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.. Total Quality Management
Security Through

Bodyguard Services
International Ltd

The Bodyguards
. Bible
. . . . . . . . .
The BSI Training Manual

© BSI Ltd All rights reserved 2000

Company Registered Number: 3735523 VAT Number: 724545240
The Bodyguards

Copyright 1995 – 1996 – 1997 – 1998 – 1999 - 2000 – by BSI and 2001 – 2002 – 2003 by BSI Ltd

Published by: Bodyguard Services International Limited,


All rights reserved. Our copyright is rigidly enforced.

Except for use in a review, no portion of this Program
may be reproduced in any form including email and Computer
Disk without the express permission of the publisher.


This publication is not meant to replace Hands on training, there is no replacement for the
real thing but for today’s Specialist to carry out their role efficiently he/she will have to study
constantly to keep up to date with new practices.

• General Overview / Personal Security
• Bodyguard Lifestyle
• Bodyguard Protocol
• Client Contact
• Client Profiling
• Client Education
• Threat Assessment
• Operational Planning
• Operational Orders
• Security Advance Party
• Residential Security Team
• Hotel Security
• Restaurant & Venue Security
• Office Security
• Client Travel Security
• Vehicle Travel Security
• Team Formations
• Walking Drills
• Vehicle Embus - Debus Drills
• Defensive / Offensive Driving – Anti Ambush Techniques
• Escort Drills
• Secured Meetings
• Unarmed Combat
Pistol Marksmanship Training
• Hostage / Kidnap Briefing
• Introduction to Hostage Rescue
• Hostage Rescue - Dynamic Entries
• Special Response Teams
• CQB Tactics
• Electronic Counter Measures
• IED - Introduction
• IED - Building Search
• IED - Vehicle Search
• Bombs - Introduction
• Bombs - Mail & Deliveries
• Basic Surveillance Techniques
• Vehicle Surveillance - Give Away Signs
• Counter Surveillance, Espionage Theory
• Tactical Communication
• Radio Communication
• Escalation & De-escalation of Force
• First Aid – Trauma Management
• Terrorist Tactics
• Use of Force Theory

General Overview / Personal Security
There are three main principles that I personally think apply to most situations.

These are: -
• That the individual is responsible for his or her own security”
• That the security measures must match the threat level”
• That constant awareness is the cornerstone of good personal
All security is a compromise and in the field of close protection, that compromise is between
the requirements of the security and the demands of living a near normal life as possible by
the VIP.

A security procedure without the correct mental approach is a total waste of time.

We are faced with THREAT – this is the basis of our business and we need to look at threat
from 3 perspectives: -
The second and third areas are reactive and totally in the hands of the first. Evaluation is a
function and is determined by time! One is incapable of evaluating if time is negligible. What
will happen is the classic freeze scenario, “do I shoot or do we run”

I don’t want you to get any opinions of when trying to become a bodyguard you will end up being
in a James Bond lifestyle. This is a hard business to get into and harder one to stay in; the
primary reason is because most of us within the profession know each other if not personally but
professionally buy reputation.

We have a saying in this business that you’re only as good as your last job.

What we will teach you over the next 30 days are real life practical skills that can be used
the moment you start your first contract. What’s expected of a professional Bodyguard: -
Reliability, Personality, and Confidentiality.

But the primary expectation is one of Professionalism.

E.g. NO Drink, Drugs, Emotional problems ETC

The object of Personal Security is to reduce the risk of Kidnap, assassination or Criminal act
by the application of certain principles and procedures to normal daily life.

Protocol is one of the most common reasons for BODYGUARD’S being hired or fired,

such subjects as dress, hygiene, habits and behavior. The subject can be covered but
you will learn as you go on in the industry, clients requirements vary. Dress code may
be formal, informal or a cultural requirement.

Protocol should be written into the SOP’s for each contract:


Appearance is very important, it is the first impression a potential client will see of you. If you
are dress immaculately people will assume you to be able to take care of yourself and also
carry out your business in the same manner, feel good with your dress and it will show by
your confidence.

Your suit is what you will be wearing most of the time when with corporate clients, stay away
from 100% polyester & Linen as they crease very easily. Only if a client prefers a single or
double suit then either should be fine, try to go for the conservative looking suit, navy blue or
grey choose black suits carefully, try to steer away from the MIB look or the stereotypical BG
look. Make sure your suit trousers fit you properly and just reach your shoes; short trousers
should not be an option.

Pastel shirts are all right throughout the working day but try to wear white shirts for the
evenings. Always have spare shirts around when traveling and in case for emergencies.
Wear long shirtsleeves, if you have any tattoos, make sure they are covered the appearance
of the shirt collar and cuffs are important… always make sure they are clean.

Ties should be silk and match your choice of suit and shirt, keeping the not smart and in line
with your collar.

Wear a decent size belt; keep to black with not a fancy shiny buckle.

Shoes should be tie-ups and not slip on's, always tie in double knots for safety. Black shoes
go with most clothing and should always be kept very clean. Make sure they fit you correctly
you will be doing a lot of walking and standing around. Blisters can be painful and will
detract you from your primary duty.

Socks should be dark in color or match the clothing you are wearing, not white or multi


Avoid body odor at all costs, shower and wash as much as possible. Teeth should be
cleaned and breathe fresh, nails clipped and clean, hair combed and looking well taken care
of beards trimmed and stubble free. Try to wear odorless deodorant with hardly any scent.


Smoking is not acceptable even if the client smokes try not to smoke on duty. Nose picking
should not be done, Try to use a handkerchief and be discrete. No gum chewing at all. Wear
comfortable clothing and underwear, the last thing you want is to be fidgeting with your
underwear etc?


Always be on your best behavior, you do not know who is watching you at any time, maybe
not your client but associates.

Never let your client see you having fun and talking and laughing with other team members,
drivers or any waitress, could be seen as you not doing your job correctly.

CLIENT Contact
Before attending a meeting with a potential client you should endeavor to gather as much
information on the individual and company. This will dictate you’re the best course of action
for the contract negotiation process.

Basic background checks by using credit reference agencies, companies’ house and
relevant publications / who’s who etc the Internet is a great tool for looking for and
researching people or companies.

You will need to establish the following Who he is and what position he holds?

What is the nature of his business?

What business partners there may be?

Where and how is he financed?

Arrive at the meeting early and carry out counter surveillance before entering. You may even
position outside protective surveillance if you feel necessary.

During the interview you will need to build up an accurate picture of events, which would
warrant your services. Not all clients will be truthful and may hold back on certain
information. Experience in interview techniques will be beneficial in allowing this information
to be obtained.
• What are the reasons for using your services?
• Assess those reasons, is there a real threat or possibly imagined?
• Are you there it boost an ego, be a companion or deal with a
dangerous situation?
• Has a threat actually been made to the client?
• What restrictions will the client be putting on you?
• Is the threat to be treated seriously?
• Have the authorities been made aware?
• What action and procedures have been instigated if any?
You will need to discover if any surveillance has been put on the client, this will include
physical & electronic.

If surveillance is present this could indicate the possible origin of the treat.

You will need to ascertain the level of skill involved in the surveillance:
• Government High level
• Commercial Medium level (Private Investigators)
• Private Low level (Criminal elements)
Now you should have a reasonably accurate picture of the treat and be in a position to
recommend a few solutions on how you are able to help.

Make the client aware of the solutions and that they are based on information given,
possible further investigations may change the outcomes.

.. decided to accept the contract a detailed threat assessment should begin
If you have

CLIENT Profiling
A client profile will include preferences and restrictions you will have to work with

Always keep in mind that you are in the firing line, should the client restrict your suggestions
in such a way it would be dangerous for you and your team, turn the contract down.
People Family - Blood/ Marriage
Associations/Clubs/Religious affiliations
Places Places of birth - Blood/Marriage
Places of living - Home/Holiday
Places of work/Places of leisure
Personality Aggressive, abrasive, confrontational, stubborn, easygoing, approachable
Beliefs Religious
History Past affiliations
Previous threats
Lifestyle Single
Now you can establish a threat level and the best approach to effectively protect your client.

CLIENT Education
The ability to communicate effectively with your client and educate him in matters of his own
security is essential.

Client education should show the treats/ dangers along with self-protection procedures/
techniques that the client/ family must adopt in their daily lives, without if possible affecting
normal everyday tasks.

Begin by briefing the client as how the opposition gains intelligence/ information; this should
include his patterns/ habits, surveillance techniques and informers.

The client should limit access to information about

• Movements, patterns, lifestyle.
• Travel modes, itineraries, business arrangements.
• Clients company position, duties, associates/ colleagues.
• Plans of client’s office/ home.
• Security arrangements/ procedures.
Feed false information out on your clients, movements and routes?

Basic counter surveillance procedures should be installed to the client/ family & staff
• Vehicles cursing or passing the area
• Persons loitering or sitting in vehicles
• Empty vehicles/ vans parked in the area
• Work crews appearing to do no work
• Door salesmen, religion callers, and surveys
• Phone calls requesting information on client or family
General Security Advice
• Travel by different routes at different times if possible
• Avoid the use of pubs, restaurants/ venues at pre-arranged times
• Never walk alone & avoid walking at night
• Advise staff not to provide information on the clients/ families activities
• Avoid meeting unknown persons at scheduled times & unknown locations
• Try to memorize all office, home, emergency phone numbers
• Press releasers & memos should not contain travel plans, times, phone
• Any photos of client/ family should not be recent
• Carry out a clean desk policy & use shredders/ safes
• Do not use designated parking
• Never book restaurants etc in your own name
Traveling Advice
• Always search the vehicle and surrounding area before entering & driving
the vehicle
• Keep the vehicle clean and uncluttered, no news papers on the seats or
dashboard etc.
• If the choice of vehicles is available then change at random
• Do not have the company logo on the vehicle
• Avoid personalized number plates
• Never have less than half a tank of fuel
• Never use the same petrol station if possible
• Always use the alarm & keep all doors/ petrol cap, doors locked
• Never leave more than the ignition key when maintenance is being carried
• Instruct the chauffeur on defensive diving techniques
• Always drive at the safest possible speeds
• Keep all doors locked when driving
• Try to use busy roadways
• Keep the vehicle moving at all times
• If attacked stay in the car & use as a weapon, fit emergency sirens/ lights to
attract attention
• If you feel you’re under surveillance, drive to the nearest police station
• Cross bolt the Exhaust.
• No identifying stickers.

Home Advice
• All telephones situated away from windows/ glass doors
• If unsure of any caller, take their number and call them back
• At night keep all curtains closed & and are drawn before turning lights on
• Fit lights with timers on in different rooms
• Fit dead locks & security chains
• Have a good alarm system with panic buttons around the house especially
the bedrooms
• Have mobile phones as back up to landlines
• Keep any outside lights on after dark use timers at different times on porch
lights, so not to have any pattern.
• When answering the door use a peep hole/ cctv, peep hole situated in the
wall rather than the door
• Only allow visitors that are expected
• Keep all rubbish bins in a secure area
• Instruct all staff on door/ telephone procedures
• Never label property/ vehicle keys
• Never allow children to answer the door/ phone

THREAT Assessment
The threat assessment is an ever growing animal & should be revised and updated

Also with all the information of the current threat of your client, you will need to study
national and international newspapers/ news broadcasts. Look for crime trends, terrorism
groups/ tactics and any political situations your client may be faced with the Internet is a
great source of information utilize it.

When all the information as been attained you can now categorize the threat level and
establish the procedures needed to protect the client effectively.

The following principles should apply, your threat assessment should be

The assessment must be CLEAR (It must be understandable)

LOGICAL (The report is rational & based on the facts)

ACCURATE (Not based on rumor, hearsay & up to date)

RELEVANT (Include info relevant to the clients needs)

BRIEF (Simple)

Attacker’s selection of target

• Threat is directed at client for who he is
• Threat is directed at client for who he represents
• Threat is directed at client for what he represents
Attackers motivation

• Political
• Criminal
• Religious
• Vendetta/ Grievance
• Financial
• Mentally disturbed
• Publicity
Attackers method
• Assassination
• Kidnap
• Injury/ Maim
• Psychological
• Blackmail/ Extortion
Attacker’s technique/ how the threat will be carried out
• Bomb
• Shooting
• Knife
• Poisoning
• Kidnapping
From collating the above information you can categorize the appropriate threat level
• Cat 1 - An attack is definite (High risk)
• Cat 2 - An attack is probable (Medium risk)
• Cat 3 - An attack is remote but possible (Low risk)
The client must also be protected from other possible threats and accidents such as
• Illness
• Fire
• Theft
• Harassment
• Environmental hazards
• Foreign conflicts/ policy
• Logistic problems
You will now need to establish the best approach to take to ensure an effective working
relationship between your client/ associates and family. A personal profile of the client, work
colleagues and family will dictate how this will be best achieved.

The only way to succeed is to thoroughly plan any operation, with contingency plans for
almost every possible scenario. Remember only a fool would believe they could handle
unforeseen circumstances without prior planning. At this stage the opposition as an
advantage, even when preparing for a small operation keep the big picture in mind.
Remember if the client is ever witness to confrontation, you have failed in your primary
• You must thoroughly brief all operatives concerned?
• What is the situation?
• What has been instigated & by whom?
• What are the team responsibilities?
• What do they need to know to be successful?

.. are to be involved in the planning; will all have different ideas & comments…
All operatives
listen to what each as to say.

Always ensure that the location is secure, use electronic counter measures or even post
guards. Remember the most brilliant planned operation is no good if the opposition can
listen in.
• Operation (Code name)
• Commence at (Time & Date)
• Advanced recce (Time, date, weather conditions etc)
• Lighting up times (First & last light)
• Team members (Names)

Introduce the team members to the area that they will be operating:
• Photographs
• Maps
• Models
• Road types
• Rail travel
• Pick-up points
• Towns etc
• Friendly Forces (Operation support, Police, Military, Security
companies, their roles)
• Unfriendly Forces (Who/ what they are, what they are expected to do,
background information)

What is to be achieved:
• Itineraries?
• Stops
• Expected timings
• Weather etc
Break down into stages:
• 1 - Preparation/ build up
• 2 - The client pick-up
• 3 - The journey
• 4 - The drop off

A brief outline of how the team will carry out the mission, Include actions on:
• Fire
• Attack
• Threat
• Bomb

• Breakdown
• Medical
Detailed Tasks

Full details of what and how the team will carry out the mission. Each member is to know his
role and each other's. All routes in/ out, actions on attack etc

Service & Support

• List all equipment:

o First aid kits
o Search kits
o Vehicles
o Weapons
o Radios
o Flashlights
• Give all relevant:
o Timings
o Dress codes
o Food & rest details
o Comms
o Route cards
o Phone numbers
Signals & Support
• Nominate 1/Cs and 2/Cs
• Give all call signs, codes, color coded maps, radio frequencies
• Lost comms
• Set watches
• Any questions and answers

SECURTIY Advance Party

Although this is two separate items we can group them both into SAPs. The role of the
Security Advance Party is simple, to obtain intelligence to check the routes and search the
area that the VIPs will use. This is ok in theory, however very few teams enjoy the luxury of
advance intelligence and planning, due to costing. The SAP have varied duties however
there main role is to check that the route the party will take, is safe and secure, as is the
venue they are visiting.

One of the parties may be sent covertly a few hours ahead to do a methodical search of a

• Full postal address
• All relevant telephone numbers
• Maps/ grid references
Special Events
• All reservations/ bookings (Clients & team)

. purchase of any tickets needed
Route Selection
• Main route
• Secondary route
• Exact mileage
• Exact timings; test runs to be made at different times of the same day, to
gain an overall time
• Locations/ phones (coins/ card etc)
• Location of phones on route
• All communication black spots
• Safe havens/ emergency RV`s (police/ military establishments if
• Location/ numbers of all nearest hospitals/ A+E units
• Are doctors on site/ on call?
• First aid equipment at locations
• Vehicle breakdown services/ response times
• Road works/ any heavy vehicle movements
• Weather
• Places of interest
Danger Areas
• Traffic lights/ roundabouts
• Heavy traffic areas
• Cross roads
• Tunnels/ bridges/ railway crossings
• Overlooking buildings/ bankings
• Narrow roads
• Unlit areas/ no lights
• One way streets
• Areas of high crime
Police Assistance
• Officers in charge
• Anti-terrorist/ special branch numbers
• Canine units/ bomb units, reaction times
• Contact names/ numbers/ pagers/ radio frequencies
Location Arrival/ Departure
• Exact drop off/ pick up points
• Arrival times
• Alternative times/ entrances
• Is the client to be met by anyone specific?
• Plans/ layout
• Surrounding area/ man holes/ outside buildings
• Floors/ stairs
• Elevators, what capacity
• Roof/ joining buildings
Location Parking
• Where is the parking area/ is there a VIP area
• Security in operation

• Facilities for chauffeurs/ BGs etc
• Toilets/ phones
• VIP route
• Alternatives
• Areas to be secured
• Is the VIP eating at location?
• How & where the food is prepared
• Arrangements for protection team
• Any press/ TV present
• What are the limits of access?
• ID being used
Liaison with other personnel
• Protection teams
• Security
• Guests (obtain guest list)
• Managers/ fire, medical officers
Fire Drills
• Fire alarms
• Extinguishers/ types, service details
• Alarm system in use
• Nearest fire station/ number

Linear route planning theory

Linear - continuous, horizontal, non-stop, not crooked, shortest, straight-ahead, unbroken,

true and uninterrupted.

This means that we need to plan a direct route from A – B, this is not necessary a straight
route because of various other problems.

What Problems
• Road works
• One way Traffic
• Public demonstrations
• No go areas of town
• Bottlenecks etc
Route planning is one of the jobs that the SAP should undertake.

What information will go into route from the VIPs home to a private function?
1. Firstly two routes need to be planned because of Intelligence reasons.
2. You must know where the nearest Police Station & Hospitals are.
3. Any road works
4. Any possible bottle necks
Think about what else you should include in your route plan?

Security. Through Total Quality Management
.. Route Card
Code Blue Parking areas

3.8 miles
Turn right @ lights 3.5 miles

Hospital 3.2 miles

3rd Exit

. .
Code Red Zulu
. . . . . . . .
Roadwork’s 2.2 miles
Hairpin Bend
2.3 miles

Straight run

Large bushy area

Police Station 2nd 1.8 / 1.3 miles Leisure Centre
exit / ⅔ mile on the

BT box 0.9 miles

Code green Zulu 10 Storey Apartments

Code yellow Zulu

© BSI Ltd All rights reserved 2000

Company Registered Number: 3735523 VAT Number: 724545240
What I’ve done here for you is basically give you an idea of the amount of effort it takes
to plan residential security.

Rural Residence
• It is easier to erect dedicated security measures, fences and sensors,
• A client can become a target due to the isolation
• It is an easy task for mounting surveillance from surrounding areas
• Countryside will be dark at night making approaches hard to notice
City Residence
• High population allows your client to blend in
• There are more choices of routes
• Excellent communication systems and support
• Faster response times for police and medical support
• Surrounding streets well lit at night
• Allows for greater access and perimeter control
• Client has privacy
• Counter surveillance can be more easily mounted
Semi – Detached
• You should consider opposition access into residence through
adjoining attic space
Apartment Block
• Access is limited and easily guarded
• Other apartments can be approached for intelligence, counter
surveillance and possible aid
• Alarms & security systems
• Power supplies
• Floor plans, construction alterations
• Ground plans
• Lifts & shafts
Residence Perimeter Security
• Vet all neighbors, properties, who are they
• Ensure all street lighting working
• Outside wall, fence to be at least 8 feet tall
• Walls & fences set up to restrict climbing
• Wall posts in be inserted in concrete
• No trees or obstacles to view over
• Use only the main entrance, keep all others locked
• Main perimeter to manned at all times

• Driveway to be well lit
• Keep the main parking area away from the residence
• Outside blind spots to be well lit
Residential Internal
• Solid doors, strong windows and frames
• Blast or protective coated glass
• All bushes, trees to be cut back
• Full alarm system
• Well made locks and chains
• Bars or grills on ground floor windows
• Back up power generators
• All skylights, drainage, man holes to be secured
• Full use of curtains & blinds
• Spare flashlights & candles around the house
Residence Staff
• Staff to be restricted to the areas of duty
• Only long serving staff to be allowed to the client’s main areas
• Regular vetting of all staff
• No staff in security control rooms
• Be careful on subjects talked in front of staff
• Brief client, staff on security measures
• Utilize a need to know basis
Mail Procedures
• If possible use a post office box, arrange mail to be collected
• All main deliveries to the main gate
• Mail & delivery vehicles to be left outside the property
• Log all incoming & outgoing mail, phone calls
• No unexpected parcels or mail
• Delivered mail to be left outside residence
• All delivery personnel to be identified get to know who they are
• If personnel different, check with the company
• Laundry to be done outside, and to be picked up by a security
• All calls to come through the security office
• Keep all phone points away from windows
• Phone checks for bugs done regularly
• All emergency numbers at hand
• Never give out client phone numbers; take the callers number and
call back
• Never answer with the client’s name
Key Security
• All spare keys kept in control box and labeled
• Key box locked with no access
• Maintain key log and do not label individual keys

.. • Know where and who as the keys at all times
Safe Room
• This is used as a refuge if an attack takes place
• It must be secure with its own telephone link, toilet, food & water until
help arrives
Operations Room
• Used for daily running and admin of security
• Manned 24 hrs a day, situated not disturb the client and family
• Ensure it as toilet, food and rest facilities
• The control room should be unidentifiable from the outside
Actions On
• Detailed plans in the event of attack, fire or medical emergency
• Escape routes and procedures
• Awareness of false or decoy fire alarms
• Communications routine ready and operative
• Bomb threats
• All hospitals, doctors, plasma, drug centers to be known with
addresses and telephone numbers, response times
Leaving Residence
• Always vary times and exit points
• Recce the street and surrounding areas before leaving
• Use all available staff for the above
• Comms check before leaving

Evacuation Process

1. In a state of civil unrest, these are the procedures you should follow. The
Evacuation of personnel is the very last step in assuring that their safety is upheld.

2. At the beginning of civil unrest and when there is no alternative, ALL families
should be evacuated along with any other items such as pets or personnel

3. When civil unrest starts to increase ALL non – essential personnel shall be
evacuated, and the four most senior personnel into the one property nearest the

4. All documents that are not taken will be destroyed.

5. Supplies of food and water must be brought in to sustain the staff for up to two

6. Also a full medical kit and a small supply of petrol.

7. After careful consideration the delegate in charge must make the final decision to
evacuate the remaining personnel and close the office.

8. Finally they should leave the countries via the routes indicated in this file.

“A defensible space is a living residential environment which can be employed by
inhabitants for their enhancement of their lives, whilst providing security for their
families, neighbours and friends”



Delegation de la Commission des Communautes Europeennes en Republique



Over the past few months there has been a growing state of unrest, though quiet at the
moment there appears to be a groundswell of discontent that could manifest itself at
any time.


The aim of this survey is to suggest recommendations and procedures that can be
carried out by the Delegation, its members or any specialist security team that may be
assigned to this location.

No costing's have been involved, but expenditure has been kept in mind, therefore no
electronic devices have been considered. The main theme being enhanced security by
use of simple methods.

The brief will be in the following phases: -


Phase 1 Exterior

Phase 2 Perimeters

Phase 3 Grounds

Phase 4 Outbuildings

Phase 5 Cars and car parking P.O.L. machinery

Phase 6 Building

Phase 7 Fire equipment, drills and ancillary equipment

Phase 8 Staff

Phase 9 Communications

Phase 10 Local guards

Residences and personnel

Phase 11 Residences

Phases 12 Personnel and Families

Phase 13 Routes

Phase 14 Misc


The only buildings that overlook the Delegation are government offices or state run
hotels; this virtually precludes them from being used in an offensive manner against the
Delegation or its members.


The existing walls offer no obstacle to a would be intruder, unfortunately considerable

expense would be involved to improve the situation, therefore it is likely to remain as it

All gates should be closed and locked when not in use. It is recommended that the two
gates (visitors and vehicles) now in use should be replaced or repaired as they are both
in a bad state of repair and cannot be locked, (no locks).

The visitor’s gate should have a bell and to be opened by the guard who will enquire
about the nature of the caller's visit before he is admitted into the main building.

This guard should be positioned inside the Delegation by the inner security door, which
allows him to observe the entrance outside, and he is also on call for any internal
disturbances, if needed.

The telephone operator is in a position to observe the reading room while still carrying
out her duties.

Phase 3


The area surrounding the building is not large in extent, however easy access to the
sides and rear of the premises should be restricted by placing grills at locations (13)
sheet 1.


Many of the lights are not working or in a bad state of repair, vandal proof dusk/dawn
automatic lights with at least one light per wall having a protective covering should
replace these.

To the rear of the building an infrared sensor arc light to be positioned so as to

illuminate the maximum amount of ground. Both systems to have a manual override.


A small incinerator could be utilized at the rear of the building to burn (under controlled
conditions) the waste paper from the shredder and the used confidential typewriter
ribbons. Also any litter that has accumulated in the Delegation.


All ladders and any object that could assist intruders to scale the walls to the upper
floor must be either locked in the outbuildings or securely fastened to an outside wall.

Phase 4


The outbuildings to the rear of the Delegation should be cleared of all unnecessary

Those, which are unoccupied, should be locked. The rooms that are in daily use must
be secured at the end of the working day.

Water Supply

The water supply meter is situated behind the front wall. This has no covering and
needs to be boxed in. There is an old cistern at the same location the cover of which is
rusting away, it needs to be replaced and secured by a padlock (sheet 1 -2-)

The fresh water cistern to the rear of the building has a strong metal cover but needs a
padlock (sheet 1 -5-) Adjacent to this cistern are the water pressurizing tank and water
pump; they are partially covered by part of the outbuildings but need a protective
grillage for them to be satisfactorily secured. (Sheet 1 -6-)

Power Supply

The electricity power supply board is located in an open recess (Sheet 1 -7-) at the side
of the building; this area can be easily secured by the placement of a strong metal grill
door across the opening.

Emergency Generator

There is no alternative power supply to the Delegation in the event of a prolonged

power failure.

The above-mentioned recess phase 4/ (3) is an ideal place for the installation of a small
emergency generator. The size and power to be determined by the appropriate

Phase 5

Cars and car parking areas

The drivers of the Delegation's vehicles must ensure that they have a full tank at the
start of each working day and it should not be allowed to fall below the half way mark.
They should also carry out their daily checks (oil, petrol, water, tyres pressure and tyres

Any abnormalities to be reported to the relevant person. The H.O.P.'s car should be
fitted with run flat tyres or have an anti puncture solution (i.e. ultra seal) within the tyres.

On.. up country trips, two spare wheels are to be taken. There are many puncture repair
devices on the commercial market (inflates and seals the tyre at the same time). Each
car should carry one; this also applies to privately owned vehicles.

Car search mirrors

These are extremely useful when the underneath of a vehicle needs to be inspected.
They could be constructed locally to reduce costs.

Car parking

When not in use the H.O.P.'s car should be parked in the drive inside the Delegation
and locked.

In times of heightened civil unrest as many cars as practical to use the parking area.
The remaining cars to be dispersed to the private residences. The car park opposite
the Delegation to be vacated until the situation returns to normal.


If any fuel or inflammable products are kept on the premises as emergency reserves or
generator requirements, then they must be stored in a separate location, have the
necessary fire precautions and the place to be securely locked.

Phase 6


The building is substantially constructed of concrete blocks with a cement render finish.
The first floor is of concrete whilst the roof and the first floor ceiling are constructed of
timber. Asbestos sheeting covers the roof.


Many of the windows on the upper floor are the louver type and where these have no
grill protection, entry into the building is very easy, others are of the old shutter design
and offer no barrier to a would be intruder.

Several of the windows (ground and first floor) have light mesh grills: stronger units
should replace these. The majority of the lower floor windows have adequate

If grills are to be fitted to the 1st floor windows then they should be placed on the inside
of the building and some of them to have an opening section or the facility to be
removed quickly in an emergency, thereby allowing the window to be used as an
alternative fire escape.

Air conditioners

Grills, making sure that the protection does not interfere with any repairs or servicing
that these units might require, should secure all unprotected air conditioners.


Both the upper and lower fire doors are made of wood; the keys to open them are kept
in a glass-fronted box near by. They are warped and ill fitting, they should be replaced
by modern metal quick release doors.

Inner security door

This is of glass and aluminum construction and is controlled by the telephone operator
who has her post to the side (sheet 1 - Tel. Op.) The guard is positioned in the

Immediate area where he can observe the visitors gate, whilst the telephonist can see
directly into the reading room (which is outside the main Delegation offices - see sheet
1 Reading room).

The H.O.P. and the representative from Brussels discussed a possible change in the
layout of this door.

Proposed security door

Once a person is admitted on the premises there are no restriction to his or her
movements, therefore a second inner security door should be installed at the foot of the
stairs. On the stair side of the door a release button will allow free movement for upper
floor staff while the telephonist controls the entry for visitors or workmen.

Doors H.O.P. Office

Entrance to the H.O.P. office is through the double doors in the secretariat, however
there is another entrance leading into the waiting room, this door can be retained but
there must be no facility to open it from the waiting room side.

Porch door

An ornamental grill and door to enclose the open porch area, it will be padlocked during
the hours of darkness thereby greatly increasing the security of the main entrance. As it
is in a prominent position careful thought should be given to its design.

Rear door (sheet 1 -8-)

There is an office door to the rear of the building and as it has a non-functional purpose
this door could be bricked up.

Terracotta Grill (Sheet 1 A -2-)

This is situated on the stair landing and allows ventilation into the upper floor, however
a few blows of a heavy hammer could demolish it quickly and easily. A strong heavy
grill fitted on the inside would secure this location. Again because of its prominent
position an aesthetic design would be pleasing to the eye.


There are no key cupboards in the Delegation there should be one for each floor and
one for the confidential area.

The .. night watchman holds the keys for the majority of the building; this is in order to
allow the cleaners into the building early in the morning. This system should be
changed as soon as possible.

Possible alternatives
1. Duty officer holds the keys and opens the Delegation each morning.
2. Re-arrangement of cleaners timetable
3. Extra security to supervise the cleaners
4. If the second inner second inner security door is installed, the
cleaners can continue on the ground floor unsupervised. They can
proceed to the first floor when members of the staff are present.
Pros and cons

This situation can be viewed in two ways.

1. If the night watchman holds the keys, he could be overpowered and
his attackers would have free access to the Delegation and plenty of
time to carry out their nefarious activities.
2. If he is not in possession of the keys he cannot enter the 'building in
the event of a fire and telephone for assistance.
A compromise is possible: he holds a key which will allow him access to a telephone, if
this is to be the case, then he must know how to operate the exchange and be supplied
with a list of emergency numbers.

This matter will have to be settled by the Delegation as could involve extra duties or

Phase 7

Fire precautions

In the whole of the Delegation there are only two fire extinguishers. Each office should
have a small capacity extinguisher whilst the bottom and top of the stairs there should
be placed two 91-litre extinguishers.


Smoke alarms should be installed in strategic locations and a simple method of alerting
the delegation of any impending dangers ought to be available, perhaps the old-
fashioned iron triangle?

Fire assembly-point

A point outside the grounds of the Delegation should be designated the "fire assembly
point". On the outbreak of a fire, all staff will evacuate the building and gather at the
F.A.P. They will exit by the nearest and safest door; in large fires the stairwell can
cause a chimney effect so caution must be applied if any member decides to use the
stairs as a mean of escape.

Specific duties should be allocated to members of the Delegation so in the event of an

emergency, the evacuation can run smoothly.

Telephonist fire duties

On the outbreak of fire the telephone operator will call the relevant authority
immediately. However it must be ascertained that there is a fire before such action is
taken. This also applies to any other emergencies.


If a fire breaks out and it is not of a serious nature then an attempt should be made to
put it out or control it until assistance arrives (decision of senior person on post at the
time of the fire)

Logbook: the telephonist to keep a record of all visitors in a logbook. Suggested




1/1/1991 {1} SMITH.J JONES T 09:00 11:30 -----------

1/2/1991 {2} S&W REPAIR 10:00 12:00 WILL CALL


Phase 8


The Delegation has a small number of staff; therefore it is unnecessary to implement a pass

A second inner security door is installed this should be sufficient to ensure that the
confidential areas are restricted to the relevant personnel.

Phase 9


The question of radios is being dealt with directly by H.Q.; however it appears it could take
considerable time before the necessary documentation could be granted, therefore other
methods might have to be considered.

Below is an example of a possible radio network that could be used when radios become

Each location would be given a call sign.

..• Delegation D1
• House D2
• House 2 D4
• House 3 D5
• Car 1 D6
• Spare D7
• Car 2 D8
A duty officer's list would have to be compiled.

The duty officer would disregard his own station call sign and take the control call sign for
the duty period. Control would keep a listening watch for the complete period of duty. Other
stations would keep open in accordance with the situation and battery life.

The network would not be used for chatter, is an emergency network and is to be used for
exactly that: "An emergency".

Code words

A list of code words would be necessary to cover the most serious eventualities, i.e.
1) Place names
2) Personnel
3) Situations
4) Movements
5) Medical
6) Threats - low/high
7) R.V.s
8) Evacuation
9) Assistance
10) Miscellaneous
The senior members to have their own battery chargers and spare batteries so they can
keep their station open 24 hours a day.

If possible the Delegation network to have a link with one of the other friendly
establishments, particularly one that could come to their assistance in a dire emergency.

Phase 10

Local guards

It has already been emphasized to the local guards that a higher stage of security is
necessary due to the changing political situation, local and international. They have adapted
to the re-arrangement of their duties knowing it is for the increased protection of all.

However they are reluctant men, they must treat all creeds with awareness and courtesy.

Phase 11

Residences and Personnel

Whenever a rented dwelling comes to the end of its lease consideration should be given to
taking another residence in lieu, if it complies with any of the following.

1) Is it closer to the Delegation?
2) Does it offer greater security?
3) How does it fit in with the evacuation plans?
4) Will it receive better communications?
5) Is there a good neighborhood?
6) Location away from areas where unrest is likely to occur.

Personnel and families traveling car or by foot

These guidelines are to assist the families and dependants of Delegation's members when
they leave the security of their dwellings.

By: Car
1. Is your journey really necessary?
2. Try and travel with company or in convoy
3. Vary your timings and routes, particularly for your regular visits. This can
be difficult for appointments, however you can arrive 15 min early!
4. If you are stopped by a road block (Police or Demonstrators) do not follow
taxies or local cars down the side streets, turn around and keep to the main well
illuminated routes until you reach your destination.
5. If you have to open your window to talk to anyone, open it only sufficient
to carry on a conversation. Two to three minutes should be enough.
6. Make sure your car has plenty of fuel, oil, and water. Regular servicing is a
7. Have a spare key secured hidden on the outside of the vehicle (make sure
to remove it during servicing)
8. Have an emergency puncture repair canister in the car
9. Small medical pack
10. Correct tyre pressures
11. If radios become available and you find yourself in a dangerous situation
call for assistance.
12. Never leave the car unlocked especially with the keys in the ignition

On foot
1. Whilst walking in town, carry a secondary purse or wallet secreted on your
person. In it hold your keys, I.D. cards, large monetary notes. Have only the bare
essentials in the exposed handbag or wallet.
2. Don't wear excess jewellery, leave it at home, take off your gold Rolex, and wear
the imitation model.
3. If an incident occurs, but you are not involved, move away as quickly as possible,
without panic! If you become agitated or frightened find a public place, restaurant,
bar-cafe, library, etc. enter inside and compose yourself then telephone for
assistance if necessary. This is when a good local knowledge of the town
becomes very important.
4. Carry all relevant telephone numbers on a small plastic covered card.

Emergency Provisions

Hold at least two weeks supply of food and water, you might have to feed people stranded in

your residence. Have plenty of torches, lamps, batteries, candles and popular medicaments
<Paludrin, Arête, Aspro, etc.)


Three buildings overlook the Residence, but only one constitutes a danger, it is the building
under construction, which overlooks the rear entrance.

There is a small shantytown at Point 8, only if there were widespread food shortages, only
then these people might possibly be a cause for concern.


The existing garden wall varies between 3 - 4 m in height; there are lights approximately
every 15 mins. These wall's lights should be on an automatic dusk/dawn facility.


The garden is extremely well tended; there are no areas where intruders could hide. The
night watchman should lock and check the outbuildings at dusk and re-open them at first
light. This includes the changing rooms and the pool filter section.

All cars to be garaged nightly, the doors locked and the garage interior light to remain on.
The vehicles are to be locked and the keys deposited into the house key cabinet.

The electrical meters are housed in a wooden cabinet inside the garage: this should be
changed for a stronger metal unit.

Building exterior (Site Plan C)

The a/c’s (6) are all at ground level and have no protection this should be rectified. Also the
butane cylinders need to be housed in a protective casing.

Infra red sensor lights are advised to be placed at points (C) (normal wattage) and at point
(D) (arc light).

The arc light will face out onto the garden. The lights are to have -a manual override so they
do not interfere with-any social functions.

Building Interior Safe keep

The upper floor should be made into the safe area of the dwelling.

This can be easily achieved by the installation of a heavy grill door at point (E) and the
windows to have protective grills. Because of the danger of a fire, the grills must have the
facility to be removed quickly and easily.

More fire extinguishers are required and they need to be positioned at strategic points
particularly upstairs.

Two key cabinets are required, one for the numerous personal keys of the H.O.P., the other
for staff use.

Departure of H.O.P

The H.O.P.'s departure should start from point F, as this is the least observable position.
(From outside of the residence). The vehicle is not to move off until a member of his
household staff or security guard has checked the area outside the main gates.

Arrival of H.O.P.

Whenever possible the H.O.P. to inform the household his E.T.A. A member of his staff will
wait by the gate, and open it immediately the moment his car approaches. If radios are
available, a single code word would be sufficient to warn the guard of his imminent arrival.


Rope ladders or knotted ropes are to be kept upstairs for an emergency escape. If young or
elderly people are amongst the household, then a makeshift escape slide is advisable.

There must be strong fixing points for the rope or slide to be fixed to.

The H.O.P. Residence has an internal alarm system but as the family's dog remains inside
at night it cannot be activated.

Gas attacks

It is not envisaged that the Delegation will find itself in such a situation. However because of
the close proximity of government buildings it is possible in an extreme state of civil unrest
troops would use tear gas to break up any large demonstrations around these government

In such a case tear gas might drift across to the Delegation, staff will obviously retreat from
the gas cloud, but they should try and stay within the office complex.

If gas is encountered while traveling by car try not to stop, continue to drive away from the
area and open the windows to dissipate the gas as quickly as possible.


The above recommendations and procedures have been offered to cater for a case of
extreme civil unrest. The political situation will dictate the level of measures that should be

This is not a comprehensive assessment of the Delegation security requirements; no

thought has been given to electronic devices (except "smoke alarms), which would increase
its security but unfortunately its expenditure also.

Local contractors and security guards can carry out most of the recommendations. .

Security is given little thought by the majority of people; if the Delegation's personnel
become security conscious this will go a long way to combat the present dangers.

The team leader is in overall control, but will delegate the day-to-day running of the Ops
room and team rosters to his 2I/c. As the nerve centre this room will be in constant
communication with all Bodyguards, even those who are off duty. The Ops room should
display all maps of the area of operations, duty rosters, location board, so at a glance you
can see where your manpower, vehicle and the VIPs are.

A comprehensive list of kit is required to stock an Ops room: -

• Radio base station
• Hand held transceivers
• Mobile repeaters
• Chargers & extra batteries
• Adaptors
• Mobile phones
• Notebook computer and printer
• CCTV monitors
• Landlines and exchange for the main residence
• Direct telephone lines
• Fax machine
• Full first aid kit
• X-ray machine to screen mail & packages
• Fire fighting equipment
• Vehicle search kit
• Room search kit
• Bomb blanket
• Gas masks
• Mobile alarms, panic buttons
• All Ops room documents duplicated in a go bag
You should also have a Radio Log, Incident Log, Visitors Log and a Key Log. On the staff
change over there should be a briefing on the days events + information given on any
incoming personnel or outgoing VIPs.

A typical Ops briefing will contain: -

1. Assignments and updates
2. Intelligence
3. Shift to Shift messages
4. Daily events
There will be one other main item within the Ops room. If applicable a Security cabinet
should be in the Ops room with the relevant weapons and ammo stored safely in. There
should be a log maintained for both weapons and ammo and orders for weapons &
ammunition sheet giving relevant weapons procedure.

HOTEL Security
• Always liaise with hotel security, many hotels have set procedures for their
• Often the hotels reputation is enhanced by high profile clients and will co-
operate fully

• Full advance party, recce and search procedures
Points for hotel stay
• Easy logistics and administration
Points against hotel stay
• No control over staff or other guests
• No control of building and access security
• Advance party waiting to scan the area on arrival and as added protection
• Vet all guests either side, above and below client’s suite
• Have the security control room next to the client’s room with joining
• Check all floor waiters as to noise levels on the client’s level
Selection of room/ suite
• Not below the height of thrown objects, 2 floors.
• Remain between 6th and the 10th floors for easy exit in an emergency
• Fill adjoining rooms with protection team members
• No adjoining balconies either side, below and above
• Lock and remove all keys to adjoining rooms except protection team
control room
• If possible have client suite exit through the security control room
• Site rooms at the end of hallways for better control
• Site rooms away from stairwells and lifts

RESTAURANT and Venue Security

• Avoid regular visits to the same restaurants, especially times and dates
• Do not use client’s name when booking
• Full security advance party before client arrives, one SAP member to mark
and save the table
• Client’s table sited in a secured position
• Clients table not to be sited on routes to the kitchen, bathrooms, windows
and exits
• Check for dress codes and consult with client
• If the team is not joining the client then their table should overlook but not
within earshot
• Counter-surveillance and outside team members try not to attract
attention to themselves
• If a long period elapses during the meal, rotate team members inside and
• Protection team to be one course ahead of the client’s meal
• Protection team has enough money for there and the client’s meals
• Arrange with the client an early warning signal for his exit
• For formal or award dinners vet all persons seated around the client also
any other threats and other protection teams working at the same venue.
A good counter measure for the client security, is booking false reservations… but ensure
the Manager knows of this, as would not put your client in good standing with the Restaurant
in the future.

Theatres .. and Cinemas
• Full SAP
• Book seats so that the team members are at each end of the row as well
as behind, if possible book the whole row.
• Do not seat the client in the middle of the row
• Seat near fire exit
• Always carry flashlights
• Leave either early or late to avoid the rush
• Do not take client through crowds
• Liaise with the management for emergency drills
Public Appearances
• Liaise with location security and management
• Liaise with police
• Study the guest list for problems with other guests, move seating
arrangements if necessary
• Arrange all arrival and pick up points and times
• Brief all persons presenting or have contact with your client on security
• Full comms check for black spots inside the building
• Arrange for team to rotate, for refreshments and waiting areas
• Check location security
Rostrum Security
• If the client is on stage, seat team members either side of client and
backstage looking in also at the venue entrance looking at the rostrum.
• Keep the front row of seats empty if possible
• Team must be ready to give body cover at all times
• Large stores have security; you should liaise with them
• Extra vigilance at lifts and stairways, not all the team in the lift at once us
stairs or send a team member first and secure the area.
• In smaller stores not all team to go with the client, one team member to
check back rooms and exits
• If the shop gets crowded then more protection team to enter
• If parking is a problem, vehicles to circle or park away then return when
• Be aware of all shopping centers layouts, if possible an SAP before the

OFFICE Security
The office environment should be treated as an extension of the residence. Many of the
security implementations will be the same. However it should be realized that there is a lot
more personnel, activity and visitors.

It is not often that we can choose the office location, however if it is possible, the following
guidelines will allow for greater security from a protection standpoint.
• It should be situated on main street routes with multiple choices of
• The building should not to be overlooked by premises and be out to sniper

range, especially at embus / debus points.
• The building should give you total control of security, alternatively control
of a whole floor, with the preference of occupying penthouse.
• A choice of entrances and exits that can be controlled by security, CCTV
or alarms.
• Dedicated lifts if possible.
• Garage for client vehicle with CCTV or security guard.
• Suitable outside fencing, lighting and main gate control.
• Avoid buildings with underground parking areas.
• Avoid buildings outside large car parking areas.
• If building is shared, attempt to secure clients area with its own dedicated
• Control of building access, parking, switchboards.
• 1.D badges for all personnel with area access control.
• Grilles and shutters to be fitted on ground floor windows.
• Roof entry doors, skylights etc. to be locked and monitored.
• Alarms or night security on building.
• CCTV for all approaches, entrances, stairs.
• Silent alarms and panic buttons fitted for receptionist and P.As.
• Blast proof windows, strengthened outside walls.
• Back up power supplies.
• Air conditioning systems and ventilation shafts, alarmed, secured and
checked regularly.
Client Office
• Situate office in center of building.
• If office on outside wall, situate away from parking area and not
overlooked by other buildings.
• Office network to be self-contained with reception, toilet, mailroom, within
the suite.
• Separate bathroom, kitchen and rest area for client.
• Client office to have restricted staff access with clean desk policy.
• Secretaries and security control to have direct access to client office.
• Visitor / waiting area not to have direct access to client office but via
reception area.
• Safe room for client.
• Silent alarm and panic button installed.
• Do not site client office near the mailroom.
• Visitors chairs to be sited at an angle to the client and should be deep and
soft to make sudden moves difficult.
• Unnecessary clutter kept of desk. Especially potential weapons to be used
on client.
• Client desk should be large to prevent attackers getting over or around
• Clients chair should be upright and should swivel to enable fast evasive
movements and possible hardened.
• Situate coffee tables between visitors and client's desk.
• Possible use of two-way mirror with security observation.
Daily Routines

• Similar to residence security.

..• Admittance by appointment only.
• Visitor vehicle security check if brought on property.
• Electronic visitor screening. ( Metal detectors. X-ray )
• Establish visitor-vetting routine with front reception, i.e. airlock systems.
• Searching of persons and baggage both physically and electronic.
• Security escort while on the premises.
• Only vetted workman allowed to carry out maintenance.
• What comes in with visitor goes out with visitor.
Employee education

The education of employees is essential in helping the protection team carry out their duties
and should cover the following:
• To be aware of strangers in building, especially at break periods,
beginning and end of shifts.
• Strangers using cameras, tapes, taking notes should be noted and
• Aware of inquiries where no names are left or visitors who are taking extra
care to view security procedures.
• Challenging of all unknown people in building.

CLIENT Travel Security

Collate all previous travel information if the journey has been made before, especially if the
destination is the same

Organize initial contact booking for

• Transport
• Entertainment
• Client or VIP waiting areas
• Vehicle rental
• Police or security
Prepare all movements details, timings and seating arrangements for
• Trains, planes, vehicles and taxis
• Ensure all arrival / departure timings are known as well as alternative
times for possible problems
Arrange for
• Currency exchange
• Language interpreters
• Vaccinations
• Visas
• Emergency rendezvous and safe houses
• Comms and emergency services procedures in foreign countries
• Baggage handling
Train Travel
• Full security advance party checks for routes and station

• If train has compartments, book the whole compartment for the client
• Team must command views of the compartment, corridor and platform
• Seat client appropriately
• Team members to sit directly behind the client and on the other row
• If using sleeper compartment, never book in the client’s name and ensure
client’s name is not on the compartment door
• Check all search all waiting staff before allowing them entry
Air Travel
• Full advance party for;
• Airport layout, rest areas, VIP lounge, bathrooms and restaurants
• Liaise with airport security
• Aircraft design and exit points
• Checking in procedures and passport control
• Parking and debus points
• Any firearms procedures
• Baggage to labeled and secured for team ID and evidence of tampering
• Team to handle baggage until placed in hold of aircraft, if possible load
last and collect first
• Baggage to be tagged with the business address and not the home
• Board plane behind the clients
• Exit plane in front of the clients
• Seat client in a window seat near an exit point
• One team member to carry all passports and documentation
• Liaise with all airline staff and cabin crew
Counter Hi-Jacking Precautions
• Travel on airlines that have few political enemies
• Avoid Middle Eastern and American airlines as these are prime terrorist
targets at present
• Book tickets on two different airlines and only collect one set
• Collect tickets at the airport thus minimizing your travel arrangement
• Plan to fly direct to the destination and avoid stopovers
• If a stop over is unavoidable, exit the aircraft and wait in the VIP lounge at
the terminal
• Avoid first class seats, neutral tourist seats are more anonymous
• Avoid flashy clothing and jewelry
• Operate with a clean passport, visa stamps can be placed on a separate
piece of paper

VEHICLE Travel Security

The client’s journeys will fall into one of the following categories:
• Daily Journeys - A daily part of the client’s lifestyle, traveling to work, school,
• Short Notice - Journeys made with little or notice, attending meetings etc
• Special Occasions - Journeys made and booked in advance, holidays, theatre,
Travel Vehicles

..• Utilize the most suitable vehicles for the journey/ ground covered
• Strengthened front/ rear of vehicle
• High density lights
• Individual switches for all lights
• Pressurized oil dispenser/ petrol tank explosion proof interior
• Armor plating/ bulletproof panels
• Bolt in exhaust
• Run flat tyres
Before Vehicle Entry/ Then Inside

Visual check of all surrounding area, embus/ debus location

All doors/ windows are locked when in vehicle

All windows opened no more than 1”

Driver to have clear all round view

Vehicle/ necessary paper work to be carried

Check all equipment, tool kit, first aid, flares, search kits, respirators if
Embus/ Debus
• Access the ground while arriving, anything out of the ordinary
• Do not rush
• Even team spacing, all round observation
• Give the client body cover at all times
• Avoid obvious VIP parking places
• Stop vehicles as close to the embus/ debus location as possible
• Clients door to be nearest to the entrance when stopping
• Reverse into parking spaces for easy out
• If working armed, do not use weapons hand for opening doors
• Location of arrival and departure points are the most dangerous
• Counter surveillance if possible
• Always park so that the vehicles can move off quickly and easily
• At arrival drivers to remain behind the steering wheel, hand brake off, foot
brake on, in move off gear, doors locked
• When at the destination, have the vehicles secured and alarmed or
watched at all times
In Vehicle Seating Arrangements
• Seat belts if worn, can you release quickly, get your weapon or cover the
• Client must wear seat belt
• Client never behind the driver, you can not cover from behind the driver
• Team leader in each vehicle
• Runner in each vehicle in case of lost comms
• Radio procedure to be used at all times
• All radio transmissions to be treated unsecured
• Commercial radios off
Vehicle Movements
• Where possible keep the vehicle moving
• Never sit in stationary vehicle
• Vehicle to travel at the safest speeds for the protection of the client
• Always know your exact location
• Distance between vehicles, fast, slow, heavy traffic

• Do not let anyone in between convoy
• Always be ready for evasive action
• Lead car to signal and maneuver well in advance
• Vet all cars before allowing them to pass
• Never bluff other cars, even if you have the right of way
Counter Ambush
• Change the client's vehicle without notice
• Move lead and rear vehicles around the client’s vehicle
• Convoy leaves without client; client leaves later in low profile car
• False radio comms in plain talk
• Switch arrival and departure points at the last minute
Fatal Mistakes
• Complacency
• Slow reaction time, shock to reaction
• Lack of maneuverability
• Not knowing location of vehicle
• Lack of skill training
• Lack of panic and stress training
If Vehicle comes under attack
• Client down on the floor with body cover, head rests removed
• Counter action with aggressive positive speed and determination
• Never attack the ambush unless absolutely necessary
Actions On
• Police stop or break downs
• Partial road block, drive straight through, aiming for the rear half of the
blocking vehicle
• Complete block, if possible, reverse out or PES vehicle engages target
while client’s turns away
• Beware of decoy

TEAM Formations
The Protection Team

This word can be misleading, as YOU may be the only one on the team. This means your
role can be multi-functional from Driver, Mechanic, Medic and Agony Aunt. Having said this
it is not uncommon for you to be on a job where, with various members of a Middle Eastern
royal family, there will be 30 – 40 people employed over several residences.

