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Evil and God

Evil and God

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Categories:Types, Research
Published by: Volnei Ramos Martins on Feb 10, 2011
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outweigh the goods produced. Warwhich generates many of the same virtues as athleticsis a case in point. But to refute
(9) it need not be argued that all evils which in turn produce or provide occasion for the development of certain virtues
are justified. One needs only one case where the introduction of evil is both required and justified. Our mention of
athletics is a case in point.

McCloskey's final complaint that no significant moral philosopher lists such virtues as courage, fortitude, magnificence
in bearing pain, and generosity in his list of intrinsic goods is beside the point. What is at issue is simply whether here
we have at least one case where G entails an E which G outweighs. We have provided such a case. Thus, though
McCloskey's argument shows that this will not justify all evils present in the worldwhich is really to shift to the
inductive argumentit does not refute the type of counter-case to (9) here advanced, and hence fails to rescue the
deductive argument.

In short, the atheologian has not refuted the counter-cases against the truth of (9). Of course, in the strict sense the
whole question of actual counter-cases is irrelevant to disproving the necessary truth of (9). It is relevant to its truth, but
not to its necessity. The mere possibilitywhich seems undeniablethat there is some G so related to E that G outweighs E
and it is impossible that G obtain or be actual and E or possibly E fail to obtain would establish that (9) is not a
necessary truth.

We may conclude, then, that the atheologian has not shown that (9) is a necessary truth, and consequently has not
established that there is a contradictioneither implicit or explicitbetween propositions 1 a, 2, and 3. That is, he has not
shown that there is a logical incompatibility between the claim that God exists and possesses the properties of
omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness and the affirmation that evil exists. Of course, that the atheologian

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