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Constitutional Law - Case Briefs

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Constitutional Law

Keyed to: Chemerinsky Second Edition
Gray Publishing & Media, Inc. Publishers Copyright © 2005 By Gray Publishing & Media, Inc

Dear Students:

Welcome to Casebriefs Digital Editions, the original digital briefs. Since 1995, Casebriefs has been published and offered electronically to law students throughout the U.S. Casebriefs was first published to facilitate the seamless integration of the ³hand written, paper briefing process´ with contemporary electronic techniques. Its purpose is to save you time, and facilitate your being more efficient and productive in your briefing process. Its objective is to enable you to spend your time more efficiently for analyzing and discerning the concepts of the law and for developing your legal perception. Casebriefs should never be used as a substitute for assigned reading and writing assignments. It should be used only to assist you in your assignments and not as authority. You will only shortchange yourself if you do not read and perform according to your professor¶s instruction. Understand that while we have taken great care in publishing Casebriefs, at times, mistakes may be made that even we do not catch, and therefore, we apologize for this at the outset. We wish you the greatest success in your studies and should you wish to contact us, please visit our Web site at www.eCasebriefs.com or call us at 561-249-4140 x 103. Thank you,

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2 Marbury v. Madison

Table of Contents
CHAPTER I. The Federal Judicial Power......................................................................11 Marbury v. Madison......................................................................................................12 United States v. Emerson..............................................................................................13 Silveira v. Lockyer........................................................................................................15 Ex parte McCardle........................................................................................................17 United States v. Klein...................................................................................................18 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.......................................................................................19 Allen v. Wright.............................................................................................................20 Singleton v. Wulff.........................................................................................................21 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow................................................................22 United States v. Richardson..........................................................................................24 Flast v. Cohen...............................................................................................................25 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al..............................................................................................................26 Poe v. Ullman................................................................................................................27 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner....................................................................................28 Friends of the Earth, Incorporated v. Laidlaw Environmental Services.......................29 United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty.............................................................30 Baker v. Carr.................................................................................................................31 Vieth v. Jubelier............................................................................................................32 Powell v. McCormack..................................................................................................34 Goldwater v. Carter.......................................................................................................35 Nixon v. United States..................................................................................................36 CHAPTER II. The Federal Legislative Power...............................................................38 McCulloch v. Maryland................................................................................................39 Gibbons v. Ogden.........................................................................................................40 United States v. E. C. Knight Co..................................................................................41 Carter v. Carter Coal Co...............................................................................................42 Houston, East & West Railway Company v. United States.........................................43 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States...............................................44 Hammer v. Dagenhart...................................................................................................45 Champion v. Ames........................................................................................................47 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp................................48 United States v. Darby..................................................................................................49 Wickard v. Filburn........................................................................................................50 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States...............................................................51 Katzenbach v. McClung, Sr. and McClung, Jr.............................................................52 National League of Cities v. Usery...............................................................................53 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority................................................54 United States v. Lopez..................................................................................................56 United States v. Morrison.............................................................................................58 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.....59 Pierce County Washington v. Guillen..........................................................................61 3 Marbury v. Madison

New York v. United States...........................................................................................63 Printz v. United States...................................................................................................64 Reno v. Condon............................................................................................................65 United States v. Butler..................................................................................................66 Sabri v. United States....................................................................................................67 South Dakota v. Dole....................................................................................................69 United States v. Morrison.............................................................................................70 Katzenbach v. Morgan and Morgan..............................................................................71 City of Boerne v. Flores................................................................................................72 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer......................................................................................................73 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida............................................................................74 Alden v. Maine..............................................................................................................75 CHAPTER III. The Federal Executive Power................................................................76 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer...................................................................77 United States v. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States.............................79 William J. Clinton, President of the United States v. City of New York.....................80 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States...............................................81 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.......................................................................................82 Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., Inc..................................................................83 Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Jagdish Rai Chadha.................................85 Alexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore B. Olson.....................................87 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp...............................................................89 Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury..................................................90 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.......................................................................................................91 Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald..........................................................................94 William Jefferson Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones.........................................................95 CHAPTER IV. Limits On State Regulatory And Taxing Power....................................96 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly....................................................................................97 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v. Paul, Director, Department of Agriculture of California....................................................................................................................100 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission................................................................................................................101 Hines, Secretary of Labor ad Industry of Pennsylvania v. Davidowitz......................102 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc v. Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York....................................................................................................................103 Aaron B. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia............................104 South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc......................105 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.................................................................................106 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.............................................................................108 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York..........................................109 Hughes v. Oklahoma...................................................................................................110 Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission................................................................................................................111 Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland.............................................................112 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture..................................................................................................114 4 Marbury v. Madison

State of Minnesota v. Clover Lead Creamery Co.......................................................115 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin...........................................................116 Maine v. Taylor and United States.............................................................................117 Loren J. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.............................................................................118 Bibb, Director, Department of Public Safety of Illinois v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc....................................................................................................................................119 Raymond Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware.................120 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.................................................................121 Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California...................................................................................................................................123 Reeves, Inc v. William Stake......................................................................................124 South-Central Timber Development, Inc v. Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources of Alaska....................................................................................................125 Toomer v. Witsell.......................................................................................................127 United Building and Construction Trade Council of Camden County v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden...................................................................................128 Lester Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana......................................130 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Kathryn A. Piper............................................131 CHAPTER V. The Structure Of The Constitution's Protection Of Civil Rights And Civil Liberties.........................................................................................................................133 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore........................................................134 Slaughter-House Cases (Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company)..........................................135 Saenz v. Roe................................................................................................................137 Twining v. New Jersey...............................................................................................139 Duncan v. Louisiana...................................................................................................140 The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley.......................................................141 Marsh v. Alabama.......................................................................................................142 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co............................................................................143 Terry v. Adams...........................................................................................................145 Evans v. Newton.........................................................................................................146 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc..........147 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.................................................................................................148 Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board..............................................................149 Shelley v. Kraemer......................................................................................................150 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.......................................................................................151 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co...........................................................................153 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority...................................................................154 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis....................................................................................155 Norwood v. Harrison..................................................................................................157 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn...............................................................................................159 Blum v. Yaretsky........................................................................................................161 Reitman v. Mulkey......................................................................................................163 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn........................165 CHAPTER VI. Economic Liberties..............................................................................168 Allgeyer v. Louisiana..................................................................................................169 5 Marbury v. Madison

Lochner v. New York.................................................................................................171 Coppage v. Kansas......................................................................................................173 Muller v. Oregon.........................................................................................................174 Adkins v. Children's Hospital.....................................................................................175 Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.........................................................................................176 Nebbia v. New York...................................................................................................177 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.................................................................................178 United States v. Carolene Products Co.......................................................................179 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.............................................................180 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore........................................................................181 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.......................................183 Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell.................................................................186 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.......................................187 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus........................................................................188 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.......................................................................190 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.......................................................192 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon................................................................................193 Miller v. Schoene........................................................................................................194 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City...................................................195 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council...................................................................196 Dolan v. City of Tigard...............................................................................................197 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island..........................................................................................199 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency..........201 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff........................................................................204 Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington................................................................205 CHAPTER VII. Equal Protection.................................................................................207 Romer v. Evans...........................................................................................................208 United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz......................................................209 Railway Express Agency, Inc v. New York...............................................................210 New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer...............................................................211 United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno..................................................212 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc............................................213 Dred Scott v. Sandford................................................................................................214 Korematsu v. United States.........................................................................................215 Loving v. Virginia.......................................................................................................216 Palmore v. Sidoti.........................................................................................................217 Plessy v. Ferguson......................................................................................................218 Brown v. Board of Education.....................................................................................219 Washington v. Davis...................................................................................................220 McCleskey v. Kemp....................................................................................................221 City of Mobile v. Bolden............................................................................................222 Palmer v. Thompson...................................................................................................223 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney................................................224 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp..............225 Brown v. Board of Education.....................................................................................226 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education...............................................227 6 Marbury v. Madison

Milliken v. Bradley.....................................................................................................229 Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell..............................231 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co......................................................................................232 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena............................................................................234 Grutter v. Bollinger.....................................................................................................235 Gratz v. Bollinger........................................................................................................238 Easley v. Cromartie.....................................................................................................240 Frontiero v. Richardson..............................................................................................242 Craig v. Boren.............................................................................................................243 United States v. Virginia.............................................................................................244 Geduldig v. Aiello.......................................................................................................246 Orr v. Orr....................................................................................................................247 Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.............................................................248 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County......................................................249 Rostker v. Goldberg....................................................................................................251 Califano v. Webster....................................................................................................252 Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service...................................................253 Graham v. Richardson................................................................................................256 Foley v. Connelie........................................................................................................257 Ambach v. Norwick....................................................................................................258 Plyler v. Doe...............................................................................................................259 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia...........................................................261 CHAPTER VIII. Fundamental Rights Under Due Process And Equal Protection.......263 Zablocki v. Redhail.....................................................................................................264 Michael H. v. Gerald D...............................................................................................266 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio.......................................................................268 Meyer v. Nebraska......................................................................................................269 Troxel v. Granville......................................................................................................270 Skinner v. Oklahoma..................................................................................................272 Griswold v. Connecticut.............................................................................................273 Eisenstadt v. Baird......................................................................................................275 Roe v. Wade................................................................................................................276 Planned Parenthood v. Casey......................................................................................277 Stenberg v. Carhart.....................................................................................................279 Maher v. Roe...............................................................................................................281 Planned Parenthood v. Casey......................................................................................282 Bellotti v. Baird...........................................................................................................283 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health.............................................................284 Washington v. Glucksberg..........................................................................................286 Lawrence v. Texas......................................................................................................288 Whalen v. Roe.............................................................................................................291 Saenz v. Roe................................................................................................................292 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections...............................................................293 Kramer v. Union Free School District........................................................................294 Ball v. James...............................................................................................................295 Reynolds v. Sims........................................................................................................296 7 Marbury v. Madison

Bush v. Gore...............................................................................................................297 Boddie v. Connecticut.................................................................................................300 United States v. Kras...................................................................................................301 M.L.B. v. S.L.J............................................................................................................302 Lewis v. Casey............................................................................................................303 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.............................................304 Daniels v. Williams.....................................................................................................306 County of Sacramento v. Lewis..................................................................................307 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services........................................308 Goldberg v. Kelly........................................................................................................310 Board of Regents v. Roth............................................................................................311 Goss v. Lopez..............................................................................................................312 Paul v. Davis...............................................................................................................313 Mathews v. Eldridge...................................................................................................314 CHAPTER IX. First Amendment: Freedom Of Expression.........................................315 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission............316 Boos v. Berry..............................................................................................................317 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White....................................................................318 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc....................................................................321 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley................................................................322 United States v. American Library Association, Inc..................................................323 Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olsen....................................................................326 New York Times Company v. United States..............................................................327 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart..........................................................................329 Alexander v. United States.........................................................................................330 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton.........331 Thomas And Windy Hemp Development Board v. Chicago Park District................333 City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C...................................................335 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union...............................................337 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette..................................................338 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission....................................................................339 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc........................................340 Rust v. Sullivan...........................................................................................................341 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.............................................................................342 Schenck v. United States.............................................................................................346 Frohwerk v. United States...........................................................................................347 Debs v. United States..................................................................................................348 Abrams v. United States.............................................................................................349 Gitlow v. New York....................................................................................................350 Whitney v. California..................................................................................................351 Dennis v. United States...............................................................................................352 Brandenburg v. Ohio...................................................................................................353 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire...................................................................................354 Gooding v. Wilson......................................................................................................355 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota.........................................................................356 Feiner v. New York.....................................................................................................357 8 Marbury v. Madison

.......................... Welch... Valeo......... v..........................397 Buckley v...... California................. Township of Willingboro..... Black...........................................F................. v................................................................................. Reilly......................................................................................................................... Inc...............................................................405 Ward v................................................ Inc........M................... New Jersey............407 Greer v....................... Shrink Missouri Government PAC......................................................................................... Pap's A..........................406 Adderley v.............. Perry Local Educator's Assn...................................................................391 Florida Star v...410 International Society for Krishna Consciousness................................ American Civil Liberties Union..............................................................................................................412 9 Marbury v...365 Ashcroft v..................................... Rogers............. Inc............................................................409 United States v......................................................................... v.......... Inc............................................................................ Youngs Drug Products Corp........................................................................................................................................................................................... Ferber.........382 44 Liquormart................................................J....... American Civil Liberties Union................ Inc................398 Nixon v....................................................... Rhode Island..................................................................................... Lee............... Virginia Citizens Consumer Council....................................411 Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.........400 Hague v..........373 Sable Communications of California.................. v........ Johnson................375 Ashcroft v............................................................................ California............................. City of Shaker Heights............................................................................ Committee for Industrial Organization.......................371 Cohen v...... Forbes.... Inc...366 Young v................. v................. v.........390 Cox Broadcasting Corp.. v................................................................380 Friedman v.................... Rock Against Racism....................................................383 Lorillard Tobacco Co... Georgia............................................................................................................. Mosley................. Kokinda............................................396 Texas v............................................. Inc..........370 Stanley v.....379 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp...........................................Beauharnais v...............................................................................................................................403 Police Department of the City of Chicago v...................................................................... United States.......... Federal Communications Commission374 Reno v...............376 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v............401 Schneider v................... v............................................... Florida.................................399 First National Bank of Boston v.............. Colorado.................................... Sullivan.................................................378 Bolger v..........384 New York Times Company v........................363 Miller v............388 Dun & Bradstreet............392 Bartnicki v................................. v................................387 Gertz v........364 New York v..................359 Roth v.. Illinois.......402 Perry Education Assn..........................408 Lehman v........................ The Free Speech Coalition..........393 United States v.. Vopper...369 City of Erie v......................................................................................................................389 Hustler Magazine v............................. Greenmoss Builders................... Cohn.......... Public Service Commission of New York.... Slaton....... v......................................... Bellotti..............381 Linmark Associates....362 Paris Adult Theatre v................................................................................................ American Mini Theaters............... B..358 Virginia v... O'Brien.........................404 Hill et al.............................................................................................. Falwell..372 Federal Communications Commission v..................... Inc.............. Spock.......... Pacifica Foundation................ Madison ......

............................................................418 Hazelwood School District v.............................................................................. Davey...............................449 Mitchell v..........420 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v..............432 CHAPTER X................ Fraser............................... Irish-American Gay................................... Kuhlmeier.............................. Virginia........................................451 10 ......... 403 v.... First Amendment: Religion............................... Murphy....................................... City of Haileah....................................................... Procunier.....................................................447 Lee v.............................................................423 Boy Scouts of America v............ Abbott..........................................................438 Church of the Lukumi Babala Aye v........431 Houchins v....................426 Branzburg v..............430 Pell v.......................429 Richmond Newspapers v....................................................................................... Ballard.......................... State of Alabama............................ Tornillo.......... Seeger.439 Locke v............................. Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.................................................................. Southworth..... United States Jaycees...................... Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue........................... Verner............................ American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter442 Larson v............. Hayes.. Vitale.................................... Kurtzman............................................................................................ Valente......................................437 Sherbert v...................Parker v. Cowles Media Company................................................... Weisman........................................................................ Des Moines Independent Community School District............................... KQED.............................. v............................................. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia..................422 Hurley v............................................................433 United States v.....................................415 Tinker v.............428 Miami Herald v..................419 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v...........421 Roberts v...............................424 Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company v...............................................................413 Thornburg v....................................................................................................................................417 Bethel School District No.......445 Santa Fe Independent School District v.................446 Engel v.............................. Patterson..................................................................................425 Cohen v.436 Employment Division................................................ Dale......................450 Zelman v............ Department of Human Resources of Oregon v......... Simmons-Harris............... Levy.............................................. Doe.......................................................................................................................444 Rosenberger v.......................... ex rel....................427 Red Lion Broadcasting Co........................................440 County of Allegheny v..........443 Lemon v....................................................... Federal Communications Commission...................................................434 United States v..... Helms..........................................................414 Shaw v...................................... Smith....................................................

The Federal Judicial Power 11 Marbury v.CHAPTER I. Madison .

the appointment has been made. 5 U. were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. Emerson . Synopsis of Rule of Law. of 42 new justices of the peace for the District. which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court. under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District). if available to the Supreme Court. The importance of Marbury v. the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution). Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction. including Marbury's. Brief Fact Summary. 12 United States v. Madison is both political and legal. William Marbury (Marbury). No. ‡ To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action. seeking delivery of his commission. Facts. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court? Held. it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the federal government." mandamus is the appropriate remedy. brought suit against President Thomas Jefferson's (President Jefferson) Secretary of State. and Marbury has a right to the commission ‡ Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury's commission. that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government "to do a particular thing therein specified. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams. Madison Citation. outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. James Madison. Although the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. A few of the commissions. an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia. requiring James Madison to deliver his commission. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. Issue. which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson's inauguration.Marbury v. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court.S. ‡ As the President signed Marbury's commission after his confirmation. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson. Discussion. which may not be enlarged by the Congress.

§ 922(g)(8).S. the Revolutionary concern of thwarting tyranny and Madison's vision that the Second Amendment of the Constitution be placed in Article 1. Section 9. moved to dismiss his indictment under 18 U. a restraining order was placed on Defendant. Issue. among the other individual freedoms. The Defendant. (iii) 13 United States v.D. ‡ Textual analysis shows one dependent ("A well regulated Militia. United States v. the statute is unconstitutional. Defendant claims that the statute is unconstitutional. ‡ Historical analysis focuses on the Anglo-American history of individual arms possession. Emerson demonstrates several methods of analyzing the meaning of a constitutional provision including: (i) plain text. Synopsis of Rule of Law. § 922(g)(8) for possession of a firearm while being under a restraining order. Emerson . Yes.S. Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm while under that order. but rather. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas argued that the dependent clause does not qualify. The Second Amendment of the Constitution confers an individual right. Does the Second Amendment of the Constitution confer an individual right to keep and bear arms? Held. in violation of 18 U. (ii) historical. being necessary to the security of a free state") and one independent ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed") clause. as it abridges his right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment of the Constitution. § 922(g)(8) allowed a state court to deprive a party to a divorce proceeding of his Second Amendment rights without specific findings. Discussion. ‡ Because 18 U. The Defendant argued that the statute violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Supp.S. Indictment overturned. During his divorce proceeding. ‡ Structural analysis argues that the placement of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights is indicative of its application to individuals. Facts.C. Emerson Citation. Texas 1999). 2d 598 (N. shows the purpose of the independent clause. Timothy Joe Emerson (Defendant). 46 F.C. ‡ The court finally argues that prudential concerns should not outweigh the importance of securing the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.United States v. which may not be abridged without due process.C. Brief Fact Summary.

the Northern District of Texas balances the outcomes of the various methods and applies the result to the statute at hand.structural. In this case. Lockyer . (iv) stare decisis. and (v) policy concerns. 14 Silveira v.

Issue. The Second Amendment of the Constitution does not grant an individual right to possess or own firearms. equal protection. brought suit alleging that California's amendments violated the Second Amendment of the Constitution. not to all persons in a state as a Fifth Circuit decision 15 Silveira v. the "collective rights" view. 2002). use." Second. denied." The court adopts the third view. holds that the Second Amendment of the Constitution guarantees to individual private citizens a fundamental right to possess and use firearms for any purpose at all. applying to semi-automatic "assault weapons. Facts. the "limited individual rights model" which advocates that "individuals maintain a constitutional right to possess firearms insofar as such possession bears a reasonable relationship to militia service. shall not be infringed." The majority observed that the text alone does not provide the answer to which theory of the Second Amendment is correct. subject only to limited government regulation.3d 1052 (9th Cir.S." The third. Does the Act and its 1999 Amendments violate the Plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights? Held. In reaching its conclusion. use. No. 540 U. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution") does not grant an individual right to possess or own arms. the state of California amended portions of its gun control law.Silveira v. Silveira and other current California "assault weapon" owners or those who wish purchase an "assault weapon" (the "Plaintiffs"). 312 F. 1046 (2003) Brief Fact Summary. the right of the people to keep and bear Arms. and transfer" of such weapons. subject only to generally applicable constitutional constraints. and transfer" of assault weapons. ‡ The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State. the federal and state governments have the full authority to enact prohibitions and restrictions on the use and possession of firearms. Lockyer . the "collective rights" view espouses "that the Second Amendment right to 'bear arms' guarantees the right of the people to maintain effective state militias. the court determined that the use of the word "militia" refers to a state military force. cert. but does not provide any type of individual right to own or possess weapons. In 1999. The Plaintiffs. Lockyer Citation. entitled the California Assault Weapons Control Act (the "Act"). and the like. Synopsis of Rule of Law. such as due process. brought suit against the state of California for certain laws the state passed strengthening the state's restrictions on the "possession. Assault weapon owners or those who wished to acquire assault weapons. First." The laws strengthened the state's restrictions on the "possession. "the 'traditional individual rights' model. Under this theory of the amendment. The court recognized three interpretations of the Second Amendment of the Constitution various groups have advocated.

the historical context surrounding the passage of the Amendment supports the collective rights model." Additionally. This case offers an interesting analysis of the Second Amendment of the Constitution and how its main purpose was to "protect the people from the threat of federal tyranny by preserving the right of the states to arm their militias. The court then recognizes the significance of the use of the phrase to "bear Arms" instead of to "possess" or "own" arms. in the absence of the amendment. so as to implement the policy set forth in the preamble. that "[t]he debates of the founding era demonstrate that the second of the first ten amendments to the Constitution was included in order to preserve the efficacy of the state militias for the people's defense--not to ensure an individual right to possess weapons.advocated. and forbids the federal government to interfere with such exercise." Further. The court then found that the phrase "keep and bear" had to be construed together. The courts historical research revealed "the Second Amendment was enacted in order to assuage the fears of AntiFederalists that the new federal government would cause the state militias to atrophy by refusing to exercise its prerogative of arming the state fighting forces." Discussion." 16 Ex parte McCardle . and that the states would. The court determined that the use of the phrase "bear Arms" refers to a military function or purpose. be without the authority to provide them with the necessary arms. [ ] the most plausible construction of the Second Amendment is that it seeks to ensure the existence of effective state militias in which the people may exercise their right to bear arms. ‡ The court observed "[w]hen the second clause is read in light of the first.

McCardle. the repeal of jurisdiction is valid. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court ruled on the merits. Fifth. Does the Act of Congress repealing Supreme Court appellate review of habeas writs remove jurisdiction in McCardle's case? Held. petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States (United States) for a writ of habeas corpus. Klein ." ‡ Due to the constitutional authorization. 74 U. Facts. However. Another politically-charged case. ‡ The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not conferred by Congress. and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution). McCardle contended the Act was unconstitutional in providing military trials for civilians and claimed his prosecution violated provisions of the Bill of Rights. 17 United States v." but only the constitutional authority to divest jurisdiction is examinable by the Supreme Court. Congress. Congress repealed jurisdiction out of a fear that the Supreme Court would rule adversely on the constitutionality of the Military Reconstruction Act. McCardle argued the Military Reconstruction Act (the Act) and his prosecution were unconstitutional. by repealing the United State Supreme Court's (Supreme Court) appellate review of writs of habeas corpus. Discussion. the Constitution confers jurisdiction "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. After writing a series of articles that were highly critical of Reconstruction. a newspaper editor arrested for writing articles critical of Reconstruction. the Supreme Court notes that it is "not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. Yes. Issue.S. However. federal officials arrested McCardle under the Act. effectively took jurisdiction over McCardle's case away from the Supreme Court. including the First. Brief Fact Summary.Ex parte McCardle Citation. Congress passed a law repealing Supreme Court appellate review of writs of habeas corpus. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 506 (1868).

128 (1871).S. such finding was to act as a bar to jurisdiction. ‡ By requiring the courts to make a specific finding of fact in a case over which the court has jurisdiction and then removing the court's jurisdiction after the finding. By disallowing the full effect of the pardons. The Respondent. The statute overreached the power of Congress by attempting to exercise authorities constitutionally delegated to the judicial and executive branches. brought suit in the United States Court of Claims. . Brief Fact Summary. 18 Plaut v. Klein Citation. Congress attempted to reduce the President's constitutional authority. seeking compensation for property taken during the Civil War. The Respondent now argues for affirmation on appeal. Issue.United States v. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had ruled that a presidential pardon had the effect of proof one did not support the rebellion. Congress is not limiting jurisdiction. Congress went further and required that if a court find that a pardon was secured without an express disclaimer of guilt (of aiding the rebellion). Inc. In response to the decision. No. Is the statute in question a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Exceptions and Regulations Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. Spendthrift Farm. arguing that the statute requires dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction. Although Congress has power to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts. Klein does not represent Exceptions and Regulations jurisprudence as much as it represents the separation of powers outlined in the United States Constitution. Facts. Congress passed a statute stating that a pardon was inadmissible as evidence in a claim for seized property. The President of the United States has the constitutional authority to pardon offenses. The United States now appeals. The estate of the Respondent who was pardoned had received a judgment granting recovery from the Court of Claims. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. This allowed pardoned individuals to petition for return of property or compensation from the federal government. United States v. but rather prescribing a rule of decision for the courts. Klein (Respondent). Judgment affirmed. 80 U. ‡ Congress impaired the presidential pardons by requiring that they be inadmissible as evidence in these cases. it may not use this power to effectively prescribe a rule for the decision of cases before the courts.

Petitioner had brought suit prior to the decision. The Plaintiff . under § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act). Scalia) argues Congress has violated the separation of the judicial and legislative powers. which the framers of the constitution envisioned as dispositive. In response. In 1991. Synopsis of Rule of Law. No. but the suit was dismissed in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling. Spendthrift Farm (Respondent). However. Inc.Plaut v. The suit was dismissed for not being filed in a timely fashion. Brief Fact Summary. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) ruled that actions brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) of the Act must be brought within one year of discovering the facts leading to the violation and within three years of the violation itself. Facts. Wright . 514 U. Citation. Appeals court ruling affirmed. ‡ Congress may pass retroactive legislation that affects cases still pending appeal. Discussion. if they could have been brought under the previous law. this amendment requires cases to resume prosecution after judgment has been rendered. 19 Allen v. Petitioner attempted to resume prosecution of the dismissed case. May Congress require Article III courts to reopen cases on which they have passed judgment? Held. Congress amended the law to allow cases filed before the decision to go forward. 211 (1995). sued the Defendant Respondent. ‡ A judgment "conclusively resolves the case. Issue.S. Justice Antonin Scalia (J.Petitioner. by requiring courts to set aside final judgments. Plaut (Petitioner). Congress may not require the federal courts to reopen a case after a court has rendered final judgment. Spendthrift Farm." The statute in question offends this postulate.

Allen v. Wright
Citation. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Brief Fact Summary. Parents of black public school children brought suit against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), alleging that insufficient denial of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools interferes with their children's ability to receive an education in public schools. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Article III standing requires that a plaintiff allege a harm directly traceable to specific action on the part of the defendant. Facts. Parents of black public school children sued the IRS, alleging that by not denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, the IRS was harming their children in two ways. First, the IRS conduct was in fact giving federal financial aid to racially segregated institutions. Second, the conduct encourages the operation and expansion of such schools and this interferes with desegregation of the public schools. Issue. Does the harm alleged by the respondents fulfill the constitutional requirement of standing? Held. No. Reversed and remanded. ‡ Addressing the first allegation, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor) notes "an asserted right to have the government act in accordance with the law" is insufficient to grant jurisdiction. Extending this line of argument, she says "[a] black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine." Furthermore, the issue of funding the schools does not harm the respondents directly. ‡ The second allegation does present harm, that the respondents' children are being denied an integrated educational experience. However, the IRS's actions are too far attenuated from this harm. There is no evidence that denying tax-exempt status to the private schools in question would result in a more integrated public education system. Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens), dissenting, postulates that removing tax-exempt status from the private schools, will make the schools more expensive to operate, causing them to be less cost competitive or requiring them to change their admissions policies to remain open. Discussion. While the dissent's argument has theoretical soundness - removing tax-exempt status will cause an immediate increase in cost - the majority points out that this does not guarantee integration. For example, Private donors could still make up the difference in lost funding.

20 Singleton v. Wulff

Singleton v. Wulff
Citation. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). Brief Fact Summary. Two Missouri physicians sued the state, charging that Missouri's statute prohibiting Medicaid payments for abortions which are not "medically indicated" unconstitutionally interferes with the decision to terminate a pregnancy. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The rule prohibiting third-party standing should not apply when the relationship of the litigant and the one whose rights he asserts is significantly close and where there is some obstacle to the first party bringing a suit on his own. Facts. Two Missouri physicians sued the state, showing that they had provided abortions to Medicaid-eligible patients. The state had denied payment for these services on statutory grounds. The physicians stated that they would continue to perform such procedures and stood to be denied payments in the future. Issue. Do the physicians have standing to bring the suit when the immediately affected are indigent women seeking abortions? Held. Yes. Court of appeals ruling affirmed. ‡ Two standing questions were presented: (i) whether plaintiff sustained injury in fact and (ii) whether they are the proper individuals to assert the constitutional right in question. The first question is easily answered. Here, the physicians have been denied compensation and stand to be denied further compensation. ‡ As to the second question, the general rule of prohibiting third-party standing only applies if the relationship between the litigant and the party directly affected is such that the litigant does not effectively serve as a proponent of the affected party and if there is some impediment to the affected party bringing suit himself. Here, the litigant was deemed to effectively serve as a proponent. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) does not say that there must be an absolute obstacle to the directly affected party bringing suit, only that there is some genuine impediment (e.g., protecting the privacy of her decision to terminate a pregnancy, the imminent mootness of her claim, etc.).

21 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow

Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow
Citation. 124 S.Ct. 2301 (2004) Brief Fact Summary. A father, who was an atheist, sued his child's school district for allowing the Pledge of Allegiance (the "Pledge") to be said by the district's students. Synopsis of Rule of Law. "[I]t is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person, [the child in this case] who is the source of the plaintiff's claimed standing." Facts. The teachers in the Petitioner, Elk Grove Unified School Dist. (the "Petitioner"), lead the children in their classes in the recitation of the Pledge every morning. The Respondent, Michael A. Newdow (the "Respondent"), is an atheist whose daughter participates in the recitation of the Pledge. The Respondent argued that since the Pledge includes the words "under God" it entailed religious indoctrination of his child in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). ‡ The district court concluded the Respondent has standing to sue on behalf of his daughter as "next friend". The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its first opinion, found that the Respondent "has standing 'as a parent to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter.' " On August 5, 2002, the Respondent's child's mother filed a motion for leave to intervene or to dismiss the complaint. The child's mother, Ms. Banning, had "exclusive legal custody" of the child which "include[ed] the sole right to represent [the daughter's] legal interests and make all decision[s] about her education" and welfare. She alleged "her daughter is a Christian who believes in God and has no objection either to reciting or hearing others recite the Pledge of Allegiance, or to its reference to God." The California Superior court entered an order "enjoining [the Respondent] from including his daughter as an unnamed party or suing as her 'next friend.' " The Ninth Circuit addressed the California Superior Court's findings and concluded "that Newdow no longer claimed to represent his daughter, but unanimously concluded that 'the grant of sole legal custody to Banning' did not deprive Newdow, 'as a noncustodial parent, of Article III standing to object to unconstitutional government action affecting his child.' " Issue. Does the Respondent have standing to bring this action? Held. No. The flag is "a symbol of our Nation's indivisibility and commitment to the concept of liberty." The "under God" language was added to the Pledge in 1954. California law requires all students to engage in patriotic activities every morning, and further recognizes that the Pledge satisfies that requirement. Students who object on religious grounds may abstain from participating in the activities.

22 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow

‡ The court observed that standing is a prerequisite to any party bringing a federal case. The court observed "[o]ne of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations." Further, "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." The court has went so far as to recognize a "domestic relations exception « divest[ing] federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Additionally, "that it might be appropriate for the federal courts to decline to hear a case involving 'elements of the domestic relationship,' [ ] even when divorce, alimony, or child custody is not strictly at issue[.]" Based on the February 6, 2002 custody order, the Supreme Court determined "that the two parents should " 'consult with one another on substantial decisions relating to' " the child's " 'psychological and educational needs.' " However, additionally, the order authorized Banning to " 'exercise legal control' " if the parents could not reach " 'mutual agreement.' " Meaning, she was given the tiebreaking vote. ‡ Further, "it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person [the child in this matter] who is the source of the plaintiff's claimed standing. When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law." As such, the Respondent, due to the state of California's finding that he lacks status to bring a "next friend" suit, lacks standing. Concurrence. Judge William Rehnquist ("J. Rehnquist"), Judge Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. O'Connor") and J. Clarence Thomas ("J. Thomas") concur in the judgment, but dissented in part. The dissenting justices object to the majority's "erect[ion] [of] a novel prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional claim." Discussion. It is very interesting to read the majority's decision alongside the dissenting opinion, to see how the standing doctrine can be construed in different ways.

23 United States v. Richardson

United States v. Richardson
Citation. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). Brief Fact Summary. Richardson, the Plaintiff-Respondent (Plaintiff) sued Congress. He alleged that public reporting under the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") Act of 1949 violates Article I, s 9, cl. 7 (the Act) of the United States Constitution (Constitution), the statement and account clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Standing is denied to "generalized grievances." Facts. Plaintiff sued Congress, hoping to compel release of detailed funding records of CIA funding. Plaintiff based his standing to sue on his status as a United States taxpayer. Issue. Is taxpayer status sufficient to establish standing to bring suit in this case? Held. No. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) applied the two-prong test developed in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). To establish taxpayer standing, a plaintiff must (a) challenge an enactment under the taxing and spending clause (in Art. I, § 8 of the constitution) and (b) claim the enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations on taxing and spending. ‡ The Supreme Court argued that, as Plaintiff cannot state a specific injury that affects him differently than any other taxpayer, the suit represents a general grievance and falls outside the federal courts' authority to review cases and controversies. Dissent. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Potter) argued that the Flast test is inappropriate, as the Plaintiff is asking for the determination of a duty that has not been honored by the government. Discussion. The majority holds tightly to the narrow exception carved out by Flast in large part to prevent other parties from bringing suits against the government arguing standing only as taxpayers.

24 Flast v. Cohen

Flast v. Cohen
Citation. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, including Flast (Appellants), brought suit, claiming standing solely as taxpayers, seeking to enjoin expenditure of federal funds on religious schools. Appellants claimed such expenditures violated the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Taxpayer standing is appropriate when the plaintiff challenges an enactment under the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution and the enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations on taxing and spending. Facts. Congress had funded, under Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (the Act), writing, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools. Appellants brought suit, claiming that these expenditures violated the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment of the Constitution. The only claim to standing provided was that all Appellants were taxpayers. Issue. Have the Appellants established standing to bring suit in an Article III court? Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) states that standing refers to the plaintiff(s) having a "personal stake in the outcome" of the case. In the taxpayer context, the Supreme Court outlines two requirements to show this personal stake. ‡ The first requirement is that the taxpayer must challenge the constitutionality only of exercises under the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution. Expenditures which are incidental to a regulatory statute or other incidental expenditures do not give rise to taxpayer standing. ‡ The second requirement is that the moving party must allege that Congress acted beyond the scope of a particular constitutional provision. It is insufficient to allege spending beyond the powers delegated under Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. Harlan) argues that the two requirements outlined by the majority do not establish that P has a personal stake in the outcome. Discussion. The Supreme Court establishes a two-prong test that allows taxpayer standing without opening the federal courts to generalized grievances.

25 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al.

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al.
Citation. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Brief Fact Summary. The Respondents, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc. (Respondent), brought suit as taxpayers. They alleged that the Department of Health Education and Welfare grant of United States property to a religious college violated the Establishment and Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Taxpayer standing is appropriate when the plaintiff challenges an enactment under the taxing and spending clause and the enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations on taxing and spending. Facts. Under the property clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution, Congress may dispose of and regulate property belonging to the United States. Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (the Act), the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare conveyed a 77acre parcel to the Petitioner, Valley Forge Christian College (Petitioner). Respondent sued on behalf of its 90,000 "taxpayer members," alleging that Congress violated the Establishment Clause with its grant of property. Issue. Does the Respondent have standing as a taxpayer to bring this suit? Held. No. Reversed and remanded. Because Respondents sue on an administrative action authorized under the property clause of the, they fail the first prong of the standing test developed in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), requiring Congressional action under the taxing and spending clause. Dissent. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) sees the rise of standing jurisprudence as a means to sidestep deciding important rights issues by effectively slamming "the courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits." Discussion. Regardless of the dissent's moral and fair play arguments, the majority holding in this case is a straightforward application of the rule developed in Flast v. Cohen, which has yet to be overturned.

26 Poe v. Ullman

Poe v. Ullman
Citation. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Brief Fact Summary. The Appellants, several couples and their physician (Appellants), brought suit, seeking the overturn of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on the use of such devices. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A penal statute is not ripe for constitutional challenge unless it is enforced by the state enacting the statute. Facts. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors construed a state penal statute as prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on their use. Appellants included a couple who had several pregnancies result with severely abnormal progeny which died shortly after birth, a couple whose wife had experienced a severely traumatic pregnancy and their physician, who believes the safest course of treatment for the couples includes using contraceptive devices. Issue. Is the petitioners' claim ripe for judicial review? Held. No. Judgment affirmed. Connecticut has never attempted to fully prosecute any case under the statute. Because of this, not only have the Appellants not suffered injury in fact from the statute, but there is no evidence that they would be prosecuted for acting in violation of the statute. Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) argues that the mere threat of prosecution is injury in fact, that it is "not the choice worthy of a civilized society" to require individuals to risk penalty for their behavior to have their constitutional rights determined. Discussion. Although ripeness is the central issue in Poe, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) does not articulate any clear guidelines to evaluate ripeness. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seems to articulate that a penal statute that has not been enforced is not ripe for judicial review.

27 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner

Brief Fact Summary. sought declaratory judgment on the 1962 amendment to the Federal Food. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found the challenge appropriate at the current time. Note that the concrete nature of the question (did the Commissioner overreach his statutory authority?) allowed the issue to be fit for judicial decision by an Article III court.Abbott Laboratories v. Reversed and remanded. Education. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Facts. The Petitioners. A group of 37 drug manufacturers (representing more than 90% of the nation's prescription drug suppliers) brought this suit. 136 (1967). did the Commissioner properly construe the statute by requiring the establish name to be used every time the trade name is? ‡ The Supreme Court also found undue hardship on the parties involved in postponing a judicial decision. and there is undue hardship to the parties if such consideration were withheld. Laidlaw Environmental Services . Have appellants brought an action ripe for judicial review? Held. The companies would have to spend a large amount of money changing typefaces and printing new materials. Issue.S. Gardner Citation. Abbot Laboratories (Petitioners). Declaratory judgment is appropriate when the issues are fit for judicial decision. alleging the Commissioner exceeded his authority by requiring the use of the established name every time the trade name was used in all printed matter relating to the drug. Yes. as all parties agreed that the issue was purely legal. 28 Friends of the Earth. Drug. The amended Act required pharmaceutical manufacturers to display the "established name" (to be established by the Secretary of Health. and Welfare) in type at least half as large as that used for any proprietary name or other designation for the drug on all printed materials referring to the drug. 387 U. and Cosmetic Act (the Act) that required prescription drug manufacturers to print the "established name" of the drug on labels and other printed materials that referred to the drug. The general guidelines of Abbott Laboratories continue to apply in ripeness cases. Incorporated v. or large penalties if they refuse to make the changes and a court determines the Commissioner was proper his construction of the regulation. The issue was. Discussion.

Laidlaw Environmental Services Citation. 693 (2000). However. Incorporated (Plaintiff). Friends of Earth. Ct. the burden is on the Defendant to show the conduct cannot reasonably be expected to occur in the future. Brief Fact Summary. Geraghty . the defendant could stop and restart the same activity for (theoretically) an infinite amount of time without facing a judicial decision on the activity. Not in this case. alleges Defendant was violating mercury discharge limits of the Clean Water Act.Friends of the Earth. Defendant holds a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. When a defendant argues that voluntary cessation of an activity renders a suit moot. Can Defendant's voluntary conduct sustain a finding of mootness? Held. 29 United States Parole Commission v. If a defendant can make a case moot simply by ceasing the complained of activity. when a Defendant asserts mootness on the basis of his voluntary conduct. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) carves out this mootness exception for obvious reasons.respondent. Plaintiff Petitioner. Reversed and remanded. the Defendant has not demonstrated why or how the complained of actions will not reoccur in the future. contends that its shutdown of a waste processing facility and its compliance efforts render a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act moot. Issue. Incorporated v. and brought a citizen suit against Defendant. Defendant argues that the suit is moot either because it achieved substantial compliance with the permit guidelines by August 1992 or because of its shutdown of the facility in question. Defendant . Synopsis of Rule of Law. ‡ In the current case. the defendant has the burden of proving that the allegedly wrong behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Laidlaw Environmental Services (Defendant). Discussion. 120 S. Facts. ‡ A case compelling compliance requires the Plaintiff to establish the complained of behavior will continue to occur.

Besides his own suit he also sought certification of the suit as a class action on behalf of all federal prisoners who are or will become eligible for parole. Plaintiff brought suit challenging the validity of the Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines. 30 Baker v. More importantly.United States Parole Commission v. As discussed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 388 (1980). Plaintiff had twice been denied parole from a federal prison. The district court denied Plaintiff's request to certify the suit as a class action on behalf of "all federal prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on parole. Discussion. Plaintiff was released from prison while his appeal to the court of appeals was pending. Carr . brought suit against the Defendant-Petitioner." and also granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on the merits. even if the named Plaintiff's case becomes moot before certification of the class. The purpose of the "personal stake" requirement is "to assure that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. May a trial court's denial of a motion to certify a class be reviewed on appeal even when the named plaintiff's personal suit has been settled or decided? Held. the absence of the named plaintiff does not destroy the format of the dispute as appropriate for judicial determination. the question is whether or not review of the denial of class certification will be allowed when there are still putative class members with ripe claims. Geraghty. a federal inmate and Plaintiff-Respondent (Plaintiff). however. Brief Fact Summary. regardless of the plaintiff's absence in the putative class." if certification of the class is appropriate. the case is still "in a form capable of judicial resolution. A class action may survive. Reversed and remanded. the United States Parole Commission (Defendant). If the personal stake requirement is in place to "assure that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. 445 U.S." it is clear that this is met in the case before the claim became moot. Facts. if the named plaintiff had a personal stake. Geraghty Citation. Issue." Justice Harry Blackmun also argues that the named representative retains a personal stake in obtaining class certification to satisfy the case or controversy requirement. Now. Yes.

the dissent argues that the Supreme Court has opened up all state districting to judicial oversight. In the current case. Reversed and remanded. 369 U. Appellants brought suit. IV.S. challenging malapportionment of state legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants challenged the state apportionment of legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These claims are nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to the political branches of the government by the Constitution. § 4 of the United States Constitution (Constitution). so long as these grounds are independent from political question elements. Dissent. the claim is that the Appellants are being denied equal protection of the laws by being underrepresented in the state legislature. Apportionment cases had often been brought under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV. one vote" legislation. in which the United States guarantees to the individual states a republican form of government. The Supreme Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case is separable from the political questions. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has long held that such challenges present a political question. Yes. Carr. § 4 of the Constitution. Brief Fact Summary. This line of cases helped equalize representation between country and city dwellers in an increasingly urbanized nation. This is a separation of powers issue. An apportionment case may be reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. apportionment challengers have generally based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause of Art. In a vigorous dissent. not addressable by the courts. Issue. Discussion. Baker v. ‡ In the past. 186 (1962). Frankfurter) argues the political question is inseparable from the equal protection claim and that the Supreme Court has effectively overturned a century of apportionment jurisprudence. Facts. Carr is the first of the cases developing the Supreme Court's "one person.Baker v. Carr Citation. ‡ In Baker v. 31 Vieth v. Jubelier . In particular. Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Is it possible to bring a malapportionment claim without raising a nonjusticiable political issue? Held.

Bandemer. in error? ‡ If not. Issue. Yes. we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that [Bandamer] was wrongly decided. Synopsis of Rule of Law. what is the appropriate standard? Held. Scalia then observed "no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. 541 U. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. J. Norma Jean Vieth and Susan Furey (the "Plaintiff-appellants"). The Plaintiff-appellants in this matter. The Supreme Court in [Bandamer] stated it was "not persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and manageable standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be decided. 478 U.S. the cases were justiciable. Second.Vieth v. Richard Vieth. 109 (1986)].goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible standard. Scalia set forth a portion of the Supreme Court of the United States' ("Supreme Court") holding in [Bandamer]." ‡ There is no "constitutionally discernable standard. Scalia") writing for the majority first observed that [Davis v." 32 Vieth v. The Plaintiff-appellants argued that the districting constitutes an unconstitutional political gerrymander.S. 267 (2004) Brief Fact Summary. J." Thus. Lacking them." J. Jubelier Citation. Cases involving political gerrymander are non-justiciable because "[no provision in the Constitution] « provides a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the States and Congress may take into account when districting«" Facts. but did not agree to a standard to adjudicate them. The constitutionality of a map drawn by the Pennslyvania General Assembly establishing districts for the election of members of the United States House of Representatives (the "House") was challenged. Jubelier . Bandemer] held that political gerrymandering claims were justiciable. challenged a map drawn by the Pennslyvania General Assembly establishing districts for the election of member of the House. Scalia first criticizes Justice Powell's proposed fairness standard from [Bandamer] and argued it was not a judicially manageable standard. he criticizes the dissenting judges proposed standards and observes "the mere fact that these four dissenters come up with three different standards-all of them different from the two proposed in [Bandamer] and the one proposed here by appellants-. Was the Supreme Courts prior decision in [Davis v.

However. to break down a large and intractable issue into discrete fragments as a way to get a handle on the larger one. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. J. Also. but the very subjects that judges already deal with in practice. J. "[i]t is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process from the attempt to define standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right is burdened or denied. Scalia's and the pluralities criticism of his opinion that "[i]t does not solve [the] problem [of determining when gerrymandering has gone too far] to break down the original unanswerable question .." Also. Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most serious claims." Concurrence." Also. Souter") or Justice William Breyer's ("J. Kennedy") filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. In is interesting to observe how the various judges attempt to arrive at a manageable standard. "[t]hat no such standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. into four more discrete but equally unanswerable questions. "it would be contrary to precedent and profoundly unwise to foreclose all judicial review of similar [apportionment] claims that might be advanced in the future.. ‡ J. Stevens") filed a dissenting opinion. when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned." In response to the criticisms. Souter observed. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J." Further. Souter entered an opinion advocating a "fresh start" and a five-part test. He stated. he would "not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases. Scalia's observation that "[w]hile we do not lightly overturn one of our own holdings.Dissent. for we have long believed that "the right to vote" is one of "those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." Discussion. 'this court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Those include. "the predominant motivation standard fashioned by the Court in its racial gerrymandering cases" or the approaches from either Justice David Souter's ("J.' " 33 Powell v. "[i]t is common sense. that there are a variety of standards that courts could apply to identify "impermissible partisan influence. and the elements I propose are not only tractable in theory. He confronted head on J. Breyer") dissenting opinions. the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on the side of caution. McCormack . Where important rights are involved. "Justice Powell's three-factor approach in [Bandemer]". however.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A textually dependent commitment is necessary for judicial review (i. Does the House have a textual commitment in the constitution to determine the qualifications of its members? Held. Issue. In Powell. ‡ The Defendants-Respondents. Facts. Case reversed and remanded. how to interpret the text on which such commitment depends. McCormack Citation.. In other words. alleging the House did not have the constitutional authority to deny his seat when he met the qualifications expressly set forth for Representatives in Article I of the United States Constitution (Constitution). There is actually one independent and one dependent issue in Powell. Plaintiff sued. Plaintiff argued and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) agreed. First. Brief Fact Summary. is there a textually dependent commitment? Second. Also.Powell v. 395 U. the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution).S. it is clear and conceded that Powell met the requirements specifically mentioned in Article I regarding qualifications of representatives. 34 Goldwater v. the House denied membership to the Plaintiff-Petitioner. the Supreme Court must interpret the textual meaning. members of Congress including the Speaker of the House John W. the ratification debates and historical context of the framers limit the qualifications to those set forth in the Constitution. what power the Constitution confers on the House. 486 (1969). Powell (Plaintiff).e. After his reelection to the 90th Congress. Carter . McCormack (Defendants). it was found that Plaintiff had engaged in deceptive and possibly illegal actions surrounding his service as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. argued that the House has broad powers under Article I. Yes. § 5 of the Constitution to determine the qualifications of its membership. Discussion. The "textual commitment" to a constitutional provision by a political branch is justiciable. Plaintiff now sues for installment as a representative. he was asked to step aside while the other representatives were sworn in. After being elected to the House of Representatives (the House). Once this is established. During the 89th Congress. ‡ The Supreme Court also notes that to hold otherwise would nullify the framers' decision to require two-thirds vote for expulsion. he was later asked to inform the Governor of New York that his seat was vacant.

this is not a nonjusticiable political question as defined in Baker v. United States . Plaintiff sued. concurring in judgment. Carr. Brief Fact Summary. While recognizing the People's Republic of China. Concurrence. concurring. arguing that as the Senate must ratify treaties. Goldwater v.Goldwater v. Carter Citation. 996 (1979). concurring. Powell). the matter should be left to the political branches. Carter represents both the United States Supreme Court's (Supreme Court) political question jurisprudence and ripeness law. Brennan). 186 (1962). Discussion. the constitution is silent as to the rescinding of treaties. views the case as not ripe for review. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Dissent. alleging that the Senate must rescind treaties. United States Senator Barry Goldwater (Plaintiff). There is no majority opinion. 444 U. but argues that if there were.S. as the Senate has not yet taken official action. Justice William Rehnquist (J. the Defendant rescinded the United States treaty with Taiwan. Questions of a purely political nature are nonjusticiable. In particular. as there has not yet been Congressional action. 35 Nixon v. the Senate's approval is also required to rescind treaties. Is the present case justiciable? Held. Case reversed and remanded for dismissal. sued. Specifically. The Plaintiff. The fact that different termination standards may be proper for different treaties. and therefore nonjusticiable. He argues that the case is not ripe. The Defendant. ‡ Justice Lewis Powell (J. No. the political branches are not yet at a constitutional impasse. Justice William Brennan (J. views the case as entirely political.S. In the absence of a majority opinion. rescinded a treaty with Taiwan as part of recognizing the People's Republic of China. 369 U. dissents. Rehnquist). Issue. United States President Jimmy Carter (Defendant). Facts.