When starting a job there are two main areas’ that will always arise.
The close escort section, possibly three, each with three teams of four men, i.e. twelve on
duty at any time, three VIP drivers, that is four on duty at any one time, two VIP vehicles and
nine escort vehicles. This would give the luxury of three shifts in a 24-hour period. This is a
typical military structure, but the basis of this organization is where most civilian commercial
planning is derived. In reality most teams are half this number working two 12-hour shifts.

We into the swing of terminologies, abbreviations and acronyms and now need to
start to .define these terms.
• Boss or TL – Team Leader
• 2 I/c – Second in Command
• BG – Bodyguard
• PES – Personal Escort Section
• RST – Residence Security Team
• SAP – Security Advance Party
Before we look at each of the above separately, we need to look at how the levels of
resources for an operation are determined. When arranging the protection of a VIP the first
considerations will usually be, how many men are needed, and what sort of organization and
equipment is required. These answers are determined by the following factors: -
• Level and nature of the threat
• The importance of the VIP
• The VIP’s lifestyle and circumstances
• The political acceptability of a Bodyguard
• Resources available – manpower, materials and finance
Our job is varied as is the security objectives, so we aim to protect against the following: -
1. Unintentional Injury – Vehicle Accidents, Medical Emergencies
2. Embarrassing Situations – Media Control, Private Life
3. Intentional Attacks – Terrorist or Criminal Kidnapping

The following summarizes the operational side of CP work: -

• Planning
• Intelligence gathering
• Advance Security and logistics preparation
• Operations Room
• Communications co-ordination
• Information exchange
• Manpower co-ordination
• Logistics management
• Special equipment service and management
Bodyguards are the circle of protection around the VIP. The easiest way to achieve this is as
follows: -
• Observation – Using their eyes to assess the situation around the VIP
• Body Cover – By shielding the VIP with their own bodies
• Systematic Protection – Doing the job carefully – Vigilance
• Avoidance of Routine – Avoiding the habits of daily routine
• Reconnaissance and Planning – Planning and clear concise orders
• Review of Security – Always review your security procedures
• Relations with the VIP – BG’s must be professional
• Operational Security – Monitoring any leaks from the Team
• Administration – Documentation, Personnel Evaluation
Constant Training

The team should train “Actions on Drills” continuously.

Physical Fitness

It is down to the BG to maintain his own physical fitness, through self-discipline and pride.

Equipment used in the Protective Effort

1. Operatives Equipment
a. Identification
b. Communications and Alarms
c. Firearms
d. Travel and Administration
e. Personal Kit – Leather man etc
2. General Operational Equipment
a. Transportation – Vehicles, Air Travel
b. Communications – Permanent, Mobile
c. Operational Kit – Medic, Search etc
d. Technical Equipment – Explosive Detection
3. Principal’s Protective Equipment
a. Alarm Systems – Permanent, Mobile
b. Surveillance – Permanent, Mobile
c. Physical Barriers & Lighting
d. Armor – Body, Vehicles, Buildings
The best way to protect the life of a VIP in the event of an attack is to remove him or her
from the scene. However the basic assumption is that the evacuation will proceed without
1. The VIP may be killed or injured. The basic plan must continue, but the
destination will now be the Hospital.
2. One of the CP is killed or injured.
3. An obstruction makes evacuation from the scene impossible.
4. Traveling by vehicle – the vehicle is immobilized.
It is therefore our task to control the following: -

Accessibility, Vulnerability, Schedules, Routes, Habits, Attitudes and Awareness

The primary formation is the V this is a reasonably good formation as it can be closed down
easily and is very adaptable.

Fig 1 – Open V

3⊗ ⊗4

2⊗ VIP⊗ TL⊗


Fig 2 – Closed V

.. ⊗3



⊗ TL



Fig 3 – Open Box

⊗3 ⊗4


⊗ TL

⊗1 ⊗2

The box gives poor protection but favors the image. It works on low threat and low density of

Fig 1 – Closed Box formation

⊗3 ⊗4

⊗ VIP ⊗ TL

⊗1 ⊗2

Good security, but bad for the image. This is used in a high-risk area and no person should
be allowed in the box.

Fig2 – All round

⊗3 ⊗4

⊗2 ⊗ VIP ⊗ TL


This is good where a lot of people are in close proximity to the VIP, it can also be quickly
changed from closed box to all round and back again.

In reality it will be more likely that there will be only one or two Bodyguards on the job.

Fig3 – One on One


⊗ BG

This scenario is dictated because the Bodyguard is right handed to draw his weapon, but
still within arms reach of the VIP.

The side you chose to stand should be dictated by the potential threat.

If he or she is window-shopping and the shops are on the right, you’re going to have to be
on the left.

Be adaptive.

For two Bodyguards covering the VIP the most commonly used position is this.

⊗ VIP ⊗ BG

⊗ BG

But remember to adapt as your surroundings change.

Also pace is very important the VIP will dictate this, if he is with a friend chatting and walking
slowly, you should be behind them.

If they are moving fast then you will need to be out front.

Fig4 – The classic formation

.. ⊗2 ⊗ VIP ⊗ TL


Whilst there is an open front, there is the ability to give fast cover,

Arcs of Responsibility

Body cover

Whatever the profile requested by the client, we should never sacrifice security for

The BG should always be within striking distance of the client.

All escort members should have a pre-determined area of responsibility, sequentially

overlapping, and these are, jointly, areas of observation and fire.

The PES team must act as one, avoid natural hazards {alleys}, and discourage crossing
wide busy streets.

All members of the PES must know where the VIP is at all times as well as looking around
for potential hazards.

Fast, Aggressive action

Whilst CP work is generally defensive, it is only that because an attacker will more often
have the element of surprise.

Unless an attack is observed at a very early stage, a PES will always be reacting – however
that reaction must be fast and aggressive.


The first priority is to give continuous body cover. If the situation is being handled by one
person the rest of the PES should be providing cover and moving the VIP to safety.

VEHICLE Embus – Debus Drills

The client will carry out most his or her journey by vehicle which being very vulnerable, the
two main points are the embus and debus procedures.

At the point he embuses & debuses he loses the relative protection of the PES and the
maneuverability of the vehicle. Therefore this procedure has to be completed quickly and

There are six fatal mistakes that result in VIPs being ambushed.
1. Becoming complacent – day in day out routine.
2. Not reacting – Attackers rely on what is termed as dead time of shock to gain
3. Not allowing an exit point – Remember to maintain distance to maneuver.
4. Vehicle location – A lack of route awareness and safe havens.
5. Skills – No basic skills, remember your training.
6. Panic – If you panic it’s over, if you are well trained that will automatically kick
In order to counteract any threat at the embus - debus point we have established a series of
drills to help minimize the risk of any attack.

• No rushing
• Maintain distance between team members
• Correct distance between vehicles no more than 15 inches
• Vehicles to stop as close as possible to entrance or exit
• Windows closed and doors locked
• Correct use of seat belts
• Driver should know the vehicle capabilities
• All round observation
• Body cover
The driver should remain behind the wheel at all times with the engine running, it should be
in gear, with the handbrake off and foot on the foot brake. Prior to departure the vehicles
should be called forward 6-7 minutes before departure. Moving from the vehicle to the
building should be done as speedily as possible without looking panicky. As a rule of thumb
if you were a sole BG, I would let the VIP enter the building first and reverse the procedure
on the way out. The VIPs door should be in direct line with the building entrance where
possible. Doors should be kept locked for as long as possible and the VIP remains in the car
until the BG opens the door for him. If we presume that the SAP has done their job correctly
and the building is a safe area, then the VIP can lead, followed by the BG. We must also
assume that if we are in a right hand drive vehicle, the VIP must sit behind the BG on the left
hand side of the vehicle. I do not hold with the theory because a door in a building is on the
right hand side that the VIP has to walk around the car, the car can turn so the vehicle door
is on the correct side.

• The threat
• The clients habits/ know him or her
• The clients perception and attitude towards the team members
• Scheduled and unscheduled stops
• Walking drills
• Beware of embus - debus drills overseas, driving on the opposite side of
the roads

Orthodox - This is when the vehicles are stopped in such away as to allow the client to
embus - debus on the same side of the building.

Unorthodox - This is when the vehicles are stopped in such away that the client as to walk
around the vehicle in order to embus - debus to enter a building.
• Drills have to be adapted for convoys of more vehicles.
• Client should always sit in the rear of the vehicle on the opposite side
from the driver
• When entering vehicles always drop down backside first keeping feet on
the ground for a stable position, swing legs in when ready.
• When arriving the second vehicle to be in position and team members on
the ground first and in positions giving all round observation.
• When leaving team not to move until the client is safety in the vehicle,
then move in a quick manner but do not run.
• Keep vehicle distances about 12" apart, rear vehicle to turn wheels
outwards in case of a ram or fast maneuvering.
• Vehicle engines to be left running and driver behind the wheel ready for
any action.
• Vehicles to be ready before time when client is ready to depart.
Remember if the team look alert, professional and confident would be attackers may
think twice before attempting any actions.

DEFENSIVE / Offensive Driving – Anti Ambush Techniques

Before we look at specific techniques and procedures, we need to review some basic

• Protect the VIP. Should an attack occur, the BG must as is his task to
provide body cover.
• Remove the VIP from the danger area.
• All actions fast and aggressive.
• Use appropriate drills, do not attack the ambush.
• Remember double ambush tactics.

80% of attacks on vehicles result in the driver being killed or injured. Of only 20% of those
that escape, the driver remains unhurt.

Terrorists will endeavor to stop a vehicle by killing the driver.

Attacks on moving vehicles have followed one or two patterns which can be summarized as
follows: -
1. Stationary Cut – off
2. Moving Cut – off
Stationary Cut – offs {Roadblocks}

Any roadblock has been planned with the benefit of surveillance, as they must know times
and routes.

Should the worst happen, your actions depend on variable factors we have mentioned, that
is that the block may be Late, Early, Perfectly timed and may also be Partially blocked,
Perfectly blocked and also the block may have been Perceived in time or Perceived late.

The drills will either be Defensive or Offensive.

Defensive are the “Escape to the rear” options, but be aware of being blocked to the rear.

Offensive tactics are those where ramming a vehicle will need to take place.

Ramming when done properly, will severely stun, injure or even kill the attackers and give
you time to make your escape. A 4,000 lb vehicle at approx 10mph develops 160,000 ft/lb of

This energy can be transmitted to the attackers via their own vehicle. Even with
considerable front-end damage, a vehicle will still run.

Moving Cut – off or Moving Attack

The drills are aggressive and most often rely on impact. Never “side swipe” a chasing
vehicle, as you are likely to lock up both vehicles and create a perfect target for all the
firepower to be brought to bear.

To foresee such an attack, we are usually over-concentrating on what is happening ahead

and it is important always to have someone looking back to detect and anticipate an attack
from the rear.

Techniques of Ramming

• Slow down using cadence braking
• Shift into a low gear
• Brake suddenly, about two car lengths away
• Pick a point to ram {rear} when your bumper rises after braking – GO
• Keep on the accelerator
• Don’t swerve
• Drive straight through
Remember when ramming a vehicle.
• Always go for the rear of the vehicle, as the front {engine} is heavier.
• Hold the gear lever so it doesn’t jump out.
• Accelerate all the way
• Thumbs out of the steering wheel.
• NEVER hit broadside.

..• At night use full beam.

Before setting off on a journey and whilst en-route, due attendance must be paid to some
standard procedures and the usual list of do's and don'ts. Drivers must be trained BGs who
enjoy a high standard of driving skills and should have attended a course in offensive and
defensive Evasive driving.

General Rules

Know your vehicles

It is essential that you do your best to insist on accurate timings. Establish the time your
boss wants to arrive at a specific location, work backwards from your 'time en-route' from
your recce and advise as to the time you will have to leave. Be firm - leaving late could put
everyone in a flat spin, cause tensions resulting in poor convoy work and endanger the VIP
if speeds become excessive to the point of being unsafe.

If asked how long a journey will take and what time to leave - always give yourself a margin
and give them a 'soonest and latest'. The soonest is when you would like to leave the latest
is that time which could cause being late for an appointment and require an unacceptable
speed en-route. Given that information, it is then their decision when they leave, knowing the

Choice of Vehicle

Often we, as operatives, cannot influence choice but, ideally, we would like to see the
• Auto box, power steering
• Central locking doors and boot.
• Air conditioning.
• Run flat tyre system.
• Vehicle suited to normal tasks.
• Good power to weight ratio.
• Reliability.
• Not overly ostentatious ego sober color scheme.
Depending on the threat level and available resources, you should also consider: Engine
• Armoring, preferably with lightweight Kevlar or similar.
• Self-repairing fuel tanks.
• Full air-filtering system.
Ensure you have the correct and most appropriate vehicle for the journey ego four wheel
drive in snow or poor conditions, or one equipped with air conditioning in summer.

The driver must have complete familiarity with the vehicle, it's mechanics and handling
characteristics and know the driving under all conditions and be familiar with the vehicle's
characteristics when braking at speed. He must be a mechanic and a good first-aid

technician as well as a driver.

Brief all passengers with a driver's introduction, which asks all passengers to report anything
suspicious, and on the actions they should take in an emergency.

Ensure departure procedures are always followed (vehicles searched and secured if
• Engines to be warmed up before departure
• Check outside the residence immediately prior to departure for any
suspicious vehicles or individuals
• The driver should adjust all equipment to suit his comfort i.e. seat belt,
steering, mirrors
• Lock all doors and boot
• Windows closed or open no lower than two inches
• Sunroof closed
• VIP to sit in the rear, behind the BG on the opposite side to the driver
• Check Comms are working, but not immediately prior to departure. So as
not to 'warn off' the enemy
• Ensure you have time to carry out all the pre-driving checks ego POL.,
lights, brakes, indicators, tyres etc.
• Drivers must be fully competent in radio procedures and equipment and
be prepared to use a phone if Comms fail. Communications should be
established between all vehicles and arrival and departure points.
• Any SAP vehicle some three minutes only in front of the VIP vehicle if on a
daily journey
• A first aid kit should be carried inside the car - not in the boot. The vehicle
should also carry a crowbar, sledgehammer, a comprehensive toolkit and
a search kit. At least two respirators should be carried inside the vehicle,
plus fire extinguishers, some tools and spares (bulbs, fan belts, good map
book or maps, jump leads).
• The driver should keep the vehicle clean and tidy at all times and ensure
that all the equipment in his vehicle is readily available and accessible at
all times.
• A route recce card must be carried in the vehicle and the driver must be
fully conversant with the position of the safe havens, motorway entry and
exit points and have good map appreciation. If an attack occurs, it is not
the time to start studying a route recce card or map.
Remember - you are vulnerable when in a vehicle.

On The Road
• The driver should also fasten his seatbelt. There is ongoing controversy
over the BG and the use of a seatbelt, but he must be aware of the law and
not draw undue attention to the vehicle by not wearing one. The VIP
should always wear a seatbelt.
• Drive at the maximum safest speed, taking into account the road and
weather conditions and the vehicle's capabilities. Pay attention to driving
and traffic conditions.
• Drivers must be constantly aware of vehicles or obstacles, which may
cause his vehicle to be blocked. At a halt, always plan an escape route

.. such as breaking across fields, crossing traffic lanes, side streets and
turnings and fast reversing.
• 'Safest Position' - is the safest position to drive on the road, given the
actual and potential dangers as they may exist.
• He will be able to maintain a good view, which will be increased by a slight
• He can stop the vehicle safely should the vehicle in front of him suddenly
brake. c. He can extend his braking distance so that a following driver has
more time to react. d. He can move up to an overtaking position when it is
safe to do so.
• Accelerator sense - 'the ability of the driver to vary the speed of the
vehicle by accurate use of the accelerator to meet changing road and
traffic conditions’.
• He must maneuver smoothly at all times.
• When cornering, he should position early either nearside or offside, to see
around the bend quickly and maintain stability - endeavor to straighten a
winding road.
• A driver must visually scan the area several hundred yards ahead where
possible, or anticipate, by the use of intelligence gathering, where the
road will go i.e. use of tree lines or telegraph/lighting poles. He must be
alert for hazards such as objects in the road i.e. bricks, timber, potholes,
pedestrians, straying vehicles and anything out of the ordinary. His
'commentary driving' training should ensure he maintains a 360 degree
awareness at all times.
• The driver should not stare at dividing lines or at an area immediately in
front of the car's bonnet as this can lead to 'road hypnosis' and he will
switch off. This may happen on long motorway journeys.
• The driver must not allow himself to fall into a false sense of security. He
must remain alert at all times. Everyone's well being is in the hands of one
or two people - the drivers.
• Drivers should not engage in conversation whilst driving, play the
commercial radio or become distracted by activities within the car.
• Whilst waiting, do not 'bonnet' or 'nosy-park'. Never leave the vehicle
unless ordered to do so by the team leader, but equally never sit in the
vehicle if parked for a long time, then don't leave the vehicle unattended
but find a position of dominance to watch the vehicle if unable to stand
• Do not open doors for occupants unless you are the sole BG/Driver and a
one-car drill is in operation.
• Borders - when abroad there should be efficient forward-planning, to
ensure the convoy has a speedy progress without undue delays. All
paperwork, passports and weapons should be thoroughly checked.
Reconnaissance of border procedures is essential.

Always know your exact location, so you can summon assistance accurately, if needed.

Convoy Control and Procedures

As with single vehicles, there are some general rules, which need to be reasonably closely
adhered to and addressed before we can get into convoy drills, or, as we more commonly

know it - Tactical Driving or 'Tac Driving'.

Should an escort vehicle accompany the VIP car, then other considerations now apply.
Additional vehicles could be as high as 5/6 should other family members, corporate
colleagues or connected individuals accompany the Principal.


• The PES 'back-up' vehicle is only concerned with the VIP and with no
other vehicles.
• The driver must be as familiar with the threat assessment and enemy MO
as any other team member. He should know what to expect.
• The vehicles involved, in this case the VIP and PES back-up vehicle
should be closely matched in performance.
• The VIP driver must signal well in advance, turns and stops, so as to
assist the back-up driver in being able to secure in advance a lane for the
VIP vehicle and allow correct positioning.
• The PES driver must keep a constant and close watch on the VIPs car -
anticipate un signaled turns and stops, stay close when traffic is heavy
and drop back when traffic is light. The maximum distance must never be
more than 50 meters, whatever the conditions, but the closest position
would be dictated by the conditions that apply. One needs to drive close
enough to prevent any intrusion by another vehicle between the two cars,
but always leave enough room to maneuver.
• Lane procedure dictates that the PES vehicle will always be offset either
nearside or offside.
• All vehicles approaching from the rear must be checked by the PES and
monitored before being allowed to pass.
• There must be efficient communication between vehicles with the suitable
use of minimum code words.
• The VIP driver must be considerate of, and drive at all times, not only for
himself, but the follow vehicle. The very safety of men in this vehicle
depends on how well the VIP driver operates. He must not lead them into
dangerous situations by a selfish act.
• The VIP driver must not attempt to intimidate or bluff other drivers. He
may have the right of way, but it is not worth the risk to contest this, if
other traffic refuses to concede.
• Other cars must not be allowed to get between the VIP car and escort


Two Car Drills

In civilian CP work, it must be considered a luxury if resources extend to an SAP vehicle and

a QRF ..vehicle, but often you will enjoy the benefit of a PES vehicle as back-up. As outlined
in the general notes about the PES, is a follow-car which provides:
• Create room/provide cover in heavy traffic.
• Protection to the rear of the convoy and vetting of all overtaking vehicles
to the extent they can prevent vehicles from overtaking the convoy.
• Constant anti-surveillance.
• Instant reaction to incidents.
• The PES can block the road to the rear of the convoy if required and also
to the front, should a threat materialize from that quarter.
• Primarily, the PES can place themselves between the VIP and threat from
whichever direction that threat may come.
• They can provide emergency transport in the event of breakdown of the
VIP vehicle or its loss in an attack and can supply additional manpower
should the worst happen on the journey.
The position for the PES vehicle is always to the rear of the VIP vehicle and it is with this
position in mind that the following two car drills have been developed to 'afford the VIP
vehicle the most comprehensive protection from the PES vehicle.' The convoy must always
allow itself 'Room to Maneuver'.

Whilst we are going to look at the 'by the book' convoy procedures, you must always
remember that as a civilian, 'non-official' convoy, strictly adhering to procedures is likely to
get most people on the road 'pissed-off'. The resultant attention and horn-blowing directed
towards your vehicles causes unnecessary attention and embarrassment to the VIP. If, by
not using indicators, you run the risk of causing an accident - be sensible. The real world is
not the same as Government service.

SECURED Meetings
• Clients often need privacy while conducting meetings
• Schedule the meeting to be held in one room then change at the last
minute, ensuring it is placed away from an outside wall/ window
• Change the meeting venue at the last minute, bussing all parties to the
new location together
• Electronic and physical screening of all meeting participants
• Physical and electronic search of meeting area
• Remove all unnecessary furniture of the surrounding area
• Beware of gifts to client
• Secure the area once meeting has commenced
• Full counter surveillance during the meeting with scanners left operating
and calls barred. Checks to include vehicles and relevant locations for
bug receivers

ELECTRONIC Counter Measures

Why do you believe an electronic sweep is necessary?

Establish the possible Identification and movements of the opposition:

Only limited measures can be used against government bugging, sophisticated

equipment along with surveillance, mail intercept & hard wiring


Private investigators use mid range equipment & phone taps


Individuals with no experience using cheap and nasty kit

Opposition Tactics
• Prior knowledge of meetings & schedules - phone Enquirer, bugs,
• Inside information - staff & associates
• Surveillance of target
• Opportunism for planting bugs
• The amount of time opposition has had access to area for planting bugs;
hard wiring is time consuming
ECM Search Procedure
• Opposition is clever, take your time & be thorough/ systematic
• Search to be carried out under secure conditions - No staff
• Use two person teams
• Begin outside the building
Exterior Building Search
• Scan area visually - foot prints, disturbances, tampering
• Driveway & pathways
• Manholes, flowerbeds, gardens
• Vehicles or packages
• Drainpipes/ guttering
• Windows, grills/ vents
• Entrance ways & doors
• Electrical boxers, wiring, bells
Interior Search Procedures
• Scan room visually
• Close eyes and listen to the room taking in all the sounds
• Divide the room into half and begin to sweep in opposite directions
• Floor to waste height, waste height to ceiling, the actual ceiling itself
• Search all electrical equipment, use the function test but also pull apart
and check components
• If possible have a second model for reference
• Check all screw heads for tampering

..• All furniture should be probed, recent repairs
• Ceiling panels removed
• Walls checked for recent repairs, wallpaper, plaster
• Windows, frames, balconies
• All lifts and service areas
• Utilize electronic as well as a physical search

Hand-to-hand combat is an engagement between two or more persons in an empty-
handed struggle or with handheld weapons such as knives, sticks, and rifles with
bayonets. These fighting arts are essential military skills. Projectile weapons may be
lost or broken, or they may fail to fire. When friendly and enemy forces become so
intermingled that firearms and grenades are not practical, hand-to-hand combat skills
become vital assets.


Today's battlefield scenarios may require silent elimination of the enemy. Unarmed combat
and expedient-weapons training should not be limited to forward units. With rapid
mechanized/motorized, airborne, and air assault abilities, units throughout the battle area
could be faced with close-quarter or unarmed fighting situations. With low-intensity conflict
scenarios and guerrilla warfare conditions, any soldier is apt to face an unarmed
confrontation with the enemy, and hand-to-hand combative training can save lives. The
many practical battlefield benefits of unarmed combat training are not its only advantage.
1. Contribute to individual and unit strength, flexibility, balance, and
cardio respiratory fitness.
2. Build courage, confidence, self-discipline, and esprit de corps.
We are always surprised by the amount of people who turn up for CP training who have no
martial skills whatsoever. When it comes to the bottom line, you have to be able to fight and
remember, you’re seldom, if ever, going to be armed, due to the legislation of certain
countries. Close protection is all about avoiding the threat. But, as always there will be a
time when you will have to fight for your life and that of your honor. But to balance those
comments I am equally surprised by the martial artist that believe that because he or she is
a Black Belt they will make an excellent BG.

You will, in every circumstance have to engage the following: -

Aggression is always the primary glue that holds the rest together.

You may take any one part away from the list and you can still win, but aggression
must always stay.

I have read too many manuals about how to stop an attacker rushing towards you with a
couple of blows to vital organs. This is total rubbish; a person who is high on adrenalin and
fear with one goal of hurting you or your VIP cannot be stopped in this way. The only way he
can be stopped is to deflect the charge and or bring him down. This will never happen
cleanly and it will turn into a grappling match. At this point the rest of your team is hopefully
doing what they should be and removing the VIP from danger. Once on the floor you must

aim for the most venerable part of the body, eyes, ears, throat and testicles to name a few. If
however you take the assailant down and manage to stay upright, then in a brief few
seconds, you must make the decision as to whether to finish off the threat or re-group to
your team.

You must always train to achieve as realistic an effect as possible.

Skilled opponents know that you can never go far wrong if you engage your opponent
aggressively. Backing off from an attack, puts you on the back foot mentally as well as
physically. You must close with an attacker; forget the aim of blocking blows.


You must remember that pain alone will not stop an attacker. This person, possibly being
assisted by drugs, will seldom be stopped by Magnum rounds. One way to give him the
good news is to gain a response from the Central Nervous System to disable him. The eyes
throat and ears are good targets, but when it all goes to pot the stationary targets you
practiced on are now bobbing and weaving all over the place.

Attack may be broadly the following or a combination of a number: -

Striking attacks are the easiest to deal with. You do not have to think is my attacker skilled or
un-skilled as in the fractions of seconds you have to deal with a situation it would do you
little or no good at all.

You must make an Instant Response Action to the threat (IRA) In Battle,


To defeat a skilled kicker you must –

• Cover up
• Close up
• Sweep or grapple to the ground
At all costs any type of physical engagement should be avoided, a good BG will pre-empt
the engagement by being aware of the situation around him or her. You must act fast to take
your attacker out of the equation, you do not want a prolonged confrontation.

Chokes, grabs, traps, wrist and arm locks

First and most important principal you should be the giver rather than the receiver. Chokes
and strangles when applied properly will work within seconds, all this rubbish about kicking
or head butting backwards is crap, a good attacker will limit all these area’s from your reach.

The whole idea is speed aggression and simplicity in dealing with the attacker.

Knife Attacks

(within .reason) or just run away. But we are involved in the field of Close Protection, where
On confronting a person who is holding a knife, my advice is to give them what they want

free choice often doesn’t enter in to it.

If you are armed shoot them!

Use any weapons you can get your hands on sticks, chairs, dustbin lids, etc.

You are going to have to move in close, it is all a question of Distance / Reaction. You will
for sure receive some damage but if you use your forearms no major arteries will be cut.
Although the Legislation in a country allows it or not I always carry an ASP telescopic baton
to give the offender the good news with.

Defense against Hand Gun attacks

Unfortunately it has become so easy to obtain firearms on the black market, that the weapon
of choice nowadays is a firearm.

A person will have 2 main objectives if he attacks with a gun: -

1. To Kill
2. To Kidnap
Under stressful conditions with people around them, the chances of an assassin hitting a
target at anything over 15 feet is unlikely. If you research most attempted assassinations the
assassin is usually very close.

What do you look for in a person who would attempt such a task.

Stress, Tension, Nervousness, over-concentration and Fear.

If you can spot this and move towards the offender, you are cutting these persons options
down and giving them less time to react.

So, you’ve had a handgun pulled on you and you are unarmed, this is not one of those times
you close up and rush the target.


Bring him in! – If he is not within reach, he must be induced to come closer to you or for you
to move closer to him.

An expert assailant will know that a short - barreled weapon held tight against the body is
extremely hard to take away from someone.

Despite fear and stress, you have to be calm enough to assimilate as much information as
pertinent to your safety and survival.

Before we start with this we need to first look at what type of firearm is being used, a
revolver – either single or double action or a high spec automatic.

My preference to be faced with is a revolver, which would require a full pull through to action
it in double action mode and similar with a pistol.

(No knee jerk reaction with a revolver)

With an automatic I have heard of stories about training to push back the slide to stop it
firing. To do this you have to be extremely skilled and prepared to take a risk.

Not for me!

We now have the assailant in close pointing a handgun at you. Firstly you probably have
about ⅔ of a second to move out of the line of fire.

9 times out of 10 the weapon will be pointed at your head, this actually makes life easier as
all you have to move is your head.

Note: - To hit a weapon hand when the weapon is pointing in your face means that
movement of your arms happens below his line of site, sheltered by his own arm.

A split second before you strike, look away. You won’t lose your point of contact and he will
feel that he is in control of the situation.

You need to strike the weapon hand away from you, but keeping control of the hand so it
doesn’t come back on you.

You must now finish him off, if both hands are tied up, use your head or knee’s.

Dos and Don’ts

• If you are ordered to put your hands up never raise them above head
• Do not show any prior movement towards the weapon, don’t stare; the
eyes give the game away.
• Always keep the weapon in your peripheral vision
• Try to act natural – Frightened.


There are basic principles that the hand-to-hand fighter must know and apply to successfully
defeat an opponent. The principles mentioned are only a few of the basic guidelines that are
essential knowledge for hand-to-hand combat. There are many others, which through years
of study become intuitive to a highly skilled fighter.

Physical Balance. Balance refers to the ability to maintain equilibrium and to remain in a
stable, upright position. A hand-to-hand fighter must maintain his balance both to defend
himself and to launch an effective attack. Without balance, the fighter has no stability with
which to defend himself, nor does he have a base of power for an attack. The fighter must
understand two aspects of balance in a struggle:
• How to move his body to keep or regain his own balance. A fighter develops
balance through experience, but usually he keeps his feet about shoulder-width
apart and his knees flexed. He lowers his center of gravity to increase stability.
• How to exploit weaknesses in his opponent's balance. Experience also
gives the hand-to-hand fighter a sense of how to move his body in a fight to
maintain his balance while exposing the enemy's weak points.
Mental Balance. The successful fighter must also maintain a mental balance. He must not
allow fear or anger to overcome his ability to concentrate or to react instinctively in hand-to-
hand combat.

Position. .. Position
A vital principle
refers to the location of the fighter (defender) in relation to his opponent.
when being attacked is for the defender to move his body to a safe position--
that is, where the attack cannot continue unless the enemy moves his whole body. To
position for a counterattack, a fighter should move his whole body off the opponent's line of
attack. Then, the opponent has to change his position to continue the attack. It is usually
safe to move off the line of attack at a 45-degree angle, either toward the opponent or away
from him, whichever is appropriate. This position affords the fighter safety and allows him to
exploit weaknesses in the enemy's counterattack position. Movement to an advantageous
position requires accurate timing and distance perception.

Timing. A fighter must be able to perceive the best time to move to an advantageous
position in an attack. If he moves too soon, the enemy will anticipate his movement and
adjust the attack. If the fighter moves too late, the enemy will strike him. Similarly, the fighter
must launch his attack or counterattack at the critical instant when the opponent is the most

Distance. Distance is the relative distance between the positions of opponents. A fighter
positions himself where distance is to his advantage. The hand-to-hand fighter must adjust
his distance by changing position and developing attacks or counterattacks. He does this
according to the range at which he and his opponent are engaged

Momentum. Momentum is the tendency of a body in motion to continue in the direction of

motion unless acted on by another force. Body mass in motion develops momentum. The
greater the body mass or speed of movement, the greater the momentum. Therefore, a
fighter must understand the effects of this principle and apply it to his advantage.

The fighter can use his opponent's momentum to his advantage--that is, he can place the
opponent in a vulnerable position by using his momentum against him.
• The opponent's balance can be taken away by using his own momentum.
• The opponent can be forced to extend farther than he expected, causing
him to stop and change his direction of motion to continue his attack.
• An opponent's momentum can be used to add power to a fighter's own
attack or counterattack by combining body masses in motion.
The fighter must be aware that the enemy can also take advantage of the principle of
momentum. Therefore, the fighter must avoid placing himself in an awkward or vulnerable
position, and he must not allow himself to extend too far.

Learn how to break your fall

If your intention is to run your opponent backwards at 100mph into any object, particularly
the floor, self-preservation in your opponent will cause him to release his grip on you.

You must train to develop an instinctive reaction to dropping and twisting body weight to
break free of bear hugs and hit the ground running.

Elbows – Used properly, they are one of the best close quarter weapons available.
They are extremely hard to block and are like having a heavy hammer in your
personal arsenal.

Fists – Give you the range to your target, however some people just cannot punch
and usually do more damage to themselves rather than the opponent.

Kicks – These are extremely difficult to use effectively in a street fight.

The main target areas that you should aim for if you have to kick are, the stomach,
and anything below the waist knees’ Groin etc.

Grappling – learn how! Some 90% of street battles will end up with two people
wrestling each other to the ground. Remember what you have been taught so far
use everything at your disposal, head butt, bite and elbow.

Blunt Instruments – These are like the TKD kickers, give them distance and they
will beat you to death. As before you will have to COVER UP AND RUSH IN.

Leverage. A fighter uses leverage in hand-to-hand combat by using the natural movement
of his body to place his opponent in a position of unnatural movement. The fighter uses his
body or parts of his body to create a natural mechanical advantage over parts of the
enemy's body. He should never oppose the enemy in a direct test of strength; however, by
using leverage, he can defeat a larger or stronger opponent.
Close Range Unarmed Combat.
In close-range combative, two opponents have closed the gap between them so they can
grab one another in hand-to-hand combat. The principles of balance, leverage, timing, and
body positioning are applied. Throws and takedown techniques are used to upset the
opponent's balance and to gain control of the fight by forcing him to the ground. Chokes can
be applied to quickly render an opponent unconscious. The soldier should also know
counters to choking techniques to protect himself. Grappling involves skilful fighting against
an opponent in close-range combat so that a soldier can win through superior body
movement or grappling skills. Pain can be used to disable an opponent. A soldier can use
painful eye gouges and strikes to soft, vital areas to gain an advantage over his opponent

Mid Range Unarmed Combat

In medium-range combative, two opponents are already within touching distance. The
arsenal of possible body weapons includes short punches and strikes with elbows, knees,
and hands. Head butts are also effective; do not forget them during medium-range combat.
A soldier uses his peripheral vision to evaluate the targets presented by the opponent and
choose his target. He should be aggressive and concentrate his attack on the opponent's
vital points to end the fight as soon as possible.

Long Range Unarmed Combat

In long-range combative, the distance between opponents is such that the combatants can
engage one another with fully extended punches and kicks or with handheld weapons, such
as rifles with fixed bayonets and clubs. As in medium-range combative, a fighter must
continuously monitor his available body weapons and opportunities for attack, as well as
possible defence measures. He must know when to increase the distance from an opponent
and when to close the gap. The spheres of influence that surround each fighter come into
contact in long-range combative.

PISTOL Marksmanship Training



The main use of the pistol or revolver is to engage an enemy at close range with quick,
accurate fire. Accurate shooting results from knowing and correctly applying the elements of
marksmanship. The elements of combat pistol or revolver marksmanship are:

..• Grip.
• Aiming.
• Breath control.
• Trigger squeeze.
• Target engagement.
• Positions.

The weapon must become an extension of the hand and arm. It should replace the finger in
pointing at an object. A firm, uniform grip must be applied to the weapon. A proper grip is
one of the most important fundamentals of quick fire.

One-Hand Grip. Hold the weapon in the nonfiring hand; form a V with the thumb
and forefinger of the strong hand (firing hand). Place the weapon in the V with the
front and rear sights in line with the firing arm. Wrap the lower three fingers around
the pistol grip, putting equal pressure with all three fingers to the rear. Allow the
thumb of the firing hand to rest alongside the weapon without pressure. Grip the
weapon tightly until the hand begins to tremble; relax until the trembling stops. At
this point, the necessary pressure for a proper grip has been applied. Place the
trigger finger on the trigger between the tip and second joint so that it can be
squeezed to the rear. The trigger finger must work independently of the remaining

Two-Hand Grip. The two-hand grip allows the firer to steady the firing hand and
provide maximum support during firing. The nonfiring hand becomes a support
mechanism for the firing hand by wrapping the fingers of the nonfiring hand around
the firing hand. Two-hand grips are recommended for all pistol and revolver firing.

Fist grip. Grip the weapon as described in paragraph a above. Firmly close the
fingers of the nonfiring hand over the fingers of the firing hand, ensuring that the
index finger from the nonfiring hand is between the middle finger of the firing hand
and the trigger guard. Place the nonfiring thumb alongside the firing thumb.

Palm-supported grip. This grip is commonly called the cup and saucer grip. Grip
the firing hand as hand. Place the nonfiring hand under the firing hand, wrapping
the nonfiring fingers around the back of the firing hand. Place the nonfiring thumb
over the middle finger of the firing.)

Weaver grip. Apply this grip the same as the fist grip. The only exception is that the
nonfiring thumb is wrapped over the firing thumb.

Isometric Tension. The firer raises his arms to a firing position and applies
isometric tension. This is commonly known as the push-pull method for maintaining
weapon stability Isometric tension is when the firer applies forward pressure with the
firing hand and pulls rearward with the nonfiring hand with equal pressure. This
creates an isometric force but never so much to cause the firer to tremble. This
steadies the weapon and reduces barrel rise from recoil. The supporting arm is bent
with the elbow pulled downward. The firing arm is fully extended with the elbow and
wrist locked. The firer must experiment to find the right amount of isometric tension
to apply.

Natural Point of Aim. The firer should check his grip for use of his natural point of aim. He
grips the weapon and sights properly on a distant target. While maintaining his grip and
stance, he closes his eyes for three to five seconds. He then opens his eyes and checks for
proper sight picture. If the point of aim is disturbed, the firer adjusts his stance to

compensate. If the sight alignment is disturbed, the firer adjusts his grip to compensate by
removing the weapon from his hand and reapplying the grip. The firer repeats this process
until the sight alignment and sight placement remain almost the same when he opens his
eyes. This enables the firer to determine and use his natural point of aim once he has
sufficiently practiced. This is the most relaxed position for holding and firing the weapon.


Aiming is sight alignment and sight placement sight alignment is the centering of the front
blade in the rear sight notch. The top of the front sight is level with the top of the rear sight
and is in correct alignment with the eye. For correct sight alignment, the firer must center the
front sight in the rear sight. He raises or lowers the top of the front sight so it is level with the
top of the rear sight.

Sight placement is the positioning of the weapon's sights in relation to the target as seen by
the firer when he aims the weapon. A correct sight picture consists of correct sight alignment
with the front sight placed center mass of the target. The eye can focus on only one object at
a time at different distances. Therefore the last focus of the eye is always on the front sight.
When the front sight is seen clearly, the rear sight and target will appear hazy. Correct sight
alignment can only be maintained through focusing on the front sight. The firer's bullet will hit
the target even if the sight picture is partly off center but still remains on the target.
Therefore, sight alignment is more important than sight placement. Since it is impossible to
hold the weapon completely still, the firer must apply trigger squeeze and maintain correct
sight alignment while the weapon is moving in and around the center of the target. This
natural movement of the weapon is referred to as wobble area. The firer must strive to
control the limits of the wobble area through proper breath control, trigger squeeze,
positioning, and grip.

Sight alignment is essential for accuracy because of the short sight radius of the
pistols and revolvers. For example, if a 1/10-inch error is made in aligning the front
sight in the rear sight, the firer's bullet will miss the point of aim by about 15 inches at
a range of 25 meters. The 1/10-inch error in sight alignment magnifies as the range
increases--at 25 meters it is magnified 150 times.

Focusing on the front sight while applying proper trigger squeeze will help the firer resist the
urge to jerk the trigger and anticipate the actual moment the weapon will fire. Mastery of
trigger squeeze and sight alignment requires practice. Trainers should use concurrent
training stations or have fire ranges to enhance proficiency of marksmanship skills.


The firer must learn to hold his breath properly at any time during the breathing cycle if he
wishes to attain accuracy that will serve him in combat. This must be done while aiming and
squeezing the trigger. While the procedure is simple, it requires explanation, demonstration,
and supervised practice. To hold the breath properly the firer takes a breath, lets it out, then
inhales normally, lets a little out until comfortable, holds, and then fires. It is difficult to
maintain a steady position keeping the front sight at a precise aiming point while breathing.
Therefore, the firer should be taught to inhale, then exhale normally, and hold his breath at
the moment of the natural respiratory pause ( Breath control, firing at a single target.) The
shot must then be fired before he feels any discomfort from not breathing. When multiple
targets are presented, the firer must learn to hold his breath at any part of the breathing
cycle. Breath control must be practiced during dry-fire exercises until it-becomes a natural
part of the firing process.


Improper .. triggerPoorsqueeze
causes more misses than any other step of preparatory
shooting is caused by the aim being disturbed before the bullet leaves
the barrel of the weapon This is usually the result of the firer jerking the trigger or flinching. A
slight off-center pressure of the trigger finger on the trigger can cause the weapon to move
and disturb the firer's sight alignment. Flinching is an automatic human reflex caused by
anticipating the recoil of the weapon. Jerking is an effort to fire the weapon at the precise
time the sights align with the target.

Trigger squeeze is the independent movement of the trigger finger in applying increasing
pressure on the trigger straight to the rear, without disturbing the sight alignment until the
weapon fires. The trigger slack, or free play, is taken up first, and the squeeze is continued
steadily until the hammer falls. If the trigger is squeezed properly, the firer will not know
exactly when the hammer will fall; thus, he does not tend to flinch or heel, resulting in a bad
shot. Novice firers must be trained to overcome the urge to anticipate recoil. Proper
application of the fundamentals will lower this tendency.

To apply correct trigger squeeze, the trigger finger should contact the trigger between the tip
of the finger to the second joint (without touching the weapon anywhere else). Where
contact is made depends on the length of the firer's trigger finger. If pressure from the trigger
finger is applied to the right side of the trigger or weapon, the strike of the bullet will be to the
left. This is due to the normal hinge action of the fingers. When the fingers on the right hand
are closed, as in gripping, they hinge or pivot to the left, thereby applying pressure to the
left. (With left-handed firers, this action is to the right.) The firer must not apply pressure left
or right but increase finger pressure straight to the rear Only the trigger Linger must perform
this action. Dry-fire training improves a firer's ability to move the trigger finger straight to the
rear without cramping or increasing pressure on the hand grip.
• The firer who is a good shot holds the sights of the weapon as nearly on
the target center as possible and continues to squeeze the trigger with
increasing pressure until the weapon fires.
• The person who is a bad shot tries to "catch his target" as his sight
alignment moves past the target and fires the weapon at that instant. This
is called ambushing, which causes trigger jerk.
Follow-through is the continued effort of the firer to maintain sight alignment before, during,
and after the round has fired. The firer must continue the rearward movement of the finger
even after the round has been fired. Releasing the trigger too soon after the round has been
fired results in an uncontrolled shot, causing a missed target.


The closest and most dangerous multiple target in combat is engaged first and should be
fired at with two rounds. This is commonly referred to as a double tap. The firer then
traverses and acquires the next target, aligns the sights in the center of mass, focuses on
the front sight, applies trigger squeeze, and fires. The firer ensures his firing arm elbow and
wrist are locked during all engagements. If the firer has missed the first target and has fired
upon the second target, he shifts back to the first and engages it. Some problems in target
engagement are as follows:

Recoil Anticipation. When a soldier first learns to shoot, he may begin to anticipate recoil.
This reaction may cause him to tighten his muscles during or just before the hammer falls.
He may fight the recoil by pushing the weapon downward in anticipating or reacting to its
firing. In either case, the rounds will not hit the point of aim. A good method to show the firer
that he is anticipating the recoil is the ball-and-dummy method.

Trigger Jerk. Trigger jerk occurs when the soldier sees that he has acquired a good sight
picture at center mass and "snaps" off a round before the good sight picture is lost. This may
become a problem, especially when the soldier is learning to use a flash sight picture.

Heeling. Heeling is caused by a firer tightening the large muscle in the heel of the hand to
keep from jerking the trigger. A firer who has had problems with jerking the trigger tries to
correct the fault by tightening the bottom of the hand, which results in a heeled shot. Heeling
causes the strike of the bullet to hit high on the firing hand side of the target. The firer can
correct shooting errors by knowing and applying correct trigger squeeze.


The qualification course is fired from a standing kneeling, or crouch position. All of the firing
positions described below must be practiced so they become natural movements, during
qualification and combat firing. Though these positions seem natural, practice sessions must
be conducted to ensure the habitual attainment of correct firing positions. Assuming correct
firing positions ensures that soldiers can quickly assume these positions without a conscious
effort. Pistol marksmanship requires a soldier to rapidly apply all the fundamentals at
dangerously close targets while under stress. Assuming a proper position to allow for a
steady aim is critical to survival.

Pistol-Ready Position. In the pistol-ready position, hold the weapon in the one-
hand grip. Hold the upper arm close to the body, and the forearm at about a 45ø
angle. Point the weapon toward target center as you move forward.

Standing Position Without Support. Face the target. Place feet a comfortable
distance apart, about shoulder width. Extend the firing arm and attain a two-hand
grip. The wrist and elbow of the firing arm are locked and pointed toward target
center. Keep the body straight with the shoulders slightly forward of the buttocks.

Kneeling Position. In the kneeling position, ground only the firing side knee as the
main support. Vertically place the foot, used as the main support, under the
buttocks. Rest the body weight on the heel and toes. Rest the nonfiring arm just
above the elbow on the knee not used as the main body support.

Use the two-handed grip for firing. Extend the firing arm, and lock the firing arm
elbow and wrist to ensure solid arm control.

Crouch Position. Use the crouch position when surprise targets are engaged at
close range. Place the body in a forward crouch (boxer's stance) with the knees
bent slightly and trunk bent forward from the hips to give faster recovery from recoil.
Place the feet naturally in a position that allows another step toward the target.
Extend the weapon straight toward the target, and lock the wrist and elbow of the
firing arm. It is important to consistently train with this position, since the body will
automatically crouch under conditions of stress such as combat. It is also a faster
position from which to change direction of fire.

Prone Position. Lie flat on the ground, facing the target. Extend arms in front with
the firing arm locked. The arms may have to be slightly unlocked for firing at high
targets. Rest the butt of the weapon on the ground for single, well-aimed shots.
Wrap the nonfiring hand (fingers) around the fingers of the firing hand. Face forward.
Keep the head down between arms as much as possible and behind the weapon.

Standing Position With Support. Use available cover for support--for example, a
tree or wall to stand behind. Stand behind a barricade with the firing side on line with

..the edge of the barricade. Place the knuckles of the nonfiring fist at eye level against
the edge of the barricade. Lock the elbow and wrist of the firing arm. Move the foot
on the nonfiring side forward until the toe of the boot touches the bottom of the

Kneeling Supported Position. Use available cover for support--for example, use a
low wall, rocks, or vehicle. Place the firing-side knee on the ground. Bend the other
knee and place the foot (nonfiring side) flat on the ground, pointing toward the
target. Extend arms alongside and brace them against available cover. Lock the
wrist and elbow of the firing arm. Place the nonfiring hand around the fist to support
the firing arm. Rest the nonfiring arm just above the elbow on the nonfiring-side


After a soldier becomes proficient in the fundamentals of marksmanship, he progresses to

advanced techniques of combat marksmanship. The main use of the pistol or revolver is to
engage the enemy at close range with quick, accurate fire. In shooting encounters, it is not
the first round fired that wins the engagement, but the first accurately fired round. The soldier
should use his sights when engaging the enemy, the only exception being if this would place
the weapon within arm's reach of the enemy.

TECHNIQUES OF FIRING (Hand-and-Eye Coordination)

Hand-and-eye coordination is not a natural, instinctive ability for all soldiers. It is usually a
learned skill obtained by practicing the use of a flash sight picture. The more a soldier
practices raising the weapon to eye level and obtaining a flash sight picture, the more
natural the relationship between soldier, sights, and target becomes. Eventually, proficiency
elevates to a point so that the soldier can accurately engage targets in the dark. Each
soldier must be aware of this trait and learn how to best use it. Poorly coordinated soldiers
can achieve proficiency by being closely supervised. Everyone has the ability to point at an
object. Since pointing the forefinger at an object and extending the weapon toward a target
are much the same, the combination of the two are natural. Making the soldier aware of this
ability and teaching him how to apply it when firing results in success when engaging enemy
targets in combat.

The eyes focus instinctively on the center of any object observed. After the object is sighted,
the firer aligns his sights on the center of mass, focuses on the front sight, and applies
proper trigger squeeze. Most crippling or killing hits result from maintaining the focus on the
center of mass. The eyes must remain fixed on some part of the target throughout firing.

When a person points, he instinctively points at the feature on the object on which his
eyes are focused. An impulse from the brain causes the arm and hand to stop when
the finger reaches the proper position. When the eyes are shifted to a new object or
feature, the finger, hand, and arm also shift to this point. It is this inherent trait that
can be used by the soldier to rapidly and accurately engage targets. This instinct is
called hand-and-eye coordination.

Flash Sight Picture. Usually when engaging an enemy at pistol/revolver ranges, the firer
has little time to ensure a correct sight picture. The quick-kill (or natural point of aim) method
does not always ensure a first-round hit. A compromise between a correct sight picture and
the quick-kill method is known as a flash sight picture. As the soldier raises the weapon to
eye level, his point of focus switches from the enemy to the front sight, ensuring that the
front and rear sights are in proper alignment left and right, but not necessarily up and down.
Pressure is applied to the trigger as the front sight is being acquired, and the hammer falls

as the flash sight picture is confirmed. Initially, this method should be practiced slowly,
gaining speed as proficiency increases.

Quick-Fire Point Shooting. This is for engaging an enemy at less than 5 yards. It is also
useful for night firing. The weapon should be held in a two-hand grip. It is brought up close
to the body until it reaches chin level and is then thrust forward until both arms are straight.
The-arms and body form a triangle, which can be aimed as a unit. In thrusting the weapon
forward, the firer can imagine that there is a box between him and the enemy, and he is
thrusting the weapon into the box. The trigger is smoothly squeezed to the rear as the
elbows straighten out.

Quick-Fire Sighting. This is used when engaging an enemy at 5 to 10 yards away. It is

used only when there is no time available to get a full picture. The firing position is the same
as for quick-fire point shooting. The sights are aligned left and right to save time, but not up
and down. The firer must determine in practice what the sight picture will look like and where
the front sight must be aimed to hit the enemy in the chest.


In close combat, there is seldom time to precisely apply all of the fundamentals of
marksmanship. When a person fires a round at the enemy, many times he will not
know if he hit his target. Therefore, two rounds should be fired at the target. This is
called a double tap. If the enemy continues to attack, two more shots should be
placed in the pelvic area to break the body's support structure, causing the enemy to


Traversing 360ø. In close combat, the enemy may be attacking from all sides. The soldier
may not have time to constantly change his position to adapt to new situations. The purpose
of the crouching or kneeling traverse 360ø is to fire in any direction without moving the feet.
The firer remains in the crouch position with feet almost parallel to each other. The following
instructions are for a right-handed firer. The two-hand grip is used at all times except for
over the right shoulder. Turning will be natural on the balls of the feet.


