioned and then a particular case of it be added as well. should be examined as follows: First of all. if he defines ‘medicine’ as ‘knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men’. accordingly. This sort of view. Otherwise. it is clear that a man who does not define through terms of this kind has not defined at all. so that both would then be definitions of the same object. But whether he has mentioned and defined its essence or no. e. does not generally find acceptance: for of each real object the essence is single: if. and a better one.

inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more scientific. and these representations are not the same. a point. a letter is more intelligible than a syllable. Among definitions of this kind are those of a point. then. for instance. however. for most people learn things like the former earlier than the latter. a line of a plane. inasmuch as the definitions are different. whereas the others require an exact and exceptional understanding. for any ordinary intelligence can grasp them. Of course. just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number. Likewise. a plane of a solid. since a correct definition must define a thing 459 . a line than a plane. either supposing that its terms are absolutely less intelligible. The statement that a definition has not been made through more intelligible terms may be understood in two senses. it is better to try to make what is posterior known through what is prior.in each of the definitions. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior. One must. any one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior and more intelligible has not defined it at all. and a plane than a solid. than a line. or supposing that they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Clearly. Absolutely. it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression through terms that are intelligible to them. a line. for they say that a point is the limit of a line. unless it so happens that the same thing is more intelligible both to us and also absolutely. all of which explain the prior by the posterior. also. and a line more than a point. and a plane. in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things through terms of that kind. then. for it is the prius and starting-point of all number. not fail to observe that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the term they define. Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for the solid falls under perception most of all – more than a plane – and a plane more than a line.

just as what is absolutely healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body. Perhaps. different things are more intelligible to different people. then. that the right way to define is not through terms of that kind. not to all. will have to say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing. as they become more sharpwitted. and so a different definition would have to be rendered to each several person. and the species too is annulled. then. the converse. For annul the genus and differentia. if the definition is to be constructed from what is more intelligible to particular individuals. so that those who hold that a definition ought to be rendered through what is more intelligible to particular individuals would not have to render the same definition at all times even to the same person. viz. to the same people different things are more intelligible at different times. so that these are prior to the species. not the same things to all. first of all the objects of sense. and these belong to the order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than. as it happens.through its genus and its differentiae. are really and truly definitions. those who say that such definitions. All such points as this ought to be made very precise. It is clear. those which proceed from what is intelligible to this. what is absolutely intelligible is what is intelligible. or the other man. but through what is absolutely more intelligible: for only in this way could the definition come always to be one and the same. for if the species be known. the genus and differentia must of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows also what ‘animal’ and ‘walking’ are). For. also. that. and prior to. the species. Moreover. They are also more intelligible. whereas if the genus or the differentia be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well: thus the species is less intelligible. and made use of in the course of discussion as occasion requires. Moreover. but to those who are in a sound state of understanding. The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general 460 .

Some people think. One must. whoever has said ‘the passage of the sun over the earth’ has said ‘the sun’. This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object is not used. of the failure to work through more intelligible terms is the exhibition of the prior through the posterior.g. e. as we remarked before. e. One ought to learn up all such points as these.approval if the definer happens to have framed his expression neither from what is absolutely more intelligible nor yet from what is so to us. One form. e. and use them as occasion may seem to require. and all the terms that are essentially relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain relation to something. so that in bringing in the ‘day’ he has brought in the sun. so that the one is not even more intelligible than the other.g.i.g.’ Another form occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered of what is at rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion: for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion. exchange the word for its definition. Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three forms: (1) The first is when an opposite has been defined through its opposite. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature. For in bringing in ‘day’ he brings in the sun.g. however. Clearly. (2) Another is – if he has used the term defined itself. observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other way. and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too must be embraced. the definition of ‘day’ as the ‘passage of the sun over the earth’. supposing any one had defined the sun as a star that appears by day’. 461 . so that it is impossible to understand the one term without the other. To detect errors of this sort. that both are objects of the same science. also. e. the double without the half. then.

e. in using the subordinate term one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term ‘virtue’ employs the term ‘good’. see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division by another. or ‘«the good» is a «state of virtue» ‘. also. Moreover.(3) Again. and ‘two’ is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good. supposing any one to give it. the definition of ‘body’ as ‘that which has three dimensions’. This sort of error is always found where the essence of the object does not stand first in the expression. A second is. or what it is that 462 .g. Likewise also. 5 Generally speaking. for to be ‘divided in half’ means to be divided into two. or the definition of ‘man’. e. though the object is in a genus. see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate term. seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise. For ‘half’ is derived from ‘two’. it has not been placed in a genus.g. e. ‘An «even number» is «a number divisible into halves»‘. and two is even. ‘an odd number’ as ‘that which is greater by one than an even number’. so that the latter terms are subordinate to the former.g. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and ‘odd’ and ‘even’ are such terms: for both are differentiae of number. as ‘that which knows how to count’: for it is not stated what it is that has three dimensions. see whether. whoever employs the term ‘half’ employs the term ‘even’. one commonplace rule relates to the failure to frame the expression by means of terms that are prior and more intelligible: and of this the subdivisions are those specified above. then.

as (e. since it is impossible that there should be more than one definition of the same thing.g.’ Moreover. for it is said essentially to do the latter. if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper genus. e.g. as has been said before.knows how to count: whereas the genus is meant to indicate just this. for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally thought to be relative to the best. see if. while the term to be defined is used in relation to many things. he has failed to render it in relation to all of them. see if he uses language which transgresses the genera of the things he defines. and is submitted first of the terms in the definition. however. defining. see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather than to the better. in a case where the term to be defined is used in relation to several things. one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard to genera. for any one else besides the doctor is capable of producing disease. Moreover. justice as a ‘state that produces equality’ or ‘distributes what is equal’: for by defining 463 . but only he who mentions both these things. Again. For in rendering it as ‘knowledge of writing’ has no more defined it than by rendering it as ‘knowledge of reading’: neither in fact has succeeded. then. in some cases that what has been said corresponds to the actual state of things: in some it does not. e. Moreover. the man who renders medicine as relative to both of these things has not defined it any better than he who mentions the one only. It is only. all those terms which are not used essentially in relation to both things: as medicine is said to deal with the production of disease and health. Here.) if he define ‘grammar’ as the ‘knowledge how to write from dictation’: for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. In fact he has done it perhaps worse. but the former only by accident: for it is absolutely alien to medicine to produce disease.g.

too. it yet is not true of the genus. 6 Again. for instance. clearly the one stated could not be a differentia of the genus. does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying ‘plant’ a man does not specify ‘a tree’. for. and so by leaving out the genus of justice he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring in its genus. clearly he has not defined it at all: for the aforesaid terms do not differentiate anything at all. neither of them could be a differentia of the genus. or has mentioned something such as is utterly incapable of being a differentia of anything. Further. ‘aquatic’. we must examine in like manner whether the differentiae. Or see if. or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby the nearest genus is defined. and ‘biped’. ‘animal’ or ‘substance’. Either.it so he passes outside the sphere of virtue. he who mentions merely the higher genus by itself. that he has stated be those of the genus. clearly. for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera. then. For then he would not have left out anything: but would merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression instead of by name. as. For if a man has not defined the object by the differentiae peculiar to it. On the other hand. e. It is the same thing if the object be not put into its nearest genus. we must see whether the differentia stated possesses anything that is co-ordinate with it in a division. for differentiae that 464 . seeing that all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. in regard to the differentiae. though the contrasted differentia exists.g. ‘flying’. it ought to be put into its nearest genus. For a genus is always divided by differentiae that are co-ordinate members of a division. if not. by the terms ‘walking’. for then.

since of everything either an affirmation or its negation is true. though it be true. if added to the genus. see if. i. 465 . the genus of ‘line’. Likewise. always makes a species. however.e. will be either with or without breadth. and lengths which have not. Moreover. If. yet the addition of it to the genus fails to make a species. as also is ‘length with breadth’: for ‘without breadth’ and ‘with breadth’ are differentiae. so that ‘length’ as well. for they allege that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus. length must always either lack breadth or possess it. breadth. this be no true differentia.are co-ordinates in a division with the differentia of a thing are all true of the genus to which the thing belongs. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those who assert the existence of ‘Ideas’: for if absolute length exist. Likewise. this could not be a specific differentia of the genus: for a specific differentia. clearly. But ‘length without breadth’ is the definition of a species. if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact: for there exist both lengths which have. The genus will then be found to partake of its own species: for. also. Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who assert that a genus is always numerically one. seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated of the genus. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species. see if he divides the genus by a negation. and this is what is done by those who assert the real existence of the ‘Ideas’. as those do who define line as ‘length without breadth’: for this means simply that it has not any breadth. and the genus and differentia constitute the definition of the species. it will admit of the definition of the differentia. also. For then. no more is the one adduced. how will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of ‘length’ universally. seeing that it is a coordinate member of a division with this.

e. so that again the genus is divided by a negation. then. Or possibly ‘good’ here is not the genus but the differentia. for co-ordinate in the division with that which is possessed of breadth is that which possesses no breadth and that only.g. whereas ‘good’ indicates not the essence but a quality: and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia. see if he has stated the genus as the differentia. ‘a state’ indicates the essence of virtue.g. supposing he had defined something as ‘length possessed of breadth’. could not be genera. For the differentia is never an 466 . and dividing it by such an affirmation as is bound to have a negation as its co-ordinate in a division. Both. on the principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the other: for ‘good’ does not include ‘state’. ‘Virtue is a good or noble state: for ‘good’ is the genus of ‘virtue’. nor vice versa: for not every state is good nor every good a ‘state’. Moreover.g. clearly ‘good’ cannot be its genus: it must rather be the differentia’.e. further. and consequently. See. see if he rendered the species as a differentia. it is a species and not a differentia. as do those who define ‘contumely’ as ‘insolence accompanied by jeering’. There is no difference between dividing the genus by a negation. Look and see. whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual rather than a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality. Again. in defining privations. For ‘blind’ means a thing which cannot see when its nature is to see. Moreover. whether the differentia belongs only by accident to the object defined. for jeering is a kind of insolence. i. e. if ‘state’ is the genus of virtue. further.It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a negation as well. e.

or any of the things which are under the species. is predicable of the genus. For if ‘animal’ is to be predicated of each of its differentiae.g. for the differentiae are predicates of the species. see if the genus be predicated of the differentia. for instance. Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own genus. then he could not have defined the term. Moreover. but prior to the species. Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different genus. seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than the various species. but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. ‘man’ be predicated. Likewise you must inquire also if the species or any of the objects that come under it is predicated of the differentia: for this is impossible. if any of the species be predicated of it.accidental attribute. Again.g. if they are animals. Again. Moreover. for the general view is that the genus is predicated. not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species. 467 . the differentia is clearly the human race. For none of the aforesaid can possibly be predicated of the genus. Moreover. not of the differentia. if either the differentia or the species. neither contained in nor containing the genus in question. for every animal is either a species or an individual. see if the differentia fails to be prior to the species: for the differentia ought to be posterior to the genus.) is predicated of ‘man’ or ‘ox’ or other walking animals. seeing that the genus is the term with the widest range of all. Animal (e. For the general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern genera. then ‘animal’ would be predicated of the species several times over. any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not belong to it. the differentiae will be all either species or individuals. e. the result will be that the differentia is a species: if.