As such. White). ‡ The majority further argues that impeachment is the only check on the Judicial Branch by the legislature. believes the case at bar is nonjusticiable. concurring. Nixon (Petitioner). Nixon now appeals. etc. Justice Byron White (J. The arguments presented focus on checks and balances and separation of 36 Nixon v. trial by coin toss. The Petitioner.Nixon v. impeachment trials are nonjusticiable. asks the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to decide whether Senate Rule XI. is constitutional. 224 (1993). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion." or the Senate acting beyond its constitutional authority. 506 U. judicial oversight would be counter to the Framers' system of checks and balances. Impeachment trials are nonjusticiable. a former federal judge. was sentenced to prison for lying under oath to a federal grand jury. The Petitioner refused to resign from his post and continued to draw his salary while incarcerated. cl. Issue. The committee provided full transcripts and summaries to the entire Senate and more than the necessary two-thirds voted to impeach on two of the three articles. found that there is no prohibition to the judicial review of impeachment trials. a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. I § 3.).S. concurring in judgment. as applied in his impeachment trial. Does Petitioner have the right to have the entire Senate receive evidence and testimony? Held. Concurrence. United States . Brief Fact Summary. arguing that Rule XI violates the impeachment trial clause. Facts.g. which allowed a Senate committee to receive evidence and testimony. United States Citation. The majority draws a bright line by concluding impeachment trials are nonjusticiable. but that there are times when a Senate impeachment trial is reviewable (e. The Petitioner. Souter). someone just being "a bad guy. No. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments«" The majority argues this provision gives the Senate the sole discretion to determine the appropriate manner of trial as well. Art.. He also found that the Petitioner was "tried" by the Senate and the Senate fulfilled its constitutional duty in so doing. the Senate invoked Rule XI. ‡ The impeachment trial clause of the Constitution states. 6 of the United States Constitution (Constitution). ‡ Justice David Souter (J. In the ensuing impeachment trial.

but much is also made of the inclusion of the word "sole" in the impeachment trial clause. 37 .powers.

CHAPTER II. The Federal Legislative Power 38 McCulloch v. Maryland .

To enumerate all powers delegated to the Union "would partake of the prolixity of a legal code. Maryland Citation. The State of Maryland. attempted to levy a crippling tax on the Maryland branch of the Bank. refused to pay the tax. Reversed and remanded. 39 Gibbons v. let it be within the scope of the constitution. May state action dismantle a federal institution? Held. are constitutional. which are not prohibited. which are plainly adapted to that end. When the Bank's cashier. and all means which are appropriate. the state sued for payment. Ogden . ‡ The Constitution is ratified by the People. It also offers a concise definition of the legislative power of Congress and judicial review of legislative acts ("Let the end be legitimate«"). As such. unhappy with the Bank. Issue. The State of Maryland sued the Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States for non-payment of state taxes levied against it. The Bank of the United States was a controversial entity in the early years of the country. but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution. ‡ "Let the end be legitimate." ‡ "[A] power to create implies a power to preserve« [A] power to destroy." Discussion. However. The United States Constitution (Constitution) is the supreme law of the United States and state law must defer to it. 17 U. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. not yield to that over which it is supreme.McCulloch v. Maryland is the most important case defining the relationship between the Union and the states. ‡ The government of the Union is one of limited and enumerated powers. McCulloch. (4 Wheat. it is the supreme law of the United States. is hostile to and incompatible with these powers to create and preserve« [W]here this repugnancy exists.) 312 (1819). not the states. that authority which is supreme must control. if wielded by a different hand. McCulloch v. and hence emanates its authority from the People. Synopsis of Rule of Law. No." Only the "great outlines" of these powers should be delineated.S. the constitution is not one of exhaustive powers.

Gibbons (Defendant). Their licensee and the Plaintiff . Is the scope of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause narrow in scope? Held. Chief Justice John Marshall lays (J. Ogden Citation. New York issued an exclusive steamboat license to Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston. Ogden (Plaintiff). interchange of goods. Congress should also have the ability to govern navigation between states and even into states.Gibbons v. even those that are inland). When Defendant began operating a competing ferry service. as well. Defendant argued that because his ferry was licensed under federal law as "vessels in the coasting trade. Discussion. Marshall) the foundation for future Commerce Clause cases by broadly interpreting Congress' power under the clause." he had the right to operate his ferry. Brief Fact Summary. who licensed Plaintiff to operate a ferry service between New York City and Elizabethtown Port. No. ‡ Plaintiff argued that Congressional power under the Commerce Clause is limited to traffic: buying and selling. Facts. New Jersey. 22 U. (9 Wheat. C.Appellant. ‡ However. 40 United States v. E.) 1 (1824).S. Ogden is the first case addressing the scope of the Commerce Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gibbons v. Plaintiff sued. for operating a competing ferry service. Knight Co. sued the Defendant . . Extending this argument. but not to navigation.Respondent. Reversed and remanded. the foreign commerce power would be effectively nullified (every state deserves the opportunity to trade with foreign countries. The State of New York had issued an exclusive license to operate steamboats in New York waters to Fulton and Livingston. as long as the commerce is not entirely intrastate. Issue. were Congress unable to regulate navigation. The commerce power is a broad regulatory power.

thereby controlling almost the entire refined sugar manufacture in the United States. The government alleged that by entering into the contracts. and as such. 41 Carter v. dissenting. Knight Co. 1890. Carter Coal Co. the act overreached the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Yes. Citation. Harlan). Exercise of the Commerce Power may not destroy the police power retained by the states. E. Dissent. the Defendants combined and conspired to restrain the trade and commerce in refined sugar among the several states and with foreign nations. entered into contracts to purchase four refineries in Philadelphia. The Appellee-Defendants. American Sugar Refining Company (American) purchased four refineries in Philadelphia. Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. American and other sugar refineries (Defendants). Issue. contrary to an act of Congress promulgated on July 2. Brief Fact Summary. argues that if Congress has the ability to regulate interstate commerce. . 1 (1895). The company was subsequently sued by the federal government for engaging in combinations in restraint of trade. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Appeals court judgment affirmed. Knight Co. effectively monopolizing sugar refining in the United States. The majority draws a distinction between the manufacture of a good and its final disposition. Discussion.S. Does the act of Congress overstep the authority given by the Commerce Clause? Held.United States v. C. E.C. Facts.. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) also says that a good's use in commerce is only incidental to its manufacture. The somewhat dubious distinction between manufacture and activities in commerce is characteristic of the narrow view of the commerce power taken by the Supreme Court between 1890 and 1937. 156 U. it must also have the ability to remove restraints on interstate commerce.

Respondent challenges the constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (the Act). the Act called for collective bargaining among the employees of the industry. Issue. the Act seeks to control certain activities that are not "commerce." ‡ Furthermore.S. and defined various unfair trade practices. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) notes that commerce includes transportation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Carter Coal Co. 298 U. the Act also affects intrastate commerce to a large degree.Carter v. Among other provisions. Carter overturned a key piece of New Deal legislation. Judgment affirmed. sale. By that definition. Citation. The same regulations aimed at interstate commerce also affect coal produced and sold in the same state. Brief Fact Summary." Facts. 42 Houston. The case is another example of the narrow construction of the Commerce Clause before 1937. Discussion. "Commerce" is the equivalent of "intercourse for the purposes of trade. East & West Railway Company v. and exchange of commodities. Does the Act overreach Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause? Held. minimum and maximum price controls. The Act sought to stabilize the bituminous coal mining industry and promote its interstate commerce. 238 (1936). Yes. purchase. United States .

S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Interstate Commerce Commission brought suit. 495 (1935). who were maintaining vastly different rate structures for shipments from Shreveport than from similar points within Texas. Congress may affect intrastate commerce. East & West Railway Company v. ‡ The Supreme Court also argues that Congress may regulate the intrastate commerce of those carriers when the intrastate actions act as a hindrance to interstate commerce.A. The government brought suit against railway companies in Texas. Court of appeals ruling affirmed. May the federal government regulate carriers engaged in intrastate commerce where the same carriers engage in interstate commerce? Held. where the transactions of intrastate and interstate commerce are so related that the preservation of interstate commerce must involve intrastate instrumentalities as well. 295 U.L. Louisiana lies just east of the border with Texas. but illustrates the generally inconsistent conceptualization of the Commerce Clause during this period. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) argues that where a carrier is involved in intrastate and interstate traffic. Railways in Texas were charging much more for shipment of goods westward into Texas than they were charging for a shipment from Dallas and Houston eastward.S. 43 A. United States Citation. Issue. 238 (1936) and A. the Congress may regulate the interstate commerce in which the carrier engages. Shreveport. 298 U. alleging that the rate differences negatively impacted interstate commerce. Facts. Discussion. Schechter Poultry. Brief Fact Summary. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. This holding seems somewhat inconsistent with the holdings in Carter Coal. 342 (1914). 234 U.A.S. United States .Houston. Yes.L.

was sued under the "Live Poultry Code. Independent contractors generally unload the poultry in Manhattan or one of the four railway terminals in New Jersey that serve New York City. New York City was the largest live poultry market in the United States. Dagenhart .A. The United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) conceded the poultry is shipped interstate. Brief Fact Summary." which regulated the poultry industry by requiring collective bargaining. Facts. 44 Hammer v. Issue. Defendant's.L. bought poultry from the contractors in New York City and processed the birds in Brooklyn. as the Defendant corporation buys the poultry in state and sells the poultry in state for in state consumption.A. Ninety-six percent of the live poultry in New York comes from other states. United States Citation.A. a slaughterhouse in New York City. Defendant does not sell poultry interstate. 295 U. 495 (1935).S. No. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Defendant. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. Discussion. slaughterhouse operators. the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate the corporations. The Supreme Court makes a strong distinction between the fact that 96% of the poultry coming into New York City was from out of state and the fact that the Defendant corporation bought and sold to in state entities. and a minimum wage.L. the corporation is not involved in interstate commerce. this distinction becomes less important in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence after 1937. The Commerce Power ceases where the currents of interstate commerce stop. The processed birds were sold directly to retailers in New York State. However. among other provisions. Judgment reversed and remanded. Schechter Poultry Corporation (Defendant). Therefore. a 40 hour work week. A. Does the Commerce Clause give Congress the power to regulate the Defendant's business? Held. However.

Dagenhart . J. Can Congress control interstate transport in a manner that strongly impinges on the manufacture of goods? Held.Hammer v. minor sons . The father of two employed. and one between 14 and 16 . However. "[I]f an act is within the powers specifically conferred upon Congress. Facts. the States are still free to regulate manufacture as they please. Issue. they are subjecting themselves to the control of Congress. when a State begins to ship manufactured goods across state lines. Congress' power under the Commerce Clause cannot undermine the police power left to the States by the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). A father brought a suit on behalf of his two minor sons. seeking to enjoin enforcement of the law as exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. To say otherwise would give Congress power to control all manufacture in all states. seeking to enjoin enforcement of an act of Congress intended to prevent the interstate shipment of goods produced with child labor. 247 U.brought suit as next friend to his sons. 251 (1918). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (J. No direct regulation of the States has occurred. ‡ It is largely indisputable that. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Holmes) dissenting. Brief Fact Summary. Holmes notes. Dagenhart Citation. Congress passed a law which would prohibit the interstate transportation of manufactured goods produced by a factory. ‡ The Supreme Court argues that the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution reserves local police authority to the States. Manufactured goods may be made solely for in state use.one under 14. would effectively remove that authority which the amendment relegates to local authorities. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) first notes that interstate commerce can necessarily not begin with manufacture. It is only with the transportation of the goods that the interstate commerce power begins. No.S. which within thirty days prior had allowed children under age 14 to work or children between the ages of 14 and 16 to work for more than a specified workload. To allow Congress to exercise power over local manufacture. if considered only for its immediate effects. ‡ As far as secondary effects. it 45 Hammer v. the act in question is within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Dissent.

Discussion. 46 Champion v. however obvious it may be that it will have those effects.seems to me it is not made any less constitutional because of the indirect effects that it may have. The dissent's argument clearly undermines the majority view. and later Commerce Clause cases are in line with the dissent. and that we are not at liberty upon such grounds to hold it void. Ames .

only their shipment across state lines.S. Discussion. A cynical (or practical) view would explain the difference between the holdings by saying the morally conservative Supreme Court had no problem extending the commerce power to quash gambling but could not extend it to injure the cause of big business. The Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Champion v. 247 U. Defendant argues that the act overreaches Congress's commerce powers. Appeals court judgment affirmed. 47 National Labor Relations Board v. Dagenhart. Congress is not prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets. Ames would appear to be at odds with the majority opinion in Hammer v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Appellant is an express carrier challenging the constitutionality of an act of Congress prohibiting the carriage of lottery tickets across state lines. . not the carrying of parcels in general.S. the Supreme Court ruled that prohibiting the interstate transport of products of child labor is not regulating interstate commerce per se). The majority in Hammer ruled that this is not regulating interstate transport but Congress' attempt to regulate an intrastate activity (in Hammer. Issue. May Congress regulate shipment of lottery tickets from one state to another? Held. as the mere transport of the tickets is not interstate commerce. 321 (1903). Facts.Champion v. Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was indicted under an 1895 act criminalizing the interstate shipment of lottery tickets and similar instruments. Ames Citation. Congress has the ability to regulate transport of goods in interstate commerce when such regulation does not affect the internal affairs of the states. Yes. 188 U. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Note that the statute criminalizes the shipment of lottery tickets. 251 (1918).

National Labor Relations Board v. According to the majority. Defendant was the fourth largest producer of Steel in the United States. specifically. It was a conglomerate owning ore. Yes. and thus could affect interstate commerce. May Congress regulate the practices under which goods involved in interstate commerce are produced? Held.S. 1 (1937). alleging that Defendant discriminated against union members with regard to hire and tenure and was coercing and interfering with its own employees' ability to self-organize. and warehouses. Congress is within its powers to regulate the employees' ability to self-organize. In particular. Jones & Laughlin (Defendant).B. Dissent. railways and steam barges. Darby ." Congress has the explicit power to control them insofar as they affect interstate commerce. argued that stare decisis required that pure manufacture be outside the powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) notes that Defendant's activities are so "far-flung" that any deleterious action in its local operations would have a direct and immediate effect on interstate commerce. McReynolds). Its operations spread across several states. Discussion. Reversed and remanded. refineries. ‡ If intrastate activities have a "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce. ‡ Defendant's denial of its employees' right to self-organize is an imminent cause of labor strife.B. Justice James McReynolds (J. 48 United States v. As such. proceeds under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Act).L. The suit brought by the N. Issue.") brought suit against the Defendant.R. and limestone properties. 301 U. Facts. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. in the sense that intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce are within the purview of the commerce power. Congress' power to regulate commerce is plenary. coal. Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case is the first in long line of cases representing an expanding commerce power for the United States Congress that continues into the 1990s. Citation. almost any activity that affects interstate commerce is open to Congressional regulation. the discharge of certain employees based on union affiliation.R. dissenting. Brief Fact Summary. The National Labor Relations Board ("N. for engaging in unfair labor practices.L.

The Defendant-Respondent. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Dagenhart. Darby represents the overturn of the narrow construction of the Commerce Clause. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. May Congress prohibit the employment of workers producing goods for interstate commerce at other than statutory set wages and hours? Held. Filburn . Defendant was indicted for violating the standards developed in the Act. Darby (Defendant). The Defendants mills produced a large proportion of lumber that was shipped to other states. The Defendant was engaged in the lumber business in Georgia. Yes. ‡ Hammer v. ‡ "The [Tenth A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. United States v. Darby reinforces the view of the commerce power as a plenary grant of power to Congress. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. 312 U.United States v.S. 247 U. Darby Citation. 251 (1918) is specifically overruled as a "departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the commerce clause«" ‡ Exercise of Congressional regulation over intrastate activities is an appropriate means to the legitimate end of regulating interstate commerce." The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) states a view of the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) that held firm for most of the 20th century: that the Amendment sought to codify concerns the Constitution had already addressed. the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism. The Respondent now argues the standards promulgated under the Act are an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power. Also. 49 Wickard v. United States v." Facts. Issue. 100 (1941). was indicted under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the Act) for violating minimum wage and maximum hours limitations. Apart from establishing as constitutional labor regulations that continue to the present day.S. including minimum wage and maximum hours in a workweek. Congress may regulate intrastate activities so long as there is a connection between such activities and interstate commerce.

The Appellee. When viewed in the aggregate (if everyone overgrew wheat "for personal consumption"). May Congress regulate purely intrastate activities under the commerce clause? Held. United States .1 bushels per acre. 111 (1942). and eggs. Brief Fact Summary. but when viewed in the aggregate of all farmers "similarly situated" it may significantly affect the value of wheat in commerce. Filburn Citation. Note that the Supreme Court seems to say Congress can compel an individual to purchase wheat when the individual could grow wheat for personal consumption. if those activities affect interstate commerce. however. In the Fall of 1940.S. He sold milk. He was assessed penalties on this amount of 49 cents a bushel. Filburn is in some ways the greatest exercise of the commerce power recognized by the Supreme Court. it does compete for wheat in commerce. Yes.11. Inc.1 acres and a normal yield of 20. Facts. and the kept the rest for the following seeding. Issue. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) acknowledges that the effect of the single farmer may well be negligible to interstate commerce. Discussion. the Appellee's 1941 wheat allotment was 11. He also grew a small crop of winter wheat every year. Appellee sold a portion of the wheat.Wickard v. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. which yielded 239 bushels from his excess acreage. 317 U. by taking away the demand for wheat by the one who grows it. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the demand for wheat goes down. v. As the one growing the wheat does not have to buy wheat. Wickard v. or $117. 50 Heart of Atlanta Motel. used some to make flour for home consumption. He was penalized for growing wheat in excess of his allotment allowed by the Department of Agriculture. Pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (Act). Appellee was an owner/operator of a small farm in Ohio. Congress may regulate the activities of entities totally apart from interstate commerce. used some as feed for poultry and livestock. produced wheat only for personal and local consumption. poultry. this decrease in demand would have a significant effect on interstate commerce. Filburn (Appellee). he planted 23 acres. ‡ Although the wheat may be entirely for personal consumption.

Douglas) concurs in the judgment. largely because in The Civil Rights Cases. than the impact on commerce. and McClung. not the impetus behind the Act. Heart of Atlanta Motel had 216 rooms available to transient guests and had historically rented rooms only to white guests. ‡ Congress heard testimony from many sources describing the hardships blacks face in securing transient accommodations throughout the United States. . United States Citation. rather than § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Jr. Issue. Facts. Congress may regulate the ability of commercial institutions to deny service on the basis of race under its power to regulate interstate commerce. He feels that it is more appropriate to rest civil rights legislation on the constitutional status of the individual. The view expressed by J. 312 U. (Appellant) operated a motel which refused accommodations to blacks. v. ‡ It does not matter that Congress was addressing a moral issue (see the dissent in Hammer v. Appeals court ruling affirmed. Douglas was eschewed by the majority.S. Concurrence. 379 U.S. Inc. 109 U. Appellant intended to continue this behavior to challenge Congress' authority to pass the Act. With an increasingly mobile populace. Inc. Yes. Heart of Atlanta Motel. What the Supreme Court is examining is Congress' power to enact the legislation. Justice William Douglas (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. 251 (1918) and the Supreme Court of the United States' (Supreme Court) opinion in Darby. 247 U. 3 (1883). Sr. but he is uneasy resting the decision on the Commerce Clause. 51 Katzenbach v. 100 (1941). illustrates the plenary nature with which the Supreme Court had vested the commerce power.S.Heart of Atlanta Motel. May Congress prohibit racial discrimination in hotel lodging under the Commerce Clause? Held.S. Dagenhart. the Supreme Court had ruled that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution could not regulate private behavior. Appellant contends that Congress has overreached its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Act. Heart Atlanta Motel. the Appellant. this brought increasing difficulties to many United States citizens. Approximately 70% of its guests are from outside the state. McClung. 241 (1964). Appellant solicits business from outside the State of Georgia through advertising in national travel magazines and other media. The first of the modern civil rights cases before the Supreme Court. Prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act). Brief Fact Summary.

Citation. the Appellees. a family-run business in Alabama did not serve blacks in the restaurant. 241 (1964). Alabama. (Appellees). and Sr. Because of the local nature of its operations. 379 U. McClung. Ollie's Barbecue served barbecued meats and homemade pies from its location in Birmingham. Many of the issues in the case had been answered in Heart of Atlanta Motel. and McClung. Ollie's Barbecue. Congress has the ability to require desegregation of restaurants under the Commerce Clause. Ollie McClung Jr. Usery . Approximately 50% of its food was purchased from a local supplier who procured it from out of state. Brief Fact Summary. McClung was decided on the same day as Heart of Atlanta Motel and represented the desegregation efforts by the Supreme Court. Yes. May Congress regulate racial discrimination by locally owned and operated restaurants? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 294 (1964). Issue. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. The largest remaining question was whether the Appellees' establishment serves interstate travelers or offers food that a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce. Discussion. 379 U. it is notable that the Supreme Court ruled that Congress' authority extended from the Commerce Clause. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) ruled that Congress had authority to regulate the restaurant under the Commerce Clause. the restaurant had only served black patrons on a carry-out basis. Sr.S. Jr. 52 National League of Cities v. Katzenbach v. which was in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act). Because Appellees admitted the latter query was true. Before and after passage of the Act.Katzenbach v.S. argues that Congress has overstepped its powers under the Commerce Clause. Facts. Again.

among other things. Rehnquist) states that the Act would require states to substantially restructure traditional ways in which they have operated. Blackmun) does not see the ruling in this case as outlawing federal power in forcing states to comply with environmental regulations and other such areas where the "federal interest is demonstrably greater." Discussion. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority . Brief Fact Summary. apply the Act's provisions to public employers. specifically the requirement that state governments pay their employees the new minimum wage and overtime. brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (the Act). Congress amended the Act to. Reversed and remanded. May Congress regulate the employment practices of state governments? Held. Usery Citation. Justice William Rehnquist (J. The Appellants. Usery is the first attempt by the modern Supreme Court to establish a jurisprudence of state sovereignty based on the text of the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) acts to preserve the States' sovereign authority and limit the Congress' power to compel State actions. Concurrence. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. National League of Cities (Appellants). In 1974. No. Dissent. Issue. National League of Cities v. 833 (1976).National League of Cities v. 426 U. Appellants allege that the requirements of the amendments will greatly increase the cost of operating state governments to the extent that the governments will require greater income or provide decreased public services. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) believes that the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has erred in saying that the Constitution refers to the states' sovereignty acting as a restraint on Congress' commerce power and the political process allows the states to deal with such issues. Synopsis of Rule of Law. He argues that this is a power reserved to the States and that to force States to comply with Congress' view of how they should operate their traditional affairs destroys the States' separate and independent existences. in the midst of which a state's right to pay employees a substandard wage is difficult to discern. Appellants also argue that Congress has intruded upon powers left to the States in so amending the Act.S. 53 Garcia v. Stevens) notes that the federal government may require the states to obey a vast number of regulations. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Facts.

not judicial review. Much litigation was spawned after the National League of Cities v. Powell) attacks the decision on two grounds: (1) stare decisis . Rehnquist) joins both dissents and adds. Brief Fact Summary. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority Citation. 469 U. Appellant argued that as a transit employee. The Appellant. arguing that its function as a transit authority was a "non-traditional" function of state government. ‡ Justice William Rehnquist (J. O'Connor) dissents on the ground that "state autonomy is a relevant factor in assessing the means by which Congress exercises its powers. it was bound by the standards of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Dissent. his employer fit into the latter category and was thus bound by the FLSA. None. brought suit against his employer the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (Appellee). Garcia (Appellant). 426 U." 54 Garcia v. Issue. Justice Lewis Powell (J. That decision determined whether certain state employers represented "traditional" state functions not bound by the FLSA or non-traditional functions operating outside the state's sovereign authority.Garcia v. Reversed and Remanded.it has been only 8 years since National League of Cities and (2) that the political process is insufficient in itself to maintain the federalist structure of government. "I am confident [that state sovereign restraints on the commerce power will]. in time again command the support of a majority of this Court. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority . 833 (1976) decision. 528 (1985). Facts. Usery. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the determination of traditional and non-traditional state functions is an inappropriate standard for determining whether Congress may enforce the FLSA against a public employer. What is the scope of state immunity under the Commerce Clause? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. ‡ The Supreme Court removes the standard by overturning National League of Cities and leaving any decisions regarding Congressional control of state actions to the political process. The division between Congressional regulatory power under the commerce clause and state sovereignty is defined by political action.S.S. Thus." ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J.

Discussion. and illustrates the passion different Justices feel toward the issues of state sovereignty and the commerce power. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority acts primarily to invalidate National League of Cities. Lopez . 55 United States v. Garcia v.

Mere possession of a firearm does not have enough of a connection to interstate commerce to support prohibition under the commerce power.38 caliber handgun to school. It is not clear by the text or by the legislative history of the statute that possessing a gun in a school zone has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 514 U. 549 (1995). ‡ Justice David Souter (J. was indicted under the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the Act). Defendant challenged the law as an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power. state charges were dropped. (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (people or things in interstate commerce) and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.S. The Act prohibited knowing possession of a firearm at a place the individual has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone. the only judicial inquiry is whether the means are plainly adapted to the end and (2) that the Court's decision returns Commerce Clause jurisprudence to the state it was in at the beginning of the century.United States v. a high school senior. Stevens) argues that the vital importance of education to commerce among the states and with foreign nations justifies the use of the commerce power to secure the educational environment. Souter) argues two main points: (1) that if there is any rational basis for claiming an activity involves interstate commerce. an activity must "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to be within the Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Rehnquist) notes three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the commerce power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce. Facts. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Lopez (Defendant). Dissent. ‡ The Court argues that in the final category. The Defendant. and Defendant was indicted under the Act. Kennedy) concurs. He acknowledges that the importance of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and maintains that 56 United States v. ‡ Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. The next day. No. Appeals court ruling affirmed. Lopez . Concurrence. Brief Fact Summary. Lopez Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Defendant was arrested under Texas state law for bringing a . Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. but with reservations. May Congress prohibit mere possession of a firearm in a designated space under the Commerce Clause? Held. Issue.

as Souter. However. dissenting. but believes the Supreme Court should develop a new standard of review that better reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause. the majority attempts to reincorporate the Commerce Clause jurisprudence from the early 20th century with the following cases. Discussion. Lopez is a radical departure from the Commerce Clause cases from 1937 until 1995. In his concurrence. Kennedy hints at another hidden fear: if the Commerce Clause jurisprudence is being redefined.a stable landscape is necessary for the federal court system in general. ‡ Justice Clarence Thomas (J. bemoans. Notably. Thomas) concurs. what does this say about the modern civil rights cases (which were all decided under the Commerce Clause)? 57 United States v. he agrees there is not a significant commercial nexus in the purpose or design of the statute. Morrison . United States v.

111 (1942)) by noting that intrastate activities must be considered in the aggregate only if the activities themselves are economic in nature.S. Now Respondent argues this section of the Act is beyond the scope of Congress' power to regulate commerce. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. she was allegedly repeatedly sexually assaulted by two varsity football players. Christy Brzonkala enrolled at Virginia Tech in the fall of 1994. Morrison Citation.S. Dissent. ‡ Applying the three-prong test from Lopez. Ct. Morrison makes clear that Lopez is not a speed bump in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 317 U. Brief Fact Summary. dissenting. Concurrence. Filburn. was sued under part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (Act). Facts. Issue. Discussion. but reiterates his belief that the Supreme Court should develop a new standard for review of Commerce Clause cases. Justice David Souter (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 549 (1995). argued that the aggregate effects of sexual assault are economically felt and therefore proper subject for regulation by the commerce power. 1740 (2000). Appeals court ruling affirmed. The Respondent. Morrison (Respondent). including the Respondent and the university in Federal District Court. Thomas) concurs.S. U. United States v. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) determined that violence against women does not substantially affect interstate commerce. 58 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. ‡ The Supreme Court further defined the aggregate effects test (see Wickard v. Army Corps of Engineers . 514 U. After the incident Brzonkala suffered severe emotional distress.United States v. Is § 13981 of the Act a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power? Held. but rather a new direction altogether. including Respondent. No. which penalized crimes of violence motivated by gender. Souter). She finally brought suit against the two male students. Intrastate actions must be economic in nature to be viewed in aggregate by courts reviewing a Commerce Clause case. 120 S. The Supreme Court is more capable of reining in congressional action as not substantially related to interstate commerce. Shortly after enrolling. She twice participated in academic hearings against Respondent and later dropped out of the school.

which "stated that § 404(a) extends to intrastate waters: a. physical." ‡ The Petitioner.S. "Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use. this area was a "successional state forest" with several seasonable ponds.Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. A consortium of cities and villages sought to purchase a "disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste. U. that migratory birds had been observed in the potential "disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste." A government agency attempted to stop them from buying the site.S. but since they would have to fill certain of the ponds on the site.S. including the territorial seas'". or b. was informed by the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission (the "Commission"). Now. The Petitioner wished to purchase the site. a consortium of 23 suburban Chicago cities and villages. 159 (2001) Brief Fact Summary." The Petitioner was informed by the Chicago Gravel Company of such a site in two Illinois counties that used to be home to a sand and gravel pit mining operation. or c." The court observed "§ 404(a) authorizes respondents to regulate the discharge of fill material into 'navigable waters. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (the "Petitioner"). Army Corps of Engineers Citation. Do the provisions of §404 of the Act extend to the waters providing a habitat for migratory birds? 59 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.' [ ] which the statute defines as 'the waters of the United States. Army Corps of Engineers . was looking for a "disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Respondent. The purpose of the Act was to "restor[e] and maintain the chemical.S. 531 U. In an attempt to clarify its jurisdiction under §404(a). Issue. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce." Accordingly. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species. the Respondent in 1986 promulgated the "Migratory Bird Rule". or d. needed a permit under §404(a) of the Act. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines. This case involved the interpretation of Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (the "Act"). U." Facts. and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." The Respondent then interpreted §404 of the Act to "confer federal authority over an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois which provides habitat for migratory birds. the Respondent then asserted jurisdiction over the site pursuant to part (b) of the "Migratory Bird Rule" and refused to issue the required §404(a) permit. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties. Army Corps of Engineers (the "Respondent").

taken in the aggregate. the Court draws a new jurisdictional line. Stevens") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice David Souter ("J." Discussion. wholly located within two Illinois counties. some only seasonal. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. It is interesting to read the majority and dissenting opinions alongside one another to see how different justices construe where and when the commerce clause applies. No. The court concluded that the "Migratory Bird Rule" is not supported by the text and purposes of the Act. one that invalidates the 1986 migratory bird regulation as well as the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over all waters except for actually navigable waters. Breyer"). Ginsburg") and Justice David Breyer ("J. it is enough that. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J.Held. which was most likely undertaken for commercial reasons. ‡ Further." The dissent then recognized that the activity being regulated is the "discharge of fill material into the water". Guillen . "[t]he causal connection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of commercial activities associated with migratory birds is not 'attenuated. the class of activities in question has such an effect. The dissenting justices argued "[i]n its decision today." Further. and wetlands adjacent to each. "it is not necessary that each individual instance of the activity substantially affect commerce." Dissent. Souter"). their tributaries.' it is direct and concrete. Additionally. Additionally. "the migratory bird rule does not blur the "distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. "[p]ermitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use." ‡ The court also rejected the Respondent's contention that the "Migratory Bird" rule "falls within Congress' power to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce" because the Act clearly extends to "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States". fall under § 404(a)'s definition of 'navigable waters' because they serve as habitat for migratory birds. The court rejected the Respondent's argument that "isolated ponds. Its holding rests on two equally untenable premises: (1) that when Congress passed the [Act] it did not intend "to exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation. and (2) that in 1972 Congress drew the boundary defining the Corps' jurisdiction at the odd line on which the Court today settles.". 60 Pierce County Washington v." ‡ The justices found that the "Migratory Bird Rule" could be analyzed under those activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.

if the information provided to the federal government is also provided to Plaintiffs attorneys. sections. Guillen . the states objected that §152 did not contain a confidentiality provision. Synopsis of Rule of Law.Ct. [ ] a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution"? 61 Pierce County Washington v. which may constitute a danger to motorists. The Respondent's counsel sought to obtain information about previous accidents that occurred in the relevant intersection.C. ‡ On July 5.C. Guillen Citation. This case involves the Hazard Elimination Program (the "Program"). the Department of Transportation (the "Department") recommended legislation providing for confidentiality of the information. and pedestrians. but the Petitioner refused to provide any documents. which protects information 'compiled or collected' in connection with certain federal highway safety programs from being discovered or admitted in certain federal or state trials. §409. The states feared that before improvements could be made to the dangerous roads. the states or local government must "undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. their liability would be increased with regard to accidents on those roads.C. 123 S. Pierce County Washington (the "Petitioner") applied for. The Petitioner received the funds on July 26. and eventually receive §152 funding to make improvements. sections.Pierce County Washington v." Section 152(a)(1) provides that state and local governments must "conduct and systematically maintain an engineering survey of all public roads to identify hazardous locations. 1996. In response. The Program grants state and local governments funding to improve the most dangerous portions of their roads. 1996.S. Ingacio Guillen's (the "Respondent") wife." Upon its passage. citing 23 U. and elements. information learned from the evaluation of the roads "shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State court or considered for other purposes in any action for damages arising from any occurrence". including roadside obstacles and unmarked or poorly marked roads." Facts. assign priorities for the correction of such locations. §409. § 409. 720 Brief Fact Summary. To be eligible for funding under the Program. "[B]oth the original § 409 and the 1995 amendment can be viewed as legislation aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Legislation made certain information gathered from state and local governments about their most dangerous roads inadmissible in federal and state court actions. Issue.S.S. and elements. which provides in pertinent part. Does "23 U. Congress subsequently promulgated 23 U. the Respondent. bicyclists. and establish and implement a schedule of projects for their improvement. was killed in a car accident in an intersection that the Petitioner.

Congress could have reasonably believed that the adoption of 23 U.C. and. § 409 "would result in more diligent efforts to collect the relevant information." The court recognized that §152 was promulgated by Congress to "reduc[e] hazardous conditions in the Nation's channels of commerce. The regulation of the roads has traditionally been within Congress's commerce power." This effort was frustrated due to the state's fear that their liability for negligence actions would be increased "by providing would-be plaintiffs a centralized location from which they could obtain much of the evidence necessary for such actions. ultimately. United States . greater safety on our Nation's roads. Based on [United States v." Discussion. even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Based on this problem. or persons or things in interstate commerce.‡ Yes. better informed decisionmaking.S. Congress can "regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. more candid discussions of hazardous locations. Lopez]. 62 New York v. the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce." Additionally.

the take title provision is a constitutional exercise of regulatory power. one provision requires that a state take title of and assume liability for radioactive waste produced within its borders for which it cannot provide disposal. However. ‡ It is clear that Congress cannot force a State government to enforce a federal regulatory scheme. Brief Fact Summary. Congress may not "commandeer[r] the legislative processes of the States" by compulsion. White). argued that by allowing the States to choose to take title or to dispose of the waste themselves. ‡ It is also clear that requiring a State government to take possession of the waste is equivalent to requiring a State to spend state funds. argues that the congressional exercise of authority was in response to a mandate from the States and that the formalism adopted by the majority actually hinders Congress' ability to respond to State requests. Stevens) argues that it is improper to say "Congress does not have the power to issue 'a simple command to state governments to enforce legislation enacted by Congress. Disposal is a national issue. Part of the widening federalist jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. From this. Issue. The Act in question sought to address the problem by offering various monetary incentives to states for opening their own sites. . United States stands for the proposition that if Congress could commandeer the States' actions in all areas. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J.S. Low-level radioactive waste is a common byproduct of many modern processes. May Congress compel the States to choose between expending state funds and enforcing a federal regulatory scheme? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. United States Citation. Dissent. it follows that requiring a State to choose between to unconstitutional alternatives is not a constitutional exercise of federal power. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the Act) sought to address disposal of radioactive waste.'" Discussion. No. Appeals court ruling affirmed. the United States (Respondents). ‡ The Respondents. One provision of the Act requires the State to take title to any waste of which it is not able to provide disposal. Facts. there would be no political need for States. 144 (1992). Justice Byron White (J.New York v. in that such waste must be stored for hundreds of years before further disposal becomes safe. New York v. dissenting. 505 U.

United States .63 Printz v.

"The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. 1998. ‡ The interim provisions violate the federalist structure of the constitution. Printz extends the Tenth Amendment prohibition of compelling state action to administer federal programs from state legislatures New York v. 521 U. May Congress require state law enforcement agents to administer the background checks required by the Act? Held. New York addressed the issue of Congress requiring state legislatures to dispose of radioactive waste or take title to it. Various state chief law enforcement officers ("CLEOs") brought suit. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. the Constitution of the United States relegates the authority to enforce it to the President of the United States. 505 U. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. United States Citation. whereas Printz deals with the federal government requiring action of state and local executives. ‡ The provisions also violate the federal separation of powers. Stevens) reiterates his previous position that the Tenth Amendment's borders should be established by the political branches. Dissent. Thomas) concurs. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Concurrence. Because the Act is a federal statute. Printz and another county sheriff (Petitioners). 64 Reno v. but also lacks the ability to control intrastate point of sale transactions under the commerce power. Brief Fact Summary. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. Congress has stripped the federal executive of his constitutional duty to enforce federal legislation. alleged that this requirement overreaches the power of the Federal Government. In the interim.Printz v. the Act required state and local law enforcement to do background checks before issuing firearm permits.S. Issue. Condon . but goes further in saying that Congress not only lacks the ability to require the interim provisions under the Tenth Amendment." Facts. 144 (1992) to state executive agencies. United States. The Petitioners. By putting the enforcement of the interim provisions in the hands of state and local officials. Discussion. alleging that the interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the Act) unconstitutionally required state executive officers to apply a federal regulatory program. by requiring state executive officers to administer federal regulations. No. 898 (1997).S. The Act called for the establishment of a national background check system for hand gun purchasers by November 30. by removing Presidential oversight from a federal program.

Butler . May Congress require State compliance with the DPPA? Held. it cannot be said to commandeer state government in violation of the Tenth Amendment. In Reno v. The Tenth Amendment does not prevent the Federal Government from regulating the States as individual entities if it does not ask the States to enforce a federal program. arguing that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA") violated the Tenth Amendment's limitation on the Federal Government's power to regulate the states. argued that by requiring States to abide by the federal guidelines. Condon Citation. the Supreme Court of the United States illustrates two basic concepts: (i) the supremacy of federal law (Congress may pass laws that affect state action) and (ii) the sovereignty of the individual States (Congress may not pass laws that require the states to expend resources enforcing federal policy). Issue. Neither does it require the South Carolina legislature to enact any laws or assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private citizens. 666 (2000). These penalties apply to individuals and state agencies. Yes. South Carolina brought suit against United States Attorney General Reno. The DPPA establishes penalties for disclosure or resale of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 65 United States v. 120 S. The DPPA does not require the states to regulate their own citizens. Brief Fact Summary. South Carolina's Attorney General Charlie Condon (Respondent). Congress has overstepped the limitations of the Tenth Amendment. As the DPPA only restricts state government action. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. The Respondent. Discussion. Ct. Condon. The Tenth Amendment limitations on federal power extend only to attempts by the Federal Government to compel legislative or executive action on the part of the States in the regulation of their citizens as part of administering a federal program. Facts.Reno v.

Brief Fact Summary. Stone) argues that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has overstepped judicial restraint in declaring the Act unconstitutional. The Act authorized the setting of limits on the production of certain crops and the imposition of taxes on crops produced in excess of these limits. absent a nexus with interstate commerce. Justice Harlan Stone (J. ‡ The taxing and spending power is broad . § 8 of the United States Constitution (Constitution). however the Supreme Court's view of the Tenth Amendment's intersection with the taxing and spending power has subsequently changed. but Congress may not use taxation as a means to exercise powers retained by the States. Appeals court ruling reversed and remanded. which is a local issue. Butler Citation. Facts. Respondent alleges that this tax acts as a regulation of crop production. Issue.S. Butler. This is beyond the powers delegated to the Federal Government. May Congress tax crop production in excess of preset limits? Held. Butler views the Tenth Amendment as a mere tautology. Discussion. delegated to the states. 66 Sabri v. not limited to the enumerated list of issues in Article I. seeks judgment that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (the Act) is unconstitutional in its scope. ‡ However. United States . a view which has changed in subsequent cases. No.United States v. In particular. United States v. Dissent. Specifically. the regulation of agriculture is. 297 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 1 (1936). Butler's holding that the taxing and spending power is broad is still good law.that is. the tax in this case was levied to discourage production of crops beyond the limits set by the Act. Congress may tax and apportion for the general welfare. the Respondent (Respondent).

S. Basim Omar Sabri (the "Petitioner").S. or series of transactions of such organization." The district court found that §666 was invalid.C. The majority first quickly disposed of the notion that the "statute must require proof of connection with federal money as an element of the offense. or agency receiv[e]. The Petitioner was charged under "18 U.000 in federal funds. the majority observed "Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal monies to promote the general welfare. subsidy. 541 U.000 under a Federal program involving a grant. I. 2001. I. A federal statute made it illegal to bribe a public official. The Petitioner. government. so he offered three separate bribes to a councilman between July 2. transaction.C. loan." Issue. proscribing bribery of state. 600 (2004) Brief Fact Summary. § 8. "[W]hether 18 U. in connection with any business. To the contrary. which imposes federal criminal penalties on anyone who 'corruptly gives. Art. cl. The city counsel of Minneapolis received a substantial amount of federal funds in 2001." Second.000 or more. or agrees to give anything of value to any person. is a valid exercise of congressional authority under Article I of the Constitution"? Held." ‡ Third. with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State. government. Art. 18.Sabri v. § 8. United States . and not frittered away in graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value for dollars. and that the statute was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause in serving the objects of the congressional spending power. the Eighth Circuit held "there was nothing fatal in the absence of an express requirement to prove some connection between a given bribe and federally pedigreed dollars. 2001 to July 17. United States Citation. contract. The Petitioner did not think he could obtain the requisite licenses or abide by the applicable zoning laws." The court observed "not every bribe or kickback offered or paid to agents of governments covered by § 666(b) will be traceably skimmed from specific federal payments. cl. A statute criminalizing bribery need not "require proof of connection with federal money as an element of the offense. or show up in the guise 67 Sabri v. was a real estate developer that wished to build a hotel and retail structure in Minneapolis. § 666(a)(2). A real estate developer bribed an official to obtain certain licenses and zoning permits. "Congress does not have to sit by and accept the risk of operations thwarted by local and state improbity. and it has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. local. or any agency thereof. offers. § 666(a)(2). insurance. local or Indian tribal government.' " Criminal liability will be found where "the organization. benefits in excess of $10. or other form of Federal assistance." Facts. to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare. in any one year period. or agency involving anything of value of $5. and tribal officials of entities that receive at least $10. Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law.S. guarantee. 1.

In particular. and that an agent of the entity is bribed regarding a substantial transaction of that entity. No connection whatsoever between the corrupt transaction and the federal benefits need be shown. the Court appears to hold that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the exercise of any power that is no more than a "rational means" to effectuate one of Congress' enumerated powers. Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. Discussion. shows that more than one constitutional provision can be used to analyze a given issue. Thomas would have decided this case under the Commerce Clause." The court criticizes the majorities justification that just because money is fungible there is a federal interest in "prosecut[ing] a bribe paid to a city's meat inspector in connection with a substantial transaction just because the city's parks department had received a federal grant of $10. Dole ." J.000 in federal benefits of any kind." Moreover. Thomas criticizes the majority's conclusion that "[a]ll that is necessary for § 666(a)(2) to apply is that the organization. This case offers an interesting analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause. J. that "possibility portends no enforcement beyond the scope of federal interest. Thomas") filed a concurring opinion "find[ing] questionable the scope the Court gives to the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to Congress' authority to spend." Concurrence. or agency in question receives more than $10. but nonetheless concurs in the judgment. 68 South Dakota v.000". for the reason that corruption does not have to be that limited to affect the federal interest. depending upon which perspective you look at the issue from. however.of a quid pro quo for some dereliction in spending a federal grant. government. The concurrence.

Appellant alleges that the federal withholding of a small percentage of highway funds to states allowing public possession or purchase of alcohol by individuals under 21 years is unconstitutional. Facts. Justices William Brennan and Sandra Day O'Connor both dissent on the unrelated ground of the Twenty-first Amendment.S. A withholding of a small amount of funds is not a coercive measure and a proper exercise of taxing and spending power. the Department of Transportation will withhold approximately 5% of the federal highway funds earmarked for the state. 483 U.C. which relegates regulation of alcohol sales to the states. 23 U. Morrison . Congress may put "strings" on funds disbursed to States. 69 United States v. As a consequence. § 158 directs the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds otherwise available to states that allow the purchase or public possession of alcohol by individuals under 21 years of age. Dole Citation. so long as the conditions are explicitly stated. Yes. Issue.2% alcohol. South Dakota allows individuals nineteen and over to purchase beer with up to 3.S. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. Dissent. Appeals court ruling affirmed. Non-coercive financial incentives by Congress are a constitutional exercise of the taxing and spending power.South Dakota v. 203 (1987). May Congress withhold funds from states that do not maintain a 21 year old drinking age? Held.

Appeals court ruling affirmed. ‡ Applying the three-prong test from Lopez. she was allegedly repeatedly sexually assaulted by two varsity football players. Morgan and Morgan . United States v. Concurrence. 70 Katzenbach v.S. Intrastate actions must be economic in nature to be viewed in aggregate by courts reviewing a Commerce Clause case. 514 U. After the incident Brzonkala suffered severe emotional distress. 120 S. She finally brought suit against the two male students. including the Respondent and the university in Federal District Court. which penalized crimes of violence motivated by gender.S. Issue. argued that the aggregate effects of sexual assault are economically felt and therefore proper subject for regulation by the commerce power. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 549 (1995). Justice Clarence Thomas (J. 1740 (2000). Is § 13981 of the Act a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power? Held. 317 U. but rather a new direction altogether. Filburn. but reiterates his belief that the Supreme Court should develop a new standard for review of Commerce Clause cases. Shortly after enrolling. dissenting. Ct. She twice participated in academic hearings against Respondent and later dropped out of the school. 111 (1942)) by noting that intrastate activities must be considered in the aggregate only if the activities themselves are economic in nature. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) determined that violence against women does not substantially affect interstate commerce. ‡ The Supreme Court further defined the aggregate effects test (see Wickard v. Christy Brzonkala enrolled at Virginia Tech in the fall of 1994. Justice David Souter (J. Souter). Facts. Dissent. Morrison makes clear that Lopez is not a speed bump in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. including Respondent. was sued under part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (Act).United States v. No. The Supreme Court is more capable of reining in congressional action as not substantially related to interstate commerce. Morrison (Respondent). Thomas) concurs. Now Respondent argues this section of the Act is beyond the scope of Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Respondent. Discussion. Morrison Citation. Brief Fact Summary.

384 U. but on grounds that Congress must still have constitutional bounds on its powers. on the basis of English illiteracy. Harlan) dissents not so much on the general test the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) develops.Katzenbach v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Justice John Marshall Harlan (J." Facts. ‡ In the current case. Why would § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment be necessary if Congress could only overturn legislation that the courts could invalidate on their own? 71 City of Boerne v. Dissent. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) establishes the test that a Congressional enactment under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is plainly adapted and consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution. Flores . 641 (1966). A congressional enactment under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) is effective if it is "plainly adapted to [its] end" and consistent with "the letter and spirit of the constitution. Discussion. Issue. Appeals court ruling affirmed. Yes. The majority states that the Appellant's view of Congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates the text. The State of New York contends that the Act can only be given effect if the New York literacy requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Attorney General alleges that § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act) can only be sustained if the Court determines New York's requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Act prohibits denying voting rights to individuals who have successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Brief Fact Summary. both prongs of the test are met: the Act specifically prohibits denying voting rights to a class of voters. Does § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow Congress to overturn state legislation without a judicial determination that the state legislation violates the Fourteenth Amendment? Held. he believes Congress has overstepped its authority by regulating what is essentially a states rights issue.S. Morgan and Morgan Citation. New York State required English literacy as a prerequisite to voting. In this case.

No. Reversed and remanded.City of Boerne v. unless the government demonstrates (1) a compelling government interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Souterg) dissented in part. ‡ The Supreme Court acknowledges remedial laws may also be preventative legislation. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor (J. Specifically. Flores Citation. The Supreme Court holds that Congress still has authority to "enforce" by passing legislation affecting otherwise constitutional state statutes. Brief Fact Summary. Issue. but it may only enforce constitutional rights. ‡ The ability to create substantive constitutional rights under § 5 of the constitution would destroy the Constitution's status as the supreme law of the land and relegate it to mere legal code. Congressional action under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution may be remedial or preventative in nature. which the majority upholds as precedent Discussion. 72 Fitzpatrick v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 494 U. Can Congress create a substantive right under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Congress passed the RFRA. Bitzer . After the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) narrowed the scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution in Employment Division. Boerne v. but says there must be congruence between the means and the ends to be achieved and proportionality to a remedial or preventative objective.S. not create substantive rights. largely due to their unhappiness with the Smith decision. Facts. Congress may not create a substantive constitutional right. 521 U.S. Flores slows down the expansion of Congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 507 (1997). The Respondent argued the ordinance is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Archbishop of San Antonio challenged a city ordinance of Boerne under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). the RFRA prohibits government from "substantially burdening" the exercise of religion. but it may only do so in a remedial or preventative manner. O'Connor) and David Souter (J. Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. seeking specifically to overturn the test developed in Smith. 872 (1990). Smith. Dissent. even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.

as well. Congress amended the Act authorizing private suits for monetary damages. citing its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bitzer is the first case in the Rehnquist Court's expanding view of the Eleventh Amendment. Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act).S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In doing so. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) notes that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to exercise authority that infringes on areas otherwise relegated to other entities under the Constitution. Can Congress abridge sovereign immunity by exercising its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held. authorizing private suits for monetary damages. Because of the § 5 grant of this authority. 445 (1976).Fitzpatrick v. Brief Fact Summary. 73 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Yes. Discussion. Issue. Fitzpatrick v. Affirmed. Congress may authorize private suits against states under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that are impermissible in other contexts. In 1972. Bitzer Citation. Facts. Appellant argues that the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution grant of sovereign immunity to the States prevents Congress from authorizing such suits. the Supreme Court allows Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity under the section. In 1972. Congress cited its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Florida . 427 U.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Dissent. Issue. ‡ Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only authority Congress has to authorize a private suit against a state. I. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens believes the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits suits against a state by citizens of another state. Discussion. 3? Held. Art. The Indian Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. cl. Respondent argues that as a sovereign state. Congress cannot make it appear in federal court without abrogating its sovereign immunity. 44 (1996). Maine . Synopsis of Rule of Law. The current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence does not focus on the clear text of the Eleventh Amendment. ‡ Justice David Souter argues that the majority gives the states sovereign immunity that they did not enjoy. which acts as a bar against bringing suit against a state defendant. but rather the interpretation of the judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity. seeking to enforce good faith negotiation as required under the Indian Gamin Regulatory Act. No.S. Brief Fact Summary. Petitioners brought suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Facts. Florida Citation. § 8. Petitioners sued the state of Florida. ‡ Congress made clear in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that it intended to abrogate States' sovereign immunity. 517 U. May Congress allow suit against a state under the Indian Commerce Clause. which authorizes suits against state governments to enforce good faith negotiations with tribes attempting to allow gambling on reservations. even prior to the ratification of the constitution. it lacks the ability to do so under its Article I powers. 74 Alden v. However. Holding affirmed.