Reloading was an overlooked problem for many years until it was discovered that soldiers
were being killed due to dropping of magazines, shaking hands, placing magazines in
backward, and placing empty magazines back into the weapon. The stress state induced by
a life-threatening situation causes soldiers to do things they would not otherwise do.
Consistent, repeated training is needed to avoid such mistakes.

STEP 1: Develop a consistent method for carrying magazines in the ammunition

pouches. All magazines should face down with the bullets facing forward and to the
center of the body.

STEP 2: Know when to reload. When possible, count the number of rounds fired.
However, it is possible to lose count in close combat. If this happens, there is a
distinct difference in recoil of the pistol when the last round has been fired. Change
magazines when two rounds may be left--one in the magazine and one in the
chamber. This prevents being caught with an empty weapon at a crucial time.
Reloading is faster with a round in the chamber since time is not needed to release
the slide.

..STEP 3: Obtain a firm grip on the magazine. This precludes the magazine being
dropped or difficulty in getting the magazine into the weapon. Ensure the knuckles of
the hand are toward the body while gripping as much of the magazine as possible.
Place the index finger high on the front of the magazine when withdrawing from the
pouch. Use the index finger to guide the magazine into the magazine well.

STEP 4: Know which reloading procedure to use for the tactical situation. There are
three systems of reloading: rapid, tactical, and one-handed. Rapid reloading is used
when the soldier's life is in immediate danger, and the reload must be accomplished
quickly. Tactical reloading is used when there is more time, and it is desirable to
keep the replaced magazine because there are rounds still in it or it will be needed
again. One-handed reloading is used when there is an arm injury.

Rapid Reloading.
• Place your hand on the next magazine in the ammunition pouch to ensure
there is another magazine.
• Withdraw the magazine from the pouch while releasing the other magazine
from the weapon.
• Let the replaced magazine drop to the ground.
• Insert the replacement magazine, guiding it into the magazine well with the
index finger.
• Release the slide, if necessary.
• Pick up the dropped magazine if time allows. Place it in your pocket, not
back into the ammunition pouch where it may become mixed with full
Tactical Reloading.
• Place your hand on the next magazine in the ammunition pouch to ensure
there is a remaining magazine.
• Withdraw the magazine from the pouch.
• Drop the used magazine into the palm of the nonfiring hand, which is the
same hand holding the replacement magazine.
• Insert the replacement magazine, guiding it into the magazine well with the
index finger.
• Release the slide, if necessary.
• Place the used magazine into a pocket. Do not mix it with full magazines.
One-Hand Reloading.
• With the right hand.
• Push the magazine release button with the thumb.
• Place the safety ON with the thumb if the slide is forward.
• Place the weapon backwards into the holster.
• Insert the replacement magazine.
• Withdraw the weapon from the holster.
• Remove the safety with the thumb if the slide is forward, or push the slide
release if the slide is back.
With the left hand.
• Push the magazine release button with the middle finger.
• Place the safety ON with the thumb if the slide is forward. With the .45-
caliber pistol, the thumb must be switched to the left side of the weapon.
• Place the weapon backwards into the holster.
• Insert the replacement magazine.

• Remove the weapon from the holster.
• Remove the safety with the thumb if the slide is forward, or push the slide
release lever with the middle finger if the slide is back.

These are the basic stances used in firing

a handgun. As you can see a young
teenager is demonstrating the moves.
This proves it is not difficult to learn.

Firing from protective cover.

Last round spent

One/ Change
action / eject magazine Magazine gone / replace & return fire.
while reaching for a new clip.


Poor visibility firing with any weapon is difficult since

shadows can be misleading to the person. This is mainly
true during EENT and EMNT (a half hour before dark and
a half hour before dawn). Even though the weapon is a
short-range weapon, the hours of darkness and poor
visibility further decrease its effect. To compensate, the
operative must use the three principles of night vision.

Dark Adaptation. This process conditions the eyes to

see during poor visibility conditions. The eyes usually
need about 30 minutes to become 98- percent dark
adapted in a totally darkened area.

Off-Center Vision. When looking at an object in daylight,

a person looks directly at it. However, at night he would

see the..object only for a few seconds. To see an object in darkness, he must concentrate on
it while .looking 6ø to 10ø away from it.

Scanning. This is the short, abrupt, irregular movement of the firer's eyes around an object
or area every 4 to 10 seconds. When artificial illumination is used, the firer uses night fire
techniques to engage targets, since targets seem to shift without moving.

Weapon Selection & Handling

If Unarmed Combat for the Close Protection operative could realistically take up a book in its
own right, then a complete dissertation on this subject could probably fill four, but at the end
of it we'd also equally be none the wiser. No other subject matter contains such divergent
views on so many aspects and I've tried to give a somewhat different slant on the process.
I've concentrated on Handgun selection, although touched on the role of shotguns and full
autos. For most operatives, it will be the exception that they will get to carry a weapon in the
civiy field and out of that small percentage, even fewer will carry a full auto weapon.
Shotguns, particularly where a large estate is involved, can be a standard piece of kit,
although no one will own up to carrying one for any more concrete purpose than culling the
local rabbit population. The scene we set for the whole of this chapter is one where the
operative is abroad.

Single BG drills. Fast accurate weapon handling with a VIP slung over your shoulder is
somewhat of a challenge. At the same time you will be tracking backwards hence the
exaggerated crouch, which gives good control of your Principal with your backside.

That being the case, predominantly, the weapon will be a handgun. There may be a wider
variety of weapons in the residence and carried in
vehicles, but we are going to concern ourselves with the
handgun side of things. Broadly, you'll be faced with
either a Revolver or Semi-auto Pistol and we'll look at the
pros and cons of both, but before that we need to
examine the role of the handgun per se, whichever the
variety, and dispel some myths.

Primarily, the handgun is a defensive weapon. It's

accuracy, out past 25ft, under severe stress conditions is
poor and, realistically, ranges of 10-15ft, given the
situations we envisage the weapon would be used in, is
probably more like an effective range. In training
scenarios I regularly see people miss man-sized targets
from 3ft under stress and time constraints. If artificially
induced, pressure can so dramatically effect accuracy, just think what being stabbed, shot at
and bombed might do to your aim. We're constantly bombarded with statistics about
handgun engagements with regard to the AVERAGE distance of a confrontation; number of
rounds fired, hit-rate, reloading characteristics etc, but one needs to carefully analyze the
source. We all quote statistics to support our individually preferred manner of tuition but for
most of us, the stats we quote are those from the very large body of case history from the
North American police and FBI experience. Whilst relevant in a broad way, in some areas
the experience doesn't relate to CP work nor, equally, does the British Police firearms
thinking which influences their CP firearms approach. No CP body of case history of any
size exists to prove any point or theory one way or another. A commonsense approach to

application, tinged with some intellectual work on the likely scenarios one can foreseeable
perceive, tested against the experience of others in similar situations may get us some way
down the road. Before moving off elsewhere, some statistical information may prove
thought-provoking and set the scene for what you are about to read.

FBI summary of officers killed, together with police gunfight data, has remained consistent -
92% of all fire-fights occur within 20 feet, with 6% out beyond 50 yards, resulting from
sniping incidents and nearly all officers killed are within 10 feet of their assailant, with half
dying at 0-5 feet. In 1988, most NYPD shootings were within 7 feet and the hit ratio was a
startlingly low 11 % ('Making a Cop', Ranchlin, 1991). The FBI's 1992 Law Enforcement
Officers Killed & Assaulted Report covered a 10-year period in which 650 officers were killed
by firearms, 500 by handguns. Distances were 367 killed at 5 feet or less and given that 500
died by handgun, the proximity at which the majority of engagements took place is truly quite
frightening. The NYPD's own, very detailed analysis, published each year of 'Firearms
Discharge - Assault Report' shows that from 1991 to 1993, with nearly 1,000 shooting
incidents as a body of experience, 52% took place in the dark and 50% were at less than 21
feet. The average number of shots fired by officers was only 4 and the average hit rate is
only 16%.

How relevant? These statistics are for trained police officers that, often, are responding to a
call and are preparing to attend a potentially dangerous scene. They may have weapons
drawn and be prepared mentally for the worst, even then the hit rate at ranges, measured
sometimes at punching range, is between 10-16%. Imagine then how difficult shooting
would be if, from nowhere out of a crowd, a gunman faced you with a drawn weapon letting
off rounds - a hit rate of 2%?? Maybe, an instinctive desires to cover up and drop? A
fumbled draw? - Whatever the result, don't believe that what you calmly practice on the
range will be how its actually going to work.

The Steyr TMP (Tactical Machine

Pistol). One of the best full auto
weapons on the market. But if
you found yourself in a GP role
where you need full - auto
weapons_ check the
remuneration part of your
contract. You don't need it.

Always bear in mind that as a CP

operative, you're likely to be
reacting to a situation not in
charge of it from the start. What
works for an armed undercover
Robbery Squad officer isn't
translatable, as he may be able to
'get the drop' so to speak. In CP
work, the boot will be on the other foot. I'd first like to go back a few years and look at some

Influences on handgun work.

In 1929 a major in the US Army Coast Artillery Corps, Wm D Fraser published a book called
'American Pistol Shooting: A Manual of Instruction in Modern Pistol Marksmanship'. It was a

.. whilst being primarily a target shooter's guide, contained some advanced
book, which,
theories on combat shooting and his breakdown of the elements of combat shooting are as
relevant today as they were sixty years ago.

• Suitable Pistol
• Accessible carrying position
• Properly made Holster
• Skillful Pistol manipulation
• Natural, accurate gun pointing
• Coolness and self-control in action
If we were to go back as far as 1906 for a synopsis of the thinking on the first point above,
i.e. 'Suitable Pistol', we would need to be a 'fly on the wall' at the invitation of the American
Ordnance Department, to manufacturers of revolvers and semi-auto to submit their designs
for competitive testing. As a result of the trials, subsequently held in 1907, the Cavalry Corp
took delivery of 200 .45 pistols, manufactured by Colt. There was a substantial resistance to
its adoption and much support for continuing with the preference for revolvers, was assisted
by the success the British were having against the Boers armed with semi-auto Mausers.
The attractions of the semi-auto were, however, undeniable i.e. (as stated at the time)....
• Reduced recoil, improving accuracy and reducing a tendency to flinch
• Facility of re-charging, especially in cold weather and when on the move
• Greater capacity of rounds in the magazine than is carried in any revolver
In 1907, the military thinking about the handgun was as accurate then as it is today. They
understood it as a weapon of last resort and that when brought into use it would be in an
environment of extreme necessity. They understood the ranges would be short and the
length of time of engagement usually brief. They summarized the requirements as follows:

• Certain Effect (stopping power)

• Speed of manipulation
• Ammunition capacity
• Accuracy
• Safety
One of the most radical designs of pistol since
the Browning. The H & K P7 'squeeze cocker' is,
in the author's view, the best pistol for a GP role.
The problem is that with the larger capacity M
16, the butt size is large, even for a big hand. It
also feels top heavy when in the holster. If you
can sacrifice some capacity then the P7 M8 is
the ideal choice.

They recognized the pistol as, a 'personal

weapon of protection' - that in skilled hands it
was convenient, accurate, reliable and safe, but
that in untrained hands, that there was more
danger from accidental discharge than from the

The Ordnance Dept. issued a pamphlet in 1912, 'Manual of the Automatic Pistol' and without
the date on it you wouldn't know it wasn't written yesterday and it echoed what we readily
accept that the handgun is a weapon of last resort, but in that role it is ideal for the job. They
referred to its limited range and to the planning required to have it accessible and to hand if
needed. The interesting aspect of the manual was its realization that pistol work is
essentially 'Grab & Shoot'. They stressed a 'great rate of fire' and 'snap shooting'. However,
the proposed underlying training in the Manual was firmly based on the 'Marksmanship'
school, emphasizing 'slow fire', target orientated shooting as the 'foundation' of combat

This polarity in combat pistol work has continued since then to the present day, where until
only recently it has dominated Police and Military thinking as to how training should
accomplish effectiveness. The classic 'off hand' dueling stance became the basis of all
marksmanship dominated pistol work. This continued with formal procedures for training in
'Principles of Marksmanship'. Unfortunately, the empirical experience of those who were at
the sharp end of pistol confrontations had no forum for the dissemination of knowledge and
were voices in the wilderness.

The 'modified' weaver stance. Whilst not ideal from

a number of aspects, it is still the stance 'of

With practice, it's practical advantages for turns,

pivots, fire and movement, all conspire to outweigh
the more static isosceles stance.

The problem is that the weaver constantly creates

a two-handed approach and experience suggests
that in a firefight, stress leads to 'instinctive' one
hand shooting.

Lost was the experience of the gunfighter of the

old west and although a lone voice could be
occasionally heard, the mould was set. At times
however, certain individuals whose experience
and strength of purpose were too strong to ignore
broke that mould. Such a man was William Ewart
Fairburn who, in the early years of this century, as
an officer in Shanghai Municipal Police was
instrumental in bringing about the most radical changes to the use and training in handguns.
The International Settlement in Shanghai was unquestionably, at that time, the single most
lawless place in the world, with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic levels.
Organized gangs of professional kidnappers roamed the streets armed with the latest in full
and semi-auto weapons and when caught would use them.

Conditions in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly packed, poorly lit, overcrowded
maze of Chinese buildings, against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters, skilled in a
variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons. The Queensbury rules and 'principles of
marksmanship' proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.

A weapon
today he
.. would
that if Fairbairn was alive
have felt completely
at ease with, the CZ 85 has to be
one of the best 'out of the box'
pistols available today. Based on
the Browning design, it is a
traditional pistol, but for reliability,
accuracy and cost, it is one of the
Fairbairn, with others, developed
combat concepts and training
systems for pistol, knife, stick and
unarmed combat that, due to its
success, was to eventually find its
way into all Commando training and
for training the special operations people in the British SOE,
(Special Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service) during
the Second World War, as well as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought
of the first 'Killing House', or 'Mystery House' as it was called then and also the 'Double Tap',
but most importantly he realized the one vital aspect of training.
From 1910 to 1919, Fairbairn accompanied nearly every patrol that was involved in a
shooting or was likely to be involved in one. From that he ascertained what natural instincts
came into play when a man was under fire or was faced with a knife or threatening situation.
As a consequence, his training in the use of handguns duplicated both the conditions where
engagements took place and natural instincts into account. He knew his men would crouch
under fire and was quite clear how they would angle their bodies and extend their weapon
arm under a variety of conditions. He trained to accommodate the instincts. He knew that his
officers would only ever have a fleeting glimpse of a target, light would be poor and they
would have unstable footing, with noise and explosions going around them, as well as being
on the move. The accepted 'principles of marksmanship' v no basis for training a man to
survive in such conditions.
I've summarized it as follows:


Over the years, we have been much influenced by target competition work from slow fire to
even the more Combat and Practical Pistol competition disciplines. There is much value that
has come from the culture dish of 'Practical Pistol', but equally there is so much 'padding'
that the core element of effectiveness is lost.

Fairbairn developed his method of 'shooting to live'

instruction where his men would trained to
instinctively fire in two shot bursts (double tap),
without ever bringing the weapons to a 'line of
sight.' Fairbairn knew that at times of stress, a
man would look at I opponent not at the sights of
his weapon and that weapon alignment should be
taught to instinctive.

The beauty of the weaver position is that one can

move into other shooting positions with ease and

the same grip and relative body position remain unaltered. Kneeling should be a temporary
position if in the open, with a brief drop to the knee to take a shot with a lowered profile and
then up and off. Don't settle onto your back heel.

If you're some distance from the threat or behind hard cover, then you can settle into the
'sniping' kneeling position and settle onto your rear heel. Not shown in the photograph on the
left is the elbow position, which should be braced
against the inside of the left knee, with both then
pressing against each other. Don't rest your elbow on
the top - bone to bone - as they simply rock about and
provide no stability.

The arguments over Stance and Grip for a handgun

will rage into the distant future to when man is shooting
'Ray Guns', as will the argument about the choice of
Revolver or Pistol. Whilst, ultimately, a matter solely of
personal preference - remember in a CP role when
abroad, choice of weapons will probably be a 'fait
accompli'. You won't have a choice, but get what
you're given. As a consequence, you must be familiar
with as wide a variety of both pistols and revolvers.
You need to know the mechanical differences,
shooting characteristics, stripping, carry problems of
as many weapons as possible. Resist the temptation
to have a personal favorite. All handguns have a different 'natural pointing ability' and will
feel different when speed drawing and endeavoring to achieve a natural 'hand/eye co-

Caliber is again a consequence of the weapon you're given but, predominantly, you are
likely to be given a semi-auto in 9mm cal. Despite what you may read, the 9mm is a 'stopper'
with the correct load. American Police engagements indicate that the chances of re-loading
in a fire fight are negligible and although police work can't entirely influence CP thinking, the
inclination would be to have as large a magazine capacity as possible, but don't ignore your
speed loading training. If you can carry spare mags. Do so.

For many people, the more 'natural' pointing ability of the revolver gives them a be chance of
accuracy, but cylinder capacity must eventually militate against their choice. 1 problem with
semi-auto pistols is traditionally one of safety. To be brought into I quickly, a pistol needs to
be in what has come to be known as 'Condition l' - locked: cocked - a round in the chamber,
hammer back and thumb safety on. Ultimately, as safe carry and operate as a revolver on
double action, it has always seemed a problem for so authorities to accept that a weapon
can safely be carried all day in that condition and drawn and used without cause for
concern. Hence the drive for a 'safe' pistol and for n we've simply ended with a situation
where 'we've painted legs on a snake". I refer to 1 double action pistols with a de-cocking
lever, designed to safely lower a hammer into (double action mode, after chambering a

Accuracy gained by having a single action pull with a traditional pistol is now lost a much
harder double action is required for the first shot, giving a totally different, a slower cadence
for the first 'double tap'. Only the 'squeeze cocker' H & K P7 has, for IT been a truly
innovative development in pistol design since Browning first sat down at 1 workbench.

Glock's. with
. their trigger safety, less so, and the majority of DA's you can bin their
development has been driven by the American police authority's need to provide safe but
regrettably emasculated pistols to police officers who are unable to train with enough rounds
through reasons of economy. This has resulted in such weapons as H & K double-action
pistol, which is simply that, a pistol that will only operate from double-action mode. If much
further development (sic) occurs we'll eventually SI cylinders introduced into semi-autos.

The H & K USP in its worst form is solely

double-action. In the text I refer to
developments, which are so ridiculous as to
reach a point where they put a cylinder on a
pistol. Well with this they are almost there.
The ultimate example of 'painting legs on a
snake '.

Even Fairbairn recognized the constraints

that economics caused in operating safely.
As his Chinese officers were restricted to
only 32 rounds as a 'qualification' course of
fire in training, Fairbairn felt unable, from a
safety aspect, to allow his men to carry
locked and cocked. He didn't even allow
them to load and unload themselves and
another officer inserted the magazine into the weapon for them after the weapon had been
holstered, before they left the station house. The weapon, carried in Condition 3, was then,
on being drawn 'actioned' to chamber a round and cock the hammer. Fairbairn had the
safety pinned back so as to be inoperative.

After nearly 30 years, 1've never had a safety problem with working from leather, with the
pistol having been in Condition 1. Safety is a function of training, correct practices and
correct adherence to safety procedures, and, fortunately, as civilians, we are not constrained
by any wider economic issues apart from the depth of our own pocket, we should endeavor
to put as many rounds down range in training as we can.

Prone. If you are going to be somewhere

for a time and you've no cover, you're
going to have to get down. Be aware that
you lose vertical vision when on the
ground. The position shown allows the
greatest mobility and flexibility of shooting
positions than being flat on your belly.

The Prone position illustrated above, is

the one that allows the greatest flexibility
of movement. By pushing the bent leg down and bending the
straight leg, you can effectively shoot from 5 o'clock, all the
way round to 7 comfortably.

You'll also find that you are able to shoot with a higher
elevation than if you were in a basic, prone isosceles, where
you will find it difficult to shoot high.

Lets first of all look at how a weapon is carried.


Holsters are 'Situational' - by that I mean they are not simply a means of carrying a weapon
rather that their design, position and use are related to a variety of situations where wearer
may find himself requiring access to a weapon under or over a range of clothing again,
themselves dictated by 'situation'.

One may be stationary, mobile in a vehicle, formally dressed, casually dressed, sedentary
all day or very active. One may even be in a pair of swimming trunks on the beach. A person
may also be constrained in how he is able to draw a weapon due to the logistics 0 situation
and all these 'tactical' factors inhibit and condition holster use design. 1 following aspects
essentially dictates the use and design of holsters:

• . The nature of the weapon

• . Security
• . Speed
• . Concealment
• . Clothes to be worn
• . Right or left handed
• . Existing preferences or prejudices
A good GP holster, this pancake type from Gould & Goodrich
has 3 slots for a variety of positions, a reinforced paddle thumb
break. It can be worn tilted on the shooter's strong side or
straight up for a cross draw should the situation demand. A
flexible piece of kit.

A vital point to bear in mind is that the greatest influence on

how a weapon is drawn is not the type of holster, but where it is
worn. A police officer, choosing a holster to be worn in an overt
role would be wanting security and accessibility. He would have
a holster with a top strap, covered trigger guard, steel springs
integral in the design to keep the weapon secure and grab free.

A CP role asks for another factor to be taken into account 'Concealment'. Concealment
unfortunately is an inhibiting factor to accessibility. The need to be covert with handguns has
led to the development of holsters, which can be worn

• . Behind the hip

• . Small of back
• . Under the arm
• . Within another carrying device e.g. 'Bumbag'
When casually dressed_ the 'Bumbag' holster is a must. It takes
considerable practice to draw a large frame auto from such a
holster_ but all the practice is worth the effort. Once you've
recovered from the 'Velcro burns' you should have quite a slick

This photo illustrates a 'cross draw' position_ but you can move the
bag more to your right and thereby facilitate a very short_ fast

standard .. draw.
Hip holsters can either be worn on the belt or inside the pants (ISP). Broadly, they can be
holsters designed to be worn 'strong side' (weapon hand side) or used in a 'cross draw'

PROs and CONs

Ankle Holster

Of little use in a CP field and are more the preserve of the undercover policemen. If one was
to spend every minute sitting down, then it may have a part to play.

Shoulder Holster

Its advantages are purely 'situational'. It has to be the ideal carry when a large degree of car
work is involved, as sitting down does not hinder its accessibility. Also, in certain formal
social engagements, where a jacket with tails is worn, then a hip holster can be untenable
and one may have to resort to use of a shoulder holster. In other circumstances, a shoulder
holster is not an ideal 'concealed carry'.

By definition, a shoulder holster involves a 'cross draw', where the weapon is held either in a
vertical position or in a horizontal one - but forward. There is nearly always a 'thumb break'
system of closure, but with practice, speed of draw is good. The major disadvantages are in
the cross draw.

The two ways to carry in a shoulder holster. Left

- in the vertical position and right in the
horizontal mode. The latter suits a medium size
pistol as distinct from a full frame semi.

To encourage 'instinctive point and shoot' ability,

we need to co-ordinate our natural pointing/eye
link. This action is like punching i.e. we don't
watch our punch when we strike a target, nor
watch the fist on its journey, we watch the target
and our co-ordination of hand eye when involved
in pistol work, happens the same way. Pointing
and punching are naturally co-coordinated for us
and we should use them for weapon alignment,
without recourse to those traditional principles of
marksmanship, where every point of reference is aligned in the first instance with the eye. If
we swing a weapon, however, to acquire a target, we lose the co-ordination of hand and eye
and so it is with a 'cross draw', where we have to swing the weapon in an arc to the target
and then endeavor to stop its swing at the right time. Swinging past and over-compensating
all come into play.

Such delay, whilst measured in factions of a second, together with suspect accuracy, all
count, unlike the hip holster draw, where it is relatively easy to align the weapon onto the
target early. With a draw from the shoulder holster, you have to wait for the swing to settle
on the point of aim, also creating in nearly every instance, a 'long arm shot' whereas, if

occasion demands, one can adopt an instinctive shot from close to the body when drawing
from the hip. At very close, even touching range, extending your arm is the last thing you
want, as your weapon can be deflected or ripped from your grasp and your shooting hand
and arm can be jammed across your chest as you attempt to draw, losing all leverage

Hip Holster

These come in a variety of designs, construction and material. They range from 'clip on' to
belt slide' with a vertical hold or with an 'FBI tilt'. Awkward to wear for long periods in a
vehicle they are, however, the favoured holster of choice. The draw can be effected quickly
and the weapon lined to the target and ready to shoot long before it may be in its final ideal
position. Its use is complicated far more by clothing than the shoulder holster, where two
hands can easily effect a smooth draw, but practice in clearing a jacket with either the strong
hand on the way to the draw, or with the weak hand from the back, makes perfect. From the
draw, the weapon can be aligned and 'punched' to the target to maximise the hand/eye co-

I use the word punched advisedly, as the punching action must not end with any impact,
which will throw the point of aim down. A more correct terminology would be point. Stability
of the holster during the draw is important and holster construction is such that there is
usually complete rigidity in the holster, with no play either with the holster or belt
combination. A spring, thumb break or tensioning screw will keep the weapon held firm
during active movement, yet give smooth, unrestricted extraction on the draw.


If you have to carry a weapon, then don't restrict your ability to use it. If you wear a topcoat,
keep it unbuttoned as with a jacket. Ensure nothing, such as a loose shirt will impede the
draw. Coming out with nothing but a handful of woolly jumper is not advised. Try methods of
weighting a coat pocket to assist the 'sweep' of the jacket to clear for the draw. Personally, I
find this creates inertia, particularly if you hook the coat in the middle as your hand moves
back for the draw. Don't wear gloves and don't get involved in carrying anything i.e. parcels,
suitcases, flowers, presents etc.


Practice speed reloads with both revolvers and pistols and establishes how best to carry
what you're going to reload with. A well honed reload with a semi-auto can be as fast as you
could fire a round, but whilst revolvers get more complicated, with practice, they can be
reloaded quickly. Speed loaders for revolvers are seldom as convenient to carry as a flat
magazine with 15 rounds for a pistol.

A body of evidence says, however, that reloading in a fire fight is not a common feature, but
that shouldn't negate one's thinking on carrying a good supply of ammo and how best to
reload quickly.

Stance, Grip, Target Acquisition


W.E. Fairbairn was the leading exponent, through personal observation of 'behavior under
fire' and he categorized such behavior and personal preferences of his men. He was able to
conclude that - "Stance was a function of distance". He was primarily interested in people's
instinctive reaction in a fire fight and noticed the predominant variations were broadly that
the stance was 'open or closed' to the target and that his men would shoot either one or two
handed. Again, the predominant factor was the distance between them and their enemy and
here we enter a minefield.


Over the years, the influence of the so called 'Weaver' stance, with the angled body and
pushing/pulling opposing grip has come to dominate in certain quarters of combat pistol
shooting. In its defense, it has a lot going for it and allows good 'fire and movement' and
ease of getting into 'positional' shooting such as kneeling and prone. It allows 'turning' and
'targeting' more easily than say the FBI or 'Isosceles' stance and as a training stance from
which work as a foundation of instruction it is more than suitable. We must remember
though, that its so called inventor, Jack Weaver of Lancaster, California, was above
everything, a competitive shooter and, its effective use in 'Practical IPSC' competition,
popularized by Jeff Cooper has given it a pre-eminence that often doesn't allow room for the
more 'instinctive' reactions to a fire fight.

Don't believe the bollocks about the stance absorbing recoil, a stance allows you the best
platform for engagement and most flexibility of movement. Unfortunately, the instinctive
reaction to crouch under fire prohibits instinctive movement and consequently the argument
at this point in favor of the Weaver stance can weaken. The Weaver stance in its various
guises has a long history, pre-dating we are told, its supposed introduction by Jack Weaver
in the South Western Combat League matches of the '50s and later. A book called
'Shooting' written by a then Colt Firearms representative, John Henry Fitzgerald, showed a
picture of him in the so-called Weaver stance, back in 1930. The argument of stance is
actually a 'red herring' and it is more importantly the choice of shooting one-handed or
supported with the other hand, which is the real argument.

There will never be a successful conclusion to the argument as there is no correct solution
or ideal. What works at the time, works. It's that simple. What's important is that we train
people in a way that will provide responses as close to the natural instinctive response as
possible. There is little point spending countless hours trying to 'make water run uphill'.


One Hand &Two Hand Grip

In a CP role, particularly in a 'one to one' role as BG with no back-up PES, it may be

necessary with the weak hand to either fend off or hold your Principal, whilst drawing a
weapon with the strong hand and immediately you're two handed, training becomes
redundant. This scenario as described, tends however, to disguise the main argument and
that again is a person's instinctive reaction when returning fire, which, more often, will be to
shoot strong hand only.

The FBI as far back as prior to WW2 adopted two handed shooting, when they allowed
supported shooting from behind barricades at ranges out at 25-50 yards. From the

'Isosceles' one can shoot both single and double handed and when single handed, one can
shoot with an angled posture. It allows a 'combat crouch' (an instinctive reaction under fire),
but disallows mobility, particularly when completely square on and shooting two handed,
unlike the modified Weaver which allows far more flexibility for fire and movement.

Two handed shooting obviously has its place and is advocated by those people who favor
the requirement of a 'flash site picture' as distinct from the 'instinctive' shooter. Personally, I
do not feel that the two schools of thinking are in any way contrary as again, the argument is
purely dominated by distance. A two handed hold increases stability and therefore accuracy
of the weapon, particularly when firing multiple shots ('double taps') and also lessens the
chance of a weapon being torn from your grip.

Remember - you're coming under fire and will have to react. Speed of draw, target
acquisition and trigger release have to be a smooth continuous movement and your training
needs to be as close as possible to your natural instinct.

The Draw

Whether you are at 30 feet or 3 from your target or enemy, one thing remains constant - the
speed of the draw. At 20 plus meters, once the weapon is out you may feel relaxed enough
to take a two handed grip in a Weaver or Isosceles stance, gain a good 'Index' sight picture
and loose off a round. At 3 feet you will probably be squeezing the trigger as your weapon
has just cleared the holster and aligned with the targets. It's only distance that dictates the
process of target acquisition and stance and grip variables, but the one constant factor must
be a fast draw. Of all your various drills and practices, this is the one that you can repeat
10,000 times and it won't cost you a penny. Its a 'dry' training drill that you should practice
until you're sick of it. Practice it standing, walking, crouching, falling, sitting and running, but
practice it. Practice it with a variety of outer layers of clothing, from loose shirts to jackets
and topcoats.

The draw from the Weaver stance. From a concealed

carry, the jacket must be well clear of the holster. Note
the index finger outside the holster and stiff until such
time as it can safely acquire the trigger.

Irrespective of the range and the speed and cadence

of shots, the draw is always the same - fast. You will
never be fast and accurate, however, unless you are
smooth. Practice to be smooth before you bleed the
speed into the draw. If you go too fast too soon you will
simply be jerky and robotic. Note the slight drop of the
forward shoulder to present the butt of the weapon
better to the hand and create some air between the
back and the butt for the hand to slip between.

Accuracy is affected by two factors when drawing:

1. A poor grip
2. A jerky, robotic action (as if you were
still working by numbers)
If you acquire a poor grip on a weapon whilst in the holster, it will only get worse once its out
and you're firing. If you're not smooth on the draw, the 'jerky' action will negate the body's

automatic .. sensing system which co-ordinates hand/eye and brain.
The draw can be broken down into the following parts:
• Target acquisition
• The thumb draws across the top of the abdomen, catching the jacket, the
thumb is really to help locate the jacket as it is the little and adjoining
finger that actually catch the jacket. The jacket must be flung over the
back and anything less than a really vigorous movement will simply allow
the jacket to fall back over the butt of the weapon.
• As the fingers hook the jacket, the lead shoulder can be dropped slightly
and the rear hip, behind which the pistol is sitting, can be canted back
slightly, which helps present the weapon to the hand and also allows the
jacket to stay behind more. This is only really practical in a Weaver
position. This also allows the hand to fit between back and butt.
• The web of the thumb is dropped down over the butt plate with the index
finger down and stiff outside the holster.
• The weapon is drawn vertically up with a high arm lift and then pivoted
almost immediately to align with the target.
• As the weapon is pushed towards the target, at a point appropriate, the
safety can come off or the cocking lever squeezed and the shot taken. The
point appropriate for the safety to be released is dependent on the
situation i.e. training or for real.
The choice of grip and stance all have a part to play in the draw, but its unchangeable
characteristics are speed and smoothness. Start off slowly, keep the whole thing one
smooth action and then 'bleed' the speed into it as your actions become more automatic.
The weak hand, if of the box variety, may pull the jacket, back from behind, but this won't
work with a vented one.

Whilst in the learning phase of the short draw, it's

essential that someone check your weapon
position. As the pistol leaves the holster, it should
pivot as if the weapon hand has a screw going
through it and into your ribs, around which the
hand and weapon rotate. The butt rests on the
hipbone. In that fixed position wherever you point
the body, the weapon will point.

The 'speed rock'. At close ranges you may need

the speed of a short draw with the weapon firing
as soon as it leaves the holster and is pointing at
the target. The only concern is that there is a
natural tendency for people to push the weapon
towards the threat, even if close. In a way it's part of
a natural instinct to want to, in some way, cover
your face. Short draws do have their place and
should be practiced.

Speed and Accuracy

The two are often seen in conflict and often accuracy can fall in relation to increased speed,
but the importance of getting a weapon into action quickly cannot be stressed strongly
enough. Waiting in an undercover van, weapon drawn on 'robbery' detail with known 'faces'
to identify and the advantage of surprise, the stance and weapon support that a police
officer would adopt cannot be cross referenced to a CP situation, but in police training
manuals you will see this influence and also that of the basic principles of marksmanship. In
a CP role, the first you may know of an engagement is when a round comes through your
car window. It’s too easy to be clinical and classroom-like in the preparation of a training
package and disregard 'Instinct and Reality'.

If you come under fire and your priority, correctly, is to get your VIP away, then you need to
keep an assailant's head down. You need to divert his attention from being the attacker to
being attacked. He needs to come under fire quickly and whilst it would be ideal if you hit
and stopped him in the first instance, in reality the best you can realistically hope for is
'suppressive fire'. Distance also dictates the feasibility of being accurate. If all you have is a
handgun, it will probably only buy you time to escape. Put rounds down as quickly as
possible, endeavor to be accurate, but above all else, be instinctively quick in getting into

Target Acquisition

This means what it says - not just acquiring a 'site picture', but also establishing your target?

Incoming fire has a source. To be on aim before acquiring a target will cause a loss of
hand/eye co-ordination. The head turns; eyes acquire the target at the same time as the
strong hand goes for the weapon. The grip on the weapon at this stage is critical, as a weak,
imperfect grip will only ever get worse, never better. And when rounds are 'loosed off', a
poor grip will become exaggerated with recoil. The target is visually acquired and the
weapon drawn and 'punched' towards it. A round can be let off the moment the barrel is
pointing towards the target. The eye doesn't need to see both the target and the end of the
barrel for the body to co-ordinate with the brain.

Keep both eyes open. Under stress, we develop tunnel vision and if you've ever been
Involved in a fight or highly stressful situation, you'll know the feeling. Narrowing your
peripheral vision any further by closing one eye is not recommended. If you need to close an
eye to obtain a perfect 'site picture', then I would submit your enemy is too far away to
bother shooting. At the distances likely to be involved, I also question the necessity of
having a 'flash site picture'. As it means you've waited for a complete posture before you
engaged with a view of weapon/target. With tunnel vision, the narrow tunnel within which
your site has now to appear, on line with the target means an even longer time before you
can let a round off. Your mind can still co-ordinate your barrel to the target, without your
eyes having a part in the process. I'm not talking about 'hip shooting' rather that your
weapon is out in front, but not necessarily playing a visual part with your eye co-ordination
and the target.

As we have said previously, in a fight you don't maintain a site picture, which includes your
hands, feet, elbows and the target. We instinctively concentrate on the target and are even
able to hit a particular target on the body whilst looking elsewhere i.e. we can easily hit a
man with body shots while we look at his eyes. The same goes for pistol work. We are close
enough to the target to be able to accurately shoot 'center of mass' in an instinctive fashion,

What I .personally feel suits me, however, should not have application across a wide range
of individuals own preferences and if we lose sight of a person's own behavior and instinct,
we are going against the first tenet of training.

Positional Shooting, Turns and Pivots

At Combat Shooting's basic level for CP work, you will need to be skilled in the following:

Normal Safety Procedures (NSPs). Until you are competent to handle a weapon safe!

Under all circumstances, you will be unable to practice any drills on a range. At all time you
must treat every weapon as loaded, not point a weapon at anything you do not intend to
shoot and during a course of fire, have your weapon pointed down range at all time: When
on a firing point you will not handle your weapon or any weapon that may be on table. If your
weapon is in your holster it will stay there at all times.

Safe handling of a weapon must become instinctive but not so instinctive that you bee on
unaware of your actions with a weapon. You must constantly have a conscious awareness:
of the weapon's muzzle and remember 'touching triggers - tragedy'.

You will need to be skilled at the following basics:

• Working from stances
• The draw
• Weak hand shooting
• Positional shooting - standing, kneeling, prone
• Turns/pivots - right turns, left turns, 180
degrees turns and pivots
• All the above must be practiced whilst on
the move as well as when stationary. Short
draw/hip shooting
• Punch to buy time
• Body cover/weapon handling - with multi-
directional threats
In the early learning stages of giving body cover and
returning fire, there is a tendency to shoot low, particularly
if you need to get rounds off as the weapon leaves the
holster. At close ranges you will always put the rounds in
the knees without some effort to correct the aim.

As training advances, there must be the inclusion of:

• Shooting from a moving vehicle and team drills
• Advanced barricade work
• Low light shooting and 'torch and pistol' work
• Stress fire training
• Basic hostage recovery
• Advanced team drills - fire and movement
• Counter attack techniques
• Use of pyrotechnics
All the above with handguns, shotguns and, if abroad, full auto SMGs.

The start of training is the 'punch to buy time' drill. Resist the tendency to want to strike the
face. Someone committed to a draw will carry on regardless. Hit the shoulder on the weapon
side and hit it hard. If done properly, it will almost spin your opponent round. If he's just
acquired a grip on the weapon, it will often fly out of his grip, but at worst he will be
completely off line to take a quick shot which buys you time to draw and shoot. You acquire
the weapon as you hit and rock back to shoot. Punch to buy time is the only way at close
range that you will have a chance against someone who has the drop on you and is already
going for his weapon. You won't outdraw him.


The trigger safety is a mechanical

safety, which is incorporated into the
trigger in the form of a lever. In the
untouched state the trigger safety
blocks the trigger from being moved
backward. If the weapon is dropped or if
the trigger is subjected to an off-centre,
lateral pressure, it is still impossible for
the gun to fire.

The trigger being pulled by the trigger

finger can only release this safety. It
automatically re-engages after the
trigger is released.

This situation offers maximum possible

firing readiness combined with
maximum safety for the user.

In the secured position the firing pin

safety mechanically prevents the firing
pin from moving forward. A spring-
loaded pin projects into the firing pin
cut-out and blocks it.

As the trigger is pulled towards the rear,

an extension on the trigger bar pushes
the firing pin safety up and opens the
firing pin channel.

The trigger being pulled to the rear can

only release this safety.

This situation offers maximum possible

firing readiness combined with
maximum safety for the user

.. position the firing pin
In the secured
pushes the trigger bar onto the safety
ramp under the influence of the firing
pin spring.

There is no possibility in this position of

the firing pin being released.

The trigger being pulled to the rear can

only release this drop safety.

This situation offers maximum possible

firing readiness combined with
maximum safety for the user.

Basic Firearm Safety Rules

As a firearms owner and user, you must take the responsibility for the safe handling
and safe storage of your firearm.

You are taking the first step by reading this page, but you can go further by enrolling in any
one of the numerous shooting safety courses available in your country.

Firearms safety is up to you!

1) Handle all firearms as if they were loaded!

Never forget that a gun has the potential to produce serious injury or death in a single
instant of carelessness. Make safe gun handling a habit to be followed at all times. After you
determine that a gun is unloaded, continue to handle it as though it were loaded.

2) Always keep your firearm pointed in a safe direction!

In selecting a safe direction, you must also take into consideration that a bullet can ricochet
or glance off any object it strikes, and that bullets can penetrate walls, ceilings, floors and

Remember: You should never point a gun (whether loaded or unloaded) at another person
or at yourself.

3) Keep your finger out of the gun's trigger guard and off the trigger until you have

aligned the guns sights on a safe target and you have made the decision to fire!

By keeping your finger completely outside the trigger guard until you are aimed at the target,
you guarantee that any shots you fire will go safely in the direction of your intended target.

4) Always be certain that your target and the surrounding area are safe before firing!

Remember that a bullet can travel as much as several miles, so you should be certain of
what your bullet could strike before you pull the trigger. Never fire at a movement, a noise, a
flash of colour or a rustling bush without positively identifying your intended target.

5) Whenever you handle a firearm, the first thing you should do (while keeping it
pointed in a safe direction with your finger outside the trigger guard) is to open the
action to determine whether or not the firearm is loaded!

If you do not know the proper way to open the action of a particular firearm - do not handle
it. Instead, consult the owner's manual, your local gun dealer or a more knowledgeable
shooter. Do not experiment

6) Thoroughly read the instruction manual supplied with your firearm!

Never use any firearm unless you completely understand its operation and safety features.
If you do not have an instruction manual, contact either the retail store where you purchased
your gun or the manufacturer directly or request that one be furnished to you.

7) Before firing your weapon, you should routinely make sure that your firearm is in
good working order and that the barrel is clear of dirt and obstructions!

Any obstruction that prevents the bullet from moving easily down the barrel can cause
pressure to build up in the weapon. A small bit of mud, gun grease, excess lubricating oil or
rust can cause pressure to build up to the point where the barrel bulges or bursts upon
firing, resulting in a damaged gun and serious bodily injury to the shooter or those around

8) Only use ammunition recommended by the firearm manufacturer, and always be

certain that the ammunition matches the calibre of your gun!

Most modern firearms have their calibre designation stamped into the barrel (for example,
"9x19" or ". 45 Auto") Your box of ammunition should bear the exact same designation. Just
because a cartridge fits into your gun does not mean it is safe to fire. Firearms are
designed, manufactured and tested to standards based on factory-loaded ammunition.
Hand-loaded or reloaded ammunition deviating from factory specifications should not be
used. Use only the correct ammunition for your firearm. Attempting to fire even a single
improper bullet can destroy your gun and cause serious personal injury or death.

9) Quality ear and eye protection should always be worn when shooting or

Exposure to the noise of gunfire can permanently damage your hearing if protection is not
worn. Shooting glasses, preferably with side panels, help to guard against eye injuries from
ejected cases and the splash back of pebbles and fragments from the backstop.

Wearing eye protection when disassembling and cleaning your gun will also prevent eye
injuries from loosened springs or other parts, as well as from aerosol solvents and cleaning


10) Never use firearms while under the influence of drugs or alcohol!

Handling and using a firearm requires your full and continuous attention, alertness and
unimpaired judgment. Avoid handling firearms while taking prescription medicines, which
can make you, draw, drowsy, slow your reflexes and impair your normal senses or

11) All firearms should be stored unloaded and secure in a safe storage case,
inaccessible to children and untrained adults

12) The transportation of firearms is regulated by laws. Always transport your firearm
in a safe, unloaded condition and in accordance with applicable laws.

Remember - no set of rules can cover all possible situations. The safe and rational use of a
firearm depends on the common sense and proper training of the user. Always follow safety
rules and think before using any firearm


GLOCK 17 / GLOCK 17C1)

Calibre: 9x19mm


Calibre 9x19mm 9x19mm

Action Safe Action System Safe Action System

Length (slide) 7.32 in. 186 mm 7.32 in. 186 mm

Height 2) 5.43 in. 138 mm 5.43 in. 138 mm

Width 1.18 in. 30 mm 1.18 in. 30 mm

Length between sights 3) 6.49 in. 165 mm 6.73 in. 171 mm

Barrel length 4.49 in. 114 mm 4.49 in. 114 mm

Barrel rifling Right, hexagonal Right, hexagonal

Length of twist 9.84 in. 250 mm 9.84 in. 250 mm

Magazine capacity 4) 10 / 17 / 19 (31) 10 / 17 / 19 (31)

Mass (weight)

Empty without magazine 22.04 oz. 625 g 21.87 oz. 620 g

Empty magazine 2.75 oz. 78 g 2.75 oz. 78 g

Full magazine 5) ~9.87 oz. ~280 g ~9.87 oz. ~280 g

Trigger pull (standard) ~5.5 lbs. ~2.5 kg ~5.5 lbs. ~2.5 kg

Trigger travel for discharge 6) 0.5 in. 12.5 mm 0.5 in. 12.5 mm

Number of safeties 3 3

Tactical Scenario Case

Two FBI agents were killed and five wounded in Miami during a confrontation with robbery suspects at
approximately 9:45 a.m. on April 11. Prior to the shootings, the Agents, along with officers of the Metro-
Dade Police Department, were conducting a mobile surveillance, attempting to locate two males
believed to have committed a number of violent bank and armoured car robberies. Observing a vehicle
matching the description of one that had been stolen and used in previous robberies, an attempt was
made to stop the car. When the Agents in three FBI vehicles subsequently forced the suspects’ vehicle
to a halt, two males, aged 32 and 34, emerged firing weapons. They used a 12-gauge shotgun with a

modified ..pistol grip stock equipped to fire eight rounds; a .223-caliber semiautomatic rifle with 30
round magazine; and two .357-caliber handguns. The resultant gun battle left the two assailants and
two Agents dead, as well as five Agents wounded. The victim Agents, both killed by rifle fire, were 53
and 30 years of age with 24 and 3 years of service, respectively.


FBI Agents:

Richard Manauzzi Injured (unspecified injuries).

Gordon McNeill Seriously injured by .223 gunshot wounds to the

right hand and neck

Edmundo Mireles Seriously injured by a .223 gunshot wound to the

left forearm.

Gilbert Orrantia Injured by shrapnel and debris produced by a .

223 bullet near miss.

John Hanlon Seriously injured by .223 gunshot wounds to the

right hand and groin.

Benjamin Grogan, 53 Killed by a .223 gunshot wound to the chest.

Gerald Dove, 30 Killed by two .223 gunshot wounds to the head.

Ron Risner Uninjured.


William Matix, 34 Killed by multiple gunshot wounds.

Michael Platt, 32 Killed by multiple gunshot wounds.

Weapons involved in the gunfight:


Matix: S&W M3000 12 gauge shotgun (1 round #6 shot fired).

Platt: Ruger Mini-14 .223 Remington carbine (at least 42 rounds fired),

S&W M586 .357 Magnum revolver (3 rounds fired),

Dan Wesson .357 Magnum revolver (3 rounds fired).


McNeill: S&W M19-3 .357 Magnum revolver, 2-inch barrel (6 rounds .

38 Special +P fired).

Mireles: Remington M870 12 gauge shotgun (5 rounds 2 ¾ inch 00

buckshot fired),

.357 Magnum revolver (make & model unknown), (6

rounds .38 Special +P fired).

Grogan: S&W M459 9mm automatic pistol (9 rounds fired).

Dove: S&W M459 9mm automatic pistol (20 rounds fired).

Risner: S&W M459 9mm automatic pistol (13-14 rounds fired?),

S&W (model unknown) .38 Special revolver (1 round .38

Special +P fired).

Orrantia: S&W (model unknown) .357 Magnum revolver, 4 inch barrel

(12 rounds .38 Special +P fired).

Hanlon: S&W (model unknown) .38 Special revolver, 2-inch barrel (5

rounds .38 Special +P fired).

Manauzzi: Apparently lost possession of his handgun during the vehicle

collision and was unable to locate and recover it during the
gunfight (0 rounds fired).

From the time in which Grogan and Dove first spotted the Monte Carlo occupied by Platt and Matix to the
time in which the last gunshot was fired by Mireles, approximately nine and a half minutes elapsed. The
gun battle itself lasted over four minutes.

The Injuries of Michael Platt and William Matix

The gunshot wounds present on Matix’s body (six wounds, A-F) and Platt’s body (12 wounds, A-L) are
identified and detailed in alphabetical sequence in the autopsy reports prepared by Dade County Medical
Examiner Jay Barnhart, M.D. These reports have been reproduced in Dr. Anderson’s book. Dr. Anderson
refers to each wound using the same identification letter and terminology as documented in the autopsy

reports. ..
I. The first encounter: Platt and Matix inside the Monte Carlo
(estimated duration: approximately 1 minute)

II. The initial hits on Platt: Platt exiting the Monte Carlo
(estimated duration: several seconds)

III. Platt’s devastating attack: Platt outside the Monte Carlo

(estimated duration: approximately 1½ minutes)

IV. The final fusillade: Platt and Matix in Grogan/Dove’s car

(estimated duration of approximately 1½ - 2 minutes).

Tactical Briefs #7, Figure 1. FBI-Miami Shootout Crime Scene

I. The First Encounter: Platt and Matix Inside the Monte Carlo

Matix’s1st gunshot wound (right forearm wound E) – Grogan Matix’s 2nd gunshot wound (right head
wound F) - McNeill

Matix’s 3rd gunshot wound (right neck/chest wound B) - McNeill

Immediately after Matix/Platt’s Monte Carlo was forced off the road by three FBI vehicles (occupied by
Special Agents Grogan/Dove, Manauzzi, and Hanlon/Mireles), it sideswiped a Cutlass sedan and collided
head-on into a tree. Platt (sitting in the passenger seat) then fired 13 rounds from his Mini-14 through the
closed driver’s side window of the Monte Carlo at Manauzzi in the car directly beside them, then at
Supervisory Special Agent McNeill’s approaching car, then at McNeill (hitting his shooting hand), and then
at Mireles (who fell to the ground after being hit in his left forearm). Dr. Anderson conjectures that Platt
might have felt he’d sufficiently suppressed the threats emanating from the left front of the Monte Carlo,
and he pulled back from the window. This would have given Matix the opportunity to fire towards the left
rear at Grogan and Dove with his 12-gauge shotgun.

Because the driver’s side door had been damaged during the collision with Manauzzi’s car (as well as the
proximity of Manauzzi’s car immediately beside the Monte Carlo), Matix could only partially open his door.
He leaned out from his sitting position and fired one round of #6 shot towards Grogan and Dove, which hit
the grill of Grogan’s car. Dr. Anderson feels this is most likely when Matix received his first wound, right
forearm wound E, which entered his right forearm just above the wrist. Dr. Anderson believes Grogan fired
this shot, which hit Matix from a distance of approximately 25 feet. Grogan’s bullet entered Matix’s forearm
on the little finger side, travelled just beneath the ulnar and radius bones, cut the ulnar artery, and exited
the forearm on the thumb side.

Dr. Anderson speculates that Matix probably withdrew back inside the Monte Carlo to examine the wound.
At this point, McNeill (who’d already fired four shots across the hood of Manauzzi’s car and into the cab of
the Monte Carlo when he was hit in his gun hand by one of Platt’s .223 bullets) apparently saw Matix’s
movement and fired the last two rounds out of his revolver at Matix. The bullet from McNeill’s shot number
5 is believed to have caused Matix’s 2nd wound, head wound F.

