not without serious misgivings that I venture

at this late hour of

workers and



to place before my felloware interested in the growth

of philosophical thought throughout the world, some of the notes on the Six Systems of Indian Philo-

sophy which have accumulated




as early as 1852 that I many years. published my first contributions to the study of


Indian philosophy in the Zeitsckrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. My other occupahowever, and, more particularly, my preparations for a complete edition of the Rig- Veda, and

voluminous commentary, did not allow me at that time to continue these contributions, though my interest in Indian philosophy, as a most important part of the literature of India and of


Universal Philosophy, has always This interest was kindled

remained the



to finish for the Sacred

Books of the East

(vols. I

and XV)



my translation of the Upanishads. sources of Indian philosophy, and

especially of the Vedanta-philosophy, a system in which human speculation seems to me to have


of the other systems of Indian philosophy also have from time to time

very acme.



roused the curiosity of scholars and philosophers in Europe and America, and in India itself a revival of philosophic and theosophic studies, though not
leads to a

always well directed, has taken place, which, if it more active co-operation between Euro-

pean and Indian thinkers, rnture of most important

be productive in the results. Under these cir-


cumstances a general desire has arisen, and has repeatedly been expressed, for the publication of
a more general and comprehensive account of the six systems in which the philosophical thought of

India has found

its full


More recentlv the excellent publications of Professors Deussen and Garbe in Germany, and of Dr. G. Thibaut in India, have given a new impulse to
these important studies, important not only in the eyes of Sanskrit scholars by profession, but of all

who wish to become acquainted with all the solutions which the most highly gifted races of mankind have These proposed for the eternal riddles of the world. studies, to quote the words of a high authority, have indeed ceased to be the hobby of a few individuals, and have become a subject of interest to the whole nation Professor Deussen's work on

the Vedanta-philosophy (1883) an( l nis translation of the Vedanta-Sutras (1887), Professor Garbe's

Samkhya-Sutras (1889) followed work on the Su^khya-philosophy (1894), by and, last not least,, Dr. G. Thibaut's careful and

translation of the

most useful translation

of the Vedanta-Sutras in


of the East (1890

and XXXVIII of the Sacred Books and 1896), mark a new era in the


of the Viceroy of India, see Times, Nov.




study of the two most important philosophical systems of ancient India, and have deservedly placed the names of their authors in the front rank
of Sanskrit scholars in Europe. object in publishing the results of


my own

studies in Indian philosophy was not so much to restate the mere tenets of each system, so deliberately and so clearly put forward by the reputed authors
of the

a more

principal philosophies of India, as to give comprehensive account of the philosophical

activity of the Indian nation from the earliest times, and to show how intimately not only their religion,

but their philosophy


was connected with the


of the

a point

of view which has of late been


maintained by Professor Knight of University *.



was only

a country like India, with all advantages and disadvantages, that

such a rich development of philosophical thought as 'we can watch in the six systems of philosophy,

have taken


In ancient India there

could hardly have been a very severe struggle for

were abundantly provided by nature, and people with few tastes could live there like the birds in a forest, and soar like birds towards the fresh air of heaven and the eternal sources of light and truth. What was there to do


necessaries of


who, in order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, had taken their abode in the shade of groves or in the caves of mountainous valleys except
for those

to meditate

on the world
See 'Mind,'


which they found them-

vol. v. no. 17.



placed, they did not know how or why ? There was hardly any political life in ancient India, such as we know it from the Vedas, and in consequence neither political strife nor municipal ambiNeither art nor science existed as yet, to tion.
call forth


the energies of this highly gifted race. we, overwhelmed with newspapers, with

parliamentary reports, with daily discoveries and discussions, with new novels and time-killing social

have hardly any leisure left to dwell on metaphysical and religious problems, these problems formed almost the only subject on which the old
inhabitants of India could spend their intellectual Life in a forest was no impossibility in energies.

the Avarm climate of India, and in the absence of

the most ordinary means of communication, what was there to do for the members of the small
settlements dotted over the country, but to give expression to that wonder at the world which is

the beginning of all philosophy ? Literary ambition could hardly exist during a period when even tli^
art of writing was not yet known, and when there was no literature except what could be spread and handed down by memory, developed to an extra-

ordinary and almost incredible extent under a careBut at a time when fully elaborated discipline.
people could not yet think of public applause or private gain, they thought till the more of truth

and hence the perfectly independent and honest character of most of their philosophy.

my wish to bring the results Indian philosophy nearer to us. and, if possible, to rouse our sympathies for their honest efforts to throw some rays of li<rht on
of this

It has long been



the dark problems of existence, whether of the objective world at large, or of the subjective spirits,

whose knowledge of the world

constitutes, after


the only proof of the existence of an objective world. The mere tenets of each of the six systems of Indian philosophy are by this time well known, or easily


accessible, I should say,

than even

those of the leading philosophers of Greece or of modern Europe. Every one of the opinions at

which the originators of the

six principal schools of

Indian philosophy arrived, has been handed down to us in the form of short aphorisms or Sutras, so as to leave but little room for uncertainty as to
the exact position which each of these philosophers occupied on the great battlefield of thought.


know what an enormous amount

of labour had

to be spent and is still being spent in order to ascertain the exact views of Plato and Aristotle,

nay, even of

Kant and Hegel, on some

of the most

important questions of their systems of philosophy. There are even living philosophers whose words
often leave us in doubt as to what they mean, whether they are materialists or idealists, monists
or dualists, theists or atheists.

Hindu philosophers

seldom leave us in doubt on such important points, and they certainly never shrink from the consequences of their theories. They never equivocate or try to hide their opinions where they are Kapila, for instance, the likely to be unpopular.

author or hero eponymus of the Samkhya-philosophy, confesses openly that his system is atheistic, ani.svara, without an active Lord or God, but in spite of
that, his

system was treated as legitimate by his conit

temporaries, because

was reasoned out


the Purushas or spirits. despite of all their hideousness. is Deity. the not dishonesty. as he thought. can provide any room for a creator or governor of the world. nevertheless atheists. and hence the Sa?/zkhya-philosophy declares itself fearlessly as an-i. and what was the true is meaning of them. the so-called Purushas. This leads to philosophical ambiguity. in order to escape the damaging charge of atheism. but From yet endowed with wisdom. free from all the if trammels of human activity and personality. Lord-less. original matter. even though they have no eyes as yet to see what is hidden behind the idols. no theory of evolution? whether ancient or modern (in Sanskrit Parmama). the Yoga. nay. to find in the some place for an Isvara or a personal God. the most decided monist. try even by any means to foist an active God into their philosophies. Mere names have acquired with us such a power that the authors of systems in which there is clearly no room for an active God. and admitted. old Sa?/ikhya system reported to have been a worshipper of idols and to have seen in them. symbols of the as the cause of all things. shrink from calling themselves nay. them there would be no evolution of Praknti. nor in any reality the lookers-on themselves. a philosophical point of view. What is most curious is that a philosopher. no objective world. power. and has often delayed recognition of a Godhead.X PREFACE. and the upholder of Brahman.svara. such as *Sa/kara. useful. and will. leaving it to another philosophy. for the ignorant. as a neuter. What I admire in Indian philosophers that . required some transcendent and Without invisible power.

As a careful reason er. and. They do not allow themselves to be driven one inch beyond their self-chosen position. These are sensuous perception. but . and as none of these can supply us with the knowledge of a Supreme Being.PREFACE. and verbal authority. XI they never try to deceive us as to their principles and the consequences of their theories. they hold that the objective world requires though not necessarily a visible or tangible substratum. leave us in no doubt that they are and mean to be atheists. however. because their reverence stronger than their reverence for anything else. he does not go so far as to say that he can prove the non-existence of such a Being. denies the reality of anything but the One Brahman. as a monist. is concerned. the Universal Spirit. even to the verge of nihilism. though likewise idealists and believers in an unseen Purusha (subject). that he cannot establish His existence by the In ordinary channels of evidential knowledge. they are never afraid to speak out. for instance. theists or atheists. as others have done. They are bona Jide idealists or materialists. and a if real. which is for truth is to account for the whole of the phenomenal world. so far as the existence of an active God. like Kant. inference. they say so. monists or dualists. a maker and ruler of the world. any trace of intellectual cowardice. neither of these statements can I discover. is a fearless idealist. on the contrary. The Vedantist. Kapila never refers to Him in his Sutras. They first examine the instruments of knowledge which man possesses. but he is satisfied with stating. If they are idealists. and an unseen Prakriti (objective substance). as a personal creator and ruler of the world. The followers of the Samkhya.

He recognised in every man a soul which he called Purusha.). his aloneness. such as >Siva. such as is granted to human beings. would for ever have remained dead. her evolution. though we should always remember that with him there is nothing phenomenal. as postulated by other systems of philosophy or religion. or primordial matter with its infinite potentialities. because without such without such endless Purushas.Xll PREFACE. for himself his oneness. more than a phenomenal existence. Only through the presence of this Purusha and through his temporary interest in Prakriti could her movements. that does not in the end rest on something real and eternal. he simply treats them as 6ranyesvaras and temporal gods (Sutras and he does not allow. and thoughtless. her changes and variety be accounted for. spirit. or a power. He does not argue against the possibility even of the gods of the vulgar. even to the III. just as the movements of iron have to be accounted for by the All this movement. 57. the Lord. Supreme Isvara. motionless. comm. though he boldly confessed himself an atheist. the creator and ruler of the world. however. Whatever we may think of such views of the . Kapila. was by no means or Karyesvaras. philosophy is to make Purusha turn his eyes away from Prakr/ti. produced a nihilist or Nastika. so as to stop her acting and to regain is presence of a magnet. and all the rest. We must distinguish however. and his perfect bliss. nothing confined in space and time. Visrmu. simply a desire to abide within the strict limits of knowledge. or subject. his indepen- dence. literally man. he held that Prakriti. and the highest object of Kapila's temporary only.

the Vedanta. he. It is in the bows before his self-chosen Veda as the seat of a revealed authority. and other systems of Indian philosophy. positive This may be true to a certain extent and particularly with regard to the Vedanta-philosophy. it seems to me the very perfection for the treatment of philosophy. freshness. and that is the straightforwardness and freedom with which they are elaborated.PREFACE. in the etymological sense of the word. but we can always appreciate the perfect freedom. However imperfect the style in which their theories perfect have been clothed may appear from a literary point of view. but not argumentative. It has sometimes been said that asserts. but we must remember that almost the first question which every one of the Hindu systems of philosophy tries to settle In thus giving the Noetics is. It never leaves us in any doubt as to the exact opinions held by each philoWe may miss the development and the sopher. and downrightness with which each searcher after truth follows his track without ever looking right or left. How do we know ? the first place. dialectic eloquence with which Plato and Hegel propound their thoughts. for some reason or other. like the Vedantists. Generally speaking. nature of philosophy that every philosopher must be a heretic. they admitted three legitimate channels by which knowledge can reach . a free chooser. that throughout. there is one thing which we cannot help admiring. Xlii world as are put forward by the Sa?7ikhya. that is. the thinkers of the East seem to me again superior to most of the philosophers of the West. even if. Hindu philosophy it is but does not prove.

$abda. but authority In some systems rejected. perception. or anything else ! Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of truth. though always with the proviso that even the Veda could never make a false opinion true. >Sruti. Mohammedan. freely chosen or freely and authority. and then advancing step by step from the The Vedantist. inference. whether perception. a very How much high distinction of Indian philosophy. of course. Hindu philosophers have built up their various systems of philosophy. paruseless controversy ticularly among Jewish. Such an examination of the authorities of human knowledge (Pramanas) ought. inference. to form the S&mkhya philosophers. and Christian philosophers. as it seems to me. may nevertirely dependent theless accept some of the utterances of the Veda as they w ould accept the opinions of eminent men or <Sishfas. and to have clearly seen this is. who profess themselves enon reasoning (Manana). in others it is the word of any recognised Thus it happens that the authority. The same relative authority is granted to Smrtti or tradition. would have been avoided. but there with the proviso that it must not be in contradiction with ^Sruti or revelation. or their various conceptions of the world. or the Veda.XIV PREFACE. telling us clearly what they take for granted. lation or the foundations to the highest pinnacles of their systems. us. r introduction to every system of philosophy. that authority is revelation. revelation. Apta-va&ana. if a proper place had been assigned in limine to the question of what constitutes our legitimate or our only possible channels of knowledge. after giving us his reasons why reve- Veda stands higher with him than .

that there should be multiplicity in the world. but can be destroyed . nescience human nature. XV sensuous perception and inference. how it was possible.PREFACE. but must be accepted as the result of or Avidya. it would constitute a limit to what was postulated as limitless. for it was Second-less. That ignorance. But then came the question for Indian philosophers to solve. could have received no impulse to change. exists. and would have made the concept of the One self-contradictory. and allows to perception and inference no more than an authority restricted to the phenomenal (Vyavaharika) world. but presupposes a long preparation of metaphysical thought. because if the existence of anything besides the absolute One or the Supreme Being were admitted. is indeed astounding. undisturbed by any foreign influences. The conception of the world as deduced from the Veda. either from itself. They knew that the one absolute and unde- termined essence. if there was but the One. actually puts $ruti in the place of sensuous perception. and that there should be constant change in our experience. for it was perfect. namely. whatever the Second by the side of the One might be. that it is not and cannot be real. though unreal it in the highest sense. what they called Brahman. fold Then what is the philosopher to say to this maniand ever-changing world ? There is one thing only that he can say. All that exists is taken as One. It could hardly have been arrived at by a sudden intuition or inspiration. nor from others. and chiefly from the Upanishads. not only of individual but of ignorance as inseparable from ignorance. at least for the discovery of the highest truth (Paramartha).

includes ourselves quite as much as what we call the objective world. however. it is clear that our name of nihilism would be by no means applicable to it. a cosmos which. and as nothing that can at any time be annihilated has a right to be considered as real. e. by Vidya. though we suffer from it for a time. it follows that this cosmic ignorance also must be looked upon as not real. like the mirage in a desert. that the former can be annihilated. Only it must be remem- we perceive can never be the absolute Brahman. is called forth. knowledge. not to exist. which looks upon This is . the Vedanta view. just as the moon which we see manifold and tremulous in bered that what ever changing reflections on the waving surface of the ocean. another is that of the Sa?khya. i. has its reality in Brahman alone.XVI PREFACE. unapproachable remote- Whatever we may think of such a view of the cosmos. as little as it is possible to define Brahman. the latter never. though deriving its its phenomenal character from the its real moon which remains unaffected in ness. one view of the world. nor can it be said only. Self nor what in our knowledge is not our Self. is not the real moon. nothing that exists in our knowledge could exist. . it should be remembered. just as our own ordinary ignorance. the Brahman. but a perverted picture only. with this difference. can never claim It is impossible to absolute reality and perpetuity. only nor perceptible in its true character by any of the senses but without it. according to the Vedanta. the knowledge conveyed by the Vedanta. neither our it is not visible. The phenomenal world which. The One Real Being is there. define Avidya. but temporary It cannot be said to exist.

and to include on the contrary name self every botanist. but its definition is. of Des It is in that Walhalla of real Cartes and Spinoza. why should an observer. A President. a collector and analyser. And if hitherto no one would have called hima philosopher who had not read and studied the works of Plato and Aristotle. that I claim a place of honour for the philosophers representatives of the it is Vedanta and Samkhya.PREFACE. This determining idea has secured even to the guesses of Thales and Heraclitus their permanent place among the historical representatives of the development of philosophical thought by the side of Plato and Aristotle. The itself is of no consequence. and treats the individual perceiver as or separation produce final bliss or absoluteness. These two. I hope that the time will come when no one will claim that name who is not acquainted at least with the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philosophy. entomologist. however powerful. XV11 our perceptions as perceptions of a substantial something. and by their discrimination individual. b . of Prakrtti. and Kant in the original. or bacteriologist. eternally besides these two admitting nothing powers. of Des Cartes and Spinoza. Of course. Hume. of Locke. the Vedanta and the Samkhya. possible so to define the meaning of philosophy as to exclude men such as even Plato and Spinoza altogether. the potentiality of all things. which by their union or identification cause what we call the world. does not call himself His Majesty. with some other less important views of the world. as put forward by the other systems of Indian philosophy. constitute the real object of what was originally meant by philosophy. that is an explanation of the world.

no one knows so well the and I can own case that few people can be so more than a description of some of the salient points of each of the six recognised systems of Indian philoIt does not claim to be complete on the sophy. own purThus. full ? however of information. if . with but slight modifi- and the longer I have studied the various the more have I become impressed with the systems. we do not give a full account of every one of their good qualities. if I can claim any thanks. as It professes to be no yet. I believe that defects of his book as the author himself. for they all share so . truth of the view taken by Vigwana-Bhikshu and cations others that there behind the variety of the sixsystems a common fund of what may be called is national or popular philosophy. history. Kapila. far away in the distant North.XVlil PREFACE. to me less important and not calculated to appeal to European If we want our friends to love our sympathies. much in common. from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his poses. Even thus it could not well be avoided that in giving an account of each of the six systems. . a large Manasa lake of philosophical thought and language. truly say in my conscious of the defects of this History of Indian It cannot be called a Philosophy as I myself. while I should not be surprised. friends. contrary. because the chronological framework is. Badarayana. it is for having endeavoured to omit whatever seemed. claim the name of philosopher As a rule. almost entirely absent. This is what I have tried to do for my old friends. but we dwell on one or two of the strong points of their character. and in the distant Past. there should be much repetition. and all the rest.

and my best reward will be if a new interest shall spring up for a long neglected mine of philosophical thought. whom I consulted about the various degrees of popularity enjoyed I at the present in his day by different systems of philosophy own country. being branches. little as it may be. the BrahmaSutras. a native of India. of the less important treatises also are studied. and if my own book were soon to be superseded by a more complete and more comprehensive examination of Indian philosophy. students of philosophy may think that there is really too much of the same subject.PEEFACE. b2 . and the Vallabhas. the Ramanu^as. such as the Paw&adasl Some and Yoga-Vasish^Aa. the great Commentaries of the A&aryas and the Bhagavad-gita. mixed with religion. has become a living faith. discussed again and again in the six different schools. although expensive much in other sacrifices are occasionally The Agnishfoma was performed. such as the Upanishads. at Benares. especially in Bengal. The Purva-Mlma msa / is still studied in Southern India. the Advaitis. but the works studied are generally the later controversial treatises. not the earlier ones. he writes. informs me that the only system that can now be its said to be living in India is the Vedanta with danta. Sanskrit scholars were to blame XIX having left out too much. A friend of mine. me for have done my best. the MadhThe Vevas. the Nyaya only finds devotees. and numerous Pandits can be found to-day in all these sects who have learnt at least the principal works by heart and can expound them. year performed last Of the other systems. but not parts.

What we want are texts and translaand any information that can throw light on tions. But though we may regret that the ancient method of philosophical study is dying out in India. have devoted themselves to the honorable task of making their own national philosophy better known to the world at large. though it may show clear traces of Sanskrit . do not take to these studies. inevitable I as it is said to be in India. have been doing most valuable service. is neglected and so is the Yoga. we should welcome all the more a new class of native students who. except in its purely practical It is feared. that and most degenerate even this small remnant of philosophical learning will vanish in one or two generations. however. is always dangerous. The Vaiseshika form. after studying the history of European philosophy. even if belonging to orthodox Brahmanic families. But such journals as the Pandit. Germany. and a mixing up of philosophical with religious and theosophic propaganda. Nor should the chronology of Indian philosophy. Italy. In the their labour be restricted to Sanskrit texts. the Liyht of Truth. as there is no encouragement. as the youths of the present day. the Brahmavddin. enthusiasm of native students may seem to have carried them too far. and England. In some cases the France. and lately the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society. hope that my book may prove useful to them by showing them in what direction they may best assist us in our attempts to secure a place to thinkers such as Kapila and Badarayana by the side of the leading philosophers of Greece. Rome.XX PREFACE. South of India there exists a philosophical literature which.

and he be allowed to appeal to younger men for such may help as he himself in his younger days has often and nor the gladly lent to his Gurus and fellow-labourers. F.. the translator of the Vaiseshika-Sutras. and the Das.E. find their labours amply rewarded in that field. XXi influence. complain that there is nothing left to do in Sanskrit literature. M.A.PREFACE. and their friends.. 1899. I believe. author of the 'Philosophy of the Upanishads.I. M. OXFORD. would. as yet. . Gough. C. contains also original indigenous elements of great beauty and of great importance for historical Unfortunately few scholars only have taken up. E. May i. How much may be done in another direction by students of Tibetan literature in furthering a study of Indian philosophy has lately been proved by the publications of Sarat Chandra and Satis Chandra Achaiya Vidyabhushana. A. but young students who purposes. M. In conclusion I have to thank Mr. memory which he had at twenty-six. the study of the Dravidian languages and literature.' for his extreme kindness in reading a revise of my proofA man of seventy-six has neither the eyes sheets.


.. . . . . .. . .. . . .. .. . . 34 36 39 CHAPTEE TheVedas The Philosophical II.. INTEODUCTOEY CHAPTEE.. . . .. . Buddhist Pilgrims. .. Prasena^it and Bimbisara . ... .. . . . Philosophy and Philosophers Sruti and Smnti ... . . THE VEDAS.... 43 Basis of the Vedic Gods Three Classes of Vedic Gods Other Classifications of Gods The Visve or All-gods .. 46 48 49 51 . . .. ... .. . ..... A^atasatru A^atasatru Buddhist Period . Hiouen-thsang King Harsha .. Brahma-^ala-sutta Mahabharata Buddha . . . 28 30 Greek Accounts . .. . ... . kanaka. Period antecedent to the Upanishads Intellectual Life in ancient India 6 6 9 1 1 Kshatriyas and Brahmawas .. . . ..... PAGE i 3 Upanishad-period... . . ... . . ... . .. . . . . 14 18 19 21 21 . from about 700 B... . The Evidence of the Upanishads. . c. ..CONTENTS.

. . ... . . ... ..146 . . . . . Tendencies towards Unity Henotheism Monotheism and Monism Pra^apati . . . . .. . . . .113 . . . . . . THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. . Brahman. . 4.. .. .. . . . . Karman . Word East and West Mind and Speech . 98 1 1 1 1 1 1 Literary References in the Upanishads The Six Systems of Philosophy . . ... 88 93 95 Pra^apati.. . .. .. . .. . Mnemonic Literature The Brihaspati.. 6... Brahman... . ..... . Brahman. . . . . . .. . . . .114 . .138 . . . .. Atman . 2.. . Atman. . Infallibility of the Veda . . . 59 60 63 64 68 72 77 . .XXIV CONTENTS. . . . . Philosophical Ideas Metempsychosis Sawisara .. ..... . ... . . . . . Immortality of the Soul . .123 137 Common 1. 52 53 53 55 57 57 . . its various Meanings Br?h and Brahman.. . . . . . . . . 5.. Three Guwas . among . .. ... .Philosophy . .146 . CHAPTEE III. . . . Pessimism .. . . Atman .. . . .137 . . Bnhaspati-Sutras Books of Reference .. . PAGE the Gods . Search for a Supreme Deity Hymn to the Unknown God .. . . .. . . .. Dates of the Philosophical Sutras . .116 . . .119 . Hymn . .121 ... . . . .. . Tad Nasadiya Ekam . . Visvakarman Tvashfri . . . . . 3. . .. . 97 Prasthana Bheda .118 . . Sawkhya-Sutras Vedanta-Sutras . . Growth of Philosophical Ideas .143 . ..139 .

. ... . . . .. . of . X 53 . . . . .. . . Philosophy and Religion Karman Brahman .226 . . to the Samkhya . Studying Philosophy . ..184 . . .. .148 . . . . Freedom Different in this Life ..187 .. . ..236 ... XXV CHAPTER IV. . .. . 239 243 255 . . . .. .. . Ways Ramanuf/a Metaphors . .. Pramawas Pramawas according . .189 .190 .182 .. ..229 . . . . .... . Badarayawa Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta .224 . . . . .. . . Appeals to the Veda . . . . PAGE Vedanta or Uttara-Mimamsa . . . .. .217 .. . . ... . The Meaning of Veda . . . VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMAA/SA. 224 is Everything . . . World . 159 Translation of the Upanishads Character of the Upanishads . .227 229 . . The Sthula. .. .and Sukshma-sarira The Four States Eschatology . . Vedanta-Sutras . 203 204 209 215 . . . . . . .. .. . . . . ..188 188 Pratyaksha Anumana Sabda .195 195 . . . Authority of the Vedas . . .. ..CONTENTS. . . .. . . . .179 . .. . . .. . . . . . . .220 .. .. .. . . The Phenomenal Cause and Effect Keality of the Creation or Causation Dreaming and Waking The Higher and the Lower Knowledge Is Virtue Essential to Moksha ? The Two Brahmans . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . 198 199 199 202 . Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda Vidya and Avidya Subject and Object . . . .186 .

. .266 270 275 . Upanishads . . . . .. .311 ... .312 313 . . .. Samkhya-karikas Date of Gaudapada Tattva-samasa . . . . . .. . . . . .. SAMKHYA-PHILOSOPHY.... .310 .. . .. . . 309 .....320 . . 281 Age of the Kapila-Sutras . .322 326 .XXVI CONTENTS. .. .. . . PURVA-M!MAM8A. . . .. Asvalayana's Gr/'hya-Sutras Did Buddha borrow from Kapila? . . .316 . .. ..281 . . .292 . . . Anteriority of Vedanta or Atheism and Orthodoxy Authority of the Veda Samkhya hostile to Priesthood . The Avyakta Buddhi. . . . CHAPTER V. . . . . .. .. The Tattva-samasa . Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mimamsa Is the . 279 CHAPTER VI.. .294 . ... .. 314 Bana's Harsha/oirita . Pramawas of (?aimini Sutra-style . Ahamkara Five Tanmatras . . . . .-500 Samkhya 303 305 306 307 Parallel development of Philosophical Systems Buddhism subsequent Lalita-vistara . PAGH Purva-Mimawsa Contents of the Purva-Mimamsa 258 263 . ... ... .. . .286 288 . . . Purva-Mimamsa a system of Philosophy? ..318 . .. . . . . . . . . ... . .. . 328 .. . . . . .290 . .. . . . to ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Asvaghosha's Buddha-ftarita Buddhist Suttas . .265 . . Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin ? . Samkhya-Philosophy Later Vedanta mixed with Samkhya Relative Age of Philosophies and Sutras .321 . List of Twenty-five Tattvas . .

(5) Avidya. . ..... Sawkhya . Anugraha-sarga Bhuta-sarga . . . .. . . .... .. . .. . 338 . .. . -355 .... . -335 -33^ . of the .... Manas Five Mahabhutas Purusha Is Purusha an Agent ? Three Guwas Is Purusha one or many ? .CONTENTS... .. .361 . Bondage Dakshiwa-bondage. . . ... . . Nature of Pain Vedanta and Samkhya Vedanta. . . . .. . . .330 330 331 .. 358 358 359 The True Meaning .. . . -33 -33 .-35 . .. .369 -374 37^ 379 The Sastra . .. .. . .360 . .. .. . .. . XXV11 PAGE Sixteen Vikaras . ... . . Origin of Avidya .. . . 352 353 354 Mulikarthas ShasbJi-tantra . . .. . . .. .366 . .. . . .. . Vedanta Sayings Early Eelation between Vedanta and Sawkhya Traiguwya San&ara and Pratisaw&ara .. Adhyatma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (28) ... . . .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . -343 -345 . Nescience Weakness Atushti and Tushft Asiddhis and Siddhis Tushfts and Siddhis . . .. Bandha..331 .. Avidya. . .. . Gifts to Priests Moksha Pramawas Du/ikha . 346 348 348 350 35 1 351 (5) .. Five Buddhindriyas Five Karmendriyas ... .. .. .-352 . . . .. .. ... . Aviveka Atman and Purusha . . . . ... .... and Aviveka Sawkhya. . . Adhidaivata Abhibuddhis (5) Karmayonis Vayus (5) (5) Karmatmans Asakti.. . .. . . . . .. .. . Adhibhuta.. .. .. .. . . . 334 335 . ..367 .356 356 357 35? . . . .

... . .450 . .... . . . . . .XXViu CONTENTS. . .443 . Cosmic .Philosophy Misconception of the Objects of Yoga Devotion to Jsvara. ...C. ...411 . .416 . . ..4^1 . Development of . but Disunion Yoga as Viveka Pata%ali. . Dispassion.. . ..442 . ..454 Other Means of obtaining Samadhi .. Second Century B.. . . . Chronology of Thought . PAGE 380 . 386 387 389 390 . 384 Purusha and Prakriti State of Purusha.. . . . . .. Sawkhya Parables . . . . of Yoga-Sutras . . .. . . .392 393 The Atheism of Kapila Immorality of the Samkhya 395 . Yoga. 447 . . ... Meaning of Pain when Free Purusha Prakriti an Automaton Prakr/ti's Unselfishness Gross and Subtle Body . . . . . .444 .. . .. . Samadhi Apnu//Vitii . . not Union.. . YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . ? . . 404 405 407 . . . ..412 415 The Yoga. .. .418 . . . . . .. .. . .. Misconceptions . . . . . .. . . .. VII. Vairagya Meditation With or Without an Object. . .429 ... ..402 ..391 . . . .. .. .410 .440 440 Functions of the Mind Exercises . . -398 -399 CHAPTER Yoga and Sawkhya Meanings of the word Yoga . . ... U'vara once more . ..421 . . . . . . . . . . What is Isvara ?.... .381 . Kapila's Real Argument The Theory of Karman . . . Prakn'ti. . . Retrospect Is Sawkhya Idealism ? .432 438 The Four Books Jfitta True Object of Yoga . Vyasa . . . . ..

. . Tarka IX. III.. V. . VI.493 493 496 Perception or Pratyaksha Inference or Anumana . . . Vitawc?a.. . 508 509 6ralpa. .. .. .. . Siddhanta IV. .. .. .459 462 466 468 ..500 500 504 504 504 505 Prameya Samsaya . ... .. . .496 . Comparison or Anumana or abda . ... . . .489 .485 .. . . .458 . . 474 476 484 . Objects of Knowledge ... . Dignaga Bibliography Nyaya-Philosophy Summum Bonum Means of Salvation The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas Means of Knowledge . The Avayavas. .. . . .. . . . . Dn'shfanta. . 509 .. . . .456 . . .501 . . ... . . .. . .471 ... Prayof/ana. .. . Object Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika . . XXIX PAGE Kaivalya.. ... ..481 489 . . .. .. Pramawa . .. . . .. Nyaya and Vaiseshika .. .496 . Helps to Yoga Vibhutis.CONTENTS..492 .. Hetvabhasa. -455 . . . . .. VII.471 CHAPTER Eelation between VIII. . .. Madhava's Account of Nyaya I. .. ... . . NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA. or Members of a Syllogism Indian and Greek Logic VIII..... . Freedom . .. . . .. . . . . .490 . ... . . .. . . Gati. . . Nigrahasthana .469 ... . Word II. . Padartha.. . . . . . . .. Nimaya X-XVI. . .. . . . . . .... Miracles True Yoga The Three Gunas Samskaras and Vasanas Kaivalya Is Yoga Nihilism ? .. . . . Yogangas.. .. . Vada...491 .. .. . .... ... .... . Powers Sawyama and Siddhis .

. .. . . .. .544 -545 545 . -553 -556 -557 559 . ... .... Mind. . . . . . .. not of Things 560 562 Pramawas Anumana in different Philosophical Schools for Others . .. . ..VESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY.. . . of Ideas. .. . . -552 553 555 ... PAGE Judgments on Indian Logic The Later Books of the Nyaya . .. .. . . .516 516 518 Word . .. . .... .. Comparison abda. . Prameyas. .... . ... . Date of Sutras Dates from Tibetan Sources .. . ... . . .. ... .. .. Atman Memory Knowledge not Eternal More Prameyas Life after Death Existence of Deity Cause and Effect Phala..... . VAI. Rewards Emancipation Knowledge Syllogism .. .. . -565 CHAPTER IX.. 546 549 549 552 . .. .. Kawada . 536 ... ..... 515 .. . Vedanta on Sphofa Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofo Nyaya on Sphoa Vaiseshika on Sphofa Indriyas. ... .. . . Senses arira. . 530 532 532 . ... .. Past. the .. . . 539 542 543 . . Upamana..-576 574 577 . . . . .. . . 520 527 Words express the Summum Genus Words expressive of Genera or Individuals? All Words mean TO ov .XXX CONTENTS. ..510 513 Time Present. .. . . The Eight Pramawas Thoughts on Language Sphofa . . . Body Manas. Future . Objects of Knowledge . ...

. ..... . ... 586 587 589 . Examined ........CONTENTS...581 ..... .. 583 584 586 586 Samanya "Vlsesha Sama>vaya Abhava The Six Systems ...... 578 578 579 580 582 582 .... .... ...... ... . ..... ............. ......... Substances Qualities XXxi PAGE Actions Cause Qualities Time Space Manas Amis or Atoms ..


such as the Seven Sages. and wise saws of every kind. were generally quoted as the utterances of certain persons or at least ascribed to certain names. but hardly any for studying the lives or characters of those who founded or supported the philosophical systems of that country. even though they contained nothing very original or personal. the simplest views of the world and of the destinies of man. Not even their dates can be ascertained with any amount of certainty. WHILE is in most countries a history of philosophy inseparable from a history of philosophers. We have some idea of who B . from the earliest times. so as to have something like a historical background. Philosophy and Philosophers. maxims of morality and worldly wisdom. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Their work has remained and continues to live to the present day. In Greece. in India we have indeed ample materials for watching the origin and growth of philosophical ideas. but of the philosophers themselves hardly anything remains to us beyond their names. nay even popular sayings.

and what we know hardly ever rests on contemporary and trustworthy evidence. they cannot find a human . We read that Thales warned King Croesus. no poet makes at large. quite true that every literary composition. we know that Socrates drank poison. with any political characters. of Gotama and Ka?iada. of Badarayawa and 6raimini. The Hindus seem to have He felt this indebtedness of the individuals to those before and around them who. grows from a soil that is ready made for him. lived at the all this is unknown our ever at to us. and no philosophical system is elaborated by the people But on the other hand. and he breathes an intellectual atmosphere which is not of his own making. we know next to nothing. but there is nothing to connect the names of the ancient Indian philosophers with any historical events. nor do I see chance of knowing more about any them than we do present. or with dates before the time of Buddha. presupposes an It is poem makes itself. the founder of the Yoga. no philosopher owes everything to himself. whether they were friends or enemies.2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Whether any of these Indian philosophers same time and in the same place. and that Anaxagoras was the friend of Pericles. they lived. that no himself. where and when but of Kapila. whether some were the pupils and others the teachers. Thales was. if far more strongly than the Greeks. whether in prose or in poetry. . we are told that Empedocles finished his days by throwing himself into the flames of Aetna. and what they did the supposed founder of the S&mkhya philosophy. individual author. and who was Plato. of Pata/l^ali.

nay even to individual poets. $rutam. 3 have recourse even to mythological arid personages in order to have a pedestal. commonly Brahman. or the Word. recognized as possessing human authority only.SRUTAM AND SMfl/TAM. but only to have seen them as they were revealed to called them by a higher power. $rutam or /Sruti came afterwards to mean what has been revealed. author. while Srmntam or Smriti comprised all that was individual. and has always been treated as the work of an whether man or god. Nor are even these fictitious poets supposed to have created or composed their poems. though many of the names of these poets are clearly fictitious. what was heard. and an authority for every great thought divine and every great invention of antiquity. Snmti or tradition might at once be overruled by what was called $ruti or revelation. from an Indian B 2 . The Hindus are satisfied with giving us the thoughts. human or divine. to observe how the revealed literature of the Hindus. $rutam and Smntam. and was not the work of men or any personal being. which really mean two periods. a name. so that if there ever was a conflict between the two. It is curious. What we call philoin its sophy systematic form. The Hindus have divided the whole of their ancient literature into two parts. and leave us to find out their antecedents as best we can. however. is. and Smr^tam. such as the hymns of the Rig-veda. exactly as we understand that word. what was remembered. have in later times been ascribed to certain families.

and followed by large commentaries or independent treatises which are supposed to contain the outcome of a continuous tradition going back to very ancient times. the large number of technical terms possessed by them in common or peculiar to each system. that they represent the last result of a long continued study of philosophy. Nor can we doubt that what I for a long time the philosophical in embodied thoughts of India were call a Mnemonic Literature. divergOne ing from and appealing to the same teacher. not revealed. period. Brahmana There is no topic within the sphere of philosophy which does not find a clear or straightforward treatment in these short Sutras. understood him. in composed We short aphorisms or Sutras or in metrical Karikas. is complete. nay even to the though in their present form they the work of medieval or modern are confessedly In the Sutras each system of philosophy writers. can leave no doubt on this subject. would be invaluable to us in other systems of philosophy. nor of antagonistic schools. thing must be quite clear to every attentive reader of these Sutras. We should always know where we and we should never hear of a philosopher who declared on his deathbed that no one had are. but belongs to Smriti or tradition. ascribed to authors of whom we hardly know anything. imperfect as it is from a literary point of view. carried on for centuries in the forests of India. namely. /Srutam. possess it in carefully and systematically elaborated manuals. to the Sutra. .4 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The ideas which are shared and hermitages by all the systems of Indian philosophy. and elaborated in its minutest details. point of view. The Sutra style. such as Hegel's or Plato's.

). the Tripkaka. about 80 B. under King Va^agamani. i. ink. singing together. but reeds. and the different parts of the Canon were not consigned to writing. but of course the inevitable chances of oral tradifor philosophy exposed to all That Mnemonic Period existed as well as for everything else. and At this time also the A^Aakatha (commentary). but an invitation was addressed to a member of the Samgha who knew the text by heart.MNEMONIC LITERATURE. e. carefully strict guarded by a peculiar and educational discipline. and settled. but only of oral and even musical repetition.C. and if we have to begin our study of Indian philosophy with the .' Such a state of things is difficult for us to imagine. c.. they caused it to be written down in books. only. rehearsed by certain individuals. we hear nothing as yet of paper. the monks. we must accustom ourselves to the idea that all that could be called literature then was mnemonic very tion. The very name of a Council was Samgiti or Mahasawgiti. and in order that the Law might endure for a long time. assembled. was unknown in India and even at the Bud- dhist Councils was when their Sacred Canon. Whenever there arose a dispute as to the true teaching of Buddha.. 5 Writing for literary purposes before the rise of Buddhism. was not settled by an appeal to any MS. It is actually mentioned that the Southern Canon was not reduced to writing till the first century B. perceiving the decay of beings (not MSS. still if we wish to form a true idea of the intellectual state of India in pre-Bud- dhistic times. Nothing can be more explicit it than the statement that point ' : the chronicles of Ceylon on Before this time the wise monks had in handed down the texts of the Tipkaka orally.

and that there will be a storm. as yet. in our sense of the word. this period is in fact the most valuable though of systematised philosophy. and that is the last stage of the Vedic period.C. Atman. and that there will be thunder and lightning to follow soon. previous to the Sutras. we are driven to admit a long familiarity with philosophic problems before the time that gave birth to the Upanishads which we possess. Period antecedent to the Upanishads. in Indian philosophy. to allow us to suppose that they were the products of one day or of one generation. Sutras. TJpanishad-period. and many more. such as Brahman. The Upanishads contain too many technical terms. these Sutras themselves as the last activity carried on must be considered outcome of a long continued philosophical by memory only. little or is electricity in the Indian mind. Even if the later systems of philosophy did not so often appeal themselves to the Upanishads . mere guesses at truth. it nothing.6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. like life and strife. that there is philosophy in As we can feel that there contains. during which we can watch something growth. I should even go a step further. as represented to us in the Upanishads. there must have been. ready made. Nay. In order to be able to account for what seem to us mere sparks of thought. on reading the Upanishads. Dharma. like For gaining an insight into the early growth of Indian philosophic thought. we feel. nay there was. Mimjimsa. Yrata. from about 700 But while the Sutras give us abstracts of the various systems of philosophy. . Yoga. B. the air. one period.

like the Ganges and the Indus. speakers of Aryan languages. philosophy was not yet separated from religion but the earliest in the . India was fertilised.UPANISHAD-PERIOD. of the at least among the races that of the best had taken possession of soil of Asia and Europe. seems always to have been not only the first religion. India. Upanishads. all starting from a vast accumulation of religious and philosophic thought of which we seem to see the last remnants only in our Upanishads. rerum . we must leave these dangerous enterprises to others. nothing would be more wel- come tribes to the historian of philosophy. J we could easily see for ourselves in though flowing very different directions. we can see the Indian mind also being nourished through ever so many channels. as well as If it is the object of philosophy to discover the causes of things. as their authorities. as has been hastily thought. For the present we must be satisfied with the germs of thought such as we find them in the Upanishads. Bhils. not only by the Ganges and Indus. If some of the seeds and germs of philosophy could be discovered. and Koles. that. It is true that during that distant period which in the archives of we can watch religion. among the savage tribes of to-day. but the first philosophy also. while the original springs are lost to us for ever. and language which reach back far beyond the Upanishads and even beyond the folklore of Khonds. but by ever so many rivers and rivulets. all pointing to the Snowy Mountains in the North. but until these have been classified according to language. these systems of philosophy can all be traced back to the same distant And as heights from which they took their rise.

law. we should be careful not to conclude at once that they must have been borrowed by one system from the other. essential that is. morals. or dii. we should carefully gather whatever there attempt to study Indian philosophy in tiated before^we of our in- its differen- and systematised systems. where we have researches. dawn. .8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. whatever tributaries it may have received afterwards. and calling them Dyaus or Agni. is Considering how small our historical information as to the intellectual and social life of India at it is different times of its history. if at a later time we nascent thought meet with the same ideas and words turning up in different systems. whether of religion or philosophy. day and night. Much formation may represent a chaos only. historical it so little to guide us in our is of great importance to remember that there was such a distant period of and that. the feeders of the idea of the Godhead. the gods ? Here are fire. the sky-god. of day and night. and calling all of them Devas. of rain and thunder. literary cover faint traces in language. earliest what was the creation of the mythological gods but an attempt to explain the causes of light. by postulating agents for every one of them. has left us no Here and there we can dis- India. Indra. monuments. the Bright. the Asvins. religion. that distant period to which we have to assign this earliest growth of language. of fire. of dawn. indicating the footBut in prints left by the strides of former giants. and philosophy. forgetting that there was an ancient reservoir of thought from which all could have drawn and drunk. but we w ant r . cognoscere causas. first Of course. thought. light or Ushas.

as they are there represented to us. The picture which these sacred books give us of the seething thoughts of that country may at first sight seem fanciful and almost incredible . which seems fully to justify the saying that India has always been a nation of philosophers. In certain chapters of the Brahmanas and in the Upanishads we see a picture of the social and intellectual life of India at that early time. but because the men of ancient India. unless they contained a certain verisimilitude It is eyes of the people ? as some quite clear that they were not composed. even think of us. it does not follow that we have not before us a faithful account of what really existed at one time in the land of the Five or Seven Rivers. provincial poet like Horace should have thought so much of ages to come. . times. not to say. that they wished to appear more ancient than more heroic. 9 such a chaos in order to understand the kosmos that followed. the scholars of The idea that the Europe. are different from Greeks and Romans and from ourselves. people seem to imagine. more They did not enlightened. or on anybody else.INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT INDIA. Intellectual Life in ancient India. We must not allow such ideas of fraud and forgery to spoil our they were. and had no word as yet for Such thoughts belong to much later posterity. and even then we wonder rather how a local. Why should these accounts have been invented. is an absurd fancy. if by tradition only. more marvellous. in order to impose after in the two thousands of years on us. ancient nations of the world wished to impose on us.

The more of themselves than If. because the energies of the people of Europe.s'vatara-upanishad ' : Whereby do we live. and on the fourth by almost impassable mountain barriers.10 faith INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and our interest in ancients thought much of the nations of the distant future. r termination directed against barbarous tribes. a country which for thousands of years was free from w ar except the war of exocean. seems incredible to us. in ancient times. particularly while there was as yet no struggle for life. times. without much effort on the part yielded in abundance all that was necessary for the support of life. and what they were intended for here on earth. should not a different kind of life have been possible in a country which. to ask who they were. they did not so very farfetched a problem. however. conBut why siderably preponderating over the latter. and whither do we go ? O ye . whence it know how or why. as far back as we know anything about them. to thoughtful people. Thus we read at the beginning of the Whence are we born ? iS'veta. as an inten- and nobles and sages in India should have been absorbed in philosophical questions seems no doubt strange to us. what the ancients tell us about their own or about the past which could never have extended very far back. the so-called sons of the soil ? After all. ancient history. finding themselves placed on this planet. which was protected on three sides by the silver streaks of the of its cultivators. That in very early times kings as possible. we should always try before first of all to understand it we reject it as impossible and tional fraud. was not they came. the former. have always been divided between practical and intellectual pursuits.

might be thought that all this was due to the elevating influence of an intellectual aristocracy. originally in the sense of a pure or unmixed breed. such as we find from very early times to the present day in India. E. the Supreme Spirit ' l ? Kshatriyas and Brahmans. 311. or the elements be considered as the cause. and was applied from about the middle of the sixteenth century by rough Portuguese sailors to certain divisions of Indian society which had struck their fancy. a Portuguese word. XX . chap. the man. and the less we avail ourselves of it . But this is by no means the case. or He who is called Purusha. the better state we shall be able to understand the true ! of society in the ancient times of India. B.. Caste is. The fact is that we have to deal in the earlier period of ancient India with two rather than with four castes and their numerous subdivisions. or chance. that is. or what fetish 1 See also Anugita. VIII. This term caste has proved most mischievous and misleading. S. of course. . II who know Brahman. or necessity. whether in pain or in pleasure ? Should time or nature. the Brahmans. To ask what caste means in India would be like asking what caste means in England. The so-called Kshatriyas or It military nobility take nearly as active a part in the intellectual life of the country as the Brahmans themselves. p. It had before been used in the sense of breed or stock.KSHATRIYAS AND BRAHMANS. In 1613 Purchas speaks of the thirty and odd several castes of the Banians (Vani</). (tell us) at whose command we abide here.

Pravara (lineage) otherwise we shall have once more the same confusion about the social organisation of ancient India as about African fetishism or North American totemism Each foreign word should (feiti9o) . 329. while the great bulk remained simply Vis or VaLvyas. and after- wards merchants and mechanics last To the very also. it should be most Otherwise every social carefully defined afresh. the three great divisions. that is. slaves. means in Portugal. its own distinction will be called caste. read as early as the Mahabhanita The three abide in the three castes thus darkness in the S'udra.VIII. to say nothing of $&pindatya or Samanodakatva. were classed as altogether outside the pale of political ] The Aryas in India were naturally differentiated like other people into an intellectual or priestly aristocracy. or. Kshatriyas. >Sudras or Dasas. Kula (family). have in India the Aryan settlers on one side. and the highest. Gotra (race). 6rati (kith). the Kshatriyas. in the ' 1 Thus we : Brahmami. and the native inhabitants on the other. E. the Brahmans. cultivators of the soil which they had conquered the latter. while the races of indigenous origin who remained hostile to the end. if submissive to their conquerors.. Brahmans. B. The We former are named Aryas or Aryas. are the .) . goodness. ! always be kept to native meaning.' (Anugita. that is. or ruling aristocracy. p. What we really want to know is what was implied by such Indian words as Varaa (colour). every idol a fetish. householders and cultivators of the soil. S. qualities passion in the Kshatriya. and a fighting society. every stick a totem. if generalised for scientific purposes.12 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

division into Aryas and Dasas was due to descent. in the ordinary occupations of The later subdivision civilisation. In ancient times neither Kshatriyas nor Vaisyas were excluded from taking part in those religious and philosophical struggles.CASTES. Originally they were all of them called twice-born. roots. under different forms to the present day. that into Brahmans.' ^i I ^ have been due to occupation only. does not concern us for our present purpose. The lessons as described by Manu. Nay women also claimed a right to be . and the Vaisyas represented originally the undifterentiated mass of the people. of sages who dwell in forests and live 011 fruits. engaged an incipient of Indian society. Kshatriyas. and are buried at present under a heavy heap of rubbish. and Vaisyas seems for all.VIII. which seem to have occupied India far more than wars of defence or conquest.. and not only allowed.) While the (Anugita. Bisley and others. The Brahmans had to look after the originally to welfare of souls. and air is prescribed for the three twice-born ' : (classes) . Still even that rubbish heap deserves to be sifted.E. as I believe it is now being sifted by scholars like Mr. Thus we read in the Mahabharata The order of Vanaprasthas. the Kshatriyas after the welfare of the body politic. and as preserved which the names of Varwa (colour) and G&ti (genus) teach us had long been forgotten even in Manu's time. is prescribed B. but obliged to be educated in Vedic knowledge and to pass through the three or four Asramas or stages of life. 13 and Vaisyas. p. the order of householders S. though it may soon have acquired an hereditary character. 316. shared certain privileges and duties in common.

14 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. He was a king ). Up. from a social and political point and was against the privileges of teaching sacrificing. life we look back once more to the intellectual of India in the ancient Vedic times. was Mithila. is represented to us in later times as the famous wife of Rama (Ramapurvatap.). not so much as a brave knight. Ar. of the Videhas. A^atasatru. we must not forget that Buddha also was a Kshatriya. Ganaka. as bestowing his patronage on the most eminent sages of his kingdom. successful We read of him as taking part in metaphysical discussions. and that his chief opposition. claimed by the Brahmans as their exclusive property. Besides. i i daughter. and they occasionally asserted it with great force and dignity. Sita. i Brih. But in the Upanishads he is represented. victorious in chivalrous tournaments. heard in their philosophical assemblies. II. of view. a prince of Kapilavastu. or at least in the times represented to us in the Upanishads. one of the most famous philosophical teachers of . and against the infallible and divine character ascribed by them to their Vedas. his capital and wide (Kaush. The Kshatriyas never surrendered their right to take part problems of life and death. Up. The Evidence If of the Upanishads. . the strong reaction in the discussions of the great for against priestly supremacy came at last from them. as the friend of Yagwavalkya. and his far . whose at the time when the Upanishads were composed had already spread Up. as presiding over philosophical councils. IV. not as a general or conqueror. we fame read there of an ancient King kanaka.

his Atman his ear space. such as Gargi. As Yagwavalkya claimed these cows on account of his superior knowledge. the other Brahmans present propounded a number of questions which he was expected to answer in order to prove his superiority. such When Yagwavalkya. who is the deity that shall swallow death ? What becomes of the vital spirits when man dies ? What is it that does not forsake man in the hour of death ? What becomes of man after his speech at death has entered the a fire. Artabhaga. his mind the moon. Up. i. the ether. Ar. the daughter of VMaknu To (Brih. the victor in these disputations the king promised as a reward of a thousand cows with ten padas of gold fixed to their horns. the hairs of his body the herbs. Asvala. While death swallows the whole world.KING GANAKA. What is important 1 Kaushitaki Up. i . And so he does. Ill. his breath the wind. his body the earth. his blood and seed the waters ? Whither did the descendants of King Parikshit go ? contains the worlds 1 yet is What is the soul ? What and from it Who rules everything ? different from everything Far be me to say that these and other questions were answered by Yagwavalkya in a manner that would seem satisfactory to ourselves. The first question is how a man who offers a sacrifice can be freed thereby from the fetters of death. modyam. Then follow questions such as. 15 1 performing a great this king sets apart a day for a Brahsacrifice. and even women. Up. Ill. IV. Bhh. Ar. the Upanishad period. a disputation in which philosophers. take an active part. 5). the hair of his head the trees. . i. his eye the sun.

' another feature. in these public assemblies not only was a royal reward bestowed on the victor. question which. and royal rewards bestowed on Do we know those who were ? victorious in these philosophical tournaments of the sayings of kanaka has remained One famous in Indian literature for ever. retired into a private place in order to come to an understanding about they thought. that. Ar.C. namely. neither Achilles nor Ulysses would have shone in them. a time previous to the establishment of Buddha's religion in India. to us at in the fifth century B. While Mithila is burning. as not admit of being discussed one of any other country where at that time such religious congresses would have early been thought of. That these disputations took place in public and in the presence of the doubt. and that his answers should have satisfied his contemporaries. there king we have no reason to is one passage (Brih. ' When is burnt. unless it were in Egypt. Ya^/navalkya and Artabhaga. Mithila. his capital. and deserves was destroyed by a conflagration. Up. There is no other country in the world where in such ancient times such disputations would have been thought of. Neither Menelaos nor Priam would have presided over them. did in public. he turned round and said. 13) where we are told expressly that the two disputants. but the vanquished was Very curious is . public discussion at that early time. Ill. nothing that is mine to remain so.. 2. Besides.l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is that such questions should have been asked that they should have formed the staple of all.

Ill. statements. is (Brih. Must we withhold our belief from such III. Ar. Up. 4. It true we meet in the everywhere in ancient times. to by 'to burst/ and not the causative by 'to make fall off/ 'to burst' have been vipaf? cut off. between Indra and Pratardana.e. because we have learnt to doubt the burnt hand of Mucius Scaevola and the suicide of Lucretia ? I believe not. call all this call it We may exaggerated. we also read of private conferences in which Ya^/lavalkya enlightens and after receiving every kind of present from him is told at last that the king gives him the whole of his kingdom.) they had sounded as in- credible in India itself as they sound to us. 26). it does not follow that the great gatherings of Indian sages find such as we presided over by their kings should be equally 1 I translate vipat by 'to fall off/ not i. 2 3 . in the case of $akalya (Brih. 9. we are told. between Pra. Would C . the god of death. 17 Nor sometimes threatened with losing his head was this a threat only. between Sanatkumara. Up. surrenders himself to him as his slave. and Narada. and Viro&ana. for such stories would hardly if have been invented.KING KANAKA. between Yama. but it actually happened.f/apati. but we have no right to mere invention. l . Upanishads with philosophical dialogues between gods and men also. the representative of the Brahmans. for the cases are not quite parallel. IV. i. and Na&iketas. the typical warrior deity. Besides these public disputations. But though these are naturally mere inventions. such as Kaush. Indra. nay his royal patron 6ranaka.

VII. in order to secure his But though this may have been the original relation between Brahmans and Kshatriyas. 2 Brfli. . however. I relation do not mean. Ar/atasatru was king of Kasi (Benares). as he appeals to his fame as widely established. the warrior class had evidently from a very early time produced a number of independent thinkers who were able to 1 2 Kaushitaki Up. till at last the India was that which king has to offer him not only gold and land (the Raikvapama villages in the shas) but his own amity and his instruction. When he has convinced Balaki of the insufficiency of the information which this learned Brahman had volunteered to impart to him. 2. Up. i). a certain have a record of another disputation between a King Af/atasatru and the Brahman Balaki. and here again it is the king who has to teach the We Brahman. foundation in fact. (/tfmnd. Up. II. i. Even imagination requires imaginary. country of the Mahav?^'daughter. IV.l8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to deny that originally the between the kings and the sages of ancient in we see represented. Brahman Raikva. not vice versa. See also the dialogue between Sanatkumara and Narada . the proud Brahman actually declares himself the pupil of the king 2 . and remained so to the time represented by Manu's Law-book. for inthe case of King 6r4nasruti and the stance. and must have been later than kanaka. who contemptuously rejects all offers of friendship from the king. Ar.

leave the period represented by the and turn our eyes to that which follows Upanishads. as represented to us in the Sacred writings of the Buddhists. and which is marked by the rise and growth of Buddhism. naturally in the course of his studies and teacher himself. gives up is instructed by the sage >Sakayanya.. of eminent we see a number Brahmans approaching King Asvapati and making themselves his pupils. Buddhist Period. The Kaikeya. we know at all events that it was reduced to writing in the first century before our era. In the Maitra- King Br^hadratha who and kingdom. V. during the reign of Asoka. grapple with and to hold their 19 own against the to them particularly priests. What is our Self and what is Brahman (V. 1 1 i ) ? and this question the king was supposed to be able to answer better than any of the Brahmans. we may therefore safely accept its descriptions as us a true picture of what took place in India giving c 2 . in their in one subject.C. in the TTAand. and cited. though not written down. question which they discuss is. Though there is every reason to suppose that their sacred When we the original text of the Tripifaka. . the yawa-upanishad we read his Self.BUDDHIST PERIOD. namely. whose name may contain the first allusion to $akas and their of retires into the forest. descendants in India. knowledge of the Atman. belongs to the third century B. nay. Up. who were superior as we are told. Such a royal pupil would become a sage 1 1 Again. we find no very sudden change in the intellectual life of the country. and was settled and recode.

soon as Buddhism arose Vedism disappeared from soil of India. including kings and nobles. however.C. we are probably not far wrong if we look upon the doctrines which he gave form and life. who actually gave up his palace and made himself a beggar. and even of the Buddhist laity. if we consider that Buddha died about 477 B. We have no reason to doubt that some of the later Upanishads were composed long after King A.soka had extended his We the patronage to the Buddhist fraternity. for if we of may retain name the young prince Kapilavastu. as represented originally by one of the many schools of thought which were springing up in India during the period of the Upanishads. even in its latest offshoots. at all events with the very peculiar names of these literary com- must not. Buddha. his ambition was to found His object was to induce people to withdraw from the world and to live a life of abstinence and meditation in hermitages or mona society. suppose that as positions. when highest importance that the Buddhists at the time their Suttas were composed. may seem to us at first . India is a large country. however. Nay. It seems to me a fact of the the Upanishads. while Buddhism was slowly but surely supplanting the religion of the Veda. asteries. was not satisfied with teaching a philosophy. were acquainted with the Upanishads and the Sutras. and Vedism may have continued to flourish in the West while Buddhism was gaining its wonderful triumphs in the East and the South.. new The description of the daily life of these Buddhist monks.20 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and which became later on the to feeders of what are that called in India the six great systems of philosophy.

Brahma-<7ala-sutta. but have were very creditable for the now been superseded.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. the read in the Tripkaka. such as. sight as incredible as 21 before in the what we saw Upanishads. for instance. We in the Veda and the followers of Buddha formed compact bodies. showing the same respect and veneration to this poor monk We asking him any questions or making any Bante or Lord is the title by suggestions to him. the followers of Buddha. and now forming part of the Buddhist l canon. i. we cannot do better than consult one of the many Suttas or sermons. supposed to have been preached by Buddha himself. drawing near to Buddha and sitting down respect- We fully 'at one side before venturing to ask him a read question (Samyutta Nikaya III. likewise of King Bimbisara. of Kosala. of Magadha. before which the paramount sovereigns of India address these mendicants. hardly have been so. when they were made. If we want to get an idea of the immense wealth and variety of philosophic thought by which Buddha found himself surrounded on every side. each being held together by generBut this can ally recognised articles of faith. the sacred code of Buddhists. by Grim1876). . as we read in the Brahma(/ala-sutta that even among the disciples who 1 We Ehys time possess now an excellent translation of this Sutta by Davids. The earlier translations by Gogerly. of King Prasenagdt. 4). Prasena#it and Bimbisara. the Brahma-^ala-sutta are too apt to imagine that both the believers . blot (Sept Suttas Palis.

such as Suppiya. other by religious hatred. and he who eminent in knowledge and virtue is even by is most Buddha dis- himself called is ' a true Brahma?*a. followed Buddha. such as the Vedanta and Samkhya. In the Brahma-iyala-sutta. spoke in support of Buddha. with many subdivisions. were but seldom inflamed against each i. the two are constantly addressed together by Buddha. though they differed. and We must divided the whole of India between themselves. Buddha mentions no less than sixty-two of them. Brahmawa is often used by him as a mere expression of high social rank.' Brahman with us first caste. which. though standing himself above them all. particularly when philosophical questions are discussed. spoke openly against all the three. in e.22 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. we can discover the faint traces of some of the schools of philosophy which we shall have to examine hereafter. in support of his doctrines and while others. as far as their daily life and outward ceremonial were concerned. meaning either a member of the orone belonging to the three castes of the twice-born Aryas. such as Brahmadatta. the net of Brahma. which all philosophical theories are supposed to have been caught like so many fishes. some. often used in two senses which should be kept tinct. . and claims to be acquainted with every one of them. Their relation was not originally very different from that between different systems of philosophy. and Samanas or Buddhists. Though there was a clear line of demarcation between Brahmans his disciples. try to get rid of the idea that Brahmans and Buddhists were always at daggers drawn. who are under the spiritual sway of the Brahmans.

and partly not. we are are eternalists. but it was empty. Living creatures transmigrate. they and the world. including their names. the Lord of all. is The soul. p. he became dissatisfied and longed for other from the World of Light. translated by Khys Davids. But he who had come first began to think that he was Brahma. eternal. And just then other beings fell 1 2 Brahma-#ala-sutta. . peak. them radiating light. and there then be beings reborn in the World of Light (Abhassara). 26 seq. giving birth to is steadfast as a mountain nothing new. who profess to be able to remember an endless succession of former births. there appeared (they say) the palace of Brahma. and their former dwelling-places. After remaining there in perfect joy for a longperiod. feeding on joy. but not with regard to others. account of how people began to believe in one personal Supreme Being. the Ruler. Then a certain being fell from the World of Light and came to life in the palace of Brahma. and who proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal 2 They told 1 . made of mind only. .BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. the Supreme. in all respects like him. When the world-system began to re-evolve. There are some Samanas and Brahmans who are with regard to some things. or in the ordinary God. traversing the air and continuing in Here follows a most peculiar glory for a long time. but they are for ever and declare. ever. This would be like the asvata-vada. beings. their lineage. 23 There are some Samanas and Brahmans. According eternalists to will this world-system will pass away. They hold that the soul and the world are partly eternal.

Nay. neuter. and it was thought that this Brahmcl must be eternal and remain for ever. and limited in duration of life. Lastly. They maintain Next follows either that the world or that it is is finite or that it is infinite. and who set forth the infinity and finiteness of the world. . immutable. The other beings he looked upon as created by himself. they had come. tongue. that it neither finite nor infinite. while others who are free from such failings remain steadfast. the Ancient of days. masc. the Maker and all Father of Creator. and eternal. and body form an impermanent Self. This Brahma reminds one of the Isvara of the Samkhya and other philosophies. while others who abstain from such indulgences remain steadfast. because he was there first and they came after him. and eternal. ear. must be distinguished from Brahma. because as soon as he had wished for them. immutable. the that are and are to be. nose. that there are certain gods so full of envy that their bodies become feeble and their mind imbecile. while those who came after him were impermanent. while heart or mind or consciousness form a permanent Self. and therefore will remain for ever steadfast.. infinite in height and depth. mutable. but is finite in lateral extension. these beings themselves also thought that he must be the Supreme Brahma. Again. and eternal. These fall from their divine state. immutable. some Sam anas and Brahmans are led to the conclusion that eye. another class of speculators who are called Antanantikas. or lastly. Then we are told that there are some gods who spend their lives in sexual pleasures and then fall from their divine state.24 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which as Brahma.

They will not admit any difference between good and bad. there are Samanas and Brahmans who hold that everything. p. or a cause. Some maintain that the conscious soul after death has form. Those who hold to this are called wriggling eels. often taking refuge It that Buddha himself was in Agnosticism or the Ae/mlnavada 1 . M. 105. that there is is chance in the world or that there not. others that ] it has no form.. the soul and the world. that man continues after death or that he does not. others again Keligion. is would seem. took the same view. 25 The next description of the various theories held by either Samanas or Brahmanas seems to refer to what is known as the Sy4dv ada. often disinclined to commit himself on some of the great questions of philosophy and religion. M. and they will not commit themselves to saying that there another world or that there is not. Natural . that anything has a result or reward or that it has not. the founder of (rainism. because they can remember that formerly they were not and now because they prove by means of logic that the soul and the whole world arose without they are. Next. but they differ on several points regarding this conscious existence. He was often in fact an agnostic on points which he considered beyond the grasp of the human mind. who Furthermore. and Mahavira. are accidental and without a cause.BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. there are Samanas and Brahmans hold and defend the doctrine of a conscious existence after death. the theory that t everything may be or may not be. according to some of the Suttas.

it is held that the soul after death happy. is both or is neither. Against this view. and others that it neither has nor has not form. and while in that state form. and have in their general outlines been traced back to some of the teachers of Buddha. both Again. has and has not. There are. such as Alara Kalama. happiness in this salvation soul is is and maintain that complete here on earth. or no form. others that it is infinite. and that therefore the highest Nirvana consists in putting away all sensuous delights and entering into the first (VMna.. they call that Against this view. the senses. it is asserted that such happiness involves reasoning. there are some Samanas and Brahmans who teach the entire annihilation of all living beings. has and has not. that is. are the it is highest Nirvana. c.26 that it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1. Their arguments are various. or neither . however. i. that it is finite. that has various modes consciousness. and is thereKhys Davids. p. Thus when the possible in perfect enjoyment of the five pleasures of life. Some say that others it it it has one mode of conof sciousness. Some say it is finite. a state of joy born of seclusion and followed by reflection and meditation. again. e. has nor has not form or neither. others that Lastly. said that sensuous delights transitory and always involve pain. is has limited. 48. is however. Uddalaka and others They uphold the doctrine of l . that it is both and that it is neither. others who say that the soul after death has either unconscious. others that it has unlimited consciousness. is miserable. . Dhyana. infinite.

fore gross. birth. The very dwelling of the mind on care and joy is declared to be gross. as if the philosophical of Buddha himself was so very different at teaching . which produce desire. and true Nirvana can only consist in total absence of all longing after joy and thus entering into the third 6rMna. disease. and to impart the truth that leads to true Nirvana. misery. grief. true Buddhist. while the highest 27 when Nirvana can only arise has been conquered and the soul reasoning has entered the second 6rAana. existence. pain. because any sense ofjoy must be gross. while Buddha alone is able to cut off the root of all error and all misery. reproduction. arranged into two classes so far as they are concerned either with the past or with the future of the soul the soul. death. a state of elevation and But even this does not satisfy the internal calm. attachment. weeping. serene and thoughtful.BKAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. are condemned by him as arising from the deceptive perceptions of the senses. indeed. Lastly. being always taken for granted. a state of self-possession and complete equanimity. a state of joy. born of all serenity without reasoning. By division and subdivision there are said to be sixty-two theories. though well known by Buddha. sorrow. and theories. This abstract may give an idea of the variety of philosophical opinions which were held in India at The Brahmaor even before the time of Buddha. and the final Nirvana is said to be reached in the fourth 6rMna only. even this is outbidden. and therefore. It does not seem. (/ala-sutta professes that all speculations about the past and the future are included in this Sutta of the net of Brahma. The extraordinary part is that in the end all these . as it seems.

all springing from the same summit. Some say . into full details. Some destroyed and others that there say everything is doubtful . containing descriptions of the philosophical then flourishing in India. from that of other schools which had flourished before and during his lifetime in India nay. we can . Some is no doubt. that it exists. we by the great. Karikas and Sutras. too.28 first INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of philosophical schools it shows at differed all events be gathered from other how large a number how they was in existence then. often perceive clear traces of a distant relationship between Buddhism and the six orthodox systems of Like streams. If now we compare one sects in the of the numerous passages Mahabharata. Some say the permanent principle is impermanent. as has been so often supposed in the case particularly of Buddhism in its relation to the Sa??ikhya philosophy. and others. and others that it exists and does not exist. that one channel of thought was derived from another. chap. similarity between their statements and those which we have just read in the Buddhist Brahma-r/ala-sutta. which as known to us from the Though the Brahma-^ala-sutta does not enter may Suttas. almost verbal. is We piety remains after the body some say that it is not so. and from each other on some very Mahabharata. . essential points. they run on irrigating the same expanse of country without proving in the least philosophy. XXIV observe the various forms of piety to be as it were contradictory. ' : shall be struck Thus we read in the Anugita.

and others for indigence. . say the . without any covering. Some are for taking food others are intent on fasting. say the Saugatas or Buddhists. whatever the date of our Mahabharata may be. the great teachers. Brahman as possessed of quali- they are distinct. the ego and non-ego are two different principles. but . ' that the Self exists is. but only momentarily.MAHABHARATA. .' . . say the Uc/ulomas they are one. . Knowledge is one. he says. Some have matted hair and skins and some are clean-shaven and . . and others that it is not so. say it it 29 is of one form or twofold. body is is lost others.' This last can only refer to the followers of Buddha. r hold the contrary. . after the ' Some hold. who know Brahman and one . Some people are for bathing some for the omission of bathing. Some say both time and space exist. such is the view of the . Mimamsakas nothing exists. Some extol final emancipation and various kinds of enjoyments some wish for riches. that the Lokayatas or .TTarvakas. Some people extol actions. that of the Tairthikas. too. who hold that special acts are the cause (of everything) manifold they are. say the /Simyavadins something exists. perceive the truth. believe that it is others that it is distinct and others again that it is manifold. say other Mimamsakas. and others tranquillity. Some Brahmawas. dins (] . thus say the YogaMras they are mixed. . Everything is doubtful. say the atomists time and space . Everything is impermanent. the view of the Satyavadins (Syadvanothing is doubtful.' The commentator Nilakan^Aa refers all these remarks to certain sects known to us from other ' . worshippers of the ties . and others that is mixed. it is thus say the Tarkikas permanent. sources.

far more than his doctrine. a man who made a new epoch in the growth of Indian philosophy. Buddha. is are the ancient philosophers the rule of the Naish^Aika BrahmaMrins bathing that of the householders.' Thus both from Buddhistic and Bran manic sources we learn the same fact. as preaching a new gospel to the poor. His teaching must have acted like a weir across a swollen river. such as he is described to us in the Suttas. but a real power in the history of India. first. not a mere name. I cannot that it was Buddha's marked personhelp thinking ality. Those so. that what all. they is not say the astrologers. real existence at omission to bathe . that great influence on his contemporaries many generations after his death. there must have been Whether he some one. gave him the and on so existed or not. And no if we consider that Buddha was a prince or nobleman who gave up whatever there w as of outward splendour pertaining to his rank. He need not have been a powerful prince. but rather philosophy. as some have imagined.30 IXDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the existence of a large number of religious and philosophical sects in the ancient days of India. of the midst of this whirlpool of philosophical opinions there rises the form of Buddha. and still more of Indian religion and ethics. calling for Out a hearing. are. at new not as the herald of any brand which he has to teach. 1 who say that it we see has no . wonder. that is to say. r Does not this refer to the solemn bathing which is the first step towards the stage of u Gr/hastha or independent householder ? 1 .

at a later time. like Devanam priya. he was a Kshatriya.BUDDHA. but consulted his own time. a privilege that had always been recognised as belonging to those only who were Brahmans by birth. the coincidence title name is ' . this is the same Agdtasatru. i. to him on what he ought Buddha It has been supposed by some scholars that to do. note. B. and the very fact making himself a popular teacher and religious reformer attracted attention as a social anomaly in the eyes of the people.s'atru. silenced the Brahman Balaki (Kaush. was that he had arrogated to himself the privilege of being We a teacher. He. and it does not appear that he and his house had any suzerain over them. who were Brahmans by birth.' should be taken. of his Like several of the philosophers in the Upanishads. At all events. XI. a Videha princess. and requires further explanation. p. IV. cer- tainly striking. Curiously enough one of these kings has the name of A(/atasatru. a name well known to us from the Upanishads. as a general ' However of royalty. E. sends two of his ministers. i. Tripkaka also. 2. But. so in the see that. enemy. . see in fact that one of the principal accusations brought against him. 31 but he belonged to the royal class. kings appear as friends and 1 we S. by the kings of the son of Vaidehi. king of Kasi (or Benares). e.. as in the Upanishads. Up. i). as we saw in the Upanishads. not as a proper that may be. we find Buddha also not only patronised. A(/ata. but likewise the counsellors of princes. in order to consult without an according to others. And as these Brahmans had always been not only the teachers of the people. who.

There is in this respect a clear continuity between the Upanishads and the earliest appearance of Buddhism and if some of the tenets and technical terms of the Buddhists also are the same as those of the Hindu schools of philosophy. king of Kosala. but if this shows that they are post-Buddhistic. the turning of the wheel from the same source. long before he had become recognised as the founder of a new they take a prominent part in public convened for discussing the great problems assemblies. monk was clearly prefigured in the Parivra//aka or itinerant mendicant of the Upanishads (B?~ih. and Prasena^it. Upanishads. to beg. without Bhiksh. l . XVII 'You : arc the one person to turn which is the Brahman. religion. Buddha. or afterwards for settling the canon of their religious texts.' . patrons of a philosopher. such as Buddha. Nirvana. little difficulty in accounting for this as for the conThe Buddhist tinuity between Sanskrit and Pali. as the awakened and 5). chap. it suggests at the same time that the old Upanishads must have been pre-Buddhistic. and which is this wheel. could hardly be understood without the previous employments of the root Budh in the Veda nor Bhikshu. and which does not turn hack. king of Magadha. the nave of checked by the quality of goodness as its circumference. and possibly 7\akrapraalso is taken vartana. Anugita. Para gati. The best known are Bimbisara. beggar. the spoke the understanding. But though Buddhism and the Upanishads share 1 Cf. enlightened. it is true.32 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. there would be as . is taken from the dictionary of the Upanishads. that of religion and philosophy. in the The name of . occurs in later Upanishads only. Ill. the highest goal.

the old saying that the Indians are a nation of philosophers would seem to have never been so true as at the time of the great . the India at the time of Buddha would seem D . if whole of once more to have been absorbed in religion and philosophy nay. Buddhism in its practical working produced a complete social revolution in India. Though kings and noblemen who had embraced the doctrines of Buddha were not obliged to become actual mendicants and join the fraternity. classes could jt>in the Buddhist fraternity. without reference to his birth. In fact. Though it did not abolish caste. if only he was of good report and free from certain civil disabilities. Anybody. without any of that previous discipline which was required from a Brahman. in villages or towns. they seem to have been re- ceived with splendid hospitality. including a public cussion. and of wealthy persons such as AnathaWhenever the Buddhist friars appeared pmcftka. he was free from all family ties and allowed to support himself by charitable gifts (Bhiksha). as we see in the case of the kings already mentioned. we may judge from the Tripifcika. He could then become an itinerant (Parivra^aka) friar. and the arrival of Buddha himself with his six hundred or more disciples was generally made the occasion of great sermon. 33 things in common which point back to the same distant antiquity. a public dis- rejoicings. and other entertainments of a less spiritual character. Once a member of the Samgha. it led to a mixture of which had formerly been kept more carefully distinct. as has many sometimes been supposed.BUDDHA. they could become patrons and lay sympathisers (Upasakas).

. in its earlier elements. . no doubt. took the warmest It is interest in the proceedings of that Council. represented by schools and sects striving against each other. Nor have are the scant accounts which the Greeks left us of what they saw during and after the invasion of India by Alexander the Great at variance with what we learn from these native Nothing struck the Greeks so much as the philosophical spirit which seemed to pervade authorities. We among the Brahmans as among the Buddhists with an immense variety of philosophical and religious thought. period. There never was such a thing as a state-religion in India. perhaps too much to say that he made Buddhism the state-religion of India.34 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Buddhist Councils. to the new brotherhood founded by Buddha. Greek Accounts. It might be objected.C. 242 B. Asoka certainly extended his patronage. but by serious argumentation. events. at all may we be assigned to the same Buddhistic meet get just the same picture. This Asoka. even that of Asoka. held. like kanaka of old. Mahabharata which. formerly confined to Brahman s only. not yet by persecution. at Vaisali. but there was nothing in India corre- sponding to a Defender of the Faith. at and later on at the new residence of Asoka. Pateliputra. we are told. are onesided and exaggerated but when we consult the . that the authorities on which we have to rely for a description of the intellectual state of India at the time of these Councils.

D 2 . like 6ranaka municated. the members of the third Asrama who had to live in the forest. 35 When Megasthenes 1 the that mysterious country. . ambassador of Seleucus Nicator at the court of . adds that they neither live in cities nor even in houses./Tandragupta (Sandrocottus). W. subsisting on leaves and wild fruits. by J. however much they may have differed in their philosophical His Hylobioi or forestand religious opinions. or in later Ancient India. and lie on beds within ' They abstain from animal food and sexual pleasures. and give themselves up to asceticism as if their and meditation. Even we see described in the Upaniname did not tell us. i.. Prasena^/it and Bimbisara. we are distinctly informed that they lived in the forest. at a certain distance from their villages.sized enclosures. their knowledge to such as will listen to them. 1877. c Crindle. and wore garments made and 1 2 of the bark of trees (Valkala) -. the members of the Buddhist brotherhood who then seemed to have lived most amicably with the Brahmans. M p.GREEK ACCOUNTS.C. describes what he saw in India in the third century B. such shads. p.. he speaks of gymnosophists living on mountains or in the plains. They he writes. have generally been accepted as representing the /Sramanas or Samanas. 97 seq. They comwe are told. with kings. dwellers are probably meant for the Brah manic Vanaprasthas. who. Strom. A(/atas'atru.' having their abode in groves in front of moderate. 'in a simple style. and spend their time in listening to serious discourse and in imparting of rushes or skins. cities live. Nothing at least is said of any personal enmity between them. Clement Alex. 305.' The so-called $armanas mentioned by Megasthenes.

times King Harsha. remaining for whole days motionless in a fixed attitude. though there are early coins. and by enduring pain. for no one else can have been meant by Clement. Clement of Alexandria. The most important among them visited India from was Hiouen-thsang who 629 to . saw Buddhism century. and this also in perfect accordance with what we have hitherto learnt about India as the home of philosophers. Beginning with the fourth century of our era. adds at the end that there are also philosophers in India who follow the precepts of Butta. both by undergoing active toil. Some pendent centuries later we have another and is inde- source of information on the intellectual state of India. such as Fa-hian. that is. Hiouen-thsang. Chinese Buddhists who made their pilgrimages to India. This is Greek mention of Buddha. which point to Greek influence. as to their Holy Land. Buddhist Pilgrims. witnessed alreadv the evident simis c? decline. at the time when what I call the Renaissance of Sanskrit literature and national independence began. with the figure and name of Boddo. described to us the state of the country such as they saw it. those who came of its flourishing in the fifth later in the sixth and / seventh centuries.36 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Those who came early. consulted them by messengers regarding the causes of things. after repeating all this. We are also the first told that these philosophers practised fortitude. The name was never mentioned by Alexander's companions. whom they honour as a god on account of his extraordinary holiness. and who through them worshipped and supplicated their gods.

1 Memoires sur les Contrees Occidentales. we are told. seems to have been in his heart a Buddhist. assembled the >Srama^as from different kingdoms. 645. whether followers of the Vedas or of Buddha. Every year he '. commonly called $ri-Harsha of Kanyakub^a. having studied the Buddhist writings under some of the most illustrious teachers of the time. who by this time had made himself a proficient Sanskrit scholar and Buddhist theologian. Twenty kings were gathered there. was allowed to eat flesh in his dominions. and the king himself was present to judge of their learning and their good behaviour. was invited by the king to be present at one of these great assemblies. Julien. 251 seq. . This travels and whose king. the schools of the most illustrious teachers whose lectures he attended. and whoever had killed He built a living thing was himself put to death many hospitals and monasteries. i. p. Stanislas Julien. He describes the Buddhist monasteries scattered all over the country. Each disputant had his chair. and their public assemblies. 37 have been translated by my late friend. on the southern bank of the Ganges. and made them discuss in his presence the most important points of Buddha's doctrine. No one can doubt the trustworthiness of this witness. is who though he bestowed his patronage and protection on all sects alike.CHINESE ACCOUNTS. particularly those that took place at the court of /S'iladitya Harshavardhana 610-650. described as having conquered the five Indias. No one. though he may have been deceived in some of his observations. each bringing with him both $ramanas and Brahmanas. Hiouen-thsang. and entertained many Buddhist friars at his own expense.

excited the anger of some Brahmans who were present. escaped. They tried to set fire to the camp and the magnificent buildings erected by the And when they failed in this. Hiouen-thsang himself seems to have taken an active part in this who Congress of Religion. however. While in other countries the people at large cared more for their national heroes. the interest the great problems of humanity here on earth.' After reasonable deductions. at This gives us the first idea of what that time religious persecution meant on the These part of Buddhists as well as of Brahmans. and every day rich it alms were bestowed on the $ramanas. and forgave the would-be assassin. as celebrated in their in epic poetry on account of their acts of bravery or cunning. hired an assassin to kill the monarch.38 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. This. large A camp was constructed. Its kings surrounded themselves witli a court of sages rather than of warriors. but exiled a large number of Brahmans from his kingdom. The king. one dominant interest pervaded the whole country. and I still believe it was he is mentioned by his Sanskrit name as Moksha' ' deva or as the all ' Master of the Tripiteka. most of them of a priestly rather than a warrior remained true to its character. and the people at large developed and strengthened their old taste for origin. such as we should making make in the case of the descriptions of any enthusiastic witness. they actually king. as would seem. but they cannot be altogether denied. persecutions may have been exaggerated. enough seems to me to remain to show that from the time of the Upanishads to the time of Hiouen-thsang's sojourn in India. India under the sway of its Vedic poets. .

. as described Bhagavad-gita. in the KHstma was of Kshatriya himself. The two great worship is epic poems are there to testify that hero- human heart. was a warrior. strange to say. and the Hindus. and is not extinct even at the Of course. India is large We must not forget that even in the Vedic hymns Indra. India a nation of philosophers. If the account spiritual state of India at the 1 given by Hiouen-thsang of the time of his visit See Dahlmann. the hero of the Bhagavad-gita. King Harsha. l . the most popular of their gods. But many even of these epic innate in the heroes have a tinge of philosophical sadness about them. and that in early days men and even women will place muscle higher than brain. the poetical form of what we should call epic poems. is at the same time the recipient of the highest wisdom communicated to him by KHshna. Dharmasastra and to a certain extent it may have fulfilled that purpose. enough for many phases of thought. and Argoma. class also had their and that their achievements also excited the interest of the people. speak of their Mahabharata as a Law-book. if we call the people of present day.KING HARSHA. that the Sanskrit language has no w ord for epic Itihasa refers to the matter rather than to poetry. origin. Das Mahabharata. 39 dured religious and philosophical problems that has enfor centuries. and was looked upon as r It is curious the very incarnation of the Deity. the greatest among them. this is not meant to deny that the warrior popular heroes.

translated by Cowull and Thomas.40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. incurring thereby the displeasure In the Harsha-/rarita' of the king or of his friends. of Hiouen-thsang. to feel convinced of the faithfulness of his account. and we feel doubtful sometimes which of the two he favoured most in Brahmanism his his own mind. the king perceived a large Harsha-frarita. as it would seem. While still at a distance from the holy man's abode. pay his respects to a sage of the name of Divakara. . for instance. we hear very little or The king in himself. and obeying the orders of the same king. but of violent persecutions by one side or the other. attended by only a few of his vassals. his stay at the court of and of Harsha should seem to be tinged too Buddhist priest. as living together apparently in perfect peace. but Bai^a also. p. 235. or of excommunications and massacres. the king is represented to us as entering a large forest. whether followers of Buddha or of the Veda. the friend and patron tolerated both Buddhism and realm. the king leaves his ing suite behind arid proceeds on foot. When approachthe abode of the sage. nothing. We see him. represents to us the different schools and teachers. but had been converted to Buddha's doctrine. They would naturally discuss their differences and exchange opinions on points on which they were agreed or opposed to each other. much by the sentiments of the we have only to consult the history of Harsha as written in Sanskrit by Ba/ia. though not a Buddhist. surrounded by his retinue. No doubt Hiouen-thsang looked at India with the eyes of a follower of Buddha. without. who had been by birth and education a Brahman.

adepts in sacrifices requiring seven priests. followers of Krishna (Bhagavatas). assayers of metals (?). Lokayatikas (atheists). students of the Purcbias. from cities. We cannot dissociate intellectual schools. I a always the same from century to century ? Such life as here described may seem very strange to us. . and others beside. raising doubts. the real life of India was not lived in However. 6rainas in white robes creepers. pondering. life from palaces. Now in the ask once more. is there any other country world of which a similar account could be given. all diligently following their own tenets. students of legal institutes. museums. 6rainas. followers of the Pa/l/taratras. 4! number of 'Buddhists from various provinces. Even at present it should be remembered that towns are the exception in India. or squatting on the roots of trees. it would seem. devotees dead to all passions.with mendicants (Bhikshus orParivra#akas).KING HARSH A. towns. adepts in grammar. and that the vast majority of universities. urging objections. but that is our fault. ($vetambaras). giving etymologies. religious students (Brahma/iarins). resolving them. and all the rest. discussing and explaining moot points of doctrine. and disputing. because we forget the totally different conditions of in- tellectual life in India and elsewhere. dwelling in bowers of lying in thickets or in the shadow of branches. even incredible. followers of Kapila (Samkhyas). but in villages and forests.' and all this. nay. perched on pillows. believers in God as a creator (Naiyayikas). followers of the Upanishads (Vedantins). ascetics who pulled out their hair. in perfect peace and harmony. seated on rocks. followers of (Vaise- Kamda shikas).

the minute accounts of the Buddhists in their Tripi^aka. As far back as we can trace the history of thought in India. but philosophers. An insight into this state of things seemed is nearest to the heart of man. a world of thinkers. a society in which spiritual interests predominate and throw all material interests into the shade. / were not dreamers. let If they them be called necessary as a preliminary to a study of Indian philosophy as being throughout the work to me of the people rather than that of a few gifted individuals.42 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. meditate on the problems of life and on all that . in villages. and their Here the old sages were free to adjoining groves. the testimonies of the Greek invaders. from the time of King Harsha and the Buddhist pilgrims back to the descriptions found in the Mahabharata. . dreamers of dreams without which life would hardly be worth living. and in the end the Upanishads themselves. and the hymns of the Veda. \ve are met everywhere by the same picture. a nation of philosophers. people live in the country.

has been preserved to us. turning out to be When . There have been curious misunderstandings about this newly-discovered relic of ancient literature. we shall is find them in a stratum as where philosophy yet from religion. people it at the conclusion that very beginning of all find in the hymns of the Rig-veda the very songs of the morning stars and the shouts of the sons of ' jumped would bring us near to the things. having nothing whatNo ever to do in its origin with any litera scripta. But seeing that the Veda was certainly more ancient than anything we possess of Aryan literature elsewhere. of these ancient hymns. during the long night of centuries. II.CHAPTER The Vedas. Aryan literature which. an almost miraculous way. chiefly by means of oral tradition. in a certain sense. that is in the Vedas.' many these expectations were disappointed. of in Aryan language and thought. if literature may be called. IF after these preliminary remarks we look for the real beginnings of philosophy on the soil of India. it one has ever doubted that in the Veda we have the earliest monument of and. and that we should God. and long before the fatal divorce between hardly differentiated religion and philosophy had been finally accomplished.

considering that we have no contemporaneous dates to attach them to. and often. and real. as a is minimum date for the Vedic hymns. . In the end. very simple. and with little of positive beauty. and more ancient and primitive in thought than the oldest hymns of Babylonian or Accadian poets. and it was even hinted that they might be but forgeries of those very suspicious individuals. and the historian now sees that in the Vedas we have to deal. natural. as it always does after an excessive enthusiasm. but with what is and has been not with what is beautiful. The Vedic hymns were looked on askance. the historical school has prevailed. from our point of view. very commonplace. Whatever the Vedas may be called. but what gained by such bravery ? Such assertions are safe so far as they cannot be refuted.C. the Brahmans or Pandits of India. And . and that such a date does not become positive by mere repetition. they are to us unique and priceless guides in opening before our eyes tombs of thought richer in relics than the royal tombs of Egypt. however. not with I what European philosophers thought ought to have been. It may be very brave to postulate 2000 B. they teach us that very useful lesson that the earliest religious aspirations of the Aryan conquerors of India were simple and natural. but neither can they be proved. This 'too is a lesson worth learning. a reaction set in. we are probably on safe ground. often commonplace. or even 5000 B. nay sometimes very commonplace.44 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. If we grant that they belonged to the second millennium before our era. though we should not forget that this is a constructive date only. but with what is true and historically If the Vedic hymns are simple. or novel truth.C.

cities and libraries. all that I mean and could mean is that they contain fewer traces of an advanced civilisation than the hymns deciphered from cuneiform which we find mention of such things as temples in stone and idols of gold. though I confess that it is that very fact.' may be very old as far as the progression of the equinoxes is concerned. for do not speak here of philosophical we have learnt by this time that they are of no age and of any age. the advanced civilisation at that time which they reflect. not In that yet reached by the poets of the Veda.' ' ' made known or ' the wide heaven is the habitation of thy liver.' my of turquoises and of crystal. whatever their age. but in the progress All this of human thought these ideas mark a point.' of bronze and lead thou art the mingler. faces. ideas.THE VEDAS. We should look in vain in the ideas as ' ' Veda for such advanced ' deep/ is ' the holy writing of the mouth of the the god of the pure incantation. the light of mankind. are thought than the very latest hymns Rig-veda. these Babylonian hymns sense. Whatever may be the date of the Vedic hymns. sceptres and crowns. in the Veda. There are thoughts in those ancient Mesopotamian hymns which would have staggered the poets of tablets.' thou art as strong bronze. . and public squares. that makes the Babyearly in more modern of the lonian hymns I so interesting in the eyes of the historian. such as their chief god being called the king of blessedness. 45 when I say that the Vedic hymns are more ancient and primitive than the oldest Babylonian and Accadian hymns.' thy will in I fill heaven and the angels bow their hand with a mountain of diamonds. of altars. &c.

C. Let us begin with the simplest beginnings. the empire of the human mind.. they have their own unique place and stand by themselves in the literature of the world. What can be simpler than the simple conviction that the regularly recurring events of nature require certain Animated by this conviction the Vedic agents ? poets spoke not only of rain (Indu). an agent of fire and light. for every verse. far superior to the most ancient inscriptions. nor would it be easy even now to prove a negative One of these agents to this view of the world. whether 1500 or 15000 B. but of a rainer (Indra). far superior to the oldest chronicles. unless there was an possible to agent behind who controlled them. in them. they called Savitar as distinguished ('^L^TT/P. It seemed im- them that sun and moon should rise every day. human mind we find Whatever aesthetic judge- ments may be pronounced on them. but they were natural thoughts. the . and there is certainly little of poetical beauty in them. or vtnos). in the eyes of the historian and the psychologist they will always retain their peculiar value. but of a lighter and burner. is nay every word an authentic document in the history of the greatest empire. as established in India in the second mil- lennium B. We may smile at such thoughts. They tell us something of the of which early growth of the no trace anywhere else. the enlivener. The Philosophical Basis of the Vedic Gods. yet inseparable from Surya. a Dyaus (Zevs) and an Agni (ignis). not only of fire and light as a fact.46 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.C. should grow strong and weak again every month or every year.

then the moon which was supposed to send dew and rain.' as Deussen truly says. the sun. 47 Soma. same root Su. we can only guess at. 1 requires neither hypothesis nor induction. and in it we have application of the to recognise the only true solution of Indo-European mythology. Greek Helios. of Agni. and other such Vedic deities. the personification of. ' ' should in future talk about these things who does not know the liig-veda 1 The process on or . earth. and deserve our attention. but of Indian philoNo one. light and sky. used for sacrificial purposes and prepared i. from a plant called Sorna or the enlivener. ligion and the mythology of the Vedic sages have a philosophical basis. while more or less obscured in in all it the Big-veda as other religions. 83. was likewise at first what enlivens. or the activity attributed to the great natural phenomena. we cannot watch it with our own eyes. Whatever may have existed before these gods. . e. p.PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF VEDIC GODS. This was the beginning of philosophy. The gods of the Vedic. takes place were in the full light of day. and likewise of Aryan philosophy. if we wish to understand the beginnings not only of Indian mythology and religion. fire. and indirectly of all the Aryan people. can sophy also. a plant known to Brahmans and Zoroastrians before the In this way both the reseparation of the two. dark sky. of Prithivi. the rain. the first law of causality. from the heavenly. Deussen. were the agents postulated behind the great phenomena of nature. and lastly the enlivening draught. of Vanma. while the creation of Dyaus.' which originally all gods depended for their very existence. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic.

called Dyaus. and several others connected with meteoric phenomena. of rain the Marutas. To the earth belong Prithivi as active . agent and as a masculine noun came first. the twin agents of morning and evening Ushas. those of the sky. second. the agents of . know now by what very satisfied simple process the Vedic Aryas how they the whole drama their earliest craving for created their gods. as rising from the earth as well as from the sky. At all need not be refuted before it has been Possibly the naming of the sky as an proved. those of To the first belong mid-air.40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. To mid-air belong Indra. events. as a feminine. this hence To say that fetishism or totemism. . the agents of the . the agent of the rain-cloud Iludra. . the agent of the bright sky and day Varu??a. that of the mere objective sky. Vayu and Vata. and those of the earth. . the agent of the dark sky and evening Surya. These gods were the first philosophy. Dyaus. the storm-clouds . the agent of the enlivening or morning sun Asvinau. the maiden of the dawn. the agent of the sky Mitra. the agent of fire other rivers. active. We causes. sphere in the giver its change between light and darkness. . Three Classes of Vedic Gods. and divided of nature into three acts and the actors into three classes. the first attempt at . it Aryan Theogony was preceded by a period of is simply gratuitous. . . apparently there must be an agent. There was the sky. sometimes the Dawn also. the agent of the atmo. Dyaus. the agent of the sun Savitn'. the earth i Saras vat and Agui. the agent of storm and lightning. . herself. air Parr/anya.

of the earth. are triads clearly visible in nature. and sky. but human was suggested by nature herself. The gods. Though the Devas are known in the Kig-veda and the 1 M. and of the clouds l . of the stars only. and winter. If we call this creation and likewise first classification of the Devas or gods. mirrored in ancient mythology in every part of the world. however. E . air. were noticed and named. but they never rose to the rank of the high gods. and therefore. p. Other Classifications of Gods. and different phenomena by the same agents. M. 49 It is curious to explaining the wonders of nature. They were less interesting to the dwellers in India.OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF GODS. morning. as gods of the sky. or again. There in this pantheon. the return of calmer weather (Pleiades). summer. determining certain seasons. Earth. noon. and night. spring. under different names and forms. observe the absence of anything like star-worship in A few India among the Aryan nations in general.. the philosophy of the race. the system was of course no settled same phenomena being often represented by different agents. These triads are very different from the later number assigned to the gods. and marking the time of rain (Hyades). because they did not exercise the same influence on their daily life as they do in Europe. Contributions to the Science of Mythology. such as were connected with human affairs. or the time for mowing (Krittikas). had evidently been known before they were distributed into three classes. we can clearly see that it was not artificial or the work of one individual only. 475.

i. Visve Devas. to which two other We 1 Satap. Daksha. eleven . i. and in the or again that they wr ere Vasus. though possibly the as in a late verse. number of seven veda VIII. on earth. may possibly be counted as Vanma. 3. the Asvins and Iludra. 5. but when we ask who these three times eleven are. Mitra. and Kig-veda X. Vedanta-Sutras 28. The seven Adityas. 475. 28. .50 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Aryaman. we find no real tradition. Ushas. meant for if. 6. p. too. times eleven replaced by the eight Vasus. I. they are Agni. We are told that they were the gods clouds (I. 139. p. plying them to . XII. Even this taken by some scholars in the general sense of many. but see in fact the three very uncertain. I doubt whether there is any physical necessity for this number '. It seems rather due to a taste very common among uncivilised tribes of playing with numbers and multi2 We see the difficulty any extent experienced by the Brahmans themselves when they had to fill the number of thirty-three and give their Sometimes they are called three times names. 2 3 Contributions. but only more or less systematising theories. and Maruts number of each of these classes of gods seems to have been originally seven rather than eleven. Avesta as thirty-three. 1 1). Bhaga. 122. Br. We can perhaps make out seven Vasus. the Marutas. the eleven Maruts. What we look for in vain in Veda are the names of seven Maruts or seven Hudras. the Adityas. . 205. we are told. Adityas. all this is A??isa. 3 but the Rudras. Indra. and the twelve Adityas. and Tvash^rt. in the sky. like devanam bhuyishthsih but it is at all events recognised in the Higis '.

E 2 . The first sented by different step in this direction seems to be reprethe Visve or the Visve Devas. It would be endless to give the names of all Maruts together. the gods who are praised in the hymns addressed to the Visve Devas. Vasus. so that even the other classes (Ganas). having been taken for the solar light in each sucI look upon cessive month. not simply all the gods (omnes). 51 gods are added as leaders.THE VISVE OR ALL-GODS. from Sarva. What is really important in these Visve is that they represent the first attempt at comprehending the various gods as forming a class. Br. are different from other class-gods inasmuch as their number is hardly fixed. in the sense of all the These Visve. therefore. all these attempts at a classification of the Vedic gods as due once more to the working of a philoIt is not so much sophical or systematising spirit. the exact number or names of these gods. Visva bhuvanani sarva. In still later times the number of the Adityas. to bring their number up to the required thirty-three. Visva is all. Sometimes. i. It means the gods to- gether. that interests the philosophical observer. Indra often stands at their head (Indra^yesh^aA). but there is hardly one of the Vedic gods who does not at times appear as one of them. 'all beings together.' The Maruts are called Visve Mariita/^. as Taitt. Gesammtgotter (cuncti). i. such as Adityas. The Visve or All-gods. though they belong to the class-gods (Gawas). the two words can be used together. Ill. as the fact that attempts had been made at so early a time to comprehend certain gods under the same name. was raised to twelve.

52 or INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Another god or goddess. Agiii-Shomau. as a class. Vishnu with his three represented originally the same heavenly as rising in the morning. strides Aditi. while from another point of view. but that in certain of his duties Agni was Indra and was Savit?^'. but they ought not to be ignored by those who are interested in the progress of the ancient mythological religions from given multiplicity to postulated unity. as an essential character of the godhead. and setting in the evening. such as Aryaman. such as Indra-Agni. Hence arose a number of dual gods. being. should have attracted so little attention hither- to. also the two Asvins. Tendencies towards Unity among the Gods. important not only for mythological but for philosophical and religious purposes also. the fifth volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. Soma and Gandharva. Mitra-Varunau. owing to their position in nature. or Agni. and hence a poet might well take upon himself to say direction. that Agni not only acted with Indra or Savitn'. Mitra and Varu?za. other movements also tended in the same Several gods. was . But while the first this conception of Visve Devas marks important approach from the many incoherent gods scattered through nature to a gradually more and more monotheistic phase of thought in the Veda. On other occasions three gods were praised as working together. culminating at noon. were seen to perform the same acts. was identified with the sky and the air. They are passed over. Rudras may be comprehended under the wider concept of Visve. It is all the more curious that this important class. even in that rich treasure-house of Vedic Mythology.