Afterward. There is only Fourteenth Amendment authority. only when no substantive right has been created. Discussion. ‡ The United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) recounts the judicial development of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and its application in the federal courts. the Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida. and only when the means is congruent and proportional to the remedial or preventative ends. no argument for construing immunity from the Eleventh Amendment. and then. 517 U. The Petitioners. The dismissal was upheld by the Maine Supreme Court. 75 . but while their suit was pending. Petitioners had originally brought suit in federal court. State sovereign immunity prevents a non-consenting state from being sued in state court for violations of federal law. The dissent again argues that there is no historical basis for sovereign immunity for the states. Dissent. No.S. the State of Maine (Respondent) violated overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). There is no Article I power to abrogate sovereign immunity either in state or federal court. Issue. petitioners brought their suit in state court. 706 (1999). The Supreme Court again expands the concept of sovereign immunity. Maine Citation. where it was again dismissed. and hence. alleging that their employer. a group of probation officers (Petitioners). Facts. 44 (1996). 527 U. ‡ The Supreme Court rules that to allow Congress to bring a non-consenting state into state court when it could not do so in federal court would make hollow the doctrine of sovereign immunity. brought suit in Maine State Court. Brief Fact Summary. and the District Court dismissed their claim.Alden v. May Congress require non-consenting states to submit to private suits in their own courts under Article I? Held.S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. State Supreme Court ruling affirmed.

The Federal Executive Power 76 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Sawyer . v.CHAPTER III.

To avoid this potential harm to the national defense. ‡ A strike was ordered to begin. Facts. or of national security or defense. there are "needs of public safety". he is not to create laws. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. The President may not make such an order without the direction of the Congress or under the express authority of the United States Constitution. The President was justified in his actions because the world is still recovering from war and he kept the Congress fully informed of his actions. 579 (1952). The President is limited to vetoing and suggesting laws. Brief Fact Summary. 77 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. ‡ Justice Jackson: The President's power is at its lowest when he acts without the support of Congress. Concurrence. The power is equivalent to his Constitutional power minus the Constitutional power of Congress over the matter. Yes. Issue. but the President issued his executive order to prevent the strike. Steel workers threatened to strike and shutdown all steel mills throughout the United States. ‡ United Steelworkers and steel mill owners failed to come to a labor agreement over a period of several days.Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Dissent. ‡ Justice Frankfurter: Presidential power to seize property has been granted only when "war is imminent". The President's power to issue orders is limited.S. Did the President exceed the limit of his powers by issuing the seizure of all steel mills? Held. ‡ Justice Douglas: The existence of an emergency does not create powers for the President. (Petitioner) complied with the Executive order but is now refuting the authority because Congress did not approve the order. The order seized all steel companies and forced the presidents to serve as operating managers under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce. Sawyer . the President issued an executive order placing control of all mills in the hands of the Secretary of Commerce. Sawyer Citation. 343 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Discussion." In that case alone it would be appropriate for a military commander to take control of a supply center to prevent the disruption of the war efforts. there was no such danger. The only time an order such as this would be sustained would be in the "theater of war. President of the United States . Furthermore. Here. Nixon. the President acted alone without the support of Congress. only a perceived threat. Richard M. 78 United States v.

Withholding information in a criminal trial will cut deeply into the guarantee of due process and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. Clinton. though the Plaintiff was not indicted himself. Conversations between the President of the United States (the President) and his advisors are generally privileged. The Plaintiff. Our government consists of three interdependent and coequal branches. but that privilege is no absolute. several of the Plaintiff's associates were indicted on charges of conspiracy and obstruction of justice. President of the United States v. that privilege must be weighed against the fair administration of justice. claiming that his advisors may fear to speak candidly if they know that the conversations may later be used against them in a court of law. However. 79 William J. Nixon. Facts.United States v. The Plaintiff brought this motion to quash the subpoena on the grounds of executive privilege and separation of powers. The court agreed that the President's communications to his advisors are subject to general claims of confidentiality.S. 418 U. Weighing the countervailing arguments against each other. The Plaintiff argues that all private conversations between himself and his advisors/associates are absolutely privileged. the President of the United States Richard Nixon (Plaintiff) refused to turn over tapes of his secretly recorded conversations that had been subpoenaed to assist in the prosecution of individuals in the Watergate break-in. Richard M. ‡ The district court denied the Plaintiff's motion to quash and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted review. President of the United States Citation. The district court issued a subpoena ordering the Plaintiff to produce the tape recordings of his conversations with his advisors in one of the criminal cases that had ensued. Issue. the President's generalized interest in confidentiality cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of the criminal justice system. Are the Presidents' confidential conversations with his advisors/associates subject to an absolute privilege? Held. Discussion. No. 683 (1974). City of New York . ‡ The Plaintiff also raised a separation of powers argument. the Supreme Court said this was based on public policy grounds. there is no absolute privilege. While the Supreme Court recognizes a need for a strong Presidential privilege. In the famous Watergate scandal. which the Supreme Court rejected. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brief Fact Summary.

417 (1998). including a procedure where the President must notify Congress of the cancellation and Congress can veto the President's cancellation with a majority vote. that Congress properly enacted the Act and that the spending and taxing issues in this case fall within the Act. Historically. the President of the United States. Brief Fact Summary. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. William Clinton (Defendant) used his newly acquired Line Item Veto Power to cancel two items of congressional spending. Therefore. Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. Breyer) wrote the opinion and feels the majority is flawed because it assumes that the Defendant has been granted the authority to "repeal" or "amend" laws. Chadha (1983). The Defendant used the Line Item Veto power to cancel an item of spending that would benefit only New York and also to cancel a tax break to farmers' cooperatives. the Line Item Veto is unconstitutional because the "repeal of statutes. Kennedy) felt there was a separation of powers problem.William J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. "Our very liberty is at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers: concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty. The Defendant. 80 A. City of New York Citation. Concurrence. The Line Item Veto Power is unconstitutional. no less than enactment. Congress did not attempt to give the President the true power to "veto" portions of already enacted laws. May Congress grant the President the authority to cancel parts of legislation after they have been enacted as law? Held. Issue. Here constitutional silence on the President's power to repeal or amend duly enacted statutes is equivalent to an express prohibition. The Plaintiffs the City of New York and various others (Plaintiffs) and the intended recipients of the vetoed spending sued. 524 U. Clinton.S. Facts. The Act sets out procedures the President must follow. must conform with Article I" [INS v. The constitutional veto takes place before the bill becomes law. United States . It is undisputed that the Defendant complied with the Act. influencing and vetoing legislation.] Dissent. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (the Act) gave the President of the United States (the President) the power to veto (cancel) provisions of certain spending and taxing bills after they had been signed into law.L. it is a repeal rather than a veto.A." Discussion. President of the United States v. Justice Stephen Breyer (J. it has been established that a President must approve an entire bill or veto it in toto. whereas the statutory Line Item Veto takes place after the bill becomes law. No. The President's Line Item Veto power differs from that of a constitutional veto. The President's role in lawmaking is limited to initiating. The Defendant simply followed the Act as handed down by Congress.

495 (1935). 295 U. 81 Panama Refining Co. set forth standards to guide the formulation of the codes. look to trade and industrial groups that propose the codes because they must be "truly representative" of the industry members. Brief Fact Summary. Congress delegated to the President the authority to approve and implement codes of conduct for various industries. Discussion. the NIRA sets up no specific standards for the President to apply in determining whether to accept or reject the proposed codes. A. was indicted for violating one of the codes. Thus. Since there were no standards or guidelines for creating the codes. the Congress improperly delegated legislative power. The Defendant. the President of the United States (the President) redelegated that power to business groups and boards of various industries. in determining what limits Congress set for the President.A. The statute did not. Issue. the codes must not promote monopolies or be oppressive to small enterprises. Second.A. May Congress delegate unrestrained law making authority to the executive branch? Held. to create industry wide codes of conduct. First. No. United States Citation. Under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). which were suggested by numerous trade and industrial groups. In short. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. One such code was the Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry (the Code). Facts. the code-making authority granted to the President is an unconstitutional delegation of power. v. two grounds should be examined.S. To determine whether the passage of these codes was an improper delegation of legislative authority. The Defendant was indicted and convicted for violating portions of the Code. Ryan .L. however. This leaves the discretion to the President virtually unfettered. Schechter Poultry Corporation (Defendant). the legislature may not delegate to the executive branch the unfettered authority to make law. Synopsis of Rule of Law. which proscribed labor and operational standards for poultry businesses in and around New York City. In turn. Congress delegated authority to an executive agency to regulate various industries.L. Congress may not delegate law-making authority to an executive agency without prescribing specific standards for the exercise of that authority.A.

The delegation of authority was unlawful and invalid. Ryan Citation. from enforcing the Executive Order. v. Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff. Congress would be free to delegate authority at will to the President. Panama Refining Co. or an administrative body. Discussion. Congress simply left the matter to the President (in deciding the circumstances and conditions under which the transportation of petroleum products should be prohibited) without setting standards or rules to be followed.Panama Refining Co. congressional delegation of power to the executive branch must be specific and limited." Under the United States Constitution (Constitution) Congress is not allowed to abdicate or transfer its essential legislative powers. Based on this provision. . Congress delegated to the President of the United States (the President) the power to restrict or prohibit the interstate and foreign transport of petroleum. Congress enacted a provision of the National Industrial Act (NIRA) that gave the President the power to prohibit the transportation of petroleum products in excess of the amount permitted by state law. The NIRA did not include any policy guidelines for prohibiting or not prohibiting the transportation of petroleum production in excess of state allowances. Facts. American Trucking Assn. The President was granted unfettered discretion. May Congress delegate unrestricted law-making authority to the President? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot delegate to others the essential legislative functions with which it was vested. If the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) were to hold the legislation valid. It is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for Congress to delegate law-making authority to the President without imposing standards or rules limiting that authority. 82 Whitman v. the President made an Executive Order enacting such a prohibition. Issue. Congress let the matter to him "to be dealt with as he pleased. another officer. No. certain government officials (Defendant).S.. but the Court of Appeals reversed. (Plaintiff) brought suit to enjoin the Defendants. The District Court granted a permanent injunction against enforcement. Inc. 293 U. 388 (1935).

No. Judge Antonin Scalia ("J. Issue. Inc. not lower or higher than is necessary--to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety. The NAAQS must be issued for each air pollutant for "which 'air quality criteria' have been issued under § 108.' it said. "[W]hether § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)?" Held. § 7408. "[t]he Court of Appeals held that [§109(b)(1)] as interpreted by the Administrator did not provide an 'intelligible principle' to guide the EPA's exercise of authority in setting NAAQS. writing for the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") observed. The district court found specifically that the EPA's interpretation of the statute provides no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. Synopsis of Rule of Law.." These NAAQS must be reviewed by the Administrator at "at five-year intervals" and make "such revisions . "Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA.C.' [ ] The court hence found that the EPA's interpretation (but not the statute itself) violated the nondelegation doctrine. based on [the] criteria [documents of § 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety. Citation. The district court however found that the EPA "could perhaps avoid the unconstitutional delegation by adopting a restrictive construction of § 109(b)(1). This case involved whether a provision in the Clean Air Act (the "Act") was an inappropriate delegation of Congressional authority to an agency." The District of Columbia Circuit found that §109(b)(1) improperly delegated legislative power to the Administrator in violation of Article 1. which [the Supreme Court] interpret[ed] as requiring the EPA to set air quality standards at the level that is 'requisite' that is." When analyzing a delegation challenge. Facts. National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). the court must determine whether a statute has delegated a legislative power to an agency in violation of Article 1." The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. are requisite to protect the public health. fits comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent. Scalia")... §1 of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). 531 U.S. 457 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. so instead of declaring the section unconstitutional the court remanded the NAAQS to the agency." The court also 83 . 'lack[ed] any determinate criteria for drawing lines. '[The] EPA.Whitman v. §1 of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much." Section 109(b)(1) of the Act requires the EPA to set "ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator. as may be appropriate. American Trucking Assn.S. 42 U. Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") mandates that the Administrator of the Environment Protection Agency ("EPA") promulgate. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that when allocating decision-making authority to agencies Congress must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.

J.. and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring 'fair competition. the Supreme Court found that "Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA.'" J. ‡ J. Based on these precedents and others." Discussion. the court recognized the "the scope of discretion that § 109(b)(1) allows is well within the outer limits of the Court's nondelegation precedents. the court recognized "[i]n the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes.disagreed with the lower courts suggestion "that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute. American Petroleum Institute]. Scalia compared the limits in this statute to those limits present in recognized by the court in [Touby v. not lower or higher than is necessary--to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety. as the Court of Appeals did here. United States] concerning the Attorney General's right to designate a drug a controlled substance and those limits in the Occupational Safety and Health Act upheld by the Supreme Court in [Industrial Union Dept. which [the Supreme Court] interpret[ed] as requiring the EPA to set air quality standards at the level that is "requisite" that is." ‡ The court recognized certain minimum requirements or limits in the text of §109(b)(1) of the Act." Further. the court has never "even in sweeping regulatory schemes [ ]demanded. which the Supreme Court has upheld. fits comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent. Jagdish Rai Chadha . one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion.' " Based on these principles. Scalia then laid out various other statutes. Scalia then recognized. 84 Immigration and Naturalization Services v. This case provides an interesting discussion of the non-delegation doctrine and how hard it is to prove that a delegation was improper. AFL-CIO v. that statutes provide a 'determinate criterion' for saying 'how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.

the legislative veto is unconstitutional. Jagdish Rai Chadha Citation. which purported to authorize one House of Congress. However." is not the type of action that bicameralism and presentment applies. Bicameralism and presentment were built into the Constitution to act as a check on each branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. whether a particular deportable alien could remain in the United States. Chadha filed a petition with the Defendant and the Defendant agreed that the statute was unconstitutional. Dissent. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Here. Facts. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not permit Congress to then delegate the same authority to one House of Congress. Chadha overstayed his visa and the Defendant. White) found that the legislative veto in the Act is one of approximately 200 statutes. Justice Byron White (J. Is the one-house "legislative veto" unconstitutional. Chadha and others (Plaintiffs). White also argues that the concept of a "legislative veto. it is subject to both the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article 1 of the Constitution. Jagdish Rai Chadha . challenged a federal statute. Yes. by resolution. the House of Representatives passed a resolution that Chadha did not meet the statutory requirements for suspension of deportation. Since the action of deciding whether to deport a given alien is legislative. Synopsis of Rule of Law. since Congress did not write a new law when allowing one House of Congress to override the Attorney General's decision.Immigration and Naturalization Services v. the Attorney General reported the suspension of deportation to Congress. The Plaintiffs. in which Congress has reserved a "legislative veto" to ensure accountability of the executive and independent agencies. Legislative action is not legitimate unless there is bicameral approval and presentment to the President of the United States. Only bills and their equivalent are subject to bicameralism and presentment. Neither the Senate nor the President reviewed the decision. began deportation proceedings. to invalidate the decision of the Attorney General of the United States (Attorney General) to allow a specific deportable illegal immigrant to remain in the United States. the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Defendant). Thus. Concurrence. Chadha was an alien who was lawfully admitted into the United States on a non-immigrant student visa. even when authorized by a properly enacted statute? Held. 462 U. Congress delegated the Attorney general the power to determine. Under the Act. then bicameralism and presentment were not necessary. J. The court of appeals held that the separation of powers doctrine was violated by the Issue. Powell) thought the case should have been decided on a 85 Immigration and Naturalization Services v.S. Congress's initial delegation to the Attorney General of the deportation decision was done with bicameralism and presentment. The Immigration judge found that Chadha met the requirements set out in the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) for suspension of deportation. 919 (1983). Brief Fact Summary.

The House impermissibly assumed a judicial function when reviewing the INS's decision over Chadha's deportation. Theodore B. The one-house legislative veto is unconstitutional. Olson . Discussion. Independent Counsel v.narrower separation of powers ground. 86 Alexia Morrison. This is legislative in character. Bicameralism keeps the people free from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power. The framers of the Constitution found bicameralism and presentment to be essential. in order to have force and effect must be considered and passed by both houses of Congress and then presented to the President for his signature. The Act allows one house of Congress to deport an alien who would otherwise be granted permanent residency. Nearly every legislative act. ‡ The structure of the Constitution allows one house to make a unicameral decision in only four instances. ‡ A question to consider is whether Congress was taking "legislative" action. However. Congress previously made a deliberate choice to delegate authority to the executive branch to determine which deportable aliens will be allowed to stay in the United States. none of which are present here.

Art II.Alexia Morrison. Dissent. The Court of Appeals held the Act was unconstitutional. Does the Constitution require that the President of the United States (President) exercise sole and exclusive control over the appointment of all executive officers? Held. Olson Citation. it is clear that she is an inferior officer and not a principle officer. The Supreme Court of 87 Alexia Morrison.S. If further investigation is needed. § 2. To the contrary. An Independent Counsel was appointed by the Special Division of the D. cl.C. he is required by the Act to make a preliminary investigation and report to the Special Division (three judges) of the D. Theodore B. was the subject of an investigation by the Independent Counsel and Appellant. Brief Fact Summary. thereby substantially affecting the balance of powers. He feels the decision "deprives the President of a purely executive function." Discussion. 487 U. Theodore B. Dinkins (Defendants). Schmults and Carol E. Independent Counsel v. the Appointments Clause of the Constitution does not provide a limit on interbranch appointments. Theodore B. while the appointment of inferior officers can be done by the heads of departments and the Courts.C. Congress is granted great leeway when determining where to vest the power to appoint inferior officials. No. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Appointments Clause. Olson. a law giving judges the authority to appoint an Independent Counsel did not violate the United States Constitution (Constitution). 654 (1988). The President appoints principle officers with advice and consent of the Senate. divides the executive officers into (1) principle and (2) inferior officers. 2 of the Constitution. Edward C. If the Attorney General receives information that a government official may have violated federal law. The Appellees. Circuit Court of Appeals. On its face. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ethics in Government Act (the Act) created the position of independent counsel to investigate high-ranking officials for federal criminal violations. Alexia Morrison (Appellant). Justice Antonin Scalia (J. tenure and authorized duties. Scalia) dissents because he feels criminal investigations and prosecutions are executive functions. Since the Independent Counsel is an inferior officer. The Independent Counsel can only be removed by the Attorney General for "good cause" or it terminates when all investigations and prosecutions are complete. Olson . to investigate a high-ranking government official. Facts. The President does not have exclusive authority to appoint executive officers. The official responded by claiming that the appointment of an Independent Counsel was unconstitutional. Issue. Since the Petitioner is subject to removal by a higher executive branch official and since her office is restricted in jurisdiction. Independent Counsel v. the Special Division must appoint an independent counsel to investigate further and prosecute if necessary.

Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (3) the office is limited in jurisdiction granted by the Special Division and (4) his or her office is limited in tenure. . (2) he or she can only perform certain.the United States (Supreme Court) decided that the position of Independent Counsel is an inferior officer because (1) he or she is always subject to removal by the President. limited duties proscribed by the Act. 88 United States v.

Curtiss-Wright (Defendant).S. Secretary of the Treasury . diplomatic and foreign affairs officers to help in his decision. In order to achieve the United States' foreign policy aims. Regan. 89 Dames & Moore v. 304 (1936). Discussion. There is a fundamental difference in the role of government in foreign affairs and domestic affairs. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Yes. the President has broad authority to conduct foreign affairs. The Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia in violation of the Joint Resolution and the Executive Order. Facts. The non-delegation doctrine does not bar Congress from delegating great authority and discretion to the President of the United States (the President) in the conduct of foreign affairs. 299 U. The President has confidential information as well as consular. May Congress delegate law-making authority to the President in matters of foreign affairs? Held. Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to ban the sales of arms to countries involved in the border dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. Issue. the President is better able than Congress to judge conditions that exist in foreign nations and is afforded substantial discretion and wide latititude in those decisions. a weapons manufacturer. Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant. Citation. The President is the United States' sole representative to foreign nations. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. The federal government has both constitutional and inherent authority to conduct foreign affairs as it sees fit. The President immediately made an Executive Order banning such sales.United States v. was convicted of selling arms to warring nations in South America in violation of an Executive Order that was made pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress.

Brief Fact Summary. where Congress is seen to assent to the president's action. Dames and Moore (Plaintiff) brought suit claiming that the executive agreement was unconstitutional and beyond the President's power. The President of the United States. there has been a longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the advice and consent of the Senate. Rumsfeld . President Carter did so under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Secretary of the Treasury Citation. The Supreme Court of the United States' decision was narrow in that the President of the United States does not necessarily possess plenary power to settle claims. then the president can settle such claims. In January 1981. the United States Embassy in Iran and United States diplomats were held hostage so President Carter froze all Iranian assets in the United States. An Executive Agreement has the same force and effect as a treaty and can alter the rights of the United States Citizens. Facts. The President of the United States does have the right to terminate legal proceedings and settle claims of United States Citizens against foreign governments. The President of the United States does not have the plenary power to settle claims against foreign governments through an Executive Agreement. The Plaintiff. Congress gave the president substantial powers to seize and handle foreign assets. Yes. Congress created a procedure to implement future settlement agreements. President Carter signed an executive agreement containing a provision terminating all legal proceedings against the Iranian government in the United States Courts and requiring United States citizens to arbitrate all claims against Iran. In this country's history. 90 Hamdi v. However.S.Dames & Moore v. Here. ordered the dismissal of pending litigation against the government of Iran in United States Courts and forced the claims into arbitration pursuant to an "executive agreement. In 1949. The President of the United States has the power to settle claims by United States Citizens against foreign governments. Discussion. Does the President of the United States have authority to settle claims of United States citizens brought against foreign nations? Held. even without the consent of the United States Citizens whose claims are being compromised. 654 (1981). in fact. 1979. the President of the United States does have the power to settle claims where. settlement was necessary to resolve a major foreign policy dispute and Congress has acquiesced in the President's actions. Jimmy Carter (President Carter). However. Regan. as in this case." Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. On November 4. so President Carter's actions were appropriate. 453 U. although what President Carter did under the IEEPA was not specifically sanctioned.

The AUMF authorizes the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against "nations. due process demands that "a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. __U. organizations or persons" associated with the September 11. vacated and remanded the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 2001 terrorist attacks. Pursuant to the narrow definition of enemy combatant proffered by the government in this case.Hamdi v. However." Facts. an Act of Congress. Yaser Esam Hamdi ("Mr. 124 S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the government can hold an enemy combatant for the duration of a conflict. Issue. J. Hamdi's indefinite detention as an enemy combatant. filed a writ of habeus corpus opposing Mr. O'Connor") writing for the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court"). The Petitioners.Ct. the government is allowed to hold the petitioner pursuant to the Authorization of Use of Military Force ("AUMF"). for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured. The Petitioners filed a writ of habeus corpus opposing Mr. No other substantive facts are offered in the opinion. "detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering. Based on the narrow set of facts offered by the government in this case. ‡ Whether the United States government can detain a United States citizen on United States soil as an enemy combatant.S. Hamdi") and his father Esam Fouad Hamdi ("Petitioners"). 2633 (2004) Brief Fact Summary." Relying on [Quiren]. ‡ Justice O'Connor. Rumsfeld Citation. Hamdi's indefinite detention by the United States as an enemy combatant. and he was not entitled to challenge his characterization as an enemycombatant. is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use. O'Connor observed nothing prevented the United States government from holding a United States 91 Hamdi v. when an enemy combatant is narrowly defined as " ' part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' " in Afghanistan and who " 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States' " there? ‡ What is the appropriate means for an individual designated an enemy combatant to challenge his classification as such? Held. Rumsfeld . The Supreme Court concluded.__. ("J. The Fourth Circuit held the Petitioner's detention was appropriate.

[A]t least in the context of enemy-combatant determinations. comports with the Due Process Clause «. Hamdi's "detention falls squarely within the Federal Government's war powers. "including the function involved" and the "burdens the Government would face in providing greater process" J. Additionally. ‡ Absent suspension. Stevens") dissent and argue the "[t]he proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime detention authority over citizens is consistent with the Founders' general mistrust of military power permanently at the Executive's disposal. O'Connor distinguished [Milligan]. Thus. J. Thomas") also dissented. Scalia") and Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. O'Connor refers to the [Mathews v. J. J. and [the Supreme Court] lacks the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. this would defeat 92 Hamdi v. by pointing to the fact Milligan was not a prisoner of war. Eldridge] balancing test. Thomas argues Mr." As such.citizen as an enemy combatant." Additionally: [t]he Government's asserted authority to detain an individual that the President has determined to be an enemy combatant. the Supreme Court then made certain allowance to account for "the exigencies of the circumstances.S.C. Mr. Since the writ was not suspended here. Hamdi's interest in "being free from physical detention by one's own government. or (2) Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus. The habeus determination cannot be made solely as a matter of law. ensuring individuals are only detained according to the law. and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. §2241. First. Mr. at least while hostilities continue." Second. O'Connor recognizes important interests on both sides. without further hearing or factfinding. which weighs "the private interest that will be affected by the official action" against the Government's asserted interest." ‡ Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. Hamdi is entitled to further process. Rumsfeld . the government's interest in ensuring that those who fought against the United States do not return to battle against the United States. the Petitioner is properly before an Article III court under 28 U. Hamdi was detained in a combat zone." The justices also argue only Congress can "authorize suspension of the writ. The writ is an important check on the Executive." However." Dissent. [T]he Executive's decision that a detention is necessary to protect the public need not and should not be subjected to judicial second-guessing«. The majority then held: "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification. the Petitioner is entitled to "a habeas decree requiring his release unless (1) criminal proceedings are promptly brought. despite the fact Mr. the writ of habeus corpus (the "writ") is available to all United States' citizens.

and dispatch that the Founders believed to be so important to the warmaking function. O'Connor makes a very interesting observation that permeates must of constitutional law. She states: [s]triking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. how the Executive who is charged with the security of the nation should not be the one to have the final say in issues regarding liberty. Discussion. Indeed. J. and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad. "[t]he Government has failed to demonstrate that the Force Resolution authorizes the detention complained of here even on the facts the Government claims. The justices stated. and the constant tension between "security and liberty. "[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict." The justices stressed the balance of powers inherent in American government. A. Ernest Fitzgerald . like the detention or imprisonment of Mr. Ginsburg) concurred in part and dissented in part. ‡ Justice David Souter (J.the unity. it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake. We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. secrecy. Relying on [Youngstown Sheet & Tube] J. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. Hamdi. Souter) and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. The court continued. Congress should make an assessment before a citizen is subject to lockup in this sort of situation. O'Connor rejected the governments assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances." Also." 93 Richard Nixon v. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested. Meaning. the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers.

The White House later retracted the statement saying that the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee. Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity? Held. was fired from his job with the Air Force as costmanagement analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain cost-overruns. If not. there is the constitutional remedy of impeachment.Richard Nixon v. 94 William Jefferson Clinton v. The President must be empowered with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of his office. A. the President of the United States Richard Nixon (Defendant). An internal memo was passed through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a "top notch cost expert" but with "very low marks of loyalty" and recommended that they "let him bleed. Yes. his visibility would subject him to numerous suits for civil damages. 457 U. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President. A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired after he testified in front of Congress about cost overruns in certain military projects. The Plaintiff brought suit and the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of absolute immunity from suit. Ernest Fitzgerald Citation. Facts." At a press conference. The Defendant. The Plaintiff. Paula Corbin Jones . vigilant oversight by Congress and the press.S. White) felt that this decision places the President above the law. The Air Force said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. 731 (1982). Justice Byron White (J. Brief Fact Summary. claimed that he made the firing decision. the Defendant said he personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. Dissent. This immunity stems from the President's unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense importance of his duties. Discussion. Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff). Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. To keep the public safe. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the President's energies to the concerns related to private lawsuits. the President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public policy rooted in the structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle.

her supervisors were hostile and rude to her and her duties were changed to punish her for rejecting those advances. Does the President have immunity from all suits against him while he occupies the office? Held. a sitting President is not immune from suit for unofficial acts. Paula Corbin Jones Citation. The Defendant's Separation of Powers argument fails because there is no indication that the judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as executive. it is not the case. Moreover. which occurred while the Defendant was Governor of Arkansas in 1991. In 1994. A sitting President does not enjoy temporary immunity from all civil suits until he has left office. The Defendant. 95 . the Supreme Court observed that this decision would not result in a deluge of private litigation against sitting presidents. The Plaintiff claims she was summoned by a state trooper to the Defendant's suite where he made sexual advances towards her that she rejected. The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the president until he leaves office. the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant regarding sexual advances (in a hotel). 681 (1997). the United States Constitution (Constitution) affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that took place before he took office. Although the Defendant claims that in all but the most exceptional cases.William Jefferson Clinton v. 520 U. As a result. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) distinguishes this matter from a situation where a public official is sued based on some sort of official action taken. The Defendant's argument rests on neither history nor precedent. Discussion. Facts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. or that this decision will curtail the scope of official powers of the Executive Branch. while he was Governor of Arkansas. Issue. The Defendant sought to postpone the proceeding of a civil lawsuit until after he left office. No. The Defendant was a speaker at the conference and the Plaintiff was a state employee working at the reception desk. Brief Fact Summary. Paula Jones (Plaintiff). In the latter situation the public official is generally granted immunity. the President of the United States William Clinton (Defendant) was accused of sexually harassing the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff filed suit seeking actual and punitive damages.S.

v. Limits On State Regulatory And Taxing Power 96 Lorillard Tobacco Co. Reilly .CHAPTER IV.

For commercial speech to come within that provision. If both inquiries yield positive answers. and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. The [Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. It requires that 'the speech restriction directly and materially advanc[e] the asserted governmental interest. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Reilly . The state of Massachusetts passed certain regulations banning the advertising of smokeless tobacco products and cigars. Reilly Citation. but instead a reasonable " 'fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. Issue. rather. v." The restriction need not be "the least restrictive means". we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. Next.' " 97 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Yes.Lorillard Tobacco Co. we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. . The analysis involves four elements: "At the outset. 533 U. v. Next. For commercial speech to come within that provision. Public Service Commission of New York] analysis involves four elements: "At the outset." ‡ The court recognizes that only the last two factors are applicable here. O'Connor") writing for the majority begins by laying out its framework for analyzing commercial speech under [Central Hudson]. 525 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. Federal law regulates cigarette advertising so that is not at issue here. a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. If both inquiries yield positive answers.. 'This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture.." Facts. we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. Does Massachusetts' statutory scheme violate the Supreme Court of the United States' regulations of commercial speech? Held. and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Massachusetts placed restrictions on various tobacco related advertising.S.' " The fourth step requires "asking whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it. The third factor "concerns the relationship between the harm that underlies the State's interest and the means identified by the State to advance that interest. we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.

strict scrutiny is appropriate. the means chosen may be insufficiently related to the ends they purportedly serve. whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 'commercial. the majority "disagree[d] with petitioners' claim that there is no evidence that preventing targeted campaigns and limiting youth exposure to advertising will decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. J. the fact that outdoor advertising included advertising visible from outside a store and the fact that advertisements of any size are banned. Ginsburg") and Justice William Breyer ("J." The court made similar observations about the underage use of cigars." "Second. statute[s] may be so broadly drawn that. Additionally. Breyer"). Thomas states "I join the opinion of the Court. concurring and dissenting in part." Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. "[t]he broad sweep of the regulations indicates that the Attorney General did not 'carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed' by the regulations. these regulations would constitute nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers." ‡ J. it unduly restricts communications that are unrelated to its policy aims." The Supreme Court criticized the substantial geographical reach of the regulations. Thomas") filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. J." Dissent. Reilly .' " As such. "First. however. The court observed.‡ As to the third factor. J. The effect would be that "[i]n some geographical areas." ‡ J. O'Connor observed that the Food and Drug Administration found "[t]he recent and very large increase in the use of smokeless tobacco products by young people and the addictive nature of these products has persuaded the agency that these products must be included in any regulatory approach that is designed to help prevent future generations of young people from becoming addicted to nicotine-containing tobacco products. v. Thomas would "subject all of the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny and would hold that they violate the First Amendment. O'Connor concluded "[o]ur review of the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided ample documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. while effectively achieving its ends." 98 Lorillard Tobacco Co. Judge Clarence Thomas ("J. [but] I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys. Stevens") filed an opinion joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. J. O'Connor concluded "that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use. that the regulation did not satisfy the fourth prong of the [Hudson] test. Stevens discusses how statutes restricting speech can be invalid for two different reasons. O'Connor argued." J.

Department of Agriculture of California . Paul.Discussion. This case offers a very good example of how the [Central Hudson] factors are applied. Director. 99 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers. Inc v.

by weight excluding the skin and seed. It does not matter because the two laws can co-exist." In contrast. the Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. Paul. Issue. despite the dissimilarity of the standards. There is no need to look into Congressional intent if "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce. 100 Pacific Gas& Electric Co. prohibits the transportation or sale in California of avocados which contain "less than 8% of oil. Therefore. When a state and federal law exist with different standards. challenge the California law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). which gauges the maturity of avocados by oil content. Inc v. 373 U." There is no present record. 132 (1963). the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will not decide which one preempts the other one. The Appellants. as long as they can coexist. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. A California avocado oil law differed from a Federal avocado law. Synopsis of Rule of Law. (Appellants). Federal marketing orders approved by the Secretary of Agriculture gauge the maturity of avocados grown in Florida by standards. v. which demonstrates an inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation. When a state statute is different than a federal statute. Department of Agriculture of California Citation.S. California markets certain Florida avocados which although mature under Federal law do not satisfy California's requirement of 8% oil. Section 792 of California's Agricultural Code. Florida Lime and Avocado Farmers sued because of the stricter California law precluded them from the Florida markets. Facts. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission .Florida Lime & Avocado Growers. Director. which should apply? Held. which attribute no significance to the oil content.

but that is not supposed to be accomplished "at all costs. 190 (1983). it frustrates the goal of developing nuclear technology as a source of energy. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. cost and other state concerns. 461 U. The Plaintiff contends that the moratorium provision of California's law is preempted by the Act on three grounds. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will not interfere where there is a permissible and good basis for the state law. Facts. a state law placing a moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants does not impede federal law's objectives of developing nuclear energy. the primary purpose of the Act was to promote nuclear power. As to the first ground. Yes. until it demonstrated technology or a means of disposal for high-level nuclear waste. Brief Fact Summary. California's State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission (Defendant) and asserted that state law was preempted by the Federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (the Act). First. With regard to the third and final ground. State law is preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 101 Hines. which are aimed at ensuring they are safe.S. As to the second ground. and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). it regulates nuclear plant construction allegedly predicated on safety concerns and thus falls within a field controlled by the federal government. Federal law that governed the regulation of safety aspects concerning nuclear power plants. (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant. did not preempt state law. Third. which effectively placed a moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants within the state. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission Citation.Pacific Gas & Electric Co. Davidowitz . Issue. The Plaintiff. v. but that the states retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need. it conflicts with decisions concerning nuclear waste disposal made by Congress. However. Second. The California state law is not preempted on this ground because it is based on safety and not economics. Discussion. Will a state law be preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress? Held. California adopted a law that imposed a moratorium on the certification of nuclear energy plant. the state law does not conflict with federal rulings and regulations. Secretary of Labor ad Industry of Pennsylvania v. Synopsis of Rule of Law." The state law is not preempted. Congress intended the federal government to have authority to regulate safety with nuclear technology.

Hood & Sons. states cannot enact laws which conflict/interfere/curtail or complement. Congress wanted one uniform national system. A federal district court enjoined the enforcement of the state Act. 312 U. Issue. Discussion. In 1939 Pennsylvania passed an Alien Registration Act (the state Act). A state alien registration law was challenged on the ground that the federal alien registration law occupied the field and therefore preempted the state law. or enforce additional regulations. Davidowitz and other aliens (Appellees). the federal law. The next year. Davidowitz Citation. The Appellees.P. provide information and carry a registration card to be shown to police. and on other constitutional grounds. If the federal government exercises superior authority in a particular field and enacts a complete system of regulation. naturalization and deportation. the Federal Alien Registration Act (the Federal Act) provided for a single registration and they did not have to carry a registration card. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the federal law. or enforce additional or auxiliary regulation? Held. the states cannot conflict or interfere with. If the Federal government has exercised superior authority in a particular field can the states enact laws which conflict or interfere with. The federal government has the power over immigration. When the federal government provides a complete standard for the registration of aliens.Hines. or they would be criminally prosecuted. Du Mond. He felt that the Supreme Court cannot strike down a state law that was immediately concerned with social order and safety of its people. challenged the law as denying equal protection to aliens. Brief Fact Summary.S. Secretary of Labor ad Industry of Pennsylvania v. Stone) did not think Congress made a complete and exclusive registration system for aliens. which required aliens to register annually. Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York . curtail or complement. Inc v. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) declares that Congress intended for federal government to occupy the field of immigration regulation and not the states. Dissent. 102 H. or even enforce additional or auxiliary regulations. Facts. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (J. 52 (1941). No.

exclude them. Facts." 103 Aaron B. New York's embargo was invalidated based upon the dormant commerce clause. by customs duties or regulations. is that every farmer and every craftsperson shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty of free access to every market in the nation. No. Du Mond. May a state deny a license for a new plant to acquire and ship milk in interstate commerce on the grounds that such limitations on interstate business will protect and advance local economic interests? Held. H. Hood & Sons. 336 U. Hood & Sons. The Plaintiff challenged using the Dormant Commerce Clause. which have the purpose and effect of curtailing the volume of interstate commerce to aid local economic interests will not be sustained. Issue. the Defendant stated that the creation of the fourth plant would draw milk supplies away from other existing processing plants and would tend to deprive the local market of an adequate supply of milk. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia .F. The Plaintiff challenged the denial based on the dormant commerce clause. DuMond the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York (Defendant) denied the Plaintiff. Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of New York Citation. Restrictions. Cooley v. Inc v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Seeling Inc stated "Our system fostered by the Commerce Clause. A state may not promote its own economic advantages by the curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce. States may not enact laws that burden the exportation of local products in order to protect and advance local economic interests. Moreover.H. a license to build a new milk facility.S. Discussion. Inc. The Plaintiff was a Boston distributor of milk who received milk from three New York plants. The Defendant. Such was the vision of the founders. 529 (1939). that no home embargoes will withhold exports and no other state will.P. G. such has been the doctrine of this court which has given it reality. (Plaintiff).P. but the Defendant would not allow it and denied the Plaintiff a license for the new plant on the grounds that the issuance of the license would tend to destroy competition in a market already adequately served. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that a state may not enact laws that burden the exportation of local products in order to protect and advance local economic interests. The Plaintiff wanted to build a fourth plant in New York. Brief Fact Summary. a Boston milk distributor.A.

Those. The Defendant was a consignee of two ships that left port without a local pilot and were found liable under the law. Pennsylvania enacted a law requiring ships entering the Port of Philadelphia (the Port) hire a local pilot to guide them through the Port or pay a fine. Congress recognized that the states would have certain powers to effect interstate commerce. . only when Congress acts to exercise its Commerce power is a state's exercise of that same power affected. The Court also held that the grant of the Commerce power to Congress did not preclude the states from exercising any power over commerce. which in substance stated that the states could regulate all pilots in the rivers. Cooley v. It was a fair exercise of legislative discretion. Congress is not given absolute power in this area. The Court observed that by passing the Act. contending that the Commerce Clause's provision that Congress could regulate commerce gave them exclusive jurisdiction over commerce and not the states. which did not require uniform national regulation by Congress.S. The Congressional power to regulate commerce is not exclusive of all state powers to regulate commerce. The fine was to be paid to the Plaintiff. Inc. Aaron B. In 1803. A state law required ships to hire local pilots to guide them through the Port of Philadelphia. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia Citation. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) established the "Selective Exclusiveness Test" for judicial review of state regulation of commerce. To the contrary. Is the Congressional power to regulate commerce exclusive of all state powers to regulate commerce? Held. The Plaintiff relied on a 1789 Act of Congress (the Act). harbors. No. Other states have made similar regulations. Brief Fact Summary. 53 U. The Supreme Court declared that states had the power to regulate the areas of commerce that were local nature. Thus. (12 How.Aaron B. Issue. Barnwell Brothers. 104 South Carolina State Highway Department v. The Supreme Court observed that the regulation of pilots was local in nature and did not require one uniform rule. Cooley Cooley (Defendant). Discussion. Facts. The Supreme Court also limited its decision to the facts before it and did not attempt to discern all the activities that were primary local and primary national. the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (Plaintiff). The Defendant. Synopsis of Rule of Law.) 299 (1851). and ports until the Congress enacted legislation to the contrary. challenged the law's constitutionality. or to pay a fine. The Supreme Court felt that the law was appropriate.

A state law placing width and weight limitations on trucks operating on state highways does not impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce so as to violate the United States Constitution's (Constitution) Commerce Clause. Specifically. 303 U. v. The Plaintiff challenged the state law as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Barnwell Brothers. Inc. The regulatory measures taken by South Carolina are within its legislative power and they do not violate the Constitution's commerce clause. No. The Plaintiff. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) first pointed out that Congress decided not to regulate the weight and width of motor vehicles and left that power to the States.South Carolina State Highway Department v.S. Brief Fact Summary. Citation. Discussion. Does a state law imposing restrictions on weight and width of trucks that use state roads violate the Constitution's commerce clause? Held. The district court enjoined enforcement of these regulations. trucks could not use South Carolina's highways if their width exceeded 90 inches and if their total weight exceeded 20. they were appropriate. Further. state regulations limiting width and weight of trucks operated on state highways does not violate the Constitution's commerce clause. Facts. in violation of the Constitution's commerce clause. (Plaintiff) challenged a state law prohibiting the operation of trucks on state highways as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 105 Southern Pacific Co. The Supreme Court also recognized that South Carolina had a great local concern in passing its regulations. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The state has a primary and immediate concern in taking care of their highways. South Carolina passed a law that prohibited trucks of a certain weight and width to use their state highways. The state may impose nondiscriminatory restrictions with respect to the character of motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce as a safety measure and as a means of securing the economical use of its highways. Issue.000 pounds. 177 (1938). determining that they would seriously impede motor truck traffic passing to and through the state and would increase its cost. since South Carolina's regulations were nondiscriminatory. Inc. Barnwell Brothers. Arizona .

national uniformity in regulation. Also. created a law limiting the number of railroad cars per trains as a safety measure.S.created for its safety measures . which dealt with the regulation of the highways. imposes on interstate commerce. will be found to violate the Constitution's Commerce Clause. safety and well-being of the states people. prohibited the operations of trains of more than 14 passengers or 70 freight cars and authorized he state to recover a money penalty for each violation. In deciding whether a state law . (Defendant) asserted that the law violated the United States Constitution's (Constitution) Commerce Clause. The Defendant. The Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912 (the Law). Facts." The Supreme Court also determined that the Law imposed a serious burden on interstate commerce. The trial court found for the Defendant and the state supreme court reversed. If train length was to be regulation. the state of Arizona (Plaintiff). Issue.violates the Constitution's Commerce Clause. v. The Plaintiff. 177 (1978). Brief Fact Summary. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will balance the benefit of the law against the burden it imposes on interstate commerce. such as only Congress can impose. The Supreme Court must determine the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains. the Southern Pacific Co. 761 (1945). This finding was irrespective of the statute's effect on interstate commerce. Are the benefits of a state law safety measure limiting the length of trains outweighed by burdens on interstate commerce? Held. The state supreme court believed that the statute was enacted within the state's police power and that it bore a reasonable relation to the health. The Supreme Court determined that the usage of trains with greater than 14 passenger cars and more than 70 freight cars is standard practice on many United States railroads. Barnwell. Discussion. Yes. is "practically indispensable to the operation off an efficient and economic national railway system. a state law that puts a significant burden on interstate commerce. 325 U. Arizona Citation. yet provides no real improvement in safety. 303 U. Arizona's law greatly burdens the 106 Southern Pacific Co.Southern Pacific Co. adopted as a safety measure. v. Arizona . the Law does not provide any actual safety benefits and in actuality makes train operation more dangerous.S. The Supreme Court also distinguishes this case from South Carolina v. it should be done by Congress and not individual states. The Supreme Court also must determine whether the relative weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the rule that the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the Constitution's Commerce Clause from state interference. Synopsis of Rule of Law. If the length of trains were to be regulated.

Defendant because they have to haul over 30% more trains through Arizona than other unregulated states. 107 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey .

The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and held that the law advanced legitimate health and safety concerns. Protectionist state laws are unconstitutional because they unduly burden commerce.S. Just because they have waste of their own. violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Rehnquist) dissented because he thinks New Jersey should be able to prohibit the importation of solid waste for reasons of health and safety. but not based geographic origin of the goods. The Defendant state passed a state statute prohibiting the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the state«" until the State Commissioner determined that it could be imported without endangering the public health. Issue. which regulate commercial activity. State laws. Discussion. Yes. the City of Philadelphia (Plaintiff) challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the "valueless" waste is not entitled to constitutional protection. state of New Jersey (Defendant) statute. Brief Fact Summary. 437 U. The statute treats inherently similar products differently solely due to where they originated. may not favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests. Dissent. 108 C & A Carbone. Justice William Rehnquist (J. All objects of trade deserve protection of the Commerce Clause. including waste. which prohibited other states from disposing of solid and liquid waste in New Jersey.City of Philadelphia v. The Plaintiff. The trial court held that the statute unduly burdened interstate commerce because it discriminated against out of state products. The Supreme Court holds that the statute on its face and in effect. Inc. Town of Clarkstown. which counteracted the burden on interstate commerce. A state can discriminate. Although a state may argue that its goal is to protect the health and safety of its citizens this goal may not be reached by discriminating against articles of commerce from other states. New York . New Jersey Citation. safety and welfare. does not mean they should have to take everyone else's waste too. Facts. violates the principle of nondiscrimination. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that a Defendant. 617. v. the New Jersey statute prohibiting out-of-state waste disposal in New Jersey landfills violates the commerce clause because it unduly burdens interstate commerce. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Is it a violation of the Commerce Clause for one state to prohibit others from selling and transporting legitimate articles of commerce within its borders? Held.

383 (1994). May state and local governments enact laws that favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out of state competitors of their facilities? Held. the local ordinance requiring all wastes to be processed at the local transfer station violates the Commerce Clause. The Defendant. The Plaintiff. Dissent. New York (Plaintiff). including out of state firms. State and Local governments may not enact laws that favor enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities. of access to a local market. v. It squelches competition in the waste-processing service altogether. Because the ordinance attains its financial goal by depriving competitors. In order to finance the waste transfer station. The Plaintiff town sought an injunction to force the Defendant to comply with the town ordinance. Town of Clarkstown. (Defendant). Oklahoma . Discussion. was challenged as violating the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. Facts. which required all waste to be processed at a local waste transfer facility before leaving town. Souter) dissents because the difference between the local ordinance here and in other cases is that this law does not differentiate between all local and out of town providers. did not process their waste at the local station more than six times. With respect to the stream of commerce the ordinance discriminates. it violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. the Town of Clarkstown. No.C & A Carbone. 109 Hughes v. The state courts rejected the Defendant's argument that the ordinance violated the commerce clause. Justice David Souter (J. Brief Fact Summary. Inc. Inc. for it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is within the limits of the town. A local ordinance. He felt the majority was greatly extending the Dormant Commerce Clause. This law bars the import of the processing service.S. but instead the one entity responsible that the job gets done and all other entities regardless of their location. the Plaintiff adopted an ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste generated or brought into the town to be processed at the transfer station for a fee above market price. 511 U. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that state and local governments may not enact laws that favor local enterprises by prohibiting patronage of out of state competitors or their facilities. New York Citation. a company that processed waste. Violators would be punished through fines or jail time. C & A Carbone. leaving no room for investment from the outside. entered into a consent decree with the state of New York to close its landfill and build a new solid waste transfer station on the site. The measure falls outside the class of measures that the Commerce Clause has barred States from enacting against each other.

on its face. Discussion. Facts. 322 (1979). Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Plaintiff. Now. Oklahoma Citation.S. Brief Fact Summary. the Plaintiff's law prohibiting the taking of minnows for sale outside the state violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. a state's regulation of wild animals should be analyzed in the same manner as a state's regulation of natural resources. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission . The rule requires inquiries into (1) whether the statute regulates evenhandedly or discriminates against interstate commerce. Oklahoma (Plaintiff) enacted a statute that provided "no person may transport to ship minnows for the sale outside the State which were seined or procured within the waters of this State.Hughes v. William Hughes (Defendant) who operated a Texas commercial minnow business. challenged the law because it violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 110 Hunt. It is a violation of the Commerce Clause for states to enact laws that attempt to conserve natural resources for use by their own residents. The Supreme Court determined that the state's legitimate interest in conservation was not advanced by the least discriminatory means possible." The Defendant. A state law that prohibited the transportation of minnows outside the state violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Governor of the State of North Carolina v. (2) whether it serves a legitimate local purpose and (3) whether alternative means could promote the local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate commerce. Issue. The statute overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at the State's border. Yes. Did the Plaintiff's law violate the Commerce Clause? Held. 441 U. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) disregarded the rule that a state owns all the wildlife within it and has the right to qualify ownership.

By prohibiting Washington apples from marketing apple's under their state's grades.Hunt. Brief Fact Summary. 432 U. grade. it violates the Commerce Clause. North Carolina (Defendant). North Carolina defended their statute asserting they were trying to prevent apple fraud. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission Citation. which caused it to violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). 111 Exxon Corporation v. more so than North Carolina's. The Washington system is expensive and the industry is competitive. Discussion.S. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) contends that North Carolina evened the playing field unfairly and in violation of the Commerce Clause. Governor of the State of North Carolina v. if a state law has a discriminatory impact. The statute raises the cost of selling apples in North Carolina. Governor of Maryland . enacted a statute requiring all closed apple containers to bear "no grade other than an applicable U. Because the Washington grade is known for being superior. on the ground that it had a discriminatory impact. Issue.S. Can a facially neutral state law be unconstitutional and in violation of the Commerce Clause if it has a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce? Held." which is set by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). even if it is neutral on its face. 333. which is unfairly economically advantageous to local apple growers in North Carolina. A district court agreed with the Plaintiff. which was superior to the quality set by the USDA. The Plaintiff challenged the statutes' constitutionality contending it burdened interstate commerce by altering Washington apples when they got to North Carolina. The State of Washington (a huge apple-producing state) had a different grading system. except for North Carolina apple growers. A North Carolina law was challenged by the Plaintiff. the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (Plaintiff). Synopsis of Rule of Law. it has a leveling affect. Facts. The Defendant. A facially neutral state law is unconstitutional and violates the Commerce Clause if it has a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. Yes.

