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Chemical Warfare Service Chemicals in Combat

Chemical Warfare Service Chemicals in Combat

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Published by Bob Andrepont
United States Army history of the Chemical Warfare service in combat in World War II
United States Army history of the Chemical Warfare service in combat in World War II

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Published by: Bob Andrepont on Feb 06, 2011
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Establishment of a New Guinea base in August 1942 and the events
of the Papua Campaign brought sharply into focus the problems dealing
with the condition of both gas warfare and nongas warfare chemical
materiel. SWPA chemical officers had been aware from the first that
much of the equipment received was rushed production not of the
highest quality, but conditions of storage and issue in New Guinea
demonstrated that every weakness in design, manufacture, inspection,
packaging, and shipment was magnified many times when items were
subjected to the extremes of heat, humidity, and rough handling un-
avoidable in the tropics and semitropics. Sometimes these problems
could be resolved or reduced to manageable proportions in SWPA;
sometimes they could be met by improvements in the United States;
sometimes area forces simply had to adjust to living with the problems.
Often a combination of these solutions applied, as in the case of the
flame throwers, for example.


The deterioration of bleach, mentioned above, was another problem
which called forth a joint effort but which was never solved with com-
plete satisfaction. SWPA received and stored bleach in light-gauge,
painted and unpainted steel drums of 70-, 100-, 140-, and 300-pound
capacity. Handling the larger drums was a problem, but it became
apparent, late in 1942, that the handling difficulty was insignificant
compared to the problem arising from corrosion of the containers and


(1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (3) Office of the Chief of
Engineers, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineer Supply, pp. 57-58, Tables 4 and 5.



deterioration of the bleach. Copthorne in December 1942 ordered a
survey of bleach in semitropical and tropical storage to determine how-
great the loss might be. Base section chemical officers found that all
the 100-pound nonpainted drums surveyed had corroded and that the
bleach had deteriorated below the standard acceptable for decontami-
nation. Corrosion of larger unpainted drums, for some unexplained
reason, was negligible while 77.2 percent of 100-pound drums painted
brown had corroded. Orange-painted drums in both 70- and 100-
pound sizes had stood up well. In all, the CWS turned over 25 tons
of deteriorated bleach to the engineers for water purification use. A
few weeks later the New Guinea base reported corroding drums and
deteriorating bleach. Copthorne could only advise that, since there was
probably no solution other than the impractical one of lacquering the
drums inside and out, deteriorated bleach should be turned over to
other services and replacement requisitioned. A part of the replace-
ment could come from Australian sources, but the bulk would have
to come from the United States.33
OCCWS was at work on the problem when Copthorne informed it
of his experience. The War Department CWS finally succeeded in
obtaining a more stable bleach and in improving the container,34

the tropical climate continued to take its toll in every storage place
from Australia to the Philippines. Fortunately, the deteriorated bleach
was still adequate for the hygienic uses to which the Quartermaster
Corps and the Corps of Engineers could put it. Because of this second-
ary use, the demands on critically short transportation were no greater
than they would have been had each service obtained its own supply.
The CWS SWPA was forced to adjust to the demands of continuous
survey of stocks and handling transfers.35

Noncorrosive Decontaminating Agent

Another decontaminant problem concerned the noncorrosive decon-
taminating agent (DANC). The agent was a mixture of solvent,
acetylene tetrachloride, and a dry chemical known as RH 195. The


(1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 10 Dec 42, sub: Corrosion of Chloride of Lime Containers
(CWS USASOS 470.6), and 1st Ind, CCWS to CCmlO USASOS, 24 Feb 43. CWS SPCVO 470.6
(12-10-42). (2) Ltr, CWO Serv Comd APO 502 to CCmlO USASOS, 14 Jan 43, no sub, and 1st
Ind, CCmlO USASOS to CWO Serv Comd APO 502, 2 Feb 43.


Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, from Laboratory to Field, ch XVI.


Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War IL



two components were shipped and stored unmixed in a 2-compartment
6-gallon drum with the RH 195 packed in the compartment above
the acetylene tetrachloride. The dry chemical apparently corroded the
seal between the two compartments allowing the contents to mix; the
resulting mixure had a life of about three months. Drums dented in
shipment almost inevitably corroded because the lacquer on interior
surfaces scaled off around the dent. After the first discovery of this
packaging deficiency in October 1942, base section chemical depot
troops opened dented drums and transferred serviceable RH 195 to
bottles. If the chemical had combined with the solvent, the mixture
was stored for its serviceable life, and when manpower and equipment
were available the solvent was reclaimed at the end of that life. The
area CWS obtained a crimping machine to reseal drums containing new
and reclaimed solvent. The War Department CWS strengthened the
RH 195 compartment, made it of a metal more receptive to preserva-
tive lacquer, provided a corrosion-proof plastic gasket between com-
partments, and, eventually, designed a new dual container. But still
the CWS in the Pacific had trouble—the old container continued to
come through the supply system. One base section received 14,000
old containers in the four months ending in September 1943. The
noncorrosive decontaminating agent problem was one that the CWS
SWPA learned to live with.36
The one and a half quart decontaminating apparatus for dispersing
the noncorrosive decontaminant and the 3-gallon apparatus were poorly
crated. The crate consisted of a wooden frame with a cardboard liner;
both cardboard and wood frequently failed with almost disastrous
results when the crates were used as a base in warehouse stocks.37
Another minor but annoying packaging defect was in the pack for
shoe impregnite. The War Department CWS shipped the preparation
in small cans packed in cardboard boxes. The boxes were too heavy
for one man to handle, and the cardboard simply disintegrated after
brief exposure to the weather. The CWS solved this problem by
switching to small wooden boxes.38


(1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 16 Nov 42, sub: Deterioration of RH 195 Containers.
CWS USASOS GSCW 400.2. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO USASOS, 18 Dec 42, sub: Deterioration of
RH 195 Containers. CWS SPCVO 470.6 (12-18-42). (3) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 29 Sep
43, sub: Defective DANC Containers (CWS USASOS GSCW), with 1st Ind, ACCWS Field Opns to
CCmlO USASOS, 25 Oct 43. CWS SPCVO 457 APO 501 (29 Sep 43). (4) Grothaus-Brady Rpt.


Grothaus-Brady Rpt.


Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45.



The Gas Mask.

A considerably more serious problem arose from the effect of the
jungle climate on gas masks and carriers. Fungi attacked the glass
lens of the Australian gas masks which American troops were using.
Molds and mildew covered and rotted gas mask carriers and the harness
of the mask itself. Rust and corrosion ate away canisters, buckles, and
rivets. In the 41st Infantry Division the chemical officer, Colonel
Arthur, prescribed a daily brushing of the carrier, but this only retarded
the growth of mold and mildew. Furthermore, brushing was possible
only for masks kept by individuals, who usually had them only for
short periods. Assault troops carried masks in landing and dropped
them as soon as the risk of initiation of gas warfare was determined to
be slight. These masks were uncared for until chemical officers could
assemble details or obtain service troops to collect, inspect, and store
them. In early operations losses were large, as much as 45 percent in
one assault, and the number of recovered masks rendered unserviceable
was also large. Better recovery techniques, especially those evolved
when service detachments landed with assault troops, reduced losses
to 5 percent and greatly increased the number of serviceable masks

OCCWS believed that the SWPA mask problems might be solved
by the introduction of the lightweight service mask in 1943. The
lightweight mask and its carrier were more rugged than the training
mask then in use in SWPA, and the carrier was water resistant and
therefore was more resistant to mold and mildew. Also, the CWS
provided an adhesive tape waterproofing for the canister. Colonel
Arthur set up a wearing test of the mask in the 41st Division. The
facepiece was plainly superior to that of the training mask, but the
canister rusted as badly, and the adhesive tape waterproofing tended
to remove the paint, thus accelerating rusting. With waterproofing
clamp in place the rubber hose from canister to facepiece softened and
distorted in twelve days, and the adhesive tape waterproofing proved
of doubtful value under tropical conditions. Also, the carrier, although
apparently more resistant to deterioration, proved somewhat bulky to


(1) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO USAFFE, 7 Jun 43, sub: Mold on Gas Mask Carriers.
Sixth Army 475—Weapons for Jungle Warfare. (2) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War
II. (3) Ltr, CO 42d Cml Lab Co SWPA to Chief Tech Div OCCWS, 1 Sep 43, sub: Transmittal of
Mold Cultures.



wear and, as in Normandy, offered a target for sharpshooters. Arthur
recommended that the SWPA-devised training mask and waterproofing
be retained but that the lightweight facepiece be substituted for the
training facepiece. The War Department approved Arthur's suggested
modification of the training mask, and supplies were furnished to make
theater modifications. The CWS tried again with an assault mask with
cheek-mounted canister, but no significant number of these masks
became available in the theater before the end of the war. In sum,
this was again a problem that the SWPA CWS tried to overcome
with various expedients but without a real solution, for it was unable
to find a means of preventing mold, mildew, and corrosion.40