. after a time.also volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. 46. I. All these tendencies direction. p. Agni. was called the past son. ways. I. if once clearly conceived. father. if me Henotheism. they declared that there was behind all the gods that one (Tad Ekam) of which the gods were but various names. so fully developed in the hymns of the Yeda. Ekam sat vipra/i bahudha vadanti. is as for quite another . Deussen. in The sages call that One Yama. 164. syncretism to address either Indra or Agni or . and. 104. MONOTHEISM AND MONISM. Rv. p. Monotheism and Monism. called 'mother. included the ideas of being one and without an equal. Geschichte der Philosophie. worked together in one and made some of the Vedic poets see that the idea of god. Agnim. gods.HENOTHEISM. They thus arrived at the less distinctly more or conviction that above the great multitude of gods there must be one supreme personality. calling it Henotheism l . 53 and gods and the five races and the future. Professor misunderstood was called all the of men. Weber has strangely he imagines that I designated this phase of religious thought as Henotheism. the time being the only god in existence with an entire forge tfulness of all other Vanma. and it was this phase. Matarisvanam ahuh. 352 . This phase of religious thought has been well described in fifth the same see . and Vanma is one thing. 1 many Agni. which I wished to mark definitely by a name of its own. they call it Yamam. Matarisvan. To it is identify Indra.

Speaking as yet hymns i only. but in others. the latter. X. respects.o 1 collection of 7 in the Rig-veda a each on an average conhymns. was less widely worshipped This has been a very common mistake. because we possess in our Rig-veda-samhita but one hymn addressed to a certain deity. 129. we have taining about ten verses. and represents the whole of Vedic mythology and religion even less than Homer represents the whole of Greek mythoIt is wonderful enough that logy and religion. . other than it there nothing since has been. such conclusions as that. therefore that god was considered as less important or than other gods. Anit avatam svadhaya tat ekam. That One breathed breathlessly by itself. . tasmat ha anyat na para/j kirn fcana asa. Tlie former thought led by itself to religion. In trying to trace religious the onward movement in the of and philosophical thought Veda. as ive shall see.54 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. a monotheistic to a monistic philosophy. and upon his mythology as the mythology of the the Ilig-veda whole of Greece. just as there was for looking upon Homer as the sole representative of the whole epic poetry of Greece. we should of the recognise once for all the great difficulties with which we have to contend. made at different times systematically in some or less at random. Kv. But we must never forget that is but a fragment. We different places. 2. more have no right to suppose But and this collection in was that we have even a hundredth part of the religious and popular poetry that existed during the Vedic We must therefore carefully guard against age. and I confess that there is some excuse for it.

there are differences also that cannot fail to strike the attentive reader. Pra#apati. which. years ago. I called Unknown God. but the art of mnemonics being studied all the more as a discipline essential to intellectual life. we are . as much as possible. and very likely at different periods. we must be told. to what Deva. ya/i deveshu adhi devaA eka/i . we can to the discover traces of the former in the famous the hymn X. men.PRAAPATI. nay often chaotic form. and abstain as much as possible from attempting to systematise and generalise what comes to us in an unsystematised. which is religion. 55 such a collection should have escaped destruction or forgetfulness. and says towards the end whether it should be. however. Nor can the hymns which have come down to us have been composed by one man or by members of one family or one community only they reach us in the form of ten collections (Manc?alas) composed. and tentative monism. Though there is great similarity. writing being perfectly unknown. What has come down to us of Vedic hymns. which is philosophy. between what has been called tentative monotheism. he should offer his sacrifice. by an almost incredible. 121. when we keep in mind that the ancient literature of India was purely mnemonic. is to us a fragment only. Distinguishing therefore. yet well attested process. by different careful not to go beyond the evidence before us. Here the poet hymn asks in every verse to whom. and we must be on our guard not limits assigned to us by to go beyond the the facts of the case. In all such matters. nay even monotony running through them.

He was called iS'atakratu. the all-powerful the conqueror. or for a father of gods and men. VIII. we can watch a slow and natural satisfied progress. that the ground for this lies deeper. . xviii. or Abhibhu. Muir. thou art the great Visvadeva translate. as in Greece all demand It is other gods.56 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. with an entire forgetfulness that one only can be so be above Semitic . 89) Indra was to be praised for his marvellous deeds. in the demand for and in the supply of a supreme deity.' The last word is difficult to if but its real purport becomes clear. when (Rv. V.. 7 we 1 Arist. each with their own limited supremacy. they imagined that the . At first. as men have one king. and also that the idea of oneness idea of is really involved in the God as a supreme and unlimited being. 5. whether Rar/ah or Maharajah. . Aristotle might no doubt have strengthened his argument by appealing to India where ever so many But had each their own king. Politics. he who alone was god above gods/ Many of the ordinary gods are constantly represented as supreme. for instance. must be governed by one king gods however. Still all this would clans and tribes have the monistic craving for a time only. : and all-wise. but this is demand here made by the poet all very different from the distinct for a god that should gods (Exod. thou art the maker of all things. (all-god). for a god above much more like the (narrjp av8pS>v re 6t5>v re). i. n). O. 2. and where it might seem natural to imagine a number of supreme gods. S. T. it was he \vho had made the sun to shine. p. Aristotle already 1 remarked that. I believe. At the end the poet sums up by ' saying Visva-karma visvd-deva/i maha'n asi. Here too. &sit.

however. fact all that a Creator can such as Agni. He seems to have been too old. He remained the workman. It The maker should not be forgotten. as having begotten everything (visvam bhuvanam </a(/ana). re/crew. being supposed to have created even some of the gods. too mythological a character for philosophical purposes. X. TVASHTRI. that there was already another maker. the maker of all things. 7 . and Brahmaviaspati (Rv. 23. well known as the father of Saranyu and Visvarupa. i. stantive. 2. If Agni himself is called Tvash^H II. He had all the requisites for becoming a supreme deity. 57 remember what we saw before with origin of the Visve Devas. 9). and still more in Visvakarman. 17). god whose friendship the other gods were eager to secure (VIII. He is in be required to be. the Hephaestos. we see the clear germs that were to grow into the one supreme As soon as Visvakarman was used as a subdeity. or creator of all things is the nearest approach to the one and only god of later times. called Tvashfrn. only that he did not rise to the position of a real creator of all things. 89. II. Indra. Tvashtfn. in fact. of the Vedic gods. 1 10. the had their Brahmans had what they wanted. as when he is addressed as having formed heaven and earth (X. 5). reference to the Visvakarman. the 3). their god above all gods. they All-maker. nay. merely in consequence of that syncretism which identified Agni with ever so many (Rv.VISVAKARMAN.e. this is . i. he is so here and there. In such adjectives as $atakratu.

not in the sense of an but in the sense of an ancient daimon in which it is applied in other hymns to Varmza. When Tvash^ri is called Savitrz.58 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. gods. given to Tvash^ri and It is to his son Visvarupa. p. Ill. such as Dyaus. II. it. become a supreme god and creator was his having belonged to a more ancient pre-Vedic stratum of causes gods. this does not necessarily imply his identity with the god SavitH. meaning the why he did not. 1 Contributions. just as in other places he is praised as the nourisher or preserver of all One of the creatures. and that we should take evil spirit. considering that he (Indra). name possible of Asura. a purely abstract 1 . had himself supplanted the older gods. identical with Dyaus (Zeus) as has sometimes been supposed. also that the We possibilities. This might also account for Indra's hostility to Tvashf?^'. his mythological character. . Those who so confidently identify Yama and Yami with Adam and Eve seem to have entirely forgotten In that Yama never had any children of Yami. as the sun (Rv. like Prar/apati or Visvakarman. as a new god. and other ancient Devas. must be prepared for many such though I give them here as guesses only. but it is a mistake to suppose that as father of Yama and Yami he was ever father of Sara?iyu conceived as the progenitor of the whole human race. enlivener. but the word should in that case be taken as a predicate. the simper of all things. Tvash^r/ is sometimes but he never becomes. 560. 19). Tvash^ri is best known as the and the grandfather therefore of the Asvins (day and night). points in the same direction. 55. but more particularly with Tvash^ri'.

arms and feet. while producing heaven and earth l . II. unless he is conceived as a bird. meaning This blowing has reference to the forge on which the smith does his work. 9.T. Visvakarman.SEARCH FOR A SUPREME DEITY. the All-maker. 1 and we must take care not to ascribe angels' wings to Tvash/rt or to any god of Vedic times. 8. a merely subordinate spirit. like Tvashiri (Rv. from whence the all-seeing Visvakarman : ' produced by his might the earth and stretched out the sky ? The one god who on every side has eyes. mouths. Wings were used instead of bellows. . At a later time. The work of Visvakarman is described in the following words. 59 and in this we see the real difference between Tvash^H and Visvakarman. 4).S. the support. deity . Visvakarman. 81. who is sent to act as hairdresser to Buddha. X. as Visvakamma. which have a slight mythological colouring What was the stand. 2 Taitt. what and how was it. no parents. 355. blows (forges) with his two arms and with wings. and not as a man. induced them likewise to give a more personal character to Pra^/apati. originally a mere predicate. we can see from the fact that the Taittiriya Brtihmana ascribes the very acts here ascribed to Visvakarman to How Brahman 2 . their fates ! The gods also have Search for a Supreme Deity. This name. p.' vague and uncertain the personal character of Visvakarman was in Vedic times. 6 . became with the Buddhists. has no antecedents.. V. Br. Muir. and no offspring. one supreme deity which led the Vedic priests to address their hymns to the Visve Devas or to Visvakarman as the maker for The same human yearning of all things. O.

howFirst of all my ever. 390. it 568). . very I doubt this still. O.60 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. like all that is omitted in the Pada-text of the Rig-veda. the expression of a yearning after one supreme deity. who had made heaven and earth. be used with great caution. and secondly our Samhita of the Rig-veda is but a segment. He who all gives who . this was I probably no excuse for omitting it. my Ancient Sanskrit Literature translated I many times since. and His later origin has been inferred from the others. in (p. 1. V. and though. lie 2. will be seen that History of It has been ' have had but little Hymn . lord of creatures. Savitri. Pra</apati.. as I thought. is used in the Rig-veda as a predicate of several gods.S. and I give therefore the translation of the hymn as I gave it in 1 ' 860. But many first scholars take it as intended from the verse for the individualised god. gives strength . X. Hirawyagarbha he was the one born lord of all that is. I considered and still consider this verse as a later addition.T. probably a very small segment. but to alter. i o. such as Soma. The whole hymn must have been. He stablished the earth and this sky Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice? life. the sea and all that in them is. had left out in my Index one passage. 121. fact that his name occurs but three times in the Rig-veda *. In the beginning there arose the germ of golden light. whose comimmortality mand the bright gods revere whose shadow is 1 Muir. index verborum is by no means infallible. to the Unknown God. These arithmetical statistics should. for very good reasons. of the mass of religious In the case of Pra^apati poetry that once existed.

he. trembling in their minds. he whose two arms these regions are Who is the god to whom He who we should offer our sacrifice ? 5. He through whose greatness these snowy mountains are. whom we should 6. the two armies) standing firm by his help. poets have their own ways. He who by May he the righteous. However. the . because it seemed to me that. and the earth firm. GOD. they say. He through he through heaven. he who alone is god gave strength above all gods Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 9. he over whom the rising sun shines forth Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 7. man breathing and beast Who is the god to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 4. nay the highest light in the air sacrifice ? Who is the god heaven and earth (or. at the end of every verse. if Pra^apati had been known by the poet as the god who did all this. and the sea. look up. is my critics have evidently overlooked. he would not have asked. who created the heaven. 6l Who is the god to whom we through his power became the sole king of this and slumbering world he who governs all. which and produced the sacrifice. thence he arose who is the sole life Who is the god to whom we should offer our 8. he who measured the to whom the sky is strong. or he. holding the fire. Then follows the verse But the strongest argument against the which final verse.HYMN TO THE UNKNOWN and mortality (gods and men) should offer our sacrifice ? 3. who the god was to whom sacrifice should be offered. sacrifice ? his might looked even over the waters. offer not destroy us. the creator of the earth. He to whom offer our When germ and generating of the bright gods the great waters went everywhere. the distant river. whom the heaven was established. he who also created the bright and mighty waters Who is the god to whom we should our sacrifice ? which I treated as a later addition. with the Kasa.

fullgrown divine personalities.7). may we be the lords of wealth. Prar/apati we find such names as Purusha. one god. may that be ours. that lame and weak. pp. like Pra^/apati.62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. through the idea of the one supreme god. 81. And what is curious is that we see the same attempt l Like Visvakarman and repeated again and again. . DhatH. developed into These names have had different fates in later times. the . ovo^aToOerrjs and others. M. Hira?iyagarbha. whatever names may have been given to him. support (X. that it it is been divided by the was a later addition. 244 seq. even though all With the existence of other gods was not denied. or rise to the surface in the more modern pantheon of India others have disappeared altogether after a short existence. though not.. Pnma. . breath. But the deep which they made in the Indian mind has groove remained. and to the present day the religious wants of the great mass of the people in India seem satisfied . name-giver of the gods. exalted above all other gods. spirit . and character of the hymn.' . the monotheistic yearning was satisfied. this conception of Pra</apati as the lord of created things and as the supreme deity. golden germ . or have resumed their purely predicative character. 1 Even the gods of modern times M. spoils the It runs as follows : 10. arranger Namadha. Some meet us again during the Brahmana period and in the Atharvawa hymns. all names for the Eka Deva. maker VidhatH. no other but thou has held together all these things whatever we desire in sacrificing to thee. man . fact that this verse has not Padakara. Skambha. therefore. I still hold. '0 Pra^apati. Theosophy.

the god above all gods. 63 such as /Siva and Vistmu. By the side of the stream of thought which we have hitherto followed. We have now to take another step in advance. these modern gods have always retained in the eyes of the more enlightened of their worshippers traces of the character of omnipotence that was assigned even in Vedic times to the one supreme god. with the male or female sex. not even Pra^apati or Visvakarman. was limited ipso facto. such as Kali. Long Darkness. as neither male nor female. Atman. first In the eyes of more thoughtful men every one of the gods. are but new names for what embodied in the lord of created things (Prae/apati) and the maker of all things (Vi. . originally was Brahman. ATMAN. It indeed full of obscure passages. 108. nay goddesses even. 164.s-vakarman). This hymn. called by a personal and proper name. has been explained by Haug (Vedische Rathselfragen und Riithselspriiche. that One. Parvati. Durga. TAD EKAM. yet among. where. but it still contains much that has to be cleared up. that is. as neuter.e. was considered as fit for such a being. Tad Ekam. we see in India another powerful movement which postulated from the more than a god above. other gods. the author of which is called Dirghatamas. and thus we see that as early as the Yedic hymns it was spoken of as Tad Ekam.BRAHMAN. 1875) and more successfully by Deussen. and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited and absolute power. 6 x ). i. in his Allge- meine Geschichte der Philosophie. We come across it in the 1 hymn is of Dirghatamas (I. In spite of their mythological disguises. as the primary cause of all created No name that expressed ideas connected things. p.

54. but the meaning has on the whole remained much the same. Yama. 8. abyss (in which it lay)? . The One is placed in the nave of the unborn where all beings rested/ Again in a hymn ' to the Visve Devas. Agni then (comes) the heavenly bird Garutman that : . though bearing the great gods . and in whose shelter ? Was the water the deep i. i. those or who the unmanifested. over or all that is unmoving and that moves.64 after asking INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is ' the Unborn. 129. 82. the and again between the One without is. that is. This One. who he was that established these six ' spaces of the world. which One. that named and the names. translated since. What covered ? Where was it. Nasadiya Hymn. and established the whole world.)?' ' This should be read in connection with : the famous forty-sixth verse They call (it) Indra. that walks is flies. where we read mentioned also in X. the poet. 6. form or the unborn. p. Mitra and Varuwa. 569. : when speaking of heaven and earth. Matarisvan. There was then neither what is nor what is not. of which I likewise gave a translation in my History of Ancient Sanskrit It has been frequently Literature' (1859). III. in the shape of the Unborn (masc. says They keep apart all created things. they call it Agni. and tremble the One rules not. the poet asks.' Here we see the clear distinction between the is the One that is various gods. Was it perhaps the One (neuter). nor the heaven which is beyond. there was no sky. the poets call in many ways. being differently born.' The same postulated Being scribed in ' most fully de- hymn X.

other than it there has been nothing. That One breathed by itself without breath. Their ray which was stretched it is across. in the beginning all this was a sea without light the germ that lay covered by the husk. which was the seed springing from mind poets having searched in their heart . what is not. from a mythological Trpcoros to a metaphysical irpw-rov. who it has declared here. Even the question which in Europe was asked at a much later date. 6. . in spite of much labour spent on them by eminent scholars. It is strange to meet with this bold guess in a collection of hymns the greater part of which consists of what must seem to us childish petitions addressed to the numerous Devas or gods of nature. 65 2. from whence was born this creation ? The gods came arose ? later than this creation. 3. There was no death. power below. was it below or was there were powers. it who 7. he or does even he not know ? There are several passages in this hymn which. where the Creator could have .NASADIYA HYMN. Darkness there was. and will above. whether he made or did not forsooth make knows it. 4. But the step from a sexual to a sexless god. and he is constantly oscillating between a personal and impersonal or rather superpersonal cause from whence the universe emanated. this creation arose. hence was there nothing immortal. remain as obscure now as they were to me The poet himself is evidently not quite clear in his own mind. in 1859. above? There were seed-bearers. There was no light (distinction) between night and day. found by wisdom the bond of what 5. had evidently been made at that early time. that One was born by the power of heat (Tapas). and with it the decisive step from mythology to philosophy had been taken. the Highest Seer in the highest heaven. then knows whence from whom . Love overcame it in the beginning. selfin it Who He then knows.

Savitr/. 2 : must not. Indra. 8 1 was the support. not necessary that the historical progress of thought. howcould have become possible.66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The poets who utter these higher truths seem fully conscious of their own weakness in grasping them. nor forget that there always have been priin vileged individuals whose mind was untrammelled by the thoughts of the great mass of the people. or It Varu/ja. I ask for the hidden . truths far beyond the reach of their must have required considerable boldness. the all-seeing These startthe earth and stretched out the sky ?' outbursts of philosophic thought seem indeed ling to require the admission of a long continued effort of meditation and speculation before so complete a rupture with the old conception of physical gods and 4 'What was the stand. ever. measure every nation with the same measure. from whence Visvakarman produced by his might . Soma. 5 and 6. and afterwards addressed by such dark names as Brahman and Atman. the poet says 'As a fool. 167. as if inspired by a power not themselves. : ignorant in my own mind. had evidently passed through the minds of the Vedic seers when they asked. to declare that these gods were nothing but names of a higher power which was at first without any name at all. whether religious or philosophical. called simply Tad Ekam. X. Rv. Thus. proclaimed. and who saw and fellow men. that One. should It is We have been exactly the same must we every country. in I. a TTOV o-rco found for creating the world out of matter or out of nothing. what what and how was it. when surrounded by millions who never got tired of celebrating the mighty deeds achieved by such Devas as Agni.

places of the gods ' 67 the sages. in order to know six skies in the form of the unborn : he who supported the that was he perchance One?' ' And again in Who has seen (no form) bears breath of the earth. and that One Being which was . did not claim inspiration ab extra. as they said. in order to weave.' Not having discovered I ask the sages who may have dis. from parentage and sex. but strove to rise by their any own exertions out of the clouds of their foolishness towards the perception of a higher truth. and it is certainly difficult to imagine how 1 strings This calf seems meant for the year. if endowed with personality at all.NASADlYA HYMN. not knowing. the self? who knows. 347. v. and. had perceived in their heart what was the bond between what is and what is not. to ask this ? ' 4 of the same hymn the firstborn. between the visible and the invisible. Prar/apati is often identified with the year. The wise. seasons see Galen. between the phenomenal and the real. and hence also between the individual gods worshipped by the multitude. then so far only as personality was necessary for will. stretched the seven strings over the newborn calf . nay even by many Jews and Christians to their Jehovah or from the character of a mere Deva. 1 covered. as the substance of all the gods. entirely free from mythology. when he who had no bones him that has bones (form)? Where is the ver. the blood. This was very different from the vulgar personality ascribed by the Greeks to their Zeus or Aphrodite. and in the seven we might see a distant recollection of a year of seven . All this represented an enormous progress. F 2 . : Who went to one In selves all this it is who proclaimed quite clear that the poets themthe great truth of the One.

. it viction was had been formed that there of our Rig-veda-sawhita before that age that the conis but One. many Such efforts had been made in the same direction. Before that highest point of religious speculation was reached. the name of the transcendent soul as used in the Sawkhya system. we find Bnihman used as another name what before was called Tad Ekam. Agni. which afterwards became so important as the two main supports of Vedanta-philosophy. and nevertheless the Being that was really meant by all such names as Indra. if later on we meet with such questions as of . One above Being. a Being raised high all the conditions and limitations of per- sonality and of human nature. names as Brahman and Atman. or. If then its various Meanings. do not spring into incubation. but which even at present is beyond the reach of many who call themselves Christians. lord of creatures.68 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Matarisvan. poets had arrived at a conception of the Godhead which was reached once more by some of the Christian philosophers of Alexandria. all is the the age when the collection was finished. for chronology is very difficult to apply to the spontaneous intuitions of philosophical truths. could have been achieved at that early period and. it were. it may be. in the midst of prayers and sacrifices addressed to a crowd of such decidedly personal and as mythological Devas as Indra and Agni and Still it was achieved and whatever rest. neither male nor female. even at the same time. That One. nay even by the name of In fact the Vedic Prar/apati. or Purusha. life without a long previous Brahman.

p. so that originally it would have meant what swells or grows. Muir starts from Brahman in the sense of prayer. He then assigned to Brah- man the more abstract welfare. first of all. Roth maincould have come to mean prayer. Lastly. and was derived from the root Barh or Bn'h. is necessity.BRAHMAN. repeated the same view. however. while with the ordinary change of accent Brahman means he who prays. M. . 69 Was Brahman the first cause ? Whence are we Whither are we By what do we live hastening By whom constrained do we obtain born ? ? ? our lot in life whether of happiness or of misery. ye knowers of Brahman ? Is time. 240. namely sacred songs. means prayer. 1 confess I can see tained that Brahman expressed the . or is Purusha to be considered the source ?' We names fit naturally ask. Dr. whence came these ? What did Brdhman mean so as to become l to signify rb ovroos ov ? It is curious to observe how lightly this question has been answered Brali. and that of universal force as the Supreme Being. and what meaning of growth and causes growth and welfare. ' ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS.' words difficult to render into intelligible 1 M. Gemiiths auftretende und den Goiter n zustrebende Andacht. he assigned to Brahman the meaning of force as manifested in nature. have mostly thought. ' force of will directed to the gods and he gave as the first meanDie als Drang und Fiille des ing of Brahman. no continuity in this string of Other scholars. Theosophy. by Dr. is accident. man. is the nature of things.. Here the first question seems to be how Brdhman Prof. to swell it was said or to grow. are the elements. Haug.

is English. came to supply a name for prayer as well as for deity. increasing. as expressed by the word Brahman. i o) sees in Brahman the ' prayer. This evolution of thought must have taken place long . bursting forth. when we are trying to discover the almost imperceptible transitions by which a root which expresses the idea of growing forth (Vriddhau).this is little more seems to me than what we mean by saying that they magnify the gods (Deussen.' lifting up of the will above one's own individuality of which we become conscious in religious I must confess that here too there meditation. 1. but how are life . the absolute or impersonal god. Deussen (p. trace of such thoughts in the Veda.. Even if a more profound intention were supposed to be necessary for the word Brahman in the sense of prayer. c. . p. of the heart. The second meaning. lastly. 245). of the prayers there are very matter-of-fact Most petitions. they to be derived one from the other I Prof. holy These are mighty strides of thought. according to him. Though the idea of prayer as swelling or exalted thought may be true with us. the elevation of the mind. and all that has been said of the swelling little. there would be nothing to prevent its having originally grown out of Brdhman in the sense of word. growing strong. the fervid impulse of the will. and without any analogies in the Veda itself. When it is said that the hymns make the gods grow (Vndh). then sacred and divine a sacred or magic formula words. opposed to ordinary language sacred wisdom. decidedly modern. . there is if any. seem to be several missing links in the chain of meanings.JO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Of course we cannot expect perfect certainty in a matter like this.

3. and we should never We can but guess there- forget this in trying to the faint traces which the earliest steps interpret of the human mind have left on the half-petrified sands of our language. strongest. as we say. long before the Aryan Separation. to come forth. long before the final constitution of the Aryan language of India. 2. as little as Brahma?^as-pati could have been possible without Brahman 1 . Hence Brihat means simply great (like great from I suppose. however. What is equally certain. and that word has been conceived as that which breaks forth. Up. an utterance (Ausdruck). is synonymous with Ya/ias-pati.BRAHMAN. to break forth. to grow. We BHmhayati also w ere quoted by Indian gramr marians in the sense of speaking and shining. Br/h. The next step to consider is the name BrihasWe must start from the fact that Brzhaspati pati. tasya esha patih va&am brahma * ity upasate. 20. yo . all. growing). Cf. vag ghi br/hati. and admitted by uncertain are the intermediate links is connecting the two. and VII. and I can say no more. 1 See /fAand. to spread. meant to grow. that BHmhati and . and that the root BHh meant to grow. I. should note.2. or is uttered. ' ' Here we can see that speaking could originally have had the meaning of uttering. Unless Brih had once meant speech. 2. it would have been impossible to form such a name as Br/has-pati. broad. that Vn'h or which I take to be a parallel form of VHdh. lord of speech. That Brahman means prayer is certain. strong Barhish^a. fore. though we cannot attribute much importance to the fact. 7! the Vedic period. BHh. . before ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. I. u.

Word. the Latin vei'bum and the German Wort can be regularly derived from the same root. holy wisdom to the source of that wisspeech. prayer lifting without any idea of swelling meditation or up of hearts. l . ^/aga/c A'a brahmavnwhanam 1 : ' (Vedantism. so alien to Vedic poets. Divyadasa Datta quotes a passage from the YogavasishMa Brahmavn'wihaiva hi ^agarj. have been used as a name of that universal force which manifests itself in the creation of a visible universe. But if I am Brdhman the it original meaning right in seeing of what breaks forth. we can easily understand how the general concept of word was specialised in the sense both of sacred utterance or formula and of . such as . p. so far as it bursts forth. We need not suppose that it had to ascend a scale first from holy word. the absolute god. the word or speech. whether in speech or in nature now comes a much more perplexing question. We may But It can hardly be doubted that Vrih or BHh is a parallel form of VHdh and it is a well-known fact that both . that is. If we have arrived at this. or shone forth. what broke forth.72 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. from the very beginning though in a different direction. From this point once gained I make the next step and suppose that Brdh-nlan was formed to express what was uttered. Bnh and Brahman. corresponding In that to a possible Sanskrit Vw'h-a or Widh-a. suppose therefore I say no more that Brdhman meant force or even germ. they are known to in us. Brahman could dom. . 28). of a force that will manifests itself in audible become easy to understand how also.

occurs frequently in Eig-veda.' remarks on it.Bfl/H AND BRAHMAN. 4.' IX. WORD. . but in the face of well-known facts he added Without wishing to give a de' : In the Rig-veda we have only va'/ca/i words. or whether it was an idea that sprang up independently in both countries. which. gyeshtharag&m Miscellaneous Essays. which we met in Va&as-pati and BHhas-pdti *. X. 26. that was with God.h man also may be taken as a direct deriuttered vation in the sense of the word. remained still undecided. the lord of This Va&. and by whom all things were made. This is a question the answer of which must lead to the most far-reaching consequences. published an article with the object of showing that the Logos-idea had no antecedents in Greece to account for it. 3. was 'the active power of Brahma. . pati/i as II. &c. 2 1 pate. and again patiw vaA'a/i. The important question. 2 After reading Colebrooke's proceeding from him early as 1805. as Colebrooke pointed out as speech. and in the present state of our knowledge I should not venture to go much beyond. I. 473. So far we on safe ground. few Sanskrit scholars could help being reminded of the Logos or the Word that was in the beginning. was whether this idea of the creative Word was borrowed by the Greeks from India. 23. IX. the utterer. 28. and brahman are still as the speaker.' This was certainly a startling assertion. p. even after Colebrooke's remarks. or by the Indians from Greece. brahnia^am. 73 case Brd. But Colebrooke and other Vedic scholars have often pointed out the fact that in the Veda already we find a goddess Va&. 166. brahma^as pate. however. as two Brahma^as i. speech. Professor ' Weber in his 'Indische Studien.

considering the close relations at that time existing this on between Alexandria and India.' that the facts of the case lead us to a very If I different. VaA' is a a masculine. but there are dissimilarities also which ought not I hope I to To say nothing else. but was influenced by the Vedic VaA. I have tried to show in my ' Lectures on Theo- sophy. . leaving classical and Sanskrit scholars to form their own conclusions. that the Alexandrian Logos idea had no antecedents in Greek philosophy. similarities. she obtained the highest position.. no doubt. nay to the very opposite opinion. though at last. did not enter on a discussion of the arguments which prove the absence of antecedents of the Alexandrian Logos idea in Greek to were intended philosophy. While Professor Weber had asserted that the Logos appears in Alexandria without any preparatory steps.' He simply on account of the invigorating influence which the gods were believed to derive from the hymns. and that involves more feminine. Logos than a difference of grammatical gender. that the goddess of Speech was conceived as furnishing to Pra^/apati the strength of creation. it was because I thought it better to state the facts as they really are. the surmise is obvious.74 cision INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. being identified with the absolute Brahman. There are. ' India. that the growth of this Neoplatonic idea was influenced by the like views of the philosophical systems of that it may have been says again. question. be ignored. without entering on any useless controversy. particularly in the shape of Om.' Professor Weber's somewhat have thus given a correct account of vague yet startling assertion.

Real Indian philosophy. true that Professor Weber was careful to add quite in 1 Theosophy.BtfTH AND BRAHMAN. favour of any Indian influence having been exercised on the philosophers of Alexandria. distant relationship. as a potentia of the absolute Being. stands completely cannot claim for it any historical relationship with the earliest Greek philosophy. the presumption in 1 . such as exists guistic indications whatever in support of such a view. 384. and the Logos also ? Then the question arose. which are very well known to every up student of the early history of Greek philosophy If I have succeeded in this. it in We the Upanishads. we must here also admit that what was possible in India was possible in Greece likewise. was there at least a between Charis and the Haritas. that striking as are the coincidences between the Vedic Va& and the Greek Logos. p. In all this I thought It is that facts would speak far better than words.' I had said before. of the Vedic is of the Haritas. 79). The two are as independent of each other as the Greek Charis. even in that embryonic form in which of the ' ' we by find itself. the red horses Dawn' (p. would fall to the ground of itself. I arrived in the end at the conclusion. and the claims of India and Greece would be equal so far as the original idea Word. 75 I did my best to point out these very steps leading to the Logos. The Historical Antecedents of the . between Zeus and Dyaus. between As there were no linVaA. was concerned. when she has become the wife of Hephaestos. and that we have no evidence to support us any further conclusions. Logos. WORD.

the idea of the Greeks teraction having borrowed their Logos from Vedic VaA. we read ' in Prov.' But with all this I cannot admit that there is any evidence of borrowing or of any kind of in- between Indian and Greek philosophy. 381. as the companion of Pra(/apati 2 . ' the clause that he did not intend to give any opinion on this question/ hut after such a confession it is hardly becoming to hint that those who have given an opinion on this question. viii. . I was by we read of Va& ' him. The historical consequences of such an admission would carry us very far indeed. would require a far stronger lever to lift and to remove the weight of evidence on the other side than the arguments hitherto brought forward. T. M. and I should have thought that after the historical antecedents of the Logos and the Logoi in Greece had been clearly laid open. viii. If 1 M. 2 KAMaka 12. Sophia. 5 (27. i). before his works of old. rejoicing always before him. the Purvapaksha and the Uttarapaksha. 22. It is easy to state the pros and cons.. is made to say. had derived their information from him.76 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the conclusion. in Prov.' While in the Kanaka we read of VaX* impregnated by Pra</apati. Theosophy. but the both are meant in the end to lead on to Even stronger Siddhanta. as one brought up with him . and it . The Eternal possessed me in the beginning of his way.or from the 0. 30. p. and I was daily being his delight. and the Sophia of the Old Testament 1 might have been adduced. coincidences between VaA. would not have been revived. for as Wisdom.

It seems not to have been perceived that an exchange of philosophical thought is very different from an adoption of useful arts. 77 the Greeks had really borrowed their idea of the Logos from India. Every indication of a possible intellectual intercourse between Greeks and Hindus in ancient as well as in more modern times. coined money. the difficulties of an interchange of thought. wood. without a perfect knowlanguages. but the position of the Christian missionary in India. astronomical observations. nothing beyond mere possibilities of an exchange of religious or philosophical ideas between Greece and India has as yet been established. may. or It is only a philosopher that clothing materials. accredited by membership in the ruling race. or articles of trade whether jewels. can teach or influence a philosopher. are far greater than we have an instance of a foreign philosoimagine. Has he left any trace of Chinese thought. has been carefully noted and strongly urged of late. is very different from what the position of a few Buddhist .EAST AND WEST. it ? This requires some fuller consideration. but I feel bound to say that. pher becoming a proficient in the philosophical ledge of the We language of India in the case of Hiouen-thsang. in India ? Modern missionaries. such as alphabetic writing. and even in the cases of two such men meeting. whether derived from Confucius or Lao-tze. particularly for ancient times. if unsuccessful in conversions. why should they not have adopted any of the consequences that followed from East and West. no doubt. have left some imprint of Christianity and European philosophy on the native mind.

That there was a time when the ancestors of the Aryan speakers had the same language and held many of their mythological and religious names and no longer doubted. for instance. though. we must be is marriages and funerals. even satisfied with names.78 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and could not here. or Kanada his Anus from Epicurus ? It is interesting. and India by Alexander the Great. assumed no importance till we come to the invasion of Asia Minor. But long before that time both Greeks and Hindus had invented many tilings. whether in Persia. without our having to imagine that there was at that time any exchange of ideas we meet between the two countries on such points. Persia. Asia Minor or Greece. Pythagoras. such as kings. numbers. no doubt. even monks could possibly have been in ancient if they had reached Alexandria. times. as. A courier may be very conversant with French or Italian. or even to translate a book of Vico's into English. to point out coincidences between Kapila and Zenon. and learnt to speak and converse on certain subjects in Greek or Egyptian. but let him try to discuss metaphysical questions. Later expect contact between Indians and Greeks. If then in India as well as in Greece with similar philosophic ideas. common mythological speculations. priests. and seasons. should we suggest at once that Epicurus must have borrowed his atoms from Kanada. ideas in common. Plato and Aristotle. but it is even more interesting to point out the shades of difference in cases where . with a name meaning atom and with the atomic theory. and it will be perceived what difference there is between an interpreter and a philosopher capable of discussing religious and metaphysical problems.

79 they seem most to agree. while ascetic practices were certainly not confined to either India or Greece. KaXd. there was a more real intercourse even between philosophers of Greek and Indian origin. -fjSea friend Professor Co well and others. North of India. both civilised uncivilised. is best exhibited by the often attempted identification of the names of Pythagoras and Buddha-guru. least of all as a name of the teacher Buddha. elaborate an ideal Monism. and whether as a common it Aryan name or as borrowed. love. At first sight it is certainly startling. but if traced back to its origin. is very different from that of Pythagoras and other philosophers. Pytha could never be the same as Buddha. Kama. word. The real character of most of these coincidences between Greek and Hindu philosophy. or Goras as Guru.EAST AND WEST. after the establishment of a Bactrian . and TO. First of all. virtue. wealth. but no one would venture to accuse either Greeks or Indians of borrowing or of theft on such evidence. Buddha-guru does not occur. what is good. evaporates completely. o0eAi/ia 3 How is what is pleasant ? the triad of thought. well ? If the Vedanta could why not the Eleatics as And yet where is there a trace of such a philosophical theory as the absolute identity of (the Self). TO. and Brahman (the absolute being). Artha. and the Platonic TO. It is quite true that after Alexander's conquests. The belief in transmigration among the Buddhists. in the and and kingdom. besides being borrowed from the Veda. and deed widely spread has been shown very clearly by my old is what useful. Who would see to be found in Greek philosophy ? more than a very natural coincidence between the Atman Sanskrit triad of Dharma.

noses and eyes. i. 1897. The Hindus had a god of love in the Veda. nor is there any reason to doubt that the idea of temples or monasteries or monuments.e. Indian coinage. howIndia. but he was very different from the Kama. which With regard to require more convincing proofs. are the very gods found on the earliest Mauryan coins. on coins. came from Greece. shows as clear surviving traces of as.8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. V. >Siva. We earlier are now Greek in possession of specimens of workmanship in India. the Lycian tombs. than this much Kama on the back of a parrot. coins. facts bearing on this subject have been very carefully put together by Count Goblet d'Alviella in his Ce que I'lnde doit a la Grece. heads. The later influence which Christianity is supposed . imaged on more modern coins as an archer sitting of sculptured idols. it should be observed that the three gods mentioned by Patafkjrali as used for commerce. on the back of a parrot. were anthropomorphic. built and carved in stone. even when a in stone. and Visakha. But even he brings forward coincidences. as early as the Veda. had legs and arms. Skanda. while some of the Indian architecture. that too may be admitted. 3 99 provided that Visakha can refer to Kama and many of the 5 > shooting his arrows ? It cannot be doubted that the art of coining money was introduced into India by the Greeks. and the absence of workable stone in many parts of India would naturally have been unfavourable to a development ever. and if the images of Indian gods and even of Buddha on ancient may be supposed to have favoured idolatry in Indian gods. cf. Psm. native wood-architecture for instance.

and may. if it should be admitted at all. I. nay even before. But iteration yields no strength to argument.EAST AND WEST. It should not be forgotten j that as the Bhagavad-gita bears the title of Upanishad. to have exercised in 81 originating or in powerfully influencing the sectarian worship of K?'istma does not concern us here. Ever since the beginning of Sanskrit studies.e. 167. That Clement of Alexandria knew the name of Butta is well known. that they should learn to translate both Sanskrit and Greek before they venture to compare. does not help us much even as indicating the way by which the idea of the Creative Word could have reached Clement of Alexandria or Origen. If Damascius tells us that there were Brahmans l we must not forget that this living at Alexandria refers to the end of the fifth century A. I believe. be older even than the New Testament. D. have been rightly warned by native scholars themselves. such but no one... G . Some who have been most anxious to gather coincidences between the Bhagavad-gitsi and the New Testament. as the late Professor Telang maintained. can account for of those them. these startling similarities between Krishna and Christos have been pointed out again and again. he even knew that he had 1 See Goblet d'Alviella. p. it may belong to the end of the Upanishadperiod. and . No as they are. for. and we are as far as ever from being able '^ point to any historical channel through which the legends of Christ or Kn'srma could have to travelled. one can deny the similarities. it would have to be referred to a much later period than that which gave rise to the six systems of philosophy.

' but the same coincidences. which have been proved to be anything but real coincidences. under an Indian fig-tree sitting (faux religiosa) has nothing whatever in with Nathaniel sitting under a Palestinian common fig-tree. who have pointed out coincidences quite as startling between the religious and philosophical folklore of uncivilised and civilised faces. No critical historian would listen for one moment to the similarities to startle New Testament. according to Eusebius. Some of the coincidences between Buddhism and Christianity are certainly startling. particularly by their number. for be forgotten. On this point we owe a great deal to students of ethnology. such arguments as have been used to establish a real exchange of thought between India and Europe in ancient times. are story of Buddha The repeated again and again. for the last time in my paper on Coincidences. been taken a god. Nor should it Clement or Origen was able to study the VedantaSutras or the Buddhist Abhidharmas. or that their opinions were influenced by a few Indian travellers staying at Alexandria who cared for none of these things. was one of the teachers But all this is far from proving that of Clement. without our dragging in what has no power of proving anything-. without venturing to suggest any borrowing . I have treated of them on ' several occasions.82 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that Pantaenus who. and the parable of the Prodigal Son scriptures in is in the surely very different in spirit Buddhist from that There remain quite sufficient and perplex us. but in several cases they exist on the surface only and are not calculated to carry conviction on one side or the other. had preached the Gospel in India.

likewise the 1 Contributions to the Science of Mythology. Again. according to M. No doubt. Nor should phares. p. and possibly. is mentioned in the legend of St. 383. very characteristically from the Persian bridge. as Alasando. p. has been authenticated on Indo-Parthian coins as Gondoof name King Gondaphoros. to century the author of the the Mahavamsa 4 . among so low a race Klamaths 3 but no one has ventured to say that the two accounts had a common origin or were as the borrowed one from the other. it is well known that the creation of the world by the Word has been discovered . for it differs also. This should serve as a useful warning to those who are so fond of suggesting channels through which Indian thought might have influenced Palestine or Greece. D. Alexandria was known by name.e. had its antecedents as far back as the and is matched by a similar bridge among Veda. The which seems so peculiar to the Persians. as early as the third B. S.. that of Vasu Deva as Misdeos. Levi. who name of his nephew Abdayases. such channels were there neither mountains nor seas would have formed impassable . p.EAST AND WEST.. G 2 . as I pointed out. barriers. was certainly a missionary religion quite as much as Christianity was at a later time. community of origin. the North American Indians 2 I say. Besides.C. All this is true. 2 4 Theosophy. and shows that the way between Alexandria and Benares was wide open in the first century A. bridge. 168. Le Comte d'Alviella. 3 Theosophy. for instance. On the other hand. Buddhism. and vice versa. or 83 any historical bridge. 177. a similar . Thomas' travels to India. I.

Bodda and Zarades Babylon. and Terebinthos may contain traces of Thera (elder). literature of India has we can hardly imagine names as that the occurrence of such (Zoroaster) among the followers of Mani. was right when he looked 1 a similarity It has been suggested that Scythianos may have been an adaptation of . but we could not expect any bond jide historian to accept any one of them as a proof of a real influence having been exercised by Greece on India or by India on Greece. All this is possible. We have before us ever so many possibilities. and of a Buddhist some of the highest philosopher. in spite of for all his mysti- cism. unless ment of India is once more to be revolutionised. would help us to discover the secret springs of the wisdom of Kapila or Buddha /SVikya Muni. but they leave the question which concerns us here totally untouched. . at a time when Greek philosophy and religion might Eastern guides. Gorres. have been forgotten that in the Dialogues between Milinda and Nagasena we have a well authenticated case of a Greek king (Menandros). the whole structure of the literary developstill. nay even probabilities. a name of Buddha. or that of Terebinthos the the very founder of the pupil of Scythianos l . Though the no trustworthy chronology. but no more.S'akya the Scythian.84 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. All this is true. and yet we are as far as ever from having discovered a Greek or Indian go-between in flagrante delicto. or still have been amenable to Indian schools of thought might have gratefully received fresh impulses from the West. discussing together problems of philosophy and religion. They may point out Manichaean sect in whence these heresiarchs derived their wisdom.

Brahman without beginning Equally strong is the statement of Madhava himself.' . such as changes of men and women into animals or plants. l Tempting as the distant relationship between Bra'h- ever so many man and ~Brih. worship of trees and ancestors. which is the eternal essence of speech. we could not admit it without admitting at the same time a community of thought. See Sarvadarsana-sangraha. ask why If people ask why. Ind. Vivartate*rthabhavena prakriya gag&to yatha. with verbum and Word may be. Sphotekhyo niravayavo nitya/i sabdo brahmaiveti. is more convincing than all of them taken together. The eternal word which is called Spho^a and does not consist of parts. in technical terms in order to establish 85 an Indian influence on Greek or a Greek influence on Indian His principle was right. Bibl. To return to the origin of the word Brahman. though he philosophy. they might as well the discovery of one coin with the name of Augustus on it is a more convincing proof of Roman influence in India than the discovery of pieces of uncoined gold. but one such equation as Dyaus = Zeus. p. Is changed into the form of things. It is the same as in ComThere may be ever so many parative Mythology. or end. applied it wrongly. belief in spirits and visions in sleep or dreams.EAST AND WEST. like the evolution of the world. and of deep philosophical thought. similarities between two mythologies.. is indeed ' Brahman. at a period There is a curious passage in Bhartnhari's BrahmakawcZa which seems to identify Speech and Brahman. in the sense of speech. 1 140: Anadinidhanam Ibrahma sabdatattvam yad aksharam.

on the sacrificer who presses Soma. and that Brahis man. from a consideration of the facts hitherto examined that in India itself Brahman. 2. I.86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Soma. I Hear. I am knowing. could not have assumed the meaning of the object of prayers. 125. they rest on me. I wander with the Adityas and the Visve Devas. In order to show what direction the thoughts connected with Veda. one and is all ! tell 5. he who breathes. speaking in her own name. 30. speech. the of those who merit worship the 4. I . gods have thus established me in many places. what whomsoever this. lie By me it is that he who sees. I support Mitra and Varima both. as a name of the TrpvTov KIVOVV. I support Agni and the two Asvins i. who never required any prayers at all. previous to the Aryan Separation and we certainly have no evidence sufficiently strong to support so What we may carry away bold a hypothesis. the Brahma?ias and Upanishads Va. eats food without . I bestow wealth on the zealous offerer. is introduced in hymn X. need not have passed through a stage when Brdhman meant prayer only. that is. (?) even I myself. for I him . I support the swelling (?) 3. entering into many. the Universal Spirit. who hears what is spoken. good love. . thee what believe. I shall first of all subjoin here a few passages from the hymns. : Va& took in the as saying ' : wander with the Vasus and the Kudras. say gods. first the queen. also in Atharva-veda IV. . staying with many. and also for men . the gatherer of riches. I support Tvashfr't and Pushan and Bhaga. knowing 1 it. prayer.

P. 148). him a sage. for the people. . him I make him a Rishi. The power of speech is greatly extolled. and touch yonder heaven with 8. I bring forth the this world. my height. This is. I bend the bow for Rudra (the storm-god) that his arrow may strike the hater of Brahman I make .. here also there is nothing. beyond the ask such have I become through my greatness. sifting as by a sieve the coarsely ground flour.' is there any trace in these utterances of the thoughts that led in the end to the conception of the Greek Logos? There is another hymn (X. I have entered both heaven father (Dyaus) on the is earth. to lay all things. beyond the sky. . like ourselves. 6. I hold earth I 011 .EAST AND WEST. make formidable. G. I 87 a Brahman. (my ?) summit of in the sea my I origin in the waters. approaching to the conception of the Word as a creative power. an important thought. meet with such observations as that words We were made in the beginning in order to reveal what before had been hidden. no doubt. as yet. war and 7. where we meet with some important remarks showing that language formed an But object of thought even at that early time. 71) which is very obscure and has for the first time been rendered more intelligible by Professor Deussen (A. indeed spread forth like the wind. to wonder at The struggle for life that is going on among words is alluded to by saying that the wise made speech by mind (Manas). and eloquence is celebrated as a precious the existence of such a thing as language. p. showing that those who uttered it had not yet ceased. all from thence spread over beings.

rests. p. and we shall not be very far from the world of thought in which Plato and Aristotle 1 moved. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. taught by the Brahman. when on the verge of darkness. the knowledge of the origin of things. as Deussen says. that great sun -coloured Punish a. nay he is supposed to remove all sin and to procure sustenance for his friends. Mind and Speech. is We meet with passages of a very similar character. in various parts of the Brahmanas. The knowledge of all things or. and names by Aoyof. .' Here we have only to translate forms by e'i'Sr). nor do we find more than slight anticipations of the Neo-platonist dogma that the creation of the universe was in reality an utterance of the hidden thoughts and words of the Deity.17).. 12. One of the most startling is found in a verse inserted in the Purusha- hymn. I. after having thought all forms.88 gift. 290. All shout when the eloquent man apthe assembly subdued or spellbound pears. addressing I know them.e. the wise. we look in vain for the clear and definite idea that language and thought are given ' in the Taittiriya-aranyaka (III. holding men by his words (Sabhasaha). both word and thought. and having made their names. The following passages will give some idea of what was thought in India about mind and language and their mutual relation. which can be so clearly read in the Greek word Logos. he. They may be Sec Deussen. in this But although we can discover hymn an appreciation of the mysterious nature of speech.

mind the ancestors.MIND AND SPEECH. this world. i 'Pra^apati. Ar. Up.e. let a second body be born of me. alone and lonely. the nature of speech and the relation between speech and thought. after having created the Veda (Brahman. The same are the three Vedas. breath the Sama-veda. 4. Up. the three' Pra(/apati alone was this. He then entered the waters with Brahman. and men. for Va& was his. 89 vague and mystical. VII. speech the Eig-veda. 14. That was created (sent forth). breath men. the threefold Veda. mind the Ya^/ur-veda.' The unborn is Va/j. i. $atap. for she will go and become all this. i. Va& as the He thought. mind the air. 2 this Va&. 5. breath the sky. Then from the egg there arose fold Veda. but they show at all events that a good deal of thought must have been expended by the early thinkers of India on this problem.' Bn'h. and Va& was his own. $atap.' first Brahman. I. 2. 3 mind. Ar. neut. I. 24 : 'He desired. speech is : 'The Atman consists of There are also the three worlds . speech. ancestors. . Brahm. Brahmana VI. &c. i. and he (death or hunger) embraced speech with his mind. speech the gods.).' ~Brih. He desired. neut. 21 and from Va& Visvakarman (the all-maker) begat ' : living beings.' And ibid. I. that is. The same are gods.. Let me create (send forth) second. and there arose from the water an egg which he touched and commanded to multiply. 5. and breath. : Paft&avimsa Brahmana XX. created the : waters out of Va& (speech). 17 'This world in the beginning : was Atman (Self).

' is the Self. of the Manavas. Speech. . 1. Ar. w as sent forth by Svayambhu. beginning without beginning or Vidya (knowledge. works.' And to quote but one passage from the /Santi-parva. breath the or very similar and often contradictory Thus we read in ideas occur in later works also.' and he adds an important verse from some Snu'iti In the beginning divine Va&. from which all shall we Br/h. and often contradictory.90 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sutras I.' >Sa??ikara. I May have a wife . the self-existent. are certainly vague. ' : of all beings and the procedure of of all acti\'ties. The same I. or. of which : 8533 'In the r 1 have to treat further on. because they sprang from different minds without any prearranged system but tbey seem to me to show at all events that thought and language must have occupied the philosophers of . Up. the several names. 3. and chaotic. more correctly. . to which many more might be added. the clan of Manu. These utterances. 4 ' ' : : ' activities proceeded And again In the beginning Mahe.svara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms . but they often contain old thoughts.' The Laws Manu. 2. was uttered by Svayambhu. Manu 2 1 : 'In the beginning he (Brahma) fashioned from the words of the Veda. eternal. 28. Manas (mind) child. without beginning or end. and conditions of all things. consisting of Veda. speech the wife. the divine Va& (speech) of the Vedas. Sophia) end. quotes from the He with his mind united himself with speech. 1 Vod. when treating of Sphofa (word). are no doubt later than the Brahma?(as. . Maha- bharata.

I. I communicate.' Some of the Brahmanic thinkers say in so many words that Speech is Brahman ($atap." : They went to appeal to Pra^apati for his decision. Br. "I am excellent. and the mind runs after them. this also serves to show that at all events these early guessers did not accept language simply as a matter of course. verily. and Pra</apati decided in favour of Mind. 4. just as every thought- Greek must have known that there was a reason why Logos meant both word and thought. &c. ' : are words produced. 262) we read on the conihen the lord of speech was produced. and even in later times those of modern Europe. 8 its : came Thus the better of the two.MIND AND SPEECH. 10." Surely I am better than thou. II. as most of our modern philosophers are so apt to do.' ' In the Anugita (p. 5. took place between Mind and Speech as to which was Both said. I am Mind said " : " Speech said Surely I am better than thou. 9! India far more than they did the philosophers of Greece. But that ancient chapter of thought which lies beyond . 'A dispute once /S'atap. Br. 4. i." surely better than thou. for what thou knowest I make known. and since thou art only an imitator of what is done by me and a follower in my wake. Vag vai Brahma). and the co-existence of Brthaspati and Brahma/zas-pati could hardly have failed to suggest to them the identity of Brahman and BHh ful in the sense of speech. First. And if some of them assigned the first place to thought and others to speech. for thou dost not speak anything that is not understood by me. but tried hard to discover whence it and what was we read in the true relation to thought. that trary lord of speech looks up to the mind.

He calls given currency. I prefer to begin with Brahman as a synonym of B?vh in Br/haspdti. 17. though they produce conviction in some minds. and then rising to the object of prayer. I all these scattered indica- cannot bring myself to accept the evolution of the various meanings of the word Brahman as I am particularly elaborated by former scholars. such as we find it afterwards. whether ritualistic or unpremeditated. Brahma \ No doubt in those dark fore passages through which words passed silently bethey emerged into the full light of literature. in all. . for more popular purposes. or. meaning word or speech. the Urgrund der it der zum Heiligen. and to admit by the side of it another Brahman. II. 7. as a masculine. which. in fact the Brdhman. i. 239). meaning that which utters or drives forth (Pra/t-yavayati) or manifests or creates. cannot be expected to produce the same Taking into account tions.Q2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. whether as a neuter. which is much emporstrebende the same idea to which Roth and others have Welt. cialised meaning of prayer. and from prayer came to mean he who is prayed to. Br. we may often fail to discover the right footsteps of 1 Tuitt. but which certainly requires a fuller Instead of beginning with the spejustification. that which is the universal support (Skambha) or force (Daksha). had a ritualistic origin (p. Gottlichen Wille des Menschen. Brahman. the childhood of all philosophy is for ever lost to us and can be reconstructed by conjectures only. reluctant to differ on such a point from Professor Professor Deussen holds that Brahman Deussen.

bnt not yet as definite systems of philosophy. every (created) thing. . I. 2. more particularly of the Vedanta and Samkhya systems. KLVOVV. 1 He who Yoga and Mimamsa Cf. as clearly as possible. 23. though. 8. 93 their progress. who does not become bewildered when pondering (on it). and the two together may be called the two pillars on which rests nearly the whole of the edifice of Indian philosophy. . 8. by assigning to Bnihman the rb TrpcoTov final meaning of TO 6V. and who recognises the Atman in . that on which all scholars agree. : at the end of the Vedic period. Apastamba-Sutras. i The Brahmam who is wise and recognises all things to be in the Atman.ATMAN. I. as not one corresponds fully and exactly to the character of Brahman as developed in the history of the Indian mind. 8. 8. The next word we have It is to examine is Atman. TO 6Vro>y 6V. we shall see. ' of the Apastamba-S&tras. Atman. is. I. also are mentioned by name 13. as the cause of the world. II. even of those terms. As early as the time that 23. next in importance to Brahman only. and we must be prepared for differBut the really important point is ences of opinion. 5 .' indeed in heaven And in the definition of same Sutras. 4. the prevalence of Vedantic ideas l at the time of the author of this Sutra ' : He who is intelligence itself and subtler than pervades the in the the thread of the lotus-fibre. 23. he shines . which presupposes. we read. we find a Brahman.

mother.94 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. bahim dddhana/i atnuini. grandson. life. was frequently used in the sense of what we call soul. IX. words addressed to a dead person. (form of absolute knowledge). universe and who. unchangeable and larger than the He who is different earth. the breath (Atma) to the wind. I call Myself. probably because again extremely obbelongs to a pre-Sanskritic. whoever upon them. ' we have are dear. X. son. grandfather. Rv. mean whether we should translate it by life or by spirit. If in is 5. is though Aryan stratum of Indian speech. as ' in to and.' in several places. i 13. like the spirit or breath.' But Self may here be translated by soul or person also. 3. 30 we read : Atmanam G'ayam pitiiram put ram paiitram pitamahiim. father. divides himself.' In the end Atman became the regular . wife. r/iinitrim miitaram ye priyas tan upa hvaye. 1 6. 'putting strength into oneself. contains this universe .' Again we read.' The etymology At man it scure. and that often grammatical rather than real. su'ryam MkshuA gaMatu. va'tam atma.' instead of 'I magnify the Lord. there can be little doubt that in the Veda Atman. Kv. My soul doth magnify the Lord. spring all (objective) He is the primary cause. possesses the highest From him who bodies. From step soul there is but a small step to Self. In some passages it is difficult to say vital breath. the Atharva-veda IX. However. eternal and unof changeable. ' to translate in English. still means breath. from the knowledge of this world which is obtained by the senses and is identical with its objects. just as we may say. May the eye go to the It then came sun. i.

not go through all the be seen in any Sanskrit dicmay but we have still to see at what stage in I need development Atman became the definite name of the soul or Self within. pp. 200 seq. 247 seq. There are passages such as Rv.PRA0APATI. have thus seen three words growing up in the hymns and Brahmanas of the Yeda. in Asu and Asti.' witness of atmaiva hy atmana/i sakshi. so that in the thing. bhumyaA asu/< in offers Atman asn'k a'tma kva svit. Brahman.15)^ sa va ayam atma sarvesham bhutanam adhipatiA. he is the king of all Pra^apati. Atman. and we read (/S'atap. This transition of meaning a curious parallel to that of As. 5. which we examined before. . 'That Atman is the sovereign of beings. Thus we read at first atmanam atmana pasya. Theosophy. Prar/apati. BRAHMAN. each of which by itself represents in nuce a whole philosophy or a view of the world. . Br.5. or more recentl}-. 'Where was the breath. ATMAN. I. 4. evidence which tionary its .' all beings. Deusseii's Gescliichte Philosophic. and Atman. pp. XIV. the soul of the world (Paramatman). the spirit of the world ? ' But in other passages the inmost nature of anysignifies simply and more particularly of man. Atman philosophers would have called the quiddity. 324 seq. see thy Self by thy Self.' In this sense Atman is afterwards used as the name of the highest person. 1 We See Anthropological Keligion. 164. ' or Indian philosophers the Idant& of things. 'Self is the Self.. sarvesham bhutanam rac/a. Brahman. 95 pronoun 1 self. der pp. end it means much the same as what medieval rendered by spirit or life. the Here Atm may be blood.

Many times it is said that he was everything and that he desired to become many. He created the primeval waters and rose from them as Hiranyagarbha. In other places.. as one. In Pragdpati we have the admission of a personal and supreme being. however. that a boar brought forth (Udbabarha or Udvavarha from V?^h) the l earth. 134. . 7). 287. There occur even in the Brahmanas allusions to the legend well known from the Puranas. or that a tortoise supported it belief in that Pra(/apati. pp. . in which case matter also \vould have come out of him. constituted the foundation of all the monistic philosophy of that country. A was the beginning of monotheistic religion in India. to animate. India. and thus created the world. 1 M. and to rule all Whether this Pra^rapati was himself the things.M. X. the creator of gods and men. material cause of the world may seem doubtful. while the recognition of Brahman and Atman.96 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or that the waters themselves produced a golden egg from whence arose Pra^/apati. a creator and ruler of the world. in order to send forth. there was water over which Pra^apati breathed as We wind and produced the earth. the primeval waters seem to have been admitted as existing by themselves and apart from Prat/apati also read that in the beginning (Rv. 121. as a personal god. a god above all gods.

WE all have thus learnt the important lesson that these ideas. such as high-roads or rivers.e. in spite of all this. metaphysical. and otherwise. Growth of Philosophical Ideas. The wonder is that. and without any preconceived system. Parampara. tradition i. we should find so at much unity preserved to in the numerous guesses truth us among these Vedic ruins.CHAPTER III. being often wanting. This was due. that there was this earliest We nor public opinion to protect it. to the to those who handed down the saved of it. we are told. munication. even the simplest means of comneither control. and at last collected whatever could be It would be a mistake to imagine that there was a continuous development in the various meanings assumed by or assigned to such pregnant terms as Praf/apati. We must remember that philosophy existed for a long time without being fixed by writing. THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. much more than the Nacheinander. Every Asrama or settlement was a world by itself. must not suppose that these ideas follow each other in chronological succession. cosmological. or even Atman. burst forth in India in great profusion and confusion. It H . Brahman. Here once more the Nebeneinander gives us the true key. authority.

scattered all over the country.98 is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or what not only breath. das in Selbst. while meaning what bursts or drives forth. which is characterised by persistent attempts at clear and systematic thought. and why Atman meant soul. I have ventured to render by the BrahmaTias and the Self. But if the period of Upanishads we have to find our way through religious and philosophical thoughts. much more in accordance with what we learn from the Brahmawas and Upanishads of the intellectual life of India. possess of the six systems of philosophy. of all things. as well as creative power and creator. as through clusters of thickly tangled creepers. came to signify speech and prayer. to admit an infinite number of intellectual centres of thought. but life. the outlook becomes brighter as soon as we approach the next period. cannot possibly claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment . We must not imagine that even then we can always discover in the various systems of philosophy a regular hisThe Sutras or aphorisms which we torical growth. the Brahmans themselves thought of their philosophical literature we may learn even from such treatises as the Prasthana-bheda. We stand better how Brahman. they are rather the last summing up of what had been growing up during many generations of isolated thinkers. Prasth&na Bheda. in which either the one or the other view should then underfound influential advocates. spirit. from which some extracts by way of introduction to some gave papers of mine on one of the systems of Indian I What modern . each distinct from the other. essence.

published as long ago as 1852 in the Journal of the German Oriental Society. 3. and examination/ These Padarthas are the important or essential topics of the Nyaya philosophy but it has proved very misleading to see Padartha here translated by categories. definition. 44. and is more comprehensive than 4 logic. Dr. wrangling.' the latter for Buddha. vol. 'is logic Gotama 4 in five Adhyayas as promulgated by Its object is (lessons). 'and i 'to go. more particularly It is of logic.' The fourth ' member of 3 a syllogism is called Upanaya. occurs also in Gautama's Dharmasastra II. and I think it may be useful to give once more some extracts from it ] . example. used sometimes as synonymous with Mimawsa. It is but fair to state that the credit of having discovered that tract of its Madhusudana Sarasvati. could possibly be called categories or praedicabilia. 1894. I have kept the former for the Nyaya. Deussen translation of the Prasthana-bheda has been pubas an Introduction to his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. . p. As the MSS. Trithen. .. I myself came to be acquainted with it through my old friend. belonged really to Colebrooke. 3 knowledge of the nature of the sixteen Padarthas by means of name. No one could understand why such things as doubt. who had prepared a illness critical edition of but was prevented by It from publishing it. 99 philosophy. time by Professor was published in the and death mean- Weber in his Indische Studien. and it is no wonder that Ritter and others should have spoken of the 1 Nyaya with open A new lished by Prof. 'philosopher. and perceived importance. it. vary between Gotama and Gautama.e$o8os.' Ballantyne translates Nyaya by yu. 2 Nyaya is derived from ni 'into. &c. ' or Anvikshikl as an old name of philosophy.PRASTHANA BHEDA. 'Nyaya 2 . leading towards 'induction.' he writes. i. H 2 . 1849.

Sutras I. The highest Samanya general and found in more than one is Satta or being. cf. what Thus it point of the highest has come to pass that Padartha. &c. substance. but such a translation. for they represent what can be predicated. of the objects This philosophy also of our experience. coinme Aristote. in general. inseparable inherence. Abhava. contempt. St. is 4. le in his work on Indian Logic. Visesha. Guwa. or objects. what predicated by. differences. 'There is also the Vaiseshika philosophy in ten promulgated by Kawada. * the six Padarthas. negation.' These Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas. en 6mnnerant 1'a comine fait le Stagirite. Samanya. quality. . parts and the whole. was used in Sanskrit in the sense of things in It is rightly translated by general. doubtful even in 1 Bartliolemy p. II n'a point montro. is or. literally the meaning of a word. activity. category when applied to the five Padarthas of Ka/tada. &c. leurs propriety's. at least 1-5. 1. To which may be added 7. as between cause and effect.' 8 seq. from an Indian is view. Dravya. residing in Samavaya. Its object is to establish by their similarities and dissimilarities lessons. cherche a distinguer 356. if such things were represented to them as the categories of Indian logic. is called Nyaya. 3. what object. Hilaire. may indeed be called categories. or sense (Artha) of words (Pada). Karman. as they have done. 'Mais les philosophe Vaiseshika n'a point categories entre elles. remarks. leurs rapports et leurs But this is exactly what he has done. : 2. viz. what is special. the differentia or eternal atoms. 5.100 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 6.

would of course be quite misleading when applied to the Padarthas of Gotama. 1 third. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh chapter. The second. and the members. the co-operation of several acts for a single I give this more intelligible description from Colebrooke. and bars or exceptions in the tenth. the Karma-Mimawsa twofold. are discussed in the ninth. meaning not so much what has to be proved or established. i. is. adapting to variation or copy of certain sacrificial acts what designed for the types or models of them. the object of this philosophy. The fifth chapter tries to settle the order of all sacrificial performances.' The objects of these twelve chapters are then indi- cated very shortly. find their place mostly under Prameya. IOI the case of the sixth or seventh Padartha of the Vaiseshikas. Dharma. as what forms the object of our knowledge. and so as to be hardly intelligible without a reference to the original Sutras. TheKarma-Mima??isa has been brought out by the venerable (raimini in twelve chapters. 330 seq. chiefly sacrificial. its is varieties of opened in the seventh chapter and carried on more any was Inferrible changes. . fully in the eighth. and the sixth the qualifications of The subject of indirect precepts performers. vol. in Gotama's system. and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth that 1 . and fourth chapters treat of the differences and Dharma. is explained as consisting of acts of duty. The real categories would. (work-philosophy) ' : and the $ariraka-Mima???sa (philosophy of the embodied spirit). its parts (or appendent contrasted with the main act). principal purpose of each sacrificial performance.PRASTHANA BHEDA. p. Miscellaneous Essays. Madhusudana continues The Mimamsa also is viz.

passages which have obscure indications of Brahman. as enjoined by S'ruti. name of Devata-kanc/a. Vedanta. but to judge from Mini. Next follows the $ariraka-Mima??isa. passages which have obscure indications of Brahman. and this. known by the belongs to the Karma-Mima??isa. such as Uttara-Mimamsij Brahma-Mima/Jisa.' for Read Adya Akhya in the Prasthana bheda. the right meaning seems to be the settling of the order of performance.102 result is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in the third. so far as he or it is an object of knowledge. consisting of four chapters. somewhat different version of these titles. and refer to Brahman so far as he . undivided. of which the chief purpose is different. and the incidental effect of an act. because it teaches the act called Upasana or worship. Thus the consideration of the Vedanta refer to 1 Professor Deussen has given a. is discussed in the other ' l . &c. to the inward. composed which by (raimini. for instance. &c. recitation. &c. i. an object of worship. and it is quoted by different names.' It is in fact much more what we call a system of philosophy than the PurvaMlmamsa.S'ruti. In the first section are considered Vedic passages which have clear indications of Brahman in the second. the subject of the one. consisting of four chapters. as the subject of the chapter the successive order of recitation. subject-matter. second-less Brahman. . Its object is to make clear the one' ness of Brahman and Atman (Self). and mostly is Brahman. i. ' In the first lecture is shown the agreement with which all Vedanta passages refer. directly or indirectly. and to exhibit the rules which teach the investigation (of it) by means of Vedic study. according ' to . Sutras V. There is is also the Samkarsha^a-kcuicZa. fiftli He gives.

&c. are disposed In the second section is shown the faultiness of. such as Pradhana. and tries to establish the incontrovertible validity of his own arguments in the second lecture. while considering the going to and returning from . Vyasa or Badarayawa. all In the fourth section are considered apparent contradictions between Vedic passages referring to the senses and their objects. and by the arguments employed by the Samkhyas. the objections to the convergence of the Vedanta passages on Brahman. and in the fourth section such words as Avyakta. undertakes their refutation. which is to ideas. and in the second those referring to individual souls. the Kanadas. Here. translated as independent of Brahman or Purusha.. Agd. generally.PKASTHANA BHEDA. T because every examination should consist of tw o parts. 103 texts has been finished. of the views of the followers of the Samkhya. second-less The convergence of all Vedanta texts on the Brahman having thus been established. ' by nature. as stated by the Snmtis of the Samkhya-yoga. referring to the creation of the elements and other subjects. of which it can be doubtful whether they may not refer adapted and formulated by the Samkhya philosophers. Here in the first section. in the first section. the establishment of our own doctrine and the refutation of the doctrine of our opponents. are considered. are removed in the first part. though quite wrongly. PrakHti. In the third section the contradictions between the passages of the Veda. In the third chapter follows the examination of ' the means (of salvation). fearing an opposition by means of arguments such as have been produced by acknowledged Smntis and various other systems.

all as recorded in different . if not purely referring to the unqualified Brahman. In the fourth section the means of obtaining a knowledge of the unqualified Brahman. In the fourth section the obtainment of disembodied aloneness by the unqualified Brahman is first described. and meditation. In the third section there is tautological. control. road of a man In the third. and afterwards the abode in the world of Brahman. promised to all who know the qualified a (or lower) man who knows Brahman. the further (northern) who died with a full knowledge of the unqualified Brahman is explained. and the internal. the Vedanta. In the second section the meaning of the word Thou is made clear. a collection of words. 'This. are investigated. section is described salvation of a man even in this life. and afterwards the meaning of the word That. both the external. $akhas or branches of the Veda and at the same time the question is discussed whether certain attributes recorded by other $akhas in teaching a qualified or unqualified Brahman. when free from the influence of good or bad acts. (transmigration). such as quietness. In the second section the mode of departure of a dying man by means of repeated study of the Veda. another world dispassionateness has to be examined.104 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as sacrifices and observing the four stations in life. In the fourth chapter follows an inquiry into the special rewards or fruits of a knowledge of the ' In the first qualified and unqualified Brahman. is considered. any other doctrine is but a complement . is indeed the principal of all doctrines. may be taken together or not. after he has realised the unqualified Brahman &c.

Vaiseshika. and the remaining two. as they are Snm'ti or tradition. l Of course these systems of philosophy cannot be called Smriti in the ordinary sense of but. of it. and the other recognised branches of knowledge belonged. 105 it alone is to be reverenced by wish for liberation. . which together represented as the eighteen branches of the Trayi (the Veda). they may be said to teach Dharma. Purva. still as the best of all Here we He made an important distinction also between the four. the philosophies of Gotama and Kanada are treated simply as Smritis or Dharmasastras. the Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies on philosophies. According Madhusudana. nay like the Mah&bharata of Vyasa. if not in the legal. the distinction itself should not be passed over.Mimamsa on one side. and this according to all who the interpretation of the venerable $amkara this is and therefore the secret ' ! see clearly that Madhusudana considered the Vedanta-philosophy as interpreted by Sawikara. Dharmasastra and not >Stuti . and Uttara. Though it may be difficult to are understand the exact reason of this distinction. 1 See Dahlmann. the other. the Nyaya. if not as the only true one. Das Mahabharata als Epos und Eechts- buch. at least in the moral sense of that word. 1896. like the Laws of Manu.PRASTHANA BHEDA. Anyhow it is clear that Samkhya and Yoga were looked upon as belonging to a class different from that to which the two Mimamsas. or revelation. to It is curious indeed that this distinction little has been hitherto so remarked. nay even Nyaya and Vaiseshika. and the Ramayana of Yalmiki.

whose thoughts are distracted. or original matter in the third aloofness from sensuous objects in the fourth stories about . and then a recapitulation which is of interest. 'that after the various systems have been explained. it should be clear that there are after all but three roads.supata and Pii/V.' Madhusudana brought out by the venerable Kapila In the first . . The chief object of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy is to teach the difference between Praknti and the . contemplation. . Adhyaya the considered objects for discussion are in the second the effects or products of . Purushas. posture. and. the supernatural powers ness. observances. the in the fifth there is refutation ttetcher (IV. ' The Samkhya. regulation of breath. . as a means ' are discussed repeated practice and dispassionateness in the second the eight accessories which serve to produce deep meditation even in one towards it.'aratra-systems. Pradhana.106 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Here in the first part meditation. and meditation . 29) restraint. in the devotion. the theory of atomic agglomeration. such as (II. i. The chief object of this philosophy is to achieve . consisting of four parts. &c.' After this follows a short account of the Pa. in six was Adhyayas. in the fourth alonethird. concentration by means of stopping all wandering thoughts. such as Pingal (IV. 1 8). dispassionate persons. Here Madhusudana says. The Arambha-vada. which stops the activity and distraction of the mind. Then follows the Yoga-philosophy as taught by the venerable Pata%yali. continues. of opposite opinions in the sixth a resume of the whole. 1 1).

that of the BrahmavMins (Vedanta). of the From this point of view the objective) world. says that the self-luminous and perfectly blissful Brahman which has no second. as the world. that of the Samkhyas. This and an effect which was not theory.PKASTHANA BHEDA. 13. teaches that first produced the activity of causes which are. and these different views have . fire. by becoming successively double atoms. the theory of illusion. 2. appears by The third mistake. theory. and Pasupatas. those of earth. effected world existed before as real. says that Pradhana alone. is evolved through the stages of Mahat (perceiving) and Ahamkara (subjectivity) into the shape of the (subjective and posed. water. Yoga(the world). that of the Tarkikas (Nyaya Vaiseshika) and the Mimamsakas. These Munis cannot be in error. though in a subtile (invisible) form. the theory of evolution. begin the world which culminates in the egg of Brahman. and air. llamas (moderate). while the Vaishnavas (Ramanu^a.) hold that the world is an actual and true evolution of Brahman. through The second theory. and was rendered manifest through the activity of a cause. is patan^alas. and Tamas (bad). considering that they are omniscient . sometimes called Prakriti or original matter. &c. through its own power of Maya. com- Gunas of Sattva (good). But in have put reality all the Munis who forward these theories agree in wishing to prove the existence of the one Supreme Lord without a second. IOJ The Parmama-vada. ending in the theory of illusion (Vivarta).. as it &c. The Vivarta-vada. The first theory holds that the four kinds of atoms (A.

but will become more intelligible hereafter when we come to examine each of the six philosophies by itself. But however we may admire this insight on the bhikshu. could not be expected at But all comes once to know the true goal of man. only been propounded by them. have striven to discover the truth. and because they were afraid that human beings. right when we understand their that object. who are bent on part of Madhusudana and others. . which we see now and then in other writers also. may be many. but truth is one. such as Vi<7/iana- showing that there is behind the diversity of Vedanta. and thus. whether by the light of revelation or by that of their own unfettered reason. in fact. and Nyaya one and the same truth. it is our duty. and the fact that to the present day these six different systems of philosophy have held their own in the . from not imagined that understanding true these Munis would have propounded what is contrary to the Veda. But it shows at all events a certain freedom of thought. in order to keep off all nihilistic theories. to study the different paths by which different philosophers. Sa??ikhya. It is the very multiplicity and variety of these paths that form the chief interest of the history of philosophy. though it gives a general survey.' Much of what has here been translated from Madhusudana's Prasthana-bheda. accepting their opinions. though differently expressed that philosophies. men. is obscure. a>s historians of philosophy. have become followers of various paths. nor is it at all certain that his view of the development of Indian philo- sophy is historically tenable. with their inclinations towards the objects of the world.I08 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

first of all These philosophers are 1. propounded by the thinkers of India. still less the ipsissima verla. also called Ka7iabhu<7. 5. 3. also called /Stesha or Phamn. or its author. also called Akshapada. 2. Kanabhakshaka. Pataw/ali. be accounted for without admitting a growing up of different philosophical schools side by side during a period which preceded their last arrangement. the author of the Yoga-Sutras. 109 midst of a great multitude of philosophic theories. shows that we must try to appreciate their characteristic before attempting with Madhusudana peculiarities. who therefore must have existed before the time when the Sutras Nor could the fact that received their final form. Gotama. to eliminate their distinctive features. often refer to some of the Sutras quote and refute the opinions of other Sutras.PEASTHANA BHEDA. 6raimini. It is easy to see that the philosophers to whom our Sutras are ascribed. called also Uttara-Mimamsa-Sutras. Badarayawa. Unfortunately such references hardly ever give us the title of a book. the Nyaya-Sutras. the author of the Samkhya-Sutras. 6. the author of or UMka. Kanada. or Vyasa-Sutras. the author of the Purva-Mimamsa- Sutras. 4. the author of the Vaiseshika-Sutras. cannot be considered as the These Sutras first originators of Indian philosophy. the reputed author of the Brahma-Sutras. Kapila. When they refer to such we know that they topics as Purusha and Prakn'ti refer to the Samkhya. if they speak of Arms or . called also Vyasa Dvaipayana or Krishna Dvaipayana. other philosophers.

Some of these. Hall to be not earlier than about 1380 A.. by the strong commotion roused by the rise of the Buddhist school of philosophy.110 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. D.Philosophic.. atoms. ' Curbo. to take covery. and afterwards of religion. which as early as the had probably been already superseded by the popular Sawkhya-karikas and then forThis late date of our Sawkhya-Sutras may gotten. are so modern that they could not possibly Sawkhya be quoted by ancient philosophers. these Sutras should be looked upon as a mere rifaccimento.C. therefore. an activity called forth. 71. refer to the that their remarks are pointed at the But it by no means follows that they or Vaiseshika-Sutras exactly as we now possess them. and they may be even later. sixth cent. there is certainly nothing to be said against the arguments of Dr. we know Vaiseshikas. A. Die Suwkhya. . Startling as this discovery was. D. as has been proved. have been proved by Dr. Hall's dis- In this case. p. but has also been fixed upon as the period of the greatest philosophical activity in India. claims not only the famous Sutras of Pamni. for instance. Our SawkhyaSutras. the place of earlier Sutras. it would seem. but though a still I still hold that the for Sutra-style literary arose in period when writing are purposes was in its tentative stage. seem incredible. we know that even in our time there find learned Pandits ancient who no difficulty in imitating this down and The Sutra-period. his Council in 242 B. Hall or against those by which Professor Garbe l has supported Dr. F. reaching Sutra-style. as far as Asoka's reign in the third century.

are absent altogether. The Southern not claim to have reduced their A curious distinction is made in a commentary on the Gautama. would seem. Badarayana and 6raimini. . where it is said that 'those parts of the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads are called Vedantas. nor with the names of the reputed founders of the six systems. and there is a wide difference between inscriptions we should remember and do Buddhists 1 literary compositions. refer. The names of Pata/lr/ali. when they occur. danta does not occur. Literary References in the TTpanishads.C. except those of the two Mimamsas. If the third century B. except in the $vetasvatara.Sutras XIX. or Ka7^ada. Nyaya and Vaiseshika are altogether absent. namely Samkhya and Yoga or Samkhya-yoga. in India. Velosophy. should seem too late a date for the introduction of writing for literary purposes that even inscriptions have not yet been found more ancient than those of Asoka. to quite different per- The Six Systems of Philosophy. nor do we meet with such words as Hetuvidya. it sonalities. while the names of Kapila and Gotama.' . Ill of considerable importance to remember that of the technical names of the six systems of phiIt is two only occur in the classical Upanishads. or Anvikshiki.THE SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 12. Munc/aka and some of the later Upanishads 1 Mima?ftsa occurs in the general sense of investigation. were more than the final editors or redactors of the Sutras as No we now possess them. one can suppose that those whose names are mentioned as the authors of these six philosophical systems.

nay even of a Buddhist chahave sprung up and have been reduced mnemonic form in various Asramas. though not necessarily our own. because in the meantime the meaning of the word had been changed from short mnemonic sentences to fully developed the discourses. Sawkhya or Yoga. ever so many theories of the world.. 1 city of Anuradhapura in Ceylon a branch of the tree at Buddha . from Gay a.112 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sacred Canon to writing before the first century B. partaking of a Vedanta.. must be later than that of the earliest Brahmanic Sutras. we are told. as representing the whole outcome of the philosophical activity of the whole of India through so All we can say is that phigenerations. should have been irretrievably lost. and we must take care also not to look upon what has been left to us in the old racter. is recognised in the Buddhist Canon. c. Possibly Sutra was originally meant for the text to be elucidated in a sermon. to ferment in India during the period losophy began many by Brahmanas and Upanishads. and lastly that tilled name of Suttas. though it is well known that they kept up close with their Northern co-religionists who were acquainted with writing During all that relations 1 . the to be called The sac rod Bo-tree in the was grown. that the existence of Upanishads. therefore. nay even in some of the Vedic hymns. could to a Dar^anas. considering that it could be mnemonic only. so that long Buddhistic sermons came Suttas in consequence. We need not wonder that much of that literature. between 477 and 77 B. as a component part of the Buddhist Canon.C. time.

that of the old pre-Buddhistic literature we have but scanty fragments. it would seem. the Laukalost. and not It is a sad truth which we have to learn more and more. not long ago that I received a Sanskrit treatise written in Sutras with a commentary. for yet for Buddhistic mendicants. 3. to say nothing of such poems so and Ramayawa. I. in We the general decay of Sanskrit scholarship. know now that such Sutras could have been produced at any time. That some of the earlier philosophical Sutras were shown in the case of the B?^'haspati-Sutras. of them has been found as yet in India. Misc. it is likely that they still existed in his time. who deny the existence of what is given by the senses. 429. . and that even these may be. 3. possibly intended for the Vanaprasthas. Vedanta-Siitras see by Taranatha TarkavJi/aispati with the Siddhanta Kaumudi. 113 Brihaspati-Stitras. vol. no. and intended. mere reproductions of lost originals. India still possesses scholars who can imitate Kalidasa. the work of a living 1 2 Colebrooke. though no MS. everything beyond They are referred to by BhaskaraMrya at BrahmaSutras III. 592. These are said to have contained the doctrines of the out and out materialists. IV. Essays' . and the Bhikshu-Sutras 2 quoted by Panini. i. Brahmanic. 53 \ and as he gives an extract. or sensualists. The same applies to such Sutras as the VaikhanasaSutras.Btf/HASPATI-SUTRAS. I . p. 2 They were identified . and we should not forget that even at present. and Mahabharata successfully that few as the It is scholars could tell the difference. is yatikas or /farvakas. as in the case of the Sa?^khya-Sutras. in some cases.

B. in Europe and India.114 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. .7mnda//prakriva Tarkalarikara. . For the Vedanta-philosophy of Badarayawa the most useful book is Thibaut's English translation of the text of the Sutras and /Sa?kara's commentary in j the S. and preserved in what may seem to us an almost miraculous manner.7. scholar in India. may gain by themselves a knowledge of the six recognised svstems of Indian Philosophy. ii. or that we possess what we possess in its original form. which might have deceived many a European scholar of Sanskrit literature \ If that is possible now.. and in the Catalogues. p. 1896. 259 seq. as in the case of the KapilaSutras. it was possible in the fourteenth century. though grateful at an earlier time ? why what has been preserved. vol. we for should not imagine that we possess all. 'the Sutra and the commentary. German. xxxiv and xxxviii. both were composed by me. He makes no secret that Sutraw vrittis /robhayam api mayaiva vyaraA'i. The titles of the more important of the original Sanskrit texts may be found in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essavs. from which students of philosophy. should not the same have taken place during the period of the Renaissance in India. 1887. of the various collections of Sanskrit MSS. nay even At all events. particularly those ignorant of Sanskrit. Deussen's translation of the same work. I shall mention here some of the most important works only. vols. if. preceded as it was by his in Of books written by -A'andrakanta and gives additional Sutras to the Katantra on Vedic Grammar. Books of Reference. published since his time.' is ' It called Katantra/. E.

Colebrooke. translated from the Sanscrit by H. 1892. The Samkhya Karika by Iswarakrishna. 1837. German we have the Samkhya-Prava&anaBhashya. iibersetzt von K. T. Garbe. also the Bhashya or commentary by Gaurapada translated and illustrated by an original comment by H. we have the Sutras with $abarasvamin's . can be thoroughly recommended. Die Samkhya-Philosophie. which deals chiefly with the nature and authority of the Veda with special reference to sacrificial and other duties. 1894. Of the Samkhya-system we have the Sutras translated by Ballantyne in 1882-1885. Garbe. by Der Mondschein der Samkhya Wahrheit. 1852. 1892. . Samkhya-Sutras. the Aphorisms of the Samkhya Philosophy of Kapila. with illustrative extracts from the Commentaries. Vigwana-bhikshu's Commentar zu den In Samkhya-Sutras. Hindu Philosophy. iibersetzt von II. is also a very useful work. Also Aniruddha's Commentary and the original parts of Vedcantin Mahadeva's commentary on the Richard Garbe. 1865. Of the Purva-Mimamsa or simply Mimamsa. 1889. London. 1881. commentary published as yet no book be studied. The Sankhya Karika of Iswarakrishna. Oxford. Va&aspatimis'ra's Sa7?ikhya-tattva-kaumudi. advantage.BOOKS OF REFERENCE. ' Garbe. Wilson. except Professor Thibaut's translation of I in the original but there is in English in which that system may 2 . . may : still be consulted with Other useful w^orks are John Davies. 115 'System des Vedanta/ 1883. H. von H. 1885. nach den Quellen.

482. and the third centuries during B. Laugakshi Bhaskara's Arthasawgraha. It is true that Buddhism and (-rainism were likewise but two philosophical systems out of many. 491. Gough. con- . 1850-57.C. 478. and that it has been But if in possible to fix their dates. 21 and 22.Il6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Sanskrit Series. by Ballantyne. Allahabad. this social chiefly due to the political importance which they acquired the fifth. Indica. published in the Benares of philosophy may be studied in an English translation of its Sutras by A. 1873 also in a Gertnan trans. 4. No. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft. vols. we cannot wonder that all attempts at fixing the dates of the six recognised systems of philosophy. and We know also that there were many teachers. with the exception of the last book. and not simply to their philosophical tenets. and afterwards the canonical books of the Buddhists. Dates of the Philosophical If in Sfttras. their case we know something about O is their dates and their historical development. nay even their mutual relationship. and in some articles of mine in the same Journal of the German lation Oriental Society.. The Yoga-Sutras are accessible in an English translation by Rajendraldla Mitra. the fourth. should hitherto have failed. 1849. The Nyaya-Sutras of Gotama have been translated. E. 462. a short abstract of that philosophy. consider the state of philosophical thought India such as it is represented to us in the in we Brahma^as and Upanishads. Benares. in the Bibliotheca Nos. and 492. The Vaiseshika system by Roer.

developed into a powerful sect.DATES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SUTRAS. are presupposed by Buddhism. became likewise the founder of a sect of his own. are mentioned by the side of 6rainism. the Maskarin. the Nirgrantha. Another. originally an A^ivaka. Gosaliputra. but they have left no traces in the literary history of India. 117 temporaries of Buddha. the prince of the clan of the Sakyas. like the brotherhood founded by Buddha. 1 Kern. 6r7iatiputra. because the society founded by him. the contents of a book may have become 182. Nor should we forget that. Agita Kesakambali. in their literary form. This is owing to the vague- ness of the quotations which are hardly ever given In India. One of these only became known in history. literature. belonged to the same period of philosophical and religious fermentation rise to the first spreading of Buddha's doctrines in India. Kakuda Gautama. I. however. Sam^aya Vaira^i-putra. the founder of Katyayana. p. then a follower of Mahavira. during the mnemonic period of verbatim. Purana Kasyapa. In the Buddhist annals themselves other teachers such as 6rfiatiputra. Gosali with the bamboo stick. the (rainas. it is by no means clear that any which gave of these systems. though the date of the Buddhist Canon may be fixed. . though not the authors of . disappeared 6r/mtiputra or was actually the senior of Buddha. Nataputta Though it seems likely that the founders of the six systems of philosophy. Bucldhismus. which. the date of many of the texts which canonical is we now possess and accept as by no means beyond the reach of doubt. the Nirgrantha or gymnosophist. has now l the Sutras which we possess.

nor have we any right to say that our Gotama-Sutras existed in his time. the A&aryas.veshika- and once the Vaiseshikas are actually mentioned by name (I. Sm/'/ti once (V. is very frequently appealed to. which the Sa?/<khyas were supposed to disregard. 86). 68). careful not to rely too to. when he quotes no means follows that he knew Naiyayikas. D. are very chary of references. Sawzkhya-Stltras. They clearly refer to Vaiseshika and Nyaya. when they examine the six categories of the former (V.vikha philosophy in their minds . considerably modified. . but it is not certain. much on quotations from. and Vaiseshika Darsanas. The Sa??ikhya-Sutras. is . by our Gotama-Sutras. while the teachers. are explained as com- prehending Kapila himself. mentioned in general. when we see Bharb'/hari (died 650 A. 25). Whenever they refer to the Anus or atoms. 85) and the sixteen Padarthas of the latter (V. Even at a much later time. whose name occurs in both iSVuti and Snm'ti.-firya (VI. is mentioned as one who had obtained spiritual freedom. as well as others.) referring to the Mima?/isaka.-a. (V. and Vamadeva. But of individual philosophers we meet only with Sanandana A/. we know that they have the Vai. as we possess them.possible. while the title remained the same. or rather allusions other systems of philosophy. it is We must therefore be very probable. though he may well have known these philosophies after they had assumed their Again. /SYuti. Sawkhya. 69) andPawX. 32. It systematic it form.Il8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. when VI. 123). we have no right to conclude that he knew these Darsanas exactly as we know them.

and even when he refers to other philosophical systems. and Atreya. Audfalomi. Badari. and Yoga a long previous development reaching back through Upanishads and BrahmaTias to the very hymns of the Kig-veda. they quote each other mutually. and Vaiseshika were in his mind when he composed his Sutras. because. Pasupatas. Karslmagdni. 3. . Asmarathya. nay even their technical terms. and among Mimamsic their authors. Badarayana refers refer- ences. Vedanta-Stltras. Samkhya. Samkhya Philosophy (1871). is it clear that the systems of the authorities he refers by name to (raimini. 1 19 The Vedanta-Sutras contain more frequent logical purposes. to any literary work. and Pa/iAaratras. It is equally difficult to fix the relative position *- systems of philosophy. Kasakn/tsna. He never however. he seems to avoid almost intentionally the recognised names of refers. all of whom he is endeavouring to refute.VEDANTA-SUTRAS. the Yoga. We cannot be far wrong therefore if we assign the gradual forma- from Buddha tion of the six systems of philosophy to the period (fifth century) to Asoka (third century). as I explained before. though we have to admit. are presupposed by p. but they too do not help us much for chrono- more or less clearly to the Buddhists. With regard to the relation of Buddhism to the six great of the orthodox systems it seems to me that all we can down honestly say is that schools of philosophy handing doctrines very similar to those of our six or classical 1 orthodox systems. Samkhya. the 6rainas. Still Purva-Mlmamsa. particularly in the cases of Vedaiita. nay to a Badaraya>ia also. Bhandarkar.

which occasionally seems to amount* to downright scepticism and atheism. prove any actual borrowing of Buddha or his disciples at that early time ? part earlier samasa was an work. But this is very different from the opinion held by certain scholars that Buddha or his disciples actually borrowed from our Sutras. must keep all this in mind if we wish to gain a correct idea of the historical origin and growth of what we are accustomed to call the six philosophical have seen already that philosophical discussions were not confined to the Brahmans. it is quite clear that what we now possess of in India. how is is a In the Upanishads and Brahma?? as. We We It is out of and religious mass of philosophical opinion. there as yet great latitude and want of system. could we. in the form of Sutras. could not have been written down during the time when writing for any practical purposes except inscrip- . which was common property this floating that the regular systems slowly emerged. without on the parallel dates. which belong to the sixth century Even if we admit that the Tattvaafter Christ. though there common note running through them all. but that the Kshatriyas also took a very active and prominent part in the elaboration of such fundamental philosophical concepts as that of Atman or systems of India.120 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Though we do not know in what form this took place. philosophical manuals. Even in the hymns we meet with great independence and individuality of thought. Self. We know nothing of Samkhya-literature before the Sca??ikhya-karikas. and a variety of opinions supported by different teachers and different schools. the Buddhist Suttas.

The value of these allusions to writing which occur in the literature of the Buddhists depends. not to the original We must authors. very few. on the date which we can assign. probably took place in something like the form of Sutras. purposes. 14. as classified in the Pratisakhyas. any. I. There is no allusion historical to writing in the hymns. if there had been manuscripts in existence at the same time ? When that mnemonic literature. The very helplessness of the Sutra-style would thus become intelligible. p. came for the first time to be reduced to writing. generally admitted.MNEMONIC LITERATURE. for in India also . Letters at that this time were as yet monumental only. of course. which continued down to the Sutra-period. and which was handed down from generation to generation according to a system which is fully described in the What would have been the use of Pratisakhyas. never forget that there was in India during many centuries a purely mnemonic literature. it is next to impossible that there should be no allusion to it in the poetical or prose compositions of the people. Even as late as the time of $amkara. the Brahmanas and Upaniif shads . Sutras II. but to the writers of our texts. tions on 121 monuments and coins was still unknown in India. in the Sutras. Mnemonic Literature. I believe. 451). that whenever writing has once become popular. which are represented by them (Ved. that Smr/ti. the written letters are still called unreal (AnHta) in It has now been comparison with the audible sounds. that elaborate system. or at all events for literary had not yet been employed so far as we know.

unless it was reduced to Often the name may writing at the proper time. if not to prove. while the body of a work was enHence when we see the Sa?nkhya tirely changed. whether to her it was her name was or a name assigned by tradition. such as the Visuddhi-magga (chap. Much of that mnemonic literature has naturally been lost. And so this could only . monumental writing is anterior to literary writing. at all events render probable the position assigned here to Buddha's teaching as subsequent to the early growth of philosophical ideas in their systematic and or less technical form. which had so far answered all purposes and was not easy to supplant. It to might be possible. have survived. while our present Sutras date from the fourteenth. nor even the Samkhya-karikas which seem to have superseded the ancient Sutras early in the sixth century. mentioned by name in the Buddhist texts. Writing material was scarce in India. At the same time there existed the old mnemonic literature. it is impossible to tell whether even at that time there existed a work on the Sawkhya-philosophy in the form of Sutras. She called Maya or Mayadevi. invested with a kind of sacred character. It is clear at all events that it could not have been our Sa//<khya-Sutras. by a reference to the more name real assigned to his mother. part and parcel of the ancient system of education.122 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the number of those who could read must have been very small. it seems more likely that the name was given to his mother by early tradition. and that if it was given not without a purpose. Considering that in Buddha's eyes the world was Maya or illusion. and to the adoption of a cursive alphabet. XVII).

is known that. as the meaning it might name of not likely to have found a place in the Buddhistic legend during the early period of Indian philosophy. equally significant that less it does occur in the later and more or apocryphal Upanishads. it would seem. /SVetasvatara. is for ever lost to us. as represented in the early Buddha's mother. X. Vedic given as that of the author of two is hymns. ' In the I. and of PrakHti in the Samkhya-philosophy had been replaced by the technical term of Maya. Brihaspati His name is no doubt a very perplexing character. we read. till he turns away from her and she ceases to exist. a certain amount of philosophical mnemonic composition after the period represented by the old Upanishads.THE BB7HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. is Upanishads. X. can see this clearly in the case of the We Bn'haspati-philosophy. but whatever may have existed in it. But whether in Samkhya or Vedanta. in the old classical Upanishads. the name of May& never occurs and it It is well . 10. and before the systematic arrangement of the philosophical Sutras. Maya in its technical belongs certainly to a secondary period. i. 71. a distinction being made . for instance. and therefore be argued that May&. Maya?)i tu Prakntim vidyat. Let him know that Prakrit i is Maya or May4 PrakHt This refers. 123 have been after the name of Avidya (nescience) in the Vedanta. The Bnhaspati-Philosophy. 72. There was.' to the Samkhya system in which Prakriti acts the part of Maya and fascinates the Purusha. and even in the Sutras of these two prominent schools. no doubt. at all events as far as he is concerned.

having become or having assumed the shape of ukra. His name is well known In Rv. overcame the godless people (adevi/i vis&h). 15. but for Thus we read. between a Bn'haspati Angirasa and a Brihaspati Laukya (Laukayatika ?). for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the Asuras (demons). VIII. with B?*?'haspati as his ally. 96. B?^'hasdecidedly modern. the Let no man demons).124 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. good other is evil that this By it they show that and that evil is good. not for their benefit. as with one who has fallen from his station (caste). so that Brihaspati-purohita has become a recognised name pati is besides the of Indra. He is afterwards quoted as the author of a law-book. it is. It seems strange. as it were. we read that Indra. We may possibly account for this by referring to the Brahma?ias and Upanishads. for it is wrong Its reward lasts only as long . ' 7. sacred should be studied (by the Asuras. should have been chosen as the name of the representative of the most unorthodox. it is said. that the same name. 9 : Bn'haspati. That being so.>s the pleasure lasts. which upsets the Veda and the books. that of the preceptor of the gods. Up. barren. knowledge. Maitrdyami their own destruction. therefore. in which Bn'haspati is represented as teaching the demons his pernicious doctrines. name of the planet Jupiter. which we still possess. . brought forth that false knowledge. and sensualistic system of philosophy in India. and they say new law. also as one of the Vedic deities. (but the demons only) study that false . as having BHhaspati for his Purohita or chief priest and helper. and of the preceptor or Purohita of the gods. atheistical.

as false knowledge. .THE B#/ HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. Let that it is 1. 8. 2. possessed of a desire for knowledge pleasures do not tempt him away. and What is untrue they see as praising untruth. There- Kai/?a Upanishad KaM. What is said in the Vedas. after considering. : 4 Va#. for thus said Widely divergent and opposed are these two. like they the blind led by a man who is himself blind V ledge fancy themselves And ' again : The gods and the demons. VIII. we wish to know " the Self. 125 false doctrine 1 : not be attempted. II. : ! he thought. knowledge Those who are wrapt up . the him. A7. like jugglery.and. these to deluded demons take their stand. clinging it. Up. wander about floundering and deceived. the other as (Yama) believe Na&iketas to be . true. that is true. on that the wise take their stand. went once into the presence of Brahman 4 Having bowed before (their father Pra^apati ). these demons believe in a difference of the Atman (from themselves). Up. II. they said "0 blessed one. the one known I knowledge. and therefore a very On that Self different Self was taught to them. even many same time both the imperfect knowledge (of ritual) and the perfect knowledge (of Self). do thou tell us Thus. destroying the true boat of salvation. 5. 4. wishing to know Self. But in reality. and obtains immortality by means of the at the He who knows perfect 3. Up. crosses death by means of the imperfect. II. what is said in the Vedas. 2 in imperfect know- alone wise and learned.