At trial.S. Moreover. Synopsis of Rule of Law. However. Brief Fact Summary. Although the consuming public may be the 112 Exxon Corporation v. The statute creates no barrier against interstate independent dealers. place added costs upon them. Did Maryland's law impermissibly burden interstate commerce so as to violate the Commerce Clause? Held. The Commerce Clause protects the interstate market. Issue. The effect of this law was to force various companies to divest themselves of their Maryland gas stations. the state law prohibiting oil companies from operating gas stations was upheld even though those affected were mostly out of state oil companies. Discussion. prohibiting petroleum producers and refiners from operating gas stations within the state. The Commerce Clause protects the interstate market. not particular interstate firms. no particular interstate firms. the Plaintiffs prevailed on due process grounds.Exxon Corporation v. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Facts. There were no virtually no petroleum producers and refiners in Maryland. The state of Maryland passed a law prohibiting producers and refiners of petroleum products from operating retail gas stations within the state to correct inequities in the pricing. Blackmun) dissented because he felt the majority failed to condemn impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce in retail gasoline marketing. Exxon Corporation and other oil refiners (Plaintiffs). Governor of Maryland . A Maryland law. The Plaintiffs. from prohibitive or burdensome regulations. A state law that causes some business to shift from one interstate supplier to another does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Interstate commerce is not subjected to an impermissible burden simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to shift from one interstate supplier to another. upholding the law against the Plaintiffs. the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. arguing it had a discriminatory effect and that violated the Commerce Clause because it impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. the producers and refiners could not directly sell their product in Maryland. Governor of Maryland Citation. nor does it prohibit the flow of interstate goods. It is not justified by a legitimate state interest and can be vindicated by a more even-handed regulation. No. 117 (1978). it does not discriminate against out of state retailers because there are no in state retailers. did not violate the commerce clause. sell petroleum to independent retailers in Maryland. Dissent. The Plaintiffs challenged the law. He felt the law violated the Commerce Clause. or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail market. Therefore. 437 U. All gasoline in Maryland originates from out of state. from prohibitive or burdensome regulations. He felt the laws effect was to protect in state retail gas station dealers over the out-of-state retailers. Those effected by the law were predominantly out-of-state producers.

Healy. Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture . v. 113 West Lynn Creamery. not to its burden on commerce.independent refiner. that argument relates to the wisdom of the statute. Inc. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that a state law that causes some business to shift from one interstate supplier to another does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Thus.

Healy. The system at issue here although. 186 (1994). with the proceeds paid to local dairy farmers. is a de facto tariff. Prevention of local industry by protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition is the hallmark of the economic protectionism that the Constitution's Commerce Clause prohibits. Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture (Defendant). Issue. Massachusetts' pricing order does not assist local farmers.West Lynn Creamery. discriminates against interstate commerce and thus is unconstitutional under the Constitution's Commerce Clause. which taxed all milk sales in the state. has been mollified by the subsidy. The pricing order is funded principally from taxes on the sale of milk produced in other states. Healy. was challenged on the ground that it violated the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause. although taking two steps to achieve its goal. Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture Citation. The Defendant's. but disburses its assets to local producers of the distributed goods only is unconstitutional. Synopsis of Rule of Law. a milk dealer who purchased out-of-state milk challenged the pricing order. 114 State of Minnesota v. 512 U. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. A Massachusetts's law. Does the Massachusetts statute violate the Constitution's Commerce Clause? Held. The state courts rejected the challenge. Facts. the state's milk tax subsidy burdens interstate commerce. which would otherwise lobby against the tax. rationale for this order was to protect local dairy producers. a State's political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse. which imposes a tax on the sale of local products the proceeds of which are distributed as a subsidy to in-state producers of the product. A state pricing order.S. which imposed a tax on in-state milk sales. This is because one of the in-state interests. Yes. When a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax. States are not allowed to enact tariff's on out of state goods. The Plaintiff. Clover Lead Creamery Co. An assessment scheme that levies on all distribution of a good. Massachusetts enacted a pricing order. . West Lynn Creamery (Plaintiff). This violates the cardinal principle that a State may not benefit in state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. regardless of whether it was produced in or out of state. but instead burdens interstate commerce. v. Inc. The proceeds from the tax were then disbursed to Massachusetts' dairy farmers only.

however. The burden is not "clearly excessive" in the light of the substantial state interest in promoting conservation of energy and other natural resources and easing solid waste disposal problems. enacted a statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable. This degree of burden on the out-of-state plastic industry has been exaggerated. which we have already reviewed in the context of equal protection analysis. 115 Dean Milk Co. The Defendant. 456. Minnesota (Defendant). nonrefillable containers. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) observed that the statute at issue did not discriminate between intrastate and interstate distributors because both were prohibited from selling milk in disposable plastic containers. v. the law banning plastic milk containers is not a "clearly excessive burden" on out of state interests. Synopsis of Rule of Law.State of Minnesota v. the state allowed the sale of milk in paperboard cartons. Facts. Discussion. Issue. However. the burden imposed in interstate commerce was minor. Here.S. A Minnesota law banning the sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable. If a state law purporting to promote environmental purposes is in reality enacted as a means of economic protectionism. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. Yes. Can a facially neutral state law violate the Constitution's Commerce Clause if the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits? Held. (Plaintiff) filed suit to enjoin the statute. the Supreme Court determined that the change of containers is not an excessive burden upon out-ofstate producers. but aimed at protecting the environment. 449 U. Citation. A facially neutral state law will violated the United States Constitution's (Constitution) Commerce Clause if the incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Moreover. City of Madison. Pulpwood producers are the only Minnesota industry likely to benefit significantly from the statute at the expense of outof-state firms. The express purpose was to address the problem of solid waste management in the state. Wisconsin . Clover Lead Creamery Co. nonrefillable containers was challenged on the ground that it had a discriminatory purpose. since milk products may continue to move freely across the State border and changes in packaging will be only a slight inconvenience. The Supreme Court also observes that this statute was not a protectionist measure. Brief Fact Summary. Here. The Plaintiff. a virtually per se rule of invalidity applies. arguing that the actual basis for it was to promote the economic interest of certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industry and to harm the plastics industry.

Wisconsin (Defendant) because its pasteurization plants were more than five miles away. The Defendant passed an ordinance barring pasteurized milk that had not been processed within 5 miles of the City. Discussion. but which also burden commerce.Dean Milk Co. may not place itself in a position of economic isolation. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) observes that the ordinance plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. 65 and 85 miles from the Defendant city. The practical effect of the ordinance is that it excludes milk pasteurized in Illinois. in its dealings with another. Since the milk came from more than five miles away the Plaintiff was denied a license to sell the milk in the Defendant city. The Plaintiff contended the ordinance put an undue burden on interstate commerce.S. The Plaintiff. upon being denied a license to sell milk in the Defendant City. Dean Milk (Plaintiff). "[O]ne state. Taylor and United States . challenged the Defendant's milk plant ordinance on grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Facts. If there are reasonable alternatives available. The Defendant city's ordinance protects the in-state milk production business from out of state competition. Synopsis of Rule of Law." 116 Maine v. the City of Madison. The Plaintiff. the local ratings could be checked by the United States Public Health Service in order to enforce the provision. City of Madison. Wisconsin Citation. 340 U. The Supreme Court observed that the Defendant city could have sent its inspectors to plants that were more than five miles away or could exclude from its borders milk not produced in accordance with the Defendant city's standards. 349 (1951). Brief Fact Summary. Issue. v. states must consider reasonable alternatives when enacting laws intended to protect public health. a local health ordinance that places a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. a milk distributor bought its milk from farms in Illinois and Wisconsin. Does a local health ordinance that places a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause when reasonable and adequate alternatives are available? Held. Moreover.

Here. Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Inc . The Defendant. prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Dissent. enacted to protect the State's fisheries from parasites and non-native species. 131 (1986). Facts. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. The District Court dismissed the Defendant's motion and the Court of Appeals reversed. ‡ Maine intervened to defend the validity of its statute. Taylor (Defendant). the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) upholds this patently discriminatory law. challenged Maine's law prohibiting the importation of live baitfish on the ground it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). receive or purchase in interstate commerce any fish possessed in violation of State law. A law in Maine. before it acts to avoid such consequences. 477 U. The Defendant operated a bait business in Maine and imported live bait called "golden shiners" against federal law. Where a law is discriminatory on its face. Bruce Church.S. the Supreme Court determines that Maine chose the least discriminatory means to establish their legitimate objective. State may regulate matters of legitimate public concern even though interstate commerce may be effected. The environment is a legitimate concern for Maine because importing minnows could ruin Maine's fragile fisheries. He feels that Maine should have the heavy burden of showing there are no other alternatives. Discussion. The federal law made it a crime to import. but this alone does not render it unconstitutional. Stevens) does not like the fact that Maine is the only State that can blatantly discriminate against out of state baitfish. the state must show that the law both serves a legitimate local purpose and that the purpose cannot be achieve by available nondiscriminatory means. Therefore. Maine cannot be expected to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific community agrees. Pike v. Issue. The Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine's statute was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Taylor and United States Citation. A state statute that affirmatively discriminates against interstate commerce passes vigorous a strict scrutiny test where it attempts to prohibit significant damage to the State's environmental well-being. Does a state statute that affirmatively discriminates against interstate commerce pass the strict scrutiny test where it attempts to prohibit significant damage to the State's environmental well being? Held. on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous. in defense of criminal charges. Brief Fact Summary. Maine's statute directly restricts interstate trade by blocking all inward shipments of live baitfish.Maine v. 117 Loren J.

118 Bibb. Inc. Navajo Freight Lines. it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 137. Discussion. Loren Pike. Inc Citation.000 in losses unless the order was enjoined. Department of Public Safety of Illinois v. Where a nondiscriminatory law effectuates a legitimate local interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental. Pike v. The closest available packing shed to the Defendant state was California and calculated they would suffer $700. 397 U. Bruce Church. state of Arizona (Defendant) that prevented the transportation of uncrated cantaloupes within the State.000 packing plant. a cantaloupe farming company. The Plaintiff. a legitimate State interest. Issue. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) developed a test for determining whether nondiscriminatory state laws violate the dormant commerce clause. from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from their Arizona ranch to the California packing place. Where a state statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental. Director. the State's interest is not worth the Arizona cantaloupe company building and operating a new $200.Loren J. Yes. Bruce Church. . However. Inc. it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Where there is a legitimate local interest it must be measured against the burden it composes. ‡ The Plaintiff filed suit in district court to enjoin the order on the ground that it was unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The purpose of the law in question here was to protect and enhance the reputation of growers within the State. Facts. Can a nondiscriminatory state law violate the dormant Commerce Clause? Held. issued an order prohibiting the Plaintiff. the Defendant state's official in charge of enforcing the law. (Plaintiff) challenged a law enacted by the Defendant. An Arizona law requires that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must be packed in closed standard containers approved by government officials. Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff sued arguing that the law violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) Synopsis of Rule of Law.S.

The carriers will not be able to switch cargo that does not allow certain mud flaps. so that it does not outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences that seriously impede it. 520 (1959). Moreover. 359 U. Inc. Navajo Freight Lines. Douglas) first observed that States have an important interest in providing for the safety of their highways. Director. The Plaintiff. then it cannot stand. challenged the constitutionality of Illinois' mudguard law on the ground that it interfered with interstate commerce. ‡ The District Court found for the Plaintiff and required the Defendants. Department of Public Safety of Illinois v. In determining whether a state's nondiscriminatory highway safety law violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Moreover. Justice William Douglas (J. Inc. the costs of doing business would be greatly increased.850 to obtain the mud flaps required in Illinois. 119 Raymond Kassel v. Navajo Freight Lines. Issue. Brief Fact Summary. States have the power to regulate their highways. these mudguards create operational delays and costs. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware . In Arkansas. while in all other states either shape was acceptable.S. Is this Illinois statute requiring a special mudguard constitutional? Held. The statute also seriously interferes with the "interline" operations of motor carriers. The Plaintiff challenged the Illinois law arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause because it unduly burdened interest commerce and enforcement should be enjoined. The Supreme Court observed that trucks could not enter Illinois and Arkansas without stopping at the border to change their mudguards. The Supreme Court also determined that contoured mudguards have no real safety advantages over straight mudguards and in actuality actually caused additional hazards. states were required to have straight mudguards. from enforcing the law. (Plaintiff). which is the changing of trailers between carriers. Discussion. The state of Illinois passed a law requiring trucks to have contoured mudguards. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) must look to the total effect of the law as a safety measure. However. safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity.500 to $45. here. or problematic. The District Court determined that the cost per truck would range from $4. The clearly violates the dormant Commerce Clause. however. the Illinois regulation would seriously interfere with "interline trucking". Facts. Bibb and other Illinois officials (Defendants). Citation. a trucking company. If it is too slight.Bibb.

455 U. Since there is no significant safety interest the law violates the Constitution's Commerce Clause. Iowa enacted a statute banning trucks more than 60 feet long. The Plaintiff.S. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware (Plaintiff) had 65-foot doubles. Also. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware Citation. Was Iowa's regulation offering only marginal safety benefits an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce? Held. 329. The Plaintiff used 65foot trucks. Facts. concluding there is no valid safety reason for barring 65-foot doubles from Iowa's highways Issue. However. Pennsylvania and New Jersey also ban 65-foot trucks. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Iowa failed to present persuasive evidence why their law limiting trucks to 60 feet instead of 65 feet was safer.Raymond Kassel v. Dynamics Corp. The Plaintiff sued saying the law violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). v. of America . the regulations will be declared invalid under the United State Constitution's Commerce Clause. Iowa was the only state in the western or midwestern United States to outlaw the use of 65-foot doubles. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Iowa's truck-length limitations were unconstitutional because Iowa failed to present persuasive evidence that banning Plaintiff's truck made the roads much safer. Although state regulations concerning highway safety are important. He felt the Supreme Court intentionally left out the fact that along Iowa's route 80. The statute compels trucking companies to either route 65-foot doubles around Iora or use the smaller trucks allowed by the Iowa state statute. Discussion. The Iowa District Court found the statute unconstitutional. Iowa enacted a highway safety law limiting the size of trucks to 60 feet. 120 CTS Corp. Brief Fact Summary. Dissent. Yes. if the furtherance of safety is marginal or the burden on commerce substantial. Rehnquist) dissents because he feels the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has overstepped their authority to review state legislation. Iowa's statute creates a burden to the interstate flow of goods by truck because certain trucks cannot pass through Iowa. Iowa is not in step with all the surrounding states.

(Defendant) and challenged the law based on the Commerce Clause. Discussion. (ii) it did not create inconsistent regulation by multiple states and (iii) it applied to domestically-incorporated corporations with substantial resident shareholders. v. Dynamics Corp. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) observed that the law does not discriminate because it applies to both Indiana and non-Indiana corporations. The state of Indiana's corporate takeover law provides that when one acquires "control" shares in an Indiana corporation.S. CTS Corp. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. Corporations are created under the auspices of state law and therefore states can formulate rules and regulations regarding their internal operations if they do not discriminate. Issue. 481 U. The state of Indiana passed an anti-corporate takeover law protecting domestic corporations. The Supreme Court also found that Indiana's law would not result in inconsistent regulations. The district Court held that the statute violated the Commerce Clause and federal securities laws. a vote of the preexisting disinterested shareholders was required. Does the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) invalidate a state law. which regulates corporate takeovers? Held. Although tender offers may be hindered. the acquiring party will obtain voting rights only if the takeover was approved by a majority of the preexisting disinterested shareholders. The Plaintiff. This case implicates the dormant Commerce Clause. that is not enough to invalidate the Indiana law. Dynamics Corp. of America Citation. state laws limiting corporate takeovers do not violate commerce clause and are therefore not unconstitutional.5%. Facts. v. which would have increased the Plaintiff's stake to 27. A state law that delineated shareholder's voting rights and limited the effectiveness of tender offers was held not to violate the Commerce Clause because (i) the law was equally applicable to in-state and out-of-state offerors. The Plaintiff owned 9. The Plaintiff challenged the statute because most hostile takeovers are initiated by out of state corporations. they did not discriminate. 69 (1987). which is concerned with those statutes discriminating against interstate commerce. As a result. Synopsis of Rule of Law.CTS Corp. Brief Fact Summary. of America . Dynamic Corporation of America (Plaintiff) wanted to purchase the Defendant. There are three reasons why a law concerning corporate takeovers is constitutional: ‡ The law was equally applicable to in-state and out-of-state offerors ‡ It did not create inconsistent regulation by multiple states and 121 CTS Corp. No. Here.6% of the Defendant corporation and initiated a tender offer.

the law does not prohibit ANY entity from offering to purchase shares in Indiana corporations. 122 Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. Also. Most importantly. the primary purpose of the Indiana law is to protect shareholders of Indiana corporations. v. State Board of Equalization of California .‡ It applied to domestically incorporated corporations with substantial resident shareholders.

any action taken by a State within the scope of congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to a Commerce Clause challenge. "If Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce. may give States the power to enact laws that restrict the flow of interstate commerce. Congress. Issue. The Plaintiff. Brief Fact Summary. pursuant to the Constitution. The Plaintiff challenged the statute arguing it violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. challenged a California law that imposed a tax on out of state insurers. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate Commerce among the states. Facts. the one exception to the dormant Commerce Clause is that Congress may authorize certain State laws. pursuant to a law promulgated by Congress.Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. Inc v. 451 U. The California Superior Court ruled the tax unconstitutional. Yes. v. 123 Reeves. but the California Court of Appeals reversed that decision. State Board of Equalization of California Citation. The tax applied when an out-of-state insurer's state of incorporation imposed higher taxes on California insurers doing business in the state than California would otherwise impose on that state's insurers doing business in California. The Plaintiff argued that the law violated the United States Constitution's (Constitution) Commerce Clause. 648 (1981). California. enacted a law imposing a retaliatory tax on out-of-state insurers." Discussion. the Western & Southern Life Insurance Company (Plaintiff). Therefore. Synopsis of Rule of Law.S. Congress may confer upon the States the ability to restrict the flow of commerce. Can Congress give the States the power to enact laws that restrict the flow of commerce? Held. William Stake .

which for many years sold to private buyers. The Plaintiff. as opposed to "market regulator". 124 South-Central Timber Development. Brief Fact Summary.Reeves. There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the state itself to operate freely in the market. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Department of Natural Resources of Alaska .. Facts.S. as is the case here because they are selling cement. Commissioner. William Stake Citation. a State acting as a "market participant" may favor their in-state buyers. South Dakota built a state-owned cement plant. Inc v. which sold to both in and out-of-state buyers for 50 years. Yes. South Dakota implemented a policy that gave preference to in state buyers. Reeves Inc. The Plaintiff was a long time out-of-state buyer and sued South Dakota for violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. Discussion. Later. are not bound by the Constitution's Commerce Clause and can favor their in-state businesses. their commercial activities are not bound by the Commerce Constitution's Clause and may favor in-state interests. States that are "market participants" in the buying and selling of goods. Dissent. (Plaintiff) a long time buyer sued under the United State Constitution's (Constitution) Commerce Clause. When a state becomes a "market participant". 429 (1980). 447 U. but later gave preferences to in-state buyers. South Dakota built and operated a cement plant. Issue. Inc v. The Constitution's Commerce Clause is applicable to State taxes and other regulatory measures that impede interstate commerce. Powell) dissents because he thinks this is exactly the type of economic protectionism that the Constitution's Commerce Clause was intended to prevent. May a State give preference to in-state buyers? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Alaska could not legitimately prefer its own residents in the processing market only in the initial timber market. Brief Fact Summary. but allows it to go no further. A seller. the market participant exception is limited to the particular market in which the State is a participant. the Supreme Court found Alaska to be a direct participant in the timber market. 467 U. develop new industries and make a larger profit on their timber resources. Issue. The purpose of the requirement was to protect Alaska timber processors. As a condition of Alaskan timber purchasing. Thus. He felt Alaska was indirectly paying buyers to use Alaskan processors and that there were other ways to accomplish that same result. Commissioner. Facts. Alaska claimed it was a "market participant" and therefore precluded from the strict scrutiny test. Although state-owned businesses may favor in-state purchasers. 82 (1984). ‡ The Plaintiff. impose a requirement on "down-stream" market participants without violating the dormant Commerce Clause? Held. defines "Market" narrowly and precludes a states's exercise of leverage in the market in which it is directly participating in order to regulate a "downstream" market. Inc (Plaintiff) filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent this requirement as it violated the United State Constitution's (Constitution) Commerce Clause. If the state acts as a "market participant" a state can impose burdens on interstate commerce within the market it is a participant. Rehnquist) dissents because he thinks the line between participant and regulator is a fine line. He therefore.South-Central Timber Development. No. felt it was unfair for the Supreme Court to decide that the Constitution's Commerce Clause barred their chosen path. Alaska is more than merely a "market participant" because they are imposing a requirement on their timber after the sale. The State of Alaska requires buyers of Alaskan timber to process it in Alaska before they export. South-Central Timber Development. Inc v. the buyer had to get it processed in the State. acting as a market participant. Discussion. 125 South-Central Timber Development. for Commerce Clause purposes. Dissent. Department of Natural Resources of Alaska Citation. Inc v. they may not attach conditions to the sale of products that will burden interstate commerce. Commissioner. May a State. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). ‡ The court of appeals determined that Congress had authorized Alaska's processing requirement. but not in the processing market. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Here. "usually has no say over. Department of Natural Resources of Alaska . S.

how the product is to be used after sale." The State may not impose conditions that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of a particular market.and no interest in. Witsell . 126 Toomer v.

the State's shrimp supply.Toomer v. Does a state law that discriminates against out of state fishermen violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause where its purpose is to conserve natural resources. Discussion. Facts. the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause was to help fuse the Nation. the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to outlaw classifications based on non-citizenship.S. The Plaintiffs sued saying it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause. to ensure that people enjoy the same rights in each state. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden . the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) must determine whether the law discriminates against citizens of other states and if so. but to exclude out of state shrimp boats creating a monopoly for South Carolina fishermen. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Moreover. The South Carolina law clearly discriminates against non-residents merely because they are non. Toomer and other out-of-state commercial fisherman (Plaintiff). If a State violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause. challenged a South Carolina Law that imposed higher license fees to out-of-state boats based than in state boats. Therefore. 334 U. Although it is not absolute. Because of the nature of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. whether there is a substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of another state. 385.residents of South Carolina. a citizen of State A may enjoy substantial equality with citizens of State B. The Plaintiffs contended that the purpose of the statute was not to conserve shrimp. Brief Fact Summary. Yes. South Carolina enacted a statute that imposed a license fee for out of state commercial shrimp boats that was 100 times greater than resident shrimp boats. The Plaintiffs based their challenge on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). However. there was no indication that non-resident fishermen were the source of the problem that the statute was aimed. 127 United Building and Construction Trade Council of Camden County v. Witsell Citation. the Privileges and Immunities Clause invalidates South Carolina's license fee law. ‡ South Carolina contends that the purpose of the law was to protect natural resources. but its effect creates a monopoly for residents of the state? Held. The Plaintiffs. Issue. it does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where no substantial reason for the discrimination exists besides the fact that they are merely citizens of another state. Therefore. the statute is unconstitutional.

There is a two-part analysis in determining whether a local ordinance violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. a court must determine whether the discrimination burdens the "fundamental" privilege (here it was employment). Mayor and Council of the City of Camden . Mayor and Council of the City of Camden Citation. ‡ Here. ‡ Also. Yes. the law also applies to in-state residents who do not live in Camden.S. Discussion. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. United Building and Construction Trade Council of Camden County (Plaintiff) challenged the ordinance under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. there is no "substantial reason" for the discriminating treatment. they are therefore. The Defendant. Here the fundamental privilege was employment. asserting that it discriminated against non-Camden residents. was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution's (Constitutions) Privileges and Immunities Clause. can vote against such ordinances and legislators who 128 United Building and Construction Trade Council of Camden County v.United Building and Construction Trade Council of Camden County v. the Defendant contends that the Privileges and Immunities Clause (i) applies to states and not cities (ii) does not prohibit discriminatory laws based on municipal residency and (iii) does prohibit laws which also discriminate against in-state residents as well as out-of-state residents. Issue. part of the State and covered by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. They. the City of Camden. First. 465 U. Does this law violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause? Held. a court must determine whether there is no "substantial reason" for the discriminating treatment. however. Second. The Plaintiff. A municipal ordinance requiring that 40% of employees working on cityfunded projects be residents of the city. since cities derive their laws from the State legislation. 208 (1984). the discrimination burdens a "fundamental" privilege. First. Second. New Jersey (Defendant) passed an ordinance that all city projects needed at least 40% of Camden residents. The Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents states (and cities in this case) from discriminating against non-residents if two elements are met. However. Facts. the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents states and cities from discriminating against non-residents if (1) the discrimination burdens a "fundamental" privilege (here it was employment) and (2) there is no "substantial reason" for the discriminating treatment.

Out-of-state residents have no protection except for the Privileges and Immunities Clause protections. 129 Lester Baldwin v.propose ideas pertaining to such ordinances. Fish and Game Commission of Montana .

Non-residents are not deprived of a means or a way to make a livelihood by paying this higher fee.S. 436 U. A Montana state law required higher fees for hunting for out-of-staters and the Plaintiffs. Issue. 130 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. equality of all people to such game is not necessarily for the well being of the United States. is constitutional because it is not a "fundamental right" entitled to protection by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Kathryn A. Only with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity. Discussion. Brief Fact Summary. Piper . must a state treat all citizens. The licensing scheme.Lester Baldwin v. The Plaintiffs assert that the Montana law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution because it imposes an unreasonable burden on citizens from other states. A state law. Elk and other big game hunting targets are associated with recreational hunting. The desire to share in the limited supply of such animals in Montana is not covered by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. was at least 7 ½ times as expensive for nonresidents as residents. The Plaintiffs sued because Montana imposed higher hunting fees on out-of-state hunters than resident hunters. 371 (1978). Is a state law unconstitutional when it imposes a higher fee on a recreational sport and not a "fundamental right"? Held. The Plaintiffs argued that the law violated their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). which imposes higher fees for out-of-staters on recreational hunting. Fish and Game Commission of Montana Citation. No. residents and nonresidents equal. such a state law is not unconstitutional because recreational hunting does not constitute a fundamental right entitled to protection by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Moreover. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Facts. which applied to elk-hunting. Lester Baldwin and other recreational hunters (Plaintiffs) challenged the law. The district court denied all relief.

The practice of law is essential to the economy and is therefore a privilege protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause." It does not preclude discrimination against nonresidents when: (1) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment and (2) the discrimination against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's and objective. Kathryn A. New Hampshire has substantial reasons for demanding lawyers be residents and the rule does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause. New Hampshire neither advances "substantial reason" for its discrimination against nonresident applicants to the bar. J. Ms. Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court included the prohibition on admission. Kathryn A. Issue. Kathryn A. Piper (Appellee)." There is no substantial reason for denying nonresidents admission to the New Hampshire to and the discrimination does not bear a close relationship to the State's objectives.S. The Appellee sued the Supreme Court of New Hampshire contending that the rule violated her rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Rehnquist) dissents because he thinks the practice of law does not easily transfer across state lines and is different from other occupations. Yes. the practice of law a "fundamental right" and therefore protected by the Fourteen Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause.Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. the Appellee could not because the Appellant. Piper . However. 470 U. a nonresident of New Hampshire. nor 131 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. The Appellee claimed the decision violated her rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Constitution). 274 (1985). but could not because New Hampshire would not allow nonresidents to practice law in New Hampshire. Discussion. States have an interest in demanding residents practice law in New Hampshire because it makes the pool of lawyers better. The Appellee. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Piper Citation. The opportunity to practice law is a "fundamental right. Rehnquist feels the state has a substantial interest in creating its own sets of laws that parallel the states interest. Specifically. Judge William Rehnquist (J. Out-of-state lawyers are essential to the field because they will be more likely to bring unpopular claims. desired to practice law in New Hampshire. Is the practice of law a "fundamental right" and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause? Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) concluded there is no evidence to support New Hampshire's justification for their rule. The Appellee is a resident of Vermont who wanted to practice law in New Hampshire. The opportunity to practice law is a "fundamental right. the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (Appellant). said only the New Hampshire lawyers were allowed to practice there. Dissent. Facts. Brief Fact Summary.

demonstrates that the discrimination practiced bears a close relationship to the State's objectives. 132 .

CHAPTER V. The Structure Of The Constitution's Protection Of Civil Rights And Civil Liberties 133 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore .

) 243 (1833). Does the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution apply to local government? Held. The Bill of Rights does not apply to state and local government. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Citation. The Constitution was designed for the federal government and not the states. only to Federal government. Marshall) writing for the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) observed that the framers intended the Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) to apply only to the Federal government and not the states. 134 Slaughter-House Cases (Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. since there was no conflict between the city and state's action and the Constitution the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction. The Plaintiff. The States each have their own Constitution with their own powers. No. Amendments were enacted to guard against the encroachments of the federal government and not the states.S. Without words specifically stating that the Amendments of the Constitution apply to the states. the Amendments themselves lack words allowing for an interpretation that they apply to the states. (7 Pct. the Supreme Court refused to recognize that they did. The Plaintiff claimed that the city took his property without just compensation and in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Issue. Justice John Marshall (J.Barron v. Moreover. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company) . Baron (Plaintiff). the city of Baltimore (Defendant) for taking his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant because they ruined his wharf by diverting streams and making water too shallow for his boats. Here. a wharf owner sued the Defendant. Article 1 § 10 of the Constitution provides an exclusive list of the restriction upon state government. so the Amendments did not apply to them. 32 U. Facts. Discussion. Also. Each state formulated their own constitution. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the amendments do not have any language indicating that they apply to the states.

However. The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans argued that the law violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution because it denied them due process. Brief Fact Summary. or Privilege and Immunities Clauses of that Amendment may be used to interfere with state control of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. Do the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states? Held. However." If this clause was meant to protect a citizen of a state against his own State's legislation. Due Process. not state. Justice Stephen Field (J. then the drafter would have used that language. Field) dissents because the citizens of a State are also citizens of the United States and are protected. The Amendments were promulgated to ensure that former salves were protected from laws passed by the federal government. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. Dissent. Butchers challenged the constitutionality of a state law giving a monopoly to a particular slaughterhouse. Issue.) 36 (1873). The Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges and immunities of national. The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution applied only to slavery. not the citizens of the 135 Slaughter-House Cases (Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. This clause protects the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States. In 1869. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) observed that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution protects the privileges and immunities of national. and neither the Equal Protection. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company) Citation. No.S. not state citizenship. The language is "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) apply only to former slaves. not to effect fundamental changes in the relation of government. together (with the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution giving slaves the right to vote) these amendments were designed to remedy the grievances of blacks. citizenship. The underlying purpose of the three post-Civil War amendments to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was to eliminate the remnants of African Slavery. as they did in the previous sentence. denied them equal protection and abridged their privileges and immunities. Louisiana passed a law giving a monopoly over the New Orleans slaughterhouse business to the Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company. the amendments also forbid enslaving other races. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company) . (16 Wall. 83 U.Slaughter-House Cases (Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. Facts. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to protect newly freed slaves from discrimination.

‡ The rights claimed by the Plaintiffs are not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The fourth article of the Constitution also has a Privileges and Immunities Clause which states. when analyzing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. the restraint imposed by Louisiana upon the Plaintiffs' trade cannot be considered a deprivation of property. ‡ Also." This clause protects fundamental rights. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. 136 Saenz v.states. Roe .

‡ J. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States. 489 (1999). Discussion. Rehnquist felt that California. California enacted a law limiting the welfare benefits for citizens who lived in California for less than 12 months. Thomas). The welfare family would be paid the amount they received in their last state of residence. Rehnquist). Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas fears the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause will be a new tool for inventing rights. The district court preliminarily enjoined implementation of the statute and the court of appeals affirmed. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) applies the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause for nearly the first history. The Respondents. Roe . and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Thomas thinks the majority applies a meaning to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution that the framers did not intend. he contends. Dissent. Brief Fact Summary. Issue. Justice William Rehnquist (J. and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. drained the Privileges and Immunities Clause of any meaning. J. ‡ J.S. 526 U. The Supreme Court determined that durational residency requirements violate the right to travel by denying a newly-arrived citizen the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens in the same state.s law was a good faith residency requirement. are citizens of the 137 Saenz v. Yes. Roe Citation. The state's legitimate interest in saving money provides no justification for its diction to discriminate among equally eligible citizens. Rehnquist does not like the fact that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution has only been applied once before and was overruled five years later. Synopsis of Rule of Law. J. a State must provide the same benefits to new residents as it does to other residents. California passed a law that awarded less welfare benefits to residents who lived in California for less than 12 months than it paid other residents. Facts. Does a statute providing lower benefits to families who have lived in California for less than 12 months violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution? Held.Saenz v. Dissent. Brenda Roe and Anna Doe (Respondents) recently moved to California and challenged the law on equal protection grounds. The Slaughter-House Cases.

It has been understood that the Privileges and Immunities clause protects the right to travel. 138 Twining v.United States and of the State wherein they reside. New Jersey . The Supreme Court did not think rational basis test or intermediate scrutiny applied here." The right to equal benefits is protected throughout the states of the United States. No State shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States. The right to travel includes a citizen's right to be treated equally after residing in a new state.

211 U. but not in the body of the Constitution. ‡ Although provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the States if the provisions are incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. but they both include the rights in their laws. Twining (Defendant). New Jersey was one of the few states that did not incorporate in its constitution the right against compelled self-incrimination. New Jersey Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. was a denial of the due process of law. Facts. The Defendant contends that the compulsory testimony. provisions of the Bill of Rights may apply to the states if they are part of the Due Process of Law. Discussion. The Defendant. this right of self-incrimination is not.S. challenged the law under both the Due Process Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution make the right against self-incrimination applicable to the States? Held. Issue. Louisiana . The exemption from compulsory testimony was included in the Bill of Rights. 78 (1908). 139 Duncan v. No. The right is included in every state's constitution besides Iowa and New Jersey.Twining v. Certain provisions of the Bill of Rights may apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. if the provisions are necessary for the due process of law. self-incrimination. A New Jersey law provided that a jury may be instructed to view a criminal defendant's failure to testify as something negative. Brief Fact Summary. New Jersey's law providing that a jury may draw an unfavorable inference from a criminal defendant's failure to testify was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

The purpose of a jury trial is to protect defendants against overzealous or corrupt prosecutors and compliant. Thus. Louisiana Citation. Moreover. liberty. Black) and Justice William Douglas (J. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) observed that a fundamental right to a jury trial exists in criminal cases punishable by up to two years in prison. biased or eccentric judges. The Defendant claimed he was denied Due Process of Law." Because trial by jury is fundamental to our scheme of justice it is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and is incorporated and applicable to the States. The Defendant requested a jury trial and was denied it because Louisiana only provided trials for capital cases or cases with punishment of hard labor. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The reason for that is that judicial or prosecutorial unfairness is less likely. 140 The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is applicable to the States. The Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor of simple battery." Discussion. Yes.Duncan v. 391 U. 145 (1968). They support "selective incorporation" because it keeps judges "from roaming at will regarding policies outside the Bill of Rights and has already made most of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. the States may not "deprive any person of life. which was punishable up to two years in prison and with a $300 fine. However. Facts. The Defendant claimed his denial of a jury trial violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.S. there is no problem with the integrity of those cases resolved without a trial. Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause make the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applicable to the States? Held. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the court does not try to establish a bright line between petty and serious crimes. Duncan (Defendant) was charged with simple battery and was denied a jury trial. Issue. The Defendant. Stanley . Douglas) concurred because they believed that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the States. Concurrence. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution's (Constitution) right to Jury Trial is a fundamental right and is applicable to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution's Due Process Clause. The controlling factor is the maximum possible sentence and not the sentence the judge actually imposes. The concurring justices do not think that the States should be able to experiment with protections provided by the Bill of Rights. Justice Hugo Black (J. a constitutional problem does not exist with accepting waivers or prosecuting petty crimes with a bench trial instead of a jury trial. or property with due process of law.

109 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. All the Defendants were in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (the Act). the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution can only prohibit state action. does regulate private citizens. Alabama . ‡ The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does not give Congress the power to regulate private rights. Although the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Brief Fact Summary. public transportation. Facts. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits only State action. Stanley and Nichols. Also. Justice John Harlan (J. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). which subjects any person who denies another full and equal enjoyment of inns. 141 Marsh v.The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. No. were charged with refusing to allow people of color to stay at their inns. Dissent. Owners of theatres and hotels were prosecuted for discriminating against African Americans. not action by individual citizens. Discussion.S. Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Constitution) prohibit discrimination by private citizens? Held. Congress does not have the power to pass laws prohibiting discrimination by private citizens. ‡ The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution gave Congress the power to enforce the Amendment through appropriate legislation. racial segregation is not a "badge of slavery" sufficient to bring the Thirteenth Amendment into operation. theatres and other places of amusement to criminal prosecution. Ryan and Singleton refused to allow people with color in their theatres. Issue. Stanley Citation. Harlan) thinks the holding is too narrow and does not take into the account the full effect that the Fourteenth Amendment was supposed to have. accommodations owners. by prohibiting slaveholding. 3 (1883).

Marsh. A Corporation owned a town called Chickasaw in Alabama. The Supreme Court specifically states that a private town is not the same as a private homeowner. the town was treated like a town. 501 (1946). The more an owner opens up his property to the public. Meaning. Marsh declined to obtain a permit and refused to leave the sidewalk. A private entity that acts like a governmental body and performs a public function is subject to the United States Constitution (Constitution). the more the Constitution is applicable. ‡ Marsh claimed that applying the statute to her violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. was arrested for trespassing after attempting to distribute religious literature in a privately owned Alabama town. Marsh was arrested and charged with violating Alabama's anti-trespassing statute.S. where the public was free to do as they pleased. The fact that the property (the town) is privately owned. Here. Facts.Marsh v. Issue. a Jehovah's Witness. Brief Fact Summary. because the town acts like a government body. it applies. Marsh. Discussion. does not justify restricting fundamental liberties. Alabama Citation. Therefore. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) first recognizes that if Chickasaw had been a municipality the antitrespassing statute would not be unconstitutional. a Jehovah's Witness was told she needed a permit to distribute her flyers. Alabama's attempt to convict Marsh cannot stand. However. 326 U. Metropolitan Edison Co . it is not appropriate to suppress unwanted religious expression in the town like it would be in a private home. 142 Jackson v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Yes. Is the Constitution applicable to privately owned towns? Held. The town was accessible and used freely by the public except for the fact that the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned title to the town and paid the police.

Metropolitan Edison Company (Respondent). ‡ State authorization and approval is enough to make it a State Action ‡ There is extensive interaction between the State and the Respondent. the Petitioner stopped paying her bills and four days later. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 143 Jackson v. is extensively regulated by the State and received state approval in many aspects of their service.S. The Petitioner claimed she did not receive bills. Marshall) dissents because the Respondent has a monopoly. Facts. As a result. Metropolitan Edison Co Citation. Does the operation of a utility by a private party constitute state action? Held. Dissent. Metropolitan Edison Co . with no notice. It is established that private action is immune from the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The actions of a private entity are not considered state action unless there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action. the bills were not paid. a customer of the Respondent. ‡ Also. regulation by the State does not necessarily mean it is a public function. The Petitioner. 345 (1974). The Respondent is a privately owned corporation with an exclusive license to deliver electricity in Pennsylvania.Jackson v. had opened an account with the Respondent. Issue. Pennsylvania approves their termination procedures. Just because a business is subject to detailed and extensive state regulation does not convert its action into state action. Dodson. Discussion. No. The Respondent is not performing a public function because state law imposes no duty on the state to furnish utility service. the Petitioner claimed she asked them to open an account for her twelve year old son Robert. Here. Someone living in the Petitioner's home. the Respondent shut off her electricity. claimed that the Respondent performed a public function and therefore could not shut off her electricity without notice and hearing pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Jackson (Petitioner). Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. After Dodson left the residence. Also. it is heavily regulated by the State. 419 U. it is hard to distinguish where the Respondent falls because although it is a private company. Brief Fact Summary. The test is took look if there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and challenged action so that the action of the private actor may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. However. there must be a sufficiently close nexus between Pennsylvania and challenged action to find a state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

lawyers and grocers. but that does not mean it is a State action ‡ The Respondent performed an essential public function (service of electricity). but that does not make it a State action.‡ The Respondent has a monopoly. 144 Terry v. but they are not state actors and the same should be true in this case. ‡ The government regulates all doctors. Adams .

S. Yes. Does a private. excluded members based on race. the Defendant's county -wide candidates had invariably been nominated in the Democratic primaries and elected to office. 461 (1953). Discussion. brought a class action to determine their rights under the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution. a private organizations primary election constitutes a public function." The Plaintiffs. thereby making it subject to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Defendant's members are all white. Facts. The Defendant argues that its association is a private club because it was not governed by state laws and did not utilize state elective machinery or funds. The Defendant. 145 Evans v. Brief Fact Summary. Issue. A private political party that controls the outcome of elections is engaging in state action. regardless of race. For a state to allow what the Defendant wants is to defeat the purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment. which strips blacks of their right to vote for elected officials if they cannot join. The Defendant Association held preprimaries and for more than fifty years.Terry v. The Defendant was held to be engaging in state action for purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because the Defendant had control over the ultimate outcome of the election. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Adams Citation. successful. a group of Negro voters (Plaintiffs). It is immaterial that the State does not control the Defendant Association because their candidates are always successful. the Jaybird Democratic Association (Defendant). 345 U. the Defendant argued that the Fifteenth Amendment constitutional challenge does not apply to their "self-governing voluntary club. The Defendant's primary is the only part of the election that determines who governs the county. The Defendant is a very successful Texas political organization that operated a lot like a political party. Moreover. Newton . political association have to follow the Fifteenth Amendment? Held. The President of the Defendant Association admitted that the purpose of the party was to exclude blacks from voting and to escape the Fifteenth Amendment's command that everyone could vote.

Facts. For years. Operating a park is a public function and therefore. 296 (1966). Therefore it was a public park. The park was eventually opened by the city and Negroes were allowed to use it. Issue. The provision was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Just because the Senator gave money to private people to make it whites-only. Logan Valley Plaza. Where tradition of municipal control becomes firmly established. Georgia that was to be used as a park for whites only. the senator devised land to Macon. The city was named trustee.Evans v. ‡ Parks provide a municipal service that serves an entire community. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 382 U. Brief Fact Summary. 146 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. The Defendants. Georgia to be used by whites only. Is operating a park a public function and therefore subjected to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. The City argued they could not enforce segregation in a public park. Upon his death. The city resigned as the trustee and a state court appointed private trustees to continue the exclusion of Negroes from the park.S. A provision of a will left by a Senator Augustus Bacon (the Senator) conveyed a park to Macon. Mass recreation is clearly in the public domain. substituting private trustees will not move the park from the public to private sector. The Plaintiffs. Discussion. a group of Negroes (Plaintiffs). Newton Citation. Yes. individual Managers from the Board of Managers (Defendants) sued to remove the city as trustee so as to effectuate the Senator's will. Inc . intervened alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution's Equal protection clause. the owner is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. does not mean the city can become untwined. and a Board of Managers was created under the trust to administer the park. the city used this park as a tax exemption. black people cannot be excluded because operating a park is a public function.

the more the owner's rights become limited by the rights of those who use it.S. Inc Citation.Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Facts. Peaceful picketing in a location open to the public. The Supreme Court analogized the private shopping center in this matter. Discussion. The more an owner opens his property for public use. Logan Valley Plaza. held that private property may in some instance be treated as public property for First Amendment constitutional purposes. this access could be tempered by the state in that the state could regulate First Amendment speech to prevent interference with the normal use of the property by others. Is a privately owned shopping center considered a public location. However. hinder access to members of the public who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights. Issue. The specific store being picketed in front of was a non-union store. However. The Plaintiff. Specifically. specifically a private shopping center. the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) applies. The picketing involved no violence. Inc. Tanner . The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas enjoined all picketing outside the shopping center. Alabama. Thus. The union challenged this exclusion. 391 U. the state could not by way of trespass laws. 501 (1946). is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the injunction on the basis that the picketing was a trespass on the Plaintiff's property. picketed outside their parcel pickup areas. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brief Fact Summary. v. there were some instances of congestion in the parcel pickup areas. claiming it was a public function and that their First Amendment constitutional rights prevail. A shopping center owner barred union members from peacefully picketing outside the shopping center. Shopping centers serve a public function and therefore. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) in Marsh v. 147 Lloyd Corp. Weiss employed only nonunion employees so the Defendant. 326 U. to the business block involved in Marsh. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas based its decision on the Plaintiff's property rights and that the Defendant's reason for picketing was to compel the employees of Weiss to join a union. those who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights for a purpose consistent with how the property is used. 308 (1968). (Plaintiff) owned a public mall that was occupied by Weiss Supermarket (Weiss) and Sears. so that the First Amendment of the Constitution applies? Held. The Supreme Court also determined that the shopping center was open to the public.S. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 (Defendant). Logan Valley Plaza.

mall security told the Respondents that they were trespassing and would be arrested unless they left the premises. On November 14. v. not private property owners." Discussion. Facts. 551 (1972). 407 U. Yes. Petitioner instituted and upheld a policy strictly forbidding the distribution of flyers (handbills) on the mall premises. a private entity is not required to provide a forum for such an exercise. This was done in a quiet and orderly fashion." ‡ It is an infringement of property rights to force a private actor to yield to an individual's First Amendment constitutional rights when "alternative avenues of communication exist.Lloyd Corp. The Petitioner. Lloyd Corp. Private property is not considered public property just because the public is invited to use the property for its intended purpose. (Plaintiff). The Respondent. owns a sixty commercial tenant shopping mall including all land and buildings on a fifty acre lot. Ltd. one customer complained. However. Tanner (Respondent) and five others. Respondents quietly left the premises and began distributing their handbills from the public sidewalks and streets surrounding the mall. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A person may exercise freedom of speech rights against another private entity without restriction or interference. Public streets and sidewalks bound the mall on each side. National Labor Relations Board . distributed flyers to mall shoppers inviting them to a meeting protesting the Vietnam War and the draft.S. 1968. The picketing in Logan Valley involved was "directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was being put. Respondent and 5 others entered the mall and began distributing invitations to mall shoppers. Tanner Citation. ‡ Logan Valley is factually distinct from the instant case. 148 Hudgens v. Issue. For the eight years prior to this incident.. However. Brief Fact Summary. The First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) limit state action. As a result. Can a privately owned shopping mall prohibit the distribution of flyers and restrict an individual's freedom of speech rights when the nature of the handouts is unrelated to the mall's operations? Held.

The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers with arrest for trespassing if they would not leave. it may restrict First Amendment rights based solely on the content of the speech. not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). owned by the Petitioner. it is not restricted by the prohibition on content-based speech review that a state actor would be under in the same circumstances. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The majority overrules the holding of Logan Valley and reasserts the holding of Lloyd. Kraemer . the general manager of the shopping center threatened to have the strikers arrested if they did not leave. Brief Fact Summary. A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and. A mall may look like and function as a small town would. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was located within a shopping mall. After the picketers had been marching for about half an hour. 149 Shelley v. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail locations in Atlanta. So. Hudgens (Petitioner). Yes. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Butler Shoe Co. 507 (1976). therefore. yet it does not have all of the attributes of a town. National Labor Relations Board Citation. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public? Held. Issue. Facts.Hudgens v. Because a shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town.S. 424 U. Discussion.

1 (1948). Kraemer Citation. ‡ The signed agreement stipulated that for the next 50 years none of the parcels could be sold or leased "by people of the Negro or Mongolian race. However. Synopsis of Rule of Law. . in violation of the covenant. Shelley (Appellant). Louis. Does judicial enforcement of a private discriminatory agreement amount to state action? Held. the Appellant. an African-American.Shelley v. Rives (1880). legislative acts or the enforcement of common law rules by the judiciary. But. brought suit to block the sale and have the property revert to the previous grantor or a person whom the court would choose. ‡ On August 11. unaware of the covenant. 150 Lugar v. Brief Fact Summary. purchased a parcel of this land from Fitzgerald. Discussion. in St. The remaining landowners sued to enforce the restriction. 1945. this case introduces indirect state action that results from a private individual engaging the courts as a means of enforcing a discriminatory agreement. Kraemer (Appellee). Yes. Parcels of land were originally sold with a restrictive covenant prohibiting non-Caucasians from owning or occupying any portion of them. 334 U. Issue. Since Commonwealth of Virginia v. Direct action is what would most commonly come to mind. one since 1882. In 1911. This holding could be interpreted very broadly to make almost all private disagreements state action. Edmondson Oil Co. Facts. 30 land owners agreed to a restrictive covenant attaching to all 57 parcels in the community.S. the Supreme Court has chosen to limit this application to restrictive covenants." At the time AfricanAmerican families owned 5 lots. Judicial enforcement of a private agreement is state action. The Supreme Court discusses the distinction between direct and indirect state action. One lot was eventually sold to the Appellant. ‡ The Appellee. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has held that a state may act through its different agencies including the judiciary.

When is a private person's actions so entangled with the actions of the government as to be construed as state action? ‡ Has the attachment of the prejudgment lien resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority? ‡ Is the Appellee a "state actor"? Held. ‡ The state law permitted the Appellee to file an ex parte petition based solely on the belief that the Appellant might sell his property to avoid paying creditors. the Appellee money. or a rule of conduct imposed by the state. ‡ The Appellant subsequently sues the Appellee on the grounds that it acting jointly with the state took his property without due process of the law Issue. Thirty-four days after the levy. In order for the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to find state action. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Second. owed the Appellee. Brief Fact Summary. Facts. 457 U. The Appellant. the trial judge dismissed the attachment for the Appellee's failure to establish the alleged statutory grounds for the attachment. ‡ A hearing was conducted after the attachment to determine the validity of the attachment. the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state.S. or because his conduct is otherwise attributable to the state. by acting together with or getting significant assistance from a state official. . The Appellant was a lessee-operator of a truck stop who owed his supplier. Edmondson Oil Co. a two-part test must be satisfied. Citation. Edmondson Oil Co. the Appellee filed an ex parte petition and had the local sheriff exercise a prejudgment attachment on the Appellant's property. the party charged with the deprivation must be a state actor by virtue of being a state official. Conduct is "fairly attributed" to the state when (1) it is caused by the exercise of a right created by the state and (2) the actor is one for whom the state is responsible. In order to prevent the Appellant from disposing of his property before paying his creditors. the Appellant maintained possession of the property. ‡ The state granted the prejudgment writ of attachment and sent the local county sheriff to exercise it. (Appellee) money. Lugar (Appellant). or by a person for whom the state is responsible. 151 Lugar v. But.Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 922 (1982). First.

' Had the sheriff not been involved and the statute provided a self-help option for creditors. . Since the ex parte procedure is one dictated by state statute then the first prong is satisfied.' 152 Edmonson v. ‡ Yes. Because the Appellee relied upon the state statute and the help of the sheriff. "A private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of the 14th Amendment. Discussion. Leesville Concrete Co." Such "joint participation" does not require something more than invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of the state's procedures.‡ Yes. his actions were considered 'state action. then Appellee would not have been classified as a 'state actor.

peremptory challenges were created exclusively for courtroom use and are. a state actor. 614 (1991). Kentucky (1986) to civil litigation. Wilmington Parking Authority . During voir dire. No. Discussion. Clearly. 500 U. Appellant requests an explanation for the excuses that is not race-based. It violates the equal protection rights of the juror. Citation. the Appellee used two of its three preemptory challenges to excuse black persons.Edmonson v. therefore. Appellant is suing Appellee for negligence. ‡ Discriminating on the basis of race in a civil trial versus a criminal trial is no less harmful to the potential juror. state action. Exercising peremptory challenges in a civil dispute is a form of state action by a private actor. The Appellant. here. (Appellee). But. claiming that an employee allowed a truck to pin him against construction equipment. Brief Fact Summary. During voir dire. 153 Burton v. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) provides three attributes that determine whether conduct is governmental in nature: (1) extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance. the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the request because this was a civil trial.000 in damages. in Federal District Court. the Appellee. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Leesville Concrete Co. and (3) whether the injury caused is aggravated by the incident. ‡ Because the attorney for Appellee used the preemptory challenges and the courtroom to discriminate he was. Issue. Leesville Concrete Co. the Appellee used 2 of 3 peremptory challenges to excuse black persons from the jury. The majority applies the two-part test as described in Lugar to extend the holding in Batson v. Appellant was a construction worker who was injured on the job while working for Appellee. The trial proceeded with 11 whites and 1 black. May a private litigant in a civil case use preemptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race? Held. was injured at a construction site and brought suit against his employer.S. Facts. Edmonson (Appellant). But. They found Appellant to be contributorily negligent and awarded him $18. according to the Lugar test. (2) whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function.