Protective Clothing

As noted above, storage and issue of antigas protective clothing was
a quartermaster responsibility, but the CWS was vitally involved in
providing impregnation services and in prescribing the use and care of
protective clothing. The SWPA chief quartermaster issued instruc-
tions, in the name of the Commanding General, USASOS, on protective
clothing in December 1942, in January 1943, and in March 1943. The
last of these instructions repeated the then current War Department
policy of providing as yet undesignated "double layer" protection
based on the cotton herringbone twill "fatigue" uniform as "minimum"
and with an additional impregnated woolen or cotton khaki uniform
as "complete" protection.41

Patently, complete protection was beyond the SWPA capacity, and
the instructions provided that only one set of outer garments plus

accessories per individual should be issued or should be held in forward
depots for issue to combat troops. Forward depots were also authorized
to hold normal replacement quantities to be called forward when
needed by operational organizations. The instructions also prescribed
storage and maintenance procedures including provision for CWS
inspection of clothing in storage.42


(1) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 16 Jun 43, sub: Rpt on Field Test of M4-10-6
Gas Mask (41st Div 470.6), with 2d Ind, forwarded by Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 9 Jul 43,
sub: Lightweight Service Masks. USAFFE FECW 470.72. (2) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CG Sixth
Army, 22 Oct 43, sub: Wearing Tests on New Type Masks. Sixth Army AG 470.72—Protective


Ltr, AG USASOS to CG's Sixth Army et al, 26 Mar 43, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing.
USASOS GSQMS 421 in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing.





USASOS elaborated the storage, requisition, and issue procedures
for protective clothing in May 1943. At the end of the month, the
commanding officer of the subbase at Oro Bay, which had officially
opened late in April, informed the Commanding General, 41st Infantry
Division, that 70 percent of the base protective clothing stock, most
of which was held for the division, was unserviceable.43

The unserv-
iceable clothing had rotted or the fabric had lost its tensile strength.
Much of the unserviceable clothing was that dyed jungle green on
which chemical service units in Australia had expended so much effort.
Since CWS officers had made the serviceability tests, the CWS SWPA
was aware of the problem. In a little more than a week after the first
notification, Copthorne asked Sixth Army to determine the extent of
damage. Sixth Army replied that almost all clothing in loose storage
or in the hands of individuals had deteriorated. Clothing received from
the United States and stored in its original waterproof bales and pack-
ages off the ground and under cover had not deteriorated. Similarly,
those sets of clothing in the hands of individual soldiers which had been
stored, as prescribed, in the bottoms of barracks bags hung so that air
would circulate under the bag had not deteriorated. Since all troops
did not have the opportunity to hang barracks bags in positions where
air would circulate, Sixth Army ordered protective clothing withdrawn
from individuals for storage in unit supply, but storage conditions in
unit supply were far from ideal. The best that unit storage could
accomplish was slightly to prolong garment life and, perhaps more
importantly, to make garments available for regular serviceability


CWS officers soon learned that the effective life of protective clothing
was likely to be six months and that the best which could be expected
was a year.45

Colonel Smith, then chief of the USASOS Chemical
Section and later Copthorne's deputy, undertook the direct supervision
of protective clothing distribution plans and liaison with quartermaster


Ltr, CO Advance Subbase B to CG 41st Div, 30 May 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing. USAFFE
Advance Subbase B 422 in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing.


(1) Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 9 Jun 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing. USAFFE
FECW 420, cited in Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 29 Jun 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing.
Sixth Army AG 420W in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st Div to CG 41st
Div, 22 Jun 43, sub: Inspection of Impregnated Clothing. 41st Inf Div 470.6 in Sixth Army 422.3
Protective Clothing. (3) Memo, CmlO Sixth Army CO Hq Co Sixth Army, 23 Jun 43, no sub. In
Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing.


Also see Stauffer, Operations in the War Against Japan, p. 202.



on the subject. In the circumstance, Smith had no choice but to
provide protective clothing for forward area troops and to plan re-
placing it every six months. Replacement was provided either from
the United States or from stocks impregnated in SWPA. In order to
carry on impregnation in the area, processing units were required. The
105th Chemical Processing Company arrived in SWPA in June 1943
just as the extent of the clothing problem was becoming known. Since
the unit did not receive its own plants for another six months, it
worked at processing in the improvised theater plant to rebuild the
theater reserve. Copthorne and Smith sought to move the 105th and
the eighteen companies received in 1944 into forward areas so that
impregnating facilities, both for building up clothing reserves and for
reimpregnation in the event of gas warfare, could be close to the
organizations with the greatest need, but obtaining USAFFE or GHQ
authority and transportation for these forward moves was extremely