All this would. be wrong that this highest deity should ever have misled anybody.' First This passage is curious in several respects. Secondly w e see an alteration which was evidently made inis r tentionally. while in the Maitrayana Upanishad Bn'haspati takes his place. in which this episode of Bn'haspati giving false instruction to the demons more fully detailed. or in the shadow in the water. were told to look for it in the person seen in the pupil of the eye. even the demons. in the possibility that the Atman could / be in some place different from themselves. or in the image in a looking-glass. no Brahman study what is not in the Vedas. that to sav. and as this would be the individual man. or this will be the result (as in the case of the demons). refer to a visible body goes on to say that the about full of pleasures in Atman Then Prar/apati moves is what a dream. howonly. unlikely that Brihaspati was introduced Upanishad because it It is not in the later in order to w as r felt to take the place of Pra^apati. of all it is a clear reference of one Upanishad to another. still If thon in the Upanishads already Bn'haspati was introduced for the purpose of teaching wrong and unorthodox opinions./TMndogya. he declares at last that Atman is what remains in deep sleep. without however losing its own identity. In the A'Mndogya Upanishad it is the Pra^tipati himself who imparts false knowledge of Atman to the Asuras.126 fore let INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. namely to the . we may possibly be able to under- stand how his name came to cling to sensualistic . ever. In the A7mndogya the demons who believed in the is i/ Anyata (otherness) of the Atman.

C. which we about the That would fix their date fifth century B. he was them. . 1 Colebrooke. is a name of Vyasa. has is Sutras or in metre does not appear. well known that the Lalita-vistara Besides. 429. or a scepticism.Sutras. i. II. it has been supposed that Pamni meant by Bhikshu. 127 and how at last. opinions. we can see in in which many years ago I out these curious traces of an incipient pointed In later Sanskrit. some of the hymns come to mean an infidel in general. the Brahma . menlost to us. That such opinions time. tions (IV. a Barhaspatya. and has been readily accepted therefore by all who wish to claim the still possess. '. to a scholion of Bhaskara on the Brahma-Sutras. of the latter as /Silalin.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. z See before. 3.Sutras L sometimes ascribed to Vyasa. the son of Parasara. he seems to have known. e. But although such we have no means of fixing their date as either anterior or posterior to the other philosophic Sutras. no) the author of the former as As Parasarya Parasarya. but whether composed in follower of BHhaspati.. is it rather a broken reed to rest upon for chronological purposes. were contained. Pamni knew of Sutras which are and some of them may be He also safely referred to the time of Buddha. p. in quoting Bhikshu-Sutras and Na^a-Sutras. If we may trust. 113. Among the works mentioned in the Lalita-vistara as studied by Buddha a Barhaspatyam is mentioned. some Sutras ascribed to BHhaspati in which the doctrines of the ^arvakas 1 . however. Sutras may have existed. held responsible for existed even at an earlier however unfairly. even at that late time. unbelievers.

and mav be said to be hostile to all religious feelO ings. opposition against the religion of the Traces of an Vedas (Kautsa) . they are expressed in verse.128 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. possible antiquity for the But Parasarya of India. There are some tenets of the followers of Bn'haspati which seem to indicate the existence of other schools of philosophy by their side. Brahmans. because they is generally con- and istic home of all that is most spiritual was by no means devoid of sensualidealistic. we know them. nay even earlier. as if taken from a Karika rather than from Sutras.C. But though it is difficult to say philosophers. go far beyond Buddhism. though the lines that separate philosophy and religion in India are very faint. while Buddha's teaching was both religious and philosophical. though we should not doctrines of the B. Of course the doctrines of Buddha would be called certain sceptical and atheistic by the vaka as well as Nastika are to the Buddhists. old such theories how is may have been in India it that. authority do the same hesitate to assign to the Vedanta a place in the fifth century we cannot on such T slender for the Sutras themselves. The Barhasif being inter jxtrcs.. sensualistic opinions crop treatises up among them. which sidered as the possess a peculiar interest to us. as soon as we get any coherent on philosophy. patyas speak as they differ from others as others differed from them. They would show us that India. When we meet elsewhere w ith the heterodox doctrines of Bri'haspati. and /iar- as far as / names freely applied But the doctrines of Brihaspati. greatest literature philosophical have been chosen as the titular would hardly name of Vyasa and .

was called by the Vedantists Pratyaksha. that of Nastika. As viewed from a Brahmanic point of view. in his Epitome of all an account of the Nastika or TTarvaka system. but the very name given to these heretics would seem to imply that their doctrines had met with a world-wide acceptance Another name. ipso facto.K/HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. and the them would give us an entirely false idea of the religious and philosophical battles and battle-fields of ancient India. is given to them as saying No to everything exthe Sutras. He looks upon it as the lowest of all. like sense-perception. but to out and out nihilists only. begins with K . are interesting to us from a historical point of view. even towards a qualified atheism. (Lokayatikas). and it is for that very reason. a name not applicable to mere dissenters. they prove. because in arguing against other philosophies. and to ignore cept the evidence of the senses. These Nastikas. Madhava. appear in 129 hymns. curiously enough. like that of the Samkhya. and on account of the strong feelings of aversion which they excited. particularly to the evidence of the Vedas. that is. Sarvadarsana-samgraha or the philosophical systems. and we have no other. self- evident. which. as we shall see. schools of Indian philosophy could tolerate much they were tolerant. the existence of orthodox philo- The recognised sophical systems before their time. the opposition represented by Bn'haspati and others may seem insignificant. but nevertheless. the Brahmaftas. that it seemed to me right that their philosophy should not be entirely passed over by the side of the six Vedic or orthodox systems.THE B. . But they had nothing but hatred and contempt for the Nastikas.

if that is the meaning originally intended by that word.' This name Lokayata occurs already in Pamni's Ga>ia Ukthadi. as the name of a Rakshasa. 2). The Aarvaka is clearly connected with that of and this is given as a synonym of Buddha Aarva. in which the elements think. fire. the Nyaya four. perception (Pratyaksha) and inference (Anuthe Sa?/ikhya three. the other world is denied. by Bala.s'astrin in the Preface to his edition of the of name represented as a teacher of the Lokayata or world-wide system. and he is is given treated as a historical individual to pati whom Brt'has- or ViU-aspati delivered his doctrines.130 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. authority of knowledge. shows clearly that there must have been i. and Aarvaka or Lokayatika. e. is given in the Prabodha- following words: 'The Lokayata system in which the senses alone form an authority. see that the Vaiseshika acknowledged two. other We shall philosophical systems already in existence. in the water. in which wealth and enjoyment form the ideals of man. A short Kasika (p. The statement that the Lokayatus admitted but one Pramana. and death It is the end of all things. He is account of this system fcandrodaya 27. should be noted however. that Hema&andra distinguishes between Barhaspatya or Nastika. namely sensuous perception. and wind (not Akasa or ether). adding trustworthy mana) . affirmation (Aptavakya) . though he does not tell us which he considers the exact points on which the two are supposed to have differed. The Buddhists use Lokayata for philosophy in general. in which the elements are earth. 18. adding . as not to be ignored in a catalogue of the philoAarvaka (not Aarvaka) sophical forces of India.

any new again with regard to the soul. i. They held that it simply the body over again. e. In the Upanishads we see traces of an even earlier triad of elements. air. speak (Abhava). for the evolution of consciousness arid intellect out of mere We except that they took refuge simile. was the body that felt./Tarvakas. though they saw it day rotting away and decomposing. While other systems water. as we see in the history of the Greek a-To^ia. than as adding ideas of their own.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. that saw and heard. admitted five. earth. By such opinions they naturally in conflict with religion even more than every never came with do not know how they accounted philosophy. 131 six. The /Tarvakas only denied this. but was for soul. Not only philosophers. as if it had been. an idea as that of the four or five elements. the two Mimamsas and adding presumption (Arthapatti) privation Of these and others we shall have to Even what seems to us so natural hereafter. They held that what was called soul was not a thing by itself. and exhibits to us the K&xvakas as denying rather what had been more or less settled before their time. All this shows the philosophical activity of the Hindus from the earliest times. fire. and yet such an idea was evidently quite familiar to the . probably because it was invisible. and ether. appealing to the intoxicating power that can be developed by mixing certain ingrediflesh. with a K 2 . that remembered and thought. excluding ether. they admitted four only. required some time to develop. but every Arya in India had a word So it is and never doubted that there was something in man different from the visible body. comparison (Upamana) .

seeking his true interest. . resides only in the body. " Since in I am " fat. it is no wonder that they should have considered the highest end of man in sensual enjoyment. Sarvadarsana-sawgraha. fire. because covered with husks and dust ' ] '( 1 See for those vorsos Cowell and Gough's translation of the p. water. to consist . 4. Thus we read There are four elements.' In this way the soul seems to have been to them the body qualified by the attribute of intelligence. &c. &c. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and air. Holding this opinion. And it alone since fatness. rich with the finest white . which by themselves are not intoxicating. would fiing them away. as an analogy to the production of soul from body.. mixed together .. And from these four elements alone is intelligence : ' produced Just like the intoxicating power from Kinwa. earth. and therefore supposed to perish with the body. is the soul and no other. And such phrases as " " my body are only signi- ficant metaphorically. : ' A verse is Is to such is The grains. and that they have accepted pain simply as an inevitable concomitant of pleasure.132 ents." these attributes abide in the same subject." I am lean.should quoted The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects. l)e relinquished as accompanied by painthe warning of fools berries of paddy. What man.

water cold. or nature. and certainly no Self in another world. the three Vedas. Why sacrificer 1 is ? not his own father killed there by the Dhatri. 133 From all this we see that. though fundamental philosophical principles are involved. productive of rewards. Madhava in his six Darsanas on which we have The following verses preserved by Epitome are nearly all we possess of the teaching of Brihaspati and his followers Fire is hot. It is a pity that all authoritative books of these materialistic philosophers should be lost. as they would probably have allowed us a deeper insight into the early history of Indian philosophy than the ready-made manuals of the chiefly to rely. teaching utilitarianism and crude hedonism in the most outspoken way. If a victim slain at the 6ryotishoma will go to heaven. creator. instead of Svabhava. Nor are the acts of the Asramas (stations in life) There is or the castes. nature (Svabhava). the chief character of the j^arvaka system was practical.THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY.' Bnhaspati himself following invective ' : is held responsible for the no paradise. no deliverance. can here be used ironically only. . the three staves (carried by ascetics) and smearing oneself with ashes. They are the mode of life made by their creator ' for those who are devoid of sense and manliness. rather than metaphysical. The Agnihotra. and the air feels cool By whom was this variety made ? (we do not know). therefore it must have come from their own : ' .

It is well that we should this know how old and how widely it spread materialism was. like ^r'arphari Turphari. let him drink Ghee. knaves. How can there be a return of the body after once been reduced to ashes If he ? it has who has left the body goes to another world. If the *Sraddha-offering gives pleasure to beings that are dead. The speech of the Pandits is (unintelligible).134 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. If those who are in heaven derive pleasure from offerings. would be useless. and likewise other things to be taken in hand. Then to give a viaticum to people who travel here on earth. for without we should hardly . The three makers of the Vedas were buffoons.' Tliis . after borrowing money. Then why not give food here are standing on the roof? As long as he lives let a to people while they live happily man . As a means of livelihood. nothing else is known anywhere.IK The of flesh was likewise ordered by is any modern certainly very strong language. and demons. ? Why does he not come back again perturbed by love of his relations Therefore funeral ceremonies for the dead were ordered by the Brahmans. eating demons. as strong that has ever been used by ancient or materialists. The obscene act there (at the horse sacrifice) to be performed by the queen has been Proclaimed by knaves.

wild mass of guesses at truth idea of A . It is this denial philosophers in India of a personal god or nevertheless. stamped Buddha at once as a heretic. is in India from what it has been shall elsewhere. seems altogether out of place in India. the Pramanas. were tolerated as find of the authority of the Veda which. and tried to bring their doctrines into harmony with Vedic texts. however. Barhaspatyas against the Brahmans who followed the Veda are the same which the followers of from him. orthodox as long as they recognised the authority of the Veda. the borrowing. it would be far easier to prove that Buddha derived his ideas from Brihaspati than from Kapila. and who. the reputed founder of the Samkhya. that on the vital question of the authority fore. We the who deny existence Isvara. so natural to us. in the eyes of the Brahmans. of the Veda the Sa??ikhya agrees. understand the efforts 135 that were made on the other side to counteract it by establishing the true sources or measures of knowledge. remained Some Considering thereagainst them. while those who followed the Sa??ikhya. and who on many important points did not differ much secure within the pale of of the charges brought by the orthodoxy. arid drove him to found a new religion or brother- hood.THE B5IHASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. If we are right in the description we have given sistently. essential both for religion and for very different The idea of orthodoxy. of the unrestrained and abundant growth of philosophical ideas in ancient India. and other fundamental truths which were considered philosophy. however incon- Buddha brought with orthodox Brahmanism and differs from the Buddhists.

\ve know. the latter from the former. such . and we need not rush at once to the conclusion that. What we may learn from these utterances is that a large mass of philosophical thought must have at existed in India long before there was any attempt dividing it into six well-defined channels of systematic philosophy. any binding public opinion to produce anything like Hence we have as little right to order in it.136 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. therefore the former must have borrowed from the latter. Rome. because similar opinions prevail in Buddhism and in the Sawkhya-philosophy of Kapila. or. imagine what the spirit of the philosophy of the ancient Indian heretics. as far as we know. that the Hindus borrowed the idea of building say was from the Phenicians. unfortunately. They are to us no more than names. not even. well Though we can may have of their been. Raikva. or that of building Stupas from the Egyptians. or reducing it to writing. whether they are called TTarvakas or Barhaspatyas. floating in the air. as some hold. or any other ancient leaders of Indian thought mentioned the Upanishads. In India we move in a world different from that which we are accusships tomed to in Greece. such as the names of Ya^Havalkya. maintain that Buddha borrowed from Kapila as No one would that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. and there was no controlling authority whatever. in We which they arrived. or Modern Europe. Even when the names of certain individuals. but of the processes by which they arrived at them we know next to nothing. and credited there with certain know a few of the conclusions at utterances. much less doctrines than of any other school of philosophy.

into new We with any attempt at proving or disproving it among the prominent writers of ancient or modern times. To a Hindu the idea that the souls of men migrated after death bodies of living beings.METEMPSYCHOSIS SAJJfSARA. are given us as the authors of certain systems of philosophy. or nearly all. and which belong to no one school in particular. we must not imagine that they were the original creators of a philosophy in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle seem to have been so. but without any literary authority in Greek. but was like the air breathed cannot be urged too by every it living and thinking man. like language. the systems of Indian philosophy which all philosophers seem to take simply for granted. Kapila. It corresponds in meaning to the Sanskrit Sa?7isara. 137 as 6raimini. The best known of these that which ideas. like Metensomatosis. be explained that we find all. belonged to no one in particular. and is rendered in German by Seelenwanderung. 1. This is a Greek word. nay. of animals. strongly that there existed in India a large common fund of philosophical thought which. Thus only can a number of ideas in Metempsychosis Sawsara. which belong to India rather than to any individual philosopher. even of plants. is is known under the name of Metempsy- chosis. Common It Philosophical Ideas. As early as the period of the Upanishads we hear of human souls being reborn both in animal and . and others. is so self-evident that it was never meet hardly ever questioned.

idea from the Egyptians.138 in vegetable INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. particularly the Sa/wkhyaparticularly philosophy. Celtic. nay. a mere looker on. that some systems. Among the Aryan races. and Eastern it Asia. it not the Purusha that migrates. was held by Empedocles this In Greece the same opinion but whether he borrowed . Italian. howlinguistic ever. Immortality of the Soul. And why not .sarira. Mortality . Africa. 2. do not admit what understand by Seeleuwanderung. but the Sukshma- Sawkhya Purusha by Soul the subtile body. as is commonly supposed to have been the case. or whether Pythagoras and his teacher Pherecydes learnt it in India. anything that has sprung from Prakr/ti or nature. The idea of the immortality of the soul also should be included in what was the common property of all This idea was so completely Indian philosophers. why not in other countries. bodies. taken for granted that we look in vain for any elaborate arguments in support of it. India certainly among races belonging to the same stock ? It should be remembered. traces of it have lately been discovered even among the uncivilised inhabitants of America. To me it seems that such a theory was so natural that it might is perfectly well have arisen independently among different races. and its highest purpose is this recognition that it is above and apart from . The Self remains always intact. the is we commonly If we translate instead of Self. ? In and if developed spontaneously this was so in India. and Scythic or Hyperborean tribes are mentioned as having entertained a faith in Metempsychosis. a question still hotly discussed.

a longcontinued metempsychosis and as to a final annihila. Sat. Besides. All Indian philosophers have been charged with pessimism. Indian philosophers are by no means dwelling for ever on the miseries of life. but not derived their in all. the followers of tautological in Sanskrit. why should the Aryas have had to learn lessons from savages. . originally are not likely to have looked upon what is as what ought not to be. but all the other Bn'haspati schools rather fear than doubt a future life. would deny a future life. There are scholars so surprised at this unwavering belief in a future and an eternal life among the people of India. that posed to be universal among savages who thought that man left a ghost behind who might assume the body of an animal or even the shape of a tree. and need not have forgotten the so-called wisdom of savages as little as the >Sudras themselves from it ? whom they are supposed to have learnt 3. and in some cases such a charge may seem well founded. as they at one time were no doubt savages themselves. that they have actually tried to trace it back to a belief suption of the true Self. it does not thereby acquire any right to our consideration. decays and decomposes before our that such an expression as Atmano Self. and though it cannot of course be disproved. People who name for good from a word which meant nothing but being or real.PESSIMISM. Pessimism. 139 to with the Hindus is so entirely restricted the body which very eyes. immortality of the would sound to Indian ears as a contradiction in itself. sounds almost No doubt. *mHtatvam. This is a mere fancy.

in fact. If we begin with Cr'aimini. not the principal impulse to philosophical thought in India. we should have more right to call it eudsemonistic than pessimistic. that ought at all events to be accounted for. which was caused by nescience. which is chieHy . we cannot expect much real philosophy from his Purva-MimamsA. and the attainment of the highest happiness. and. we are accustomed to call pessimism. and that this counted for and removed. overcome.140 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Considering that the aim of all Indian philosophy was the removal of suffering. which was produced by knowledge. because. if Pain. are not always whining They life is and protesting that not worth living. and in no way encourages suicidal expedients. something suffering is in the world. is full start from the conviction that the world suffering. that it is something anomalous. may well have caused the question why it existed. They would. to observe the unan- in India. however. They simply state that they received the first impulse to philosophical reflection from the fact that there They evidently that in a perfect world suffering had no thought place. imity with which the principal systems of philosophy nay some of their religious systems also. be of no avail. according to Indian views. an imperfection. Indian philosophy contains no outcry against divine injustice. certainly. That is not their pessimism. of suffering should be acThis seems to have been if one of the principal impulses. and how it could be But this is not the disposition which annihilated. the same troubles and the same problems would have to be faced again and again in another life. seems to be possible. as such. and. It is interesting.

a clear perception of human suffering and its causes. but is it too well known to should be remeni- . in the end. and proclaims as its highest object the complete cessation of all pain while the Yoga philosophers. The Samkhya. begins ground. declare that this is the best means of escaping from all earthly troubles (II. arid so far as serving to diminish or extinguish the ordinary afflictions of men. concerned with ceremonial questions. and through it cessation of all pain and even Gotama's philo. of reaching KaiThe Vaiseshika promises valya or perfect freedom. and had the same object. such as &c. all the other philosophies take much higher Badarayana teaches that the cause of all evil is Avidy4 or nescience. to its followers final knowledge of truth. 141 sacrifices. 2). which all obtained by the complete destruction of pain by means of logic. Up. meditative absorption (Samadhi).philosophy. at least such as we know it from the Karikas and the Sutras. not however the Tattva-samasa. i). II. the annihilation of DuAkha or suffering (Nirva/ia) require further elucidation. sophy of logic holds out blessedness (Apavarga) as is in its first its Sutra complete highest reward. and. and thus to bring about that true knowledge of Brahman. That Buddha's religion had the same origin. and that it is the object of his philosophy to remove that nescience by means of science (Vidya). which is also the highest bliss (Taitt. they were never supposed to secure the highest beatitude for which all the other and The Uttara-Mima?nsa philosophers were striving.PESSIMISM. at once with the recognition of the existence of the three kinds of suffering. But though these sacrifices are represented as being the means of a certain kind of beatitude. after pointing out the way to .

though it cannot be removed from the body. little reflection allows us to perceive their common assumed. no doubt. as soon as the Self has fully realised its aloofness from the body. false know- . If therefore all i. when quired they all under different names. Besides this conviction that all suffering can be removed by an insight into its nature and origin. The Vedanta gives Avidya. The cause of all suffering having been discovered in ourselves. source. different guises in different but this ought not to deceive us. in our works and thoughts.142 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and a systems. being traced back to our worldly attachments. the Sar/vkhya. nescience. though the cause of suffering is inhave but one answer to give. mental pain. pain. we reap what we have sown. that is represented as the chief purpose of a philosopher's life on earth. would vanish by freeing ourselves from the desires which cause these attachwhile all ments. ceases to affect the soul. Even physical pain. end of DuAkha. we suffer what done. e. though without any hope of a rich harvest. the Nyaya. Indian philosophy professes its ability to remove pain. and it the sowing of good seed. name bered that other systems also have one and the same for the state to which they aspire. non-discrimination. Thus. We is are we have what we have made ourselves. whether in this or in a previous existence. whether Nirvana or DuAkhanta. there are some other ideas which must be traced back to that rich treasury of thought which was open to These common ideas every thinking man in India. Aviveka. Mithyiu/ftana. all clamour against divine injustice is silenced at once. it can hardly be called pessimistic in the ordinary sense of the word. for.

the continuous working of every thought. If by 'to be' is meant Samsara or the world. deed. All works. all must bear and do bear fruit/ is a sentiment never doubted by any Hindu. and deed through all ages. however enormous.KARM AN. ledge. however long it may last. Allahabad. to be broken again by means of that true knowledge which is supplied bythevarious systems of philosophy. It never was. only And with this difference. so common in Knowing what ' ' is ' ' 5 Cf. is nothing in the eyes of Hindu like proofs of immortality.' the philosophy. is. Length of time. or bad. . then Hindu philosophers would never look upon it as real. 143 and these various aberrations from knowledge are generally represented as Bandha or bondage. idea that 'to be could ever become not to be seems to have been impossible to the mind of the Hindus. 4. The idea of the soul ever coming to an end is so strange to the Indian mind that there seemed to be no necessity for anything European meant by to be. the soul itself continues after the obtainment of freedom or final beatitude. that while works will cease to work when real freedom has been obtained. whether to-day that ' or thousands of years ago l . The next idea that seems ingrained in the Indian mind and therefore finds expression in all the systems of philosophy is a belief in Karman. the same eternity which is claimed for works and their results is claimed for the soul also. it never is. good word. revealed by a Brahmin Yogee. 1898. The Mysteries of Karma. and never will be. Karman.

is not poise between them. and all this according to their previous merits and demerits. and souls become active and re-embodied. and unreality only. In the Sa?>ikhyathese Pralayas take place whenever the philosophy three Gimas of Prakrit i recover their equipoise 2 . new though with a higher enlightenment (Vikasa). solution occurs at the end of each According to the Vedanta there Kalpa a Pralaya or disof the universe. and Brahman is then its reduced to (Karariavastha). of Avidya. Brahman has then assumed its new Karyavastha or effective state which lasts for another But all this refers to the world of change Kalpa. while creation results from the upsetting of the equiWhat is truly eternal. S. containing both soul and matter in an Avyakta At the end of this Pralaya. . or real reality.e. has been invented. To reckon a thousand years as one day would not satisfy them. destructions or absorptions of the whole world. eternity. such as when a man once in every thousand years passes his silken kerchief over the chain of the Himalayan mountains. the very popular idea of Pralayas. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but even then eternity and reality lie In order to get an easier hold of this far beyond. 2 Sawkhya-Sutras VI. p. I. 1 Thibaut. 42. (undeveloped) state \ however. It is the world of Karman. the temporary produce Maya. xxviii.144 philosophers. V. By the time he has completely wiped them out by this process the world or Sawsara may indeed come to an end. it is not yet of Nescience. i. Brahman creates or lets out of himself causal condition a world. matter becomes gross and visible once more. They represent length of time by much bolder similes.

the idea of Pralayas. that is. The idea of the reabsorption of the world end of a Kalpa (aeon) and its emergence again there follows at the in the next Kalpa. and Professor Garbe is inclined therefore to claim the idea of Pralaya as peculiar to the Samkhya-philosophy. The exact nature of the Pralayas differs so much. if motion springs up in them and they are united. there ensues dissolution (Pralaya). 221. 1 Sawkhya-Philosophie. and its freedom from all conditions and fetters. It in more recent. nay even the name of Samsara is absent from them . If they are separated. are already quite familiar to the poets. according to different poets likely that and philosophers. does not occur as yet in the old Upanishads. than that they should each have invented the same theory under slightly varying aspects.K ARM AN. absorptions. and their beginning (Kalpakshaye and Kalpadau). that among whom have borrowed it from a from the popular belief of is. that it is far more they may common those source. . what we call creation. of their end the Bhagavad-git& IX. and may recover at any moment its selfknowledge. and of Kalpas or ages. creation According to the Vaiseshikas this process of and dissolution depends on the atoms. as and as adopted may be so. its self-being. but 7. from it by the other systems *. p. affected 145 by the cosmic illusion. they were brought up and from all whom they learnt their language and with it the materials of their thoughts. or at least is so for a time only.

and something between the two. so well is known in the later phases of philosophy. so that the Gumis become in component constituents of nature. the cause of all and variety. 6. tainly speaks of /Sruti (Sutras it As long as we know the Samkhya. warm. and neither cold nor warm . in the of quality. in ancient times. 5). such as cold. familiar as it may The Sa?>ikhya-philosophy in supposed to have been originally without a belief the revealed character of the Vedas. It is important to observe that the distinction between $ruti and Smn'ti. but rather as something it substantial by itself. Gunn means quality. as yet in the old Upanishads. 5. idea. revelation and tradition. and appeals to it even in matters of minor importance. which has been claimed as originally peculiar to the Sawkhyaphilosophy. calling it /Sabda. when ordinary fact the sense. One more common element presupposed by Indian of the supreme authority acter ascribed to the Veda. certainly a startling sound to us at present. Infallibility of the Veda. The impulse to everything in nature. occurs in philosophy. antithesis.. is ascribed to the three Gu^as. seems in its unscientific form to have been quite familiar to most Hindu philosophers. but it cerI. O . but we are warned expressly life not to take it. is is philosophy might be pointed out in the recognition and the revealed charThis.146 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. not to be found Three Guwas. ' m>od. recognises the authority of the Veda. The theory of the three Gunas also. In the most general sense they represent no more than thesis.

GU7VAS. as we read. and it might therefore be argued that it does not In that form it count for much. became uneven. L 2 . Moved by the Highest. dark. unevenness. Upanishad V. was Ra^as (obscurity).' Here we have clearly the names of the three Gunas. in which the three Gunas are fully recognised. caused by a preponderance of one of the sion is three. but the Maitrarecognised yana Upanishad shows several Samkhya influences. and so on through every part of physical and moral nature. and this is the form of Sattva (goodness). Tension between these qualities produces activity and struggle: equilibrium This mutual tenleads to temporary or final rest. That Sattva. and neither bright nor dark. it became uneven. That llamas.THREE bad. That Tamas stood in the Highest. than the later Upanishads or the Bhagavad-gita. when moved. in the 2 ' : Maitrayana This world was in the beginning Tamas (darkness) indeed. in order to establish the general acceptance of the theory of the Gunas. when moved. ran forth as essence (Rasa). for instance. . not for more. 147 and neither good nor bad bright. at all events. sometimes represented as Vishamatvam.

33. 3. We know little of Biidaraya?ia. 47. But though he calls him the author of the Mahabharata. *Samkara. and this judg- . in the whole of his commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras. In India he has been identified with Vy. as Vyasa of the Mahabharata also is hardly more than a name to us.CHAPTEE IF IV. we know that the Sutras must have existed before their commentaries.mkara. we have to take as our chief guides the Sutras of Badarayana. 32. their commentator. and to have had intercourse with the gods. to have lived at the end of the Dvapara and the beginning of the Kali age. 3. and begin with the Vedanta. Vedanta or Uttara-Mimawisa. never mentions that the Vyasa of the epic was the author of the book on which he is commenting. now we pass on to a consideration of the six orthodox systems of philosophy.. that ASamkara himself did not consider these two Vyasas as one and the same person.e. III. the re- puted author of our Sutras.isa. I. II. c. This Vyasa is said by /Samkara. 1. 3. the collector of the Mahabharata. but without sufficient evidence. though he mentions This convinced Windischmann Badarayana as such.. nor should we gain much by that identification. and the commentary of *Sa. Of course when we possess commentaries on any Sutras. that the Sutras of Badaraya?ia were older therefore than Samkara. I.



ment ought not to have been lightly disturbed. It was excusable in Colebrooke, but not after what had been said byWindischmann, particularly when no new argument could be produced. All we can say is that, whatever the date of the Bhagavad-git4 is, and it is
a part of the Mahabharata, the age of the VedantaStitras and of Badarayana must have been earlier.



also say that

Badarayana himself never

any work which could be assigned with any amount of certainty to any time after our era. Even when Badarayana quotes the Snm'ti, it does not follow that /Samkara is always right when
refers to

suggesting passages from the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita), or from Manu, for it is not too much to
say that similar passages may have occurred in other and more ancient Srnnti works also. Badarayarai
certainly most provoking in never quoting his If we could follow $amkara. authorities by name.

Badaraya^ia would have referred in his Sutras to

Bauddhas, 6rainas, Pasupatas and Paft&aratras, to Yogins, Vaiseshikas, though not to Naiyayikas, to By the Sawkhyas, and to the doctrines of (j'aimini

name of Sruti Badarayana, according to $amkara, meant the following Upanishads, BHhad-aranyaka, /^Aandogya, Kanaka, Kaushitaki, Aitareya, Taittiriya,

Munc^aka, Prasna, /Svetasvatara, and 6rabala. This must suffice to indicate the intellectual sphere in which Badarayana moved, or was supposed to have

moved, and so


be said to determine his

chronological position





another Vyasa, who was the father of $uka, the teacher of Gauc?apada, the teacher of Govinda, the

Deussen, System des Vedanta,

p. 24,



teacher of $a?kara, and who, if $a?>ikara belonged to the eighth century, might have lived in about

the sixth century of our era


literary works to which >Sa??ikara refers commentary are, according to Deussen (System,


in his
p. 34),

among the


that of the Big-veda, of the

Va^asaneyins, Maitrayamyas and Taittiriyas, and Ka^as, (nothing from the Sama and Atharvasamhitas)

among the Brahmanas, the


Arsheya, Shac^viwisa, /S'atapatha, Taittiriya, Ta/^c/ya, TTMndogya among the Arawyakas, Aitareya and

and among the Upanishads, Aitareya,


Ka^Aa, Kaushitaki-brahmana,

Kena, jfiTAandogya, Maitrayaniya, Munc/aka, Prasna, jSvetasvatara, Taittiriya. These are sometimes called the old or classical Upanishads, as being quoted by

though Paiwgi, Agnirahasya, Narayawlya and G'abala may have to be added. As belonging to Smn'ti$amkara quotes Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita),

Ramayana, Marka/ic/eya-purana, Manu,Yaska, Pa?iini, Paribhashas, Samkhya-karika, and he refers to Sa??ikliya-Sutras (though it is important to observe that he
gives no ipsissima verba from our Samkhya-Sutras), to Yoga-Sutras, Nyaya-Sutras, Vai.veshika-Sutras, and to Mlmamsa-Sfrfcras. When he alludes to Sugata

Buddha he

refers once to a passage

which has been

traced in the Abhidharma-KosAa-vyakhya. He also knew the Bhagavatas and the Svapiuidhyayavids.
old Upanishads,

Though the name of Vedanta does not occur in the we can hardly doubt that it was the

Another sternum of Vyasa, given by native writers, is Naraya/w, VasishMa, (Padmabhava), *S'akti, Parasara, Vyasa,






kara, &c.



Vedantic thoughts, contained in the Upanishads, which gave the first impulse to more systematic
philosophical speculations in India. Several scholars have tried to prove that Samkhya ideas prevailed
in India at



time than, the Vedantic ideas.

But though there
theories in

germs of Samkhya the Upanishads, they are but few and

certainly are

the strictly Vedantic concepts meet us at every step in the hymns, the Brahma/ias, the Aranyakas, and in the Sutras. Vedanta is clearly
far between, while

the native philosophy of India. It is true that this philosophy is not yet treated systematically in the

Upanishads, but neither


the Samkhya.

To us







thought on the ancient

philosophical of India, Vedanta is

and the question whether clearly the first growth lived before Badarayana, or whether the Kapila
systematic treatment of the

Samkhya took


before that of the Vedanta, can hardly arise.

only wonder that those who maintain the priority of the Samkhya, have not appealed to the Lalita-vistara, twelfth chapter, where, among the subjects known to Buddha, are mentioned not

only Nirghar^u, X/^andas, Yagraakalpa, 6ryotisha, but Samkhya, Yoga, Vaiseshika, Vesika (Vaid-


Arthavidya, Barhaspatya, AsA'arya, Asura, There Mri'gapakshiruta, and Hetuvidya (Nyaya).

are several

names which are

difficult to identify,


there can be no doubt that the five philosophical systems here mentioned were intended for Samkhya,

The Yoga, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, and Barhaspatya. two Mimamsas are absent, but their absence does
not prove that they did not exist, but only that they were considered too orthodox to form a proper



This shows the real subject of study for Buddha. character of the antagonism between Buddhism and

Brahmanism, now so often denied or minimised




confirmed by similar references, as when Hema&andra in his Abhidhana mentions indeed such names
as Arhatas or (9ainas, Saugatas or Buddhists, NaiyaBarhasyikas, Yoga, Samkhya or Kapila, Vaiseshika,

Nastika, AUrvaka or Lokayatika, but omits the two really dangerous systems, carefully the Mimamsa of Badarayana and that of 6raimini. It should also be remembered that considerable



doubt has recently been thrown on the age of the Chinese translation of the Lalita-vistara, which seemed to enable us to assign the original to a date

The case is not at all events anterior to 70 A. D. quite clear yet, but we must learn to be more
cautious with Chinese dates.
It has been the custom to give the name of Vedanta- philosophy to the Uttara-Mimams4 of

Badarayam, nor
should not


there any reason




Vedanta is used as synonymous with Upanishad, the Uttara-Mimawsa

certainly the Vedanta-philosophy, or a systematic treatment of the philosophical teaching of the

no doubt, that Vasish^a as well as Gautama distinguishes between Upanishads and Vedantas (XXII, 9), and the commentator to


Gautama XIX,

7 states distinctly that those parts of the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads only are to be called Vedantas. But there is no real harm

in the received

name, and we see that the followers of the Vedanta were often called Aupanislmdas.

See Brahmavadin, Feb., 1898,

p. 454.





Badarayana, the reputed author of the Vedanta-Sutras, we had to confess before that we know nothing about him. He is to us a name


and an


intellectual power, but nothing else. the date of his great commentator, /Samkara, in the eighth century A.D., and we know that another


commentator, Bodhayana, was even

know that Bodhayana' s commentary was followed

by Kamanu^a. It is quite possible that Bodhayana, like Ramanu^a, represented a more ancient and more faithful interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras, and
that $amkara's philosophy in its unflinching monism, is his own rather than Badarayana's. But no MS.

Bodhayana has yet been discovered. still more ancient commentator, Upavarsha by name, is mentioned, and /S'amkara (III, 3, 53) calls him Bhagavad or Saint. But it must remain doubtful again whether he can be identified with the


Upavarsha, who, according to the Katha-sarit-sagara,

was the teacher of Panini. It must not be forgotten

that, according to Indian

tradition, Badarayana, as the author of the VedantaSutras, is called Vyasa or Vedavyasa, Dvaipayana


Krishna Dvaipayana. Here we are once more in a labyrinth from which it is difficult to find an exit. Vyasa or Krishna Dvaipayana is the name given to the author of the Mahabharata, and no two the styles can well be more different than that of Vyasa of the Mahabharata and that of Vyasa, the
supposed author of the so-called Vyasa-Sutras. I think we should remember that Vyasa, as a noun,

meant no more than compilation

or arrangement,



as opposed to Samasa, conciseness or abbreviation so that the same story might be recited Samasena,



and Vyasena,


a complete


should remember next that Vyasa is called Parasarya, the son of Parasara and Satyavati


and that Pawini mentions one Parasarya

as the author of the Bhikshu-Sutras, while Va/raspati Misra declares that the Bhikshu-Sutras are

the same


the Vedanta-Sutras, and



followers of Parasarya Parasarins. (Pan. IV,
This, if



consequence called



no.) rely on


would prove the

existence of our Sutras before the time of Pamni,
or in the fifth century B.

This would be a most


gain for the

chronology of Indian philoare





(Vivyasa) not only the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the Puranas, but also the Vyasa-Sutras, nay even a prose commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras,

that the work ascribed to him must be taken as the work of several people or of a literary period rather than of one man. I formerly thought that Vyasa might have represented the period in which the first attempts were made to reduce the ancient mnemonic literature

we can hardly doubt

of India to writing, but there is nothing in tradition support such a view, unless we thought that

Vyasa had some connection




Indian tradition places the great Vyasa between the third and fourth ages of the present world, whatever that may mean, if translated into our
If Vyasa had language. really anything to do witli our Vedanta-Sutras, it





would hardly have been more than that he arranged
or edited them.

His name does not occur



Sutras themselves, while that of Badarayawa does, and likewise that of Badari, a name mentioned by (raimini also in his Purva-Mimawisa l In the Bhaga.

vad-gita, which might well be placed as contemporary with the Vedanta-Sutras, or somewhat later, Vyasa is mentioned as one of the Devarshis with Asita and Devala (X, 13), and he is called the greatest of Rishis (X, 37). But all becomes confusion again,
if we remember that tradition makes Vyasa the author of the Mahabharata, and therefore of the Bhagavad-gita itself, which is even called an Upani-


The only passage which seems
the relative



to settle

age of the Vedanta-Sutras and the 2 Bhagavad-gita is in XIII, 3 'Hear and learn from me the Supreme Soul (Kshetrar/ria) that has been
celebrated in

many ways by Rishis

in various metres,

and by

words of the Brahma-Sutras, which are and furnished with reasons.' Here the words Brahma-sutra-padai/?,' the words of the seem to me to refer clearly to Brahma-Sutras,' the recognised title of the Vedanta or Brahmathe



Whatever native



say to

the contrary, the words definite and argumentacan refer to Sutras only. And if it is said, on the other side, that these Brahma-Sutras, when they
refer to Snm'ti, refer clearly to passages

taken from

the Bhagavad-gita



and must therefore be later, They never mention the name of the

Colebrooke, M. E., II, p. 354. Prof. T. E. Amalnerkar, Priority of the Vedanta-Sutras, 1895.



Bhagavad-gita, nor do they give any ipsissima verba from it, and as every Smrzti presupposes a $ruti.

may have been meant



sages which


the Bhagavad-gita had adapted, and Brahmahave shared with other Snmtis.

Sutra, on the contrary,

a distinct




more significant where it occurs, because neither the word Sutra nor Brahma-Sutra occurs ao;ain in ~

any other passage of the Gita. However, even admitting that the Brahma-Sutras quoted from the
Bhagavad-gita, as the Gita certainly appeals to the Brahma-Sutras, this reciprocal quotation might

be accounted for by their being contemporaneous, as in the case of other Sutras which, as there can
be no doubt, quote one from the other, and sometimes verbatim.

As to the commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras being the work of the same Vyasa, this seems to





the question.

There are

hundreds of people in India

who have the name

of Vyasa. Nor has it ever been positively proved that Pataf/r/ali, the reputed author of the YogaSutras, was the same person as Pata/l^ali, the author

Mahabhashya, the great commentary on Pa?iini's grammar, and on Katyayana's Varttikas. Some scholars have rushed at this conclusion,

chiefly in order to fix the date of the Yoga-Sutras, but this also would force us to ascribe the most

heterogeneous works to one and the same author Even the age of Pata^r/ali, the grammarian and

author of the Mahabhashya, seems to

me by


Botli Lassen

seem inclined

to accept the identity of the

and Garbe, Die Sawkhya-Philosophie, p. two Puta%alis.




I gladly admit the settled. plauof Goldstiicker's arguments that if Pataft^ali sibility presupposed the existence of the Maurya-dynasty he

means positively

might be placed in the third century B.C. I look upon the Ar&aA, which he mentions in the famous Maurya-passage, as having been devised by the Mauryas for the sake of trade, as the first coins with
images of the
gods, introduced

by the Maurya-

Such coins, when they contain images dynasty. of the gods, should not, according to the grammarian, be called simply by the names of the gods,
but by a derivative name, not >Siva, but $ivaka, just as we distinguish between an Angel and an Angelot. And I pointed out before, the very gods

mentioned here by Pataf^/ali are the gods the images of which do occur on the oldest Indian coins which we possess, viz. Siva,, Skanda, and Visakha, the last, if taken for Kama. As a constructive date
therefore, that assigned

by Goldstlicker to Pata%ali

might stand, but that
tive date.

is very different from a posithe name of Maurya in the MahaBesides, bhashya is doubtful and does not occur again in it. saw before that Badarayana refers in his


Sutras to 6raimini, the author of the Purva-MimamsaSutras, and that (7aimini returns the compliment

by referring to Badarayawa by name.


likewise acquainted with the atheistical doctrines of Kapila and the atomistic theories of Kanada,








India this



proving the later date of Badarayawa.


must learn to look on Badarayana, 6raimini, Kapila, and similar names, as simply eponymous

so that at whatheroes of different philosophies ever time these systems were reduced to the form



of Sutras, certain opinions could be called




scholiast to

Colebrooke states, on the authority of a Manu and Ya^fiavalkya, that the instruc-

were often reduced to writing by his pupils, and that this would account for the fact that the author of a system is often quoted in the third person in his own book. It would be interesting if this could be established with reference to
tions of a teacher

ancient texts, but I remember nothing of the kind. All this is very discouraging to students accustomed to chronological accuracy, but it has always seemed


far better to

acknowledge our poverty and the

utter absence of historical dates in the literary history of India, than to build up systems after systems which
collapse at the first breath of criticism or scepticism.





that there

speak of a chronology of thought, what is a chronology which enables

us to distinguish a period of Yedic thought, subdivided into three periods of Mantras, Brahmanas, and Upanishads. No one would doubt the succession of these three periods of language, but if some scholars wish to extend each period to thousands of

them success. I confess I do not share the idea that we should claim for Indian literature as remote an antiquity as possible. The same attempts were made before, but nothing was gained by them, and much was lost as soon as more
years, I can only wish

After the sober and critical ideas began to prevail. would follow that of Buddhism, Upanishad-period marked, on the Buddhist side, by the Suttas, on

the Brahmanic

and possibly somewhat earlier, by the large mass of Sutra literature. To that period seem to me to belong, by similarity of thought,

not of style, the six systems of philosophy.




should have said by style also, because the earliest form in which we possess these systems is that of Sutras. Unfortunately we know now how easily even that very peculiar style can be, and in case of the Samkhya and some of the legal Smritis, has been

must not therefore ascribe too much weight to this. The next period would be what


have called that of the Renaissance, beginning at a time when Sanskrit had ceased to be the language spoken by the people, though it continued, as it has

to the present day, to be cultivated by the learned. Such are the difficulties that meet us when we

attempt to introduce anything like chronological order into the literature of India, and it seems to


far better to state

them honestly than

to disguise




the importance of that literature,

philosophical portion, It has something to quite independent of age. teach us quite apart from the names and dates of its authors and grateful as we should feel for any real

and more particularly of

light that can be thrown on these chronological mazes, we must not forget that the highest interest of the

Vedanta and the other philosophies
but their truth.


not their age,

Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta.

fundamental doctrines of the Vedanta, the Hindus themselves have helped us and given us in a few words what they themselves
for the

we ask


as the

my thought. Three Lectures on the Vedanta' (1894) In one half verse I shall tell you what has been

quintessence of that system I quoted these words at the end of



taught in thousands of volumes






is false,

the world

the soul


Brahman and nothing




There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth enjoying, there is nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman, is
This resume of the Vedanta

very true, and

very helpful as a resume of that system of philosophy.



distinguish fundamental doctrines and


we must




can never carry


these details in

our memory, but we may always have present before our mind the general structure of a great system of thought and its salient points, whether it be the
philosophy of Kant or of Plato or of Badaraya?ia. It would be quite impossible in a historical sketch of
the six Indian philosophical systems to give all their details. They are often unimportant, and may
easily be gathered from the texts themselves, such as we have them in the original or in translations but they must not be allowed to crowd and to


obscure that general view of the six systems which alone is meant to be given in these pages. have another and still shorter abstract of the




the famous words addressed by Uddalaka to his son vetaketu (AMnd. Up. VI, 8),
' '

namely, Tat tvam asi,' Thou art That.' These words, however, convey little meaning without the context in which they occur, that is to say, unless we know



meant by the Tat, that, and by the Tvam, The Tat is what we saw shadowed forth in

See also Theosophy,

p. 3





the Upanishads as the Brahman, as the cause of the world, the Tvam is the Atman, the Self in
various meanings, from the ordinary I to the divine Soul or Self, recognised in man and it is

the highest aim of the Vedanta to show that these two are in reality one 1 This fearless synthesis,


in the simple

words Tat tvam




the boldest and truest synthesis in the whole

history of philosophy. recognised the Tat or

Even Kant, who clearly it, that is the Ding an sich

behind the objective world, never went far enough to recognise the identity of the Tat, the objective

Ding an


and the Tvam, the Ding an



the subjective side of the world. Among ourselves such a synthesis of the subjective with the objective

would even now rouse the strongest theological, not philosophical, protests, whereas the theologians of India discuss it with perfect equanimity, and see in it the truest solution of the riddle of the world.

In order fully to understand it, we must try to place ourselves firmly on the standpoint of the

Vedanta philosophers, forgetting all our own inherited theological misgivings. Their idea of the Supreme Cause of the universe went far beyond


meant by God, the creator and ruler of the world (Prar/apati). That being was to them a manifestation only of the Supreme Cause or Brahman, it was Brahman as phenomenal, and it followed that, as Brahman, as they held, was indeed the cause of

everything, the All in All, man also could be nothing but a phenomenon of Brahman. The idea therefore that it would be blasphemy to make the creature

Mawdukya Up.


Ayam Atma Brahma.


that God is hardly a name that can be used for that Supreme Brahman. including gods all and men. the absolute Cause of the universe. equal to the creator so far as their substance was concerned. and present likewise in all its phenomenal manifestations. it was the absolute divine essence. in fact. never presented itself to their minds. manifested in a subjective and personal creator. nothing but truth in the doctrine that man in his true nature was the same with Brahman. but from the Vedanta point of view it means real identity. real recognition of the original divine nature of man. as it did in the hymns of the and though they might have shrunk from identifying gods and men with that personal divine being. this lifting up of the Tvam into the Tat might prove the equivalent of the idea of divine sonship. Their Tat was something behind or above the purely personal creator. that he shares in the nature of Brahman. r Pra<yapati I say when as the creative god. for we ought never to forget that we and the absolute Cause of w hen taken have always to be satisfied with what we take God to be ( Vidyamatra). the lord of all creatures. They saw. also. the Godhead. or in the spirit of God. however much hidden and disfigured for a time by Avidya. because theology steps in and protests against them as irreligious and blasphemous. Prar/cipati. With us unfortunately such questions can hardly be discussed in a calm philosophical spirit. Translated into the language of the early Christian philosophers of Alexandria. just as the Jews declared it blasphemy in Christ to teach that He was . and that we can never go beyond. Even their god beyond gods (Deveshu adhi ekaA) did not satisfy them any longer. or ignorance. they saw Rig-veda . taken as such. and all its consequences.1 62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

of the Father and in vital all modern His sons. The first is taken from the JTMndogya Upanishad w hich belongs to the Sama-veda and is generally regarded as one of the earlier Upanishads *. bring us very near to the earliest Christian philosophy. and help us to understand it. of man and God. nay that 163 He and the Father were one. B. seem to be moving in the most serene atmosphere of thought. though indirectly. but we get the grapes from which the juice was extracted and made into wine. arid. The teachers of the Vedanta. I Christianity. E. It is as difficult to give an idea of the form of the Upanishads as of the spirit that pervades the Upanishads. may help to show us the early Vedantists as they were. though it was recognised as the early fathers of the Church. and in an unimpassioned and truly philosophic spirit. 92 M 2 . these Vedanta teachings may. p. though under a strange form. T 1 Translated in S. I. as it was understood by the great thinkers of Alexandria. however. If properly understood. groping their way in the dark. the unity by of the Father and the Son. To maintain the eternal identity of the human and the divine is very different from arrogating divinity for humanity and on this point even our philosophy may have something to learn which has often been forgotten . We do not indeed get there the pure wine of the Vedanta.. while resuscitate in striving to man the consciousness of the identity of the Tat and the Tvam. Tat tvam asi. equal to God.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. A few extracts. and in their stiff and algebraic Sutras they were working out these mighty problems with unfaltering love of truth. nay.

' being only the name. the grandson . arising from speech. and stubborn. but the truth being that all is steel. by one nugget of gold 5. as it were. speech. the difference . : and so stubborn.e. is ' : What ' of clay all that known. The son said ' : Surely those venerable men . four. is that instruction. /Svetaketu was the son of Arum. arising from speech. by one pair of nail-scissors 6.164 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' 7. darling. but the truth being that all is gold Arid as. all that is made of gold is known. but is made of clay is the truth being that all is clay And as. ' all that is made of steel (Karsrmayasam) is known. a Brahma?ia by birth only. arising from thus. . His father said to him are so conceited. the difference being only the name. my dear son. by which ' that instruction. To him ' : of Arima) said is his father (Uddalaka. when he was twenty2. of Arima. the difference being only the name. my dear son. /Svetaketu returned to his father. 1. my for that instruction dear son.' Having begun his apprenticeship (with a teacher) when he was twelve years of age. a Brahmabandhu. $vetaketu. ' conceited. having then studied all the Vedas. have you ever asked by which we hear what is not perceived. The father replied My dear son. not having studied (the Veda). as you 3. considering himself well-read. i. who. as by one clod 4. considering yourself well-read. ' we perceive what is not by which we know what is not known ? heard. go to school for there none belonging to our race. is. the son $vetaketu. Sir ? he asked. rny dear son. FIRST KHANDA.

was . ^ born. for breath comes . But how could ' it be so. For if they had should they not have told it me ? Do you.' ' Be it so. SECOND 1. Water thought. may I be grow forth. be born of that which that which is. ' It sent forth earth (food). without a second and from that which is not. ' i . Man (Purusha). ' It sent forth fire. water fire alone. but parts. most food is then produced. my dear son. consists of sixteen Abstain from food for fifteen days. may I grow forth. therefore tell me that. is From water alone eatable SEVENTH KHAJVTDA. my dear son ' ? the father continued. fire may I be many. I be may I grow forth. only was in the beginning. 'It thought. without a second. How not could that which ? is. that which is. without is a second. Therefore whenever it rains anywhere. 'In the beginning. one only.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. No. ' anybody anywhere is produced on him from many. my dear son. my son. 3. one only. may many. one only. ' 2. That thought. there was that only which is (TO 6V). 165 (my teachers) did not it. ' It sent forth water.' said the father. drink as much water as you like. know that. may I 4. in the beginning there was that only which is not (TO 6V). And therefore whenever is hot and perspires. known why Sir. Others say. food produced.

ANDA. understood what he yea. And whatever his father asked him. my son. there was one part of the sixteen parts left to you. will not from water. which would not burn much more than this (i. Sir. he knew it all ! ' by heart. one part only of the sixteen parts (of you) is left. Go and eat Then wilt thou understand me. 2. my dear son. and that. be cut off. lighted up with food.' He it. make honey by col- lecting the juices of distant trees. he understood NINTH KB.' They do not ' ' : ' : occur to me. if you drink /SVetaketu abstained from food for fifteen days. and reduce the juice into one form. and by it you remember now the Vedas.' After that. speech from said. of a firefly.1 66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.' 2. one coal of the size be made to blaze up again by putting grass upon it. thus. 1. ' : What shall Then he came to his father and said The father said I say ? Repeat the Rile. my dear son. The father said to him fire : one coal only of the size 'As of a great lighted of a firefly may be left. e. and will thus burn more than this. taketu ate. my son. breath from water. and therefore with that one part you do not remember the Vedas. ' .' 3. 'As the bees. he understood what his father meant when he said Mind. and afterwards approached his father. And as these juices have no discrimination. and water. Ya^us. ' Then his father said to fire him : 5.' Then Sve4. Thus. He replied and Saman verses. fire. may ' 6. As of a great lighted if left. burnt up. comes from ' : food. very little).

run. know not or that. .' the father replied. It is the True. ' Be my child. that they become again and again. ' that exists has Self. or a musquito.' It is the and thou. That which is that subtile essence. a lion. in Self. Sir. Be it so. I am this or that river. inform me still more. or a worm. ' as those rivers. so that they 167 might say. or a wolf. or a boar. or a wolf. whether a lion. the clouds lift up the water from the sea to the sky. that subtile essence. all these creatures. my son. it so. e. or a gnat. the eastern (like the Ganga) toward the east. when they have become merged in the True (either in deep sleep or in death). know not that they have come back from the True. ' 2. my son. /SVetaketu. that they become again and again.' said the son.' said the son. ' 4. inform me still more. Sir. or a musquito. in it all 3. >Svetaketu. when they are in the sea. or a midge. or a boar. whether 3. And In the same manner. ' its Self. ' or a gnat. or a midge.' the father replied. my son. art Please. Whatever these creatures are here.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. Now that which its all that exists has Self. or a worm. They go from sea to sea (i. it. TENTH These rivers. when they have come back from the True. Whatever these creatures are here. They become indeed 1. and send it back as rain to the sea).' it is the ' ' and thou. It is it. sea. do not know. It is the True. my child. the western (like the Sindhu) toward the west. art Please. I am the juice of this tree same manner. in the that they are merged in the True. all these creatures.

' ' What It is broken.' ' ' ' do you see there ? 'These seeds. my child. inform me still more. ' art it.1 68 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Break it. ' If one it . to strike at its stem. Sir.' said the son. this. In exactly the same manner.' It is ' broken. but it would live.' Break one of them. ' if it leaves branches.' ? ' Not anything. that branch withers a second. left it . Sir. almost infinitesimal. the whole tree withers. TWELFTH KHA#Z>A. that branch withers if it leaves a third. Pervaded by the living Self that tree stands firm. If he were to strike at its top. i .' ' know dies when the living (Self) has ' the living (Self) dies not.' Please. in it all that exists has its Self.' thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree. . : Thus he spoke my son. . but it would live. If he were tree here. That which is that subtile essence. Sir. that branch withers. of its . It is the True. and thou. Fetch me from Sir. ELEVENTH were to strike at the root of this large would bleed. If it leaves the whole tree. it would bleed. ' i . drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing But if the life (the living Self) leaves one 2. $vetaketu.' ' ' What do you see there Sir. ' Be it so. but it would live. It is the Self. This (body) indeed withers and 3. it would bleed.' the father replied.' ' ' Here is one.

it was melted. $vetaketu. and thou. of it from the surface of the water. art . for. inform me more/ said the son. That which is the subtile essence. in it all is that exists has Self. which you do not perceive ' of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists. How replied ' is it ? ' : The son ' It is salt/ Taste Taste it from the middle. father said Here also. Please. ' How ' is it ? The son ' replied : It is salt/ it from the bottom. which water last night/ it. That which is the subtile 3. It is the True. my child/ the father replied. 2. that subtile essence there. still O /Svetaketu.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. ' Be it so. The son having looked for course. ' : How it ' is it ? The son replied The father said on me/ It is salt/ ' : Throw away and then wait He did so . in it all that It is the True. 169 The father said: 'My son. The son did as he was commanded. ' 3. my son. Believe it. Sir. 2. son . The father said to him Bring me the you placed in the salt. THIRTEENTH ' 1. my but there indeed it is. It is the Self. it/ exists has its Self. art it/ ' It the and thou. its Self. essence. but the salt continued to exist. ' : Then the indeed. and then wait on me in the morning/ ' . Place this salt in water. The father said Taste ' : found it not. you do not perceive the True (Sat). in this body.

who meets with a teacher to inform him. I have been brought left here with my eyes covered.170 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. FOURTEENTH KHA^Z>A. Go in that direction. or " I have been the north. Sir. inform me still more.' said the son. my child/ the father replied. and leave him then in a place where there are no human beings and as that person would turn towards the east. . If a is ill. . go in that direction thereupon. breath in heat in the Highest Being (Devata). Please. here with my eyes covered." 3. Sir.' the father replied. he would by asking his way from 1. it so. he " knows them. village to village arrive at last at the Gandharas. inform me still more. ' Be my man child. in that exists has Self. It is the True.' It is the and thou. learn that there is " delay so long only as I am not delivered (from this body). it " and as is the Gandharas. his mind in breath." 2. and then I shall be perfect. or the west. 'That which is the subtile essence. in exactly the same manner does a man. O /Svetaketu. having been informed and being able to judge for himself. as long as his speech is not mind. ' it all its Self. Then. covered . and shout. his relatives assemble ? him and ask " : Dost thou know me round Dost thou know me merged heat ? in his (fire).' said the son. T i . 'And as thereupon some one might loose his " bandage and say to him. art Please. ' Be it so. FIFTEENTH ' KHAA /)A. it. 'As one might lead a person with his eyes away from the Gandharas.

FIRST VALLI. that he possessed. The son said of many (who have still to die) . surrendered (at a sacrifice) i. ' 171 But when his speech is merged in his mind. and has by many scholars been classed as of later date. mind in breath.' . at the head in the I go midst work of Yama 6. ruler of the departed) which (the to-day he has to do unto me ? of many (who are now Look back how hereafter. it was with those who came before. It is the True. to whom it He ' said wilt thou give me ? a second and a third time. heat in the Highest Being. had to be true to his word and to I go as the 5. art Please. 4. That which is the subtile essence. (The father. Va^asravasa. ' /Svetaketu.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. He (knowing that his father had promised to give up at a sacrifice all that he possessed.' so. He had a son of the name of Na&iketas. and therefore his son also) said to his father Dear ' : father. breath in heat (fire). his * exists has its Self. sacrifice his son. like corn he springs up again. look forward how come A it will be with those who mortal ripens like corn. Sir. The next extract is from the Ka^Aa Upanishad of the Ya^ur-veda. inform me still more. ' Be it so. ' : Then the father replied (angrily) I shall give thee unto Death. in it all that 2. and thou.' the father replied. having once said ' : though in haste. ' What will be the dying). my child.) first. desirous all (of heavenly rewards).' said the son.' It is the Self. it. then he knows them not.

.172 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and free from anger. Vaivasvata bring water. Thereupon one of the attendants of Yama is sup- posed to say ' :) Fire enters into the houses.' . Leaving behind thirst. . returning to his house after an absence of three nights. righteousness. peace-offering Brahmana that dwells in the house of a 8. pacified. after having seen thee freed from the jaws of death. 7. Auddalaki Arum. his sacred and his good deeds. says :) Brahma?ia. destroys his his expectations. as thou. when a Brahmana That fire is quenched by this enters as a guest. and Death. will With my leave. He shall sleep peacefully through the night. be that he may from anger towards me and know me and greet me. Yama said thy father. and there is no one to receive him. when I shall free thee. hast dwelt in my house three nights without eating. during which time Na&iketas had received no hospitality from him. know thee. ' Hail to thee first ! and welfare 10.' : have been dismissed by 1 1. all his sons and cattle/ hopes and and (Yama. rejoice in the world of heaven. a venerable guest. ! ' A foolish man without receiving food to eat. is is Naiketas . his possessions. as the of the three boons I choose that Gautama. and be again towards ' thee as he was before. said: 'In the heaven-world there no fear afraid on thou art not there.' 12. to me Na&iketas said kind. ' therefore choose now !' : three boons. 9. my father. (Na&iketas then enters into the abode of Yama Vaivasvata. both hunger and all and out of the reach of sorrow. Death. and no one account of old age.

being pleased with him. and how they . Yama then told him that fire-sacrifice. learn it from 14. ' 1 9. NaAiketas said ' : On this point even the gods have been in doubt indeed. O Na/dketas. Choose now. said again : Na&iketas. hidden in darkness. and another teacher like thee is not to be found : surely no other boon is like unto this/ 'Choose sons and grandsons who 23. This. taught by thee This the third of my boons/ I 2 1 . and thou. in the beginning of the worlds. That fire all men will proclaim as thine. Choose anunderstand. and how many. should like to know. I will tell it thee. hast declared it to be not easy to understand. some saying. that it is the attainment of the eternal worlds. 'Thou knowest. and which thou hast chosen as thy second boon. the fire-sacrifice which leads us to heaven tell it to me. ' : . and let me off that boon/ 22. 173 IT. Yama said and when thou understandest that fire-sacrifice me. this I ask as my second boon/ reach immortality.. he is others. do not press me. he is not. O Death. . Then M?^'tyu. Death. Na&iketas. ' : are to be placed. thy third boon/ 20. other boon. and what bricks are required for the altar. Death said : . which leads to heaven. when a man is dead. and their firm support. Na&iketas said There is that doubt.' 15. for I am Those who live in the heaven-world full of faith. Death said ' : . is thy fire which leads to heaven. Na&iketas. And Na&iketas repeated all as it had been told to him.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. know. this is On this point even the gods it is not easy to have been in doubt formerly That subject is subtle.

' Only that boon to be chosen by me. but do not ask 26. Na&iketas. slowly decaying here below. Death. and live thyself as many harvests as thou desirest. and horses. the freedom from decay enjoyed by the immortals. wear out the present vigour of all the Even the whole of life is short.' NaMketas said: 'Thoughts of to-morrow. hundred years. me about dying. desires. tell us what there is in that great Hereafter. keep dance and song for Keep thyself/ can be made happy through wealth.' . after having approached them. that on which there is this doubt.174 shall live a INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. pleasures which arise from beauty and love?' Death. such are indeed not to be obtained by be waited on by them whom I give to thee. No man long live. and long life. Choose the wide abode of the gold. as as thou is (which I have chosen) 28.' If thou canst think of any boon equal to that.' Whatever desires are difficult to attain among these mortals. herds of cattle. choose wealth. 'No. . after he has pondered on the and knowing. Na&i- ketas does not choose another boon but that which enters into what is hidden. elephants. ments.' rulest ? What mortal. would delight in a long life. when we see thee 1 ' 27. senses of man. Let us Shall we have wealth. on the wide earth. thou thy horses. I make thee the enjoyer of all ' 24. Be (king). 29. ask for them according to thy wish fair maidens with their chariots and musical instru' 25. men. earth.

for even many pleasures did not tear thee away. and puffed up with vain knowledge.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OP THE VEDANTA. chain a man. even when they hear of him. who is able to teach this (the Self) wonderful is he who comprehends this. ignorance. . the wise prefers the good to the pleasant. He (the Self) of whom many are not even able whom many. good is one thing. hast dismissed ' them 4." he thinks. round and round. "there is no other. It is well with him who clings to the good he who chooses the pleasant. go ' 5. do not comprehend wonderful is a man. having different objects. deluded by the delusion of wealth. . misses his end. staggering to and fro. sures that are or seem delightful. Death said: 'The . and what is known as wisdom. I believe Na&iketas to be one who desires knowledge. when found. 175 SECOND VALLI.' leadeth to wealth. wise in their own conceit. but the fool chooses the pleasant through them. the careless child. . the pleasant another these two.' Thou.' . in which many men 'Wide apart and leading to different points are these two. the wise goes round about them and distinguishes 1." thus he falls again and again under my sway.' ' by the blind. Thou hast not gone into the road that perish. all.' The good and the pleasant approach man 2.' Fools dwelling in darkness. ' : Yea.' The Hereafter never 7. "This is the world. like blind men led ' rises before the eyes of 6. greed and avarice. to hear. after pondering all plea3. O Na&iketas. when taught by an able teacher.

they do not understand nor is that one killed. but when is . then.' 19. he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind.' Yama said 1 1 Though thou hadst seen ' . the endless rewards of good deeds. eternal. because he has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. O Na/dketas. The it sprang from nothing. I have obtained what . O dearest. who has removed from it all qualities. who is hidden in the cave. not to be obtained by argudeclared by another. the foundation of the world. is killed. who has entered into darkness. 'A mortal who has heard this and embraced it. who dwells in the abyss. : the fulfilment of all desires. everlasting he is not .176 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. ' The wise who. the rest. by means of transient things. Ancient is unborn. it is easy to understand. Hence the Na&iketa fire-sacrifice has been laid by me first then. killed.' 13. Thou hast obtained thou art truly a man of true resolve. is That doctrine it ment. by means of meditation on his recognises the Ancient. May it now 9. for the eternal not obtained by things which are not eternal. is not transient (the teaching of Yama). we have always an i o.' for . nothing sprang from it. yet being wise thou hast with firm resolve dismissed it all. The house (of Brahman) is open. 'The knowing Self is not born.' 12. If the killer thinks that he kills. if the killed . thinks that he this one does not kill. it dies not. the wide abode. and has thus reached that subtle Being. I believe. inquirer like thee Na&iketas said I know that ' ' ! : what is is called treasure is transient. that which is magnified by praise. Self. ' though the body is killed. who is difficult to be seen. the shore where there is no fear.' 1 8. rejoices. as God.

imperishable Brahman for those to cross over to the fearless shore. who is or whose mind not tranquil. ' 177 The is is great. nor by understanding.' ' The Self chooses him But he who has not first (his body) as his 24. and subdued. Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot. own. He whom the Self chooses. save who rejoices and rejoices not ? 22. he ' goes to able everywhere.' 21. greater than hidden in the heart of the creature. know that God. those householders light Tri?ia/dketa sacrifice. Those who know Brahman call likewise. smaller than small. he walks far . 'May we is be able to master that Na/t'iketa .' ' who wish 3. as unchanging among changing things. Who. entered into the cave (of the heart). 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda. A man who free from desires and free from grief.FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. is sitting still. nor by much learning. x . own them shade and who perform the 2. 20.' THIRD VALLI.' 23. Self. he can never obtain is the Self (even) by knowledge. not at rest. turned away from his wickedness. by him the Self can be gained. ' 1 . There are the two. ' Though down. as great and omnipresent.' . he never grieves. sees the majesty of the Self by the grace of the Creator (or through the serenity of the elements). dwelling on the highest summit (the ether in the heart). drinking their reward O in the world of their works. though lying myself. rite which a bridge for sacrificers which is the highest. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies.

'But he who has understanding and whose mind (the reins) always firmly held. The senses they call the senses their roads.' O 6. and that is the ' highest place (step) of Vishmi. his senses (horses) are unmanageable.178 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the mind. he reaches the end of his journey. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects. but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle. who is mindful and always pure. ful and always impure. from whence he is not born again. who is unmind7. beyond the mind there is the intellect. He who has no understanding and whose mind is ' never firmly held. beyond the objects there is the mind.' He who has no understanding.' ' 4. the body to be the chariot.' That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth.' Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped. then wise people call him the Enjoyer. his senses are under control.' ii.' ' 8. But he who has understanding. the senses. beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person (Purusha). the Great Self is beyond the intellect. this i is 2. ' Beyond the Person there is nothing the goal. the objects of When he (the Highest Self) union with the body.' 10. is the horses.' But he who has understanding for his cha9. and the mind the reins. the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer. the furthest road. 'A wise man should keep down speech and . rioteer.' in ' 5. like good horses of a charioteer. reaches indeed that place. intellect.' 13. but is ' enters into the round of births. never reaches that place. like vicious horses of a charioteer. and who holds the reins of the mind.

I knew that I could count on the same indulgence which is always granted to a first attempt at translating. sound. nay. 179 mind is he should keep them within the Self which knowledge he should keep knowledge within the . published in 1879 and 1884.TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. wrong in following a text. such as it is presupposed by the commentaries of /Samkara. Though I was well aware of the of all difficulties of such an undertaking. in 1879. difficult is the path (to the He who has perceived that which is without without touch. my my But I do not wish it to be understood that I consider my translation even scholars Our best now as quite free from doubt. . and he should keep that the Quiet/ 14. When therefore. know how far we are still from a perfect understanding of the Upanishads. instead of intro- N 2 . I undertook a translation the more important Upanishads. without decay.' . without smell. . able. often. Self which is the Great .' Translation of the Upanishads. awake having obtained your boons. without begin' ning. 'Rise. understand them The sharp edge of a razor is is I ! (the Great) within the Self w hich T difficult to Self) 15. eternal. without end. without taste. without form. is beyond the Great. all I could hope for was to give a better translation than what we had before. and unchangefreed from the jaws of death. pass over the wise tell it. as in our case. May I be allowed to say here a few words with transtranslation. at guessing and deciphering an ancient Nor have I been at all convinced that I was text. Those who know regard to lation of the Upanishads. will easily see that I have altered it in several places.

I work.l8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. all the translators of the S. My determination discover also. who after all lived a thousand years ago. in 1897. and when my translations diller from his. as those who come after me a will field no doubt glean many a stray ear even in which so many mowers have mowed. may be criticised. from Professor Deussen's its help. giving what they could give at the without waiting for the ninth year. anybody who will take the a sacrifice in trouble to compare them with my own will find a good harvest of them. and I never Besides represented it as more than a pis aller. shows what an immense advance has been made with have adopted many emendations in the extracts given above. But the work of the children that glean some ears is very different from that of the mower who has to mow a whole field alone. E. Though time. has placed at the disposal of all Vedantic students what may almost be called a mowing machine in place of a sickle and . B. ducing conjectural emendations. such as it was at the time of $a??ikara. the careful and brilliant translation of the Sixty Upanishads published by Professor Deussen. however obvious they seem to be. but have simply corrected them. Such a work as Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavad-gita. I have hardly ever referred to the mistakes made by earlier translators of the Upanishads. published in 1891. Scholars should learn that the more obvious their emendations are. whenever it was impossible to be satisfied a satisfactory meaning. to with /Sawkara's interpretations. had to make that. the more difficult it becomes to account for the introduction of such palpable corruptions into an ancient text. .

further out of our depth if we maintain. outside the Vedantic horizon. or 17. The technical repetition of certain words in IV. The name of Naiketas. or 16. whether before or after the time when the Vedarita and Samkhyaphilosophy assumed each its own independent and systematic form. and whose mind is so thoroughly imbued with Vedantic ideas. except last and probably spurious or additional in the verse. Anybody can see also that the second Adhyaya differs in spirit from the first. If we could always at what time each Upanishad was finally settled and reduced to writing. 1 8 is later. for instance. and that V. therefore. and Atman in that of the Vedanta.TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. our task would be much lightened. nor is Purusha entirely To say. with regard to the Ka^Aa Upanishad. 1 7 might indicate that the Upanishad originally ended there. and who three Vallis only. 13. that Purusha must always be taken in the technical Samkhya sense. is never mentioned in the second chapter. that there But Atman We was a time when it consisted of one chapter and It may have been so. . suspect Vedantic influences. whereas Purusha and PrakHti at once remind us of Sawkhya by no means unknown to early Samkhya philosophers. Whenever we come across such words as Atman and know Brahman we doctrines. But on the other shall prove that it was not so ? hand. what do we know of the compilers of the Upanishads to enable us to speak so positively on such a subject ? Everybody can see that there was a division at III. is is go still going too far. all I l8l can say is that I always differ most reluctantly from one who has devoted so many years to Vedantic studies. for instance. at least at present.

as derived from Na&iketa. while what we find here are philosophic rhapsodies rather than the Upanishads really are. also. we Here. still and second plenty of work left first Valli. appears as NaAiketa. we are still like children playing on the sea-shore and finding now and then a pebble or a shell. Nowhere. watch that period of chaotic thought. half religious. is that the systematic philosophy of India would be perfectly unintelligible without the previous chapter of the Upanishads. in India at least. for with all that has been achieved are on the threshold only of a truly historical study of Indian philosophy and literature. Character of the Upanishads.1 82 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. not from the old form NaHketas. What is quite clear. if we knew more of the utterances of such men as Heraclitus show some or Epimenides in Greece. have here quoted from the seem worthy of the name of hardly Upanishads It would have been almost impossible philosophy. except in India. whilst the great ocean of that ancient literature lies before us undiscovered and unexplored. to describe them so as to give a clear idea of what Such utterances as will I us philosophy always means something systematic. which preceded. and then We In as compared with the there come. the age of pbilosophy. With But that is the very reason the Upanishads are so interesting to the hiswhy torical student. can we consecutive treatises. And however unsystematic . they might likeness to the outpourings of the authors of the Upanishads. Possibly. is fact. for those who after us. may easily discover a different spirit in the third. however. half poetical. properly so called.

CHARACTER OF THE UPANISHADS. there is really during the age that shads. that which is alone true and real it and know that.' that is. these relics of the 183 childhood of philosophy may more system in them than at first sight. Upanishads. you cannot handle it. no tree. art not different from that divine nature which ' ' pervades the whole world. is as true as it is difficult to explain. we see that that highest wisdom had already been fully elaborated in the of famous teachers he is formula of Tattvam asi. and is then only learning from his father the highest wisdom. You cannot see it. it is there. no fruit. schools If /SVetaketu is is recorded to us in the Upanirepresented as attending the till twenty-four years of age. and without it there would be no seed. though invisible.' Thou art that. but you can taste though invisible. man. cannot be doubted that they represent the soil which contained the seeds of philosophy which sprang up and had their full growth in the great it Whatever we may think systems of philosophy of a later age. They contain a number even appears of technical terms which show that the Upanishads did not spring up in one day. That divine essence. as the germ of life in the smallest seed. but to we must remember tradition that a long continued oral must naturally leave a wide door open of these additions of every kind. as without God there would be no That this ancient wisdom should be so world. often mixed up with what seems to us childish and absurd. thou. and that there must have been a good deal of philosophical controversy seem. . is present likewise. in this unreal or phenomenal world. as salt pervades the sea.

and that only after having gained a virtue. such as Upanayana. as . always give rise and most fanciful interpretations. Now then a desire to know Brahman. 'Now then research of Brahman. would there arise a desire to know Brahman.184 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. knowledge of the sense of Then or Therefore. contained in 555 short paragraphs.S fttras If .' The two words Atha and AtaA which. and first of all. Vedadhyayana. and that he is therefore likely to feel a desire to understand the be true Veda and to know Brahman. it seems to me best to take Atha in the sense of Now. Ve cUinta. In that case the Mimamsd might be looked upon first. learning by heart the text of the Veda. and which occur again and again at the beginning of Sanskrit works. and we should have to consider the practice of virtue and the performance of sacrificial acts as a necessary .' or as Deussen translates Giyn&sh. as one body. I believe. but a carefully reasoned system. We read there in the ' first Sutra and as a kind of title. that in real life the first step would have been to study the Purva-Mimamsa. reception by a teacher. and Ata/z. we find no longer rhapsodies. &c. If we must assign to them any special meaning. including the Upanishads. also. implying to endless thereby that the student has fulfilled certain preliminary conditions. were originally no more than introductory. It may some commentators maintain. now we turn to these. to the philosophy elaborated by Badaraya/ia. the Purva-Mimawsa forming the the Uttara-Miinib/isa the second part. particularly of the sacrificial Dharma. or what is called Dharma. law. the so-called Vedanta-Sutras.

VII. 2. Ar. . 9. V. 3 JOand. wish to know. . Ill. 1 2 . Up. . instead of ViMra. by being defined and So. present to the mind of Biida- Gign&sa.. according to the commentator. is l . 4 J^and. 185 preliminary to a study of the Vedanta-philosophy. however. . to give an idea of the enigmatical style of the Sutras. and their utter uselessness without a commentary. (origin. VII. i. 7. The best answer. 3.VEDANTA-S^TRAS. 6. 18. . Up. as it is generally expressed. to Badarayana and his predecessors. research or discussion. like all be known as So But although Brahman cannot other things. how- Brahman that Manas is Brahman that Vi^fiana is Brahman 3 that the sun is Brahman 4 nay that Narayana is Brahman 5 there ever. or. and dissolution) 6 of this world proceed . ' is : That JDmnd. He was may have used I confess I doubt impossible. it can be explained negatively as Not so and Not so. because in the true sense Brahman cannot be defined or known. 7. Up. Up. . i VII. 12. XI. and can thus be cleared from many doubts which arise from the various utterances about it in the Upanishads. Ill. i. When we read. 5 Mahanar. i Brill. II. ' for trying to determine what or at least what he or it was the origin &c. that food -. 4. on purpose. 2. Up. 2 Brill. subsistence. i. is surely room enough Brahman really is. Khaud. IV. Up. to all these questions That from which is that given in the next Sutra. . we should have to consider works as essential for producing that purity and serenity of the mind without which a knowledge of Brahman all this is whether raya?ia. 19.' The full sense of this Sutra. 2 Brih. 6 The words which actually occur in the Sutra are printed in italics. Ar.

these fruits having their definite places. they live. times and causes. Brahman. e. not as having itself grown out of it or as belonging to it. and the nature of whose arrangement cannot be conceived by the mind that cause is Brahman. when born. can at first be supplied by the Veda In support therefore of our Sutra which is only. in the Sutras. And here we should mark a curious feature of orthodox Indian philosophy. but rather as an independent witness. or manifestation. caused by former actions. If it be asked. that can only be meant for intuition. but simply by the Veda (Upanishads). such intuition also presupposes a previous working of the organs of sensuous perception. that is Brahman. try to know that. by names and forms. contains many agents and enjoyers. while the object of such Sakshatkara. omniscient. how this is known. subsistence and dissolution of the world. Up. Though the Vedanta appeals to the Veda. the commenwhich world is differentiated tator insists very strongly that such knowledge is not to be gained by sense perception or by inference. looking back to it . passages of which have been collected and properly arranged some places he admits as a second source of knowledge Sakshatkara. i. it appeals to it. that into which at their death they re-enter. strictly speaking. a passage is quoted from the Taitt. If in but. intended to give a general idea of Brahman. omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin. where Varu^a explains to his son that ' that from which these beings are born. and is the abode of fruits or effects. i.1 86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that by which.' Appeals to the Veda. Ill.

as it were. But it is characteristic of the Vedanta-Sutras. because we have no historical documents. of their offspring. Pramawas. How this came about. to The same applies. also. as part of the question. the sources and authorities of knowledge. we do not know. than the other systems. that they pay much smaller attention to the Prama/ias. and. a less degree.Sfarvakas admitted but one senses. This shows that a certain time must have elapsed after the final redaction of the Upanishads and the return. for sanction 187 and confirmation. to their original home. We saw how the all . but that there had been something very important intervening between the old Upanishads and the first attempts at systematising Vedanta and Samkhya doctrines in the form of Sutras is very clear by the manner in which the Sutras This constant appeal to the appeal to the Veda. they defended that excluding sensuous knowledge against the uncertainties inherent in it. we cannot tell. they seem to come back to get the approval of the Veda. How tial do we know ? a question which forms an essen- preliminary to all philosophy in India. These questions of Pramawa are often referred to in the . because we do not possess How those Sutras. the Sutras.PRAMAJVAS. Veda as the highest authority was justified by the most elaborate arguments. as the recognised highest authority. after they had done so. the evidence of the others. source of knowledge. though in other systems They all speak as if they had for several generations elaborated their doctrines independently. or to establish their conformity with the Veda.

and union of Manas. and perhaps the oldest Pram&nas. an authoritative order. and Pra. I. what is seen. standard. and survives in the modern Persian Ferman. just as a Sadhana (means) produces Siddhi. When we come to the Sawikhya. from Ma. The first PraPratyaksha. description Anumana. mind. Pramanas according to the Sawikhya. The Pramana which serves as a means (Sadhana) of determining. It may be translated by measure. accurate knowledge. and at the same time union of the sense with Manas. though it is also used in the sense of what can be perceived by the senses. truth or certainty.e. It is explained (Sawkhya-Sutra 89) as cognition which arises from contact (with objects) and represents their form. the Dn'shte. and is said to involve really three stages. produces Pramiti. It is generally explained by Indriyartha-sa?miikarsha. mind.l88 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The former seems to consist in our seeing an object. to measure. ma?ia. with doubt and without doubt. Pratyaksha. commentaries. Self. is what we mean by sensuous shall find there a we very full of the three essential perception. and then declaring that it is this or that the latter in simply accepting . Pratyaksha. . contact of the senses and their respective objects. There is a distinction made between two kinds of Pratyaksha. Pramaia is originally the instrument of measuring. i. contact of the sense-organ with its object. called Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa. forth. and /Sabda. viz. with Atman. but not so much in the text. authority.

is immediate contact with the ear through the ether. i. without any previous idea of it. till it strikes the shore. 100) as knowledge of the connected on the part of one who knows the connection. such as when we awake from sleep. I. w hich will be more fully explained hereAnumana. see a tiger. e. and on its own objects only. as when we perceive fire (Vyapaka) from perceiving smoke This is a very imperfect description of (Vyapta). and is conveyed by Akasa or ether. so that it brought into is transmitted we are told. rawakararia.ANUMANA. is the Asadhaitself. Anumana. As we have the common illustration illustration. the special or exclusive instrument of the knowledge conveyed by it. one wave propelling the other across the vast ocean of ether. Each sense working by and at once run away. is heard by the ear only. the ear. Sound. an our present purpose. which explained (1. c. and that we know the absence of smoke when we see no fire. as being invariably connected (Vyapya) something else that is perceived. that we know the presence of fire when we see smoke. always supposing that fire but it suffices for has been proved to be the Vyapaka or the sine qua non of smoke. by means of we may perceive the beating of a distant drum. T after. as waves (ViAita). for instance. But not every sound . or as knowledge of something that but is known with is not perceptible. 189 a thing such as it is.. The next Prama^a is is Anumana or inference. .

we Sutra V. . Anin. plant. the concomitance between smoke and fire and the like. is explained to be instruction given by one that can be trusted (Aptopadesa) this one that can be trusted (I. p. any other person also endowed with authority and therefore considered back to one. convey knowledge that cannot be gained either by perception or by inference alone. goodness. but only by the The same applies to Aptava&ana. or for verbal knowledge as is conveyed The Hindus knew quite well that by a word. 1 tion Samkhya-Philosophie. nay. That the connecbetween sound and meaning. 37. another word. as words such as greatness. for believing the Word. but for the Samkhya and other systems. word. whether this $abda. and that it may have been intended at first for Brahman. also such animal. $abda being for the Vedantists the Veda. and therefore the authority see from of words by themselves. 101) or word. . metal. on which the Anumana rests. 154.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. because the invariable . even dog or cow. these three Pramanas all easily be shown that any knowledge conveyed by word must equally depend on experience. or on acquaintance with the person who is or is not to be trusted. nay. Sabda. another Pramana.3. It might as trustworthy. The question that /S'abda had really a far more general and more philosophical meaning. was taken to signify the Veda such as we originally I have elsewhere given my reasons possess it T . is. . occupied the Sawkhyas. can have been established by sensuous experience only and the trustworthiness of go Pratyaksha.

can It means what hardly be translated by aptus. at first sight makes the case still worse is . word. considering that the question of the possibility of knowing or of the instruments of knowledge. we must be satisfied with what the Sa?7ikhya philoand there can be no doubt that sophers tell us . has been obtained or received. However. This would seem indeed to lower the Vedanta-philo- sophy to the level of but a in all Pre-Kantian philosophy. which is explained by Yogya. the other systems of philosophy are well acquainted with them. used in the Samkhya-philosophy. considering that they admitted a divine. or even of a book believed in by the world at large. though not the later Vedanta works. the followers of the orthodox . and they are even referred to by the commentators of the Vedanta all The Sutras of also. forms the founda- tion of every true system of philosophy. it is difficult to understand how they could afterwards take it in the general sense of the word of one that can be of philosophy have trusted. It seems strange at first sight. not a human origin of the Veda. little reflection will show us that there was What the Vedanta a sufficient excuse for this neglect. Apta. that the Brahma-Sutras. and Aptavakya or for term Aptava&ana need than it originally have meant no more our traditional language such as it is. should apparently have attached so little importance to what may be called their Critique of Pure Reason. though was explained afterwards as meaning the word of a person worthy of confidence. $abda. Samkhya understood /Sabda in the sense of Veda though. question for us to consider is The important what other systems made of these three Pranuwas.SABDA.

witli objects of right knowledge and its its instruments and results of actions. become invalid. presented to us by the senses. a doctrine which undertakes to objects. The commentator admits this when he says. . are ignored. namely Brahman. could not well appeal at the same time to the evidence of the senses. : support of truth may and does readily in long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self. was often invoked by the modern orthodox Samkhyas under the name of $abda or word. the only evidence invoked by Badarayafta is $ruti or revelation. it does not enter his mind that the world bf effects. inference. nor to inference which is founded on it.' prove that the manifold world.192 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and that the manifoldness of the visible world is but the result of that nescience which the Vedanta is meant to destroy. and one that could never claim more than a subordinate place. To most philosophers revelation would seem a very weak instrument of knowledge. perception. &c. which. But we must remember that it is the highest object of the Vedanta to prove that there is only one true reality. perception. that while Pratyaksha. because the If ' we absence of manifoldness deprives them of their Hence. acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity (Brahman).. the ordinary means of right knowledge. even if treated as a subdivision of Anumana or inference. or right knowledge. and Anumana. as we saw. It will then become intelligible why an appeal to the evidence of the senses or to inference would have been out of place and almost self-contradictory in the Vedanta. is unreal. though it acknowledge their importance for all the ordinary Thus /Sawkara continues 'So transactions of life.

over this difficulty by accepting as well founded the reasoning of some person of recognised eminence.' How well B4darayawa must have been acquainted with the ordinary evidences of knowledge. Kamida. and other founders that even o . As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered. says ' : In matters to be is mere reasoning o 1 not to known from $ruti be relied on. such as Kapila. while other works. both Pratyaksha and Anumttna. is excluded when the fundamental truths of the Vedanta are at stake. 3. Nor can we get ing as having a sure foundation. every kind of Tarka or speculation. is best shown by the new meaning which he assigns to them. there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not go on undisturbed. are shown by people still more ingenious to be fallacious. being Snmti. whether Kapila or any one else. 193 is untrue and hence. the Veda being to him self-evident. it is impossible to accept mere reason. nay even the Sawkhya and Yoga systems (IV. But everything else. One sees how arguments which some clever men had excogitated with great pains. .21). such as the Law-books of Manu. n. the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita). 2. 28) Pratyaksha to Srut'i (revelation) and Anumana to Snm'ti (tradition). as long as true knowledge does not present itself. which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only. since we observe men of the most undoubted intellectual eminence. reasoning. i . applying (I. has no proper foundation. and how the arguments of the latter are refuted in their turn by other men so that on account of the diversity of men's opinions. are true in so far only as they are not in opposition to the Veda. Thus /Samkara.SABDA. II.

and have possibly to admit a weak link in the strong chain armour of both Badardyana and awkara. on reasoning only. for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation. and. maintain that no reasoning whatever is wellfounded. that it is self-luminous like the sun for the its but .' Here we approach a very difficult question. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot. as it it is devoid of characteristic itself to inference signs or qualities. to some things reasoning admittedly founded on perception that although with regard is known to be well founded. i.' they using reason against reasoning.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. form and the like. cannot lend and other means of right knowledge. though not unfamiliar to ourselves. reasoning cannot there escape from the charge of being ill-founded. have contradicted each This rejection of reason and reasoning. seems certainly strange in a philosopher and it is not unnatural that $amkara should have been taunted by his adversaries with . You cannot. to an end. on account of its excessive abstruse- even be thought of without the help of the for it cannot become the object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as ness. As all reasoning and inference. of philosophical other. with regard to the matter in hand there will be no escape. the supreme authority of the established against those who doubt it ? is How Veda It to be may be is : orthodox to say that the Veda enough own proof. say. holy texts .' schools. the whole course of practical human life But even is this does not frighten ' would have to come $amkara. ' ' Moreover.e. he replies.' if all reasoning were unfounded.

i.THE MEANING OF VEDA. and at the same time the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour Authority of the Vedas. and Brahman is Veda. It is hardly But who says so ? Who but a fallible mortal ? enough if we were to say that the Veda was the oldest document which the Brahmans possessed. have meant originally knowledge or wisdom o 2 . that its authority requires no support from elsewhere how are objections to be silenced . that its very language required to be interpreted by competent All this might have helped to invest the persons. but was originally conceived in a far deeper sense. nirapeksham). The Meaning of Veda. and are perfectly fearless in the treatment of all other problems they can enter into the most subtle controversies. and yet they are satisfied with the mere assertion that the Veda wants no proof. We often read that Veda is Brahman. (II. like Aptava&ana. that it is direct evidence of truth. I hold. Veda. just as the light of the sun is its own evi- dence of light. was not merely the name of a text or of texts. to which we referred before. (pram4?iyam. 195 ? The Vedanta have no superstitions on any other philosophers points. i). my impression has always been that this would be taking too low a view of the Indian intellect. and in such passages Brahman is now generally taken in the sense of the Samhitas But and Brahmanas such as we possess them. Veda with some kind of mysterious character but . might it not. that it may even have been brought into India from another country.

but an first act em- bodying for the time a definite idea which came by being uttered. and as such would come very near Wisdom or Sophia. animals. first After all. and as such a Sophia was impossible without words. II. 3. not a mere thought sign or a means of communication. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 10). even in a very early period of thought. I do not venture to speak little I positively on such a subject. 28 ' : We . the creation of divine thought. Nay he speaks still all know from more distinctly in I. 4. recognise in every word an act of a Divine Thinker. might we not here also have a faint recollection of Brahman as the Word. Upari. People who have at all about what a word is. and afterwards thrown forth and realised in our objective world. To prevent all misunderstandings I say at once that I do not entertain the idea that such thoughts were borrowed from Greece and Alexandria. the All I should venture to suggest is that the idea of Word or the Logos being the first revelation. as it seems to us. just as in every species they have to recoginto existence nise the will of a Divine Creator. and men [. because there is so of real evidence left to which we could appeal. give it to my mind simply as an idea that has presented itself as a way out of many difficulties. Ar. and not hymns and Brahma/ias. manifestation or creation of a Divine Power is by no means so strange. i. whether in Greece or in India. Veda means to originally knowledge.196 or Sophia . would naturally. or had been matured during the as yet undivided Aryan period. so far as to declare that the Veda >Sawkara goes is the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and ( conditions (species) of gods. and Bf'ih. 3.

such as the earth. as they seem to me the only way in which we can free our Vedanta philosophers from the charge of childishness.' shows that the worlds. thinkers of Brahman In that case the recognition by Indian as the Word or the Divine Thought. this I may sound to many Sanskrit scholars. self-evident. sound. not to sensuous experience nor to inference. &c.. were created. e. to Brahman. and in support of which there is but one appeal. the Vedic that is. from the word Bhur. &c. and that after that he created the things corresponding to these words. but the word. the idea. if I know well how entirely hypothetical. It might then be said quite truly that the $abda. in fact all that the Veda or Va/v or *BHh = word. absolute. first remembers the word denoting the thing. e. ' 197 that any one. or Brah- man is eternal.' What should he do when there is as yet no word to remember. i. We words became manifest in the mind of Pragrapati the creator. for imagining that they could establish the highest truths which are within the reach of the . but to the Word full itself. not mystical. or as Veda. observation. when setting about something which he wishes to accomplish. would by no means be so surprising as it sounds to us at first. or the Veda.. i. but could not entirely suppress these thoughts. when it says 'uttering Bhur He created the earth. self-luminous. before the creation. truth for which the Vedanta-philosophy is fighting.' he says. and after that sets to work. became manifest. which had become manifest in the mind (of Pra^apati). was Two such words as Brahman and Atman would by themselves convey that eternal said to be. The Sruti also.THE MEANING OF VEDA. has first to be created ? therefore conclude that.

the Work-part. Sam- kara is is useless to a bold enough to declare that the whole Veda man who has obtained knowledge. or rather in the oral tradition of the Veda. all A phenomenal world. such as we find it in our manuscripts. or ' ' Not all the Vedas together. true knowledge than is a small tank of water in a country flooded with water/ man who has neglected the Vedas and disregarded the rules of the four A. we must be satisfied with the expressed view of Badaraya?ia that the evidence for what the Vedanta teaches is neither perception nor inference. in fact.sramas.' Mukti. 4. are more useful to one who has obtained he says. Of course a distinction has to be made. the 6r?lana-karica. the hymns and Brahman as. Returning to the Vedanta. of an suppose enjoyer of what is to be enjoyed. Both are called Veda or tion. the Brahmanas and even some of the Upanishads. however. a man who has lost caste. chiefly the Upanishads. or freedom. 36).198 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. revela- exist for the true philosopher. but the Word ($abda) alone. as we possess them now. human mind. and thus become The hymns and Bralmia/ias liberated (III. may still be allowed to study the Vedanta as the fountain of true knowledge. on such authorities as the hymns. of good works and refer in fact to the . they prethe existence of a manifold creation. Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda. and yet the work-part does not /Stuti. such as we know it from the Sutras. and has been made by Badarayawa between the Knowledgepart. except in order to be discarded as soon as he has understood the knowledge-part. and the Karma-kanc/a.

that object and subject. their fruit. It is to be observed in as a lower stage. and replace it by VidyL Subject and Object. has some important remarks on it discussed. not real. and You (or which fall under the concepts of ' We in say. Thou.SUBJECT AND OBJECT. but phenomenal. of the Ego and Non-Ego). art it Paramatman or Brahman). p. and it is this and annihilate Avidya. but as on to a higher stage. like darkness and light. ] ' . there is but one Brahman and nothing beside it. ? and the If the immense variety of the objective world Veda is true. are their very essence opposed to each other. 199 is But all this. 62. as we shall see. and that the one can never therefore as we should take the place of the other.bject of the Vedanta-philosophy to expel view of the world cannot be It can therefore be due called Avidya. . that is. 1 it follows further that Three Lectures on the Vedanta. and if. such as essential in leading it is. How then the are we to account for the manifold Thou's. the 6rivatman. the world. the Vedanta philosopher is at once met by the question. as we told. This Avidy^ is the next point that has to be /Sawkara. Nescience. many individuals. Nescience. our true at the same time. it belongs to the realm of Avidya. only to what is the very o. is well known.' he says. and If then the highest truth contained in the is Veda are the Tat (the Tvam Asi. and vanishes as soon as true wisdom or Vidya has been obtained. in the introduction to his comAs it mentary.

such as the body with its In I am. I am this. so that what is conceived as object can never in the same act of thought be We can. caused by a false apprehension and predicate. as we might call it). while object means with him what unreal and phenomenal. we may conclude is that to transfer what that what is perceived as You or Non-ego with its qualities. ' adds. objective. never say or think nor ought we ever to substitute subjective are we. has slowly to be over- . or vice ve*rsa to transfer what is subjective to what is objective.' he object always remains the object. the Nevertheless. but transferring the essence and is This the qualities of the one upon the other. combining what " " is true and what is false.' he is continues. and the whole visible world. : We for objective ' ' qualities. that is what perceives as We. to what is subjective.PHILOSOPHY. verb has a totally different character from what it has is ' in ' thou art T ' or ' he ' is. the Ego.' It is clear that $amkara here uses subject and object not only in their simple logical sense. which consists of thought. it is a habit in human nature (a necessity of thought. for conceived as subject.200 their INDIAN .' arise from a false apprehension which. such as it is. but that by subject he means what is real and true. and by not distinguishing one from the other. in fact the Self. to say.' object and subject mutually exclude each other.' ' A subject can never be anything but a subject." this is mine. This means that are you. must be altogether wrong. though it is inseparable from human thought." &c. Therefore.' Such statements therefore as ' am strong. and vice versa. of subject a habit. attributes also can never be interchanged. or You instance.' or I am blind.' the organs.

and it is in causing this mistake that the chief power of Avidy& or Nescience consists. It must not be however. for many of our own fallacies arise from the same Avidya. I should even go so far as to say that this warning might be taken to heart by our own philosophers also. our Nescience might indeed be called forth. as darkness is with So far as in true reality we are light. individual ignorance. Brahman. 2O1 come and at last to be destroyed by the Vedanta- philosophy. This distinction between subject and object in the sense of what is real and what is phenomenal very important. and are due in the end to the attribution of phenomenal and objective qualities to the subjective realities which we should recognise in the Divine only.SUBJECT AND OBJECT. as the result of accumulated thoughts and deeds before the mountains were brought has truly been called a general cosmical Nescience. or what is real and subjective of what is phenomenal and objective. or. is It follows in fact from this fundamental distincpredicate tion that we should never what is pheno- menal or objective of what is real and subjective. is simply our own supposed. inevitable for a time. It the Nescience of Brahman. and as underlying the Human Self and the phenomenal world. from an Indian point of view. It should rather be looked upon as inborn in human nature. and stamps the whole of the Vedanta-philosophy with its own peculiar character. that the Avidya or Nescience which makes the world what we make it and take it to be. we can . our being unacquainted with the truths of the Vedanta. . if for a time only and if we remember that it can be annihilated.

devoid of all form. for. nothing that is real can ever be annihilated. . it was said to be nought. and phenomenal. why all go on undisturbed. should not be obeyed. the fundamental doctrine of There is $amkara remains always the same. as the subject. never changing. never in contact with anything. even of the work-part. there is knowledge no reason why the ordinary course of secular and . Brahman the simple reason that there is nothing but Brahman. that is conditioned. for 19). 14). a general principle of the Vedanta. understand why according to The Phenomenal Reality of the World. but Brahman is not the individual soul. But it is very curious to find that though $a??ikara looks upon the whole objective world as the result of Nescience. as long does not present itself.202 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to that Brahman or Atman phenomenal pure. religious activity should not more particularly. Brahman and nothing else and to this . eternally anything To ascribe intelligent and free. nothing must be ascribed that is peculiar to the individual living soul (I. and the commands of the Veda. no doubt. 'The entire complex of phenomenal considered as true so long as the knowledge of Brahman and the Self of all has not arisen. .' Hence. he nevertheless allows it to be real for all practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). The individual soul is. But apart from this concession. 3. Brahman. just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to existence is l)e as true true until the sleeper wakes. i. . All we may predicate of that Highest Brahman is that it is one. so that nothing that is liable to annihilation has a right to be called real. Thus w e r read (II. which in its present state is personal.

supposed to be latent in the cause. the world. . 24. Creation or Causation. and the effect is always selves. so far as such foreign terms can be applied to the reasoning of the Vedanta. It is easy to say that Karana is cause and Karya effect. it is clear that creation in our sense cannot exist for the Vedantist.CREATION OR CAUSATION. that the created world is the effect. As long . it does not exist for Badaraya?ia only so far as it is a calling forth out of nothing does it approach the ideas of Creation with Badaraya?^a would be nothing but the result of Nescience. if Brahman is everything. we approach the problem of what we call the creation or the making of the world. and not only as the efficient. If with these ideas. seem to be the same as those which we use ourand yet they are not. a living Vedantist. taken as granted. 203 would be the same error as to ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether of the sky. and that Brahman is the cause. Hence. all its sins Lectures on the Vedanta. But the Vedantists have elaborated their own According to them theory of cause and effect. and yet Brahman is again and again represented as the cause of the Vedantist. cause and effect are really the same thing looked at from two points of view. as creation is con- ceived as a making or fashioning of matter. Here lies our great difficulty in rendering Hindu- The terms used by them philosophy intelligible. seems therefore to draw a quite legitimate inference when he l says 1 that the universe with p. Divyadasa. and nothing exists besides Brahman. the substance of the world can be nothing but Brahman. but as the material cause as well.

and crossways. for instance. and miseries mijst have existed latent in Brahman. just as steam existed latent in water before it was heated. 'Only when a cause exists is an effect observed to exist. i. Thus he continues. other. rests identity of their dogma of Brahman and the phenomenal as a general the substantial world. The . ' different from each principle. but he appeals likewise to observation. This question of cause and effect and their mutual relation has occupied most of the philosophical systems of India and when we remember what different views of cause and effect have been held by some of the most eminent philosophers of Europe. Tadananyatvam. The non-difference of the two (cause and effect) in is perceived. Effect. it is not surprising that the Hindus also should have arrived at very different results. are not effect. not when it does not exist. the non-difference or substantial identity of cause and and the Sarakhya philosophers agree with them up to a certain point.204 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. i. though it does not become evident as vapour till fire is brought near Cause and to- water.' On this. 14. In the threads again we perceive finer threads. and in these again still finer threads. and so on. are not other. that is. II. Vedantists stand up for Karya-kara?iabheda. but merely threads running lengthways. Nor does /Sa?/ikara support this principle by passages from the Veda only. cause and effect. when we do not perceive the thing which we call cloth in addition to the threads. an aggregate of threads. II. On this ground we conclude that the . 15. they. In the Vedanta. we read in so many words.

at last. Brahman which the air with ether. and ask again what it is. and black. such is our petty nature. as applied to the sprout. a distorted shadow. viz. we Almighty cannot see Him.' A^amkara adds that. ' Perhaps this earth and : all that is in it storms. as. when we see through its leaves and fruits. The Veda has declared that what is posterior in ' time. being. but we see His shadow. can never become the object of perception. it would be nothing if it through Brahman. as it were. in the nature of the cause. the sun and the skies. has its tinued existence of the cause (in the effect) is not perceived. previous to its And actual beginning. e. is with- out a second and the ultimate cause of the whole when we look at a tree and ask what it is. means only that the causal substance.' Is not this pure Vedanta ? only that the Vedantists hold that a cause. This is the real Pantheism of the Vedanta and strange as it may sound to us. the seed. the term birth. cataracts. viz. these again with and. in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which spring sprouts and new trees. the ether with world.CAUSE AND EFFECT. for instance. Or again. are the in fact. . while what Tennyson calls the distorted shadow would come very near to the Avidya of $amkara. mountains. the effect. white. that it lives : from our own philosophers or our poets.' air. its bark and wood. 205 very finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes. that it exists through Brahman. that it would not be at all but for Brahman. it would not be difficult to match it whether the answer comes that were not Brahman. Even so recent a poet as Tennyson is reported to have said. by its very nature. even in cases where the coni. red.