Irvis . This is a case of racial discrimination by a private entity on government property. 715 (1961). 107 v. Facts. refused to serve the Appellant. property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. Delaware Parking Authority (Appellee). 365 U. is a restaurant located in a parking garage owned and operated by the Appellee. Inc. The amount of governmental entanglement is measured by the mutual benefit gained by each from the relationship. whereby the state "elected to place its power. Is the lessee of government property a state actor? Held. it was declared a state actor subject to the mandates of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. 154 Moose Lodge No. The result is that the Coffee Shoppe became an extension of the Appellee. simply because he was black. the Appellant parked his car in the garage and proceeded to enter the front of the Coffee Shoppe where he was promptly refused service because of his race. Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law." ‡ When a state leases its property in the manner present in this case. At the same time the state received the benefit of increased revenue from the restaurant's customers. The statutory purpose of the Appellee is to provide adequate parking facilities for the public.Burton v. In order to fund the construction of the parking facility in question. Because the restaurant was determined to be an "integral part" of the garage by directly contributing to the financial success of the Appellee. Therefore. A private entity becomes a state actor when a "symbiotic" relationship exists between the state and the individual. ‡ The construction and maintenance of the building were derived completely from governmental funds and the Appellee was responsible as the facility landlord. Discussion. the Appellee entered into commercial leases with prospective tenants. Wilmington Parking Authority Citation. A coffee shop. Brief Fact Summary. then the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) applies as if it were a covenant written into the lease agreement. In August 1958. Yes. Eagle Coffee Shoppe. Wilmington. Burton (Appellant). located in a government owned parking garage. The Appellee affirmed the action of the Coffee Shoppe by not taking a stand and ending the lease. ‡ The Coffee Shoppe received a benefit from the state by being located in the parking garage. each benefits and is interdependent upon the other.S. a "symbiotic relationship" existed.

155 Moose Lodge No. Facts. 407 U.C. there is no symbiotic relationship between the practices of Appellant and the state as was seen in Burton. 107 v. The regulatory scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not sufficiently implicate the state in the discriminatory guest policies of the Appellant to make it a "state action. liquor license.S." ‡ The Liquor Control Board plays no part in establishing or enforcing the club's membership or guest policies. No. ‡ The issuance of liquor licenses according to the state law does not discriminate against racial minorities. Appellant's refusal to serve him was a "state action. Justice William Douglas (J. The Justices conclude that this attribute alone is not enough to make them disagree with the majority. or be served liquor is not affected by the state law. Their right to apply for. Douglas) wrote the dissent and was joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Moose Lodge's (Appellant). ‡ Appellee alleges that by issuing a liquor license. They believed that the action of Appellant amounted to state action because of the regulatory scheme and license quota system in play at the time ‡ The license regulatory scheme includes a section requiring all club licensees to adhere to the state Constitution and by-laws. Brief Fact Summary. § 1983. Issue. Irvis Citation. enough to convert the private actor into a state actor? Held. Is the issuance of a state license to a private entity. Therefore. Irvis . 163 (1972). Marshall). purchase." Synopsis of Rule of Law. Being licensed by the state does not automatically convert private action into state action. requests that the Pennsylvania Liquor Board revoke the Appellant.Moose Lodge No. ‡ Appellant is a private club that is located in its own building. Only club members or guests are permitted on the premises. the state is entangled with Appellant so that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) forbids its discriminatory membership practice. This is an action for injunctive relief under 42 U. Appellee claims that because the state of Pennsylvania issued the license. Dissent.S. Irvis (Appellee). 107 v. The Appellee.

Harrison . The ability of blacks to obtain liquor licenses or be served was restricted by the actions of the state. the city of Harrisburg had received its full allotment of liquor licenses. The majority indicates that to expand previous decisions to allow any state support to concert a private actor to a state actor is too broad a reading.‡ The licensing scheme has an incurable flaw. 156 Norwood v. At the time of this case. Discussion. This would eliminate the distinction between state and private action and make all private individuals subject to the Equal Protection clause. Hence. a complex quota system. the actions of Appellant were state action.

segregated schools because it encourages continued racial discrimination. the state was directly supporting segregated education. Since the program began. Harrison Citation.S. Even though the intent of the program was not to discriminate. ‡ The district could found that the lending program did not violate the Constitution. but to help children in the state. Does a state funded program that benefits both public and private school students equally. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) is violated when a state provides aide to students of private. The number of private schools in Mississippi has increased over the years since mandatory desegregation. which benefits the private schools and supports the discrimination exercised by those schools. violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution simply because some of the private schools have racially discriminatory admissions practices? Held. The Supreme Court found that the textbook lending program was analogous to those tuition grants. The Supreme Court stated "A State's constitutional obligation requires it to 157 Norwood v. ‡ The state of Mississippi has a 33 year-old program that provides free textbooks to all students in both public and private schools. therefore. Synopsis of Rule of Law.Norwood v. Harrison and other (Appellees). Delores Norwood and others (Appellants). The Appellants. The Appellants argued that by supplying the textbooks to the segregated private schools. A textbook lending program is a form of tangible. are the parents of four schoolchildren who are challenging the state of Mississippi's textbook lending program. They claim that the program encourages discrimination by providing textbooks to the children who attend private. ‡ The Appellees. claim that the state must provide assistance to private schools that is equivalent to assistance provided to public schools. 455 (1973). Harrison . The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) first observed that in the past. Issue. the number of all white private schools greatly increased. in violation of the student's constitutional rights to fully desegregated schools. ‡ The Appellants filed a class action on behalf of all the students in Mississippi to enjoin the textbook lending program. the effect of the assistance results in discrimination and is. financial assistance. 413 U. segregated schools. Brief Fact Summary. a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Yes. the Supreme Court had enjoined state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools. Facts.

steer clear. Kohn . By supplying these basic instruments. the government is endorsing the practice of segregation. 158 Rendell-Baker v. but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination. The aide provided by the state is a vital component of education and necessary for the private schools to carry out their goals." Discussion. not only of operating the dual system of racially segregated schools. Equal Protection violations will result when either the effect or the intention of the state action is discrimination.

brings suit because she was fired from her position as a school counselor in retaliation for her opinion of administrative policy. The decision to discharge the Petitioners was not compelled or influenced by any state regulation. ‡ The students responded by picketing the home of the president of the board and were threatened with suspension.S. specific personnel matters were left to the school. a close nexus exists between the school and the state. Rendell-Baker (Petitioner). 457 U. Because the school receives almost all of its funds from the state and is heavily regulated. ‡ The Respondent.Rendell-Baker v. Issue. alcohol. The most intrusive regulation by the state was that it had the power to approve those hired as vocational counselors. Although the general operations of the school were regulated by the state. This analysis relies on the previous decisions that define a symbiotic relationship and the entanglement between the state and a private actor. ‡ In 1977. Kohn Citation. Kohn (Respondent). Is a private school's dismissal of its staff considered state action when the majority of its students' tuition is provided by the state? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. So. Five others were later fired after they voiced their intention to form a union. ‡ Students are referred to the school under Massachusetts Acts of 1972 and the school districts pay the tuition for the referred students. Facts. 830 (1982). the school's action must be considered state action. 159 Rendell-Baker v. or behavioral problems from local public high schools. Dissent. No. In the spring of 1978. Private conduct is not state action simply because the private entity serves a public function. The school in this case provides education to students that have difficulty adhering to the traditional curriculum of the public school districts. The Petitioner. These public funds accounted for 90+% of the school's operating budget. is the administrative director of the privately owned school who accepts students with drug. Petitioner was fired by Respondent for her role in a student-staff council tasked with making hiring decisions. A local paper was made aware of the situation and the 5 teachers told the president they were going to form a union. Kohn . five other teachers were fired for writing a letter to the school's board of directors supporting Respondent's dismissal. Brief Fact Summary.

Just by providing funding to the school and general operating regulations the state is not running the school. 160 Blum v. Yaretsky .Discussion. The school is a private entity similar to a corporate contractor that relies on numerous governmental contracts for business. The actions of the school are not an extension of the state as it makes independent management decisions.

Issue. ‡ In 1975 the URC decided that Respondent should be transferred to a health related facility providing a reduced level of care. Medicaid recipients have nursing home stays paid for by the City of New York if they meet specific eligibility criteria. There is no indication that these decisions were influenced by the state's obligations to adjust payment accordingly. The fact that the state responded by adjusting the benefits does not make the state responsible for the decision to transfer the patient. Did the decision by a nursing home committee to transfer a Medicaid patient to another facility violate his Due Process rights under the Constitution? Held. Respondent was transferred without notice or benefit of administrative hearing to challenge the decision. The state encourages these "medical judgments" to help achieve its legislative goals. Yaretsky . The majority oversimplified the problem by mischaracterizing the facts. the state and the nursing homes are closely intertwined and interdependent for their financial survival. Respondent alleges that this transfer was done in violation of his rights and federal law under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). is a Medicaid recipient who was transferred from a nursing home to a lower level of care in a health related facility after case review by the nursing home's utilization review committee. The decision was based on independent medical judgment made by private parties. 991 (1982). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. The state is heavily involved in the placement of the patients. ‡ Federal regulations require each nursing facility to establish a utilization review committee (URC) of physicians who periodically review patient cases for appropriate patient placement. Brief Fact Summary. The majority provides a nice review of the three axioms for determining when there is state action by a private entity. Facts. They are as follows: 161 Blum v. So. No. 457 U.S. Dissent. Private entity decisions are not converted to state action simply because the state reacts to the decision. ‡ The URC may decide that a patient does not need the intensive level of care found in the nursing home and transfer the patient to a lower level of care. The Respondent. Yaretsky Citation. as this is just a legislative means of cost containment.Blum v. Yaretsky (Respondent).

or ‡ The private entity has exercised powers that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. Mulkey .‡ Being subject to state regulation does not convert a private action into state action." 162 Reitman v. ‡ A state is responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided significant encouragement of the decision.

facilities. ‡ Proposition 14 was passed by California voters after the Respondents filed their complaint against the Petitioner. ‡ This provision would involve the state in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree. 387 U. State action will exist when the purpose of state legislation is to encourage racial discrimination. Brief Fact Summary. Facts. Mr.S. sued the Petitioner. under sections 51 and 52 of the California code for refusing to rent them an apartment due to their race. Mulkey . and Mrs. At the time the Respondents attempted to rent the apartment. a private owner because of their race. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The trial court granted the Petitioner's summary judgment motion. the Respondents sought injunctive relief and damages against the Petitioner. 369 (1967). The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) affirms the holding of the California Supreme Court. Reitman (Petitioner). §§51 and 52 of the California Civil Code provided that all persons are free and equal and are entitled to the full and equal accommodations. privileges. endorsed by the state. Pursuant to these statutory provisions. or services in all business establishment of every kind whatsoever. Yes. Mulkey Citation. The Respondents.Reitman v. ‡ The intent of Proposition 14 was to nullify previous laws that protected the rights of racial minorities to own and possess property. therefore. The right to discriminate was now immune from state regulation at any level and was. The California Supreme Court held that Proposition 14 was invalid because it denied equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). advantages. The state of California passed Proposition 14 preventing the government from interfering in any case of private discrimination as it related to the ownership or possession of property. Proposition 14 states that neither the state of California nor its agencies would interfere with a private person's choice to discriminate against others when selling or leasing property. Did Proposition 14 invalidly involve the state in racial discriminations in the housing market? Held. ‡ The Petitioner moved for summary judgment and argued that Proposition 14 had rendered §§51 and 52 of the California Civil Code null and void. 163 Reitman v. Issue. Mulkey (Respondents). The Respondents tried to rent an apartment and were rejected by the Petitioner.

This legislation went beyond just repealing existing anti-discrimination laws. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn." The majority's decision is constitutionally unsound. Dissent. The effect was to make private housing discrimination untouchable by the state government. . the state has encouraged private discrimination. the state is actually encouraging such activity to take place. as it is neutral on its face. Proposition 14 does not foster discrimination. by abandoning its open housing statutes in favor of a supposed position of neutrality. Discussion.‡ The Supreme Court observed that California. 164 Brentwood Academy v. As a result. The judiciary should not take it upon itself to strike down a rule that was passed by the voters without "pervasive evidence of an invidious purpose or effect.

290 of them. The Respondent's members include 84% of Tennessee's public schools. Citation." Facts. The Respondent. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. and the Petitioner sued alleging state action in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). is a not-forprofit membership corporation that regulates interscholastic supports among the public and private high schools in Tennessee." Tennessee's State Board of Education (the "Board") in 1972 went so far as "to adopt a rule expressly 'designat[ing]' the Association as 'the organization to supervise and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high schools in Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis. Various school officials played integral roles in the association. there being no offsetting reason to see the association's acts in any other way. The Respondent found that the Petitioner violated a rule by exercising "undue influence" in recruiting. This matter stems from a 1997 proceeding against the Petitioner. 288 Brief Fact Summary. while its board of control tends to administration." 165 Brentwood Academy v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. "[T]he association's regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn." while "authoriz[ing] the public schools of the state to voluntarily maintain membership in [the Association]". there being no offsetting reason to see the association's acts in any other way. Yes. . and superintendents elected by the member schools. and the public school administrators who so serve typically attend meetings during regular school hours. Tennessee Secondary School Association (the "Respondent"). was comprised of 84% of all public schools in the state. The Respondent assessed various penalties on the Petitioner.Brentwood Academy v. An association of secondary schools in Tennessee.' " The Board has also approved on several occasions the recruiting rule applicable to this matter. in charge of regulating interscholastic sports. the Respondent adopted the following statement in its place: "recogniz[ing] the value of participation in interscholastic athletics and the role of [the Association] in coordinating interscholastic athletic competition. compared to 55 private schools. Although the original recruiting rule was dropped in 1996. a private parochial school and member of the Respondent association. Additionally. "[T]he association's regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association.S. 531 U. assistant principals. "[t]he Association's rulemaking arm is its legislative council. "[W]hether a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools may be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school"? Held. Brentwood Academy (the "Petitioner"). The voting membership of each of these nine-person committees is limited under the Association's bylaws to high school principals. Issue.

but as surrogate for the one State. Thomas observed.' " "or when a private actor operates as a 'willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents[. who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and functions in practical terms. though only if. [ ] its ambit cannot be a simple line between States and people operating outside formally governmental organizations. be different if the [Association's] membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. of course. or acted in a 166 Brentwood Academy v.‡ Justice David Souter ("J. J." Further. many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign.' Until today.' or when government is 'entwined in [its] management or control' ". J. either overt or covert. recognized that not only actions directly perpetrated by the state are considered state actions. was created. "In sum. we held the organization's connection with Nevada too insubstantial to ground a state-action claim. not as a collective membership. writing for the majority. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. "when it has been delegated a public function by the State" and "when it is 'entwined with governmental policies. and the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual is to be treated sometimes as if a State had caused it to be performed." ‡ Applying [Tarkanian] here. the majority recognized "if the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced. the Association is an organization of public schools represented by their officials acting in their official capacity to provide an integral element of secondary public schooling." Dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. Instead. without the public school officials. J. Scalia") and Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J.]" State action has also been found where "a nominally private entity « is controlled by an 'agency of the State' ". "The situation would. "state action may be found if.' " ‡ J. Souter recognized dicta from [Tarkanian] that arguably would apply to the facts before it. "[t]here would be no recognizable Association." However. . "[w]e have never found state action based upon mere 'entwinement. or encouraged by the government. Souter recognized that 84% of all public schools in Tennessee are members of the Respondent association. ‡ The majority then examined [NCAA v.' " "when the State provides 'significant encouragement. we have found a private organization's acts to constitute state action only when the organization performed a public function. Thomas") drafted a dissenting opinion with which Justice William Rehnquist ("J. legal or tangible." Consequently. Tarkanian] and recognized "[s]ince it was difficult to see the NCAA. Rehnquist"). Souter then discussed various facts that the Supreme Court of the United States (the "Supreme Court") has examined to determine if the requisite nexus exists. Those facts include when a challenged activity "results from the State's exercise of 'coercive power. coerced. to the extent of 84% of its membership. there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. Kennedy") joined. Souter").

The majority's holding--that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association's (TSSAA) enforcement of its recruiting rule is state action--not only extends state-action doctrine beyond its permissible limits but also encroaches upon the realm of individual freedom that the doctrine was meant to protect. marching bands. it could affect many organizations that foster activities. this entwinement test may extend to other organizations that are composed of. or counties. policemen. forensics. Tennessee has not "exercised coercive power or ." The court then concludes that the role the Respondent association plays by organizing and administering interscholastic contests "is neither a traditional nor an exclusive public function of the States.. Discussion. music. provided such significant encouragement [to the TSSAA]. teachers. the dissent worries "if the majority's new entwinement test develops in future years. and sponsor extracurricular competition among high schools--not just in athletics. either overt or covert" to constitute state action.. public officials or public entities. Finally. a "symbiotic relationship" does not exist between the state and the Respondent association. Indeed. but in such diverse areas as agriculture.symbiotic relationship with the government. enforce rules." ‡ J. or controlled by. and cheerleading. cities." Further. such as firefighters. mathematics." 167 . It is interesting to recognize that the dissent argues the "entwinement" doctrine that the majority advocates is entirely new. Thomas first goes through the attributes of the Respondent association and determines that they "cannot fairly be attributed to the state. Specifically.

Louisiana .CHAPTER VI. Economic Liberties 168 Allgeyer v.

A state may not legislate in such a way as to deprive its citizens of liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling.S. This contract was formed in New York and was outside the jurisdiction of the Plaintiff state. The Plaintiff state's constitution prohibited foreign insurance companies from doing business in the state if they were not incorporated in the state.Allgeyer v. but a notification of coverage was written in the Plaintiff state. Facts. Is Article 236 of the Louisiana state constitution a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. An insurance company contracted to insure property within the Plaintiff state. 169 Allgeyer v. Louisiana . Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Yes. The Defendant was convicted of violating the Plaintiff state's law and order to pay a fine. Allgeyer (Defendant). As a result. to be free to use them in all lawful ways. Louisiana (Plaintiff) with a citizen of the state. The contract was formed in New York. The statute as written does not provide due process of law because it prohibits an act that the Plaintiff had a right to do under the Constitution. ‡ A letter of notification of coverage was written in the Plaintiff state and sent to a local citizen. The term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause embraces "the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties. to pursue any likelihood or avocation. necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. Louisiana Citation." This is an improper and illegal interference with the conduct of a citizen's right to contract and carry out the terms of the contract. unless they had a place of business and an authorized agent within the state. 165 U. The Louisiana court upheld the Defendant's conviction. Brief Fact Summary. ‡ The Defendant. The Plaintiff state had an article in its constitution prohibiting foreign corporations from doing business in the Plaintiff state. purchased the aforementioned marine insurance policy from Atlantic to insure goods shipped from New Orleans. ‡ Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York (Atlantic) wrote an insurance policy to cover property located within the Plaintiff state. the state claimed that the Atlantic was conducting business in the Plaintiff state in violation of the Plaintiff state's constitution. to live and work where he will. 578 (1897). and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper.

it cannot legislate in such a manner as to deny an individual's liberty. The Supreme Court defines liberty to include the right to contract. But. 170 Lochner v. Here the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) chose to analyze the problem from the standpoint of the citizen rather than the corporation. New York . The state maintains policing power in relationship to the corporation.Discussion.

reasonable. and appropriate exercise of its police power? Held. safety or welfare.S. White). designed to protect the health of the delicate manufacturing baker. ‡ The law as it was passed is not within the police power of the state because it does not relate to the public health or the health of bakers. Harlan). only if such interference is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose such as the protection of public health. Facts. 171 Lochner v.Lochner v. New York Citation. by determining the hours a baker can work. New York . Day) felt that the right to contract may be infringed upon for the purpose of protecting a person's health. The Petitioner. No. ‡ Baker's are persons capable of entering into and making contracts for the sale of their labor and skills. Dissent. A state may interfere with a person's right to contract for his labor. or 10 hours per day." He sees this statute as the beginnings of labor laws meant to protect the health of the worker by prohibiting excessively long workweeks. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or right to contract. was convicted of a misdemeanor for violating the New York state statute that limited the number of hours a baker could work in a bakery. 198 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. New York passed a statute that limited the number of hours a baker could work to no more than 60 per week. Brief Fact Summary. ‡ Justice Oliver Holmes (J. Is the state's interference with a baker's right to make a living by limiting the number of hours worked in a week or day a fair. Justice Byron White (J. ‡ The right to purchase or sell labor is part of the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Both dissents see the statute as an appropriate exercise of the state's police power. ‡ Justice John Harlan (J. The baker is described as a fragile worker who is susceptible to more health ailments because of his unusual working conditions and habits. Issue. Petitioner worked more than the stipulated amount and was convicted of a misdemeanor. Holmes) disagrees with the broad definition of "liberty. 45 (1905). Lochner (Petitioner). and Justice Day (J.

those workers are put in and put others in danger when extremely fatigued. 172 Coppage v. Clearly. The majority characterizes the statute as an interference with a person's right to contract and earn a living. The idea that a baker is an occupation that puts the public at risk is dismissed as a simple notion.Discussion. The position is compared to those who work in a steel foundry and coal mine. Kansas .

No. Oregon . the Kansas legislature passed an act designed to encourage the unionization of employees. The Petitioner. the employee has the choice to refuse employment if union membership is more valued than the position offered. 236 U. Can a state prevent an employer from making employment conditioned upon an individual's status as a union member? Held. Kansas Citation. States are prohibited from the arbitrary interference with a person's freedom to contract because of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).S.Coppage v. 173 Muller v. while refraining from joining a union is not infringing upon any freedom. 1 (1915). At the onset. Facts. Employment relations are the same as a contractual arrangement. Both contracting parties have the right to terminate the employment 'at-will' for any reason. In 1903. Both the employer and employee are free to choose how their relationship will be defined. The act prohibited employers from making jobs conditioned upon an employee's refusal to join or continue to participate in a union. Discussion. Coppage (Petitioner). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brief Fact Summary. was found guilty of violating the Kansas state law that prohibited employers from asking employees not to join or remain a member of a labor union as a condition of employment. Issue. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) indicates that the decision of a person to accept employment.

Discussion. The reasoning for the law was.Muller v. Women are compared to children and implied not completely competent to enter into their own labor contracts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. factory or mechanical manufacturer. are a special class of worker that needs protection. Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) defines women as a class needing protection based on the traditional concepts of a woman's role in society. Yes. This statute is within the state's police power to protect the health of the general public because the physical wellbeing of women is paramount to the production of healthy offspring." Issue. but this liberty is not absolute. like minors. 174 Adkins v. "the physical organization of women. her maternal functions. 208 U. The general right to contract is protected by the United States Constitution (Constitution). Muller (Petitioner). In 1903. Oregon passed a statute limiting the hours a woman can work to just 10 hours if she was employed in a laundry. 412 (1908). Is a state statute limiting the length of a woman's workday constitutional? Held.S. Children's Hospital . Brief Fact Summary. The discussion focuses heavily on the physical weakness of women and their inherent reliance on men for support. The Petitioner. was found guilty of violating Oregon state statute that limited the length of the workday for women in laundry facilities. the rearing and education of children and the maintenance of the home. Women. Oregon Citation.

Facts. The freedom to contract may be restricted only when exceptional circumstances exist as they relate to the police powers of a state. the District of Columbia passed a statute that established a minimum wage for women and children.S. Discussion. 175 Weaver v. Brief Fact Summary. 261 U. This case reflects the change in society's regard for the female worker. . the constitutionality of which was challenged in this matter. It is inappropriate to restrict a woman's freedom to contract for her labor service when such restriction is not equally applied to a man. Children's Hospital Citation. In 1918. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Co. the closing of businesses is mentioned as a detractor and weighed against the potential thriftiness or lack thereof of women workers. Specifically. 525 (1983). Is the fixing of a minimum wage for children and women constitutional? Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) expressly recognizes that a mature woman has the same contracting competence as a man. The payment of a minimum wage puts a burden on the employer that is completely unrelated to his business. The Supreme Court decides to side with the business owners and the economic consequence that a minimum wage would have on them. Palmer Bros. Issue.Adkins v. The District of Columbia imposed a law upon all employers forcing them to pay their women and child workers a predetermined minimum wage.

then it was justified in prohibiting the use of shoddy. Sometimes the shoddy will be made of secondhand garments and soiled rags. A restriction on the manufacturing of items is an interference with the contractual bargain between buyer and seller that can only be upset in the interests of state policing power.Weaver v.000 are filled with shoddy. 176 Nebbia v. The Appellee. If the legislature saw the spread of disease as a great danger and the use of shoddy was a prevalent practice in the manufacture of comforters. 402 (1926). Dissent. Co. is a manufacturer of comforters that use this material as filler and allege that the act is unconstitutional. ‡ Scientific studies showed that any bacteria were eliminated in the sterilization process performed at the end of manufacturing. Synopsis of Rule of Law. All evidence shows that the any harm to the health of the public is eliminated during sterilization. Appellee manufactures nearly 3 million comforters a year of which 750. New York . (Appellee).S. Palmer Bros. Palmer Bros. Yes. Discussion. Co. Issue. 270 U. The provision is ruled unconstitutional because the state's concern and intent for instituting the law was eliminated as a concern by the results of scientific studies. Brief Fact Summary. the restraint is unreasonable and arbitrary. Facts. Does the provision forbidding the use of shoddy in comforters violate the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. A consumer protection act was passed that prohibited the use of shoddy as a filler for comforters. ‡ The government was concerned that these soiled items posed a threat to the health of the public who purchased comforters with this type of stuffing. ‡ Shoddy is comprised of clippings and leftover material from cutting tables. Citation. So.

177 West Coast Hotel Co. But. The modern approach to analyzing the constitutionality of social and economic regulations by states is to presume their validity unless no reasonable set of facts support the reasoning. Does a statute establishing a minimum retail price for milk violate the Constitution? Held. Brief Fact Summary. A state is free to adopt any reasonable economic policy deemed necessary to promote public welfare and to adopt legislation to serve this purpose. 291 U. The Petitioner. was charged with violating this law when he sold 2 quarts of milk below the state minimum. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The state minimum milk price was 9¢ a quart.S. a grocery store owner. This law was passed to curtail the severe price-cutting that occurred as a result of a milk surplus. The law is a reasonable means of preventing "ruthless competition from destroying the market. not the state. New York Citation. The Respondent. 502 (1934). sold 2 quarts for 13¢.Nebbia v. Parrish . The burden of proof is on the individual challenging the law. or unless there is no rational relationship to the articulated purpose of the legislation. New York (Respondent). a clear violation of the statute. No. v. Nebbia (Petitioner). established a minimum retail price for milk. Facts. Petitioner." Discussion. Issue.

Wage and hour laws generally do not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. This case overrules Adkins v. Issue. 178 United States v. 300 U. West Coast Hotel (Appellant). Parrish Citation. The Appellee was a maid who worked for less than the state minimum of $14. Facts. Parrish (Appellee). Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Carolene Products Co. ‡ The exploitation of a class of workers who are at a disadvantaged bargaining position is in the best interest of the health of the worker and economic health of the community. .S. Children's Hospital. Washington instituted a state wage minimum for women and minors. The Appellant. 379 (1937).50 per 48-hour week. v. the state is justified in adopting such legislation to protect the rest of the community from the burden of supporting economically disadvantaged workers. paid the Appellee. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) reverts to reasoning that women are in an inferior position and need to be protected from those who might try to take advantage of the situation.West Coast Hotel Co. Is the fixing of minimum wages for women and minors constitutional? Held. Furthermore. She brought suit to recover the difference in pay from the Appellant. It is important to note that the Depression colored the Supreme Court's analysis. less than this minimum.

Discussion. This was done to prevent potential health hazards to the consuming public. There is sufficient evidence to support the reasoning of Congress that this type of product is a danger to public health and should be eliminated from the market. Congress reviewed over 20 years of evidence indicating that a mixture such as "Milnut" posed a danger to the public health because of the stripping of essential healthful elements. was convicted of the commercial shipment of "Milnut. . (Appellee). Facts. In 1923. the existence of supportive facts is to be presumed. Lee Optical of Oklahoma. Inc. Synopsis of Rule of Law.United States v. ‡ Before passing the regulation. Even if there is no evidence. Does the Filled Milk Act of 1923 violate the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) provides complete deference to the decision making of the legislature and abstains from reviewing data in support of the decision. then it is not the place of the judiciary to second-guess the legislative reasoning. Carolene Products Co. No." This is a product composed of skimmed milk and coconut oil blended together to imitate whole milk or cream. Carolene Products Co. Citation. When evidence exists in support of economic or social legislation. 304 U. Brief Fact Summary. 144 (1938). The Appellee. It is sufficient that a rational basis for the decision be identified.S. Issue. 179 Williamson v. Congress passed an act that prohibited the interstate shipment of skimmed milk mixed with any fat other than milk fat.

348 U. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. v. Is a statute limiting the function of an optician constitutional? Held. Issue. Facts. the Supreme Court provides its own scenarios of "could have happened" during the legislative decision making process. because they run afoul of a particular school of thought. then it is a valid reason for the law. Lee Optical of Oklahoma. Discussion. 483 (1955). Inc. This is an example of how low the burden was eventually lowered for rational basis. As long as it is constitutional. The Oklahoma legislature passed a statute prohibiting opticians from fitting or duplicating eyeglass lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist. The reason for the regulation does not matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will no longer use the Due Process Clause or the 14th Amendment to strike down state laws. Citation. The District Court of Oklahoma held that the regulation limiting the extent of an optician's practice violated the United States Constitution (Constitution) because it was not reasonable or rationally related to the health and welfare of the people.S. Yes. A law need not be logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. regulatory of business and industrial conditions.Williamson v. Gore . Here. 180 BMW of North America. It just needs to be a rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Inc.

BMW (Petitioner). Inc. the reprehensibility was low. In 1990.000 from an authorized dealer in Alabama. Gore (Respondent). Brief Fact Summary. it was placed in company service and later sold as used. v. ‡ On appeal. However. Synopsis of Rule of Law. purchased one these damaged vehicles and was awarded actual damages. The Respondent. This specialist informed Respondent that his car had been painted to cover minor damage to the body.S. Issue. Inc. the Supreme Court of Alabama found Petitioner's conduct reprehensible and that the punitive damage award would not have a substantial impact on the financial viability of the company. sold slightly damaged. (ii) the disparity between the harm or potential harm and (iii) the punitive damage award and the difference between the remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in similar cases. 559 (1996). v. the Respondent purchased a new BMW for $40. Yes. The award is "grossly excessive" as measured by (i) the degree of reprehensibility of the non-disclosure. new cars for full value and never told the buyers about the damage. the Court found the computation of the amount was in error and reduced the award to $2 million accordingly. Punitive damages were determined by estimating that Petitioner had sold approximately 1. But. After 9 months he decided to take the car to a detailer to have it shined and cleaned. The Petitioner. 517 U. the Petitioner admitted that it was company policy to repair any damage to vehicles during shipping. Therefore. 181 BMW of North America. ‡ At trial. Gore Citation. Gore .BMW of North America.000 cars in Alabama for more than they were worth. If the cost of the repair exceeded 3% of the car's retail value. if the cost of repair was less than 3% the car was sold at full retail value. plus $4 million punitive damages. ‡ Actual damages to Respondent were estimated at 10% of the car value based on expert testimony. ‡ The non-disclosure caused only minor economic harm to the Respondent and provided no harm to the health and safety of others. Punitive damages may be imposed to further a state's legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition as long as they are not "grossly excessive." Facts. Does an award of $2 million in punitive damages to the purchaser of one car exceed the constitutional limit? Held.

In TXO Production Corp. ‡ The award is substantially greater than statutory fines available in Alabama for a similar action. The Supreme Court implied that if the conduct results in public harm. Each component weighs the nature of the offense and harm caused or potentially caused against the amount awarded. Campbell . ‡ The Supreme Court develops a three-pronged test to measure excessive punitive awards. Alliance Resources Corp. The Supreme Court has become overly concerned with "punitive damages that have 'run wild'. 182 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.. then the outer limit of excessive is raised. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not guarantee that awards will be fair and cases such as this should be decided and remain in the state courts. Dissent. 2711. But one cannot force its rules on another state and thereby punish a company for practices that are legal in another state. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) determined that a punitive award 4 times the actual damages was close to being excessive. A state has the authority to protect its citizens from deceptive trade practices. v. 509 U. 443.S.‡ The amount of punitive damages awarded is 500 times the amount of Respondent's actual damages." Discussion.Ct. v. 113 S.

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. By doing so. Campbell was driving on the wrong side of the highway. It was determined that Mr. Initially. where full compensatory damages are $1 million.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. an award of $145 million in punitive damages. fraud. The insurance company of the driver at fault. v. Campbell and his wife's appeal. that they had no liability for the accident. 1513 (2003) Brief Fact Summary. the Petitioner. An accident ensued." Facts. v. that [State Farm] would represent their interests. acted inappropriately. Campbell . Those include: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct. [based on the circumstances]. Campbell's unsafe pass caused the accident. State Farm would not post a bond to allow Mr. it he were to bring a "bad faith action against State Farm and to be represented by Slusher's and Ospital's attorneys. and that they did not need to procure separate counsel. the Petitioner refused to pay the excess $135. Campbell and his wife filed suit against the Petitioner. A car accident occurred resulting in the death of one individual. Mr. "[W]hether. who was not injured. and the driver sued the company and was awarded a substantial amount of compensatory and punitive damages. Campbell's insurer. The Campbells retained their own counsel for the appeal. Additionally.000. alleging "bad faith. the three guideposts from [BMW v. Mr. contested liability and declined offers to settle with the estate of the deceased and with the permanently injured individual. The Petitioner assured the Campbells that "their assets were safe. Campbell was 100% at fault and a judgment of $185. and State Farm satisfied the entire judgment. however. and the incapacitation of another. Gore] must be applied. and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 123 S. Campbell") (collectively referred to as the "Campbells") attempted to pass six vans on a two-lane highway. agreed not to satisfy their claims against Mr. The Utah Supreme court reinstated the punitive award.849 was entered against him. Campbell Citation. The Campbells' policy limit was $50." Slusher and Ospital were the representatives of the deceased and the incapacitated victims of the accident. and one individual was killed and another permanently disabled. Curtis Campbell ("Mr. When analyzing the validity of a punitive damage award." The case eventually went to trial. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In 1989. Campbell and his wife were unscathed. Campbell. The trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1 million and the punitive award to $25 million. Mr. the Utah Supreme Court denied Mr. The estate of the deceased and the individual that was incapacitated. (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. (the "Petitioner"). Issue. Despite the outcome of the appeal. and a jury found that Mr.State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." The jury awarded the Campbell's $2. Nonetheless. While driving with his wife. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.849 above the policy limits.Ct. Campbell to appeal the verdict. Mr. is excessive and in violation 183 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident." which it says is the most important of the guideposts. and the harm was the result of intentional malice. "[t]he most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10. the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others. Reprehensibility is judged "by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic. Gore]." The court also found that the punitive damage award could not be upheld under the guise that State Farm was a recidivist. that. which a punitive damages award cannot exceed. the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability. we have no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145to-1 ratio. ' " The court observed. the majority recognized "[o]ur jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate. v. or deceit. the majority recognized the Utah Supreme court "awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells' harm. and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Specifically "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. however." Based on [BMW v." Moreover. ‡ The third and final guidepost concerned the "the disparity between the punitive damages award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. or mere accident. especially since the damages in the case before itwere entirely economic and not physical. will satisfy due process. courts are instructed to examine three "guideposts" when construing the validity of a punitive damage award: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct. few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. to a significant degree. (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award." The court recognized that the $1 million compensatory award was complete compensation. trickery. Yes. [ ] an amount dwarfed by the $145 million 184 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. Campbell . ‡ The court then construed the second guidepost and refused to "impose a bright-line ratio." The court discussed each in turn. ‡ The court first discussed the "reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct. in practice. The court first recognized there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on compensatory and punitive damages awards. "[i]n the context of this case. the reinstatement of the $145 million dollar punitive damage award was excessive." The court then criticized the Utah Supreme Court's condemning of the Petitioner "for its nationwide policies rather than for the conduct directed toward the Campbells.000 fine for an act of fraud.of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States"? Held." Further." However.

Thomas") also filed a dissenting opinion arguing "the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damage awards." ‡ Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. that the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against 'excessive' or 'unreasonable' awards of punitive damages. v. "I would not join the Court's swift conversion of those guides into instructions that begin to resemble marching orders. Gore] factors should be applied. Blaisdell . Inc. Dissent. it did so moderately.' " As such. J. she argued "[t]oday's decision exhibits no such respect and restraint. No longer content to accord state-court judgments 'a strong presumption of validity. Scalia") filed a dissenting opinion adhering to his view expressed in his "dissenting opinion in [BMW of North America. to a significant degree. Ginsburg recognized that "[w]hen the Court first ventured to override state-court punitive damages awards. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J.punitive damages award. Ginsburg") entered a dissenting opinion arguing that punitive damages awards are the prerogative of the states." ‡ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J." Discussion." The court refused to look at criminal penalties in making their assessment." However.' [ ] the Court announces that 'few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. v. This case offers a good example of how the [BMW v. Gore]. will satisfy due process. 185 Home Building & Loan Assn.

v. Generally. 398 (1934). The legislation addressed a legitimate government purpose. Kansas Power & Light Co. Discussion. Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant. (Appellant). v. Synopsis of Rule of Law.Home Building & Loan Assn. No. the Minnesota legislature passed the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law. The law is temporary in operation. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) provides a description of contractual impairment as that which releases a person from contractual obligation. Home Building & Loan Assn. Issue. contests a Minnesota law that prevents mortgage holders from foreclosing on mortgages for a period of twoyears. 186 Energy Reserves Group. Inc. The Depression was a proper emergency situation that warranted the action by Minnesota. The state was justified under the circumstance of the Depression to extend foreclosure timing to protect the economic interests of the state and its citizens. if the state can provide sufficient justification for the interference (such as safeguarding the community for health or economic reasons).S. In response to the Depression. Sales could be postponed and periods of redemption extended except for those loans that were made after the passage of the law. . This law allowed homeowners to seek relief from foreclosure proceedings. A state law may impair the contractual obligations of private parties when there is a legitimate state interest and justification. 290 U. But. Blaisdell Citation. Does this provision violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) by impairing the obligations between private parties in contracts? Held. The contracts affected by this legislation are limited and it does not arbitrarily affect all mortgage contracts. then the law will likely be constitutional. Facts. The time extensions are not unreasonable. a state is not permitted to interfere with private contracts.

The state of Kansas regulated the price of natural gas sold in the intrastate market. had a contract with the Respondent. Kansas Power & Light Co. Citation.Energy Reserves Group. Facts.S. Therefore. No. Also. ‡ Kansas passed a law prohibiting private parties from increasing the contracted gas prices even if the federal government increased the prices. v. Is this provision a violation of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. 459 U. Energy Reserves Group (Petitioner). v. 187 Allied Structural Steel Co. 400 (1983). Kansas Power & Light (Respondent) that allowed the price paid for the gas to increase if federal regulators increased the price to an amount greater than the contract amount. Issue. Price regulation existed and was foreseeable at the time of contracting. It prohibited natural gas producers from charging higher prices even if the federal government set higher prices. Inc. the state has a legitimate interest in correcting any discrepancy between the interstate and intrastate markets. The Petitioner. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. Spannus . Brief Fact Summary. (2) does the impairment serve a significant and legitimate interest and (3) is the law reasonably related to the legitimate state purpose. A state law restricting ones profit expectations is not a substantial impairment of a contractual obligation. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) articulates a three-part test for determining when a state government interferes with private contracts: (1) is there a substantial impairment of the contractual provisions. the Kansas law did not impair Petitioner's contractual expectations.

234 (1978). Does Minnesota's Act violate the Contract Clause? Held. Yes. (Appellant). Brennan observed that the burden on companies is small. Spannus . Brief Fact Summary. but they had worked for the company for 10 years. the state charged Appellant a fee of $185. v. ‡ In the summer of 1974.000 under the Act. Brennan) argued that the Act was designed to prevent corporations from obtaining a windfall by closing shops early and eliminating pension contributions. In order for the contract clause to remain viable. The Appellant funded a pension plan for all employees. In 1974. ‡ Minnesota passed a law requiring any employer with more than 100 employees who provided pension benefits. Allied Structural Steel Co. in that employment termination could not affect the right to receive the money. The Supreme Court of the United States observed that the Act nullified express terms of the company's contractual obligations and imposed a completely unexpected liability in potentially disabling amount. even though the state is exercising its otherwise legitimate police power. Also. if must be understood to impose certain limits upon the power of states to interfere with existing contractual relationship. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. J. v. administered its own pension plan for its employees. So. to pay a pension funding charge if the funds were insufficient to cover all employees who had worked for at least 10 years with the company. 438 U. But. the Appellant closed its Minnesota office. Justice William Brennan (J. permanent and immediate change in the contractual relationship. At age 65 each employee was entitled to receive a pension equal to 1% of their average monthly salary. The Act substantially altered the employer's obligation to the employees by retroactively modifying the funding of the pension plan. Spannus Citation. Dissent.Allied Structural Steel Co. Facts.S. the law was not designed to remedy a generalized economic or social problem. Furthermore. That same year the Appellant closed its office in the state and was fined accordingly. This resulted in a severe. Nine of the employees did not have vested rights under the company's plan. Minnesota passed the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act (the Act) that would penalize large employers who did not have enough funds to cover the pension of all employees who had worked for a company for at least 10 years. multiplied the number of years of service. the company was free to terminate the pension plan at any time for any reason. The Appellant. The pension right became vested. 188 Allied Structural Steel Co.

398 (1934). 290 U.The companies expected to contribute to the funds and the Act just ensures that all qualified employees actually have an interest available to them. v. Here. v. 189 United States Trust Co.S. New Jersey . The state must provide a significant justification for interfering with the contracts of individuals. Blaisdell. there was no emergency or crisis that warranted such an interference with the pension funds of companies. The majority relies on the analysis of Home Building & Loan Assn. to support its conclusion here. Discussion.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Petitioner argued that this changed the state's contractual obligation to repay the bonds. special scrutiny exists when the changes might affect the state's own contractual obligations. Only where the state's promise is not purely financial. The Petitioners. v. the reservation of tolls was purely financial. The majority 190 United States Trust Co. Brief Fact Summary. the United States Trust Company of New York and various bondholders (Petitioners). New York and New Jersey formed a Port Authority (Authority). Dissent. may the state impair its own debts. nor should it be used to overrule sound legislative decision-making. States are free to change and repeal laws. originally passed a law prohibiting the use of toll revenue to pay for railroad passenger service upgrades and maintenance. Here. However. v. during the energy crisis of the 1970's. However. the state of New Jersey (Respondent). which repealed the original legislation and allowed the toll revenue to be used to upgrade and maintain the railroad system. The Contract Clause should not be used to preserve a property right of third parties who contract with the government. States cannot impair their debts merely because they would prefer to spend their money in a different manner. A less drastic alternative was available to achieve the state's goal. This repeal was not a necessary or reasonable means of achieving the goal of encouraging citizens to use the transit system instead of automobiles.United States Trust Co. A state cannot refuse to meet its contractual obligations to private creditors simply because it would prefer to spend the money for the greater good of the community. both New York and New Jersey passed laws. In that case. 431 U. in the 1970's. the Authority took over a financially troubled. Issue. which may affect existing contracts so long as reasonable conditions and public interests justify its enactment. privately owned commuter train. Government interference with government contracts is subject to greater scrutiny than when the interference concerns a contract between private parties. The Respondent. The Contract Clause does not prevent a state from enacting legislation. 1 (1977). The situation is different when it comes to the state impairing its own contracts. In 1960. brought suit alleging that the repeal of the original legislation violated the Contract Clause in that it impaired their rights to payment on the bonds. Does the repeal of the earlier legislation impair the obligation of New Jersey to the bondholders? Held. Yes. the nature of the contract must be scrutinized. Facts. In 1962 New York and New Jersey entered a contractual arrangement not to finance railroad deficits with revenue pledged to make bond payments.S. Discussion. it passed a subsequent law allowing the tolls to pay for upgrades. However. New Jersey . New Jersey Citation. Bonds were sold to support the independent authority and bridge and tunnel tolls were pledged to protect the bondholders.

.focuses on the self-interest the state may have when changing statutes that impact their financial responsibilities to private parties. 191 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.

192 Pennsylvania Coal Co. Mahon . A permanent physical occupation of real property that is authorized by the government is a taking within the constructs of the United States Constitution (Constitution) regardless of the public interests that may be served. would obtain permission from property owners to run cable through their premises. ‡ In 1973. Dissent. Brief Fact Summary. but permanent physical occupation of property under the authorization of the government constitute a "taking"? Held. v. Discussion. Permanency results in a per se taking. 419 (1982). Respondent's installation of cable is a taking because the cable occupies space within and upon the building. the New York legislature passed an act stipulating that a landlord "could not interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property.S. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that this does not amount to a taking of the property. Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. This decision relies upon the subjective analysis of whether property was permanently occupied or temporarily invaded." ‡ The Court of Appeals concluded that the act was a legitimate exercise of the state's police powers. Facts. 458 U. A New York law requires a landlord to permit a cable TV line be run through the property. Yes. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV (Respondent). This is a taking because the landlord had no choice but to surrender a portion of his building to the Respondent. The fact that the state wished to provide a public service is of no consequence. Issue.Loretto v. for this permission the Respondent would pay the owners 5% of the gross revenue recognized from the installation of cable in the apartment buildings. but temporary occupation is open to interpretation. Does a minor. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. Prior to 1973 the Respondent. In exchange. This analysis is illogical. The majority is unconcerned with the reason for installing the cable.

so it is not a taking. the government is not confiscating or making use of the land. Facts. Does this act result in a taking of the coal company's property rights? Held. v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Yes. 260 U. the state passed a legislative act in 1921 that prohibited the mining of land that might result in the sinking of the land where a person's home was located. Respondent bought the rights to the surface of the land in question from Petitioner and subsequently built his home on it. Issue. The regulation is narrowly constructed to protect only those that acquired surface rights. But. But. Discussion. The Petitioner. Brief Fact Summary. it would be improper to provide a person who assumed the risk of acquiring only surface rights with greater rights than they bought. But Respondent claims that Petitioner lost this right when the state passed legislation that forbids mining when it might cause the land to collapse. Pennsylvania Coal (Petitioner). The legislation is not a taking as it is designed to protect the public from harm. Here. Mahon Citation. wants to mine under the Respondent. Also. this is an interference with the bargain of the sales contract. home for coal. 193 Miller v. The Respondent took the chance there would be coal under his home and agreed to let the Petitioner mine for it.Pennsylvania Coal Co. Mahon's (Respondent). A taking can result from regulation of property that seriously interferes with the use or enjoyment of the property by the owner. Dissent. Whether a regulation goes too far and becomes a taking is a question of degree.S. Schoene . Petitioner reserved the rights to remove any and all coal located beneath Respondent's home. 393 (1922).

When forced to choose. Issue. No. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law.S. Discussion. The statute did not provide any compensation to the property owners. The owners of the trees were not compensated. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) weighs each of these factors to reach its conclusion. 276 U. Facts. There are 3 factors to consider when determining if a taking exists: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with expectations and (3) the character of the governmental action. Schoene Citation. This construct helps explain the differing result found in Pennsylvania Coal. The Respondent. Reduction in value of property does not equate to a taking. but they were allowed to keep the wood to use as they chose. 272 (1928). Schoene (Respondent). but allowed to keep the chopped wood for their use. Does this regulation result in a taking? Held.Miller v. The Cedar Rust Act of Virginia allowed for the removal of infected red cedar trees from the property near orchards in an attempt to prevent the dissemination of plant disease. 194 Penn Central Transportation Co. is of greater value to the public. the state does not exceed its power by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another. acting under Virginia state statute. cut down a number of red cedar trees in hopes of preventing the spread of disease to nearby apple orchards. which in its opinion. v. Here. New York City .

In 1968. Issue. Discussion. New York City Citation. then it does not result in a taking. the Respondent has a legitimate interest in preserving the general welfare by continuing the current use of the Terminal asis. 104 (1978).Penn Central Transportation Co. The Respondent. South Carolina Coastal Council . v. If the restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate public interest. the Petitioner entered into a 50-year lease agreement with a British company to construct a multistory office building on the top of the existing terminal. the application to build was denied. Synopsis of Rule of Law. But. Facts. Diminution in property value alone does not establish a taking. Brief Fact Summary. Penn Central Transportation (Petitioner). 438 U. Dissent. New York City (Respondent). The Respondent is not interfering with the current use or economic value of the property. The restrictions do not interfere with the present use of the Terminal. 195 Lucas v. It still allows Petitioner to profit from the Terminal and obtain a "reasonable return" from its investment. Furthermore. passed a regulation that prevented the Petitioner. This is a taking because the Respondent is asking companies like the Petitioner to bear the cost of maintaining designated historical landmarks throughout the city. The Petitioner's argument that it is being denied the opportunity to further develop the property for economic gain is not a sufficient intrusion upon the property. The cost should be borne by the citizens of the city that insists these locations remain unchanged. May a city place restrictions on the development of individual historic landmarks without effecting a taking requiring just compensation? Held. Yes. The plan was to increase revenue by renting the office space.S. from adding an office building structure to the top of Grand Central Station.

City of Tigard .000 in 1986. in 1988 the South Carolina legislature passed the Beachfront Management Act (the Act) that barred the building. Issue. since a state's common law principles would not prohibit the Petitioner from building on the land. It is unreasonable for a state to prohibit the owner from using the land as he originally intended. The majority describes two types of regulation that are considered takings: (1) where the property owner suffers a physical invasion of his property and (2) where the regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the property. was not allowed to build homes on the South Carolina beachfront property he owned. Lucas (Petitioner). The Act's stated purpose was to protect property from storms. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Facts. Regulation of land use must account for owners' traditional understanding as to the states power over their property rights. If a regulation prohibits all economically beneficial use of land and the proscribed use could not have been prohibited under a given state's nuisance law. Discussion. But. The Supreme Court of the United State (Supreme Court) observed that mandated preservation of private land looks like a conversion of private property to public. unless it can be shown that this use results in a nuisance or that general property law prohibits such a use. A state trial court found that the land was valueless as a result of the regulation of the Respondent. South Carolina Coastal Council Citation. a classic taking. The Petitioner. The Petitioner purchased two beachfront lots for $975. The majority also focuses on the original intent and plans of the property owner to preserve the common law property rights as a means of determining whether a taking exists. then a taking has occurred. However. Yes. Does the no-build regulation result in a compensable taking? Held. the South Carolina Coastal Council (Respondent). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Blackmun) argued that the majority has created a new rule and exception that are not based on precedent and would apply in a very situation that does not exist in this case.Lucas v. 505 U. the regulation is a "taking" which requires "just compensation" to be paid to the landowner. here. He intended to build single-family homes on each lot.S. The Petitioner did claims that the passage of the Act resulted in a taking of the property since he cannot use it for the intended purpose. Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner did not challenge the state's right to pass the Act or its justifications for doing so. 1003 (1992). 196 Dolan v. tides and beach erosion and as an environmental protection. Dissent. By way of example the Supreme Court stated that the owner of a lake bed is always aware that he may be stopped by law from flooding adjacent property to create a landfill.