As Matix pulled back inside after firing at Grogan and Dove, who were positioned behind the Monte Carlo,
Matix’s head and upper torso were still rotated to the left when McNeill’s bullet hit him, producing head
wound F. The bullet hit Matix just forward of his right ear, below the temple, shattered the cheekbone, hit
and fractured the base of the cranium, and entered the right sinus cavity under the eye. This hit bruised the
brain (but did not penetrate the cranium or brain) and Dr. Anderson believes it most probably knocked
Matix instantly unconscious.

McNeill’s sixth shot hit Matix, causing the third wound, right neck/chest wound B, and the bullet entered the
right side of his neck after he slumped unconscious momentarily forward against the driver’s side door. It
penetrated his neck at a downward angle and severed the blood vessels behind the collarbone, ricocheted
off the first rib near the spine and came to rest in the chest cavity. It bruised but did not penetrate the right
lung. This wound interrupted the blood supply to his right arm and might have also disrupted the brachial
plexus to cause dysfunction of the nerves that supply the arm. Dr. Anderson speculates that Matix’s right
arm was probably paralysed by this injury, either immediately by disruption of the nerves or eventually by
total loss of blood circulation to the arm. Dr. Anderson feels this wound would have ultimately been fatal,
due to the severed blood vessels. Bleeding from this injury during the next 2-3 minutes caused almost a
litre of blood to accumulate in the chest cavity. However, for the next minute, it is believed that Matix
slumped over onto his back and lay unconscious on the front seat of the Monte Carlo.

Dr. Anderson observes that although Platt fired 13 rounds of .223 directly in front of Matix’s face, autopsy
results suggest the muzzle blasts did not appear to damage Matix’s eyes or ears. His corneas were intact
and there was no blood in his ear canals to indicate that his eardrums had been ruptured.

Platt’s blood .. was not found anywhere inside the Monte Carlo, and because of this Dr. Anderson believes
Platt did not receive any bullet wounds while he occupied the passenger compartment.

II. The Initial Hits on Platt: Platt Exiting the Monte Carlo

Platt’s 1st gunshot wound (right upper arm/chest wound B) – Dove

Platt’s 2nd gunshot wound (right thigh wound L) - Dove?

Platt’s 3rd gunshot wound (left foot wound I) - Dove?

Platt’s 4th gunshot wound (back wound K) - Orrantia?

Dr. Anderson theorizes that when Platt saw Matix slump over after being hit by McNeill’s bullets he might
have decided that his chances of getting away were better if he exited the Monte Carlo.

As Platt crawled through the passenger side window, one of Dove’s 9mm bullets hit his right upper arm,
just above the inside crook of the elbow. According to Dr. Anderson, the bullet passed under the bone,
through the deltoid, triceps and terse major muscles, and severed the brachial arteries and veins. The
bullet exited the inner side of his upper arm near the armpit, penetrated his chest between the fifth and
sixth ribs, and passed almost completely through the right lung before stopping. The bullet came to a rest
about an inch short of penetrating the wall of the heart.

(However, the accompanying autopsy report states that the bullet passed through the biceps muscle,
and the autopsy photograph seems to support the medical examiner’s observation. The autopsy
photograph shows an entry wound of the upper right arm, just above the inside bend of the elbow, in
the location where the biceps muscle begins to show definition. The photograph suggests that the
bullet passed through the biceps muscle of the upper arm in front of the bone. We discussed our
observation with Dr. Anderson and he agreed with us. He stated that he would correct this error in a
future revision to his report.)

At autopsy, Platt’s right lung was completely collapsed and his chest cavity contained 1300 ml of blood,
suggesting damage to the main blood vessels of the right lung. Dr. Anderson believes that Platt’s first
wound (right upper arm/chest wound B) was un-survivable, and was the primary injury responsible for
Platt’s death.

The Monte Carlo came to a stop with its passenger side wedged against an uninvolved vehicle (Cutlass)
that was parked in the driveway of a duplex home where the incident took place. After Platt crawled out the
window and was rolling off the front hood of the Cutlass, Dr. Anderson believes he has hit twice more,
most probably by Dove, in the right rear thigh and left foot, (right rear thigh wound L and left foot wound I,

The bullet that produced the thigh wound entered the inside back surface of the right thigh and exited the
outside surface of the leg, and involved only muscle tissue.

The bullet that hit Platt’s left foot entered behind the little toe and passed laterally through the foot from left
to right, exiting above the big toe.

Dr. Anderson feels Platt’s fourth gunshot wound (back wound K) might have incurred shortly after he
exited the Monte Carlo. The wound is a left to right grazing wound to the back, and may have been
inflicted by Orrantia, who was in a position across the street and in front of the Monte Carlo. Orrantia’s
bullet might have hit Platt after he got back onto his feet in front of the Cutlass and was turning to his left.
The bullet abraded the skin just to the right of the spine in the location of the upper shoulder blade.

III. Platt’s Devastating Attack: Platt Outside the Monte Carlo

Platt’s 5th wound (right forearm wound D) - Risner? /Orrantia?

Platt’s 6th wound (right upper arm/chest wound C) – Risner

Platt’s 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th wounds (right foot wounds E, F; and left foot wounds G and H) - Mireles

After Platt crawled out of the Monte Carlo and rolled off the front hood of the Cutlass, he took a position at
the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass. He fired a .357 Magnum revolver at Risner and Orrantia,
who were both across the street shooting at him. Dr. Anderson believes that the revolver would have been
easier for Platt to manipulate due to the injury incurred to his right upper arm by Dove’s bullet (Platt right
upper arm/chest wound B).

Dr. Anderson feels Platt received his fifth wound (Platt right forearm wound D) when, after shooting at
Risner and Orrantia, he turned to fire at Grogan, Dove and Hanlon (who’d by now joined up with Grogan
and Dove after running across the street with Mireles). The bullet, fired by either Risner or Orrantia, hit the
outside of Platt’s right forearm (midway between the wrist and the elbow) fractured the radius bone (the
bone in the forearm on the thumb side), and exited the forearm.

The bullet also affected the muscles that control the thumb’s ability to grip causing Platt to drop his .357
Magnum revolver. The revolver was found at the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass after the

Dr. Anderson believes that shortly thereafter, Platt incurred his sixth wound (Platt right upper arm/chest
wound C), which was inflicted by Risner. The bullet entered the back of Platt’s right upper arm (mid arm),
passed through the triceps muscle and exited below the armpit. It then entered the muscles in the side of
his chest and came to a rest in the soft tissues of the right side back, below the shoulder blade. The bullet
did not penetrate the rib cage and the resultant wound was not serious.

Platt then apparently positioned the Mini-14 against his shoulder using his uninjured left hand and
manipulated the trigger with a barely functioning finger on his right hand, and fired three shots. One shot
was directed at Orrantia and Risner’s location, which hit the steering wheel of their car. Flying debris from
this bullet injured Orrantia. Two shots were fired at McNeill. The first bullet missed McNeill, but the second
hit his neck. The second bullet stunned McNeill’s spinal cord causing him to collapse, and he was
temporarily paralysed for several hours afterwards. McNeill recounts that Platt was smiling at him as he
was shot.

Platt left his position at the passenger side front fender of the Cutlass, moving between the Cutlass and
Trans Am, and began rapidly closing distance with Grogan, Dove and Hanlon who were behind
Grogan/Dove’s car. (A Mini-14 magazine was recovered adjacent to the passenger side front fender of
the Cutlass suggesting that Platt reloaded before he began his charge.)

At this point in the gunfight, Dove had relocated from behind the passenger side door of his car, around
the back of the car and had taken a position near the driver's side door. (Dove’s gun, a S&W model 459
9mm automatic, had been hit by one of Platt’s bullets. Whether or not this occurred before or after he
moved to the opposite side of the car is unknown.) Grogan had moved to occupy a position near the
driver's side rear fender. Hanlon had fired his gun dry after shooting at Platt from around the passenger
side rear fender/bumper and was hit by one of Platt’s bullets in his gun hand while reloading. Hanlon then
rolled over onto his back behind the car. Within moments he saw Platt’s feet standing at the passenger
side rear of the vehicle. Dr. Anderson states that it was at this time when Platt left large smears of blood as
well as arterial blood spurt patterns on the rear of the vehicle. As Hanlon attempted to push himself under
the left rear trunk to maximize his cover against Platt, he heard Grogan cry out, "Oh my God!" Platt killed
Grogan with a single shot to the chest. Platt then rounded the rear fender, saw Hanlon, and fired one shot
into Hanlon’s groin area. Hanlon rolled over onto right side into a foetal position expecting to be shot again
and killed. However, Platt immediately shifted his attention to Dove, firing twice directly into Dove’s head.
Dove instantly collapsed; his head coming to rest just inches away from Hanlon’s face. According to Dr.

Anderson,.. Hanlon recalls that Platt fired several more rounds, apparently at Risner and Orrantia. The
spent cases from Platt’s Mini-14 fell onto Hanlon’s body.

After firing at Risner and Orrantia, Platt opened the driver’s side door of Grogan/Dove’s Buick. Just as he
was stepping to enter the car, Mireles fired the first of five rounds of 00 buckshot from the Remington 870
shotgun he was carrying when he was hit in the forearm at the beginning of the gunfight by one of Platt’s
bullets. Dr. Anderson feels this first shot by Mireles caused Platt right foot wounds E and F, and left foot
wounds G and H. These wounds did not knock Platt off his feet.

Sometime during the gunfight, Matix regained consciousness and apparently crawled, unseen by the FBI
agents, out the same window Platt had used to exit the Monte Carlo. Orrantia reported that Matix remained
near the passenger side front fender of the Monte Carlo for a while without ever firing a shot. When Platt
entered the driver’s side of Grogan/Dove’s car, Matix joined him by entering the passenger side door.
According to Dr. Anderson, forensic evidence indicates that Matix never fired a weapon after he received
his initial injuries while occupying the driver’s seat of the Monte Carlo.

IV. The Final Fusillade: Platt and Matix in Grogan/Dove’s Car

Platt’s 11th wound, scalp wound A – Mireles

Matix’s 4th wound, face wound D – Mireles

Matix’s 5th wound, face/spine wound C – Mireles

Matix’s 6th wound, face/neck wound A – Mireles

Platt’s 12th wound, chest/spine wound J - Mireles

Mireles fired a total of five rounds from his Remington 870 shotgun from a range of about 25 feet. With his
first shot it appears he struck Platt in both feet when Platt was about to enter the driver’s seat of
Grogan/Dove’s car. Mireles fired the remaining four shots at the windshield and driver’s window, but
according to Dr. Anderson there’s no compelling forensic evidence to indicate that any of the pellets from
Mireles’ shots 2-5 hit Platt or Matix. Dr. Anderson speculates that Platt might have ducked below the
window openings, possibly in Matix’s lap, to have avoided being hit by the buckshot.

At about this moment in the gunfight, Metro-Dade police patrol officers Martin Heckman and Leonard
Figueroa arrived on the scene. Shortly thereafter, Heckman covered McNeill with his own body to protect
McNeill from being hit again. Dr. Anderson does not document the actions of Figueroa.

Platt’s specific actions at this stage of the gunfight have been subject to controversy. Civilian witness
Sidney Martin described Platt as leaving Grogan/Dove’s car and walking more than 20 feet to Mireles’
position and firing three shots from a revolver at almost point blank range at Mireles and then returning to
Grogan/Dove’s car. Mireles does not recall this happening. McNeill recalls seeing what appeared to be
bullets striking the pavement. Heckman does not remember Platt being outside the car, but he does recall
Platt pointing a gun out the driver’s window at him and their eyes meeting. Risner and Orrantia, who were
both across the street, state that they never saw Platt approach Mireles and fire at him.

In Cautionary Note #2 (four paragraphs that are published in the Introduction section), Dr. Anderson
postulates that Platt exited the driver’s side door of Grogan/Dove’s car, staggered out a few steps, fired
three shots from Matix’s .357 Magnum revolver (using his left hand) towards the general direction of
Mireles and/or McNeill without hitting anyone, and then immediately got back into the driver’s seat of
Grogan/Dove’s car. Dr. Anderson feels that the bones broken in Platt’s feet by Mireles’ first shotgun blast
(as well as the large amount lost blood) would have prevented him from walking very far. He goes on to
explain that the effects of deep shade, position and angles of the participants/witnesses, obstructed views,

etc., probably influenced individual perceptions of Platt’s actions.

After Platt got back into Grogan/Dove’s car he attempted to start the engine. Dr. Anderson observes that
the injuries to Platt’s right arm probably prevented him from being able to use his right hand to turn the
ignition key. This forced Platt to lean away from the driver’s side window to use left hand to turn the key on
the steering column. Matix was apparently attempting to help Platt start the car.

Mireles then drew his .357 Magnum revolver, got to his feet, moved laterally about 15 feet parallel with the
street, clear of McNeill’s car, and then began walking directly towards Platt and Matix, who were sitting in
Grogan/Dove’s car. Mireles fired six rounds of .38 Special +P from his revolver. Mireles revolver shots 1
and 2 were fired at Platt, shots 3, 4 and 5 at Matix, and shot 6 at Platt. Five of the six bullets hit Platt or

Mireles first shot at Platt hit the back of the front seat behind Platt’s left shoulder. Dr. Anderson theorizes
that the sound of the gunshot would have caused Platt to turn his head to the left to look for the source of
the gunfire. Mireles second shot then hit Platt above the outer edge of the right eyebrow (Platt scalp wound
A). The weight of the projectile that was recovered from Platt’s scalp was about 19 grains, suggesting that
the bullet hit the driver’s side window post and fragmented. After the fragment penetrated the skin it
ricocheted off the curvature of the right side of Platt’s forehead, and travelled between the skin and the
exterior surface of the skull for a distance of about 2 inches before it stopped above the right temple. The
fragment did not penetrate the cranium.

Dr. Anderson postulates that Platt then laid back on the front bench seat of Grogan/Dove’s car, placing his
head and shoulders (face side up) in Matix’s lap on the passenger side, in attempt to use the driver’s side
door as cover against Mireles’ gunfire. Platt’s movement and positioning trapped Matix upright on the seat
with his back against the passenger side door. Mireles third shot hit Matix’s face just below the left
cheekbone and adjacent to the left nostril (Matix face wound D). The projectile fragmented in two; the
largest embedded in the bone beside the nose, a smaller fragment penetrating the left sinus cavity.
According to Dr. Anderson, this wound was not significant, and probably was inflicted as Matix was looking
at the approaching Mireles. The size and weight of the two fragments suggests the bullet probably hit the
driver’s side window frame before it hit Matix.

Matix then apparently tried to make himself as small a target as possible. He tucked his chin into his chest
and pressed his back against the passenger side door to slide his buttocks on the bench seat in attempt to
get as low as he could. Dr. Anderson claims this would have accounted for the wound path caused by
Mireles’ fourth bullet (Matix face/spine wound C). The bullet hit Matix’s face just outside the lower right
edge of the right eye socket, at about seven o-clock. The bullet travelled downward through the facial
bones, through the right side of the lower jaw, into the neck, and entered the spinal column between
cervical vertebra number 7 (C7) and thoracic vertebra number 1 (T1) where it severed the spinal cord at
the base of T1.

Matix’s body would have immediately relaxed, according to Dr. Anderson, causing his head to tilt
backwards. His face would have risen upwards by the time Mireles’ fifth bullet hit him in the face (Matix
face wound A). The bullet hit Matix’s chin just below the right corner of the mouth, penetrated the jaw bone
and into the neck where it came to rest beside the right side of the spinal column at C7. The bullet did not
damage the spinal cord.

By this time Mireles had reached the driver’s side door of Grogan/Dove’s car when he fired his sixth and
final shot. Mireles extended his gun through the driver’s side window and fired at Platt (Platt chest/spine
wound J). The bullet penetrated Platt’s chest just below the left collarbone, travelled through the
musculature of the shoulder and neck and stopped in the fifth cervical vertebra (C5), where it bruised the
spinal cord. Dr. Anderson observes that the wound path of this bullet through Platt’s body could only have
occurred if Platt were lying on his back on the front seat.

Mireles’ sixth and final shot ended the gunfight. Platt and Matix both lay on the front seat of Grogan/Dove’s

car. If Matix .. was not already dead, he would be shortly. Arriving paramedics came to the aid of the FBI
agents first and then shifted their attention to Platt and Matix. According to Dr. Anderson, paramedics
found no signs of life in Grogan, Dove or Matix and no first aid were attempted. Whereas, Platt appears to
have still had a heartbeat because paramedics inserted an airway tube and began administering
intravenous fluids. Platt died at the scene without regaining consciousness.


Dr. Anderson concludes his forensic analysis of the gunfight by pointing out the remarkable accuracy of
the FBI agents in achieving solids hit on both Platt and Matix, despite the fact that the suspects were
obscured by deep shade, dust and gun smoke. He provides specific examples of accurate shooting by five
of the eight Agents involved: Grogan, McNeill, Dove, Risner and possibly Orrantia.

He also points out the ability of several of the people involved in the shoot-out, both suspects and FBI
Agents, to continue to perform both physically and mentally through sheer willpower after having sustained
severe gunshot wound trauma, and provides specific examples of determination on both sides.

(Note: toxicology tests conducted on the body fluids of Matix and Platt revealed neither was under the
influence of chemical intoxicants. Both were alcohol and drug free at the time of the shoot-out.)


Kidnap & Ransom

We will not go into K & R in to much detail as it is such a specialized subject, but we will go
over a few details.

Kidnappings and extortion are on the upswing. The highest risk area in the world is South
America and Columbia in particular. Columbia has the record for the most kidnappings and
the highest ransom demands. For many criminals kidnapping is a business, and kidnappings
in Columbia are often professional, well-planned operations lasting considerable periods of

The US has a much lower level of kidnappings than overseas high-risk areas, but they do
occur. US incidents are rarely publicized by those involved because corporations and
individuals want to avoid any repeat attacks or threats. Extortion against corporate assets or
products also occurs in the US, and is also on the upswing. Despite the increase in US
situations, effective law enforcement, stiff penalties and strong security measures continue
to keep the US safer than other countries.

The increasing sophistication of corporate security systems may be contributing to an

increase in these types of crimes. One theory is that the increased sophistication of
corporate security systems is much tougher to crack, and that kidnapping is an effective way
to obtain the knowledge to complete the crime.

A government handbook for employees residing overseas has the following description of
the need for K & R insurance:

Unfortunately, kidnapping has become a major security issue in several countries outside of
North America. In the last several years, statistics have shown an escalation of incidents in
Italy, the Philippines, Columbia, Pakistan, and Brazil. Obviously, no one plans on being
victimized by this sort of criminal activity. But when it does occur, the financial fallout can be

overwhelming to the families involved. Consider the following scenario: three men suddenly
confront an executive in a foreign country leaving his office, each with firearms. He is forced
into a vehicle, which quickly flees from the scene. A ransom for his release is set at
$1,000,000. The ransom is paid in full and he is released within 30 days. Fortunately for his
family, this gentlemen had an insurance policy that specifically covered such an occurrence.
As a result, neither he nor his family suffered any significant financial loss as a result of this
criminal act.

Without diluting the importance of [coverage] factors, the primary consideration for any
"Kidnap and Ransom" policy still lies in the expertise that will be utilized for hostage retrieval.
The negotiating team is probably more important than the policy. The policy should provide
for both an experienced negotiator and the facilities necessary to ensure that the hostage is
returned unharmed.

A vital role for any close protection officer is to make the client aware of the situation of him/
her being kidnapped and being held hostage for a ransom. For reasons such as financial
reward, political statements and even publicity.

Lets say that nine times out of ten the client will freeze in these situations, then it will depend
upon the bodyguard & protection team to take control and direct any action/ movement.
Hopefully the client will obey instructions and escape with out being injured.

The briefing should be given to any client who could face an hostage/ kidnap situation; if
captured it most likely you will be held in isolation. When left on your own, the human mind
goes through many emotions, especially when faced with the danger of death.

The client should be made aware of certain points, which could save themselves in
the event of kidnap.
• Try to maintain your emotions
• Do not offer resistance once the kidnap has been successful
• Be prepared to accept isolation
• Do not antagonize your captors
• Do not make threats or promises
• Attempt to create a relationship between you and the captors
If possible try to make a mental picture and note the following
• Descriptions of captors
• Descriptions of places
• Any sounds & smells
• Direction taken from the place of the initial capture
• Persons in authority/ how many captors/ male or female
• Weapon systems used
• Any conversations between the captors
• The time

INTRODUCTION To Hostage Rescue

The protection team is to counter the attack whilst the client is still free, giving the client safe
escape from the danger.

Will stress its not the job for the protection team to instigate a rescue attempt, if there client
as been successfully kidnapped.

.. rescue teams are normally military or police units that are dedicated to these
but there are times when clients have the need for private units or teams.

It is very rare for a client to have the need or resources to employ a full time Hostage
Rescue Team. It is very intense and team members need to be rotated on a two-week or
four-week turn around. Normally using five guys per team on one shift, on a daily basis
having three shifts working eight hours maximum. Obviously this would be the idea scenario
and be categorized as very high risk, a definite threat involved.


• Composition of team members should be five guys, two pairs and one
team leader to control.
• The team leader and members need as much intelligence as possible,
• Number of attackers
• Race of the attackers, language spoken
• Clothing of the attackers
• Weapons and equipment used
• Method of entry and building plans
• Details on the client, dress, medical
• Location of client and attackers
• Location of any other friendly personnel
• Identify all possible means of entry
• Enter by covert means where possible
• Enter by the roof or highest floor possible
• Secure entry points
Room clearance
• Work in pairs
• Check and clear doors, if locked use means to bust open
• Entering room, identify targets before engaging with fire
• Check all hiding places and for other doors
• Room clear, try to secure and lock if at all possible, door wedges or tape
so everyone knows its clear
• Clear rooms and building progressively, room by room and floor by floor
• All stairways when cleared should be held and secured
• Work in teams, fire and maneuver, room by room
Control the situation
• Try to avoid being silhouetted or illuminated
• Use the buildings lighting to your advantage
• Fast and aggressive movement through the building
• Use flash bangs or concussion grenades
Building clear
• Ensure all attackers either dead or taken prisoner, all secured
• Principle is safe
• Route out of building secure and safe
• Co-ordinate with medical agencies if needed

Mobile Rescue Procedures
• Team consisting of four to five guys positioned in one vehicle
• Their vehicle to follow the clients convoy, in distance for a fast response
time, one minute
• Watch the flow of traffic and adapt accordingly
• Keep communication up and running
• Move in fast and very aggressively
• Use flashing lights and sirens to get attention
• Cover the client's vehicle
• Smoke
• Return fire
• Well aimed covering fire
• Give window of escape for the client
• Remove client from the threat
• Escort or take to safe house

HOSTAGE Rescue – Dynamic Entries

A dynamic entry is just that, dynamic, fluid and as the potential to rapidly change in
circumstance and dimension at any moment. The potential for violence and lethal
confrontation are extremely high. In general to reduce the potential for a lethal confrontation
and the destruction of evidence the entry must be conducted rapidly and forcefully. The team
must seize the site quickly dominating every person and areas inside it without delay or

Tactical Principles

Use your eyes and ears. People commonly search with their eyes using vision bands
beginning at a particular focal distance. Unfortunately the pressure of searching an armed
advisory using bands as a pronounced tendency to fixate visual focus at a specific distance.
This can easily cause you to walk into uncomfortably close proximity with an opponent, or
fail to locate him at longer rangers. By changing eye focus “in and out” and changing your
line of sight to cover the exposed areas, this problem can be avoided. You may find it
unnatural to begin with, but with practice it becomes immensely more effective.

Never turn your back on anything you have not cleared. Retain the advantage and search
systematically. Make sure that all walls and enclosed areas are checked thoroughly before
turning your attention to another area. What you miss can kill you, do not chase suspects
through a location passing uncleared areas.

Stay away from corners and maximize distance to potential threat areas, this will create a
reactionary gap between you and your opponent. Allowing time to think and take the correct
action, take corners and walls wide.

Move correctly. Do not bounce around, apply the proper movement techniques so you have
the ability to fire your weapon accurately immediately. You must maintain the ability to return
fire and fire when necessary. You must correctly practice and use proper shooting on the
move techniques, failure to maintain a weapons platform or gunmount will breakdown your
ability to protect yourself with accurate fire. In addition failure to apply these methods will

reduce ..your control of an adversary by presenting a less than dominate appearance and
. the likely hood of a confrontation.
may increase

Watch your front site. Do not panic and point shoot, point shooting is panic shooting.
Shooting accurately the first time and placing your rounds exactly where you need them is
likely to result in fewer rounds being fired.

General effects of stress in operational situations

• Visual blocking – Tunnel vision, seeing black and white only

• Respiratory distress – Escalated breathing pattern

• Audio blocking – Sounds are muffled and faint, unable to hear at times, unable
to speak at times, will revert back to your native language

• Increased heart rate – Your heart rate will escalate as if you where running

• Inability to perform intricate manual tasks – Your ability to complete detailed

specific tasks and technical movements is greatly reduced

• Target fixation – You will stare at the perceived threat and block out all other
threats in the area

Team configuration and structure

There are a multitude of variable circumstances that will dictate the size, training and
configuration of a team. The margins of error and danger are extremely high during these
operations so we tend to use personnel of specific training and operational backgrounds.
Remember this is a simple and very generic structure that can be modified to meet your
specific requirements.

A minimum of 8-man entry team should be utilized, the responsibilities with in this team
should be organized and designed in the following method.

Team leader

This person is responsible for the planning, overview of the operation and personnel

Pointman or scout

The most senior and experienced tactical operator, this is one of the teams greatest
assets and strengths. Responsible for planning the direction of flow of the operation
inside, personnel and second in command. The team leader and pointman work
hand in hand, both pointman and team leader move actively as team members with
their respective partners inside the site.

Back up man/ second in command

This position should be filled with your second most experienced operator, this
position is responsible to back up the pointman and follow him where ever he
moves, pointmans shadow.

Operator 4

Responsible to clear rooms and conduct operation, works in conjunction with team

Operator 5

Responsible to clear rooms and conduct operation, works in conjunction with

operator number 6

Operator 6

Responsible to assist the team where directed and fill in as needed, suspect

Operator 7

Responsible to assist the team where directed, a reinforcement position

Operator 8

Responsible for removing all obstacles and barriers preventing the flow of team
members inside and outside. As needed inside the site he will be called up from the
team to put doors down or breach obstacles.

Types of room entry methods

There exist many different methods of room clearing techniques, here are four methods

Button hook

The operators are staged on the door, he steps in the threshold of the doorway and
reverses direction into the room and rapidly clears the entry point kill zone. Move
continuously to a point of domination in the room.

Recommended use of this method is for large doorways, also used to backup and
provide coverage for the first operator in the room if he criss crosses.

Positive – this allows the operator to enter from a staged position and provides a
method of clearing the 90 degree angle to the 1st operators back as he enters.

Negative – the operator as a tendency to drop the head and weapon momentarily
upon entry into the room, in addition the footwork is a little more difficult and not as
smooth as the criss cross to maintain gunpoint.

Criss cross

The operators are staged on the doorway, they are on gunpoint and move directly
across the doorway threshold into the room rapidly clearing the entry point kill zone.
They move to their points of domination in the room, basically continuously walking
in a straight line into the room and covering the 90-degree angle as they move. A
general rule is that the operator on the hinge side of the door is the low man and first
in the room.

Recommended use of method is for all standard doorways, this may not be used for

..large doorways as described in the buttonhook.
Positive – this allows the operator to maintain his footing and direction of travel,
allowing good gun point control while moving directly to the 90 degree angle with
little difficulty.

Negative – Must cross completely across the doorway while entering.


The first operator button hooks and the second operator leans over the first while
moving into the room. The second is covering and moving with the first to cover is
back as he penetrates the entry point kill zone. To begin the team is stacked on the
doorway, the first operator button hooks and the second is criss crossing.

Slicing technique

Operator slices the doorway prior to the physical entry, allowing eyes on the
objective before entering room. The operator maintains maximum distance from the
threat area while slicing, with this technique 75-80 % of a room can be cleared
without entering. Control from the exterior of the room is the real advantage of this
method prior entering. This is used on open doors to rooms, the operators stack on
the doorway, the first slice’s the doorway then himself and team operator can now
criss cross through the doorway. When closed doors are presented the operators
will stage automatically on both side of the door, the door will be breached or
opened and the operators enter in criss cross fashion.

Common mistakes

• Silhouetting the muzzle of the weapon into the threat room prior to entry,
this is a direct failure to slice properly or moving improperly
and evaluating the terrain your operating in.

• Operators fail enter the room simultaneously, there is a long time between
the operators entering the doorway.

• Failure to cover the 90-degree angles immediately upon entry, operators

tend to focus on the center of the room.

• Failure to communicate with each other, you must communicate your

intentions and desires to other team members, rapidly, briefly
and coherently.

• Failure to remain calm, adrenaline overload and lack of emotional control

under stress, this is at times the most difficult single thing to
over come and fight through.

• Failure to maintain gunpoint and stance while moving, shooting on the

move should be practiced.

Everyone of you can discuss the specifics of the entry and type of
configuration you use. These are just suggestions and safety rules, the safety
rules for clearing operations can not be ignored or forgotten. A number of our
fellow operators have lost their lives establishing these rules and guidelines.
Please consider them and attempt to make them part of your S.O.P`S.

SPECIAL Response Teams
Introduction to operational procedures for United States teams, these protocols can
be adapted for international teams.

There are many different names depending on the part of the country in which they operate.
Some of the names are:
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
EMT Emergency Response Team
SERT Special Emergency Reaction Team
EST Emergency Services Team
HRT Hostage Rescue Team
ETF Emergency Task Force
SOG Special Operations Group
Although the names may change their mission remains the same - TO SAVE LIVES!

Primary and Secondary Missions

The Primary Mission:

This includes hostage rescue, counter-terrorism, kidnapped children, and fugitive and felony
arrest teams.

Secondary Missions

Include executive or witness protection, protecting vitally important locations, intelligence

gathering, and training other operational teams.

Special Response Teams

Are closely integrated teams that are uniquely equipped to function in high threat environments.
Their training lends itself to a wide range of tasks and situations. Their versatility and
effectiveness make them an invaluable necessity to any unit responsible for the protection of
human lives.

Personnel selected for SRT should be -

• Volunteers or placed forward for selection
• In excellent physical condition
• Intelligent
• Extremely motivated
• Well versed with various weapon systems
Team members must be able to control their emotions and think in a logical, trained, instinctive
fashion when under stress.

Six Man Team

The six-man team formation must be versatile and able to handle whatever situation develops
under, at times, stressful conditions. Two such teams can be split into three four-man teams as
needed. The organization of the six-man team is as follows:
1. Point man/ scout
2. Team Leader

Entry Man
Entry Man
5. Equipment Man
6. Rear Guard
Point Man

Responsibilities include scouting the objective, and providing forward security during team

Team Leader

Plans, coordinates and leads the team. Primary responsibility is the safety of his men.

Entry Man

Two positions on the team. Responsible for the initial entry and probably first contact with the

Equipment Man

Carries team equipment. If all other factors are equal he should be the physically strongest
team member when all other factors are equal.

Rear Guard

Provides rear security for team during movement.

Each member of the team should be cross-trained in the duties of each position and be
prepared to flow into another position as requirements dictate or in the event of casualties.


The following is a basic inventory of equipment. The mission will dictate whether additional
specialized gear is needed.


There are three basic uniform groups, which can be described as "high profile," "low profile,"
and "black clothes." What each individual on the team wears will depend on the particular unit,
its objectives and where it is going.

High Profile

Normally, this is the conventional uniform worn on daily duty. If the team wears a suit and
tie then this will be the "high profile" uniform.

Low Profile

This category defines street clothes that blend with the environment. "Low profile" is utilized
covert operations and infiltration.


This is the combat uniform. They should also convey maximum psychological impact.
Example: black hoods and gloves create a strong image, but black tends to silhouette the
wearer at night. The best overall uniform is a two piece tropical military cammie uniform
that has been washed in a black dye to create a dark mottled look. This makes it nearly
invisible in shadows or darkness. Jump suits are impractical as they restrict movement. The
complete uniform should include eye protection, gloves and lightweight boots that support
the ankle and have a heavy rubber traction sole to insure silence.

Individual Equipment
• Individual lighting -2 flashlights, one secured to the person.
• Knife, single edged - for cutting away straps, rope, etc.
• Small mirror,
• Gas masks
• Black tape,
• Plastic flex cuffs,
• Cammie stick,
• Load bearing vest,
• Notebooks and pens,
• Sidearm holster (thigh or shoulder),
• Personal rappelling gear,
• Communications gear,
• Small canteen (always full),
• Flash bangs
• Gloves - non-cloth, poly urethane with ribs on inside.
• Hood,
• Foul weather gear,
• Body armor,
• Heavy duty watch,
• First aid dressing,
• Weapons (long gun and pistol),
Team Equipment
• Extension mirrors,
• Lighting - 500,000 to 1,000,000 candle power,
• Special weapons - scoped rifle, high capacity sidearm
• Chemical agents and smoke,
• Team rappelling gear,
• First aid gear,
• Battering ram,
• Climbing gear,
• Vehicles,
• Communications gear,
• Ladder, hard rubber on ends for stealth,

Individual weapons: no single weapon can serve all missions. The most versatile weapon for
close engagements is the submachine gun, of which, the H&K MP5 series is the choice of
professionals world wide. Where longer shots may be required a compact assault rifle is a
better choice.

.. To Tactics

The sequence of events that may call an SRT into action would generally occur as follows:
• Locate and isolate threat if possible.
• Start notifications - supervisors, teams, etc.
• Establish tactical communications.
• Establish command post.
• Establish outer perimeter.
• Notify SRT.
• Notify medical support personnel.
• Isolate phone and communications to threat if possible.
• Call in off-duty personnel.
• Isolate and interview witnesses at Command Post.
• Commence evacuation plan.
• Any other support notified.

Is an acronym describing the deployment of an SRT unit. There are four phases known as the
(1) Pre-confrontation phase, (2) Immediate action phase, (3) Planning phase, and (4) Execution

Pre-Confrontation Phase
• Personnel selection phase,
• Training,
• Write S.O.P.,
• Collect intelligence,
• Contingency planning,
• Logistical support,
• Liaisons with other agencies, groups, governments,
• Security.
Immediate Action Phase

• This is when the situation requiring SRT occurs.

Planning phase
• Analyze situation,
• Strategy planning - look at options,
• Tactical approach planning,
• Inventory of all available resources,
• Evacuate or warn civilians (when possible),
• Review all available intelligence.
Execution phase
• Control situation,
• Negotiate with subjects/ threat,
• Assault the threat/ Evacuate hostages,
• Debrief.
Command Post

The Command Post is center of operations where Command Personnel, the Press and the
Public come together. SRT operations domestically attract a lot of publicity and media attention.
The Command Post provides a place for cooperation with the press. It is very dangerous to
have a rouge news team interfering with operations or exposing themselves or the team to
danger under the guise of "the people's right to know."

The Command Post should be located in a safe place on the interior boundary of the outer
perimeter. A chain of command, including the following persons, should be at the Command

Commander/ Duty Officer

Scribe Recorder

SRT/ Support
• SRT Officer in Charge
• Intelligence Officer
• Command Post Security Personnel
• Perimeter Control Personnel
• SRT Teams
• Equipment
• Scribe-Recorder
• Dispatcher
• Clean-up Crew

There are two Scribe-Recorders responsible for keeping an accurate record of everything
pertaining to the operation. This information will later be transcribed to an official record which
may be used to justify the actions of the SRT in court.

The Command Post will need to have men responsible for maintaining security and order
present to prevent operations from being disrupted.

Tactical Command Post

The Tactical Command Post is for SRT Only. Here, the team plans the final details of the
assault. The Tactical Command Post is located at the exterior boundary of the inner perimeter.

Resources In A Crisis

An SRT unit may be able to call on many resources in an emergency. Law enforcement Teams
may have access to all city or county facilities under an Emergency Action Plan.

Some of these additional resources are:

• City, County, State, Federal or Military Motor Pools for vehicles of all types.
• Fire Department/Rescue Service - ladders, waterpower.
• No one can break into a building or vehicle faster than a fireman.
• Ambulance/EMS - Medical Support
• Utility Company - Cut, water, power and telephones off.
• E.O.D. - Explosives handling.
• Private Contractors - Build special apparatus or provide details on a building
they constructed.

Scouting ..
Scouting can be defined as locating the threat, judging its capabilities and determining how to
neutralize or apprehend suspect(s). The Scout is a very important position and is the second in
command under the Team Leader. The multifaceted nature of this position makes it very

Before leaving the Command Post the Scout should preplan his observation points. The closest
terrain should be scouted first.

The acronym COCO is used to assist in scouting and preparing the briefing for the team.
Cover/Concealment - Both for the threat and the team.
Observation - What the team can see and what the threat can see.
Critical Terrain - Fences, high ground, buildings, power lines, etc.
Obstacle - Dogs, creeks, walls, things to negotiate.
Avenue Of Approach

Ingress and egress (how to get into and out of the area). Two ways in and two ways out.

The Scout selects the sniper position, four points of entry (two conventional entries, two
unconventional), and selects or changes the inner perimeter.


Most effective if augmented with photographs and/or video. Sketches should be made from
ground up. Sketches should show yardage to key points, angle of shots for snipers. It is
important to indicate compass directions and position of the sun. Wind direction should be
included for various times of the day. A rule of thumb for judging distance is to remember that
the average telephone pole is 35 feet; the average one story home is twelve feet.

Five Point Paragraph Order

Prior to the assault a SRT unit should receive written orders clearly outlining the mission.

• Situation
• Mission
• Execution
• Administration/equipment
• Communications/command
The an acronym which shows the format of such an order. No mission should be undertaken
without such an order. After the operation it may be important to have documentation showing
exactly why certain actions were taken.

• Location, type of action, information on threat, level of threat (threat
assessment), intelligence, weather, weapons.
• The objective of the operation. Should be written like a press release.

• Use names, specify duties, tactics and backup plans.
Administration/ Equipment
• List available gear and responsibilities of team members.
Communication/ Command
• A clear statement of the chain of command, radio frequencies, codes, call
signs, is important.
Team Movement

A team moves from cover to cover along the safest possible route. When moving or clearing an
area, firepower, noise and light discipline must be maintained at all times.

Know the difference between "cover" and "concealment."

• Cover - The enemy can't see you and you are safe from small arms
• Concealment - Though the enemy can't see you, he can still kill you with
small arms fire.
Movement Over Open Ground

Before leaving cover pick the next position to move to and insure all team members know
where to go.
• Choose the shortest route and avoid exposure.
• Do not run in an exaggerated zigzagging movement because it increases
your exposure time.
• Keep weapons pointed in direction of enemy.
• Always keep a cover man-watching enemy.
Building Search

When possible enter building from top and search down. If the suspect(s) choose to flee they
will run into the inner perimeter personnel.

Avoid fatal funnels

The fatal funnel is created by the narrow opening of a doorway or other such barrier.
Hallways are one long fatal funnel. An enemy waiting inside a room only needs to sight in
on the opening and wait for the target to appear.


First man in advances with his weapon aimed in direction of travel. He covers the first

Second man moves behind first and inches up sidewall taking furtive peaks up as more of
the next level appears. Second man stops on stairs before breaking the plane formed by
an imaginary line between the level above and the stairs below.

Third man crawls up the stairs on his back with weapon facing toward next level. Other
team members cover any openings and to the rear. Secure each level as you go

.. Assaults

Prior to assaulting a vehicle it should be immobilized. Shoot out tires and/or disable
engine. Assault vehicles from the front or the rear depending on the location of engine.
The engine block will give some protection. Distractions should be used extensively to
improve chances of success.


It is necessary to examine detailed layouts of the particular aircraft involved. Aircraft have a
number of possible openings from above, below and side. An aircraft maintenance chief
familiar with the aircraft is invaluable. Vehicles and aircraft present their own unique
problems due to their design. It will take extensive planning and teamwork to be

• Anything that takes the suspects attention off the team is a distraction.
• The split second gained by the team may make the difference between life
and death.
• An "explosive entry" is both entry and distraction.
• Automatic weapons fire through walls or windows.
• Stun grenades tossed inside prior to entry.
• Smoke and tear gas.
• Simultaneously breaking windows on the 1-2 corner while team enters on
the 3-4 corner.
• Intense lights shining through the window onto the threat or into his/ her

CQB Tactics
The most feared situation for any
military or Special Forces unit is a
Close Quarters Battle (CQB). The
reason is because there are
campers, snipers, and many other
hazards that await them in an
enclosed facility. It takes a well-
trained and practiced team to
execute a successful Counter
Terrorist (CT) Operation. Some of
the most well known military units
known for CT Ops are Delta, SEAL
Team Six (now DevGroup), Special
Air Service, and lately Marine Force
Recon. All of these units train
harder than any other unit in
existence. The reason is obvious,
the engage in CT Ops, they need to know how to operate and be successful.

No CQB Op is the same; they do however have common characteristics. Usually there are
campers, or a person who chooses a place to hide out and wait for you to engage them. Early

Warning Systems (EWS) are also common. The major threats are always the same however.
If you are approaching a building or facility, which has hostile enemy personnel (Tangos)
inside, unless you are very stealthy, you almost have to expect to take fire. Snipers are also a
common threat in a CQB situation. All of these threats can be remedied however, with the
correct tactics.

The hardest obstacle to overcome is stealth. Most of the time, the tangos will know your entry
point and will base their defensive formation to defend against that entry point. Which brings
up the next formidable obstacle. They have some idea where you are or will be; you only know
their general vicinity. That gives the tangos a great advantage over you. You must consider
this before formulating a plan of action.

The mentality you want to have when facing a CQB is to operate swift, silent, and "deadly."
Swift and efficient movement, combined with a level head and stealth is the best offence
against a hazardous situation. If you are a commander of a team, you must remember that.
Make sure that your team operates under those conditions.

The first thing that a CT unit needs to do

before they jump into the shooting and
looting is to even the odds. The tangos
know that you're out there but you don't
know much about them. For those of you
aren't familiar with Reconnaissance, it is
going "behind enemy lines" to gain
information about your enemy.
Reconnaissance is a non-violent
operation where a shot is fired only if
necessary. This proves very useful in a
CT situation because if you know where
your enemy is, you can exterminate them
with much greater ease.

The SEALs were the very first to preach and publicize this attitude, but 2 is always better than
one. From the first phase of BUD/s (Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Training), SEALs are
assigned a swim buddy. From that your swim buddy accompanies point on anything you do.
Reconnaissance should be done in the same manner. So to make a long story short, the first
thing you should do when Reconnoitring an area of Operations (AOP) is to divide the team up
into smaller teams of two. This is smart because if all goes to hell and a fire fight breaks out
two people stand a better chance than one.

The next thing to do is to set up a rally point. The rally point is a point in the AOP where the
entire team will regroup after reconnaissance. This point needs to be a strategic position in a
number of ways. The Rally Point needs to be concealed from enemy view, it's not a huddle in
football, and they will shoot you. The Rally Point also has to be a defensive stronghold. If,
unfortunately, all goes to hell, the team needs to be together. The team returns to the rally
point at that time and defend it.

Reconnaissance is the stealthiest part of an entire CT Op. You cannot be detected! The idea
is to gain intelligence on the enemy without them detecting you. Movement should be
concealed and slow. I'm sure you've seen it mimicked in the movies. Try not to run unless
necessary because a fast moving object attracts the eye before a slow moving object does.
Running also makes a lot more noise than walking. The enemy will most likely hear you before
they see you. This is where Reconnaissance communication is important. A chapter is
devoted later on to communication during assault because recon communication is different.

You must
ones are
.. enemy
have a set of hand signals. Don't get nervous, you only need a few. The important
sighted, sniper, danger zone, and a good sniper position. The hand signals
should be simple, not elaborate, and very easy to remember. I'm sure you can come up with
some logical hand signals. There are a number of things you are looking for when
reconnoitring an AOP. These things include but are not limited to good sniper position for your
team, enemy personnel, tango snipers, danger areas (Open areas that attract gunfire), good
cover and concealment, possible entry points, and enemy escape routes. Once you have
found these things, you must record them. The second member of the Recon Team needs to
carry approximately 3 by 5" spiral notebook and a pencil (mechanical). Map the area that you
have reconnoitred and either write down what you found and where or mark the map with
symbols. This is up to the team; there is no real rule for reconnaissance unless you are in the

Movement is probably the most difficult part of reconnaissance. You must move undetected
and still get good intelligence. The two man teams need to move as one. This is accomplished
by appointing a point man early on. The point man is the front man in the formation who
basically decides where and when to go. The point man needs to be competent and stealthy.
Basically, the way movement works is that the point man decides a path to take and leads his
team member along that path. Just remember, that you never split up. Move as a team

After you have completed the recon of the AOP, return to the rally point. The Officer in Charge
(OIC) collects the information and sets up a plan. This should be the only time that talking is
permitted on a Recon Op. They conveying of accurate information and intelligence is crucial,
don't screw it up,

The most important things to remember about reconnaissance are you don't fire a shot. It
needs to be practiced and the art needs to be perfected. Only the most skilled military units
participate in reconnaissance operations in the real world, so you can imagine the difficulty.
Follow the above and you should be fine. So far it's worked for my team.

Communication is vital for a team's

success. There are a number of forms of
communication used by today's Special
Forces units. The very first and still
favorite in some cases are hand signals.
Hand signals are completely quiet and
they are effective. The other common
method of communication is through
tactical radios (TacRadio). Even though a
good radio is expensive, if you're a
serious team, you will want to shell out
the money. NOTE: Some tournaments do
not allow radio communication. Refer to
the rules in your area before purchasing!!
TacRadios offer more flexibility than hand
signals and can be more effective. If you
do purchase radios, spend the money to
get a decent one because if your team relies on TacRadio comm. Units and they go down,
you're screwed.

Depending on if you have military experience or how serious your team is, you may have pre-
Assigned positions in the team. Common military positions include the Point Man, OIC,
Corpsman (medical Officer), Assaulters, Grenadiers, and Rear security. These positions will

be referred to for the rest of this document. The acting position of a team member is a good
reference for radio communication. While some teams choose to use names, our team quickly
chose the position naming reference over names. WE found names to be cumbersome while
positions worked out quite nicely.

Whether you use TacRadios or hand signals, communication should be short and to the point.
You don't want to get caught waiting around in an open area because your comm. isn’t
effective enough. That's begging for an ambush to happen. Simple code words are an asset to
radio communication. Hand signals are for more developed and serious team and need to be
developed by the team itself. Teams are most familiar with signals that they come up with on
their own. The same goes with code words.

Communication Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are best developed by the teams
themselves. The information above is only there to help you formulate your own ideas. No
matter what form of communication you choose, the same principles apply. Restrict
communication to only necessary comments that directly affect the mission. For TacRadios,
make sure that the ones you choose have a hands-option. Holding your weapon and
concentrating on the task at hand can be complicated enough.

Shooting is a fundamental skill that won't

be covered in detail in this manual.
Shooting is a vital part of any Op. After
all, you have to shoot the tangos to take
them down don't you? Shooting in a CQB
situation is actually quite different from
that of any other Op. The reason is
because in CQB the action is fast.
Shooting in CQB is based upon initial
volume of fire and instinct. Reaction time
is very important in CQB.

There are a number of fundamentals that

help and apply to CQB though. The first is
that you never look away from your gun. Keep your weapon in front of you at all times. The
only exception belongs to the Point Man who may need to use his sidearm (if available). Don't
look anywhere that your weapon is not pointed. Believe it or not, it's much easier to depress
the trigger than to look, have to swing your weapon to your target, and then depress the
trigger. If you head moves, your weapon goes with it. This is even truer with a sidearm.

The next fundamental skill is a readiness stance. Keep your weapon in front of you a slightly
on a low angle when moving in a "clear" area. The reason is because if you're not in a clear
area, you actually present less of a target. Movement like that is also important because you
are more relaxed. When in CQB, tenseness is a bad thing. Tenseness causes premature firing
of the weapon and a lot of missed targets because of poor aiming. You do not however want
to move in this manner when you know that you're near tangos. If you're moving through a
danger area, keep the weapon in a firing position with a relaxed grip. If you're too tense, you
may have a tendency to jerk the weapon when firing which could throw your aim off. By the
way, missing is a bad thing!

The third and equally important aspect to combat shooting in CQB is reloading. Yes, there is a
SOP for reloading. The most efficient reloading technique is used by the U.S. Airborne
Rangers. The first thing to do if you need to reload is to check for cover. If there is cover move
to it. Once behind cover, drop to a knee and if necessary, draw your sidearm to within easy
reach in case of an emergency. Replace magazines quickly and engage in the fire fight again.

The last
needs to
.. and most important aspect of CQB shooting is a field of fire. Each team member
have a pre-assigned field of fire. A team member's field of fire is the area that the
team member is going to concentrate on when moving unless moving through an open area at
which you engage targets of opportunity. The point man has the front of the team covered with
the help of the OIC. The OIC covers the near flanks of the point man. The next man in the line,
which is usually a corpsman, covers the left and right of the team. The Assaulters cover
targets of opportunity. The rear security team member (last man in formation) covers the rear
of the team. This is an important position because the most common guerrilla tactic is to
engage a larger force from behind. Another important thing to remember is if you fire in your
field of fire let your team know who is firing by calling out "contact!" If you "drop" the tango, let
the team know by saying, not yelling, "tango down."

The above needs rehearsal and should

be trained again and again. My team
focuses on target shooting under
controlled circumstances working on a
"reflex or Instinct shot." Basically, we set
up a target, mimic clearing an area, and
engage the target of reflexes. That
involves bringing the weapon up for the
ready position and firing until the target is

Most of this chapter involves being in a

heavy firefight. In a CQB situation you
mostly only use cover temporarily when
entering a room that has not been cleared
yet. In a firefight however, good cover
could mean the difference between your
team losing or winning. Concealment applies to every aspect of CQB. You want to take
down the tangos swiftly and stealthy. At least that's what our team attempts to do.

Good cover is usually very hard to find in CQB. The most common and effective is a
door/window opening. They provide full cover of the body and allow for quick movement.
When using a door or window opening for cover, keep your weapon ready to fire at all times.
Stand close to the opening but not to the point where you are exposed to fire. To fire from that
position, lean at the hips to expose the smallest target to the enemy and engage either targets
of opportunity or in your field of fire depending on the situation.

Concealing yourself is very important in CQB. The most important time for concealment is
during the entry of the building or facility. Make your approach silent and not obvious. Good
concealment is usually found with corners and foliage. Depending on the design of the target
building, these options may not be present. If that situation comes up, stealthy movement is
really the only solution.

The best way to conceal yourself is with good clothing and camouflage selection. Don't choose
to wear black "ninja suits" for a daytime Op. Face paint camouflage is also a good addition.
Make sure that every part of your body is covered in some manner including your hands and
face. If you've chosen good camouflage, you should be able to use most objects as
concealment. One important thing to add is if you really don't want to be noticed, don't stare at
your enemy. If you're in your car sometime and you're at a red light, stare at the person next to
you and they will most likely look back. That's the human man's sixth sense. Focus on your
target for short periods of time and then return to watching your target. Five seconds usually
works good for us.