They are the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world. of the omniscient Lord. that is. that is Brahman' Let me evolve names and ('A7*and. of and Smrzti is called illusion (Maya). there were ever so many passages declaring that Brahman is one and unchangeable. except that. VI. This problem of cause and effect in connection with the problem of Brahman and the world was no doubt beset with difficulties in the eyes of the Vedantists. be asked how two such answers ' : opinions can be reconciled. as it were. the cause passes again beyond the sphere of visibility. from all this is the Omniscient Lord. however. . and not. particularly to the Upanishads. 14.206 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. lie. and from him. while in other passages the same Brahman is called the Creator. as the Samkhyas hold. and in support of this a number of Vedic passages may be quoted. $amkara Belonging to the Self.' of Greek philosophy. while the term death means no more than that through the secession of these particles. ' . sustentation. VIII. they are the figments of or as different from Nescience. the creation. there are names and forms (NamaThese correspond very closely to the Logoi rupa). Up. power (*S'akti). not to be defined as either real (Brahman). or nature (Prakrtti). the wise one. Different. i) what in >S'ruti ' . it. forms' (AV/tind. becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continued accretion of similar particles. from a second non-intelligent power. instead of being the ideas of a Divine Mind. If they turned to the Veda. called Prak?*iti. Up. ' 3. such as He who is called Ether is the revealer of all forms and names that wherein these forms and names are contained. and reabsorption If it of the world are said to proceed. 2) .

as far as man is concerned. as the material cause of the world. though very imperfectly. not like the The true Logoi. creations of a Divine Wisdom. even in the Lord. Otherwise Kapila takes much the same view of the relation between cause and effect as the Vedantist. and these. Self. is called the material cause (Upadana) which he at the is himself immaterial. a power far generally. Though dif- . as Lord or Isvara. Ar. though of the world. no real effect would be possible without the continuance of its cause. The Karya-kara?iabheda.e. only so far as . PrakHti exists. it is taken notice of by he. translated by Nature. PrakHti itself being its material cause. Ill. According to both. 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Svel. threatened by is all these the Samkhya He imperilled. less philosopher starts with a PrakHti. creating (Taitt. of the cause. de- pends upon the limiting conditions or the Upadhis of name and form. are represented as products of Nescience. sits speaking/ i. on taking (Purusha) notice. the Purusha. free is all the time free from from names and forms. To steer between all these rocks is no easy matter. according to the Vedanta. 7) . is valid as much for S&mkhya as for Vedanta. and informed or enlightened man the whole phenomenal world is really non-existent. 207 having defined all forms and having made their names. the identity of cause and effect. nay the world. while effect are held to same time cause and is be identical in substance. Up. for the truly Brahman. 12). The Lord as creator. VI.CAUSE AND EFFECT. While the Vedantist breakers. all conditions. 12. is considered as unreal. may therefore be called the efficient cause of man and the world. different from Brahman.

the effect from the cause therefore. the promise is fulfilled. as the and afterwards its religious Brahman and the world. while the Asat-karyavada is peculiar to Nyaya and Vaiseshika. i. 4. the identity of For he says (II. fSawkara himself certainly gives us the impression that with him the recognition of the identity of cause and effect came first. and strongly supported by the Buddhists. is And whole world an effect of Brahman. This is so characteristic a dogma of the Sawkhya that this philosophy is often spoken of as the Sat-karyavada.208 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. both are the same newly An effect substantially. but this could never be used as an argument that the Sft???khyaphilosophy is older in its entirety than the Vedanta. 'Thus the non-difference of is to be conceived. lie causality.' curious that Kapila seems. produced or created. . there would be no says. and non-different from It is it. the cause being never destroyed. and is the effect of something real. i. ferent in appearance or phenomenally. p. 232. Professor Garbe first l . which might be compared with ' Hume's view of If it 1 Samkhya -Philosophic. law or hold (Niyama) between cause and effect. to guard against what is known to us as For in Sutra I.' The Sat-karyavada. it is a is not something new manifestation only. but rendered invisible only. claims it Kapila. were only priority. 20). Whether this doctrine of the identity of cause and effect was proclaimed by Kapila or by Badarayana is who almost impossible to settle. application. almost in so many words. may be right in supposing that would be a more natural theorem for a follower it for of the Sawikhya than of the Vedtinta. the doctrine that every effect pre-exists.

strictly speaking. not meant in the sense in which the clay is the material cause of a jar. a certain ambiguity many as to what is meant by material and real. There first is more is is in this often- quoted simile than at sight meant to show that as the rope It is appears. but which. we shall also see that Nescience Brahman. is often illustrated by the very popular simile of the rope which is mistaken for a snake. as well as in other systems of philosophy. the there is being that. in fact our sense of the word. just as the appearance of the snake in the simile requires the real substratum of a rope. Dreaming and Waking. and apart from Brahman the world would be simply nothing. And so in a certain p . If we once see this may quite as well be called the material cause of the world as clearly. There Brahman. Brahman presents itself as the world. even in its mistaken character. would have denied all reality in the highest sense to everything except Brahman. and in the same way no real change can be claimed for is to the world. 209 Herbart's Selbsterhaltung des Realen. One There would have thought that philosophers. is. therefore. Brahman this is is called the material cause of the world. so Brahman no idea of claiming for the rope a real change into a snake. when perceived as the world. If. has the very real effect of frightening those who step on it. Even the apparent and illusory existence of a material world requires a real substratum. who look upon everything as the result of Avidy& or Nescience. which is Brahman. with the Vedaiitists no matter at all. to the snake. however. in the Vedanta.DREAMING AND WAKING.

carrying the Vedanta principle to its extreme consequences. that dreams on awaking are dreaming found to be unreal. that for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham) things may be treated as real. Although some Vedantists have been credited with holding the same opinion. which even Berkeley and Kant would readily have allowed. there is another important argument. /Samkara himself argues most strongly against this extreme idealism. that in perceiving anything we These maintain that perception in of the same kind as all other perception. He holds. It is clearly directed against Buddhist philosophers who. but perceptions in full day-* When the light are not contradicted by dreams. a concession. also points out that there is this difference between and waking. not only perceive our perceptions. things is therefore unnecessary. But besides the concession to which sense they do. and not our perceptions. . by-the-by. therefore. not only allows the reality of the objective world for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). He dreams is and that the admission of the existence of external No. whatever we may think of them in our heart of hearts. but perceive someHe thing not ourselves. held that everything is empty and unreal. and that all we have and know are our perceptions only. This is called the $ilnyavada (doctrine of emptiness or vanity) or Vidyamatra (knowledge only). but he enters on a full argument against the nihilism of the Buddhists. and have actually been called Cryptobuddhists in consequence. says $a??ikara. we alluded before.210 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. there is a difference between perceiving viands and perceiving the satisfaction arising from eating them. Dreams at night are contradicted by full daylight.

but it is real in so far as it is phenomenal. and what was the meaning they attached to Avidya by which not only the individual Egos. In the Upanishads p 2 .' to which all things perceived by us are referred ? If our perceptions conform to anything without is the existence of such perceived objects No one would say that peripso facto admitted. and just as when we speak This must suffice to show what the Vedantists thought of the difference between the real and the phenomenal. and that European scholars also should have failed to form a clear idea of that creative Nescience of which we can neither say that it is or that it is not. us. 211 Buddhist replies that. we admit something that impresses as well as something that is impressed. ception and what is perceived are identical they stand to each other in the relation of instrument of an impression. the Ved4ntist answers that. for nothing can be phenomenal except as the phenomenon of something that is real. the Vedantist asks What is meant by that 'without us. Creation is not real in the highest sense in which Brahman is real. like all other words. we never can be said to perceive anything but perceptions. effect. different schools even in India should have differed in their views about Avidya.DREAMING AND WAKING. but the whole phenomenal world exists or seems to exist. that they are perceptions of things as if they were without us. though we perceive perceptions only. Avidya. And if the Buddhists answer that these perceptions are illusive only. these perceptions are always perceived as perceptions of something. No wonder that. with all these ambiguities about the phenomenally real and the really real. in spite of that. has had a history. .

more efficacious. it shows us. a man. though in the end identical with Brahman. But there between Vidy (knowledge) and For what is performed with Avidy& (nescience). 10 call : Prakn'ti (nature) as Maya (magic). 4.' is not pure Vedanta. he Up. Thus we read. Know the ignorance of the individual became the cause of what we call objective reality. viz. just as we saw that the higher concept of the Self. I. often used in the simple sense of ignorance. when awake. Up. Ar. Up. in his ignorance. 10: 'Both perform the sacrificial act. i. when dying. IV. We are right therefore. that is Or again. the way by which . and with the Upanishad.212 it is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. this Nescience or Ignorance In some of the later Upanishads assumes a more inde- pendent character and even a new name. is said to shake off his body and his Avidya.' Here we see that it is ignorance alone which imparts a false character In the same of reality to the visions of a dream. with faith. Maya. 3. knowledge. he takes that to be real whatever he fears. who knows and he who does not know. arose from that of the individual personal Self.' If he feels in a dream as if he were murdered. Kh&nd. IV. Brz'h. sense simply subjective. and the Though this great Lord as the Mayin (magician). at all events. but the result of that universal Nescience. Vidya. is a difference ' : Upanishad. if historically we trace the concept of Avidya back to the subjective ignorance of the individual. 3. It is then no longer the Nescience of the individual. I believe. 20 then. IV. and Both are in that opposed to Vidya. when as yet not free from the limits of the Ego. ' we should Thus we read the phenomenal in the /SVet. which is the cause of what world.

the . or pure or was covered up (Upahita) or blinded. . the personal Brahm or Isvara how Avidya in fact became a $akti or led. and. scent. grasping. 213 the same time. five efferent The ) or acting senses (Adhyavasaya l are the senses of speaking. the Manas. if we may say so. evacuating and generating 4. feels. perceives. in both There is here again a certain ambiguity. the Indriyas. the central organ of perception. as we say. and. Manas being that which. and to react on them by will. 1 Adhyavasayo buddhi/A. belonging as were to Brahman himself. and potentia. both afferent and efferent. touch. ready to receive what is conveyed to it by the separate senses. Avidy& being caused in the individual soul ((rivatman) by the Upadhis. taste. the material organic body. ditions or impositions. from another point of view. : The Mukhyaprana. there was the world. The five afferent (Upalabdhi) senses are the senses of hearing. thinks and wills . Sawkhya-Sufcras II. to the admission of an active and creative Lord. senses. Maya of the internal or subjective This was originally the only Maya. sight. 13. the Atman. itself. conditioned by the so-called Upadhis. somehow or other related to Brahman But before there arises this it May& of objective nature. going. the conSelf.DREAMING AND WAKING. . 3. These Upadhis are 1. vital spirit (uncon- scious) 2. the Upadhis being caused by primeval Avidya. the five senses. at . deceived by that Maya or Avidya.

a growth.214 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. was unreal . called the Upadhis. The objective environment. but universal. is in That there man something that can be called Atman or Self requires no proof. arid if it be asked why they should ever have been treated as Self. comprehending the phenomena of our inward as well as of our outward experience. We can understand how it this startling idealism or monism for it is not nihilism. meanings of the senses (Artha). though our philosophy has no better name for call led to two distinct. and it is only through Avidya that the Atman has become identified with them. All that we should phenomenal. would himself be not. conditions. To these is sometimes added 5. the only possible answer is that it was through Nescience or Avidya. or would not be. for he who would say so. for all these have a beginning. All . The question then is What is really can say. are to be treated as Not-self. All these are not the or the objects or Atman. yet closely united views of the world. What in our is common language we call the Ego or Aha?nkara but a product of the Manas and quite as un- substantial in reality as the Manas itself. but. as the phenomenal was considered . for perishable it cannot be the Indriyas or these. but if a proof were wanted it would be found in the fact that no one being the disguised Atman). and therefore an end. but through a Nescience that is not only casual or individual. It cannot be the body as influenced that body is the Manas or the Mukhyaprima. the senses and the whole body. I (I ' am not ' I or what is there real behind the I. by our objective environment.

that is. not how Brahman is to be known. in worshipping a personal god. it was in that sense real also. and can only exist. These are even allowed the highest knowledge. and this not for this life only. behind And this led to the admission The higher knowledge consists in the distinction and thereby the freedom of the Self (Atman) from all its Upadhis. the lower. they are really worshipping Brahman.THE HIGHER AND THE LOWER KNOWLEDGE. as a reward of their worship. that is. but how it or he is to be worshipped in or his phenomenal state. the higher knowledge. comfort that. 215 impossible without the noumenal. without the real Brahman. well known under the names of Apara-. happiness on earth and in heaven. is recognised as obligatory on all who have not yet reached the individual deity. nay by way of preparation. and Para. This is the true Moksha or freedom which implies knowledge of the identity of the Atman with Brahman. the true Godhead. that is. it it. and teaches. and deliverance from birth and rebirth in the constant evolution (Sa??isara) of the world. or even under the name of any its This worship (Upasana) being enjoined in many parts of the Veda. but chiefly on its work-portion (Karmakant/a). with Brahman by the strict Advaitists or Monists of two kinds of knowledge. The Higher and the Lower Knowledge. it In this sense has been truly said that $a??ikara . as a personal Lord and Creator. The lower knowledge is likewise founded on the Veda. exists. and they are promised. a slow advance (Kramamukti) towards complete in its Moksha or freedom. though phenomenal aspect only. but for all eternity.

and the symbols of symbols appeal to the eye. without the spirit or in a corrupted spirit. . symbols are either given up. why should religion ? not also the other ? To my mind.' he says. . he tried to ' ' introduce the right spirit of idolatry. Who would object to the use of language in But if the one is allowed. or stocks and stones also are unobjectionable. till it has acquired the strength to resist the nipping frost of worldliness When the scepticism. idolatry is a necessity of our The tender seed of a religious spirit requires to be carefully preserved in a soft coating of symbols. are not objectionable. Idolatry in the sense of religious symbolism and I believe the most orthodox Hindus would take no other view cannot be open to objection. in his Lecture on Vedantism. Divyadds Datta. there must be. Verbal symbolism is language.2l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. this point others to his defence of a worship of the popular gods. I may quote the words of a living Vedantist. apart from And not attendant corruptions. . whether to in words Verbal the ear. that $a??ikara was opposed to the abuse of ritualism. and that is all the difference things between them. some appealing to among $amkara's contempt of all ritualism and Karman. . its growth. Symbolism or things. and . [but are they its if and to the same extent. idolatry. religious spirit is mature. stage of nature. is a religious algebra. or suffered to remain from their harmlessness. though with him On it was always symbolism rather than idolatry. and though he did not cut off all connection with idolatry. which has given rise to much controversy the Hindus themselves. It is certain. . did not attack or destroy idolatry. At one ?] so. . p. 12. formal symbols. verbal symbols.

and ourselves. If I. for See Moksha or the Vedantic Release. they are still. Vishmi. Indra. and subject to creation and dissolution as much as /Samkara himself expresses this opinion very clearly when (I. by Divyadas Datta. partake of oblations offered at numerous sacrifices. . This also was in the beginning the result and the reward of moral virtue. like ourselves. such as 1 we find it described. . in whom he believed. . as he says.. These . sometimes as symbols of the great Infinite. are phenomenal. others would not have followed my steps. sometimes as symbols of lower orders of beings in whom he believed. at one and the same time. he did so. O Lord ' ' ' ! Is Virtue Essential to Moksha? Another question which has been hotly contested both in India and in Europe is whether Moksha can be the result of knowledge only. requires a fulfilment of moral duties also as far as I understand $amkara. 3. virtue is certainly preIt is the same question which meets us supposed. lower orders of divine beings. S.IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA ? 21 7 $amkara did bow to idols. had not walked without remission in the path of works. end lead to Moksha. 28) he says: 'The gods (or deities) must be admitted to be corporeal. or whether it l Though.' If $amkara did not claim full freedom or Moksha for himself. vol. subject to birth and death.' he says. Yama. part 4. Brahma.' though by their divine powers they can. xx. of the restraint of passions and of perfect in the tranquillity of soul. for the sake of others.. knowledge alone can . A. with regard to the Buddhist Nirva/ia. Journal of the R. &c.

All of them. na //a me pravn'ttiA.' But even in this passage we are not told that virtue or self-denial by itself could or perfect freedom read a few lines further. but it soon assumed a different character. presuppose high morality on the part of the candidate. G'anamy adharmam. is misses his end. Dhammapada . which is generally quoted The good is one thing. ignorance (Avidya) and what is known as wisdom (Vidya). ' : the Ka#7ia Upanishad II. in the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.2l8 instance. a work which was meant to present different views of Moksha. though they do not explicitly say so. Yea. well with him. if he who chooses the pleasant. if we only : Wide apart and leading to different points are those two. we see secure Moksha .' And Still Na/tiketas is praised because he desires know- ledge. convincing are passages taken from the is Bhagavad-gita. as representing freedom from all bondage and illusion. a man . G'uniimi \\lnc\i has been somewhat freely translated ' : For . and likewise in the There are a few traces left sidered an the Upanishads. i. the wise prefers the good to the pleasant. ' nay. showing that virtue was conIn essential preliminary of Moksha. so that Ar</una is made to say for himself: dharmam. for that purpose. It objects chain a man. clings to the good but he . and less not tempted away from it by pleasure. we read these two having different the pleasant another . no doubt. but the fool chooses the pleasant through greed and avarice. amounting to a denial of all reality in subjective in world. na /ra me mvritti/t. the objective. The good and the pleasant approach the wise goes round about them and distin- guishes them.

which will also pass away. may well be uttered 2 &)1 ! Lead me from the unreal to the real Lead me from darkness to light Lead me from death to ! ' immortality its ! lower knowledge only. the heaven world. but that is very different from saying that Moksha can be obtained by mere Good works. 22). 3. that Moksha cannot be achieved by sacrifices or by moral conduct. if performed from pure motives and without any hope of rewards. by charitable . sacrifices. form an excellent refers to the preparation for reaching that highest knowledge which it is the final aim of the Vedanta to impart. the Pan/t-adasi. by gifts' (Bnh. but in the end by knowledge only. no doubt.IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA I ? 2 19 what I would that later do not. and has for reward another world. May such unchanging love as foolish people feel ' for earthly pleasures I call upon Thee ' ! never cease in my heart when by worshippers of Brahma or Isvara. 4. who is yearning for Brahman and true Moksha. even merely abstaining from sin. to produce passages which declare that a sinful man cannot obtain Moksha. Hence a prayer such as. And thus we read ' : Brahmanas seek to know Him by the study of the Veda. Up. but not by the true Mumukshu. It would not be difficult. IV. should lay great stress on the religious and moral side of Moksha is quite compatible with what has been maintained before. ceremonial works. that is. but what I hate that such as do I/ That treatises. Even the prayer from the BHhad-aranyaka (I.

however. that whosoever is born of sin. of the highest But when the knowledge has once been reached or is Brahman all within reach. v. broken. to be conceived and to be is the same thing. but by an Avidya. 2. properly understood. II. Sagu/iam and Ni rgu n am. heart is away. remains always Nirgunam or unqualified. inherent in sentient nature. Dangerous as this principle seems to be. this sense alone that Brahman also may be said to be affected by Avidya. while passages in the Upanishads to show that some Vedantists taught that a man who had there are reached Brahman and the highest knowledge. to imagine that true Moksha can be obtained by moral conduct alone is a mistake. sometimes seems as if *S'a??ikara and Badarayawa had actually admitted not only two kinds of knowledge. w hen He has been beheld who is both high and low (Muwd Up. doubts are solved. whatever we may think about him. but two Brahmans also. The true Brahman. whether good or bad. was even in this life above the distinction of good and could do nothing that he considered good and nothing that he considered evil. extinguished are all his works. of St. I. ' works. 68). John (Ep. . not by the Avidya of single individuals. but this would again apply to a state of Nescience or Avidya only and it is in It .220 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that whosoever evil. nay by Avidya. 8). knows Brahman cannot if is hardly more than the saying dangerous. so likewise. and as. The Two Brahmans. that is. all T ' fall The fetter of the Hence. sinneth not. with or without qualities. it God. with to be produced regard to Brahman. so far as we are concerned.

active. we can i. is e. 221 conceived by us and becomes to us qualified. If in the later Upani- Sat and Asat. being and not shads Brahman being. so that in truth na. we can and more than everything In that sense Brahman may be called both being. In full reality Brahman is as little affected by qualities as our true Self is by Upadhis (conditions). not being. Atman and Brahman being substantially one. No. is Brahman In the same way the creation of the world and of man not the work of Brahman. unaffected and untrammelled by . as our maker. no is all he is not say. the qualified Atman. ' without perceiving or it itself (esse est percipere). It will be seen how small a step it was from this view to another which looked upon Brahman itself as affected by Avidya. is. not raising him. perfect. and blessed. being in the highest sense. nay which changed this Avidy& into a $akti or potentia of Brahman. perceiving. make Brahman. he is not that. Brahman but Na.' then these three predicates are in reality but one. If the qualified Brahman makes us. at least according to the interpretation of /Samkara. but the same Nescience which clouds us for a time. clouds ipso facto Brahman also. predicate nothing of . as different from all that the world calls being or true. This is ambiguity runs through the whole of the Vedanta. but the result of Avidya and of man while under her sway. for he or it could not be is called Sa-id-ananda.THE TWO BRAHMANS. Only we must (6rivatnian) never forget that all this is illusion. we. this. creative and personal through the deception of the same universal and inevitable Avidya. He that else. and he could not perceive himself or itself except as independent. thus lowering him. to the character of an active creator.

tive attributes. practised in ancient.uid the Brahman under as I. of Brahman as our own that an ecstatic perception of as Brahman was allowed now and then modern times.svara. nor Yogin a man united with God.222 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. a revival of its true nature. or let us say. like the sun that is not lighted. . as we shall see. accom- plishment) as an approach of the individual soul towards God. else (Advitiya). anything highest dicates. but lights itself. but Yoga is effort towards Nirodha or suppression of A'itta (the activity of thought) (see Yoga-Sutras I. . this Brahman cannot It is known by any pre- subjective. the personal God. TO oWcoy 6V. and not it liable to objec- can only know itself. and even though. preserver. Having no of course be qualities. the convictions of the people of India. as creator. a return. not dissolver of the universe. It seems only a concession to the prejudices. The fatal mistake which interpreters of the Vedanta-philosophy both in India and Europe have made is to represent this absorption or recovery (Samradhanam. there can only be recovery what or restitution. just as everything else exists. Even Yoga. Our knowledge of Brahman also can only be consciousness subjective Atman or Self. where there is There can be no such approach identity. worshipped different names. shall thus understand the distinction which We the Vedaritists and other Indian philosophers also make between the Brahman. this perception also could only be a perception of the Atman as identical with Brahman. 2). and This Isvara exists. strictly speaking. If it knows. a becoming of the soul of it always has been. as phenomenally only. did not mean technically union. such as the Yogins in possible in a state of trance.

223 as absolutely real. If we have once grasped that synthesis. character of the Vedanta. and have little if anything to do with the true Vedanta in its highest rests chiefly and truest form. as this identity of subject and absorption of the object object. and man at last obtains true knowledge and Mukti. It on the tremendous synthesis of subject object. that there is really but little room in it for nay even for ethics. from this one fundamental doctrine and though its . and determines.THE TWO BKAHMANS. we know the All its other teaching flows naturally Vedanta. though he does not cause. of the I and This constitutes the unique It. These personified by the power or Nescience. This consists in the complete surrender of all we are and know. they contain no thoughts. rewards and punishments. so entirely new at the time when they were uttered. the identification of cause and and effect. he is always Brahman. The soul and the world both belong to the realm of things which are not real. Most important acts are ascribed to him. it is of Avidy& a phenomenal world. and whatever he may appear to be. though When by the acts themselves. It must be clear to any one who has once mastered the framework of the true Vedanta-philosophy. psychology or kosmology. as I have here tried to explain it. But it is He through whose grace deeds are followed by rewards. directly or indirectly. or this by this subject. though this Mukti involves by necessity the are produced directly disappearance of Isvara as a merely phenomenal god. carefully thought out and worked out details are full of interest. unique as compared with the every other philosophy of the world which has not been influenced by it. complete . he rules the world.

to which we alluded before. but. acts. The individual souls also were supposed. to be drawn back into Brahman. again at the beginning of every new Kalpa. and lias leavened the whole of India. to be followed in great periods by a taking back of it into Brahman. at the end of each Kalpa. and not reality. it accepted all that is taught about the gods in the hymns and in the Brahma^as. from the day of their birth on earth. Philosophy and Religion. was accepted as an emanation from Brahman. They are clothed in their Upadhis (conditions) according to the merit or demerit which they have acquired by their former. as a philosophy interfere with popular religion on the contrary. . and recommended a number of sacrificial and ceremonial hymns and were even considered as a necesThey sary preliminary to higher knowledge. Nor did the Vedanta . unless entirely liberated. Here we perceive the so principal moral element in the ancient Vedanta. from all eternity. and this doctrine far as it is meant for practical life of Karman or deed. date. to break forth again and acts as resting on the authority of these Brahmawas. we though long-forgotten. The creation of the world. interesting to see how this very bold philoof the Vedanta was always not only tolerated. Karman. though not the making of it. sophy It is its but encouraged and patronised by religion and by recognised representatives. . The individual souls.224 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. has remained to the present day. whether it was under the The whole sway of Brahmans or of Buddhists. so far as they can claim any are told.

KARMAN. which is the eternal life-spring of Brahman. such as it is. Like it has to be accepted as existent but it from Brahman in so far as it can be destroyed by Vidya. It This is is their Theodicee. . for at the end of a Kalpa even gods like Indra and the rest have to begin their career afresh. In fact it might be said with some truth that Avidya is the cause of but that the cause everything. had to be taken as the result of acts far back before the beginning of all things. seems to them but paying off a debt or laying up capital for another life. healthy. is the result of acts character and fate of each man are the result of his acts in this or in a former acts of others. except of Brahman . man we A who enjoys health and wealth is made to feel that he is spending more than he has earned. though for a time only. it is not to be accounted for as as On little Brahman can be accounted for. left the contrary. whether. life. it may be a reward in disguise. . is aware even necessarily a punishment. as say. It is not stated. A man who suffers and suffers. Q . which is answerable for the whole of this phenomenal world. 225 the world. possibly also of the with them the solution of what we venture to call the injustice of God. It might seem sometimes as if Avidya too. unjustly. another strong and It can be the result of former acts only. this primeval Avidy& is unexplained. But this is never clearly the doer of them of them or not. The merit which can be acquired by man even in Brahman differs this state of Avidya is such that he may rise even to the status of a god. by a Divine caprice that one man is born deaf or dumb or blind. and that he has therefore to It cannot be make up his debt by new efforts. in this life.

of that primeval conception. the Brahman clearer if that receives them. though the two agree with each other again when we remember that Kant also denies the validity of these forms of perception and purposes in this thought when applied to transcendent subjects. but in the highest sense they too are phenomenal only. name and form . though subjective. as . remembering only that. According to Kant it is man who creates the world r as far as its form (Namarupa) is concerned ac. is and nothing else. They too are but Namaand the reality that lies rupa.226 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or as a modification of Brahman but no. tical though true for all pracphenomenal life. Avidy4 is beyond our powers of Brahman is Everything. the Rupa. These powers of conception are real indeed for all practical purposes. cording to the Vedanta this kind of creation is due And strange as it may sound to apply to Avidya. According to $a?/<kara the world is. while the Vedanta treats them also an as the result of Nescience. understanding. that name of Avidya to Kant's intuitions of sense and a his categories of the in common element this different names. behind them. though hidden under It would be natural to suppose within that Atman had been taken as a : part of Brahman. the forms of intuition and the categories of thought. according to the Kantian philosophy. In this sense the Vedarita is more sceptical or critical than even Kant's critical philosophy. This might become we took Brahman for the Kantian Ding Atman sich. are accepted as true. there is them.

THE STHULA. Here we have in fact the Holenmerian l . said to see by the mind (Manas. anticipated in India. and supplied by the common language of the people. These are the conditions or Upadhis which consist of Manas. mind. If the Atman within seems. Henry More. 1 Hence a man vovs).AND SUKSHMA-SARIRA. senses. and not a part only only. and the $arira. perception. Pranas. also. and omnipotent too well that in ourselves it is The Sthftla- and Stikshma-sarlra. peculiar in it is We word corresponding tations we may though with proper limicontinue to translate it by mens or to it. receiving and arranging what has been conveyed to it by the have no separate organs of sense. Q 2 . 280. all this. I tried to 227 on a former occasion. this is once more due to Avidya. may Theosophy. owing to Avidya. show theory of Plotinus and of Dr. determination. as determined by the outward world. but it seems to have been more or less the common property of all Indian philosophers. Brahman ought . mind. limited like the Brahman when seen in the objective world. This Vedantic arrangement of our organic structure and our mental organisation is curious. the whole of Brahman in all its integrity. to be though we know but very far from omniscient. so far as it depends but he on a is previous interaction of percepts. vital spirits. omnipresent. What is the admission of a central organ. Indriyas. It would represent perception as uniting and arranging the great mass of sensations. but it includes besides Upalabdhi. Adhyavasaya. p. body. wrongly conceived and individualised.

organs of sense.and Sukshma-sarira. latter invisible spirit. to most systems of Indian philosophy. Samana. through-. is satisfied tries to explain all with one. Vyana. mind. also be said to decide and act by the mind (Manas). may seem very crude.228 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. What is more interesting is the distinction between the Sthula. we find a fivefold division into Pra/ia. leaving particularly the question of the change of mere sensations into percepts (Vorstellungeri). with-. Upana. and out-breathing. but. off-. By the side of the vital spirit. This body is supposed to remain after death. and of percepts into Here the concepts. the coarse and the fine body. the former the visible outward body the . and psychical phenomena whatever as the result of the action and interaction of elemen- tary Vorstellungen (ideas or presentations).sarira which is supposed to migrate after death from world to world. for the most part. and Udana. is is body. He too. The thin it or invisible. but afterwards defined differently and without much reference to any This also is a doctrine common physiological data. and consisting of Mukhya Prtuza. unapproached and unexplained. the Manas. though it is difficult it to see by what physiological observations could have been suggested. while the outer body is dissolved into its material elements. in an unconscious state. subtle this Sukshma-. the Mukhya Prana. It is not like a human body with arms and legs. and> Indriyas. though transparent or nevertheless accepted as material and . vital Manas. meaning originally forth-. . a subject so carefully elaboAll this rated by modern philosophers. philosophy of Herbart would supply what is wanted. being opposed to the admission of various mental faculties.

and then to take. with the full recog. the state of dreaming. according to merit paths into the next life. but the Manas remains active. . we can hardly understand how Vedantists accepted this account of the Sukshma-sarira. but to return unchanged at the time of In the fourth or disembodied state awakening. the state of death. the Atman with the Sukshma-sarira is supposed to escape from the heart through a vein in the head or through the hundred veins of the body. second the Indriyas cease to act. and knowledge. the circumstances attending the departure of the soul. While these are absorbed in the vital spirit. simply on the authority of the Veda. In the first state the Atman is supposed to be perceiving and acting In the by means of the Manas and the Indriyas. the state of being awake. The Four States. Such sophy fancies like seem strange in systems of philothe Vedanta and. different Eschatology. in fact. moves through the veins of the body and sees dreams made out of the remnants of former impresThe third state arises from a complete separation of Atman from Manas and Indriyas. a complete Eschatology. and the Atman. joined to the Manas. which sions (Vasanas). nition of the limits of human knowledge. remains in full activity. the state of deep and dreamless sleep. It is taken over from the Upanishads. Here again we come across an original idea of Indian philosophy. the doctrine of the four states. the Atman in the heart is supposed to have for a time become one with Brahman.ESCHATOLOGY. to which is added as the fourth.

had to be accepted with the rest. or the highest knowledge. After the supreme and superhuman authority of the Word or of the Veda had once been recognised. and that may be the excuse for it. really a weakness that runs through the whole of the Vedanta. or the wisdom of the world. They cannot even be treated as Naisargika. as a means of subduing the passions in the l . But these dreams about the details of a future life are a mere phantasmagoria. and the Upanishads. and cannot be helped.230 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. They are simply Mithyagwana. under its wellunderstood limitations. 1 See (Sawkara's Introduction to the Aitareyu Upanishad. fanciful or false knowledge. For practical purposes Avidya may often be called common sense. if not that which is commonly illustrated by the son of a barren woman that is. and the truly enlightened man cannot be either an actor or an enjoyer However. while much may be taken over from the Veda as due to Avidya. But we should see clearly that. incorporated as they are in the hymns. though accepted as part of the Apara Vidya. because they involved an actor and an enjoyer of the fruits of such acts. All the sacrificial rules. or inevitable. had no place Para Vidya. the Brahmanas. nay the very conception of a sacrifice. and the usual result followed. such as the horn of a hare. as a preparation. a self-contradictory state- ment any that kind at least which is unsupported by This is evidence. Vedantists had once for all bound themselves to accept the Upanishads as revealed truth. . the lower knowledge only. a great portion of the sacred traditions of the Vedic age. we are here really moving in an Avidya within that Avidya.

in the pages We who are told there that. the Murdhanya the Nac?i. company with the Pit?^'s. they had to be mentioned life though they are better studied of the Upanishads. together with the promises of rewards vouchsafed to them. the waning year. the ether. all such commandments. 23! and purifying the mind by drawing it away from the low and vulgar interests of life. the capital following path of the fathers (PitHyana) or the path of the gods (Devayana). the world of the fathers. In the moon the departed lastly the moon. the latter for those who are good and have already reached the is meant for not the highest knowledge. might perhaps have been tolerBut when we come to a full description of ated.ESCHATOLOGY. either The former lower. carried along by the and have Udana through vein. night. The former leads on to smoke. the subtle body in which the Atman is clothed migrates. here. the stations on the road by which the subtle body is supposed to travel from the veins of this body to the very steps of the golden throne of the Lower Brahman. we wonder at the long suffering of the true philosopher who has learnt that the true and highest knowledge of the Vedanta removes in the twinkling of an eye (Apatata^) the veil that in this seems to separate Atman from Brahman. in then descend again. the waning moon. souls remain for a time enjoying the rewards of and their good deeds. if good people. and supported by the remnant of . As these eschatological dreams have been included in the Vedanta system. in the case of persons have fulfilled their religious or sacrificial duties lived a good life. but have not yet reached the highest knowledge.

cloud." Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls the pass over into a state of identity (Sabhavyam) with ether. it may be of interest to see in what sense $arakara 1. or into a state of similarity (Samyam) The Purvapakshin (opponent) maintains that only. . : mode of that descent. Anlage. may warrant. and plants.' he says. vol. &c. the plants springs seed which. becomes smoke. unrewarded merit due to their good works. and whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and a merely indicated meaning. Thus the following words also. from the ether to the Then the sacrificer having become air air (wind).B. We now have to inquire into last.. dwell there as long as their in his ' commentary on Sutra * III.22 took it It has been explained. because this is directly stated by the text. after having reached the moon. when matured in the womb.E. On this point the Veda makes the following statement " They return again the way they came to the ether. &c. Thibuut's translation. xxxvii. called indication only (Lakshana. that the souls of those who perform sacrifices. the earliest allusion to metempsychosis or Seelenwanderung. to the From ether. secondary application of a word). place what is Otherwise there would take i. the state is one of identity. smoke.232 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.. As this is. as far as I know. having become a cloud he falls down as rain. begins a new life on earth in such a station as the rest of his former deeds (Anusaya). the former is to be preferred. wind. rain. e. "Having become air ! S. . ' works their and then redescend with a remainder of good works. having become mist he becomes a cloud. having become smoke he becomes mist..

They return as they came to the ether. are appropriate only if the soul be understood to identify itself with them. has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether." &c. In cases where it is another in the literal sense of the word. passes air. When the body. to an end. How is this known thereupon into the power of the to be the meaning For it is Because thus only is it possible. And as conis. To this we ($awkara) reply that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether. cloud. &c. nection with the ether it impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text." &c.' We see from this that similarity only.. from the ether to the air. $amkara believed in a an outward and temporary similarity (in its . consisting of water which the soul had assumed in the sphere of the moon it for the purpose of enjoyment. on account of its allno other connection (of the pervadingness. and so on. For these reasons the souls' be- coming ether. &c. dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes like ether. the souls became identified with ether.ESCHATOLOGY. but their entering into a state of similarity to it. &c. eternal. in doing so. air. then becomes subtle and then gets mixed with smoke. Sukshma-sarira) and the ether. he violently between the departed . This is the meaning of the " clauses. is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated. moreover. mist. they could no longer descend through the air. 5 233 he becomes smoke. Hence it follows that the souls (of the departed) become really identical with ether. and rain and it is important to observe how. not possible that one thing should become 1 If. souls) with it can here be meant.

For the progenitor must exist long before he eats the rice or the beans. with them. and are after that redescending upon earth. rain. plants as the habitat. &c. arid had looked throughout on ether. sesamum. can only mean that it is joined with a progenitor. .234 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. though the temporary habitat only. beans. the word used in the Sutras. 45. or becomes merely connected /Samkara decides strongly in favour of the latter view. cloud. rather than altering a word of the Sutra. and is able to beget a child. mist. have already reached the moon. nay. if it is said that the plant. corn. though the Vedantists may be bound by *S'a?kara's interpretation. Anyhow. on account of their pious works. and replacing Sabhavyam by Samyara. the is child when begotten is the soul that had ascended to and descended from the moon. be- comes a progenitor. though here again the actual words of the Sutra have certainly to be twisted by him . XLIII. denies this with reference to the departed who. Lastly. when eaten. in his further descent. S. actually becomes a plant. of the departed in their subtle body 1 .. it seems to me as if the author of the Sutras himself had taken a different view. according to $amkara. though other people amkara himself has to admit that may really. such as rice. sink so low as to become plants. I must confess that. 1 See Vishwu Dh. A similar difficulty arises again when it has to be determined whether the departed. twisted the natural meaning of Sabhavya. and born again according to his former works. this also. air. on account of their bad He only deeds.

12) who reap the fruits of their evil actions in owing to their evil moon and descend again. 8. Upanishad V. at once frees a man from all illusion. They are not supposed ever to retura to All this is world of Samsara (IV. 4. they enter the flame. neither t:ie . they knowledge or the Samyagdarsana. 10. which does not mean universal. as mentioned in the Puranas. but thorough and com- plete knowledge. hand him over to a person who is said to be not-a-man. and then lightning but all these. the waxing year (northern pre- world of the Devas. but guides only who. the sun. different After leaving the body.ESCHATOLOGY. Little is 235 said in the But Badaraya?ia tries to that the Upanishads know of a third make it clear class of beings (III. share in all the powers of Brahman except those of creating and ruling the universe. air. we are told. Upanishads of those who. the moon. to the world of Varuna. 17). the day. But while evil doers are thus punished in different hells. lastly to that of Pra^apati or the qualified Here the souls are supposed to remain till realise true and Brahma. then to that of Indra. i. when the departed has reached the lightning. Finally the souls. the year. Theirs is the third place alluded to in the jKMnd. the . the waxing moon. those pious and have also reached at knowledge of Brahman follow a who have been least the lower road. deeds. and while pious people are fully rewarded in the moon and then return again to the earth. This person conducts him cession). are not abodes for the soul. if obtained on earth. hardly to be called philosophy. that knowledge which. when fully released. the world of Vayu. do not even rise to the Samyamana (abode of Yama) and then ascend to earth again.

of past and present. though childish. is also by necessity above the distinction of good and evil. and must be judged from a purely historical point of view. which. 3. namely Brahman. to become once more what the Atman always has been. But in the beginning it meant no more than that the Atman. This has been always laid hold of as the most dangerous doctrine of Vedantism. of cause and effect. having recovered its Brahmahood. Freedom in of importance to remember in these ancient fancies is that the enlightened man may become free or obtain Mukti even in this life (6rivanis What mukti 1 ). . do the different descriptions of the road on which the souls of the pious are supposed to wander towards Brahma. whether good or bad. 28. but as freedom that can 1 Vedanta-Sutras III. help us into the Vedanta. and which naturally vary according to different schools. The Atman. and no doubt it may be both misunderstood and misapplied. But much towards a it real insight would have been unfair to leave out what.236 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and then to wait till death removes the last Upadhis or fetters. remain like broken chains hanging heavy on the mortal body. this Life. This is indeed the real object of the Vedanta-philosophy. is a characteristic feature of the Vedanta-philosophy. is even in this life so free from the body that it feels no longer any pain. though they fetter the mind no longer. and cannot do anything. to overcome all Nescience. This never was intended as freedom in the sense of licence. which is above the distinctions of subject and object.

is full The company of the good. strictly philosophical. Hindi and English translations by Durga Das Ray. with what is gained by thy Karman. whether as a student (Brahma&arin) or as a householder (Qri- In order to make this quite clear.FREEDOM IN THIS LIFE. or youth. banish all Let thy mind be satisfied desires from thy heart. it may serve at Though not least to show is the state of mind in which the true Vedantist meant to maintain himself." not be proud of wealth. being at rest and blessed in itself and in Brahman. Who art thou ? Whence didst thou come ? Ponder on this. and published at Darjeeling in 1888. O Brother. Leaving all this Do which of illusion. Life is tremulous like a water-drop on a lotus-leaf. and is ascribed to $amkara. even in its popular form. Fool give up thy thirst for wealth. It was carefully edited with Bengali. No one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline. It is hardly necessary to say or to prove that the Vedtlnta-philosophy. ' ! Who are is thy wife and who is thy son ? Curious " the ways of this world. is for a moment the only boat for crossing this ocean of the world. of friends. though only. the Hammer of Folly. . it may hastha). It is called the Mohamudgara. 237 neither lapse into sinful acts nor claim any merit for good acts. holds Far from it. Time takes all away in a moment. be useful to add a few verses from one of the many popular works intended to teach Vedanta to the masses. out no encouragement to vice. leave quickly and enter into the place of Brahman.

and give up all of difference. Brahma. So long as a man can earn money. or relafor war or peace. I and the whole world are nothing why then is there always. the hair grey. here for thee. and so is the mother's womb. Thus is the dwelling manifest the misery of the world. Indra. the youth delights in a beautiful damsel. the Sun and the Rudras. friend.238 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. To live under a tree of the house of the gods. his family is kind to him. an old man is absorbed in cares patient. to yet man abandon all worldly enjoyment surrender not make happy ? . to sleep on the earth. whether not trouble about enemy. there is truly no particle The rich are afraid even of their of happiness in it. it is useless to be angry with me and imSee every self in Self. thought The child is given to play. and in others there dwells Vishnu alone. the seven oceans. But when his body becomes infirm son. life is waning yet the breath of hope never ceases. when does such Do tion. morning and evening. Consider wealth as useless. in me. The body is wrinkled. O Man How ! can there be satisfaction Day and night. Time is playing. no one clings to the Highest Brahman. leaves not the anchor of hope. Preserve equanimity if you desire soon to reach the place of Vishnu (Vistmupada). winter and spring come and go. the rule established everywhere. any sorrow ? In thee. . The eight great mountains. is As in birth so is death. this is . to put on a goat-skin. the stick in the hand shakes. son. the mouth has become toothless. thou.



through old age, no


in the house asks after

Having given up

lust, anger, avarice,



Fools traction, meditate on thyself, who thou art. without a knowledge of Self are hidden in hell and

In these sixteen verses the whole teaching of the disciples has been told. Those in whom this
does not produce understanding,

who can do more






of Studying Philosophy.



not be exactly moral teaching as




But there


two ways of studying


may study



critical or in

would no doubt fasten, spirit. at once on the supersession of morality in the Vedanta as an unpardonable flaw. One of the corner-stones, without which the grandest pyramid of thought must necessarily collapse, would seem to be missing in it. The historian on the other hand will be
a historical

with simply measuring the pyramid or









thoughts the labour

will carry him.

He would thus understand

it has required in building up, and discover some counteracting forces that possibly render the absence even of a corner-stone intelligible,

It is surely aspardonable, and free from danger. tounding that such a system as the Yed^nta should

have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an
ancient Gothic cathedral.
of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has




ventured to erect such a
storms or lightnings.

never frightened by Stone follows on stone in

regular succession after once the first step has been made, after once it has been clearly seen that

the beginning there can have been but One, as there will be but One in the end, whether we




We may

prefer to

look upon the expansion of the world in names and forms as the work of Sophia or as the realised

Logos, but we cannot but admire the boldness with which the Hindu metaphysician, impressed with the miseries and evanescence of this world, could bring

himself to declare even the Logos to be but the result of Avidy:! or Nescience, so that in the destruction of

that Avidya could be recognised the highest object, and the summum bonum (PurusMrtha) of man.


need not praise or try to imitate a Colosseum, but if we have any heart for the builders of former days we cannot help feeling that it was a colossal and stupendous effort. And this is the feeling which I cannot resist in examining the ancient Vedanta.

Other philosophers have denied the reality of the
world as perceived by us, but no one has ventured to deny at the same time the reality of what we call
the Ego, the senses and the mind, and their inherent forms. And yet after lifting the Self above body and
soul, after uniting

heaven and earth, God and man,
these Vedanta philosophers

Brahman and Atman,

have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal beings who have to act and to fulfil their duties in
the contrary, they have shown that there can be nothing phenomenal withthis

phenomenal world.


out something that is real, and that goodness and virtue, faith and works, are necessary as a prepara-




nay as a sine qud non, for the attainment of that highest knowledge which brings the soul back to its source and to its home, and restores it to its true nature, to its true Selfhood in Brahman. And let us think how keenly and deeply Indian thinkers must have felt the eternal riddles of this
world before they could propose so desperate a solution as that of the Vedanta; how desperate they must have thought the malady of mankind to be before they could think of so radical a cure. A student
of the history of philosophy must brace himself to follow those whom he wants to reach and to under-

has to climb like a mountaineer, undismayed by avalanches and precipices. He must be able to breathe in the thinnest air, never disstand.


couraged even


snow and


bar his access to the

highest point ever reached by the boldest explorers. Even if he has sometimes to descend again, dis-

events strengthened his lungs and his muscles for further work. He has done his athletic exercise, and he has seen views

appointed, he

has at

such as are never seen in the valleys below. I am myself not a mountaineer, nor am I altogether a




if I

can admire the bold climbers

Mount Gauri-Samkar,

can also admire
heights of the to us in clouds





Vedanta where they seem lost and sky. Do we imagine that these ascents were undertaken from mere recklessness, from mere love
of danger? It is easy for us to call those ancient explorers reckless adventurers, or dispose of them with the help of other names, such as mystic or
pantheist, often but half understood by those who The Vedaritists have often been employ them.



called Atheists, but as the gods which they denied were only Devas, or what we call false gods, they might thus far have been forgiven. They have been called Pantheists, though their theos, or their theoi, were not the Pan, but the Pan was their theos. They have been called Nihilists, but they themselves have drawn a sharp line between the up-

the emptiness-doctrine, and their own teaching, which, on the contrary, insists throughout on the reality that underlies all

holders of the $unya-vada


phenomenal things, namely Brahman, and inculcates
the duties which even this world of seeming imposes on all who are not yet in possession of the highest truth. That this phenomenal world has no exclusive
is surely implied by its whatever perishes can never Besides, If heaven and earth shall pass real. if we see our away body, our senses, and all that has been built up on them, decaying and perishing every

right to the


of real

very name. have been

day before our very eyes

the very Ego, the Aham, dissolved into the elements from which it sprang,



should not the Vedantist also have held to his

alone is really real, and everydream and that even the Nama-rupas, thing the words and things, will vanish with each Kalpa? To sum up, the Vedanta teaches that in the highest sense Creation is but Self-forgetful ness, and Eternal Life remembrance or Self-consciousness. And while to us such high abstractions may seem useless for the many, it is all the more surprising
belief that
else a


that, with the Hindus, the

fundamental ideas of the
between Buddhists and Vethe Sat or





that the former hold the world to have arisen from


is not,

the latter from






Vedanta have pervaded the whole of their literature, have leavened the whole of their language, and form

day the common property of the people ideas assume in the streets a different garment from what they wear among the learned in the Asramas or the forests of the country.
to the present
at large.

No doubt these

K-Jffay even

among the learned few stand up for the complete Advajfca or Monism as represented by

The danger with /Samkara's Vedantism was that what to him was simply phenomenal, should be
taken for purely fictitious. There is, however, as a difference between the two as there is great between Avidy^ and Mithyagwana. May4 is the

cause of a phenomenal, not of a fictitious, world; and if $amkara adopts the Vivarta (turning away)
instead of the Parinama (evolution) doctrine, there is always something on which the Vivarta or illusion

at work,

and which cannot be deprived of



There are schools of Vedantists who try to explain the Sutras of Badarayana in a far more human spirit.

The best known

the school of Ramanur/a, who lived in the twelfth century A. D. 2 If we place $a???kara's
3 the claim literary activity about the eighth century of priority and of prior authority would belong to


But we must never

forget that in India

more than anywhere

philosophy was not the


2 8

In the only passage where the Sutras speak of Maya it need not mean more than a dream.
Wilson, Works,
I, p.




788-820 A.D.



750 A.D.





property of individuals, but that, as in the period of the Upanishads, so in later times also, everybody was free to contribute his share. As we find a

number of teachers mentioned in the Upanishads, and as they give us long lists of names, pupil succeeding teacher through more than fifty spiritual
generations, the commentators also quote ever so many authorities in support of the v^ews which they
either accept or reject.

Hence we cannot accept

/Samkara as the only infallible interpreter of the Vedanta-Sutras, but have to recognise in his com-

mentary one only of the many traditional interpretations of the Sutras which prevailed at different times in different parts of India, and in different schools. A most important passage in this respect is that in which ASa??"tkara has to confess that others (apare tu vadina//) differ from him, and some, as he adds, even
of our

own (asmadiyas a




This allows us


a fresh insight into the philosophical life of India is worth a great deal, particularly as the

difference of opinion refers to a

fundamental doctrine,

namely the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman. iSamkara, as we saw, was uncompromising on that point. With him and, as he thinks,

with Badaraya?za also, no reality is allowed to the (Atman) as an individual (Criva), or to the world

as presented to
soul's reality is

and by the senses. With him the Brahman, and Brahman is one only.


souls also.

others, he adds, allow reality to the individual this is the very opinion on which


another philosopher, Ilamfmur/a, has based his own interpretation of Bddarayana's Sutras, and has



p. xx,




founded a large and influential sect. But it does not follow that this, whether heretical or orthodox
opinion, was really first propounded by Ramanu^a, for Ramanucfa declares himself dependent on former

teachers (Pur vaMry aA), and appeals particularly to a somewhat prolix Sutra- vritti by Bodhayana as his



himself quotes not


Bodhayana, but

him Tanka, Dramic?a (or Guhadeva, Kapardin, BharuH. One of

them, Dravicfa,
to $aikara,

expressly said to have been anterior



and so must Bodhayana have been, if meant by the Vrittikara whom $amkara him-.

self criticises

ought, therefore, to look on Ramanu^a as a perfect equal of /Samkara, so far as his right of interpreting Badarayana's Sutras, according to his own It is the same here as everyopinion, is concerned.




The individual philophilosophy. but the mouthpiece of tradition, and that


tradition goes back further and further, the more we try to fix it chronologically. While $a/?ikara's




Advaita, i.e. absolute Monism, that of has been called Visish^a- Advaita, the

doctrine of unity with attributes or Monism with a difference. Of course with Ramanur/a also Brahman

the highest reality, omnipotent, omniscient, but this Brahman is at the same time full of compassion

or love.




new and very important


Brahman, compared with the icy self-sufficiency ascribed to Brahman by $amkara.
in Ramanuir/a's

Even more important and more humanising





p. xxi.
p. 31.


The Vedanta-Philosophy,



recognition that souls as individuals possess reality,
A/lit, what perceives and what does not soul and matter, form, as it were, the body perceive, of Brahman l are in fact modes (Prakara) of Brahman.

that Kit and


Sometimes Kit



a conscious cause, AHt matter but there is always Isvara as a third, the Lord and this, originally Brahma, is later on iden;

the Supreme Spirit as for the unconscious effect or

Vislmu, so that Raman w/a's sect is actually called $ri-Vaistmava. It assumed no doubt the greatest importance as a

without much

ado with

religious sect, as teaching people how to live rather than how to think. But to us its chief interest is

philosophical character, and more particularly its relation to the Badarayana-Sutras and $arakara's

explanation of them.

Brahman, whether under the name of Isvara, Vishnu or Vasudeva, or Bhagavat, is with Ramanuf/a as with $a??ikara both the efficient and the material cause of all that exists, and he is likewise the lord and ruler of the world. But here mythology comes in
at once.

according to Ramanu^a, the individual soul ((7iva), from spring Samkarshana,

From this Brahman,

Samkarshana Pradyumna, mind (Manas), and from Pradyumna Aniruddha or the Ego (Aharikara).
Brahma, masc., here called Vasudeva,

not without

qualities, as >Samkara holds, but possesses (7/kina

(knowledge), $akti (energy), Bala (strength), Aisvarya

(supreme power), Virya (vigour), and Te^as (energy), as his Gu?tas or qualities. Much more of the same



be found in Colebrooke



Colebrooke, Misc. Essays,
Ibid., I, p. 439.








Vedantism has

real philosophical character of Ramanw/a's for the first time been placed in its

true light by Professor Thibaut, from whom we may soon expect a complete translation of Ramanw/a's own commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, the Sri-

As, according to Ramanugra, Brahman is bhashya. not Nirguna, without qualities, such qualities as intelligence, power, and mercy are ascribed to him, while with /Samkara even intelligence was not a
quality of Brahman, but

Brahman was


these being. to possess, as conqualities, supposed stituent elements, the material world and the indi-


thought, and





vidual souls, and to act as the inward ruler (Antaryamin) of them. Hence, neither the world nor the
individual souls will ever cease to exist.

All that

Ramanu</a admits
stages as


that they pass through different

Avyakta and Vyakta. As Vyakta, developed, they are what we know them to be on earth as Avyakta they are enveloped (SamkoHta). This involution takes place at the end of each Kalpa,

when Brahman assumes its causal state (Karanavastha), and when individual souls and individual
things lose for a time their distinct and independent character. Then follows, by the mere will of Brahma,

new creation of gross and visible and an assumption by the individual souls matter,
the evolution, or the
of new material bodies, according to the merit or demerit of their former existence. The important

that the individual souls,

according to

Ramanuf/a, retain their individuality even when they have reached the blissful abode of Brahman. The
not considered by him as merely the result of Avidya, but is real, while Brahman is to be looked





upon and worshipped as a personal god, the creator and ruler of a real world. Thus Isvara, the Lord, is not to be taken as a phenomenal god and the difference between Brahman and Isvara vanishes, as much as the difference between a qualified and an unqualified Brahman, between a higher and a lower knowledge. Here we perceive the influence exercised on philosophy by the common sense or the common sentiment of the people. In other countries in which

philosophy is, as it were, the private property of individual thinkers, that influence is far less perBut extreme views like those propounded ceptible.

by /Samkara were, as might be expected, too much for the great mass of the people, who might be willing to accept the doctrines of the Upanishads in their vagueness, but who would naturally shrink

from the conclusions drawn from them with
exorable consistency by >Sa??ikara.



it is


to say, as >Samkara says, I am not,' it is difficult at least to say, 'I am not I,' but 'I am Brahman.' It may

be possible to say that Isvara or the Lord is Brahman but to worship Isvara, and to be told at the same


but phenomenal, must be trying even to the most ardent of worshippers. If theretime that Isvara

Ramanur/a, while professing his faith in the Upanishads and his allegiance to Badaraya^a, could

give back to his followers not only their own souls, but a] so a personal god, no wonder that his success should have been so great as it was.

In the absence of any definite historical materials is quite impossible for us to say whether, in the


at the time of

development of the Vedanta-philosophy Badarayana and afterwards, it was

the absolute


as represented





that took the lead, or whether the more temperate Monism, as we see it in Ramanur/a's commentary, There are certainly some exercised an earlier sway.

Sutras which, as Dr. Thibaut has shown, lend them-

more readily to Ramanur/a's than to Ssunkara's interpretation. The question as to the nature of individual souls seems decided by the author of the Sutras in favour of Ramanw/a rather than of $amkara. We read in Sutra II, 3, 43, The soul is a part of Brahman.' Here the soul is clearly declared to be a part of Brahman, and this is the
selves far

by a as it were,' since Brahman, being not composed part, of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense of

view of Ramanur/a

but /Samkara explains



the word.

This seems a bold proceeding of /Samkara's and, though he tries to justify it by very ingenious

arguments, Ramanu^a naturally takes his stand on the very words of the Sutra. Similar cases have

been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut



this very

diversity of opinion confirms what I remarked before, that the Vedanta philosophers of India, though they

look both on Upanishads and the Sutras as their highest authorities, often present a body of doctrine

independent of them
that had


were, of thought to be independent of the mother;

colonies, as


country, but are anxious nevertheless to prove that their own doctrines can be reconciled with the old

This was

the position

assumed by

Badarayana towards the Upanishads, so much so that nearly the whole of the first book of his Sutras had to be devoted to showing that his own views of Brahman were not in conflict with certain passages in the Upanishads.



them may




to the lower Brahman, some to the individual soul as one with Brahman and it is on these points that, at a later time, $amkara and Ramanuf/a would

What was important for naturally have differed. Bcidarayawa to show was that no passages from the
be quoted in support of other philosophies, such as the Sa??ikhya, of which both /Sawkara and RamanuT/a would disapprove.

Upanishads could

are anxious to

In the same manner both /Samkara and Ramanuc/a show that they themselves are in

perfect agreement with Badarayana. Both, however, approach the Sutras as if they had some opinions of their own to defend and to bring into harmony

with the Sutras.

can only suppose that schools in different parts of India had been growing up fast in the hermitages of certain teachers and their
pupils, and that all were anxious to show that they had not deviated from such paramount and infallible authorities as the Sutras and the Upanishads. This was done by means of what is called Mimawsa, or a critical discussion of passages which seemed to be ambiguous or had actually been twisted into an


unnatural meaning by important teachers. Dr. Thibaut therefore seems to me quite right when he says that both $amkara and Ramanm/a

pay often less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing



to bear testimony to the truth of their philosophical theories. This only confirms what

I said before


about the rich growth of philosophical India, independent of Sutras and Upani-

though influenced by both.






p. xcvi.



admit that Badarayam wished to teach in his Sutras nothing but what he found in the Upariishads, it must not be forgotten that the Upanishads contain
ever so many conflicting guesses at truth, freely uttered by thinkers who had no personal relations with each other, and had no idea of propounding

a uniform system of religious philosophy. If these conflicting utterances of the Upanishads had to be

reduced to a system,

we can hardly blame $amkara

for his taking refuge in the theory of a higher and a lower Brahman, the former being the Brahman of philosophy, the other that of religion, and both, as

he thought, to be found in different parts of the Veda. By doing that he avoided the necessity of arguing

away a number

of purely anthropomorphic features, incongruous, if applied to the highest Brahman, and dragging down even the Brahman of the lower Vidya
to a lower stage than philosophers

Ramanugra's Brahman
according to


would approve always one and the
the knowledge of but his Brahman is

same, and,



likewise but one

more than an exalted Isvara. He is able to perform the work of creation without any help from Maya or Avidya and the souls of the departed, if only their life has been pure and holy, are able to approach this Brahma, sitting on his throne, and to enjoy their rewards in a heavenly The higher conception of Brahman exparadise.
in consequence hardly

cluded of course not only everything mythological, but everything like activity or workmanship, so that creation could only be conceived as caused by Maya

Ved. Sutras II, 2, 2, sub fine: Avidyapratyupasthapitanamarupamayavesavasena, Through being possessed of the Maya of names and forms brought near by Avidya.'


runs counter to the conception of Brahman. least of all in . even of the individual soul being a separate part of Brahman. a personal god. as explained by $a?'/ikara. and of the soul. that of $awkara being kept for unflinching reasoners who. and an eternal soul that yearns for an approach to or a reunion with that Being. instead of one Vedanta-philosophy.252 . while the very idea of an approach of or Avidya the souls of the departed to the throne of Brahman. I at all may events utterly unsuited to the West. I have nothing to say against this criticism. nay. whether in the Upanishads or in the Sutras and their commentaries. quired. trying hard to reconcile their Monism with the demands of the human heart that re. never separated except by Nescience. of God. The idea of an approach of the soul to Brahman. was incompatible with the fundamental tenet that the two were. or of their souls being merged in Brahman. that of RamanuT/a. and always will require. and unworthy of the name of philosophy. am well aware that the view of the world. It must be admitted therefore that in India. springing from the same root but extending its branches in two very different directions. to be again joined to Brahman after death. as propounded by the Vedantists. as the last cause of all that is. supported by an unwavering faith in Monism. do not shrink from any of its consequences another. however prominent it may be in the Upanishads and in the system of Ilamanur/a. we have really two. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. has often been declared strange and fanciful. and always remain. whatever have been its value in the East. nor have I ever tried to make propaganda for Vedantism. one and the same.

In the whole world there is no study. and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of social and might dwindle away into mere phantoms.RAMANUffA.' my Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random. I quite admit that. And I go even a step further. But I maintain that it represents a phase of philosophic thought which no student of philosophy can afford to ignore. After all it is not everybody in life. it will be the solace of death. Nay. It has been the solace of my life. and quite understand what he meant when he said. that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the practical side of life. so beneficial and so political life ' elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Persian trans- lation of the Upanishads). I know no better and A man may be a Christian. and an honest . contemplative and preparation than the Vedanta. in amassing wealth. who is called in de- upon to take an active part in breaking whether fending or ruling a country. or stones . At the same time I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedanta. and yet a good citizen and I should say the same of a Vedantist. as a popular philosophy. for fitting men to lead 7 quiet lives. the Vedanta would have its dangers. Platonist. And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedanta. or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called mystic and inarticulate thought. I can fully agree with Schopenhauer. except that of the original (of the Upanishads). and which in no country can be studied to greater advantage than in India. and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life. 253 England.

own most idea identical Thus. it is curious to observe of the Vedanta.254 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and have our shrink from adopting the plain and simple language of the Upanishads that the Self of God and man is the same. St. if clothed in softer language. though proved point by point by Berkeley. but if it is true that 'those also serve who only stand and wait. and of the voice of God within us nay. we repeat with This is We . Self. they do not jar at on our ears. may often seem very startling to us. hesitation of our body as the temple of God. one of contains the prayer. the very type of manliness and strength. are in full harmony with our intimate convictions. among which we move : . our own favourite hymns And Should that a higher gift than grace flesh and blood refine. the unreality of the material world.' then may we not hope that even the quiet in the land are not so entirely useless as they appear to be ? And while some of the most important doctrines before us in the plain and direct language of the Vedanta-Sutras. called useless They may be by the busy and toiling portion of humanity. when placed all how. speaks like a Vedantist of the shadows . nay. Paul that we live. being in God. and move. God's Presence and His very And Essence all-divine ! also speak without pure Vedanta. seems to many a pure fancy and yet one of our most popular poets. if not self own blasphemous. while the that our in and the Divine Self are nature might seem irreverent. both mental and physical. yet we Again.

when the Vedarita has to Tennyson. And my Were But The gain of such large life as matched with ours Were Sun to spark unshadowable in words. and yet no shade of doubt. Metaphors. though differently expressed. is often meant for the same. ' 255 of the Self was loosed. because they can only illustrate. Themselves but shadows of a shadow-world. no doubt . and not to allow these inevitable prejudice us against what. however unwilling we may be to confess it. leave us in the end unsatisfied. as a cloud passed Melts into Heaven. but in philo- sophy illustration also by means of metaphors has its value. The Ancient Sage. and I doubt whether they were ever meant for more than that. Thus. though fascinating at first sight. Goethe. and others. For more than once when I Sat all alone. and the English words which we have to adopt in rendering Indian ideas are never quite adequate. All we can do is to strive to approximate as near as possible. . There is one more point that requires a few differences to remarks. Indian It thought will never quite square with English thoughts. not mine utter clearness. This is true. into the Nameless. to show that after all there is some of the Indian leaven left in us. and that most of them. but It has often deals too much cannot prove.METAPHORS. been said that the Yedanta-philosophy in metaphors. I touched limbs the limbs The word that is The mortal limit revolving in myself the symbol of myself. strange. and thro' loss of Self would be easy to add similar passages from Wordsworth.



explain how the Sat, the Real or Brahman, dwells within us, though we cannot distinguish it, the author
of the jfTMndogya Up. VI, 13, introduces a father telling his son to throw a lump of salt into water, and

some time to take it out again. Of course he cannot do it, but whenever he tastes the water it is In the same way, the father says, the Sat, the salt.



within us, though

we cannot



by Another application of the same simile (Brihad. Ar. Up. II, 4, 12) seems intended to show that the Sat or Brahman, in permeating the whole elementary
world, vanishes, so that there is no distinction left between the individual Self and the Highest Self 1


that the manifold beings are produced from the Eternal as sparks spring from a burning fire, we should remember that this
illustrates the idea that all created beings share in the substance of the Supreme Being, that for a time they seem to be independent, but that

Again, when we read



they vanish again without causing any diminution in the Power from whence they sprang. The idea of a creating as a making of the world

most repugnant to the Vedantist, and he tries in every way to find another simile by which to illus-

trate the springing of the world from Brahman as In order to avoid seen in this world of Nescience.

the necessity of admitting something extraneous, some kind of matter out of which the world was
shaped, the Upanishads point to the spider spinning web out of itself; and, in order to show that


things can spring into existence spontaneously, they


See Deussen, Upanishads, Bnh. Ar. Up. II, i, 20.

p. 416,

fora different explanation.



use the simile of the hairs springing from a man's head without any special wish of the man himself.



may be

quite true that none of these

were they intended as arguments in support of the Upanishadphilosophy, but they are at all events very useful in reminding us by means of striking similes of certain doctrines arrived at by the Vedanta philosophers
illustrations can be considered, nor
in their search after truth.



IT would be interesting to trace at once the same or very similar tendencies as those of the Vedanta in

the development of other Indian philosophies, and particularly of the Sarakhya and Yoga, and to see

what they have

to say on the existence

and the

true nature of a Supreme Being, and the relation human beings to that Divine Being, as shadowed






Veda, though

differently interpreted by different schools of philoBut it seems better on the whole to adhere sophy.

to the order adopted by the students of philosophy in India, and treat of the other Mima?sa, the Purva-

the Former Mimamsa, as it is called, in connection with the one we have examined. The Hindus admit a Purva-Mima?rtsa and an UttaraMima?HS'i, that


They look upon the Vedanta



Uttara- or later Mima?^sa, and on that of G'aimini as the Purva-, or prior. These names, however, were

not meant to imply, as Colebrooke seems to have supposed, that the Purva-Mimfvwsa was prior in

time, though



true that


sometimes called really meant no more than that


of Philosophy, vol.

Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i, p. 239. Kilter, History iv, p. 376, in Morrison's translation.
p. 122,





the Purva-Mimamsa, having to do with the KarmakancZa, the first or work-part of the Veda, comes first, and the Uttara-Mimarasa, being concerned with
the Grfl&nak&nda,, comes second, just as an orthodox Hindu at one time was required to be a Grihastha or



and then only to

retire into the

and lead the contemplative

of a Vana-

prastha or a Samnyasin.


shall see, however,

that this prior Mima??isa, if it can be called a philosophy at all, is very inferior in interest to the Vedanta, and could hardly be understood without

the previous existence of such a system as that of Badarayana. I should not like, however, to commit

myself so far as to claim priority in time for the Vedanta. It has a decided priority in importance, and in its relation to the (r/lana- portion of the



saw why the




cannot be used for chronological quotes purposes, for (7aimini returns the compliment and quotes Badarayana. How this is to be accounted
for, I

tried to explain before. Badarayana endeavoured to



clear that while


order into

the Upanishads, and to reduce their various guesses to something like a system, 6raimini undertook to do the same for the rest of the Veda, the so-called Karmakaijc/a or work-portion, that is, all that had

regard to sacrifice, as described chiefly in the Brahmanas. Sacrifice was so much the daily life of the

Brahmans that the recognised name for sacrifice was simply Karman, i.e. work. That work grew up in different parts of India, just as we saw philosophy springing up, full of variety, not free even from contradictions. Every day had its sacrifice, and in some respects these regular sacrifices may be
s 2



They depended on the seasons or regulated the seasons and marked the different divisions of the year. There were some rites that lasted the whole year or even several

called the first calendar of India.

And as philosophy existed, independent of the Upanishads, and through BMarayana attempted to make peace with the Upanishads, we must conexisted for a long time without the Brahmar/.as, such as we possess them, that they grew up without being restrained by
sider that sacrifices also

generally binding authorities of any kind, and that at a later time only, after the Brahmanas had

been composed and had acquired some kind of authority, the necessity began to be felt of reconciling variant opinions and customs, as embodied in the Brahmanas and elsewhere, giving general as well as special rules for the performance of every

kind of ceremony. We can hardly imagine that there ever was a time in India when the so-called priests,

know how to perform their own sacrificial duties, for who were the authors of them, if not the priests? But when the Brahmanas once existed, a new problem had to be solved how to bring the Brahmanas into harsettled in distant localities, did not

mony with themselves and with local customs, and also how to

existing family and discover in them a

meaning that should satisfy every new generation. This was achieved by means of what is called


is little

investigation, examination, consideration. room for real philosophy in all this, but

there are questions such as that of
sacrificial duties,


or duty,

which offer an opportunity including for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its rewards while in accounting for seeming contradic;

tions, in


arriving at general principles concerning

problems would naturally turn up which, though often in themselves valueless, are In generally treated with considerable ingenuity.


the work of 6raimini secured for


works ascribed to Badarayafta, Kapila and others, and was actually raised to the rank of one of the six classical philoa place

by the




sophies of India. It cannot therefore be passed over in a survey of Indian philosophy.

While Badaraya^a begins

his Sutras

with Athato



therefore the desire of


ing Brahman,' 6raimini, apparently in imitation of

begins with Athato Dharmaf/ig^asa, Now therefore the desire of knowing Dharma or duty.' The two words Now therefore offer as usual a large
' '

number of interpreters, but they mean no more in the end than that now, after the Veda has been read, and because it has been read, there arises a desire for knowing the full meaning of either Dharma, duty, or of Brahman, the Absolute the former treated in the Uttara-, the latter in the Purva-Mimamsa. In fact, whatever native commenscope to a



may say to the much more than a

contrary, this first Sutra is title, as if we were to say,


begins the philosophy of duty, or the philosophy of (raimini.

Dharma, here translated by duty, refers to acts of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices. It is said to be a neuter, if used in the latter sense,
a very natural distinction, though there is little evidence to that eifect in the Sutras or in the literature

known to us. This Dharma or duty


enjoined in the Brah-



and these together with the Mantras are held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that whatever is not Mantra is Brahmana, whatever is not Brahma/ia is Mantra. The Brahmarias are said to consist of Vidhis, injunctions, and Arthavadas, The injunctions are meant either to make glosses. us do a thing that had not been done before, or to make us know a thing that had not been known

Subsequently the





into Utpatti-vidhis, original or general injunctions, such as Agnihotram guhoti, he performs the Agnihotra, and Viniyoga-vidhi, showing the manner in

which a


to be performed. The latter injunctions as to the details, such as



he performs the


with sour

milk, &c.


settle the exact

and there

follow the Prayoga-vidhis which order of sacrificial performances, lastly a class of injunctions which


to perform a sacrificial act.

They are called Adhikara-vidhis. The hymns or formulas which

are to be used at

sacrifice, though they are held to possess also a transcendental or mysterious effect, the Apurva, are by 6raimini conceived as mainly intended to remind

the sacrificer of the gods
sacrificial gifts.


are to receive his

likewise lays stress on what he calls Namadheya or the technical name of each sacrifice,


such as Agnihotra, Darsapurttamasa, Udbhid, &c. These names are found in the Brahmawas and they
are considered important, as no doubt they are, in The Nishedhas defining the nature of a sacrifice.




p. 5. p. viii.

Thibaut, Arthasawigraha,



or prohibitions require no explanation. They simply state what ought not to be done at a sacrifice.

Lastly, the Arthavadas are passages in the Brahmanas which explain certain things they vary in character, being either glosses, comments, or ex;

planatory statements.
Contents of the Purva-Mlmaws..
I cannot do better than give the princontents of (raimini's Sutras, as detailed by cipal


Madhava in his Nyaya-mala-vistara \ The Mima/wsa consists of twelve books. In the first book

discussed the authoritativeness of those collec-

tions of

words which are severally meant by the

terms injunction (Vidhi), explanatory passage (Artha(Mantra), tradition (Snm'ti), and name (Namadheya). In the second we find certain subvada),


sidiary discussions, as e. g. on Apurva, relative to the difference of various rites, refutation of erro-

neously alleged proofs, and difference of performIn ance, as in obligatory and voluntary offerings.

the third are considered revelation ($ruti), sign or sense of a passage (Linga), context ( Vakya), &c.,




respective weight, when in apparent then the cerarnonies opposition to one another called Pratipathi-Karmam, things mentioned by the

way, Anarabhyadhita, things accessory to several main objects, as Praya^as, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth the chief subject is
the influence of the principal and subordinate rites on other rites, the fruit produced by the (ruhA


See Cowell and Gough in their translation of the Sarvadarp. 178.



of the

when made

dice-playing, &c.,

Butea frondosa, &c., and the which forms part of the Ka^/asuyafifth

the subjects are the relative order of different passages of the /Sruti, &c., the order
of different parts of a sacrifice, as the seventeen animals at the Va(/apeya, the multiplication and
non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of the /Sruti, the order of mention, &c., as

In the

determining the order of performance. In the sixth we read of the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, then: obligations, the substitutes for prescribed matesupplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the Sattra-offerings, things proper to be given,

and the

different sacrificial fines.

In the seventh

treated the


of transference of the cere-

monies of one

sacrifice to

another by direct

in the Vaidic text, others as inferred

command by name or
' '

In the eighth, transference by virtue of the

clearly expressed or obscurely expressed by the predominant sign,' and cases also



where no

transference takes place. In the ninth, the discussion begins with the adaptation (Uha) of hymns,

when quoted in a new connection, the adaptation of Samans and Mantras, and collateral questions
connected therewith.

In the tenth the occasions are discussed where the non-performance of the and nonprimary rite involves the preclusion performance of the dependent rites, and occasions


rites are precluded,

because other rites pro-

their special results, also Graha-offerings, certain Samans, and various other things, as well In the eleventh we as different kinds of negation.
find the incidental

mention and subsequently the discussion of Tantra, where several acts are




combined into one, and Avapa, or the performing an act more than once. In the twelfth there is the discussion on Prasaiiga, when the rite is performed with one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference, on Tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (Samu&Maya), and option. It is easy to see from this table of contents that

Kant would have felt much the But we must take philosophies as they are given us and we should spoil the picture
neither Plato nor

wiser for them.


of the philosophical life of India, if we left out of consideration their speculations about sacrifice as con-

There are passages, however, which appeal to philosophers, such as, for instance, the chapter on the Pramanas or the authoritative sources of knowledge, on the relation between word and thought, and similar subjects.
tained in the Purva-Mima/msa.
It is true that in

most of these questions are treated the other philosophies also, but they have a peculiar interest as treated by the ritualistic Purva-

Pramawas of



we turn our


to the Pra-

manas, the measures of knowledge, or the authorities to which we can appeal as the legitimate means
of knowledge, as explained by the Purva-Mlma??isa, we saw before that the Vedantists did riot pay




quainted with the

them, though they were acthree fundamental Pramawas

and revelation. The on the contrary, devoted considerPurva-Mimamsa, able attention to this subject, and admitted five,
sense-perception, inference,

Sense-perception, Pratyaksha,

when the organs



are actually in contiguity with an object (2) Inference (Anumana), i. e. the apprehension of an

unseen member of a known association (Vyapti) (3) by the perception of another seen member Comparison (Upamana), knowledge arising from

(4) Presumption (Arthapatti), such as can be derived of a thing not itself knowledge perceived, but implied by another (5) >S'abda, verbal




information derived from authoritative sources.
sect of Mima?nsakas,


those who follow Kumarila admitted besides, (6) Abhava, not-being, Bha^a, which seems but a subdivision of inference, as if we infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or

absence of clouds and rain.


it is

of information



examined, but

curious that

Mimamsakas should

admit this large array of sources of valid cogconsidering that for their own purposes, establishing the nature of Dharma or duty,

they practically admit but one, namely scripture or /S'abda. Duty, they hold, cannot rest on human

which underlies ought all duty, can only be supplied by an authority that is more than human or more than fallible, and such an authority is nowhere to be found except in the


Veda. This leaves, of course, the task of proving the superhuman origin of the Veda on the shoulders of 6 aimini and we shall see hereafter how he per?





Before, however,


enter on a consideration of

any of the problems treated
a few remarks have to be

the Purva-Mimamsa,
peculiarity in

made on a



the structure of the Sutras.
subject fully,

In order to discuss a


to arrive in the

end at a


opinion, the authors of the Sutras are encouraged to begin with stating first every possible objection

that can reasonably be urged against what is their own opinion. As long as the objections are not
perfectly absurd, they have a right to be stated, and this is called the Purvapaksha, the first part. Then follow answers to all these objections, and this
is called the Uttarapaksha, the latter part and then only are we led on to the final conclusion, the This system is exhaustive and has many Siddhanta. but it has also the disadvantage, as far advantages,

as the reader


concerned, that, without a com-

mentary, he often feels doubtful where the cons end and the pros begin. The commentators themselves differ sometimes on that point. Sometimes again, instead of three, a case or Adhikarana is

stated in five members, namely 1. The subject to be explained (Vishaya).

2. 3.


The doubt (Samsaya). The first side or prima facie view (Purvapaksha). The demonstrated conclusion (Siddhanta) and The connection (Samgati).
l ,

is illustrated in the commentary on the first and second Sutras of the Mimamsa which declare that a desire to know duty is to be entertained, and


then define duty (Dharma) as that which recognised by an instigatory passage, that


to be

by a

Here the question to be passage from the Veda. discussed (Vishaya) is, whether the study of Duty in
Sarvadarsana-sawgraha, p. 122; translation by Cowell and Gough, p. 180; Siddhanta Dipika, 1898, p. 194.






The Purvapaksha says
it is

really necessary to be underof course, No, for


said that the

Veda should be

learnt (Vedo

*dhyetavyaA), that clearly means either that it should be understood, like any other book which we read, or

should be learnt by heart without any attempt, as yet, on the part of the pupil to understand it, simply as a work good in itself, which has its reward in




a very

common view among


Brahmans for, as they had no written books, they had a very perfect system for imprinting texts on the memory of young persons, by making them learn every day a certain number of verses or lines
by heart, without any attempt, at first, of making them understand what they learnt and afterwards

only supplying the key to the meaning. This acquisition of the mere sound of the Veda was considered
highly meritorious

nay, some held that the





not understood than


This was in fact their printing or rather their writing, and without it their mnemonic

would have been simply impossible.


we warn

our compositors against trying to understand what they are printing, Indian pupils were cautioned against the same danger and they succeeded

in learning the longest texts by heart, without even attempting at first to fathom their meaning. To us

such a system seems almost incredible, but no other system was possible in ancient times, and there is

no excuse

for being incredulous, for it in India to the present day.




Only after the text had thus been imprinted on the memory, there came the necessity of interAnd here the more pretation or understanding.

connection. is Therefore the imaginary opponent. though I must confess There that its meaning is not quite clear to me. that is. These considerations in support of the Siddhanta or final conclusion would probably fall under the name of Samgati. he should immeand because. 269 enlightened of the Indian theologians argue that the Vedic command Vedo-dhyetavyaA/ the Veda ' ' is to be gone over. is to be acquired. After that he bathes. it is what can be the use of the Mima?nsEi? The pupil learns the Veda by heart. to be learnt stood. asked. though his learning of diately bathe the text of the Veda is useful in every respect.SUTRA-STYLE.' implies that it is also to be underpreferable this intelligible purpose is to the purely mechanical one. after to his house is having finished his apprenticeship. though miraculous rewards may be held out for that. the Veda. proper performance of are besides several points in the course of this dis- . viz. objects that the study of the Mimamsa not necessary at all. a more minute study of the sacrificial precepts of . and learns to understand it in the house of his teacher. so that it is argued there would actually be no time for any intervening study of the MimamsEi. marries and sets up his own house. considering that it rests on no definite sacred command. by and that heart. But if so. But here the Siddhantin forward and says that the Snm'ti passage enjoining a pupil's bathing (graduating) on returning steps not violated by an intervening study of the Mima??isa. the its commands. cannot be considered superfluous. such as is given in the Mima??isa. the Purvapakshin. as a means towards the highest object of the study of the Veda. because it is not said that.

on which more information to be desired. the so-called is four Kriyaphalas. though sacred. but these books. a reward in heaven. such as. They were acknowledged to literature of . call revealed. and I doubt whether such a problem could have arisen in the ancient any country besides India. it could not establish a duty. were riot represented as having been the work of Jehovah. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for instance. It is clear that O */ even to start such a claim as being revealed for any book requires a considerable advance in religious and philosophical thought. It follows either that the Veda has no binding authority at all. important like any other work. no doubt. The Jews. arid it is interest- ing to see how they try to escape from all the diffi- culties arising out of their postulate that the Veda must be the work of a superhuman or divine author. This is a dilemma arising from convictions firmly planted in the minds of the ancient theologians of India. or whether it is what we should If it were the work of a person. or of some authority. had their sacred books. such as the Yeda promises again and again nor could .270 cussion. to those therefore who perform Vedic* sacrifices. much Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin? This discussion leads on to another and more one. inspired person. it promise any rewards as a motive for the performance of any duty least of all. whether the Veda has supreme whether it is the work of man. The subject is interesting even though the arguments may not be convincing to us. or that it cannot be the work of a personal or human author. then.

tried to maintain a superhuman authorship in favour of the silver . as in the case of Moses. or by apostles such as St. or St. and particularly the Mimamsakas. even if it bore a human or historical name. Let us see therefore how the down Mark Mimamsa deals with this problem of the Apaurusheyatva. even though they maintain at the same time that they are historical documents written by illiterate people. when given. how much more easily ! Veda. eternal and infallible. even if. as they point out. because. the human recipient would always be a possible source of error.HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? 27! have been composed. To the Brahmans. i. however true the message might be. therefore Deuteronomy must be considered the work of a superhuman writer and some of our modern . this would exclude the possibility of error. Inspiration in satisfied these the ordinary sense of the word would not have Indian orthodox philosophers. 1 quote from Madhava's introduction to his com- . The Mimamsa philosopher would probably have argued that as no writer could relate his own death. if not written down. so that we mistake mother-of-pearl for then may we misapprehend the meaning of revealed words However. they actually related the death of their reputed author. was superhuman. can deceive us. by historical persons. for. any part of the Veda. the non-human origin of the Vedas. John. as being liable to misapprehend and misinterpret such a Even the senses. much as the Gospels are in the eyes of certain Christian theologians. e. theologians have not been very far from taking the same view. message. the first thing is to see how the Brahmans. as not they truly remark.

a very comprehensive treatise on the subject. are not without a beginsay. so also are the Yedas. that the Vedas must be of 1 new objection. then proceeds to establish the Apaurusheyatva. . are given us as the names of the authors of these branches of the Veda and hence it Veda. case of Vyasa's Mahabharata and Valraiki's Rama- ya?ia. p. vol. &c. by showing that they were He perfectly intelligible. in accordance. Vyasa. if it &c. human origin.272 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY..' ' they hold that as the Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa and other poems are recent. l . are known to be their human authors. having written the Nyaya-mala-vistara. and hence we find men quoted in As in the as the authors of the Vedas. And Ka^Aa. the Purvapakshin is ready witli a namely. than hand down the oral tradition. Valrniki. uphold approximation towards the Vedas. i.' that is to 'Some people. were suggested that such names as were meant for men who did no more like teachers. 10. The Vedas. both Vidhis (rules) and Arthavadas (glosses). thus in the case of the Kanaka. Taittiriya. as he says. the recognised objectors. and other sections of the &c. mentary on the Rig-veda in He is a great authority matters connected with the Purva-Mimarasa. . Kauthuma. which had been denied. with 6raimini's Sutras. the non-human authorship of the Veda. Ka^Aa. In his introduction he establishes first the authority of the Mantras and of the Brahmanas. and he means of course the Purvapakshins. See my Second Edition. he says. they continue. them ning or eternal... follows that the Vedas were the works of human authors.

we may surely mistake the meaning of words. not as the name of a man. This subject had been discussed before. which is the We Siddhanta or final conclusion. (raimini should appeal to a former Sutra in which he established that even the relation of words to their meanings is eternal. For as we may mistake mother-of-pearl for silver. pre-temporal. therefore.' as it were pro-vehens. and therefore liable to error quite as much as the evidence of our senses. &c. done by showing that Ka^/ia did not compose. or eternal. the Purvapakshin. and Pravahana meaning 'carrying along. of a Kusuruvinda Auddalaki. can understand therefore why in the next Sutra. but only handed down a certain portion of the Veda. and hence the meaning of words of the Veda also. wishes us first of all to keep in mind that the words of the Vedas themselves are superhuman or supernatural. The Vedas. or Babara Pravaham. nay. and is Veda before the beginning of all time. in answer to the inevitable Objector-general.HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? because 273 we see in the Vedas themselves the mention Thus we read of a Babara of temporal matters. communicated to historical persons. that sound itself is eternal. and that Babara Pravcaham was meant. who had maintained that the relation between words and their meanings was conventional (6eo-ei). 6raimini. Pravaham. It is seen from this that what is claimed for the not only revelation. and thus fortified he next proceeds to answer the objections derived from such names as Kanaka. established by men. therefore. but existence from all eternity. could not have existed in times anterior to these persons mentioned in them. but as a name of the wind. Babara imitating the sound. in this place. and hence cannot be prehistoric. This is T .



Then follows a new objection taken from the fact that impossible or even absurd things occur in the Veda for instance, we read that trees or serpents

performed a

that an old ox sang foolish 1 Hence it is argued once for the Madras.
sacrifice, or

more that the Veda must have been made by human But the orthodox (raimini answers, No beings. for if it had been made by man, there could be no

injunction for the performance of sacrifices like the (ryotish toma, as a means of attaining Svarga or paradise, because no man could possibly know either the

means, or their effect and yet there is this injunction in the case of the 6ryotishoma, and other sacrifices

are not different from


Such injunctions as Let a

man who

desires paradise, sacrifice with the 6ryotishon the are not like a speech of a madman

contrary, they are most rational in pointing out the
object (paradise), in suggesting the

means (Soma,



mentioning (Dikshamya, &c.).




the necessary subsidiary acts see, therefore, that the com-

of the Veda are not unintelligible or absurd. we meet with such passages as that the trees and serpents performed certain sacrifices, we must recognise in them Arthavadas or glosses, conveying




in our case indirect laudations of certain sacrifices,


even trees and serpents perform them, how much more should intelligent beings do

to say,
' !



the same

As, therefore,

human workmanship can
origin and

no flaws that might arise from be detected in the Veda,

concludes triumphantly that its superhuman its authority cannot be doubted.
Miidruku, see Muir, Sansk. Texts, II,






This must suffice to give a general idea of the character of the Purva-Mimamsa. may wonder




should ever have been raised to the rank of

a philosophical system by the side of the UttaraMim&msa or the Vedanta, but it is its method
rather than the matter to which

seems to have invested


applied, that with a certain importance.
it is

of discussing questions has been adopted in other branches of learning also, for instance, by the highest legal authorities in trying

Mimamsa method

to settle contested questions of law. meet with in other systems of philosophy also as the recog-




of discussing various opinions before

arriving at a final conclusion. There are some curious subjects discussed by (raimini, such as what authority can be claimed for

from revelation, how far the recognised customs of certain countries should be followed or rejected, what words are to be contradition, as different

sidered as correct or incorrect


or again,

how a good





has been performed can, in

spite of the lapse of time, produce good or bad results for the performer. All this is certainly of

interest to the

student of Indian literature, but

hardly to the student of philosophy, as such.
Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mim&wsa.
point seems to require our attention, namely, the charge of atheism that has been brought This sounds a very against (raimini's Mimamsa.

One more

strange charge after what we have seen of the character of this philosophy, of its regard for the Veda, and the defence of its revealed character,
its insistence

on the conscientious observance
T 2



ceremonial injunctions. Still, it has been both in ancient and in modern times. So brought
early a philosopher as Kumarila Bha^a tells us that the Mima/nsa had been treated in the world
as a Lokayata



an atheistic system, but that

he was





Professor Banerjea- tells us that Prabhakara also, the other commentator of the Mima/msa, had openly
treated this system as atheistic, and we shall meet with a passage from the Padma-Pura?ia supporting the same view. However, there seems to be a mis-

understanding here. Atheistic has always meant a great many things, so much so that even the most
could be imagined, the Vedanta, has, like that of Spinoza, been accused of The reason is this. The author of the atheism.



Vedanta-Sutras,Bcidaraya?ia, after having established the omnipresence of Brahman (III, 2, 36-37) by quoting a number of passages from the Veda, such

is all

is all

this' (Mu^cZ.


II, 2,







(III, 2,

(A"Mnd. Up. VII, 25, 2), proceeds to 38) that the rewards also of all works

proceed directly or indirectly from Brahman. There were, however, two opinions on this point, one, that

the works themselves produce their fruit without any divine interference, and in cases where the fruit
does not appear at once, that there


principle, direct result of a deed,


Apiirva, which

a superis the

and produces

fruit at a later



the other, that

are directly or

Lokayata is explained by Childers, s.v., as controversy on fabulous or absurd points, but in the Amba/Ma-Suttu, I. ,3, it is mentioned as forming part ot the studies proper for a Brahman.

Muir, III, 95.

indirectly requited


by the Lord. The latter opinion, which is adopted by Badarayana, is supported by a quotation from Bn'h. Up. IV, 4, 24, This is indeed the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of

we are informed by next Sutra, accepted the former Badaraya^a The command that he who is desirous of opinion. the heavenly world should sacrifice,' implies, as he holds, a reward of the sacrificer by means of the
(jaimini, however, as

in the


and not by any other agent. But how a sacrifice, when it had been performed and was ended, could produce any reward, is difficult
sacrifice itself,

to understand. In order to explain this, 6raimini assumes that there was a result, viz. an invisible something, a kind of after-state of a deed or an invisible antecedent state of the result, something Apurva or miraculous, which represented the reward inherent in good works. And he adds, that if we supposed that the Lord himself caused rewards

men, we should often have to accuse him of cruelty and partiality

and punishments and that

for the acts of



better therefore to allow that


works, good or bad, produce their own results, or, in other words, that for the moral government of the

world no Lord
Here, then,


see the real state of the case as


between (7aimini and Badarayana. Graimini would not make the Lord responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in the world, and hence reduced everything to cause and effect, and saw in the inequalities of the world the natural result of the
continued action of good or evil acts. This surely was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue



partiality which have so often been brought against him. It was but another attempt at justifying the

wisdom of God, an ancient Theodicee,




we may think of name of atheism.


certainly did not deserve

however, thought otherwise, and quoting himself, he says, Badarayana thinks the Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action/ and



even the cause of these actions themselves, as we may learn from a well-known Vedic passage (Kaush. Up. Ill, 8) He makes whomsoever he wishes to lead up from these worlds,

he adds that he

do good deeds and makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds.'



a charge very freely brought against

who deny certain characteristics predicated of the Deity, but do not mean thereby to deny its If the Mimamsakas were called atheists, existence.

meant no more than that they

tried to iustify the J

But, once having ways were accused of ever so been called atheists, they many things. In a passage quoted by Professor
in their


own way.

Banerjea from a modern work, the Vidvan-modatararigmi, we read They say there is no God, or world nor has the world any sustainer maker of the


or destroyer





conformity with his maker of the Veda, for


obtains a recompense in works. Neither is there any


words are








self-demonstrated, for since

has been established
be dependent upon

how can


This shows how the Mimamanything but itself ? sakas have been misunderstood by the Vedantists,

and how much $awkara


at cross-purposes with







has happened in this case in India

is what always happens when people resort to names of abuse rather than to an exchange of ideas. Surely a Deity, though it does not cause us to act, and

does not itself reward or punish us, is not thereby a non-existent Deity. Modern Vedantists also are

enamoured of their own conception of Deity, that of Brahman or Atman, that they do not hesitate,

Vivekananda, for instance, in his recent address on Practical Vedanta, 1896, to charge those who He is the atheist,' differ from himself with atheism.

he writes,



does not believe in himself.

believing in the glory of

your own



Not what the

Is the

calls atheism.'

Pftrva-Mimawsa a system of Philosophy?