But all the same. nor does it denote a locality. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved. see if he has rendered an affection as the differentia: for every affection. that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern genera. it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs. The words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’ ought therefore to be added. See. subverts the essence of the thing. it clearly follows that the species must be in two non-subaltern genera. Hence. as ‘biped’ carries with it either ‘flying’ or ‘walking animal’. From this possibility. and ‘biped’ is the differentia of both. too. still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be used of two non-subaltern genera. even though it be in the water. on the ground that ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’ indicate mere locality. but only the one or the other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher than this. while the differentia is not of that kind: for the differentia is 468 . but a certain quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land. Thus ‘walking animal’ and ‘flying animal’ are non-subaltern genera.‘walking’ and ‘biped’ import with them the genus ‘animal’. clearly he will have made a bad mistake. each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia is true. for ‘aquatic’ does not mean ‘in’ anything. if he has rendered ‘existence in’ something as the differentia of a thing’s essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another. then. Again. and we ought to add the words ‘except they both be subordinate members of the same genus’. too. people condemn those who divide animals by means of the terms ‘walking’ and ‘aquatic’. if intensified. if ever the differentia does denote existence in something. If. for both these are subordinate to ‘animal’. will still be a and not an aquatic-animal.

Again. Or see if. The definition of a thing’s natural function is ‘that for which it would be used by the prudent man. if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping water. then.’ rather than of the ‘reasoning faculty’: for ‘wisdom’ is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to be wise. and by the science that deals specially with that thing’. and each of these denotes a relation: for it speculates upon something. by defining ‘wisdom’ as the virtue of ‘man’ or of the ‘soul.g. whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations. This is classed as speculative. Look and see also if the definer renders each relative term relatively to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing else. Thus sight can only be used for seeing. we may lay down absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia anything in respect of which it is subject to alteration: for all things of that kind. Still. see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative term relatively to something else. and it is absolutely impossible for a thing to exist without its own special differentia: for if there be no ‘walking’. a man has rendered any differentia of this kind. there will be no ‘man’. In fact. some can be used in relation to something else as well. he has made a mistake: for we undergo absolutely no alteration in respect of our differentiae.generally considered rather to preserve that which it differentiates. he has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e. as in the case also of knowledge. but a strigil can also be used to dip up water. acting as such. for the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative. destroy its essence. he has made a mistake: for that is not its natural function. and produces something and does something. if intensified. If. 469 . practical and productive.

For sleep is not an attribute of sensation. so that health would be an attribute of them. with regard to all periods of time look and see whether there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined: e. perplexity is not an attribute of opposite reasonings. nor pain of parts naturally conjoined: for then inanimate things will be in pain. or cause for effect. but only a cause of pain: nor again is a failure of sensation sleep. Moreover. the definer has made a mistake. all those who say that ‘sleep’ is a ‘failure of sensation’. For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain. or sensation fails because we go to sleep. Likewise also an equality between contrary reasonings would be generally considered to be a cause of perplexity: for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of the two we are to do. but the one is the cause of the other: for either we go to sleep because sensation fails. Similar in character. or that ‘perplexity’ is a state of ‘equality between contrary reasonings’. whereas it ought to be. is the definition of ‘health’. e. too. if it is a failure of sensation. say. be unable to admit it. if the thing of which the term defined has been stated to be an affection or disposition. supposing the ‘immortal’ to be defined as a ‘living thing immune at present from destruction’. as knowledge.Moreover. For every disposition and every affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition. since pain will be present in them. or whatever it may be.g. Likewise. people who define in this way put effect for cause. For a living 470 . however. too. being a disposition of soul. Sometimes. is formed in the soul. people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort.g. as a ‘balance of hot and cold elements’: for then health will be necessarily exhibited by the hot and cold elements: for balance of anything is an attribute inherent in those things of which it is the balance. or that ‘pain’ is a ‘violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined’. Moreover.

vice versa. or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed. as we have said.) a definition of ‘justice’ as the ‘ability to distribute what is equal’. Whenever. Suppose (e. indeed. Still. so that it is not meant that it is immortal only at present. whereas what is meant by the word does not so belong. then the two could not be the same. This would not be right. whereas what is rendered according to the definition does not. we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction.g. So. see if the thing admits of degrees. we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal. Moreover. owing to the ambiguity of the words ‘immune at present from destruction’: for it may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at present. 7 You should look and see also whether the term being defined is applied in consideration of something other than the definition rendered. in this case this result does not follow. than the man who is able to distribute what is equal: so that justice could not be an ability to distribute what is equal: for then also the most just man would be the man with the most ability to distribute what is equal. or. Possibly. then. for ‘just’ describes rather the man who chooses. then. or that it cannot be destroyed at present. if ever it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only or past.thing that is immune ‘at present’ from destruction will be immortal ‘at present’. this commonplace rule ought to be followed. what is rendered according to the definition admits of degrees 471 .

too. and likewise will be both real and not real. it will be both beautiful and not beautiful. they yet do not both become greater together: e. and the opposite of ‘beautiful’ is ‘not beautiful’.g. the beautiful’ is ‘what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears»: or ‘the real’ is ‘what is capable of being acted upon or of acting’.while the thing does not. For either both must admit them or else neither. if they had been the same. so that ‘not pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘not beautiful’: for of identical things the opposites. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful. but flame is less the body that consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought to be more applicable to the same thing. ‘not pleasant to the ears’ is the same thing as ‘not beautiful’. while both of them admit of degrees. see if. suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse. then. see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you. suppose two things to be before you. while of ‘pleasant to the ears’ the opposite is not pleasant to the cars’: clearly. Take. the definition of ‘fire’ as the ‘body that consists of the most rarefied particles’. if indeed what is rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing. In like 472 . are identical. therefore. Again. see if the term to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content of the definition is less applicable. had they been the same thing. Moreover. Moreover. but more particularly to one of them. something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the ears. while the other does not apply to both alike. however. Moreover. For ‘fire’ denotes flame rather than light. for instance. see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken separately: thus. so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should. For ‘pleasant to the ears’ will be the same as ‘beautiful’. If.

for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is 473 . the end in anything being whatever is best in it or gives its purpose to the rest. seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something. to which its genus is relative. is relative. For of everything relative the essence is relative to something else. to have said that knowledge is ‘conception of a knowable’ and that wishing is ‘conation for a good’. e. Likewise. if he has defined ‘grammar’ as ‘knowledge of letters’: whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered either the thing to which the term itself is relative. either in itself or in respect of its genus.g. He ought. Or see if a relative term has been described not in relation to its end. therefore. or that. Certainly it is what is best or final that should be stated. and then see if there be any discrepancy between them. see whether the definition fails to mention that to which the term.manner we shall show also that the same thing is both real and unreal.g. if he has defined ‘knowledge’ as an ‘incontrovertible conception’ or ‘wishing’ as ‘painless conation’. Moreover. e. Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that kind is an end. also. that desire is not for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what is pleasant as well. of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms. whatever it is. 8 If the term defined be relative. either in itself or in respect of its genus.

any one who maintains the existence of Ideas 474 . or a cloud as ‘condensation of the air’. but the aforesaid differentiae must be added. or ‘pleasant’. or in the case of the incontinent man the quality of the pleasures. irrespective of its manner and the amount involved. e. or ‘desire is a conation after the pleasant’ – instead of saying ‘the apparently good’. e. so that their aim need not be really good or pleasant. Moreover. to have rendered the definition also accordingly.g. On the other hand. people sometimes define night as a ‘shadow on the earth’. or an earthquake as a movement of the earth’. and in any other cases where it applies. place. also. nor a movement of the air a wind. ‘wishing is a conation after the good’. Or again. therefore. One should always attack deficiency.g. should be stated. also. Likewise. the quality and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious: for all men strive for honour. whereas they ought to specify as well quantity. For a movement of the earth does not constitute an earthquake. For it is not the man who gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent. but only apparently so. For often those who exhibit the conation do not perceive what is good or pleasant. for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its cessation. in other cases of the kind: for by omitting any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. quality. see if the word ‘apparent’ is left out. but only he who gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. Likewise. in defining the covetous man the quantity of money he aims at. or a wind as a ‘movement of the air’.not true in all cases. They ought. so that it is not enough to define the ambitious man as him who strives for honour. in the case of conations. and cause. so that they would count the activity as the end rather than its completion. Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity or quality or place or other differentiae of an object.

and likewise also what has knowledge and what lacks it. in the case of relative terms. see whether a particular multiple be made relative 475 . Thus if the pleasant be identical with the beneficial. even though he does render the word in question: for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the general view is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant. then. 9 Moreover. then. using the elementary principles drawn from consideration of contraries and of coordinates. they therefore cannot be for an apparent good or an apparently pleasant: for the existence of an absolutely – apparently – good or pleasant would be an absurdity. e. and what it is to know and to be ignorant.g. look at what is in the state. see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular object of belief: and. We have. Speaking generally. while if it be of what is in the state. the man who is pleased is benefited. a man in a sense defines ignorance as well.ought to be brought face to face with his Ideas. if the definition be of the state of anything. and absolute wishing is for the absolutely good. if a multiple be relative to a fraction. look at the state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind. For if the first be made clear. Moreover. see if the species is rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered as relative. supposing belief to be relative to some object of belief. to be on our guard in all such cases against discrepancy. in definitions of this sort it happens that what the definer defines is in a sense more than one thing: for in defining knowledge. too. the others become in a certain sense clear as well.

and this becomes clear. Suppose. moreover. also.g. neither of these things to be the contrary of the term originally used. a man who so defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he is defining. In the same way. ‘half’ is ‘that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself’. For to the contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries are conjoined. for else we should find that each is being interpreted by the other. so 476 . whether (e. if the opposite of the term has the opposite definition. e. ‘injurious’=productive of evil’ or ‘destructive of good’.g. for one or the other of thee is bound to be contrary to the term originally used. Moreover.g. For to say ‘inequality’ is the same as to say ‘privation of equality’. Thus (e.to a particular fraction. See. then clearly neither of the definitions rendered later could be the definition of the contrary of the term originally defined: and therefore the definition originally rendered of the original term has not been rightly rendered either. then. Therefore equality so defined will be ‘the contrary of the privation of equality’. supposing any one were to define equality as the contrary of inequality: for then he is defining it through the term which denotes privation of it.) if ‘useful’=‘productive of good’. We must in the case of contrary terms keep an eye on this mistake. For if it be not so rendered.) inequality is generally held to be the privation of equality (for ‘unequal’ merely describes things that are not equal’). it is therefore clear that that contrary whose form denotes the privation must of necessity be defined through the other. whereas the other cannot then be defined through the one whose form denotes the privation. with contraries.g. as (e. the one is sometimes a word forced to denote the privation of the other. too. clearly a mistake has been made. if for the word we substitute its definition. Seeing.) the definition of ‘half’ is the opposite of that of ‘double’: for if ‘double’ is ‘that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that other’. that of contraries.

also. Moreover. that neither of the contraries be so formed as to denote privation. the state.g. then ‘good’ will be the ‘contrary of the contrary of good’. e.g. the result again is that he uses the very term being defined: for ‘good’ is inherent in the definition of ‘evil’. though he has added this. or. or else that in which it is naturally formed primarily. e. since it is clear that ‘evil’ too will be ‘the contrary of good’ (for the definition of things that are contrary in this must be rendered in a like manner).that he would have used the very word to be defined. he has made a mistake. Likewise. or has failed to add in what it is naturally formed. then.) in ‘man’ or in ‘the soul’. if he has failed to say that ‘blindness’ is the ‘privation of sight in an eye’: for a proper rendering of its essence must state both of what it is the privation and what it is that is deprived. ‘good’ be the contrary of evil. suppose ‘good’ to be defined as ‘the contrary of evil’. and not in the ‘reasoning faculty’: for if in any of these respects he fails. and evil be nothing other than the ‘contrary of good’. but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner like the above. Clearly.g. or whatever it may be whose privation it is: also if he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is naturally formed. whether in defining ‘ignorance’ a privation he has failed to say that it is the privation of ‘knowledge’. For what is generally thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge. Suppose. If.g. Examine further whether he has defined by the expression ‘a privation’ a term that is not used to denote a privation: thus a mistake of this sort also would be generally thought to be incurred in the case of ‘error’ by any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. placing it (e. then. e. but rather that which 477 . has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily formed. he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation. see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation. or contrary. he has used the very word to be defined. however. then.