Does this specific required right-of-way easement amount to a taking? ‡ Does an "essential nexus" exist between the "legitimate state interest" and the permit? ‡ If so. Respondent later noted that automobile traffic was increasing and decided to encourage alternative methods of transportation by building a bicycle and walking path along the business corridor. No. approximately 10%. 512 U. then what is the required degree of connection between the easement and the projected impact of the proposed development? Held. applied for a permit to expand the size of her commercial building. ‡ Petitioner owns a plumbing and electric supply store in the Central Business District and within the 100-year flood plain. She applied for a permit to double the size of her establishment. City of Tigard (Respondent). Issue. City of Tigard . ‡ The prevention of flooding is a legitimate interest especially since Petitioner plans to surface her parking lot and expand the amount of impervious surface in the flood plain.Dolan v. Respondent approved the permit. The same is true for the pathway because it serves a legitimate purpose of reducing traffic. But.000 square feet. Generally. of Petitioner's property for easements. This goal was achieved by requiring new business development to donate land for the pathway.S. Respondent codified a development plan in its land use regulations. City of Tigard Citation. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. but conditioned it on the dedication of 7. Respondent also adopted a Master Drainage Plan for the flood plain located around the creek. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Respondent. The Petitioner. no taking will result if the government can show that the requirement is roughly proportional to the impact of the development on the community. 374 (1994). the code requires that businesses located within the Central Business district devote 15% of their land to open space and landscaping. Dolan (Petitioner). 197 Dolan v. approved the permit on the condition that Petitioner dedicate 10% of the total land area to the city for a bike path and drain. In particular. a required easement will result in a taking because it is a permanent physical invasion of the private property. ‡ The requirement must be "roughly proportional" to the impact of the new development.

The burden of demonstrating that the property owner has been unreasonably impaired should stay with the property owner. 198 Palazzolo v. it finds the "reasonable relationship" test is too easily confused with the low level of scrutiny required for the "rational basis" test. On the other hand. So.Dissent. Rhode Island . the majority chooses a compromise that is more closely akin to a rational relationship. The majority shuns the use of a strict "specific and uniquely attributable" test because it is too rigorous given the nature of the interests. It is not the state's responsibility to go beyond showing a rational. impartial reasoning for its land use specifications. Discussion.

" Issue. 606 Brief Fact Summary. Rhode Island Citation. Under Rhode Island law. Kennedy observed "we have given some. binding upon the State through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. one was to develop a private beach club. the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations. and the character of the government action.Palazzolo v. A developer needed a "special exception" from the Council to fill a salt marsh. alleging that the State of Rhode Island's wetland regulations as applied by the Respondent to his parcel of land. we have observed. that a regulation 'den[ying] all economically beneficial or productive use of land' will require compensation under the Takings Clause." The special exception was refused. salt marshes on the property would have to have been filled. the Petitioner sued in state court asserting that the Respondent's "application of its wetlands regulations took the property without compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Petitioner owns a piece of land on the waterfront in Westerly." J. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use. J. First. Rhode Island . Of the Petitioner's many proposals to develop the property. Rhode Island. Were the "[s]tate's wetlands regulations. and after the rejection. No. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (the "Respondent"). but his multiple attempts to do so were rejected by the Respondent. guidance to courts confronted with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory taking. Kennedy also held (i) the claim was ripe and (ii) the "claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective 199 Palazzolo v. 533 U. a taking nonetheless may have occurred. Anthony Palazzolo (the "Petitioner"). with certain qualifications. violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). but not too specific. Facts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. as applied by the [Respondent] to [the Petitioner's] parcel [a taking of] property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?" Held. A "special exception" was only granted if the proposed activity serves "a compelling public purpose which provides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to individual or private interests. Kennedy") wrote the majority opinion and recognized "[t]he owner is not deprived of all economic use of his property because the value of upland portions is substantial" and as such the case must be remanded for consideration under the [Penn Central] principles. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. In order to do so. a deprivation of all value does not lie. The Petitioner. depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner. almost all the of the Petitioner's property is designated coastal wetlands.S. If an owner of property "is not deprived of all economic use of his property because the value of upland portions is substantial". The Petitioner sought to develop the land. sued the Respondent.

Scalia argued "the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title « should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking. inexplicably. Further. not an unconstitutional total taking) by the government." Concurrence. O'Connor interprets the majority's decision as not removing the "regulatory backdrop against which an owner takes title to property from the purview of the [Penn Central] inquiry. interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine. "[a] blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken. the petitioner is not the appropriate party to bring this action and as such did not have standing. O'Connor's opinion.]" Thus.date of the state-imposed restriction. It is interesting to observe how the different justices apply [Penn Central] to the facts of this takings case. the salience of these facts cannot be reduced to any 'set formula. Discussion. O'Connor recognized that a more difficult question as presented by this case." J. It simply restores balance to that inquiry. As before. Courts properly consider the effect of existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expectations in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred." In other words. J. the owner of the property at the time the regulation was passed is the correct party. v. the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.' to allow a subsequent purchaser to nullify an unconstitutional partial taking (though.' " ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. O'Connor") filed a concurring opinion. J. Stevens didc not agree that "a succeeding owner may obtain compensation for a taking of property from her predecessor in interest" because a "taking is a discrete event" that "occurs at a particular time[. "what role the temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition plays in a proper [Penn Central] analysis. Rather. Inc.' and produce unacceptable 'windfalls. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. Scalia") also filed a concurring opinion specifically disagreeing with the main principle underlying J. "that it may be in some (unspecified) circumstance be '[un]fai[r]. Stevens") concurred in part and dissented in part. O'Connor argues that "[o]ur polestar instead remains the principles set forth in [Penn Central] itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings." ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency . Under these cases." J. 200 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. The 'investment-backed expectations' that the law will take into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional." J.

The result of these two ordinances was to stop development on virtually all property subject to the Respondent's jurisdiction for a period of 32 months. This matter involved two ordinances passed by the Respondent. the government has a "categorical duty to compensate the former owner" regardless of whether the entire piece or only a portion of the piece of property is taken. "[W]hether a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution"? Held. Stevens"). first observed that this dispute must be analyzed under the [Penn Central] framework despite the Petitioner's argument that [Lucas v. Inc. are entirely factual and require an analysis of the "purposes and economic effects of the government actions. Development. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. Stevens observed. makes it 201 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Citation. retirement or vacation residence". 1983 and the second was effective from August 27. Stevens then distinguished between two types of takings cases governed by the Fifth Amendment ± physical takings and regulatory takings. but with respect to that factor as with respect to other factors. writing for the majority. 302 (2002) Brief Fact Summary. Those owners bought the land near the lake for the purpose of building "at a time of their choosing" a single-family home "to serve as a permanent. The purpose of the ordinance was to preserve the lake in its pristine state. Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council (the "Petitioners"). a case applying a categorical rule. however. "the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim. This is a hard and fast rule. those takings that do not constitute a "categorical taking". requiring the maintenance of the status quo while studying the impact of development on lake Tahoe. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency .Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. On the other hand. is applicable. and regulations prohibiting private uses. The Petitioners. 1983 to April 25.000 owners of improved and unimproved parcels of real estate.' " Issue. brought suit on behalf 2. on the other. As to physical takings. The first ordinance was effective from August 24. The validity of a moratorium passed by a planning agency on development around Lake Tahoe was at issue. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (the "Respondent"). At the time of their purchases. Pursuant to [Penn Central]. regulatory takings. on the one hand. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The ordinances banned development on two main types of land. until August 26. the 'temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.S. the owners "did so with the understanding that such construction was authorized provided that 'they complied with all reasonable requirements for building.' " Facts. Inc. 1984. J. v. 1981." J. South Carolina Coastal Council]. "high hazard" lands and "Stream Environment Zones" ("SEZ"). over the years had dramatically affected the clarity of the lake. v. 535 U. "[t]his longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use.

Inc." This rule would encompass "numerous normal delays in obtaining building permits. Stevens then concluded that the 32-month moratorium applicable in this matter." Further. He stated "[l]ogically. the 'temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted. "[a] rule that required compensation for every delay in the use of property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking. or other areas that we cannot now foresee." The court then emphasized the word "no" and recognized that the court in a footnote said that "no" meant 100% not 95%.' and vice versa." ‡ The [Lucas] rule "states that compensation is required when a regulation deprives an owner of 'all economically beneficial uses' of his land. fire-damaged buildings. does not satisfy the [Lucas] 100% requirement. no matter how brief.' " Generally a moratoria of more than one year must be viewed with skepticism. J. but as the District Court's opinion illustrates. petitioners' proposed rule is simply 'too blunt an instrument' for identifying those cases. Anything less than full elimination of value would result in application of [Penn Central]. businesses that violate health codes. rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. v. that must be balanced against the importance of informed and deliberate decision making. ‡ The majority refuses to adopt the rule that "any deprivation of all economic use. constitutes a compensable taking." 202 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council. Along those lines. the majority recognized "[t]here may be moratoria that last longer than one year which interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency . changes in zoning ordinances." As such.' " " ‡ J." Instead." The court refused to treat the land use regulations before them "as per se takings [because this treatment] would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford. the [Penn Central] framework must be applied. a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use." "The outcome instead 'depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case. but with respect to that factor as with respect to other factors. But our holding was limited to "the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted. and the like"." "Under that rule. because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted. However.inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a 'regulatory taking. a statute that 'wholly eliminated the value' of Lucas' fee simple title clearly qualified as a taking. the majority observed "we have eschewed 'any set formula' for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government. Stevens observed "the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim. "orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes. Additionally. variances.

land-use planning devices" would be considered takings. that such a delay "does not resemble any traditional land-use planning device. short-term." Discussion. Rehnquist") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. the majority said the taking was only temporary.Dissent. Rehnquist also criticized the majority's argument that if the Petitioner's argument is accepted. Thomas"). Scalia") and Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. Instead. Rehnquist also opposed the majority's refusal to apply [Lucas] where it was admitted that for the three-year period the Petitioners' did not have any economically viable use for their land. It is very interesting to read the majority and dissenting opinions along side one another and recognize how differently they apply taking clause precedents. J. J. The dissenting justices found there was a taking because the Petitioners had not been able to build on their land for about six years. The dissenting justices argued that this worry is misplaced because there are "other background principles of state property law that prevent the delay from being deemed a taking." They criticized the majority for not inquiring into how far the regulation actually goes. Additionally. Midkiff . and the dissent was adamant this description is inappropriate. and disagreed with the majority's 32 month finding. "traditional. 203 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Judge William Rehnquist ("J.

S. Facts. The Petitioner. Ones property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 229 (1984). The result of this was a monopolized real estate market that improperly inflated rates. Discussion.Hawaii Housing Authority v. even though compensation was paid. but to attack perceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii. Issue. Legal Foundation of Washington . This is a legitimate public purpose. Brief Fact Summary. The price had to equal the fair market value of the owner's leased fee interest and Petitioner could not sell more than one parcel to any one purchaser or lessee. forced landowners such as the Respondent. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) determined that the exercise of eminent domain was an appropriate action by the state to rectify this public harm. Midkiff (Respondent). 467 U. This was done in an effort to spread land ownership more evenly amongst the islands' inhabitants. No. The social evil is the concentration of landownership in only a small group of people. Hawaii Housing Authority (Petitioner). Is the transferring of title from lessors to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of ownership of fees simple a taking by the state of Hawaii? Held. 204 Brown v. So. The land ownership of the Hawaiian Islands is concentrated in a small group of descendants of Polynesian chieftains. to sell parcels of their land to those who were leasing the land. In order to spread land ownership to more people." Sale prices were set by either a condemnation trial or by negotiation between the lessor and lessees. Midkiff Citation. The Hawaii Legislature enacted its Land Reform Act not to benefit a particular class of individuals. Petitioner could condemn the property and sell the parcels to the lessees to "effectuate the public purposes. They subsequently lease their land to a multitude of homeowners by parcel.

(b) the requirement that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. ‡ On the other hand. (c) the requirement that the lawyers direct the banks to pay the net interest on the IOLTA accounts to the Legal Foundation of Washington (Foundation). Facts. The state of Washington's program was established by the Washington Supreme court. not the governments gain is how "just compensation" is measured.related charitable and educational purposes. use IOLTA to pay for legal services for the needy.Brown v. only the taking of property without "just compensation". There are four essential features of Washington state's IOLTA program: "(a) the requirement that all client funds be deposited in interest-bearing trust accounts." Since Washington's law "requires client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account" it cannot be a "regulatory taking". Legal Foundation of Washington . and allowing that money to be used to pay for legal services for the needy was challenged as an invalid taking. could be a per se taking requiring the payment of 'just compensation' to the client. 216 Brief Fact Summary. ‡ Based on the above. Washington Legal Foundation]. no net interest can be earned by the money that is placed in IOLTA accounts in Washington. Most states. In [Phillips v. "[a] law that requires that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use. and (d) the requirement that the Foundation must use all funds received from IOLTA accounts for tax-exempt law. the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") found that the interest generated from IOLTA accounts is the property of the owner of the principal. Since Washington's law "requires client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account" it cannot be a "regulatory taking". Stevens") writing for the majority observes the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the taking of property.' " 205 Brown v. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. the court observes that if "petitioners' net loss was zero. Whether a states' taking of IOLTA interest constitutes an unlawful taking requiring "just th compensation" pursuant to the 5 Amendment? Held." Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law." The court held "(1) that just compensation is measured by the net value of the interest that was actually earned by petitioners and (2) that. by operation of the Washington IOLTA Rules. The property owner's loss. A state law authorizing the creation of interest on lawyers' trust accounts ("IOLTA"). Legal Foundation of Washington Citation. however.S. including the state of Washington. the compensation that is due is also zero. No. 518 U.

and Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. 206 ." Discussion. Rehnquist"). on the ground that the former owners suffered no 'net loss' because their confiscated property was created by the beneficence of a state regulatory program.Dissent. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. Kennedy"). without paying compensation. Thomas"). In so holding the Court creates a novel exception to our oft-repeated rule that the just compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken. Scalia") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice William Rehnquist ("J. Scalia observes "[t]he Court today concludes that the State of Washington may seize private property. This case offers an interesting look at how the Fifth Amendment's takings clause extends further than just to the taking of real property. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. J.

the legislation is constitutional as long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate state interest. By singling out a group and denying them the protected class status has the Colorado amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. the Respondent defended citing the newly enacted state law. was not leased an apartment by the Respondent.S. But. Colorado passed a constitutional amendment that repealed all prior provisions that designated homosexuals as protected class for Equal Protection purposes. This is the exact type of action that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) is supposed to thwart. Yes. A law declaring that it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than all others to seek aid from the government is a denial of equal protection in the most literal sense. 207 Romer v. Brief Fact Summary. Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals to make them unequal to everyone else and does not further a proper legislative end. Facts. Evans . 517 U. Evans Citation. The majority indicates that this amendment results in discrimination against a group because it singles them out and denies them protection of the law. ‡ Petitioner was denied housing because of his sexual orientation and brought a claim against Respondent under the municipal code. Equal Protection Romer v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class. The majority is bending the Constitution to fit the current fashion of including homosexuals as part of the protected class. The law is too broad to be held useful to achieve any goal. Romer (Petitioner). 620 (1996). Meanwhile. the state passed legislation that denied homosexuals protected class status. Evans (Respondent) because of his sexual orientation. Judicial precedent indicates that the states have always been free to enact laws barring certain groups from preferential treatment. Issue. Dissent. The group's recourse is to petition the lawmakers to amend or repeal prior acts. Several municipalities in Colorado had passed legislation that banned discrimination against homosexuals in housing transactions. The Petitioner.CHAPTER VII.

Fritz Citation. 449 U. Congress could properly determine that those who had acquired entitlement to the retirement benefits while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater equitable claim to those benefits than those who became eligible only once they qualified for social security benefits. No. plus social security. but insists that the actual original reason for the classification must be presented. Was the classification of railroad workers by Congress arbitrary and irrational resulting in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. in 1974.S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any classification is presumed valid as long as there is some plausible reason for the act. Some of these individuals were allowed to continue to receive windfall payments. 209 Railway Express Agency. But. Congress became concerned that the system would be bankrupt if payments continued in this manner. The "current connection" test is not arbitrary and has been used before. it enacted the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 that classified all railroad workers based on years of service and retirement status. 166 (1980). It is improper to simply accept the reasons now provided by government attorneys. The majority shows that extreme deference is given to the legislature when analyzing social or economic acts. Congress needs just a rational basis for its social and economic legislation. Discussion. while others were limited to the lesser amount of the retirement fund or social security. The original railroad retirement fund allowed workers who had worked for the railroad at some point in their careers to receive a pension. So. Inc v. Therefore. Dissent.208 United States Railroad Retirement Board v. The retirement fund for railroad employees originally provided a windfall for those who were eligible for social security and railroad benefits. Issue. Fritz United States Railroad Retirement Board v. In 1974. Brief Fact Summary. The legislature never has to state the reasoning for a law under the rational basis test. Agrees that the proper test is the rational basis test. Facts. This created a windfall payment to retired railroad workers. plus a pension available from another employer. New York . legislation was enacted to reduce the costs and make the program financially viable. Congress determined that the system would be bankrupt by 1981 if it continued to pay the windfall.

New York Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Appellant operates about 1. Concurrence. recently passed a law forbidding advertising vehicles when the advertisements were not related to the business of the vehicle. 336 U. Beazer . By classifying the types of advertisements on vehicles. The Appellant. sells advertising space on the side of its trucks.S. Railway Express Agency (Appellant). has the Appellee violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. This classification is proper because the law is on an evolutionary path and may be refined later to include a larger population of advertisers and vehicle operators. Issue. Brief Fact Summary.Railway Express Agency. Appellant sold the use of the sides of the truck as advertising billboards to its clients. The majority describes this law as being narrowly construed to target a particular group of advertisers. Inc v.900 delivery trucks in New York City. To increase revenue. The burden of showing unreasonableness should always be on the person questioning the regulation. Facts. Discussion. 210 New York City Transit Authority v. Even a law that appears to be too narrowly drawn will survive rational basis review because complete deference is given to the state for its reasoning. New York (Appellee). Appellee passed a law specifically prohibiting such advertising unless it was connected to the business of the vehicle. 106 (1949). No. This classification has a relation to the purpose for which it was made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution protects. The Appellee.

The Petitioner has a legitimate interest in the safety of the services provided. The special classification created by Petitioner's rule serves the general objective of safety and efficiency. New York City Transit Authority (Petitioner). Moreno . Does Petitioner's hiring policy violate the Equal Protection Clause by refusing employment to methadone users? Held. Brief Fact Summary. 211 United States Department of Agriculture v. Discussion. when they no longer have the same traits as active users. this does not invalidate the entire rule. the majority is reluctant to impose judicial judgment over that of the business' management. The Petitioner. The Respondent. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A rule will violate the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution if it circumscribes a class of persons according an unpopular trait or affiliation. refuses to employ methadone users. even though the available positions may have had no safety responsibility. but still has a high failure rate. Beazer Citation. 568 (1979).S. The majority indicates that just because a rule may create sub-classifications that are not as closely connected to achieving the legitimate interest. Issue.New York City Transit Authority v. exceeding 25%. Facts. Respondent applied for a job with Petitioner and was denied because he was being treated for a drug addiction with methadone. No. It is improper to classify those who are on methadone treatment as a drug user. 440 U. This treatment is an effective cure for the addiction. brings suit on behalf of all methadone users who might work for Petitioner under the auspice that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Beazer (Respondent). This discriminates against them as potential employees. Dissent.

Issue. This change is rationally related to the prevention of fraud caused by unrelated groups pooling their resources. Dissent. was receiving food stamps from the Appellant. ‡ The Appellee was a 56-year old diabetic who lived with a single mother of 3 small children. But. A household originally was defined as "a group of related or unrelated individuals. the United States Department of Agriculture (Appellant). Texas v. the Appellant changed the definition of household to include only those groups of related persons living together. Moreno Citation. It provided assistance to all households below a certain income level. Moreno (Appellee). The Food Stamp Act has complete sections devoted to such purpose. Does this classification of "household" violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. now her food stamps have been discontinued and the family will loose its ration if it continues to allow the Appellee to live with them. The Appellee. 528 (1973). Cleburne Living Center. Discrimination against a politically unpopular group is not a constitutionally permissible government interest. the Appellant changed the definition of household and Appellee lost all program assistance. The Congress may not pass bills designed to purposely harm a politically unpopular group regardless of the reason. Discussion. who are not residents of an institution or boarding house. Yes. Inc. 413 U. In 1971. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brief Fact Summary.United States Department of Agriculture v. 212 City of Cleburne.S." In 1971. she and the mother received food stamp assistance. The majority recognizes that the intent of this amendment was to discriminate against hippie communes. In 1964 the food stamp program was established. The fact that there might be unintended consequences does not make the change unconstitutional. This will fail the rational basis test. Facts. This classification simply does not operate as to rationally prevent the prevention of fraud. Prior to the change. This is an exception to the rational basis low level of scrutiny seen in previous cases. .

for the establishment of a group home for the mentally retarded in the community. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Facts. Is the mentally retarded part of a "quasi-suspect" class subject to a higher scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause? ‡ Is the special use permit requirement constitutional? Held. Sandford . Legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The Respondent bought a property from a private owner with the intention of starting a group home for the mentally retarded. As a group they have been able to attract the attention of lawmakers on several issues. It was expected that 13 persons would reside in the house of 4 bedrooms and 2 baths. City of Cleburne (Petitioner). The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit determined that this group is a "quasi-suspect" class and that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution).S. Cleburne Living Center (Respondent). Inc. ‡ No. No. It is clear that the only reason this permit was required was because the mentally retarded were involved. Petitioner required Respondent to apply for a special use permit and then denied the application. Texas v. 213 Dred Scott v. 432 (1985). 473 U. The mentally retarded do not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class because the lack of history of discrimination and they are not politically powerless. Brief Fact Summary. Issue. denied a special use permit to the Respondent. There is no rational basis for requiring this particular group home to have a permit when other similar arrangements are not required to do so.City of Cleburne. The Petitioner. This is a group that has political clout and has not suffered from prejudice in the past. Cleburne Living Center. Citation. Discussion.

Sandford Citation. When his owner died. Discussion. United States . in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 214 Korematsu v. was a slave who was taken to Illinois before the Civil War. 60 U. The original framers of the United States Constitution (Constitution) were clear in their words and actions. The Petitioner.S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Petitioner was a slave in Missouri and later taken to Illinois. he attempted to sue the executor of the estate. No. Issue.Dred Scott v. "All men" included the dominant race and not the Africans who were imported as slaves. He attempted to bring suit in a court of law to establish that he was a citizen of the state of Illinois and a free man. the Respondent Sandford (Respondent). They are still property as they were originally. The Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional and slaves are property not citizens. Is Petitioner a citizen of the United States and entitled to use of the federal court system? Held. Brief Fact Summary. Dred Scott (Petitioner). The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) simply did not recognize slaves as people and did not agree that indentured servitude needed to be eliminated. Facts. 393 (1856).

because of the intense concern for national security at the time. the power to protect the United States must be commensurate with the threatened danger. all of the group were excluded from the area.S. Dissent. But. Synopsis of Rule of Law. But. a law forcing all people of a particular race to leave an area would violate the United States Constitution (Constitution). 215 Loving v. Legal restrictions that interfere with the civil rights of a single racial group are subject to strict scrutiny. The military should have discretion to make decisions. these folks were asked to leave.Korematsu v. There was evidence of disloyalty in the group. First. No. The Petitioner refused to leave his home and was convicted in federal court for staying at his home. United States Citation. Virginia . Murphy) stated that the regulation is an example of racism. The General felt that curfews imposed at the time were not sufficient to protect the area from the dangers of espionage and sabotage. The Petitioner. the Commanding General of the Western Command of the United States Army decided that all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from the military area of San Leandro. 214 (1944). The appropriate test for this situation is "the public danger should have been so immediate. the United States (Respondent). but the specific persons could not be readily identified in an expedited manner. Korematsu (Petitioner). 1942. pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions. Normally. The majority creates an exclusion for this case. When under conditions of war on homeland soil. ‡ Justice Robert Jackson (J. imminent and impending" that a delay would have been devastating. Discussion. but it appears that this was ignored and that persons may have sabotaged the military integrity of the West Coast. was forced to leave his home that was located in a military area in California. Issue. claimed that the expulsion was necessary in the time of war. the government tried imposing a curfew. 323 U. a Japanese-American. Brief Fact Summary. Was it beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did? Held. Justice Frank Murphy (J. there are limits to the military's power. but when martial law has not been declared within an area. So. The Respondent. ‡ Petitioner was not excluded from the area because of hostility to him or his race. Facts. Jackson) said that the Petitioner was convicted of a crime that would not have been a crime had he been of a different race. The Petitioner claims that this rule was racially discriminatory. On May 9. California.

they were indicted for violating the state law against interracial marriages and later sentenced to one year in jail. the state of Virginia (Respondent). But the trial judge suspended the sentence for 25 years. Sidoti . Discussion. are a married interracial couple. The purpose of the law is clearly stated as to preserve the integrity of the white race especially since it does not prohibit interracial marriages between any of the other races.S. and were convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting mixed marriages. 388 U. Yes. Issue. The justification provided by the state is an obvious endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy and is impermissible. In the fall of that year.C. were both residents of Virginia. They returned to Virginia after marrying in Washington. Loving (Petitioner). They were married in Washington. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) decidedly rejects the notion that because this law was equally applied to the white husband as the black wife it is not discriminatory. and Mrs. It must the strict scrutiny test or in other words be necessary to further a compelling state interest. to prevent interracial marriages violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. if they would leave the state and never return as a couple. Restricting the freedom to marry based solely on racial classifications violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. D. in 1958 and returned to their home in Virginia. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Facts. 1 (1967). Mildred Jeter. 216 Palmore v. Brief Fact Summary. Virginia Citation. D. a white male. Racial classification is treated the same as racial discrimination. a black woman and Richard Loving. Does the statute adopted by Respondent.C. Mr.Loving v. The Petitioners.

" However. Is a state court's ruling divesting the Petitioner of her child because she married someone of another race in violation of the United States constitution? Held. who she eventually married. that the mother did see fit to bring a man into her home and carry on a sexual relationship with him without being married to him. 429 (1984) Brief Fact Summary. Sidoti (the "Respondent"). The Respondent also made various allegations about how the Petitioner did not care for the child.Palmore v. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law. The Petitioner. Although racial prejudice is a reality." The court admitted "[t]here is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin. and the Respondent. the Respondent sought custody of the child citing changed conditions. Clarence Palmore.' " Discussion. in Florida. Anthony J. however. if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus more vulnerable to peer pressures. 217 Plessy v. cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody. In September 1981. The Petitioner was awarded custody of the three-year-old child. The Petitioner and the Respondent were divorced in May 1980. "[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. It is of some significance. and eventually married a black man. Ferguson . Sidoti Citation. directly or indirectly. but the law cannot. This Court feels that despite the strides that have been made in bettering relations between the races in this country. give them effect. courts cannot consider the effects of a biracial upbringing when making a custody assessment. however real. The court hearing the custody matter found "[t]he father's evident resentment of the mother's choice of a black partner is not sufficient to wrest custody from the mother. 'Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held. "The effects of racial prejudice. 466 U." Facts. Such action tended to place gratification of her own desires ahead of her concern for the child's future welfare. The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") first recognized that a custody issue generally would not be of interest to the court.S. suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come. Yes. ("Mr. Synopsis of Rule of Law. it is inevitable that Melanie will." Issue. However. Jr. and its effects are far reaching. partially because one parent had a relationship with. Linda Sidoti Palmore (the "Petitioner"). the court recognized important federal concerns in this case based on "the Constitution's commitment to eradicating discrimination based on race. Palmore"). the conditions being that the Petitioner was cohabitating with a Negro. A state court granted custody of a child to one Caucasian parent over another Caucasian parent. were both Caucasians.

He was denied a seat on a train because of this mixture. the Constitution cannot rectify this. Is the Louisiana statute providing for separate railroad cars constitutional? Held. one cannot be inferior to the other. Plessy (Petitioner). The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) was introduced to ensure that whites and blacks receive equal treatment.Plessy v. was denied a seat in the all white railway car because one of his great-grandparents was black. The Petitioner. Yes. There was to be no commingling of the races in the same car unless a partition was provided. The majority rests on the idea that social inequity can never be resolved until individuals treat each other differently. as long as there was "separate but equal" accommodations. ‡ The state of Louisiana passed legislation that provided "separate but equal" railroad cars for blacks and whites. Discussion. there was no violation of Equal Protection. this treatment was not something that the government could force on people. the legislation is depriving citizens of their right to choose. Segregation of the races is not unconstitutional. If one race is socially inferior. Therefore. Facts.S. Petitioner was 7/8 white and 1/8 black. By requiring the races to stay separate. It is clear that the motive of this statute is to keep blacks out of the coaches occupied by the whites. Dissent. Ferguson Citation. 163 U. 537 (1896). Brief Fact Summary. But. This legislation is inconsistent with equality of rights. 218 Brown v. Board of Education . Legislation is powerless to erase racial distinctions. If the civil and political rights of both races are equal. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue.

it is in the nation's best interest to desegregate the races and educate equally. Although the tangibles of the schools may be equal.Brown v. 219 Washington v. Delaware and Virginia the public schools were segregated by race. Petitioner and the rest of the class sought to enter the schools attended by whites because they contend that the black schools are not equal and cannot be made equal. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) rejects the holding of Plessy. The doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place in public education. Does segregation of children in public schools solely based on race deprive the children of a minority group equal educational opportunity? Held. Separation is inherently unequal. 483 (1954). South Carolina. At the time all public schools in those states were segregated and thought to be "separate but equal. Public education must be available to all races equally. 347 U. Issue. Therefore. school aged children from 4 different states who wanted to attend public school with white students. In Kansas. separation of the races generates a feeling of inferiority and effects educational opportunities. The Petitioner. Education is considered necessary to succeed in life and be a good citizen. Davis . Facts. It discusses the profound effect separation has on the hearts and minds of young children as they try to understand and learn about society and their place in it. Board of Education Citation." Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion.S. Brief Fact Summary. Yes. Brown (Petitioner). was a class action representative of black.

A rule that is neutral on its face and rationally related to a legitimate state interest is constitutional even though it may impact a race disproportionately. Facts. Kemp . Instead. 426 U. Issue. Washington. The test needs to be proven that it is an indicator of future job performance. Does an employment test that results in a higher failure rate amongst black candidates deprive them of their Equal Protection rights? Held. The Petitioner. He claims that the test was racially biased and cited the relatively low number of black cops on the force as evidence. a black man failed the written test to become a Washington. The test is administered generally to all applicants and is used to determine the level of verbal skills the candidate has. Dissent. No. required each police officer applicant to submit to a round of testing including physical tests and a written personnel test. ‡ Petitioner took Test 21 in 1970 and failed it.Washington v. it is treated as requirement that measures initial competence. He claims that this test is racially biased because the majority of black applicants who took it failed.C. 220 McCleskey v.C. Every other court presented with this same issue has found in the opposite. The majority focuses on the use of the test as a means of qualifying candidates for the job. D. Washington (Petitioner). Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 229 (1976). Disproportionate impact is not the sole indicator of invidious racial discrimination. Discussion. D. The validity of the test was never determined or discussed as a possibility of a design flaw. In order to enter the 17-week training course an applicant had to achieve 40 out of 80 on Test 21. Test 21.S. Davis Citation. police recruit.

the application of sentencing guidelines is unconstitutional. ‡ Petitioner offered the Baldus study as evidence that sentencing was more often based on the race of the defendant and to a lesser degree upon the race of the victim.McCleskey v. Does the introduction of a statistical study indicating that race enters into capital sentencing decisions prove that Petitioner's sentence is unconstitutional? Held. Kemp Citation. McCleskey (Petitioner). but it does not serve as a predictor of sentencing in a particular case. Dissent. Brief Fact Summary. 279 (1987). Facts. 481 U. The Baldus study proves that sentencing is biased according to race and it could have been used to predict the outcome in this case.S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. was a black man convicted of murdering a white police officer. The Baldus study describes sentencing in general and does not prove that discrimination occurred in this particular case. The Petitioner. The jury found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were aggravating circumstances warranting the death penalty. Now he claims that sentencing was administered in a discriminatory manner. A criminal defendant has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination and that this had a discriminatory effect on him. Issue. The jury sentenced Petitioner to death. Discussion. 221 City of Mobile v. Petitioner was involved in an armed robbery of a store where an off-duty police officer was shot in the face and killed. The majority accepts the results of the study as being representative of sentencing in general. Because of this bias. No. Bolden . It provides a retrospective review of the outcome of a group of cases. A criminal defendant has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination and that this discrimination had a discriminatory effect on him.

Dissent. The Petitioner. The Respondent. Issue. it has never had a black councilman. Each councilman runs for an open seat on the council and is elected by a majority vote. He will then serve a term of four years. ‡ There is no indication that this type of government was developed to purposely prevent a black person from being mayor. The Petitioner City has a 3-person council. Bolden (Respondent). Justice Byron White (J. Although the Petitioner City has a large black population. if the purpose was to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of minorities. Past discrimination is also not enough to make a government configuration unlawful. where the majority vote getters are awarded seats on the council. Bolden Citation. State action that is racially neutral on its fact violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if it is motivated by a discriminatory purpose. State law governs this design of government. Multi-member legislative districts will only be found unconstitutional when their purpose is to minimize the voting power of racial minorities. the City of Mobile (Petitioner). Reverse Court of Appeals. 55 (1980). Thompson . 446 U.S. White) argued that there is no basis for the majority opinion that the Respondent needs to show a discriminatory intent. To prove discrimination. It is not enough only to show that minority council members were not elected in proportion to their percentage of the total population. No. The district court found invidious discrimination and the court of appeals affirmed. The councilmen run in an open election. Facts. 222 Palmer v. Brief Fact Summary. as evidenced by the lack of any black persons in the city council. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. the minority group needs to show more than a disproportionate number of representatives in the government. alleges that his voting rights have been adversely affected by this method of election. Does the at-large system of municipal voting violate the rights of the black voters of the Petitioner City? Held.City of Mobile v. Legislative apportionment could violate Equal Protection. has a 3-person council.

The decision to close the pools affected all citizens equally and though it may have been racially motivated. 403 U.S. Dissent. Jackson. Mississippi operated public swimming pools. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An official governmental action that denies access to public facilities to all citizens does not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). 223 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. public golf courses and parks. Feeney . Is this closing of swimming pools state action that denies Equal Protection to the black citizens in the community? Held. Brief Fact Summary. A state may not avoid integration by eliminating all of its public services such as school. Thompson Citation. but kept them segregated until it eventually closed or sold them all. The city maintained segregated swimming pools while it desegregated the zoo. 217 (1971). A city may choose to close pools for any reason. No.Palmer v. Some of the black citizens then filed suit to force the city to reopen the pools as desegregated facilities. The city decided to close all pools instead of desegregating them. Issue. parks or pools. The Supreme Court of the United States (Constitution) has never held an act unconstitutional solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it. Facts. no one group was more disadvantaged than another as a result." Discussion. It may not close facilities for the purpose of "perpetuating or installing apartheid.

A gender neutral statute that adversely impacts one gender does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) if it does not have a discriminatory purpose and it does not actually classify one gender. 442 U. in its application and by definition a veteran is gender neutral. 224 Village of Arlington Heights v. It was not designed to favor men over women. Brief Fact Summary. Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for veterans over non. Synopsis of Rule of Law.veterans for civil service positions. At the time only 1% of the veterans were women. The law is a preference for veterans of either sex over non-veterans of either sex.S. So. Feeney Citation. Feeney (Respondent). But. . since most of the veterans are men. The Respondent. rule that provides a hiring preference to military veterans. 256 (1979). This statute was designed to reward and help veterans reenter society after their service. Issue. Facts. challenges the Petitioner. No. Discussion. ‡ The District Court found that this practice has a severe impact on job opportunities for women. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. The benefit of this act was offered to any person who was a veteran. it appeared that this legislation was meant for men only. Does the hiring practice that favors veterans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution? Held.Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. the Petitioner is discriminating against women. Personnel Administration of Massachusetts's (Petitioner).

applied to the Petitioner. (Respondent). Respondent brought suit because the decision by Petitioner disproportionately affects racial minorities. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. Does this denial to rezone violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. The rezoning was denied and Respondent sued citing racial discrimination. Respondent wanted to build 190 townhouses on the parcel of land for low and moderateincome tenants. The entire area had been zoned for single-family homes since the late 1950's. There is little in the sequence of events of the denial to rezone that leads one to conclude that the decision was racially motivated. for rezoning of a parcel from single family to multi-family. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 429 U. low-income housing. There must be a motivating discriminatory purpose. No. Discussion. Issue. single-family homes surround the site in question. Petitioner denied the request. Facts. In fact. Village of Arlington Heights (Petitioner). Discriminatory effect alone does not render a governmental decision unconstitutional. Board of Education . There was simply no evidence of discriminatory intent or purpose behind this decision to deny the rezoning. Citation. 252 (1977). Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.S. The Respondent.Village of Arlington Heights v. 225 Brown v.

226 Swann v. Apart from the delay gained by asking for clarification of the principles of Brown I. Board of Education. The Supreme Court disappointed them by not only not providing concrete guidelines. Issue. Federal courts may sit in equity to enforce judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). local school boards sought judicial guidance as to the appropriate remedy for the segregation. ‡ Because of the variety of local problems. What is the appropriate judicial remedy for the damages caused by school segregation? Held. Warren also notes that the steps toward compliance would vary depending on the circumstances present in various local school systems. some of the defendant school districts met the ruling with great resistance.Brown v. Board of Education Citation. 349 U. Facts. Warren) stated that local school districts were to come into compliance with Brown I at the earliest possible date. but also requiring the district courts to sit in equity over their compliance process . Brief Fact Summary. asking that the district courts apply principles of equity to guide individual districts into compliance with the tenets of Brown I. Synopsis of Rule of Law.that is. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 294 (1955). After Brown I.S. Discussion. ‡ Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. the Supreme Court remanded the individual cases to the district courts in which the suits were filed. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education . Cases remanded to federal district courts for equitable resolution.S. While some school districts readily adopted plans to desegregate their school systems. After ruling school segregation unconstitutional in Brown v. asking that the judicial review of the school districts' policies maximize its flexibility. the respondents in Brown II were asking for clear goals and guidelines for reaching compliance with Brown I. others sought guidance from the Supreme Court on the appropriate remedy for school segregation. 347 U. J. Equitable remedies were appropriate because of the traditional flexibility of such remedies and because of the ability of equity to reconcile the personal stakes of the plaintiffs with the public interest in the elimination of obstacles to the implementation of Brown I.

The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) made clear that the federal courts have almost carte blanche in desegregating previously segregated school systems. 294 (1955) (Brown II). The scope of District Court authority is broad. ‡ The courts may redefine district lines to desegregate the systems. School districts undergoing desegregation under Brown v. as long as the time involved in the busing does not risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process. ‡ Single-race schools are not per se a "mark of a system that still practices segregation by law. their authority only exists when the local school boards "default" in their efforts to desegregate. many school districts still sought to maintain vestiges of their preBrown I segregated systems. but enters only when local school districts have not voluntarily brought themselves into compliance with Brown I/II. but is appropriate only where local districts have failed to bring themselves into compliance with Brown I on their own accord. and Brown v. even though such redistricting may cause initial inconvenience and burdens. ‡ Busing is an appropriate remedy. Facts. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education . Board of Education. Discussion. 347 U. 349 U. Defendant school districts brought suit. broad as it may be. However." and the burden is on the school district to demonstrate that the school's racial makeup is not the result of past or resent de jure segregation. alleging that District Courts had overreached their authority. The authority is broad. Issue. 227 Swann v." The court "should scrutinize such schools. 483 (1954) (Brown I). ‡ What is the scope of District Court authority under Brown II? ‡ When is it appropriate for the court to invoke that authority? Held. sought clarification of their duties and the scope of federal district courts' power under [Brown I/II].S." ‡ Mathematical racial quotas are an allowable exercise of judicial authority. In the wake of Brown II. Synopsis of Rule of Law. as well. ‡ Remedial authority does not put judges "automatically in the shoes of school authorities. when used as a starting point after a "total default" of the school board's duty. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education Brief Fact Summary. Board of Education.S.Swann v. under Brown II.

" J. Bradley Citation. Not without an interdistrict violation or effect. merely inconvenient and convenience is not as important as preserving individuals' rights to an integrated education." how taxes would be levied and distributed and who should make curriculum decisions. Thus. Bradley Milliken v. Brief Fact Summary. 230 Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. 347 U. The District Courts cannot redraw the lines of integrated school systems to achieve racial balance in a segregated school system absent an interdistrict violation or effect.S. Until Milliken. The "core of [his] disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go unremedied. The proposed redistricting would cause significant administrative and financial problems for the resulting school system. which reigned in the power of federal courts to remedy segregation in public schools. this is not the case here. Burger). Issue.228 Milliken v. unless there was an interdistrict effect with a segregated district. Milliken is the first case since Brown v. 717 (1974). The District Court redefined the area in question from the city itself to the outlying school districts in the metropolitan area. an interdistrict remedy may be in order. Discussion. White argues that the remedy espoused by the District Court is not impossible. writing for the majority. Dissent. Facts. including redistricting. ‡ The scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. notes that there are many practical difficulties in the proposed plan. 483 (1954) (Brown I). Board of Education. establishing racial quotas and busing. However. the courts had been given broad powers in equity to enforce the holdings of Brown I by a variety of methods. May District Courts redraw the boundaries of integrated school districts to achieve integration in a segregated district? Held. or if discriminatory acts of one district caused segregation in another. The schools of the city of Detroit. Justice Byron White (J. Michigan were racially imbalanced in the eyes of the District Court. the discriminatory acts of a single district must be a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. ‡ Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Attempts to integrate the Detroit schools had been unsuccessful. a total of 54 school districts. if district lines were drawn on the basis of race. White) argues that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is asking District Courts to consider administrative convenience over violations of constitutional rights. In the present case. Dowell . Milliken drew the line at redistricting integrated districts. It is unclear what the status of currently elected school officials would be in the new "super district. 418 U.S. The court's remedy was to redraw lines of neighboring suburban school districts to achieve racial balance within the city's schools. including the Detroit district itself.

Discussion. 231 Richmond v. Dowell. The majority's primary concern is for returning control of the school districts to local authorities. Should the desegregation decree be dissolved as of the time the SRP was enacted? Held. sought dissolution of the District Court-imposed school desegregation plan. Rehnquist) notes that the lower courts have been inconsistent with their definition of a "unitary" school system.A. It is clear that under the latter definition. Brief Fact Summary. Rehnquist further states that a District Court's authority to enjoin a school district only extends to the point necessary for the district to remedy past discrimination to the extent practicable. alleging that the District Court injunction was still in effect. over half of Oklahoma City's schools have a racial component of at least 90% white or 90% non-white students. J. They balance the needs of desegregating the schools with the knowledge that not all segregation is de jure and perfect racial balance is just not possible in some situations. In 1972. 498 U. The Petitioner. . ‡ J. (Respondents). Facts. Marshall) notes that under the SRP. The District Court ruled that the desegregation decree was dissolved. a district may still maintain some vestiges of past discrimination. Some courts defined unitary as meaning a district had removed all vestiges of segregation. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari. The SRP was not discriminatory on the basis of race. In 1985. Reasonable compliance to correct past wrongs is the standard put forward. Board of Education of Oklahoma City (Petitioner). J. Case reversed and remanded for further review. Dowell Citation. et al.Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. the Board of Education adopted a new plan ("SRP") for assigning students to schools. After a reversal by the Court of Appeals. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. District Court authority over school districts extends only until the districts in question have complied with the injunctions long enough to reasonably redress past segregation. Croson Co. as long as the district was making a good faith effort to remedy the situation. 237 (1991). The Petitioner was sued by the Respondents. Other courts defined unitary as meaning that a district has currently desegregated its assignment policies. Marshall finds this to be persisting segregation and would leave the decree in place. ‡ Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J.S. Issue. the District Court imposed a desegregation plan for the Oklahoma City Public School System. Dissent.

Yes. A state requiring a mathematical quota to remedy a generalized assertion of past racial discrimination denies non-minority applicants equal protection. Croson Co. 488 U.S. To address this disparity. less than 1% of the City's construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the period from 1978 to 1983. the City of Richmond (Appellant). ‡ Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Facts. who was denied a project under the Minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan) sued the Appellant. the 30% quota cannot be logically attached to the harm suffered by anyone. the City Council conducted public hearings and voted to approve the Plan. sued the Appellant. J. . Croson Co. any remedy could be plausible without any surety that it is narrowly tailored to remedy the perceived wrong. Citation.A. believes the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is second-guessing the first- 232 Richmond v. 469 (1989). Does the Plan violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of Equal Protection of the laws? Held. and may use spending power to remedy private discrimination. O'Connor notes that race-based classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny. J. Croson Co. Issue. alleging Equal Protection violations. alleging that the Plan denied the Appellee equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). However. ‡ A generalized assertion that there had been past discrimination in the construction industry cannot support this particular remedy. that is. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. Marshall). Dissent. a non-minority business under the Plan. Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. The Appellant was approximately 50% black. they must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.A. unless the prime contractor was itself a Minority Business Enterprise. Brief Fact Summary. J. dissenting. (Appellee) a subcontractor. Synopsis of Rule of Law. J. which required 30% of the dollar amount of a prime contract be subcontracted to Minority Business Enterprises (which were owned/controlled by at least 51% minority members).A. J. In this case. O'Connor) noted that the Appellant has legislative authority over its procurement practices. O'Connor invokes an essentially "slippery slope" argument to note that without particularized findings. The Appellee. however. The Appellee.Richmond v.

v. Inc. but believes that the Appellant's ordinance is unconstitutional by the Supreme Court's reasoning.hand knowledge of discrimination found by the Appellant and represents an attack on affirmative action programs in general. Marshall believes that "benign" classifications should not be subject to strict scrutiny. However. The principal holding of Richmond v. Stevens). Scalia) concurs that strict scrutiny must be applied to all racial classifications. 233 Adarand Constructors. Discussion. regardless of whether they are described as remedial or benign. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. if not today. for reasons other than addressing past wrongs. concurring. The majority also suggests that there are instances where race-based legislation may be narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination. Pena . Croson is that strict scrutiny must be applied to all state and local legislation that classifies by race. J. a minority is not being subjugated by its status as a minority. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia (J. suggests that racial classification may be appropriate. as the majority is admitting that it is disadvantaging itself and as such. he believes that they are always impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Concurrence.A. then at some time in the future. ‡ J.

Scalia) argues again that there can never be a compelling government interest to justify a racial classification. O'Connor. Namely. Again. 469 (1989). 488 U.S. Pena Citation. Mountain Gravel. Given that the federal statute was intended to remedy past discrimination.. Dissent. Yes. Adarand extends strict scrutiny to racial classifications at the federal level.A. Issue. Concurrence. Bollinger . v. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. extends the Fourteenth Amendment requirement to the states in Richmond v. alleging that the federal governments incentives to hire minority subcontractors denied him equal protection of the laws. to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment. J. 200 (1995). Inc. Synopsis of Rule of Law. a low-bidding subcontractor denied a contract on a federal highway project. Discussion. 515 U. Adarand Constructors had submitted the low bid on a subcontract for a federal highway project. Race classification by the federal government is subject to strict scrutiny. Court of Appeals ruling reversed and remanded.Adarand Constructors. Facts. Croson Co. O'Connor). leaves the door open for some remedial legislation to pass muster under strict scrutiny. The government's policy included a presumption that minority-owned businesses were socially and economically disadvantaged. regardless of benign or remedial motive. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. Does the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection require the federal government's racial classifications to withstand strict scrutiny? Held. the prime contractor.S. J. Stevens argues that it should be subject to the rational basis test. 234 Grutter v. Adarand Constructors. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Stevens) reiterates his belief that benign or remedial racial classifications should be subject to a lesser level of review. writing for the majority. J. would receive additional federal funds for awarding subcontracts to businesses owned by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Mountain Gravel awarded the contract to a higher bidder on this basis. sued the Secretary of Transportation. strict scrutiny is applied to all race-based classification. Brief Fact Summary.

" Although race is relied upon. alleging the Law School's admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). was the applicant's race." The Law School's goal "[b]y enrolling a " 'critical mass' of [underrepresented] minority students. who without this commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.Ct. ‡ Whether the use of race by the Law School as a factor in student admissions is lawful? ‡ Whether the Law School's policy is narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest? Held. Facts. However.8 grade point average and 161 LSAT score. O'Connor then set forth the appropriate standard of review to 235 Grutter v. One of the criteria relied upon by the Law School when deciding who should be admitted. Bollinger Citation. 156 L. J. The Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body because "attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission".S. The University of Michigan Law School (the "Law School") initially put the Petitioner on a waiting list. began her analysis by citing and reaffirming [Bakke]. but an en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The Petitioner was a white Michigan resident with a 3. The District Court struck down the Law School's use of race as a valid factor in their admissions decisions. 2d 304 (2003) Brief Fact Summary." was to "ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School. which stood for the proposition that student body diversity is a compelling state interest.Grutter v. Hispanics and Native Americans. justifying the use of race in university admissions. (the "Petitioner"). The race and ethnicity portion of the Law School's admission policy encouraged "racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against.Ed. Bollinger . 539 U. the Law School eventually rejected her application. 306. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 2325. writing for the majority. The Petitioner sued in District Court. ‡ Yes. 123 S. the Law School's diversity policy did not define diversity solely in racial and ethnic terms. O'Connor"). The Petitioner in this matter was Barbara Grutter. Issue. like African-Americans. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. The Constitution's Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit a law school's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.