Let me say once more that, in allowing a place to the Purva-Mimamsa among the six systems of Indian
Philosophy, I was chiefly influenced by the fact that from an Indian point of view it always held such

a place, and that by omitting it a gap would have been left in the general outline of the philosophic thought of India. Some native philosophers go so

both systems, that of (raimini and Badarayana, by the same name of Mimamsa, but to look upon them as forming one whole. They actually take the words in the first Sutra of the
far as not only to call



then a desire to know

Brahman,' as pointing back to (raimini's Sutras and
as thereby implying that the

be studied


Purva-Mimamsa should and should be followed by a study
Besides, the

of the Uttara-MimamsEi afterwards.

authors of the other five systems frequently refer to
(raimini as

an independent thinker, and though



sacrificial system of the Veda would seem to us to deserve the name of a system hardly

treatment of the

of philosophy, he has nevertheless touched on


a problem which

falls clearly

within that sphere of

Our idea of a system of philosophy is from the Indian conception of a Darsana.

meaning philosophy, as a love of comes nearest to the Sanskrit 6ri(//iasa, wisdom, a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise. If we take philosophy in the sense of an examination of our means of knowledge (Epistemology), or with Kant as an inquiry into the limits of human knowledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in


based, not on independent reasoning, but on the authority of the /Sruti, would lose \vith us its claim to the title

Even the Vedanta,

so far as

it is

of philosophy. But we have only to waive the claim of infallibility put forward by Badarayana in favour of the utterances of the sages of the Upanishads,

and treat them as simple human witnesses to the truth, and we should then find in the systematic
arrangement of these utterances by Badarayarza, a real philosophy, a complete view of the Kosmos in which we live, like those that have been put forward

by the great thinkers of the philosophical countries of the world, Greece, Italy, Germany, France, and




HAVING- explored two of the recognised systems of Indian philosophy, so far as it seemed necessary in a general survey of the work done by the ancient thinkers of India, we must now return and enter
once more into the densely entangled and almost impervious growth of thought from which all the

high roads leading towards real and definite systems of philosophy have emerged, branching off in different directions.

seems to me, by far the most important for the whole intellectual development of India, the Vedanta, has been mapped out by us at least in its broad
of these and, as



It seemed to me undesirable to enter here on an examination of what has been called the later Vedanta which can be studied in such works as the Pan&adasi or the Vedanta-Sara, and in many

popular treatises both in prose and in verse.
Later Vedanta mixed with Sawkhya.

would be unfair and

unhistorical, however, to

look upon this later development of the Vedanta as simply a deterioration of the old philosophy. Though
it is

certainly rather confused, if compared with the system as laid down in the old Vedanta-Sfttras,



represents to us what in the course of time became of the Vedanta, when taught and discussed in the different schools of philosophy in medieval

and modern



strikes us


in it is

the mixture of Vedanta ideas with ideas borrowed

as it would seem, from Samkhya, but from Yoga, and Nyaya sources. But here again it is difficult to decide whether such ideas were actually borrowed from these systems in their


whether they were originally comwhich in later times only had become property restricted to one or the other of the six systems of
finished state, or

In the Pa?U*adasi, for instance, we meet with the idea of Praknti, nature, which we
are accustomed to consider as the peculiar property of the Sa/mkhya-system. This Prakrit! is said there
to be the reflection, or, as we should say, the shadow of Brahman, and to be possessed of the three Gunas or elements of goodness, passion, and darkness, or, as they are sometimes explained, of good, indifferent, and bad. This theory of the three Gu?;as, however,

altogether absent from the original Vedanta at least, it is not to be met with in the purely Veduntic


occurring for the





/SVetasvatara Upanishad. Again in the later Vedanta works Avidya and Maya are used synonymously,
or, if

distinguished from one another, they are supposed to arise respectively from the more or less The omniscient, pure character of their substance

but personal tsvara is there explained as a reflection of Maya, but as having subdued her, while the






by substance,




hardly allows that

we should

for the


of goodness.

individual soul, Pragma or 6riva,


represented as

having been subdued by Avidya, and to be multiform, owing to the variety of Avidya. The individual
being endowed with a causal or subtle body, body to be its own, and hence error and suffering in all their variety. As to the desoul,

believes that

velopment of the world, we are told that it was by the command of Isvara that PrakHti, when dominated by darkness, produced the elements of ether, a,ir, fire, water and earth, all meant to be
enjoyed, that

to be experienced

by the individual

this we can hardly be mistaken if we the influence of Samkhya ideas, obscuring recognise and vitiating the monism of the Vedanta, pure and



In that philosophy there is no room for a Second, or for a Prakn'ti, nor for the three Gums, nor for anything real by the side of Brahman.


that influence was exercised

we cannot

discover, possible that in ancient times already there existed this influence of one philosophical system upon the other, for we see even
it is


some of the Upanishads a certain mixture of what we should afterwards have to call the disin

tinctive teaching of Vedanta,

philosophy. idea of private property in any philosophic truth did hardly exist. The individual, as we saw before,


Samkhya, or Yogamust remember that in India the

was of little consequence, and could never exercise the same influence which such thinkers as Socrates
or Plato exercised in Greece.

If the descriptions of

life emanating from the Indians themselves, and from other nations they came in contact with, whether Greek conquerors or Chinese pilgrims, can




be trusted,
or as private,

we may

well understand that
to be truth,


what was taken

was treated not but as common property. If there was

an exchange of ideas among the Indian seekers after truth, it was far more in the nature of cooperation towards a common end, than in the

any claims of originality or priority That one man should write by and publish his philosophical views in a book and that another should read and criticise that book or carry on the work where it had been left, was

individual teachers.


If never thought of in India in ancient times. A. referred to B. often, as they say, from mere civility, Pm/artham, B. would refer to A., but no

one would ever say, as so often happens with us, that he had anticipated the discovery of another,

some one else had stolen his ideas. Truth was not an article that, according to Hindu ideas, could ever be stolen. All that could happen and did happen was that certain opinions which had been discussed, sifted, and generally received in
or that

one Asrama, hermitage, Arama, garden, or Parishad, religious settlement, would in time be collected



members and reduced


a more or less

systematic times we may

that form was in early see from the Brahmanas, and more


particularly from the Upanishads, i. e. Seances, gatherings of pupils round their teachers, or later on

from the Sutras.

It cannot be

doubted that these

Sutras presuppose, by their systematic form, a long continued intellectual labour, nay it seems to me difficult to account for their peculiar literary form except on the ground that they were meant to be
learnt by heart

and to be accompanied from the very



beginning by a running commentary, without which they would have been perfectly unintelligible. I suggested once before that this very peculiar style of the Sutras would receive the best historical explanation, if

could be proved that they represent




attempts at writing for literary purposes Whatever the exact date may be of

the introduction of a sinistrorsum and dextrorsum

alphabet for epigraphic purposes in India (and in spite of all efforts not a single inscription has as yet been
discovered that can be referred with certainty to the period before Asoka, third century B. c.), every classical

knows that there always is a long interval between an epigraphic and a literary employment of the alphabet. People forget that a period marked

by written and a large

literary compositions requires a public, public, which is able to read, for where

no supply. Nor must we forget that the old system of a mnemonic literature, the Parampara, w as invested with a kind of sacred character, and would not have been easily

no demand there




mnemonic system was upheld

strict discipline which formed the principal of the established system of education in India, part as has been fully described in the Prati.sakhyas. They explain to us by what process, whatever

by a

existed at that time of literature, chiefly sacred,

was firmly imprinted on the memory of the young. These young pupils were in fact the books, the scribes were the Gurus, the tablet was the brain.


can hardly imagine such a state of literature,

and the transition from it to a written literature must have marked a new start in the intellectual
of the people at large, or at least of the educated



Anybody who has come

in contact


the Pandits of India has been able to observe the





achieved by that


discipline even at present, though it is dying out before our eyes at the approach of printed

nay of printed editions of




need hardly say that even


idea of the introduction of a Semitic alphabet into India by means of commercial travellers about 800
or 1000 B.C.

were more than a hypothesis,



not prove the existence of a written literature at The adaptation of a Semitic alphabet that time.
to the phonetic system as elaborated in the Prati-

sakhyas may date from the third, possibly from the fourth century B.C., but the use of that alphabet for inscriptions begins in the middle of the third
century only

and though we cannot deny the

possibility of its having been used for literary purposes at the same time, such possibilities would

form very dangerous landmarks in the chronology of Indian literature.

But whatever the

may have

origin of the peculiar Sutrabeen and I give my hypothesis

as a

hypothesis only all scholars will probably agree that these Sutras could not be the work of one individual philosopher, but that we have in them the

outcome of previous centuries of thought, and the labours of numerous thinkers whose names are forgotten and will never be


final result of



of Philosophies and Sfttras.


we keep

this in mind,


shall see that the

question whether any of the texts of the

six philo-

IV. i i and inserts it totidem verbis in his own work. 3. But all such conclusions. before each system reached the form in which we possess it. to whom . III.RELATIVE AGE OF PHILOSOPHIES AND SUTRAS. Ka^ada was clearly acquainted with Gotama. 1 Kajendralal Mitra. we have no Kanada. because during its mnemonic period anything could be added and anything left out. IV. 33. I. 5 and II. rayawa five and Badarayafta and because right to their systems show an acquaintance with the other systems of philosophy. while Gotama attacks in turn certain doctrines of Kapila and Bada- He does the same for the Yoga-Sutras in II. applicable to European literature. is really a question im- The tests for settling the possible to answer. cised by Kapila. at Kapila. . taking the one who is quoted or the predecessor who quotes. 287 sophies which we now possess should be considered as older than any other. I. actually adopts one of Badarayana's Sutras. 24 in the Sawkhya-Sutras which we possess. 46. that therefore he was them l . relative ages of literary works. p. which would be perfectly legitimate in Greek and Latin literature. xviii. are not applicable to Indian literature. if we as feel justified in one Greek author quotes another. Thus. It has ignores all anterior to all of been supposed. and VI. who is acquainted with Kapila. contemporary of the one But because G'aimini quotes Bada6raimini.e. because Patan^ali other systems. the S&mkhya-Sutras are ascribed. have no weight whatever in the literary history of India. . arrange them in chronological succession.. which occur rayana. is clearly critileast in our Kapila-Sutras. 34.

the reputed author of Yoga-Sutras has been referred to the second century B. are so little the work of the founder of that system. i 3 and in several of the minor Upanishads. and is mentioned in as early an authority as the Asvalayana-Gn'hyaIn the Maitray. VI.288 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the Sutras which embody their teachings and have been handed down to us as the earliest documents within our reach. but while Pata%ali. with Yogins. it is now generally admitted that our Sawkhya. Age of Kapila-Sfttras.Sutras cannot be earlier than the fourteenth century A. was the same as what we possess in Pata/lr/ali's Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy. Up. but Sa/wkhya occurs in the compound Samkhya-Yoga in the /SVetasvatara Up..D. which have come down to us. classical We for look in vain in the so-called Upanishads the names of either Samkhya or Vedanta. It occurs in the Taittiriya and Ka^Aa Upanishads. and afterwards in All such indications may the smaller Upanishads. as a technical term. Yoga. that it would be far safer to treat them as the last arrangement of doctrines accumulated in one philosophical school during centuries of Parampanl It is easy to see that the Yogaor tradition. . It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the six philosophies as so many channels of thought. philosophy presupposes a Sa?7ikhya-philosophy.C. 10 we meet even Sutras. 22. occurs earlier than the name of any other system of philosophy. But it by no means follows that the Yoga. It should be first observed that Vedanta also occurs for the in time the same SVetasvatara VI. known in those early times. VI. The Sutras of Kapila.

so voluminous a work as the Mahabhashya . It is quite possible that our Samkhya-Sutras may only be what of the old Sutras. 5. according to Professor Garbe. if they had been in existence in his time ? . Varshaganya. the Sutras of Panini. whether from scattered MSS. But we must not go too It late a period as the sixteenth century. wrote also a commentary on them. the As author of the Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi. and have been TJ . D. Va&aspati Misra. who evidently knew the Sutras of the other systems. can be safely referred to about 1150 A. as was then the fashion. why by no means follows that every one of the Sutras which we possess in the body of the Samkhya-Sutras. quotes not a single Sutra from our Samkhya-Sutras. such as PaMasikha. is of that modern date. but appeals to older authorities only. 39 we meet with the Samkhya as the name of a system of philosophy and likewise as a name of its adherents. Ra^avcartika.. V. as. and the composition of which is assigned by Balasastrin to so far. for instance. D. and the Even Madhava about 1350 A. why should not certain portions of the Samkhya-Sutras have been preserved here and there. we should call the latest recension We know that in India the oral tradition of certain texts. In the Bhagavad-git IJ. as we know. or from the recollection of less forgetful or forgotten If that was the case. He declares that they were all com- posed by the well-known Vi^/nana-Bhikshu who. was interrupted for a time and then restored again. who. to our Samkhya-Sutras their antiquity was first shaken by Dr. with individuals... become valuable hereafter 289 for chronological purposes.AGE OF KAPILA-SUTKAS. FitzEdward Hall. never quotes from our Samkhya-Sutras and not.

Deusscn. equally ascribed to that author). p. the utterances of Kapila. at least in that final But if we literary form in which it has reached us. it . 361. who wrote his account of India in the 1 See Hall. . more than possible that our Sutras of the Samkhyaphilosophy contain some of the most ancient as well as the most modern Sutras. Vedanta. Sawkhya-karikfts. at so late a date as the fourteenth or even the sixteenth century ? It was no doubt a great shock to those who stood up for the great antiquity of Indian philosophy. accept so very modern a date for our Kapila-Sutras. we are fortunate in being able to assign a much earlier and much more settled date if But we must to another work which for centuries seems to have formed the recognised authority for the followers of the Sa?7ikhya in India. as well as those of Lsvara-KHshfta and even of VigwanaBhikshu. That these Karikas are older than our Sutras could easily be proved by passages occurring among the Sutras which are almost literally taken from the 1 . till they meet us at 'last in their final form. PafU-asikha and Varshaga?iya. 12 . the so-called Sawkhyakarikas or the sixty. may not be older than the time of Des Cartes. Asuri. added to or remodelled from time to time. Samkhya-Sara. consider the circumstances of the case. to have to confess that a work for which a most remote date had always been claimed.nine or seventy Versus memoriales of Isvara-Krtshna (with three supple- mentary ones. Karikas Alberuni.290 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

a Tripkaka (lit. as has been shown.D. See Mayer's Chinese Header's Manual. existence.C. and his translation of the Abhidharma-Kosha-sastra. But though we are thus enabled Samkhya-karika to the sixth century A. Nanjio's Catalogue). 7. The name given is to it in Chinese.D.D. 1. was well ac- quainted not only with Lsvara-K?^'shna's work. and there are no dynasty.. in the reign of the . assigns his Native tradition. Sawkhya und Yoga. we are to the first century B.300 in B.D. work 1 2 Garbe. law-teacher of the Kh&\\ dynasty. ' the Golden Seventy Discourse. possibly Paramartha. made by . and was followed by the Kh&n He lived till 582 A. with Gauc/apada's Nay. had in consequence to be replaced by a new transto assign the lation by Hiouen-thsang. A. which gives the exact dates. 547 A. U 2 .D. another step backward. 557 to 589 Paramartha came to China in about Emperor Wu-ti of the Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 2 502 to 557 A. . first 29! half of the eleventh century. told. For the Samkhya-karikas exist in a Chinese translation also. less than twenty-eight of his translations now in (not 583). TTan-ti was not considered a good Chinese scholar. it by no means follows that this work itself did not exist before that time. p. but likewise. we can even make commentary on it 1 .Kan-ti true truth).SAMKHYA-KARIKAS. that of the Suvama-Saptati-sastra being the twenty-seventh (No.' the number supposed to refer to of verses in the Karika. for instance.

about 788 A. is Jan. $arakara's literary But career began. and could not in any sense be called.D. . This commentary also. as is generally How then could he have supposed. and he. so difficulties arise But even here new we were informed by Beal. had been translated into but how is that possible Chinese before 582 A.. D. but the specimens he sent me did not suffice to settle the question whether it was really a translation of Gauc?apada's commentary. to translate portions of the Chinese commentary for me . been the literary grandson of Gauc/apada. Takakusu. 1887. . and son or pupil of Govinda ? As Mr.D. and that Fleet. Kasawara. Beal could no longer be consulted I asked one of my Chinese pupils.. after carefully collating the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit commentary of Gauc/apiida. It but right to state here that Telang in the Indian Antiquary. without upsetting the little we know of Gauc/apada's $a?7ikara is represented as the pupil of date ? Govinda who was the pupil of Gauc^apada. places /Samkara much earlier. the author of the commentary on the Karikas. Date of Gatif/apada.292 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in the Indian Antiquary. in 590 A. 95. In order to escape from all these uncertainties I wrote once more to Japan to another pupil of mine. and actually to have given the name of $a?ftkaradeva to his son in honour of the philosopher. informed Chinese translation of the commentary me was that the not. XIII. a translation of So much trouble may Gauc/apada's commentary. assigns 630 to 655 as the latest date to King Vrishadeva of Nepal who is said to have re- ceived $a7ftkara at his court. with regard to the age of Gauc?apada. the late Mr. Dr.

dutifulness (Dharma).' to Asuri. 1 This would seem to place the Tattva-samasa later than 70. as the Tattva-samasa adds. and freedom (Moksha). Pata%ali. Shashd-tantra. i. 2 See Karika. art thou satisfied with the state of a or householder ? GHhastha After a thousand years he came again. was a jRishi ' ' descended from the sky and was endowed with the four virtues. . but they show.asikha. had been communicated by him to Asuri. e. whereupon Asuri quitted the state of a householder and became a pupil of These may be mere additions made by Kapila. wisdom (Pragma). vv. proclaimed by the greatest sage. A similar account is given by Paramartha in his comment on the first verse. separation from desires (Vairagya). Kapila. and said to him ' : Asuri. at all events. The author of the Karikas informs us at the end of his work that this philothis difficulty sophy. it reached even Isvara-Kri'shria 2 He calls it the . and Asuri admitted that he was He then satisfied with the state of a GHhastha. the Sixty-doctrine. by Asuri to Pa?iA. and. He saw a Brahman of the name of O-shu-li (Asuri) who had been worshipping heaven or the Devas for a thousand years. that to him also Kapila and Asuri were persons of a distant past. 71. Kipila (Kapila)/ he says. came a third time Paramartha. by an uninterrupted series of teachers. ! 293 be caused by one unguarded expression Anyhow is now removed. . from Pan&asikha to Patan^ali l and had been widely taught until. and /Samkara's date need not be disturbed.DATE OF GAUDAPADA.

why there should never have been such Sutras for so important a system of philosophy as the Samkhya.svarathings comprehended under the name of Para- . if they ever existed or. they did not. they are what they are. When we see the Karikas declare that they leave out on purpose the Akhayikas. Tattva-samasa. also Besides these stories other K/'i'shna. what could have become of the real Samkhya-Sutras. But however far the Karikas of may go work rise back. The Karikas themselves presuppose such a tradition quite as much as the much later Sutras which we possess. Everybody has wondered. therefore. at Isvara-Knshna's time there existed a body of as Samkhya-philosophy which contained such we find in our modern Sutras. such as were handed down for other branches of learning by oral tradition.) Karikas on grammar. were omitted by I. this cannot prove their posteriority to the Sutras as we have them but it shows that . an age that gave to other Karikas like BhartHhari's (about A. There is clearly a great gap between the end of the Upanishad period and the literary period that was able to give rise to the metrical w. They are both meant to recapitulate what existed. in the form of Sutras. the illustrative stories contained in the fourth book of our Sutras. if 650 .294 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. never to originate what we should call new and original thoughts. a metrical in the style of a later age. but neither Karikas nor in stories in the the Tattva-samasa. In what form could the Samkhya-philosophy have existed in that interval ? To judge from analogy we should certainly say.ork of Isvara-Kristma. D.

We know text of the far too little of the history of the so confident a conclusion. p. and probably is so.' And It appears from the Preface of again he wrote the Kapila-bhashya that a more compendious tract in the form of Sutras or aphorisms.' he wrote. but I find no other marks of a modern date in the body of the work. it has been put down at once as modern. if to justify Colebrooke told us Samkhya l long ago that. and why was the proper text-book of the Samkhya-philosophy. pp. but that we are in actual possession of it. 2 I. e.TATTVA-SAMASA. 295 v4da. Colebrooke. 7. . as if what is new to us must be new chronologically also. I ascribed to the same author. probably controversies. On in it of its being the contrary there are several indications an earlier form of the Samkhya- philosophy than what we possess in the Karikas or in the Sutras. no. It was a mere accident that he. and i. could ' ' the scholiast of Kapila 2 may be should he not ? the Tattva-samasa Whether that Tattva-samasa not find a copy of it. it is the metrical text 1 Essays. Under these circumstances I venture to say that such a work in Sutras not only existed. 244. sucb as those on the necessity of an Isvara. bears the is title of Tattva-samasa. sometimes almost verbatim. namely in the much neglected Tattva-samasa. or whether the of Kapila be extant. trusted. Because it contains a number of new technical terms. When it agrees with the Karikas. to Kapila. is not certain. Sutras of Paw&asikha be ' : so. admit that the introductory portion of this tract sounds modern. Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya.

296 that seems to INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. me to presuppose the prose. and not the it for author of the Tattva-samasa. which are recognised in the Tattva-samasa. Not being and thus it came to pass that most scholars have been under the impression that in India also this metrical version was considered as the most authoritative and most popular manual of the Samkhya-philosophy. takes granted that the Tattva-samasa was certainly prior to the Kapila-Sutras which we possess. and even supposed by some to have been himself the author of our modern Samkhya-Sutras. no mean authority on such matters. For why should he defend Kapila. and which are still absent from the Samkhya-karikas also. This is the way in which certain 1 Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya. Introduction. . of the Tattva-samasa Colebrooke decided to translate instead the Sa?khyakarikas. might seem to presuppose the recognition of an Isvara. It should also be mentioned that Vi^wana-Bhikshu. and why should he have found no excuse for the existence of the Kapila-Sutras except that they are short and complete. In the Sutras themselves find no allusion as yet to the atheistic or non- which distinguish the later texts of the Samkhya. against the charge of Punarukti or giving us a mere useless repetition. though this is very doubtful but the direct identification of Purusha with Brahman in the Tattva-samasa points certainly to an earlier and less pronounced Nirisvara or Lord-less character theistic doctrines . of the ancient Samkhya. not the we prose the metrical version. while the Tattva-samasa is short and compact 1 ? able to find a MS. The so-called Aisvaryas or superhuman powers.

10. and that but a small part of the moon of knowledge remained . while in the Bhagavata Purana I. Hall. 297 have learnt since from prepossessions arise. the Samkhya is spoken of as Kala-vipluta. these Ballantyne We known at all except to those seen Professor Wilson's English edition of them. Nor Karikas were hardly who had can we doubt that it in the part of India best known really an important and popular work. 2 Five are mentioned by Hall in his Preface. Even in the sixteenth century Vi^nana-Bhikshu.. quotes one com- mentary by Kshemananda. but it is not quite clear to me whether this is the same as the one published by Ballantyne. 5).TATTVA-SAMASA. 13. The comif I understand mentary published by Ballantyne is. in his commentary on the Samkhya-Sutras (v. and then the Samasakhyastitra-vritti/z.e. called Samkhya-krama- dipika. during the whole of his intercourse with learned natives. p. anonymous. while the Tattva-samasa was well known to all the native assistants whom he employed. 33.. I. 3. if we consider the number of commentaries written on it 2 and the frequency of allusions to it which occur in other commentaries. i. to Ballantyne was . . Professor Wilson told me that. l that at Benares. must not forget that in modern times the in Samkhya-philosophy has ceased to be popular parts of India. p. him rightly. It gives first what it calls the S&mkhya-Sutrara. he met with one Brahman only who professed to be acquainted with the 1 Drift of the Sawkhya. complains that it has been swallowed up by the sun of the time. p. destroyed by time. nor have I We several had access to any other MSS. where he resided.

and. as such. which is called An-i.. . Hence we may well understand that Sawkhya MSS.Bhikshu at least. both the Samkhya-Sutras and the YogaSutras are really mere developments of the Tattvasamasa-Sutras. exposition of the Samkhya. By itself it would fill a few pages only. Both are called therefore Sa?>ikhyaas prava&ana. and thereopposition to the Sawkhya. definitions without Some of them are mere any attempt at etymology. the Doctrine of the They are mentioned in the Preface to Hall's edition of tho Samkhya-pravaA'ana-bhashya. and Professor Bhandarkar (1. it would agree very well with the somewhat puzzling name of Samkhya. which means no more than enumeration. fesses to be. c. According to Vi^/lanaBhikshu in his commentary on the Sutras (pp. writings of this philosophical school. the latter adding the peculiar arguments in support of the existence of an Lsvara or fore called Sesvara. it is And the 1 here important to remark also that Sixty.298 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. In fact it is a mere enumeration of topics. it seems to me just the book that was wanted to fill the gap to which I referred before. name of Shashh-tantra. 1 and that in time it more voluminous we accept it as what it proits compared with this. in Supreme Lord. 3) states that the very name of Sawkhya-prava&ana was unknown on his side of India. it was considered to be in India. are scarce in India. p.s-vara. It is possible also that the very smallness of the Tattva-samasa it may have lowered in the eyes of native scholars. 1 10). All other derivations of this title seem far-fetched commentaries. 1856. ed. Hall. or Lord-less. up to the time of Vign&na. 6. may have been eclipsed by But if and what. and entirely absent in certain localities.

philosophy. The whole arrangement is different from the other and more recent treatments of Samkhya . no doubt. relegated meet with technical subjects and technical terms which are 'not to be found at all in other and. are to the very end as a separate topic. as it We would seem. 299 is given by Isvara-Krtstwa. more modern Samkhya works. starting-point of the whole system. the Sarvanukrama and other Anukramanis described in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature 1 . together with the 10 Mulikarthas or fundamental facts which make up the sixty topics of the At the end of the 25 great topics of Shashri-tantra. . However. and there is no other work in existence of which it could be called an abstract. for instance. The smallness of the Tattva-samasa can hardly be used as an argument against its ever having been an important work. for we find similar short. in matters 1 These Anukramas have been very carefully published in the Anecdota Oxoniensia by Professor Macdonell. the Tattva-samasa we find the straightforward detogether would claration ' : Iti tattva-samasakhya-samkhya-sutrani/ Here end the Samkhya-Sutras called Tattva-samasa. Samasa seems to mean a mere abstract but Samasa may be used also in opposition to BHhat. such as we possess them. previously exhibited in 62 and 63. or at all events the author of the 72nd of his Karikas. The three kinds of pain. to whom I had handed over my materials. certainly not either of the Karikas or of the modern Sutras.TATTVA-SAMASA. yet old Sutra-works. for instance. At first sight. which generally form the . and the 33. should by occur and be accounted for in the Tattva-samasa. which as containing the 17 (enumerated in 64 and 65).

on no real argument whatever. and the other schools.300 of this kind in INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. out positive proof. though the commentary is. with the limited means at our disposal. We there could arise in time the systematic arrangement and final representation of systems such as have been handed down to us in the Sutras of the Vedanta. I think we can enter the misgivings and fears of those who felt . we must avoid being too positive either or asserting the age and authenticity denying of Sanskrit texts. though it may support a suggestion. the Satkhya. of the seeds scattered about in the Upanishads. It cannot be denied that in the Upanishad period Vedantic ideas are certainly more prevalent than I go even a step further those of the Sa/mkhya. to attempt to prove the anteriority either of the would Vedanta or of the Samkhya. What weighs with me is the fact that Indian Pandits evidently considered the Tattva-samasa-Sutras as the original outlines of the Samkhya-philosophy. and internal evidence. as far as I can see at present. of a later date. as systems of philosophy. no doubt. and admit that the Sawikhya-philosophy may have of the into been a kind of toning down of the extreme Monism Advaita Vedanta. Anteriority of Vedanta or Sawkhya. while the idea that they are a later spurious pro- duction rests. External or historical evidence we have none. and as distinguished from the Sutras in which we possess them. All I can say is that there is no mark of modern age in their language. It must be clear from all this how useless it be. can but seldom amount to can understand how.

the $vetasvatara. and . know as Samkhya ideas Vedanta preponderate. Ksithsi Upanishads. These are the points which seem most startling even to ourselves.ANTERIORITY OF VEDANTA OR SAMKHYA. so decidedly in the Upani- shad literature. and it is quite possible that they may have given rise to another system free from these startling doctrines. for instance. the two points which are most likely to given offence to ordinary consciences. . however. of ourselves. there are utterances that come very near to what we rather than Vedanta doctrines. such as we find in the Samkhya. at least as interpreted by the school which was represented rather than founded by $amkara. would seem to have been the total denial of what is meant by the reality of the objective world. such as Bodhayana and other Purv4Mryas. of the soul. though sacrificing the Isvara in order to save the reality of each Purusha. that we can well understand that in the oral tradition of the schools the Samkhya doctrines should have exercised a limited influence whatever favour they may have found with those who were repelled by the extreme views of The followers of Kapila the monistic Vedanta. These conflicting views of the world. emerge already in the Upanishads and in a few of them. and of God. had an advantage over the Vedantists in admitting only. Now. They certainly formed the chief stumbling-block to Ramanm/a and those who had come before him. have caused difficulty or and the required surrender of all individuality on the part of the subject. that is. Maitray. startled 30! by the unflinching Monism of the Vedanta. and led them to propound their own more human interpretation of the Vedanta.

They were also opposed to the common consciousness of man- kind in admitting the reality of individual souls. and the illusory character of all that is objective. independent of Brahman or Purusha. or a something objective. the Sa/ttikhya. while the Sawkhya allowed at events the temporary reality of the objective world and the multiplicity of individual all . the Vedanta unflinchingly following its straight course. and the Sa??ikhya was clearly dualistic when postulated nature. avoiding certain whirlpools of thought which seemed dangerous to the ordinary swimmer. It would seem therefore that on these very important points the Samkhya was more conciliatory and less defiant to the common sense of this is posterior mankind than the Vedanta. and disless appearing when that look ceased. and when it allowed to the individual souls or (rivas also an independent character. but diverging afterwards. To the people at large it would naturally seem as if the Vedanta taught the oneness of all individual souls or subjects in Brahman. as presented to us in the Tattva-samasa. though called into life and activity by the look of Purusha only. the other. but as something real in the it ordinary sense of that word. it might well be accepted as an indication that these two streams of thought followed parallel courses. starting from a common fund of ancient Vedic thoughts. It should be of an Isvara or remembered that the denial personal Lord did not probably form part of the original Samkhya. not only as the result of Avidya or Maya.302 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. a Prakriti. and though far from proving that it was therefore to the Vedanta in its severest form. Dualism is always more popular than rigorous Monism.

the difference between the two systems would certainly seem to be irreconcilable. by means of this diplomacy. souls. or whether. We must remember that in the eyes of the Brahmans the Samkhya is atheistic and yet orthodox. such as the Vedaiitists. while minor differences between them would ment. had occupied that the Samkhya before them . in India at least admit of a friendly adjust- Atheism and Orthodoxy. This seems to us. us so vital a point in every philosophy as theism or atheism. for the present Hamanu^a. like Of course. difficult to scholars think that the recognition of the supreme authority of the $ruti was an after- Some thought with Kapila.impossible but the fact is that orthodoxy has a very different meaning in India from what it has with us. a mere stroke of theological diplomacy. and so far it might seem to indicate . also could claim the authority of If that his interpretation of Badarayana's were so. we should be forced to admit philosophers wished. The Samkhya. Whether in its origin the is Samkhya was quite independent of the Veda. 303 we must leave it an open question whether the extreme monistic view of the Veda was due to $amkara. by orthodoxy was with them not much more than a recognition of the supreme authority of the Veda. though it may express a less decided submission to it. What we mean . never denies the authority of the Veda in so many words. to be raised to the same position which others. whatever we may think of its Yedic character. Indian philosophers to' Even on what seems seem to have been able to come to an understanding and a compromise. he PurvaMryas in Sutras. say. But if so.ATHEISM AND ORTHODOXY.

This does not affect the authority of the . had tried to represent his philosophy as supported by passages from the Veda. But he really says no more there than that certain remedies for the removal of pain. important here to remember that the Sawnot only declared for the authority of the Veda. v. should deny the correctness of the interpretation of the Veda. the great defender of Vedantism. that is. as human knowledge. proves after all no more than that a difference of opinion existed between the two. . 2). To judge from a passage in the beginning of the Samkhya-karikas it might seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy above the Veda. That *Sa??ikara. of the Upanishads. and that other remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good but that of the two the latter are better. enjoined by the Veda. like Bnhaspati or It is It is quite another question whether it really carried out the spirit of the Veda. are good. as a system of philosophy. from all than sacrifices or I.304 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and that this is incomparably higher Veda as a whole. adopted by Kapila. more efficacious (Tattva Kaumudi. compared with philosophy or We must not forget that after all it is >Sruti or O revelation itself which declares that all remedies are palliative only. and that real freedom (Moksha) suffering can be derived from philosophical knowledge only. the posteriority of the Samkhya. particularly Buddha. as well as $awkara. khya but had never openly rejected it. but it would show at the same time that Kapila. other meritorious acts (Sawkhya- pravaana 5).

perception. Nyaya. However He mean only. that word. but is placed by him on an even higher pedestal. liable to error and to require Though it is true. 5 by Aptasruti. that with the true Samkhya philosopher the Veda does not possess that superhuman authority which is ascribed to it by Badarayana. therefore. or. That revelation is to be looked upon as superior to experience or sensuous perception is stated by him in so many words in I. pramawam. There are many passages where Kapila appeals quite naturally to $ruti or In I. for in- befell Buddha. What authority Kapila assigns to the Veda may be gathered from what he says about the three and Aptava&ana. And that the Veda is not the commentators may differ. artifice to escape the fate which. while perception and inference are not. inference. correct. though. Svata^- but are admitted to be confirmation. is the received. which clearly means received revelation or revelation from a trustworthy source. 147. is shown by the fact that Kapila (Sutras V.AUTHORITY OP THE VEDA. 305 Authority of the Veda. 36 he appeals to both Sicuti and revelation. the word of a trustworthy explains Aptava&ana in v. where we read There is no denial of what is established ' x . I cannot bring myself to believe that this concession on the part of Kapila was a mere stance. but in many places he appeals to $ruti/ alone. it possible sources of knowledge. 51) declares it to be self-evident. $ruti can here the Veda and only considered as equal to sensuous perception inference. person. no doubt. or true may be. the Veda as interpreted by Kapila. reasoning.

IV. 20. is which men are liable.' by Again. bondage arising from having to offer gifts to priests. the Sa??i- khya. 80. 147. be condemned as superstitious and mischievous 2 As springing from the great mass of philosophic thought accumulated first in the Upanishads. 22. II. and it seems There is full of meaning. 83. may be found in SamkhyaSutras I. It was probably 1 But are not the elements . one passage only in which a decidedly hostile feeling towards the Brahmanic priesthood may be discovered in Kapila's Sutras. 154. Sflwkhya hostile to Priesthood. III. 20) V Other passages where the authority of /Sruti is invoked as paramount by Kapila. mere Vikaras of Ahawkani? 2 See Tattva-samiisa 22 Sawjkliya-karikas 44. 36. ' They cannot be says so formed. self-consciousness (II. and even the fact that it did not appeal to a personal Lord or creator. $ruti.' he ' says. It was probably at considered as neither orthodox nor unorthodox. &c. because $ruti that they are formed of Ahamkara. but ought not to one called Dakshma-bandha. when the Nyaya philosophy tries to establish by reasoning that the organs of sense are formed of the elements. or supposed to be so by the commentator. like the Vedanta-philosophy. Among the different kinds of bondage to be. 22. which seems to . . was evidently at first riot considered sufficient to anathematise it as unorthodox or un-Vedic. 15. Kapila squashes the whole argument by a simple appeal to $ruti. was simply one out of many attempts to solve the riddle of the world. 77.306 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

as its very name implied. to call one channel of philosophic thought. more ancient than the with words. was safe under the shadow of the Veda. authoritative tradition as human. if the Veda had not been considered by it as of supreme authority. to the Veda was an afterthought and not an original system. riot only widely X 2 . revelation as not human. has often proved most mischievous. ception of the development of Indian philosophy. as the highest authority much even on philosophical questions. at a 307 later time when the Vedanta and other had already entrenched themselves behind systems revelation. I know that other scholars maintain that with the Samkhya any appeal only. that other systems. not even essential part of the quite honest. The result of this desire to fix dates. It is possible that there may have been originally a difference between $ruti. whether Samkhya or Vedanta. nay. or the Veda. it must be clear that. and that with Kapila the Veda was treated at first as coming under AptaBut however this may be. as we catch glimpses of it now and then in the course of centuries. Scholars of recognised authority have arrived at and given expression to convictions.DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS. other. unless our conva&ana. while the Vedanta. having been proved un-Vedic. where dates are impossible. may We admit that the Samkhya has no need of the Veda. came to be considered as objectionable or unorthodox. is entirely wrong. would be mere playing Parallel development of Philosophical Systems. in the present state of our knowledge. and Apta-va&ana. in the form in which it has reached us. but why should it appeal to it even on indifferent questions.

while the it Samkhya ideas stand out less prominently. springing from a common source and flowing on side by side in the same direction. to the ascendency gained at owing. would seem. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . Both branched off. religion. cannot be a than Latin. No one would say that Greek was older than Latini Greek has some forms more primitive than Latin. but Latin also has some forms more primitive than Greek. slowly day older may be and almost imperceptibly at first. time than productions in nor would any Sanskrit scholar deny that the Sutras of Badarayana are older than the Sa?nkhyaSutras. as a language. but diametrically opposed to each other. like language. as we now possess the two. It is true that we know earlier literary productions in Greek at a literary much Latin. Instead that early period already by the Vedanta. from the time when the Aryan separation took place.308 different. Brahmawas and they meet us again in some of the Upanishads. by a very natural tendency. Greek. A reference to the history of language may make my meaning clearer. We meet with philosophical ideas of a Vedantic character. But it for all that. far India and a In limits of any chronology. parallel and formed under similar conditions. In their embryonic form they both go back to some indefinite date. mythology. as far back as the hymns the of the Ilig-veda in . philosophy also formed at first beyond the we may of kind common property. learn how. instead of being satisfied with taking things as Nebenein- ander. The chief cause of this confusion has been that. we always wish to arrange things Nacheinander or in causal connection. though as yet in a very undecided form.

is BhikshaMry in the B-rih. for instance. 5. Buddhism subsequent to Upanishads. no doubt. In the Kaush. however. Up. Manu and 2 afterwards. that the third and fourth Asramas are not only so clearly distinguished in early times as they are (BrahmaMrin in II. as a social institution. The very name its of Upanishad. The technical term for this . comes from the same source. Up. i. we read of a man who a village and got nothing JTMnd. has begged through in the (Bhikshitva) begging (V). 3.BUDDHISM SUBSEQUENT TO UPANISHADS. that the name of Bhikshu does not occur in the classical whether in Upanishads. is fully recognised. is so peculiar that occurrence in ancient Buddhist texts proves once for all the existence of some of these works before the rise of Buddhism. It is true. but the right of begging. 5. a BrahmaA-arin is mentioned who has begged. Up. it seems far more probable to me that they were survivals of an earlier period of as yet undifferentiated philosophical thought. applied to the members of the Buddhist fraternity. the first or the third of the Asramas or Vanaprastha). The very name of Bhikkhu. that passages in support of Sa/n-khya ideas occurring in certain of the older Upanishads were foisted in at a later time. 309 of supposing. Bhikkha- . What remains of the chronological framework of Indian philosophy is in the end not much more than that both Vedanta and S&mkhya ideas existed before the rise of historical Buddhism. Ill and exactly the same compound. seems to me simply taken over from the Brahmans. IV. The recognition of mendicant friars also. Ar.

and taken over by the Buddhists from the Vedic Brahmans. &c. occurs in the Dhammapada 392 BhaikshaHry occurs also in the Mwic/aka I. That many of the technical terms of the Buddhists (Uposhadha. 213. so much so that it has been rightly said. Up. . 2. as kept by the Brahmans.) could have come from the same source only. has long been known. . 3. p. ing Asrama. Without Brahmanism no Buddhism. Gaha^Ao. and many other customs adopted by the Buddhists. the rainy season. VIII.310 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the only Asramas that remained among the Buddhists were two. I less have explained before why at present I attribute importance than I did formerly to the occurrence 1 S. Socially. E. n. Vanapa^Ao. the as was not known before the spreadIt is true that in its social meanof the three or four stages. clearly taken over from the Varshas. Lalita-vistara. . that of the Grihins and that of the Bhikkhus. for instance. we can hardly doubt that the three or four stages (Brahma&ari. the retreat during the rainy season. Mrya. name does not occur in the classical Upanishads but. and so is the quinquennial celebration is of the Pan&avarsha-parishad. The institution of the Vasso l . IV. Bhikkhu) were known before the rise of Buddhism. we find Asramin in the Maitray. so that the fact that the substantive Bhikshu does not occur in the classical Upanishads can hardly be used as an argument to prove that the status of the mendicant friar ing of Buddhism. 13.

though not of the Vedanta-Sutras he knows Valmiki. and kanaka. we must abstain from using them for assigning any dates to their Sanskrit originals. Yoga. and titles. Puranas. the passage so often quoted from the twelfth chapter would be of considerable value to us in forming an idea of Indian literature as it existed at the time when the Lalita-vistara here the names not (Nigha^u das. the son of Sarasvati. the author of the Ramayana. in the Lalita- vistara. Khan(Kalpa). has been ascribed to the first century A. of a 31! number of Vaiseshika. what would be most important for us. By far the important passage in it for our present purpose is the conversation between Arac/a and the future Buddha. perhaps place more reliance on Asvaghosha's Buddha-A-arita.D. the names of Itihasas. astronomy (6ryotisha). If the date assigned by Stanislas Julien and others to certain Chinese translations of this work could be re-established. /Siksha. with great probability. possibly including Samkhya. while Hetuvidya can hardly be anything but Nyaya. known most king. Vedas. Samkhya. Nyaya. as a teacher of Yoga. Atreya as a teacher of medicine.JTARITA.ASVAGHOSHAS BUDDHA. But until the dates of the various Chinese translations of the Life of meant for Buddha have been re-examined. He mentions Vyasa. Asvaghosha's Buddha-&arita. ?) composed. Nirukta. was originally grammar. Yoga. the well. ritual three systems of philosophy also. but. and Vaiseshika. as the compiler We may of the Veda. We find only of the Vedic glossary the Nigamas (part of Nirukta). here already called Bodhisattva . which.

and we have actually the name of Kapila. D. This Arac/a it in the twelfth book.312 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.C. the name of Kapila does (XII. and was then probably retranslated into Sanskrit as Vastu. ascribed to the first century A. and even a disciple of his is mentioned..vastu l also occurs. a clear reference to that philosophical system which is known to us under the name of Samkhya. while Vastu means thing. of Samkhya-philosophy. were at all events reduced to writing in the century B. may clearly a teacher be of Sa??ikhya in an is and. which. we find there also first views ascribed to the Brahmans of Buddha's time which clearly breathe the spirit of the Sa??ikhyaBut it would be very unsafe to say philosophy. 2 1 ). Vastu became Vattliu in Pali. though the name of Samkhya does not occur. to the Vedanta has been met with in Asvaghosha's Buddha-arita. whatever the date of their original composition may have been. The name of Kapila. If we consult the Buddhist Suttas. as the birthplace of Buddha and as the No reference dwelling of the famous sage Kapila.. Here then we have in a poem. All we can fully 1 I write Vastu. because that alone means dwelling-place. and may be safely used therefore as historical evidence for that time. the reputed author of that system. . or of anything very different from what we find already in certain Upanishads. earlier state . and to maintain that such passages prove in any way the existence of developed systems of philosophy. Buddhist Suttas. more. though the substitution of the Vedantic of name of Brahman for the Sawkhya name Purusha deserves attention.

Parmama.ASVALAYANA'S GS/HYA-S^TEAS. and many more far as I know. Dharma. Another help for determining the existence of ancient Sutras and Bhashyas may be found in the GHhya-Sutras of Asvalayana and /S'amkhayana. Pakudha and Sa^k/aya Nor are Makkhali. such as the Lankavatara where the names of Kanada. and from nowhere else. We should remember that in the Buddhist Canon we find constant mention of Titthiyas or Tirthakas and their heretical systems of philosophy. so tsvara. (raimini. Some Kapila. or Kanada. as I pointed out in 1859 in 1 my History Samar5f?a-Phala-Sutta 3. Gotama of these names occur in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts also. Six con/Sa-svata. there is not one of which we could say that it could have been taken from the Sutras only. Agita. the names of the reputed authors of the six systems of Brahmanicphilosophy absent from the Tripi^aka. Brahman. one of them. Kapila. Nitya (? Anitya). Brthaspati are met with. . Here. Asvalayana's Gnhya-Stltras. Nigan^o Nataputta. 313 say is that there are a number of terms in the Suttas which are the very terms used in the Vedanta. works belonging to the age of Vedic literature. Pataf^/ali. Akshapada. but again not a single specimen or extract from their compositions. though it may be to the very end of what I call the Sutraperiod. being the well-known founder Kassapa. Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies. Akshobhya. such as temporaries of of (jrainism. Atman. Buddha Purana are mentioned. 1 . . but. But we hear nothing of any literary compositions ascribed to B4daraya?ia.

nor any other Sutras would ever have been intelligible. nor the grammatical. though leaving out a few names and adding others. Gargi Va&aknavi. Mahabharata and Dharmaftaryas are out altogether. give the same list. Mahapai?gya. it seems to me. Siitras IV. we find not only the Rig-veda with all its subdivisions. Bharata. ^Sakalya. Sulabh4 Maitreyi. 1 Buddha. not only to the existence of Sutras. 4. in the sense which we ourselves assign to borrowing. Paila. 10. left . Bahavi. Sau^ami. $a??ikhayana. the Bashkala (text). Aitareya. Kahola Kaushitaka. the Sakala (text). 10. (raimini. Paimgya. Mahaudavahi. without which. Asvalayana. as I said before. Vaisampayana. that instead of Bharata and Mahabharata. Mancfavya. Bhashyas. but I cannot even now bring myself to believe that the author of Buddhism borrowed from the Samkhya or any other definite final system of philosophy. had as much we may learn from the fact How careful be. of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. Bharata (ninanti.314 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. we must . Su^atavaktra. Babhravya. of the law. Mahaitareya. or even possible. neither the philosophical. Did Buddha borrow from Kapila I ? may seem very sceptical in all this. Mahakaushitaka. teachers Gargya. Suyagwa Audavahi. other MSS. but of Bhashyas or commentaries also. Mahabharata. The most valuable part in both sets of Grihya-Sutras is their testifying at that early and probably pre-Buddhistic time. 1 Sutras. as known to us in its Sutra form. but such names as Sumantu. The ^S^ikhayana G?^'hya/Saunaka. Gautama. read Bharatadharma/raryas while in the Samkhayana Gn'hya-Sutras IV. Manc/ukeya. . Vadav& Pratitheyi.

for . that is. (4) 6ratilakos. (5) Paribba^akos. But not one of these names helps us to a real chronological date. (8) Aviruddhakos. we can never know whether a certain book of a certain author is refer to intended. which could hardly have been established long before Buddha's appearance. that his belief in Samsara or migration Who of souls It was borrowed from Badarayawa or Kapila ? belonged to everybody in India as much as a belief in Karman or the continuous working of deeds. Gotamakos. pupils of the shaveling. how do we know that they anything written that we possess ? Unless we meet with verbatim quotations. if we lay hold of any- thing to save us from drowning while exploring the chronology of Indian literature. as handed down in various Asramas. i. such as (i) Agdvakos.e. were told that in Professor Hardy's most valuable translation of We the Anguttara a number of philosophical sects were mentioned which existed at the time of Buddha's appearance. and (10) Devadhammikos. may In the great dearth of historical dates it no doubt be excusable. the latter belonging to the Digambara sects. (2) Nigan^Aos. the Buddha. while Munc/asavakos.even when the names of the principal systems of philosophy and the names of their reputed authors are mentioned. for instance. and Gota- . the tradition. (7) Tedancfrkos. would say. Agdvakos and Nig&nthos are the names of (7aina ascetics.DID BUDDHA BORROW FROM KAPILA ? 315 right to many of the so-called Sa?>ikhya or Yedanta ideas as Kapila or anybody else. (6) (9) Magandikos. strange to see how often our hopes have been roused and disappointed. Our difficulties are very great. two things which should be It is carefully distinguished. (3) Muw<iasavakos. or simply the general Parampara.

All they teach is that at the time Brahmanic and Buddhist existing side means. Varaha-Mihira also. 1898. Ka^adas the followers of the Vaiseshika school. knows indeed of Aupanishadas.. p.. ascetics. Kapilas. Ehys Davids. but the Vedantins.. the six Darsanas. do we meet with actual quotations from our Sutras of in later works. we do not hear a single word. We get dates from the names of any of these schools. a name not clear to me. Buna's Harshafcarita. by any desires. Teda>ic/ikos. Not even Bana. S. . the Aupanishadas can hardly be meant for anybody . A. Magandikos. if schools they were. which have been referred to the sixth.D. seventh.e. makos would seem to be schools which owed their The other names existence to Buddha himself. in the sixth Cf. K. have been intended for ascetics no longer impeded i. if meant for Magadhikos. 197. as is flict sects were by side in large numbers. and eighth centuries A. religious mendi- cants. (ratilakos. no historical national Devas. while Devadhammikos are clearly worshippers of the ancient therefore Brahmanic. Paribba^rakos. people of Magadha. Jan. but by no commonly supposed. may again.316 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and and possibly Vedic. of their eponymous heroes or their written works. J. would be applicable both to Brahmanic and Buddhist sects. in his Life of King Harslia. Ka^adas and if the Kapilas are the followers of the Sawkhya. with each other Of the six recognised systems of philosophy. would be Buddhists Aviruddhakos. in constant con1 . Sawmyasins carrying the three staves.

D. and not the Vaiseshika-Sutras by Kanada. Does that prove that Gotama's Sutras were unknown in the seventh century of the 1 It may or may not. but fere not Gotama's Nyaya-Sutras. . while mentioning the Sutras of the other systems. And here again. He relates that Gimamati defeated a famous Samkhya philosopher name of Madhava. 317 Kapila and Kanabhu^ (Vaiseshika). We cannot be too careful in such matters. likewise in the sixth century. who was the pupil of Kapila. was the Yoga-philosophy. That MMhava (1350 for his seventy or seventy- A. and all that Is vara.Krishna did was to select seventy of them two Karikas.. are told even that there were originally 60. but again he tells us no His own special study. that therefore these Sutras did not exist in his time. for the unreserved acceptance of a purely conjectural date is very apt to inter- with the discovery of a real date. as little as But it is no we may conclude from the fact that Hiouen-thsang translated the Vaiseshika-nikayadasapadartha-sastra by 6rrtana&andra. informs us that these Karikas contain the words of Kapila or of Pan&asikha.BANAS HARSHAJTARITA. as I pointed out before. the more. is no doubt. he says not a word of the most important of them all. but even this does not help us to the dates of any Sutras composed by them.). should not have mentioned those of the Samkhya. a strong argument in support of their non-existence in his time. though he speaks of a number of Yoga works. Hiouen-thsang likewise mentions a number of Nyaya works.000 We Gathas. the pupil of Asuri. D. as is well known. century A. mentions The Chinese translator of the Karikas. proof.

What we possess in the shape of commentaries may not be very old. If. particularly the Karikas. I am quite aware that many scholars will object. it is true. India. a mere S4mkhyam or Parisamkhya. These Samasa-Sutras. 362. p. for commentaries may come and go 1 in different schools. give us certainly better arranged accounts of that philosophy. the Tattva-samasaSutras are older than our Samkhya-Sutras. If then I venture to call the Tattva-samasa the oldest record that has reached us of the Samkhyain the ac- philosophy. they would always retain their value as showing us in how . great a variety the systems of philosophy really existed in so large a country as India. M. as I believe. . and I may now add to Satish Chandra Banerji.318 Sfttras INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Both of them. Yet I doubt whether we may conclude from this that these Sutras did not exist at his time. 1898. are hardly more than a table of contents. but that would only show once more that they presuppose the existence of a commentary from the very first. their account of the Samkhya-philosophy would always possess its peculiar interest from a historical point of view while even if their priority with regard to the Karikas and Sutras be doubted. as may be seen in the excellent editions and translations which we owe to Professor Garbe. and will prefer the description of the Samkhya as given in the Karikas and in the Sutras. The Tattva-samasa. and if I prefer to follow them count I give of that philosophy.. of Pata/i^ali J . while the M.

p. Kapila is said to 7. 3. and his clan in order to become his pupil. 319 Sutras which they intend to explain. he said Reverend Sir. ed. engraved on the memory of teachers and pupils. they reappear in our Samkhya-Sutras. u. Chronology is not a matter of taste that can be settled by mere impressions. have revived the Sawkhya (Sawikhya-Sara. begins witli an introduction which sounds. . no doubt.THE TATTVA-SAMASA. How tenacious that philosophical ParampaKi was we can see from the pregnant fact that the Akhyayikas or stories. we are told. it would be very difficult to prove that it was so. took refuge with the great Tfo'shi Kapila. like a late tradition. Where were they during the interval if not in Sutras or Karikas. the Karikas. though it may sound like a late tradition. for though absent in the Tattva-samasa and in the Karikas. certain A Brahman. Hall. but reminds us in some respects of the dialogue at the beginning of the Chinese translation But of the commentary on the Samkhya-karikas. the teacher (not necessarily the origi- and having declared his family. 'I shall tell thee. the pubwhich we owe to Ballantyne. What is here on nator) of the Samkhya ' : l . overcome by the three kinds of pain.' topics which are twenty-five Then number : follow the 1 In the Bhagavata-purawa I. his name. now lost to us ? lication of The commentary on the Tattva-samasa. note). must surely have existed both before and after the time of Isvara-Kn'srma. though left out in. earth the highest (the summum bonum) do to be saved in ' ? What is truth ? What must I ? Kapila said. would remain unchanged.

V. colour. savour. 2. The Sahara (evolution). winds or vital spirits. . The Mahabhutas (material ments) III. The five Vilyus. Bhutadi) 4-8. . XIII. The Adhibhtita instruments. (active organs) 19. The sixteen ViMras (modifications). List of Twenty-five Tattvas. and the ten T Indnyas. tive elements). The Traigunya (triad of forces). to bud- TV X. i VII. five acts Buddhi or the Indriyas. The Adhyatma / \ A referring to the thirteen VIII. A1 . The Aha?nkara (the subject). of three . II. Tai^asa. i. Ahamkara. . / a 0> 9-13. Manas (central organ or mind) 20-24. 14-18. and odour. IV. . The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive organs) . ferentiated or undeveloped principle) The Buddhi (intellect). . XII. five Karmendriyas . Manas. kinds (Vaikarika. i of The five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions). The Prakriti as Avyakta (the non-dif. kinds of Ahamkara. touch. XT. of eight kinds . Ihe Adhiuaivata v rin 11-1 tlln. The eight Prakritis (primary and produc1. VI. IX. ele- 25. 3. The five Karmatmans.320 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. I. The PratisafJiara (dissolution). { The .. The Purusha (Spirit or Self). The five Karmayonis (sources of activity).e. The five Tanmatras (essences) of sound.' . .

321 XIV. Buddhi (light or perception). Pramana (authorities). XXIV. Anugrahasarga (benevolent creation). shall often have to use these Sanskrit terms. threefold. Here then the Avyakta. ninefold. Bandha (bondage). He then continues ' : i . Asakti (weakness). is meant to elucidate their meaning. even when they can be found. Tushd (contentment). and 4-8. eightfold. Avidya subdivisions. with sixty-two XV. Siddhi (perfection). eight. 3. threefold. (creation of material elements).THE AVYAKTA. XVI. fivefold. The Avyakta (chaos).' The Avyakta. XVII. Moksha (freedom). is neuter (the undeveloped). Du/ikha I (pain). XXI. As in the . The commentator begins by asking. and have given these titles or headings in Sanskrit. Mulikarthas (cardinal facts). threefold. Now what are the eight PrakHtis V and he answers. Ahamkara (subjectivity). again in technical terms which will have to be explained ' ' : I. XX. which follows immediately on the Sutra. are too often unintelligible or misThis commentary leading without a commentary. (Nescience). XXII. Bhutasarga fourteen. because their English equivalents. twenty-eightfold (nine Atushds and eight Asiddhis). XIX. but the English word seems never to square the Sanskrit terms quite accurately. XVIII. the i. explained. five Tanmatras (transcendental elements). XXIII. 2. and it does so on the whole satisfactorily. threefold.

. And these are its synonyms. invisible." . &c. pre-eminent. without beginning or end. Pradhanaka (chief). And again. without savour and odour. middle. fall to Brahman as being what is called the substantial cause of the world. the conviction " This is so and so. this (Pratipatti).. but alone of all the eight PrakHtis unproduced (Aprasuta). It is given as a synonym of Purusha further on. seem hardly to be appropriate here. cloth. as the ear. Prasuta (productive). without attributes. not a horse this is a post. indestructible. unchanging. one only. ' 2. . that is to say. and to be synonymous with Purusha or Atman rather than with the Avyakta. not otherwise. in It is that which there regard to a cow. words applicable to the Avyakta. Tamas : . but strictly 1 speaking Prakn'ti also would. is not so beginning. Brahman 2 Pura (abode). producing (Prasuta). as it would seem. &c. intangible. but of an immaterial world. from a Vedantic point of view. Dhruva (unchanging). this Avyakta is subtle. 2 Brahman seems out of place here. such And why ? Because it has neither manifest. (darkness). The learned eternal. Akshara (indestructible). nor end. beds. without parts. under certain circumstances Pradhana (principal). are It is manifest. world various objects such as water-jars. nor has It is it any parts. inaudible. not a man. and Pradhana in the sense of nature.322 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. object). but common to all. Mahat in the sense of mind. the Avyakta not apprehended by the senses. is And what is is called Buddhi (intellect) ? Buddhi through Adhyava'saya (ascertainment). &c. Kshetra (field. declare it to be without beginning and middle. is a cow.' Buddhi. vases. to be beyond what is great *.

it If taken in a psychological sense. it would clearly presuppose the later phases. sense is more important than commentaries. or at least Tanmatras. it is impossible that this should have been its original meaning in the mind of Kapila. Manas.' is Buddhi. Manas. But originally it must have been meant as Prak?^'ti illuminated and intellectualised. the most wonderful phase of Prais generally taken here in its subjective or psychological sense. If Buddhi meant only determi- nation (Adhyavasaya).BUDDHI. and as yet senseless Prakriti. and no longer as dull matter. as subjective. the possibility supplies. can only be PrakHti as lighted up. in a cosmic sense. not only Ahamkara. and the senses and the other organs of the soul. dull. the Mahat. but likewise something that is knowable and determinable. or of the determination of this and that. as rendered capable of perception. and however violent our proceeding may in the cosmic seem. and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of Aha?7ikara (distinction of subject and object). such as Mahabhutas. we can hardly help taking this Great Principle. no doubt. 323 Such kn'ti. Now the first step after Avyakta. Indriyas. the undeveloped. only after mere material contact has become conscious- Y 2 . and Indriyas. like Prakriti in the beginning. but whatever native and Euro- Buddhi pean authorities may have to say. of individual perception also. this psychological acceptation is the Though accep- common Buddhi among native writers on Samkhya. in a later stage. Only after PrakHti has become lighted up or perceptive. apprehensive senses. even in its widest sense. yet The Buddhi or the Mahat must here be a phase tation of growth of the universe. mind.

by contrasting them with their opposites. and their new relation as perceiver and perceived. knowledge. is the opposite of Adharma. there seems no escape from it. then he refers the be quite right in a later phase of the development of PrakHti. for instance. it is in . dispassionateness. It could not be the antecedent of Ahamkara. Manas.324 ness. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. S. and lastly he decides with his Buddhi what to do. he explains them by a very favourite process. then he Manas). as I on one side and this and that on the other. super- power. (i) Dharma. ' ' ' ' ' a complete forsaking of native guidance. and we imagine the or individual. Banerji on p. can distinction. if it were no more than the act of fixing this or that in thought. What may ' native interpreters have all - made on of Buddhi 23 be seen in their commentaries. nay. I am glad to find that Mr. (3) Vairagya. virtue. 146 of his work arrives at much the same conclusion.' This may considers external senses. vice. C. it cannot possibly be right as representing the first evolution of PrakHti from its chaotic state towards light and the possibility of perception. There are eight manifestations of this Buddhi (intellect). whether general between subject and object (Aha??ikara). and saying that (i) Dharma. VaA'aspati Misra's commentary first his Karika : Every man uses (with the various objects to his Ego (Aha?wkara). namely. This may seem a very bold interpretation. virtue. human and is and tradition. As each of these requires explanation. (4) Aisvarya. and even the Tanmatras. revelation It is not opposed to. but unless a more reasonable and intelligible account can be given of Buddhi. (2) 6r/lana. enjoined by >S'ruti and Smn'ti.

discrimination. Thus has Buddhi scribed. in its eight forms been de- are. is the opposite of powerlessness. superhuman power. its and has happiness for 6r/iana or is outward mark. 2 Mahat. taken collectively. and consists in not being dependent on or influenced by external objects. Tamasa. Their opposites are classed as bad. These Aisvaryas are believed in by Sawkhya and Yoga. knowledge. 325 harmony (2) with. Mati. dark or Through going liberation. the great. Khyati. through there takes place knowledge there arises through dispassionateness men are absorbed in Praknti (Prakrit ilaya?). wisdom. . such as sound. Pragma.. &c. upward. through superhuman power there comes unfettered movement. the opposite of Agwana or ignorance. &c. $ruti. These four kinds of intellect (Buddhi) are classed ' as Sattvika. thought. Manas. becomes the Upadhi or mental limitation of Brahma or Hirawyagarbha. the (3) Vairagya. extreme minuteness. unless the Sawkhyas own meaning both to Brahman and Brahma. the practice of the best people. Synonyms of Buddhi . being able to assume the smallest form and weight.BUDDHI. inspiration. is the opposite of passion. and the elements (Bhuta). 2 1 give their This also seems out of place here. as a means. In later times Buddhi. the states of thought (Bhava). virtue. e. dispassionateness. and are acquired by Yogins by means of long and painful practices. Brahma masc. mind. explained as the understanding of twenty-five subjects (Tattvas). and consists of the eight qualities such as Amman. (4) Aisvarya. i.

interpreted in a psychological or epistemological sense. I feel. e. by powerful enemies. I hear. and DM. giving the cosmic process. It Abhimana. one. in the old uncial writing that shows forth here We and there. I am lord and am Isvara. Srrm'ti. he asks. and superhuman powers. and before Buddhi has assumed the character of sense- have. am in the sound. assumption or misconception. How could this be possible before the distinction between subject and object has been realised by Aha??ikara. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. devoted to virtue. I enjoy. Ahamkara. is said to assume the form (Rupa) of virtue. thought. to perception (Buddhindriya?ii) ? read the Samkhya-philosophy in two texts. and as personal and that the idea of a cosmic stage of intellect. ' What is is called Aha??ikara ? And I he answers. as it were. &c. dominated by Tamas (Gu?ia of darkness).' >S'a?yikara in his commentary on the VedaritaSutras gives. and this consists in the belief that i. if dominated by Sattva (Gu?za of purity). rich. imagines that he . because his wife and children are unhappy. Now. in fact. 3. firmness. Thus intellectuality has been entirely forgotten. memory. I taste. I and I I I smell. as when a man. though from a different point of view. it takes the four opposite forms of vice. It is quite clear that in all these explanations continuity of meditation. shall be slain am some more instances. the other in the minuscule letters of a much later age. by me a man was slain.326 Dhn'ti. dispassionateness. Pragwanasantati. knowledge. if while. I see. Buddhi is only can we account for the statement that this Buddhi. &c. taken as intellect.

but to Prak?^'ti only. which again is impossible without a Non-Ego. luminous. must remember proceeding. thin. that jumps. blind. after that matter has passed through Buddhi. it was taken in its ordinary rather than in its technical Samkhya I quite admit that this is a somewhat bold how to get without it at a proper of the ancient Samkhya. Sanumana. the rival understanding of the Vedanta. or that he stands. impotent. Tair/asa. or ' he Synonyms of Ahamkara. are Vaikarika. whereas all these things do not pertain to him at all. I cannot see. or rather modifications of it. and Ahamkara as a condition presupposed in any mental act of an individual thinker. objectively the creation of what is subjective and objective is ment of what the only possible meaning of the cosmic Ahamkara. or something objective. Thus we are told that there are three or four . Ahamkara was so familiar in the sense of Egoism that. like Buddhi. dependent on inference. is in the Samkhya something developed out of primordial matter. is stout. Bhutadi. is 327 unhappy. or fears. walks. sense.AHAMKARA. doubts. as a cosmic power.' Here we must distinguish again between Ahamkara. that he has desires. not dependent on in- ference. without the introduction of the Ego or I. whatever it may mean in later times. Buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object. that he is dumb. deaf. but We that Ahamkara. modifying. or fair. Niranumana. After that only do we watch the develop- is objective in general into what is But while this or that (the Tanmatras). the first of elements. its psychological interpretation is far more easy.

dominated by the Sattva-gu?ia. and the notes of the gamut. for unintentional good . savour. but no longer as a cosmic potentia. B. These five modes of Ahamkara are spoken of as Karmatmans also. G. rather confused. Nishada. Dliaivata. 1). in sounds Differences of sound. and The essences of sound are perceived only. C. Gandhara. The five sub(substances) stances or essences as emanating from Ahamkara. helps to do hidden works (4) the Sanumana Ahamkara is responsible . e. the Vaikarika. shows This division. E. /foshabha. grave. and thus divides the whole world into what is subjective and objective. the very essence of our acts. . . helps to do good works (2) the Tai^asa. A. dominated by the Gunas. F. for unintentional evil works. i. (5) the Niranumana. colour. such as Shac/r/a. contact odour. are . dominated by the Ra^as(3) the Bhutadi. Though Ahamkara means only the production of Ego. Pa/U'ama. while in another place the Tattva-samasa itself explains that Ahamkara Buddhi directed towards the perception of the nature of what is Self (subjective) or Not-Self (objective). circumfiexed. If it is asked. 4-8. Five Tanmatras. matras the essence of sound. guwa. though at all events that the Aha?nkara is here treated as simply a moral agent. yet should be taken as an act of the production of Ego involves that of the Non-Ego. Madhyama. helps to do evil works dominated by the Tamas-gima.328 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. (i) modifications of the Ahamk4ra. such as acute. ? What are the five Tan- he answers.

Amuc/Aa. but no difference in the essence of colour. but rough.FIVE TANMATRAS. Differences of are perceived in savoursavour. black. and the great elements PrakHtis. Aghora. cold. and their synonyms. not to be experienced. perceived of sound. corrosive. are Differences The essences of odour of Thus have the essences been indicated : . sweet. . are perceived. Ami. is colour are perceived in colourof colour. acid. three being negations of the qualities of the Mahabhutas. though sometimes very inaccurate ones. or evolve. are perceived. from Avyakta to the Tanmatras. . not-terrible. riot-stupid the last therefore not perceptible. touch soft. such as and hot. astringent. not differentiated. the answer is because they alone Prakurvanti. purple. 329 but there is no difference in the essence in The essences of touch are perceived only. but there is no difference in the essence of odour. perceived in odour such as sweet and odour. red. The essences of savour only. slippery. . are perceived. offensive. Differences of touch. Differences green. are called Prakritis. natures. atomic. according to the three Gunas preAnd if it is asked why ponderating in each. bitter. but there is no difference in the essence of savour. are said to be Avisesha. there is no difference in the essence of touch. The essences of only . hard. such as white. are perceived. salt. not-pleasurable. Mahabhutas (?). Asanta. only. such as pungent. . they alone bring forth. there yellow. Abhogya. these eight Prakritis only.

mind. the skin. Kara/ta.' Manas.' as its object sound. perform each its own work. and the organ of generation. instruments.' Central organ of the senses or KOLVOV ala-OriTripiov might be the nearest approach to the meaning of Manas but mind may do. and at the same time active like the Karmendriyas. or perceptive organs. the nose Being produced from the Tanmatras. the eye colour. 'The five Karmendriyas or organs of feet. and the Five Buddhindriyas. as perceiving.' organs (including Manas). 14-18. 'Now the organs are set forth. as perceptive. the organ of excretion evacuation. The ear perceives odour. performs its acts of doubting and ascertaining.33 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Their synonyms are. II. action. 9-13. and the nose. the skin touch. both perceptive and active. constitute the five Buddhindriyas. Five Karmendriyas. like the other organs. the tongue. Sixteen Vikaras. hands. voice. the hands work. If it be asked ' ' Which are the sixteen Vikaras ' or evolutions ? the answer is. Thus have the eleven organs been explained. the eleven sense five elements. The voice utters words. the organ of generation pleasure. a view of considerable antiquity. the ear. the eyes. are represented as being of the same nature as the objects perceived. the feet perform movement. Sa??ikhya definition. if we only remember its ' 1 9. the organ of excretion. Manas. the tongue' savour. Vaika' . . the senses.

Akritis.' Purusha. are earth. 257. colour. sound. spotless. and ether. Light helps the other four by Here the we Air helps the other four by drying. /Santa. shapes. 2 Anu. Mahabhutas explained. Vikaras. helps the other four. fearful. sound. and colour.' are told. not an agent. Aksha Five Mahabhfttas. by being their support. because rests in the body (Puri say ate). four qualities. sound. Or Akshara. atomic. without qualities. modifications. or gross elements. AvadhHtani. scribed. III. Thus have the sixteen Vikaras been destupid. 'What is is the Purusha ' ? and the answer is without beginning. Now it is ' asked. changing. special. perceptive. species.' (?). elements. Purusha objects. not producing. : Thus Their synonyms are Bhutas. Water is possessed of colour. sound. sound is and touch. eternal. experiencer. and savour. 25. seer. 'The Mahabhutas. Air is possessed of two qualities. omnipresent. it subtle. Bhutaviseshas. touch. pleasurable. water. light. earth. 20-24. touch. Niyata. Muc/Aa. skin (or body ?). imperishable ? . kept under organ. ripening. rika.PURUSHA. Ether helps the other four by giving space. ' Light possessed of three qualities. Siunkhya-Philosophie. Why is it called Purusha it being old (Pura?iat). Tanu. touch. 2 p. Vigraha. knower of is. and because it serves I Because of its 1 Garbe. air. are the five Ether has one quality. appliances \ . and odour. 331 Padani. special elements. Ghora. Earth is possessed of five qualities. savour. Water helps the other four by moistening.

Why is it subtle ? Because it is without parts and supersensuous. is the Purusha without beginning ? Because there is no beginning. like the sky. a time) pleasure. Hira?iyagarbha. not made. omnipresent ? Because. Purusha also was probably used both for the divine and for the human side of the same power. and its extent is endless. And why but it is probably meant for no more than that we never perceive a beginning. and no end of it. being perceptive it Why enjoy er Be- perceives (for awhile) not an agent ? Because pain. in the name of Purusha. it can produce nothing. pain. These are. and it was seer ? cannot be made. . it reaches everything. as Purohita (Director). no middle. middle. Why cause eternal ? Because and bad are not found in it. or end of it. that is. &c. It is the multiplicity only of the Purusha which ' is peculiar to the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. and trouble. Why Why for perceptive ? Because it perceives (that Why good. fanciful etymologies and we can hardly doubt that we have. a recollection of the Vedic Purusha. Why spot- Because neither good nor evil acts belong to the Purusha. Why not-producing? Because it has no seed. Like Brahman when conceived as Atman. of course. Why it is indifferent and without the qualities (Gimas). one of the many names of the supreme deity. indifferent. by the side of Prat/apati. Visvakarman.' This is not a very satisfactory answer.332 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Why Because it perceives ? the modifications of Prakrtti. Thus has the Purusha of the Sawkhya been described.' . without qualities ? Because the qualities of is. the knower of body or of objects ? Because it Why pleasure and knows the less ? qualities of objective bodies.

seems. 5. Colour. earth (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa + gandha). He. Akshara. Tanmatras. Evacuating in Payu. whatever stage of life he may be in. tasting in tongue. 4. 3. the sixteen Vikaras. 333 The synonyms of Purusha are. Pi-ana. Gandha. organs (Ragasa) (5 + i Manas (mind) Buddhindriyas. Sound. Srotra. ether (sabda). a topknot. He who knows these twenty-five substances. Sabda. Te</as. Pn'thivi. Vikaras. water (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa). Ghraxa. 1. containing a list of the twenty-five Tattvas. he is liberated. poet. male. 5. fire (sabda + sparsa + rupa). 2. Vayu. Rupa. Touch. 2. man. i. Gihva. spirit. 4. Odour. 2. . Avyakta 2. Sparsa. Here. Nara. Kshetragwa. or Buddhi (light 5 Tanmatras (Sattvika) (subtle elements). Kavi. viz. hearing in ear. Self. 1 . 3. 4. 2. Rasa.i. knower of objects or of the body. the eight Prakn'tis. 5. Akasa. name. but this doubtful. Thus have the twenty-five substances been described. 4. first Purusha I (subject). and intelligence as Samashii. YaAkaA ] . air (sabda + sparsa). indestructible. 10 Indriyas. 5 Karmendriyas. Atmari. r. Prakrit! (object). Brahman. Mahabhutas (Tamasa). A'akshus. Moving in feet. Pumgu^a^antugivaA. and whether he wear matted hair. smelling in nose. 3. i. and Manas). 1 As ya/i. Mahat | 3. Ap. Sa. the part of the Tattva-samasa is ended. Ahawzkara (subjectivation).PURUSHA. Generating in Upasth. Karmendriyas. not yet individualised). 5 1. and Purusha. Buddhindriyas. Savour. or be shaven. 3. a male living creature. Puman. Speaking in tongue. Grasping in hands. TvaA touch in skin. there is no doubt. This verse is it often quoted by Samkhya philosophers. anybody. I supposed it the relative pronoun could hardly be used as a might be meant for the indefinite pronoun is ya/ika/j. in the three divisions of Prakn'tis. 5. and the Purusha. seeing in eye.

see here once more that the three Gmias We must have had originally a much wider meaning than is here described. control and restraint (of the organs). greed. reflection. these are called bad conduct. fault-finding. or is he not ? If Purusha were an agent. freedom from hatred. rudeness. violence. whereas originally they must have had a much larger cosmic sense. worthlessness. even when the Suwkhya We speaks of moral qualities.334 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. . would render the original conception of the Samkhya-philosophy quite unmeaning. . The first is. these qualities belong to nature as seen by the Purusha. . which consists in kindness. he would do good actions only. and there would not be the three different kinds of action. indifferent. nihilism. de- votion to women. seems to me. Is the Purusha an agent. never to Purusha apart from Prakriti. The three kinds of action But passion. mobile. bad bright. anger. heavy. displaying of supernatural powers. sloth. contrary ingredients of Prakrit! in its differentiation of good. and which. discontent. (3) Madness. dim and dark light. must never forget that. impurity. of cosmical ideas which in the case of it We see here the same narrowing we had to point out before Buddhi and Ahamkara. drowsiness. intoxication. They are here taken as purely moral qualities. They are not they are on the qualities or mere attributes at all . shown by change of coun(2) tenance. called virtue (Dharma). which seemed to require fuller treatment. lassitude. Is Purusha an Agent? Now follow a number of special questions. these are called indifferent conduct. are (i) Good conduct.

XIII. as it were. but the Self (Atman).' Is Purusha one or many? Now comes the important question. deluded by the conceit of the I (Ahawikara). health. The Sa?nkhya answer is that the Purusha is clearly many. Nay. perceived in the world is clear that agency belongs to the Gunas. foolish and intoxicated by vain imagination and saying.' ' And He ' XIII. even while staying in the body. not to himself. 31:This imperishable supreme Self. Is that Purusha one or many? The answer to this question divides the Samkhya from the Vedanta-philosophy. confusion and purifying (of race). pain. a fool imagines that he the agent. trouble. 29 :sees (aright) who by all respects performed looks upon actions as in Prakn'ti alone. and follows that Purusha is not the agent. 2 7) 'Acts are effected by the qualities (Gunas) of PrakHti in every way. though in reality he is unable by himself to bend even a straw.IS PURUSHA ONE OR MANY? 335 Three Guwas.' And then it is said (in the Bhagavad-gita III. from being without beginning and devoid of qualities. this triad is Whenever it it Deceived by passion and darkness. and upon the Self as never an agent. because of the variety in the acts of pleasure.' Ibid. imagines that the I : is the agent. neither acts nor suffers. All this was made by me himself is ' and belongs to me. and taking a wrong view of these Gimas which belong to Prakriti. he becomes an agent. .

birth. That is true. read.S'vet. 15. i. that is pure. all would be unhappy. The first from . on account of the manifoldness indicated by form. is to be. i. I. Va#. Ar. cf. Vedanta Sayings. . that up by (sacrificial) he is beyond the l . society or loneliness. liberation. health. Vyasa and others. 1 These verses arc meant to represent the views of the Vedanta. That is Agni. and they are mostly taken from the Upanishads. 2. Thus Kapila. Ill. Sawih. 32. that is Brahman. where we should I. Hence purity of race. what has been and what is. that it is is water and Prar/apati ~. 3. but many. Ill. Hiranyagarbha. he is lord of that immortality which springs food. ' is all this. such as Harihara. all Pan&asikha and Pata/l^ali. Asuri. Purusha 1.336 birth INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that is immortal. 12. that is Surya. as the Vedantins hold. case of people affected by trouble. 2 p. immortality of the ordinary immortal gods 2. all would be happy if one were unhappy. birth and death. And why so ? Because (as the Vedanta says). describe Purusha as one. Mahanar. not one Purusha. and death also on account of the stages in life (Asrama) and the difference of caste ( Vama). confusion of race. If there were but one Purusha. and in the Eig-veda X. and other Sawikhya teachers describe Purusha as many. 90. 7 . Yat annenadhirohati. that is Vayu. that is /ifandramas. occurs also Taitt. there is fortune. then if one were happy. Up. abode. see Deussen. Geschichte. Up. and so on in the . 152. But teachers who follow the Vedanta. .

different in different people). whether moving or motionless. the One stands like a tree planted in the sky by him and by the Purusha. head and eyes everywhere. it is seen as one and as many. that the sages know as Brahman. like the moon in the water. it was spread out. the highest point. glory of the sun it is . the Higher than which there is nothing else. Bhag. the Self of . z . 12. the Lord. in the outcast. Up. all. Gita XIII. dwells beings. Shining through the qualities (Guna) of all the senses. cows. 9 . the great refuge of all 7. Wise 4 people see the same (Atman) in the Brahman. 2 3 Svet. 12. settled in everybody. and gnats. the source of all . For he alone. ] . in beasts. 17 . the master 6. hearing everywhere in this world. Up. Gita V. &c. and yet free from all the senses. 14. Ill. Cf. the great Self. it stands covering everything 4. . 3 8. As one and the same Mahanar. For there is but one Self of beings. in the dog and the elephant. he by 9. gadflies. and nothing greater. X. 2 of all. Ill. that in which everything is absorbed. 18. 337 it is it is indestructible. This Self of the world ? is one by whom was Self as made manifold Some speak is of the several. cf. because of the existence of knowledge. (because knowledge 11. Bhag. all this is filled 5. in worms and insects. . in all whom all this 10. 20. Brahmabindu Up.VEDANTA SAYINGS. 4 string passes 1 vet. He is all substances everywhere. having mouth. Having hands and feet everywhere. 13. Up. nothing smaller.

seem to regard it as a kind of syn- cretism. . Early Relation between Vedanta and Samkhya. Gunas. which remind us at once of the Vedanta-philosophy but even these terms are used far more freely in the Brahmawas and Upanishads than in the Darsanas. and others. Brahman. and the Purusha being many. and pearls. corals. deer. gropings in the dark but the idea that if the one was right the other must be wrong. . Maya. Though there is in the Upanishads which w e possess a of philosophic thought r decided preponderance of a Vedantic interpretation of the world. There are certain technical terms. and We see in these extracts a mixture of . but may also represent to us a period when these two views of the world were not yet finally differentiated. and were not felt to be altogether incompatible. in elephants.338 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which are looked upon as the peculiar Samkhya. such as Atman. &c.. The Most relation between Samkhya and Vedanta is during the Upanishad-period scholars it by no means clear. are given in the same breath. property of the . such as Purusha. All these views were at first no more than guesses at truth. Avidya. thus is one and the same Self to be known as dwelling everywhere in cows. Buddhi. &c.. through gold. jewels. Vedanta and Samkhya terms and ideas and in verse 10 the two views of Brahman being one. to that of systematised arid controversial philosophy. porcelain.' &c. and silver. the Samkhya philosophers are not altogether wrong when they maintain that their view also can be supported by Yedic authority. belongs decidedly to a later period. men.

the Undeveloped. and obtains immortality. is not in strict accordance with the systematic but still less does it represent to us Samkhya. Mahan Atma. 7. Sattvam Uttamam. 6. 3. is development. Purusha. Manas. Beyond the Purusha is there ' the goal. 4. Buddhi. showing to us how little of technical accuracy there was as yet Vedantic ideas. 2. the highest point. as given same Upanishad. 339 nor are they always used in the same sense or in the same order by earlier and later authorities. VI. as here described. higher than that being is the great Self (Mahan Atma). VI. beyond the objects is the mind (Manas). 8. vary slightly. 8. Ill. beyond this great (Self) is the highest. Z 2 MaMn Atma. the Great Self (Mahan Atma) there is beyond the intellect. beyond the undeveloped there is the Purusha. Beyond the Great the Undeveloped (Avyakta).' In the same Upanishad. that is : the highest being (Sattvam Uttamam). Indriyas. beyond the mind is intellect (Buddhi). Avyakta. Avyakta. successive The Even the two accounts. 1. Beyond the Undeveloped all-pervading and that knows him is liberated. Thus we read in the Kanaka Up.RELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAMKHYA. we read Beyond the senses is the mind. Manas. III. 5. We get 7. .' the Purusha. beyond the mind is nothing. 10. Purusha. 10. 7. 1 1 : 'Beyond the senses are the objects (Artha). Arthas. ii. the Every creature imperceptible. in the during the Upanishad-period. Indriyas.

as Indriyarthas. 5. where we read name of Purusha. as Professor Wilson l . Sawkhya-pravafcana- p.. I. but even then it would only occupy the place of (rivatma. attested by conceiving (Manas). intangible. the Ekadasakam is Sattvi- kam. and is very small. 43. and how could this be said to emanate from the Avyakta ? Another passage which reminds us of Sa?khya rather than of Vedanta-philosophy occurs in the He who has the Maitray. present a in every single man. lent of the Phenician certainly not an equivaMot. called 1 See Samkhya-Sutras cf. generally the first emanation of PrakHti in its undeveloped (Avyakta) state. i8H. because. and the Manas bhashya. which is entirely intelligent. the Highest Being ? The word may be meant for Buddhi. 71 . the five Kar. and Thibaut's remarks . the idea of parts (Awsa). that is the live Buddhindriyas. the individualised Self. The Anubhuti-praka. As to 3. But why should Buddhi. II. mendriyas. dwells of his own will here in part ' : . the Great. And this part. Up. see Vedanta-Sutras II. 2 see Garbe. 1 8. for Buddhi is often called Mahat. 61. p. knowing the body.s'a roads Buddhipurvam. they are implied by the Indriyas or senses.ira) is Pra/yapati. in his Introduction. willing (Buddhi). and belief in subject and object (Ahawk. Mahfm Atm& looks conjectured many years ago like a Vedantic term. man who is fast asleep awakes of his own will. but difficult why It it is should be called Great is to say. II.340 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2 3 as invisible. be replaced by Sattvam The omission Uttamam. of the Arthas as objects would not signify. Deussen translates 3 Abuddhipurvam. xcvii.

2. so that his and that overis upward or downward. nor does the commentator help us much. he sees not the creator. and he who dwells in that body is called Bhutatman (the True. (Self) remains untainted. enters on a good or evil birth. such as Samkalpa. however. touch. Then this And the explanation. in the sense of Aha?nkara. $ 138). his immortal Atman elementary Atman). unless he is right in recognising here the germs of the later Vedantic ideas of a Pra^/apati. 341 him. powered about. called the elemental Self (Bhutatma) who. overcome by the bright and dark fruits course of action. by the pairs is (the opposites) he roams The five Tanmatras (of sound. This passage does not contain much of Samkhya By and he the words Purusha and possibly Buddhipiirvam seem to allude to Kapila's ideas Other words rather than to those of Badarayana. Carried along by the Gimas. the holy Lord. is obscure. point to the same source. body. the intelligent. he becomes bewildered. the aggregate of all these is called /Sarira.EELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAA/KHYA. One more passage of the Maitray. darkened. lotus-leaf.Upanishad. abiding within him. and the five Mahabhutas (gross elements) also are called Bhuta. Then. yet may here doctrines. Tau/asa and Pragma. and because thus bewildered. Visva. The whole passage. . also. thus overpowered. like a drop of water on a but he. III. and smell) are called Bhuta (elements). as reminding us of S&mkhya There we read There is indeed that ' : other different one. e. be mentioned. the Bhutatman. is in the power of the Gunas of Prakn'ti. Adhyavasaya and Abhimana. light.' intelligent. called Visva or Vaisvanara (Vedanta-sara. taste. i. is the body made is the driver thereof. thought.

it is upon Samkhyawe must remember that Atman. pound to be looked as belonging to the The Maitray. But if this Bhutatman is said to spring from Prak? viti. and Mahabhutas. this is mine. Nor could any be said to be purely objective. is by no means so clear as has sometimes been imagined. however. though likewise called Atman. In fact. unstable. Bhutas. because their little Purusha does not spring from Prak?v'ti. it could not possibly stand for the Purusha of the Sawkhyas.' Here we see again a mixture of Samkhya and Vedanta ideas. which is a compound of Tanmatras. and that he dwells in the body. Upanishad. or downward pairs. $arira. upward in his course. quoted sometimes as a synonym of Purusha. as Atman as Prakriti springs from him. binds himself by himself. the Vedanta such terms as Atman and possibly Bhutatman. and seems to have been borrowed from it when it occurs in some of the later Upanishads. strictly speaking. and. A comsuch as Bhuta-Purusha would be impossible.342 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. crippled. It is a term peculiar to the Maitray. like many other things in the Maitray. It would therefore correspond to the Vedaritic (rivatman. If. This Bhutatman. overcome by the he roams about. he enters on a good or evil birth. overcome afterwards by the fruits of what he has done. cannot be supposed to stand here for Purusha. Ill. believing "I am he. vacillating." &c. the Samkhya claiming such terms as Prakriti and Gums. though system. this Bhutatman fits neither into . Upanishad. as a bird is bound by a net. Up. full of devices. and. fickle. he enters into Abhimana (conceit of subject and He object). i itself says that the Atman of Bhutatman is another.

which is Vedanta. but the name of Vedanta also is not absent. the three Gunas. 343 the Vedanta. A similar mixture of philosophical terms meets us in the $vetasvatara Upanishad. But though Upanishad Samkhya ideas would seem to Vedanta ideas are not excluded. in i. 10 Maya is directly identified with Purusha occurs in III. . In verse is I. we have Pradhana. at least the later Vedanta. Samkhyayoga. The very prevail. for instance. In this all this we may possibly get a glimpse of a state of Indian philosophy which was. while in IV. and would rather seem to belong to a philosophy in which these two views of the world were not yet finally separated. neither pure Samkhya nor pure Vedanta. 12. all we meet about 1 of with some more remarks Sattva. as yet. or better still as one word. and Maya. IV. Sawkhya should be here taken as the title of the two Samkhya and Yoga. It cannot well mean Priifung. VI. Traiguwya. difficult and rather obscure expression the Maitray. If now we first return to the Tattva-samasa. an expression which would be impossible in the Vedanta- Another in philosophy. 22. IV. Upanishad is Niratman (selbstlos]. which Samkhya. nor into the Samkhya-philosophy. unless we look on these Upanishads as of a far more modern date. where it Praknti. explained as systems. and is certainly perplexing even in the Samkhya.TRAIGU^YA. 13). evidently stands for Brahman. 10. and on their philosophy as the result of a later syncretism. name of Samkhya 1 and Yoga occurs (VI.

excitement. disgust. nor our qualities without subOur commentary continues : He now the answer sion. contentment. such as covering. heaviness. as defined in the Samkhya. virtue. passion. of endless variety. Darkness . movement. attainment of what is it Passion evil. lightness.' he says. goodness against taking the Gunas of the Smkhya in the sense of qualities. separation. ' are not mere accidents of nature. is Goodness (Sattva) short consists of happiness. as Colebrooke had already warned us ignorance. . drowsiness. explained as dust. is of endless variety. These three qualities. purity. asks. misery. patience.' ' ' ' might be a better rendering. and Tamas. In short it consists of trouble or madness. there being neither thought in English corresponding to Gu?ia. &c. ourselves have inour ideas of substance and quality from Greek and medieval philosophers. such as grief. joy. darkness. qualities. attainment of what In is wished for. distress. ignorance. PasThe triad of Gu?^as means the three Guwas. is. the triad consists of Goodness. but even with us We a definition of inherent qualities is by no means easy. complacency. considering that our substances never exist without stances. but are of its essence. though for a time retainConstituent parts ing their different colours. of endless variety. but is for the present it nor word herited best to retain Guna..344 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Ra^as. mist. intoxication. such as calmness. &c. In short is it consists of pain. What is the triad of Gu?ias ? and and Darkness. itc. sloth. and enter into its composition like different rivers forming one stream.

Saw/iara cause of movement and and Pratisawytara. V. or as Hegel's thesis. for instance. Evolution is as follows : From the Avyakta (undeveloped Praknti) before explained. antithesis and synthesis. These Gimas have been again and again explained as Dravyam. These Gunas act a very prominent part in Indian philosophy. and darkness all that is not bright. The four sides of a cube. San&ara is evolution. manifested in in morals nature by darkness. in fact the beginning of creation. we should remember that we also call sugar sweet. it calls forth the sensation of sweet- The Hindus look upon the state of equilibrium of the three Gmias as perfect.. We can best explain them by the general idea of two opposites and the middle term between them. . matter quality and what is qualified . these being .SAjYA'ARA AND PEATISA^A'ARA. Then comes the question. &c. bad. is far has the triad Gunas been be known that goodness is all that bright. What is San&ara and what is Pratisa?I&ara ? The answer is. of the 345 ex- Thus plained. passion all that excites. This is what is named Trai- Let it gunya. and indifferent. If the Samkhyas look on cer- happy instead of happifying. being considered in the Samkhya as inseparable. and mist by good. light. see in the preponderance of any one of first and they them the activity in Prakriti or nature. Pratisafl&ara dissolution or re-involution. would be called its Gmias as much as the blue of the sky. and have quite entered into the sphere of popular thought. with many applications and modifications. VI. tain objects as meaning that ness in us.

Vaikarika. elements. Samkhya.346 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Adhibhtlta. Bhutadi. of Prak?'tti. as under the influence of llamas producing luminous. From the Tanmatras. Aha??ikara into Buddhi (intellect). Tanmatras. are produced the material This is the development or Sa/U'ara. What is Adhibhuta ceived is objective. arises From this Buddhi. Buddhi into Avyakta (the undeveloped). which under the influence of Tamas produces the gross material elements. Adhyatma. (essences) . spring the gods and the senses from the first of elements. from the luminous. what is to be received and perceived by p. Adhidaivata (pertaining to deity) ? To this it is answered. and Adhyatma (subjective). Pratisa?7/:ara or dissolution is as follows : The material elements are dissolved into the essences. when superintended by the high and omnipresent Purusha intellect. Buddhi (intellect) arises. . both. . no beginning. From the modified or Vaikarika Aha??ikara. essences. Thus has dissolution been explained. all being different forms The Undeveloped is nowhere dissolved. the essences and senses into Aha?kara. Ahamkara is subjective. the Buddhindriyas and Bhutadi (first of elements). modified. because it was never evolved out of anyKnow both Prakrit! and Purusha as having thing. that is.Philosophic. Brahma is deity. modified of Sattva Tau/asa. ' Ahawkara . Intellect is subjective. 236. it is Now asked. what is to be perVII-IX. (Spirit). 1 Gurbe. and or this of eight kinds. the Tanmatras . meant by (objective). jectivity). and Adhidaivata. the substance of (conceit Aha??ikara is of I. sub- of three kinds. Tair/asa.

The organ of is excretion subjective. Whoever has forms of the objective. AND ADHIDAIVATA. mind. what deity. and the deity (Adhidaivatam) is freed from evil and released from all his sins he experiences the qualities . is the deity. Indra is the deity. without being myself able to connect any definite ideas with them. the sun. wind. is is the deity. the properly what is qualities (Gu?^asvarupa^i). is the The skin is subjective. I did not like to leave them out altogether. Thus in Pragdpati. Manas. what is to be enjoyed is objective. Varuna is the is ! The nose what is is subjective. objective. what deity. what is to be excreted The organ of generaobjective. the case of each of the thirteen instruments is there what is subjective. Here ends (Gu?ias). is what is to be smelled objective. is the deity. is the deity. tion is subjective. to be tasted is objective. is is moon. is Vishnu is the deity. The voice is subto be uttered is objective. is to be conceived objective.ADHYATMA. I I ought to say that in this and the subsequent paragraphs had often to be satisfied with giving the words such as they stand. what has to be gone over is objective. Aditya. is what is to be touched The eye is the deity. what is to be grasped is objective. but is not united to them. it 347 is objective. The ear is subjective. The feet are subjective. subjective. The two hands are subjective. Vayu. the deity. Earth jective. but 2 while they may be safely passed over by philosophical readers. 1 Evidently taken already as god of the waters. . The tongue is subjective. the discussion of the Tattvas (substances) 2 . Rudra what is is the deity. and the deity. ADHIBHUTA. Mitra is the deity. Akasa. -/Tandra. learnt the substances. fire. is subjective. ether. Agni. to be heard is objective. lord of creatures. what is to be seen is objective.

elicit from Sanskrit scholars some better elucidation than I am ablo to #ivo. O resolves or The character of Dhr/ti or energy is when a man and carries out his resolution. Kartavyata.348 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. They are Vyavasaya. an act of the intellect. the will of doing such acts as hearing. Abhimana. Karmayonis (5). is said to consist in study of the Veda they may. Lkkhh. &c. . is The apprehension that this has to be done by me ascertainment an act of the intellect. sions) been explained. I hope. Kartavyata. ? XL What is are the five Karmayonis The answer that they are Dhr/ti. it is Ahamkara.. Now what ? hensions) ascertainment. desire. determination to act or will. bliss. faith or faithfulness. Avividisha.. I/t&Aa. for their objects. Vividisha. faith faithfulness. is an act of the intellect pertaining to the BudKriya. At present most of them seem to me to consist of useless distinctions and hair-splitting definitions of words. the act of the intellect. Abhibuddhis (5). X. an idea of the mind. Thus have five Abhibuddhis (apprehendhindriyas. an act conceit. pertaining to the Karmendriyas. Kriya. is wish. performed by the senses that have sound. Abhimana. such as speaking. conceit. &c. /Sraddha. desire. action. &c. directed towards the perception of the nature of Self and not-Self. energy. . is of the intellect.. 1 The text is somewhat doubtful. desire of knowledge. is action '. Sukha. carelessness. The answer are the five Abhibuddhis (appreis. $raddha.

Satkaryavada. But Sukha or bliss arises when a man. with real and this is products. dishti is a state belonging to Prakriti which helps to destroy cause and effect by showing that they are one and the same. It a state belonging to Prakriti cause and effect. and not-percipient. being always engaged in penitential acts. I have taken Grneyft. 349 religious studentship. giving and receiving- proper gifts. subtle. referring to each of the subjects with which Vividisha. penance. Satkaryam refers to the cerned. . but this is a mere guess. (Prakr/ti) being eternal. Vividisha or desire of knowledge is the source of knowledge of thoughtful people. the desire of knowledge. in order sacrifices to obtain blessedness. Vividisha. is conThe construction is very imperfect. What has to be known is the oneness (belonging to Prakn'ti). Some the text for portions of these verses are obscure. devotes himself to knowledge. I separate Sukshmam and take it in the sense of Sukshmatvam.. Thus have the five destroying is Karmayonis been explained (?). &c. and penance. . and Ballantyne has very properly left it It may mean that Vivialtogether untranslated. is and probably corrupt. 6rneyam. the separateness (ofPurushaandPraknti).. and not to be disturbed . but may be excused in what is after all no more than an index. The third line is quite unintelligible to me. AvividisM or carelessness consists in the heart's being absorbed in the sweetness of sensual pleasures. and making Homa-oblations.KARMAYONIS. sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be performed..