it is not true of any one of the objects described by the term. e. are synonymous.g. So always wherever the words ‘capable of acting on’ or ‘capable of being acted upon’ are added. then. For in some cases it will not do so. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word ‘mortal’ in his definitions of living creatures: for the Idea (e. if ‘beneficial’ means ‘productive of health’. ‘Error’. see whether the like inflexions in the definition apply to the like inflexions of the term. This is. if.has been deceived.g. the definition applies in a like manner to the whole range of the ambiguous term. or of motion. the absolute Man) is not mortal. and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate things or of children as ‘erring’. For terms whose definition corresponding their common name is one and the same. does ‘beneficially’ mean productively of health’ and a ‘benefactor’ a ‘producer of health’? Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the Idea as well. so that the definition will not fit the Idea. 10 Moreover. congenitally present with it’: for this is found in plants as much as in animals. what happens to Dionysius’ definition of ‘life’ when stated as ‘a movement of a creature sustained by nutriment. whereas ‘life’ is generally understood to mean not one 478 . In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind are useful. moreover.g. see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously. the definition and the Idea are absolutely bound to be discrepant: for those who assert the existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon. e. then. is not used to denote a mere privation of knowledge. Further.

if any one were to define 479 . as some answerers call ‘ambiguous’ what is really synonymous. and therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that a man may see the ambiguous character of the word. and the man asserts that what is really synonymous is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered will not apply to the second sense as well. this meaning must clearly be synonymous with those others. viz. so that the answerer will be generally thought not to have defined it correctly. or else prove beforehand that so-and-so is ambiguous or synonymous. whenever the definition rendered fails to apply universally. it is best in questioning to treat such terms as though they were synonymous (for the definition of the one sense will not apply to the other. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and is always used to describe one thing only. one should secure a preliminary admission on such points. as the case may be: for people are more ready to agree when they do not foresee what the consequence will be. there will be more than one definition of those other meanings. for there are applicable to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term. vice versa. whichever course he pursues. Otherwise. and. and wish to render the definition of the one sense only. for to a synonymous term the definition should apply in its full range). see if the definition of this second meaning applies also to the other meanings: for if so.kind of thing only. If. Since ambiguous terms sometimes pass unobserved. the one previously rendered and also the later one. and yet fail to see that he has rendered a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense he intends. but to be one thing in animals and another in plants. Further. Again. he is equally at fault. In either case. no admission has been made. however. whereas in answering you should yourself distinguish between the senses. call synonymous what is really ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of the term.

finding that his definition does not apply to them all. e. if now the definition of a finite line’ be the ‘limit of a finite plane’. then one may retort to such a man that though in some things one must not use the language of the people. see if the definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. but that even the term does not properly apply to all those senses. and. seeing that there are no more terms used now than formerly. and see if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it: if not.a term used in several senses. A definition is said to be equimembral with the term defined when the number of the elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and verbs in the definition. just because his definition will not do so either. that some one has defined a ‘finite straight line’ as ‘the limit of a finite plane. 11 Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some complex term. it is clear that neither does the whole definition define the whole complex. yet in a question of terminology one is bound to employ the received and traditional usage and not to upset matters of that sort. such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’. ‘such that its centre is in a line with its extremes’) ought to be a definition of straight’. in the case of some if not of all. Suppose. But an infinite straight line has neither centre nor extremes and yet is straight so that this remainder does not define the remainder of the term. Moreover. take away the definition of one of the elements in the complex. whereas in a 480 .g. were to contend not that the term is ambiguous. the rest (viz. if the term defined be a compound notion. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be merely one of term for term.

as in the example just given: for ‘speculative’ is a less familiar term than knowledge. clearly. however. clearly it is of the differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should be rendered. for the differentia is less familiar than the genus. in the majority. The mistake is even worse. so that it is not this. and not the genus. ‘pellucid mortal’ for ‘white man’: for it is no definition. or if not.g. if possible in every case.definition terms ought to be rendered by phrases. but the differentia. For at that rate. e. Look and see also whether. a man is substituting for a term not merely another term but a phrase. in the exchange of words. simple objects too could be defined by merely calling them by a different name. if actually a less well known term be substituted. It might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia. Take. and the genus is always the most familiar term of all. e. 481 . that ought to have been changed. the sense fails still to be the same. the term to be altered would also be that denoting the genus and not the differentia. If. and moreover is less intelligible when put in that form. for instance. see if in replacing one of the terms by something else he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia. in which case. the explanation of ‘speculative knowledge’ as ‘speculative conception’: for conception is not the same as knowledge – as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same too: for though the word ‘speculative’ is common to both expressions. Moreover. ‘cloak’ instead of ‘doublet’. seeing that it is the less familiar. yet the remainder is different.g. for the one is the genus and the other the differentia. seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar.

Suppose ‘white’ to be defined as ‘colour mingled with fire’: for what is bodiless cannot be mingled with body. whereas ‘white’ does exist. so that this could not be a definition of ‘odd’. the sense here intended requires to be defined. while if it be a science of some real thing. the definition is clearly altogether false.If he has rendered the definition of the differentia. those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish to what the object is related. yet they are not ‘odd’. So that this will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition at all. If. are wrong either wholly or in part. whenever he says that an odd number is a ‘number with a middle’. e. e. on the other hand. with other 482 . further definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word ‘number’ is common to both expressions. suppose some one to have defined ‘medicine’ as a science of Reality’. for it ought to hold of all reality. also. whereas what is contained in the definition is not.g. so that ‘colour’ ‘mingled with fire’ could not exist. but not of another. For if medicine be not a science of anything that is real. Now both a line and a body have a middle.g. it is partly false. and it is the word ‘odd’ for which the phrase has been substituted. see if the term of which he renders the definition is a reality. if it is said to be of Reality essentially and not accidentally: as is the case with other relative terms: for every object of knowledge is a term relative to knowledge: likewise. 12 Again.g. but have described it only so as to include it among too large a number of things. see whether the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e. the phrase ‘with a middle’ be used in several senses. Moreover.

but the wish to do it. again. then each and every relative term would be used in relation not to one thing but to a number of things. Moreover. moreover. and omit nothing’. for what produces or preserves something else is one of the things desirable for something else. Again. as ‘one who pilfers in secret’: for clearly. that constitutes the thief.g. For there is no reason why the same thing should not be both real and white and good. It might be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence what is best in anything. Sometimes. by saying that justice is ‘what preserves the laws’ or that wisdom is ‘what produces happiness’. have for their object some real thing. Clearly. or of a thief. people define not the thing but only the thing in a good or perfect condition. impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar to the term rendered: for not only but the majority of the other sciences too. or as in any way desirable because of something else.relative terms. not general. for a definition ought to be peculiar to its own term. and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself than to be desirable for 483 . so that it would be a correct rendering to render the object in relation to any one whatsoever of these. then the one will be a good rhetorician. if to render what it is accidentally be a correct way to render it. if the right way to render account of a thing be to render it as it is not in itself but accidentally. and the other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering in secret. inasmuch as all such are convertible. if they each do this. It is. then. so that each will be a science of reality. see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as desirable for what it produces or does. e. such a definition does not define any science at all. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as ‘one who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances.

Even if the situation here described does not so far appear very absurd because of the occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for it is quite possible for two men to have a mina between them. or as a ‘product of A and B’ or as an ‘A+B’.g. the definition will be true of both and yet of neither of them. and yet each singly fails to have it. and the other. for then both will exhibit both justice and injustice: for if justice be temperance and bravery. 484 . be a profligate. for a man who defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the whole. too. you may have the parts and yet not have the whole. then injustice will be cowardice and profligacy. both and yet neither will be just: for both together have justice. e. The arguments are particularly appropriate in cases where the process of putting the parts together is obvious. 13 See also whether in defining anything a man has defined it as an ‘A and B’. so that parts and whole cannot be the same. and yet this will follow if the one be temperate and yet a coward. yet least that they should have contrary attributes surely seems quite absurd. suppose. In general. so that this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated. clearly. justice to be defined as ‘temperance and courage. as in a house and other things of that sort: for there.something else. though brave. though neither of them has it by himself). all the ways of showing that the whole is not the same as the sum of its parts are useful in meeting the type just described. If he defines it as and B’.’ For if of two persons each has one of the two only.

If. see if that medium is not the same. see whether the parts perish together with the whole: for it ought to happen. that the whole perishes when the parts perish. vice versa. Or again. but only in combination.g. whereas the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any single subject. per contra. and yet the product be no more good than evil. and the parts neither.If. but in a number of them. so that the whole will then be found primarily not in one subject only. a line and a number. for many things that are productive are not good in themselves. they are good taken singly.g. see if the whole be good or evil. If so. see if the one thing is more distinctly good than the other is evil. see if the term that has been defined is in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject. and to be either good without qualification. on the other hand. suppose shamelessness be defined as ‘the product of courage and false opinion’: here the goodness of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion. or for things good or bad to produce a neutral thing. he has said that the term being defined is not ‘A and B’ but the ‘product of A and B’. there is no necessity that the parts should perish too. or. For it is impossible either for a neutral thing to produce something good or bad. look and see in the first place if A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some things are so related to one another that nothing can come of them. Moreover. vice versa. Or again. but each in a separate one. but one thing in the case of the whole and another in that of the parts. e. accordingly the product of these ought to have corresponded to this excess. or at least more good than evil. or. when the whole perishes. unless each be in itself good or bad. clearly that term could not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the same things wherein its parts are. and bad or neutral in 485 . Again. Or it may be that this does not necessarily follow. however. both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject. e. if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither.

as produced from a better and worse. Moreover. the whole may very well not be good. If a man has defined an object as ‘A+B’. any more than in the case of syllables: for the syllable is not synonymous with any of the letters of which it is made up. however. If. This again.combination. or as the ‘product of A and B. or the ‘drink made of honey and water’.’ Thus e. but that it is a product of them compounded in such and such a way. and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist ‘+ B. the same criticisms will apply as have already been given for meeting each of them. For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product of so-and-so. unless the elements compounded be in themselves good. for some drugs are such that each taken alone is good.’ for ‘honey+water’ means either the honey and the water. What has just been said is most clearly illustrated in the case of things that make for health or sickness. fails to be worse than the better and better than the worse element. bad. see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements: for it ought not to be. just as in the case of a house: for here the materials do not make a house irrespective of the way they are put together. see whether the whole. the first thing to be said is that ‘A+B’ means the same either as ‘A and B’. as in the cases just instanced. if they are not. Moreover.g. see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition: for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible. Moreover. distinguish between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be ‘+’ another. supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some identical thing capable of 486 . need not necessarily be the case. but if they are both administered in a mixture. Again. then. he admits that ‘A+B’ is + B’ is the same as either of these two things.

suppose courage to have been defined as ‘daring with right reasoning’: here it is possible that the person exhibits daring in robbery. For the two must not relate to any casual object that is the same. it be true that A and B are each found in the same time as the other. but to occur ‘because of’ a thing is not the same as to occur ‘+ a thing’ in any of its aforesaid senses. Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the aforesaid division at all. any more than each to a different object. and right reasoning in regard to the means of health: but he may have ‘the former quality+the latter’ at the same time. they must relate to the function of courage. none the less. clearly the definition rendered could not hold of anything. rather. in relation to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right reasoning in respect of medical treatment).g. however.g. meeting the perils of war. justice and courage are found in the soul).g. and not as yet be courageous! Moreover. and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question. e. as there is no possible way in which A can exist B’. For what this means to say is that it is because of a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs. not even this combination of ‘the one+the other ‘makes him ‘courageous’.containing them (as e. e. look and see if possibly the two are not used in the same relation. even though both be used in the same relation as well. or else in the same place or in the same time. or whatever is more properly speaking its function than this. e.g. 487 .g. among the various senses above distinguished. Thus e. still. a definition of anger as ‘pain with a consciousness of being slighted’. If.