Smart Movement is a vital part of
success for a CQB Op. Movement in
CQB is swift and silent. There should
always be a purpose for movement.
Never move unnecessarily because it just
puts your team in danger. When moving
be sure to stay low and present as little of
target as possible to the enemy. Running
is usually a last resort. Quick and silent
movements are preferred to running
which is more noticeable and makes
more noise. Of course if your team is
compromised (discovered), running is
required because you need to get some
cover to engage and neutralize the

Covering areas is a crucial aspect of movement. If you approach an open hallway, staircase,
intersection or some form of open area, your team's movement needs to be covered. Hall
Ways and intersections are the most commonly encountered obstacles. When moving across
a "T shaped" hallway, the point man approaches the area and peeks around the corner. If a
tango is there, the scout should neutralize the threat. If not, the scout should drop to a knee
and cover the corner he just cleared. The next man in line should cross the open hallway and
leave enough room for the rest of the team on the other side. Once across the other side, the
OIC (second man in formation) is responsible for covering directly ahead of the way he just
came. Once the point man gives the word, the next man crosses. He then aids the point man
in covering the open area. The team crosses the open area one by one until the point man
comes across and assumes the position of point and the "patrol" continues.

Clearing and covering corners is another important aspect of movement. If you approach a
corner, the point man should tell the rest of the team they've reached a corner. The point man
then "slices the Pie" on the corner. Slicing the pie involves maximizing the team members view
while limiting the reaction time of the tango. Slicing the pie involves making a 90-degree
movement around the corner. In other words, the point man takes a step back from the corner
turns his body so his point of view is looking directly past the edge of the corner. He then side
steps turning his body slightly as he moves to maximize his field of vision.

When encountering opposite corners as in the "T Shaped" hallway, you need to separate the
team. The OIC and one other team member goes to the opposite corner as the point man. On
a three count, the Point man and the OIC slice the pie at the same time, which prevents the
chance of a rear ambush. The man coupled with the OIC covers the OIC's movements
remaining approximately three steps behind the OIC in case the OIC goes down. After both
corners are clear, the OIC or point man decides which way to proceed and the team regroups
and begins the "patrol" again.

Clearing rooms can be very difficult. If you approach a room with an open door the team needs
to set up on both sides of the opening. When moving across the opening, do not be detected.
If you are, you're screwed. The point man should give warning to the team when he first sees
the doorway and the team should act appropriately. When the team splits up, an assaulter
should accompany the OIC to the opposite side of the door opening as the point man. On the
OIC's order, the Point man swings in through the doorway making a 90-degree turn to his
nearest side. For example, if the point man is on the left side of the doorway, he'll enter and
turn left. Right after the point man enters, the OIC follows and turns to the opposite side of the
point man. Be sure to make those turns 90 degrees because room corners are a favourite for
tango campers. After the OIC, the next man on the point man's side enters and follows the
same path as the point man but makes approximately a 60 degree turn focusing more on the

centre of
OIC's path
.. theinstead
room. The next man on the OIC's side enters in the same fashion but follows the
of the point man. This continues until the entire team is in the room and the
room is deemed clear by the OIC. Example of entry: Point man goes left, OIC goes right,
Corpsman left, 1st Assaulter right, 2nd Assaulter left, Rear Security, right.

A closed door is handled differently however. If a closed door is encountered, the point man
and OIC line up on the opposite sides as before. The OIC moves first and positions himself
on about a 45-degree angle opposite the door swing. In other words, if the door opens and
swings left, the OIC will be on the right side of the doorway. The OIC then kneels and has
his weapon trained (aimed) directly ahead into the open space laying beyond the door. The
OIC must leave enough room for the door to open! The point man opens the door on the
OIC's order. At about .5 seconds after the door is opened, the point man makes his normal
entry procedure as above and the operation continues as normal with exceptions to the
OIC and the 2nd Assaulter. Instead of the OIC clearing the room, the next man in the line,
in the case above, the 1st Assaulter clears in the OIC's place. Everything goes accordingly
except for the 2nd Assaulter who positions himself next to the OIC and covers the team's
rear. Once the room is clear, the OIC and
2nd Assaulter move in with the rest of the
team and the "patrol" continues.

An important point to remember is when

clearing a room; do not engage targets of
opportunity. Engage targets that lie in
your path only. If you turn to shoot the
tango, you'll hit your own man before you
hit the enemy. Strict fields of fire are
required in order for this method of room
clearing to be efficient.

Using snipers is fairly complicated in

CQB. Snipers need to have a position that
provides both cover and concealment.
This information will cover this use of
snipers in a close quarters Battle.

A sniper's purpose in CQB is to cover the movement of the assault and recon teams and take out
difficult targets that the OIC deems puts the Assault team in danger. TacRadios are required if
you're going to snipe. A sniper must have excellent determination and concentration. The Sniper
may be the most experienced and trained member of the team. Be prepared, being a sniper is

A sniper in CQB is responsible for locating targets on the exterior of the building and for taking out
threats to the assault team. The sniper needs to have a radio with direct contact to the OIC. He
also must have a scope and in some cases Night Vision Goggles (NGVs) or an NVG scope on his
rifle depending on if the Op takes place during daylight or night.

If a sniper makes contact with a tango, he needs to report this to the OIC before he acts unless
the Tango poses direct threat to the Sniper. When reporting the Tango to the OIC, the Sniper must
have a location, approximate range, and difficulty rating of the shot. The OIC then decides
whether the Sniper takes a shot or if the assault team deals with the threat. The only other time
the Sniper has the option to shoot without OIC authorization is if the Assault team is in direct
danger and there is no other option. A sniper is a last resort and serves for intelligence purposes
more than anything else. If you're going to use a sniper, he must be a crack shot. A sniper must
practice shooting and become very accustomed to his weapon. I would recommend practicing
firing from a number of positions because no one-sniper position is the same as the next. You
never know when you'll need to be prone or be in the sitting position.


Hopefully this manual has expanded your knowledge on CQB and will help your team to succeed.
A lot of the information in this manual comes from real military tactics from units such as the
Airborne Rangers, Navy SEALs, Marine Force Reconnaissance Companies, Army Delta, and the
British Special Air Service (SAS). My team practices these tactics and so far we've had some
great successes. Out of all the combat situations out there, CQB seems to be the most difficult.
Hopefully this manual will make it less difficult and reduce the time it takes for you to develop your
own SOPs and tactics. Good luck and Happy hunting.

IMPROVISED Explosive Devices (IED)

The Improvised Explosive Device {IED} has become the most popular method of attack by
terrorists worldwide and is high on the list of criminal extortionists. Explosive or Incendiary
material in large or small quantities can be delivered by post or courier with devastating

Explosions within confined spaces will obviously create more damage than devices in the

IED’s are popular because: -

• No need for close contact
• Chance of high success
• Publicity
• Easy to make
• Small packets with unusual postmarks, foreign mail from unusual sources
and special delivery
• Unfamiliar handwriting or incorrect spelling or typing, particularly foreign
• Any small books or catalogues, particularly anything unrequested
• Titles on address, but no addresses
• Restrictive markings such as confidential
• Excessive postage
• Mis-spelling of common words
• Oily stains or discolouration
• No return address
• Excessive weight
• Lop sided or uneven envelope
• Protruding wires or foil and small holes
• Excessive securing
• Visual distractions
• Smells e.g. Almonds or Ammonia
• Any springiness, but will not bend
• Hold up to light to see the outline
Actions on finding a suspect device
• Do not open any suspect packages
• Don’t over handle the package
• Never Bend a package
• Remove the VIP from the area
• Don’t place the device in water

..• Remember where the device is in the building and give a thorough
• Don’t use radios within a 50 metre area
• Remember that a delivery of a suspect device could be a hoax to get the
VIP into the open

One of the biggest threats you will face is the bomb, as you search for the 20th time you
may start becoming lazy. NEVER ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN.

Know the MO of the terrorist bombs, how they work, what to look for

There are many classifications for explosives, but basically they can be regarded in two

Low explosive
• Burns very fast and causes a heaving effect, commonly used as
High explosive
• Creates a shock wave due to compressing the explosive and raising its
temperature, causing it to ignite with a shattering effect. High explosives
are difficult to ignite, normally a series of other explosions are needed to
trigger the main high charge.
Application of explosives
• People
• Buildings
• Vehicles, planes, boats or trains
Bomb types
• Letter, posted or hand delivered
• Package
• Vehicle
• Incendiary
IED components
• Power/ timing unit
• Detonator/ igniter
• Explosive compound
• Arming trigger
• Anti-handling device
Victim activation trigger
• Trip wire
• Application of pressure
• Releasing of pressure
Tilt or vibration
• Light activated
• Radio transmission
• Electric cable
• Manual

Initiation or fuse types
• Chemical
o These are usually time delay, acid eats through a wire allowing a striker
to fire thus detonating the explosive. Chemical fuses are of short
duration; an easily made chemical fuse is the durex bomb.
• Mechanical fuse
o Some form of mechanical action is needed, a trip wire – wire wrapped
around the drive shaft of the vehicle, mousetrap.
• Altitude/ barometer fuse
o Usually used on aircraft, contains mercury that expands as pressure of
altitude drops initiating the explosive.
Types of explosive

• Commercial

o Quarex, gelamix, frangex

o Commercial explosives are slow burning and have less energy than
military explosives

• Military

o Semtex, PE4, C4, plastic (px)

• Home made

o Manufactured from mixes such as weed killer, ammonia, sugar, petrol

IED security precautions

• Letter bombs
o Packages of up to 22Ibs can be sent through the mail
o Mail should never go direct to the client
o Arrange for mail to be delivered to security staff direct and not left in the
o If possible use X-ray machines, vapor analyzers, metal detectors
o Post office can screen mail before delivery
• Handling suspect mail
o Do not open
o Reduce handling
o Remove client and unnecessary staff from package
o Do not place in water
o Place in bomb pouch or outside in the open
o Keep away from flammable, gas lines
o Do not use radios
o Call special branch or bomb squad
• Types of vehicle bomb
o Devices that have been placed in a hurry, packages or bags that are
either placed in, leaned on, balanced against or put under the vehicle.
o Devices that have been fitted secretly for some period of time
o A vehicle that has been made into an explosive device or car bomb for
use against buildings

Types ..of triggers

. Wired to the brake light
• Wired to a tilt switch and activated upon driving away
• Wired to the milometer for detonation after a certain distance
• Wired to doors, bonnet, boot

Use two team members and one supervisor with a checklist, search in opposite directions
until back to the start position.
• Surrounding area
o Garage doors
o Windows, gates, drains
o Foot and tyre prints
o Jack marks
o Oil and fluid drops
o Broken glass
o Wire, string and loose dirt
• Beneath vehicle
o Engine compartment
o Seat & foot wells
o Fuel/ brake lines
o Exhaust system
o Transmission
o Petrol tank
• Exterior
o Coachwork
o Bumpers
o Doors
o Bonnet/ boot
o Petrol cap
o Locks/ handles
• Wheels and arches
o Tyres – slashes and valves
o Hub caps
o Wheel nuts – tampered or loose
o Arches
• Interior from the outside
o Look through the widows
o Any packages
o Wires or tape
o Doors to be opened from the rear first
o One team member to watch through the opposite window whilst the
door is opened very slowly
• Interior from inside
o Around, under and between seats
o Head rests
o Seat belts
o Under floor mats
o Foot wells
o Door panels & pockets
o Switches

o Interior light
o Instrument cluster
o Cigarette lighter
o Heater vents
o Radio or cassette
• Bonnet
o Locking spring
o Hinges
o Framework
• Engine block
o Any tampering or wires
o Vents, heater, wiper motors
o Air, oil, brake, fuel filters, reservoirs and lines
o Manifold
o Carb, distributor, coils and plugs
o Steering column and linkage
o Radiator and fan
o Fuse boxes
o Clutch, brakes and accelerator linkages
o Battery
• Boot
o Any tampering
o Locks, hinges and interior light
o All panels
o Mats
o Lights, wiring and petrol tank neck
o Spare wheel, jack and tool kit
Start the vehicle and check all switches, lights and brakes. Remember the following
• Firstly you should know the general lay out of the Internal Combustion
Engine, as you will have to distinguish between what should be there and
what looks out of place.
• Firstly before you approach the car, use the remote control key fob to
open and close the doors quickly.
• With the car locked approach carefully. Utilizing the search mirror and a
torch check underneath the vehicle for any protruding items, remember
these could be concealed using axel grease or black paint.
• Check all four tyres front and behind, check the exhaust and the front grill.
• Now check around the vehicle for any off cuts of wire or foil.
• Using the auto-unlock fob, unlock the doors.
• Firstly look through all of the windows for any disturbances in the car and
any protruding items.
• Open the driver side door checking there are no wires or connection
strips, check the door panels and if they come off, take them off to check
behind them.
• Do the same for the remaining three doors.
• Using the same opening instructions, open the boot of the vehicle.
• Check behind the light panels, and any removable panels.
• Remove the boot carpet and carefully take out the spare tyre and check it.
• Now move into the rear of the car, lift any carpet or rugs, and alter any
seating to check behind them.
• Do the same in the front of the car.
• Now check to see if any internal lights or seals have been tampered with.

..• In the front of the car open any fuse boxes and ashtrays, check
underneath the stirring wheel and ignition systems.
• If possible dismantle the glove compartment and check behind it.
• Check the dash for any movement or unseating.
• While doing this any open headed screws should be checked for
• Now checking the bonnet release switch, open the bonnet.
• Using the same door-opening principal carefully open the bonnet.
• Now open the Petrol cap in the same way and check for tampering.
• Now if you know your engines, check for unusual items, wires, packages
• Check anything that is detachable, hoses, filters, fluid containers etc.
• Check headlights and battery source.
• If you are happy with everything close all but the drivers door.
• Some modern Mercedes & BMW’s allow the engine to be started from the
key fob.
• Start the engine.
• If you are still here, put the car into gear and take it out for a spin.
• Make sure you accelerate & decelerate rapidly.
• If you are 100% happy return to pick up your VIP.
• Now remember do not leave the car once you have checked it over.

IED Building Search Procedures

If relevant, you will need to start outside. If you were searching a hotel room on the 10 th floor,
this would probably be overlooked.

In theory there should be 2 X 2 man teams. They will work diagonally around a building,
both teams in the same direction. Should a device be encountered, only two people are risk
at any one time.

They will check the following: -

• Shrubbery
• Flower Beds
• Driveway
• Manholes
• Vents and appliances
• Down pipes
• Disturbed soil
• Suspicious vehicles
• Windows & grills
• Entrance
The search will now move inside. With limited resources, you must, in the majority of cases,
split you search in to priorities. If you have limited time or manpower, then with the
assistance of plans and knowledge of the VIPs location and areas to be visited, color code
you prioritized areas.

RED – The most important area where a device will definitely kill

AMBER – Preferable to search

GREEN – All other areas

The search should be carried out, accompanied by someone who knows the premises.

“Watch where you put your feet” – “How you handle things” and “See, don’t just look.
• Exterior
o Scan the area visually for anything out of the ordinary, foot prints,
disturbances and tampering
o Search order will depend on location layout, but should include;
• Grounds
o Driveways
o Manholes
o Flower beds
o Suspicious vehicles or packages
• Building
o Drainage pipes and guttering if possible
o Windows, grills and vents
o All entry points
o Electrical boxes, telephone connection boxes, wiring and bells
• Interior
o Hallways, corridors, bathrooms and rooms
o Scan room visually for anything unusual
o Close eyes and listen for any noises
o Divide the room in half and begin to sweep in opposite directions until
meeting in the middle
o Go back over the area covered by your partner meeting at the start
o Floor to waist – waist to ceiling – the actual ceiling
o Search all electrical equipment, unscrew and check internally
o Be sure to check all screw heads for tampering
o All chairs and upholstery to be probed, recent repairs etc
o Ceiling panels checked
o Walls to be checked for recent repairs to wallpaper and plaster
o Include all windows, frames, ledges and balconies

BOMBS - Introduction
What they look like

Bombs are easily disguised in many ways, but you can be sure the last thing it is likely to
look like is a bomb. Very often it is not what a package looks like but where it is seen can
give it away. In other words the device can look innocent but put under a vehicle, or against
a door, this same object now becomes very suspicious. The terrorist will shape, paint and
disguise a bomb to try and make it inconspicuous, even seven tons of explosive in the back
of a lorry will be concealed or covered. There is no easy answer to this question, a well-
concealed bomb can go undetected without much effort.

There is another type of bomb the incendiary device, it is very small and designed to create
a limited explosion which will start a fire. It can be made to fit inside a cigarette packet, or
any other container. Terrorists will carry an incendiary bomb on their persons until a good

place as .. been found to conceal it.
Over the past few years it has become apparent that no one type of car is used nor one type
of bomb. Indeed to identify a well placed car bomb you first need to know the underneath of
the car quite well to spot something out of place. So once again common sense counts for a
great deal, as does trying to spot the unfamiliar. Look before and give a full search before
even touching the vehicle that causes you concern.

You might consider a good idea, if you or staff take some time out from
any distraction's to think:
If I were a bomber looking to plant a bomb, where would I plant it?
• To maximize damage?
• To cause the most injury?
• To start the worst fire?
• To give me the best chance of being undetected and making my escape?
Test your security you may be surprised how useful this exercise can be. In your situation
consider what type of disguise the bomb could be in, such as a bag, briefcase, parcel or
package. Remember that whatever precautions you take against the bomber will also help
detect the burglar or any thief.

Remember terrorists assess likely targets before they try and leave a bomb at a later date.
There is a lot you and all your staff, visitors can do to deter them by replacing fear with
vigilance. No criminal will act if your normal behavior will deter him or her, or steps you have
taken will increase their risk of being caught.

BOMBS – Mail & Deliveries

Postal bombs may be sent in envelopes no thicker than a quarter of an inch or larger
packages. In either case they may be of the explosive or incendiary variety. As before check
the package for excessive tape and postage, any protruding wires or foil and a smell of
almonds or ammonia. Are there any oil stains or smudge marks on the package and does it
feel excessively heavy for its size.

Remember post bombs may explode on opening, look for

• The postmark -Especially if foreign and the name and address of sender, do you
normally get letters or parcels from here?
• The writing - Which may be foreign style, do you recognize it?
• The balance - Is it evenly balanced?, if the letter or parcel is lopsided, treat it as
• The weight - If it seams to be excessive for the size of letter.
• Any holes - Are they any holes or pin points which could have been made by
wires?, any wires sticking out.
• Stains - Are there any stains or grease marks?
• The smell - Some, but certainly not all explosives have an aroma of marzipan or
• The feel - In the case of letters, it will indicate whether there is only folded
paper inside the envelope of if there is stiffening, for example,
cardboard or the feel of metal in which case treat it as suspect.
• The outline - Can you see if there are any unusual outlines if you hold it up to the
• The flap - Is the flap of the envelope stuck down completely? there is usually a

small gap.
• Stamps - The terrorist often puts too many stamps on the letter or parcel to
ensure it will pass through the post office.

Other points to look for

• Do not accept presents or parcels from Unknown persons, especially
parcels that have not been ordered.
Do not allow suppliers to enter your grounds or home
Discourage the leaving of parcels on window sills or at the door
Check all deliveries carefully before accepting them
Be suspicious of a change of postman, milkman or regular delivery person
Encourage regular correspondents to write their name on the outside of parcels and
bulky letters
• Give very clear instructions to the members of your staff and household
on all above points.

The picture you are now viewing shows the effect of an explosive charge on what, in this
instance, was a 2.8 tonne armored Mercedes belonging to Alfred Herrhausen, chairman of
Deutsche Bank, who was assassinated on 30th November 1989. Only 22lbs of TNT placed
on a child's bike blew the Mercedes some 82 feet across the road.

The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has become the most popular method of attack by
terrorists worldwide and is high on the list of criminal extortionists. IEDs are popular because
no need for close contact chance of success is high publicity easy to make.

It may pay to look at the dynamics of explosive material and the injuries they can cause.
Explosives are substances which, when detonated are very rapidly expanded to large
volumes of gas. When a bomb, grenade or other casing confines the explosion, such high
pressures will rupture the casing, imparting high velocity to the resulting fragments.

The remaining energy then produces a blast shock wave and the displaced air creates a
blast wind. The shock wave created by the compression of the surrounding air is not
dissimilar to a large amplitude sound wave. The rapid rise in pressure can be in the order of
hundreds of thousands of pounds per square inch and the blastwave moves away from the
source as a sphere of rapidly expanding compressed gas.

The velocity of the shockwave in air is over 3,000 meters per second, although it will soon
fall to the speed of sound, depending upon the nature and composition of the charge. Like
sound waves, blast pressure waves will flow over and around any obstruction like a wall and
affect anyone mistakenly sheltering behind it. The pressure level at 90 degrees to the
direction of travel of the shock front is called 'Incident Pressure'. There is a suction, or
negative pressure, which follows after the blastwave, but although much less than the pos-
itive pressure, is ten times longer.

A blast wave will travel much faster through a liquid or solid, due to the greater density of the
material. Blast injuries in water are more severe at a great distance. Direct contact with
Armor plate during an explosion will result in more serious injuries. There are three other
physical factors, which need to be understood regarding blast injuries. A condition known as

'Spalling' .. results from the shearing forces created on a body where the different densities,
reacting differently to the pressure wave, causes a pressure pulse, which compresses and
heats small air bubbles as it passes over. The compressed and heated bubbles expand and
implode with an explosive force. As the blastwave passes over the body, it creates specific
damage at the surface of the tissue. An eardrum that will rupture at 7lbs per square inch and
the lung at 50lbs per square inch, will suffer severe damage. If the blast pressure is high
enough, similar damage will be occasioned to the abdomen, causing severe disruption. The
lungs can also be crushed between the diaphragms, which rises violently under the ram
effect of the pressure-driven abdomen.

Blast Wind

The rapidly expanding gases displace an equal volume of air. This air travels immediately
behind the shock front at very high speed, creating a dynamic pressure. At some distance
away it may blow a person over, causing a variety of injuries. Closer to the explosion, there
will be a traumatic amputation - the mass movement of air will actually blow limbs off. In the
immediate vicinity of the explosion there may be total disintegration of the body.

An explosive device is usually constructed in a way that, contained with the blast wind, will
be high velocity fragments of metal or flammable material. The PIRA petrol bomb, where
one pound of explosive attached to a one gallon can of petrol placed against an outside wall,
door or attached to a window grille, sent a fireball some 30 to 40 feet and successfully
destroyed whole buildings.

General Bomb Management

• Establish! Assess the probability of an actual or threatened bomb incident
to your Principal, Residence, or other site.
• Estimate the consequent damage: Physical, Psychological
• Plan effective PREVENTATIVE measures to reduce the likelihood of an
• Develop Control and Containment techniques to reduce the consequent
damage if an incident, real or threatened, does occur.
Explosions in confined spaces such as vehicles or buildings are even more devastating than
in the open. Devices may come in many guises:

1. Package Bomb

May be any type of package, even a carrier bag. They can be left innocuously anywhere in
or near a building or vehicle.

2. Incendiary Device

Consists of combustible material in something as small as a cigarette packet or cassette

box. Pushed down the back of a settee or similar, it can cause severe damage.

3. Car Bomb

A small amount of explosive on or in the car, detonated by a variety of means, will demolish
a vehicle and its occupants. The devices may be of the explosive or fire bomb type. Cars
packed with explosive and left in a strategic position will devastate large buildings, or if timed

correctly, kill specific targets whilst in convoy - a popular method of assassination by the
Italian Mafia, most recently used against investigative magistrates.

4. Letters or Parcel Bomb

Explosive or incendiary material in large or small quantities can be delivered by post or

parcel delivery with devastating consequences.

5. Bomb Threats

A bomb threat can have a serious effect on the operation of a business and the confidence
of its employees. Whilst experience shows most bomb hoaxers make calls, every care must
be taken to evaluate the call and act accordingly.

The blast from an explosive device in its spherical form travels up as well as along and
windows above ground floor level are also liable to shatter and cause casualties. Ordinary
window glass subject to blast shatters into sharp-edged pieces including long slivers. At

High velocity, these pieces can cause severe injuries or death. Furthermore, blast waves
can penetrate into a building and shatter internal
glazing such as borrowed lights to corridors. Since
corridors are usually circulation and escape routes,
borrowed lights and glazed door panels often need
protecting as well (see Chapter 5 - Office Security).
Shatterproof film or possibly the use of laminated glass
which missile-forming properties are very much less
than those of ordinary glass. Polycarbonate sheets
over glass will also assist, as will approved net curtains
or drapes in the residence or VIP office.

The three photographs on this page illustrate the

potential for devastation that can be wreaked by a car
bomb. The attack was against a coach of Soviet Jews
on their way to Ferihegy Airport in Budapest.

Perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists,

a Fiat Tipo, packed with 20 kilos of
plastic explosive in its boot, was
detonated by a radio working on the
400-500MHz ranges from some 150
feet away.

Due to the ever-present threat of

attack, a Police car, followed
immediately by another Police car
bringing up the rear, preceded the
coach. The bomb contained steel
balls and more by good luck than
anything, the main force was directed
away from the road. The lead Police
car took most of the blast, with two

device .was detonated prematurely. On the left are the remains of the billboard that the Fiat
Police officers being seriously injured. Occupants of the coach sustained minor cuts. The

was parked behind.

Left: Remains of the Fiat.

Right: The Police lead vehicle and the bus.

Remember - Don't site the VIP suite overlooking a car park area or main road.

Don't site your mailroom in the middle of the building. In an office, the damage is already
done if a suspect package is not checked until it is in the mailroom, at which point, if it is
discovered, it is now in the middle of the building if that is where the mailroom is situated.
The effect from a confined blast in a building can be devastating. Its effects will not be
restricted to the room in which it detonates.

Currently, no company can feel safe from being the recipient of any incendiary device. They
are easily constructed from household materials, yet their potential for devastation is out of
all proportion to their size. The incendiary or small letter bomb is still a current threat,
although at the time of writing, the incidence of reported suspect packages in London has
fallen by 80%, given the IRA ceasefire. The incidence however, of incendiaries in retail or
meat packers targeted by the extreme elements of the Animal Activists is holding steady.

The attraction of the letter or parcel bomb to a terrorist, extortionist or crank, is that he can
reach the innermost sanctums of an operation, be it a company, politician or businessman
whilst remaining remote. Devices, given the ingenuity of construction, particularly in battery
technology and electronic timers, can mean the perpetrators can be thousands of miles
away when the explosion takes place. The Brighton bomb was placed some three months
prior to being occupied by Conservative Party members for their conference, but also
illustrated the folly of having untrained people carry out search procedures.

In any Improvised Explosive Device (LED), you will find the following:
• Times and Power Unit
• Detonators or Igniter
• Explosive or Incendiary mixes
And Optionally
• An Arming Device
• An Anti-Handling Device
The old acronym 'HIT' helps in understanding the requirements a terrorist is looking for:
H - Hide - The terrorist must have a concealed hiding/firing point
I - Initiate - Must have a means of initiation
T - Target - Must be there at a specific time
Confusion often arises with the terminologies, particularly that relating to the anti-handle]
device and 'Booby Traps'. A bomb designed to be operated, say, by 'remote control', IT have
an anti-handling device. This is so as to score a hit should the device be discover: prior to
the proposed time of detonation and is considered to be 'booby trapped'. Howe,

A device designed to explode as a result of being initiated by the intended victim generally

referred to as a 'booby trap'. A device may therefore be either booby-trapped a booby trap in
its own right. In either case it is VICTIM OPERATED.

Also, an arming device can be the initiator for the bomb. In the case of the Pan, bombing,
three Barometric switches were used as arming devices and finally to initiate device. The
first two armed the device on reaching a prescribed altitude on its journey to Frankfurt and
then to Gatwick, the third switch as 12,000 feet completed the circuit initiated the bomb. It
will pay to look in slightly more detail at the main elements of a de' and methods of initiation.

Time and Power Unit

As was illustrated with the Brighton bomb, the ability to control to within a few seconds
months later, an explosion, is one of the deadliest attributes of a bomb. This allows
perpetrator to be miles away from the event and to precisely target the explosion time"

In the event of the Brighton bomb, the terrorists had, however, to guess as to which n
Margaret Thatcher would be staying in. The time element can be controlled in a number of

1. Timer Operated
2. Command Operated
3. Victim Operated

Timer Operated

• Mechanical i.e. alarm clocks, watches, candle, barometric

etc. - electronic i.e. Video timers etc.
• Chemical i.e. a chemical that will eat through to initiate a

Command Operated

• Command wire
• Remote Control
Victim Operated (or delay devices)

This could be by a variety of means - by say, opening a car door, sitting on a

seat, starting the vehicle, moving away, opening a package, turning on a light

• 'Anti-Lift' i.e. Trembler device. 'Anti-Tilt' i.e. Mercury switch

• 'Anti-Open' i.e. Micro switch, or simply making contact.
Heat/Light operated
• Pressure on/Pressure release - - - Tension on/Tension
• Electrical i.e. engine, light switches etc. Photoelectric

Power ..Unit
In the majority of cases, the power to initiative a device will be by battery. This could be as
small as a 1.5-volt watch battery for an incendiary device or a car battery attached to the end
of a command wire. Flat batteries such as those contained within modern Polaroid film
packs are powerful and concealable. Battery technology is such that the construction of an
explosive or incendiary device is made relatively easy. Size of battery is less important if the
device is 'command' detonated. A car battery will be perfectly adequate. Other power
sources may be mechanical, chemical, light or people.

Detonators and Igniters

A detonator is needed to supply the initial boost to the main explosive charge. Detonators
can be commercially obtained or homemade. They are all essentially the same, with a small
explosive charge contained within a metal tube, wired so as to connect to the power source.

There are many varieties of detonator, some delay based, either a slow fuse or working
through a chemical reaction such as the action of acid on a soft metal spring, eventually
activating a plunger onto a detonator.

An igniter for an incendiary mix needs to be nothing more complicated than a bulb where the
filament is exposed and placed within an incendiary mix. When a current passes through it,
the filament glows hot and ignites the mixture.


The lax security at quarries and mining operations has provided a regular supply of
commercial explosives such as Gelamix, Quarex and Frangex. Modem Dynamites, are now
very stable and most make no use of the classically unstable element, 'Nitro-Glycerine'.
Commercial explosives are much 'slower burning' than military types and produce a far
lower energy output. Placed and packed carefully, however, it is equally as devastating in
the hands of terrorists as military explosive.

The support provided to terrorist organizations by many former Eastern bloc countries also
gave easy access to such products as the ubiquitous Semtex (a mix of ROX and PETN).
Other military explosives such as PE4 have found their way into terrorist hands. TNT is still
the classic military demolition explosive, usually foil covered to prevent the ingress of
moisture and sometimes coming with an integral detonator. There are many varieties of
initiation devices available to terrorists, particularly chemical or simple percussion delay

By choice, however, terrorists favor the use of 'plastic' explosives or PX. Safe to handle,
totally benign until a detonator is added and malleable. It can be sawn, molded and abused
without any problem, plus it is odorless and non-toxic. Plastics come in many forms and
most are based on conventional RDX combined with a plastic polymer. Homemade
explosives such as ANFO and ANAL and CO-OP mix are all easily constructed and in
reasonably large quantities, very effective. They need to be delivered in large quantities of
many hundreds of kilogram’s to be equally as effective as a moderate amount of military
explosive, but if time and circumstances favor, they can be devastating, as the security
forces in Northern Ireland know only too well.

Incendiary mixes are usually all homemade from simply household items such as weed killer
and sugar. The proportions dictate the degree of bum or explosion one wants to achieve.
Incendiary devices, as small as one contained in a cigarette packet, can result in the
ultimate destruction of whole buildings, with damage running into millions of pounds.

Explosive material will either be high explosive (HE) or low explosive (LE). HE is more
'brissant' than LE, in other words, it has a high shattering effect, whereas LE is used to push
and shove.

Low Explosive (LE) Must be contained won’t work when damp Prone to friction/spark Will
not cut steel

High Explosive (HE) needs no containment Okay when damp/wet not affected by spark Cuts

Low Explosive is usually - black powder, smokeless powder, homemade. Such items as
Harpic, fertilizer, petrol or diesel oil, soap flakes, sugar, paint thinner, battery acid are all
possible ingredients for LE mix.

Arming Switch

A device may need to be carried some distance before being placed in-situ and in order to
facilitate its safe handling; it may need to have an arming device. Such a device would be
necessary with any bomb designed to be initiated by 'tilt' or 'trembler'. A letter bomb,

Whilst under construction, needs to be safe until sealed, at which point, an arming device
such as a pin or wire can be removed, hence the need to look for 'tell-tale' holes in a suspect
letter or package. The barometric switch is another version of the arming switch and may
also be the initiator. A single switch to complete an electric circuit may be incorporated in a

Victim Operated

Such devices require the compliance of the victim to initiate the explosion. This may be a
simple 'pressure on/pressure release' device, using such household items as a mousetrap or
clothes peg. In both cases, on release of the pressure e.g. mousetrap, a circuit is formed
and the detonator ignited or with a clothes peg under the wheel of a car, which on moving
on, pressure is applied to close the circuit.

Pressure devices could be simply constructed from the pressure mat, integral to most
burglar alarm systems, or it could be made from tin foil and soft foam layers, which could be
placed within a car seat or in a room under a mat. Micro switches can be bought for pence
and constructed into anything the victim may open, such as a book or box in the post.

Light sensitive switches can be used, but the safe construction by a terrorist and its
subsequent arming, is often a dangerous complication. Heat sensitive devices can be
attached to the exhaust manifold of a victim's vehicle. The mercury tilt switch, bought for a
few pence at Tandy electrical stores and used in the assassination of MP Airey Neave, is
simplicity itself. The tilting of mercury in a small glass vial will complete a circuit and initiate
the charge.

These ..are
.advantages and disadvantages of the choice of initiation and it pays to
summaries these.

Initiation Advantage Disadvantages

Remote Easy escape can be jammed, lose

line of sight

Time accurate prematurely

detonated by


Command Wire Accurate, can’t be Easily detected & cut


Timer Leave and go often unreliable, the

longer left

May be found
leave & go more
Booby Traps Victim Operated
dangerous to post or

Go off for no reason

NOTE - An explosive letter bomb can be sent through the post in an envelope no thicker
than one quarter of an inch. A package up to 22lbs in weight can be sent through the post.

A system must be established in both the residence and the office to screen incoming mail.
Investment in a variety of technology, from x-ray machines to discriminating metal detectors
and vapor analyzers are worthwhile. The outlay, as always, will
be determined by 3 factors:
• Level of Threat
• Regional Risk
• Depth of Pocket
A cheap hand-held, non-linear junction detector can greatly
assist in screening incoming mail.

Examples of a Cassette Incendiary, showing the time, power unit and

incendiary mix, a favorite device of the Animal Liberation Front. On the
left of the photograph is a simple device illustrating the use of a spring-
loaded clothes peg and power unit, suitable for a number of purposes.

Remote Control Device. Remote control unit with the device installed in a cigar box. The
range of such a device_ whilst only measured in 10's of metres can still make an effective
terrorist weapon.

• Small packets with unusual postmarks, foreign mail from unusual sources
and special delivery.
• Unfamiliar handwriting or incorrect spelling or typing, particularly foreign.
• Any small books arriving, particularly anything unrequested.
• Titles on address, but no names.
• Restrictive markings such as 'Confidential', 'Personal' etc.
• Excessive postage.
• Mis-spelling of common words.
• Oily stains or discoloration.
• No return address.
• Excessive weight for its size.
• Lop-sided or uneven envelope.
• Rigid envelope, either card or metal stiffening.
• Protruding wires or tin foil and small holes or pinpricks.
• Excessive securing material such as masking tape, string etc.
• Visual distractions.
• Unusual smells i.e. almonds or ammonia.
• Any springiness. Be suspicious if it fees springy, but does not bend - be
• Hold up to light to see any unusual outline.
Actions On Finding a Suspect Device

Remember the effects of a bomb inside a building are far more severe than when out in the
open. Some Do's and Don'ts:

• Do not open any suspect package

• Don't over-handle suspect packages
• Never bend a suspect package
• Get the client away whilst your other Immediate Action Drills take place
• Don't place a device in water

..• If the device was found in a building, try and remember exactly where the
device is with a description.
• Don't accept delivery of any unexpected package
• If you have grounds in a residence, select a flat open area away from the
main building to place the suspect package. If not, then place on a flat
surface in a room close to the door of the building. Remember, whilst the
explosive blast in an open space may be reasonably safe, windows will
still be blown open up to a long distance.
• Don't place a device near flammables
• Don't select a safe area near gas or other service lines
• Don't use radios within 30 to 50 metres
• Don't put anything on a device (pressure switch)
• Don't bring devices into a building
• Remember, delivery of a suspect device could be a hoax to get the VIP
into an open space
Don't simply condition your thinking to believe that 'suspect packages only contain explosive
or incendiary material. There is a growing practice of sending 'nastiest' in the post. These
can range from pins, to razor blades, broken glass and needles. Don't ignore the dangers of
an innocuous envelope - it can still contain a threatening letter or an extortion demand.
Always inform the police, don't throwaway and don't ignore them.

BASIC Surveillance Techniques

It is always essential to report thoroughly all observations of the targets movements
regardless of insignificant they may appear. They may mean something to someone who
has the whole picture.

In general it is best if operatives do not wear hats as they do tend to stand out, unless it is
part of your cover.

Women should always try to avoid wearing tight cloths for obvious reasons. Having said that
it is important for teams to be mixed in case your target meets a female and enters a cloths
shop etc. Likewise teams should also consider mixed dress - some in casual cloths & maybe
one in a suit, just in case. If you are all in casual order and the target goes into a hotel/
restaurant you will lose them.

Avoid wearing jewelry, rings etc, they are made to attract attention. Even down to your
watch, a big, flashy, shiny one that goes bleep every hour does not help.

Try to layer your cloths, it is easier to take off cloths to change your general appearance. If
convenient you can change cloths with other team members, always try to do this out of
sight as it makes you rather obvious.

Avoid looking like a surveillance vehicle. Try not to have to males together. Equipment to be
kept out of sight. Don’t have coffee cups, cigarettes, food wrappers outside the vehicle etc.
Do not sit with your seat belts on, engine running it may alert the target. Use a family car
with a child seat in the back.

When on vehicle surveillance consider your position, i.e. - if parked anywhere near a school/
playground you will be seen and reported by a member of the general public.

When in a vehicle or on foot surveillance you should always be looking ahead. What would
you do if the target stops, turns etc, plan ahead in your mind.

If you suspect your under surveillance it can go two ways you can compromise them letting
them know they have been seen or we can use them to feed back false information.


What You Need to Know


Various myths and misconceptions have built up about the role of the Bodyguard, and the
techniques he, or she uses to achieve results.

One area of activity that almost every ‘layman’ immediately associates with BG work is
electronic surveillance. It's certainly a very interesting area, which probably explains why
many works of fiction, both on TV and in popular literature, concentrate on it.

In reality, the vast bulk of the work of a professional BG is carried out without recourse to
such methods. Indeed, there are many investigators who have never used electronic
surveillance equipment in careers spanning many years!

However, to avoid this field altogether, is to ignore one of the most interesting tools available
to the investigator today. Modem technology has made a wide range of equipment and
techniques available and these offer extensive intelligence-gathering capability to operators
who know how to deploy them effectively.

Almost every company and individual in the western world relies on some form of telecom-
munications on a day-to-day basis. However, the telecommunications system in every coun-
try is wide-open to infiltration by modem electronic devices. More interestingly still, most

People remain completely unaware how insecure there home, office or mobile telephone,
tax machine or data link is. The enterprising investigator can, therefore, collect some very
useful data using electronic surveillance methods and equipment, in many cases without
anyone ever being aware this is taking place.

One important restriction to be aware of is that the operation of unlicensed transmitting

devices, the connection of unapproved devices to the public telecommunications network
and the interception of telecommunications is generally illegal in the UK. However, do note
that it is the operation of such equipment, which is illegal. Its sale, purchase, possession or
rental is. Collegial and so there are many suppliers who can supply electronic surveillance
equipment, ostensibly for export use.

The final most important point you should know about electronic surveillance equipment is

that it is .. almost always open to detection and counter surveillance (i.e. measures which
prevent its effective use). This is both an advantage and a disadvantage to the investigator.
On some 9ccasions he or she may be deploying electronic surveillance, but on other
occasions may be engaged in detecting and removing it!

In this section we will consider the range of equipment available, and some situations in
which it may prove useful. In no way is it intended to be an instruction manual on the use of
the devices covered. At this stage it is for information only. Some of this equipment will be
referred to again in the appropriate section of the main course.

Types of Electronic Surveillance

The main forms of electronic surveillance, or 'eavesdropping', are LISTENING DEVICES

(known As 'bugs') and TELEPHONE MONITORING (known as 'taps') and there is a subtle
but important difference between the two. A listening device can be located in any room or
area, either operating independently or carried by an individual, to monitor everything that is
said in that area. A telephone-monitoring device, on the other hand, is used solely to monitor
what is being passed over a telephone line.

Listening Devices

Listening devices consist of four basic components: a MICROPHONE, a TRANSMITTER, a

RECEIVER and a RECORDING DEVICE. The operator can configure these devices in order
to provide the most effective monitoring of the individual area in question; what is suitable for
one assignment may be inappropriate for another.


The smallest surveillance microphones currently available are typically 5mm X 5mm X
10mm. These may be hidden, for example, under a desk or in a light fitting, but it is more
usual to disguise them in an innocent, 'host' device such as a pen, briefcase or plug adaptor.


The transmitter is a very important part of any surveillance installation. These come in a vari-
ety of shapes and sizes, the smallest being approximately 35mm X 18mm X l0mm. As with
microphones they can be either hidden in a room or disguised as an innocent item.


If using a transmitter you will also need a receiver. There are various types on the market
and performance is usually related to size. Receivers are available which can monitor up to
five different signals at the same time.


Every surveillance configuration should employ a recorder if it is to be truly effective. This

can be situated either with the microphone (making a transmitter and receiver optional) or at
a remote location with the data being relayed over a transmission link. The chief
disadvantages to locating the recorder in the area to be monitored are the space
requirement and also the need to maintain the device (i.e. replace the tapes and batteries).
The great advantage to concealing the recorder in the area to be monitored is that these
devices are almost impossible to detect with counter surveillance equipment. (If your
recorder is located ala remote location then it is always possible, indeed quite likely, that the
transmission signal may be picked up by a debugging device.)

Finally remember that no matter what kind of listening device is used their effectiveness
always depends on the skill of the operator in choosing and using devices, from the range
we discuss in this publication, which are most appropriate for the situation in question.

Telephone Monitoring.

As we have seen, by no means are all surveillance devices attached to telephone

equipment, but a good many items are. Depending on the assignment in question it may be
necessary to employ both a listening device and a telephone monitor.

It should also be remembered that, with the development of modern communications, it is

now possible to monitor any type of information sent down the telephone line. This includes
voice transmissions, facsimile (fax) transmissions and computer data transmissions. In each
case these may be recorded and, in the latter two cases, deciphered with the use of an
encoding machine or even just a compatible fax machine or computer.

There are three methods of monitoring 'phone calls:

1. Wire a device to the telephone line.

A recording device, or a transmitting device, can be attached at any point on the wiring sys-
tem to monitor voice, fax and data signals. The most basic devices simply plug into an
extension socket on the same line as that being recorded. More advanced devices are
available to monitor the operation of microprocessor controlled telephone systems (e.g.
PABX systems).

2. Locate a transmitter on or near the telephone equipment.

In these situations the telephone handset or base is usually chosen to house the 'bug'. This
form of eavesdropping is only suitable for the monitoring of voice communications.

The smallest transmitter currently in use is approximately 35mm X 18mm X l0mm and will
transmit to a receiver about 400 yards away. (For best results the receiver should usually be
located in the same building or a nearby-parked vehicle.)

3. Specialized telephone equipment.

It is possible to obtain telephone apparatus, which looks like, and indeed works like, a stan-

dard home .. or office telephone but which incorporates a monitoring device. The monitored
party uses this apparatus in all innocence.

These devices can transmit, but their great advantage is that they can release the data they
collect down the telephone line to a remote monitoring position, either nearby or even on the
other side of the’ world. When used in this way they are extremely difficult to detect and vir-
tually maintenance free.

Counter surveillance Equipment

It is important to remember that every type of electronic surveillance device can be detected
in some way. Whether or not this is an advantage or disadvantage depends on which side of
the fence you happen to be on at the time! The main factor that complicates detection is the
wide range of surveillance equipment available and the many permutations in which the
operator may deploy it.

The best counter surveillance or debugging device is the operator him or herself! Knowing
the devices that are available and how they are used, as covered in this booklet, makes
detecting and removing them much easier. For example, knowing how to identify non-
standard telephone or electrical equipment, or knowing what sounds or other telltale signals
are emitted by common surveillance devices.

Having said this a number of electronic devices are available to aid in the detection of trans-
mitting devices. These work either by:

1. Radio Field Strength Testing

In other words, simply detecting that a transmitter is in operation. These can be used to
quickly scan a large room but are not always useful in precise location of the transmitter
since various external factors can affect radio field strength.

2. Radio Receivers and Spectrum Analysis

In simple terms these monitor the transmission emitted by the bugging device itself and by
filtering out background radio signals, innocent transmissions and signals onto which the
bugging device may have smuggled (or hidden its signal behind) allow precise location of
the device.

3. Additional equipment to detect taps placed on telephone lines.

These usually work by detecting tiny abnormalities in the operation of the line. They carry
out checks such as tone sweep, line voltage and current test, line carrier detection and also
allow on-hook listening. Again, it is a case of the more expensive the device the more
effective it will be and the cheaper it is the more rudimentary it is likely to be.

4. Jamming Devices

Devices are available which prevent the use of listening, recording and transmitting devices,
particularly when these have been applied to telephone lines. These are generally effective
but the disadvantage is that the party who is eavesdropping is immediately alerted to the
fact that their intrusion has been detected and may take other steps to monitor your

In summary the best piece of advice is to say that all forms of telecommunications are inse-
cure and impossible to protect completely against surveillance. Even codes, ciphers and
scrambling devices can be defeated quite easily. For example, governments worldwide do
not usually license the use of any telecommunications equipment in their respective country
unless they have first discovered how to tap into it for themselves.

Having examined the various principles that apply to electronic surveillance we will now look
at the various items of equipment that are available today. Different manufacturers may use
different names but the principles of each item of equipment are essentially the same:

Basic Transmitting Devices

Basic transmitters range in size between approximately 35mm X 18mm X 1Omm, up to

approximately 85mm X 50mm X 25mm for deployment where space is at less of a premium.
Most investigators prefer to use the cheapest possible transmitting devices, which do not
need to be recovered after the operation is complete; prices start at £10.

Two important points about transmitters are that the larger the transmitter the more powerful
it will be. For example, the smallest 35mm X 18mm X 1Omm device may only be capable of
transmitting a signal up to 0.25 mile. A 85mm X 50mm X 25mm device, on the other hand,
may transmit up to two miles. Many transmitters have their own battery supply; the disad-
vantage of this is that they need to be replaced periodically or the transmitter eventually
'dies'. Some transmitters connect to the power supply of a host appliance (e.g. a telephone
or a plug adaptor). These will operate indefinitely without maintenance; the disadvantage is
that they take more time and effort to 'plant' in the first place.

Another point to note when deploying a basic transmitter is that it must be disguised in a
suitable location, such as a desk, light fitting or telephone.

Covert Transmitting Devices

A covert transmitter is essentially a basic transmitting device, which is disguised as (or,

alternatively, is located in) an ordinary day-to-day item. The host item operates in the normal
way but conceals the transmitting device. These items can then be 'planted' in a location to
be monitored or even, for example, given as a gift. Again, as with basic devices, the range
over which the transmitter can operate is directly related to its size.

Covert transmitting devices must either be powered by their own batteries or wired into a
power source. Transmitters disguised as wall sockets or plug adaptors are therefore very
common since they have direct access to mains electricity. These are some of the items a

covert transmitter is most commonly located within:

• An electrical wall socket.

• A plug adaptor.
• A telephone (handset or base).
• A fountain pen.
• A desk or handheld calculator.
• A briefcase.
• An 'exit' sign.
• An emergency lighting luminary.
• A smoke detector.
• A PIR detector (part of a security alarm system). . A false air vent.

The shrewd operator will also devise and construct his or her own covert transmitters, thus
making it extremely difficult for other people, however experienced, to discover where a
transmitter mayor may not be located.

Covert transmitters (or alternatively a recording device) can also be body-worn, i.e. located
on the person of an operator to record meetings and conversations. In this situation they are
known as a 'wire'. For best results a body-worn transmitter may be used in conjunction with
a pen microphone.

Receivers for use With Listening Devices.

Any transmitter must be used in conjunction with a suitable receiver. Transmitters and
receivers used in electronic surveillance can operate on any radio frequency but most
typically operate on narrow band FM over a frequency range of UHF 365-455 MHz. Most
good quality counter surveillance scanners search for transmissions anywhere in the 1 MHz
- 2 000 MHz range. Some transmitters are designed to 'smuggle' their signals alongside
another FM signal (e.g. a commercial radio station) to make detection more difficult. This
does not by any means make detection impossible.

Receivers are available in various formats including handheld, desktop and briefcase size. A
small handheld receiver will be around 85mm X 65mm X 25mm and will allow you to monitor
one transmitter. The most advanced receivers are often mounted in a briefcase and will
allow the monitoring and recording of four or five transmitters. It is not the quality of the
receiver that determines how far from the transmitter can operate, but the quality of the
transmitter and its power source.

Receivers are rarely used independently and should mostly be used with a compatible
recording device.

Recording Devices

A good recording device forms the heart of any electronic surveillance system. Any profes-
sional recording machine or portable household audiocassette recorder will do this job with
the proviso that the better the quality of the machine the better the quality of the recording.

The main drawback with recording devices is that the amount they can record depends on
a) the length of the tape and b) the life of the power source, ego the batteries. In longer-term
surveillance operations (and also situations where the recording device is to be concealed in
the premises being monitored) it is therefore customary to use a compaction device, wired
between the receiver and the recorder. These allow up to 8 hours of recording to be made
on one side of a standard C120 cassette tape. Some compaction devices allow several
recorders to be wired together (known as cascading) so that many weeks of recording may
be made without any maintenance being required.

Pen Microphone

A pen microphone is a very useful adjunct to a recording system. These are available in two
types: a simple pen microphone, which is wired to a recording device and a transmitting pen
microphone, which transmits its signal to a remote location.

Pen microphones (which appear to be a high quality fountain pen and do actually work as
pens) are ideal in noisy environments. The pen can then be placed in position in front of the
party whose voice is to be recorded and background noise cut to a minimum.

JSonic Ear

Also known by some operators as a 'bionic ear' this is a very useful surveillance device. It
basically consists of a highly sensitive gun microphone, often positioned in a parabolic 'satel-
lite' dish. When carefully aimed this device will pick up normal conversation at a distance of
100 yards plus; coverage of greater distances (up to one mile) is often possible in good
conditions and when used in conjunction with an amplifier.

The main limitations of the sonic ear are that it is cumbersome and it, and its operator, must
be concealed at some distance from the subject, i.e. in undergrowth or under cover of
darkness. The sonic ear cannot be used successfully on an unattended basis.

Wall Contact Amplifier System

A WCAS (or wall listener) can be invaluable on many assignments. It basically comprises a
highly sensitive limpet microphone attached to a powerful amplifier. This can be attached to
a wall to monitor a conversation on the other side, even from outside buildings. The quality
of the reception depends on the quality of the device; the best WCAS can eavesdrop on
normal conversation through a 12" brick or concrete wall. Even the most basic models can
make conversation audible through standard block or timber partition walls or doors.

Telephone Extension Monitor

This is one of the simplest and most inexpensive telephone monitoring devices available
and always useful to keep as part of your kit. It simply consists of a speaker linked to a
standard telephone wall plug (some models are equipped with crocodile clips). When
plugged into a telephone extension socket (or clipped into any junction box) any
conversation on the line in question can be monitored.