Tair/asa. but their special functions organism are often stated differently by different authors. Karmatmans XIII. mana.e. is action of the senses (Indriyas) and of other organs of the body also. of these winds has never been they are rendered by vital spirits. Sanuand Niranumana. They form a kind of physical or AntaAkara^a. the (Ego as ? They are Vaikarika. wind called Udana is superintended by the throat. The Vaikarika. is the doer of good works. possible. They may have been intended to account for the vital processes which make the discovered. The wind nose. Samana. and Apana is superintended Apana because it leads away and moves downward. '. The Tauyasa. because the Bhutas. nothing gained except explaining obscurum per obscurius. Bhutadi is used in the sense of Manas. Bhutadi. but their original intention escapes us altogether. What are the five Karmatmans. and is called Samana The because it leads equally and moves equally. modifying. Apana. though springing from the Tanmatras. called Prana called is and out. r Vyana is the all-pervader. The wind called Samana is superintended by the heart. the winds in the bodies of those who have bodies. (5). Vayus XII. and Vyana. is Praa superintended by mouth and because it leads out or called moves by the navel. What are the Vayus (winds) ? They are Prana. 1 . are due to it. luminous. i. The Bhutadi first of is the doer of bad works. It is called Udana because it goes upward and is The wind called moves out.350 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Udana. active) (5). Thus have the five w inds been meaning If The real explained.

illusion. utter gloom. five Karmatmans been explained. &c. such as minuteness. Moha. darkness. &c. &c. with inference (Niranumana) it is the doer of what Thus have the is not good and not reasonable. illusion.. whether heard or seen. great illusion is tenfold. such as minuteness and the rest. that Self is identical with things which are not Self. Avyakta. is the doer of hidden works. is the misconception eighteenfold. and against the tenfold w^orld of sense causing is threefold pain. Here darkness and illusion are again each eightfold. and the tenfold world of sense has been conquered. Mahamoha. is the fivefold Avidya (Nescience) ? It Tamas. What Tamisra. great is XIV. Weakness (28). colour. Buddhi. Moha. illusion. the Aha?ttkara is the doer if not associated of what is good and reasonable . First. XV. with inference (Sanumana). is the misconception arising from the obtaimnent of supernatural powers. gloom and utter gloom are Tamas. directed against the eightfold superhuman powers. Mahamoha. Ahamkara. WEAKNESS. with regard . Gloom unrestrained hatred. Nescience (5).. darkness. is when one supposes oneself to be liberated in the ten states with regard to the objects of sound.ASAKTT. r Asakti. namely with PrakHti. Andhatamisra. gloom. great illusion. Thus has ignorance w ith sixty-two subdivisions been explained. 351 If associated elements. Avidya. Utter gloom is that distress which arises at the time of death after the eightfold human power has been acquired. What The is called the twenty-eightfold weakness ( faults of the eleven organs of sense and the seventeen faults of the intellect. and the five Tanmatras.

the contentments. occupation for wealth. XVII. the non-recognition of the Ego (Ahamkara) Avrish^i. when after hearing that a man who knows the various principles . constipation in the organ of excretion. the is opposite understood. dumbness in the voice. dullness in the tongue. Tanmatras. occupation in acquiring the objects of the senses . without seeing the evil of injury (to living beings). perfection. contentments. Atushfa and Tushft. joyment Anuttamambhasika. there deafness in the ear. blindness in the eye. been explained. contentment. diversity is mistaken for phenomenal unity Sutara. madness in the mind these are defects of the eleven organs. XVI. . crippledness in the hands. addiction to en. as. loss of smell in the nose. leprosy in the skin. impotence the organ of generation. which are also called Asiddhis. engaging in enjoyment . that there First then the opposites of the Tushfis or They are Ananta. perfections. the denial that the . is to the organs of sense. defects of the intellect are the opposites of the Tushds. Asupara. . (Prakrit!) in recognising the Atman in the Mahat consisting (Buddhi. lameness in the feet. the conviction .352 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and of the Siddhis. Next follow the opposites of Siddhi. intellect) Avidya. Asiddhis and Siddhis. is no Pradhana Tamasalina. . after hearing words only. without seeing that it is liable to be lost AsumarUika. when . occupation in their preservation Asunetra. for instance. Thus have the nine opposites of Tushd. when. are the causes of the elements Asutara. The seventeen in . essences. non-perfections: Atara.

Pramodarnana. but . Vr/shfi. netra. though overcome by mental suffering. that such a man is not liberated Ataratara. but as their opposites have already been examined follow the Tushris Xext we may dispense with their enumeration here. Sattviki. (tattvas) is 353 liberated. to hearing ignorance. Prainoda. The names Ambhas. Thus have the eight Asiddhis. posite. Tarayanti. Satpramudita. is Asatpramuditam. taining knowledge. Kainyaka. are : Ogha. being careless as to transmigration. Some of these technical terms vary in different texts. either because of bad instruction or disregard on the part of the teacher. water. when a man. is not anxious to know. this is Apramoda. If a man.TUSHTIS AND SIDDHIS. a man understands the op. is of the Siddhis or perfections. knowledge is no pleasure to him. Thus the next pair also of Apramudita (mutually not delighted) and Apramodamana so that (mutually not delighting) should be considered. SuniariAika. Tushfis or contentments Sutara. l I am afraid they are of very small importance that even what I have given of these long lists. Ignorance of a man of undecided mind even with regard to what has been taught him by a friend is But failure of an unfortunate man in obArasya. does not succeed in knowing the twenty-five principles. A a . Sutara. the opposite plained. and Siddhis themselves. Tushfts and Siddhis. Suof the eight Tara. Uttama The names Supara. Pramudita. owing either to his obtuseness or to his intellect being impaired by false doctrines. though devoted and studying. been ex- and the twenty-eightfold A^akti (weakness) finished. Siddhis are : 1 of the nine Salila.

though as briefly '. I confess that in several cases many of these subdivisions seemed to me entirely meaningless. We have still to examine. object or p. of Nescience with its sixty-two subdiviI though certainly meaningless to my mind. the most important subjects established by the Sa<khya They PrakHti or Pradhana. but far as I know.354 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. on the contrary. they do not. are not mentioned either in the Karikas or in the Sutras. and not very closely connected with the great problems of philosophy. surprising. that is. If these technical terms were modern would occur more frequently modern works on the Sawkhya-philosophy. an See Samkhya-tattva-kaumudl. and for a right appreciation of the methods of Indian philosophy. and this. inventions. 1 are with regard to its reality its having an (Astitva).. for instance. as possible. Avadharita. SuA:i. &c. seems to me. . in as XVIII. the Mulikarthas or eight cardinal facts. 59. may possibly serve to show how long and how minutely these philosophical questions must have been discussed in order to leave such spoils behind. to speak in favour of an early and independent origin of the Tattva-samasa and its commentary. which has been taken for a sign of their more recent date. of the sources of activity. its oneness (Ekatva). may have proved very tedious. Pada. Some of them. This large number of technical terms is certainly sions. as.. which are so characteristic of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. but thought that they were of some importance historically. &c. The long lists of the instruments and the acts of intellect. they Mftlikarthas.

or Seventy-treatise.and Sthula-sarira. keeping it for the subject The only. all is Astitva with Purusha as well as with PrakHti. their temporary union and separation. and thus The Chinese name presuparriving at 60 topics. the 33 (Avidya 5 + Asakti 28) and 10. probably with reference to the original number of verses in the Karika. but it is meant as the reality of PrakHti only. Mulikarthas. of little consequence. It should be added that the commentator in this place accounts once more for the name of Shashdtantra. which the with establishing as against the Vedantins who deny it with regard to Samkhya that is chiefly concerned objective. the Sixty-doctrine. reality. the poses a Saptati-sastra. is The matter Atman khya or has of course never been doubted by SamVedanta philosophers. unless Astitva is taken in the sense of phenomenal or perceptible The highest reality of the Purusha or the reality. durability. both Prakriti and Purusha. Aa 2 . but this time by adding 17 Tushes and Siddhis. 355 and some one else (Pararthya). to Purusha his being different from Prakn'ti (Anyatva).SHASim-TANTRA. and his being intended for They are with regard its They are with regard to being many (Bahutva). Shashft-tantra. connect commentator. and Prof. the gross and the subtle bodies. while Sthiti. Astitva. is said to refer to the Sukshma. intention (Arthavattva). might seem to belong to both PrakHti and Purusha. whether he is called Purusha or Atman. his not being an agent (Akartritva). however. Garbe also. not 8. but that is more than mere Astitva.

lit. . only. such as Pi. consisting of good and evil spirits and gods. forming again 1 five classes. Brahma. shaped from the Tanmatras \ Bhtita-sarga. Tliis passage is very doubtful. Gandharvas. but as yet without a sphere in which their measuring or perceiving power could find scope. the creation of benevolence. Garur/a down to gnats . But even here the Tattva-samasa finished. men. created for them the so-called benevolent creation. follows the Bhuta-sarga in fourteen The divine creation has eight divisions. XX. which is explained as the production of external objects from the five Tanmatras or subtle essences for the sake of the Purusha. and immovable things consists of one. Yakshas. XIX. Pragrapati. After this divisions. e. Indra. Domestic animals are from cows down birds from to mice . birds. The animated or plants. the threefold creation. after seeing these (the organs of sense ?) produced. so that the creation would be represented as made for man. consisting of and animals. for it goes is not yet on to explain the Anugrahasarga. and take measuring in the sense of perceiving.356 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. domestic animals.9aas. Anugraha-sarga. creation conreptiles. This gods. the animals. living is beings. i. from immovable Sesha (world-serpent) down to worms things from the Pari^ata-tree (in paradise) down to grass. Rakshas. of man The human creation from Brahmans down to K&ndiil&s. wild animals from lions down to jackals reptiles . . wild animals. unless we connect Man a with Tanmatra. sists of and Brahma.

these as the the sixteen Vikaras. students. but they are thrown to the jackals. . This last bondage seems through priestly gifts.' to me very important. 357 XXI. they are devoted to objects of sense. Bandha. if they are ignorant and deluded by passions. Bondage. Dakshiwa-bondage. mendicants or anchorets. it is replied. is spoken of by the name of Prakriti- and thirdly bondage Vikara-bondage. That this See. GIFTS TO PRIESTS.DAKSHItfA-BONDAGE. 329) and as long as a man considers . as before (pp. and in Dakshma (gifts to often described priests). he is absorbed in PrakHti and bound by Prakn'ti. which are Vikaras. In the eight Pra- kritis. Vikaras applies world. and it is strange that it should never have been pointed out as marking the unecclesiastical and unorthodox character of the What would have become Samkhya-philosophy of the Brahmans without their Dakshmas or fees. one to be fee'd ? In the Aitareya-Brahmana already we said to have been 1 readofYatis who condemned sacrifices. There are eight Prakritis. whose minds are overcome by passions and delusions. the very name of a Brahman being Dakshimya. however. Karika 44. bondage applies to those. and who from misconception bestow sacrificial gifts on priests. Gifts to Priests. 321. whether householders. if their organs of sense are not in subjection. l . if if The bondage of the sixteen both to ascetics and to men of the they are subdued by the senses. A verse is quoted here in support priestly : The * Bondage bondage. If it (Bandha) consists be asked what the threefold bondage in.

This Moksha. as they have been fully examined before. What is most creditable is that each system should have recogeach nised more or the liminary to every philosophy. feeing of a priest should have been considered one of the three bondages shows at all events that the followers of Kapila were above superstition. Moksha. The Vedanta. XXIII. according as it arises from increase of knowledge. and from the destruction of merit and demerit there arises final beatitude consisting in complete detachment from the world. From increase of know- ledge and quieting of the passions of the senses there arises the destruction of all that is commonly considered as merit and demerit . from the quieting philosophy. Still each system of philosophy takes its is own view less of them. Pramawas. as a preThis distinguishes Indian philosophy very favourably from other philoAll systems of philosophy in India admit sophies.35^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the highest aim of Kapila's again of three kinds. however. is of the passions of the senses. Pratyaksha or perception of the senses as the first of Prama/^as. looks upon the Veda as the only source of true knowledge. importance of this question. Moksha of XXII. and . The three Pramanas which follow next require little explanation here. and looked upon sacrifice and priestcraft as hindrances rather than as helps to true freedom and the spirit. and in concentration of the Purusha in himself. or lastly from the destruction of the whole. and the character of determined by the view taken of the real nature of knowledge.

and the Bhutas. is illustrated by the usual examples. and who can therefore be These three Prama?ias. or nymphs of Svarga. is sometimes called Drish^am. &c. but the meaning if it is the same. 14. times. inference of water from the appearance of cranes. XXIV. free from hatred Apta is arid passion. actually applies to ordinary three or it 359 the six name of Pratyaksha. are so called because in the same way as in common life grains are measured by measures such as a Prastha. the For all these Apsaras. the king of the gods. weighed by a balance. the Tattvas also. the principles. is meant . never to the true world of Brahman. for instance. What- ever cannot be proved by either sense or inference has to be accepted as Apta-va&ana. inference of fire from the rising of smoke. the existence of Iridra. inference. what is seen and instead of Veda we meet with >Sabda. and sandal wood. all virtues. and endowed with relied upon. for Sensuous what is perceived. are measured or proved by the Prama?ias.DUJ7KHA.. perception. such as. The last paragraph in the Tattva-samasa points back to the first. Munis such as Vasish^a must be accepted as authorities. mana. the Northern Kurus. &c. things. i. The Pramanas of the Mimamsa would apply to the world of Avidya or nescience See only. and AnuApta-va&ana (Samkhya). We saw in the beginning how . Meru. The names vary someVedanta-Sutras II. the Bhavas (their modifications). inference of rain from the rising of clouds. elemental substances. man who is explained as a name for a assiduous in his work. DuAkha. word. learned. the golden mountain. as. right affirmation. or measures.

bile. Adhibhautika is pain that arises from other living is it is that beings. three- a Brahman was introduced who.360 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. separation from what is liked. thunderbolts. &c. from a study of the Tattva-samasa. or final beatitude. as pain arising from cold. envy. such as is due to desire.. But if I am right. is not born again. as a desire for water arises in a thirsty man. Adhidaivika caused by divine agents. In giving an account of the Samkhya. Freedom from pain. I was cpiite aware that the Karikas or the Sutras might have supplied us with a clearer and better -arranged account of that philosophy. &c. The True Meaning of the Sawkhya. wild beasts. and thus is finished the commentary on the Sutras of the Tattva-samasa. heat. without mixing it up with the Karikas or Sutras. or phlegm. union with what is disliked.. took refuge with the great Jfo'shi Kapila. &c. wind. is cattle. that the Tattva-samasa is older than either. anger. folly. Adhibhautika. If we ask what was meant by that threefold pain. the answer Adhyatmika. whether produced by wind. is to be gained. it seemed to me more important that we should know what . If a Brahman is affected by this threefold pain. overcome by fold pain. the doctrine of the great sage Kapila. Adhyatmika is pain arising from the body. and Adhidaivika. as we are told. and from the mind (Manas). such as is thieves. Whoever knows the philosophy which is contained This is in the Tattva-samasa. a desire to know (the reason) arises in him. &c. rain. I have followed entirely the Tattva-samasa. greed. all under the direction of the Vedic pain that Devas.

not only as actual suffering. we can easily see how this dry system was developed in later times. should have opened man's eyes to the fact that there was something wrong in the or limited in his nature. But though the Karikas and Sutras give us a more systematic account of the Sawkhya. whether intellectual or moral. and it is world in which he found himself. It must be confessed. or what kind of comfort.NATURE OF PAIN. something like a really human sentiment. such as Kapila. All we can learn is that a man crushed by the burden of what is called the threefold misery. that neither in the Sutras. which can promise no more than a temporary happiness on earth or in Heaven. and . an insight into the mind and heart of the founder of that philosophical system. all that is essential can be found in the Samasa. do we find what we most value in every philosophy. We can well understand why pain. nor in the Tattva-samasa. should seek advice from a philosopher. but as an appaacross Here we come rent anomaly or imperfection in the universe. and seeing no hope of relief either by means of good actions or of sacrifices. no doubt. it could have afforded to any human being. if only we try to arrange the dry facts for ourselves. the 361 Samkhya really was in its original form. By comparing the Tattva-samasa with the Karikas and Sutras. Nature of Pain. If we were asked why such a system should ever have been imagined and elaborated. believing that he could procure for him entire freedom from all his troubles. the Karikas. we should indeed have little to answer.

even in their imperfect conception. if not in this. could ever be without its effect. who shrink from charging any divine power with injustice or cruelty towards men. and an excellent principle it was. How then could : they be the authors of suffering. and it certainly did so in India. This was the fundamental principle of their ethics. must have existed already before this question of the origin of suffering could well have been mooted but religion seems rather to have increased the difficulty of the questioner than solved it. nay was first brought to life.362 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. particularly of that suffering. such as being born blind. Jt was but another version of what we mean by eternal punishment. bodily or mental. without which the world would it fall to pieces . or deaf. was that all that seemed wrong in the world must have been the effect of causes. The gods or god. or dumb. great. the origin of evil.' This seems 1 human by the ancient Indian philosophers. quite intelligible that this consciousness of his limitation should have acted as the first impulse to an inquiry for the cause of it. of deeds done. in a wider sense. This would naturally lead on either to a religious or to a philosophical A religion solution. then in a former No deed (Karman) good or bad. or mad. nay even of Prar/apati. and the answer which to felt have been keenly gave as to the origin of suffering or. its reward or punishment. however low an opinion they may otherwise have formed of Indra and Agni. for it has rightly been observed that . Visvakarman or Brahma. small or life. were generally supposed to be good and just. Here then it was that philosophy was called in. for which the individual was clearly not responsible.

and annihilated. because through an in- . whether good or evil. though the seeds themselves were the deeds performed by men. from all the bondage of the He must world. would go on for ever. whether. from all limitation. they went so far as to admit at least the superintending care of a Divine Being. eternal punishment for eternal love. however. and could not have been otherwise. man's former of his fellow creatures . cannot hang in the air. and with it all bodily sufferings might seem to end. though allowing deeds to have their effects. acts can be shaken means only. because man himself had made it what it was. or what was called Samsara. man must learn what he really is. just as the giver of rain enables seeds to grow.NATURE OF PAIN. off In order to achieve this deliverance from all suffering. learn that he is not the body. as independent actors. is 363 in reality but another name This idea of eternal love. and therefore liable to take all their consequences upon themselves. And here the bold answer was. In some cases. for the body decays and dies. Yes. a creator and ruler of the world but even this idea Indian philosophers would : not have taken for granted. whether as an individual or as a member of a class. it presupposes an eternal lover. there arose question which could not well be suppressed. namely. but by one by means of knowledge or philosophy. But this is again denied. But though this ought to have sufficed to convince men that the world was exactly as it ought to be. the Samsara can be stopped. a personal God. in fact. Whether it was beyond the power of man ever to put an end to the unbroken and irresistible sequence of the effects of the deeds of himself and a new the cycle of life and death.

the latter is the view of the Samkhya-philosophy. and absolute in itself. independent.364 visible INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but they differ The view which the Vedanta took of man has sometimes been mistaken for human apotheosis. Both may have had the same roots. clom. and will vanish again like everything else. and whose eminence they could have reached. and behind the Ego. the Self. as the eternal Subject. as we saw. in fact. blissful in its independence and in the complete aloofness from everything else. The former was. sophers there were no theoi left But people forget that for these philo- whose company man could have joined. or as Purusha. in their later growth. Ego formed by surroundings or cumstances. or the individual person. undetermined by any qualities. just as learn therefore that for the cir- he not even what also has been meant by the Ego. Brahman. and what they wanted was reconciliation between the Divine within and the Divine without. Then what remains ? There remains behind the body. perfect. agency (Adnshtfa or Apurva) a new Ego would its spring up. not even for the Vergottung of Eckhart it was meant for complete freedom. liable to suffer for it was is in this life. or as something beyond all names that had ever been given to the Divine. Their Moksha or Nirvana was not meant for Vergotterung. what is called the Purusha or the Atman. . whether as recovery of the Divine as Brahman. or as Atman. freedom from all conditions and limitations. the view of the Vedanta. namely. the Eternal. The Divine which they meant was the Divine in man. self. the Unconditioned. A man must is former acts. and that Self is to be recognised either as identical with what was in earlier times conceived and called the Divine.

but they are visions which. The most curious thing is that such views could be held by the philosophers of India without bringing them into conflict with the representatives of the ancient religion of the country. Such views cannot be and rising criticised as we criticise ordinary systems of religion or morality. a world that must exist. None of them seems to me to have so completely realised what may be called the idea of the soul as the Phoenix. solutions Whatever we may think of these two of the world's great riddle. consumed by the fire of thought from his own ashes. whether of ancient or modern times. of anything beyond our bodily senses. we cannot but admire their originality and their daring. would be philosophically most unfair. satisfied 365 in his and blissful in his own being and own thinking. of anything divine. if you like. and hence was carefully distinguished in India from the atheism of the Nastikas or nihilists. and it does call the Samkhya atheistic. of admitting an active or limited personal god. . particularly if we compare them with the solutions proposed by other philosophers. soaring towards which are more real than anything that can regions be called real in this life.NATUKE OF PAIN. To and the Vedanta not. to have seen is like having been admitted to the vision of another world of . It is true that the Samkhya-philosophy was accused of atheism. but that atheism was very different from what we mean by It was the negation of the necessity it. They are visions. however different in its eternal silence from what we and from what the ancient seers of India imagined it to be. who denied the existence of anything transcendent.

but it was by no means so. the Indian priesthood great credit that they treated both systems as orthodox. provided always that the students had. raise himself to the status of a god.366 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It was a common belief in India that man could. acquired the strength and fitness necessary for so arduous a task. This might no doubt be called apotheosis effect. to start from such opposite points of view as the Vedanta and the Samkhya. nothing calls Brahman. and yet in India they seem quite 'bond fide. we may see by an extraordinary defence set up for the so-called atheism of the It seems to us perfectly Samkhya-philosophy. How different the world of thought in India was from our own. was expressly stated that it was in order to put an end to such vain desires of becoming and it personal gods that Kapila ignored or left out of question the existence of such theomorphic or anthropomorphic beings as could ever excite the We are hardly prepared for such rivalry of men. There are ever so many legends to that or Deva. Vedanta and Samkhya. . absurd. . At first sight no two philosophies would seem to be so different from each other. by severe penance. explanations. including the small gods and the still smaller men. nay. We have thus finished our account of the Vedanta and of the Sa?>ikhya-philosophy. The Vedantist of the school of /Sa?>zkara looks upon the whole world. including animate and inanimate nature. as a phenomenal manifestation of an unknown power which he There is nothing beside it. by a previous severe discipline. or at all events as not prohibited. if we consider the popular superstitions of the Hindus at the time.

AND AVIVEKA. but also as its material cause. But whence Brahman. this phenomenal world ? or rather. 367 that can be called real except this one invisible Then came the question. and it was clearly that of Ramanu^a and his followers. to ignorance. so far as real. is as we see it and live in changeful. if indeed there is any- thing material in the objects known to the Vedantist? Under the circumstances thus given. but to some primeval ignorance directed towards Brahman as manifested and seen. but one answer is possible. This ignorance or Avidya. but so far only. who But explain the world as an evolution (Pari/iama). AVIDYA. as he starts with the idea of there being but one real being from eternity to eternity. It is universe as a development of Brahman was possibly the original view taken by Badaraya?ia. and consequently never.VEDANTA. Avidya. and Aviveka. That Brahman it world. Brahman. not. that is. could ever change or be changed. until real. and yet that the is real cause of it. as it really is. such it. . ever passing away. incapable of change. however. We we have become Ved^ntists. in the Vedantic sense of that word. Hence nothing remains but ful phenomenal to ascribe the changecharacter of the world to something else. and that the Brahman. not only as its efficient. two facts that the world is changing and unreal. He accepts the this was not $amkara's theory. Vedanta. is the world. is is The phenomenal world. impossible to think that this eternal Being. How could that eternal Brahman ever give rise to the world. according to the Vedanta. and. to our individual ignorance. whatever name be given to This view of the it. never see it or know it.

which is a weakness or a defect. such as by the Vedanta-philosophy. i. masculine. is not to be called real. as may become to us . Therefore it is. and represent Avidy& as an actual . illusive power. power (/Siakti) of Brahman. can be in full reality nothing but Brahman. nothing therefore that could ever have dominion over Brahman. or is answerable for call creation. that is the never really unreal. if not the minds of other Vedantists. and it be anything. and. as not there. was that we know as a fact that Avidy4 or Nescience that it is is there. must not be called something The great difficulty how Brahman could ever be affected by Avidya. may become the creator and ruler of the world.368 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as soon as we soon as we are able to annihilate is it given Vedantist holds that nothing that can be annihilated can claim true reality for itself. in fact. the only thing that exists ? The answer given by $amkara. The Avidya. We individual souls. is one and all though here again. which satisfied his mind. but we see also know through it. is avoided by looking upon Brahman. but ourselves also. While that state of Avidya lasts the true Brahman. e. neuter. or as Maya. it is nothing by the side of Brahman. as for to us by Vidya or knowledge. though O 7 for a while we are divided from it. which what we once. though real. Brahma. while affected by Avidya or seen through Avidya. in fact performs. if not again Brahman. other Vedantists differ from $a?kara. because forgetful of Brahman through Avidya. again. should of course ask at We Whence comes is it ? what How can that Avidy& or that Maya. All such views are excluded by the postulate that Brahman is free. the time under a cloud or forgetful of itself.

a word often translated by Nature.SAMKHYA. PrakHti things. And it develops not only into an objective or material world. But in order to account for the world of experience. but only as having been blinded for a while by Avidy& so as to forget ourselves. containing in itself the possibilities of all By itself it has no consciousness. The call we question whence it came is never asked. and calls it Praknti. as little as could ask that question with regard to Brahman. it Bb . and it has had no beginning. may be called the undeveloped matter or Urstoff. into what we should the subjective or intellectual world. the whole Brahman and we ourselves also remember dignity. If call we represents has never arisen in our philosophy. Aviveka. soon as the cloud of. or Selfhood. It is. AVIVEKA. our true Self. both what perceives and what is perceived. that is Brahman. the so-called Isvara. Sawkhya. this creator also recedes and is restored at once to his true state and He. receive worship from his creatures. attitudes towards the world form indeed the kernel the Vedanta monistic. It accepts the the Samkhya is decidedly dualistic. The Samkhya takes what seems a very different These attitude towards the problem of the world. or Lord. but at the same time. it has been. Creator. whole objective universe as real. 369 But as such. or becomes what he is and always has been. because the idea which it of every philosophy. Avidya is lifted. not as if we had ever been divided from it. it simply grows or develops into consciousness when seen by Purusha. supplying the instruments of perception and thought. but in reality untranslatable. . and thereby recover our true Brahmahood.

matter. This would come very near to the recognition of the subjectivity of all our knowledge. is really meant by Buddhi in this place.370 is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. dull. me procreate. according to passages of Sruti and : Smriti. and also perceptible. commonly translated by perception. so long as Praknti is at work so long only as it is perceived by a Purusha or a true Self. 63) remarks As. the great. but really a kind of perception that involves something like what we should call inPrak?-iti. no doubt. such as ' (/fAand. so as to render it perceptive.' the creation of . under the eye of a Purusha. This is an important condition. inert matter alone would not account for the world. the Samkhya philosopher saw clearly enough that dead.' In this stage Praknti in order to called indicate its Mahat. let Up. is supposed that this undeveloped PrakHti it is always noticed or perceived by a Purusha (Self). 3) Let me multiply myself. 2. though it supplies. the possibility of the intelligence of the individual also. In the cosmical sense the development of the world is often spoken of as Samashfi. possibly importance in the great development of the universe. in the psychological sense. It is the Indian is ' Let there be light. It cannot be taken here in an exclusively psychological sense. operative. and as applied to each individual it goes by the name of Vyash^i. as far as I can see. is the lighting up of Praknti or dull matter by intelligence. and to the recognition that the world exists for us in the form of knowledge only. Therefore If call Prak?^'ti we he makes develop into Buddhi. and always passing through a process of evolution. tellect (rouy). VI. What. Thus Vu//lfma-Bhikshu (Sa?>tkhya-Sutras I.

which combines and regulates the impressions of the senses. follows that this when part of the individual or psychological development. the elements. as force. i. neither subjective nor objective. Perception. AVIVEKA. namely. and it is then. as Buddhi is generally explained is Ahamkara Abhimana or subjectivity). we shall see hereafter. for end all the Vikaras or evolutes serve one and the same purpose. really the cause of the creation of the as preceded by an activity of Buddhi. is here conceived as a development of Prakriti. This Buddhi.. however. cannot work without Ahamkara. according to the S4mkhya. as we must always remember. is preceded by Abhimana it e.SAA/KHYA. the powers of light and thought. and is after- wards developed into the senses. perceiving or perception. and as. and inert to the world. and thus becomes Buddhi. as yet. &c. but philosophically used with a much larger meaning. the mental activity going on within us. literally I-making or Egoism. world. if I am B b 2 . 371 (i. and not simply the personal organ of deciding.e. but begins to perceive as root Budh. two ideas often comprehended by the or to perceive. For shortness sake. identified with Manas or Anta^karana. the cosmical Buddhi. requires a new development before it can serve for conscious intellectual work. though not quite correctly. Prakriti also is inert till it is awakened (Pra-buddha). is But as a cosmic Buddhi that essential condition of all which gives light as the knowledge. Buddhi exists in human nature as the power of perception. which. Budh means And as a sleeping person is dull literally to awake. to awaken soon as he is awake. it is sometimes said that Abhimana in the or Ahamkara is the cause of creation.

are modifications of the same Prakrit!. After this development of Prakrit! into Buddhi. till it attracts or Self. would seem to be the nearest any real perception can take place. perception and thought as an instrument. feeling and touch. All these. only viewed from different points of view. hearing and sound. that before is. but a self-conscious soul. Spirit who by becoming conscious of Prakrit! and all works. Subjectivation. as that which produces the sense of subject. the phenomenal reality of hope I have understood this train of thought rightly. as subjective and objective. as we should say. requires. and as changed at last into the material reality of the sentient powers on one side. all this development remains without real consciousness. but there is much that Does Kapila really look upon requires fuller light. therefore. the elements of the senses as well as of the sense-objects. smelling and odour. approach. ] . tasting and savour. Nature. and its differentiation as subjective and objective. and therefore in one sense the same thing. though naturally there can be no subjectivation without simultaneous objectivation. its the attention of some Purusha. and the objective world on the other. and in consequence of object also. into subject and object. right. even after it has reached the stage of Buddhi. produces what is the only reality of which we have any conception. the division of the of itself.372 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. whole world. Lastly. in spite of being lighted up or rendered capable of perceiving and being perceived. ready made by Prakrit! for the use of the Purusha. such as sight and light. the next step is that it produces the Tanmatras. the faculties as well as the corresponding qualities of sense-perception.

and his freedom from PrakHti (Karika 66). 5 5). that gives the of the I first is which impulse impulse to the activity of PrakHti. philosophers like Vi^wana-Bhikshu recognised this original similarity in the tendencies both of the Vedanta and the Samkhya. but to a want of discrimination (Aviveka) with the Samkhya philosopher (S. or is it the first glance of Purusha at Prakn'ti in its state of Avyakta or chaos. call it nescience. If the Vedantist explains what we call Creation as the result of Avidya or Nescience. like a telescope. illusion. and in the end a clear recognition of his complete independence. S. generally ascribed to the working Gunas feel ? Much may be said for either view. or anything else. it is hardly fair to . the Samkhya explains it by the temporary union bet ween Purusha and Prak?^'ti. nay. we may well ask. 24. do not competent to pronounce so decided an opinion as others have done on this subject. want of discrimination. because it vanishes again by dis- criminating knowledge (Viveka). but in the end both Vedanta and Sa?7ikhya look upon what we call reality as the result of a temporary error. and it is not in the highest sense a real union. and this want of discrimination is actually called by the Vedantic term of Avidya in the Yoga-Sutras II. 1. Thus the creation of the phenomenal world and our position in the phenomenal world are due to nescience (Avidya) with the Vedantist. it is actually said to have the one object only of evoking at last in the Purusha a revulsion. This union is said to arise from a want of discrimination (Aviveka). If. Where then. AVIVEKA. it is looked through by the Purusha. is ? the difference between the two views of the universe There is a difference in the mode of representation. no doubt.SAJfKHYA. therefore. 373 till remaining inert.

and vegetal souls. one sun reflected in the countless waves of the world-ocean according to the latter there are many Purushas. blame them as having mixed and confounded the two. accurate reasoning on the part of the Sii^khyas. No doubt these two philosophies diverged in their later development. AviNescience. between Atman and Anatman. is that between the Brahman of the Vedanta. animal. therefore. If the Vedantists desired to arrive at what discrimination is called Atma-anatma-viveka. as it seems to me. it was but right that those who could interest see deeper. According to $awkara the individual souls are not. the difference between and want of discrimination. and the many Purushas of the Sawkhya. however.374 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. human. discrimination between Purusha and Prak?'/ti. On this point. According to the former there is in reality but one Atman or Self. Atman and Purusha. not as phenomenal only. as the causes of the world. there is a radical difference and this is due. according to Vedanta and Sa??ikhya. Avidya. the Sa??ikhyas looked forward to Prakr/ti-purusha-viveka. and they advanced for a time in the same direction. to a want of . . than according to Kapila they are. veka. Such a peculiarity must not be slurred over in an . should bring to light whatever features there were left of the original family likeness between common the two philosophies. as it were. Where then their is the difference ? If their later defenders forgot and laid greater stress on the points of difference than on the points of similarity between them. and their plurality is conceived as eternal. but they started with the same object in view. Greater. as many as there are divine.

if the Purusha was meant as absoimmortal. just as Vi^nana-Bhikshu and other . It may last as and at be said that this we have It is is going beyond Kapila. Apart from that. as men are descended from man. that we should see all this clearly. and unconditioned. from a metaphysical point of view. and would render the character of it lute. but it is fair to point out what the reason of this aberration may From a higher point of view the Purusha of Kapila is really the same as the Brahman or the Atman of the Vedanta. with the important proviso that everything material was due to Nescience. determined or conditioned. it ought have been clear to Kapila that the plurality of such a Purusha would involve its being limited. and being Purusha they would by necessity cease to be many. if the Purushas were supposed to be many. necessitate the admission of one Purusha. as eternal. though. but surely a right to do so. the absolute subject. just as the many gods had to be recognised as in reality the One God without a second.ATMAN AND PURUSHA. necessary. while Brahman differs was. call him Adam or Manu or any other name. mere mistakes of Brahman. because. many Purushas. Kapila has certainly brought in for- ward every possible argument plurality of individual Purushas. they would not be Purushas. In this way Vi^?7ana-Bhikshu was right that Kapila did not differ so much from Badarayana as it would seem. 375 account of the Samkhya-philosophy. and that as trees in the last resort presuppose the tree. but he has forgotten support of the that every plurality presupposes an original unity. It have been. to self-contradictory. at all events. of course. only in that the Purusha was never conceived as the material cause of the universe.

they started nevertheless from the same point and were proceeding towards the same goal. philosophers saw it clearly. are but the last outcome of the philosophical activity of a whole country. where the two follow different roads. We should remember that the grammatical Sutras of Pa?nni are contradicted again and again by grammatical forms which have fortunately been preserved to us in the earlier Brahmarcas and Mantras of the Vedic period. and possibly of some of the more ancient parts of the Mahabharata but in other respects we are left without any earlier facts. it can do . Nor should we ever forget that our philosophical Sutras. before they could assume that final and permanent form in which The they are now presented to us in literature. if he could only see that. whether of the fourteenth century A. c. If this is seen and accepted in a historical spirit. or the fifth century B. but that they must have passed through many .376 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. in fact. the final outcome of ages of inquiry and discussion. It would seem then to follow from Vi^nanaBhikshu's remarks that in India a philosopher might at one and the same time have been a follower of the Vedanta as well as of the Sa?>*khya. D. We have no such remnants of an earlier period of philosophy anterior to the Sutras. with the exception of the as yet unsystematised Upanishads. and that we are entirely ignorant of their historical antecedents.. still less from one brain. though not without a firm conviction that such perfect systems as we find in the Sutras cannot have sprung up in a day. in order to perceive the unity that underlies the apparent diversity in the philosophy of India. whatever their age. changes for better or for worse. Sutras are.

as they represent the Self as ing the common background endowed with qualities. and had certainly. has certainly seen more rightly by not resorting at once to the idea that actual borrowing must have taken place. We thought in ancient India. In one respect Vi</Mna-Bhikshu. at least to my mind. though no doubt there is danger of the distinctive features of each system becoming blurred. to mention him only. Hence his natural desire to show that they did not on any essential points contradict each other. if we dwell too much on what they share in common or on what they may have shared in common at an earlier period of their growth. cannot be endowed with qualities . or the Purusha. he attempted to do the same for the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. they were all Snm'ti. whether true or false. all To him not only Vedanta and Samkhya. were common property and could be freely philosophical adopted by different schools of philosophy. succeeded in discover- of both of them. but the six Darsanas or systems of philosophy were orthodox. petrified. whenever Vedanta and Samkhya shared the same should always remember that there must have been a period of unrestricted growth of ideas. These two. might seem to be contradicted by the Vedanta and Samkhya which show that the Self. Nyaya and Vaise- . and that during that period philosophical ideas. 377 no harm. but this is not so. After he had reconciled to his own satisfaction the conflicting tenets of Vedanta and Samkhya. as he says. On one point Vi^nana-Bhikshu may have gone too yielding to a temptation which does not exist for us.ATMAN AND PURUSHA. though not $ruti. in the Sutras that these schools It was became sterilised and far.

Origin of Avidyfi. shika are intended. that the Nyaya and Vai. standing but as unaffected by pain and joy. to be qualified by pain and joy. 1 1 truth. undefinable or inexpressible. but the other systems are never represented as merely preparations for it. not only as different from the body. according to Vi^ftana-Bhikshu. however. This is first advance toward a right underof the Self. as neither suffer- what marks the ing nor enjoying. quite as nor do I remember where Gotama and Ka/<ada themselves any passage represent their teaching as a mere step leading to the higher knowledge of Vedanta or Sawkhya. but which is really unanswer- . of the hence. is AnirvaA'aniya. of the Sa?>ikhya-doctrine might dazzle the beginner. They present themselves as independent philosophies. to the effect The question which the Sawkhya may seem have left to unanswered. the usefulness Nyaya and Vaiseshika. however. the Absolute. as a first step only towards the truth and though they admit the Self . still less that they existed as systems before the doctrines of the Samkhya began to in- fluence the thinkers indeed mentioned in as the highest The Sawkhya is the Mahabharata (XII. and also. nor as the other Darxanas : much any utterance of P>adarayaa or Kapila that such preparation was required.378 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.. 98) of India. as he thinks. The full light. To the followers of the Nyaya-philosophy Brahman. as neither thinking nor acting in any way. as slowly preparing him for the acceptance of the highest truth. seem to be any ancient evidence to support this view of Vu/mma-Bhikshu's. they teach that the Self is at all events different from the body. There does not. 1.seshika were intended as a preparation only.

as he calls it. this failure of Purusha to recognise himself as distinct from PrakHti. as his own ? What Kapila wishes to teach is that nothing is in reality his own or belongs to him except his Self. though without any declared antagonism to the Vedas. with all his regard for Aptava&ana. we have to 1 confess with the author of the Samkhya-sara (p. is. Kapila. these discussions Badarayana had only to appeal to the Veda in support of any one of his statements. or. able. nay on Buddhi or intellect. on the Aham or ego. as superintended by Purusha.THE SASTRA. is said to stand for the whole of creation. as belonging to him. could ever have arisen. a real difference And while in all Here we can observe between Sawkhya and Vedanta. &c. Hence the Sutras of Kapila received the name of Manana-sastra. and how we ourselves can know anything about its various developments. and going on from Buddhi to Ahamkara. within his experience. in fact. on everything. beginning with Buddhi or intellect. or subjectivity as inseparable from objectivity. 6) that there was nothing but the $astra itself to depend on in support of what may . had evidently meant to reason out his system by himself. on the Manas (central sense). institute of reasoned truth. and how and by what stages the development of Prakr&ti may be supposed to have taken place which led in the end to the delusion of Purusha and made him look on the senses. the Purusha. and from Ahamkara to the Tanmatras or subtle substances. 379 How this Aviveka. asked how Kapila came to know anything about Prakriti or Urstoff which. The If then it is Sastra.. the making of the I or Ego.

In place of this one Prakriti we often read of eight Prakrttis. nature. while there is no inference to prove either the succession beginning with the elements. though there is is hardly a more convenient term to render it by. that means that it chaotic. or the whole body of Samkhyaphilosophy. English renderings are very imperfect. In the Samkhya-philosophy Prakriti is a postulated something that exists. felt to l . and from Prakr/ti. be very crude and startling assertions $astra sometimes stands for Veda. is producing producing. Development of Prakriti. or that beginning with the mind in the way in which the Sawkhya-philosophy teaches. no doubt. as handed down from time immemorial in various schools in India. it is at first. those beginning with Buddhi or the distinguished as produced as well as while the first. the S'dstrn alone. we are told. the undeBut we must remember that all these veloped. or from Avyakta. It seems rather be to point the existence of a treatise. it At first sight. but not produced. When is. seems strange to us to derive Buddhi or Intellect from PrakHti. such as the Sa?ftkhya-karika or the original text of the to Samkhya. and that produces every- thing without being itself produced. Then what is meant by 6astra here ? . and of the Mnh. undeveloped. Prak?"iti very different from nature or 0i/o-i?.Sutras. but it cannot well be taken in that sense here. This need not mean more only.. can be our authority. and not infer1 ence. Mahat being than that the seven modifications (Vikaras) and For the actual succession in the evolution of AhawkAra from the Mahat. the Avyakta.380 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. &c. Cosmic. because inference can only lead us to the conclusion that all effects must have a cause. called Avyakta.

381 forms of Prakn'ti are all effects. This . After going through the long list of topics which form the elements of the Samkhya-philosophy. described as Prakasa. it is but natural that Kapila should have asked himself the question how what was postulated as the beginning. in this so-called Mahat or Buddhi. between subject and object. the undeveloped Prakriti. this first awakening of the inert substance. he imagined that it was due to the disturbance of the equilibrium of first was is three constituents (Gunas) that it awakened to life and light or thought. but serves as cause only for all the other forms of PrakHti. has no antecedent cause. and become Buddhi. or how all that did follow could be traced back to this postu- could account for all lated Prakriti.IVOVV. and serve again as causes. to its physical and intellectual activity. or potential perception. the lighting up. Whether we begin with the beginning. and hence. the differentiation between perceiver and what is perceived. is conceived by Kapila as Buddhi. the chief condition of all per- After Praknti has thus been lighted up ception. that was to follow. or with the end. the postulated PrakHti.BETEOSPECT. another distinction was necessary in this luminous and perceiving mass. Some such impulse required by all metaphysicians. a ir^rov K. the undeveloped PrakHti. This first step in the development of Prak?"iti. namely. Retrospect. so long as it is confined to PrakHti. it may be well to try to give a more general view of Kapila's system. or light. while the Avyakta itself. the phenomenal world as reflected by the Indriyas and the Manas. Given the undeveloped PrakHti.

but of this and this only(Tan-matra). according to the division produced by Ahamkara into subject and object. smelling. &c. Touch. seeing. This step from Buddhi to Ahamkara has been compared to Des Cartes' Cogito ergo sum\ but is it not rather Sum. touching. If we begin with the objective side. 18. They are not yet what is actually heard. and tasting. the five Tanis But there in the matras are realised as the five subjective powers of perception. to Aha?ttkara. As there is no hearing without sound. in fact. which are not the potentialities of everything in general. how perception is possible subjec- tively. but they contain the possibilities of both. the answer of Kapila is that there must be Tanmatras (This-only). potential perceptilnlia. seen. These five potentialities are Sound. was the work assigned. touch.382 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the evolution of the Avyakta has gone so the question arises. nor what actually hears and sees. Hence. potential Tanmatras stand before us in their 1 Duvies. is perdpi. Light. and the objects of sound. the powers of hearing. the Sawkhyas seem to have argued. which by subjectivation (Snbjectivirung. Garbe) rather than by Ego or Egoism. neither is there any sound without hearing.. and corresponding to them as the five five objects of sense. ergo cogito. that esse. and Taste. In their final form the taste. Odour. Tanmatras the potentiality of both. how it is possible objectively. as showing that being itself would be impossible unless it were first lighted up. sight. I believe. odour. and differentiated into subject and object. how this process of perception could take place. or even percipere ? I should prefer to translate When far. p. . Hindu Philosophy.

as we should say. skin. as a kind of clockwork. that in order to perception such as it really is. or mind. It should be account for remembered. acting as a door-keeper. but even this would hardly help us to a clear view of what Kapila really meant by Manas. whether it is called Atman or Purusha. generally translated by mind. This is but a poor attempt to make the Samkhya view of being and knowing intelligible. however. or into the solutions which he proposed. which is but really a kind of central organ of perception. and earth (the five Mahabhutas). Only we must guard against taking this Manas. as yet. meant to prevent the crowding in of perceptions. water. in addition to the five. air. being in fact the conditio sine qud non of all well- necessary. They all are necessary for the work of perception. quite different from the highest Self. a full insight into the problems which troubled Kapila. . conception. eyes. ordered and rational thought. and tongue. and is for a time misled into believing in his identity with the workings of Prakriti. Manas is as much a mere instrument of knowledge and a product of PrakHti as the five senses. light. 383 material shape. to arrange them into percepts. for the true Self. called Manas.RETKOSPECT. nose. subjectively as ear. is a sixth sense. The Purusha watches the clockwork. and I am far from maintaining that \ve have gained. might also be called the point of attention and apperception. and all the rest. clined to translate One might feel in- Manas by term brain. into concepts also. if brain had not It become so unscientific a in our days. These five supply all possible and real forms under which perception can and does take place. objectively as ether. and. another.

which are easily accessible in the Sutras. and that all we call bodies. could have been admitted by one and the Ahawikara . or the outside or objective world. Is Sa?nkhya Idealism ? There to is another point on which it is difficult to come understanding. our own. I feel is.' Here Buddhi. collect taxes village.384 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to the Buddhi. though decidedly different from the cosmic Buddhi that springs from the Avyakta and leads easy to see how these two Buddhis. to is after appropriating it. nor is it same philosopher. hand it on to the inner sense. which may be called Avidya. thus do the outer senses. and deserves to be taken There is Kaumudi into consideration ' : say. which suggests a very different view of the process of knowing. whether the Hindus fully realised the a clear We are asked fact that we are conscious of our sensations only. We are . not enough simply to repeat the watchwords of any ancient philosophy. to make them. the organ which determines what there is and then hands it over to Aha??ikara. and try to follow the ancient thinkers along the few footsteps which they left behind. supreme. when them over to they have perceived anything. who again remits them to the treasurer. is no more than the result of an irresistible inference of our mind. and the treasurer to the king. but that that it What is we must at least make an attempt to bring those ancient problems near to us. and the Ahawkara. an illustration in the Sawkhya-tattva36. the supreme Lord. the Manas.' they from the householders and hand 'As the seniors of a the governor of the district. or rather that one Buddhi in its two functions.

the Ego. the primary and secondary qualities. he actually identifies himself with those images. the consciousness which he assumes of it. determine not only ourselves. that this PrakHti has grown to all that it is. that the light which. but that it is given us. is the light within us that has the power of perceiving by its light that both the Aham. our Tanmatras. takes place within us. not excluding sich. But beyond that. the . though not our work. and that what we call the real. the Non-Ego. it is. The closing of the mental eyelids would be the dropping of the curtain and the c c close . more than the development of thoughtless nature as reflected through the senses on our enchanted The riddle of the world which the SamkhyaSelf? philosophy has to solve would then be no more than to account for the mistaken interest which the Self takes in that reflex. the sensuously perceiving and perceived world. our world is only an inductive world. is no Saft&ara. or under our sway. is PrakHti as looked at by Purusha. Was this the view taken by the Samkhyas ? Did they see that the our development of the world. own bodies. but the whole world. is our growth. our senses. our Ahamkara. the sky. that we are not ourselves the cause of our sensations. as we should say. our creation blue. the fundamental error by which.IS SAAfKHYA IDEALISM? 385 no doubt. and the Tvam. really take the place of what we call creation. that we do not make conscious. after deducting both . for a time at least. and all that remains. from this point of view. as Buddhi emerges from Prakriti. This identifying process would. It is within us. or. our Buddhi. our Manas. das Ding an which we can never know directly. so to we make the sky concave or say.

objective. Purusha and Prakr/ti. was taken as A&etana. freedom as alone with himself. both objective and subjective. drama of the world . and put an end to that suffering which is the result of bondage or finiteness. thoughtless.386 of the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. It sometimes seems to me as if such views had been at the bottom of all Hindu philosophy. might truly be explained as due to Aviveka. and yet with a constant longing after a higher and truer her part so long only as it . with such . though forgotten again or obscured by a belief in that reality which determines our practical life (Vyavahara). freedom from all cosmic being. But if we may credit the founders of the Samkhya. believing in the world. conscious and thinking why in its solitude Purusha was conceived as not active. and the Purusha only as subjective. but Prakn'ti as always active why Purusha should sometimes mean the eternal Self. . and the belief in the reality of things. freedom from pain. whether Kapila or Asuri or Parl/rasikha. intelligible why Prakn'ti should be supposed to play was noticed by Purusha it would explain why Prakn'ti. w hile interested in the world. By admitting this blending of cosmic and psychological views. the Buddhi of the world and the Buddhi of ourselves would indeed become one. much in the Sa??ikhya-philosophy would cease to be obscure. by itself. would undo all creation. the absence of discrimination between the It would become Self and the imagery of nature. . and sometimes man such as he is or imagines himself to be. and this final recogni- tion of our cosmic misconception would lead the Self back from the stage of the world to himself. freedom from the world. r state.

she She may altogether ceases to try to please him. when he seems to see. But this is a question c c 2 . What then becomes of the Purusha. and he has ceased to take any interest in the phantasmagoria of the world. it is said. The night. that is. whole development of PrakHti. and to will. but at last to be set it may be said that she is free by her. because there will always be new Purushas to be enchanted and enchained for awhile. we can understand why they should have represented the whole process of perception and combination. If he does not look. she does not dance for him. not to the to the Manas. to combine. but who in the end dries his tears and stops his sighs. like a spectator does so by misappre- who is carried away by his sympathies for Hecuba. and so far never annihilated. after the spell of Prakriti has been broken. and. State of Purusha. takes place only when Purusha is looking on the dancer. thrown on him by the Manas and all the products of PrakHti that support the Manas. all joy and pain. 387 advanced views. WHEN FREE. if clear to themselves that they really had made it quite human beings cannot have anything but their own knowledge. and indirectly to Prak?"iti. but to a stranger. hension only. in consequence. all willing also. when Free. to rejoice. and as soon as he turns his eyes entirely away from her. leaves the theatre of the world. to suffer. in all her disguises. on Prakrfti. as belongPurusha or the Self. and breathes the fresh air of a bright The Samkhya uses this very simile. Often has the question been asked. please others who are still looking at her. while the Purusha. ing.STATE OF PURUSHA.

388 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. like many technical terms of Buddha's teaching. 1 in the Nirvana. would be what he alone can be. freedom from passion. and hence. perfect rest. in the highest sense of the word. which no philosophy can be expected to answer. free and independent. as that of the higher bliss of the Brahmanic. not interfered with. unrestricted. perfect and happy in himself. Berlin. joy or sorrow. Buddhismus von Joseph Dahlmann. and bliss This ineffable state of the Nirvana of the Buddhists. In the eyes of less advanced thinkers. it repreself- sented tranquillity satisfaction. . the NiAsreyasa or Non plus ultra. While I Vedanta and Sar/ikhya-philosophy. in the air in India. and l agree with Dr. All that can be said is that Purusha. I cannot believe that it was borrowed by the Buddhists from either of those Nirvana was one of the ideas that were systems. but by each in his own fashion. though it is the Sa?/ikhya-Sutras. eine Studio zur Vorgeschichto dos S. while to the truly enlightened (/Santi). till first. such as the oneness with Brahman. whether ignorance or knowledge.J. and it was worked out by Bud dim as well as by Kapila and Badaniyana. was no doubt originally. 1896. absent at in It occurs in the Vedanta. has naturally shared the fate of similar conceptions. it We see in the Buddhist Suttas how was used by the Buddhists. The name itself. this unfathomable bliss assumed naturally the character of paradisiacal happiness painted in the most brilliant and even sensuous colours. freed from all PrakHtic bonds. in the simple sense of but was developed higher and higher. would remain himself. Dahlmann that the Buddhist idea of Nirvana was the same.

that happiness can be can be absolutely removed. Meaning of Pain. Kapila does not enter into a minute analysis of see his aloneness. as he calls it. probably about the same time. Dahlmann's very learned and very able pleading. it would betray end it spring up as naturally in Buddha's philosophy as in that of Badarayawa and They all took their materials from the Kapila. same stratum of thought. however. but though the Vedantist admits happiness (Ananda) by the side of existence and perception (Sa&-/. and therefore perfect bliss. while we see it into systems. if Kapila had had eyes for the ordinary sufferings only which are entailed on . or. If it had been simply taken over by Buddha from some individual teacher of an established philosophy. or happiness as a positive predicate of the Negatively. His object was to show how pain arose and how pain If freedom from limitation and pain is happiness. 389 became altogether negative. I must say once more that I cannot yet any evidence for supposing that either Buddha borrowed direct from Kapila or that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. and elaborated them its origin. he does not attempt to explain what kind of happiness he means and some Vedanta philosophers have actually objected to to the highest . But in spite of Dr. and wholly unworthy of a great philosopher. freedom from all limits or fetters. this happi- ness may surely be defined as freedom from pain. Kaivalya.MEANING OF PAIN. It would seem extraordinary. secured by the Samkhya just as much as by the Vedanta and the Buddhist-philosophy. as peculiar Brahman. Ananda highest Brahman.

we have to admit not only Prakriti. and therefore very much the same as the Atman of the Vedanta. Both Purusha and Atman. is not. the real or the better and truer Self. or fettered. In order to explain the world. it should be remembered. this suffering. With Kapila the Purusha or Self always remains. Kapila meant something else by pain. that sadness cleaves to all finite life. the even tenour of a man's life. our Like the whole evolution of PrakHti. not to the Purushas. but that is very different from always being intent on getting rid of the sufferings inherent in life on earth. must wait for further light. It is true he is after as well as before his release. Ahawkara. namely the consciousness of being conditioned. and Manas to the height or the deptli of individual existence. the Purusha.390 all is INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. he tells us. rising in the form of Buddhi. are absent in Buddha's teaching. He must have known that there happiness also for them. the sons of men. as we Purusha. Kapila evidently meant by Du/^kha or pain something more than physical or even mental suffering. He seems to have felt what Schelling felt. which is But whatever suffering inseparable from this life. perception. this suffering. . he may have meant. limited. and something between suffering and happiness. All imagine. but likewise another quite independent being. also belongs to PrakHti and not to oursuffering selves. and by their removal the idea of Nirvana has become But on this point also we almost meaningless. the method suggested by him for its removal is certainly bold and decided. and action.

In the same way all the changes of PrakHti. Nay Prakriti even. Prakrit! an Automaton? might possibly help us to understand the relabetween Purusha and Praknti better. such as Des Cartes described. the Purusha. some strange want of discernment. from mere sensation to con- . that he really possessing all that the world offers to him. as in fact a mere mechanism. all our mental conditions might be regarded as simply the symbols (Pratibimba) in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism. that takes place through were into a glass in which all For a time by this Purusha. His very body. performing all the functions which we consider our own and which are common to man and animals. superadded to the automaton. ceases her jugglery as soon as Purusha turns away. looking as it the doings of Prakn'ti are mirrored. only learn the wisdom of Kapila. whether in life or in death. but acts only as impelled by her nature when looked at by Purusha. that he himself suffers and rejoices. and unwilling to give it up again. nay his mind and his and if he can individuality. forgets his true nature identifies himself with this image of PrakHti. o always one of and many Purushas. and if we It tion took the rational soul. above all suffering. are neither he. organs of sense. which has no soul. imagines therefore that he himself sees and hears. his . he is for ever above the body.R/TI AN AUTOMATON? all 39! only the looker on of Prakrtti. above all sensation. if we saw in Prakriti an automaton. as the chose It was pensante.PRAK. how- He himself is an I. nor his ever. Professor Huxley who showed that. as a consequence of this assumption.

but as trying herself to open his eyes and make him free from her charms and fetters. We thus get before. 60. so does Nature (PrakHti) cease. nor Praknti alone. There is gazed 62. who does not expose herself again to the gaze of Purusha. . therefore really chained. but who is here represented not only as intent on pleasfor him. and by discrimination become free from them (Kurika 59). than Prakriti. wanders dependent is .392 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. has no object in view except that Purusha should in the end perceive his fetters. after she knows that she has been 6 1. at. might be taken as including pain and joy and consequent action. does lie become free. when she has made ' : We herself manifest to Purusha. No Purusha from birth to birth. although that looker on in his enchanted state imagines that he is himself doing what in reality Prak?^'ti is doing This is beautifully illustrated by the simile of the dancing-girl to which we referred before. . In many ways PrakHti serves Purusha. a new application of the simile mentioned Prakr/ti's Unselfishness. who she is noble yet does nothing for her in return minded and cares only for the welfare of him who is so ungrateful to her. the working of PrakHti. in enchanting or binding Purusha. I think. nothing more modest. ing and beguiling Purusha. is bound. and is freed/ In fact it would seem that Praknti. ceptual thought. independent of the looker on. read in the Karikas 59-62 As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage ceases to dance. or wander as she is on different Purushas.

We believe for a time in our own physical nature and in the nature by which we are surrounded. we suffer. and the Purusha is supposed to be clothed in what called the Liriga-sarira. 393 Here is indeed the Gordian knot of the whole Samkhya-philosophy. or vehicle. as soon as Purusha has distinguished between himself and what is not himself. that kills and is killed.GROSS AND SUBTLE BODY. and the dance of life is ended for ever. But the exact nature of that subtle body and its relation to the grosser body is wish it to be. We are and exposed to opened and we kinds of pain. among the Greeks also Pythagoras claimed a subtle its grosser clothing when united with the body. and so long as we do this. while all this. liberation is achieved at once. transmigration continues. Whatever we may think of the truth of such a system we canis not help admiring its consistency throughout. and its boldness and heroism in cutting the Gordian knot. Until that final liberation has been accomplished and everything like body has been completely removed. The idea of a subtle body by the side of our and we know that gross body is very natural . In the Vedanta the name of that body. Gross and Subtle Body. we imagine that we ourselves do and suffer As soon as this insight has been gained. at least so far as the liberated Self is concerned. that suffers. or subtle body. till our eyes are learn that it is Prak?^'ti that sees all acts. ethereal clothing for the soul apart from by no means as clear as we could Both Samkhyas and Vedantists agreed in admitting the necessity of a subtle body in order to make the process of migration after death intelligible. .

and consists of the senses of the body (Dehendriyas). without being injured itself. the individual. seems to me useless to attempt to reduce clear in their views and their various guesses to one uniform theory. Vedana (sensation). the Manas In the Mukhya Prami. the Its Indriyas or senses are not specialised spirits. implying beyond itself the Vishayas. to be taken as the external organs of sense. consistent . till true knowledge arises. and the individual soul recovers its true being in Brahman. and of Manas (mind). . objects required for sensation and presupposed already by Manas. The Vedantists are. the subtle body. both perceptive (Buddhindriyas) and active (Karmendriyas). according the so-called Upadhis (conditions). and on the five Pra/ias. or Asraya for the journey of the soul from existence to existence is Sukshma-sarira. this in the (7iva. and but neither the Upanishads nor the Vedanta-Sutras are always quite this in the subtle body . This subtle and invisible body or Suksh ma-sarira remains. the vital spirit. Its physical life is dependent on the Mukhya Prana. or on the process by which the one affects or controls the other. &c. of Buddhi (intellect). This to the Vedanta.394 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. dissolution of the coarse At the final body we are told that the Indriyas are absorbed in the Manas. by no means consistent in their views on these two bodies. such as ears. the subtle and the coarse body (Sukshmaw and Sthulam $ariraw). but as their functions only (Vritti).md it on the subject. according to the Vedanta. however. The Vedantists look upon or this thin and transparent vehicle of the soul as a seminal or potential (Vigra akti) body. from body arises. eyes.. which at death leaves the coarse subtle material body.

bones and marrow. It forms what we should call our personality. It seems certainly strange that at this early time Karika 40. and Suwkhya-Sutras III. sometimes called the vehicle. and (9-18) the ten senses. hair. 9. sarira should be said to consist of seventeen 1 We Why the Linga- and one (Sapta- dasaikam) elements. not to the Purushas 1 . All fitness for reward and punishment attaches to it. and is made up of six coverings. blood. The subtle or inner body. flesh. sinews. identifies himself with the subtle body. (2) Ahamkara. according to others of the element of the earth only. have still to say a few words about the charge of atheism brought against the Samkhyas. unless Eka is taken for the Purusha who. of the five or four coarse elements (Bhutas). but without it the coarse body would be useless. The Atheism of Kapila. 395 In the Samkhya-philosophy this Sukshma-sarira appears as Linga-sarira.THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. The Sthula-sarira or coarse material body consists. accord- ing to some Samkhya teachers. who also is reabsorbed in Prakrit i. being itself what it has been made to be by former works. or the sign-body. (4-8) the five Tanmatras or Sukshma(3) This body is of bhutas. . is formed of eighteen elements of (i) Buddhi. and causes the difference in the characters of individuals. and it likewise determines by means of its acquired dispositions the gross bodies into which it has to enter from life to life. for the time being. Manas. course invisible. or the Ativahika-sarira. and unchanging. is difficult to say. but the subtle body are all alike . till final freedom is obtained by the Purusha and not only the gross body.

should have been said by Kapila either for nothing or against these beings. sacrifices and surrounded as he no doubt was by and to the innumerable Vedic Devas. though blind. because the Sawkhya-philosophy looks upon every thing that is. are mentioned in the Tattva-samasa- bhashya. put nearly everything that belonged to God into Prakriti. the different BrahmS. Prakriti. viz. But even such a supreme Deva or Adhideva is never asserted or denied by Kapila. Both Pra^apati and Visvakarman. We was the blind. however. whether Pra^apati. in fact. could not walk. is always conceived as real. that of a cripple who could not see. no out-spoken atheism in that sense. Purusha the lame must remember.396 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for his benefit only. He had. There is a place in his system for any number of subordinate Devas. unless when looked at by Purusha. or Brahman. and then working. as we are told. selves. as proceeding out of something that is real (Sat- . we are told. only that this Prakriti is taken as purely objective. There is no direct denial of such a being. Most likely at his time and hymns addressed Devas of the popular had already been eclipsed in the minds of religion thoughtful people by one Deity. as elaborated by the old philosopher. him in but there is simply no place left for the system of the world. whether as the creator or as the ruler of all things. but there is none for God. Prakr/ti. meeting another cripple who As they could not live by them- they lived together. before his time. This has sometimes been illustrated by what must have been a very old fable. and as working without a conscious purpose. that traveller. the lame one mounting on the shoulders of the blind one.

but neither does he offer any something real. and ending with the last of the twenty-four Tattvas. Sawkhya-Philosophie. that Kapila nowhere puts himself into a hostile He nowhere attitude towards the Divine idea. are first in a state of equipoise. while the Samkhyas derive what is from what is l If it be asked how the unconscious Prakr&ti began to work and attract the attention of Purusha. There is this difference also between the atheism of Kapila and that of other atheistic systems of philosophy. karyavada). . The Buddhist takes the real world as the result of nothing. the fundamental between the Sa?nkhya and the other philoas Va&aspati-Misra has pointed out in his sophies. . which is strange nor does he enter on any arguments to indeed He simply disprove the existence of one only God.THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. such as Indra. know that Kant. but as soon as one of the three preponderates. there is tension. Kapila has an answer ready. . p. rejected all the logical proofs of the existence of Deity as insufficient. he says. honest thinker as he was. such proofs for denying it. beginning with the emanation of Buddhi. the Vedantist takes the unreal world as proceeding from Naiyayika and Vaiseshika derive what does not yet exist from what does exist. difference 397 Arid here we see again. and in that respect he does not differ much says from Kant that there are no logical proofs to establish that existence. and based the arguments for his belief in 1 We God on purely Garbe. and Prakrit! enters on the course of her unceasing labours. denies distinctly the existence even of the purely mythological gods. The Gu?ms. commentary on the Samkhya-karikd 9. 202.

we should say. This whole question. but produce effect Karman and transmigration. the First Cause of the world. . neither merit nor demerit. Purusha in his perfect state is noning moral. and means. in the whole of his philosophy. strong moral sentiment in the belief in (deed) Kapila also holds that deeds. will be better discussed when we reach the Yoga-philosophy and have to examine the argu- ments produced by Pata%ali against Kapila. only God. could hardly have seriously believed in. we ought to mark his impartiality and the entire absence. in worshipping them. to Kapila. possibly however. grounds. right to assume anything of the kind with regard to Kapila. except at the time of Moksha. were unconsciously approaching We should not forget that with the true Purusha. It has also been said that Kapila's only without a God. atheism meant. The Sawkhya. can never cease. when once done. existing any longer arid other for him. of anything The Devas he like animus against a belief in God. and yet he spares them and allows them to with the reservation that people. he is certainly not like allowed to be immoral. the Vedanta implies systems of Indian philosophy. accordmorality. and in support of the admission of a Supreme Being. virtue nor vice. exist. a denial of many people Devas rather than the denial of the one. but likewise system is not without any But though it is quite true that. the existence of a supreme God.398 ethical INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. generally called Isvara. the Lord. when brought face to face with this great religious Though we have no and moral problem. Immorality of the Sawkhya.

'As in the case of the son of a king. Some teach. It is really in- dispensable to final liberation. because the other Indian philosophies. still less that it encourages vice. which is only another name for reasoning. but even such a calculation. it is distinctly added that going upward is due to virtue. as Rupas or Bhavas. would serve as reduced to a strong incentive to morality. besides the admission of virtue and vice. Nay. the dispraise of passion and the praise of disThese are represented as forms of Buddhi.' The story which follows is that a young prince who was born . is assigned to a collection of Sutras. deserves to be mentioned. passion. Samkhya There is Parables. one of the unalterable convictions in the Hindu mind. Anyhow there is no ground for saying that Kapila's system ignores ordinary morality. each of which is meant to illustrate some are very much to the point. forms or states. as a preliminary. stories. may be true that mere calculation in this way morality is of consequences.SAMKHYA PAKABLES. after effect. There is. but one more feature of the Samkhya that it is not found in may be supposed to have suggested to the Buddhists their method of whole chapter of the teaching by parables. inhering in Buddhi. going downward to vice. both in this 399 This is life and in the lives to come. and they can be appealed to by one word. the fourth. so as to recall the whole lesson which they were meant to A doctrine of Kapila's. The first is meant to illustrate the complete change that comes over a man when he has been taught his true nature by means of the Samkhya. so that virtue. and therefore following the Liiiga-sarira from birth to birth.

posfrom knowing after sessed by Maya. believed that he was a prince. and says. thus the soul.' as no one takes his hand a^ain after it has once been cut off. But a minister. a kind of wild man of the woods.' The commentator adds : an extract from the Garuc/a-Purana which must have been from a Sa?7^khya source borrowed 'As everything that is made of gold is known as gold. and recovers his true nature. knows that he is a Brahman. when the possession is over. is 'like a cut-off hand. imagines that he is a /Sudra.' The seventh illustration and is meant to teach that. and not a being different from him in this phenomenal ' world. When he grew up he naturally thought that he himself was a iSabara. and lived accordingly. At once the prince gave up the idea that he was a savage. is the body. The . and assumed a truly royal bearing. went to him secretly and told him that he was the son of the king. In the same manner a man who has been told his true character by his teacher. who had found out that the prince was alive. and not a Sahara. As a Brahman possessed by an evil spirit. under an unlucky star. but it knows its own true being again. if even from one small piece of gold one has learnt to know what gold is. imagines that it Maya has come to an end. after once having surrendered the illusion of the objective. saying As a son of Brahman I am nothing but Brahman. but. no one should o identify himself witli anything objective. surrenders the idea that he is a material and mortal being.400 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. was taken out of his capital and brought up by a $abara. in the same way God the whole world becomes known. I am a Brahman.

because they appear in the modern Sutras. but once when the queen. he forgot his promise. 4<DI sixteenth. as in the case of the frog-wife.' ' The story is that of a king who. though they do not occur in the Karikas and all in the Tattva-samasa. and brought her some. is meant to teach that even an accidental negligence may be fatal to our reaching the highest goal. the king had lost her for ever. which existed for centuries. to which I called attention many years ago as connected with old Aryan folklore. as handed down by tradition. I have called attention already to the fact that these illustrative parables. Like the Sutras referring to these stories. tired after playing. while hunting. DC! . and it is just possible that the first impulse may have come from the followers of Kapila. who are so often called Kryptobuddhists or Pra&Manna-Bauddhas. that is in the sixteenth century. This system of teaching by parables was very popular with the Buddhists. asked him for some water. and disappeared in the lake. had seen a beautiful girl in a forest. other Sutras also may occur in our modern collection of Samkhya-Siitras. true knowledge also will disappear by one act of negligence. but were omitted in the Karikas and even in the Tattva-samasa. She became his wife see water. Neither nets nor anything else was of any avail for bringThus ing her back. must have existed the time in the Parampara of the Brah- mans. on condition that he should never let her He gave the promise.SAMKHYA PARABLES. and will never return. whereupon the daughter of the frog-king became a frog (Bheki).

but as . also find a philosophy called Sa?>?khya-yoga (Svetasv.ime of one person Kapya Fataf/A'ala. Yoga and Sawkhya. that he we read again in who understands Sa//<khya and Yoga to be one. 67) but we one philosophy. 26. authors. in the sense of ascetic practices and meditations. but the Bhagavad-gita V. goes so far as to say that children only. representing and Samkhya together as one. which are ascribed to different 1 . Up. and this not as a Dvandva. XII. may no doubt have existed in India in very The identification of these two names with tho n. as it were between faith (knowledge) and works. p. as a neuter sing. understands aright. . who is mentioned in the Siitnpatha-brahmawa. as it were. ' Philosophie. Sawkhyaably long been given up by him. 4. find the S4mkhya and Yoga represented.CHAPTER VII. Yoga. Thus the Bhagavad-gita V.. distinguish between Samkhya and Yoga at all. each We in its own Sutras. lias probSee also Garbe. 13). II. or possibly as Yoga Yoga belonging to the Sa?nkhya. 104. 5. Kapila and Pataf^ali and they are spoken of in the dual as the two old systems (Mahabh. once proposed by Professor Weber. not learned people. Sawkhya and Yoga. THE is relation of the Yoga to theSam-khya-philosophy not easy to determine.

15). called Puratana G. because their divergence with regard to the existence of an Isvara. It is much the same with the other philosophies. to . A according to $awkara) is mentioned already in the JjfMndogya Upam'shad VIII. were amalnay gamations of systems which had originally an independent existence. . (B. It is 403 (old). i) the Bhagavat say to Ar^una ' and this is probably what the author of meant. D d 2 .and Uttara-Mimamsa.' similar oral tradition descending from Pra^apati to Manu. Vivasvat told to Manu. . Thus royal sages came through tradition know it. or whether they were differentiacouples. the Bhagavad-gita (IV. was not so essential a point to them as it seems to us. Nyaya and Vaiseshika. Those who wanted an Isvara have formed one might have him as a first and super-eminent Purusha while those who had gone beyond this want. n Samkhya and Yoga.. having received it but this Yoga was lost here by long lapse of time. seem to sanction. But the deplorable scarcity of any historical documents does not enable us to go beyond mere conjectures and . of a origin while the two Mimamsas. easily Samkhya and Yoga might comprehensive system. and from Manu to the people (to Ikshvaku. IV. when he made : I declared this imperishable it Yoga to Vivasvat. tions of former systems. common the other systems.YOGA AND SAMKHYA. the suspicion of their former unity. by their names at least. ancient times. even Purva. which in character are more remote from one another than . Manu to Ikshvaku. 3). or Lord. and we are left in doubt as to whether the three (III. need not have quarrelled with those who still The Nyaya and Vaiseshika show clear traces felt it.

even though it does not know it. from Yu</. A Even the Vedantist does not this is really join Brahman. to mean to join oneself to something. for hard work. a though movement of the soul towards Brahman is distinctly guarded against as impossible.404 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. a very common misconception nay. to join. moment's consideration. 3. In the Bhagavad-gitft Yoga is defined as Samatva. Vy. to harness oneself for some Thus Yu^/ assumed the sense of preparing work. came. The often-cited passage from the Vedanta-Sutras II. (raimini. It has been repeated again and equability (II. whether preparing others or getting . Meanings of the word Yoga. such as we possess them. authors occasionally favour that view. we must not in such matters allow ourselves to be guided by mere impressions. would have shown that such an idea could never have entered the mind of a Sawkhya. i. Sutras. 'By this the Yoga is refuted/ proves of course no more than the existence of a Yoga-philosophy at the time of Badarayana it cannot be used to prove the existence of the Yoga. and it only requires the removal of ignorance for the soul to recover its Brahmahood. Yu^/. The soul is always Brahman. however. again that Yoga. by means of a very old metaphor. or to become what it always has been. for the simple reason that there was nothing for him that he could have wished to join.isa. meant originally Even native joining the deity. Etena YogaA pratyuktaA. and Gotama may seem to have an older air than those of Pataftr/ali. as previous to the composition of the Vedanta-Sutras. though the names of Kapila. 48). or union with it. . and Kanada. from meaning to join.

often used with such words as Manas. Possibly the German Angespannt and Anspannung may have been suggested by the same metaphor.. And as people with us use the expression to go into harness. &c. not Union. i. like Kapila. but Disunion. such as penances. ." he adds. Yoga. to prepare for work. i. and the like. in the sense of concentrating or exerting one's mind and it is in this sense only that our word Yoga could have sprung from it. 2. in his ' " misrepresented the case. though the usual explanation is that it was so by a metaphor taken from the In Sanskrit this Yu# is stretching of the bow. as the Yoga-Sutras tell us at the very beginning. or to buckle-to. A false interpretation of the term Yoga as union has led to a total misrepresentation of Patark/ali's philosophy. meaning. and does not " " . Atman. BUT DISUNION. quite right History of Indian Literature (pp. e. has entirely : when he wrote Rajendralal Mitra. NOT UNION. the outward means. was therefore Professor Weber." rests Pata%rali. I. He says. p. whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained. 238-9). satisfied with the isolation of the soul. came to mean to exert oneself. particularly in the Atmanepada." " The idea of absorption." he continues rightly./Tittam. 208. or the effort of concentrating our thoughts on a definite object. One very peculiarside of the Yoga doctrine and one which was more and more developed as time went on is the Yoga practice. 405 ready oneself. " into the supreme Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory.YOGA. to get ready for hard work. the effort of restraining the activities or distractions of our thoughts (TTitta-vHtti-nirodha). e. that is. . mortifications. Yw/.

Yoga. that it is small blame to a man who writes a complete history of Indian literature. concentration. pry into the how and where the soul abides after separation. such as it is taught in the Samkhya Pumprakr/tyor viyogo'pi yoga ityudito vaya. or Viveka. 50 Buddhiyukto (/ahatiha ubhe sukn'tadushkrite. means really Viyoga. where he states that. By which (teaching of Pata/i^ali) Yoga (union) : ' is said to be Viyoga (separation) of Purusha and Prakn'ti.406 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. we may see from a verse in the beginning of Bho<yadeva's commentary on the YogaSutras. is quite right so far that Yoga. discrimination between PurushaandPrakr/ti. subject and object." But when he charges the professor with ' not having read the Yoga he goes a little too far. from his own experience. joining. pulling oneself together. exertion. separation. Yoga might mean union. : Tasmad yogiya yu(/yasva. Even the best historian of Sanskrit literature. with a true Yogi n. did not mean union with God. but the proper term would have been Sa?/iyoga. if he has not read every book on which he has to pronounce an German literature can hardly have read every German author of any eminence. self and nature.' Yoga. or anything but effort (Udyoga. much less can the first historian of opinion.' . actions. in the philosophy of Pataf/ali and Kapila. however. and he ought to have known. Yoga (all) That native scholars were well aware of the double is success in meaning of Yoga. not Sa?nyoga). yogaA karmasu kausalam. Thus we read in the Bhagavad-gita II. Rajendralal Mitra. ' He who is good and evil devoted to knowledge leaves behind both deeds therefore devote yourself to .

by which the senses should be kept in subjection so as not to interfere again with the concentration of all thoughts on the Self or the Purusha l . a number of exercises. breathings. means ignores the (rftanayoga of Kapila. as a contrary. is often used by Pata%ali himself for Purusha. we ought first of all to try to understand their original intention. . bodily as well as mental. Before we activity begin to scoff at the Yoga and its minute treatment Sutra that Yoga of postures. no doubt. ledge chiefly. Yoga-Sutras III. Everything can become absurd by exaggeration. even in the Sawkhya-philosophy. 407 We saw that this Viyoga or Viveka was indeed the highest point to which the whole of the SamkhyaBut granted that this disphilosophy leads up. reached. In that sense he tells us in the second is the effort of restraining the or distractions of our thoughts. Self. Atman. (rfianayoga) and even when it to be maintained ? By knowwould be the answer of Kapila (by is it to be reached. because in English man cannot be used in the sense of simply subject or soul. cf. Yoga as Viveka. he presupposes it useful support. Besides. how how is . 21 II. this subduing and drawing away of the Self from all that is not Self. On the he only adds. the case with the self-imposed discipline and tortures of the Yogins.YOGA AS VIVEKA. crimination. . 41. render Purusha by Self rather than by man. is the highest object of philosophy. and this has been. Patan^ali by no (by Karmayoga) adds Patawr/ali. 1 But originally their to I prefer. and other means of mental concentration. . by ascetic exercises delivering the Self from the fetters of the body and the bodily senses.

the attempts to reduce these sensuous affections to some kind of quietude or equability (Samatva) need not surprise us. More minute directions as to how this desired concentration and abstraction could be achieved and maintained. Manas. of the outer world upon him. nor need we be altogether incredulous as to the marvellous results obtained by means of ascetic exercises by Yogins in India. We closing of the eyelids and the stopping of the ears against disturbing noises useful for serious meditation. but if carried too far they would inevitably produce those torturing exercises which seemed to Buddha. as they do to most people. The real relation of the soul to the body and of the senses to the soul is still as great a mystery to us as it was to the ancient Yogins of India. But if we ourselves must admit that our senses and all that they imply are real obstacles to quiet meditation. deserve certainly the same careful attention as the stigmata of lloman Catholic saints. Francis or St. because even a convinced Samkhya philosopher who had obtained 6rfianayoga or know- ledge-yoga would inevitably suffer from the disturbances caused by external circumstances and the continual i. so utterly foolish and useless. if only honestly related. and their experiences. in that sense This was the simple beginning of Yoga. might at first have been quite harmless. as little as we should treat the visions of St. object seems to have been no other than to counteract all consider the the distractions of the senses. unless strengthened to resist or work-yoga the ever present enemy of his peace of mind. and it was meant to be a useful addition to the Sa??ikhya. They . inroads his upon by Karmayoga e.408 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Teresa as downright impositions.

more particularly of the physical school of psychologists. enter upon an examination of the peculiar teaching of the Yoga-philosophy. to depend for our information may be . by J. 1892-3. prepared by cultivation. we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga. and the sweating processes of the American Indians in their steambooths. the Samkhya as such. to mention no other and more painful reports. after we have once understood the position of the Samkhya-philosophy though it may be quite towards the great problem of the world. We must never forget that. and I did not feel justified therefore in passing over this system altogether. p. a few words with reference to the sources on which we Before we have useful. true that. is not. . which we see among savage tribes The Hindus also.. before they and philosophers. 409 is may be or they may not be true. 823 seq. Powell. may easily be seen from the excellent Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology. but there no reason From why they should be treated as a priori untrue. may or may not But how little of true similarity there really exists between the Yoga and Tapas of the Hindus. 117 seq.YOGA AS VIVEKA. and has but carefully orgiastic ecstasies It has its roots in a soil centuries little in of philosophical common with the of the present day. although our Samkhya-Sutras are very modern. W. p. and is always presupposed by the Yoga. became civilised have passed through such a phase. this point of view it seems to me that the Yoga-philosophy deserves some attention on the part of philosophers.

the collector of the Vedas. Vedanta-Sutras. as proper names. the reputed author of the Mahabharata and of the But there are ever so many Vyasas even now. garbha. should be know too treated as yet as a hypothesis only. the author of a late commentary on Pata/l^ali's Yoga-Sutras. It has actually been asserted that Vyasa. is the same person as Vyasa. the grammarian and author of the Mahabhashya. Even the commonly received identification of the philosopher Patan^ali with Pata/1(/ali. Vyasa. and are still taken. . little about the history of Sanskrit proper names to be able to say whether the same name implies the same person. and can hardly be true in India considering how freely the names of the gods or of great Rishis We were taken. as to prove that they were but if style of language and style of thought are any safe guides in such matters. Vislmu. &c. but we should say no more. and no solid argument could posliving sibly be derived from the mere recurrence of such There are works ascribed to Hira/jyaa name. Ilarihara. ? . assigned him to the second century B. are ascribed The Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy to Patari^ali. we . It may be so. He may have been the author or the representative of the Yoga-philosophy without being His date is of necessarily the author of the Sutras. That is not the case in any other country. the divine serpent. Pata?I#ali. then why not to of course as impossible to prove Pata/Vyali that Pata/V/ali the philosopher and Pata?Vyali the It is grammarian were not the same person. course uncertain. who is also called Phamn or $esha. though some scholars have.C.410 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. with great assurance.

Second Century B.SECOND CENTURY B. 411 in ought certainly to hesitate. to the author of our YogaSutras. The fact that these Yoga-Sutras do not enter on any controversy might certainly seem to speak in . or rather ignorance. fied I think we must be satiswith the broad fact that Buddha was later . but on that point also it seems to me better to wait till we get some more tangible proof.. duty of every scholar to abstain from premature assertions which only encumber and obstruct the way to further discoveries. The second welcome as a date century would certainly be most for any of our extant philoso- phical Sutras. and should do so any other literature. In son.C. but that is no excuse for saying that the Yoga-philosophy was reduced to the form of Sutras in that century. the second century B. Besides. before taking the grammarian and the philosopher Patafk/ali as one and the same per- would no doubt be a great help if we could transfer the date of the grammarian.C. It of the present state of knowledge. because the grammarian Patan^ali has been referred to it. even the date assigned to the grammarian Patafk/ali is a constructive date only. all dates to be assigned to the philosophical it is the Sutras. and should not for the present be considered as more than a working hypothesis.C. favour of their being anterior to the other Sutras but we saw already why we could no more build any chronological conclusions on this than we should think of proving the anteriority of our Sa?nkbya-Sutras by the attacks on its atheistical doctrines which occur in the Sutras of the other philosophical systems.

to prophesy in the Saiikshepa-^amkara-Vir/aya elsewhere that (raimini. kara would appear on earth to uproot all heresies. encircling the world. in the Pataf^ali-Siitras. p.412 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. As to popular tradition. as post-Buddhistic. and it may be for the same reason that he is sometimes called Pha?iin (Phambhartn). in its systematic form. if they had lived before the great heresy of Buddha. particularly in India still I doubt whether tradition could have gone so completely wrong as . i. not of the chronology of years. . e. because they evidently refer to his doctrines. we can best understand the prominence which it gives both to the exercises which are to help toward overcoming the distracting influences of the outer world. This is the kind of useless information which tradition gives us. 1 Jf we took away these Yoga Aphorisms. and to the arguments in support of the existence of an Ixvara or Divine This marked opposition became intelligible and necessary as directed against Kapila as well as against Buddha and in reading the Yoga-Sutras it is often difficult to say whether the author had his Lord. and S&m* have been a portion of Sarikarsha?ia or Anarita. . eye on the one or the other. and that our philosophical Sutras are later than Buddha. it is no doubt of little than the value. . classical Upanishads.. the hooded serpent /Sesha. Ixvi. Chronology of Thought. Iii India we must learn to be satisfied with the little we know.though not to his name. Patan^ali. Pata7l(/ali is said to and Vyasa. but of the chronology of thought and taking the Yoga.

namely. of their danger. a kind of via media. after practising the we know for a most severe Tapas declared against it. as a preparation knowledge. such as taught by the Sawikhyaphilosophy. are often mentioned. of taste. is void of smell. which sages by their understanding meditate upon. though arranged and described in different Then we read again (Anugita XXV) That ways. Pradhana kara (egoism). is Aham.' As to the Yoga-practices or tortures that. are post-Buddhistic. with Purusha as the twenty-fifth. From Ahamkara is produced the development. That is . the great elements. if we turn to the of the Mahabharata. unperceived a development of this unperceived power is the Mahat and a development of the Pradhana (when it has) become Mahat. there can be no doubt that not only the general outlines But though the Sutras Samkhya.CHRONOLOGY OF THOUGHT. His own experience at the beginning of his career had convinced him of their uselessness. moderated than encouraged the extravagant exercises of Buddha himself Brahmanic ascetics. the wish to the existence of an Isvara against all comers. touch or that is called Pradhana (Prak?Tti). But a moderately ascetic life. and rather time. little would seem to remain that is for true peculiar to Patafw/ali. the objects of sense are stated to be a development. we find that the twenty-four principia. 413 two establish characteristic features of the Yoga. and to teach the means of restraining the affections and passions of the soul. remained throughout . of colour. Thus. nay. but likewise all that belongs to the Karmayoga or work-yoga was known before the rise of Buddhism. ' : which sound. and from the elements respectively.

the one deemed as elements. and we can well understand that the Brahmans. which for a time had been as a much new system thrown In by the Buddhist apostasy.Buddhistic as in its final . and thus to satisfy the ingrained theistlc tendencies of the people at large. which was far more serious than the denial of an Isvara. the Sa/mkhya should pre. or Lord. In that sense it might truly be said that the Yoga-philosophy would have been timely and opportune. should have tried to place before the people an even more perfect system of And. which was considered as orthodox or Vedic. the existence side by side of two such systems as those of Kapila and Buddha. admitted a belief in something transcendent. denial of an Atman and Brahman. . but as a re-invigorated and determined assertion of ancient Samkhya doctrines. if it came more boldly forward. and did by no means. not so of thought. though sprung from a soil saturated with Sfiwkhya admitting Purusha. had given its sanction to Buddha's asceticism. Lord. should have been anterior to that new and systematic development of Samkhyaphilosophy.414 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. after the rise of Buddhism. which we know in the Sutras of Kapila into the shade it this or in the Karikas or even in the Tattva-samasa in fact. would become intelligible that way Buddhism. that in its be decidedly That systematic form it was post -Buddhistic. the ideal of Buddhism. lest it should be supposed that the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. according to Patan^ali at least. by showing that the Samkhya. condemn a belief even in an Isvara. it would have seemed all the more necessary to protest decidedly against such denial. in trying to hold their own against the Buddhists.

THE YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. and translated by Ballantyne. 1852. viz. but it is curious that such a compound rules (II. gave matter for reflection to the people in India we see best by a well-known verse which ago (p.' and not Atha Yogar/i<7asa. how could ? ' there be difference of opinion between the two ? The Yoga-Philosophy. Samkhya-prava&ana. we can and as /Sabdanusasanam would Mahabhashya 2. If both were omniscient. 66). a translation 1 It is not much of an argument. both being considered as expositions of the old Samkhya. that the given by Pata%ali to the Yoga-Sutras. Atha Yoganusasanam. Sutras. easily see that Sanskrit did not sanction compounds which might be ambiguous. in my ' : I quoted many years of Ancient Sanskrit Literature History 102) is If what truth Buddha knew the law and Kapila not. 'Now begins the teaching of the Yoga. It is true that this apparent irregularity might be removed by a reference to another rule of Pawini (II. 3. The Yoga-Sutras. yet it is curious that the only apparent. irregularity should occur both in the Mahabhashya and in the Yoga-Sutras. if . the other unorthodox. reminds us of the title which the grammarian Pataf^ali gives to his Mahabhashya. and though he does not give us the reason why he objects to this and other such-like compounds. Atha $abdanusasanam. considering that Word-teaching might be taken in the sense of teaching coming from words as well as teaching having words for its object. really offend against one of Panini's According to Pamni there ought to be no such compound. 'Now begins the teaching of Words or of the Word. but title it may deserve to be mentioned. both being ascribed to same.' to the This title . may have been contained originally in some such text-book The Sutras were published as the Tattva-samasa. 415 orthodox. 14). or the Yoganusasana called also by the same name which was given to the Samkhya1 . does not belong to Pamni's Sutras.

from the Kurma-purawa. 1883. The Yoga-vfirttika. with the commentary of Bho^a Ra(/a. was given by Rajendralal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica. Markus. 1894. but Nos. and may be consulted with advantage by students of philosophy. p. called Vaiseshika-varttika. whose commentary on Kapila's Sawkhya-Sutras was mentioned before \ and who is chiefly known by his Yogavarttika.416 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and the Samkhya-sara.' Vi^lana-Bhikshu. ascribed to him. The Prasnopanishad-aloka. . which has been edited and translated by Ganganatha Jha. called Vi</nananmta. Bombay. is still most useful and trustworthy and there are in German the excellent papers on the Samkhya and Yoga by Professor Garbe in Biihler's Grundriss. an abstract of the Yoga. Misconception of the Objects of Yoga. continued by Govindadeva-sastrin in the Pandit. not always quite correct translation. Colebrooke's essay on the Yoga. There are printed editions of the Samkhya-prava&anabhashya. An explanation of Prasastapada's commentary on the Vaiseshika-Sutras. the Yoga-varttika. vol. however. represented by European scholars. but really : composed by GaueZapada (see Ganganatha. Garbe speaks well of a dissertation by P. The Isvara-gita-bhashya. which. I have not been able to obtain. . Ill. 'Yoga Aphorisms of Patafk/ali. It as 1 was almost impossible that the Yoga-philosophy. The Sawkhya-karika-bhashya. should not Other works ascribed to the same author are The Brahma-mimawsa-bhashya. is the author also of the Yoga-sara-sam- graha. A more useful edition. like all his essays. Die Yoga-philosophie nacli clem Itdjamdrtanda daryestellt. 28-68. 2).

and how little there is of the adpopulum advocacy in support of a belief in God and a personal God. elaborated his theistic and a majority in favour of a theistic philosophy of the universe as against an atheistic. There is an entire absence of animosity on his part. and by admitting devotion to the Lord God as part of that discipline. as the Brahmans say. properly so called. like other atheistic philosophers.MISCONCEPTION OF THE OBJECTS OF YOGA. Whether this was done. Kapila's atheism is discussed. namely. as is generally supposed. He criticises theists Him indeed the usual arguments by which their God. and curried favour with the quite another question. particularly in one point. certainly extraordinary to see the perfect calmness with which. 417 have suffered from its close association with the Samkhya. display any animosity against the Divine idea and its defenders. considering how little we know of the personal character of Pata?k/ali or of the circumstances under which he Samkbya-philosophy. from mere theological diplomacy is a question we should find difficult to answer. but whether Pata/l^ali may be fairly accused of having yielded to the brutal force of numbers. All its metaphysical antecedents were there. if they represent as the creator and ruler of the world. only modified. and make and unmake E e . with very few ex- many It against the few is is ceptions. in its attempt to develop and systematise an ascetic discipline by which con- centration of thought could be attained. Yoga is indeed. Samkhya. Nor does Kapila. such as our own philosophers would certainly have displayed in accusing another philosopher of atheism in trying to amend his system in a theistic No doubt there must always have been direction.

or the name of any special god. If it either by Kapila or by we remember how the two philo- sophies were in popular parlance distinguished from each other as Sawikhya with and Sa?khya without a Lord. preserves imputes no motives to his antagonist.' Devotion or Pranidhdna (lit. as it all is generally translated 'devotion to God. after they had been divested of much of their old mythological trappings. he was defending the interests of the Brahman priesthood. mentioning simply as one of many expedients. In this respect also we have something to learn from Hindu philosophers. 23. Devotion to isvara. we should have expected to see this ques- tion treated in the most prominent place.418 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. at the end of the first chapter. nor does in answering he anywhere defend himself against any possible suspicion that in showing the necessity of a personal God. I. 'Devotion to the Lord. the same time with cruelty. Pata?l^ali also He the same Samatva or even temper. Isvara was not even a popular name for God. Considering the importance of the subject. after having described the different practices by which a man may hope to become free from worldly fetters. by him responsible for the origin of evil also. and in later times was applied even to such gods as Vistmu and /Siva. After all. Misconceptions. Instead of which we find Pataw/ali. though it occurs as a name of Rudra. making But all this is done by Kapila in a calm and what one might almost call a businesslike manner and . an Isvara. placing oneself forward and into) . charge him at Kapila's arguments.' or. it is useful to see how little heat was expended on Pataw/ali.

that. is 419 explained by Bho^a as one of the forms of resignation. without wishing for any rewards consisting in worldly enjoyments.' In I. if He is called Lord. the name of Him. then goes on. the next that has to be explained in order. As has been said that Samadhi or complete absorption can be obtained through devotion to the Lord. caste) and while dispositions (Asaya. actions are either enjoined. they are instincts (Samskara) or impresIf the sions (Vasana). manifested in birth (genus. as worship of Him. that means that He and able different from all other Purushas (Selves). is a Patark/ali goes on to say never been touched by Purusha (Self) that has ' : sufferings. and the fruit thereof. . for they are eternally abiding in the very substance of Isvara. and as the surrender of all one's actions to Him. actions. His very relation to that goodness is without beginning. the order of His worship. are not dependent on each other. Lord is is called a Purusha. by His work alone to liberate Such power is due to the con- stant prevalence of goodness (a Guna) in Him. that means that He is the whole world. forbidden. ' : consequent disposiSufferings are such as Nescience. makes over all his cares to Isvara as the highest guide. because the union E e 2 . MISCONCEPTIONS. If a man. the majesty. and this prevalence of goodness arises from His eminent knowledge. it is Pramdhana. knowledge and power. Avidya.' The commentary adds . Anlage) are so-called because they lie in the soil of the mind till the fruit has ripened. or tions. who has no beginning. 24 I-svara. But the two. &c. the proof. is the nature of that Lord.DEVOTION TO ISVARA. the Lord. rewards. Pata>1<7ali we ' are told. or mixed rewards are the ripened fruits of actions life.

have been impossible without the will of such an Lsvara. while in the body. and full of virtue. eternal union with Therefore he alone eminent above all other Purushas. and Purusha. many such Isvaras. the Isvara. Altta or mind in remaining without blemish. and delusion.' . The Patafyyala-bhashya dwells very strongly on between the liberated soul and the Lord for 'the liberated or isolated souls. is is not so with of goodness is and he remains steadfast it. different. whereas in regard to Isvara there never was and never can be such bondage. even for one who has gained freedom. good. he alone having reached the final goal of lordship. modifications tending towards happiness. The emancipated implies bondage.' this difference . from a Yoga point of view. and has to be guarded against by such means as are inculcated in the Yoga but he. but this can never be predicated of the Lord. as he is always such as he is. Nor should one say that there may Though there be equality qud Purushas.' it says. While the ordinary Purushas or Selves undergoes.420 of Prakrit! INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.. alone. in enjoyment through Isvara. a return of sufferings. but he is by . the creation would. is possible. unhappiness. is not like a man who has gained freedom. yet as their aims such a view would be impossible. &c. nature be of free. Again. it His highest modification Isvara. becomes conscious of the incidence of the if pictures mirrored on the mind. less. 'attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds. Purushas. that is. and. are And though there be a possibility of more or yet the most eminent would always be the Isvara or the Lord.

though he does not go quite as far as the pares. (or the omniscient would be difficult to explains that what is meant here is that there are different degrees of all excellences. with the ideas here propounded. This Niratisaya point. But Bho^/a without the help of the commentary. and all that therefore there must be for of them a point beyond which it is impossible to go. he is but one among but he his peers. but as one of the Purushas. ' by saying : In Him the seed of omniscience) attains infinity. when put into clear and simple language. but it We may be well to try to compare our own ideas of God. His Isvara may be primus inter God. and other Aisvaryas.WHAT IS ISVARA? 42! need not point out here the weak points of this argument. and the purely relative character of the greatness and separateness claimed for the Isvara. is more than a god. is He a little What is Isvara? As Kapila had declared that the existence of such a being as Isvara did not admit of proof. Pataf^ali seems to me to come very near to the Homoiousia of man with Vedantin who claims for the Atman perfect Homoousia with Brahman.' discover in this anything like a proof or a tenable appeal to any Prama/ia. as compared with other Purushas. greatness. such as omnisci- ence. is what is claimed for Isvara or the Lord. Pata?l^ali proceeds in the next SCitra to offer what he It calls his proofs. this non plus ultra of excellence. certainly not what we mean by God. hardly be considered as a convincing argument of the existence of a Being endowed with all such transcendent excellences as Though this could . smallness.

such as Brahma and guide. is only another name for creation. there must also be a greatest. The answer is that the inducement was his love of beings. the great destructions and reconstructions of the world. could have caused that union and separation of himself and Prakn'ti which. and that where there is good and better. others. Nor does he flinch in trying to answer the The question is supposed questions which follow. the first creators. as we saw. there must be best. his determination being to save all living beings at the time of the Kalpapralayas and Mahapralayas.' Pranava might etymologically mean breathing forth or glory. without any inducement. assigned as a name to the possibly a relic of a time beyond is . What he means that where there is a great and greater. being himself not limited by time. are here postulated. 27 : His name Pra?^ava. It sacred syllable Cm. is He the ancients. of Isvara by saying. how this Isvara. Patafw/ali's argu- ment reminds us is to a certain extent of the theistic argument of Cleanthes and Boethius.' By the former ones are meant. to have been asked. and this is Isvara. as we are told. ' Next is follows his name. it shows at all events an honest intention on the part of Patafi^ali. This.422 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of course. arising from his mercifulness. Next ' Pata/lgrali proceeds to explain the majesty in I. so and by superior is meant instructor and that it would seem difficult to assign a higher position to any divine being than by placing him thus above Brahma and other accepted builders of the world. I. the superior (Guru) even of the former ones. 26. would not have been admitted by Kapila.

38. it is praise or breathing forth.' this. Amen does not mean God. But however that may be. called PraTiava. just as the name of father This may old However be true. a name. or it may ' be the contraction of a pro- corresponding to Ayam. Still we ! cannot go quite so far as Rajendralal Mitra. It may be a mere imitation of the involuntary outbreathing of the deep vowel o. and cannot It is be explained any further etymologically. there is not one in the least satisfactory syllable Om to the scholar. stopped by the labial nasal.WHAT our reach. as Bho^a says. I9vara from or son. and it is tracted to oui. and if it has any historical or etymological justification. and then drawn in ' . as Bho^a adds. but it does not satisfy the name Pranava and the may have been. used in the sense of Yes. that repetition of the syllable and reflection Om on meaning are incumbent on the student of Yoga. certainly much as hoc illud was used in French when conthat. us. but in spite of all the theories of the Brahmans.' nominal stem Avam. and to attain to Samadhi. they must have had a beginning. its . which has to be repeated a hundred or a thousand times in order to draw the mind away from all disturbing is Om impressions and to concentrate it on the Supreme Being. who sees in it an Indianised form of the Hebrew Amen First of all. And this. But why it is so we cannot tell. and how should such a word have reached India during the Brahmana period ? Pataw/ali continues by telling us in Sutra I. IS LS'VARA? 423 It is said to have been the name of all eternity. their sacred syllable. this is at all events not known to us. riot made by anybody. as a means to concentrate our thoughts.