Ginsburg") and Justice Stephen Breyer ("J." However. but they can "consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant." Concurrence/Dissent. Breyer") filed a concurring opinion stressing how"conscious and unconscious race bias. does not mean the requirement of individualized consideration is satisfied. a university's admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure each applicant is evaluated as an individual. Thomas") entered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. how "many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal educational opportunities. even rank discrimination based on race. just because there is not a quota. The justices were worried about the questions left open by the majority's decision. but also various other student attributes. The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. narrowly tailored "does not require exhaustion of every race-neutral alternative" and that the Law School "sufficiently considered workable race-neutral alternatives. They feel that the "Constitution proscribes 236 Grutter v. meaning "such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. O'Connor refused to read [Bakke] to mean the only permissible rationale for race-based governmental action was to remedy past discrimination." Concurrence. The "Law School's admissions program bears the hallmark of a narrowly tailored plan." Additionally. Universities cannot adopt strict quotas or insulate minorities from admission competition." J. Scalia") and Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.be used in analyzing racial classifications. "When using race as a 'plus' factor in university admissions. and the lawsuits that may result. the Law School's program to "obtain a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota. Racial classifications "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny". O'Connor stressed in rejecting an argument made by the Petitioner." J. If the Law School had defined "critical mass" as a specified percentage of a particular group that would be patently constitutional. Bollinger . ‡ Yes. but here "critical mass" was defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce." The majority also determined the Law School's race-based admission program did not "unduly burden individuals who are not members of the factored racial and ethnic groups. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. O'Connor also stresses the fact the Law School's diversity policy concerns not only race and ethnicity." Here. ‡ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. remain alive in our land." J.

" Dissent. J. Justices William Rehnquist (J. along with the Supreme Court's decision in [Gratz v.government discrimination on the basis of race. Bollinger . Thomas and J. Bollinger] are Supreme Court's most recent regarding affirmative action. and state-provided education is no exception." Discussion. 237 Gratz v. This decision. Scalia." ‡ J. Kennedy) and J. Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. Scalia entered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Rehnquist). They "believe[s] blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators. Thomas dissented and argued the Law School's "means are not narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts" and the type of racial balancing used by the law school was "patently unconstitutional.

156 L. 2411." In other words. See [Bakke] and [Grutter v. but nonetheless denied them admission. Synopsis of Rule of Law. is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity. Rehnquist") writing for the majority held "the University's current policy. or one-fifth the amount needed for guaranteed admission. The University assigned point values to many factors when determining eligibility for admission. ‡ Whether the use of race by the University's LSA College as a factor in student admissions is lawful? ‡ Whether the portion of the University's LSA Colleges' admissions policy concerning race. 123 S. 539 U. The University's LSA College adopted a point system to judge applicants' admission qualifications." Facts. 2d 257 (2003) Brief Fact Summary. 244. "which automatically distributes 20 points. to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race. Bollinger Citation. and the Arts ("LSA"). ‡ Yes. Bollinger].Ct. Justice Rehnquist ("J. the University of Michigan's (the "University") College of Literature. ‡ No. The University's LSA College considered all the Petitioners "qualified" applicants. or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission. is narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest? Held. one of which being race. 238 Gratz v. to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race. The Petitioners brought suit alleging LSA's admission policy violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). and were rejected from. One hundred points would guarantee admission. The Petitioners in this matter were high school students who applied for admission to. Concurrence. which automatically distributes 20 points." The majority distinguished [Bakke] and observed "[t]he admissions program [the Bakke court] described did not contemplate that any single characteristic automatically ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a university's diversity.S. the individual assessment required by [Bakke] is not present. or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission. A policy implemented by a university. Issue. is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity.Gratz v. Bollinger . Hispanic or Native American.Ed. Science. If an applicant was African-American. they were automatically given twenty points.

if race is considered "for the purpose of achieving equality. Souter") entered a dissenting opinion and determined that the instant case was more analogous to what [Grutter] approves then what [Bakke] condemns. "no automatic proscription is in order. 239 Easley v." Also." Discussion. along with the Supreme Court's decision in [Grutter v. She observed the automatic awarding of twenty points based on race "does not provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants" on a "case-by-case basis. and as such should not have been held unconstitutional.‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J." ‡ Justice Clarence Thomas's ("J. ‡ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. Thomas's argument in his Concurrence finding any manner of affirmative action unconstitutional and J. ‡ Justice David Souter ("J." Further. O'Connor") concurred and distinguished the facts in [Grutter] from those in the instant case. Ginsburg") and J. Bollinger] are the Supreme Court's most recent regarding affirmative action. This decision." Dissent. Souter's argument that certain forms of affirmative action are acceptable. Souter filed a dissent and argued "government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion. Thomas") concurrence stressed his view that "a State's use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. It is interesting to compare J. Ginsburg's and J. Cromartie . "[a]ctions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have been extirpated.

The facially neutral law must be "unexplainable on grounds other than race. No.Easley v. That party must also show that those districting alternatives would have brought about significantly greater racial balance. Synopsis of Rule of Law. At issue was whether the North Carolina state legislature used race as a predominant factor to th draw its 12 Congressional District. The critical finding made by the district court was that race instead of politics was the predominant reason the district line was drawn the way it was. Breyer recognized that the District Court's finding was based on three facts "the district's shape. J." The court additionally observed that districting is generally in the "legislature's sphere of competence" and as such the legislature must be given room to accomplish the function." not just a motivation for the line that was drawn. A three-judge district court panel concluded it did. Breyer").. Cromartie . ‡ The court decides to review the District Court's findings for "clear error" and based on that standard must be left with "the definite and firm conviction" that the District Court's key findings are mistaken. What must be shown in arguing that a majority-minority district was created." Facts. The constitutionality of a state legislature's redistricting plan was at issue. writing for the majority. its splitting of towns and counties.S. at a minimum is that the "legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . "In a case such as this one where majority-minority districts (or the approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly with political affiliation." The dissent would apply a different standard of review. This is "especially [true] where. the State has articulated a legitimate political explanation for its districting decision and the voting population is one in which race and political affiliation are highly correlated". and its heavily African-American voting population". the [three above] facts in and of themselves cannot. Cromartie Citation. Was race the "predominant factor" in North Carolina's drawing of the 12 Congressional District? Held. the party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional districting principles. 532 U.. support the District Court's judgment. first observed that this issue is entirely evidentiary. as a matter of law." 240 Easley v. Justice Stephen Breyer ("J. The burden of proof is on the party challenging the district and the burden is a demanding one. 234 (2001) Brief Fact Summary." Race must be the " 'predominant factor' motivating the legislature's districting decision. th Issue. to racial considerations. Due to the "undisputed evidence that racial identification is highly correlated with political affiliation in North Carolina. as here.

Kennedy") and Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. the court did not commit clear error. it is interesting to recognize that it really turns on the standard of review that should be applied. J. the majority erroneously finds significance in the fact there was no intermediate level of appeal. Dissent. but the majority disagreed with their findings.The district court judges attempted to elaborate on these facts. 241 Frontiero v. First. Richardson . Scalia"). Although this case concerns a constitutional issue. the majority's treatment of the district court's findings concerning expert testimony. J. Thomas also criticizes standard of review the majority applied. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. Thomas") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice William Rehnquist ("J. the majority's "foray into the minutiae of the record. Finally. Second. The appropriate standard and its application is where the majority and the dissent differ. Thomas argued that the decision of the court below was not clearly erroneous and as such." Discussion. Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. Third. Rehnquist"). not on the constitutional issues involved. the courts reliance on the fact the trial was not lengthy.

a serviceman may claim his wife as a dependent for purposes of qualifying for increased quarters. Justice Lewis Powell (J. must pass strict scrutiny. Brennan argues that gender-based classifications are always subject to strict scrutiny. Even so. A female Air Force Lieutenant sought increased benefits on the basis of her husband as a dependent. Brief Fact Summary.Frontiero v. alleges that this policy denies her the equal protection of laws afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). "[W]hen we enter the real of 'strict judicial scrutiny. Gender-based classifications.S. but disagrees that sex-based classifications are always suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.' there can be no doubt that "administrative convenience" is not a shibboleth. and other increased support. By statute." Concurrence. medical and dental benefits. a servicewoman may claim her husband as a dependant only if he is dependent on her for more than half of his support. Brennan) notes that women have a past history of discrimination against them in the United States and thus a requirement of strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications is appropriate. Brennan notes that. Frontiero (Petitioner). Reversed and remanded. which were refused by the armed services' policy of only allowing men to claim wives presumptively as dependents. Yes. Powell stops short of this. J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. like racial classifications. Discussion. 242 Craig v. 677 (1973). Powell) concurs in the judgment. Facts. ‡ The government offered no concrete evidence suggesting that there is any actual administrative time or cost saving by this classification. 411 U. Issue. Boren . J. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. The Petitioner. Does the statute offering different spousal benefits for servicemen on the basis of gender violate the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection? Held. However. arguing that such a ruling would have far-reaching implications with respect to inherent differences between the sexes. J. Richardson Citation.

‡ The District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. now alleges that this difference violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Suit was brought against the State. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 190 (1976).Craig v. Facts. Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective.S. Brennan is not persuaded by the Appellees'. Craig v. Craig (Appellant).2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18. alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Discussion. The Appellant. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. Intermediate scrutiny is distinguished from strict scrutiny at both the objective and means levels. he believes that the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is so "diaphanous and elastic" as to encourage judicial prejudice. As such. it is not constitutional. J. Dissent. Important government objectives (intermediate) v. Boren establishes intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender-based classification. Craig and others (Appellees). Specifically. 429 U. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Brief Fact Summary. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing the statute. Gender-based classifications must satisfy intermediate scrutiny requirements to pass constitutional muster. He believes that rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for gender-based classification. Boren Citation. Virginia . Oklahoma State maintained different drinking ages between men and women for the consumption of 3. 243 United States v. compelling government objectives (strict) and substantially related (intermediate) v. Yes. The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3. Rehnquist) dissents on two levels.2% alcohol beer. the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement of such objective. Issue. Furthermore. narrowly tailored (strict).

VMI has a long tradition of providing a rigorous. A state may not preclude one gender or the other from participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender. 244 United States v. exclusion of women from VMI violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Dissent. as the VMI's methods were well known to those familiar with the school. with regard to its exclusion of women. The current system violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and the appropriate remedy is to admit women to VMI. ‡ Does the current system of excluding women solely on the basis of race from VMI violate equal protection? ‡ If so. the United States (Petitioner). 518 U. Since its founding in 1839. Ginsburg categorically denies that VMI's "adversative method of training" is incompatible with accepting women. Virginia . and the student body was self-selecting in this regard. the Respondent attempted to create a separate women's program at a coeducational institution. military style college experience to its undergraduate students. The Petitioner. for diversifying educational opportunities in Virginia. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Facts. After a negative ruling by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. ‡ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. However. Ginsburg concedes that there are pedagogical benefits to having single-sex educational institutions.S. ‡ J. Issue. intermediate) scrutiny is the appropriate level of review for gender-based discrimination. 515 (1996). what is the appropriate remedy? Held. VMI has been an exclusively male institution. it was clear that the qualifications of the faculty and students at the parallel institution for women were inferior to VMI's in several indicators. maintained that the Respondent. Brief Fact Summary. Ginsburg) notes that heightened (that is.United States v. Virginia Citation. ‡ J. but that the Respondent had not established that VMI was established or maintained. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Virginia's (Respondent). Scalia) views the majority opinion as shutting down a traditional institution and that intermediate review is inappropriate in gender-based classification cases. The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the only single-sex collegiate institution run by the State of Virginia.

Much of the Supreme Court of the United States' disapproval of VMI's single-sex education lies not with its single-sex character.Discussion. 245 Geduldig v. the majority opinion leaves open the door to separate. Interestingly. but equal institutions of learning for men and women. It was the denial to women of the uniqueness of the opportunities afforded by VMI that Virginia was unable to justify under intermediate scrutiny. but rather with the lack of comparable opportunities for women within Virginia's state colleges. Aiello .

Justice William Brennan (J. Orr . Underinclusive legislation is appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause. ‡ The savings given the program by the exclusion of such conditions benefit both men and women. The majority reaches its conclusions through viewing the problem as one of underinclusive legislation. That is. 484 (1974). so long as the line drawn by the State is "rationally supportable. in that it provided for payments for disabilities not covered by workers compensation. 417 U. The excluded conditions do not affect women alone. Brennan) argues that by disallowing payments related to pregnancy. Suit was brought challenging the system as an unconstitutional gender-based classification. Furthermore. Brief Fact Summary. No. However. Among those disabilities not paid for were certain pregnancy related conditions. Does the exclusion of the pregnancy-related conditions violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held. Aiello Citation. many pregnancy related disabilities were excluded from coverage because of expenses to the program. The list of disabilities paid for by the State of California was not exhaustive. Discussion. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Dissent. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. the State inevitably discriminates against women.Geduldig v. California operated a disability insurance system that paid benefits to employees of private employers when workers compensation did not cover certain disabilities that prevented those employees from working. ‡ The list of conditions covered by the disability insurance system is not exclusive. inclusion of the excluded conditions would result in lesser amounts of funding for all other conditions. California operated a disability insurance system that supplemented workers compensation. there are conditions not covered by the system that affect both men and women.S." Facts. 246 Orr v. while the dissent focuses on the inevitable connection of the unfunded conditions with a single sex. Issue.

The State cannot argue that a classification is a proxy for financial need when financial need is a necessary determination in the particular case to begin. The husband in this particular divorce argued that the law denied him equal protection. Orr is a very straightforward decision. the statute is clearly unconstitutional. May the state restrict alimony payments in a manner that discriminates on sex? Held. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. 268 (1979). Laws of the State of Alabama would require men in some cases to pay alimony on divorce. Combined with the intermediate scrutiny afforded gender classification legislation. Issue. As the finances of both parties to the divorce are examined to determine whether a husband owes alimony. this assertion cannot even support a claim of administrative convenience. This case arises out of a petition for divorce. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 247 Mississippi University for Women v. Orr v. but women were in no case required to pay alimony. the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. ‡ In the present case. The Alabama courts would review the financial status of both partners during the proceedings to determine whether or not the husband owed alimony to the wife. the State of Alabama argues that sex is a proxy for need of financial assistance. Without an important state interest and substantially related means. Discussion. ‡ Because a gender-neutral classification serves the State's purposes just as well as a gender-based classification.S.Orr v. Orr Citation. Hogan . No. 440 U. the State may not classify on the basis of sex.

Facts. ‡ Applying intermediate scrutiny. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Does the operation of a female only nursing school by a State violate Equal Protection? Held. However. v.S. Hogan (Respondent). Discussion. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. she notes that women did not lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW. as there were state-operated nursing programs that accepted men elsewhere in the state and there is no right to attend a state-run university close to one's hometown. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the school's nursing program. Powell) argues that the Respondent has not suffered a cognizable injury. but he was denied admission on the basis of being male. Yes. the state is not technically operating a single-sex nursing program.Mississippi University for Women v. 458 U. O'Connor also argues that the means to achieving even an important governmental objective (although she found none) are absent. 718 (1982). O'Connor) notes that the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for operating a single sex nursing school.without injury a case is not ripe. In particular. ‡ J. A state may not preclude one gender or the other from participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender. Dissent. The Respondent. 248 Michael M. There is also the argument that as there is no unique educational opportunity here (there are nursing programs accepting men in the State college system). Superior Court of Sonoma County . was denied admission to Mississippi University for Women's (MUW) nursing program solely on the basis of gender. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. He now alleges this is a denial of equal protection. Issue. If men are already in the classroom. and the constitutional issue may not be reached. The majority focuses on whether Mississippi may discriminate against men in admission to nursing programs. Hogan Citation. MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of Mississippi. the state is not denying opportunities to men. as MUW allows male auditors in the nursing classes. Brief Fact Summary. The first is the lack of injury argument . there are two powerful arguments brought up by the dissent. Synopsis of Rule of Law.

S. was a 17-year-old male who had sexual intercourse with a 16-year-old female. Superior Court of Sonoma County . The Petitioner. arguing that since both parties are equally guilty of the conduct. the State cannot show that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective than the gender-based statute. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. Dissent. the female involved was not charged with any crime. 249 Michael M. ‡ Justice William Rehnquist (J. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. Rehnquist) does not specifically refer to the application of intermediate scrutiny. The Petitioner now alleges that this disparity in the statutory rape laws is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Rehnquist gives great deference to the fact that the State's alleged objective was to deter teenage pregnancies. Facts. More importantly. v. (Petitioner). ‡ The majority states that a state may attack the stated objective directly by prohibiting the conduct only of males. Superior Court of Sonoma County Citation. The reasoning behind this assertion is that females already have significant deterrence to abstain from the behavior. was charged with statutory rape in California and now alleges that the State's statute discriminates unconstitutionally against men only. J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. ‡ However. J. 464 (1981). it is perversely partial for the State to only punish a single party. Brief Fact Summary. J. The Petitioner. v. Brennan) applies intermediate scrutiny to achieve the opposite result from the majority. Brennan argues that California still bears the burden of demonstrating that the gender-based statute is more effective at decreasing teenage pregnancies than a gender-neutral statute. Does the California statutory rape statute violate principles of Equal Protection? Held. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissents. A state may provide for punishment only for males to equalize deterrents to teenage pregnancy. No. namely pregnancy itself and its attendant difficulties.Michael M. Michael M. Brennan concedes that preventing teenage pregnancy is an important objective. However. at the time of the complaint. Issue. 450 U. Because California's statute only criminalized such behavior in males.

It is hard to square the majority's decision with the holding in Orr v. Orr. but not a criminal statute. 440 U.S.Discussion. It is difficult to understand why this should be so in a remedial statute. 250 Rostker v." the State cannot classify by gender. Goldberg . that says where compensatory and ameliorative purposes are "as well served by a genderneutral classification as one that gender classifies. 268 (1979).

alleging the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Issue. Plaintiff's brought suit. Justice Byron White (J. Facts. 57 (1981). The purpose of the MSSA is to allow the armed services to select men in the event that a military draft is necessary. Discussion. The MSSA requires all males between the ages 18 to 26 to register with the Selective Service. further diminishing the payoff from the registration of women. Yes. ‡ As to the means. White) dissents. although it may clearly be applied to the case at bar. Because of this. Rehnquist notes that only men (as a group) are eligible for combat duty. ‡ Justice William Rehnquist (J. There is an important government interest (providing for a draft) and a substantially related means to achieve the interest (requiring only men to register. Synopsis of Rule of Law. As such. J. noting that the primary objective for the MSSA is to provide a supply of combat troops in times when a military draft is necessary. but only when there is an important government interest and the means are substantially related to the interest. The federal government may classify on the basis of race. Rehnquist) writes for the majority. arguing that there are jobs that can be performed by persons ineligible for combat duty. where only men are eligible for combat as a group). 251 Califano v. Men and women are thus differently situated for purposes of a draft. Brief Fact Summary. clearly an important government interest. Dissent. Webster . most non-combat positions are filled by combat-ready troops that are rotated with other troops. Again. Furthermore. J. Goldberg Citation. 453 U.Rostker v. there is no reason that Congress cannot recruit women for these positions.S. registering all women is a substantial administrative inconvenience for a small degree of payoff. Rehnquist does not use the intermediate scrutiny terminology. May the federal government require only males to register with the Selective Service? Held. Women are not required to register with the Selective Service.

488 U. remedies some part of this discrimination. the Supreme Court views that allowing women to eliminate three lowwage years from their calculation. Citing the historical wage gap between men and women.S. qualifying women for slightly greater benefits. Immigration and Naturalization Service .S. a female averages three fewer years than a male in the calculation.S. The government may enact remedial legislation to benefit women in areas where they have been traditionally discriminated against. 430 U. The Social Security old-age insurance benefits are calculated differently for men and women. the benefits were calculated based on the use of "average monthly wages. the governmental action here is not required to be narrowly tailored to meet the sought end. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) reiterates the holding of Craig v. Discussion. 469 (1989). 313 (1977). At first glance. Therefore. with the result that women's benefits are skewed slightly toward their later (higher earning) years. 252 Nguyen v." which were calculated during the period from 1950 until a male turned 65 or a female turned 62. Webster Citation. Issue. 429 U. Boren. Prior to 1972. Brief Fact Summary. while gender classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny. No. resulting in a slightly higher average than a male. In particular. 190 (1976). racial classification is subject to strict scrutiny.Califano v. Facts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. where the Supreme Court ruled that a generalized allegation of past racial discrimination is not enough to justify remedial legislation. However. Is this disparity of methods between sexes proper under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. Hence. there was a difference between the method for calculating old-age insurance benefits for men and women. saying that a classification based on gender must serve an important government interest and be substantially related to achieving that interest. Califano seems at odds with Croson.

The Petitioner was raised in Texas by the Copetitioner." Further. a United States citizen. but the 5 Circuit rejected their claim that 8 U. The Petitioner. and an unnamed Vietnamese citizen. Issue.S. The Immigration Judge found the Petitioner deportable. "Congress' decision to impose requirements on unmarried fathers that differ from those on unmarried mothers is based on the significant difference between their respective relationships to the potential citizen 253 Nguyen v.§1409(a) violated the Equal Protection Clause ("EPC"). but not if the citizen parent is the mother: legitimation. Kennedy then observed "Section 1409(a) [ ] imposes a set of requirements on the children of citizen fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a noncitizen mother that are not imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent is the mother.C. The th Petitioner and the Copetitioner appealed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board"). In 1992. No. At these proceedings the Petitioner argued he was a Vietnamese Citizen. is that § 1409(a)(4) requires one of three affirmative steps to be taken if the citizen parent is the father. In order for a classification based on gender to be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause. The Board rejected the Petitioner's claim that he was a United States Citizen. Immigration and Naturalization Service Citation. a declaration of paternity under oath by the father. the Copetitioner acquired an order of parentage from state court demonstrating the Petitioner was his son. §1409(a). began deportation proceedings against the Petitioner.Nguyen v. the United State Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS").S." The court observed "[t]he statutory distinction relevant in this case. Joseph Boulais (the "Copetitioner").' " Facts. it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Immigration and Naturalization Service . was born on September 1.S. "it must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. violates the "equal protection guarantee embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment".S.C. the Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Whether Title 8 U. §1409. Tuan Ahn Nguyen (the "Petitioner"). 53 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. because it found the Petitioner did not comply with 8 U. which sets for the criteria for someone "born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother" to obtain citizenship. Three years later. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. Kennedy") writing for the majority first lays out the relevant statutory language. or a court order of paternity. concerning acquisition of United States citizenship by children with one parent who is a United States citizen and one that is not. 533 U. 1969 in Vietnam to the Copetitioner. A statute governing how citizenship for a child born outside the United States must be proven was at issue. J. because the requirements are different depending on whether the mother or father of the child is the citizen> Held.C. then. the Respondent. While the Appeal before the Board was pending.

is justified by two important governmental objectives. "[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. Specifically. it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived. As such. by the law. Accordingly. Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth. It is very easy to prove that the mother is the biological mother of the child from the birth itself. "it must be established at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The imposition of a different set of rules for making that legal determination with respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective. Additionally. but not a maternal one. from the "birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having given birth. The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. to commit this country to embracing a child as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the United States. in the case of the unwed father. the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship.at the time of birth. but one that consists of the real. an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship. there are no assurances that the father will actually ever meet the child. "Congress is well within its authority in refusing." As to the father. and even if they know about the conception.' " ‡ The first governmental interest is ensuring that the parents are actually the biological parents of the child. the United States. "[t]he same opportunity does not result from the event of birth." ‡ In order for a classification concerning gender to be upheld under the EPC." On the other hand. as a matter of biological inevitability. the father may not even know of the conception. as a formal matter. Further. absent proof of at least the opportunity for the development of a relationship between citizen parent and child." The court observes "[i]n the case of a citizen mother and a child born overseas. The court concludes. everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and. meaningful relationship. There is at least an opportunity for mother and child to develop a real. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a child born overseas and out of wedlock. it is more difficult because he need not be present at the birth and even if he is present that does not mean he is the child's natural father." This difference is necessitated by the shear amount of trips citizens today make to foreign countries. however." ‡ The second governmental interest is "the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized. in turn. the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth. nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's identity. they may not know about the birth. Immigration and Naturalization Service . to the 254 Nguyen v.

" Although the majority says it applied heightened scrutiny. Discussion. 255 Graham v. the fit between the means and the ends of the questionable statutory provision is "far too attenuated for the provision to survive heightened scrutiny. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. O'Connor would reverse the Court of Appeals because "the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-based classification embodied in 8 U. ‡ J." In the dissents eyes. the court applied rational basis review. the interests stressed by the majority may satisfy rational basis review. § 1409(a)(4)--i. which Justice David Souter ("J." Dissent.S. O'Connor criticizes the majority for hypothesizing about the statutes' purpose. It is interesting to read this case alongside cases that apply rational basis review or heightened scrutiny. O'Connor") filed a dissenting opinion. the dissent argued the majority incompletely explains the importance of the interests served by this statutory provision. Richardson . Further. Souter").e.absolute right to enter its borders. Breyer") joined. Additionally. the dissent contends the majority did not any only says that is what it did. J. the majority dismisses the availability of sex-neutral alternatives. but not the heightened review reserved for sex based classifications. and to full participation in the political process. because it has failed to establish at least that the classification substantially relates to the achievement of important governmental objectives. Finally.C.. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. but not determining the statutes actual purposes. Ginsburg") and Justice William Breyer ("J. and try to see whether the majority actually applied heightened scrutiny or if as the dissent contends.

Connelie . The Respondent alleges that the residency requirement of the Arizona welfare statutes is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). and thus the statute is unconstitutional. writing for the Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court). Facts. Richardson (Respondent). ‡ J. Arizona required State residents to be a United States citizen or a resident of the United States for at least fifteen years to be eligible for welfare benefits. was denied welfare benefits solely on the basis of being a resident alien who has resided for less than fifteen years in the country. Richardson Citation. ‡ The Supreme Court concludes that the State's "desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens" is not a compelling government interest for purposes of strict scrutiny. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. The Respondent. declares that restrictions based on alienage are akin to classifications based on race or nationality. 256 Foley v. Blackmun. 365 (1971). Blackmun) also notes that a "person" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses both resident aliens and citizens. May Arizona distinguish between resident aliens and citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. Restrictions based on alienage are generally subject to strict scrutiny. thereby affording legal aliens equal protection of the laws. Issue. 403 U. The important holding of Richardson is that aliens are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection and that in general. Synopsis of Rule of Law. in that they are subject to strict scrutiny.Graham v.S. ‡ Justice Harry Blackmun (J. No. statutes based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny.

Burger notes that a State may deny the right to vote. Edmund Foley (Appellant). New York law prohibited non-citizens from becoming state police officers. New York State law prohibited non-citizens from being appointed state policemen. its classifications based on alienage are subject only to rational basis scrutiny. ‡ Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. namely where the State is legislating within its "constitutional prerogative. was refused the opportunity to sit for the state police exam on the basis of his alien status. run for office. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. Marshall) argues that loosening of the level of review in the present case is inappropriate. 435 U. Yes. the state has an interest in not allowing non-citizens to invade the privacy of citizens and to allow non-citizens to exercise the discretionary powers of police officers against citizens." Strict scrutiny is no longer appropriate. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When the Appellant was denied the opportunity to sit for the state police exam because of his resident alien status.S.Foley v. but rather rational basis. The Appellant. May a State discriminate between aliens and citizens in comprising its police force? Held. ‡ For the same reason that non-citizens do not sit in trial over citizens. Discussion. Facts. 257 Ambach v. Burger) wrote for the majority that strict scrutiny in all areas where alien status is used restrictively would "obliterate all distinctions between citizens and aliens." J. Brief Fact Summary. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Dissent." The police power. Issue. 291 (1978). is an extension of the political life of the community. The majority changes the standard of review in certain situations. he sued. or sit on juries to non-citizens. When a state acts within its constitutional prerogatives. as well. Connelie Citation. as these are "at the heart of our political institutions. as long as there is a rational basis for such distinction. Norwick . is not incompatible with integrity of the political process. alleging denial of equal protection. He argues that the position of police officer does not require policymaking and as such.

Doe . ‡ In particular. Issue. J. Norwick and Dachinger. However. Blackmun) argues that the New York Statutes in question are irrational. New York education statutes forbid the certification of any perspective teacher who is eligible for United States citizenship. Discussion. ‡ Justice Lewis Powell (J. May the State deny teaching certification on the basis of alienage without violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held. are resident aliens denied teaching certificates by the State of New York solely on the grounds of their lack of United States citizenship. he believes that the statute takes educational opportunities away from students. The majority says that the horizon is the ability to influence policy.S. 68 (1979). Their refusal to seek naturalization is the sole requirement for certification as a teacher that they have not met. Brief Fact Summary. Powell notes that a teacher "has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government. 435 U. 258 Plyler v. 291 (1978).Ambach v. alleging that the requirement denies to them equal protection of laws. the political process. Norwick Citation. represents a "fundamental obligation of [state] government. Under the majority's reasoning in Norwick. 441 U. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded. like the police power. is not a suitable substitute for citizenship itself." and thus allows rational distinctions based on alienage. and a citizen's social responsibilities. Yes. Dissent. They brought suit. Facts. In particular. Education. Synopsis of Rule of Law.S. Justice Harry Blackmun (J." An oath of allegiance. there is no clear horizon to a State's ability to discriminate against legal aliens as government employees. he feels. This he compares to the police power discussed in Foley. Norwick extends the rational basis test to more tangential areas of government function. The Respondents both are foreign citizens eligible to seek naturalization who have refused to do so. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) argues that hiring support staff would not raise a legitimate state interest in discrimination. as indeed the dissent in Foley had argued about police. The Respondents. but refuses to seek naturalization. Powell) argues that the unequivocal bond that citizenship establishes makes it a rational distinguishing trait for the purposes of a state exercising its governmental functions. the dissent argues that a teacher is not in such a position.

Because the undocumented aliens cannot be a suspect class (by definition) and education is not considered a fundamental right. no such showing is made. while the dissent argues that illegal aliens should be availed of nothing from the 259 Plyler v. No. In a cynical view. 457 U. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan argues that punishing the parents' illegal conduct by denying benefits to their children does not "comport with fundamental conceptions of justice. strict scrutiny is inappropriate. the dissent argues that illegal aliens have no expectation of any public benefits from the country in which they reside illegally. J. Burger) notes that "the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal aliens children are deprived of a public education.Plyler v. Brennan) suggests that denial of benefits to those whose own conduct has brought them unlawfully into the State may be acceptable under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." and accuses the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) of adopting a results-oriented approach. May Texas deny undocumented children access to public schools without violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Discussion. Dissent. Legal representatives of such children brought suit. According to the majority.S. The State may not deny free public education to the children of undocumented immigrants. However. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Texas denied the children of illegal immigrants free public education. Doe ." ‡ The majority argues that the inability to read and write is an enormous cost to bear for any possible benefits the denial of access would accrue. the children are not in the State because of their own conduct. 202 (1982). Doe Citation. as the proposed state action will impose a "lifelong hardship. Brief Fact Summary. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. the majority is trying to create a ruling that supports equity and fair play (why should children suffer for the illegal acts of their parents?). Facts. Issue. However. Texas law denied the right of undocumented children to attend public schools that were free to United States citizens and legal aliens." the majority argues that a substantial goal must be furthered for the statute to be rational. In the end. alleging Texas's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Murgia . 260 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.government whose laws they have circumvented. neither with a firm grounding in the language of the Constitution.

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (Respondent). Issue. the Supreme Court states that rational basis review is the proper level of scrutiny in the current case. Brief Fact Summary. 307 (1976). it does not represent the same type of "purposeful unequal treatment" that has been shown on the basis of race or national origin. May Massachusetts use an age classification to determine compulsory retirement of its police officers? Held. Although Massachusetts requires routine physicals annually for all officers over the age of 40. Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed. etc. The Respondent was an officer in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police. they are no longer as physically able as individuals in their 20's and 30's. and hence. anyhow). alleging that the compulsory retirement law for Massachusetts State Police denied him of equal protection under the law. drinking age. Facts. driver's licensing. Massachusetts law requires state police officers to retire upon turning 50 years old. Dissent. The Respondent. Marshall) dissents. voting rights. As such. although a physical examination just four months prior had determined the Respondent to be healthy and capable of all his job functions. ‡ Police work can be physically arduous and the individual officers must be capable of executing their duties fully in the interest of public safety. 262 . one might argue that the majority is looking at the larger picture of how age classificationsare used in this country (for example. There is a rational basis for using a set age as a proxy. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United State's (Supreme Court) majority states that although there has been age discrimination in the past and at present. 427 U. As individuals grow older. The central holding of Murgia is that age classifications are subject only to rational basis review. statutory rape. Age classifications are only subject to rational basis review. arguing that the right to work is a fundamental right and hence proper for a heightened level of scrutiny. argues that this compulsory retirement denies him equal protection under the laws. Murgia Citation. as well as that the discrimination against the elderly is more widespread and systemic than the Per Curiam opinion admits. Discussion. there is no requirement that it base retirement solely on the results of these physicals.). Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Upon his 50th birthday.S. the Supreme Court finds no equal protection violation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the Respondent was required to comply with state law and retire. Given the relatively small gain in administrative convenience in the present case (officers approaching 50 are physically examined annually. The Respondent brought suit in United States District Court.

Fundamental Rights Under Due Process And Equal Protection 263 Zablocki v.CHAPTER VIII. Redhail .

Zablocki v. 265 Michael H. ‡ Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Yes. but one of unwarranted state intrusion into private matters of citizens. However. requiring individuals with support obligations to children from previous relationships to be counseled before entering into a new marriage and perhaps incurring other support obligations. The three opinions given illustrate that the lens through which a case is viewed may result in vastly different analysis. Rehnquist argues that the statute at bar passes rational basis review. Facts. Justice Potter Stewart (J. .700 behind in his support payments. It is uncontested that the Respondent could not receive such an order because of statutory limitations and his arrearages in child support. no money is given to the supported children. The majority opinion focuses on two classes: Wisconsin residents without obligations to noncustodial. Is the Wisconsin statute's interference with the right to marry a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held. The Respondent has been unemployed for long periods of time and at the time of the suit is over $3. 1974 was denied on grounds that he did not procure a court order granting explicit permission for the marriage to proceed. the means are not sufficiently related to the government interest advanced. dependent minor children and Wisconsin residents with support obligations toward such children. Rehnquist) argues that marriage is not such a fundamental right as to trigger strictest scrutiny. for whom he is under a court order to provide monetary support. Issue. ‡ The statute as enacted is supposed to aid in collection of child support. but believe that rather than invalidating the statute on Equal Protection grounds. Rehnquist argues that marriage is not a fundamental right and thus Wisconsin is not producing a discriminatory class or intruding into personal liberties. but the right to marry is withheld from the individual. J. Concurrence. Because of this. Stewart) concurred in the judgment. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Because of the broad infringement of the statute. The Respondent's marriage license of September 27. Dissent. v. The Respondent. the State must show a compelling interest in the interference and show that the means chosen to do so are sufficiently related to the interest. Marriage is a fundamental right. Redhail Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. The court was then to give automatic permission for the marriage. Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. Gerald D. this does not resemble the enacted statute. He cites precedent that marriage is a fundamental right and that the classification at issue significantly interferes with the exercise of the right. was denied a marriage license by the State of Wisconsin under a statute requiring a court order prior to marriage of Wisconsin residents with non-custodial minor children to whom they owe a duty of support. the statute does not add any new collection devices. J. He rather argues for rational basis review. the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should have invalidated it as an impermissible regulation of marriage that invades the sphere of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Redhail (Respondent). ‡ The challenged statute was originally to be a counseling device. As such. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Stewart's concurrence does not view the case as one of discriminatory classifications. The Respondent has an out-of-wedlock minor daughter. J. which requires a compelling state interest and a sufficiently related means before the state may infringe upon it. Marshall) wrote for the majority. In the case of individuals unable to meet the requirements.

The line of argument in J. Carole and Gerald for many years commencing with the child's birth. viewing the majority's insistence on the rights of the State to preserve the unitary family as singularly incongruent to the current case. while she was still married to Gerald D. were still married and cohabiting. There is little or no resemblance to a traditional unitary family in the relationships carried on by Carole D. Michael H. now sues for parental rights over Victoria D.. Issue. . while she was still married and living with Gerald D. have since divorced and Carole D. Justice William Brennan (J.Michael H. J. but the State of California's paternity laws do not allow him to challenge the paternity of his daughter. or an organic and changing document. impregnated Carole D. Michael H. Ruling affirmed. impregnated Carole D. Synopsis of Rule of Law.. recorded as her father on her birth certificate. Gerald D. of a fundamental right to have parental contact with his child? Held.. Citation. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia (J. California's paternity laws conclusively presume that the issue (child) of a wife cohabiting with her non-impotent or sterile husband is a child of the marriage. Scalia notes that there is no established tradition of allowing a unitary family to be dissolved by a third party judicially without their consent. lived together with Victoria D. The major difference between the majority and dissent is whether the United States Constitution (Constitution) is one of predefined. The State has a legitimate interest in protecting the parental rights of a married couple having a child to the exclusion of the parental rights of a biological father. has married Scott K. and held her out publicly as their child. Victoria D. Discussion. do not impregnate a married woman whose husband may accept the child as his own). 491 U. DNA tests show that Michael H. Do California's paternity statutes deprive Michael H. J. Brief Fact Summary. and Michael H. Gerald D. This presumption may only be challenged by the husband or wife within the first two years of marriage. as she was born while Carole and Gerald D. static principles. J. is over 98% certainly Victoria's biological father. No. Facts. Brennan's dissent requires that behavior such as Carole D.. However. has Gerald D. Scalia's analysis rests on the traditional interest of the State in preserving the unitary family and discouraging adultery (if one wishes to have a paternal relationship with ones offspring. 110 (1989). Brennan further asserts that such state of affairs is more common than the majority wishes to admit. Scalia) refutes Michael H.S. and Carole D. In short.'s contention that biological fatherhood and an existing parent-child relationship entitle him to prove paternity of Victoria D. were separated. Michael H. Dissent. and Gerald D. While Carole D. held Victoria out publicly as their own offspring. Specifically. v. Brennan's approach is one based in the reality of the situation (if the traditional unitary family clearly means so little to Carole D.. Brennan) dissents.. Michael H. and Michael H's not be a societal outlier. why is the preservation of the traditional unitary family advanced as an argument benefiting her?). and Gerald D. Carole D. The situation at bar is sordid and convoluted. Whereas J. The child born from their encounter.

May the City restrict its definition of single family in such a manner as to remove certain combinations of close blood relations in the same house from that definition? Held. Nebraska . Powell) notes that municipalities generally have a broad ability to enforce single-family housing ordinances against groups of individuals living together where there is no relation by blood." At the time of the complaint the Petitioner. East Cleveland's housing ordinances restrict occupancy of certain dwellings to single family units. The majority holds it to be family associations broadly.S. 268 Meyer v. 494 (1977). Her living situation did not match one of the statutory definitions of single family. Justice Potter Stewart (J. reproductive autonomy and child-rearing. The ordinance in question. lived in East Cleveland with her son and two of her grandsons.Moore v. however. adoption. No. Powell argues the State has no compelling interest in restricting the definition of a single family in such a manner as to exclude combinations of close blood relations. The State must advance a compelling interest to infringe upon the choice of relatives of a close degree of kinship to live together. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remanded. She was charged and sentenced to pay a $25 fine and spend 5 days in jail. the decision to move in with extended family or move extended family in with ones nuclear family may be regarded as a fundamental right. Inez Moore Moore (Petitioner). Mrs. 431 U. As such. J. The Petitioner. who were cousins. recognizes only a few categories of related individuals as a "single family. or marriage. Discussion. was convicted of a criminal offense under an East Cleveland housing ordinance for having one of her grandsons living in her house. The majority and dissent differ largely in their conception of what the fundamental right involved in the case is. ‡ However. The dissent argues that the family associations are merely emanations from more basic rights. City of East Cleveland. Facts. The City ordinance does not affect the Petitioner's right to do any of these. the tradition of having family members live with others in their extended family is long and representative of the basic values underlying our society. Dissent. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brief Fact Summary. Ohio Citation. but rather the ability to have children and to raise them in the manner one deems proper. ‡ Justice Lewis Powell (J. Issue. Stewart) argues that the line of cases restricting definitions of single families focuses not so much on blood relation. rather than brothers.

McReynolds notes that the justification for the statute was most likely anti-German sentiment following the First World War. Discussion. when the State's interest in fostering a homogeneous population with "American ideals. Meyer is clearly indicative of jurisprudence prior to the development of the fundamental right/compelling state interest/substantial relation analysis of the current Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). made it illegal to teach any class in a non-English language. 390 (1923). Facts. it is difficult to ascertain why the Respondent should so influence the educational opportunities of the children of the State and interfere with parental choice of educational experiences. 262 U. was tried and convicted of teaching reading in German to a 10-year-old student in violation of state laws regulating the teaching of foreign languages. Brief Fact Summary. to teach any non-English language to a pupil prior to the ninth grade and set fines and jail time for any individual violating the statute. J. Granville . Justice James McReynolds (J. Meyer (Petitioner). the state of Nebraska (Respondent)." As such. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of parental control also extends to the type of education children receive. Issue.S. Nebraska Citation." is far greater than during peacetime. The Petitioner. The Respondent. May the State of Nebraska outlaw foreign-language instruction? Held. He also suggests that the statute may not be unconstitutional in wartime. McReynolds) notes that "mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful. No.Meyer v. 269 Troxel v.

The interest of parents in the "care.Troxel v. However. Facts. Tommie Granville (Respondent). Kennedy) believes that the best interest of the child standard required by the statute provides the necessary protection to the parent's constitutional rights. Mr. the Respondent. the Respondent's opinion of appropriate visitation times and durations differed from the grandparents'. but the couple never married. The Respondent and Brad Troxel (Mr. and control of their children" is a fundamental right that the State may not abridge without a compelling interest. 120 S. Does the Washington statute interfere unnecessarily with parental control over the raising of children? Held. Souter) argues that the statute is facially unconstitutional as it too broadly allows anyone to sue for visitation rights at any time. Two years after they separated. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. but that the statute is unconstitutional when applied to the situation of the Respondent and her children. sued their mother. under the Washington statute authorizing suit for visitation rights by any party. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. This latter point is most important. under a Washington statute that allows any individual to sue for visitation rights. custody. Issue. In the time between their separation and his suicide. as the Washington Supreme Court struck down the statute itself. ‡ Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. as there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Scalia) argues that the Court should not be deciding questions of family law. The plurality does not address the facial constitutionality of the statute. Concurrence. ‡ J. Oklahoma . The Petitioners. Because of this. Yes. Granville Citation. his parents wanted to continue to have a relationship with their granddaughters. Stevens) believes the case should have been denied certiorari. Troxel's suicide. the grandparents asked for a judicial determination in the best interest of the children. Synopsis of Rule of Law. for visitation rights. Mr. Discussion. ‡ Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Supreme Court of Washington ruling affirmed. but rather the legislature. So. Because of this. After Mr. the state must prove the existence of a compelling interest for the statute. O'Connor) reiterated that the raising of a child is one of the most fundamental of all protected liberties. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia (J. the grandparents of Isabelle Troxel and Natalie Troxel (Petitioners). The greatest difference between the plurality and the concurrences lies in whether or not the facial issue is reached. O'Connor points out two important issues: (1) the statute does not require the court to afford any special weight to the parent's decisions regarding the child and (2) there is no determination that the parent is an unfit guardian. when the trial court reviewed the suit it gave no special consideration to the Respondent's concept of the best interest of her children. Ct. 271 Skinner v. Dissent. Thomas) states that he would affirm the lower court ruling on the basis that Washington has no compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision on visitation of third parties. Brief Fact Summary. ‡ Justice David Souter (J. Troxel) had a relationship that lasted some years and produced two daughters. Troxel committed suicide. Troxel often brought Isabelle Troxel and Natalie Troxel to his parents' house. 2054 (2000).

‡ Justice William Douglas (J. Skinner represents the Supreme Court of the United States' growing awareness of the right to reproductive autonomy. Concurrence. In terms of fines and imprisonment the crimes are identical to the State. the majority in Skinner holds that sterilization in the present situation violates equal protection principles. requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with it. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual offenders in no way guarantees that new offenders will not be born. This is clear discrimination in J. ‡ J. The right to have offspring is a fundamental right. is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a Oklahoma penal institution. the Act was passed and proceedings were instituted against him. equal protection is violated. but rests his decision on due process grounds. The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses before being arrested and confined for armed robbery. Connecticut . As such. Douglas's view. During his third incarceration. was sentenced to involuntary sterilization under Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act (the Act) and now alleges that the Act deprives him of equal protection under the laws. there is no guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn offenders themselves. Furthermore. 316 U. Oklahoma defined a "habitual criminal" as a person who. Skinner (Petitioner). Stone) concurs in the judgment. Issue. Discussion. Only when it comes to sterilization do the crimes differ. May the State sterilize an individual against his will for being convicted of three felonies involving moral turpitude? Held. "having been convicted two or more times for crimes 'amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude' either in Oklahoma or another State. The Petitioner. 272 Griswold v.S. Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruling reversed. 535 (1942). Brief Fact Summary. Facts.Skinner v. Unlike later cases that focus on due process and a right to privacy. No." Such habitual criminals could be subject to forced sterilization. Oklahoma Citation. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law. arguing that the invasion of personal liberty is too great. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral turpitude) and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the eyes of the statute.

Connecticut does not have the constitutional authority to abridge that relationship. 381 U. They admit they find the Connecticut statute offensive. ‡ Justice William Douglas (J. as the enactment violates "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The opinion of the Court in Griswold is unusual in that it relies on inferred rights in the Constitution. As the law prohibits the use of contraceptives. rather than their manufacture or sale. the law is aimed at the core of the marital relationship. was arrested for providing information. 479 (1965). He notes that denying married couples the right to contraception in no way strengthens that policy. Discussion. Issue. Justices Hugo Black (J. Griswold and others (Appellants). not the judiciary. he describes the fact that the State cannot "contract the spectrum of available knowledge" consistent with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). and as such.S. but believe that unless there is a specific constitutional provision otherwise. Synopsis of Rule of Law. and medical advice to married persons as a means to prevent conception. Stewart) dissented.'" ‡ Justice Byron White (J. ‡ J." In particular. Marshall) argues that the statute should be overturned on Due Process grounds. Connecticut Citation. The Appellants. as well as the counseling and aiding the use of such contraception.Griswold v. May the government ban all use of contraceptives? Held. Douglas) describes the "penumbras[] formed by emanations from specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Dissent. . Brief Fact Summary. believing that the purpose of the statute is to enforce policies disfavoring illicit sexual contact. Connecticut law criminalized the use of chemical and mechanical contraception. Facts. The Petitioner was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Goldberg) believes that the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) guarantees that the marital relation is a right retained by the people. ‡ Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. Appeals Court ruling reversed. Concurrence. Black) and Potter Stewart (J. it is difficult to distinguish how the Supreme Court's opinion is any more "correct" than the concurring opinions offered. White) concurs on due process grounds. He argues that this is too broad a sweep to be a constitutional exercise of state authority. No. Douglas suggests that the marital relationship lies at the center of such a zone of privacy. ‡ Justice Arthur Goldberg (J. He also describes the rights to "privacy and repose" suggested by many of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights. The Petitioner was arrested after providing information and instructions on birth control methods to married people. instructions. the remedy for such legislation is through the political branches. Furthermore. Intimate marital relations lie within a zone of privacy into which the government may not intrude.

Eisenstadt v. No. to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Wade . Appeals Court ruling affirmed. but only from doctors or druggists on prescription. Berger) argues that there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) that suggests birth control must be made available on the open market. The Appellee. 405 U. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. (2) single people may not receive contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy and (3) anyone may receive contraceptives from anyone to prevent the spread of disease. Brennan) notes that "if the right to privacy means anything. the right to contraception is extended to unmarried individuals. married or single." Dissent. Facts. Here. May the state discriminate between married and unmarried couples in prohibiting birth control methods? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 438 (1972).S. The State may not discriminate between married and unmarried individuals in prohibiting the distribution of contraception. 275 Roe v. it means the right of the individual. Issue. Baird Citation. Baird (Appellee). Chief Justice William Burger (J. A right to privacy is again recognized in Eisenstadt. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. was arrested for lecturing on contraception to a group of University students and distributing contraceptive foam to a student after the lecture. Massachusetts law created three classes of people receiving contraceptive devices and drugs: (1) married persons could receive contraceptives to prevent pregnancy. as well.

Wade Citation. Facts. Justice William Rehnquist (J. which only excepts from criminality those abortions designed to save the mother's life is unconstitutional. 113 (1973). largely arguing that the three-trimester approach offered by the majority speaks more of judicial legislation than constitutional analysis.Roe v. The right to privacy is extended further again. the state may even prohibit all abortion procedures. 276 Planned Parenthood v. Dissent. but rather a more fluid approach outlined in Planned Parenthood v. Brennan) produced a continuum. depending on the trimester during which the operation occurred and whether or not the woman's life and health is taken into account. Brief Fact Summary. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. 833 (1992). Jane Roe (Petitioner). only the pregnant woman and her physician may make decisions regarding the termination of a pregnancy. The Petitioner. ‡ During the third trimester. was pregnant and challenged the Texas statute prohibiting her from acquiring an abortion. The State has a limited ability to affect a woman's ability to procure an abortion.S. Rehnquist) dissents. To what extent may the State regulate a woman's ability to procure an abortion? Held. Roe's three-trimester approach is no longer used by federal courts in analyzing abortion legislation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Casey . Roe is the central case involving a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. The Petitioner was pregnant with an unwanted pregnancy and brought suit against the State of Texas for prohibiting medically licensed professionals from performing abortions.S. Issue. He begins by noting that a statute. ‡ Prior to the end of the first trimester. 410 U. the state may regulate abortion in manners reasonably related to maternal health. 505 U. Discussion. Casey. ‡ During the second trimester. except where the life or health of the mother is at risk. It varies.

Pennsylvania amended its Abortion Control Act (the Act) in 1988-89. Unnecessary health regulations that present a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right. if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. O'Connor). 410 U. as long as those measures do note unduly overburden a woman's right. of the universe. Does the amended Act satisfy the federal courts' post-Roe conception of abortion rights? Held. and David Souter (J. 833 (1992)." ‡ J. In particular. Kennedy. as abortion should be debated at the political level. Souter note that any reservations the Suprem Court has in reaffirming Roe are overcome by the force of stare decisis. ‡ Justices Sandra Day O'Connor (J. 505 U. Souter) wrote for the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)." ‡ Because the State has an interest in potential life throughout pregnancy. Dissent. noting that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence. Carhart . Wade. largely believing Roe v. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia (J. the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. ‡ Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) states that he believes Roe was improperly decided and tradition requires the Supreme Court to overturn the holding. 113 (1973) would be overturned. that a woman give informed consent at least 24 hours before the procedure. not decided by the courts. Facts. J. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Pennsylvania amended the Act to require. Discussion. The majority takes down the rigid trimester outline of Roe and focuses more clearly on the issue of viability. 278 Stenberg v. among other things.S.Planned Parenthood v. Anthony Kennedy (J. No. that a minor have at least one parent give consent (although there is a judicial bypass option for minors) and that a married woman must sign a statement saying she has notified her husband of the procedure. and J. Kennedy).S. of meaning. Scalia) believes Roe was improperly decided. Issue. ‡ A State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability. The concurrence and dissents discuss openly their hopes or fears that a change in the Supreme Court's composition will open the door to overturn Roe. and of the mystery of human life. O'Connor. "[n]o evolution of legal principle has left Roe's central doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973. Concurrence. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. Blackmun) writes in large part to display his worry that Roe will be overturned when he steps down from the Court. Casey Citation." ‡ "An undue burden exists. Appeals Court ruling overturned. Brief Fact Summary. and therefore a provision of law is invalid. The central holding of Roe is still good law. No development of constitutional law since the case was decided has implicitly or explicitly left Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.