for how is it any more a definition to define it through this one than through the other.14 Again. Also. so too is the whole definition. seeing that both alike are naturally liable to occur in it? Such is the definition of the soul. whereas neither of the aforesaid has any contrary. else there will be more than one definition of the same thing. Moreover. For it is not enough to say it is a composition.g. but you should also go on to define the kind of composition: for these things do not form flesh irrespective of the manner of their composition. Again. is never a composition.) in a definition of ‘flesh’ or ‘bone’ as the ‘composition of fire. then no other compound could be a composition either. if defined as a substance capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity for receiving ignorance. if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable to occur. if he have described the whole compounded as the ‘composition’ of these things (e. It appears. one should attack some part of it. that neither of the aforesaid substances is the same as a ‘composition’ at all: for a composition always has a decomposition as its contrary. moreover. a definition is obscure. as (e. Where. ‘a living creature’ as a ‘composition of soul and body’). earth. but when compounded in one way they form flesh. and air’. and every kind of living creature. one should first 488 . when in another. even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance with the whole. if one knows that part and sees it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the part be demolished. first of all see whether he has omitted to state the kind of composition. bone. clearly it has not been defined. again. if it is equally probable that every compound is a composition or else that none is. though a compound. and the thing has been defined through the one.g.

so that one is better supplied with lines of attack. on the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same thing. For the answerer is bound either to accept the sense as taken by the questioner. clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished. they repeal the existing law. In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one. For one is bound. and more indicative of the object defined. let so much suffice.of all correct and reshape it in order to make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack. As to definitions. or else himself to explain clearly whatever it is that his definition means. just as in the assemblies the ordinary practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and. then. Book VII 489 . and then proceed to examine it. to discern both any shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have. if the emendation is better. and also any superfluous addition. or to adopt some correctly expressed definition. Moreover. so one ought to do in the case of definitions as well: one ought oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be better. with the model (as it were) before one’s eyes.

their formations and destructions also are the same. Thus Xenocrates argues that the happy life and the good life are the same. and in general of any thing that is related in like manner to each. too. For it is the same thing to take the opposite of the one or that of the other. their opposites also will be the same. it only follows that the one must be included under the other as ‘Spartans’ are under ‘Peloponnesians’: for otherwise. in the most literal of the meanings ascribed to ‘sameness’ (and we said’ that ‘the same’ applies in the most literal sense to what is numerically one). Again it may be examined in the light of those things which tend to produce or to destroy the things in question of their formation and destruction. Look and see also. seeing that they are the same. seeing that ‘Peloponnesian’ is not any one person nor yet ‘Spartan’. in the case of their opposites: for if two things be the same. Each. For if justice be the same as courage. however. and ‘justly’ is the same as ‘bravely’. of the two things termed ‘greatest’ or most desirable’ must be numerically one: otherwise no proof will have been given that they are the same. in any of the recognized forms of opposition. then too the just man is the same as the brave man. in a case where one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree. that Peloponnesians are the same as Spartans. and so are the things that tend to produce or to destroy them.’ Likewise also in other cases of the kind. if the one 490 . seeing that of all forms of life the good life is the most desirable and so also is the happy life: for ‘the most desirable’ and the greatest’ apply but to one thing. Likewise. may be examined in the light of their inflexions and coordinates and opposites. for it does not follow because Peloponnesians and Spartans are the bravest of the Greeks. For where things are absolutely the same. if the other of these alleged identical things can also be described by a superlative in the same respect.1 Whether two things are ‘the same’ or ‘different’.

because they are both the most desirable. they are therefore the same. the other as a ‘practical’ science. look and see if.g. each will be better than the other. so that it does not follow that. the differentiae predicted of either be not the same. the one signifies a quality and the other a quantity or relation. clearly they are not the same.) being distinguished as a ‘speculative’ science. for they are better than anybody else. Again. the one being ‘good’ and the other evil’. Likewise also in other cases. the one (e. if it is to be proved to be ‘the same’ as another. but only that the one falls under the other. clearly neither are they the same as one another. 491 . nor yet the good life. each then is better than the other! Clearly therefore what is styled ‘best’ and ‘greatest’ must be a single thing. the other also is the same as it: for if they be not both the same as the same thing.class be not included under the other. Again. If in any of these respects there is a discrepancy. for they too are better than anybody else. and if the one belong to anything as an accident. examine them in the light of their accidents or of the things of which they are accidents: for any accident belonging to the one must belong also to the other. or the one being ‘virtue’ and the other ‘knowledge’: or see if. For then the Peloponnesians are bound to be better than the Spartans. Moreover. so must the other also. This also is why Xenocrates fails to prove his case: for the happy life is not numerically single. see if the genus of each be not the same. supposing the one to be the same as something. though the genus is the same. instead of both being found in one class of predicates. seeing that the one class is not included under the other. Likewise also the Spartans must perforce be better than the Peloponnesians. See further whether.

as happens to those who assert that ‘empty’ is the same as ‘full of air’: for clearly if the air be exhausted. the remainders ought to have signified the same thing: but they do not. examine them by means of an addition.Moreover. Moreover. just as it is not the case that a man desires intercourse more intensely. For all that is predicated of the one should be predicated also of the other. and in the things of which they are predicated. Moreover. but also whether it is possible for a supposition to bring it about. see whether things that are the same in one way are the same also in a different way. Inquire also not only if some impossible consequence results directly from the statement made. from the point of view of ‘degrees’. and see whether the addition of each to the same thing fails to make the same whole. the more intensely he is in love. and of whatever the one is a predicate. which may be true or may be false (it makes no difference which). For there is either no necessity or even no 492 . though it will no longer be full of air. for ‘double’ and ‘a multiple of’ do not signify the same thing. Speaking generally. so that love and the desire for intercourse are not the same. see if the one admits an increase of degree but not the other. as ‘sameness’ is a term used in many senses. Suppose (e. subtracting the words ‘a half’ from each. the vessel will not be less but more empty. they do not admit it at the same time. showing that they are not the same. or if though both admit it.) that he has declared ‘double a half’ to be the same as ‘a multiple of a half’: then. So that by a supposition. the other should be a predicate of it as well. the one character is annulled and not the other. one ought to be on the look-out for any discrepancy anywhere in any sort of predicate of each term. that A and B are the same. or if the subtraction of the same thing from each leaves a different remainder.g.

the first thing to observe is that few if any who engage in discussion arrive at a definition by reasoning: they always assume something of the kind as their starting points – both in geometry and in 493 . It is clear from what has been said that all the destructive commonplaces relating to sameness are useful also in questions of definition. they could not be the same. in order to establish that the former is a definition. 3 This then is the way. for it is not enough to show the sameness of content between the expression and the term. if so. and these the arguments. None of the constructive commonplaces. but a definition must have also all the other characters already announced. we desire to establish one. as was said before:’ for if what is signified by the term and by the expression be not the same. on the other hand. see whether the one can exist without the other. If. whereby the attempt to demolish a definition should always be made. on the other hand. helps in the matter of definition. Moreover. 2 Such is the number of the commonplace rules that relate to ‘sameness’. and it is with the question whether they are or are not the same in that sense that we are concerned.possibility that things that are the same specifically or generically should be numerically the same. clearly the expression rendered could not be a definition. for.

surveying the expressions used both as wholes and in detail: for if the opposite definition defines that opposite term. In the second place. and genera and differentiae are so predicated in that category: it is obvious that if one were to get an admission that so and so are the only attributes predicated in that category. to say accurately what a definition is. the expression containing so and so would of necessity be a definition. and the thing before you is not in that same genus. see that the genus rendered is correctly rendered. First of all. however. and also in detail as follows. but for the purposes of the inquiry now before us the same commonplace rules serve. That a definition may thus be reached by a process of reasoning is obvious. The means whereby it should be established have been more precisely defined elsewhere.arithmetic and the other studies of that kind. For we have to examine into the contraries and other opposites of the thing. and accordingly we need only make the bare statement that to reason to a thing’s definition and essence is quite possible. The expressions. the definition given must of necessity be that of the term before us. then it would clearly be in the contrary genus: for contraries must of necessity be either in the same genus or in contrary 494 . seeing that there is not anything else predicated of the thing in the category of essence. we have to select from those contraries the one whose contrary definition seems most obvious. and how it should be given. for it is impossible that anything else should be a definition. At present it concerns us only so far as is required for our present purpose. that contraries may be conjoined in more than one way. belongs to another inquiry. have to be examined each as a whole in the way we have said. Seeing. For if a definition is an expression signifying the essence of the thing and the predicates contained therein ought also to be the only ones which are predicated of the thing in the category of essence. for if the contrary thing be found in the contrary genus to that stated in the definition. then.

vice versa. clearly the differentia stated must be predicated of the latter. It might be replied that there is no necessity why contrary differentiae should be predicated of contraries. while. that the differentiae of contraries are either contrary or else the same. e. the differentiae will be the same and the genera contrary. then those rendered in the definition would be predicated of the term before us. either all are contrary to those of its contrary. So that if contrary differentiae to those in the definition are predicated of the contrary term. if the definition of the contrary term be apparent. that both the genus and the differentiae have been rightly rendered. for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of the soul: ‘of the soul’. then. else contraries will have the same definition. If.g. for the one tends to pierce the vision. 495 . for that both should be the same is not possible. And that is all. or both genera and differentiae will be contrary.genera. seeing that the definition consists of genus and differentiae. too. Speaking generally. and likewise also the differentiae predicated of opposites are either contrary to. seeing that the body as well has its virtue and vice.g. or the same as. clearly of the term before you there will be predicated either the same genus as of its contrary. e. therefore. The differentiae. of its differentiae. each other. But this much at least is true. the definition of the term before you will be apparent also: for since its contrary is found either in the same genus or in the contrary genus. clearly the expression given must be the right definition. that are predicated of contraries we expect to be contrary. or at least some of them are so while the rest remain the same. or. those of white and black. is the differentia in both cases. while the other tends to compress it. then. of justice and injustice. unless the contraries be found within the same genus: of things whose genera are themselves contraries it may very well be that the same differentia is used of both. the contrary differentia to that given be predicated of the contrary term and not of the one in hand. Seeing.

look at it from the point of view of its inflexions and coordinates. and B defines B. 496 . look at it from the point of and like degrees. Likewise also with the rest: an admission of any one of them whatever. Moreover. ‘vigorous’ too will mean ‘productive of vigour’. then also ‘destruction’ means ‘the decomposition of its essence’. and ‘destructively’ means ‘in such a way as to decompose its essence’. the others must of necessity be agreed to as well.Moreover. look at it from the point of view of things that stand in relations that are like each other. then. then A too defines a. so that if one of them is defined as ‘productive of’ that end. Further. in all the ways in which it is possible to establish a result by comparing two and two together. Likewise. or two definitions with one thing. this will also be the definition of each of the rest as well.’ For each of these things is related in like manner to its own peculiar end. Thus if forgetfulness be the loss of knowledge. to forget is to lose knowledge. then to be destroyed is to have its essence decomposed. For if ‘healthy’ means ‘productive of health’. and ‘useful’ will mean ‘productive of good. also. for there cannot possibly be one definition of two things or two of the same thing. if A’s claim to define a is like B’s to define B. any one whatever of these is agreed to. and to have forgotten is to have lost knowledge. Moreover. if again ‘destructive’ means ‘apt to decompose something’s essence’. For genera and definitions are bound to correspond in either case. and all the rest are admitted too. If. This examination from the point of view of greater degrees is of no use when a single definition is compared with two things. if destruction is the decomposition of the thing’s essence. Thus if A defines a better than B defines and B is a definition of so too is A of a.

and to secure from those whom one is questioning. and these therefore are those which it is most important to master and to have ready to hand: for they are the most useful on the greatest number of occasions. an admission of premisses of this sort is no simple matter. is obvious from considerations presently to be urged. e.g. the most important are those of most general application: for these are the most effective. So too if any other of the commonplace rules is of general application and effective. there is no telling whether the formula stated or some other one is its definition. it should be employed. or predicated it of itself as though it were something different. for a 497 .4 The most handy of all the commonplace arguments are those just mentioned and those from co-ordinates and inflexions. that you should examine the individual cases. and that only the genus and differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. 5 That it is more difficult to establish than to overthrow a definition. for if any other things as well are predicated of the thing in the category of essence. This sort of inquiry is of service against those who assume the existence of Ideas. For to see for oneself. e.’ Moreover see if a man has used a term metaphorically. as has been said before. and then look to see in the case of their various species whether the definition applies. that of the elements of the definition rendered the one is genus and the other differentia.g. Yet without these premisses it is impossible to reason to a definition. For the species is synonymous with its individuals. Of the rest. too.