Thus does the mind become serene and capable of Samadhi. there arises serenity of mind.' 'And likewise from a reviving friendliness. I. Are they really virtuous ? if one sees vicious people. In that sense he adds. virtue and vice.' I. languor. one should not envy them if one sees unhappiness. 29 'Thence also obtainment of inward-turned thought. worldliness. and disturbance of the regular inbreathing and outbreathing. But all these are only outward helps towards fixing the mind on one subject.424 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. not having a settled standpoint. fixing of the I. . and show neither approval nor aversion. pity. one should preserve indifference. 30. tremor of limbs.' I have given this extract in order to show how subordinate a position is occupied in Patafi^ali's . one should think how it could be removed if one sees virtuous people. there is constant mind on one subject (Tattva). I.' is Inward-turned thought (Pratyaketana) plained as a turning exall away of our senses from outward objects. people. and not keeping it these are the obstacles causing . : and absence of obstacles. one should rejoice and not say. unhappiness. complacency. the chief end of the whole Yoga-philosophy. doubt. and indifference towards objects of happiness. as 'Disease. carelessness. 33. I. idleness. If one sees happy . error. unsteadiness of mind/ 'With them arise pain. The obstacles to Samadhi are mentioned in the next Sutra.' The commentator ' adds. 32. and turning them back upon the mind.3i. and of thus in time obtaining Samadhi. 'To prevent all this. distress.

are first. or protector of the universe. second in importance. sophy. works. and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to of liberation Nor directly grant it. deserts. Rajendralal Mitra is right. in the Sa?nkhya. theistic at this the Sutras themselves to see that originally a personal God was by no means looked upon as the most characteristic feature of belief in Patafk/ali's system. . perfectly free from His symbol afflictions. however. and assume . It is but one of the many means for steadying the mind. or all soul. They are pure and immutable but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experiencers of joys and sorrows. given to the Yoga.WHAT IS ISVARA? 425 mind by the devotion to Isvara. and desires. is Om. But we have only to look opinion. to have been that there are countless individual souls or Purushas which animate living beings. lii) he represented this belief in one Supreme God as the first and most important tenet of Pataf^ali's philo- The leading tenets of the Yogins. do not think.' Rajendralal Mitra does not stand alone in this . creator. in stating the tenet. with which He is absolutely unconnected. Him by facilitating but He does not their attainment is He and the very name of Sesvara-Samkhya. would seem to speak in his favour. the I summum bonum of mankind. and are eternal. the father. and thus realising that Viveka or discrimination between the true man (Purusha) and the objective world This remains in the Yoga as it was (Prakrit!). therefore. that there is a Supreme Godhead who is ' ' purely spiritual. that Rajendralal Mitra in his abstract of the was right when Yoga (p.' he says. Samkhya.

with the Yogins. innumerable embodied forms in the course of an ever-recurring metempsychosis.426 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The idea of other Purushas obtaining union with him could therefore never have entered Pata?1(7ali's head. the highest object of the Yogin was freedom. but one that has never been associated with or implicated in metempsychosis. yet of the same kind as all other Purushas. We possible to prove the existence of Lvvara. but again as one only out of many means. was originally no more than one of the many souls. aloofness. and thus only can we explain the fact that Kapila himself was considered orthodox by friends In the Vedanta-philosophy the question of the real existence of a personal Isvara foes. and not even as the most popular atmosphere of In the in India this belief one Supreme Being may have been a strong point in favour of Patavk/ali's system. The Isvara. Such a confession not of an inability to prove the existence of an Isvara does not amount to atheism. According to him. ness. in the current sense of that word. or rather Selves or Purushas. or side must remember that Kapila had committed himself to no more than that it is imany criticism. devotion to the Isvara is mentioned. supreme in every sense. this I-svara being synonymous with God. in the highest sense of the word. issues. or liberating means of obtaining of quieting the mind previous to useful altogether. and . aloneness. but restricted to a personal creator and ruler of the world. or self-centred- As one it of the that freedom. but from a philosophical point of view. efficacious of all. Pataw/ali's so-called proofs of the existence of God would hardly stand against They are mere vrapepya.

it was this natural craving rather than any vulgar wish to curry favour with satisfied the human the orthodox party in India that led to Patan^ali's partial separation from Kapila. craving after a First Cause. We certainly need . it is.. and even those Darwinians who look upon this admission of Darwin's as a mere weakness of the moment. when animated by Purusha. creator His system is therefore without a if we called or personal maker of the world. has no need to call in the assistance of a personal Lsvara. What we mean by the objective world of according to Kapila. so far as to maintain most distinctly that his system of nature required a Creator who breathed life into it in the beginning. the absolute Divine Essence of which the active or personal Isvara or the Lord is but a passing manifestation. we should have to apply the same name to Newton's system of the world and Darwin's theory of evolution. Kapila might easily have used the very words of Darwin. but it therefore atheistic. neuter. Samkhya. not is. though we know that both Newton and Darwin were Darwin himself went thoroughly religious men. IS ISVAKA? 427 though we know how saturated that philosophy is with a belief in the existence of Brahman. a mere phase of Brahman. afterwards raised into an Adi-Purusha. so far as I can see. the work or outcome of Prakrit i. would strongly object to be called irreligious or atheists. Brahman. The masc. or First Being. and. His supreme Purusha. and this is very much what Pataf^/ali actually did in his Yoga-Sutras. presented by Brahma. such as both in its subjective and objective character.WHAT never arises. in attempting to explain the universe.

not suppose that the recognition of Kapila's orthodoxy was a mere contrivance of theological diplomacy on the part of the Brahmans. Kapila appeals. as good earnest. Two systems brought only escape this charge. and Intro- . the Uttara-Mimamsa and the Yoga and in the case of the Uttara-Mimawzsa. to the Veda in when it supports his own to such passages as $vetasvatara Upanishad IV. of the of the recognition of the supreme authority of I confess that with what we know life religious of India and the character at all times. against nay even against the Purva-Mima??isa. the Tattva-samasa and the Karikas '. 4. duction to Sawkhya-pravafcana. Brahmans Besides. 5. with the highest 39.428 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Preface to Sawkhya-sara. when he wants to prove 'that the world arises from primitive matter/ and appeals to the Veda. which teach the identity of the 1 individual soul p. because it perverts the meaning of passages of the Veda. its explanation by $amkara is stigmatised as no better than Buddhism. I. The two that can be made to support his view. . Ar. 1 2. we saw. it seems to me very difficult to admit the idea of such a compromise. of atheism became more popular in seems to me an so that in the is Padma-purana the charge of atheism not against the Sa??ikhya only. do not even allude to the difficulty arising from the Isvara question. Up. 7. and that these defenders of the faith were satisfied with an sincere in- the Vedas. Hall. but the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophies also. note. which ment important arguThe charge favour of their antiquity. particularly views. oldest representatives of the Samkhya-philosophy. and BHhad. that is. as in V. in later times.

that . as it is pretended. It is then that Kapila turns round on his opponent. he is dealing with the perceptions of ordinary mortals only. Yogins without denying their reality. were by the way only. soul 429 (Brahman without qualities). and recommends the surrender of good works. perceptible Isvara. But the Another opponent controversy does not end here. Yogins. this. and complete indifference towards this world and the next. But it is but fair that we should hear what Kapila himself has to say. has never been established of by any of the three legitimate instruments knowledge or Prama/ias. And here it is important again to observe that Kapila does not make a point of vehemently denying the existence of an Isvara. the perceptions of the Kapila replies that these visions of the do not refer to external objects. as he says.KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. but "V i(//ianaBhikshu remarks with a great deal of truth. or at all events not wide enough because it does not include the perception of the Isvara or Lord. while engaged the nature of sensuous perception been explaining perception as from actual contact between the cognition arising senses and their respective objects. This may seem to us to amount to a denial of an Isvara. and that. and says that this Isvara. starts up and maintains that Kapila's definition of perception is faulty. Kapila's Heal Arguments. as it in discussing (I. has never been proved to exist at all. is He had stopped by the inevitable opponent who demurs to this definition of perception. but seems likewise to have been brought to discuss the subject. And here he 89). because it would not include.

he could not have willed to create the world if he were not so. follows fact that the a more powerful objection. some kind of which every activity presupposes is of evil. because desire. For if he were supposed to be above all variance and free. sopher follows Anyhow this is not the tone of a philowho wants to preach atheism. namely the glorification of a liberated Self or Purusha. he would have said Isvarabhavat. he would be distracted and deluded and unfit for the supreme task of an fsvara. but. free. Kapila had wished to deny the existence of God. or of one who by devotion has attained supernatural power (I. he says that ' every proof in support of an Isvara as a maker or Lord.43 if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. This is explained by Aniruddha as is referring either to a Self which almost. would break down. 95). because Isvara does not exist. have a different purpose. as he says. and therefore he must Kapila does not spurn that argument. and not. a Sat-kara. or to a Yogin who by devotion has obtained super- . and not IsvarasiddheA. it could have no desire.' Then . nor even the desire of creation . based on the Veda speaks of an Isvara or Lord. he endeavours to prove that the Vedic passages relied on in support of the existence of a maker of the world. as he has recognised once for all the Veda as a legitimate source of information. Taking his stand on the ground that the highest blessedness or freedom consists in having renounced all activity. that is. though not altogether. because Isvara has not been proved to exist. exist. and in what we shall see that it is the manner rather than the matter of the proof of an Isvara which is challenged by Kapila and defended by his antagonist. because if altogether free.

But this also he rejects. and the Purusha does no more than witness all this. 431 natural powers. for all we know. the First Self. as if exercising an active influence over PrakHti. What he means is that in the Samkhya the Purusha is never a real maker or an He simply agent. while what is really moving. and who may. 27): 'All emanations of Prakriti are operated by the Gunas . free and has remained from eternity. unintelligent Prakn'ti would never have acted. In support of this Aniruddha quotes a passage from the Bhagavad-gita (III. or the products of PrakHti are reflected on him and as anything reflected in a crystal or a mirror seems to move when the mirror is moved. . because the superintendence of the Purusha of the Samkhyas over PrakHti is not an active one. have been the origin of the later Purushottama. as in the case of a crystal (I. but arises simply from proximity. that is. but Prakriti is evolved up to the point of Manas under the eyes of Purusha. to the Adi-purusha. The Purusha therefore cannot be called superintendent. Aniruddha thereupon continues that it might be said that without the superintendence of some such intelligent being. reflects on Prakr^ti. . changing. thus the Purusha also seems to move and to be an agent. or being created is PrakHti. wrongly imagining all the time that he is himself the creator or ruler of the world. and declares that it refers either to a Self that has obtained freedom from or to the Self that all is all variance and disturbance. Vigwana-Bhikshu goes a step further. who in the theistic Yoga-philosophy takes the place of the Creator. if it is meant to prove the existence of an active creator. 96). though it remains all the time quite unmoved.KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS.

such acts are performed not by a dead or inactive Atman. in that case. as in order to settle the old question of the continuous effectiveness of . that is. the subject is again treated not so much for its own sake. and Manas). Thus when he it is said. It is the individual Purusha (6riva) that performs such acts. To this the answer altogether is that though the Atman is not cognitive. while the Atman or Purusha remains for ever unchanged. namely the uselessness supposing the Self to be without cognition. Manas on the Manas. yet the teaching anything. as little as a dead body eats. But no. The Theory of Karman. when under the influence of Prakn'ti (Buddhi. and hence the illusion that he himself cognises. a mere witness of such omniscience and omnipotence for (III. meant deluded. 56). by Prak?^ti. In another place where the existence of an Ls-vara. the impossibility of his being a creator. as developed into gender) and not for the Purusha who in reality is Manas.' is (in spite of the PrakHti. ' He is omniscient and omnipotent. namely that. but the Self deluded by Ahamkara imagines that he is the operator/ Another objection is urged against the Samkhya view that the Purusha is not a doer or creator. Ahamkara. for a time. A last of attempt is made to disprove the neutrality or non-activity of the Atman. he says. or active ruler of the world. The Atman reflects hension of the Manas.432 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. while in reality he does no more than witness the appreis. a dead body also might be supposed to perform the act of eating. is once more discussed in the Sa??/khya-Sutras.

this has wellnigh passed away out of hearing. sires.. as every activity presupposes desire. to a Lord who is nevertheless supposed to be loving and gracious. pf .THE THEORY OF KARMAN. for any desire to free living beings from pain (which is the main characteristic of compassion) and if you adopt the second alternative.' And others. &c. saying Supreme Being who acts from compassion. to the conviction that the highest state of perfection and freedom from all conditions is really far higher than the ordinary con. you hand you will be reasoning in a circle. with all its suffering. whether working for Himself or for would ipso facto cease to be free from deThis argument is examined from different points of view. the Lord. according to of the world . in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha (transCowell and Gough. but always leads to the same result in the end that is to say. since the hypothesis fails to meet either For does He act thus of the two alternatives. 433 works (Karman). Kapila. ception of the status of the popular Hindu deities. again. If you say before. as long as there before no creation. as on the one will hold that God created the world through compassion. there will be no need. and on the other hand that He compassionated it after He had created it. 228) uses the same by As for the doctrine of " a argument. The reward of every work done. we or after creation ? that as pain cannot arise in the absence of reply bodies." what has Madhava lated ' : been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of His existence. If it were otherwise. does not depend on any ruler the works themselves are working on for evermore. p. is . we should have to ascribe the creation of the world.

Nor must it also besides the be forgotten that other philosophies Sa?7ikhya have been suspected or openly accused of atheism for the same reason. by far the most effective defence against the charge of atheism. so far as I can . has been charged with atheism. It is easy to understand why almost every philosophy. escape the same suspicion. that the recognition of the authority of the Veda was considered sufficient to quiet the theological conscience . which was a later expedient. and to exalt the idea of the Godhead. or of being without a belief in the God of the vulgar. The conscience of Kapila and of the ancient Samkhyas was evidently satisfied with a belief in a Purusha in which the old concepts of the divine and the human had been welded into one. without claiming even the aid of an Adi-purusha. a first Purusha. as because it . which was supposed to imply a denial of God nor did the Nyaya and Vai. It is well known that on that ground even the early Christians did not escape the suspicion of atheism.seshika systems. 6raimini's Purva-Mima/msa. to dehumanise. but there is certainly. on the part of Kapila. if higher even than that of an Isvara. a maker and ruler of the universe. and to have made this quite clear would have been. admitted the independent evolution of works.434 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. if it endeavours to purify. can hardly avoid the suspicion of denying the old gods. whether Indian or European. Even and though entirely devoted to the interpretation of the Vedic sacrifice. though based on the belief that the Veda is of superhuman origin. of the liberated Purusha or conceived as This concept has in fact Atman superseded the concept of the Isvara. we It may be saw.

THE THEORY OF KARMAN. but otherwise we hear nothing of to consist.Sutras where an tsvara is clearly denied or postulated. quite as much as a jar (or. these parts existing in intimate relation. a watch) And that they are effects can easily be proved by the fact that they possess "? parts. being devoid of form.. for instance. that none of the three Prama^as can prove ' a Supreme Being. The Veda cannot. by later what the Isvara is philosophers such as Madhava in his Sarva-darsanasamgraha. the old argument that the mountains. see. on the other side. must be beyond the senses. must have had a maker. because we Naiyayikas have ourselves proved it to be nonAll this we admit to be quite true. we established by proof. Inference cannot. Sutras 19-21. seas. As specimens of Indian casuistry some extracts from Madhava's chapter on the Nyaya may here be of interest. but the tone in which they are met. that eternal. I quote from the translation by Cowell and Gough (p. 435 no passage in the Nyaya and Vaiseshika. bethe existence of cause there is no universal proposition or middle term that could apply. Perception cannot. &c. is There meant to be or to do. These attacks. either as the author or as the controller of the infinitesimally small elements or atoms of which the world is by them supposed one passage in the Nyaya-Sutras in which the question of a divine Lord is discussed in the usual way. But is there not. 171): 'It is quite true/ he says. shows that they at all events took them seriously. because they possess the we nature of being effects. namely Book V. admit that a Supreme Isvara cannot be is. because the Deity. as should say. may be looked upon as purely academic. F f 2 and . as met by the Nyaya philosophers.

Hereupon the Nyiiya philosopher ' : be- comes very wroth and exclaims thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school. eyes. he had any. misery. since this militates all him to and not laden with Hence he concludes that against his compassion. and to His action in consider . desire to act. one of them A maker is a being possessed of a being a maker. be pleased to close for a moment thy envy-dimmed the following suggestions. should surely have create living beings happy. produced. by the fact that they possess a limited magnitude half-way between what is infinitely great and infinitesimally small. setting in motion itself all other causes. what object this maker or Isvara could moved by none have had induced in view if in creating the world. A feeling of compassion. combination of volition. but by concurrent causes. but Aristotelian KIVOVV CLKLV^TOV)' (the But though yielding to this argument. For if any one should argue that the mountains cannot have had a maker because they were not produced by a body. it would not be fitting to admit that God created the world. not by themselves alone. We therefore abide by our old argument that the mountains have the nature of effects. and if they had no maker. that is. a knowledge of proper means. the objector asks next. creating but the idea is indeed caused by compassion only.436 again INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for you have not even shown that what you say about the eternal ether is a real fact. they could not be effects. Nor has any proof ever been produced on the opposite side to show that the mountains had no maker. just as the eternal ether this pretended inference would no more stand examination than the young fawn could stand the attack of the full-grown lion.

THE THEOEY OF KAKMAN. source nor." in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known ? It cannot be the former. 437 of a creation which shall consist of nothing but happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things.' . Therefore. for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any Yogin endowed with transcendent faculties of (Tivra.' In answer to this. how will you remedy your deadly sick- ness of reasoning in a circle [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God.' But the Nyaya is theistic interpreter and defender of the not silenced so easily. the desired end. for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the the Veda might be learned from some other Veda. for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God. Do you suspect this "reciprocal " of each which you call " reasoning in dependence a circle. and then again God's existence by the Veda]. the atheistic opponent returns once more to the authority of the Veda and says ' : But then. is obtained. since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good and evil actions (Karman) of the beings who are to be created.). and replies ' : We defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. liberation. . there is no possibility of His being produced nor can it be in regard to their being known. &c. when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour. ledge the non-eternity of the Veda. again can it be in regard to the know. still as God Himself is eternal. thus everything is clear.

is devoted to an explanation of the form and aim of Yoga. gives an account of the supernatural . that is. energy. the Highest Lord. from Kevala. knowledge). Kaivalya. explains Kaivalya to be the highest object of all these exercises. p. an Isvara. an not very successful in proving by its logic the necessity of admitting a maker or ruler of the world. means the isolation of the soul from the universe and its return to itself. and secured by devotion to Him. the Sadhana-pada. meditation or absorption of thought the second. Everything the Indian may be clear way of arguing to one accustomed to . view it would certainly seem the it is but from our point of that. whether Isvara. though the non-existence of Nyaya does not teach Isvara. now we turn to the Yoga-Sutras of Pataw/ali we find that the first book. That this is the riofht O view of the case is confirmed by the remarks made by Vi^nana-Bhikshu in his Here we are told that Yoga-sara-sa?y/graha. Vibhuti-pada. alone. even when there is some imperfection in the employment of the above means (faith. memory. the Kaivalyapada. and of Samadhi. meditation. absorbing and . powers that can be obtained by absorption and ascetic exercises while the fourth. the two results (absorption and liberation) can be brought very near by the grace of the Parama-Isvara. Brahman. the Samadhi-pada. The Four Books of If Yoga-Stltras. and not to any other being. . the means of arriving at this absorption the third. of concentration of thought. and of deep absorption and ecstasy. 18.438 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. explains . or any one else.

however different the roads followed by the Vedantins and Samkhyais yogins may be. nor by virtue or vice and their various developments. and imparts spiritual vision (6r/lana&akshus) through the Vedas. that he is the spiritual chief and father of all the that gods. thinking only with the mind. evidently quite convinced that. ' all (I. 30) . is represented as the principal factor in abstract meditation and in liberation. deceived. steadiness Isvara is with regard to the human self being secondary This devotion to Isvara is also declared to only. is quoted from the Smn'ti.' . He only adds that the powers and omniscience of the Isvara are equalled or excelled by none. a man is sure to be . the Divine idea of both schools is much the same. Vishnu. such as Brahma. For one desiring liberation the most comfortable path is clinging to or resting on Vishnu otherwise. because it leads to greater nearness to the final goal. i. 439 is By Parama-lWara meant that or the Highest Lord here particular Purusha (Self) who was never touched by the five troubles. because. or by any residue (results of former deeds) in general. Devotion to Him Hara. and a passage the impediments. he has treated of this Being very fully in his remarks on the Brahma-Sutras I. he said to consist in contemplation and to end in Steadfastness with regard to direct perception. nescience and the rest.THE FOUR BOOKS OF YOGA-SUTRAS. He probably refers to his commentary on the Vedanta and he . such as illness. and that he is the inner guide. saying much more on the Vi^nana-Bhikshu abstains from Lord. as he says. and called Pranava. put an end to &c.

the highest goal of the Yoga. rendered by movement or function which T give as thought. the impressions of the senses and all the cares and troubles of every-day life would return. Vritti. though. if there were no means of making the mind as firm as a rock. lated by mind or the thinking principle. helps which the Yoga-philosophy enlightened as carried The human mind. mind. but as far as technical . nised I know. for the attainment of liberation. Yoga. would soon be torrent away again by the of life . though fully to its true nature. restraining in or steadying the actions and distractions of thought. that is. has often been trans. a very important one. is steadying of the mind. True Object of Yoga. has also been while A"itta. The character of the Yoga consists in really important teaching that. nor could it be accepted as the most important feature of the Yoga. It curious that the Yoga should have employed is a word which. this what Pata/^ali is chiefly concerned with. It is clear throughout the Isvara that devotion to him whole of this chapter on is no more than one of the means.440 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. was not a recogterm of the Sawkhya. Now We Yoga saw that as the second Sutra he explained Altta-vn'tti-nirodha. but only a means towards it. But it is not that highest goal itself. this 7fltta. however true the Samkhya-philosophy may be. In the Sa?ftkhya the term would be Manas. it fails to accomplish its end without its those practical alone supplies. which I translate by action. it may he.

to be taken here as a psychological term. its etymological relationship with Manas pointed it out as the most convenient rendering of Manas. though it leads in the end to something like utter vacuity or selfentire suppression of all first but at the functions of the Manas. all In seer or perceiver is. it would be difficult to find a better rendering for thought. but in reality it is . and is very differently by different used most promiscuously in common parlance. which itself has passed through Ahamkara or the differentiation of far as it is a modification of subjectivity and objectivity. for the time being. Like the moon reflected in the ripples of the waters. as carried word when used by Yoga philosophers..OTTA. It is he who is temporarily interested in what going on. restraint. does not its mean movements of thought. with us also. and. as It has a development of Ahamkara and Buddhi. as we have to do whenever we render Prakrtti by nature. and indirectly As I had to only of the instrument of thought. what is meant by Kitta. in so of the Buddhi. ocean of Praknti. But for practical purposes. as a name on in real life. use mind for Manas in the Samkhya-philosophy. though not absorbed in it except by a delusion only. of course. Of course Manas is always different from Buddhi. it must be remembered that the real self-conscious absorption. is simply our thought or our thinking. 441 Manas in a state of activity. provided always that we remember being a technical term of the Yogaphilosophy. has been defined philosophers. Nirodha. the Purusha or Self. the Self appears as moving is in the waves which break against O it from the vast not moving. concentration only. and though mind.

so well known from different systems of Indian philosophy. They illustrated by our mistaking mother-of-pearl a rope for a snake. or of the head of llahu. Wrong are for silver. inference. Vedic or otherwise. and thus would establish once for all what is called the orthodox character of the Yoga. and remembering. classed among wrong notions. It is significant that Pata?l^ali should have used Agama instead of the Aptava&ana of the S4??ikhya. it perceives nothing but itself. We The sleep. when receiving impressions from the outer world. . notions require no explanation. as sensuous perception. but that the Self is altogether intelligence. and they may be either painful or not. wrong notion. was supposed in Hindu philosophy to assume for the time being the actual form of the object perceived. &c. Right notions are brought about by the three Prama^as. the fact being o 1 that there is no in- telligence belonging to Self. Fancy is explained as chiefly due to words and a curious instance of fancy is given when we speak of the intelligence of the Self or Purusha. just as llahu. saw that the mind. but supposed to swallow the moon. . the monster that is that has a head. fancy. but. A state of doubt are uncertain whether also when we is what we is see at a distance a man or the trunk of tree. for Agama means distinctly the Veda. is not a being is a head and nothing else. and testimony. Functions of the Mind. principal acts and functions of the mind are described as right notion. when once perfect in Yoga.44s INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Remembering may depend on true or false perceptions. Indian philosophers have the excellent habit of always explaining the meaning of their technical terms. takes place in sleep. on fancy.EXERCISES. while sleep has no perceptible object. 12. and even on dreams. Having introduced for the first time the terms exercise and freedom from passion. explains that in sleep also a kind of perception must take place. it remains in effort its own character. he declares that it means that state of the mind. otherwise. itself the not wiping out of an object While true perperceived. . Now is all these actions or functions have to be restrained. which is a perception of vivid impressions. however. The commentator. Remembering is that has once been a waking state. but he answers that he means hereafter to use this term in the sense of effort towards steadiness (Sthiti) of thought. ception. Patafk/ali asks at once is ' : What ' is Abhyasa or exercise ? Abhyasa generally used in the sense of repetition. because. that or is. as Such must be continuous (I. and fancy take place in a dream. repeated. I. And if it be asked what is meant by steadiness or Sthiti. free from all activity (V ritti). unchanged. and in the said to be effected end to be suppressed. 443 Sleep is defined as that state (Vritti) of the mind which has nothing for its object. we could not say that we had slept well or badly. Exercises. and this by exercises (Abhyasa) and freedom from passions (Vairagya). when. false perception. implied by the term Abhyasa 13).

is This Abhyasa if practised for (I. very good of what Vairagya is or ought to be is description A preserved to us in the hundred verses ascribed to Bhartnhari (650 A. visible whether visible or revealed is). mean much more than what we mean by the even and subdued temper of the true gentleman. It is constantly mentioned as the highest excellence not for ascetics It sometimes does not only. Next follows the definition of dispassion( Vairagya). objects whatsoever. Here The consciousness of having subdued or overcome all such desires and being no longer the slave of them. that. and this is identical with /S'ruti or Veda. while Anusravika may be translated by revealed. Vairagya. but it signifies also the highest unworldliness and a complete surrender of all selfish desires. (DHshte) stands for perceptible or sensuous objects. intermittingly Dispassion. It is interesting to see how deeply this idea of Vairagya or dispassionateness must have entered into the daily life of the Hindus. D.). &c.444 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but for everybody. is Vairagya or dispassionateness. which are preceded by two . a long time thoroughly and un14). as the consciousness of having overcome (the world) on the part of one who has no longer any desire for any a. Perhaps Anusrava is more general than Veda. such as the stories about the happiness of the gods in paradise (Devaloka). we are told. as it is derived from Anusrava. including all that has been handed down. said to become firmly grounded. and that is the highest point which the student of Yoga-philosophy hopes to reach.

and it is very doubtful whether BhartHhari was really the original author of them all. Many of these verses occur again and again in other works. Frequent enjoyment of earthly prosperity has led to your sufferings. But as the Vairagyasataka of (rainaMrya seems in more recent times to have acquired considerable popularity in India.' ' . to undertake a similar collection of verses on the same subject. p.DISPASSION. and Tamil MSS. is the precept our old Bishis. and it is the only means taught by of liberating yourself from the world. It was perhaps bold. Death follows man like a shadow. a few extracts from it may serve to show that the old teaching of Pataw/ali and Bhartn'hari has not yet been forgotten in their native country. should not be subservient to ' it. by Seshagiri .' If. one on worldly wisdom and the other on love. good deeds. therefore. VAIRAGYA. while the ." it. after Bhartn'hari. 7. 445 other centuries of verses. or whether he only collected them as Subhashitas \ Anyhow they show how the philosophy of Vairagya had leavened the popular mind of India at that distant time. you do nothing good work 1 His is actually called Subhashita-trisati. Self is imperishable and everlasting it is connected it with the body only by the link of Karman . so that you may reap a blessing hereafter. Pity it is that you have not tried the ' ' " Know ' Yourself.' ' Live in the world but be not of The body is perishable and transitory. 1896-97.. through sheer negligence. see Eeport of Sanskrit astri. nor has it ceased to do so to the present day. and pursues him like an enemy perform.

' like a pure gem.44^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the proper course to liberate your soul from the hard fetters of Karman would be to keep the passions of your heart under control. or fraud. speaking mind.' Dispassionateness. for your fellow creatures. p. to devote yourself to the worship of " Permanent God. does not mean to be thoughtless. as here taught for practical purposes chiefly. Little.' If you are unable to subject yourself physically to penances. instead of thinking what is untruth. says in a somewhat obscure to Sutra ii) Sutra seems intended describe the highest 1 state within reach of the true VairiUnn. evil. after he has attained to the knowledge of Purusha." bearing universe. and body. and body should be applied to good beasts or trees. is always valuable. all desire for the three is Gimas This c"> This at least what (I. to check your desires. like but. you will be your own enemy. good words. Grundriss. pride. to undergo austerities. and good deeds. with purity of heart. and become a victim to the miseries of this world. speech. or pithy advice. when a man. and engage in ' deep contemplation. thoughts. involving O c* 1 Garbe. speech.' 'To control your mind. and to realise in yourself the in mind the transitory nature of the Truth. the essence of a drug. and doing harm to others.' Better to do less good. . silent or inactive. malice. has freed himself entirely from (or their products). to carry out your secular affairs with calmness. but good and loving work. Patu/i/yali 1 . 49. than to do more with jealousy. reaches its highest point in the eyes of the Yoga-philosopher.

from realising the difference between what is Self and what is not Self. a (Bhutani) name . the subtle elements and the mind. and fore also not as a possessive compound remaining much the same. and Aliwga.' From may a purely philosophical point of view Purusha be translated by God.e.' Meditation With or Without an Object. the Pradhana. Buddhi . In the comI. e. if I am not mistaken. the twenty-four Tattvas. (4) mentary to the Aliwga. the subtle essences and the senses : Aliwga. 447 indifference not only to visible and revealed objects. 1 7) to explain an important distinction between the two kinds of meditative absorption (Samadhi). ledge of the Purusha implies the distinction between what is Purusha.' than ' conducive to. that is curious Rajendralal Mitra should have rendered Purushakhyate^ by conducive to a knowledge of God. i. read that the four Guwas or Guwaparvam are . Visishfaliwga. i. Vigrnana-Bhikshu explains it by Atmanatmavivekasakshatkarat. the gross elements and the organs (2) Avisesha. the Self. i. particularly as the 23. the gross elements AvisisbJalimga. where we meant for (i) Visesha. 45. and there- between Purusha and the Gunas of Prakr^ti. but such a translation would Sutra misleading here. that is. It would have been better also to translate ' be arising from. i. Pataw/ali next proceeds (1. .MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. follows so soon after. ' : It the sense. Buddhi. i. the same classes of Gvmas are described as of Pradhana. 19. (3) the Liwgamatra. however. on the devotion to the Lord.e. The knowJ . Praknti as Avyakta.e. and what is not. but likewise towards the Gimas. that is.e. which he calls Sampra^nata 1 These Guwas are more fully described in II. here called Guwas because determined by them. Liwgamatra. e. i.

and the former be considered preliminary to the latter. not having a seed object. This again is . This seems to and Asampra<7?iata. The without a Asampra^rtata-samadhi. Here the spirit of minute distinction shows itself there is once more. the Purusha. but at all events identify themselves no longer with the body. are called Prakwtilayas. take a different view. The twenty-four Tattvas are called unconscious. but only existence. known. but also Savi^a. and from which or is it some seed on which can develop. literally with a seed. looked upon as one of the Purushas. are called Videhas. and another when no definite object of meditation left. for though these two kinds of meditation may well be kept apart. from which to spring or to expand. however. When meditation (Bhavana) has something definite for its object it is called not only Pra^/iata. is mean that there one kind of meditation when our thoughts are directed and fixed on a definite object. Those who in their Samadhi do not go beyond the twenty-four Tattvas. the numerous divisions of each hardly deserve our notice. meditation called Avi(/a. but it is hardly necessary that we should enter into all the intricate subdivisions of the two kinds of meditation. which I am inclined to take in the sense of having it can fix. as sub- We are told that what is called conscious meditation may have for its object either one or the other of the twenty-four Tattvas or the Isvara. Native com- known mentators. yet. without seeing the twentyfifth. knowing.448 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. not quite clear to me. absorbed in Prakf'iti. the twenty-fifth or Purusha is conscious. others who do not see the Purusha bodyless . as referred to the subject. or.

or meditation with- out a known object. Gg . or. that there is may mean which are I a is residue not. previous impressions. Ahamkara. peculiar so to say. 449 such as Savitarka. manifested in the final act of the stopping all functions of the mind. joyous. such as Prakn'ti. Manas.MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. and as the end of all This I.' est imbuta recens servabit odorem It all may be intended that these Sawiskaras are either wiped out. it may be. or general disposition. &c. deliberawith false contive. but they can hardly be of interest to speculative philosophers except so far as they furnish another proof of a long continued study of the Yoga-philosophy in India before the actual composition of the Sutras. conception that I am am not. is explained as being preceded by a repetition of negative perception. The Asamprae^ata-samadhi. In summing up what has been said about the different kinds of Samadhi. 18. its its have rendered by previous impressions. 'Quo semel Testa diu. of previous impressions. unconscious meditation. or that there The Sawskaras. Pata?"k/ali says (I. Sutra has been differently explained by It different European and native commentators. 1 9) once more that in the case of the Videhas and Prakviti- 3 Asmita is different from Ahawkara. study of the Yoga. They may become important in a more minute l . its everything that has given to the mind flavour. character. or that there is but a small residue of them. and Sasmitil ceit. and means the mis- (Asmi) what I Buddhi. argumentative. Sananda. Savi&ara.

or with excessive zeal and those who employ excessive means with mild. or excessive. it right. to contain. . where we read that Samadhi may be said to faith. moderate. 448) the object or. with mild. tsvara Once More. the name of Samkhya. be near or within reach when the zeal or the will is strong. in ' . p. to translate this famous Sutra I. and I shall in future dispense with them. though they may contain now and then some interesting observations.' The commentator calls Nor is it simply an easy expedient. Such divisions and subdivisions which fully justify . and some more helps are mentioned in the next Sutra (I. those who employ mild means. follows at last the 23. with liajendralal Mitra. if you like. with moderate. 22) according as the means employed by them are mild.45 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. layas (as explained before. the proof of the existence of a Deity. an alternative. concentration. Every one of these Samadhis is again carefully defined. enumeration. or with excessive zeal those who employ moderate means. but that for other Yogins there are preliminary conditions or steps to Samadhi. Thus we get nine classes of Yogins. These strong-willed or determined aspirants are again divided (I. with moderate. make both the Samkhya. which has always been supposed answer to Kapila. After an enumeration of to be employed all these means of Yoga by the student. the cause of Samadhi is the real world (Bhava). and which I translated before by Devotion to the Lord. and knowledge succeeding each other. namely. memory.and Yoga-philosophies extremely tedious. energy. or with excessive zeal. with mild. with moderate. 21).

Other Means of Obtaining Samadhi. 33 translated before. Expedients. for . as may be seen from Sutras I. even the last or the highest Upaya. 29 Nor is this devotion to I.' Isvara. or as more than a somewhat forced confession of faith. such as the expulsion and retention of the breath. but always one of many Purushas and though he was looked upon as holy (I. he never seems to have risen to the rank of a Creator. contrivances to subjects may have been really useful as all draw away the thoughts from except the one chosen for meditation. no doubt. is not God in the sense in which Brahm^ might be called so. the highest God. But this opens far generally one of the Tattvas. it would be impossible to look upon it as which there is really a real proof in support of the existence of God.OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. as we saw. too large a subject for our purpose in this place. He is a God. that the orthodox Yogins derived great comfort from this Sutra as shielding Patan^ali against the charge of atheism. which we can well believe. ' 451 Sutra at once by Devotion to God. follow next. 25) and omniscient. for Patark/ali goes on immediately after to mention other means equally conducive to concentrated meditation or absorption in the thought of one object. The benefits arising from this devotion to the Lord are not essentially different from those that are to be obtained from other Upayas or means of attaining Samadhi. Though it is true. approach here to the pathological portion of the Yoga. no room in the Samkhya system. the so-called Ha^a or Kriya-yoga. a subject certainly far more important than has generally We Gg 2 . the so-called Pranayamas.

that is.452 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. to fix the attention. and even if they could be proved to have been mistaken in their observations. been supposed. they are honest in their statements as to the discipline that can be applied to the mind through the body. by being directed to the tip of the nose. Next to the moderation or restraint of the breaththe mind. One thing may certainly be claimed for our Sutras the fashion. and the same with all the other senses. the means have evidently encroached in this case also. their illusions do not seem to me to have been mere frauds. that even objects seen in dreams or in sleep are supposed to answer the same purpose. which therefore are supposed to have no longer any inclinaing. . having everything they want in themselves. provided always that these objects do not appeal to our passions. on the aims. such as the moon without. All these are means towards an end. as is now include the so-called physico-psychological experiments under the name of philosophy. at least in the days of Pata?l(/ali. and there can be no doubt that they have proved efficacious only. cognises a heavenly odour. 37). and to such . In fact any object may be chosen for steady meditation. as so often happens. or our heart within. unless. though it is far from my purpose to undertake a defence of all the doings and sayings of modern Yogins or Mahatmans. We are next told of the perception of an inward luminous and blessed state. follow descriptions of how tion towards objects. but a subject for students of pathology rather than of philosophy. we . outward which produces a steadiness and contentedness of the mind when directed towards objects which no No wonder longer appeal to the passions (I.

meaning. and our mind should always be centred on one object of meditation. supposing that our meditation was centred on a cow. in the same way the mind is supposed to become tinged by the objects perceived. 41). and which was to lead on to Kaivalya or spiritual separateness and freedom. we are told in Sutra 41 that a man who has put an end to all the motions and emotions of his mind. This impression remains true as grounded in the object. Having mentioned in a former Sutra that Samadhi (here called Samapatti) may be either Savitarka or SaviMra. or knowledge. and that some may be skipped or taken for of staircase on which the passed. 42) that when meditation is mixed with uncertainties as to word. or steadiness and consubstantiation. we are told at other times that any step may be useful. Though some of these bodily exercises are represented as serving as a kind Kriya-yoga or worksometimes called HaAa-yoga. the idea being that the mind is actually modified or changed by the objects perceived (I. . 453 an extent that Yoga has often been understood to consist in these outward efforts rather than in that concentration of thought which they were meant to produce. obtains with regard to formation grounded in all them objects of his senses con(sic).OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. becomes really red to our eyes. Now. the question would be whether we should meditate on the sound it is called Savitarka. when placed near a red flower. This true Yoga is often distinguished as Ra^a-yoga or royal Yoga from the other ing Yoga. if we ask what is the result of all this. he now explains (I. Thus. which is though it is not clear why. called mind ascends step by step. As a crystal.

right or truth-bearing. If we look upon the NirviMra Samadhi as the highest of the Samadhis. has been described. remains.subtle. or. and becomes. both Savitarka and Nirvitarka. material objects only. They are defined as having reference to subtle objects essences. the next division is into Savi&ara and NirviMra. there is highest goal of the true Yogin . forgets its own subjective form of knowing. Savitarka. as the commentator puts it. then there would follow on the completion of that meditation contentment or peace of the Self (Atman). After Samadhi. that is. is Knowledge in this state called Tfo'tambhara. quite different from the knowledge which is acquired by inference or by revelation. that is the genus cow. Its though not much more clearly. or on the meaning of it (Begriff).454 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 44). for the Purusha is neither subtle nor non. Subtle objects include Prak-riti also. without any form. Samadhi Aprar/uatft. one in form with the object. and there is nothing subtle beyond it. when the knowing mind (Pragma). or the idea or picture (Vorstellung) conveyed by it. tinged with the form of its object. to the Tanmatras. and thus we learn that the former. the Savitarka Samadhi. cow. and that is what was called before Apragr/iat& Samadhi. had to deal with and the senses. meditation . (I. still something beyond knowledge. as it were. This knowledge therefore would seem to be the but no. And from this know- ledge springs a disposition which overcomes all former dispositions and renders them superfluous. Go. Sk. Such a meditation would be called opposite is Nirvitarka when all memory vanishes and the meaning alone.

This Kaivalya or the highest bliss in the eyes of the true Yogin. but that is almost the only allusion to what in later times came to be the most prominent part of the practical or Kriyayoga. or pure ecstasy. as taken over from the Samkhya. beginning leading on to a description of meditation. are just alluded to. FREEDOM. the in- and out-breathing. no longer restricted to any of the Tattvas. as distinct from all the is Tattvas of Praknti. the Purusha to his delivered from all 455 This restores own nature. Outward helps. Kaivalya. after he has been life. without any object.KAIVALYA. supposed to prepare the mind . each Purusha on It is really meditation of himself only. the postures and other ascetic per- formances (Yogahgas). i. This short account of what first is contained in the all chapter of the Yoga-Sutras contains almost that can be of interest to European philosophers the system of Patan^ali. such as the Pranayama. e. and it may well be called the highest achievement of 6rfiana-yoga. It shows us the whole drift of the Yoga in with the means of and concentrating the mind on certain steadying things. Yoga carried on by thought or by the will alone. the outside disturbances of and particularly from the ignorance that caused him to identify himself for awhile with any of the works of Prakrit i (Asmita). and it is not impossible that it may have originally formed a book complete in itself. and in its simplest form. Freedom. and more particularly on the twenty-four Tattvas. which is tantamount to a meditation which does not dwell on anything that can be offered by an ideal representation of what is called the real world. namely.

edited by Siris Chandra Basu. and mumbling of prayers showing how little of it real philosophical ascribed to by Patafk/ali. Bombay. 1893 On the Vedantic Haj-Yoga. Helps to Yoga. the Ghera/<c/a-samhita. It is . It is quite possible that some of my readers will.456 for its INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as the second and third books of the Yoga-Sutras. Svatmarama's Ha^Aa' yoga-pradipika. translated by Shrinivas Jyangar. Walter. better still . 32). The above-mentioned Isvara-pramdh4na. Bombay. There is also a very useful German translation by H. Devotion to the Lord/ is classed here as simply one of the Yogangas or accessories of Yoga. Lahore. together with purification. Yogangas. the Ha^aprayoga. own higher ' efforts. and . it is a kind of worship (Bhaktibut that is all the visesha) addressed to Bhagavat . commentator has to say in recommendation of it. but it seems to me that they really have nothing to do with philosophy in the true sense of the word and those who take an interest in them may easily consult texts of which there exist English translations. and several more. 1880. be disappointed by my having suppressed fuller details about these matters. (II. true that considerable antiquity is claimed for some of these Yogangas. meditation. importance was It helps towards Sa- madhi. or members of Yoga. 1895. by Sabhapati Svami. the existence or non-existence of an individual Creator or Ruler of the world. penance. 1893. There is nothing to show that Patafi^/ali imagined he had thereby given a full and satisfactory answer to the most momentous of all questions. contentment. Mimchen.

102. cross-seat. and there Bhadrasana. 4. . Bhadrasana.' This will. Yoga Aphorisms. Siva. HELPS TO YOGA. great toes should be firmly held thereby the chin should be bent down on the chest. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum. and it will produce the heroic posture Virasana. is called Svastika- Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed 5. extended on the legs. be considered enough and more than enough. himself is reported to 457 have been their author. : ' . and I shall abstain from giving descriptions of the Mudras (dispositions of upper limbs). sex. while Gorakshanatha reckoned their I take a few specimens true number as 8. posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose.000 from Eajendralal Mitra's Yoga Aphorisms. p. 2. of the Bandhas or bindings. and in this . Danc/asana. Place each foot under the thigh its of side. food and dwelling of the performer of Yoga.YOGANGAS. caste.400. p. To most people these 1 See Eajendralal Mitra. 103 i Padmasana. stick-seat. and the two thigh J . and names such as Vasish^Aa and Ya^navalkya are quoted as having described and sanctioned eightyfour postures. Virasana. lotus-seat. and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases. and the left foot on the right the hands should be crossed. Svastikasana. . and under the feet. and of the rules regarding the age. 3. Sitting straight with the feet is placed under the (opposite) thighs sana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh. fortunate-seat. I believe. It is called Padmasana.

been recorded and verified so often that we can hardly doubt that these postures and restraints of breathing. and a complete indifference of the Yogin towards pain and and heat. N. are helpful in producing complete abstraction (Pratya- hara) of the senses from their objects. or Aisvaryas. Powers. minute regulations will seem utterly absurd. for some of these facts have. 55) which it is the highest desire of the Yogin to realise. or simply Bhutis. . as developed from Prakriti. They able to watch the transition from rational beginto irrational exaggerations. Pata/lr/ali's The third chapter of are called Vibhutis. Vibhdtis. in a general way. the seer. C. cold ] . That transition is clearly indicated in the Yogangas or Cf. and this not for its own sake.458 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which to a reader without physiological knowledge seem simply absurd and incredible. presented to Purusha through the agency of the Manas pleasure. Yoga-Sutras is devoted to a description of certain powers which were supposed to be obtainable by the Yogin. if properly practised. Jfo'ddhis. I do not go quite so far. Paul. Professional students for of hypnotism would probably be able to account many statements of the followers of Kriya-yoga. and PrakHti. MahaHere also we are siddhis. the spectacle. indriy4?^im. II. the same tendency nings which led from intellectual to practical Yoga. Yoga-Philosophy. but as an essential condition of perceiving the difference between the Purusha. hunger and thirst This is what is meant the complete subjugation of by the senses (Param& vasyatS.

The Samyama. and the mind can be kept fixed on one object. is thoroughly collected and fixed on one point without any disturbing causes (III. the other five being treated as merely outward helps. of Yoga. is in i) as the this and said to be the tip of the nose. of which absorption or meditation is a very madhi. its absorption. arises when while the third. DharaTia. . Siddhis. firmness (Dharana). 8). the sky or some other place. postures (Asana). place the ether. however. confinement of the Manas to one place. which comprises the three highest is called internal (III. 3). 459 find eight of these accessories mentioned. poor rendering. viz. but. illuminates one object only. By this all other VHttis or motions of the Manas are stopped. Samyag adhiyate. or perfections. Samadhi. In II. is explained etymologically as that by which the mind. restraints (Yama). 7) in contra- distinction from the other helps. It is this Sawiyama. which leads on to the Siddhis. firm grasp being no more than an approximative rendering. and absorption (Samadhi). 29 we subduing (Niyama). firmness. Sawyama and helps to Yoga. 4 three only are chosen as constituting Samyama. but in III. real the mind. Dhyana. namely Dhyana. the navel. contemplation (Dhyana). abstraction (Praty4hara). in itself. firmness holding. lost in This Sawork. Dharawa. The next. arid Samadhi. is contemplation of the one object to the exclusion of all others . regulation of breathing (Pranayama). it is still but an outside help of the so-called objectless It is difficult to find a (Nirvi^a) state (III. word for Samyama. is explained (III.SAM YAM A AND accessories SIDDHIS.

Here (III. it sounds very much like a claim of the so time. though they become so afterwards. known from the it is difficult to see why Samyama is required for is this. endeavours show that every thing exists in three forms. This is expressed by So far all is clear but Pataf^ali in Sutra III. before explaining these Siddhis. a Yogin by applying Sawyama other animals. as now. but for all that. gift of prophecy. it is said. it is now. Thus a jar it is is not yet. exists only as clay the visible jar. when it more. when So in all things. when dust again. that a Yogin by means of Sa??iyama knows what to is come and what in is past. and as no more. and that it is possible from knowing one to know the other states. is supposed to be able to understand the language of birds and get more and more into in other superstitions. to Patafw/ali. nor are they the last and highest goal of Yoga-philosophy. be . is hardly miraculous yet though. These are at first by no means miraculous. the threefold modification. superstitions which little claim on the attention of the philosopher. by no means without parallels In fact we countries. as has often been supposed both by Indian and by European scholars. when we are told . have how- . the future may present and the present accounted for by the past. to this gift. and certainly became in higher degree to the achievements by means of Sawyama claimed by the Yogins in the following Svltras. and how it is to be applied to what called Knowledge of the past from the present. as not yet. and it is no has been broken up and reduced to it . 16.460 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. i 7) because a man has learned to understand applies The same a still the meanings and percepts indicated by words. or of the future from the present.

ascension to the sky. and by meditating on the navel. he may acquire firmness. though omniscience. or whether we try to account for them in any other way. such as the soul entering another body. Then follow other miraculous gifts all ascribed to as a knowledge of former existences. acquire on the moon. see heavenly visions. 461 ever interesting they may appear to the pathologist. 38 to 49. by meditating sun. a knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. By Samyama with make respect to kindness. we are landed once more in when we are told that he may may see things may. &c. as we know. even from a . them as mere hallucinations to which. whether we accept trivial. This again natural. conquest of the organs. acquire the strength of an elephant. Samyama. but soon after the supernatural. invisible to ordinary eyes. and it is certainly noteworthy. a fore-knowledge of one's death.SAMYAMA AND SIDDHIS. such a power of making oneself invisible. They form an essential part of the Yoga-philo- sophy. a knowledge of anatomy. in fact know everything. lightness like that of cotton. by meditating on the Polar star. effulgence. or thought-reading. More of these Siddhis are mentioned from IV. a man may is himself beloved by everybody. He may actually suppress the feelings of hunger and thirst. a knowledge of another's mind. though not of the merely casual objects of his thoughts. could not be passed over. conquest of all elements. a knowledge of astronomy. if only he can bring his will or his Sawyama to bear on the things which produce such effects. by meditating on the a knowledge of geography. sometimes indicated by portents. These matters. our senses and our thinking organ are liable. unlimited hearing. conquest of time.

and bid you rise and go to the Agastya A. are told that it was in the twenty-ninth year be accounted for like other visions which he performed We of his age that Sabhapati. . born in Madras in 1840. where you will find me in the shape of Rishis and 1 M. that we find such vague and incredible statements side by side with specimens of the most exact reasoning and careful observation. In reading the accounts of the miracles performed by Yogins in India we have in fact the same feeling of wonderment which we have in reading of the miracles performed by the Neo-platonists in Alexandria.sTama. thirsting for Brahma^/Mna or knowledge of Brahman. Miracles. that I who said to him in ' : Know. because I see that : you are holy and sincere. I accept you as my disciple. relates not only which the young student had these might but miracles in the presence of many people.. M. The same writer who can enter into the most abstruse questions of philosophy 1 with perfect good faith how he saw sitting in the air so feet will tell us his master above the ground. in all creations. had a vision of the Infinite Spirit. the author of a short visions life of his teacher. philosophical point of view.462 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. pati. many One instance of the miracles supposed to have been wrought by a Yogin in India must suffice. Sabhapati Svamy. Theosophy. Sabhaare the Infinite Spirit creations am me. Lcct. neither is any soul distinct from me I reveal this directly to you. A writer with whom I have been in correspondence. xiii. and all the are You not separate from me.

still living at Lahore. The Yogin had been expecting him ever since Mahadeva had commanded him Agastya Asrama. he has left us an account of a miracle performed by one of the former members of his own Asrama. also called Vedasrem-Svayambhu-sthalam. declining. and try to do good to the monger world by revealing the truths which thou hast to proceed to the ' : learned from me. in the dead of the night.' it 463 After that. acquired Brahmagwana and practised Samadhi till he could sit several days without any food. his face benign and shining with divinity.MIRACLES. seven miles from Madras. and was again commanded Asrama. went out of his house and travelled all the night till he reached the temple of Mahadeva. to perform any miracles. Be liberal in imparting the truths that should benefit the GHhasthas (householders). howIn 1880 he was ever. But though he himself declined to perform any of the ordinary miracles. Sabhapati left his wife and two sons.' Sabhapati seems after- wards to have taught in some of the principal cities and to have published several books. He became his pupil. two hundred years old. a great Yogin. in a large cave. in a vision to proceed to the Agastya After many perils he at last reached that Asrama and found there. About i So years ago a Yogin passed through Mysore and visited . for was one o'clock in the morning when he saw the divine vision. Yogins. But beware lest thy vanity or the importunity of the world lead thee to perform miracles and show wonders to the profane. There he sat for three days and three nights immured in deep contemplation. After seven years his Guru dismissed him with words that sound strange in the mouth of a miracleGo my son.

and cut down the branches of the fruit trees to pieces. and lightning began to flash. . Student. asked ' : What power ' ' . and they all went with the Yogin to his Asrama. clouds overcast the sky. we know that such things as the miracle here related are impos- Om. The Nabob. and the tempest and the thunder. gave divine power to it. him with great reverence and hospitality.' The people implored the Yogin to calm this universal havoc. Meanwhile the Nabob of Arcot paid a visit to Mysore. edited by Siris 1 Chandra Basu. and the unhesitating conviction on the part of those who relate all this. it The stick was transformed into millions of arrows. Lahore. we possess the full divine and the Yogin power to do all that God can do took a stick. Government College. the voice of the Yogin was heard to say If I give more power. and what have A you that you call yourselves divine persons ? Yogin answered. and threw in the sky. and in the midst of this conflict of the : elements. and the rain and the wind. being a Mussulreceived Rj ah who have you that you arrogate to yourself divine honour. and the fire and all were stopped. 1880. in it is the simplicity with which everything is me told. Of course. thunder began to roar in the air. He willed. ness spread over the land. by the Mahatma Giana Guroo Yogi Sabhapati Sovarni. and the sky was as serene and calm as ever I V do not say that the evidence here adduced would All that strikes pass muster in a Court of Law. 'Yes. a deep dark- man. Destruction was impending ' . the world will be in ruins. a treatise on Vedantic Raj Yoga Philosophy.464 the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and rain began to fall in torrents.

is Prophets would soon begin to outbid prophets. But all this is beyond our province. we must also remember that the influence of the mind on the body and of the body on the mind is as yet but half explored and in India and among the Yogins we certainly meet. it but human nature small beginnings. Yoga. there events also. 465 seems almost as great a miracle in that such things should ever have been believed. or expected. with what Pata^ali describes as a foretelling of the future by a knowledge of the What could be foretold might present or the past. It was truly philosophical. leading in many cases to a systematic deception of others. and should still continue to be beThis belief in miracles evidently began with lieved. and the small ball of superstition would roll on rapidly till it became the avalanche which we know it to be. and to have been at all times and in all countries. and the chief object it had in view was to realise the dis- Hh . in its early stages. feared.MIRACLES. however interesting it may be to modern psychologists. knew little or nothing of all this. and from prophecy even of recurrent events. but a step to prophesying other whether wished for. Apart from that. indications artificial that hypnotic states are produced by ference means and interpreted as due to an interof supernatural powers in the events of life. with many . however. sible. and it was only in order to guard against ordinary being supposed to be unwilling even to listen to the statements of those who believe in Kriyayoga that I have given so much space to what I cannot help considering as self-deception. soon be accepted as the work of the prophet who foretold it. particularly in more modern times.

the separation or deliverance of the subject from all that is was objective in him the truth being that the Purusha never can be the immediate experiencer or ever . claimed by the Yogins. or miraculous powers. or perceiver of pain or pleasure. experience arises from our not distinguishing between these two heterogeneous factors of our consciousness. are useless and may even become hindrances (III. But though Patam/ali allows all these postures and tortures as steps towards reaching complete abstraction and concentration of thought. We are told again and again that our ordinary. we ought reject to remember that only by practical experiments could we possibly gain the right to them altogether. Patafw/ali always gives the preference to efforts of thought over those of the flesh. freedom. this mind not being. or as we should call it. 37) in the career of the true aspirant after Viveka. and Kaivalya. the ever objective. If he does not discard the latter altogether. True Yoga. when perfect. nay he allows that all the Siddhis. but can only see them as being reflected on the Manas or mind. between subject and object. In enumerating the means by which this distinction can be realised. Moksha. aloneness. distinction. and Yoga. between the experiencer and the experienced. but simply the working of Prakn'ti. Sutras can really be the work of one and the same Thus while in the course of Patangrali's . his. One sometimes doubts whether all the mind. in truth.466 tinction INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. repre- sented the achievement of this distinction. he never forgets his highest object. the Purusha's. though false.

as a light by which to recognise the true independence of the subject from any object and as a preparation for this. it is to serve as a Taraka (III. Sattva. across the ocean of the world. claiming the muscle of the heart as the seat of the consciousness of thought (HHdaye While the human body as such is 7ifittasa?nvit). However. by Samyama or restraint. we are sud- 46) that loveliness. or causes (Ahamkara.' Instead of Mind. for if we activity. it is to serve as a discipline for subduing all the . Patan^ali sums up what he has ' said by a pregnant sentence is (III. and defines as the entering of thought (Jiitta) into its own causal form. after the removal of the misconception of This seems not quite exact. the general drift of the Yoga remains always the same. (III. 467 we could not but give him credit for never trying to locate the mind or the act of perceiving and conceiving in the brain. strength and adamantine firm- ness be gained for the body. may as a ferry. 54). which the commentator renders by A'ittasattva. This requires some explanation. while the Manas has a cause.TRUE YOGA. last Sutra of the third book. Pata%/ali says simply Sattva. 34. bodies. we find him suddenly in III. In the passions arising from worldly surroundings. we should be told that a Guna cannot have a cause. took Sattva as the Guna. Prakrit!) as soon as Hh 2 . and is to be reabsorbed into its cause . speculations. or in something like the pineal gland. always regarded as dark and as unclean. much more from contact with other denly told colour. so that the Yogin shrinks from contact with his own. Bnddhi. 55) : mind and the Kaivalya (aloneness) Self have obtained the same achieved when both the purity.

The Three Gums. to incantations. while. to Indian philosophers they seem to be so clear as to require no explanation at all. 15) l Sattva of the mind is goodstriving for mastery and its purification means its not ness.' doubly affected by the Gimas. Manas being overcome by the other two Gu^as of Ra^as. joy. 16). which Kaivalya. first as having thorn or being them. . fitis the same as In the fourth and last chapter Patafw/ali recurs once more to the Siddhis. the thought also is threefold. has become perfectly *Santa or quieted. 'As the is The mind in threefold. natural or miraculous. the case of the Purusha. but something substantial (Dravyam). here the Sattva. but I am bound to confess that their nature is by no means clear to me.468 its INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but also to birth. also. . Guna. holding the Self. From this passion. and from this at last Atmadar-sanayogyata. 47). unfortunately. and therefore in the there are these three Gu?ias (IV. from this Indriyar/aya. serenity. from concentration. purification springs first Saumanasya. In everything that springs from nature. meditation in its various forms. or Tamas. 1 and to heat Yatharthas trigunas tatha A'ittam api triguwam. to drugs. or in ness for beholding himself. darkness (II. light. fitness for bethis Ekagrata. perfections. then as being tinged once more by the Gunas of object fact is the objects perceived (IV. and tells us that they may be due not only to Samadhi. have tried to explain the meaning of the three Gu?ias before. aloneness. subjugation of the organs of sense. We are I always told that the three Guas are not qualities.

near to what we call instinct. from being a Kshatriya. in the locality when a man is born. a Brahman. pierces the balk of earth that kept the water from flowing in. As the results of actions we have Vasanas. it produces no fruit. These rethe mainders never cease. perceptions spring The result of its instincts. as a rule. They are not said to be without beginning. wishing to irrigate his field. or that on which they lean. or Samskaras. but also rebirth. as a Brahman or /Sudra. . their support.SAMSKARAS AND VASANAS. we are told. Though. 1 This kind of memory comes very untaught ability. or . impressions. became by penance a Brahman. often dormant. such as when Nandisvara. the act of a Yogin. Sawskaras and Vasanas. cow. of man. propensity. desire all is from nescience. whether good or bad. (Tapas) or ardour of asceticism. perceptions. and in the time Brahman or /Sudra. because it is performed without any desire. as when a husbandman. became a Deva. whatever a man does has its results. or when Visvamitra. so that pensities animal pro- may lie dormant for a time in a Brahman. Impressions are caused by from desire. is neither black nor white. 469 By birth is meant not only birth in this or in a future life. &c. dispositions. 10). They show themselves either in what remains. because desires and fears can only arise when there are objects to be feared or desired (IV. and is then called memory l or in the peculiar genus. but break out again when he enters on a canine birth. bird. their them the body with habitat the mind. This is accounted for as being simply a removal of hindrances.

whether Rajendralal Mitra can be right 9. and holds that the three ways or Adhvans in which objects present themselves to the mind. not directly of the Buddhi. IV. e. present and future. and how what does not exist can be how how made to exist. e. the Hence it is said that they sprout. objective world. though somewhat fanciful. I confess I hardly understand his meaning. ever. the universalia in re. the mind. the concepts in our minds. 1 8) and as becoming conscious and intelligent for a time only by the union between it and the Purusha. It should never be forgotten that the mind is taken by Patafl(/ali as by itself unconscious (not as Svilbhasa. exists can be made not to exist. this A'itta. In what anything can ever be completely destroyed. the essence. definition of consciousness (con-scientia) as well as of the Sanskrit Saw-vid.e. side when seen by the seer (Purusha) on one and tinged with what is seen on the other. the ideas or types. so that here we should have the etymological. The Manas only receives the consciousness of perception which conies in reality from the Purusha. the same as the support of perception. when roasted. self-illuminated. as past. like seeds. but that by Knowledge and Yoga they can be annihilated also like seeds. how(III. though . IV.470 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. may be spoken of as the thought of the Purusha. i. or affect the mind. I doubt. 12) when he discovers here something like the theory of ideas or logoi in the mind of Patafi<?ali. But though Altta the work of the Manas. is i. who is pure intelligence. knowing along with the impressions of the apprehending i. connexion with this the question is discussed. and the universalia post rem. mind (Svabuddhi-Sawvedanam). correspond to the admission ofuniversalia ante rem.

of bringing him back to a final recognition of his true Self (IV./Litta by a temporary misconception only. i. free. and as such it serves no purpose of its own. perfect discrimination is rewarded by what is called by a strange tion. This again is coloured by many former impressions It be called the highest form of PrakHti. unless the old Yoga-remedies are used again and again to remove all impediments. may whom it binds and fascinates for a time with the are told. cease troubling Purusha becomes himself. but works really for another. sole purpose. and no it should have been mistaken for . knowledge and virtue being inseparable like cause and effect. even what is to be known becomes smaller and smaller. obtainment of the highest bliss of the Purusha. the term.IS YOGA NIHILISM ? 47! it is so . is independent. Is Yoga Nihilism? This is wonder that the end of the Yoga-philosophy. Prakriti. Yet there is always danger of a relapse in unguarded moments or in the intervals of meditainterfere with the Old impressions may reassert themselves. Then at last. the Purusha. the Purusha knows that he himself is not experiencer. once achieved. and mind may lose its steadiness. and blessed. have now ceased. so as not to actor . All works and all sufferings . the cloud of virtue. Dharmamegha. having done their work. (Vasana). the very Gunas. undisturbed. 24). when beginning to feel the approach of Kaivalya. neither knower nor If that is and the Manas or active mind.e. we Kaivalya. turns more and more inward and away from the world.

though himself. without any fear or hope among of another life. and on which even native expositors hold different What w e must guard against in all these opinions. studies is rejecting as absurd whatever we cannot understand at once. a mere phantasmagoria or to a nothing. aloneness may continue his life. other innumerable Purushas and is not thereby annihilated. the Purusha. I know from my own experience how . though freed .472 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. though it has ceased for our Purusha. Though I hope that the foregoing sketch may give a correct idea of the general tendency of the Yoga-philosophy. we need not attempt what Pata?~^ali himself has passed over in The final goal whether of the Yoga. nay even of the Vedanta and of Buddhism. and those who attempt to do so are apt to reduce it to that it is . But first of all. apart it is not distinctly stated. like the 6rivan- nmkta of the Vedanta. is supposed to be going on for ever for the benefit of as long as there are any spectators. to supply silence. unchanged himself in this ever- changing Samsara. but nothing can be It is what no eye has seen and predicated of it. He is from nature. that the Purusha in his from illusion. who has gained true knowledge. Nirvana in its highest sense is a name and a thought. or what to us seems fanciful or r irrational. and it is possible. However. or of the Samkhya. maintaining his freedom a crowd of slaves. always defies description.' We ' know but no one can say what it is. the play of Prak?^'ti. Secondly. complete nihilism by Cousin and others. I know but too well that there are several points which require further elucidation. what has not entered into the mind of man. the spectacle of Prakrit! will never cease.

in contradistinction to Kapila who denies that there are any arguments in continents of thought. and we be afraid to follow in their track. though often for what seemed me absurd. 36) says in so is . disclosed after be bewildering to us. to reduce them to systematic order.IS YOGA NIHILISM? to 473 a long time unmeaning. they do not deceive or persuade themselves. as Plato has erred and even Kant. should be put down as a mere economy or as an accommodation to popular opinion. reason why I doubt whether the admission of an Isvara or lord by Pataf^ali. could not be entirely suppressed. nor do they try to deceive others. a time a far deeper nay meaning than I should ever have expected. they shrink from no consequences if they follow This is the inevitably from their own premisses. support of such a being. These ancient sages should become fellow-workers and fellow-explorers with ourselves in unknown ought not to They always have the courage of their convictions. but they are not decepti deceptores. The great multitude of technical terms. remains with philosophers me are a strong conviction that Indian honest in their reasonings. before any attempt was made. because it helps to show through how long and continuous a development these Indian it may systems of thought must have passed. letter Indian philosophers l Patark/ali (II. and words that truth many are than sacrifice They may err. and I can only hope that if others follow in my footsteps. But there remains much to be done. as it was by Patafw/ali and There others. and never use empty words. truthful. 1 Satyapratish^ayam kriyaphalasrayatvat. . they will in time make these old bones to live again.

or reasoning on one side. particularly in the Vedanta. and Yoga. and these with their reputed authors. and much more like what we mean by scholastic systems of philosophy. there runs a strong religious and even poetical vein. that is. Samkhya. like the Samkhya to a certain extent like the Purva and Uttara-Mimawisa. the Nyaya and Vaiseshika also have by the Hindus themselves been treated as forming but one discipline. It WHILE in the now come and Yoga. which are very dry and unimaginative.CHAPTER VIII. and the objects which they present to us. Gotama and Kanada. businesslike expositions of what can be known. Eelation between Nyaya and Vaiseshika. on the other. conceiving. the period to which the first attempts at a written in place of a purely . and should be remembered that. we to two systems. that the literary style which sprang up naturally in what I called the Sutra-period. NYAYA AND VALSESHIKA. either of the world which surrounds us or of the world within.veshika-Sutras. Nyaya and Vaiseshika. systems hitherto examined. of our faculties or powers of perceiving. have long been accepted as the original sources We whence these two streams of the ancient But we know now philosophy of India proceeded. possess indeed a separate body of Nyaya-Sutras and another of Vai.

the TarkamHta. but continued to be so well imitated in later times that we used with great success not only in the Samkhya-Sutras. so that. with its commentary the Muktavali. omne scibile. and instead of regarding the two as two independent streams. but in more modern compositions also. was by no means restricted to that ancient period.D. old system of Anvikshikl. in the present state of our mere conjectures know- . the other after the confluence of the two. and hence we can as one. very like our Tarthe one before the bifurcation of the kasamgraha.). the Padarthas.RELATION BETWEEN NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA. &c.e. in the Tarkasamgraha. 475 mnemonic literature may have to be ascribed. i. These two systems many things in common. the two systems of Vaise- shika and shared of course Nyaya branched off. But these are as yet conjectures only. according to the preponderance of either the one or the other subject. the Tarkakaumudi. in the Bhasha-PariM'Aeda. it seems far more likely that there existed at first an as yet undifferentiated body of half philosophical half popular thought.D. It should always be borne in mind that the Sutras ascribed to Gotama and Ka^ada presuppose a long previous development of philosophical thought. which are later than Madhava find it (1350 A. may have been an and may have to remain always. and on the means of acquiring such knowledge. bearing on things that can be known. well understand that at a later time they as should have been drawn together again and treated we see in >Sivaditya's Saptapadarthi (about 1400 A. from which at a later time. There old Tarka.). For practical purposes it is certainly preferable that we should follow their example and thus avoid the necessity of discussing the same subjects twice over.

as we have to treatment.. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and I may refer my readers to him for the best information on the subject. however. were anterior to Buddha. very zealous native scholar. B.C. and. as systems of thought. But unfortunately that period in the historical development of the Nyaya which is of greatest interest to ourselves. do. for the simple reason that nothing is known of Nyaya before Gotama. should be welcome. Bodas places the Sutras of Gotama and Kanada in the fifth or fourth cent. former years to assign the Kapila-Sutras to the fourteenth or even fifteenth century A. had by him also to be left a blank. Was not Kalidasa himself assigned to a period long before the beginning of our era ? It seems now generally accepted that Kalidasa really belonged to the sixth century A. Dignaga. D. in the present state of our studies. but treat each system by itself in spite of unavoidable repetitions. Mr. in the Introduction to his edition of the Tarkasa??igraha. and he expresses a . chiefly on the existing Sutras as the authorities recognised in India itself. without however adducing any new or certain belief that the Vaiseshika. Bodas. and this . In any date. has indeed promised to give us A some kind of history of the Nyaya-philosophy in India. Dates are the weak points in the literary history of India. nay even the Samkhya. however late. Mahadeo Rajaram Bodas. we must not attempt a historical and depending. D.. would have seemed downright heresy.476 ledge. have been extremely well treated by Mr. The later periods. proofs. namely that which preceded the composition of the Nyaya-Sutras.

p. according to native interpreters. See also Prof. may be fixed by means of that of Dignaga as I tried to show in the passage quoted above (India. Satis of Buddhist Text Society. valuable to us. Kalidasa alluded to the logician Dignaga in a verse of his Meghaduta 2 . 307 seq. A more comprehensive study of Buddhist literature may possibly shed some more light on the still to be worth much. 307. IV. if I am right in supposing that in the beginning the followers of Buddha broke by no means so entirely. as explained by him and other Nyaya philosophers. with the literary It is quite intelligible 1 2 India.).DIGNAGA. and assign the same or rather an earlier date to the svamin. while Uddyotakara wrote his commentary to refute his interpretation and to restore that of PakshilaIf Va&aspati Misra is right. date of Kalidasa 477 help us to a date for the Sutras of Gotama. though it may be despised by those who imagine that the value may of Sanskrit literature depends chiefly on its sup- posed remote antiquity. is said by Ya&aspati Misra. traditions of the Brahmans. pp. I think it is Several other dates chronology of the later literature of the Brahmans. . We may suppose therefore that Dignaga was con- Now Dignaga sidered a contemporary of Kalidasa. as has generally been supposed. I have pointed out l that. and iv. p. to have interpreted the Nyaya aphorisms of Gotama in a heterodox or Buddhist sense. we should be allowed to place Dignaga in the sixth century. So late a date may not seem worth having. 16. in his Nyaya-varttikatatparya-ika. parts Chandra Vidyablmshana in Journal iii. Sutras of Gotama.

and we know that the same Sutras were explained afterwards by Dignaga. such as the existence of an Lsvara.INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. of the sixth century. the same as those which we possess. 307 seq.). though making their reserves on certain points. 16. p. This Buddhist commentary was attacked by Uddyotakara. the Buddhist. See also Journal of Buddhist Text Society. clearly for the six Brahmanic systems of philosophy. 1896. an authority which the Buddhists had rejected. We know that at the court of Harsha. which was admitted by the Nyayas. a Brahman. before he became a Buddhist. dhist. This Yasubaridha. Therefore in Vasubandha's time all the six systems of Indian philosophy must have been in existence. who travelled in India from 629 to 648 A. a commentary by Pakshila-svamin or Vatsyayana on the Nyaya-Sfitras. D. and 6rainas were equally welcome (India. while of the in the beginning 1 seventh century Dharmakirtti. But there was no reason why the Buddhists should forswear the study of either the Nyaya or Vaiseshika systems. in the form of Sutras or Karikas. Brahmans. for instance. in one case at least. but denied by Buddha. We know from Chinese travellers such as Hiouen-thsang that Vasubandha. pp. had read with his 1 not only master. meant but also the six Tirthya philosophies. was actuallv the teacher of Hiouen-thsang. Vinayabhadra or Samghabhadra the books of the eighteen schools which were Bud. or even the Sawkhya system. various systems of Hindu philosophy the Buddhists should have paid little attention to the two Mimawsas. as a very old man. . concerned as they both were why among the with the Veda. Bauddhas. For we possess.

the Nyaya-samuM'aya. the Madhyamika. Though none of Dignaga's writings have as yet been discovered. may be is there also. which are full of interest. The Sutras or rather Karikas of the Madhyamika school must. to is 479 said to have defended Dignaga l and have criticised Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika. his This would coincide with the period of the Brahmanic reaction and the general collapse of Buddhism in India. a Buddhist. we have lately gained access to some of the Sutras of the Buddhist schools of philosophy. 3 1896. Yogalura. and thus place before us an intelligible progress in the study of the Nyaya both by Brahmans and Buddhists from the sixth to the tenth century. of course. p. and every hope that other philosophical treatises for instance. a Buddhist. defended Dharmakirtti's and indirectly Dignaga's interpretation of the Nyaya-Sutras. Of the four great schools of the Buddhists. be distinguished from the system of thought which they are meant to explain. Thanks to the labours of Sarat Chandra Das and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusharta. . and Vaibhashika. while the revival of the Nyaya dates from Gamgesa Upadhyaya who lived in the fourteenth century at Mithila. Sri Sarat Chandra states that there is in the library of the Grand Lama a Tibetan translation of his Nyaya-samuft&aya (Journal of Buddhist Text Society.DIGNAGA. Sautrantika. part iii. and it was not till re-established the in the tenth century that Va&aspati Misra finally Brahmanic view of the Nyaya Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-ika. 17). In the ninth century Dharmottara. the first or in Madhyamika now lies before us the Madhyamika 'Vritti by A^andra-Kirtti. made accessible to us by the labours of these inde- fatigable scholars.

from . Madhyamikas between what is Paramarthika. is a son. Though it is different. and we should have in his Karikcas.480 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is much the same as the distinction of the later Vedanta between what is really real (ParamarthaPratitya in Pratitya-samutpada and similar words may best he rendered by dependent or conditioned. in Badarayana's Yedanta-Sutras II. we now all the six systems. this after all is not very different from the Vedantic Avidya. dependent on a father. where $a??ikara distinctly refers the doctrine that we know no objects. characteristic feature The of that system is the unya-vada. as explained by A'andra-Kirtti. The author of the Parl&adasi quotes the Madhyamikas by name as the teachers of universal nihilism (Sarvam iSunyam). else. and a father 1 A is impossible without a son. 44. 28. but only our to Sugata or Buddha. veiled. or nihilism. they would carry us back to about the first century A. As such it is referred to and refuted in Gotama's Nyaya- Sutras IV. possess them. and if it teaches the Pratityatva of everything. 2. and the Sa?>ikhya Aviveka. and Samvntika. the oldest document of systematic philosophy in India. in Kapila's Samkhya-Sutras I. In the same way everything is dependent on something . that terms. on something else need be no more than the dependence of everything The distinction made by the 1 . for instance. Pitaram Pratitya. If Nagar^una was really the author as of the Madhyamika-Sutras. no doubt. it nevertheless shares in common with them many of the ideas and even technical If it teaches the /Sunyatva or emptiness of the world. 43. D. real in the highest sense. perceptions of them. son. which will require very careful examination. 37 to 40. pure and simple.

What is peculiar to the Buddhists is extrinsic. as Satkaryavada. and we also have the well-known idea that Manas. earth. however. Bibliography. for instance. Whether Buddhist philosophy shares more in common with the Samkhya than with Vaiseshika seems to me as doubtful the Nyaya and The as ever. Many of the technical terms used by the Madhyamikas are the same as those with which we are acquainted in the other systems. meet with the five perceptions of colour. light. Du/ikha. and sound. is the very opposite of the Buddhist view of the world. forms the sixth sense.BIBLIOGRAPHY. intrinsic. divine or supernatural. It was in 1852 that published my first contributions to a study of Indian philosophy in the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandisclien Gesellschaft. We that to them neither the objects of sense nor the sensations point to an underlying substance or reality. for they hold that even the $unya is not altogether nothing. empty. and Adhidaivika. and ether. which again is not very different from what the Buddhists is and what meant originally by /Sunya. owe a great debt of gratitude to both Sarat We Chandra Vidyabhushana for their labours in Tibet. touch. 481 Vyavaharika. the veil that covers the Nirgwia Brahman or the Tad. phenomenal or the result of Maya. and with their five causes. sometimes called Samvn'ti. fundamental position of the Samkhya. water. and we look forward to many valuable contributions from their pen. mind. These papers did not extend. smell. is divided into Adhyatmika. Adhibhautika. air. taste. pain. ta/i). i i . more Sri Satis Chandra Das and particularly for retranslations from Tibetan.

I found that there was not to alter in my old account of Gotama's and Kanada's philosophies. such as Professors Deussen and Garbe. as given in the German Oriental Journal. The difficulty in giving an account of these systems for the benefit of European . through the complete translation of them by A. particularly through the publications of the Vaiseshika-Sutras the Bibliotlieca Indica. beyond the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophy as treated in the Tarkasa?ttgraha. Indian philosophy has this great adthat each tenet is laid down in the Sutras vantage with the utmost precision. These essays have sometimes been called antiquated. and Vai. and more urgent occupations connected with the edition of the Rigveda prevented me at the time from finishing what I had prepared for publication on the other systems of Indian philosophy. much new and important material has come to light in the meantime.482 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. such as J. the relation between cause and effect. the meaning of creation. so that there can be little doubt as to what Ka?iada or Gotama thought about the nature of the soul. of course. 1873. and in my paper on Indian Logic contributed to the late Archbishop Thomson's Laws much of Thought. and the relation between God or the Supreme Being and man.veshika and the other systems even papers published so long ago Colebrooke's papers on the Nyaya of Indian all philosophy. the reality of human knowledge. E. Though. and through the comprehensive rein searches of European scholars. but there is a great difference between what is old and what is antiquated. Gough. may still be recommended to who want trustworthy information on Indian philosophy. Thus it may be understood why as 1824.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. The Vaiseshika Aphorisms of Kanada. to the family of the Gautamas or Gotamas. so as to bring out the salient points of each system. a. it would seem.) A.363 (incomplete) see also Bibliotheca Indica. Windisch. 1877. Sanskrit and English. Bombay. 1 in the Pundit. than in recapitulating all their tenets. to whom we owe a valuable edition of the Yogasara- sawgraha. pp. s. being an introduction to the principles of the Yaiseshika arid Nyaya-philosophies by Laugakshi This is the same author Bhaskara. translated. both belonging. the MSS. Books in which the Nyaya and Vaiseshika-systems may be studied by those who are unacquainted with : Sanskrit are. The Nyaya-darsana with the com- mentary of Vatsyayana. Kesava $astri. . Manilal Nabubhai Dvivedi. prepared by the late Kao Bahadur Yasavanta Vasadeo Athalya. on the Nyaya and Vaiseshika were written. 1886. Gough. varying with regard to the vowel. Gautama as that of Buddha. This book reached me after these chapters 1897. Allahabad. Leipzig. 60. only that a tacit agreement Gotama has generally been by used as the name of the philosopher. and published with critical and explanatory notes. 09. The Aphorisms of the Nyaya-Philo- sophy by Gautama. 1873. Mahadeo Kajaram Bodas. 1850. The Tarkasamgraha of Annambha^a. Bombay. but not too late to enable me I i to profit 2 by several of . Benares. Uber das Nyaya-bhashya. 483 readers consists far more in deciding what may be safely omitted. 311. The Tarka-Kaumudi. E. (Gautama is the same as Gotama. besides the papers of Colebrooke Ballantyne. with the author's Dipika and Govardhana's Nyaya-bodhini.

Nor is logic the sole or chief end of Gotama's philosophy. like that of the other Darsanas. or resignation. according to the ancient commentator Vatsyayana. no doubt. and without death. Even this Brahmahood must not be an object of desire. This summum bonum which is promised to summum bonum is called by Gotama Ni/zsreyasa. state of freedom. the all. namely. the non plus ultra of blessedness. we must not imagine that the Nyaya-Sutras are anything like our treatises on formal logic. published by Goldstlicker. according to Gotama. can. and prevent that perfect freedom from all fear or hope. be realised in one way only. but should never be yearned for. as Sayana's to Nyaya-mala-vistara. his explanations and criticisms. described as consisting in renunciation with regard to all the pleasures of this life. . literally that which has nothing better. for such desire would at once produce a kind of bondage. without as being in fact what Brahman is. Ny ay a-P hilosophy Though Nyaya has always been translated by logic. There is. or indifference to any rewards in the to come fear. . This blessedness. printed. without decay. by a knowledge of the sixteen great topics of the Nyaya-philosophy. before they were . the Purva-Mimamsa. a greater amount of space allowed to logical questions in these than in any of the other but originally the systems of Indian philosophy name of Nyaya would have been quite as applicable . Its chief end.484 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which is to follow by Thin perfect itself. is salvation. for instance. and in this case. and in the nonis acceptance life of. which is actually called Nyaya in such works. by knowledge. without desire.

saw that the Vedanta recognised true salvation or Moksha in the knowledge of Brahman. 485 Summum Bonum.' every Vedantist is to learn in the end the same lesson. and far beyond the reach of the But he can be ordinary faculties of our mind. for the sake of knowledge. being a dualist. highest purpose that man can strive after in this life. and as $vetaketu was taught Tat tvam asi/ Thou art it. and to realise his identity with Brahman. which knowledge is tantamount to identity with Brahman. likewise the object of the Samkhya-philosophy. though it is to be reached by a different road. the true means of destroying all bondage recognises is and regaining perfect freedom of the spirit in our distinguishing clearly between spirit and matter. . that is. Kapila. his own salvation. but for the promised . This Brahman or God is. as the fulfilment of all desires. as the Upanishads already declare. as with us. In this respect all the six systems of philosophy are alike. and the character also of the bliss is not always the same yet in each of the six systems philosophy is recommended not. invisible. and he sees the cause of all suffering in the spirits' identifying themselves with what He therefore purely objective or material. they always promise to their followers or their believers the attainment of the highest bliss that can be obtained by man. admits all suffering is The end of an objective substratum by the side of a subjective spirit or rather spirits. and the surcease of all ' ' We suffering (Du^khanta). learnt from revelation as contained in the Veda. The approaches leading to that bliss vary.SUMMUM BONUM.

' He who knows Brahman is is Brahman curious to observe that. the Vedanta on the contrary postulates the surrendering of all between the Self and the world. which knowledge produces at once the recognition of oneself as in reality Brahman (Brahmavid Brahma eva bhavati. The roads are different. the right is name for that highest state of bliss which promised to us by the Samkhya-philosophy. The other Mima?usa. object. illusions and It also lays great stress on devotion to a Spirit. the subjects. among the other whose very existence. but it insists strongly on certain spiritual exercises by which the soul ness. between subject and Prak?-iti. if only . the Pramawas. and Prakriti. supreme spirits. while the Sa?7ikhya insists on a distinction between Purushas. may best obtain and maintain peace and from the all quiet- and thus free sufferings of itself effectually life. and between the Self and Brahman as the right means of Moksha. cannot be established by any of the recognised means of real knowledge. It indeed '). or aloneness. as the only means of final beatitude. and holds that salvation may be obtained through the performance of such works. Of the two Mima??isas we have seen already that the Brahma-Mimawsa or the Vedanta recognises salvation as due to knowledge of the Brahman. between Purusha and is Kaivalya.486 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. (7aimini. stress on works (Karman) and their right performance. but the point distinction reached at last is much the same. The Yoga-philosophy holds much the same view of the soul recovering its freedom. that of diverges It lays its chief widely from that of Badarayami. according to Kapila. all that is objective.

our sufferings. is not considered assigned to a lower class only. The Vedanta speaks of Ananda. That paradise has no attraction. Lastly. agreeing as they do among themselves. whether on earth or in heaven. They different are satisfied with teaching that from the body. . will cease by themselves. Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems. The bliss held out by the It Samkhyas also is very vague and indefinite. These two philosophies. and as final. which always reach us the soul is through the body. if this belief in the body as our own is once surrendered. whether corresponding to Brahman or to Prak?^'ti. and they think that. are satisfied with pointing out the means of it as consisting in correct knowledge. but no details are added. the though they also aim at salvation. such as can only be obtained from a clear apprehension of the sixteen topics treated by Gotama. But while we can understand that each of the six systems of Indian philosophy may succeed in removing pain. Their blissful knowledge is described as oneness with Brahman. seem to me to differ very characteristically from all the others in so far as they admit of nothing invisible or transcendent (Avyakta). or bliss. . it is very difficult to see in what that actual happiness was supposed to consist which remained after that removal.SUMMUM BONUM. but is in a kind of paradise. and would give no real satisfaction to those who have reached the know- ledge of the Highest Brahman. that but the happiness resides in the highest Brahman to be enjoyed by the souls near the throne of Brahman. 487 they are performed without any desire of rewards. or the six or seven categories put forward by Kar^ada.

1 Sacred Books of the East. if left entirely to himself. in the shorter text of the Maitreya Nirvanam anusasanam occurs. used in the sense of blown ' out. immortality.' the right form ' would be Nirvata/^. plus Nor does the well-known Buddhist term delivery.488 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Kaivalya. XV. We know indeed from was pre-Budtells Pa?iini (VIII. detachment.sasanam. p. it was borrowed there from There is one passage only. the Apavarga (bliss) of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems seems entirely negative. NiAsreyasa. isolation or ultra. Nirvfwa does not yet mean a complete blowing out of the individual soul.' but Nirvano *ghih. us very 7io?i Mukti and Moksha mean deliver- ance.' We cannot prove. can arise only from the Purusha himself. 'the wind has ceased to blow. far from all the illusions and disturbances arising from objective nature. however. What should be clearly understood is that in the early Buddhistic writings also. Even the bliss names given to the supreme each system of philosophy tell promised by different little. Lastly. 2. 61. such as Nirvat'o vata/i. 50) that the word dhistic and existed in his time. if He us that. and it does not seem to the all occur in the classical Upanishads. Nirvana help us much. or the works of Pralm'ti. Amrita. and produced simply by the removal of false knowledge. Upanishad where possibly meant for l Nirvananu. that Nirvana was used as the technical term for the summum bonum in Pa?dni's time. . Its occurring as title of one of the modern Upanishads makes it the more likely that Buddhistic sources. the fire is gone out. Apavarga. the teaching of Nirvana.

part i. wrangling. The meaning of complete annihila- was a later and purely philosophical meaning attached to Nirvana. (6) Siddhanta. instance (5) Prayo^ana. : we find them enumerated in the following list The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas. I doubt even whether the Upanishads could have given us a description of what they conceived their In fact highest Mukti or perfect freedom to be. in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society. (15) See a very learned article on Nirvawa by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhushawa. means of knowledge (2) Prameya. . p. fallacies. 489 but rather the blowing out and subsiding of all human passions and the peace and quietness which result from it. . (i) . . doubt (4) objects of knowledge (3) Samsaya. thought ' is not likely to fare better. 1 quibbles. 22. cavilling. . (12) Vitanc/a. purpose established truth (7) Avayava. argumentation. they confess themselves (Taitt. VI. (10) Vada. (8) Tarka. unable to reach it V an d when language fails. premisses clusion . con6ralpa. i) that all speech turns away from the bliss of Brahman. and no one certainly could form an idea of what that Nirvana was meant to tion be in the Buddhist Nihilistic or >Sunyata-philosophy. . . II. DHsh^anta. Pramana. 4.THE SIXTEEN TOPICS OR PADARTHAS. sophistry. Means of Salvation. Up. (n) (14) /f/^ala. reasoning . (13) Hetvabhasa. . Turning now to the means by which the Nyayaphilosophy undertakes to secure the attainment of the summum bonum or Apavarga. (9) Nirnaya.

or whether it can claim an . the question whether revelation falls under the one or the other. on a previous inference by which the authority of the word. has first been established. (16) Nigrahasthana. according to Gotama. are Pratyaksha. analogies. Upamana. sensuous perception. inference. Means of Knowledge.49 ^rati. particularly by one title of that claims the Nyaya or logic. Anumana. objects of knowledge. This may seem a very strange list of the topics It is clear to be treated by any philosophy. while the $abda or the word. comparison. as we should say. unfitness for arguing. How many if all misunderstandings might philosophers had recognised of such an introductory chapter. than a subordinate kind of inference. comprehend the whole of philosophy. first on our then on our combinatory and reasoning senses. If the necessity have been avoided we must depend for all our knowledge. depends again. and Prameya. particularly that of the Veda. that in reality the chapters on Prama?ia or means of knowledge. and >Sabda. it seems to me highly creditable to Indian philosophers that they should have understood the necessity of such an analysis on the very threshold of any system of philosophy. Imperfect as this analysis of our instru- ments of knowledge may seem. faculties. Comparison is no more because inference can only work after perception has prepared first. Perception comes begin to do its the way. and has supplied the material to which inference can be applied. false INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. The four Pramanas. word. more particularly the revealed word.

These death. whatever may be. soul. 6. and final freedom. will. objects of knowledge. we should be perfectly justified. such as body. mind. organs sense. quite clear that these sixteen topics should .OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE. quibbles. in fact. w hile premisses and reasoning lead on to the concourse little to first do with mark the r clusion 10 to logic. If from our point of view we deny the name of logic to such problems. steps instances and established truths supply materials. From Nos. fallacies. cognition. applicable to reasoning. can far more easily be settled than if such questions are not asked in limine. false analogies. comprehend omne scibile. 1 which disputants wish to reach. we have rules for dialectic rather than for We are taught how to meet the artifices of our antagonists in a long argumentation. how to defend truth against unfair antagonists. the treatment of which led gradually to subject It is the elaboration all of general rules of its thought. towards philosophical discussion. are afterwards discussed singly. as given by the Nyaya. wrangling. how to avoid or to resist sophistry. Objects of Knowledge. enjoyment. 49! independent authority. before logic became an independent branch of philosophy it was likewise mixed up with dialectic and with questions of some more special interest. fault. qualities. though a glance at the history of Greek philosophy would show us that. pain. but turn up casually whenever transcendental problems come to be treated. but have of objects The of Doubt and purpose logic. and downright misstatements.

or whatever can be predicated. and were then supposed to be something different from the old and e. mere forgotten ynomina they became nomina. names. by the sixteen categories. quibbles and all the rest. they called far more truly objects of words. . but literally it meant Artha. and that the objects of our knowledge became possible only after they had been named. Nothing shows so well the philosophical character of the Sanskrit language than this very word PadIt artha. but after a time. which has been translated by category. means in ordinary Sanskrit simply a thing. as they mostly have been. it could never have been so far extended as to include wrangling. thus showing that from the earliest times they understood that no thought was possible except in a word. their ynomina became nomina. Categories are the praedicabilia. the object. Object.492 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. that the six or seven Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas correspond far more nearly to the categories of the Aristotelian and afterwards of European philosophy in general. from y]nosco. Their language passed through an opposite process to that of Latin. and after the initial y known had been dropped. Pada. We shall see fallacies. on no account be rendered. and however much the meaning of this term may have been varied by European philosophers. as we drop it involuntarily in gnat. of a word. Latin called every kind of knowledge or to know all . Padartha. things gnomina. the meaning. What we should call objects of thought. . i.

or motions. and should be carefully distinguished from mere conjunction or succession. categories or predicates. or even to absolute Abhava. it would seem. the general and the particular. itself is one of the substances. the it Nyaya-philosophy was meant to achieve. the last known meaning. to which all words i. The seventh category. and what is peculiar to one. i. was added. six general meanings. parts and the whole. however. Knowledge (Buddhi) is which here treated as one of the qualities of the soul. very near to the Avinabhava. and can be applied to previous. the Not-withoutbeing. in the eyes of native scholars. e. Samavaya or intimate connection is a very useful name for a connection between things which cannot exist one without the other. Abhava. we have six Padarthas. The next two. e. so that many things which with us belong to psychology and logic. so as to correspond in fact to our activity or even to our becoming (Werden). stances things must be either subqualities (24). all things can be referred. and thus distinguishes it from all others. it may be useful to look at an account of given . at a later time. e. are treated by the Vaiseshikas under this head. and the like.MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OF NYAYA. more than mere local movement. Madhava's Account of Nyaya. i. such as cause and It comes effect. Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika. In order to see what. or negation. All (9). 493 According to the Vaiseshikas. comprehend what is shared in common by many objects. to present or to subsequent non-existence.

" the second he investigates the truth as to the " causes of the faults. In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines activity (Prav?"itti). the senses.494 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY." In the first daily portion fifth book he discusses the various kinds of the various kinds futility (Giiti). first book the venerable Gotama discusses the ' ' " definitions of nine subjects. and their objects . and in the second those of the remaining In the seven. and refutes all objections that could be made against their being considered as instruments of right know- ledge tion " . and in the second of the of objectionable proceedings (Nigrahasthana). Ni//. fruit or reward (Phala). transmigration (Pretyabhava). . Gotama proceeds at once to a description of the steps by which the promised is to be attained. "understanding (Buddhi) and mind (Manas). the body. the compendium of all the systems of The Nyaya-sastra.vreyasa. and each book contains two daily In the first Ahnika of the portions or Ahnikas. and final liberation (Apavarga) .' After having held out in the promise of eternal salvation to all first Sutra the his who study philosophy properly." and also the subject of "wholes" and "parts. faults (Dosha).' he says. by the great Madhava/iarya in his Sarvadarsanasa?ttgraha. first daily portion of the second book he examines doubt (8). of the third book he examines the daily portion in the soul. discusses the four kinds of proof. beginning with proof" (Pramana). consists philosophy. or highest happiness. in pain (Du/ikha). of five books. beginning with discussion (Vada). second. and in the second he shows that " presumpand other Pramanas are really included in the " four kinds of In the first proof" already given.

desire. Then follow in succes- contact. According to the Buddhists there follow on Avidya origin resting on something else. s. sorrow. and was meant generally translated by Chain to sum up the causes It of existence or of misery. fering. Upadana. Gotama or Gautama. of faults. This of successive proclaimed by Buddha has formed the subject of ever so many commentaries. lamentation. Samkhya-Philosopliie. the twelve Nidanas.MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OP NYAYA. Gautama. . Who was the earlier of the two. and Upayasa. all the varieties of existence . sensation. the six organs of perception. on these the Shac/ayatana. 2 Garbe. sensation . despair states 2 . decay and death. but what- ever the age of our Sutras (the sixteen topics) 1 may Cf. on Vi(/?lana. Vedana. p. chain grief. sufbirth. 6rati. When (Apavarga). of activity. Cf. Du^kha. none of which seems quite satisfacThe chain of Gotama is shorter than that of tory. Avidya or that cosmic Nescience The which was the Samkharas these ] . Parideva. is still a contested question.v. but the general likeness can hardly be mistaken. 495 namely by the successive annihilation of false knowledge. literally abstersion or This process reminds us strongly of purification. . on this Namarupa. names and forms sion Sparsa. really first means is step so fully elaborated in the Vedanta-philosophy. and. Bhava. in consequence. Childers. (^aramarana. attachment. been annihilated there follows ipso facto freedom. Daurmanasya. some of the links in the PadM^a Samuppada of the or blessedness Buddhists. of the last or suffering has birth and suffering. This is of Causation. /S'oka. state of exis- tence. THstma. 269 seq.

(i) Pratyaksha. inference (3) Upamana. Gotama. an antecedent *Seshavat. Anumana. impression. Perception or Pratyaksha. They are in the Nyaya as in the Vaiseshika. Anumana remarks or inference. all being means or The first measures of knowledge. Vaaspati Mi. a INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. rise of Nyaya-philosophy existed clearly before the Buddhism. Though. com. can be changed into a sensation or into a presentation (Vorstellung) or what used to be called a material idea. preceded by perception. Purvavat. i. is a question not even asked by . Pramawa. topic or Padartha is Pramana. Inference or 2. sense-perception (2) Anumana. corresponding object. which is said to consist of four kinds. from what was before. this object How a mere passive being supposed to be real. Perception (Pratyaksha) is explained as knowledge produced by actual contact between an organ 1. is Inference (Anumana).496 be. as 5). I. a consequent . i. proceeding . parison. and Samanyato Dn'shYa. and (4) /Sabda. described as of three kinds. e. proceeding from what was after. word. supposing the contiguity of the organs its of sense and of sense with outward objects had once been established.e. to examine each of the Gotama proceeds next sixteen topics. . proceeding from what is constantly seen together. the A7irvaka rejects every kind of he. as we saw.sra very acutely (Karika in attacking his antagonists for .

in such cases does not affect the of inference. 497 their mistaken faith in inference. Examples will make this clearer. or that the peacocks are screaming. . that is. may what may prove too much or too little. such erroneous opinions being never brought into contact with his organs of sense. but being sup- posed to exist on the strength of Anumana. In that case the fault arises from the conditioned character of the Vyapti or the pervasion. does really himself rely on inference. we infer as its Purva When we see that the ants carry their eggs.INFERENCE. turbance of their peacocks may really and the screaming of the have been imitated by men. Kk . (Nyaya is S. II. It is generally explained that a Purvavat. we infer as the $esha or posterior that it will rain. is universally or is marked by This uncon- ditional association afterwards treated under the name of Vyapti. When or prius we see a river rising that it has rained. The meaning of the three kinds of inference differs considerably according to different commentators. but the Vyapti only and as process soon as the relation between the sign and the fault. The however. refers to the mutual relation between a sign and what is signified by it. wander away. 37). without which he could not so much as surmise that his antagonists held erroneous opinions. It is true that in all these cases the reason given for an inference called. literally pervasion of one thing by another. OR ANUMANA. preceded by or possessed of a prius. the carrying off their eggs by the may have been caused by some accidental dishill. Thus the rising of a river may be due to its having been ants dammed up. 5. so that the observation of the sign leads to the observation or rather inference of associated with it what it.

fire and smoke is conditioned by damp and there are other cases also where fire exists without smoke. based on what is constantly seen together. the sign itself Vyapya. It requires but a certain amount of experience to infer the presence of an ichneumon infertile existence of from seeing an excited snake. and fire is what pervades the smoke. the truth of the conclusion quite another. consists of a sign (Lingin). These conditions are called the Upadhis. is . Vyapya). is truth. or to infer fire from perceiving the heat of water. as in a red-hot iron ball. on which the ancient moved. Thus the rela- tion between firewood . the latter being always conditioned by the presence or absence of certain Upadhis. The third kind of inference. had to wait till it was corrected by Copernicus. is the sine qud non of smoke. thing signified has been the inference will is come right. nay to infer the existence of an organ of touch from our feeling any animated body. Each Vyapti. Even a deaf man may sound if he sees a particular conjunction of a drumstick with a drum. what is to be pervaded. rectified. In all such cases the correctness of the inference one thing. But everything depends on whether the two are either absolutely or only conditionally related. always present when there is smoke. and the bearer The bearer of the sign is called Vyapaka or pervading. is therefore Lingin or Vyapaka. the Samanyato Drishta. that of a each inductive sign (Linga).498 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is illustrated by our inferring that the sun is moving it is seen in different places. because that is logicians depended. everything seen in different places being known to have Here the Vyapti. Thus smoke is the sign (Linga.