The great .. advantage of the telephone extension monitor is that, if left connected, no voltage
drop or audible interference is experienced making this very simple device extremely difficult
to detect.

Linesman's Telephone

The linesman's telephone consists of a handheld telephone and crocodile clips to enable it
to be connected to any telephone wiring, junction box, or overhead line. Calls can then be
monitored or even made on the line in question. This is a device, which must be used with
great discretion, as it has no legitimate purpose outside the hands of a telephone engineer.

Telephone Recorder

A telephone recorder is one of the most useful pieces of equipment in electronic

surveillance. It can be connected to a telephone line (either into an extension socket or
directly into telephone wiring) and simply left to record all activity on the line.

You may be wondering why telephone calls should be recorded using a hidden recorder
(which has to be maintained and later retrieved) when they could be simply transmitted and
recorded. The answer is that it is much more difficult to detect this form of intrusion than in
installations where a transmitter is involved.

There are two types of telephone recorder:

1. Basic Recorder

Simply switches on when the 'phone is picked up and off when the 'phone is hung up. This
type of device is most suitable for personal use, i.e. monitoring and recording one's own
telephone calls where no attempt is likely to be made to search for bugs or taps.

2. Advanced Recorder

This kind of device is almost impossible to detect as it stabilizes voltage on the telephone
line (producing no tell-tale voltage drop, the method of detection used by most telephone de-
tapping devices). It is also resistant to most jamming devices. Finally, an advanced recorder
will also monitor activity on the line when the telephone is not in use, e.g. calls made but not
answered and on-hook scans made by telephone de-tapping devices.

Some recorders use an internal recording deck but others can be connected to any external
audiocassette recorder. (Note: This will require 'remote' and 'mike' jacks.)

Field Telephone Recorder

This is an extremely simple but useful piece of equipment to have. It consists of a limpet
microphone connected to a cassette recorder jack. When attached to the handset of any
telephone this device enables a recording to be made of both sides of your telephone
Conversation. Its small size makes it suitable for use out in the field.

Monitor Telephone

The monitor 'phone is designed to look and work exactly like an ordinary home or office tele-
phone but it can be used to monitor what is being said in the room where the device is
located from any other telephone anywhere else in the world. In this respect it is what is
known by electronics experts as an 'infinity device', i.e. the listening range is not limited by
the range of a transmitter.

To use this device it must first be 'planted' in the room to be monitored. Then, simply make a
call to the monitor 'phone as normal (if necessary this can be an innocent-sounding 'sorry,
wrong number' call). When the called party hangs up, however, the microphone in the moni-
tor 'phone stays live so that the operator can hear exactly what has been said following the

Watchdog 'Phone

As with the monitor 'phone the watchdog 'phone looks like an ordinary telephone but it has a
covert use. However, this piece of apparatus simply 'listens' for any activity in the room in
question. If the microphone in the 'phone detects any activity (either a 'phone call or any
speech) it will instantly and secretly dial any telephone number you have programmed into
the device. You may then monitor what is being said in the room.

Again the watchdog 'phone works just like an ordinary telephone and its primary function is
virtually un-detectable to all but the most experienced operator.


The telemonitor is mainly used to listen in to premises owned or used by the individual who
wishes to monitor what is being said or done there. Telemonitor (which are approximately
80mm X 60mm X 25mm in size) are placed at strategic locations in the premises to be moni-
tored and plugged into a standard telephone socket (this may be a line provided solely for
this purpose or shared with a 'phone or fax line).

The eavesdropper can then monitor what is being said in the room simply by calling the
number of the 'phone line to which the telemonitor is attached and tapping in a pre-set
security code.

The great advantages of telemonitor are that they do not require battery power; all power is
drawn from the 'phone line. Also, as infinity devices, they are not limited in range; monitoring
can be done from any 'phone anywhere in the world. These devices also have a very
advanced listening range (up to 40 feet in some cases) and offer greater clarity than is
possible with a transmitter-dependent bug. Several may be used in the same building. Their
main disadvantage is that they are cumbersome. They cannot be easily planted without
unhindered access to the premises and are readily detectable by anyone who suspects they
may be in use.

Answering Machine Intruder

Answering.. machines are in very common use today but most people do not realize that
these are extremely insecure. This applies not only to the owner of the machine, but to
friends and associates who may leave confidential information on the machine unaware of
the fact that it can be very easily 'pickpocket Ted' by electronic means. The answering
machine intruder simply plugs into any 'phone line, calls the answering machine to be
'cracked' and bombards it with every possible combination of access code (following the
same procedure which the owner of the machine uses to retrieve his or her messages from
a remote location) until the code is discovered. This can often be accomplished in less than
60 seconds.

Once the access code has been discovered the intruder has the facility to listen to, erase or
change messages left by callers, or even erase or change the message that legitimate
callers hear when they call the answering machine. In short a very useful piece of equipment
for eavesdropping.

Answering Machine Guardian

The answering machine guardian is essentially an electronic counter surveillance

device and the only effective way of defeating the answering machine intruder
(above) or other unauthorized tampering.

This device is extremely simple in operation and links between your answering machine and
your telephone line. The guardian allows the correct access code to access the machine.
However, if it senses a tone burst (as caused by an answering machine intruder issuing a
rapid succession of combinations in an attempt to crack the access code) it simply
disconnects the line.

Telephone Tone Decoder

The monitoring and recording of telephone conversations can prove an extremely useful sur-
veillance technique. However, it is also sometimes useful to be able to identify the third party
telephone line to which calls are made, or from which they are received. The TID device
does this by analyzing the line identification signals sent or received over a telephone line
(live or recorded) and then showing them on a digital display.

Most TID devices work both on telephone exchanges, “which” use DTMF (touch-tone)
systems that (most developed countries) and the older-style pulse dialing exchanges.

Jamming Devices

1. Audible Jammer

This is the simplest way of minimizing eavesdropping either on your own telephone line or in
person-to-person conversation. The device works by issuing a random high frequency tone,
which desensitizes the microphone of any bug, which is placed in the immediate area (most
jammers protect an area of 150 sq. ft. or so). This renders any bug (including a sonic ear
type device) ineffective; all the eavesdropper will hear is a loud hiss.

The main drawback to this kind of counter surveillance measure is that the tone is audible to
the individuals who are legitimately participating in the conversation. It is, however, a worth
while precaution when important matters are being discussed.

Recorder Jammer

This is a device, which prevents eavesdropping by a recording device. It is effective against

taps attached to a telephone line and works by jamming the signals which operate the
recording device when the 'phone is lifted.

The Jammer works on both incoming and outgoing calls and also indicates when it has suc-
cessfully jammed a recording device. An as added feature most of these devices are also
able to indicate the presence of (although not disable) infinity devices such as telemonitor
and monitor telephones.

Counter surveillance Scanners

Wide ranges of scanners are available, from various manufacturers, to detect the use of
transmitting bugs, e.g. Body bugs, room bugs, telephone bugs etc. In general terms the
price of the scanner in question is directly related to how sophisticated and how successful it
is (prices range from £300 to £1 000). In all cases no device can be completely foolproof
and, of course, these scanners cannot detect bugs, which are merely recording devices
(recording what is being said onto tape for retrieval at a later date) rather than transmitters.

The best scanners incorporate radio field strength, receiver and spectrum analysis (dis-
cussed earlier) to provide three levels of protection:

1. Signal monitor.

Identifies that a transmitter is being used in the area being scanned.

2. Directional detector.

Leads the operator to the source of the transmission, usually by means of an audible rising
and falling tone or an LED display.

3. Verification.

This allows the operator to listen to exactly what is being received and transmitted by the
bug, hence allowing him or her to confirm a bug and not some completely innocent piece of
equipment, such as a TV set, are giving the signal.

Again, much depends on the skill of the operator. No scanning procedure can be considered
complete unless a careful physical examination of the room in question has been

Hold Invader

This is .a very ingenious device that has a limited use for some very clever electronic eaves-
dropping. It simply plugs in between your telephone base and the handset. (A telephone
with a detachable handset is required.)

The hold invader works by putting the party you are calling on a 'false hold'. During this peri-
od they hear the usual 'dead' sound in the earpiece and are given the impression that you
are not listening to whatever they say. However, if they do make any remarks to a third party
in the room the hold invader allows you to hear these! The hold invader device includes very
powerful amplification electronics; even if the party being called places their hand over the
mouthpiece then you may still be able to listen in to their conversation. The hold invader
requires a degree of conversational skill to obtain best results. For example, you may call
the other party and mention the name of a subject or a third party you wish to discuss. Then
put them on the false hold. During this time you will be able to listen in to confidential
remarks, which are made on the subject!

Voice Changer

Finally in our discussion of electronic surveillance we come to a device, which is not strictly
surveillance nor a counter-surveillance device but which, nevertheless, has many possible
uses. This is the voice changer. The voice changer is a device, which, as the name
suggests, changes your voice to make it sound like someone else! It can change the tone
and pitch of your voice and even change your accent. It can turn a male voice into a female
voice and vice versa! The device simply plugs into your 'phone between the base and the

Various different voice changers are available but they all work in the same way. It is prefer-
able to choose a model, which does not incorporate a delay between speaking and the
called party hearing your voice (as some cheaper devices do). An additional benefit of some
devices is that they allow you to make a local call sound like a long distance/international tall
and Vice versa.

The most important point to remember when deploying equipment of this nature is to ensure'
that the tone, pitch and volume is consistent when making or receiving calls which purport to
be the same person.


We hope you have found this guide to electronic surveillance equipment both informative
and interesting. We cannot stress strongly enough that this is a complex specialist field
which should not be entered into without more detailed information than is supplied in this
introductory booklet.

If you intend to enter into private investigation on a professional level, the vast majority of
your work will be done without recourse to this type of equipment. Where such equipment
may be deemed helpful, its use is discussed within the main home study course.

Important Note
Some electronic surveillance and counter surveillance equipment presently available is
either unapproved for connection to the public telephone system in the UK or consists of
unlicensed transmitting devices. Its use (although not its purchase or possession) may be
illegal in certain countries.
Audio Surveillance Equipment: A Beginner's Guide

Audio surveillance equipment falls into two basic types:

• Equipment designed to monitor conversations in a room
• Equipment designed to monitor conversations over a telephone line
In either case, the conversation may be recorded on site, or may alternatively be transmitted
to a receiver located elsewhere. In the latter case, the conversation may either be listened to
'live' or recorded.

There are several situations in which you may want to monitor, listen to, and possibly record
a conversation. For example:

When you want to record a conversation in which you are participating. This may be for
proof of a verbal contract, or for evidence to relay back to a client.

When it is necessary to record or listen to a conversation at which you cannot be present.

At the heart of every audio surveillance system is a transmitter. As the name suggests, this
picks up the sound from a room or telephone conversation and transmits it to a receiver.
These transmitters are very small and can often be disguised as phone sockets, pens,
calculators, etc. The conversation can then be heard via the receiver, which in turn may be
linked up to a recorder, which, yes, records the conversation... simple!

Room Conversation Surveillance

There are two basic types of room transmitter:

1. Portable systems

These are ideal for situations where you have full or partial access. They are frequently used
in meetings and negotiation situations. The transmitter is concealed within a briefcase, pen,
or calculator, for example. These items can be taken with you into a room without suspicion
and very discretely operated to transmit/record a conversation.

2. Fixed/static systems

These devices are best used in situations where you will not be present. There are two

Battery operated. Suitable where there is regular access, or where transmission

requirements are fairly short term.

Electrical mains driven. Suitable for situations where regular access is not possible, or
where the transmission requirements are fairly long term. This type of device is easy to
install and can be left to operate indefinitely.

Telephone Conversation Surveillance

There are .. two basic ways in which you can monitor a telephone conversation:
1. Wire Tap

This type of device is connected between the telephone line to be monitored, and a tape
recorder. The recorder automatically records both sides of a conversation on that line, and
switches off when the line is not in use. Alternatively, a tape-recorded can be used to auto-
matically record the conversation directly to tape.

2. Telephone Transmitter

This is a small device, which is connected to the telephone line, or concealed inside the
telephone socket, double adaptor or telephone receiver itself. Both sides of the conversation
will then be transmitted each time the phone is used. The conversation can then be picked
up by a receiver located 'off-site' and either listened to or recorded.

What do you need?

So, an audio surveillance system operates using a combination of:

• A transmitter (available in many guises)
• A receiver (the same type, regardless of transmitter)
• A recording device
Depending on the job in hand, you will need to employ one, two or all three of these. Our
range of equipment has been specially selected to provide the most cost effective and
efficient solutions to all your audio surveillance problems.

VEHICLE Surveillance - GIVE AWAY

• Vehicles parked in prohibited areas
• Vehicles parked in the same place for an extended time, with individuals
• Vehicles who stop and start when the clients vehicle moves
• Vehicles that pass the client and park
• Vehicles that drive very erratic, slow then fast or stops
• Vehicles that signal to turn then fail to do so
• Vehicles that follow the clients vehicle through a red light
• Vehicles that maintain the same distance all the time when behind the
• Vehicles that can be seen going on parallel streets as the client vehicle
• Vehicles who close at heavy traffic then fall back in slight traffic
• Persons leaving a building straight after the client leaves
• Vehicles parking and know one getting out
• Vehicles with covered or number plates removed
• Any vehicle seen more than once during your travels
• Persons standing around street corners or lobbies, just hanging around in
• Persons turning away when they are observed
• Vehicles that move in and out of traffic
• Vehicles that circle the area when the clients vehicle as stopped
• Vehicles with tinted windows or blocked rear windows with items
• Vehicles parked up with persons inside with seat belts on

• Vehicles with added magnetic aerials

COUNTER Surveillance, Electronic Espionage Theory

Covet observation of persons or location for the purpose of detecting current surveillance
being conducted by hostile adversaries.

If you know you are under surveillance

Do not reveal that you suspect

• Use communications to notify authorities
• Do not force confrontation
• Determine identifying information - vehicles, license numbers etc
• Use evasive driving techniques if necessary
• Report all suspected surveillance
• In a foreign country, surveillance may be conducted by police or military
The key to defeating surveillance is, when danger signs are received, do something about

A wrong decision well executed is

better than no action at all
Be unpredictable, routine kills !!!!!
Counter Surveillance

• Aware targets are persons who are observant and cautious

• Unaware targets are general public
• Hostile targets are persons who have been highly trained in surveillance &
counter surveillance
• Try and use the right looking personnel for the given task
• Equipment needed, can communications be carried or not
• Always avoid eye to eye contact with persons under surveillance
• Try to wear non descript clothing and have many layers that can be
discarded through the task
• Use footwear that is suitable and comfortable, no heel tacks that make
• Look out for personnel using body worn communications, microphones
and earpieces
• Never present yourself, what out for windows, reflections and shadows
• Use all available cover especially other people
• Always act as normal as possible be natural
• Remember people that try to start a conversation with you
• Know the general area you are working in, buses, trains and planes
• Crossing roads, look both ways it may confuse your intentions
• Use windows and shop fronts as ways to look around you
• Walk against the flow of traffic it will stop any vehicles following you, use
pedestrian walkways
• Use counter surveillance, turn about and walk back and forth, go into
shops and walk back out

..• Beware of using isolated cover, you will stand out
• Use of cover stories, no factual information to be used
• A true disguise will allow you to blend in with your surroundings, and
could be your character
• Carry a newspaper or items that can be thrown away
• Beware of large shopping stores, they have there own security systems
and staff
Espionage Theory

With Industrial Espionage high on the list of current security problem it is imperative that the
Bodyguard is well versed in this field.

1. General information may be collected by: -
Stealing rubbish, surveys, phone calls and local gossip
2. Surveillance may be carried out: -
On foot by one or a multiple of people, different vehicle types or fixed
observation posts
3. Resources
Transportation, photographic, communications, wardrobe and props
4. Target Vulnerabilities
Home – routes to/from
Office – routes to/from
Times – Patterns
Bottleneck areas
Family activities
Pattern Activity
5. Surveillance teams may make a direct approach
Men, women, children and dogs used
Prospective job applicants
Reporter, service calls, surveys etc
6. What to look for: -
Repeats – persons, vehicles
Channeling, shifting, turning and stops
Asymmetry – What looks odd, what doesn’t fit in the given environment? Use your area
knowledge to best advantage to know what you should see and expect. You will then know
the most likely vantage points from which surveillance can operate.

Apply your intellect to think how you would go about the task. This should give you a clear
insight into your own and your team’s pattern of action.
• Think about habits
• Spot vulnerabilities
• Make necessary adaptations
Surveillance and Surveillance detection are opposite sides of the same coin.

Know the following: -

Techniques, Purpose, Equipment and Surveillance consequences

The more important your VIP the more larger and in depth the surveillance will be, this also
means there is more chance of viewing the operatives.

Obviously the more difficult it is for the offenders to procure the necessary information, the
less attractive the victim becomes.

TACTICAL Communication
For Law Enforcement & Protection Personnel
Security personnel are increasingly being confronted with more violent and dangerous
situations each day. How you deal with each incident can make the difference between
going home at the end of your shift or a trip to the hospital. Great emphasis has been placed
on better training, but it seems that little has been given in the use of your most powerful
weapon you possess; your mouth.

What is tactical communication?

It consists of principles of communication used by security to accomplish three

• To ensure a standard and professional approach to persons
• To prevent conflicts from escalating
• To de-escalate situations
There are four components to effective communication;

• That is words and their structure, is self evident
Involves how the words are delivered, their tone, volume
Kinetics / Body language
• A person’s stance, gestures, or facial expressions can escalate or de-
escalate a situation faster than any words ever could
Active Listening
• This involves more than just hearing the words spoken, it involves
understanding the words, a sense of empathy for what is being said
Security safety begins with the ability to empathize with another person. Your goal is to gain
compliance, thereby avoiding the need to escalate along the force continuum, and
increasing safety to all persons involved. To maintain empathy, you must develop the skill to
deflect verbal assaults. All too often, the attacker will attempt to turn the tables on the
security and move the interview in a different direction. You must remain focused on the
topic and deflect the attackers comments.

Key words which accomplish this task should become part of your language, and be used

Examples of such key words are;

I appreciate that but......
I understand that but.....
Maybe so but.....
This allows you to re-focus, yet maintain a sense of empathy for the attacker.

Basically people fall into three categories;

Cooperate people
• Are the easiest to deal with, and compliance can be gained by mere words
alone. A calm, but firm attitude will project a positive image without being
Passively resistant people
• Have not made up their minds. The may comply, but need to be convinced
it is in their best interests to do so. They may move slowly, ignore
securities questions, trying to frustrate your actions. They may be looking
for an avenue of escape, and will try to if you do not control the situation.
Some level of physical force may be required to deal with this type of
person. Firm, clear commands, with bladed body position, are the best
way to handle the situation.
Actively resistant people
• This type will pull away from you and progress into the assault stage.
These are sure signs the situation is escalating. Your goal is to gain
control of this person as quickly as possible. Clear, firm commands, given
from a short distance, are required. You must maintain a reactionary gap,
and be prepared to move. If you shout initial commands and the attacker
begins to comply, you should tone down further commands. If you
maintain the same volume, there’s nowhere to go if the attacker does not
comply. Always have a little headroom to react to the attacker. If the
attacker presents a weapon your first concern should be to find a position
of advantage. Then a standardized challenge should be given. This tells
the attacker you are aware of his actions and also tells any assisting
security there is a serious situation involving an armed attacker. Your
directions should be clear, concise, and take into consideration your own
safety, and that of fellow persons. Do not let the attacker close the
distance at their own discretion.
It is usually easier to stay out of trouble, than it is to get out of it, once you are in it. Most
attackers can be influenced by tactical communication, because of one important reason:
-Egos. People are concerned bout their egos and how they are perceived by their friends.

When you confront someone about something they have done wrong, the person’s ego is
threatened. The mere presence of security is enough for someone to get their back up.
Couple that with insulting, abusive, or demanding language and the person may feel he has
no alternative but to resort to force.

RADIO Communication

Phonetic Alphabets

These are not phonetic alphabets as in those used to guide pronunciation; rather they are a selection of alphabets used,
particularly by radio operators, to spell out words.

Phonetic Alphabets of the World


NATO & British

British A or NY
International Forces RAF 1942-43 Telecom B French German Italian Spanish
International Police
Aviation 1952

Alfa Abel Apple Alfred Amsterdam Adam Anatole Anton Ancona Antonio


Bravo Baker Beer Benjamin Baltimore Boy Berthe Berta Bologna Barcelona

Charlie Charlie Charlie Charles Casablanca Charlie Célestin Cäsar Como Carmen


Charlotte Chocolate

Delta Dog Dog David Denmark David Désiré Dora Domodossola Dolores

Echo Easy Edward Edward Edison Edward Eugène Emil Empoli Enrique


Morse Code

Letter Morse Letter Morse Digit Morse

A .- N -. 0 -----

B -... O --- 1 .----

C -.-. P .--. 2 ..---

D -.. Q --.- 3 ...--

E . R .-. 4 ....-

F ..-. S ... 5 .....

G --. T - 6 -....

H .... U ..- 7 --...

I .. V ...- 8 ---..

J .--- W .-- 9 ----.

K -.- X -..-

L .-.. Y -.--

M -- Z --..

Letter Morse Punctuation Mark Morse

Ä .-.- Full-stop (period) .-.-.-

Á .--.- Comma --..--

Å .--.- Colon ---...

Ch ---- Question mark (query) ..--..

If the duration of a dot is taken to be
É ..-.. Apostrophe .----. one unit then that of a dash is three
units. The space between the
Ñ --.-- Hyphen -....- components of one character is one
unit, between characters is three units
and between words seven units. To
Ö ---. Fraction bar -..-.

Ü ..-- Brackets (parentheses) -.--.-

Quotation marks .-..-.
indicate.. that a mistake has been made and for the receiver to delete the last word send .
……. (Eight . dots).

ESCALATION & De-escalation of Force
When confronted by an aggressor or singled out for help by a well-meaning person, you
must immediately decide a plan of action. Do you tactically disengage or take control?

Tactical Disengagement
If your plan is to disengage, do so tactically. Do not back up while directly in front of the
aggressor. You cannot back up faster than he can walk forward. It is a better option to get
out from in front of him mad to move laterally and then disengage. This forces the aggressor
to turn, look, and then attempt closing in on you. Vital moments are spared, leaving you time
to create distance and tactically escape.

You must remember that security may think that it is acceptable to just turn and run. This
method of escape places the aggressor in a position of advantage in that your back is now
facing him. Additionally the process of turning and preparing to run allows the aggressor
time to initiate forward motion and thereby be in motion before you.

It is strongly suggested that should tactical disengagement be what is in order, you get out
from of the aggressor, issue loud verbal commands such has stop, get back etc, and then
exit initially at an angle.

Tactical disengagement is not giving up, at that time it is your only alternative. It gives you
space, time, distance and therefore the opportunity to be in a position of advantage, and not
injured or killed.

Patterns of Movement

Should tactical disengagement not be in order and the attack is in progress, then patterns of
movement should be employed. Simply stated, patterns of movement means; get out of the
way of the attacker and the attack. The untrained person may respond by backing up to
avoid attack, but as previously pointed out, the act of backing up still keeps you in front of
the attacker. Backing up may imbalance you, shielding you from what is behind you.
Backing up is slower than the aggressor can move forward. Therefore backing up should be
something that is avoided unless there is nothing else you can do. Moving laterally, or on an
oblique angle, gets you out from in front of the aggressor.

For example

If the attacker is coming straight at you and you step laterally to your strong or reaction side,
this will place you outside of the initial attack and give you the space, time, and distance to
initiate your plan.

When the attacker is striking you, your first priority must be not to get hit. If you can make
the attacker miss by moving your body or getting out of the way - do so, and then counter.
Consider with what the attacker is attacking you. Hands and feet have to be blocked or the
attack deflected as you have been taught. These actions must be smoothly performed and
done without conscious thought.

Blocking .. and deflecting
verbal commands.
the attack must done in conjunction with body movement and loud
Remember you are mentally on balance while physically and mentally
unbalancing the attacker. The key to blocking and deflecting is doing what is necessary not
to get hit, injured or killed.

Countering The Attack

With what is the attacker assaulting you? Can you tactically disengage? Do you have to
confront and block and deflect the attack? If so, then you must counter the attack and gain

FIRST Aid – Trauma Management

Trauma Care

The management of severe multiple injury requires clear recognition of management

priorities and the goal is to determine in the initial assessment those injuries that threaten
the patient's life. This first survey, the 'primary' survey, if done correctly should identify such
life-threatening injuries such as:
• airway obstruction
• Chest injuries with breathing difficulties
• Severe external or internal hemorrhage
• Abdominal injuries.
If there is more than one injured patient then treat patients in order of priority (Triage). This
depends on experience and resources (Discussed in the practical sessions). The ABCDE
survey (Airway, Breathing, Circulation, Disability and Exposure) is undertaken. This primary
survey must be performed in no more than 2-5 minutes. Simultaneous treatment of injuries
can occur when more than one life-threatening state exists. It includes:


Assess the airway. Can patient talk and breathe freely? If obstructed, the steps to be
considered are:
• Chin lift/jaw thrust (tongue is attached to the jaw)
• Suction (if available)
• Guedel airway/nasopharyngeal airway
• Intubations. NB keep the neck immobilized in neutral position.

Breathing is assessed, as airway patency and breathing adequacy are re-checked. If

inadequate, the steps to be considered are:
• Decompression and drainage of tension pneumothorax/haemothorax
• Closure of open chest injury
• Artificial ventilation.
Give oxygen if available.

Reassessment of ABC's must be undertaken if patient is unstable


Assess circulation, as oxygen supply, airway patency and breathing adequacy are re-
checked. If inadequate, the steps to be considered are:
• Stop external hemorrhage
• Establish 2 large-bore IV lines (14 or 16 G) if possible
• Administer fluid if available.

Rapid neurological assessment (is patient awake, vocally responsive to pain or

unconscious). There is no time to do the Glasgow Coma Scale so a
Awake A
Verbal response V
Painful response P
Unresponsive U
System at this stage is clear and quick.


Undress patient and look for injury. If the patient is suspected of having a neck or spinal
injury, in-line immobilization is important. This will be discussed in the practical sessions.
The first priority is establishment or maintenance of airway patency.
Talk to the patient
A patient who can speak clearly must have a clear airway. The unconscious patient may
require airway and ventilator assistance. The cervical spine must be protected during
endotracheal intubation if a head, neck or chest injury is suspected. Airway obstruction is
most commonly due to obstruction by the tongue in the unconscious patient.
Give oxygen (if available, via self-inflating bag or mask)
Assess airway
The signs of airway obstruction may include:
• Snoring or gurgling
• Stridor or abnormal breath sounds
• Agitation (hypoxia)
• Using the accessory muscles of ventilation/paradoxical chest movements
• Cyanosis.
Be alert for foreign bodies. The techniques used to establish a patent airway are outlined in
Appendix1 and will be reviewed in the practical sessions. Intravenous sedation is absolutely
contraindicated in this situation.

Consider need for advanced airway management

Indications for advanced airway management techniques for securing the airway include:
• Persisting airway obstruction
• Penetrating neck trauma with haematoma (expanding)
• Apnoea
• Hypoxia
• Severe head injury

..• Chest trauma
• Maxillofacial injury.
The second priority is the establishment of adequate ventilation.
• Inspection (LOOK) of respiratory rate is essential.
Are any of the following present?
• Cyanosis
• Penetrating injury
• Presence of flail chest
• Sucking chest wounds
• Use of accessory muscles?
Palpation (FEEL) for
• Tracheal shift
• Broken ribs
• Subcutaneous emphysema
• Percussion is useful for diagnosis of haemothorax and pneumothorax.
Auscultation (LISTEN) for
• Pneumothorax (decreased breath sounds on site of injury)
• Detection of abnormal sounds in the chest.
Resuscitation action

This is covered in lecture and in practical sessions: see Appendix 5

• The chest pleura is drained of air and blood by insertion of an intercostal
drainage tube as a matter of priority and before chest X-ray if respiratory
distress exists
• When indications for intubation exist but the trachea cannot be intubated,
direct access via a cricothyroidotomy may be achieved. See Appendix 1.
Special notes
• If available, maintain the patient on oxygen until complete stabilization is
• If a tension pneumothorax is suspected then one large-bore needle should
be introduced into the pleural cavity through the second intercostal space,
mid clavicle line to decompress the tension and allow time for the
placement of an intercostal tube.
• If intubation in one or two attempts is not possible a cricothyroidotomy
should be considered priority. This depends on experienced medical
personnel being available, with appropriate equipment, and may not be
possible in many places.
Circulatory Management

The third priority is establishment of adequate circulation.

'Shock' is defined as inadequate organ perfusion and tissue oxygenation. In the trauma
patient it is most often due to hypovolaemia.

The diagnosis of shock is based on clinical findings: hypotension, tachycardia,

tachypnoea, as well as hypothermia, pallor, cool extremities, decreased capillary refill, and
decreased urine production. See Appendix 3.

There are different types of shock including:

Haemorrhagic (hypovolaemia) shock: Due to acute loss of blood or fluids. The amount of
blood loss after trauma is often poorly assessed and in blunt trauma is usually
underestimated. Remember
• Large volumes of blood may be hidden in the abdominal and pleural cavity
• Femoral shaft fracture may lose up to 2 liters of blood
• Pelvic fractures often lose in excess of 2 liters of blood.
Carcinogenic shock: Due to inadequate heart function. This may be from
• Myocardial contusion (bruising)
• Cardiac tamponade
• Tension pneumothorax (preventing blood returning to heart)
• Penetrating wound of the heart
• Myocardial infarction.
Assessment of the jugular venous pressure is essential in these circumstances and an ECG
should be recorded if available.

Neurogenic shock: Due to the loss of sympathetic tone, usually resulting from spinal cord
injury, with the classical presentation of hypotension without reflex tachycardia or skin

Septic shock: Rare in the early phase of trauma but is a common cause of late death (via
multi-organ failure) in the weeks following injury. It is most commonly seen in penetrating
abdominal injury and burns patients.

Circulatory Resuscitation Measures

(See Appendix 5)

The goal is to restore oxygen delivery to the tissues. As the usual problem is loss of blood,
fluid resuscitation must be a priority.
• Adequate vascular access must be obtained. This requires the insertion of
at least two large-bore cannulas (1416 G). Peripheral cut down may be
• Infusion fluids (crystalloids e.g. N/Saline as first line) should be warmed to
body temperature if possible (e.g. prewarm in bucket of warmed water).
Remember hypothermia can lead to abnormal blood clotting.
• Avoid solutions containing glucose.
• Take any specimens you need for laboratory and cross matching.

Measure urine output as an indicator of circulation reserve. Output should be more than 0.5
ml/kg/hr. Unconscious patients may need a urinary catheter, if they are persistently shocked.

Blood transfusion

There may be considerable difficulty in getting blood. Remember possible incompatibility,

hepatitis B and HIV risks, even amongst patient's own family.

Blood transfusion must be considered when the patient has persistent haemodynamic
instability despite fluid (colloid/crystalloid) infusion. If the type-specific or cross-matched
blood is not available, type O negative packed red blood cells should be used. Transfusion

should,..however, be seriously considered if the haemoglobin level is less than 7 g/dl and if
the patient. is still bleeding.
First priority: stop bleeding
• Injuries to the limbs: Tourniquets do not work. Besides, tourniquets cause
reperfusion syndromes and add to the primary injury. The recommended
procedure of "pressure dressing" is an ill-defined entity: Severe bleeding
from high-energy penetrating injuries and amputation wounds can be
controlled by subfascial gauze pack placement plus manual compression
on the proximal artery plus a carefully applied compressive dressing of
the entire injured limb.
• Injuries to the chest: The most common source of bleeding is chest wall
arteries. Immediate in-field placement of chest tube drain plus intermittent
suction plus efficient analgesia (IV ketamine is the drug of choice) expand
the lung and seal off the bleeding.
• Injuries to the abdomen: "Damage control laparotomy" should be done as
soon as possible on cases where fluid resuscitation cannot maintain a
systolic BP at 8090 mm. The sole objective of DC laparotomy is to gauze
pack the bleeding abdominal quadrants, where after the mid-line incision
is temporarily closed within 30 minutes with towel clamps. DC laparotomy
is not surgery, but a resuscitative procedure that should be done under
ketamine anesthesia by any trained doctor or nurse at district level. This
technique is something that needs to be observed before doing it, but
done properly, can save lives.

Loss of blood is the main cause of shock in trauma patients

Second priority: Volume replacement, warming, and ketamine analgesia

• The replacement should be warm: The physiological coagulation works
best at 38.5°C; haemostasis is difficult at core temperatures below 35°.
Hypothermia in trauma patients is common during protracted improvised
out-door evacuations even in the tropics. It is easy to cool a patient but
difficult to re-warm, hence prevention of hypothermia is essential. Per oral
and IV fluids should have a temperature at 4042°C using IV fluids at "room
temperature" means cooling!
• Hypotensive fluid resuscitation: In cases where the haemostasis is
insecure or not definitive, volumes should be controlled to maintain
systolic BP at 8090 mm during the evacuation.
• Colloid solutions out electrolyte solutions in! Recent careful reviews of
controlled clinical studies show slight negative effects of colloids
compared to electrolytes in resuscitation after blood loss.
• Per-oral resuscitation is safe and efficient in patients with positive gag
reflex without abdominal injury: Oral fluids should be low in sugar and
salts; concentrated solutions can cause an osmotic pull over the intestinal
mucosa, and the effect will be negative. Diluted cereal porridges based on
local foodstuffs are recommended.
• The analgesic choice: The positive inotropic effects, and the fact that it
does not affect the gag reflex, makes us recommend ketamine in repeated
IV doses of 0.2 mg/kg during evacuation of all severe trauma cases.
Secondary Survey

Secondary survey is only undertaken when the patient's ABC'S are stable.

If any deterioration occurs during this phase then another PRIMARY SURVEY must
interrupt this. Documentation is required for all procedures undertaken. This will be
covered in the Forum.

The head-to-toe examination is now undertaken, noting particularly:

Head examination
• Scalp and ocular abnormalities
• External ear and tympanic membrane
• Periorbital soft tissue injuries.
Neck examination
• Penetrating wounds
• Subcutaneous emphysema
• Tracheal deviation
• Neck vein appearance.
Neurological examination
• Brain function assessment using the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) (see
Appendix 4)
• Spinal cord motor activity
• Sensation and reflex.
Head injury patients are suspected to have

Cervical spine injury until proven otherwise

Chest examination
• Clavicles and all ribs
• Breath sounds and heart tones
• ECG monitoring (if available).
Abdominal examination
• Penetrating wound of abdomen requiring surgical exploration
• Blunt trauma a nasogastric tube is inserted (not in the presence of facial
• Rectal examination
• Insert urinary catheter (check for metal blood before insertion).
Pelvis and limbs
• Fractures
• Peripheral pulses
• Cuts, bruises and other minor injuries.
X-rays (if possible and where indicated)
• Chest X-ray and cervical spine films (important to see all 7 vertebrae)
• Pelvic and long bone X-rays
• Skull X-rays may be useful to search for fractures when head injury is
present without focal neurological deficit
• Order others selectively. NB chest and pelvis X-rays may be needed
during primary survey.
Chest Trauma

. a quarter of deaths due to trauma are attributed to thoracic injury. Immediate
deaths .are essentially due to major disruption of the heart or of great vessels. Early deaths

due to thoracic trauma include airway obstruction, cardiac tamponade or aspiration.

The majority of patients with thoracic trauma can be managed by simple manoeuvres
and do not require surgical treatment.

Respiratory distress may be caused by:

• Rib fractures/flail chest
• Pneumothorax
• Tension pneumothorax
• Haemothorax
• Pulmonary contusion (bruising)
• Open pneumothorax
• Aspiration.
Haemorrhagic shock due to:
• Haemothorax
• Haemomediastinum.
Rib fractures: Fractured ribs may occur at the point of impact and damage to the underlying
lung may produce lung bruising or puncture. In the elderly patient fractured ribs may result
from simple trauma. The ribs usually become fairly stable within 10 days to two weeks. Firm
healing with callus formation is seen after about six weeks.

Flail chest: The unstable segment moves separately and in an opposite direction from the
rest of the thoracic cage during the respiration cycle. Severe respiratory distress may ensue.

Tension pneumothorax: Develops when air enters the pleural space but cannot leave. The
consequence is progressively increasing intrathoracic pressure in the affected side resulting
in mediastinal shift. The patient will become short of breath and hypoxic. Urgent needle
decompression is required prior to the insertion of an intercostal drain. The trachea may be
displaced (late sign) and is pushed away from the midline by the air under tension.

Haemothorax: More common in penetrating than in non-penetrating injures to the chest. If

the haemorrhage is severe hypovolaemic shock will occur and also respiratory distress due
to compression of the lung on the involved side.

The extent of internal injuries cannot be judged By the appearance of a skin


Optimal therapy consists of the placement of a large chest tube.

• A haemothorax of 5001500 ml that stops bleeding after insertion of an
intercostal catheter can generally be treated by closed drainage alone
• A haemothorax of greater than 15002000 ml or with continued bleeding of
more than 200300 ml per hour is an indication for further investigation e.g.
Pulmonary contusion: is common after chest trauma. It is a potentially life-threatening
condition. The onset of symptoms may be slow and progress over 24 hrs post injury. It is
likely to occur in cases of high-speed accidents, falls from great heights and injuries by high-
velocity bullets. Symptoms and signs include:
• Dyspnoea (short of breath)

• Hypoxemia
• Tachycardia
• Rare or absent breath sounds
• Rib fractures
• Cyanosis.
Open or "sucking" chest wounds of the chest wall. In these the lung on the affected side
is exposed to atmospheric pressure with lung collapse and a shift of the mediastinum to the
uninvolved side. This must be treated rapidly. A seal e.g. a plastic packet is sufficient to stop
the sucking, and can be applied until reaching hospital. In compromised patients intercostal
drains, intubation and positive pressure ventilation is often required.

The injuries listed below are also possible in trauma, but carry a high mortality even
in regional centres. They are mentioned for educational purposes.

Myocardial contusion is associated, in chest blunt trauma, with fractures of the sternum or
ribs. The diagnosis is supported by abnormalities on ECG and elevation of serial cardiac
enzymes if these are available. Cardiac contusion can simulate a myocardial infarction.
Patient must be submitted to observation with cardiac monitoring if available. This type of
injury is more common than we think and may be a cause of sudden death well after the

Pericardial tamponade: Penetrating cardiac injuries are a leading cause of death in urban
areas. It is rare to have pericardial tamponade with blunt trauma. Pericardiocentesis must be
undertaken early if this injury is considered likely. Look for it in patients with:
• Shock
• Distended neck veins
• Cool extremities and no pneumothorax
• Muffled heart sounds.

Beware pulmonary contusion and delay in deterioration of respiratory


Pericardiocentesis is the first therapy and this will be discussed in the practical session.

Thoracic great vessel injuries: Injury to the pulmonary veins and arteries is often fatal, and
is one of the major causes of on-site death.

Rupture of trachea or major bronchi: Rupture of the trachea or major bronchi is a serious
injury with an overall estimated mortality of at least 50%. The majority (80%) of the ruptures
of bronchi are within 2.5 cm of the carina. The usual signs of tracheobronchial disruption are
the followings:
• Haemoptysis
• Dyspnoea
• Subcutaneous and mediastinal emphysema
• Occasionally cyanosis.
Trauma to oesophagus: In patients with blunt trauma this is rare. More frequent is the
perforation of the oesophagus by penetrating injury. It is lethal if unrecognised because of
mediastinitis. Patients often complain of sudden sharp pain in the epigastrium and chest with
radiation to the back. Dyspnoea, cyanosis and shock occur but these may be late

.. of carinjuries:
Diaphragmatic Occur more frequently in blunt chest trauma, paralleling the rise in
accidents. The diagnosis is often missed. Diaphragmatic injuries should be
suspected in any penetrating thoracic wound:
• Below 4th intercostal space anteriorly
• 6th interspace laterally
• 8th interspace posteriorly
• Usually the left side.
Thoracic aorta rupture: Occurs in patients with severe decelerating forces such as high-
speed car accidents or a fall from a great height. They have high mortality as the cardiac
output is 5 l/min and the total blood volume in an adult is 5 litres.

Beware pericardial tamponade in penetrating chest trauma

Abdominal Trauma

The abdomen is commonly injured in multiple traumas. The commonest organ injured in
penetrating trauma is the liver and in blunt trauma the spleen is often torn and ruptured.

The initial evaluation of the abdominal trauma patient must include the A (airway and
C-Spine), B (breathing), C (circulation), and D (disability and neurological
assessment) and E (exposure).

Any patient involved in any serious accident should be considered to have an abdominal
injury until proved otherwise. Unrecognised abdominal injury remains a frequent cause of
preventable death after trauma.

There are two basic categories of abdominal trauma:

Penetrating trauma where surgical consultation is important e.g.

• Gunshot
• Stabbing.
Non-penetrating trauma e.g.
• Compression
• Crush
• Seat belt
• Acceleration/deceleration injuries.
About 20% of trauma patients with acute haemoperitoneum (blood in abdomen) have no
signs of peritoneal irritation at the first examination and the value of REPEATED PRIMARY
SURVEY cannot be overstated.

Blunt trauma can be very difficult to evaluate, especially in the unconscious patient. These
patients may need a peritoneal lavage. (Discussed in session.) An exploratory laparotomy
may be the best definitive procedure if abdominal injury needs to be excluded.

Complete physical examination of the abdomen includes rectal examination, assessing:

• Sphincter tone
• Integrity of rectal wall
• Blood in the rectum
• Prostate position.
Remember to check for blood at the external urethral meatus.

Women should be considered pregnant until proven otherwise. The foetus may be
salvageable and the best treatment of the foetus is resuscitation of the mother. A pregnant
mother at term, however, can usually only be resuscitated properly after delivery of the
baby. This difficult situation must be assessed at the time.

Blood catheterization (with cauthin in pelvic injury) is important

The diagnostic peritoneal lavage (DPL) may be helpful in determining the presence of
blood or enteric fluid due to intra-abdominal injury. The results can be highly suggestive, but
it is overstated as an important diagnostic tool. If there is any doubt a laparotomy is still the
gold standard.

The indications for lavage include:

• Unexplained abdominal pain
• Trauma of the lower part of the chest
• Hypotension, hematocrit fall with no obvious explanation
• Any patient suffering abdominal trauma and who has an altered mental
state (drugs alcohol, brain injury)
• Patient with abdominal trauma and spinal cord injuries
• Pelvic fractures.
The relative contraindications for the DPL are:
• Pregnancy
• Previous abdominal surgery
• Operator inexperience
• If the result does not change your management.
Other specific issues with abdominal trauma:

Pelvic fractures are often complicated by massive haemorrhage and urology injury.
• Examining the rectum for the position of the prostate and for the presence
of blood or rectal or perinea laceration is essential
• X-ray of the pelvis (if clinical diagnosis difficult).
The management of pelvic fractures includes:
• Resuscitation (ABC)
• Transfusion
• Immobilization and assessment for surgery
• Analgesia.

Pelvic fractures often cause massive blood loss

Head Trauma

Delay in the early assessment of head-injured patients can have devastating consequence
in terms of survival and patient outcome. Hypoxia and hypotension double the mortality of
head-injured patients.

The following conditions are potentially life threatening but difficult to treat in district
hospitals. It is important to treat what you can with your expertise and resources and
triage casualties carefully.

Immediate recognition and early management must be made of the following conditions:

Acute extradural classically the signs consist of:
• Loss of consciousness following an lucid interval, with rapid
• Middle meningeal artery bleeding with rapid raising of intracranial
• The development of hemiparesis on the opposite side with a fixed
pupil on the same side as the impact area.
• Acute subdural haematoma with clotted blood in the subdural space,
accompanied by severe contusion of the underlying brain. It occurs from
tearing of bridging vein between the cortex and the dura.
The management of the above is surgical and every effort should be made to do burr-
hole decompressions.

The conditions below should be treated with more conservative medical management, as
neurosurgery usually does not improve outcome.
• Base-of-skull fractures bruising of the eyelids (Racoon eyes) or over
the mastoid process (Battle's sign), cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) leak from
ears and/or nose
• Cerebral concussion with temporary altered consciousness
• Depressed skull fracture an impaction of fragmented skull that may
result in penetration of the underlying dura and brain.
• Intracerebral haematoma may result from acute injury or progressive
damage secondary to contusion.

Alteration of consciousness is the hallmark of brain injury

The most common error in head injury evaluation and resuscitation are:
• Failure to perform ABC and prioritise management
• Failure to look beyond the obvious head injury
• Failure to assess the baseline neurological examination
• Failure to re-evaluate patient who deteriorates.
Management of Head Trauma

The Airway, Breathing and Circulation are stabilised (and the C-spine immobilised, if
possible). Vital signs of important indicators in the patient’s neurological status must be
monitored and recorded frequently. Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) evaluation is undertaken:
see Appendix 4.

• Severe head injury is when GCS is 8 or less
• Moderate head injury is when GCS between 9 and 12
• Minor head injury is when GCS between 13 and 15.
Deterioration may occur due to bleeding

• Unequal or dilated pupils may indicate an increase in intracranial pressure

• Head or brain injury is never the cause of hypotension in the adult trauma patient

• Sedation should be avoided as it not only interferes with the status of consciousness
but will promote hypercarbia (slow breathing with retention of CO2)

• The Cushing response is a specific response to a lethal rise in intracranial pressure.
This is a late and poor prognostic sign. The hallmarks are:

o Bradycardia

o Hypertension

o Decreased respiratory rate.

Basic medical management for severe head injuries includes:

• Intubation and hyperventilation, producing moderate hypocapnia (PCO2 to 4.55

Kpa). This will reduce both intracranial blood volume and intracranial pressure

• Sedation with possible paralysis

• Moderate IV fluid input with dieresis i.e. do not overload

• Nurse head up 20%

• Prevent hypothermia.

Never assume that alcohol is the cause of drowsiness in a confused patient

Spinal Trauma

The incidence of nerve injury in multiple traumas is higher than expected. The most common
injuries include damaged nerves to fingers, brachial plexus and central spinal cord.

The first priority is to undertake the primary survey with evaluation of ABCDE-scheme:

• A Airway maintenance with care and control of a possible injury to the cervical spine

• B Breathing control or support

• C Circulation control and blood pressure monitoring

• D Disability means the observation of neurological damage and status of


• E Exposure of the patient to assess skin injuries and peripheral limb damage.

Examination of spine-injured patients must be carried out with the patient in the neutral
position (i.e. without flexion, extension or rotation) and without any movement of his spine.
The patient should be:

• Log-rolled (discussed in practical session)

• Properly immobilized (in-line immobilization, stiff neck cervical collar or sandbags).

This will be discussed in the practical sessions

• Transported in a neutral position.

.. injury (which may overlie spinal cord injury) look for:
With vertebral

• Local tenderness

• Deformities as well as for a posterior "step-off" injury

• Oedema (swelling).

Clinical findings indicating injury of the cervical spine include:

• Difficulties in respiration (diaphragmatic breathing check for paradoxical breathing)

• Flaccid and no reflexes (check rectal sphincter)

• Hypotension with bradycardia (without hypovolaemia).

C-Spine: (if available) In addition to the initial X-rays, all patients with a suspicion of
cervical spine injury should include an AP and a lateral X-ray with a view of the atlas-axis
joint. All seven cervical vertebrae must be seen on the AP and lateral.

Caution: Never transport a patient with a suspected injury of cervical spine

In the sitting or prone position. Always make sure the patient is stabilised

Before transferring

Neurological assessment

Assessment of the level of injury must be undertaken. If the patient is conscious, ask the
patient questions relevant to his/her sensation and try to ask him/her to do minor
movements to be able to find motor function of the upper and lower extremities.

The following summarizes key reflex assessment to determine level of lesion:

Motor response

• Diaphragm intact level C3, C4, C5

• Shrug shoulders C4

• Biceps (flex elbows) C5

• Extension of wrist C6

• Extension of elbow C7

• Flexion of wrist C7

• Abduction of fingers C8

• Active chest expansion TlT12

• Hip flexion L2

• Knee extension L3L4

• Ankle dorsiflexion L5S 1

• Ankle plantar flexion S1S2

Sensory response

• Anterior thigh L2

• Anterior knee L3

• Anterolateral ankle L4

• Dorsum great and 2nd toe L5

• Lateral side of foot Sl

• Posterior calf S2

• Peri-anal sensation (perineum) S2S5

NB if no sensory or motor function is exhibited with a complete spinal cord

Lesion the chance of recovery is small.

Loss of autonomic function with spinal cord injury

May occur rapidly and resolve slowly

Limb Trauma

Examination must include:

• Skin color and temperature

• Distal pulse assessment

• Grazes and bleeding sites

• Limb’s alignment and deformities

• Active and passive movements

• Unusual movements and crepitation

• Level of pain caused injury.

Management of extremity injuries should aim to:

• ..Keep blood flowing to peripheral tissues
• Prevent infection and skin necrosis

• Prevent damage to peripheral nerves.

Special issues relating to limb trauma

• Stop active bleeding by direct pressure, rather than by tourniquet as it can be left on
by mistake, and this can result in ischaemic damage.

• Open fractures. Any wound situated in the neighborhood of a fracture must be

considered as a communicating one. Principles of the treatment include:

• Stop external bleeding

• Immobilize and relieve pain.

• Compartment syndrome is caused by an increase the internal pressure of facial

compartments; this pressure results in a compression of vessels and peripheral
nerves situated in these regions. Perfusion is limited, peripheral nerves damaged
and the final result of this condition is ischaemic or even necrotic muscles with
restricted function.

• Amputated parts of extremities should be covered with sterile gauze towels, which
are moistened with saline and put into a sterile plastic bag. A non-cooled amputated
part may be used within 6 hours after the injury, a cooled one as late as after 18 to
20 hours.

Deep penetrating foreign bodies should remain in situ until theatre


Limb Support: Early Fasciotomy

The problem with compartment syndromes are often underestimated:

• Tissue damage due to hypoxemia: Compartment syndromes with increased intra

muscular (IM) pressures and local circulatory collapse are common in injuries with
intramuscular haematomas; crush injuries, fractures or amputations. If the perfusion
pressure (systolic BP) is low, even a slight rise in IM pressure causes local hypo
perfusion. With normal body temperature peripheral limb circulation starts to
decrease at a systolic BP around 80 mmHg.

• The damage on reperfusion is often serious: If there is local hypoxemia (high IM

pressure, low BP) for more than 2 hours, the reperfusion can cause extensive
vascular damage. That is why decompression should be done early. In particular the
forearm and lower leg compartments are at risk.

When the bleeding source is controlled, we recommend in-field Fasciotomy of forearm

and lower leg compartments if the evacuation time is 4 hours or more. Fasciotomy should
be done by any trained doctor or nurse under ketamine anaesthesia at the district location.

Special Trauma Cases


Trauma is a leading cause of death for all children, with a higher incidence in boys. The
survival of children who sustain major trauma depends on pre-hospital care and early

The initial assessment of the paediatric trauma patients is identical to that for the adult. The
first priority is the Airway, Breathing, then Circulation, early neurological assessment,
and finally exposing the child, without losing heat.

Paediatric 'NORMAL' values are included in Appendix 2.