The point is clear also from the following: It is easier to draw one conclusion than many. Moreover. even supposing it should be necessary to overthrow something by a universal proposition. Further. whereas to establish it is necessary to 498 . For merely to show that the definition fails to be predicated of every one of the things of which the term is predicated. Now in demolishing a definition it is sufficient to argue against one point only (for if we have overthrown any single point whatsoever. is enough to overthrow it universally: and there is no need to prove the converse of this in order to show that the term is predicated of things of which the expression is not predicated. whereas in establishing a definition. and must moreover be convertible. so that to overthrow it. on the other hand. As regards the property this is clear from what has been said: for as a rule the property is rendered in a complex phrase. but not to it alone. it is only necessary to demolish one of the terms used. The case stands likewise in regard to the property and genus of a term also.definition is an expression indicating the essence of a thing. if the definition rendered is to be peculiar to the subject. not even so is there any need to prove the converse of the proposition in the process of overthrowing the definition. In overthrowing a view. in establishing a case. For in both cases it is easier to overthrow than to establish. even if it applies to everything embraced under the term. Moreover. we shall have demolished the definition). one is bound to bring people to the view that everything contained in the definition is attributable. the reasoning brought forward must be universal: for the definition put forward must be predicated of everything of which the term is predicated. there is no longer any necessity to show one’s point universally: for it is enough to show that the formula is untrue of any one of the things embraced under the term. the definition is thereby demolished.

It appears. It is clear also that the easiest thing of all is to overthrow a definition. whereas in overthrowing it. For in establishing a property one has to show that it is true of everything included under the term in question. in establishing a genus it is not enough to show that it belongs. it is enough to show that it belongs in a particular instance. For on account of the number of statements involved we are presented in the definition with the greatest number of points for attack. it is enough to show that it does not belong in one single case. just as in other things to destroy is easier than to create. the quicker an argument comes: for there is more likelihood of a mistake occurring in a large than in a small number of things. as though. and the more plentiful the material. it is clear that you are bound to establish it in one way only. viz. even if it belongs to everything falling under the term. so in these matters too to overthrow is easier than to establish. one has to show that it belongs in every case. it is overthrown in this case as well. whereas to overthrow it. it is enough to show its failure to belong either in some particular case or in every case. but not to that only. whereas to overthrow it. the original statement has been demolished. as was explained in the case of the definition. nearly all the other rules that apply to the definition will apply also to the property of a thing.reason to them all. Then. on the contrary. but also that it belongs as genus has to be shown. In regard to the genus. while of overthrowing it there are two ways: for if it has been shown that it belongs either never or not in a certain case. The particular proposition is. it has to be shown that it never belongs at all. Moreover. by showing that it belongs in every case. 499 . easier to establish than to overthrow: for to establish it. whereas to overthrow one it is enough to show in a single case only that it fails to belong: further. In the case of an accidental attribute the universal proposition is easier to overthrow than to establish. for to establish it. too. in fact.

nor yet of the rest: for only those relating to accidental attributes apply generally to all the aforesaid kinds of attribute. an accidental 500 . the other rules too may be used as means for attacking a definition: for if either the formula be not peculiar. the property is most nearly of this kind: for it is easier to demolish. and moreover. because as a rule it contains several terms. besides this. or the genus rendered be the wrong one. Clearly. against the others we cannot bring all of the arguments drawn from definitions. that the attributes stated belong. or something included in the formula fail to belong. On the other hand. and this has to be done correctly. nor the accident as a genus or property. the definition is thereby demolished. then. so long as they do belong. both because of the number of things that people must be brought to accept. yet the genus may very well not belong as a property without as yet being thereby demolished. So that it is impossible to use one set as a basis of attack upon the other except in the case of definition. but also that it belongs in such and such a particular way: whereas in the case of the accident it is enough to show merely that it belongs. Of the rest. and.e. while it is the hardest to establish. and that the genus rendered is the true genus. The easiest thing of all to establish is an accidental predicate: for in other cases one has to show not only that the predicate belongs. because it belongs to its subject alone and is predicated convertibly with its subject.Moreover. Likewise also the property need not belong as a genus. while to establish one is the hardest. that the formula indicates the essence of the thing. it is the easiest of all things to demolish a definition. On the other hand. and that the formula is peculiar to the term). For while each of the aforesaid kinds of attribute must belong to the thing in question. For there one both has to establish all those other points by reasoning (i. besides this.

select the ground from which he should make his attack. and 501 . while in other cases it is possible to demolish what is said in two ways. Not so with the philosopher. by showing either that the predicate does not belong. and accordingly. or that it does not belong in the particular way stated. in the case of an accidental predicate the only way to demolish it is to show that it does not belong at all. The commonplace arguments through which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument with regard to our several problems have now been enumerated at about sufficient length. because it affords the least material: for in stating accident a man does not add how the predicate belongs. he must proceed actually to put them to the other party. Book VIII 1 Next there fall to be discussed the problems of arrangement and method in pitting questions. thirdly and lastly. Any one who intends to frame questions must.predicate is the hardest thing to overthrow. he must frame them and arrange them one by one to himself. first of all. secondly. Now so far as the selection of his ground is concerned the problem is one alike for the philosopher and the dialectician. but how to go on to arrange his points and frame his questions concerns the dialectician only: for in every problem of that kind a reference to another party is involved.

but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conducted against another person. or to conceal the conclusion. Those which are used to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial purpose only.the man who is investigating by himself: the premisses of his reasoning. if he grants this. The necessary premisses through which the reasoning is effected. The sources from which one’s commonplace arguments should be drawn have already been described:’ we have now to discuss the arrangement and formation of questions and first to distinguish the premisses. one will then argue that the knowledge of contraries is also the same. we are obliged to employ them as well. if he does not. Rather one should soar as far aloof from them as possible. but of opposites: for. ought not to be propounded directly in so many words. or to render the argument more clear. Those which are secured other than these are of four kinds. Nay. By necessary premisses are meant those through which the actual reasoning is constructed. which have to be adopted. although true and familiar. he may possibly be even anxious to secure axioms as familiar and as near to the question in hand as possible: for these are the bases on which scientific reasonings are built up. one should ask him to admit it not of contraries. may be refused by the answerer because they lie too near the original statement and so he foresees what will follow if he grants them: but for this the philosopher does not care. one should secure the admission by induction. or to lend weight to the argument. other than the necessary premisses. by formulating a proposition to that 502 . seeing that contraries are opposites. Thus if one desires to secure an admission that the knowledge of contraries is one. they serve either inductively to secure the universal premiss being granted. Beside these there is no other premiss which need be secured: these are the ones whereby you should try to multiply and formulate your questions.

Concealment of one’s plan is obtained by securing through prosyllogisms the premisses through which the proof of the original proposition is going to be constructed – and as many of them as possible. to most people if not invariably. and the objects of perception are better known.effect in the case of some particular pair of contraries. do not state the conclusions of these premisses but draw them later one after another. Moreover. people still ask ‘Well. This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms to prove not only the necessary premisses but also some of those which are required to establish them. Speaking generally. for this is likely to keep the answerer at the greatest possible distance from the original proposition. other than these. even if one cannot reach the required premisses in this way. or else partly by one and partly by the other. it is still open to one to formulate them in so many words. for the answerer does not foresee on what grounds it is based. must be secured with a view to the latter. For one must secure the necessary premisses either by reasoning or by induction. that were mentioned above. The way to employ them respectively is as follows: Induction should proceed from individual cases to the universal and from the known to the unknown. although any propositions which are too obvious to be denied may be formulated in so many words. because the previous syllogisms have not been made articulate to him: while the final syllogism. is likely to be kept least articulate if we 503 . but why is that?’ This result will be secured best of all by the method above described: for if one states only the final conclusion. showing the conclusion. it is unclear how it comes about. This is because the coming conclusion is less easily discerned at the greater distance and in the process of induction. a man who desires to get information by a concealed method should so put his questions that when he has put his whole argument and has stated the conclusion. The premisses. while at the same time.

for. clearly. An instance would be. that ‘anger’ is a desire for vengeance on account of an apparent slight: for. supposing one had to secure the admission that the angry man desires vengeance on account of an apparent slight.g. secure the universal premiss by a definition relating not to the precise terms themselves but to their co-ordinates. because we become angry with our parents. One should also. on the other hand. Very likely the objection is not valid. we should have universally what we intend. whenever the definition is taken in regard to a coordinate. and were to secure this. but in order to get at something else: for people 504 . In the case. but only the grounds on which we reason to them. but we do not desire vengeance on them. e. they often find that the answerer refuses to grant them because on the actual term itself he is readier with his objection. formulate your proposition as though you did so not for its own sake. but alternately those that conduce to one conclusion and those that conduce to another. too. for people deceive themselves. but still it gives a certain plausibility and air of reasonableness to the denial of the proposition. if those which go together are set side by side. the conclusion that will result from them is more obvious in advance. that the ‘angry man’ does not desire vengeance. however. for upon some people it is vengeance enough to cause them pain and make them sorry. if this were secured. It is a useful rule.lay down not the secured propositions on which it is based. If. of the definition of ‘anger’ it is not so easy to find an objection. not to secure the admissions claimed as the bases of the syllogisms in their proper order. people formulate propositions relating to the actual terms themselves. into thinking that they are not making the admission universally. wherever possible. Moreover.