Thus from smoke on a hill we should infer the presence of a particular fire on the hill. as belonging to the genus fire. but as a general concept the properties of which have been formerly comprehended as known. But this is wrong. such as is ' Earth is dif- ferent from all other elements. 499 Different from this very natural explanation of the three kinds of to which >Sesha is Anumana is another. because sesses the quality of smell. or method of residues. except artificially. by inferred from the fact that the element of earth possesses smell. In the same manner we are told that Purva. earth is being separated from all other elements One might have peculiar quality of smell. But as earth is different from all other substances. the prius. infer that smell does not belong to anything that is not earth. because we do perceive colour &c. or Sarnanyato Drishta. that all elements possessed the same. but effect.. OR ANUMANA. which are by themselves imperceptible (Indriya/a Atindriyani). as in scented articles. allowing is to be taken in the sense of what is left. This is not supposed to illustrated by an example. It would be no better than if we were to infer that smell must belong to other qualities and actions also.e. its it alone posto say. because it is Aprasakta. we may This is the residuary inference. and as no actions can take place without instruments illustrated we may infer the existence of senses as instruments Kk 2 . i. which would be simply absurd. inference. according mean subsequent us to infer its invariable cause.INFERENCE. does not apply. falling under the general concept of fire The third. is by our inferring the existence of senses. should not be taken in the sense of antecedent cause.' that left over.

the first and last are called Vita or straightforward. man may infer that it is Word 4. but not a cow. or what call the members of a syllogism. we should Comparison (Upamana) or recognition of likeness. invisible objects. &c. It inference from the sensible to the supersensible. thus becomes very like the seeing of a general concept. Among these three inferences. It is Word curious to see that among the people to be trusted (Apta) the commentator . For instance. and seeing an animal like 3. second explanation of the three kinds of Anumana. ($abda) is explained either as a preof one worthy to be trusted. With all respect for native commentators. both is ancient and modern. or Sabda. having been told that a Gavaya (bos gavaeus) is like a cow. nay I find it difficult to understand why this view should have been given up by the modern Naiyayikas. or as a right cept It refers. and association. Comparison or Anumana. effect. explained as an instrument for ascertaining what has to be ascertained by means of similarity with something well known before. either to visible or precept. shall have to deal again with Anumana We when we come to consider the seventh Padartha. the Avayavas or Premisses. a a Gavaya. Next follows a cow. or not straightforward but this only if we adopt the . our action of seeing. I must confess that I prefer the more natural explanation of the three kinds of inference being based on cause. we are told. Samanyato Dn'shte.500 for INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the second Avita.

pain. are supposed to arise from the elements. 1. . provided they are well Strictly speaking the Veda would not abda. (3) senses. that can be established by the four Pramanas. hatred. touch. (6) mind. (2) body. It is essential to recolour. or what we should call omne scibile. and their perceptions) are earth. touch. taste. are the qualities of earth. . or topic is The second Padartha all Prameya. (7) activity (will). 4. their objects 1 3. that is. of the senses. The senses or organs of sense are defined as those of smell. These elements (from which the senses draw their origin light. which alone can be perceived. Gotama next proceeds to define each of these Prameyas. (4) sense-objects. (u) suffering. &c. The first six of these are called causative. (8) faults. by enumerating the characteristics peculiar to each. unless it can be proved to be AptavaA-ana. member that 1 of the elements the first four are both According to the commentary the sensations. 501 MleMAas informed.. come under II. sight. and knowing (Buddhi). 2 Body is defined as the seat of action. (5) understanding. air.FRAME YA. (12) final beatitude. the word of one worthy to be trusted. and according to the next Sutra. the qualities of the objects of sense. should mention not only Rishis and Aryas. and hearing. and ether while the objects of the senses . and sound. but or barbarians also. (10) rewards of deeds. savour. (9) transmigration. and what they intimate. The characteristics of the Self are desire. Prameya. such as odour. water. They . will. pleasure. the other six caused. Twelve such objects are mentioned: (i) Self or soul. that is.

and of percepts into concepts. It is sometimes called the gatekeeper or controller of the senses. would naturally fall to the Manas. is eternal only. a subject little cultivated by Indian philosophers. Akasa. and concepts. Little attention. we and non-eternal. The non-eternal substances are either inorganic. 5. and hence not tangible. If. such as we know there is in sleep. if once effected. for the union of Atman and Manas. it is by the Naiyayikas explained as being the same as apprehension or knowledge. Even the distinction between percepts. mind is considered as A/m or an atom. this subject. or infinitely great. so that the sense of light perceives or sees light only. As from understanding. that is to 6. understanding. but always related to the sense. however. is paid by Hindu logicians to which has assumed such large proportions with us. and is explained as that which prevents more than one notion from arising at the same time. prevents the rushing in of all sorts of sensuous impressions at once. Anubhava. which translate by ether. it were admitted that the two could unite. The sense of scent perceives odour only. or sensitive. and the question has been fully discussed how Manas. to Buddhi. lias never been fully realised Manas or by Indian logicians. The transformation of sensations into percepts. Smarana. and as being twofold.502 eternal INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. with the Mimawsakas. Vorstellungen. can be united with Atman. organic. notion. is Mind (Manas) different say. . being A?m. and regulates them in our conit sciousness. and so on. then there could never be any cessation of knowledge. Bcgriffe. which is Vibhu. and remembrance. would be indissoluble. while the fifth.

like Atman. p. eternal (Tarkakaumudi. however. both pain and pleasure are here treated together under pain. Rewards are consciousness of pleasure and pain. . and be destroyed with the body. non-eternal. voice. and acts bear 1 . infinitely small. is eternal and numerous. results produced by faults. and Nitya. and we should lose that which retains the impressions of acts done in the body. effects without a cause. . 4. from Atman by being atomic in dimension. nay we should be unable to account for a future life and the in- we should equalities of birth in any future life have to admit. Activity (will) is the effort of body.PRAMEYA. It is 503 held by the Naiyayikas that when Manas enters a particular region of the body called Puritat. Pretyabhava is transmigration. be Anitya. 1 1 Pain is characterised by vexation . and by actions consequent on them. is Having thus examined 1 all that can form the See I. so that they are sometimes explained as 10. 24). and of the 8. . differing. of the understanding working through the mind (Manas). that the Manas is both Anu. 20. n. If Manas were supto be co-extensive with the body it would posed neutralised. The Naiyayikas hold. the effect of the union of Atman and Manas is and sleep ensues. fruit. Pravnttidosha<7anitartha/i phalam. therefore. and as pleasure also involves pain. Apavarga or final beatitude. Entire deliverance from pain and pleasure 12. while Manas. in fact. 7. in the most general sense. good or bad 9. Faults cause acts.

as when we recognise in a distant object the qualiof a post. Prayo^rana. neither of which has as yet been proved. we are told. The Avayavas. The definition given of doubt shows that the ancient logicians of India ties of a man and had carefully thought about the different causes of doubt. tenets. except so far as they offer once more the clearest evidence of a long continued previous study of logic in the ancient schools or settlements of India. III. contain nothing that is of peculiar interest to the historian of philosophy. so that they were led to the admission of three or even five kinds of IV. unless we are inclined to admit either an influence of feel we hardly Greek on Indian. we now enter on the third of the sixteen topics.504 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. object of our knowledge. as well as those referring to (IV) Prayo^ana. arises Sa?nsaya or doubt. Yet. it. VII. or Members is of a Syllogism. VI. Samsaya. and the Prameyas. purpose or motive (V) D?*ishanta. V. Siddhanta. Dnsh^anta. the To us a syllogism and the next subject. the coin- . Much more important so-called gism. Doubt. . the members of a sylloits structure are so surprised at meeting with it in the schools of logic in India. from our recognition of various attributes opposed to one another in one and the same object. . familiar case (VI) Siddhanta. the Pramanas or measures of knowledge. that is. But these disquisitions. familiar that members. example. or of Indian on Greek philosophy.

either on one side or on the other and though I am far from denying . and that the Greeks had borrowed the first elements of their philosophy from the Hindus. were more ancient than that of Aristotle. Alexander himself. who died a voluntary death by allowing himself to be burnt before the eyes of the Macedonian army. we are told. expressed years ago. and this even at a time when. my conviction. manuscripts in India were still . As two are certainly startling. as far as we know at present. therefore. We At the time when the philosophy became different systems of Indian first known to the scholars of Europe everything that came from the East was looked upon as of extreme antiquity. and particularly Indian Logic. Indian and Greek Logic. as we may gather from his desire to communicate with the gymnosophists of India. cidences between the 505 to myself I feel evidence of any direct influence. is possible in another also. by European scholars that the Hindu systems of philosophy. There had been vague traditions of ancient Indian philosophy even before the time of Aristotle. bound to confess that I see no its possibility. was deeply impressed with that idea. that we must here also admit the existence of undesigned coincidences to a much I keep to many larger extent than our predecessors were inclined must never forget that what has been to do. The view that Alexander might actually have sent some Indian philosophical treatises to his tutor at home. possible in one country.INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. One of these gymnosophists or Digambaras seems to have been the famous Kalanos (Kalyana T). It was readily admitted.

air. fire. there were many points of coincidence between Greek and Indian logic. without giving any reference. if Niebuhr and others power stood up for the opposite view and tried to derive But does Indian philosophy from Greece ? Niebuhr is reported to have said in his Lectures on Ancient History. but none in technical proper names in Comparative Mythology. and water. technical terms taken from Sanskrit. quotes Epicurus us to the HOU! being a mixture of three elements. look at Indian philosophy we discern traces of a great similarity with that of the Greeks. e. but even that one coinNo doubt cidence has not yet been discovered. . De Placit. as Indian philosophers admit five elements. quoted a passage from Aristotle in which he speaks of a fifth element and calls it dKa. akds-nominatum. like for it. i. on the other hand. the fifth being called Akasa. show a higher of historical criticism. was taken up and warmly defended by men like Gorres and others. terms. and that Aristotle might have worked them up into a system.T-ov6fj. we cannot explain this similarity except by the inter- 1 Plutarch. this being probIt ably an ingenious conjecture for aKarovo^aa-Tov \ is quite true that one such verbal coincidence would settle the whole question.506 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. inconceivable as it now seems to us. unknown. which. <Uld & fourth UKUTOVO/AaOTOV. Gorres. Gorres undertook to prove that the Greeks had actually retained some For instance.. would have clinched the argument once all. Philos.aTov. Now ' If we as people have given up the hypothesis that Greek philosophy formed itself after Indian philosophy. O r/V UVTU> CUCT^TIKOV. ether.

how they assumed a more and more definite form. as yet in a very vague and shadowy form. course which the Indians 507 had with the GraecoMacedonic kingdom of Bactra. art.' To Niebuhr and to most Is that really so ? Greek scholars it would naturally seem next to impossible that Greek philosophy. What it then remains ? It seems to me that until can be proved historically that the Greeks could freely converse with Indians in Greek or in Sanskrit on metaphysical subjects or vice versa. They know how Greek philosophy grew up gradually. too. or until technical philosophical terms can be discovered in Sanskrit of Greek. . They. or in Greek of Sanskrit origin. trace their gradual development in the and Upanishads. as certainly and Aristotle were Greeks and not to be surprised if Brahmans. should have been of foreign origin. show themselves in the hymns of the early poets of the Veda. But they ought not scholars have just the Sanskrit same feeling with regard to Indian philosophy. They feel it to as Plato be a home-grown production. religion. They also can show how in India the first philosophical ideas. public at last they were fixed in different schools in that form in which they have reached us. are as certain that philosophy was autochthonous in India as that Gotama and Ka?iada were Brahmans and not Greeks. a mere importation from India. and how to discussions. which can be watched from its first childhood.INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. rise They can Brahmanas They can show how they gave and private. how its growth ran parallel with the progress of Grecian poetry. and civilisation.

genus = Samanya. Society of Literature. whenever we meet with coincidences of any kind. that in philosophy also there is a wealth of truth which forms the common heirloom of all mankind. which is explained as refutation. Sanskrit and in Greek. as on a 1 hill. when a person. doubt there are the Vaiseshika categories = Padarthas.508 it will INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. why not in India ? Anyhow. . 1896. = the Avayavas there is inducnay. we must wait and not hamper the progress of research by premature assertions. Having once learnt this lesson we shall feel less inclined.. and may be discovered by all nations if they search for it with honesty and perseverance. and derive from their striking similarities this simple conviction only. Tarka. and deduction = Upanaya. both in . or reasoning from the fitness of the case. After the five members follows VIII. there is Dravya. a paper read before the Royal See M. Tarka. substance. and is On Coincidences. even syllogism tion = Vyapti. and species = Visesha. be best to accept facts and to regard both Greek and Indian philosophy as products of the intellectual soil of India and of Greece. quality there is . though seeing smoke does not see that there must be fire. it will be best to finish first what remains of the sixteen topics of the Nyaya. But why not ? If they could be developed naturally in Greece. But before we enter into the intricacies of the Indian syllogism. M. to conclude at once that they cannot be explained except by admitting a historical contact and a borrowing on one side or the other 1 No . VIII. Guna.

. truth only next XI. however. If this wrangling is devoid of really establishing any attempt it at an opposite opinion. ascertainment. quibbling arising from . and XVI. . It is difficult to . Nimaya. We next come to XIII. Vada or argumentation. meant to be a reductio ad absurdum. caring for wrangling by means false of fraud analogies . that prove the reverse. (ralpa. fraud in using words in a sense different from what is generally understood. These are SavyabbiMra. Nigra- hasthana. Vitanc&i. Prakaranasama. and XIV. that is. XIV. arguments that prove too much. consisting of and answers. futility arising from change of class. and Kalatita. that stand themselves in need of proof. 509 thereupon made to see that if the hill were without It is fire. XV. unfitness for discussion. both disputants.NIRA7 AYA. X-XVI. that tell equally on both sides. and not for truth. futility. Vada. paralogisms and sophisms. or specious arguments. cavilling. . is called XII. Nirwaya. Hetvabhasas. it would of necessity be without smoke. ati. IX. is The next topic to be considered IX. Khsila. mistimed. As to XV. Vitawda. Viruddha. In the last five cases disputants are supposed to care for victory only. . such as objections X. sophistical or attacking what has been established. alpa. 6rati. (7ati. Sadhyasama. ETC. they have been mentioned before. Hetvabhasa. Kh&la. Nigrahasthana.. Then follow the rhetoric or eristics paragraphs connected with rather than with logic.

&c. unfair to It all is charge the Nyaya and equally the other . The last. e. and then to that of who suffer who are always supposed to be able to march. and unmethodical. in the school of Zeno. yet continuing to talk. as an abstract of Gotama's whole philosophy. list. loose. but will have to be discussed hereafter. as his table of the categories. renders himself liable to reproof. i.. or with others. This may seem a long Judgments on Indian Logic. should unless it meant originally argument. a transitio in alterum genus. Nigrahasthana. in answer to an argument that a man is unable to travel. though in several cases there are subdivisions which have here been left out. but it cannot be called loose at the same time. it should be answered that he is is able to travel. XVI. European philosophers would no doubt be justified in saying what Hitter said in his History of Philosophy that the exposition of the It is tedious. birth or genus. unfitness for diswhen a man by misunderstanding or not understanding. Here the same soldiers man from is referred first to the class of those fever.510 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. for instance. is cussion. because understand why 6rati. mixed up with subjects which have nothing certainly to do with pure logic. If we were topics. as when. and yet at the end of the list Gotama actually apologises and says that there are many more sorts of futility. because he a soldier. as to look upon this list of the sixteen some have done. may be also too minute for our taste. mean a futile he has a fever. but so was Greek logic in its Nyaya is It beginning. which have been passed over by him.

That highest freedom and beatitude. and the Self.JUDGMENTS ON INDIAN LOGIC. The popular mind of its being unthe problems But India seems never to have doubted the fact that every good or every evil thought or deed will grow and bear fruit. and that no one can ever escape from the consequences of his own acts and thoughts. but it produced at all events a deep sense of responsibility. return to himself and be himself this net of consequences . return to whence it came. systems practical 5! I of Indian philosophy. people were taught that what seemed undeserved misfortunes. and which ignores all questions But we must learn to take philoof morality. or on what is called Samaya. be again the Universal Self. and in one respect the safest means of paying off all debts. with and with entirely ignoring all of ethics. were in fact the natural consequences of previous acts. that is. and a firm conviction that nothing can ever be lost. strongest support is a firm belief in the solidarity of life here and hereafter. Whether such a belief is right or wrong is not the question. were fully deserved. the agreement of good people. Morality with the Brahmans depends either on prescriptive sacra (Dharma). enlightened by true knowledge. We ourselves can hardly conceive a philosophy which in the end is not to be of practical usefulness. according to . sophers as they are. We must remember that philosophy in India had very different antecedents from what it had with us. Philosophy at the same time held out a hope that in the end might be broken through. Instead of complaints about the injustice and cruelty of God. free for ever from the chains and pains of this transient episode of life on earth.

which. but I can discover no looseness of reasoning in it. the eternal life of the soul.512 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. if indirectly the whole Nyaya-philosophy is called the cause of final freedom or blessedness. his philosophy is. . which is the cause of birth. with his Critique full detail of Pure Reason. Modern Nyaya is almost entirely confined to Pramana. nor in Indian philosophy in general. the Samkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy. whether right or wrong. This. nor does it betray any looseness of reasoning. like Badaraya?ia and Kapila. Prameya. which is the cause of suffering ' ' (I. We must not forget that. seemed necessary to the limits of the two. is true in a certain sense It may be said that the fundaof the Nyaya also. as he holds. the tracing of the limits of Pure Reason. . But this being done in under Gotama too. first of is it all. that Gotama just as Kant began to say. 2). which is the cause of activity. are they so far wrong ? And what is true in the case of the Vedanta. that his sixteen headings. If they hold that a knowledge of the true relation between man and the world. to establish. Prama?ia. enters on an explanation of the process by which it was possible to destroy ignorance or Mithyar/mina. and the means of knowing. mental points of this philosophy are contained in what can be known. This again may be right or wrong. is essential to true freedom and tine happiness. is the true cause of error or sin. and between man and the Author of the world. but is a mere nothing compared with what earth is lies behind and before. from a Hindu point of view. this life on but an episode that may be very important in itself. Indian views. is at all events perfectly coherent. depended on philosophy or knowledge it could not be acquired by good works or good thoughts alone.

there can be none on the side of the objector either. on That sensuous perception should be a Pramarca seem to us to have re- Gotama or his opponent what ground the evidence of the is senses can claim such authority. namely. or authority would hardly But quired further proof. 513 The Later Books of the Nyftya. Pratyaksha. Perception. the Prama?ias. starts the question. the third and fourth of the Prameyas. In answer to this Gotama uses what seems to be an ad hominem argument. it and so on ad infinitum. for though some of the objections raised may seem to us of little importance. the fifth treats of all that comes under the head of paralogisms. PEECEPTION. these books Some of the questions discussed in show quite clearly that they must have formed the subject of lively and long-continued controversy.PBATYAKSHA. This is an idea that anticipates an important element of modern As a balance may serve to weigh philosophy. they prove at all events the conscientiousness of the early Naiyayikas. but must also be weighed or tested itself. a thing. or who the authority of its authority. might be said that the authority of the senses also requires to be established by another authority. The objector would cut away the ground under his Ll . In this gives us way the first indeed a fair book of the Nyaya-Sutras outline of the whole of Gotama's philosophy. that if there is no authority anywhere. while the following three books enter into a more minute examination of its Thus the second book treats more fully of details.

are alluded to by Gotama and his school. whether . Another question also which has lately occupied our psycho-physiologists. Even such questions as to whether there is any interval of time between our hearing the sound of a word and our realising its meaning. again reminds us of modern philosophy. because for real perception there must be contact not only with the organs of sense. He also admits that contact between sense and object does not invariably produce perception. that which results from contact of sense with its object. is not incomplete. he only defends himself by saying that everything cannot be said at the same time. that in fact there may be sensation without perception. own and thus would himself have no locus stanch for offering any objections (II. the next question is whether the definition of sensuous perception. on the contrary takes it here for granted. from want of attention. and the question whether several impressions can be taken in at the same time is negatived by a reference to the running of a pin through a number of sheets of a MS. and between the mind and the Self (Atman). but likewise between the senses and the mind (Manas). This is not denied by Gotama. But admitting that sensuous perception has authority just as a lamp has light to light up the things around it. Here the piercing seems simultaneous. and that his definition of perception. yet we know that it can only be successive. as when we are so absorbed in listening to music that we do not perceive the This objects around us. 13).514 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. feet. does by no means exclude that between mind and Self. though it dwells only on what is essential (the contact of sense and object).

and in this case. we see only that it has fallen or that it has still to fall. may seem childish to us. FUTURE. of which one side only can be seen at the time. for it is the opinion of the Buddhists. it seems. so-called childish Time Present. particularly in cases where our senses can apprehend a part only of their object when perceiving. while the rest has This leads to be supplied by memory or inference. has ever seen more than one side of the moon. The objector. and on the objector's admitting such a possibility. 31). because is when we shake one branch of it. yet taking it as a whole. The illustration given by Gotama to show that a tree is a whole. if the present did not exist. but exactly in these simple and thoughts that the true interest of ancient philosophy seems to me to consist. and future. for instance. the it whole tree trembles. for instance. by Gotama (II. and as a globe. Past. we postulate and are convinced that there is another side also. Gotama remarks that in that case perception and all that springs from it that Ll2 . because the moment w e see a fruit falling from a tree. namely. he tries to account for the process by which we take a part for the whole. past. The next problem that occupies Gotama is that of time of present.TIME PRESENT. him on to another question whether there really is such a thing as a whole. No one. and as we can in reality never see more than one side at a time. Here the answer is that past and future themselves would be impossible. a very real objector. Future. but never r it is falling. a tree. is 515 discussed perception does not involve inference. denies that there is such a thing as present time. PAST.

it would be altogether impossible. Vaiseshika and secondly. events. inference. as essentially different from Anumana. of the denying it manas. comparison. mining the seniority either of the opponent or of the defender. All we can say is that. But first of all. Testimony said to be conveyed by . of at the all independent evidences. can only said in this place about the validity of inference. we find Gotama bent on establishing is Passing over what by the side of it. analogy or comparison. if presented as Sabda. authoritative as one or. Upamana. the Word. And here Gotama seems in conflict with Kawada who. Kanada's name is not mentioned here nor that of his system. because depend on what is present. his next instrument of knowledge. namely Upamana. by the side of Anumana. as we shall see. might feel tempted to conclude from We Gotama must have been later in time than Kawada.516 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. would by no means a kind of Anumana. we know that this question of the Pramanas had been discussed again and again in every school of Indian philosophy. reject it. whenever we see Upamana appealed to as a means of valid knowledge. Comparison. declines to accept Upamana. because we shall have to return to it hereafter. we know that we have to deal with followers Nyaya but the Vaiseshika. so that a mere reference to the subject cannot be used as deterthis that . We now come to the various kinds of verbal is testimony. though an independent place among the Praschool .

he enters on new problems such as the association of sense with sound. must not be taken to prove the anteriority of 6raimini's Sutras to those of Gotama's. it whether deserves a place by itself. Then. we In the examination of the validity of /Sabda or word. yet opinions differ some consider such conventions to be eternal or divine.' between acceptance of the word of an authority (Aptopadesa) and reliance on an inference. a question which is intimately connected with the question of what authority is due to the Veda as the Word par Here we meet with a number of arguexcellence. THE WORD. after Gotama has shown the difference be- tween I know and I infer. while others take them to be non- eternal or human. conveying the meaning of each word in its relation to the other words. ments in defence of the supreme authority of the Veda with which we are familiar from the PurvaMima?nsa. 517 words. though clearly referring to (raimini. who assign eternity to the $abda itself. is Though the meaning of words because admitted to be conventional. but as the highest authority is as the Veda is the word of chief authority for deterof a word is admitted to be the The argued that Brahman or God. and it is Brahman. or whether it should not rather be treated as a kind of inference. however. as we know. but which again. find again the same question started as before. the word or the sound of a word. satisfy the Mimamsakas. consisting of many words. does not authority.SABDA. mining the meaning usage of trustworthy persons. it follows that every word of the Veda possesses the highest This. and by a sentence. and certainly do not enable us to admit more than the ' ' ' contemporaneous activity of the various schools of .

He wrote a work. because they hold that there can be knowledge arising from not-being or from absence. This would prove at the same time the study of the Nyaya philosophy in the first century of our era see p. probability. be classed either under Word. Word. centuries intervening rise Hindu philosophy during the between the close of the Vedic age and the spread of Buddhism. 480. like written letters. 1 . before he became a Buddhist. it is added. inference. Arthapatti. supposed to be lost. The Pramanas seem to have formed a subject of prominent interest to the Nyaya philoin modern times they have absorbed the sophers . as we saw. whole of Nyaya. assumption. have gone out. Aitihya. - . neither more nor less. was a zealous student of the Nyaya-philosophy. that there are Gotama Prama/ias. and The Eight Pramaflas. or under Anumana. 17) '. that he must Of these four Prama/ias the first is referred by Gotama to $abda.518 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. p. and shows that their number is superabundant. non-existence. not necessarily authoritative. as supplying knowledge. IV. the others to Anumana. however. Having defended the teaching of the Nyaya. tradition. and even Abhava. Sambhava. are told that Nagaiv/una. They include. We which was. till Sarat Chandra discovered a Tibetan version of it in the library of the Grand Lama at Lhassa (Journal of Buddhist Text Society. while /iesh^a. may. parts iii and iv. called Prama/ia-samuK'aya. proceeds to criticise the four additional four Pramawas of the Mimamsakas. as when we conclude from the fact that Devadatta is not in his house. or mere gesture.

for all the discussions (f>vo-L about the or Secret hem of the question. But we shall see that . and as I passed them over before. the Indian philosophical systems. The oftener we read these discussions on the eternal character of sound.THE EIGHT PRAMAA AS. where we meet with them again as worked out by Gotama. it will be necessary to examine them more fully in this place. T 519 Here follow long discussions as to the nature of words. as is origin of language touch only the very it presents itself to Indian The way in which the problem of handled by them will no doubt be dislanguage missed as childish by modern philosophers. till we arrive again at the question whether and therefore a Pram&na by Similar questions occur in most of itself. on words and their true nature. or not. and I do not mean to deny that some of their remarks on philosophers. language are really childish. Though is the word eternal. and at last on the divine. as whether a vowel such as they deal with such purely grammatical questions i can ever be changed into the semi-vowel y. such as the existence of a Creator and the relation between the cause and the effect of our created world. The true problem of language has been almost entirely neglected by Greek philosophers and theii difference disciples in Europe. and we the minds of Hindu philosophers they are connected with some of the greatest branch out very see far. in fact whether any letter can ever become another letter. nay transcendental character of language. these disquisitions shall be surprised to how intimately in problems of philosophy. the more we shall feel the between Eastern and Western philosophy. the difference between sound (Dhvani) and words.

3. the whole question is treated by Hindu philosophers in a very serious and searching spirit. as is shown both by perception and by inference.' Perception is here taken in the sense of /S'ruti. 28 refute his objection on the ' : We We ground that (the world) originates from the Word. was right in tracing the word B?*ih. It was shadowed forth in the very language of India. and that the world was created by the Word. have now We to follow up these views as they are presented to us in a more systematic form in the Sfttra-period. Thoughts on Language. Brahma??as. in Brihas-pati. At all events the idea that Brahman was the Word. occasion examined some of the views on language. and always try to keep their eye on what is important and has often been overlooked even us. scrip- . and Upanishads of the Vedic period. by the greatest thinkers Language has been to most of us so among familiar a subject that we have hardly perceived what is behind it.520 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and have scarcely asked the questions which it has cost so much effort to Indian have already on a former philosophers to answer. back to the same root as that of Brahman. Word and Creator. but If I it received its full development in the Sutras only. We as expressed in the philosophical hymns. would carry us back even beyond what we call the Vedic period. as we saw. long before the rise of philosophical systems. existed. to which we must return for our present purpose. the connection of the two ideas. read in Sutra I. more particularly in the Vedanta-Sutras. Students of philosophy should overlook what may seem strange to them in the manner of treatment. speech.

that had their origin in the Word. lies in Brahman The only. for these. though readily admitting the non-eternal character of the gods. that is. as being infinite in number. This is afterwards confirmed by passages from /Stuti and such as BHh. it is not the individuals. possibly be ante-temporal or eternal. 52! and inference in the sense of Smn'ti. which was thought and uttered at of things first by Brahman. which is therefore more than the Word. 2. It is Brahman. ture. Ar. posed that the . I. if it contained names of non-eternal things. and as even the gods. nay the whole world. Word be supconstitutes the material cause it Nor must shown before. not with individuals. the Devas. and individual gods are allowed to have had an origin. An objection had been started that the Veda could not be considered as eternal. were looked upon as non-eternal. and that this Word is Only. as accordance with their true origin in the they are rightly said to have Veda and in Brahman. nor this or that Deva. it. word of the Veda is simply the expression of what is permanent and eternal in all things (universalia in rebus). he adds. not this or that cow or horse. with the genus that words are connected. tradition. Up. it followed that the Veda. 4 Then with SmHti. /Samkara argues. are not capable of entering into that connection. and as all individual things are created in this. that in spite of that. Hence genus to which they belong. must be admitted to have originated from the Word or the Veda. but the genus to which they belong. could not Against this. ' : . the Devas. the gods and other beings. but not the also. as containing their names. all individual things.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. having been proved to be subject to birth and rebirth. the fify (Akritis).

and comprehends all named concepts. the Mahabharata XII. me when I T. thus it said in the is Veda (Taitt. first the earth. manner the words of the Veda had to be present to the mind of the Creator. necessary for the creation three of created things. And 4. 2): '"This as. or the ideas or logoi of the world. before he in this. nay even to such thought as '(Jod spake.' The Word therefore. the eternal. Speech. so full ().' ourselves to say that the Logos of the Alexandrian . which is identified with the words of creation. was meant for more than what was afterwards called the Vedas. read in the Burnt i and whence proceeded the evolution of the world 'God in the beginning again. g. have first to think In the same of the word for what we mean to do.' I This will sound strange to confess.522 his INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. sounded strange came across these thoughts. Br. as we mind he united himself with also. Mahabh. 2. it is easy to see that Veda. could have created the is things corresponding to them. the Divine Word which we read in the Veda. XII. and the . of Neo-platonic reminiscences. the Samhitas. when we mean to do anything. II. said. Let there be light. it to many readers. if we can bring light. and Brahma^as.' If we read such passages carefully. Pra^apati. Veda stands here for Logos or Sophia. existed before creation. and there was Of course. : ' continuous process of their works. 8535 created the names and forms of things. In order to show that there all is nothing strange $amkara remarks that even we ourselves. or Speech. e." he and created the earth. 8534: 'He who exists by himself let first stream forth the Word. without beginning or end.

however hesitatingly.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. . which was meant to be the vehicle of sound and The existence of this fifth element was altogether denied by the materialists. pp. Brahmans came to Alexandria. because it is supersensible. and had fully perceived its intimate connection with some of the highest problems. and indoctrinated pagan and Christian philosophers with their ideas But as every Greek scholar of Va& or Speech. but it was admitted as an independent element by the other schools of thought. and thus to dis- Why courage further research ? Hindu philosophers have treated this whole question with so much care that we can see at least that they truly cared for it. which we translate by ether. the Barhaspatyas. We have it clear to themselves seen already that they actually postulated a fifth element Akasa. if indeed it admits of will people not see that it is far more any. Gescluclite der Logosidee. requires a very different solution from that proposed by Professor Weber. scholarlike to confess our ignorance than to give an answer. philosophers l 523 had no antecedents in early Greek there would be an end of the whole philosophy and we should simply have to admit that question. even by the Buddhists. 1896. both religious and philosophical. and I have tried to show this on several occasions. $abda means word. 218 seq. and of sound only. which were nearest to their heart. They begin with the beginning and try first to make what /Sabda is. the question . knows that the very opposite is the case. but it also means sound. and they therefore begin with asking what sound is. because 1 See Anathon Aall.

is rejected by Kanada. its substance. Sansk. All these arguments are clearly directed against the Mima/msakas who for reasons of their own re- quire >Sabda. Ka-making perceived by &c. I. . No. It then declares that sound is quality (cf. (5) that to Dadhy Atra). but not air could they held that of sound. A-making. where we can clearly see that sound is produced by a conjunction between a drum and a drumstick. Muir. ' (3) that it is made it is (the very letters being called A-kara. it changes (as Dadhi Atra changes (6) and that it it. 70 seq. because we see (i) that it is a product. sound cannot be eternal. sounds and words being accepted as momentary manifestations only of eternal sound.). is the number of those who make augmented by But to all these 1 Cf. Ka-kara &c. whether sound or word. but a i. to their honour that they allow ' full credit to the Purvapakshin who opposes the eternal character of sounds and words. which takes a special interest in the question of the elements. Ballantyne's Mimawm-Sutras. Orig.524 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which This is illustrated by the striking of a drum with a drumstick. its quality. We see (4) that different persons at once. pp. for instance. speaker. explains sound as the object apprehended by the sense of hearing (II.. III. 2. p.). and that it is only carried along by the air. having Akasa or ether for and eternally. neither substance nor action. Texts.' he says *. The opinion that sound exists always and is only made manifest by each is held by the Mimamsakas. not possibly be the vehicle Its loudness might depend on it. 21). 6 com. to be eternal. 8 . The Vaiseshika-philosophy. It must be said. however. (2) that it passes away.

but it is another letter in the place of a letter. but is sensitive only to what is intangible in sound. (raimini proceeds to defend the sounds or words of the Veda against all possible These arguments were examined by us objections. it is said that sound the same which has always been is made. and as to the increase of due to the increase of the number of conjunctions and disjunctions of the air. . only not always manifested on account of the absence of an utterer or an exciter. now heard. The letter ception of sound right in looking k. before. that everywhere at the same time that. noise. it is the same. and that we have 110 right to suppose that it is ever annihilated. eternal. we are on sound as eternal and as always present. though the sound in is may vanish. he says. perceived at applies to the As to the modification of sound. and when it was shown that the author of the Veda could not have been a personal being. Besides. the quality. difficulties 525 The word is the Mima/msaka has a ready answer. that only is means that it is employed. the same sun. it leaves . there are the definite words of the Veda which tell us of an eternal Voice.THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. when the authorship of the Veda had to be discussed. if repeated. its traces it the mind of the hearer or learner . that is (raimini's reasons in support of the eternal char- acter of sound are that. If it should be supposed that sound is a mere modification of air. to his Having thus established own satisfaction the eternity of sound. If is heard. and if it the same time by many. and though the per- is the same on both sides. the answer is that the ear does not simply hear the air. it is not the same letter modified.

when divested of its natural integuments. and Bcgriff (conand that true thought has to do with conceptual . and that. and how clearly they had perceived the intimate relation between language and thought. philosophers Though these discussions are of a grammatical rather than of constitutes a word. except in the form of words. They understood what even modern philosophers have i'ailed to understand. they deserve our attention. as to what and what according to Indian character. How well the Hindus understood that the study of language forms an integral part of philosophy. it was the duty of a student of thought to inquire into the nature of words before he approached or analysed the nature of what we mean by thought. namely. and in consequence between the Science of Language and the Science of Thought or Philosophy. as it has been truly called. They had evi- dently perceived that language is the only pheno- menal form of thought. to the question. naked thought. not as made by them. but that the Veda could only have been seen by inspired Rishis as revealed to them. nay even their own thoughts. because they show how keen an interest the ancient philosophers of India had taken in the Science of Language. their greatest grammarian. as human beings possess no means of perceiving the thoughts of others. We may therefore at once proceed to the next point.526 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the words. among their representative philosophers. that there is a difference between VorsteUurifj (presentation or percept) cept). nay skinned thought. we may gather from the fact that they actually admitted Panini. is its real a philosophical character.

Here. shows that this peculiar word Sphofci must have existed before Pawini's time. Sphofo. and is without ' . is eternal or not. but the name grammarian whom he quotes (VI. word and thought. Hindu philosophers have actually elaborated an idea which does not exist in any other philosophy. 527 words only. when examining the P4mni Darsana. i. The subject has been well treated by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-sa??igraha. apart from its component letters. he shows first of all that the /Sabda or word which Pamni professes to teach in his $abdcanusasana. Spho^ayana. the Purva-Mimamsa when treating of the question whether sound. are M&dhava inseparable. for instance. what we should call Other systems the grammatical system of Pamni. expression. but none of of a these renderings can be considered as successful. The eternal word/ which is called Spho^a. the material element of (7aimini's words. assigns a place between Purva Mim4msi and Kapila's Samkhya to the Panini Darsana. and he adds thereupon some lines from grammar.SPHOTA. also treat most fully of linguistic questions. Derived as it is from SphuZ. It is true that in Pamni's own that of Sphofa. 123). Sphoa must have meant originIt has been translated by ally what bursts forth. same as Brahman. in his survey of all philosophies. as. parts. Sutras the word Sphoa does not occur. is the true cause of the world/ is in fact Brahman. and perish when separated. and as conveying a meaning. nay that the two. notion. It really means the sound of a word as a whole. concept or idea. or is really the ' he writes.

This shows. whether in their single or their united form. It cannot be in their collective form. that the Hindus had elaborated the idea of letters. . and I only wonder that those who believe in an ancient indigenous alphabet. though ' vainly. without beginning or end. nay even of vowels and consonants.D. because letter. in the form of things.' know it as distinct from the letters composing it. each as soon as pronounced. the : in- Which developed destructible essence of language. he says. it is maintained that it is actually an object of perception.) says Brahman. and that is the the sound. where that grammarian (died ' 650 A. should never have appealed. vanishes.528 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. there must be something else by means of which knowledge is produced. and therefore cannot form a whole nor can it be in their separate form. As therefore the letters. because no single letter has the power of producing cognition of the meaning of any word.' What more ? could be said of the Neo-platonic Logos In answer to some who deny the existence of such a Sphofa. distinct from the letters though Splio^a. and whence springs the creation of the world. in support of And if it were said that cognition their opinion. arises from the separate letters of a word. . cannot produce cognition. on hearing the word cow. long before they became acquainted with the written letters of a Semitic alphabet. to the discussions of Spho^a. for all men. as we knew already from the Pratisakhyas. we ask. whether these letters are supposed to produce cognition in their collective or in their separate form. Bhartn'hari's BrahmakawcZa.

SPHOTA.' The objector. He. would arise again. . as distinct from the letters. tail. by laying it down as a principle that letters can never form a word unless they have an affix at the end. asks the question whether this Sphoa is If it required no maniwould always be there. This shows that the conventional character Mm . which expresses the meaning. as are apprehended. though one and indivisible. 14) seems to have given the right solution. simply help to convey the they meaning by means of a conventional association (0ecrei).' Kaiyate. there duced then quotes from Patan^ali's what is the word Cow ? It is proin us the simultaneous cognition of dewlap. it manifestation.' severally On this point Panini (I. however. does not thereby escape from a single difficulty. and that is what we call the Sphoa. revealed by them. ' : Spho^a itself is manifested by the letters as they are pronounced and apprehended. and horns. This dilemma is put forward by Bha^a in his Mima??isasloka-varttika The grammarian who holds that manifest or non-manifest. It is therefore some- thing distinct from the single letters which conveys the meaning. explains this more it is ' fully by saying : Grammarians maintain that the word. since. 4. hump. is not silenced at once. ' : 529 He Now Mahabhashya is that by which. conveyed all that is wished). when they are pronounced and thus the same difficulties which were pointed out before as to the collective or single action of letters. while the letters. too. if the letters expressed there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones (as the first would already have it. hoofs. this could be by its letters only. when pronounced. but if it requires festation.

when con- . Words express the Summum Genus. of the relation between sound and meaning was fully recognised in India..53 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. as explicit. Nava and Yana. it is remarked that in one sense this is really so but that. our philosophical grammarian takes another step. Nor is it enough that the letters should be the same. whereas the following letters serve only to make that Spho^a more and more manifest and first letters. the characteristic of which is consciousness of the supreme the meaning of all words is And lest it should be thought that in that words would mean one and the same thing. case all . Brahman. as a crystal reality. whether that sound was called $abda or Spho^a. because separate letters would never be a word. namely pure existence. &c. After having thus in his own way established the theory of a Spho^a for every word. namely. All this was meant to show that the admission of a Spho^a was unnecessary but we now get the orthodox answer. evanescent as soon as they have been probeing nounced. trying to prove that ultimately that summum genus (Satta). which they do not. otherwise Vasa and Sava. no more than a catching at a straw by a drowning person. and that all the objections are . would carry the same meaning. that the admission of Spho^a is necessary. namely Brahman or being. accept the revealing the invisible Sphote. we are asked to admit a Sphoa. is coloured by its surroundings. as little as flowers without a string would And as the letters cannot combine. they must also follow each other in the same order. and to be a wreath.

horse. expresses existence. If this true kernel of every word is by Hindu philosophers called the Great Atman (Mahan Atma).. in individuals. or. 53! nected with different things and severally identified with each. &c. stands afterwards for different species. such as cow. Greek as well as medieval logicians and it is exactly what my late friend Noire tried to establish. such as cows. &c. &c. is found in all things. expressed by affixes such as Tva. a state. cow-hood. as others say. and Satta. this is the great Atman root.WORDS EXPRESS THE SUMMUM GENUS. For existence.' This will remind us of of many of the speculations . &c. differen- tiated by various thoughts or words.. and the meaning of the This is existence. which form abstract nouns.. Kriya.. rest ultimately on the summum genus. expressive of definite meanings. in which it resides. &c. as found in cows. these being first of all 'existence' (Satta) or the highest genus. we must remember that. in cows. Brahman). If the stem-word.. that all words originally expressed action. to which I added the amendment that they expressed either an action or a status. and on it all words depend. as found and then only what they are in this In support of this another of Bhartrihari's is quoted: 'Existence being passage divided. This they call objects. such as Go-tva. the root expresses Bhava. horses. according to the Vedanta. horses. &c. the summum genus. is called this or that species by means of its connection with different phenomenal world. and there(or fore all words. the meaning of the stem. is the true substance of every: This is stated again by Bhartrihari Mm 2 . as the summum genus. action. existence. Brahman thing. the Pratipadika. Tal.

to be honoured 64. by The true is (for a time). 2. is Brahman' may mean when we say. the highest or universal. like the house of so called for a vanishing reason (that Devadatta. who holds Pamni holds that they mean individual things. while they are . 2. the one Supreme Being. maintaining that our ordinary words mean a genus. is. we meet with two schools. varies as it does in the case of the two Atmans. i. the other. Rama so many single Ramas.' of Genera or Individuals? Words Expressive But while the meaning of all words is thus admitted to be Brahman. reality is known under its illusory words under untrue disguises. which admits of no duality except as the result of nescience. of Vyat/i. the one of Va^apyayana. that a Brahman 'a in another. many Brahmans. I. he states that the plural and Rama. 58. the Paramatman and the 6rivatman. he shows that as . All The idea that all end mean Brah- man.e. Hence it is said denoted by all word but the relation of the two. only so long as Devadatta is the possessor of reality named the house) . Words mean TO words in the QV. and it is identical with the : ultimately identical. the true forms. but by the word house. both views as true in grammar. I. was necessitated by the very character of the Vedanta-philosophy. Ramas means always Kama.532 ' INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. pure houseis hood 3 only expressed. for in one place. The Supreme Being is the thing words. and the living or individual 1 Read Gnhatvam instead of Grihitam? .

and that words existed long before even the idea of letters had been formed. 'Two Brahmans have to be meditated on. cow. such as Go. the medicine of the diseases of language. such as (VI. Letters. the Word and the Non-word. 22). and by the Word alone is the Non-word revealed. the means of final beatitude. Though from our point of view the idea of such a Sphoa may seem unnecessary. and the straight royal road among This if all the roads that lead to emancipation. the science of sciences it is the first rung on the ladder that . like every other system of philosophy. the purifier of all sciences. at least of his followers and must say that if his explanation of a word as a number of letters ending in a suffix had been accepted. by themselves. the door of emancipation. As early as the Maitrayana Upanishad we meet with verses to the same effect. and can be considered only as the result of a scientific analysis. leads up to final bliss. and of an earlier date than itself.V ALL WORDS MEAN TO soul. . is.' In this way the grammatical philosophers endeavoured to prove that grammar or exposition of words. if OV. not of Panini himself. It was evidently not seen I by the inventors of this Spho^a that letters have no independent existence at all.' may be accepted as representing the views. as ' it was called by Pata%ali ($abdanusasana).' conveying a meaning which does not depend ' on any single letter nor on any combination of them. the breaking forth of a whole and undivided utterance. Sphoa is in fact the word before it had been analysed into letters. there would have been no necessity for the admission of a Sphoa. we cannot help . have no raison d'etre. 533 the difference between the two being due to Avidyd or temporary nescience.

and that every word is something different from its letters. For it is perfectly true that the letters. and in seeing difficulties which never attracted the attention of European philosophers. and. and receive their special meaning from their relation to the genera or all mind of Brahman. but always of classes or genera. I should add. as we should say. rendered that creation possible. admiring the ingenuity of the ancient philosophers of India in inventing such a term. Still more important is the idea that all words originally meant Brahman or TO 6V. in Greece. casually ? rather see clearly here also how long and . as it were. something undivided and indivisible. expressive of its meaning in its undivided form only. makes an organised whole of it. much-despised Neo-platonic philosophy. k. should have sprung up in India Do we not suddenly or. the basis of the Christian theory of creation. a. In such a word as Va&. a welcome surprise. All this is true and recognised now by students of the Science of Language. and afterwards in Palestine. but we have an indivisible explosion. and that we should find it so fully elaborated in the ancient world of India is surely a surprise. as creative types. Vox. we have not a combination of three letters v. This is the nay. and as genera they are eternal. required so till many evolutions of thought they reached the point which they reached in Alexandria. which would be nothing.534 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Words are not names of individuals. And can we suppose that ideas which. and this may be raised to the status of a word by means of a grammatical suffix which. as such. logoi in the These logoi existed before the creation of the world. have no reality and no power. though never even suspected by the philosophers of other countries.

even in the lower spheres in which we have to move in our daily life and amidst our daily duties. and nerved in . in which it has its true Self or Atman. which Atman is Brahman. Speaking for myself. thought. To have mounted to such heights. and where Christian philosophy began. has its true being in the alone Divine Mind. in which it lives and moves. though visible to the human mind. which ended where Greek philosophy ended. In the beginning was the Word. not visible to the human eye. nay even if we should put aside as unintelligible the beginning words of the fourth Gospel. it 535 of thought must have taken place south of the Himalayas before such Would any Greek fruits could have ripened ? scholar dare to say that all this how continuous a development was borrowed from Greece ? Would any Sanskrit scholar be so intrepid as to hint that the Greeks might possibly have learnt their Logos from the Vedic V&k ? Even if we do not accept the last results of this Indian line of thought.all the encounters with the scepticism and ma- my very youth. must have strengthened the muscles of human reason. that there in the world.' we can at least admire the struggle which led up to this view of the world. according to Indian philosophy. I am bound to say that I have felt an acquaintance with the if general spirit of Indian philosophy as a blessing it from all against the antinomies of being and thinking. even we have to descend again frightened and giddy. being strengthened by . and tried to establish ' the truth that there is is Rhyme and Reason is full a Logos. the Eternal and the Divine. That mind. and that the whole universe of Brahman.V ALL WORDS MEAN TO OV. and will remain in our memory as a sight never to be forgotten.

two have always worked together harmoniously. and to sweep away the rubbish. philosophy gaining its spirituality from religion. and true wisdom hiding where we least expect it. at the atoms of Democritus.536 terialism of our INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Humani nihil a me alienum puto ? rich kernel is often A covered by a rough skin. and had its right place in it at the right What the historian of philosophy has to do time. and to discover. for it is quite We . But there are such blemishes and such absurdities in all philosophies. Is not that something to make us think. It is no doubt. and style of Indian philosophy. or at the location of the soul in the pineal gland or in certain parts of yet all this belongs to the history of . even in the most modern. to try to understand the thoughts of great philosophers. to discover blemishes in the form easy. Why not do the same for Indian philosophy ? Why not try to bring it near to from it we may seem at us. may be Vedanta on Sphote. and to remind us religion deriving its of the often-repeated words of Terence. own ephemeral philosophy. and to cite expressions which at first sight seem absurd. the vein of gold that runs through the quartz. the brain philosophy. have now to see what the other systems of philosophy have to say on this subject. In other countries philosophy has railed at religion and reIn India alone the ligion has railed at philosophy. then to winnow what is permanent from what is temporary. Many people have smiled at the Platonic ideas. I mean chiefly the Vedanta. however far removed all first sight. to keep the gold. freedom from philosophy. if is first of all possible.

and which in conversation conveys to others what is in our own mind. but always clothed in sound. as repre- senting the Vedanta-philosophy. he produces as arguments in words earth. how were these words Beginning as usual with the Purvapresent ? pakshin or opponent. because not even the last letter with the impression left by the preceding letter in our memory. the Sphotfa. clear that the idea of a Spho^a. and it is that Spho^a from which whatever is denoted by it was produced in creation. has been mistaken for 5amkara's own final opinion. considers such calls an and. 537 them. though known to $amkara. is entirely opposed He fully admits that to the admission of a Sphoa. different therefore from perishable and changeable letters. 28. That Sphoa is what is eternal. the opponent's view. however. Sutras I. l favour of the admission of a Sphoa. 3. because they differ according to the pronunciation of each speaker. prove he goes back and 1 Ved. to admission of a Sphoa this.VEDANTA ON SPHOTA. would convey to us the sense of a word. was not accepted by all. presenting itself all at once as the object of our mental act of apprehension. /Samkara in order to himself. because they possess neither singly nor collectively any significative power. &c. entirely unnecessary. the outburst of the whole word. that the letters cannot convey the meaning. This is one of the cases where the Purvapaksha. because as soon as they are pronounced they perish.. or for the Siddhanta. earth and all the rest were created according to the which were present to the mind of the Creator. . Hence something different from the letters must be admitted. but he asks.

they are always recognised again as the same letters. 5. cuckoo and ape. Thus when the word cow is pronounced twice. the famous commenPurva-Mimamsa. may. aid an old Vedantist. we have only to look at a number of ants. being several. or a wood. whom he This Upa(III. with having borrowed an from Badaraya/za. but the letters through all this are recognised as the may be said that the letters of a word. but that the same word has been And though two individuals pronounced twice. because the ideas which we have same.538 his INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. I. 1 . 3. if it And of a row. this is not so. and not to the intrinsic nature of the holds that the apprehension of difference on external factors. Upavarsha. we do not think that two words have been pronounced. argument 1 Here tator on the . cannot form the object of one mental act. or an army. pronounce the same word differently. 53) varsha argues that the letters by themselves constitute the word. show that things which comprise several unities can become objects And if it of one and the same act of cognition. be asked why groups of letters such as Pika and Kapi should convey different meanings. such differences are due to the organs of pronunciation. high or low. i. but that their recogdepends nition is due only to the intrinsic nature of the letters. The sound which enters the ear (Dhvani) be different. which as long as they move one after another in amkara charges Sabarasvamin. no doubt. because though they perish as fast refers to elsewhere also as they are pronounced. not only as belonging to the same class. but as actually the same. strong or weak. He letters. viz.

he argues. though the theory of the Spho^a is by the Vedanta. n. . We never perceive a Sphoa. and if the letters are supposed to manifest the Sphoa. 539 a certain order. being considered essential. not have without such as gods. for. and that it is simpler to accept the letters of a word as having entered into a permanent connection with a definite sense. according to the commentary. Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofa. cows. Hence we see that. in order to maintain the identity of Brahman and the Word. convey the idea of a row. after apprehending the several letters. Without adducing further arguments.YOGA AND SAMKHYA ON SPHOTA. but in either case we should gain nothing by the Sphoa could that we admission of it. *Samkara end maintains that the admission of a Sphoa is unnecessary. The Yoga-philosophy accepted the theory of the Sphoa. and the rejected creation of the world by Brahman in accordance with the eternal words. Samkhya-Philosophie. the eternal character of the words is strenuously retained. 1 1 1 Garbe. and as in the always presenting themselves in a definite order to our understanding. by the eternal words from which all non-eternal things. p. and horses. which. but cease to do so if they are scattered about at random. It would even be preferable to admit that letters form a genus. as it would seem. nay it has been supposed to have first originated 1 it 1 . the Sphoa in turn would have to manifest the sense. finally comprehends the entire aggregate as conveying a definite sense. and as such are eternal. originated.

of the Veda. If Sphoa. then why not be satisfied with this. the Lord. What Kapila says about Sphote. rather than against the Mimarasa. according to Kapila. and from him. eternal (V. what is in fact entirely gratuitous (V. so that even at the beginning of a new creation an . proves no more than their belonging to one and the same genus. 58). it is thinkers not merely a grammatical problem distantly connected with the question of the eternity .' Eternity of the Veda can therefore. thus heated. as is of much the same character what he had said about its Isvara. It is curious to observe the elaborateness with which what seems to us a purely grammatical question is discussed in the various schools of Indian The Sphoa. and our being able to recognise them as the same. 46) because the Vedas speak of themselves as having been produced in such passages as : He became heated. is meant for the group of letters forming a word. as manifesting its sense ? Why invent something which has never been perceived. and simply speak of a word (Pada). mean no more ' than unbeginning and unbroken continuity. because. This eternity is denied by Kapila (Sa??ikhya V. he says. that Kapila's objections concerning the Sphoa were directed. Nor are the letters. 57). was against the Yoga-philosophers. we can witness their production . from Kapila's point of view. however.54 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. is to Indian philosophy. the three Vedas were produced. not that it does not exist. namely that existence cannot be proved. as Badarayana also re- marked. but not their being eternal. and which exists as little apart from the letters as a forest exists apart from the trees.

and their innate power is proved by the wonderful effects which are produced. For he holds that the Lord or Isvara could only have been either a liberated or an unliberated Purusha. without any No. as we read. they are the means of right knowledge. this 54! Veda remains the same But if. non-liberated Purusha have been the author. in the same way as germs and sprouts. such as tsvara. because he would not have this possessed the omniscience required for such a work. tain. but by some miraculous virtue. because he is free from all desires. not by any effort It must of will. and this the Hindus. because. should not call the mere breathing of We But the Vedas. because we know of no possible personal author. therefore the Veda eternal. and it presupposes a will. could not have composed enormous Veda. such as Vislmu for instance. by medical formulas taken from the Ayur-veda. a personal work. such an Isvara has never been proved to exist. nor could an active. like the notes of birds. This is the same argument which was used in the Nyaya-Sutras II. as he holds. But we must not conclude that. as a tangible and irrefutable proof of the efficiency of the Vedas. this is declared impossible by Kapila. purpose or meaning. rise spontaneously like an exhalation from the Highest Being. What is called the wT ork of a personal being always is presupposes a corporeal person. not be supposed that the words of the Veda are manifested. 68. Now a liberated Purusha.YOGA AND SAJlfKHYA ON SPHO^A. as Nyaya and Vaiseshika mainVeda was the work of a personal being. would find . for instance. the order of words in the as before. ancient or modern. Here all would depend on the experimental proof. a person in sleep.

we can see that it has a that beginning or cause. sophers. 3.542 it INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. and hence it must be non-eternal. 0. difficult to supply . . The true eternity of the Vedas of sound is. Besides. consists. there being no known barrier between the ether and our ear (II. 86). and because it is known to be factitious. p. and employment. 104). T. because it is an object of senseperception. p. 91. 115. we have no reason to find fault. we should be able it always. if sound were eternal. it is argued. intangible (II. study. Nyaya on If Sphola. in the unbroken continuity of their tradition. because. This is the same with secular words This last admission would of course be resisted and resented by Vedanta philostrongly '. but it si iows at all events the freedom Indian philosophers were allowed to handle the ancient Sacred Books of the country. Indica. This ethereal substratum to perceive no doubt. all with which 1 Vatsyayana's Commentary on the Nyaya. now we turn to the Nyaya-philosophy we find Gotama also denies the eternity of sound. even before it is uttered. Ill. according to Gotama. whilst their authority depends on the authority of the most competent persons. 3. Biblioth. S. Muir. ed. that of hearing. both in the Manvantaras and Yugas which are past and those that are still to come. but if the Hindus were satisfied.. but it is nevertheless a something perceptible by one of our senses.

because it with which we are familiar from the Purvapa. as pointed out by the native ' ' commentators. In answer to this sweeping condemnation the Vaiseshika points out VI. and the rest discovered by some critics in the text of the Vedas. the words because uttered by Him. the Veda must at least be admitted to be the work of a rational author. it is doubted whether he can justly claim any authority. such as self-contradictoriness. The Vaiseshikas the Naiyayikas or not. . the same as those ' i. and whoever its author may have been. too.ksha in the Vedanta and Mimamsaka-Sutras.VAISESHIKA ON SPHOTA. tautology. because. Thereupon the eternal character. But though this Sutra to its given twice. there attaches some uncertainty meaning. 2.' ' He who desires Such matters could not be paradise. whether human or divine. says: It has been declared that authoritativeness belongs to the Amnaya (Veda) because is and this declaration uttered by Him found likewise in the third Sutra of the first book ' it is . but they follow their of reasoning. 543 Vaiseshika on Spho/a. should known in their . X. e.' teaches duty (Dharma). i i that at all events there is in the Veda a construction of sentences consequent . 9. and not of an author of limited intelligence.' may also be translated by because it declare's it. The very last Sutra of the ' Vaiseshika-Sastra. because no merely rational author could propound such a rule as sacrifice.' But in either case there are objections. of the Veda is called in question. is lastly do not differ much from as to whether the Veda is eternal own way authoritative or not. ' upon intelligence/ or as we should say. to which the is final Sutra refers.

causes and effects to ourselves. With the Vaiseshikas. we find that. if not as and authoritative. an Isvara. after an examination of the various opinions entertained by the Nyaya and other Hindu philosophers of the significative power of words. Objects of Knowledge. because the author must at least be admitted to have been a rational being. should be treated as different from the Atman. . in his third book. but this by no means involved the eternity of the Veda. besides being the work of a rational being. Prameyas. also. at least as trustworthy safely be regarded. in this case of Isvara. the Lord. we return to the Sutras of Gotama. and other matters beyond the ken of experience. such as the rewards of sacrifices in another world. but some further supports to its authority were found in the fact that. as established by the Pramanas and the first question that meets us is. men Whatever we may think all of limited knowledge like of this argu- ment. If now. The Vaiseshikas admitted a personal author of the Veda. or not. the ISelf. he is chiefly concerned with the Prameyas. it shows at events the state of mind of the earliest defenders of revelation.544 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. the instruments of objective knowledge. the eternity of the Veda meant no more than its uninterrupted tradition (Sampradaya). he could not possibly have declared things that are beyond the knowledge of ordinary rational beings. that the objects of knowledge. is whether the senses or Indriyas. . They argued that. it had been accepted as the highest authority by a long line of the great or greatest men who themselves might infallible.

according to other systems. Senses. mere remembrance of an acid substance can make our mouth water. . After these questions have been. there is no why. that itself. he argues. and that therefore what perceives all these impressions together. the body has once been destroyed by because. would perceive . the eye colour. Some of them suggest difficul- which betray a very low state of philosophical reasoning. We meet with the question why. the skin warmth. A number of similar and answers follow. or. if not solved. the consequences of good and evil deeds would cease to pursue the Self through an endless when and rebirths. namely the Atman. holds that they are different from the and in order to prove this. he says. at the same time and in the same object. a question which would Next never occur to a Vedantist. the ear sound. follows the question whether the body is the same as the Atman. But Gotama asks it and solves it in his own way. at to Gotama goes on show N n . each sense could perceive by each sense its own object only.SARIRA. while other difficulties are such that even in our own time they have not ceased to perplex minute philosophers. all showing how much objections this question had occupied the thoughts of the series of births Nyaya ties philosophers. &c. must be something different from the several senses. Indriyas. Body. It cannot be. the Manas or mind. if memory is supposed duality of perception to be a quality or mode of the Self. BODY. /Sarira. being burnt. 545 Gotama Atman if . with the dual organ of vision. least carefully considered.

while the mind or Manas is only the instrument (Kara?ia) of knowledge by which attention is fixed on one thing at a time. as maniappealed to as showing a child's previous existence. towards a magnet. the smile of a new-born child can only arise from memory While our modern psychowould probably see in the smiles or physiologists the cries of a new-born child a reflex action of the of a previous experience. neither can Manas. different from the usual Indian arguments in support of our previous existence. mind. desire in general. because we see that iron also moves milk. when this view has been silenced by the remark that a child does not consist of the five elements only. be conceived as the Atman. And when. And here a curious argument is brought in. is not in fact. without beginning and therefore without end. muscles. the body be not Atman. not of this life only. as we should say. Gotama answers once more that a child cannot be treated like a piece of iron. as he says. because. in a former life. Manas. by the child having. namely the child's readiness to suck. arid when this also has once fested by a child. a mere vegetable. to show that our Self does not begin with our birth on earth. Mind. acquired a desire for When this again has been rejected as no argument. as a last resource. The Self is The Self is eternal. a new argument of the same character is adduced. the knower. our Indian movements objector declares that such are to be considered as no more than And the opening and closing of a lotus-flower.546 that if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which can only be accounted for. they say. is .

and why ' ? /Srutiprama^yat. like every other substance. and they may be passed by here all the more because they will have to be considered more fully VaLs'eshika system. The consideration of the body and of the substances of which it consists. and the question whether we possess one general sense only. the mind (Manas). It is chiefly concerned More with the nature of Self (Atman). The final solution only deserves clearly shows that the Nyaya also recognised in some cases the authority of the Veda as supreme. or of four. 547 more been answered by the remark that a child. earth. the discussion of sight or of the visual ray proceeding from the eye. or of five. because it displays the qualities of the five. Gotama finally dismisses all these objectors by maintaining that desires are not simply qualities. or many. in so far as it is * made of earth. fire and air. water and fire. and their relation to knowledge. water.MANAS. Here we should remember Nn 2 that. MIND. contain curious suggestions for the psychophysiologist. but can arise from experience and previous im- pressions (Samkalpa) only. . is naturally of small interest in our time. to the objects of perception are not very assigned different from what they are supposed to be in the really philosophic matter in other systems of philosophy. the difference between the two. whether of earth only. must be possessed of qualities.' because scripture says so/ What follows. when we come to examine the interesting is the discussion which occupies the rest of the third book. earth. by stating that the body our attention. but there is little of what we mean may by The qualities it. or of three elements.

15. according to I. guessing. Their Buddhi is eternal. The difference between the philosophical nomenclatures in English and Sanskrit for the Manas and its various functions is so great that a translation almost impossible. The Buddhi of the Nyaya philosophers. desire. for instance. If therefore we translate Manas therefore by mind.548 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Though there are many manifestations of Manas.' ' This is cases this declared to be due to attention. understanding. is Manas often called the doorkeeper. sensations from rushing in promiscuously preventing and all at once. 16). dreaming. yet its distinguishing feature. or as Gotama explains it (1. inference. and knowledge in general. and I am by no means satisfied with my own. while the Buddhi of Gotama is distinctly declared to be non-eternal. feeling of pleasure. doubt. the preventing of knowledge arising altogether. and its being originally different from Buddhi. and 6rn4na (knowledge) are used synonymously. we must always remember its technical meaning in Indian philosophy. verbal testimony. . or by understanding. at least so far as it enables us to transform and understand the dull impressions of the senses. and in many would be the best rendering of Manas. such as memory. and all the rest. which might often be rendered by light or the internal light that changes dark and dull impressions into clear and bright sensations. perceptions. Buddhi (understanding). is totally different from the Buddhi of the Sa7?<khyas. cognition. imagination. Upalabdhi (apprehension). we are told. It should also be remembered that is the same Sanskrit term has often very different meanings in different systems of philosophy. is what we should call attention.

who feels . and on the other side of Manas with Indriyas (senses). In answering the question.MEMORY. and meant to account for the existence of the light of reason in the whole universe while in the Nyaya-philosophy it signifies the sub. pain and pleasure. the Self or Gotama the cannot belong to the senses and their objects (Indriyartha). Manas is the instrument. Snm'ti. which is either immediate or mediate. which is but the instrument of knowledge. . who remembers. Atman. can only be the Self who in the end knows. like the Buddhi of the Samkhyas. Memory. because knowledge abides even when the senses and what they perceive have been soul. jective activity of thought in the acquisition of knowledge. according to the Nyaya. but it arises from the conjunction of Atman (Self) with Manas (attention). Memory. it falls under Anubhava. has not received from Indian If it philosophers the attention which it deserves. and the wielder of that instrument. while an eternal essence. an end and vanish by forgetfulness. who desires and acts. or in the lighting up and appropriating of the inert impressions received This knowledge can come to by the senses. 549 The Buddhi of the Sarakhya is a cosmic principle independent of the Self. must be some one different from it this. though it may be ignored. declares in this place quite clearly that real knowledge belongs to the Atman only. can never be destroyed. like the wielder of an axe. Nor does knowledge belong to the Manas. It suppressed. What is knowledge. is treated as a means of knowledge.

or kine of a bull 10. which is capable of being revived. as when the word when one has Prama/ia. as when a . Succession. as when the pounding . Connection. Relation. The subject of memory is more fully treated in III. recalls 3. There is and then another manifestation of memory in the act of remembering or recognising. as when a standard reminds one of its bearer 6. as when a thing recalls its sine qud A 'iion . as Repetition. Absence. Possession. joined with something else. and the various associations which awaken memory are enumerated as follows 1. namely he or Devadatta. 113. as . impression. . Attention to an object perceived : . Belonging. sign. . a revived Samskara. This is he. as when on seeing a man we say. when one disciple reminds . one calls up the other 4. 7. number of things together. disciple reminds us of the of rice re- teacher. . as us of the co-disciples 12. mark. Prameya. A . 2. 5. Here we have Anubhava. knowledge of this. when a property reminds us of its owner 8. minds one of sprinkling 1 1. Every Amibhava is supto leave an impression or modification of the posed mind. or Smriti. called Smn'ti. proof.550 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. or This is Devadatta. when royal attendants remind us 9. as of a wife Fellow-workers. what has to be proved learned a . as of the king . as when one body recalls a similar body. Likeness.

supply our wants 21 Motion. the Guru or teacher 15. when the ichneumon recalls the snake 14. as when a shaking branch reminds us . Merit and Demerit. when a gift reminds one of the giver 1 6. Receiving. of the wind . and they show at the same time that it is a mistake to ascribe them exclusively to the SamkhyaThough they do not add much to our philosophy. reminding us of . which make us reflect on 23. chiefly in order to stir up the thoughts of the learners. they show once more how much thought had been spent in the elaboration of mere details and this. reminding us of their . when a sword reminds one of the sheath 1 7. *Sishyavyutpadanaya. Opposition. . Desire and aversion. Covering. . Such lists are very characteristic of Hindu philosophy. Fear. . to independent activity. such as death 20. joys and sorrows of a former life22. as we are told in this case by the commen. as when investiture with the sacred string recalls the principal agent. tator himself. which makes us think of those who can . 1 551 3. Affection.MEMOKY. Pleasure and pain. as . Want. occasioner of 1 8. as . causes 19. each of which recalls the it . reminding us of a son. as . Pre-eminence. knowledge of the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy. what is feared. &c.

552 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Self or soul. including the whole apparatus of knowledge. the other. and therefore gave rise to some important questions not only of metaphysics. Knowledge not Eternal. or as we imagine that a number of palm-leaves are pierced by a pin at one blow. Some questions. senses. body. as we should say. however. and (12) Apavarga (final beatitude). Indriyas. and less attractive to the student of the problems of being and thinking. Manas ari is Ami. but of psychology also. . is naturally of a more practical character. and /Sarira. such as Atman. and not in succession. but vanishes like any other act. understanding. Manas. More Prameyas. is not in itself eternal. however. or. or objects to be known and proved. just as the fiery circle is when we whirl a firebrand with great rapidity. he states that the infinitely small. mind. the fourth book which is devoted to the remaining six Prameyas. Buddhi. He also guards against the supposition that as we seem to take in more than one sensation at the same time. that knowledge. we ought to admit more than one Manas and he ex- plains that this simultaneousness of perception is apparent only. as eating a cake full in of different kinds of sweets. are treated in it which . i) DuAkha (pain). which Gotama wishes to establish is this. While the third book was occupied with the six of the first Prameyas. atom. (10) Phala (rewards). one after Lastly. though belonging to the eternal Self. (8)Dosha (faults). central sensorium. such as (7) Pravritti (activity). (9) Pretyabh&va (trans( i migration). The important point.

literally existence after having departed this life. Existence of Deity. Another important over altogether. or even as a plant. 10) it follows that it will exist after what is called death. namely salvation. as it was by Kapila. and whether the manifestation of is anything presupposes the destruction of This is its cause. and this is proved in a very short One of the seven Self has been proved to be eternal. 553 cannot well be passed over. says (IV. Life after Death. As the Gotama made is to this tenet are easily disposed of. It comes in when a problem of the Buddhists under discussion. interesting subjects treated here is Pretyabhava.EXISTENCE OF DEITY. strongly denies this. is that a human being born again in another world as either or as some other animal being. whether the world came out of nothing. incidentally only. Some of the objections way. and reminds the opponent that . is subject. I mean the existence of a Deity. and that its chief object was the same as that of all the other systems of Indian philosophy. namely. we have already seen enough of it to know that it included almost every question within the sphere of philosophy and religion. illustrated by the fact that the seed has to But Gotama perish before the flower can appear. and the practical bearing of the Nyaya-philosophy. Though this philosophy is supposed to represent Indian logic only. if we wish to give a full insight into the whole character. but nothing said to establish what is meant by transmigration. if it is not passed treated by Gotama.

Gotama's real object. on the contrary. the Lord. of Lsvara. is confirmed by what was evidently considered by Gotama as a firmly established truth. And this admission of an Isvara. different from that of the Mimamsakas. however. like a seed. or of Nothing being the cause of the world. that is. its existence to the simple destruction of Therefore. namely. as nothing can be produced from nothing. This is certainly a curious of proving the existence of God by the very argu- ment which has generally been employed by those who want to prove His non-existence. as developed out of Prakriti. He holds. while. he continues. even though in the capacity of a governor rather than of a maker of the world. the flower would never appear. that every act of man invariably produces its result. ' We then meet with a new argument.554 if INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Nor could be said that the flower. namely that. And as Gotama differs from Gautama in denying the origin of the world out of nothing. if it had not existed previously. if it had. nor from an annihilated something. is to refute the Buddhist theory of vacuity (6'unya). destroyed the seed. who hold that all tilings. but requires the admission of an Isvara. if work done continued to work entirely of men do by itself. are real only so long as they are noticed by the Purusha. but under the superintendence of some one. the world also cannot have sprung from nothingness. and afterwards to disprove the idea that effects can ever be fortuitous. he also differs from the Sawkhya philosophers. . though not by itself. the seed were really destroyed by being pounded or burnt. as its real cause. the fact that some good or evil deeds riot seem to receive their reward would remain unaccounted way for. it would it have owed the seed.

555 that some things are real and eternal.CAUSE AND EFFECT. If we were to doubt this. because we actually see both their production and their destruction. liable even to temporary disappearance at the end of each aeon. that is taken for granted by the It is this J Sarvalaukikapramatva. This l is a novel kind of argument for an Indian philosopher to use. It simply the denial of an Isvara. liable to change. and to reappearance at the beginning of a new aeon. they hold that in the eyes of philosophers He would be but a phenomenal manifestation of the Godhead. a personal Isvara or Lord. be proved to exist by human arguments. and there would be an end of all truth and untruth. kind of a divine being. the denial of a supreme and absolute Being but we saw that even the so-called atheism of the is Samkhya-philosophy does not amount to that. and shows that with all the boldness of their speculations they were not so entirely different from ourselves. and not entirely indifferent to the Securus judicat orbis terrarum. With us atheistic implies . And even such a personal God is not altogether denied by the Samkhyas they only deny that He can . however. and if He exists as such. If. Cause and Effect. as an active and personal creator and ruler of the world. we should always remember that such terms as theistic and philosophy in the atheistic are hardly applicable to Indian sense in which they are used by Christian theologians. we call the Nyaya-philosophy theistic. but others are not. . we should doubt what has been settled by the authority of all men.

but a phenomenal manifestation of and the Paramatman must not be supposed. philosophers. it is distinctly Nyaya . . T. only they are not the sole cause of what happens. the omniscient Lord. or Self is twofold. p. if every act continued to act (Karman). as they ought. 12 Muir. 1 Bullantyne. Though Paramatman is Isvara. all-pervading and eternal. 19-21. and here the same subject is treated once to It is more. and that no effects would take place without the working of human with The actions of men. fully The argument which we met stated in Gotama's Sutras.556 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. atman. 133. an Lsvara. We Phala . now come the tenth of the Prameyas. always produce an effect. p. while the (rivatman is separate for each individual body. agents. but we require another power. it may be added at once. Hindu Philosophy. Rewards. iii. vol. to account for what would otherwise be irrational results of human actions. and that can be Isvara only. the (rivatman (the (personal Highest Self). which is one only. stated that 'the Atman Self). It is not denied thereby that human actions are required. it is said.' however. Isvara is not Paramatman. and. for instance. 0. Phala. nor bad actions bad results. S. Good actions do not always produce good results. though from a different point of view. that Lsvara. Christianity contrasted with . Hence there must be another power that modifies the continuous acting of acts. is ParamIt Paramatman before is only. the Vaiseshika philosophers also l by In the Tarka-Samgraha.. do not IV.

The ob- is not. satisfied with this. in the case of good or bad acts. or the cloth the threads. takes a bolder step. but. for no weaver would say that the threads are the cloth. on the contrary. After examining the meaning of pain. there is a permanent receptacle. is full of pain. 557 how are effects. . is Emancipation.EMANCIPATION. no subject. even pleasure. which because there alone or in capable of perceiving pain or joy in this any other state of existence. however. is no receptacle (Asraya) or. rewards or punishments. before it has been woven. that we actually see production and destruction before our very eyes. at the same time. namely the Self. such as that it is impossible in this life to pay all our moral debts. arid expressing his conviction that everything. Gotama at last approaches the He begins emancipation (Apavarga). not to be frightened by this apparently Buddhistic argument. and denies that any effect either is or is not. poslife ? life. would have ceased to is exist long before their fruit be gathered. sible in another As both good and evil works are done in this the cause. but appeals again to what we should call the common-sense view is Gotama of the matter. namely. as usual with objections. as we should say. We can see every day that a cloth. this is met by the declaration that. does not exist. that certain last subject. asked. And if it should be argued that the fruit produced by a tree is different from the fruit of our acts. namely these works. or is or is not. This objection is met by an illustration taken from a tree which bears fruit to long after jector it has ceased to be watered.

if in thought only. and of the Nyaya-philosophy in The first step towards this is the cessaparticular. If wholes are constantly divided and subdivided. and that if it is said that a man is freed from these by old age. we should in the end be landed in nihilism. in fact there though even this would really have to be looked tion.558 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. namely whether the objects of desire And this leads him on exist as wholes or as parts. 8-82). but this is not to be. Against this the smallest parts are realities view of the existence of what we should call . here used in the sense of personal feelings. cannot be further according reduced or compressed out of being. therefore. this does not imply that. sacrificial duties are enjoined as incumbent on us to the end of our lives. There cannot be annihilation because the A?ius or (IV. even when he is no longer able to perform his daily duties. is the beginning and end of all philosophy. Gotama is carried (Mithyagtfiana) back once more to a subject which had been discussed before. and this can be effected by knowledge of the truth only. which arises from false what is the distinguishing doctrine both of the Nyaya and of the Vaiseshika-philosophies. tion of Ahamkara. to how this desire. If. to their very nature. and. he should not perform certain duties. continue. of all upon as an obstacle to real emancipaNothing remains but -a complete extinction desires. namely the admission of Anus or atoms. good works will be paradise. there will be rewards for them. Therefore knowledge of the truth or removal of all false notions. eradicated and aversion also but before he explains . such as desire for a beautiful and aversion Desire therefore has to be to a deformed object. apprehension can be eradicated.

namely that ether (or space) is everywhere. and therefore in an atom also. it would be their non-existence. a Buddhist. first of all because. ether is said to be intangible. . not of Things. makes a still bolder sweep by denying the existence of any external things. After granting that. And now (Vidyamatra) doctrine. And here the Nyaya suddenly calls the Yoga to its aid.KNOWLEDGE OF IDEAS. as there would be in attempting to divide an atom. NOT OF THINGS. if . the opponent. if it were impossible to prove the existence of any external things. the usual arguments are then adduced. but vanishes. how that true knowledge. not things nothing different from our knowledge. once gained. Knowledge of Ideas. and if an atom has figure or a without and a within. or visions produced jugglery. can exist for us. like it an appeal were made by a mirage. or by should be remembered that dreams also. All we have is knowledge. if And of things remembrances. it would seem. he says. is. neither resistant nor obstructing. something. is to be preserved. or independent of our knowGotama objects to this ledge. equally impossible to prove to dreams. so that false knowledge can always be removed by true knowledge. appeal is made to a recognised maxim of Hindu philosophy. that there. nor preventing and in the end an others from occupying space . that neither occupying space against others. one more question arises. it is of necessity In reply. divisible. again. must never be a regressio in infinitum. because we saw that knowledge is not eternal. presuppose previous perception and that even in mistaking we mistake . 559 atoms.

No. . This has always excited the special interest of European logicians on account of certain startling similarities or the which no doubt exist between it and the syllogism of But from a Hindu Aristotle and the schoolman. to No. in spite disturbances from without. may seem a very humble view to take with regard to a system of philosophy which at the very outset promised to its students final beatitude as the highest reward. one subject. objectionable proceedings. however. treated as VII. in which case even such arts as wrangling and cavilling This may prove of service. of which we have had so many indications in the ancient as well as in the modern we can well understand that philoskilled in all the arts and artifices of reasonsophers. point of view this syllogism or even logic in general 1 Cowell. Nigrahasthana. 1867. would secure for their system that high position history of India.560 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. which are ' fully treated in the fifth book. which the Nyaya certainly held and still holds among the recognised systems of orthodox philoIt would be useless to go once more over sophy. namely the Syllogism. There is Five Members. while the Nyayaphilosophy retains its own peculiar usefulness as of all employed in the defence of truth against all comers. XIV. Syllogism. which requires some more special consideration. futility. XVI. Report on the Toles of Nuddea. and teaches that Samadhi or intense meditation will prove a safe preservative of knowledge. ing. But considering the activity of philosophical speculation. the topics from ati.

to go over some of the ground again. nor fully discussed in the Vedanta and chief object of the Nyaya-philoexclusive property. It has been Samkhya systems.SYLLOGISM. will find its most appro- colour mentioned as the distinguishing quality of light. Garbe. though in the larger sense of being the cause of every conception that has found expression in Knowledge. right again Right perception a thing such as it is. and by revealed authority. comparative. The Nyaya looks As we saw upon knowledge as inseparably connected with the Self. inferential. is 561 by no means the is it its sophy. 1888. Perception or wrong. sensuous. brought back to the Prama/was again which were discussed in the beginning. as we saw. Here we are parison. mother-of-pearl as This right perception. twofold. silver as silver. it is Wrong perception represents a thing as silver. den Erkenntnissmitteln. not. and once more in the Vaiseshika it but as it forms the pride of the Nyaya. M. Different systems of philosophy differed. according to the Nyayaphilosophy is. perception or remembrance. obliged. l priate place here . and authoritative. of four kinds. following the Sutras. Appendix to Archbishop Thomson's Laws of Thought also Die Theorie des indischen Rationalisten von 1 . Anumana or inference. by com- We are thus in See M. O O . . and is by inference. is language. as we saw. von R. according to the Nyaya. we found knowledge put forward as the characteristic feature of Self. represents either is This is called truth. but among which one.. Prama. treatment. receives here a more special produced by perception.

AeshZa. has been arises. Six. tradition. Perception AUrvakas. first of rivers and S4manyatodri'shZa. the ants carrying off their eggs in the third the sign of the motion of the sun was its being seen . revelation. that there is fire which we cannot see in a mountain. comparison. revelation. Others admit also Aitihya. Perception and inference Buddhists. revelation. tion) : Vaiseshikas and Perception. Sambhava. or that a mountain is a volcano. comparison. Perception. gesture. and not-being Mlmamsakas. when all that we do see is merely that the mountain smokes ? We should remember that there were three kinds of Anumana (NyayaSutras II. number of Prainanas which they admit. inference. inference. Five. examined. which takes cognisance substances. : and presumption : Prabhakara (a Mimamsaka). of After sensuous knowledge.562 in the INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. qualities. Four. according to what each considers the only trustworthy channels of knowledge. Perception. the question how can we know things which are not brought to us by the senses ? How do we know. : One. 37) called Purva vat. : equivalence. keen together. having the sign after or as the the effect. Three. or as the cause. inference. and comparison Naiyayikas. arid word (revela- Sa?>ikhyas. and actions. for instance. In class the sign of past rain was the swelling in the second the sign of coming rain was . having the sign before. : Two. Perception. Pramanas in different Philosophical Schools. . inference. $eshavat. presumption.

to pervade. what we should call the middle term in a syllogism. This expression. fieriness. may sometimes be taken as a general rule. or even as a general law. 563 in different places. 002 . is used by logicians in the sense of invariable. in possession of a true Vyapti as smokiness being there is smoke. we are told that we must be in possession of what is called a Vyapti. came to be used for Vyapya. what must be pervaded Vyapaka. Vyapti that wherever there fire. viz. It is such a Vyapti. what pervades. as we saw. a Paksha or member of our Vyapti. for instance.PRAMAJVAS IN DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS. such wherever there is smoke. however. or invariable concomitance. which we see rising from the mountain. not. and in order to arrive at it. Vyapta means pervaded Vyapya. there is fire. . that smokiness is pervaded by smokiness. fieriness by We arrive by is induction at the is smoke. inseparable from Vyapti. it Thus sea-water is is always pervaded by it. acquired in these three ways. This. was the most important word in an Indian syllogism.' The as conclusion then follows that this mountain which ' shows smoke. inseparable or universal concomitance. as the Hindus it is some cases say. If we once are that the firewood should be moist. must have fire. Literally it means pervasion. . that smoke is pervaded by or invariably connected with fire. and in this sense what is to be pervaded. we only require what is called groping or consideration (Paramarsa) in order to make the smoke. or. saltness. is called inferential knowledge (Anumana). but not that wherever there is Vyapti in order to be true would require a condition or Upadhi. The latter pervaded by fieriness. Knowledge of things unseen. there fire. in simply the sine qud non.

but what the Hindus describe as Paramarsa or groping or trying to find in an object something which can . . might and make easily clothe Ka?iada in a Grecian garb him look almost like Aristotle. The Sanskrit Anumana is not exactly the Greek o-u/zTrepacr/za. sed aliter. the smoking mountain. that constitutes the principal charm of a comparative peculiar to Indian logic Even such terms as syllogism or conclusion are inconvenient here. g. but translate it We very clumsy to European would have been easy enough to into our own more technical language. Multa jiunt eadem. because they study of philosophy. and TOV M is P. by Vyapya. Instead inferential knowledge arises from an object something which is always pervaded by something else. Wliat calls one member of the pervasion. terminus medius.crov rb rpiTcp Seixvvo'ii'. g. and it is this very thing. but it means measuring something by means of something else. or with Aristotle.564 All this INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. what should we have gained by this ? All that is i. e. axpov rS> 6 o-yAXoytoyioy Sia fj. we might have said that our knowledge that S is P arises from discovering that of saying that discovering in S is M. . Kanada e. Vyapaka or Sadhya. and that the pervading predicate is predicable of all things of which the pervaded predicate is. and the remainder might have been taken for a clumsy imitation of Aristotle. fieriness. But smokiness. this aliter. by predicate or is to be pervaded. This is done by what we may call syllogism. Paksha. and what would have evaporated. might have been translated by subject or terminus minor what pervades. may sound it logicians. terminus major e. have with us an historical colouring and may throw a false light on the subject.

ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. if it smokes. Things which cannot be seen with our eyes. follows ' is The act of taken from Annambha^a's Comis concluding. ' twofold. as fire is. will has of fire. For the present we must remember that in the case before us the act of proving by means of Anumana consists in our knowing that there is in the mountain something always pervaded by. Gotama therefore defines the result of inference (I. truth which to the looking for a terminus medius. But. 565 the be measured by something else or what can become member of a pervasion.' he says. or inseparable from something else. Next follows others. again. it being intended either for one's own benefit or for the benefit of others. The former is the means of arriving at knowledge for oneself. the relation of what pervades and what JQI) as is pervaded call is very different from what we should the relative extension of two concepts. Anumana for Others. This corresponds in fact In Kapila's the principal object of inference is system (I. that is. and the process is this. is or inferential mountain for a volcano. transcends the horizon of our senses. What pendium. knowledge. the result Anumana. By repeated observation. smoke always pervaded by fire. as arising from the perception of a connection or a law. that is. as in . and that therefore the mountain. This become more evident as we proceed. By this process we arrive at Anumiti. that the So much for the inference the inference for ourselves. in our case. when what is seen is smoke only. are known by inference. knowledge of the connected. 61) said to be transcendent truth.

because it has smoke fire . . We see the when we But we. as you may see. (3) Instance (Udaharana or Nidarsana).' Nyaya-Sutras 2 Synonyms The Karawa. we have to convince somebody else of what by inference. and hence you will admit that T was right when I said that the mountain is This is called the five-membered form of fiery. such as that wherever we have seen smoke. it has fire 3 . We are asked. we have seen fire. (4) Anusamdhana. and the five members are severally called l . like. This is the process may or may not be fire in it. Why? and we We then give our answer. Liwga. exposition. look at the kitchen hearth.566 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 4. Prainawa. and the mountain has . . Now you perceive that the mountain does smoke. (2) Apadesa. on a kitchen hearth and the like. and immediately perceive that the mountain itself is fiery. smoke (5) 1 Conclusion (Nigamana). therefore I. the case is then start with the assertion. the case of kitchen hearths and the we are reminded of a rule (Vyapti). and remember the Vyapti between smoke and (4) fire . Because it smokes. 2. for instance. if reason for ourselves. or the major premiss. We know to be true. Application (Upanaya). 3 Hetu are Apadesa. the mountain has 2 (2) Reason (Hetu ). we remember the rule. that all that smokes is fiery. The mountain is fiery. (1) Assertion (Prati^fta). 32. (5) Pratyamnaya. (3) of Nidarsana. Vaiseshika terms are (i) Prati^na. and Vaiseshika-Sutras IX. reason. different. We now approach a mountain and wonder whether there smoke.

How it is that we know any thing which we do not. how we can taken by itself. . tive and deductive reasoning. 567 In both cases the process of inference is the same. from the time of Aristotle to our own. aware of the inseparability of inducclearly The formal logician. that whatever of formal Logic in these short extracts. and as this knowledge is not confined to sensuous perceptions. in fact. it for may give a variety of . has but one object with Gotama. Deductive reasoning may in itself be most useful forming Vyaptis. and therefore more troversy. It is not so logic as it is noetic that interested Kamida. We there is must not forget. that of describing knowledge as one of the qualities of the Self.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. From this point of view we can easily see that neither induction nor deduction. however. if perceive by our senses. as they fall But the question which occupies Gotama is. more persuasive. but the second is supposed to be more rhetorical. corresponds totidem verbis to the first form of Aristotle's syllogism All that smokes is fiery. he collects. \vould be sufficient for him. useful in con- What is called by Annambha^a the conclusion : for oneself. Gotama felt it incumbent on him to inferential kind of explain the nature and prove the legitimacy of the knowledge also. he arranges and analyses the functions of our reasoning faculties. justify inferential knowledge. nay which we cannot under his observation. takes a much He was purely technical interest in the machinery of the human mind. The mountain smokes Therefore the mountain is fiery.

might be called a Vyapti. therefore all animals with differ bile are long-lived. attribute of little bile. horse. Knowledge gained by epagogic reasoning is. mules. The only object of all knowledge. Ka?^ada would say that humanity all is pervaded by mortality. because it teaches nothing new. have little little bile (B) . horse. wherever we see a different way. and that this is impossible. Or to use another instance. according Gotama. and where Aristotle concludes that kings are mortal because they belong to the class of men. But there he would not stop. because it cannot teach anything certain or unconditional. &c. but he would express himself in He would say. would say that kinghood is . or that we have never seen men humanity without mortality . and not what Gotama would call Prama. f. as for instance in men. different aspects to our knowledge. strictly speaking. The conclusion. but it can never add to it. say. and mule man. he cannot on the other rely entirely on induction. we also see the attribute the much from of long life. And if on one side Gotama cannot use deduction. i. He knew to as well as Aristotle that tirayayri in order to prove the oAo>y must be Sia TrdvTtov. and not for others. Gotama. and mule (C) (C) are long-lived (A) . He arrives at it by saying that man..568 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. He would value this Vyapti merely as a means of establishing a new he would use it as a means of deduction and rule .. is absolute truth or Prama. where Aristotle says that are mortal. that animals with little bile are long-lived. horses. Gotama does not this. 'Now we know that the elephant has little therefore we know also that he is long-lived. always e?n TO 77-6X1. if he argued for himself only. at which Aristotle arrives by way of induction.' bile.

and thus throws the onus probandi as to any case to the contrary upon the other side. but we never eliminate all real. mules. the mutual inherence and inseparable connection of l 1 ' Satasah sahafcaritayor api vyabhiMropalabdhe/i. ' ' attribute of little bile. however. that because in ninety-nine cases a Vyapti or rule has happened to be true. though not the possibility. it does not follow that it will be so in the hundredth case. we have observed long life. instance where smoke was seen without fire. if. 569 pervaded by manhood and manhood by mortality. possible. of exceptions. the other has been seen likewise. and therefore kings are mortal. men.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. If it can be that there never has been an proved. as a fact. He states. on the contrary. It would be easy to bring objections against this kind of reasoning. . and the like. much less all The Hindu. of little bile. we add horses. Wherever we have seen the attribute by saying. and we shall see that Indian philosophers themselves have not been slow in bringing them forward. One thing can be said in favour of the If we go on accumulating instances to form an induction.' Anu- manakhawcZa of TattvaJtintaniani. excludes the reality. case. and likewise in answering them. as in the afore-mentioned Indian method. The Hindu knows the nature of induction quite well enough to say in the very words of European philosophers. we approximate no doubt more and more to a general rule.' or better We have never observed long life without the still. and these by way of illustration only. exceptions. that wherever the one has been.' and by then giving a number of mere instances.

third. smoke and fire is more firmly established than it would be by any number of accumulated actual instances where the two have been seen together. We must first know them more Such objections as have fully. philosophers. IV. hitherto been started were certainly not unknown to Gotama and Ka?^ada themselves.570 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. p. to form a universal rule. would really lose its universal with their system of by the introduction of the instance. The conditions (Upadhis) under which it is allowable to form a Vyapti. 365. says that 'two members while.' But the Hindu logicians also were perfectly aware of the fact that this character l ' not essential to a syllogism. They look upon the instance simply as a helpful reminder for instance is 1 Ritter. Hindu they furnish at all events a curious parallel to the endeavours of European philosophers in defence both of inductive and deductive thinking. Thus it has been pointed out by European philosophers that the proposition that wherever there is smoke there is fire. History of Philosophy. In accordance Purvapaksha and Uttarapaksha. It cise seems hardly time as yet to begin to critithe inductive and the deductive methods as elaborated by Hindu philosophers. and though they may not throw any new light on the origin of universals. the universality of the conclusion . that is to say. have greatly occupied the thoughts of Volumes after volumes have been written on the subject. of Kamda's argument of is are by the introduction an example in the vitiated. every conceivable objection was started by them and carefully analysed and answered.' evidently superfluous. as on the kitchen hearth.

or Kevala-vyatireki. 57! controversial purposes. the and absent. is an offshoot of logic. pervasion. It is Vy4pti between the smoke the fire which is implied. there is and where fire is not. Where there is smoke. It is meant to remind us that we must look out which we see. as Whately says. is is illus- Whatever cognisable nameable.' rhetoric therefore far is more than Indian responsible for the introduction logic that of this third . smoke is not. which must depend on the character of the Vyapti. is illustrated by a case such . character which through its having a invariably attended by that establishes (in which is be established. present by such a case as. con- junction with the reason) the existence of that It is Indian character which is to be established. but not for a rhetorical syllogisms or syllogisms for others only that the instance has therefore in its ' proper place. Kevaldnvayi. The fact is that Gotama cares far more for the a Vy4pti. yet. Vyapti was considered as three- A fold in the school of Gotama. familiar case which. 35 is Gotama some The third member the to fact is or example says. member which contains the objectionable instance and rhetoric. of In Sutra I. i. is illustrated Anvaya-vyatireki. as an illustration to assist the memory. The first. is e. where it is impossible to bring forward anything that is not cognisable. or Kevaldnvayi. though it is not logic. The third case.ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. present only. The fire. trated by such a case as. as Anvaya-vyatireki. than for the manner in which it may serve hereafter as the basis formation of of a syllogism. not as an essential part of the process of the proof itself. second. and seen. and Kevala-vyatireki.

Ballantyne in his Lectures on the Nyaya-philosophy. ' 59 To be the constant accompanier of what p. all that is from the other in elements has odour. in the case of a red- hot iron ball. we have to say. the presence of wet fuel was conditions an Upadhi. in this case. is not inodorous. Earth it is is different because odorous. Here we could not go on different and say. fire. or indispensable condition. because the only case But point (Udaharana) would again be earth. d. where we have really fire without Hence it would not follow by necessity is smoke. founded chiefly on the Tarkasaragraha. i. far the Indian mind may go in these minutiae of reasoning may be seen from the following instance that there fire because there is given by Dr. This Upadhi pervades what is to be established (Sadhya-vyapaka). as water (by itself). but different from them. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. but it does not pervade what establishes (Sadhana-vyapaka). because there is fire. Much attention has also been paid by Hindu philosophers to the working of the Upadhis or assigned to a Vyapti. what is not different from the other elements is But this earth it is is not odorous. not so. Thus in the ordinary Vyapti that there is smoke in a mountain. as. because fire is not pervaded by or invariably accompanied by wet smoke. from the other elements. smoke. e. : is to be established (Sadhya-vyapakatva) consists in the not being the counter-entity (Apratiyogitva) of any absolute non-existence (Atyantabhava) having the . for instance. or that How there is no fire because there is no smoke. fuel. e.572 as. and the other therefore not not-different from elements. q.

Such native aid would seem to be almost indispensable for such an achievement. but to the late Dr. 573 that which (Samanadhikara?ia) as to be established. To be not the of inhesion constant accompanier of the argument (Sadhanavyapakatva) consists in the being the counterentity (Pratiyogitva) of some absolute non-existence [not impossibly] resident in that which possesses [the character tendered as an] argument. who was assisted in unravelling these cobwebs of Nyaya logic by the Nyaya-Pandits of the Sanskrit College at Benares.ANUMANA FOR same subject is OTHERS. . Ballantyne.' The credit of this translation belongs not to me.

referred now to the no great antiquity.D. we are told.D. would be worth having. 121. it by Professor Leumann and is certainly not later. well known by searches in ' 6raina literature. or rather with regard to the VaiseshikaSutras.CHAPTER IX. dispersed by the 144 so-called points of that system. even such a date.' in the Indische Studien. XVII. (7inaas mentioned by the author. fortunate that with regard to the Vaiseshika philosophy. originally a meant for Could this be Auluku ? . 1 Haribhadra. if in the This. The old reports on the schisms of the (rainas. was founded by the author of the Vaisesiya-sutta of the Chaulti race. the sixth. Among the various heresies there mentioned. is the age of thirteenth century A. 6'inabhadra. we are able to fix a date below which their composition cannot be placed. 9 i-i 35. VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. is true. Professor In the year 1885 his valuable re- Leumann. bhadra's date is fixed eighth century A. we consider our Samkhya-Sfttras... p. still. and hence called If there could be any doubt that this is Chauluga meant for the VaLseshika-Sutras it would at once be 1 . another step backward. pp. if only But we can make certain. published an article. Date of IT is Stltras.

after describing the (i) Bauddha. though. It is curious to observe that here again the Vedanta-philosophy. (5) from the Nyaya. already firmly For.e. us an attestation for the Vaiseshika-Sutras as early as that of the Samkhya-karikas. Haribhadra. and Sanskrit scholarship is greatly indebted to Professor C. of course. we have no right to conclude from this that these systems had at that time not yet been reduced to a sy