Specific resuscitation and intubation issues in the young include:

• The relatively larger head and larger nasal airway and tongue

• Nose breathing in small babies

• Angle of the jaw is greater, larynx is higher and epiglottis is proportionally bigger and
more "U"-shaped

• Cricoids are the narrowest part of the larynx, which limits the size of the ETT. By
adult life, the larynx has grown and the narrowest part is at the cords

• Trachea in the full-term new-born is about 4 cm long and will admit a 2.5 or 3.0 mm
diameter ETT (the adult trachea is about 12 cm long)

• Gastric distension is common following resuscitation, and a naso-gastric tube is

useful to decompress the stomach.

If tracheal intubation is required, avoid cuffed tubes in children less than 10 yrs so as to
minimise subglottic swelling and ulceration. Oral intubation is easier than nasal for infants
and young children.

Shock in the paediatric patient: (Refer Appendix 2).

The femoral artery in the groin and the brachial artery in the antecubital fossa are the best
sites to palpate pulses in the child. If the child is pulse less, cardiopulmonary resuscitation
should be commenced.

Signs of shock in paediatric patients include:

• Tachycardia

• Weak or absent peripheral pulses

• Capillary refill > 2 seconds

• Tachypnoea

• Agitation

• Drowsiness

• ..Poor urine output.
Hypotension may be a late sign, even in the presence of severe shock.

The principles in managing paediatric trauma patients Are the same as for the adult

Vascular access should be obtained. Two large bore intravenous cannulae should be
inserted. Attempt peripheral veins first and avoid central venous catheters. Good sites are
the long saphenous vein at the ankle and the femoral vein in the groin.

Intraosseous access is relatively safe and a very effective method of fluid administration. If
an Intraosseous needle is unavailable then a spinal needle can be used. The best site is on
the anteromedial aspect of the tibia below the tibial tuberosity. The epiphysis growth plate
must be avoided.

Fluid replacement should be aimed to produce a urine output of 12 ml/kg/hour for the
infant, and 0.51 ml/kg/hour in the adolescent. An initial bolus of 20 ml per kilogram of the
body weight of Normal Saline should be given. If no response is obtained after a second
bolus then 20-ml/kg type specific bloods or O Rh negative packed red blood cells (10 ml/kg)
should be administered if available.

Hypothermia is a major problem in children. They lose proportionally more heat through the
head. All fluids should be warmed. Because of the child's relatively large surface area to
volume ratio, hypothermia is a potential problem. Exposure of the child is necessary for
assessment but consider covering as soon as possible.

The child should be kept warm and close to family if at all possible


The ABCDE priorities of trauma management in pregnant patients are the same as those in
non-pregnant patients.

Anatomical and physiological changes occur in pregnancy, which are extremely important in
the assessment of the pregnant trauma patient.

Anatomical changes

• Size of the uterus gradually increases and becomes more vulnerable to damage
both by blunt and penetrating injury

o at 12 weeks of gestation the fundus is at the symphysis pubis

o at 20 weeks it is at the umbilicus and

o At 36 weeks the xiphoid.

• The foetus at first is well protected by the thick walled uterus and large amounts of
amniotic fluid.

Physiological changes

• Increased tidal volume and respiratory alkalosis

• Increased heart rate

• 30% increased cardiac output

• Blood pressure is usually 15 mmHg lower

• Aortocaval compression in the third trimester with hypotension.

Special issues in the traumatised pregnant female

• Blunt trauma may lead to

o Uterine irritability and premature labour

o Partial or complete rupture of the uterus

o Partial or complete placental separation (up to 48 hours after trauma)

o With pelvic fracture be aware of severe blood loss potential.

What are the priorities?

• Assessment of the mother according to the ABCDE

• Resuscitate in left lateral position to avoid aortocaval compression

• Vaginal examination (speculum) for vaginal bleeding and cervical dilatation

• Mark fundal height and tenderness and foetal heart rate monitoring as appropriate.

Resuscitation of mother may save the baby. There are times when the mother's life is at
risk and the foetus may need to be sacrificed in order to save the mother.

Aortocaval compression must be prevented in resuscitation of the

Traumatised pregnant woman. Remember left lateral tilt


The burn patient has the same priorities as all other trauma patients.

Assessment: Airway, Breathing (beware of inhalation and rapid airway compromise),

Circulation (fluid replacement), Disability (compartment syndrome) Exposure (%

The source of burn is important e.g. fire, hot water, paraffin, kerosene etc. Electrical burns
are often more serious than they appear. Remember damaged skin and muscle can results
in acute renal failure.

Essential .. management points:
• Stop the burning

• ABCDE then determine the percentage area of burn (Rule of 9's)

• Good IV access and early fluid replacement.

Specific issues for burns patients

The following principles can be used as a guide to detect and manage respiratory injury in
the burn patient:

• Burns around the mouth

• Facial burns or singed facial or nasal hair

• Hoarseness, rasping cough

• Evidence of glottic oedema

• Circumferential, full-thickness burns of chest or neck.

Nasotracheal or endotracheal intubation is indicated especially if patient has severe

increasing hoarseness, difficulty swallowing secretions, or increased respiratory rate with
history of inhalation injury.

The burn patient requires at least 24 ml of crystalloid solution per kg body weight per
percent body surface burn in the first 24 hours to maintain an adequate circulating blood
volume and provide adequate renal output. The estimated fluid volume is then proportioned
in the following manner:

• One half of the total estimated fluid is provided in the first 8 hours post burn

• The remaining one half is administered in the next 24 hours, to maintain an average
urinary output of 0.51.0 ml/kg/hr.

Undertake the following (if possible):

• Pain relief

• Bladder catheterisation if burn > 20%

• Nasogastric drainage

• Tetanus prophylaxis.

Clinical manifestations may not appear for the first 24 hours

Transport of Critically Ill Patients

Transporting patients has risk. It requires good communication, planning and appropriate
staffing. Any patient who requires transportation must be effectively stabilised before

departure. As a general principle, patients should be transported only if they are going to a
facility that can provide a higher level of care.

Planning and preparation include consideration of:

• The type of transport (car, land rover, boat etc)

• The personnel to accompany the patient

• The equipment and supplies required en route for routine and emergency treatment

• Potential complications

• The monitoring and final packaging of the patient.

Effective communication is essential with:

• The receiving centre

• The transport service

• Escorting personnel

• The patient and relatives.

Effective stabilisation necessitates:

• Prompt initial resuscitation

• Control of haemorrhage and maintenance of the circulation

• Immobilisation of fractures

• Analgesia.

Remember: if the patient deteriorates, re-evaluate the patient by using the primary survey,
checking and treating life-threatening conditions, then make a careful assessment focussing
on the affected system.

Be prepared: If anything can go wrong, it will, and at the worst possible time

Appendix 1 Airway Management


Basic techniques

Chin lift and jaw thrust

Placing two fingers under the mandible and gently lifting upward to bring the chin anterior
can perform the chin lift manoeuvre. During this manoeuvre the neck should not be hyper
extended. (Demonstrated in the Practical session)

The jaw.. thrust is performed by manually elevating the angles of the mandible to obtain the
. (Demonstrated in the Practical session) Remember these are not definitive
same effect.
procedures and obstruction may occur at any time.

Or pharyngeal airway

The oral airway must be inserted into the mouth behind the tongue and is usually inserted
upside down until the palate is encountered and is then rotated 180 degrees. Care should
be taken in children because of the possibility of soft tissue damage.

Nasopharyngeal airway

This is inserted via a nostril (well lubricated) and passed into the posterior oropharynx. It is
well tolerated.

Advanced techniques

Orotracheal intubation

If uncontrolled, this procedure may produce cervical hyperextension. It is essential to

maintain in line immobilisation (by an assistant). (Demonstrated in the Practical session)
Cricoids pressure may be necessary if a full stomach is suspected. The cuff must be inflated
and correct placement of the tube checked by verifying normal bilateral breath sounds.

Tracheal intubation must be considered when there is a need to

• Establish a patent airway and prevent aspiration

• Deliver oxygen while not being able to use mask and airway

• Provide ventilation and prevent hypercarbia.

This should be performed in no more than 30 seconds: if unable to intubate then ventilation
of the patient must continue. Remember: patients die from lack of oxygen, not lack of an
endo-tracheal tube.

Remember: patients with trauma of the face and neck are at risk for airway

Surgical cricothyroidotomy

This is indicated in any patient where intubation has been attempted and failed and the
patient cannot be ventilated. The cricothyroid membrane is identified by palpation; a skin
incision that extends through the cricothyroid membrane is made. An artery forceps is
inserted to dilate the incision. A size 46 endotracheal tube (or small tracheotomy tube) is

Appendix 2: Paediatric Physiological Values

Variable Newborn 6 months 12 months 5 years Adult

Respiratory rate (b/min) 50 ± 10 30 ± 5 24 ± 6 23 ± 5 12 ± 3

Tidal volume (ml) 21 45 78 270 575

Minute ventilation (L/min) 1.05 1.35 1.78 5.5 6.4

Hematocrit 55 ± 7 37 ± 3 35 ± 2.5 40 ± 2 4348

Arterial pH 7.37.4 7.357.45 7.357

Age Heart rate range Systolic blood pressure

(Beats per minute) (MmHg)

01 year 100160 6090

1 year 100170 7090

2 years 90150 80100

6 years 70120 85110

10 years 70110 90110

14 years 60100 90110

Adult 60100 90120

Respiratory Parameters and Endotracheal Tube Size and Placement

Age Weight Respiratory ETT ETT at ETT at

(Kg) Rate (b/min) Size Lip (cm) Nose (cm)

Newborn 1.03.0 4050 3.0 5.58.5 710.5

Newborn 3.5 4050 3.5 9 11

3 months 6.0 3050 3.5 10 12

1 year 10 2030 4.0 11 14

2 years 12 2030 4.5 12 15

3 years 14 2030 4.5 13 16

4 years 16 1525 5.0 14 17

6 years 20 .. 1525 5.5 15 19

8 years 24 1020 6.0 16 20

10 years 30 1020 6.5 17 21

12 years 38 1020 7.0 18 22

Appendix 3: Cardiovascular pulmonaries

Heart Blood Capill Resp Urine Mental

Blood loss
Rate Pressure Refill Rate Volume State

Up to 750 ml < 100 Normal Normal Normal > 30 malls/hr Normal

Systolic Mild
7501500 ml > 100 Positive 2030 2030
Normal Concern

15002000 ml > 120 Decreased Positive 3040 515

More than 2000 ml > 140 Decreased Positive > 40 < 10

Appendix 4: Glasgow Coma Scale

Function Response Score

Open spontaneously 4

Open to command 3
Eyes (4)
Open to pain 2

None 1

Verbal (5) Normal 5

Confused talk 4

Inappropriate words 3

Inappropriate sounds 2

None 1

Obeys command 6

Localises pain 5

Flexes limbs normally to pain 4

Motor (6)
Flexes limbs abnormally to pain 3

Extends limbs to pain 2

None 1

Appendix 5: Cardiac Life Support

Appendix 6: Trauma Response

Long before
.. to each
any trauma patient arrives in your medical care, roles must be identified and
member of the trauma 'team'

Team members (depends on availability)

Ideally: On-duty emergency doctor or experienced health worker (team leader)

Trauma Team roles

Team leader (Doctor) (Nurse)

1. Co-ordinate ABC's 1. Help co-ordinate early resuscitation

2. History patient or family 2. Liase with relatives

3. Request X rays (if possible) 3. Check documentation including:

4. Perform secondary survey Allergies

5. Consider tetanus prophylaxis and antibiotics Medications

6. Reassess patient Past history

7. Prepare patient for transfer Last meal

8. Complete documentation Events leading to injury

4. Notify nursing staff in other areas

• On-duty emergency nurse

• 1 or 2 additional helpers

When the patient actually arrives, a rapid overview is necessary.

This is known as TRIAGE.

This rapid overview prioritises patient management according to:

• Manpower

• Resources.

This will be discussed at length during the course.

Appendix 7: Activation Plan for

Trauma Team


The following patients should undergo full trauma assessment:

• Fall >3 metres
• MVA: net speed>30 km/hr
• Thrown from vehicle/trapped in vehicle
• Death of a person in accident
• Pedestrian vs. car/cyclist vs. car/ unrestrained occupant.
• Airway or respiratory distress
• BP>100mmHg
• GCS <13/15
• >1 area injured
• Penetrating injury
Disaster management

Disasters do occur and disaster planning is an essential part to any trauma service.
A disaster is any event that exceeds the ability of local resources to cope with the

A simple disaster plan must include:

• Disaster scenarios practice
• Disaster management protocols including:
o On-scene management
o Key personnel identification
o Trauma triage
• Medical team allocations from your hospital
• Agree in advance who will be involved in the event of a disaster
o Ambulance
o Police/army
o National/international authorities
o Aid and relief agencies.
• Evacuation priorities
• Evacuation facilities
• Modes of transport: road/air (helicopter/fixed wing)/sea
• Work out different communications strategies.
Medical pack (emergency)

In any emergency evacuation the medical pack should to the assembly point where
immediate assistance can to anyone suffering from burns or wounds.

The medical pack (emergency) should contain the following:

• Blanket
• Triangular bandages
• Safety pins
• Crepe bandages
• Rolls of Elastoplasts

..• Strong scissors
• Paraffin gauze (Burns)
• Shell dressings
• Blow up splints
• List of Personnel (up to date) - numbers to be verified at assembly point
• Any special medicaments
Priorities for first aid

Ask Look Listen Think Act

One out of five casualties are seriously injured, maybe unconscious and require the
following order of priorities.


A. A clear airway to breathe through - recovery position

- Insert plastic airway

B. Breathing to be assisted - mouth-to-mouth breathing

C. Circulation of the blood to be maintained - stop bleeding by - urgent treatment -


- Prevention of shock

D. Do not panic - Prevent and treat shock

E. Evacuation to the nearest medical unit.

Any remaining casualties may be injured in the limbs and will require the following order of
a) Stop the bleeding
b) Prevent shock
c) Rest and gentle handling
d) Evacuation.
If YOU are injured and still conscious, carry out the following SELF HELP DRILL

Stop the bleeding

• Lie still
• Direct pressure on or around wound - apply your shell dressing
• Put a crepe bandage on to maintain pressure firm, even
Treat pain
• Keep injured part still
Think about
• Help from others
• Look for exit wound and cover it
• You will be more comfortable if you have a chest wound if you sit and lean
to injured side, and with a stomach wound sit propped up with the knees

drawn up.

Assistance to the injured

• Maintain a clear airway
• Put unconscious casualty in the recovery position, if injuries allow it
• Keep him still
• Listen for sounds of breathing - mouth to mouth if necessary
• Check that the heart is beating - massage heart if not beating
• Stop bleeding by any or all of the following:
Direct pressure with fingers or thumbs on or around the wound. If a dressing is available,
apply it directly over the wound and press it firmly down. Make sure that it extends well
beyond the edges of the wound.

Apply a crepe bandage to maintain firm, even pressure. NOT TOO TIGHT

If blood comes through dressing put more layers on.

Expect and look for an exit wound.

Any deep wound should be plugged right to is base with dressings.

If bones protrude, then build dressings in layers around wound.

Indirect pressure by using the pressure points in arms or legs.


Elevate the limb whenever possible.

Rest the part

Prevent shock

Reassure the casualty - it is worth a pint of blood to him

Keep his body flat and raise the legs - worth another pint

Loosen tight clothing. Keep him comfortably cool. Treat the cause of shock.

Decide if evacuation is urgent to save his life

Move good limb to the side of the injured ones and tie or splint them. Tie or pin an injured
arm to the chest.

Never leave an unconscious casualty - he may stop breathing.

Always try to keep out germs.

Never give a wounded man drinks - only SIPS - and not ever
• If unconscious
• A penetrating wound of the trunk

..• Operation likely within four hours - never give alcohol in any form
Evacuate gently

- Your casualty will get more shock every time he is even slightly moved - and SCHOCK

We tend to believe that a well-run CP/EP operation, which maintains awareness and correct
procedures, will act as a deterrent to a terrorist organization. Quite probably in a large
number of cases this is the case, but if a terrorist group is deterred from action by what
would appear to be professional switched on security, we would never know, as they would
simply turn their attentions to a softer option. The use of 'lead and follow' vehicles, hardening
of the Principal's vehicle, residence and office should, we believe, all contribute to his
improved safety. None of these measures helped, however, in protecting the life of the head
of Deutsche Banke, Alfred Herrhausen, who was assassinated by West Germany's 'Red
Army Faction' (RAF). Operating spasmodically, but successfully, they have been one of
Germany's most dangerous left wing terrorist groups. It will pay us to look at one case study
and see what lessons can be drawn.

Alfred Herrhausen, Chairman of Germany's largest bank, was an individual larger than his
position at the bank. He was a senior Economist and Industrial Strategist and a personal
friend and advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. His assassination was not dissimilar in
magnitude to that of a Head of State, as indicated by the £2 million reward offered by the
West German Government for information leading to the capture of his assassins.

As a consequence of his prominence and importance, he was assigned a permanent Close

Protection Team, which daily, whilst in transit, comprised of a lead vehicle, a follow vehicle
and $200,000 of armored Mercedes, in which Herrhausen was driven. The security
provisions of ‘Protected’ targets had never deterred the RAF however. Out of 10 attacks on
prominent people, 6 had protection of one form or another, either Bodyguards, Escort
Vehicles or Armored Vehicles. Three travelled in fully armored vehicles and three travelled
in a three-car convoy.

Herrhausen lived in an up-market residential area of Frankfurt and habitually left home
around the same time. Choice of routes close from his home was limited and involved
driving through a Park area. Close to the site of the attack was a walking path, jogging area
and parking area within the Park, giving the terrorists ample cover for surveillance, pre-
planning and execution of the attack. Vehicles at the point of attack were slowed to approx.
30mph due to a school crossing and bus stop on the road and the road was prohibited to
parked vehicles. Shortly after 8.30am on the morning of the attack, Herrhausen's armored
Mercedes was blown nearly 80 feet along the road, when some 22lbs of TNT, placed on the
carrier of a child's bike, exploded some three feet from the side of the vehicle. The blast
blew shrapnel through the right rear door into the back right seat, where Herrhausen
habitually sat. He was fatally injured and bled to death shortly after the explosion, although
his driver, miraculously, was only slightly injured.

The device had been triggered by a photoelectric cell, attached to one of the white posts,
which lined the street. The beam was reflected back from a mirror also attached to a post on
the other side of the street. The terrorists, calculating the speed and length of the Mercedes,

and seating position of their target, had previously calculated the position the bike would
need to be in to explode as the front of the armored vehicle cut the beam.

On the journey, the lead car which was some 200 metres in advance of the Mercedes, had
passed the beam safely as it had been armed by command wire by a terrorist in a jogging
who, with a small electric device and battery pack, had armed the bomb having been
warned by a colleague by radio that the lead vehicle had passed the beam.

The sophistication of the method of detonation and arming the bomb was unique.

Some Weeks before, 'workmen' had chiseled a line in the pavement in which to lay
command wire and cemented over it. The remainder of the command wire, which posed
through the park, had probably been laid only that morning so as to escape Ion.

The attack was a meticulously planned and spectacular coup for the RAF. The attack
exposed serious flaws in the security measures. The lead car achieved nothing. Had it been
advance vehicle tasked to recce the route in detail, then it may well have been suspicious
bike parked in a position, which was discouraged on the particular road.

For all the reasons we know, the park area was the ideal choice for the terrorist_ equally,
security should have identified the locale as one which would give cam concern.
• Close to home with few alternates
• Traffic forced to slow
• Easy surveillance
• Tree-lined and bushy area
• Narrow road with
• Easy escape following the attack
• Ease of concealment that is joggers/walkers/couples etc. during the attack
The incident contains many of the common elements of a terrorist operation, 1 elevated, if
we could use the word in such a horrific incident by the planning! Complexity of the method
of attack. Many lessons can be learned from the attack, pro the main one being, that under
certain circumstances a ‘hardened target’ will not put off a determined, intelligent, resourced
terrorist organization, rather see it challenge. Security cannot be complacent as a
consequence of the fact they have manpower and material resources. Constant awareness
and the belief it will always hi to you, need to be maintained to enable observation,
evaluation an avoidance to all into play.

From an operational point of view the two lessons learned from this incident area.
• Surveillance recognition
• Specific route survey
The surveillance was there to see if anyone had looked hard enough. Weeks of painstaking
surveillance had been going on, not to mention the terrorists having to chisel away part of
the pavement.

The value of a lead vehicle, which is improperly tasked, is also brought into start relief.
Whilst they may have been on the lookout for potential ambush situations they missed the
bicycle. The routine of the lead car was also so well known that they used it as a timer to
arm the device.

Assessing .. the conclusions of just one incident is insufficient for a student to become fully
acquainted with terrorist tactics and from the many Kidnap/Assassination attempts the
following have merit in further study.
• Attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan March 1980,
• Assassination of Col. Shatter & Col. Turner, Tehran
• Assassination Aldo Morro, Italy
• Kidnapping Hans Martin Schleyer, W. Germany
There are, unfortunately, many other incidents to study, some successful and some not so. 1
would be comforting to think that those that were unsuccessful were so as a result of the
preventative actions of the Bodyguards. Regrettably this, in the majority of instances, is not
the case. Most failures can usually be attributed to 'balls up' by the attackers or a failure of
something outside their control. With the element of surprise and undetected surveillance,
the odds are stacked in their favor.

From 1970 to 1992 there was an increase in terrorist incidents from 298 to 5,400 in 1992 a
1713% increase in the level of terrorist activity. The geographic split of total incidents in

1992 was as follows:

• Latin America - 28 %
• Middle East - 24 %
• Asia. 19%
• Europe. 18 %
• Africa. 11 %
This gives a very one-sided view of the level of worldwide risk. Domestic bombing incidents
in the States from 1975 - 1984 amounted to some 10,100 according to the FBI 'Summary of
Bomb Incidents'. The breakdown was 7,100 explosive devices and 3,019 Incendiary
devices, which resulted in 279 deaths and 1,600 injuries, yet the figures quoted At the
beginning of this section attributed no terrorist incidents as happening in the D.S. Add To
this the huge and growing problem of organized crime and acts of extortion, leveraged by
The threat of or actual violence and the actual total for what one could consider domestic

Terrorism is huge.

USE of Force Theory

The use of force in response to Terrorism

There is no question that terrorist incidents will continue to plague the international
community well into the foreseeable future. One primary reason for this is the inherent
difficulty involved in preventing a terrorist attack before it occurs. Another is the often-
fanatical nature of individuals who carry out the often suicidal - assaults. These factors are
often the primary reason that the only action that can be taken in response to terrorism is
after-the fact. Herein, too, lies a significant and controversial problem which responses are
appropriate? Few disagree that economic sanctions against that nation determined to be
responsible are acceptable. Nonetheless, while this action may dissuade some nations from
hosting terrorist groups or providing refuge to individual perpetrators, it does little to punish
those directly responsible. It is for this reason that it is important that nations are perceived

as willing and able to make appropriate use of their armed forces to conduct retaliatory
operations. A brief, illustrative examination of US practice and policy follows.

The policy of the United States in the use of the military in responding to terrorist incidents
has remained fairly consistent in recent years. Following the bombing of the April 1986 La
Belle discotheque in West Berlin (which resulted in the deaths of two US servicemen),
President Ronald Reagan ordered an immediate and thorough investigation involving all
major US intelligence and law enforcement services. Upon conclusive finding that the
perpetrators of this incident had been trained in Libya, he ordered an air strike on a number
of targets, including terrorist training facilities. In the period of time following this attack,
Libya noticeably reduced its previously active involvement in support of international
terrorism. More recently, when Iraqi involvement in the plotted assassination of President
Bush was verified in June 1993, President Clinton ordered a Tomahawk missile strike
against the facility believed to have facilitated the planning of the operation, the
headquarters complex of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). This attack (while later
determined to be of questionable military effectiveness) provided a significant symbol of US
resolve to punish those responsible involved in terrorism directed against its citizens.
Following the attack, President Clinton issued this statement:

"The Government of Iraq acted unlawfully in attempting to carry out Saddam Hussein's
threats against former President Bush because of actions he took as President. The
evidence of the Government of Iraq's violence and terrorism demonstrates that Iraq poses a
continuing threat to United States nationals and shows utter disregard for the will of the
international community as expressed in Security Council Resolutions and the United
Nations Charter. Based on the Government of Iraq's pattern of disregard for international
law, I concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that new diplomatic initiatives or
economic measures could influence the current Government of Iraq to cease planning future
attacks against the United States.

The only thing more important than shot placement is knowing when to shoot.

A lot of time is spent talking about which weapon or ammo will best suit your particular
needs for each facet of personal defence. One topic that is rarely discussed though is how
these lethal tools should be employed. Just what are the guidelines?

Years ago I took my first use of force training while I was at the Maricopa County
Detention Academy. At the time I thought that what they were teaching me was just
watered down ‘jailer’ training, far different from actual police training. A few years later I
found out how wrong I was when I had the opportunity to attend the firearms certification
course required for all peace officers in Arizona before they may carry a weapon. As I sat
in that class I was shocked to find that it was almost identical to the course I took for
unarmed use of force back in the academy. Many people who have taken the instruction
required to obtain their concealed weapons permit also have the same belief that I held
then. Guess what? When I took the CCW course, it was not only the same material, but
also the same two cops taught it! In fact the only difference between lawful force for police
and civilians is that peace officers are not given the option of fleeing the scene to avoid

Lawful use of deadly force has nothing to do with shoot ‘em up, spray & pray
tactics. It is a last ditch option when no other course of action is available.

Regular police training emphasizes less on SWAT tactics and more on judgmental use
of force. So when gun writers lambaste cops by saying that many are less proficient
with their sidearm than the average IPSC shooter, they are doing a great disservice to
the law enforcement community. Police are trained to know when to use force in a

. manner. Anyone who buys into the belief that police should be able to
shoot .like the Terminator needs to spend more time as a ride along and less time at

Blockbuster video. Lawful use of deadly force has nothing to do with shoot ‘em up,
spray & pray tactics. It is a last ditch option when no other course of action is available.

Here, two shots have caused the attacker

to break off and back pedal away from the
victim. Shoot-to-stop is best typified here.
Further shots would constitute excessive
force and a shoot-to-kill mentality.

The governing logic behind all use of force is

simple, "You may use only that amount of
force necessary to overcome the threat."
Police apply this logic best by stair stepping
their levels of force. If you have ever wondered
why modern police carry more weapons than
Batman, here’s an example; Two police go to
arrest a transient. First they verbally command
him to comply, he resists. Next they grab him and begin to use Aikido holds to administer
pain compliance, but he pulls a knife from his belt. One officer pulls his sidearm and
covers his partner who responds to the threat with a blast of OC pepper. More verbal
commands are given, "Put down the knife and surrender!" The subject still refuses and
threatens the two officers who (in some departments) respond by firing two darts from a
hand held Tazer. Still resisting, and impervious to the barrage of non-lethal devices used
on him, the transient charges one of the officers. Officer number one responds with a
single shot that stops the attacker.

An extra magazine or speed loader is always

nice in a protracted gunfight, but the entire
philosophy of civilian defensive shooting is to
extricate you from the threat as quickly as
possible. The trade-off of an extra magazine
in favour of an OC canister makes more
sense in terms of bulk/non-lethal alternative.

In each of these steps, the officers responded to

each threat increase by raising the level of force
slightly in response. While most real world police shootings do not have this many steps,
this scenario is common and in almost all cases the officers are quickly cleared. Because
they took such extensive pains to avoid shooting the perpetrator, it would be very unlikely
for them to be convicted of criminal wrongdoing. Also, they could have shut down the
situation at any time had the transient yielded.

One of the aspects of modern defence is the ‘shoot to stop’ doctrine. It is not
uncommon for people to believe that the proper intent in a lethal encounter is to
shoot to kill. In our litigious world just uttering that phrase following a shooting is
enough to guarantee that you will become the next David Goetz, sued for your
entire future. To intentionally kill an attacker actually violates the use of force
code, Only that amount of force necessary... Yes, it’s a bizarre world we live in,
designed by lawyers and built by judges!

Use of your handgun as an impact
weapon not only raises weapons
retention concerns, but also may
damage some guns. The author’s
father once destroyed an early alloy
frame revolver by using it to repeatedly
strike an unarmed attacker. Since then
he carried a Colt 1911.

In modern force methodology, you

shoot to stop the bad guy from doing
whatever he is doing. Upon compliance
you stop firing, his death is a
coincidental factor of your response. We don’t care if the offender goes away mad,
just so long as he goes away. If this can be done with the mere sight of a .50 cal
Desert Eagle with suppresser and Tac light, then all the better for you!

Chances are, you will find that [in your state] you are not even legally
permitted to use your weapon to stop the commission of a felony unless there
exists reasonable fear of death

There will be those that argue that deadly force has its own doctrine above and
beyond normal levels of force because most state statutes specify that imminent
danger to you or another must be present in order to respond with deadly force. But
these requirements fall within the bounds of ‘only that amount of force...’ The
simplest way to understand deadly force is that it can only be used in response to a
life threatening attack. It is similar to a chess game where only a pawn can attack a
pawn, bishops can only attack bishops, and You must have a reasonable fear for
your life or that of another before you can administer deadly force. The threshold for
reasonable fear may vary from person to person. I might lack legal justification for
shooting a 6’, 180 lb man who attacks me with fists. Because I’m healthy, have no
physical impairments, and have both the professional training and experience to
respond to the threat, I would be less likely to be able to convince a grand jury that I
had serious fear of death. By contrast, if that same man attacked my 5'3" wife then
his death would likely be ruled as justified because she is shorter, weaker, and has
no defensive training. In her case it would be prudent to assume that almost any
male attacker would overcome her.

Because of their lack of upper body strength,

women have a higher reasonable fear of
harm from a single unarmed attacker than a
healthy male would. This could lower their
threshold for responding with deadly force.

A good example of reasonable fear was a

burglary that occurred out in the county several
years ago. The homeowner heard several men
moving around at the end of his hallway by the
living room. When he moved to the other end of the hallway with gun in hand they heard
him. In the darkness he heard one of the criminals tell another "Let’s ---- him up!" At this
point, against multiple attackers and in total darkness, he had a reasonable fear of
imminent danger. They had agreed to harm him.

He fired.. into the darkness hitting two of the three. Of the two who had escaped, one was
caught .later in the emergency room. His defence was that they had not been armed;
hence the homeowner had no right to fire on them. The police disagreed and found the
man’s actions reasonable.

The use of deadly force to

protect property is illegal. A
reasonable fear for a human life
must exist. In this photo the
mere sight of a weapon is used
to scare away a car thief. Were
there children in the car, and
then use of deadly force would
likely be justified.

So the next time that you hear

someone tell you that most cops
shoot poorly, try and keep in mind
that no one pay them to kill people.
The first rule to surviving a gunfight is to avoid it completely. But for those times that you
are given no alternative, use of force must be done with the utmost in discretionary
judgment. Because when the time comes you will be acting on instinct and adrenaline, it
is best to incorporate alternative steps into your training

Regime. Practice verbally challenging targets, carry a secondary non-lethal weapon, and
work out emergency procedures on the range in advance. Most of all, take the time to
learn the use of force statutes for your state by visiting the public law library in your
county. Chances are you will find that you are not even legally permitted to use your
weapon to stop the commission of a felony unless there exists reasonable fear of death.
On the flip side, most states statutorily permit the use of deadly force to stop rape,
kidnapping, or arson of an occupied structure. APC

Protectee Profile

1. Protectee’s Name…………………………………………………

2. Permanent Residence Address……………………………………………………………………….



Telephone…………………………………………Fax………………………Floor plan available?


3. Secondary (vacation) residence



Telephone………………………………………..Fax………………………..Floor Plan available?


4. Office


Telephone…………………………………………Fax………………………Floor plan available?


Secretary’s name………………………………………………..Home

Other telephones and description (Skypage etc)



5. Physical: Age…….. Height……………… Weight……………Hair Colour…………Eye





6. Personal
.. data: Sex…..Race……Date of birth………

Social Security…………………………Passport………………………Passport expiry


Drivers Lic…………………….State/Country……………………..Int’l driver’s


Major Credit cards & #s




7. Medical: Physicians name………………………………………………



Physicians name……………………………………………………………


Dentist’s name………………………………………………………………



Medication required…………………………………………………….Blood


8. Vehicles: Make………….Model………….Year……………….. Colour…………..Lic/State……..



9. Plane:

10. Boat:

11 Health Ins

Auto Ins

Other Ins Carrier……………………………………………………………Policy……………………..

Kidnap/ransom insurance………. Carrier…………………………………Policy…………………….

12.Attorney’s name…………………………………………………………


13. Protectee’s chief of security………………………………………………Telephone………………


14. Bank: Name……………………………………Tel………………………


15. History of threats against family…………………………………………………………………….


16 Any known enemies?



17. Club

18. Spouse Name…………………………………………………………………………………………….

Physical: Age……….Height………..Weight……………..Hair Colour……………..Eye




Personal.. Data: Sex…………. Race……………

Social Security………………………………….Passport………………….Passport exp


Drivers Lic……………………………… State/country………………….Int’l drivers


Medical: Physician’s


Physicians name……………………………………………………





Medication required…………………………………………………Blood




19. pouse

Physical: Age……….Height…………….Weight………………Hair colour…………Eye




Personal data: Sex………………..Race……………..D.O.B.


Social Security……………………….Passport…………………………Passport exp


Drivers Lic…………………………..State/Country…………………..Int’l driver’s


Parent of children?………….. Terms of



20. Children or other persons in household:

Name (child 1)………………………………………………………………


Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye





Personal data:

Name of


If living..away from home,

Medical: Physician’s


Dentist’s name……………………………………………………



Medication required…………………………………………………Blood


21. Name (child 2)…………………………………………………………


Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye




Personal data:

Name of


If living away from home,


Medical: Physician’s


Dentist’s name……………………………………………………



Medication required…………………………………………………Blood


22. Name (child 3)………………………………………………………


Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye




Personal data:

Name of

If living away from home,

Medical: Physician’s


Dentist’s name……………………………………………………



Medication required…………………………………………………Blood


23. Name (child 4)…………………………………………………………


Physical: Age………Height…………….Weight…………..Hair colour………….Eye




Personal data:

Name of


If living away from home,


Medical: Physician’s


Dentist’s name……………………………………………………

…………. ………….


Medication required…………………………………………………Blood


24. Grandchildren? If yes attach separate sheets with same information as for children

25 Household employees:





Fingerprints, photographs, voice tapes and handwriting samples of each family member and
blueprints of all residences.


What are the crime statistics for the neighbourhood

What is the response time for police

What is the quality of the fire, police and ambulance services?

Have you introduced yourself to the local authorities?

Have you walked /driven around the neighbourhood?

Have you introduced yourself to the neighbours?

(is there any neighbourhood interaction on security matters)

Have you made a notation of neighbours ’vehicle licence plates

And description of vehicles?

What is the layout of the grounds and surrounding terrain?

Have you produced a map or sketch?

Are there security problems caused by the terrain, such as

ditches, body of water, trees, high point overlooking the
house and grounds

What delay/deterrent protection is provided by the perimeter?

Is there a fence? Is it in good repair and of sufficient height? Is
There ahedge?

If there is a fence is the gate sturdily built with a good lock?

Is the gate locked at night? Is it locked during the day?

Is the gate mounting hardware secured so that it cannot be

Unfastened to prevent an intruder to enter?

Can the gate be unlocked with a remote control device

From within the automobile?

Have shrubbery and trees close to the fence/house been
cut back to deny hiding places ?

Are there trees, poles, or structures near the fence which could
Enable an intruder to more easily climb the fence or avoid
contact if there are electronic sensors

Has debris been cleared from both sides of the fence?

Is there sufficient lighting for the grounds and the exterior

of the house?

Are light power switches well protected?

Is there back up power for all lighting on the grounds

And in the house

How many access points to the house and grounds are there
(alley, secondary access, road etc)

Does someone regularly check the grounds and perimeter to

Make certain that fence, gates, locks, lights etc are in good repair
And have not been tampered with?

Are light bulbs replaced on a regular basis

Is the ground sufficiently level around the perimeter to enable

the installation of barrier- type intrusion detectors?

Are there trees, poles or other obstacles which would hamper

the use of invisible barrier-type sensors?

Are there animals on the grounds during the night which would
preclude there use of motion detectors?

Are there guard dogs?, and if so, who is responsible
for handling and exercising them?

If not guard dogs, are there (pet) dogs which bark to warn of
intruders? Are they secure from intruders?

Is there sufficent lighting to enable the use of CCTV?

Are there guards and if so who is responsible for supervising them

Assigning schedules etc?

Do the guards vary the patrol schedules so as not to be predictable?

Are the guards armed? And if so what is the firepower

and condition of their weapons?

Do the guards supply their own weapons, or are

these provided by the client?

Do the guards carry radios? And is there a strict

code for there use/

Are the guards proprietary? (hired and supervised by the

client or agent or provided by a contract services)

If guards provided by contract services, is the liability issue

Clearly defined and does the company carry liability insurance?

Have the .. guards, in your opinion been properly trained, particularly
In the use of the maintenance of firearms?

Are firearms secured when not in active duty?

Are all firearms regularly checked, repaired, cleaned

and maintained?

Are weapons licensed and in compliance with local regulations?

Can entrances to the residence be seen from the street or any

Area off premises?

Are entrances well lighted?

Are exterior doors of solid core and/or contain steel facing?

Do exterior doors fit and close snugly without gaps or give?

Are there steel/glass security storm doors?

Are door hinges well-secured and, if not located on the inside

Protected against the removal of the hinge pins?

Are all locks on exterior doors equipped with auxiliary locks?

Have strike plates been used and securely fastened with

deep-set screws?

Is there glass in the door which could be broken and
the lock reached from outside? If so, is the door fitted
with a double cylinder lock and the key out of reach
from the outside

If there is no glass in the door is there a peephole?

Is there a pet entrance which could permit entry by

a small person or can a lock be accessed through the pet door

Are all sliding glass doors hung so that the sliding door
is mounted on the inside? Are doors secure from
being lifted off the sliding door track?

Is the jimmy-proof lock or charley bar on all sliding

glass doors?

Are all sliding doors of reinforced bullet proof glass?

Is the garage door equipped with a good locking system

which can be unlocked and opened electronically
from inside the vehicle?

Does the garage door automatically clock itself when closed?

Is the garage kept closed and locked at all times?

Are vehicles inside the garage kept locked?

Is the door from the garage into the residence of solid core and
Does it have not only a deadbolt, but an auxiliary lock
Opened from the inside

Is the door from the basement into the upper floor of solid core
And equipped with a deadbolt plus auxiliary lock?

If there is an outside entrance into the basement, has this entrance
Been equipped with the same security specifications as other
Exterior doors (solid core door, solid fit, solidly emplaced
hinge pins, deadbolt lock?

Do all outbuildings (storage sheds pool house etc) have sturdy

Locks, hasps, and good security?

Have trellises and ladders which could be used to gain access

To upper floors been removed?

Are external fuse boxes, control panels and power sources

well secured from environmental hazards and against intrusion?

Is there a swimming pool? If there are small children, is pool

well secured with a fence, gate, locks and a floating alarm?

Are unused doors and windows permanently

Closed and secured/

Have louvre windows been replaced with solid windows

Of tempered, shatter proof glass?

Do all windows have locks? Are windows kept locked

when closed?

If windows are opened, can they be locked from in the

Open or half open position?

Do all windows have screens or storm windows which can be

Locked from the inside?

Are all of the windows and doors protected either with iron bars
Or an alarm system? If so are they (particularly bedroom windows)
Equipped with quick release fire escape devices?

Are window air conditioners bolted and secured against removal?

Are basement and garage windows fully secured?

Do any upper floor windows open onto a porch, balcony, or other

Structure. If so have they been fully secured?

Do all windows have adequate window coverings,(curtains, drapes

Shutters) to prevent someone from seeing inside?

Are skylights fully secured against intrusion?

Is the roof fully secured against intrusion?

If it is a flat roof, has a pole or something been erected to

Deter a helicopter attack?

Can the roof be accessed by scaling with grappling hooks?

Does the master bedroom have a solid core door with a deadbolt
Lock and hinge pins which cannot be removed from the outside?
Is there either a telephone line or a cellular phone?

Has a safe room been designated?

Is the safe room equipped with a separate secure telephone

Line or a cell phone?

Is the safe room rated fire safe for at least one hour?

Is the door to the safe room solid core, steel plated, and secured
With a deadbolt, strike plate, reinforced door
frame, and non-removable hinge pins?

Has the safe room been equipped and stocked with a battery
Operated light, fire extinguisher, first aid kit, two-way radio
Weapons, and water

Does the residence have an electronic alarm system?

Is it an audible or a silent alarm?

Is the alarm system connected to a central station?

or is it connected to a residence command post?

Has the .system been recently (and is it regularly tested)

Who is responsible for servicing and maintaining the system?

Is the system subject to a higher than normal rare of false alarms?

Does the alarm system need updating and/or enhancement

Or is it adequate?

What is the response to an alarm intrusion? What is

the response time?

Is the residence equipped with panic switches to signal

an emergency ? what is the response?

Is there CCTV detection system? Is it adequate, with sufficient


Who is available to monitor the CCTV what is the planned

Response to a detection?

Do you have layout and a set of blueprints for the residence

And the electronic system? Where are they kept?

Is there a fire detection system?

Are batteries regularly checked for the system?

Is there back up power?

Are fire extinguishers strategically placed around the residence?

Who is responsible for charging and maintaining

the extinguishers?

Are all occupants of the residence trained in the use of the


Is the residence equipped with interior fire sprinklers?

Is there at least one or more folding ladders on the upper floor
To facilitate escape in the event of a fire?

Do the occupants regularly practice a fire drill?

Do the occupants regularly practice an intrusion drill?

With retreat to the safe room?

Is there a command post on the grounds or within the residence?

Is the command post manned on a twenty four hour basis?

Are schedules made and adhered to for the protection team?

Are weapons safely secured within the command post\?

What form of communication system is available for the

Command post is it secure?

Is the command post off limits to employees other

Than the protection team?

Is the command post stocked with:

Medical kit
Office supplies, table, chairs and bulletin board
Fire extinguisher
Extra keys (vehicles, residence)
Layout and plans of house and grounds
Updated client itinerary
Telephone numbers
Agent schedules and post assignments
Intelligence reports
Polaroid cameras

Are procedures in place for screening visitors

Is there a locking mailbox or arrangements for delivery

of mail to the command post?

How are deliveries to the residence handles?

are they.. taken to the command post?
Is garbage/trash in a secure area or is it shredded?

Do you have names, addresses, and telephone

numbers for all staff?

Have the household employees been screened

with background checks

Has a personal profile been obtained for the client and his family

Have family members and household staff been given “security

Awareness” training to alert them to excessive wrong numbers
and indications of surveillance?

Does family and staff understand the workings of the alarm

System and use it?

Are windows and doors kept locked?

Does family and staff understand the use of ( and any codes for )
emergency communication procedures?

Have serial numbers been recorded for possessions and

Have possessions been marked with an ID number?

Have family and staff been alerted to the signs of a possible mail
or package bomb and been given procedures for handling?

Is there a strict system for key control?

Have the client and family been given a security briefing

including how to kep a low profile, varying driving routines,
defensive driving And crime prevention measures?

Have procedures been established with the children’s school

Officials To prevent children being picked up by strangers?

Do the children have escorts and secure transportation to take then

to and from schools?

Do you have make, model and licence numbers of all client

And household staff vehicles?

Has the residence been checked for eavesdropping devices?

Are the telephone lines regularly checked against wiretaps?


In addition to the above the following apartment-specific security details should be checked. All
items on the above checklist should be checked and where necessary, security alterations made to the
apartment-for example, with doors, locks, hinges, window locks, sliding glass doors etc.

What is the history of crime within the building?

Have the neighbours in close proximity (either side,

above and below) been checked out? Do you
believe them to be secure neighbours?

Have you introduced yourself to the (close) neighbours

within the building

Is there a tenant association, and is mutual security

an issue which can be established?

How secure overall is the building?

Is someone on duty in the lobby 24 hours a day to

screen visitors delivery men, repair/maintenance people?

Does the apartment have a balcony (s) which

could be .. accessed from the outside?

Are the apartment’s grounds patrolled?

Are the apartments grounds well lit?

Is there an inside parking garage?

How secure is the garage against intrusion?

Is the garage well lighted?

Is there a telephone and/or panic switch located at

strategic points within the garage?

Is the garage area patrolled?

Are you certain that no keys, or master keys

to the client’s apartment are in other hands such
as the building management?

Have background checks been made on building

management staff and employees?

Is there back up power for the building?

Is there an adequate number of elevators in the building?

Are the elevators well lit and equipped with

a mirror which reveals all occupants?

Is there an adequate intrusion detection system

in the building?

What is the response time to the alarm?

Have you checked to be certain that the extinguishers

have been charged and maintained

Does the building have a fire detection system?

Is it well maintained?

Are there fire extinguishers in each half of the building?

Have you checked the tags to be certain that the

Fire extinguishers have been charged and maintained?

Is the building well sprinklered?

Is the client’s apartment located within reach of the fire trucks

And ladders

Does the apartment have its own intrusion detection system?

Has the system been properly maintained?

What is the location of the nearest emergency hospital?

Have you located the primary and secondary routes

To the hospital?

Have you checked all hallways and exits to determine

the best escape route In the event of a fire?

Are hallways, stairs and exits free of obstructions,

equipped with handrails and well lit?

Can roof doors and skylights only be opened from the

Inside and are they kept locked at all times?

Are there bars covering roof doors and skylights?

Are recreational areas (swimming pools, gym, library)

secure and not available to the public?
are there outside doors to these areas and
are they kept locked from the public?

Have you acquired a set of plans or at least

a detailed layout of the building?


Is the building propriety to the client, that is

Is the client’s company the only one occupying
The building

If not have you introduced yourself to the other tenants?

Have you performed a background check on any of the other


Do any of the tenants present a security problem for your

Client either with their employees or their product/service
or their inattentiveness to security?

Are there building security programs which encourage

Interaction between tenants?

Is there director of security for the building?

What are the crime stats for the neighbourhood?

Is there anything about the building, grounds or location

that would make it an unusually attractive target for crime

or terrorism

Are there any environmental concerns within or about

the facility which should be addressed (poor water, asbestos,
flooding, etc.)

What is the response time for police? fire? ambulance?

What is the quality of the police, fire, and ambulance service?

Have you established liaison with the police authorities?

Have you walked/driven around he neighbourhood, noting

Anything unusual?

Have prior security surveys of the building and grounds

Been made and are they available? What are the results
of these surveys?

What is the layout of the grounds and surrounding terrain?

Have you produced a sketch or map?

Are there security problems caused by the terrain such as

Ditches, body of water, trees, high point overlooking the
facility and grounds

Is access to the facility open or restricted?

If open access, is there visitor parking on the grounds?

How is employee parking handled?

What delay/deterrent protection is provided by the perimeter?

Is there a fence? Is it in good repair and of sufficient
height and strength is the entry road/street, straight/angular?

If there is a fence how many access gates are there?

Is/are the gate(s) locked at night?

Is the gate mounting hardware secured so that it cannot be

Unfastened to permit an intruder to enter?

Is the gate
.. equivalent in strength and security to the fencing?

Is the main gate manned by a guard?

Have shrubbery and trees close to the fence and/or facility been
Cut back to deny hiding places?

Are there trees, poles or structures near the fence which would
enable an intruder to move easily, climb the fence or avoid contact
If there are electronic sensors?

Has debris been cleared from both sides of the fence?

Is there sufficient lighting for the perimeter, fencing, gates, grounds

And the exterior of the facility?

Are light bulbs replaced on a regular basis

Is the lighting sufficient to enable the use of CCTV

Are parking lots adequately lighted?

Is the lighting mounted so that it is beamed in the direction

Of the fencing(in the eyes of intruders) leaving the guards in a non-
Highlighted area?

Are light (power) switches well protected? Is the lighting

tamper proof?

Is there back up power for all grounds and buildings?

Who is responsible for controlling the lights?

Who is responsible for checking and maintaining the lights?

How many access points (alley, secondary access road etc)

to the grounds and facility are there?

Is there an interior perimeter road for the use of the guards?

Does someone regularly check the grounds and perimeter

To make sure that fences locks etc are in good repair
And have not been tampered with?

Is the ground sufficiently level around the perimeter to

Enable the installation of barrier type sensors?

Are there trees, poles or other obstacles which would hamper

the use of invisible barrier type sensors?

Are there animals on the grounds during the night

which would preclude the use of motion detectors?

Are there guard dogs and if so who is responsible for handling

and exercising them

Are there guards and if so who is responsible for supervising them

assigning schedules etc

Are backgrounds checks performed on guards at hiring?

Do the guards vary their patrols schedules so as not to be


Are the guards armed, and if so what is the firepower and

Condition of their weapons?

Do the guards supply their own weapons, or are these

provided by the client?

Do the guards carry radios? And is there a

strict code for their use?

Are the guards proprietary hired (hired and supervised

By the client or agent) or provided by a contract agency?

If guards are provided by a contract service, is the liability issue

clearly defined, and does the company carry liability insurance?

Have the guards in your opinion been properly trained,
Particularly in the use of and maintenance of firearms?

Are firearms properly secured when not in active duty?

Are all firearms regularly checked, cleaned and maintained?

Are weapons licensed and compliance with local regulations?

Does the facility have an electronic alarm system?

• Perimeter intrusion detectors?

• Fence disturbance/motion sensors?
• Exterior door alarm sensors?
• Interior motion detectors, microwave, or other sensors?
• Window sensors?

Is it an audible or a silent alarm system

Who will monitor the alarm sensors?

Is the alarm system connected to a central station, or is

it connected to a command post?

If a central station is used are there dedicated telephone lines

to carry the signals?

Who will respond to an alarm signal?

What is the response time?

Are there guidelines for a response to an alarm signal?

Will the response team be armed? What are the
limitations to the response?

If the alarm is transmitted from the facility will the

response team be able to enter? How? Will they have keys?

In the event of an alarm signal who on the company staff
Will be notified?

Has the system been recently (and is it regularly) checked?

Who is responsible for servicing and maintaining the system?

Is the system subject to a higher than normal rate of false alarms?

Does the alarm system need updating and/or enhancement

or is it adequate?

If there are no proprietary guards, who will respond to an alarm signal?

What is the response time?

Is he facility equipped with panic switches to signal an emergency

what is the response?

Is there a CCTV detection system? What is the planned response

to a detection.

Who is available to monitor the CCTV? What

is the planned response to a detection?

Are all outdoor switches located in weatherproof, tamper resistant


Do you have a sketched layout? And a set of blueprints

For the grounds and the electronic system?

Are all entrances to the building well lit?

Are secondary doors (fire exits) solidly constructed

And equipped with panic bars? And otherwise kept locked?

Are unused doors securely locked?

Is the exterior of the building itself of sufficient strength and integrity

to withstand invasion?

Is there an alarm system which controls access through the
exterior doors?

Are exterior doors of solid core and/or contain steel facing?

Do exterior doors fit and close snugly without gaps or give?

Have strike plates been securely fastened with deep-set screws?

Are door hinges well-secured and, if not located on the inside

Protected against the removal of the hinge pins?

Are all locks on exterior doors either deadbolt (with at least a

1”throw) or double cylinder

Is there glass in the door which could be broken and lock

reached from outside? If so is the door fitted with a double
cylinder lock and the key hung out of reach from the outside

If there is no glass in the door, is there a peephole?

Are all sliding doors of reinforced (bullet proof) glass?