Moreover.g. what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall. and not required on its own account. a questioner should leave it as far as possible doubtful whether he wishes to secure an admission of his proposition or of its opposite: for if it be uncertain what their opponent’s argument requires. the other has 505 . It is useful too. even though you really require the point: for insistence always arouses the more opposition. but rather something from which that necessarily follows: for people are more willing to admit the latter. e. do not be insistent. but is not the same thing. so too perception of contraries is the same. and if the one has been secured. people are more ready to say what they themselves think. for people are shy of upsetting the received opinion unless they have some positive objection to urge: and at the same time they are cautious about upsetting such things because they themselves too find them useful. occasionally to bring an objection against oneself: for answerers are put off their guard against those who appear to be arguing impartially. whereas in arguments from likeness. Moreover. do not formulate the very proposition you need to secure. for in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars. so is the knowledge also. and the universal involved is less patent. formulate your premiss as though it were a mere illustration: for people admit the more readily a proposition made to serve some other purpose. that since the perception is the same. try to secure admissions by means of likeness: for such admissions are plausible. Further. It is a good rule also. or vice versa. make the other person admit that as knowledge and ignorance of contraries is the same. Moreover. because it is not so clear from this what the result will be. Speaking generally.are shy of granting what an opponent’s case really requires. to add that ‘So and so is generally held or commonly said’. This argument resembles induction.

because most people in asking questions put first the points which they are most eager to secure. Again. and let the illustrations be relevant and drawn from things that 506 . practical. an instance of the kind of thing meant is the distinction of one form of knowledge as better than another by being either more accurate. and imagining that they cannot suffer any reverse. in dealing with some people propositions of this sort should be put forward first: for ill-tempered men admit most readily what comes first. so far as the conclusion goes. For everything of this kind lends additional ornament to the argument. On the other hand. confident in their own character. What sort of process induction is obvious: as for distinction. one should put last the point which one most wishes to have conceded. if he formulated it by itself. Moreover. the rules which should be followed are the above. Ornament is attained by induction and distinction of things closely akin. For this reason also a questioner sometimes evades observation as he adds in a corner what.been secured also. or concerned with better objects. For clearness. and productive. then. For concealment. as do those who draw false geometrical figures: for in the multitude of details the whereabouts of the fallacy is obscured. or the distinction of sciences into speculative. examples and comparisons should be adduced. it is well to expand the argument and insert things that it does not require at all. while at the close of an argument they show their ill-temper. for people are specially inclined to deny the first questions put to them. unless the conclusion that will result actually stares them in the face. Likewise also with those who consider themselves smart at answering: for when they have admitted most of what you want they finally talk clap-trap to the effect that the conclusion does not follow from their admissions: yet they say ‘Yes’ readily. though there is no necessity to say them. would not be granted.

If one has made an induction on the strength of several cases and yet the answerer refuses to grant the universal proposition. 2 In dialectics. But it is one of the very hardest things to distinguish which of the things adduced are ‘of this sort’. on the other hand. syllogism should be employed in reasoning against dialecticians rather than against the crowd: induction. because there is no established general term that covers all the resemblances: in this case. when people need to secure the universal. for then the proposition is likely to become clearer. for many things appear to answer to like descriptions that do not really do so.’ In induction. it is possible in some cases to ask the question in its universal form. and the other disputing the likeness of things that are. One ought. therefore. so as to leave no opportunity either to the answerer to dispute. it is not fair to demand that he shall say in what cases it is not so: for one should make the induction first. This point has been treated previously as well. But until one has oneself stated in what cases it is so. as in Homer and not as in Choerilus. and then demand the objection. to try oneself to coin a word to cover all things of the given sort. the one party asserting the likeness of things that are not alike.we know. 507 . then it is fair to demand his objection. but in others this is not easy. and say that the thing advanced does not answer to a like description. One ought. or to the questioner to suggest falsely that it does answer to a like description. is most useful against the crowd. they use the phrase ‘in all cases of this sort’. and which are not: and in this connexion people often throw dust in each others’ eyes in their discussion.

he checks the series of questions by an objection in regard not to some homonym. e. you should draw the distinction before putting your question in such cases: for so long as the ambiguity remains undetected. that if a person have lost knowledge of a thing while it still remains. that ‘the greater good has the greater evil as its opposite. and assert the remainder.g. which is a less good thing than vigour. but to the actual thing asserted.moreover. the greater the evil that is its opposite’: for they allege that health. e. and a cook may have a foot that is not his own. he then has forgotten it. but he has not forgotten it. the objector ought to make his objection in regard to some other. and bring their objection not in regard to the thing itself. for when it has been withdrawn. until he secures what he requires.g. for a painter may have a colour that is not his own. and form the remainder into a universal proposition. People sometimes object to a universal proposition. in the case of forgetfulness and having forgotten: for people refuse to admit that the man who has lost his knowledge of a thing has forgotten it. unless that subject happen to be the one and only thing of the kind. to claim that the objections should not be brought in reference to the actual subject of the proposition.g. e. because if the thing alters. unless 508 . however. To meet them. unless he can say that this subject is unique of its kind. but in regard to some homonym of it: thus they argue that a man can very well have a colour or a foot or a hand other than his own. therefore. has a greater evil as its opposite: for disease is a greater evil than debility. In this case too. If. therefore. so long will the objection to the proposition be deemed valid. as for instance two is the one prime number among the even numbers: for. Accordingly the thing to do is to withdraw the part objected to. he has lost knowledge of it. the questioner should withdraw the point objected to. we have to withdraw the point objected to. One should similarly treat those who object to the statement that ‘the greater the good. the man is more likely to admit the proposition.

he will be forced to admit the proposition because he cannot foresee in the rest of it any case where it does not hold true: if he refuse to admit it. he refuses to admit the point because he foresees something of the kind: for if the point objected to be withdrawn. One should put forward all propositions that hold true of several cases. For often. and the man shakes his head. without so doing. no dispute can arise. one does reason to an impossible conclusion. as vigour involves health. they admit it for true. Propositions that are partly false and partly true are of this type: for in the case of these it is possible by withdrawing a part to leave the rest true. even if it be not put as a question but 509 . you formulate the proposition on the strength of many cases and he has no objection to bring. but in argument with another reasoning per impossibile should be avoided. on the other hand. unless its falsehood is too plainly manifest. but also if.the one good involves the other as well’. If. then when asked for an objection he certainly will be unable to render one. however. if. if it be. This should be done not only when he formulates an objection. Whenever it is possible to reason to the same conclusion either through or without a reduction per impossibile. people deny that it is impossible. you may claim that he shall admit it: for a premiss is valid in dialectics which thus holds in several instances and to which no objection is forthcoming. so that the questioners do not get what they want. it looks as if the reasoning had failed. and to which either no objection whatever appears or at least not any on the surface: for when people cannot see any case in which it is not so. For where one has reasoned without the reduction per impossibile. The conclusion should not be put in the form of a question. if one is demonstrating and not arguing dialectically it makes no difference which method of reasoning be adopted.

and then those who do not see that it follows upon the previous admissions do not realize that those who deny it have been refuted: when. it looks altogether as if the reasoning had failed. Any one who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad inquirer. people deny it. If. e.g. whenever you have yourself distinguished and formulated them. he does it because the person questioned does not answer the questions. For if he does so though the person questioned keeps on answering the questions. ‘Good means this. then. ‘What is man?’ or ‘How many meanings has «the good»?’ For a dialectical premiss must be of a form to which it is possible to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.g. or else asks the same question a large number of times: in the one case he merely babbles. For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical unless the questioner himself draws distinctions or divisions before expressing them. Not every universal question can form a dialectical proposition as ordinarily understood. clearly he asks a large number of questions. 510 .advanced as a consequence. and he will not admit them at all. or this. and the other denies it. he is at fault in not taking him to task or breaking off the discussion. the one man merely asks it as a question without even saying that it so follows. does it not?’ For questions of this sort are easily answered by a Yes or a No. in the other he fails to reason: for reasoning always consists of a small number of premisses. Hence one should endeavour to formulate propositions of this kind in this form. e. whereas to the aforesaid it is not possible. on the other hand. It is at the same time also perhaps fair to ask the other man how many meanings of ‘the good’ there are.

it is impossible to refute them. In general. nor do they pay any attention if the questioner makes a definition: and yet until it is clear what it is that is proposed. too. between the conclusion and the principle. however. and. in the first place. or else all discussion about them wears the air of mere sophistry: for to prove anything is impossible unless one begins with the appropriate principles. Such (e. Now to define first principles is just what answerers do not care to do. The hardest. an argument. further.3 There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult to bring. whether they are used literally or metaphorically by the definer. whenever any problem proves intractable. while the latter have to be arrived at through many steps if one wishes to secure a continuous proof from first principles. and because of the impossibility of saying whether this obscurity is due to their being used metaphorically. it either needs definition or else bears either 511 . of all definitions to treat in argument are those that employ terms about which. because of the small number of those steps. For the former require definition. it is impossible to argue upon such terms. it is not easy to discuss it. it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or several.) are those things which stand first and those which stand last in the order of nature. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of the first principles: for while the other propositions are shown through these. whereby the succeeding propositions have to be shown. and easy to stand up to. it is safe to suppose that. these cannot be shown through anything else: we are obliged to understand every item of that sort by a definition. For because of their obscurity. that lie too close to the first principle are hard to treat in argument: for it is not possible to bring many arguments in regard to them. and connects inference with inference till the last are reached. The inferences.g.

It appears also in mathematics that the difficulty in using a figure is sometimes due to a defect in definition. on the other hand. or else the reason is that we have yet to discover in the first place just this – in which of the aforesaid directions the source of our difficulty lies: when we have made this clear. the definition of the starting-points be not laid down. Whenever. then obviously our business must be either to define or to distinguish. It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing a given position because the definition has not been correctly rendered: e. If. it is easy to bring people to see whether it is possible for the same thing to have several contraries or not: in the same way also with other terms requiring definition. the fact asserted becomes immediately clear: for the areas have the same fraction subtracted from them as have the sides: and this is the definition of ‘the same ratio’. ‘Has one thing one contrary or many?’: here when the term ‘contraries’ has been properly defined.g. if the definitions involved. whenever a position is hard to discuss. One may be sure then.g. because there are not many intermediate steps. only the arguments that can be brought in regard to each of them are not many. in proving that the line which cuts the plane parallel to one side divides similarly both the line which it cuts and the area. the nature of a line or of a circle. The case of the significance of verbal expressions is like that of these mathematical conceptions. whereas if the definition be given. or a metaphorical sense. or to supply the intermediate premisses: for it is through these that the final conclusions are shown. The most primary of the elementary principles are without exception very easy to show. on the other hand. e.g. be laid down. it is a harder task to argue to the 512 . or it is not far removed from the first principles.several senses. that one or other of the aforesaid things has happened to it. to show them is difficult and may even prove quite impossible. e.

distinguish between the mistake of taking up a wrong position to start with. and arrangement of one’s questions.point claimed. the circumstances under which such admissions should be claimed are different for a mere questioner and for a serious teacher. If. about enough has been said. With regard to the giving of answers. unless he be more sure about it than about the conclusion. he had better grant it.e. than to the resulting position. whereas in a dialectical exercise he may do so if he is merely satisfied of its truth. the premiss. if. he had better refuse. 513 . perhaps. in serious inquiry he ought not to grant it. he grants it. and that of not maintaining it properly. The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily follow because of his position: while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he who is responsible for the absurdity or paradox. Clearly. then. on the other hand. a doubt may arise whether such claims should be admitted or not: for if a man is going to refuse to admit it and claim that you shall argue to it as well. then. it is essential not to enhance the difficulty of the problem. as of a good questioner. it be essential to reason through premisses that are better assured. he will be giving the signal for a harder undertaking than was originally proposed: if. then. he will be giving the original thesis credence on the strength of what is less credible than itself. we must first define what is the business of a good answerer. In other words. 4 As to the formulation. on the other hand. but only his position: for one may. when once taken up. i.

whatever it be. whereas in a competition the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other. let us try to say something upon the matter for ourselves. and what kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position: – inasmuch. then.g. e. the statement laid down by the answerer be generally rejected. as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry: for a learner should always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to teach him what is false. while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him. then. in an assembly of disputants discussing in the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry. the latter 514 . to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked. by the speaker or by some one else. If. there are as yet no articulate rules about what the answerer should aim at. the conclusion aimed at by the questioner is bound to be one generally accepted. will be the same in either case. i. whereas if the former be generally accepted. The manner. on the other hand. by some given person.5 Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of training and of examination: – and the aim of those engaged in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition. The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the questioner’s argument is bound of necessity to be one that is either generally accepted or generally rejected or else is neither: and moreover is so accepted or rejected either absolutely or else with a restriction. however.e. as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others. makes no difference: for the right way to answer. of its acceptance or rejection.