The SWPA protective clothing reserve problem diminished during
late 1944 and early 1945 as stocks were continuously reconstituted by
shipments from the United States. Anticipated reserve demands were
also reduced by the War Department directive of April 1944 which
assigned protective clothing only to 50 percent of the area force.
Clothing still deteriorated although better packaging and the use of
the M2 water emulsion impregnating process somewhat lengthened
the serviceability period. The CWS still sought to move processing
units forward as reimpregnation insurance against a gas warfare emer-
gency, and the units, even in forward areas, were diverted to secondary
missions which would permit readiness to operate in such emergency.47
In the last year of the war, most of the area protective clothing re-
serve was stored in the Hollandia, New Guinea, base while organizational
allowances were carried in unit supply when commanders would permit,
or in forward bases when they would not. The forward bases also
stored organizational maintenance stocks. As the fighting progressed
farther and farther from Hollandia transportation for resupply became
more difficult to obtain, and, in event of gas warfare, the transportation
situation might have been desperate. Chemical officers were confident,
however, that had gas warfare been initiated there would have been
sufficient air transportation available in the interim before the process-


Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Irving R. Mollen, 28 Apr 53.





ing companies could move forward and commence operation. Certainly
SWPA was adequately supplied with processing units. Because of the
SWPA storage problems and the estimated threat of gas warfare in
forward areas, SWPA had more units than any other theater.48

Defective Equipment and Spare Parts

Some SWPA chemical supply problems were common to all theaters.
For example, the power-driven decontaminating apparatus was widely
used for water carrying and giving showers, but the parts supply, as
elsewhere, was critical. No spare parts of any description arrived in
the theater before Colonel Morgan returned to the United States after
the middle of 1943. Even when parts did begin to arrive, there were
few for the large apparatus. Some vehicles were cannibalized to keep
others in operation, but even this expedient failed because many parts
were not interchangeable among the four different makes of apparatus
and because the same type of parts wore out on all apparatus. CWS
officers arranged with their Ordnance colleagues, late in the war, to
replace worn-out decontamination motors with jeep motors, and this
local adaptation permitted some apparatus to be returned to service.49
Other munitions also failed because of faulty manufacturing, faulty
inspection, or poor packaging in the United States. Examples are the
early shipments of the M33 smoke tank, which air chemical units
rebuilt, and of M14 and M8 chemical hand grenades of which such a
large percentage malfunctioned that Colonel Grothaus, the OCCWS
observer, recommended the destruction of entire lots.50

Another major
problem which was at least aggravated by SWPA storage conditions
was that concerning the 100-pound toxic bomb.

Toxic Munitions

As noted above, bombs were early stored in three toxic gas yards
in Australia. Leakers were soon discovered among the thin-cased
bombs, and sizable detachments from two service units were required
to segregate the leakers, decontaminate the storage areas, and vent and
paint nonleaking bombs. After a time it became evident that the


(1) Mollen Interv, 28 Apr 53. (2) For information on processing company assignments, see
Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H-11.


(1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt. (3) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—

SWPA, World War II.


Grothaus-Brady Rpt.



mustard filling of some bombs was itself deteriorating. Copthorne
asked for replacement by distilled mustard, which was not so much
subject to deterioration, but OCCWS replied that the production au-
thorities in the United States could not afford the time and effort to
distill mustard when the undistilled product proved satisfactory else-
where. Concentrated SWPA CWS effort kept most of the bombs in
serviceable condition. Copthorne was anxious, as the war progressed,
to move the bombs closer to the scene of fighting. Finally, in 1944,
transportation was secured to establish a considerable stock in New
Guinea. When Copthorne's own section moved to Leyte, he again
attempted to move the bombs forward, but transportation could not
be obtained. Toward the end of hostilities, after a toxic gas yard had
been established in the Philippines, another effort was made to move
the stock forward, but a detailed inspection revealed that few bombs
were then serviceable, and the Chemical Section, Western Pacific, ar-
ranged for the disposal of bombs remaining in Australia and New


The deterioration of stocks did not mean that SWPA was without
supplies for gas warfare retaliation. General MacArthur requested that
stockage be maintained on the west coast pending the availability of
shipping. Shipping would have been allotted at once in case of emer-
gency. Also, bombs and other toxic munitions declared unserviceable
were replaced so that minimum area reserves were maintained until
near the end of the war. The area reserves, equal to four or five days'
retaliation, were in any case inadequate since the plans made late in
the war were based on the west coast stock.52

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