Are all windows within access from the ground

connected to the alarm system.

Are all windows within access from the ground connected to the
Alarm system?

Are ground floor windows protested by shatterproof glass

and iron bars?

Is the roof accessible from the ground or from adjoining buildings?

Have the roof, skylights, ducts, and other accessible entryways

been secured?

If it is a flat roof has a pole or something been erected to deter

A helicopter attack?

Can the roof be accessed by scaling with grappling hooks?

Do you have a layout and/or blueprints of the building?

Is there an inside parking garage?

How secure is the garage from intrusion?

Is the garage well lit?

Is there a telephone and/or panic button located at strategic points

Within the garage

Is the garage area patrolled?

Has a safe room/area been designated?

Is the safe room equipped with a separate secure telephone or

A cell phone?

Is the safe room rated fire safe for at least one hour?

Is the door to the safe room solid core, steel plated, and secured
With a deadbolt, strike plate, reinforced door
frame, and non-removable hinge pins?

Has the safe room been equipped and stocked with a battery
Operated light, fire extinguisher, first aid kit, two-way radio
Weapons, and water

Is there a fire detection system?

Are batteries regularly checked for this system?

Is there back up power?

Are fire extinguishers strategically placed around the facility

Are they charged and maintained?

Is the facility equipped with interior fire sprinklers?

Does the residence have an electronic alarm system?

Do the occupants practice a fire drill, how often?

Are there lit exits clearly marked?

Are there signs by the elevators directing occupants to

use the stairs in the event of a fire?

Are procedures in place to handle bomb threats and evacuation?

Are evacuations practiced on a regular basis?

Has a safe assembly area been designated for use in an evacuation?

Are there an adequate number of elevators in the building?

Are the elevators regularly inspected?

Are the elevators well lit and equipped with a mirror
Which reveals all occupants?

Are all hallways, stairs, and exits free from obstructions,

equipped with handrails and well lit?

Is there a crisis management team that meets on a regular basis?

Is there in place a crisis management plan?

Are CMP scenarios and drills practiced? Does top management


Does the company carry kidnap/ransom insurance on its top


Does the CMP include procedures for handling a kidnap or hostage

taking of a top company executive

Is there a command post on he grounds or within the facility

Is the command post manned on a 24 hour basis?

What form of communication system is available for the command

Post? Is it secure?

Is the command post off-limits to employees other than the protection

Team and guards?

Is the command post stocked with :

Medical kit
Office supplies, table, chairs and bulletin board
Fire extinguisher
Extra keys (vehicles, residence)
Layout and plans of house and grounds
Updated client itinerary
Telephone numbers
Agent schedules and post assignments
Intelligence reports
Polaroid cameras

Is strict key control maintained within the facility?

How is this handles?

Is a record
.. keys?
kept of al persons issued with and holding

What procedures are in place for handling lost keys?

are locks changed?

Are mail handling procedures in place to alert mail handlers

to possible mail and package bombs?

Are all deliveries to the building or company space

received at a central place?

Do all new employees receive security awareness

Training as part of their orientation?

Are background checks made, and/or references checked

on all employees?

Are executive briefings prepared for all executives

going overseas?

What access controls are in place to handle visitors and trades people:

• At the gate
• In the lobby
• In the anteroom of the company offices
• In restricted areas?
• At the loading dock

Is it open access within the building for employees

or are they restricted to certain areas?

What access controls are in place to handle restricted employee


Are employees badged?

Are visitors issued badges, and are these badges

collected upon the end of the visit?

Is there a visitor escort service?

Are outside repair/maintenance people escorted and supervised

during their entire visit?

Are packages and or briefcases searched?

Are stairwells locked from the inside(self locking)

Except at the ground floor and each five floors?

Do the receptionist/secretary and top execs have a silent distress
panic signal?

What is the response to the signal?

Are rest rooms kept locked?

Are closets and maintenance rooms kept locked?

Is an outside cleaning service used? Have they been checked?

Are meeting rooms and exec offices regularly checked

for eavesdropping devises

Are telephone lines secure? Are they regularly

checked for wiretaps

What procedures are in place to protect proprietary

company information?

Is there good company security?

Is there good company security?

Is the client’s staff (assistants, secretary) willing to assist

in providing information to the protection team about the client’s
itinerary and plans? Are they cooperative?

Is the client’s staff aware of the need to protect the confidentiality

Of the client’s itinerary and personal information?

Is the security director aware of the need to work with the protection
Team? Have good relations been established?


If overseas have all the above security measures

been followed and upgraded to provide even more in-depth security?

Is client and family fully aware of the need to keep a low profile and

to be even .. more aware of the need for security in a foreign country?
Have household employees and company staff, particularly foreign
household staff been fully background checked?

Have you obtained the names, addresses and telephone numbers for
household employees and company staff?

Are household employees trained in security awareness and in

the handling of mail deliveries and strangers at the door
and on the telephone?

Have you established contact with local authorities and with the U.S.
department of State?

Have you prepared an intelligence report and threat

assessment for the host country and location?

If you have employed a guard service, did you get recommendations

From the US Department of State and did you check on the company?

Have you communicated with the security personnel in other

American companies in your location and discussed mutual security
plans in the event of an evacuation?

Have company logos and other identifying marks been removed from
client vehicles and residence?

Is client’s vehicle of a low profile make and model common to

the vehicles of the host company?

Have you prepared an emergency evacuation plan in the event that

The client and his family must move quickly/

Have you prepared a stock of emergency supplies to be kept

at he residence in the event that an emergency prevents
you from leaving the country?

Are more stringent security measures taken to avoid having a bomb

Placed in or near the residence or offices such as :

• Removing any bicycle racks adjacent to the building

• Not allowing unidentified bicycles or vehicles to be parked
adjacent to the building
• Placing covers or screens over all ducts, vents mail slots etc
on the building

• Regularly inspecting the public areas of the building to note any unidentified or suspicious
objects left there
• Securing or locking paper towel dispensers, boxes toilet tank tops etc

Have children’s schools been thoroughly checked to be certain they

Are safe and reliable?

Have school administrators and teachers been given instructions

regarding not allowing children to be picked up by anyone other
than family agents and other identified individuals

Have children been given a code to identify any unknown person

contacting them or attempting to remove them from school?

Has a code been established with the client which

would be used in the event of a kidnapping?

Does the corporate crisis management plan cover the

Eventuality of a kidnapping or hostage taking?

Are you aware of the host country’s national holidays

and are you particularly vigilant during these times?


Is the client’s vehicle of a size and weight that gives comfort and solid
safety features?

Does the vehicle have automatic transmission?

Have engine, transmission, radiator. Alternator,

battery etc been upgraded for the heaviest duty available

Is the vehicle equipped with a high intensity spotlight

mounted on a swivel?

Is the vehicle air conditioned?

Does the vehicle have automatic controls for the windows

and door locks?

Is the vehicle equipped with an alarm system?

Can the alarm system be controlled electronically with a hand held

Clicker from outside the car?

Are tires fully inflated? And are all four tires kept at exactly
The same level of inflation?

Is the spare tire regularly inspected and kept fully inflated?

Is the vehicle in good condition overall?

Is it regularly maintained?

Who performs the maintenance is the vehicle

taken to the same mechanic each time

Do you carry in the trunk in addition to the spare tire flares, fire
extinguisher, flashlight, tire sealers, tool kit, tow
chain, jack, lug wrench, jumper cables, extra motor oil and
engine coolant plus a fully maintained medical kit

Does the trunk have an inside latch release to

permit escape if locked inside

Do the hood and gas cap have locks controlled from inside?

Is the car armoured? Should it be?

Is the window glass bullet resistant?

Have the radiator and gas tank been reinforced?

A the tires a “ run flat” type which will continue to roll even if
Pierced by a bullet

Is the vehicle equipped with a cell phone and is it

programmed for speed dialling? Do you have a two-way radio

Do you keep the gas tank at least half full?

Do you keep all doors and windows closed and locked at all times?

If the vehicle is not always under your direct control or well

Secured do you always perform a quick inspection of the vehicle
and its immediate surroundings before getting in?

If the driver is employed for the client’s vehicle has the driver
Been briefed as to logistics, safety and security procedures?

If permanently employed has the driver been fully

trained in executive protection driving procedures and escape
and evasion driving manoeuvres?

Is the driver aware that travel routes and times should be varied
to avoid predictable behaviour?

Is the driver aware that in an emergency, he/she must drive away

Immediately, even at the cost of the vehicle. Is the driver armed?

Has the driver been trained in defensive shooting?

Have all identifying marks logos vanity licence plates etc been
removed from the vehicle?

Have all identifying marks been removed from the parking space
used by the vehicle?

When not is use is the vehicle kept locked and inside a

locked garage whenever possible?

Is there an escort car does it function as the lead vehicle?

If a rental limousine and driver have been hired, has the drive been
Informed that the agent (rather than the client) will issue instructions?
Has the limo driver been given explicit instructions?

Are rental vehicles checked as to spare tire, fluid levels etc?



Have you put together a preliminary threat assessment?

Have you renewed your files to find any prior reports

and advance information which might be useful?

Do you have the client’s itinerary and all pertinent

information about the proposed trip. This includes:

Dates and locations to be visited

• Itinerary
• Auto/Limo rental agencies to check reservations
• Federal state and local law enforcement or intelligence
agencies as appropriate
• Airline and/or transportation agency being used
by advance agent to location

If travel is by private aircraft, have captain and crew been alerted?

Have you secured information about:

• Type of aircraft, call signs and tail number?

• Anticipated departure and arrival times?
• General aviation facility of FBO at the departure
and arrival sites with telephone numbers

• Ramp stairs required?
• Storage location for the aircraft at the FBO?
• Alternate arrival site?
• Any special arrangements?


Observe general layout of the airport, How good is security?

How is luggage handled?
Will unloading and processing of client in a special place be required?
Airline Service Rep contacted for any special handling requests?
• Obtain a good map of the area and orient yourself to important ref points and locals
• Obtain rental car, revonfirm reservations, discuss any special requirements
• Proceed to hotel observing traffic conditions, road conditions and landmarks
• Check into hotel. noting parking areas, lobby configuration, elevator locations, restaurants,
emergency exits

Telephone home office and inquire about any changes in plans?

Notify host, sponsor, or contact of arrival, make appointments if appropriate

Make appointment to meet with local law enforcement officers


Meet with general manager or resident (assistant) manager

Request meeting with reservations manager, security director,

night manager, food and beverage manager, chief hotel telephone operator
head bellman, concierge, and head housekeeper

At the meeting obtain telephone numbers for the general manager

,resident manager, and key personnel, and explain any special needs
for room arrangement, food, access control, screening visitors,
handling incoming calls need for privacy and security etc

Obtain all information about hotel restaurants and room service

Locations and hours open

Room service hours
Name of Maitre’d and/or chef Host/hostess
Request that all room service orders, mail and packages go to command post

Determine if staff wear identification badges

Determine what services (barber, beautician, etc) are within the hotel

Select rooms
.. for protectee and his/her party and determine
who is in close proximity rooms either side above and below

Examine rooms to be certain they are in good repair, safe

free of hazardous objects, comfortable and contain any
items of special request by the client Check for bugs and wire taps

Obtain duplicate keys for all rooms to be used by client

Locate emergency exits fie extinguishers, fire hoses, and smoke alarms
Establish primary and secondary exit routes for emergency

Check fire extinguishers to see if they have been charged

Check hallways and stair wells for any obstructions, hand rails
and lighting

Select location of command post check for bugs and wire taps

Arrange with head housekeeper to rearrange furniture and

obtain chalk board Bulletin board extra waste baskets
and bathroom towels

Obtain long cord for telephone in command post

Obtain supplies for command post:

Local telephone books
Legal pads
Paper clips
Expense vouchers
Time sheet
Tags for labelling keys

Other supplies and equipment recommended for command post:

Folding stock pump shotgun
Extra ammunition for shotguns and handguns
5-cell heavy duty flashlight with extra batteries
ABC type fore extinguisher
Handcuffs or flex cuffs
Electrical appliance extension cord
Telephone extension cord

Long telephone handset cord
Small screwdriver set
Key block locks
Smoke masks for each member of the team
Two-way radios , charger and spare batteries

Portable alarm system should include:

Smoke detector, door motion sensor, and panic alarm for room
Alarm annunciator for remote sensors
Paging system with sufficient pages for off-duty personnel

Medical Kit for command post should include:

Oxygen cylinder, regulator and mask
Bulky trauma dressings
Bandage material
Comfort items
Aspirin and Tylenol
Di-gel, Pepto Bismol
Protectee and protective detail medications

Meet with Security Director and ask for a walk through of the hotel
Checking entrances, exits, parking, emergency equipment, banquet
and conference rooms, kitchens, maintenance, engineering, employee
locker rooms, employee entrances and storage areas

Determine from Security Director if there have been in the past

Or are currently, any particular security problems
What is the history of crime within the hotel and the surrounding areas

How many security personnel are on the hotel staff? Can they be
Utilised to assist in extending special security to client?

Determine from Security Director locations of nearest fire station

Ambulance service and emergency hospitals

Ask Security Director for floor plans of hotel, or make sketches of

hotel layout

Make certain that there are sufficient baggage handlers with carts

Reaffirm all billing arrangements and charges to master ledger

Residence (not belonging to client)

See above checklist for residence

If alarm..system is not in place attach portable alarms
Determine if a temporary command post can be set up

Determine if a temporary safe room can be set up

Determine if al mail, packages delivered to the residence

Can be checked first by agents

Household staff should be briefed on procedures for handling

telephone enquiries and visitors

Obtain a list of service providers garbage collectors, gardeners,

pool service etc and aprox times when they are to
be in the residence

If appropriate conduct an electronic sweep of the premises to

determine if there are any eavesdropping devises or wire taps


Obtain floor plans or make sketches

Request most secure private tables for client

Request privacy and confidentiality for them
Check exits, restrooms and access to telephones
Determine where to park protectee vehicle
Make arrangements for feeding protective agents
Make reservations and arrangements for billing or payment
Determine primary and secondary routes to nearest emergency
Hospital with trauma unit
Determine primary and secondary routes to
restaurant from client’s location

Ballrooms, Banquets and Auditoriums

Meet with liaison person for host committee, banquet manager
facility manager and program manager

Obtain telephone numbers for these people

What is the purpose of this function

What is the program
How many attending
What is the suggested dress
Request that all awards and gifts be mailed to protectee

Determine seating arrangements ask to see function sheet
Will client be seated at head table, if so what is below and behind table
And how is it accessed
Is there a buffer in front of the front table
Examine podium, raised platform, stage, steps and chairs for loose
Carpet, wires, and general stability
Are stairs to podium well lit or should tape be fixed

Obtain a floor plan of the facility, showing entrance and exit routes
Under normal and emergency conditions, fire extinguishers, restrooms
Telephones, holding room and parking

Select and indicate agent posts on floor plan

Determine if protectee can be brought in through special


Identify control boxes for heat, air, light and sound.

Are they secure?

Is there back up power?

Where will protectee’s vehicle be parked? Will it be secure

under constant supervision

Who is handling security for the event? How large is the security

Have there been any problems associated with either the

event, the facility or the neighbourhood?

Do a walk through of the facility

Make arrangements for agent meal tickets
Determine what will be needed for access control
Is entry free and open to the general public
Were tickets sold, at what price
Is the event invitation only
Are invitations numbered and cross referenced by name
on a master list
May guest who chooses not to attend give his invitation to another
How many people are expected
Where is the main control point
Who will be there to check invitations?
Who will handle guests who have forgotten or lost invitations
Are handbags and parcels to be searched by whom
Will metal detectors be required
How will access via service or stage entrance be limited
to authorised personnel

How will
How will
.. authorised personnel be identified
exits to restroom and re-entry to ballroom
be dealt with
Have arrangements been made and space been provided
for the media is the space contained in some way
Has a press room been set up is it adequate
Will bystanders and hecklers standing outside be contained
in a roped off area
Establish primary and secondary travel routes to the closest emergency hospital

Outside events

Establish liaison with event sponsors and obtain details as listed

A diagram or sketch should be made
A walk through should be conducted of the entire area
Is the area fenced
Is there high ground overlooking the event area (stage)
can it be secured
Who is handling security for the event? How large is the security
Is it a seated affair
Can attendees and spectators be confined behind ropes or barricades
Have ”friendlies” been contacted to fill the front sections of the
Roped off areas
Has space and arrangements been made for the media
Is there a “foul weather” plan
Do you have a large umbrella for the protectee
If it is a night event who is handling the lighting and will
they be on hand for the event
Is there back up power
Determine primary and secondary routes to the event
Determine primary and secondary travel routes to the closest emergency hospital

Ground Transportation
Are you dealing with a large reputable rental car agency
Have reservations and billing arrangements been made and re-conformed
Does the car/Limo have an automatic transmission
Is it air conditioned
Does it have an alarm system and can it be controlled from outside
Are tires fully inflated
Is the spare tire in good condition
Check fluid levels and conduct a general examination of under-the-hood mechanism
Test all controls –air conditioning, heat, power locks etc
Rental car or limo should have in the trunk, jump leads jack small tool kit an lug wrench
Trunk should be equipped with flares flashlight tire sealers tow chain motor oil fully maintained
medical kit

If using a limo has driver been briefed and given a typed list of instructions
Report with a clean car and a full gas tank-refill at night
Speak only when spoken to
Stay with limo at al times unless relieved
Driver does not open and close doors
If trunk needs to be opened use the interior release
Don’t drink alcoholic beverages prior to or during work
Don’t eat in the car
Don’t smoke in the car
Obey all traffic laws
Do not turn on radio unless requested
In high profile motorcade keep headlights on
Keep one car length between vehicles
Follow agent recommended travel routes
Follow instructions of security agent rather than the client
Establish duress code and emergency procedures

Is the car/limo equipped with a cell phone or a two-way radio

Obtain duplicate vehicle keys
Is an escort car to be rented, if so all of the above should be checked
Where will the vehicles be parked
Is there a contingency plan for what will be done if the limo or rental car breaks down?
Do you have name, home telephone number and address for limo driver
Have you picked a primary and secondary route to ach destination to be visited by client
Have you tested the routes during rush hour, at night and at times similar to when the event will take
Are the maps clearly marked and easily read

Charter or Corporate Aircraft

Have captain and crew been alerted to departure and travel schedules? Filld in flight plan and
alternate foul weather plan?

Have arrangements been made for ramp steps if needed?

Is de-icing equipment available
What is the length of the runway and will it accommodate the aircraft
Do you know the hours of airport operation
Do you have the telephone numbers and names of airport operations people
Is there a VIP holding area at the local and site FBOs
Where are restrooms and telephones
Are there any customs regulations and clearances
Are there special requests for food equipment etc
Obtain a diagram or ma of airport and ramp areas be sure to brief all drivers on primary and
secondary routes into and out of the airport
Brief drivers on the primary and secondary routes to the hospital from the airport
Will aircraft be guarded when unoccupied
Are aircraft crew fully aware of security procedures

If additional
.. anysecurity
security posts
is needed ask the operations supervisor for recommendations for an outside
security company
What is the aircraft identifying information
After a departure wait several minutes and then notify advance agent at next stop that party is on its

Emergency Services
Where is the nearest hospital with shock/trauma unit and a doctor on 24 hour duty to the hotel or site?
Have you established primary and secondary routes to the hospital from the hotel, event etc
Do you know the locations of the emergency entrances
Is there suitable landing site for a helicopter
Is there a VIP room
Is ther a room for security and staff
What is the response time for the fire department to the various locations.
What is the response time and quality of service of the ambulance emergency services

Foreign Advances
Do you have a valid passport which will not expire in less than six months
Do you have the appropriate visa for the countries to be visited
Have you received the appropriate shots
Do you have a supply of medicines for colds, allergies, diarrhoea etc
Do you have an international drivers licence
Do you have valid credit cards
Do you have a small amount of local foreign currency
Do you have a relevant current guidebook
Have you considered prepaying an amount to your credit card companies so as to extend your credit
Have you purchased travellers checks
Have you given careful consideration to the choice of air carrier
Have you booked an “open” return flight
Are you carrying a supply of prescribed medicines and do you have a copy of your prescription
Have you noted serial numbers of and declared any firearms and packed them away unarmed in the
stowed luggage
Have you made copies of your passport and visa information credit card numbers
Have you committed to memory a few basic phrases of the local languages
Will you need an interpreter

Wrap Up

Have you collected all expense vouchers and submitted a final expense report
Have you written thank-you letters and filed your notes

Close Protection Driver Brief.

The overall rule during all vehicle mounted close protection details is that the CP agent is the vehicle
commander, not the client and it is the CP agent who will issue orders in order for him/her to be
effective in his/her duties.

The following points are some do’s and don’ts for the driver:

• Report with a clean vehicle and a full gas tank.

• Ensure that he/she has thoroughly checked the vehicle for suspicious activity or objects and
that the vehicle is fully serviceable before beginning any programmes.

• Speak only when spoken to. Unnecessary chatter cannot only be unwanted, but can pose a
problem if the agent is concentrating on traffic, route, hazards etc

• Do not leap out of the vehicle to open the door for the client, the agent will open and close
the client’s door.

• Once the client and the agent are inside the vehicle ensure the central locking is applied and
the doors remain locked until the vehicle has arrived at the designated location. The
windows must remain closed. If the client wishes a window to be open, ensure it is only
open by a maximum of 2.5 inches to prevent opportunist attacks and objects being thrown
into the vehicle.

• Do not leave the vehicle unattended. Stay with the vehicle at all times unless you are
relieved. Provisions will be made for the meals, restroom breaks, etc. If you must leave the
vehicle, you are to notify the agent, the command post, or other drivers as to where you can
be reached, how long you will be gone, and the reason for leaving the vehicle. The agent
should carry a spare set of keys for the vehicle and another set kept at the command post.
The advance agent should ensure that all drivers know how to and are able to contact the
agent and command post.

• When the vehicle arrives at its destination, the vehicle doors should be unlocked by the
driver, the engine is kept running and in drive, and the driver remains behind the wheel
helping the agent with observation of possible threats. Do not open and close doors for the
client or the agent. The agent riding in the passenger seat of the vehicle will open his door
only when he is satisfied that it is safe to do so and then he will open the clients door whilst
observing the area for potential threats.

• If the trunk needs to be opened then it should be released by the driver using the release
catch from within the vehicle. Do not remove the keys from the ignition in the event that it
is necessary to leave immediately.

• Alcoholic beverages must not be drunk within twelve hours prior to reporting for work or
during work. Do not drink any beverage whilst driving.
• Food should not be eaten in the car, nor should the vehicle be used to drive to an eating
establishment. The agent will arrange for meals. If it should become necessary to eat in the
car, the vehicle must be completely cleaned and aired before the protectee returns.

• Do not smoke in the vehicle at any time even if you are alone within the vehicle.

• Drive smoothly, safely, and conservatively, obeying traffic laws and wear your seat belt.
Stop, start, and turn gradually and smoothly, signalling turns well in advance. Pace your

..driving so that you do not run yellow lights. This is especially important if there is a follow-
up vehicle. Do not sound the horn except in an emergency.

• When approaching red lights slow down and cruise slowly up to the traffic lights keeping the
vehicle moving, a moving vehicle is safer than a stationary vehicle.

• When bringing the vehicle to a halt at a stop sign or traffic lights ensure there is enough
space between your vehicle and the vehicle ahead for you to drive around and escape if
necessary to do so.

• Do not turn the radio on unless requested to do so by the protectee or agent. Establish if the
protectee has any favourite stations and pre-program the radio stations. If not then pre-
program the stations to classical, easy listening and a good news station.

• In a high profile motorcade, keep the headlights on.

• In a motorcade or convoy, drivers should remain at least one vehicle length from the vehicle
ahead of them. The distance should be such that the vehicles do not run into each other, and
at the same time do not allow other vehicles to get in-between. If a problem develops with a
vehicle then that vehicle should drop out rather than hold up the motorcade unless it is the
VIP vehicle at which point a soft vehicle change should be carried out. A hard vehicle
change is carried out only when under attack and the VIP vehicle has been immobilised.

• If the destination is reached during darkness the vehicle lights should be on full beam and
should be pointed away from location in an attempt to blind any potential attacker.

• The driver must ensure he is furnished with maps and route cards to locations and
acknowledge that he/she has a full understanding of all routes and locations. If he/she does
not, then inform the agent immediately.

Your professionalism and co-operation is appreciated.

Written by: Damian Rawcliffe

Personal Security – 5 Main Principles

1. Situation Awareness
2. Avoid Routine (SAFER)
3. Follow security procedures
4. Exercise Common Sense and Initiative
Remain Anonymous or show strength

Situation Awareness:
Accept threat exists
Be vigilant (work and leisure)
Be suspicious
Cautious approach

Avoid Routine
Different routes (find & destroy the routine before
Different time the terrorist does it to you)
Avoid Patterns 9visiting same places)

Follow security procedure

Establish procedures for Home/Office/Family/Travel
Follow the procedures
Make them workable
Practice what you preach

Exercise common sense and imitative (# do not panic

# use any means at your
disposal to counter the threat:
*religion/knowledge of
terrorist group )

Remain anonymous or show strength

Remain anonymous:
Low profile

.. phone
in a different name
Dress conservatively
Do not display jewellery
Do not display cash
Nothing to allow people to think you are a person of status
Show strength (if anonymity is impossible)
Make the attacker believe the attack would:
Not succeed
Show professionalism
Strength in numbers (golden rule don’t show weapons)
Attacker must believe in your ability

Persons Posing the threat (*special population groups druggies etc)
Mentally unstable * Protesters
Criminals *Press
Mobs and dissidents *Enthusiastic crowd)


The use of force or the threat of force by individuals or organisations to achieve by illegal means their
political or ideological aims “Kill one terrify a thousand”

Age: 20-40
Middle class
Knows his aims
Left wing extremist
Regular job


Active – (no ties)

Stand off attacks ( Snipers, morters, cyber terrorism –computers)
Close quarter attacks
Hostage taking


Target group identification
Initial reconnaissance of target
Target selection
Close target reconnaissance
Lessons learnt

Intelligence sources G1 - Manning
G2* G2 – SY (Land/Sea/Air)
Request through chain of command G3 – Ops/Trg
Low level intelligence(local security forces) G4 - Logistics
Other CP teams G5 -PR
Media SO3 - Capt
SO2 - Maj
SO1 – Lt Col


Most likely: form of attack
Place of attack
Time of attack

Must be:Clear


Why is he/she going to be a threat
Current employment
Previous employment
Who he/she is


Type of people or organisation
Reduce lists (No of organisations are reduced through time)
ID the groups/individual
Active areas
Capable of activity in area

Individuals making up the group
The group: Names


• recent attacks
• present capabilities
( it should now be possible to reduce the most likely areas of attack)


(Study the programme)
Identify locations
Identify timings
Take this into account: Traffic conditions
Terrorist weaponry
Weakness in perimeter/building
Vehicle security

Interpretation of all available intelligence
Vulnerable elements of operation
Allocation of protection resources

Accurate threat assessment trial
Update it regularly
Use new information as it becomes available





Remove or reduce the threat
Place assets between the threat and the VIP
Remove the principal from the threat

Containment (fix location/strength)
Precise situation (known information)
Imprecise situation (N/K information)

Carried out by other agencies (last resort “strike)



Team Leader



Rank ranges between Sgt – Maj depending on the size of the team and task, usually a SSgt

Command and Tasking of team
Obtaining threat assessment
Learn about VIP
Obtain the VIP’s programme
Detail people to carry out recces and liaison where required
Make an appreciation
Deliver orders/brief team

Rank ranges between Cpl – Capt
Prepared to resume command of the team at short notice or in the team leaders absence
Involved in the planning from the onset

Man power from 1 person up to 3
Security of building
Running of ops room (24 hrs a day)
Searching of residence
Securing the location
Provides internal security
Responsible for VIP family on his return


4X PERSONS – Normally used when the threat is extremely high
Accompany the VIP when mobile or on foot
Support BG
Overt deterrent
First line of defence
Recces as directed
Accompany and protect VIP whilst out of residence
Carry out anti surveillance
Provide 360 protection


Check the routes in advance of the VIP
Search and secure locations
Manpower due to size of team
Remain in location throughout time of visit
Check the route and location in advance and remain in situ (friendly face)
Security covert (discreet/overt)
Ant-surveillance drills
Liaise with team
De-buss and Em-buss points
Check entrance points
Check routes Establish comms



Back up team
Covert protection
Can act as a lazy (PES)


Usually A Cpl




Vehicle search – 7 stages

Surrounding area (systematically

Perimeter check (drains, bushes, debris etc) 4 man team = T/L, scribe + 2 searching)

(If vehicle not in use must be:
Body work (paint scratched, grease marks #attended,
anything odd!) # guarded,
# secured )

UNDERNEATH, WHEELS & ARCHES (hands on) #must be searched if

left unattended


Don’t forget spare wheel (loose items etc) (#don’t just look for explosives
#cut cables
#Loose wheel nuts
#Draining of fluids
#Loose plugs and leads
#Bugging devises)

Look inside first then open rear door, search rear first then move forward (”then look into cockpit”)

(Visual and then hands on)
Washer bottle
Heat/cooler ducts
Bonnet itself

Test all controls, move vehicle, brake test


.. the threat triad
First assess..
Terrorist aim –(kill or severely maim)
Location (routes, (drive ways, entrances etc: recce inquire as to local ???)
Type of threat –(what form, surrounding areas/building try to think like a terrorist – plan ahead)


Size of device
Building structure
Red, amber, green (RAG) method of search (3 zone
Red = extreme hazard
Amber =Suffering injuries
Green = Possible injuries )


All four walls –( Liase with building security – Ask about any building work strange builders)
Ceiling -(Roof panels etc)
Floor - (Fitting of carpets, lumps oddities etc)
Furniture - (Look different out of place)
Outside areas –( Grounds)

CLEAR – escape routes and evacuation areas
CLEAR – Ops room/set up plans
CONDUCT – search –RAG method
SECURE –areas


Don’t touch it
Obtain a description – draw a picture
Inform TL
Mark where the device is physically
Wedge doors and windows
No radios/flash cameras


CHECK (possible secondary device)
Task agencies
Inform SUSPICIOUS OBJECT (use staff local to area who may know what it is)



The etiquette with regard to people’s rank and status –where the art of acceptable behaviour,
speech and dress is required.


On duty
Off duty

Personal Opinion
Confidentiality (keep to yourself)
Over familiarity and fraternisation
Honesty – (don’t bluff if you don’t know)
Remain approachable (don’t be awkward, be friendly, try to get on)


Picking your nose

Adjusting the crotch
Breaking wind
Revving the engine
Slamming doors
Chewing gum



Acceptable to the VIP
Suitable to the task (ask VIP what is suitable for the function)
Clean and well pressed


Odour (smoke)



Correct spacing - dependant on:
Threat level
Principals wishing
Spacing of the PES
Spacing of the BG
VIP’s image
Observation (360 degrees at all times)






Direction of travel



“V” SG

Direction of travel

4th member can be used to stay with car


Open box
Open diamond
Open “v”

Closed box
Closed diamond
Closed “v”


Remove or reduce the attack
Place your assets between the threat and the VIP
Remove the VIP from the threat

Verbal attack
Physical attack
Knife attack
Gun attack
Long range sniper
Grenade attack



Can be in two environments
URBAN points of interest

Good emergency response time

Good communications
Ease of access
Ease of evacuation
Lack of privacy
Cover for enemy surveillance
Overlooking buildings

Difficult for surveillance teams to merge with locals
Emergency response times are slow
Routes to and from a rural residence are limited
Communications are difficult
More ground to protect

Terraced house
Country House
Barracks/Embassy compound
External considerations
Internal considerations
Doors – steel core door-drop bar

VIP suite
Safe room
Staff quarters
Guest room
Public rooms

Outer cordon
Intermediate cordon
Inner cordon

Area up to the outside of the perimeter fence
Controlled by police &/or security forces
Perimeter fence should provide an effective physical barrier

Area from the perimeter fence to the residence outer wall
Controlled by RST
Should be a guard to control access who must consult RST prior to admitting anyone into the
residence grounds

Area consists of the inner security of the residence including control of access into the building
Controlled by RST

Team leader (TL) should personally introduce all team members to the VIP, Host and all house staff
members at the earliest opportunity

They need to be discreet
Maintain strict residence security
No smoking
Keep noise and movement to a minimum especially at night
Remain smartly dressed
Do not fall asleep
Do not show off with weapons
Keep the Ops room tidy
Respect the principals’ privacy and remember you are in his house
Do not enter the VIP suite or study


As well as providing a 24 hr manned Ops room, the RST is responsible for the security of the
residence as well as the principle when he is at the residence
Answering the phone
Answering the door
Checking the post
Regular security checks
Handover/takeover – any program changes
Locking and opening up procedures
Night time routine

Fire procedure
Bomb threat/hoax

Locate VIP office on an upper floor
BG office located near to VIP
Safe room located next to VIP
PA office next to VIP
Waiting room for visitor


Aware of what you see – look for signals
Vet – is it relevant
Recognise – pick up on danger signals
Obvious – ambush men with guns
Situation signs – things in the environment
Behavioural signs – body language
All approaches covered
Ambush must have depth
Ambush must be protected
Block escape from both directions – will use vehicles
Will have a means of:
Defeating armour
Forcing the VIP to exit from vehicle
Neutralise escort
Protect itself and escape
Natural defile
Few target escape routes
Target approach observed
Good terrorist escape routes
Solidly constructed door
Windows armoured/laminated
Alarm system for VIP –through to BG
Curtains/blinds for windows
Position VIP desk away from view

Other VIPSs
Business callers
Social callers
On arrival reception Inform PA
VIP or PA meets visitor & guide to office BG in attendance
On departure reverse procedure carried out
On arrival reception inform PA
Visitor called forward to PA office – BG in attendance – if necessary visitor searched
Visitor seen by VIP
Visitor will depart in accordance with normal drills – get someone to show them out

If family allows unhindered access
Visitors other than family treat as per business callers
Natural defile
No target escape
No warning
Fire positions
Terrorist escape
Occupied vehicles

Most of the signs are fixed

Think like a terrorist
Identify areas of risk
Look for other signs

Hair stands on end
White face
Filling in time – window shopping/reading
Mask his true intentions
Over emphasised
Limbs crossed – hiding intentions
Frequent touch of face – nervous = DANGER
Sudden movement to open posture

GREEN:- Unaware of surroundings –2-4 seconds to react

YELLOW:- ..General
Relaxed alert no specific focus
caution, receptive to “triggers”

ORANGE:- Specific alert tactical appreciation – legal decision, preparation

RED:- Flight imminent, mental trigger – then you know what to do with: weapon & be

** Never lapse into condition GREEN

Where possible remain at YELLOW
Move to ORANGE in known danger situation
Prepare as much as possible before the flight
Lower conditions as soon as possible

“Where observation is concerned, chance favours only the prepared mind”

The systematic observation by covert or overt means of a person


Foreign Intelligence Agencies

To ID a CP team
Method of operation

Trained/not trained
Man power –women & men
Equipment – cameras, radios, wpms


Static Ops – Long term/temporary Rural -Urban

Technical Optics, phone taps, cameras

Aerial very costly

Aim: Why are they doing it?
Start point: Where the target is? Press, house staff, CP team on the piss
Walk pasts & close target recces (CTRs) help to gain info
Stake out covering all options
The housing, if the target stop the team surrounds the target & coves all options

Protect the VIP
Remove the VIP from danger
Choose the operative drill
Don’t attack the ambush
Fast & aggressive action
Beware of the decoy – secondary attack

Drive through
Block front
Block front and rear
Vehicle change over

BG shouts “Get down”
Vehicles move away from the main threat, accelerates, lights and horn, nearest safe house
BG returns fire
BG sends contact report

BG shouts “get down”
VIP stops if you can’t ram the block
BG returns fire
Vehicle reverses out of killing zone
VIP vehicle turns
BG sends contact report


BG shouts “get down
VIP vehicle stops
BG returns fire
Vehicle reverses until rear block is there
Assess where the main threat/fire power is coming from
Vehicle moves away/Adopts/vehicle position putting the vehicle between you and threat
Exit vehicle to the protected side
Deploy smoke/driver engages enemy
BG controls VIP & considers extraction
BG/VIP extract goes to nearest safe house
Send contact report


BG shouts “get down”

VIP vehicle moves away from ambush – horn and lights
PES moves towards ambush and returns fire – run people down
Send contact report
Safe house

BG shouts “get down”
VIP vehicle stops and reverses lights and horn
PES moves in front –deploys smoke
PES vehicle returns fire
PES/VIP reverse back together, PES giving cover to VIP
Vehicles turn when able
Safe House
Contact report
BG shouts “get down”
VIP vehicle stops and reverses lights and horn
PES moves in front returns fire and deploys smoke
PES reverses back providing cover for VIP vehicle
Rear block goes in is spotted
Assessment of main threat/fire power
VIP vehicle moves away and adopts “vehicle position”
PES vehicle forms a 2T” or a “V”
PES deploy return fire and lay smoke
PES command decides on extraction
BG extract VIP from vehicle
BG/VIP & PES aggressively withdraw to cover/safe house
Send contact report

There must be a change to drive out of ambush (VIP vehicle is u/s)
BG shouts “get down”
VIP vehicle will stop =vehicle position if possible
PES vehicle stops beside VIP vehicle – must be protected side
PES driver remains in vehicle/PES deploy
BG/VIP change vehicle
PES vehicle extracts from area to nearest safe house
PES and VIP driver extract by foot
Send contact report


Options: a) Stop short – flanking attack
b) Stop short – go firm
One CAT team member will remain with vehicle – if there is more than two
CAT team move into flanking position
CAT attack enemy

Once VIP is away and extracted they break of attack
CAT extract to nearest safe house

CAT go firm – 360 degrees cover
Inform BG/VIP
BG/VIP find/manoeuvre to CAT location
BG/VIP drive to nearest safe house
Rest of CAT extract themselves


A system of drills used by CPT to detect &/or evade surveillance


Maintain personal security skills (PSS)
Beware - look round check mirrors etc
Be suspicious of people/vehicles
Avoid routine
Be methodical – don’t take short cuts
Good communications – telling people information


The employment of apparently normal acts, which may cause an abnormal reaction


Use a busy shopping centre

Use escalators and lifts
Identify possible stake out and trigger locations
Use quiet open areas such as parks and country walks
Use a different drop off and pick up location

Variations of speed
Not using vehicles immediately
Short trips
Minor traffic violations
Use of indicators


.. out openly to evade surveillance
Drills carried


Use of a 3rd party to identify surveillance on a briefed individual (CP Team)

Collect – Speak to a member of the team

Sift what’s important and what’s not use a matrix system

Brief - tell the higher authority
Acting - act out the plan



1 Immediate action
2 Stabilisation
3 Counter action

Remove/reduce the threat
Place assets between the threat & the VIP
Remove the principle from the threat

Team must aim to stabilise the situation
Avoid aggressive posture unless necessary
Prevent the situation from deteriorating

Surround the incident
Fix the enemy’s location, strength and condition

Be precise

Precise is when we know

Composition of the enemy
Strength of the enemy
Capabilities of the enemy

Location of the enemy (location of VIP)
All of these are known

This is a situation when one or more of the previous factors are unknown

If the enemy have VIP:
*Prevent escape
*Gain time – can be done by negotiating
*Gather information
*Line of compromised authority – move tactfully so you’re not seen by enemy
*Window of opportunity


Will only go into a building to rescue VIP –(fire, bomb, rounds going through safe room door)
Only go in as a last resort

Situation (surrounding area)
Aim – save VIP
Enemy – how professional are they?

Keep the plan simple
It must be structured around protecting VIP
Covert entry/overt entry – distraction


Find principle
Fix enemy’s location
Strike (react)


Principle is extremely vulnerable when moving from/to a vehicle
Risk is higher when VIP is being picked up /dropped off



When the vehicle is stationary & the VIP can de-bus on the same side of the vehicle as the entrance

FACTORS - visits

Official engagement
Private engagement
Unscheduled stop


A pre-planed visit to an event & may be known/anticipated by others who pose a threat
May be advertised in media

These include recreational visits normally outside working hours, although pre-planned it will not be
advertised and should not be known to others who pose a threat

This would include a visit at short notice not pre-planned

Vehicle in position
Stop close to pick up point
360 degrees observation by BG and driver
1BG informs Driver when VIP is arriving at vehicle
Driver always has gear engaged
Driver & 1BG identify escape routes


The principle’s profile
The threat
The programme
An appreciation
An Op order

ADC’s, PA’s, older CP teams
Pen picture to include career profile
Family and friends

Description – height and build
Medical info-blood group, conditions
Likes and dislikes
Attitude to CP
Category of VIP

-Person(s0 who pose threat –terrorist-criminal-psychopath-crank-demonstrators
-Methods of operation:- assassination, kidnap, hostage, instilling of fear, surveillance
-Gathering intelligence:- G2 Branch, Int & Sy, embassy Sy Offrs, reliable civilian Sy, police
agencies, other CP teams
-Levels of protection:- Cat 1 VIP in danger/an attack can be expected
Cat 2 VIP is in some danger an attack can not be ruled out
Cat 3 VIP is at threat

BG, full PES
Protection at place of work & places visiting
Use of armoured vehicles
Counter-attack team
Use of electronic fortifications

BG PES – reduced form
Some of the measures of CAT 1

May be given a BG and a PES
Residence and place of work may be patrolled by Police and other agencies
Places frequented by VIP may be given attention



Obtained early & discussed daily to see if there are any changes
Available form :- ADC, PA,MA or the VIP


Official (*Check programme for errors, seating plans, guest lists

Private car passes, weather arrangements accom, and feeding arrangements
programme establish places to get changed
/medical facilities, evacuation plan)

Civilian locations:-
Formal functions
Black tie dinners, banquets, public speeches and cocktail parties
Military/Embassy locations:-
Military tattoos, official calls, remembrance day, ceremonial functions, places at work

Recreational – Golf, tennis, walking etc
Sight seeing – museums, art galleries
Evening entertainment – cinema, meals, drinks, opera
Travel – railway, airports

*both to be determines on the recce phase

*visit locations and do drives as per the programme

Should always be practical & and be able to carry out drills
Should always compliment the principle –VIP in a suit BG in a suit
Never out dress the principle
Always choose clothes that blend in with the environment
Always have sufficient clothes for the task – possible overnight stays
Prior to tasks BG to confirm with VIP reference dress codes

Flying programme
Principle travelling another vehicle

The principle driving himself
Walking remember back up vehicle

Map appreciation –routes/roads
Identify locations to be visited

Known routes
Clear the routes – road works 9phone AA – teletex)
Personal security
No recce report/route card required

Unknown routes
Full drive/walk by team
Full recce reports
Route card
Good map appreciation
Check programme for accuracy – timings are ok
Check comms when out and about
Recce main route and alternative route
Drive routes the same times and day

Full recce reports produced
Good map appreciation – look for places of interest in the area that the VIP might visit
Em-bus/De-bus points (video/photograph? –location)
Entry/exit points to the buildings
Vulnerable points –(when in open)
Safe room inside each location (access at short notice)
Emergency RV points
Actions on
Comms check
360 degrees protection at all times
Use the team to the full
Car parking & vehicle security vehicles not to be left unattended
Existing Sy measures

Recce report/route cards

With the organisers and planners of the event
Military/embassy officials
Other Sy agencies

Other CP
Civil police
.. teams
and SB
Airport/Port Sy staff – for VIP flying in

RECCE REPORTS (safe houses and police stations)

Red spot system
Code words
Use of serials (comms)

All down to good comms

The aim
The factors

The courses open to the team – choose the best course

The plan – OP orders
Operational (OP) order is a method of conveying a commanders plan to those who must execute that
plan & to the others who must use it


Sense of responsibility
Mature, positive and confident
Alert and active mind
Ability to get on/communicate with people
Realistic – what you can and can’t do
Truthful and honest
Patient, tactful and tolerant
A single minded devotion to duty and priorities
Not easily bored


CP team bodyguard
Duties of a CP team BG
Prior to the operation

Must know routes to each location

Carry out a recce of each location to be visited
Be aware of the em –bus/d-bus locations
Be aware of existing Sy measures
Familiarise himself with the VIP’s profile
Other tasks allocated by the TL

During the operation
Brief the VIP on duties and drills
Introduction of yourself & driver
Previous CP experience of VIP
Brief the VI on actions on
Mobile Sy –central locking windows
Programme changes including dress
Passage of information to the team –tell them everything

Protection of the VIP

Door opening/closing
Escorting the VIP
RTA drills


Brief oncoming BG on:-
Programme changes
Dress for the day
Problem areas –likes/dislikes of VIP
Tactical considerations
Brief the team leader
Prepare information for the Post Ex Report (PXR)



Gathering information
Threat assessment
Programme – changes/timings
VIP profile
Plan the CP operation
Recce each route & location
Brief Sp staff – driver

During the operation

Brief the VIP on drills
Provide protection during the operation
Command and control
** Be prepared for CHANGE/FASTBALL**

Post –Operation
Clean up & re-supply
Post operation report – pass on the information




To save life

To prevent the casualties condition from getting worse


To prevent further injury to the casualty and to avoid injury to yourself, e.g., from fire, fumes, flames,
collapsing buildings and any other hazards

To assess and treat the casualties in the following order of priority:

Then to place the casualty in a comfortable position
To immobilise injured limbs and broken bones
To relieve pain if possible

To arrange for evacuation, if necessary, in the correct priority



Inhalation of blood, vomit or water

Foreign material in the mouth or throat, such as false teeth, blood clot, vomit, mud
and debris

Swelling of the airway
Injury to the face and neck


Breathing might be absent or noisy, bubbling, gasping or whistling

Face might be blue or pale

If conscious he might make violent efforts to breath
If unconscious he might be convulsing


Clear the airway

Open airway- jaw thrust manoeuvre

Place in ¾ prone position



Swelling of airway
The tongue falling back in unconscious casualties
Electric shock
Drowning in water, blood or vomit
Heart attack
Poisoning due to nerve agents or an overdose of drugs such as morphine


He will be unconscious

Face might be blue or pale

There will be no obvious chest movement
No air being exhaled


2 breaths initially, then 10 breaths per minute- 1 every 6 seconds

Check pulse
Lay in ¾ prone position


Stoppage of breathing

Heart attack


Check the CAROTID PULSE at the neck after the first two breaths of


Clear the airway

Lay casualty on back on a firm surface

Open airway
2 breaths of EAR
Check CAROTID pulse for 5 seconds
If no pulse begin compressions-

1 person – 15 compressions to 2 breathes

2 persons- 5 compressions to 1 breath





Casualty might feel cold and clammy on the skin

Might be pale and look anxious

There might be a blue tinge to the extremities, such as his nose, ears and fingers
Pulse might be weak and fast
Breathing might be shallow and rapid
Might complain of feeling weak, faint and giddy with blurred vision
Might be thirsty
Might be semi-conscious or unconscious


Lay casualty down, flat if possible

Clear airway and ensure he is breathing

Look for and stop any external bleeding
Support and immobilise any injured limbs
Keep the casualty warm and protect from the cold, wind and rain
Avoid over heating

DO NOT give anything to drink- only moisten lips with water

DO NOT give morphine if;
Has difficulty in breathing
Is unconscious
Has head injury


Stoppage of blood supply to the brain, ie, fainting and heart attack
Head injury
Stoppage of breathing
Drugs, alcohol, chemicals and poisons
Diseases such as diabetes and epilepsy


Will not respond to normal or loud speech

Will not respond to touch or pain such as pinching the ear lobe
Will not respond to simple commands
Might not be breathing



Check and clear airway

Place in ¾ prone
Never leave unattended because tongue may fall back into the throat and cause
Might vomit and drown as fluid runs into lungs



Two types of fractures;

CLOSED FRACTURE – no break in the skin
OPEN FRACTURE – open wound

Dress wound as appropriate and immobilise wound or limb


There is damage to blood vessels, nerves and other important structures round the fracture


The casualty might have felt or heard the bone break

Might complain of pain and tenderness at the site of injury

Might see bruising, swelling or deformity of the injured part
Might be loss of movement or abnormal movement of injured part


Stop bleeding and cover wounds with a dressing

Immobilise the limb



Might see abnormal chest movement on injured side

Breathing will be painful and difficult

Might complain of being short of breath
Might be shocked, look anxious and distressed
Lips may become blue
Might cough up blood


Clear airway

If conscious put in comfortable sitting position

If there is a lot of abnormal movement of chest wall, casualty may be more
comfortable lying on injured side
If unconscious lie in ¾ prone position, lying on injured side



Will see a wound and might hear a sucking when casualty breaths

Breathing will be difficult and shallow

Might see blood stained liquid bubbling out when casualty breaths out
Might cough up blood
Might show signs of shock


Clear airway

Seal hole leaving valve on bottom of seal

Place comfortable position or in ¾ prone on injured side




Casualty might cough up blood

Breathing will be difficult and painful

Might look shocked
Might know or suspect that he has been subject to a blast


Treat for shock

Treat sitting up if possible



Might be wound or bruising of the abdomen, lower chest, lower back, groin or buttock

Might complain of pain and tenderness in his abdomen, abdomen muscles might be
Will show signs of shock
Might be vomiting blood stained fluid


Cover wound with dressings

If any gut is visible dressing should be wet

Place casualty in ‘W’ position with knees drawn up and head and shoulders raised
Or on side with knees drawn up
Treat for shock
Request urgent evacuation
DO NOT give food or drink




SUPERFICIAL BURNS- appear red and the area might be swollen

and blistered

DEEP BURNS- appears dull-white and might be charring

Some casualties might have a combination


Put out flames

Cool part with cold water for 10 minutes

Cover burn including charred clothing with clean dry dressing

Give morphine if necessary

DO NOT burst blisters or remove charred clothing or apply lotions etc

If casualty is conscious give frequent sips of water

Place in comfortable position and immobilise and support burnt limbs


Cover burn with WET dressing and keep wet

DO NOT remove phosphorous





.. Headache, dizziness and nausea

Cramps in legs or abdomen

Pale clammy skin
Weak pulse
Might become confused and eventually unconscious


Lay casualty down in cool shaded place

Give frequent sips of cool water

Keep cool by fanning or by sponging whole body down with cool water
Heat stroke may develop


All the above

Show disturbed or uncharacteristic behaviour

Fatigue, headache, and irritability
Diminished sweating
Flushed dry skin


Lay in coolest place

Remove all clothing

Give sips of water
Sponge down and fan or expose to breeze if possible









Uncontrollable shivering

Unusual tiredness
Disturbed vision
Slurred speech
Unexpected bursts of energy
Unexpected behaviour changes
When on the move, might slow down, stumble and repeated fall down
Might collapse and become unconscious


Protect casualty from weather

Replace any wet clothes

Put in dry sleeping bag with companion
Give warm sweet non-alcoholic drinks



Feet become white, numb, cold and possibly swollen

Protect the casualty from weather

Gently clean and dry feet

Warm feet using direct body heat




Feet appear white, are numb and look like marble

Advanced will blister and go black and gangrenous

Affected area feels cold and firm to touch


Put in dry sleeping bag

Give hot, sweet non-alcoholic drinks

Frozen feet can walk





Mark casualty with: ‘M’



Up to 3 syretes



Physical symptoms such as weakness or deafness, out of proportion to or absence of injury

Severe apprehension or restlessness

Overwhelming guilt or despair
Continuing over reaction to sound such as trembling
Unexpected changes in behaviour, restlessness or over-reaction
Substance abuse
Dazed and confused state


Reassure and evacuate