Now since a man who reasons correctly demonstrates his proposed conclusion from premisses that are more generally accepted. For if the statement laid down by the answerer be generally rejected. Consequently. the statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted without qualification. (3) Likewise. too. if any of the questions put to him be not of this character. the answerer should not grant them. on the other hand. too. If. all that are less generally rejected than the conclusion sought by the questioner. of those that are not generally accepted. what is laid down is generally neither rejected nor accepted.is generally rejected: for the conclusion which the questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the statement laid down. and more generally accepted than his proposed conclusion. Accordingly. For then he will probably be thought to have argued sufficiently well. the answerer ought not to grant either what is thus absolutely not accepted at all. so that the premisses secured by the questioner should all be views generally accepted. the view laid down by the answerer be one that is generally 515 . the answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and. of the views not generally accepted. and more familiar. for then. it is clear that (1) where the view laid down by him is one that generally is absolutely rejected. if the less familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar. and. (2) If. anything that appears to be true should be granted. if the statement laid down by the answerer be neither rejected generally nor generally accepted. then. on the other hand. the conclusion aimed at by the questioner will be one that is generally accepted. If. or what is accepted indeed. but accepted less generally than the questioner’s conclusion. clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner will be one generally rejected without qualification. any that are more generally accepted than the questioner’s conclusion. for in that case the result will be that the arguments will be more generally accepted. the conclusion will be of the same type as well.

If it be relevant and also be generally accepted. then the standard whereby the latter must judge what is generally accepted or not. but because on Heraclitus’ principles one has to say so.’ refuse to admit the impossibility of contraries belonging at the same time to the same thing.g. 6 It is clear.accepted or rejected without qualification. This is why those. in order to avoid the appearance of being a simpleton. who introduce other’s opinions. he should grant it but add a comment that it is not generally accepted. The same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of one another’s positions. then clearly it will be the latter’s judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying the various points. e. too. their aim being to speak as would the man who stated the position. whether the position he lays down be a view generally accepted without qualification or accepted by some definite person. and must grant or refuse to grant the point asked. Now every question asked is bound to involve some view that is either generally held or generally rejected or neither. then. If. as Heraclitus says. he should admit 516 . then the views that are accepted absolutely must be taken as the standard of comparison: whereas if the view laid down be one that is not generally accepted or rejected. again. the answerer should grant it and remark that it is the accepted view: if it be a view not generally accepted and irrelevant. that ‘good and evil are the same thing. but only by the answerer. is himself. not because they do not themselves believe this. and is also bound to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant: if then it be a view generally accepted and irrelevant. the answerer be defending some one else’s opinion. what the aims of the answerer should be.

and also the questioner will be able to draw his inference. if. it be relevant. they ought not to be granted. he ought not to hesitate to say that he does not understand it. the answerer should add the comment that. For then the answerer will not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him. If he understands the question and yet it covers many senses. if what is said be not clear. the answerer. then supposing what it says to be universally true 517 . it may be granted without restriction. if he grants the several points with his eyes open. If what is claimed by the questioner be relevant but too generally rejected. and that if it be granted the problem proposed collapses. in the first place. if it be granted. however.e. seeing that all the premisses that are more generally accepted than the conclusion are granted him. is always permitted to say ‘I do not understand’: he is not compelled to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a question which may mean different things. the original problem collapses. when men ask these things. should yet protest that the proposition is too absurd to be admitted. for often people encounter some difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly put. if he does not understand. Clearly. Those who try to draw an inference from premisses more generally rejected than the conclusion clearly do not reason correctly: hence. while admitting that if it be granted the conclusion sought follows. i. then. in several senses. Suppose. 7 The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case of terms used obscurely. it be a view that is neither rejected generally nor generally accepted. then.that it is the view generally accepted but say that it lies too close to the original proposition. again. For the answerer. if it be irrelevant to the argument.

although he has no negative instance to show. 518 . on the other hand. he obviously shows illtemper. if they are true and generally held. On the other hand. for to bring the argument to a standstill without a negative instance. If. against the universal one should try to bring some negative instance. 8 A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent elements in the reasoning. If he does not foresee the ambiguity. shows ill-temper. if the questioner takes it in the other sense. he should say. but assents to the question having in view the one sense of the words. it be partly true and partly false. he should add a comment that it bears different senses. he should answer either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. it becomes uncertain whether originally as well he perceived the ambiguity or not. If. or else goes to establish one of these: (and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put: for as a rule people secure their universal by means either of induction or of likeness): – accordingly the particular propositions should all be admitted. he should give it an unqualified assent or denial: if. he cannot even attempt a counter-proof that it is not true. either real or apparent. the question is both clear and simple.or false. If. and also that in one it is true. however. I meant the other sense’: for if a term or expression covers more than one thing. it is easy to disagree. moreover. then. a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many instances. far more likely is he to be thought illtempered – although even counter-proof is not enough: for we often hear arguments that are contrary to common opinions. then. ‘That was not what I had in view when I admitted it. in the other false: for if he leave this distinction till later.

– but still. so as to wreck the reasoning. For people then hate him.g. for clearly his business is to oppose those positions from which questioners demolish what he has laid down. e. For the 519 . 10 Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right solution is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs depends: for the demolition of any random point is no solution. 9 Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer should try his hand at attacking it by himself. e. and which are implicitly opposed to men’s wishes. e. supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of argument but because he really thinks them. suppose any one were to say that everything is in motion or that nothing is. even though the point demolished be false. He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which results in absurd statements. clearly he is ill-tempered: for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways other than the above. this is no reason for omitting to assert the opposites of these views.whose solution is yet difficult. then. that pleasure is the good. the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium.g. and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it. a man refuses to admit the proposition without having either a negative instance or some counter-argument to bring against it. and also there are all those which only a bad character would choose.g. If.

g. but the reason of the fallacy should also be proved: for then it would be clear whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not.argument may contain many falsehoods. or by stating an objection directed against the questioner: for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been brought. just as in the case of a figure falsely drawn. It can be done either by demolishing the point on which the falsehood that comes about depends. There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his argument to a conclusion. it may be true that the point claimed is false. He. who has demolished the point on which the fallacy depends. For it is not enough to object. then it would be against his questions. writes’ and ‘Socrates is sitting’: for from these it follows that ‘Socrates is writing’. has given the solution of the argument completely. e. Accordingly. the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther. Any one who knows that it is on such and such a point that the argument depends. suppose some one to secure the premisses. then. one may object to the questions asked: for it may happen that what the questioner wants does not follow from the questions he has asked because he has asked them badly. yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any farther. whereas if something additional be granted the conclusion comes about. Thirdly. if he can do so. If. The fourth and worst kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for 520 . but it is not on that that fallacy of the argument depends: for supposing that any one should happen to be sitting and not writing. and still be no nearer a solution of the argument. the objection would properly be directed against the questioner. writes’: for he who sits does not always write. then. even if the point demolished be a falsehood. it would be impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. Now we may demolish the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’. it is not this that needs to be demolished. ‘He who sits. but rather that ‘He who sits. knows the solution of it.

since arguments of this kind are held not for the sake of instruction but for purposes of practice and examination. Moreover. it has to be demolished by means of false propositions: for it is possible for a given man to believe what is not the fact more 521 . when the answerer lies in wait for the points that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when people lose their tempers in this way. their argument becomes a contest. are two different things. and of it when presented in the form of questions. because he will not grant the steps of which a correct argument might have been made against his position: for it is not in the power of the one side only to effect properly a result that depends on both alike. four ways of making objections: but of them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions. but sometimes through false as well. For often. Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward. There are then. the dialectician is compelled to demolish it: and then false propositions have to be formulated. not a discussion. For often the failure to carry through the argument correctly in discussion is due to the person questioned. clearly one has to reason not only to true conclusions.discussion: for some people bring objections of a kind which would take longer to answer than the length of the discussion in hand. 11 Adverse criticism of an argument on its own merits. Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and not his position. and not always through true premisses. but also to false ones. when a true proposition is put forward. as we said.

for this rests with the answerer. Accordingly. and when they are claiming what originally they set out to prove – for often when they are talking by themselves they say contrary things. and upon the questioner: for it may very well be that the argument is bad. just as a geometrician should reason geometrically. however. makes it clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like strain upon the argument on its own merits. but that the questioner has argued with the answerer in the best possible way: for when men lose their tempers. for in arguments as well there is a common aim in view. it may perhaps be impossible to make one’s inferences straight-forwardly as one would wish: we have to do as we can. The responsibility. whether his conclusion be false or true: what kind of syllogisms are dialectical has already been said.firmly than the truth. except with mere contestants. then. The principle that a man who hinders the common business is a bad partner. then. for which reason they often assent. to contrary things and to what originally had to be proved – the argument is sure to become vitiated. he does grant points of that kind. and admit afterwards what they have previously denied. What has been said. who would rightly convert any one to a different opinion should do so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner. It is. and also he who in answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand the point of the questioner’s inquiry. It makes no difference whether he effects this as answerer or as questioner: for both he who asks contentious questions is a bad dialectician. for these cannot both reach the same goal. when questioned. clear that adverse criticism 522 . it will be easier to persuade or help him. for more than one cannot possibly win. however. Inasmuch as it is indeterminate when people are claiming the admission of contrary things. because while refusing to grant other points. He. clearly applies to an argument as well. if the argument be made to depend on something that he holds.

and when most. Clearly. and in the manner. were to be irrelevant to the original position. so that it is not through them that the inference comes about. not even the argument itself is 523 . or if. then. (4) Again. supposing certain additions would bring an inference about but yet these additions were to be weaker than those that were put as questions and less generally held than the conclusion. if not all. (3) The third is. he has argued his case correctly. moreover. (5) Moreover. (2) The second is. when. One must not claim that the reasoning to a proposed view shall in every case equally be a view generally accepted and convincing: for it is a direct result of the nature of things that some subjects of inquiry shall be easier and some harder. suppose the premisses be less generally held and less credible than the conclusion. though true.is not to be passed in a like manner upon questioners and upon their arguments. supposing the reasoning. neither any withdrawals nor additions nor both together can bring the conclusions about. In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of adverse criticism: (1) The first is when neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked. of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or generally rejected. supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same: for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary. so that if a man brings people to accept his point from opinions that are as generally received as the case admits. they require more trouble to prove than the proposed view. described above. though constructed from the premisses.

If. but that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing whatever on the conclusion. it is not fair to find fault: for a false conclusion must of necessity always be reached from a false premiss. then no inference as to the latter can be drawn from it: and if there appears to be. whenever there are many propositions both generally held and also true whereby it could easily be proved. whereas the latter. it will be a sophism. or again. if the 524 . It is possible also that an argument. and yet commendable in relation to the proposed conclusion. and moreover does not rest as an argument on these additions. or if it be for the one and against the other. and yet open to reproach in relation to the proposed conclusion. If something were to be shown from premisses. it may very well be that the conclusion shown is something held more strongly than either. not a proof. may sometimes be worse than one which is not so concluded. general opinion be for the one and neither for nor against the other. even though brought to a conclusion. With those which bring about a true conclusion by means of false premisses. both of which are views generally accepted. vice versa. but not accepted with like conviction. then. as is clear from the Analytics. though requiring certain additions. For there is nothing to prevent the argument being open to reproach in itself. while its conclusion is not so. whenever the premisses of the former are silly. being commendable in itself. A philosopheme is a demonstrative inference: an epichireme is a dialectical inference: a sophism is a contentious inference: an aporeme is an inference that reasons dialectically to a contradiction. requires only such as are generally held and true. on the other hand.open to the same adverse criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion and when taken by itself. Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated. but a true conclusion may sometimes be drawn even from false premisses.

It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a long chain of steps. if it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions necessary: in another sense. and this is the type most usually advanced. it is so also if some step is omitted that generally is firmly accepted. and the argument is concluded through premisses that are themselves conclusions: moreover. they will be alike for the conclusion also: if. and suppose him to make his postulates as follows: ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: ‘there genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself’: therefore ‘the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion’. when the propositions secured are such as compel the conclusion. 12 An argument is clear in one.g. on the other hand. Now ‘a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more fully itself’: and ‘there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself. which will be «opinion» in a more accurate sense than the particular opinions’: and it has been postulated both that ‘a genuine opinion-in-itself exists’. 525 . and that ‘x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else’: therefore ‘this will be opinion in a more accurate sense’. the one preponderates. when he might employ fewer steps and those already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e. sense. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends. and that the most ordinary.pro and con be alike in the case of the premisses.) that one opinion is more properly so called than another. the conclusion too will follow suit.

An argument is called fallacious in four senses: (1) when it appears to be brought to a conclusion. though an argument which leads to a false conclusion may also be of this type. ‘Has it a conclusion?’. and is not really so – what is called ‘contentious’ reasoning: (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not to the conclusion proposed – which happens principally in the case of reductiones ad impossibile: (3) when it comes to the proposed conclusion but not according to the mode of inquiry appropriate to the case. though true. as happens when a non-medical argument is taken to be a medical one. as was said above as well. they be generally rejected. a true conclusion were to be reached through premisses that are false and utterly childish. though false. For an argument of that kind does demonstrate other things that are true: for one of the premisses laid down ought never to be there at all. If. Fallacy in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than of the argument: yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either. but only when he is not aware of it: for we often accept on its merits in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true proposition if it does so from premisses as far as possible generally accepted. and this will then be demonstrated. ‘Of what kind of premisses does it consist?’: for if the latter. the argument is worse than many arguments that lead to a false conclusion. or one which is not dialectical for dialectical. whereas if. however. be generally accepted. it is bad: if they be both false and also 526 . ‘Is the conclusion true or false?’. the third. sometimes true: for while a false conclusion is always the result of false premisses. whether the result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion be reached through false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes false. the argument is dialectical. Clearly then the first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is. the second. or one which is not geometrical for a geometrical argument. a true conclusion may be drawn even from premisses that are not true.

13 Of the ways in which a questioner may beg the original question and also beg contraries the true account has been given in the Analytics:’ but an account on the level of general opinion must be given now. Again.g. People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words. if he were to beg the one or the 527 . he ought to have shown. but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms. a man begs the question if he begs his conclusion piecemeal: supposing e. then the other. or a term and an expression.) he were trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general is one: for then he is generally thought to be begging. or. fifthly. and were to claim first the one. that he had to show that medicine is a science of what leads to health and to disease. A third way is if any one were to beg in particular cases what he undertakes to show universally: e. that which he ought to have shown by itself.entirely contrary to general opinion. along with a number of other things. and begged it of certain pairs of contraries: for he also is generally considered to be begging independently and by itself what. A second way occurs whenever any one begs universally something which he has to demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e. clearly it is bad. that mean the same thing.g. together with a number of other things. either altogether or else in relation to the particular matter in hand.g. if he undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries is always one.

suppose him. or. and this would happen suppose. even without begging the opposites in so many words. for it is by a glance at the conclusion that we tell that the original question has been begged: whereas contrary views lie in the premisses. e. e.other of a pair of statements that necessarily involve one other. suppose a man begs the contrary of the conclusion which necessarily comes about through the premisses laid down. firstly.g. The securing of contraries differs from begging the original question in this way: in the latter case the mistake lies in regard to the conclusion. he were to beg two premisses such that this contradictory statement that is opposite to the first conclusion will follow from them. in a certain relation which they bear to one another. Again. The ways in which people assume contraries are equal in number to those in which they beg their original question. to try to secure universally the contradictory statement. after postulating the latter view. thirdly. viz. if any one were to beg an opposite affirmation and negation. if having secured that the knowledge of contraries is one.g. 528 .g. secondly. fifthly. For it would happen. e. that the same thing is good and evil. and were to beg that the side is incommensurable with the diagonal. if he were to beg the contrary terms of an antithesis. fourthly. if he had to show that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side. suppose any one were to claim something universally and then proceed to beg its contradictory in some particular case. he were to claim that the knowledge of what makes for health or for disease is different.

arguments relating to the same thesis and range them side by side: for this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying a point by sheer force. 529 . If we cannot find any one else to argue with. For by ‘conversion’ of an argument is meant the taking the reverse of the conclusion together with the remaining propositions asked and so demolishing one of those that were conceded: for it follows necessarily that if the conclusion be untrue. moreover. and after a few attempts we shall know several arguments by heart. Men of natural ability can do this. we should argue with ourselves. For in this way we shall be better equipped for dealing with the proposition stated. For a task of this kind a certain natural ability is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power right to choose the true and shun the false. for it then only remains to make a right choice of one of them. in dealing with any proposition. the conclusion was bound to follow. be on the look-out for a line of argument both pro and con: and on discovering it at once set about looking for the solution of it: for in this way you will soon find that you have trained yourself at the same time in both asking questions and answering them. Moreover. some one of the premisses is demolished. seeing that. given all the premisses. Select. and in refutation also it is of great service. Always. as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either of two hypotheses is no mean instrument. whenever one is well stocked with arguments pro and con: for then you find yourself on your guard against contrary statements to the one you wish to secure. for by a right liking or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they rightly select what is best.14 The best way to secure training and practice in arguments of this kind is in the first place to get into the habit of converting the arguments.

e.g. moreover. get a good stock of definitions: and have those of familiar and primary ideas at your fingers’ ends: for it is through these that reasonings are effected. to master the heads under which other arguments mostly tend to fall. This can be done with arguments that are entirely universal. and conceal your procedure as darkly as you can: this kind of effect is best produced by keeping as far as possible away from topics akin to the subject of the argument. It is better to commit to memory a premiss of general application than an argument: for it is difficult to be even moderately ready with a first principle. and in arithmetic to have the multiplication table up to ten at one’s fingers’ ends – and indeed it makes a great difference in one’s knowledge of the multiples of other numbers too – likewise also in arguments it is a great advantage to be well up in regard to first principles. You should try. because he has his premisses classified before his mind’s eye. you should get into the habit of turning one argument into several. the statement that ‘there cannot be one knowledge of more than one thing’: for that is the case with both relative terms and contraries and co-ordinates. For just as in geometry it is useful to be practised in the elements. and particularly in regard to those propositions which are ultimate: for in discussing these answerers frequently give up in despair. Records of discussions should be made in a universal form. Moreover. or hypothesis. and to have a thorough knowledge of premisses at the tip of one’s tongue. a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere mention of their loci.It is best to know by heart arguments upon those questions which are of most frequent occurrence. even though one has argued only some particular case: for this 530 . so these habits too will make a man readier in reasoning. For just as in a person with a trained memory. Moreover. each under its number.

a particular demonstration always contains a universal demonstration. You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young man. speaking generally. For yourself. to secure from those skilled in deduction their premisses.e. it is indeed fair to try 531 . for this is the thing in which they are respectively trained. in deductive against an expert. You should. too. nor practise upon the man in the street: for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. A like rule applies in Rhetoric as well to enthymemes. moreover. as well. In general.will enable one to turn a single rule into several. For it is the skilled propounder and objector who is. from inductive reasoners their parallel cases. because it is impossible to reason at all without using universals. partly granting. you should as far as possible avoid universalizing your reasonings. Do not argue with every one. partly denying the statements proposed. always examine arguments to see whether they rest on principles of general application: for all particular arguments really reason universally. For against any one who is ready to try all means in order to seem not to be beaten. To formulate a proposition is to form a number of things into one – for the conclusion to which the argument leads must be taken generally. You should try. however. and the whole object of training is to acquire ability. for the objector either distinguishes or demolishes. a dialectician. For this is what gives one ability. especially in regard to propositions and objections. as a single thing – whereas to formulate an objection is to make one thing into many. moreover. from your exercises in argumentation you should try to carry away either a syllogism on some subject or a refutation or a proposition or an objection. or whether some one put his question properly or improperly (whether it was yourself or some one else) and the point which made it the one or the other. i.

not lightly to engage with casual acquaintances. or bad argument is sure to result. These are those that are universal. It is best also to have ready-made arguments relating to those questions in which a very small stock will furnish us with arguments serviceable on a very large number of occasions. and those in regard to which it is rather difficult to produce points for ourselves from matters of everyday experience. Wherefore the best rule is. For you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from contentious argument.all means of bringing about one’s conclusion: but it is not good form. 532 .

while others seem to be so. too. For physically some people are in a vigorous condition. is evident. sometimes not. as also elsewhere.On Sophistical Refutations [Translated by W. for of these. A. through what has been stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion. while those made of yellow metal look golden. while others seem to be so but are not. i. So it is. some are really silver and others gold.Aristotle .e. through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice. too.g. though inexperience may make them appear so: for inexperienced people obtain only. For reasoning rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated. by dint of embellishing themselves. as it were. though they seem to do so for a number of reasons. Pickard-Cambridge] 1 Let us now discuss sophistic refutations. and of these the most prolific and usual domain is 533 . That some reasonings are genuine. with inanimate things. We will begin in the natural order with the first. This happens with arguments. while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense. things made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine. e. and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty. a distant view of these things. Now some of them do not really achieve this.

in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. there exists a class of arguments of this kind. who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind will make a man seem to be wise. To reduce it to a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a thing. and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer. for them. in counting. it is clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. there exists both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real. Inevitably. and it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists. Now for some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise.the argument that turns upon names only. then. those who are not clever in manipulating their counters are taken in by the experts. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae. just as people who calculate suppose in regard to their counters. Clearly. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them. and therefore we suppose that what follows in the names. and a single name. and this is the purpose they happen to have in view. Those. himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them. then. For this reason. while things are infinite in number. then. follows in the things as well. and for others to be mentioned later. the same formulae. than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality. Accordingly just as. have a number of meanings. then. Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of 534 . then. and the other upon the securing of one. and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom).

Dialectical. has been defined in another treatise: contentious arguments are those that reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that appear to be generally accepted but are not so. to the contradictory of a given thesis: examination-arguments are those that reason from premisses which are accepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know-in what manner. and the other factors that contribute to this art. and how many in number are the elements of which this faculty is composed. while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has been discussed elsewhere: let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used in competitions and contests.sophistical arguments. then. 535 . of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust): dialectical arguments are those that reason from premisses generally accepted. and how many branches there happen to be of this inquiry. 2 Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes: Didactic. Examination-arguments. and Contentious arguments. The subject.

e. accent. or fourthly to reduce him to solecism. or. combination. to make him repeat himself. and by syllogistic proof based on this – and it may be on other assumptions as well – that this is the number of ways in which we might fall to mean the same thing by the same names or expressions.3 First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals to the death. to constrain him to repeat himself a number of times: or it is to produce the appearance of each of these things without the reality. amphiboly. as a last resort. solecism. refutation. ‘Those learn who know: for it is those who know their letters who learn the letters dictated to them’. and also ‘to acquire knowledge’. fallacy. or as the second best to show that he is committing some fallacy. and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling – i.e. 4 There are two styles of refutation: for some depend on the language used. For to ‘learn’ is ambiguous. Those ways of producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language are six in number: they are ambiguity. in consequence of the argument. or as a third best to lead him into paradox. to use an ungrammatical expression. Arguments such as the following depend upon ambiguity. it signifies both ‘to understand’ by the use of knowledge. ‘Evils are good: for what needs to be is good. paradox. while some are independent of language. form of expression. i. and evils must needs be’. These are five in number. to make the answerer. Of this we may assure ourselves both by induction. division of words. For they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party. For 536 . Again.

who really was sick at the time: but the man who is in health is not sick at the same time: he is ‘the sick man’ in the sense not that he is sick now. 537 . e. Of course. ‘There must be sight of what one sees: one sees the pillar: ergo the pillar has sight’. but that he was sick formerly. Also. too (for evil of some kind is inevitable). (3) when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in co