Appeals Court ruling affirmed. ‡ Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. Roe . 120 S. ‡ Justice Steven Breyer (J. Discussion.S. Facts. The State cannot ban abortion procedures categorically without exceptions for the mother's health. Does the Nebraska statute unduly burden a woman's reproductive rights? Held. 113 (1973). and (2) its ban of the most common second trimester abortion technique imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose. The Supreme Court is clear that there must always be a maternal health exception to any regulation of a woman's right to have an abortion. Scalia) reiterates his belief that the Supreme Court of the United States' (Supreme Court) abortion jurisprudence is judicial legislation. dismemberment. but rather the rights afforded by Roe. ‡ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. It has not made such a showing. ‡ Nebraska has the burden of proving that a partial birth procedure will never be the safest alternative for a woman rightfully seeking an abortion. Carhart Citation. ‡ Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas) believes the entire line of jurisprudence since Roe v. but not endanger a woman's health when it regulates the methods of abortion. or collapse of fetal tissue to facilitate evacuation from the uterus. it is most likely the changing composition of the Supreme Court motivated pro life advocates to believe Roe might be overturned. Wade. Concurrence. Breyer) notes that a State may promote.Stenberg v. et. Issue. There is no exception in the Nebraska statute for the mother's health where partial birth procedures are the safest method of abortion. Dissent. Ct." Synopsis of Rule of Law. The holding in Carhart is not an outlier. Kennedy) suggests that the courts are ill-prepared to distinguish between various techniques for abortions. Nebraska criminalized the performance of any "partial birth" procedure in an abortion. Carhart (Respondent). Again. is misguided judicial activism. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia (J. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. the safest methods of abortion involve removal of at least some fetal tissue during the procedure and in some cases disarticulation. During the second trimester of pregnancy. 410 U. O'Connor) believes the statute is unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) there is no maternal health exception. The Respondent is a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting. The Respondent. asks for an injunction forbidding the enforcement of Nebraska's statute banning so-called "partial birth abortions. Ginsburg) quotes Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Posner that the real target of the statutes in question is not a procedure. 280 Maher v. 2597 (2000). al. Brief Fact Summary. Yes.

May Connecticut regulate funding for abortions in a manner that discriminates against the individuals having non-therapeutic abortions? Held. Powell) notes that there is no "constitutional right to an abortion.Maher v. 281 Planned Parenthood v. Brennan) believes that the State is forcing women to carry children to term and thus is making reproductive decisions for the women. 464 (1977). Casey . Connecticut Welfare Department limits state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are medically necessary.S. The State Welfare Department limits funding for first trimester abortions to those abortions that are "medically necessary." Indigent women brought suit. Discussion. claiming that the statute denies them their constitutional right to an abortion." Rather there is a constitutional right to have the government not unreasonably interfere with a woman's decision to have an abortion. Issue. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should not decide legislative policy. Understanding the majority opinion. ‡ Justice Lewis Powell (J. Brief Fact Summary. Justice William Brennan (J. but the state has put no obstacle in the way of an indigent woman procuring an abortion. Facts. one must understand that indigent woman have no funding for an abortion whether or not the State denies funding. the State is not putting obstacles in the way of indigent women wanting abortion services. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court is in no position to review the State's policy choice. Roe Citation. As such. Appeals Court ruling affirmed. Dissent. 432 U. ‡ Connecticut may make childbirth a more attractive option for the indigent by paying for a pregnancy taken to term.

However. Synopsis of Rule of Law. As such. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor) argues that in well-functioning marriages. Issue. The Pennsylvania legislature was in a position to weigh the costs and benefits of the statute. Concurrence.S. Spousal notification presents an unconstitutionally substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. It can counsel to take a child to term. . Dissent. but writes separately to voice concern that there are not concrete guidelines for the judges standing over a request for consent for an abortion. Casey Citation. Yes. there is a higher probability that a wife would not want to disclose the unwanted pregnancy to the husband. Rehnquist) argues that the statute should not be unconstitutional simply because the statute will be unnecessary in some cases or even counterproductive in some others. O'Connor also suggests that the statute represents a view of marriage reflecting the common-law view of women's status in marriage. that a woman give informed consent at least 24 hours before the procedure. Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. spouses would communicate on issues as great as having an abortion. among other things. Stevens) concurs with the majority opinion. that a minor have at least one parent give consent (although there is a judicial bypass option for minors). ‡ J. Appeals Court ruling reversed. Brief Fact Summary. in a dysfunctional marriage. and that a married woman must sign a statement saying she has notified her husband of the procedure. which is repugnant to our current view of marriage. Discussion. The amended Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act (the Act) included provisions that a married woman must inform her husband of her desire to procure an abortion except in case of medical emergency. but it may not substantively hinder access to an abortion. Does the spousal notification requirement present a substantial obstacle to a woman procuring an abortion? Held. the statute presents a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose. Pennsylvania amended the Act to require.Planned Parenthood v. 833 (1992). Justice John Paul Stevens (J. 505 U. Facts. The basic rationale here is that the State cannot put substantial obstacles between a woman and the abortion decision.

‡ Justice Lewis Powell (J. Because the statute balances parental interest in raising their children with the unique situation of a pregnant minor seeking an abortion. Brief Fact Summary. Baird Citation. Powell) argued that the rights of a woman to have an abortion must be balanced with the ability of parents to make decisions for their minor offspring. Massachusetts required unmarried. she could petition in superior court for a determination that she is mature enough to make this decision. The main point of Bellotti is the balancing of the interests of the minor woman in terminating the pregnancy and the parents in having the ability to raise their offspring. May a State condition a minor woman's right to an abortion on parental consent? Held. Facts. minor women to obtain parental consent from both parents before allowing her to acquire an abortion. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had previously held that an absolute parental veto over a minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy was unconstitutional. In the event that she was unwilling or unable to obtain such consent. or even if she is not.Bellotti v. Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. as long as there is an alternative procedure provided by the State. 443 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. Missouri Dept. If unable to do so. of Health .S. Issue. Yes. In the statute at bar. the State provides a "safety valve" of allowing a judicial determination instead of parental consent. 283 Cruzan v. A minor's right to an abortion may be conditioned on parental consent. 622 (1979). a superior court judge may issue a consent order. the abortion is in her best interest. the statute is constitutional. Director. A Massachusetts law required an unmarried minor woman to get consent from both her parents before procuring an abortion.

Cruzan's parents could not establish Ms. Discussion. Dissent. 285 Washington v. States are given wide latitude in determining how they give rights to patient surrogates. Cruzan's wishes regarding such withdrawal by clear and convincing evidence. O'Connor) concurs. ‡ Missouri is free to choose whether or not they will accept a surrogate for an incompetent's medical decisions. While the Supreme Court decides there is a liberty interest in requesting to withdraw treatment. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia (J. as the Supreme Court also ruled that Missouri has a state interest in determining how that liberty interest is to be applied in the case of an incompetent.S. Director. arguing that the State interest cannot outweigh Ms. Concurrence. the Ms. that this police power has always been afforded to the States. Issue. Rehnquist) notes that unwanted medical treatment is considered a battery at common law. Missouri Dept. Brennan) dissents. Nancy Cruzan's (Ms. the treatment must be unwanted by the patient. Missouri denied the withdrawal of treatment request because Ms. Yes. Cruzan had a discussion with a friend who testified in court that she said she would not want to be on life support. of Health Citation. not judicial choice. emphasizing that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) did not have to decide whether a State must abide by the decisions of a medical surrogate. Glucksberg . it is clear that there must be a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. alleging she has a liberty interest in withdrawal of treatment. 497 U. Ms. ‡ Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. but they are free to establish the standard by which they do so. Scalis) concurs. Synopsis of Rule of Law. but writes separately to state his opinion that the federal courts have no place making substantive decisions in this area. but were denied because of insufficient evidence of Nancy's intent. However. Justice William Brennan (J. but this was the only evidence of her personal wishes. Cruzan's family is not afforded the remedy they hoped for. Hence. Cruzan's liberty interest in having treatment withheld. 261 (1990). Cruzan's parents now bring suit on her behalf. Ms. That is a legislative. Cruzan) parents sought to withhold medical treatment from their vegetative daughter. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.Cruzan v. Does Missouri have a legitimate state interest in tempering the liberty interests of incompetent patients? Held.

Facts. Brief Fact Summary. Assisted suicide is not a liberty interest protected by the United States Constitution (Constitution). Glucksberg Citation. there are several State interests against defining such a liberty interest: preserving human life. No. Stevens) concurs noting that although the Washington statute is not facially invalid. it does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the statute might well be invalid. 521 U. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. the means chosen are substantially related to that end. Texas . Breyer) concurs with the decision." but a formulation similar to "the right to die with dignity. Appeals Court ruling reversed. 287 Lawrence v. but does not reach the narrow question of whether a mentally competent patient may ask for assistance in taking his own life. Glucksberg and other physicians who treat terminally ill patients (Respondents) seek a declaration that a Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide is unconstitutional. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. ‡ Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. as there is no constitutional guarantee to assisted suicide." Discussion.S. However. Is there a liberty interest in allowing patients the right to assisted suicide? Held. Physicians treating terminally ill patients are seeking a determination that the Washington state law prohibiting assisted suicide is unconstitutional. Issue. even life support. in terms of suicide. Rehnquist) notes that suicide is criminalized in almost every State and every Western democracy. ‡ Justice Steven Breyer (J. Given that the State of Washington has compelling state interests in preventing assisted suicide. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had already established that there is a liberty interest in withholding unwanted medical treatment. Concurrence. The Respondents. Synopsis of Rule of Law. protecting the vulnerable and fear that this may start down the path toward involuntary euthanasia. The Supreme Court does not decide whether it is constitutional for a law permitting assisted suicide to exist. 702 (1997). O'Connor) concurs. but wishes that the formulation of the right was not "the right to commit suicide with another's assistance. only that it is constitutional to pass a law prohibiting assisted suicide. This is because she finds no liberty interest in suicide in general.Washington v. To hold for the Respondents would strike down hundreds of years of legal tradition.

Thomas) dissented. Moreover." The statute defines "[d]eviate sexual intercourse" as follows: "(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person. because it overlooked the extent of the liberty interest at stake. they found the Petitioners. two adults. When the police entered the home. Lawrence") and Tyrone Garner ("Mr.S. It read: [o]ur prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. Stevens) dissenting opinion from [Bowers]." ‡ Yes. The Petitioners. or "(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. "[t]oday's approach to stare decisis invites us to overrule an erroneously decided precedent (including an "intensely divisive" decision) if: (1) its foundations have been "eroded" by subsequent decisions. Synopsis of Rule of Law. First. The Supreme Court in [Bowers] framed the issue as follows: "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. Specifically.Ct. 2472. Penal Code Ann. A statute criminalizing two consenting adults of the same sex for engaging in certain intimate contact. is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. 558. The constitutionality of the entry was not in dispute.Lawrence v. this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons." No showing has been made that the United States Government has a legitimate or urgent interest in curbing this type of personal choice. Facts. Kennedy adopted Justice John Paul Steven's ("J. (2) it has been subject to "substantial and continuing" criticism. William Rehnquist ("J. 156 L." § 21. individual decisions by married persons. Kennedy"). concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship. Dissent. J. The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") initially revisited its decision in [Bowers v. "[i]t suffices for [the majority] to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice. ‡ Is a statute that makes it illegal for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate contact valid? ‡ Are the Petitioners free as adults to engage in the private conduct of consensual sex in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution? Held. Hardwick]. Garner") (collectively referred to as the "Petitioners"). Scalia). are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.06(a). even when not intended to produce offspring. 123 S." J.2d 508 (2003) Brief Fact Summary.01(1). and (3) it has not . The dissenting justices criticized the majority's application of the doctrine of stare decisis." Additionally. John Geddes Lawrence ("Mr. Texas Citation. ‡ Justices Antonin Scalia ("J. The Petitioners were arrested and charged with violating Tex. whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law. the statutes at issue in these cases "seek to control a personal relationship that. neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. The Petitioners were arrested and prosecuted under a Texas state law for engaging in a consensual sexual act. ‡ No. in which a Georgia statute criminalizing certain sexual conduct was upheld. the statute is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Texas statute "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. which provides "[a] person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. § 21. began by criticizing the Supreme Court's framing of the issue in [Bowers]. Lawrence's home in response to a weapons disturbance. Rehnquist") and Clarence Thomas (J. engaging in a consensual sexual act.Ed. writing for the majority. Kennedy observed. is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). Issue. 595 U. were two adults. The police arrived at and entered Mr. Second.

thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else. Scalia's. instead of basing her opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution's Due Process Clause. J. the Supreme Court overruled its prior controversial decision in [Bowers v. is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. Hardwick]. " Further." Additionally. By this decision. she does so on the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." The dissenting justices then argue [Roe] satisfies this three-prong test. However. an inexorable command." Discussion. Roe . "Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals. The majority stated: "[i]n the United States. like a bare desire to harm the group. J. ‡ Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. Thomas also drafted his own dissent in addition to joining J. writing for the majority refused to base his decision on the Equal Protection Clause. J. O'Connor") concurred in the judgment. "[m]oral disapproval of this group.induced "individual or societal reliance" that counsels against overturning. disapproving of its reasoning in all respects. criticism of [Bowers] has been substantial and continuing.O'Connor stressed the "Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct--and only that conduct--subject to criminal sanction. It is not. not just as to its historical assumptions. however." ‡ J." 290 Whalen v. Concurrence. Kennedy also addressed the doctrine of stare decisis and stated: "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. Kennedy. ‡ J. Thomas described the law before the court as "uncommonly silly" and recommended that the Texas legislature repeal it.

The State of New York was collecting personal information regarding individuals prescribed drugs for which there is a legal and an illegal market.Whalen v. The statute also criminalized unauthorized release of any such information. 589 (1977). by prescription. Stevens) argued that there are two different interests implicated by zones of privacy. Yes. J. Issue. Discussion. Roe Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Roe . Facts. The State of New York maintained a centralized computer database of the names and addresses of all persons who have obtained. a drug for which there is both a legal and an illegal market. Brief Fact Summary.S. Appeals Court ruling reverse. only that there is no constitutionally impermissible invasion of privacy. May the government maintain lists of personal health information without violating a zone of privacy? Held. Stevens acknowledges the fear of accidental disclosure. The first is the right to avoid disclosing personal matters and the second is the right to independence in making certain decisions. but he also acknowledges that there is a statutory penalty for unauthorized disclosure. The Respondent has failed to establish how the statute invades any right or liberty. ‡ The statute protects against public disclosure and some degree of disclosure is already inherent in the current prescription drug system. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. The government may maintain detailed lists of personal information for administrative convenience. 291 Saenz v. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) does not argue there is no invasion of privacy here. 429 U.

526 U. but that the discriminatory means is inappropriate to the ends advanced. Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. 292 Harper v. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens noted that saving is an important issue. Stevens) notes that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) guarantees to citizens of other States the ability to be treated in the same manner as a citizen of a State to which he they are traveling. Discussion. why should one lose these when one becomes a citizen after traveling has ended. In the interim. Facts. Rehnquist is suspect. Rehnquist) disapproves of the use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution and the insistence on viewing the activities as part of "travel. they were limited to the amount payable by the State of the family's prior residence. In the interim." J. Court of Appeals ruling affirmed. where a California resident would be eligible for $456/month. The travel argument by J.Saenz v. This should be the same whether they are transiently in the new State or a traveling to settle in the new state.S. Issue. a family of two moving from Arizona would be eligible for only $275/month. Rehnquist notes that when a citizen settles in another State. States may not discriminate against non-residents in such a manner that denies them the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of that State. 489 (1999). ‡ California did not advance a discriminatory intent to the law. J. A California statute required families to live in California for twelve months before becoming eligible for full welfare benefits. May a State discriminate against non-citizens who travel to the State with regard to current residents? Held. he is no longer a traveler. Roe Citation. If he agrees that one is entitled to all privileges and immunities when traveling. but rather noted it would save the State almost $11 million annually. Virginia State Board of Elections . Synopsis of Rule of Law. they were limited to the amount payable by the State of the family's prior residence. No. For example. A California statute required families to live in California for twelve months before becoming eligible for full welfare benefits. Brief Fact Summary. Dissent.

classifications involving the right to vote are closely scrutinized. Virginia levied a poll tax not exceeding $1. Facts. Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. As such. A State poll tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. it invidiously discriminates against those who cannot afford the tax. 383 U. Union Free School District . Reversed and remanded. Residents challenged the State tax under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. a classification based on wealth is clearly inappropriate.Harper v.50 on every resident of the State 21 years of age or older. Virginia residents brought suit against the State Board of Elections. 663 (1966). Virginia State Board of Elections Citation. alleging that the poll tax violates the United States Constitution (Constitution). Douglas) notes that the tax divides the eligible voters of the State into two classes: those who can afford the tax and those who cannot.S. Yes. In the present case. Brief Fact Summary. Justice William Douglas (J. Discussion. Because voting is a fundamental right. 293 Kramer v. Does a State poll tax violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Held.

New York Education Law requires the ownership of real property within a school district or custody of children attending the district to be eligible to vote in school district elections. Stewart) argues that the classification is valid. Dissent. Warren notes that the system of exclusion excludes some members that have a direct interest (individuals whose children are not yet school age) and includes some with little interest (individuals with no children who just incidentally own real property in the district). As such. James . The right to vote is a fundamental right. His denial of voting rights was based solely on his lack of real property ownership or custody of children. Discussion. 395 U. The Petitioner is currently living with his mother within the school district. Stewart argues that the classification is constitutional. Warren) notes that the State's legitimate interest seems to be restricting a voice in school matters to those "directly affected. was refused the right to vote in school district elections. Statutes limiting the right to vote must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.S. Appeals Court ruling reversed." As the classification in the present case is not of a suspect class. J. Warren does not say that the State cannot discriminate as to who gets to vote in a school district election. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Facts. He brought suit. Kramer (Petitioner). No. The Petitioner. Issue. Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Synopsis of Rule of Law." J. Union Free School District Citation. Notice that J. Brief Fact Summary. as the State has "broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right to suffrage may be exercised.Kramer v. under a New York statute requiring property ownership in the district or children attending district schools to vote in such elections. Is the New York statute narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest? Held. only that such discrimination must be tailored to the compelling interest sought to be advanced. 621 (1939). it cannot be narrowly tailored. seeking to invalidate the statute as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution. 294 Ball v.

As the District's primary purpose is providing water to these 236. one-vote should apply. 295 Reynolds v. Does the voting scheme of the District violate Equal Protection? Held. Brief Fact Summary. Justice Byron White (J. No. The District comprises 236. They both agree that if the function is narrow enough. There is a reasonable relationship between the voting system and its governmental objectives. 451 U. the State voting scheme is acceptable. one-vote system of apportionment. The directors of the District are voted for by landowners in the district on a one-acre. the State may create voting schemes that are unconstitutional in elections for broader-based entities. In government entities of limited purpose. J. Sims . stores and delivers untreated water to land owners in central Arizona.Ball v. 355 (1981). the legislature vested the election of the District directors in the hands of the landowners of the District. The landowners' votes are prorated so that one acre of land owned entitled an individual to one vote. Discussion. James Citation. The majority and dissent differ only in the characterization of the function of the District. Synopsis of Rule of Law.000 acres in central Arizona. White stresses that the District provides electric power to several hundred thousand citizens and believes that the one-person one-vote principle should apply.S. Stewart) notes that the narrow and special function of the District justifies a departure from the popular-election requirement. The Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (the District). but if the function is broad. Facts. Dissent. then one-person. White) argues that the function of the District is not as narrow as the majority would believe.000 acres. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Issue.

" 296 Bush v. The State of Alabama requires itself to redistrict its legislature every ten years. 870 (1964). Sims Citation." If the State gives voters in one part of the State much more weight in the vote of their legislators. Hence. The Supreme Court gets around the non-justiciability of political questions by framing the argument as an Equal Protection issue: "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased. not trees or acres. Issue. ‡ Although the federal legislature has a separate apportionment for its two houses. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In most instances. Gore . Brief Fact Summary. Facts. However. Sims establishes the principle apportionment doctrine of the United States Constitution (Constitution): one-person. Under the current apportionment. Is the current system of apportionment denying to Alabama voters the equal protection of laws? Held. districts should be apportioned to allow each voter to have one. there is no such need at the State level. Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. one-vote. 379 U. only one quarter of the population lived in districts represented by a majority of the Senate and House of Representatives. Discussion. Marshall) argues that States should be allowed to determine the composition of their legislatures on their own and that this is a political question. the right to vote of voters in underrepresented parts of the State has been diluted. undiluted vote.Reynolds v. Dissent.S. apportionment of state legislatures needs to reflect a one-person. Reynolds v. The Plaintiffs alleged that the last apportionment of the Alabama legislature was based on the 1900 federal census and that the population growth in the intervening six decades has now made representation discriminatory against areas with fast-growing populations. the Plaintiffs allege that no such reapportionment has gone on in sixty years. onevote policy. Yes. lying outside the reach of the Supreme Court. he is that much less a citizen. ‡ The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) notes that "[l]egislators represent people.

" This was done despite the fact that different counties used different standards to determine what constituted a legal vote. One thing." Dissent. may develop different systems for implementing elections. either through error or deliberate omission have not been perforated with sufficient precision for a machine to count them. A controversy arose during the 2000 Presidential election around certain ballot cards. 267 (2000) Brief Fact Summary. The Justices observed: "[t]he Constitution assigns to the States the primary responsibility for determining the manner of selecting the Presidential electors. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J." The justices additionally observed that the federal questions in this case were "not substantial." The Supreme Court held that "[t]he recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. "a piece of the card ± a chad ± is hanging. the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. Those concerns are alleviated--if not eliminated--by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process.Bush v. necessary." ." Synopsis of Rule of Law. is certain. Breyer") filed a dissenting opinion." The Supreme Court stated "[u]pon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point. The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. The Florida Supreme Court ordered "that the intent of the voter be discerned from such ballots. Ginsburg"). in its features here described. Stevens"). we conclude." And. They were "designed to be perforated by a stylus but which. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law. and Justice William Breyer ("J. It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the highest courts of the States as providing the final answers. Issue. just an indentation. "[u]pon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point. Gore Citation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. is inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. When questions arise about the meaning of state laws. we are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards. "The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is practicable and." Facts." The Supreme Court observed "[t]his is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. Instead. including election laws. Yes." In certain instances. Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election. it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work." The Florida Supreme Court ordered "that the intent of the voter be discerned from such ballots." "The recount process. The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") framed the issue as follows: "[t]he question before the Court is not whether local entities." Further.S. say by two corners" and in other cases "there is no separation at all. Does the Florida Supreme Courts' decision violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution ("Constitution")? Held. however. 541 U. these justices criticized the per curiam opinion on a systematic level and observed an "endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances. for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities. it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work. A dispute arose during the 2000 presidential election over certain of Florida's ballot cards." The justices admitted "the use of differing substandards for determining voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may raise serious concerns. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today's decision. in the exercise of their expertise.

not the federal courts is the proper body to resolve this sort of electoral dispute. and this Court will have no cause to question the court's actions. to be applied within and among counties when passing on such identical ballots in any further recounting (or successive recounting) that the courts might order." J." Also. Breyer believed. These justices felt.‡ Justice David Souter ("J." No basis exists "for reading the Florida statutes as requiring the counting of improperly marked ballots. the concurring justices observed that the recount could not possibly be completed within the requisite time constraints. let alone to issue a stay that stopped Florida's recount process in its tracks. Stevens. by permitting the Florida recount to continue under uniform standards. Breyer advocates Congress. so far as Article II is concerned. This case implicates the interaction between state law and federal law. the court must be both mindful of the legislature's role under Article II in choosing the manner of appointing electors and deferential to those bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to carry out its constitutional mandate. 2 this is one type of case "in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power an a particular branch of state government. despite the fact the background of this dispute was a presidential election. The Chief Justice contradicts the basic principle that a State may organize itself as it sees fit." ‡ J. "[u]nlike the majority." J. Breyer") dissented and would "remand the case to the courts of Florida with instructions to establish uniform standards for evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted differing treatments. Connecticut ." Also. §1. Justice William Rehnquist ("J. It is interesting to examine how the different justices balance these competing bodies of law in the context of a presidential election. Souter. plainly departed from Florida's legislative scheme. J. II. Stevens. Thomas") filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the per curiam opinion." Concurrence. J. Souter and J. or practical concern related to legal questions. "[i]n any election but a Presidential election. The judges observed that based on Art. But. Ginsburg and J. J. and Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. the Florida Supreme Court can give as little or as much deference to Florida's executives as it chooses. Rehnquist"). [he saw] no warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly comply with this requirement before the date set for the meeting of electors. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. Discussion. cl. with respect to a Presidential election." Florida created a comprehensive statutory scheme to provide for "appointment of Presidential electors". With one exception. "[b]y holding that Article II requires our revision of a state court's construction of state laws in order to protect one organ of the State from another. Breyer would "repair the damage done as best we can now. "no preeminent legal concern. Congress as an elected political body "expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an unelected court. J. portions of which were joined by J. required this Court to hear this case. Breyer dissented to part I of the per curiam opinion." ‡ J. Souter") and Justice William Breyer ("J. Scalia"). petitioners' claims do not ask us to vindicate a constitutional provision designed to protect a basic human right. the way the Florida Supreme Court interpreted "legal vote" and its "decision to order a contest-period recount. 299 Boddie v. Ginsburg." Also. but writing separately because they felt the Florida Supreme Court decision should be reversed on additional grounds. However. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J.

S. If marriage is a fundamental right available to all citizens. The Petitioners. The Petitioners represent married indigents who cannot afford a divorce. if marriage is a fundamental right totally controlled by the State. if an individual cannot afford the cost of divorce. Yes. The Petitioners allege that this denies indigents equal protection under the laws. Facts. Connecticut Citation. Kras .Boddie v. The majority says that a fundamental right cannot be denied to people on the basis of wealth. he cannot file for one. 371 (1971). The dissent says that when a power is delegated to the States. unless there is a specific constitutional prohibition against it. Harlan) notes that since marriage is a fundamental right in our society the government must show a compelling interest to discriminate in the application of. divorce must be available to all citizens as well. Appeals Court ruling reversed. Conversely. The State cannot offer a compelling interest to maintain this distinction. The average cost of a divorce in Connecticut is $60 per litigant. which on average cost $60 per litigant. 401 U. ‡ Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. the requirements are unconstitutional. divorce must be in the same category. Brief Fact Summary. the State of Connecticut may do as it pleases. brought suit against the Respondent. Dissent. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Connecticut's (Respondents) divorce policies. As such. 300 United States v. Black) argues that because of the state-controlled nature of marriage. Does discriminating against indigents in applying for divorce violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. Issue. ‡ Requiring payment of fees to apply for divorce creates two classes of individuals: those who can pay the fee and those who cannot. Justice Hugo Black (J. there must be a specific constitutional provision to allow the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to rule a given statute unconstitutional. Discussion. Currently. Boddie and others (Petitioners).

United States v. Kras Citation. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Kras (Respondent), attempted to file for federal bankruptcy protection, but was unable to afford the filing fees. The Respondent now challenges the constitutionality of denying him bankruptcy protection for inability to pay such feed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Bankruptcy filing is not a fundamental right. Facts. The Respondent lived in a small apartment with his wife, two children, and elderly mother. The Respondent receives public assistance as well as a small amount of income he earns himself. The Respondent cannot even afford to save up for a full year to afford the bankruptcy filing fee. Issue. Is an indigent entitled to free federal bankruptcy filing? Held. No. Case reversed and remanded. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) holds that bankruptcy is not a fundamental right. As a fundamental right is not involved, only a rational basis is required for any classifications. Dissent. ‡ Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) recognizes that there are no "recognized, effective alternatives" available to the Respondent. Without bankruptcy protection, the Respondent will remain in insurmountable debt for the foreseeable future. ‡ Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) writes separately to condemn the majority for advancing "unfounded assumptions about how people live."

Discussion. The majority offers a sound argument here: no fundamental right, no suspect classification. The difficulty with this case is its finding that an individual does not have enough money to be bankrupt. 301 M.L.B. v. S.L.J.

M.L.B. v. S.L.J. Citation. 519 U.S. 102 (1996). Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, M.L.B. (Petitioner), lost custody of her children and cannot afford to appeal the decision. She argues that such a fundamental right requires the State to pay for the costs of her appeal. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The loss of parental rights is the loss of a fundamental right. Facts. The Petitioner lost custody of her two minor children when their stepmother, the Respondent, S.L.J. (Respondent), sued for adoption. The Petitioner is indigent and cannot pay record preparation fees of over $2,000 to appeal the trial court judgment. Issue. Must the State provide for appeal of an indigent's loss of child custody? Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) argues that as a petty criminal must be afforded access to appellate justice, so must the indigent parent whom the courts have found unfit. Fee requirements are not examined only for rationality when a fundamental right is involved. Dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas) dissents in large part by noting the difference between criminal and civil cases. He does not view there to be an inherent right to appeal in any civil case. Discussion. While it is true that a fundamental right has been abrogated here, the dissent argues that Due Process has already been satisfied. If the Petitioner had an equal protection complaint, it would have been at the trial level. The majority gives extra protection to indigent rights, where the loss of family is concerned. 302 Lewis v. Casey

Lewis v. Casey
Citation. 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Brief Fact Summary. Prisoners sued the State of Arizona, alleging they were deprived of rights of access to courts and counsel. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Access to the courts by prisoners requires that prisoners be able to address their own cases, not become legal experts. Facts. The Respondents, Casey and other inmates (Respondents), allege that the Petitioners, Lewis and others associated with the Department of Corrections (Petitioners), have not presented them with up-to-date legal materials, legal libraries and photocopying services, among others. The Respondents allege that these denials have denied them the ability to access the courts. Issue. Do prisoners have rights to particular, specific materials under the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. No. Reversed. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia) points out that the Respondent inmates have not alleged specific injuries, only generalized grievances. Because of this, the Respondents do not have standing to bring suit. Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) argues that the Supreme Court of the United States' views on standing are too strict and that the Respondents have at least a right to bring suit. Concurrence. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas) agrees in the judgment, but writes separately to decry what he sees as overreaching of federal district courts in running the day-to-day affairs of prisons. Discussion. The majority only briefly touches on substantive issues of the complaint, as J. Scalia is more interested in dismissing the case for want of standing. Even then, it is clear the majority feels that prisoners are asking for too much, even in their generalized complaints. 303 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
Citation. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Brief Fact Summary. Respondents brought a class action on behalf of parents and students residing in poor school districts in Texas, alleging the State's system of funding schools based on local property taxes denies equal protection to students in poor districts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Education is not a "fundamental right" for purposes of Equal Protection analysis. Facts. The State of Texas provides for free primary and secondary education for the children of the State. The state provides a set amount of funding for each district based on the number of students in the district. The district makes up the difference in operating expense with funds from local property taxes. This reliance on property taxes results in a large disparity in per student spending between property rich and property poor districts. Respondents allege that this denies the children in poor district Equal Protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue. Is education a fundamental right for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held. No. Reversed and remanded. ‡ If education is a fundamental right, classifications affecting access to education are subject to strict scrutiny. ‡ There is no mention of education in the Constitution. Thus, there is no explicit constitutional guarantee. The question is now one of whether education is implicitly a fundamental right. The Court notes that Respondents do not argue that there is some quantum of education that is fundamental and which the class is not receiving. Nor do they argue that the class is entitled to the best education provided by public schools in Texas. ‡ Without explicit or implicit constitutional protections, the fiscal decisions of the State of Texas are beyond review of the Court, unless they lack a rational basis. Such a lacking is not found by the Court. ‡ Thus, the Court applied the rational basis test to require the Texas law to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Dissent. ‡ Justice William Brennan dissents along two arguments: (1) the funding system of the State of Texas lacks a logical basis, and (2) that the explicit or implicit constitutional guarantee analysis advanced by the Court ignores the Court's previous decisions. ‡ Justice Thurgood Marshall argues that a right's "fundamentality" depends on the importance of the right in effectuating constitutional guarantees. Justice Marshall argues that education is so important to the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment and to participation in the political process to create a significant nexus between education and these rights, making it fundamental. "As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer," the more appropriate heightened scrutiny becomes. Thus, Justice Marshall would apply a more stringent test than rational basis. Discussion. The Court notes that a fundamental right gives rise to strict scrutiny by the Court where legislation creates classifications surrounding the right. This is most easily understood as a policy decision by the Court, with the majority holding that the preferable policy is to limit the amount and type of legislation which is subject to strict scrutiny. The importance of this case lies in an understanding of the different levels of equal protection analysis. 305 Daniels v. Williams

Daniels v. Williams
Citation. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Brief Fact Summary. Daniels (Petitioner) seeks damages for injuries he sustained while he was an inmate at the jail. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Negligent government action is not a deprivation of individual interest, and is not a violation of Due Process. Facts. Petitioner was an inmate at the local jail. One day, he slipped on a pillow left in the stairwell by Williams (Respondent), a correctional deputy. Petitioner claims that Respondent's negligence led to the deprivation of his "liberty" interest in freedom from bodily injury. Issue. Does negligence by a government actor equate to deprivation under the Due Process Clause? Held. No. Mere negligence does not require compensation according to the United States Constitution. Discussion. The purpose of Due Process is to protect the individual from action by the government. This refers to arbitrary actions by the government that infringes upon an individual's rights. This does not include failure to exercise due care in the maintenance of a building. 306 County of Sacramento v. Lewis

County of Sacramento v. Lewis
Citation. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). Brief Fact Summary. Lewis (Respondent) was a passenger on a motorcycle that was chased by police. When the motorcycle stopped, the police cruiser did not. Respondent was hit and killed at the scene. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government conduct that "shocks the conscience" and violates the "decencies of civilized conduct" also violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In emergency situations, the government is afforded greater leeway. Facts. A police officer was responding to a fight when Respondent and another failed to adhere to the police demand to stop. Instead of stopping, they maneuvered between police cars and sped off. The officer chose to pursue Respondent through a residential neighborhood at speeds of up to 100 mph. While trying to make a sharp left turn, the motorcycle slid and both driver and passenger were thrown. The cruiser avoided hitting the driver, but hit Respondent and threw him 70 feet. He was pronounced dead at the scene. Issue. Did the officer violate substantive due process when he caused the death of Respondent during a high-speed chase? Held. No. The police officer did not intend to harm or worsen the plight of Respondent. Discussion. The police officer was doing his job and using his best judgment at the time of the pursuit. He did not intend to kill Respondent or harm him in any way. If he had, then the conduct would be "shocking" and held to violate the United States Constitution. 307 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services
Citation. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, DeShaney (Petitioner), was beaten into a coma by his father. He later recovered, but was confined to an institution for the severally mentally retarded as a result of his injures. During the entire time he was being beaten, the Respondent, Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services (Respondent), was monitoring his home and paying regular visits. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Due Process Clause provides no affirmative right to governmental aide. It is meant to protect individuals from state actors not other individuals. Facts. The Petitioner was born in 1979. His parents divorced in 1980 and his father was given custody of him. His father moved to Wisconsin where he remarried and later divorced. His second wife informed authorities of child abuse against the Petitioner and the Respondent interviewed the father. He denied the accusations. Then in 1982 a local hospital reported the Petitioner's suspicious injuries to the Respondent. The Respondent began monitoring the situation and visiting the child's home. The social worker noted on at least several occasions that the Petitioner appeared to be suffering from child abuse, yet the Respondent left the Petitioner in the custody of his father. Finally, in 1983 the Petitioner was admitted to the hospital and fell into a coma due to a series of hemorrhages caused by traumatic injuries to the head inflicted over a long period of time. The father was eventually convicted of child abuse. Issue. By failing to intervene to protect the Petitioner from the abuse of his father did the Respondent deny the Petitioner his liberty without due process? Held. No. A state's failure to protect someone from violence by another individual is not a violation of the Due Process Clause. Although the state may be aware of a person's situation, it is only required to protect the person when it has deprived the individual the freedom to act on his own behalf. Dissent. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan): The state developed the social service program specifically to help children like the Petitioner. Because of this intervention and greater awareness of the situation, the state had an affirmative duty to act. ‡ Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun): The majority fails to see the duty of the state because its focuses on a rigid classification of action and inaction.

Discussion. When a person is reliant upon the state as a caretaker, then the state has a greater responsibility to protect the person. In this case, had the Petitioner been a ward ofthe state or in foster care, the state would have had an affirmative duty to remove him from the abusive home. 309 Goldberg v. Kelly

Goldberg v. Kelly
Citation. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Brief Fact Summary. New York residents were receiving financial aid under a state program. The state chose to terminate certain benefits without providing the recipients notice. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Generally, a qualified recipient of public aide has a legitimate property interest in the continuance of such benefits. Facts. New York City residents were receiving aid under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children or the Home Relief Program. The state decided to terminate support to certain families. At the time there was no requirement of prior notice or a hearing of any kind. Issue. Did the state violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it terminated assistance payments to recipients without holding an evidentiary hearing? Held. Yes. Persons receiving public assistance have a legitimate property right interest in it. Therefore, at least an administrative hearing should be held to determine assistance eligibility before it is completely withdrawn. Dissent. Welfare laws should be left to the legislature and not forced into the constructs of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Welfare is a charity program which the state should be free to regulate as it sees fit. Discussion. Because the recipients rely on the assistance for their livelihood, the majority assigns a property right to the monies. It regards this aide as an "essential" component to the recipient's life and is not a form of charity. 310 Board of Regents v. Roth

nor did it prevent him from finding another job. No. On the other hand. 564 (1972). The Respondent did not have property rights in the job because he had a one-year contract that specifically stated he would no longer be employed at the end of the year. As a result he brought suit claiming this termination policy violated his Due Process rights. Issue. Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner.S. 311 Goss v. the university did not infringe upon any of the liberties or freedoms that he has. So.Board of Regents v. the Board of Regents (Petitioner). Roth Citation. the university caused no damage to his reputation. Therefore. Facts. Dissent. He was hired on a yearly contract that was not renewed. Discussion. had a rule that allowed college professors to acquire tenure after four years of continued employment at a university. his rights were not violated. There must be a legitimate entitlement to the benefit. The Respondent. No property rights exist in one's expectations. Synopsis of Rule of Law. By declining to rehire the Respondent. The Respondent taught at Wisconsin State University for the 1968-1969 academic year. Lopez . 408 U. However. was a new college professor. it was unreasonable for the Respondent to expect to gain tenure. the first years of employment are left to the discretion of the institutions. Did the decision to not rehire the Respondent violate his Due Process rights? Held. They could hire and fire every year as they chose. Roth (Respondent). The university provided no explanation for the choice to not renew the contract. The university owed the Respondent an explanation for not rehiring him because everyone who applies or works for the government is entitled to this information. Procedural protection of property rights inure only after one has acquired benefits. During that year he was told that his contract was not going to be renewed for the following year.

there is no provision for a hearing or reconsideration of the suspension. which is protected by the Due Process Clause. each without a hearing. Yes. The Appellees. Dissent. 419 U.Goss v. Facts. However. If the student is expelled he is entitled to hearing that could lead to his reinstatement. Ohio may not withdraw the right to an education on the grounds of misconduct absent fair procedures to determine if the misconduct has occurred. Student's have a legitimate property right in their education. Students of the city public school system were suspended from school without a hearing either before or shortly after the suspensions. the student may choose to refute the allegation and request a hearing. Lopez and others (Appellees) were all suspended from the Columbus Pubic School System for up to 10 days. Discussion. if the student is just suspended. Brief Fact Summary. The majority provides students with a manner of protecting their right to attend school by making the administrators document the misconduct and provide the report to the student's parents. The majority has created a new constitutional right for school aged children. but also gives the administrators the freedom to discipline children as necessary and maintain order in the schools. Davis . This case removes the control of the classroom from the trained educational administrators and imposes judicial interference. This protects the rights. Issue. This right cannot be taken away without appropriate procedural hearings. Did the Columbus Public School System violate the Appellees' due process rights when it suspended each without having a hearing? Held. 312 Paul v. Lopez Citation. 565 (1975).S. The Ohio Revised Code allows a school principal to suspend a pupil for up to 10 days or expel him for misconduct. At that point. Synopsis of Rule of Law. They cannot be suspended without a hearing.

The Respondent was not deprived of any liberty or property interests protected by the Due Process Clause. apart from some more tangible interests such as employment is neither liberty nor property for Due Process purposes. The Respondent was on page 2 of the memo. The Petitioner. Reputation alone. Also. Kentucky law does not extend to the Respondent any legal guarantee or present enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of the Petitioner's actions. 424 U. Did the Petitioner deprive the Respondent of his liberties by designating him as an "active shoplifter"? Held. So. 693 (1976). the potential damage to his reputation is minimal. Paul (Petitioner). Facts. At the time the memo was published. He is still free to go to those stores and shop. Eldridge . Brief Fact Summary.Paul v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The posting of a mug shot in some stores does not deprive the Petitioner of any liberties. he sent a memo containing the mug shots of those who had charges brought against them. Dissent. No. He had been arraigned on the charge and pleaded not guilty. Kentucky. as the police chief. issued a bulletin to area storeowners warning of persons known to be shoplifters. 313 Mathews v. Discussion. the individual is unfairly prejudiced before a trial is had based on public opinion that has been tainted by the police.S. Issue. but the charge was later dismissed. was on that list. The Respondent. In order to alert local merchants of potential shoplifters. Thus. the memo is not an official criminal record that would fall into the hands of future employers. The Petitioner is the police chief in Louisville. He claims his reputation was injured by this action. Respondent's charge was not resolved. Davis Citation. This decision allows law enforcement to run unchecked and accuse anyone without repercussion. Davis (Respondent).

the Respondent's benefits were terminated without a hearing. Brief Fact Summary. 424 U. Facts. Dissent. before a final ruling was made the Respondent had the opportunity to see the results. This case is different than the welfare case. a governmental agency must afford an evidentiary hearing. 319 (1976). This led to the termination of his Social Security disability benefit. Prior to terminating benefits. Eldridge Citation. An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits. 314 . After a case review by the state agency responsible for monitoring his medical condition. explaining its findings and providing an opportunity for the Respondent to request time to provide additional information to prove his disability. Therefore. Discussion. Goldberg.S. After reviewing his medical records and obtaining a psychiatric consult. the agency determined that the Respondent was no longer disabled. (2) the risk of mistakenly depriving an individual of his interest and (3) the value of instituting additional or substitute safeguards. which was accepted by the Social Security Administration. because the level of disability is something that can be ascertained through the use of expert medical opinion and written reports. Furthermore. Eldridge (Respondent). But. Issue. No. Synopsis of Rule of Law. all reports relied upon. The agency wrote the Respondent a letter. after the Respondent refused to provide additional information. Is it a violation of the Due Process clause to discontinue a recipient's Social Security disability benefits without holding an evidentiary hearing? Held. the value of an evidentiary hearing is greatly diminished. The Respondent. was a disabled worker who had been receiving Social Security benefits.Mathews v. the agency made its final determination. and provide additional proof of disability. The present administrative procedures fully comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The appropriateness and scope of a prior evidentiary hearing is determined by balancing 3 factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected. The Respondent had been receiving federal disability coverage for several years when a state agency reviewed his medical condition.

v.CHAPTER IX. Inc. First Amendment: Freedom Of Expression 315 Turner Broadcasting System. Federal Communications Commission .

Content-neutral regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny. The interest in diversity of programming is not content-neutral." Dissent. it is content-neutral and constitutional. Any government regulation that limits speech because of its content is subject to the "most exacting scrutiny while those that are unrelated to content are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. Inc. The regulation does not force an opinion on to the viewing public or limit access to certain views. Issue. v. Federal Communications Commission Citation. 316 Boos v. No. This law does not impose burdens or confer benefits based on the content of the speech. Is this 'must-carry' mandate a violation of the freedom of the speech or press? Held. Federal legislation requires cable television companies to devote a portion of their channels to local programming.S. Facts. Although this goal is not harmful it still does not excuse the need for strict scrutiny. The only burden is associated with the number of channels a cable company can offer. This Act limits cable companies by reducing the number of channels that they control and it makes it more difficult for the companies to compete for the remaining channels. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The majority justifies its decision by weighing the impact of forcing the cable systems to carry local stations against the purpose of the requirement. 622 (1994). Concurrence. Laws that distinguish between types of speech based on the ideas or views expressed are content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. 512 U. The intent of the regulation is to continue to provide local access to news and community information. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the Act). required cable companies to devote a certain number of their channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations. Therefore.Turner Broadcasting System. Berry . Discussion. It is unconstitutional for the government to place on burdens on speech because of its content.

D. Protecting foreign dignitaries from insults is not a compelling governmental interest in support of a content-based regulation. Berry Citation. the regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest that is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 317 Republican Party of Minnesota v.Boos v. D. 312 (1988). "RELEASE SAKHOROV. It prohibits political speech and is clearly content-based. This regulation focuses on what a picket card would say. Does this restriction violate the First Amendment constitutional right to free speech? Held. The Petitioner wants to display a sign in front of the Soviet embassy that reads.S. The Petitioner.C. The display statute regulates speech based on it potential impact. Washington. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. It discriminates between the types of speech because a picket sign regarding employment disputes would be allowed while political opinions that are negative are prohibited. To be constitutional." Issue. 485 U. Content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum is subjected to strict scrutiny. There is a local statute that prohibits such displays if they are negative. White . Boos (Petitioner).C. Discussion. wants to display signs in front of the embassies in Washington. Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law. has a code that prohibits people from displaying signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if the signs will bring the foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute".

" J.' 'work habits. Scalia then specified the topics that can be discussed by a candidate. "how the candidate feels about cameras in the courtroom. how the costs of judicial administration can be reduced. Gregory Wersal (the "Petitioner"). ran for a judgeship and "distributed literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues such as crime.' 'education.' " Further. respondents have the burden to prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored. The Petitioner ran again in 1998 and requested an opinion from the Lawyers Board (the "Board") asking whether the "announce clause" would be enforced. including an incumbent judge." 318 Republican Party of Minnesota v. Minnesota's "announce clause" violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). including an incumbent judge." ‡ The announce clause was deemed to be both a content based prohibition and a burden on a type of speech at the core of the First Amendment. welfare. The Board would not give him a definitive answer. They included "a candidate's 'character. the proper standard of review to be applied was strict scrutiny. Synopsis of Rule of Law. White ." from "announce[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. A Minnesota legal restriction forbidding a "candidate for a judicial office. if he expresses the view that he is not bound by stare decisis. out of fear that he would be disbarred. Judges in Minnesota are elected. "Under the strict-scrutiny test." Stiff penalties were attached to a violation of the restriction. it is clear that the announce clause prohibits a judicial candidate from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal question within the province of the court for which he is running. Issue. "[W]hether the First Amendment permits the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues. except in the context of discussing past decisions--and in the latter context as well. one of the Petitioners. In 1996. Scalia"). which included allegations that he violated the "announce clause". Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. but the Petitioner nonetheless dropped out of the election. Facts. Since 1974. and how he proposes to ensure that minorities and women are treated more fairly by the court system." A complaint was brought against the Petitioner.Republican Party of Minnesota v. 536 U. to serve (2) a compelling state interest. and abortion. summarized the scope of the announce clause as follows: "[i]n any event.' and 'how [he] would handle administrative duties if elected. White Citation. As a result." Held.765 Brief Fact Summary. writing for the majority.S. how he would go about reducing the caseload." from "announce[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues" was at issue. The complaint was eventually dropped because of questions about the "announce clause's" constitutionality. judges running for an election had been subject to a legal restriction ± the "announce clause" ± forbidding a "candidate for a judicial office.

" not at the edges. Stevens argued "[t]he Court's disposition rests on two seriously flawed premises-an inaccurate appraisal of the importance of judicial independence and impartiality. "to show that the announce clause is narrowly tailored." The court found that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not have this purpose in mind when the "announce clause" was adopted. J. Scalia found that it was imperative to precisely define the term "impartiality"." Further. a "lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding"." Based on this definition." "We have never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during an election." Additionally. but rather speech for or against particular issues. J. White . Ginsburg"). As such." Third. Scalia then recognized "debate on the qualifications of candidates" is "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms. "avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. First." Is "is barely tailored to serve that interest at all. He discussed three possible meanings of the word. Scalia concluded "the announce clause is not narrowly tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality) in this sense. and remain open to persuasion." "It is simply not the function of government to select which issues are worth discussing or debating in the course of a political campaign. Stevens") filed a dissenting opinion upon which Justice David Souter ("J. J. Scalia recognized the Respondents argued two interests were "sufficiently compelling to justify the announce clause: preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary. "impartiality" can be defined as openmindedness. Impartiality in this sense "guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party. Stevens argued that Minnesota has a 319 Republican Party of Minnesota v." Dissent. it is unrealistic that a justice would not have any preconceived views.Further. Souter"). inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties. they must demonstrate that it does not 'unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression. ‡ J.' " J. and Justice William Breyer ("J. "a lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view. and with good reason. Breyer") joined. and an assumption that judicial candidates should have the same freedom 'to express themselves on matters of current public importance' as do all other elected officials. pretending otherwise by attempting to preserve the 'appearance' of that type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling state interest either. when the issues arise in a pending case. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J." The majority observed "[a] judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice." ‡ J. In other words a judge would "be willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions. "The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance." Second.

" Concurrence. J. J. in which the First Amendment holds full sway." Further. ‡ Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. J." ‡ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J.' approach. Ginsburg") filed a dissenting opinion upon which Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. however. She felt that judges will impermissibly have a stake in the outcome of all their cases. is censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. Justice David Souter ("J. and I will judge cases accordingly. Further. [she] would differentiate elections for political offices. This case offers an interesting discussion about how the First Amendment is applied to political speech. that the monies necessary to support a campaign are quite substantial. from elections designed to select those whose office it is to administer justice without respect to persons.compelling interest in sanctioning statements such as "Vote for me because I believe X. Ginsburg disagreed "with this unilocular. 320 City of Renton v. . and Justice William Breyer ("J. Breyer") joined. Playtime Theaters. O'Connor felt that the election of justices undermined the actual and perceived partiality of judges. a judge "announces his position on an issue likely to come before him as a reason to vote for him." because by making such statements. Leading to indebtedness to those that gave them the funds. Souter"). Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. if subject to recurrent elections. 'an election is an election. O'Connor") filed a concurring opinion expressing her general concerns about judicial elections. Stevens"). Inc. Kennedy") filed a concurring opinion "adhere[ing] to [his] view [ ] that content-based speech restrictions that do not fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling government interests." Discussion. and much of those monies will come from fundraising efforts." "What Minnesota may not do. "[t]he law in question here contradicts the principle that unabridged speech is the foundation of political freedom. Instead." She argued the "Court's unrelenting reliance on decisions involving contests for legislative and executive posts is manifestly out of place.

they were not completely banned from the city. it is not content-based. Playtime Theaters. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 41 (1986). (Respondent)? Held. Finley . The Petitioner had a substantial interest in avoiding the secondary effects of the adult stores and also allows the stores to be located in other areas of town.000 feet of any residential area. church. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. this is a content-based regulation.S. 475 U. Playtime Theaters. However. The ordinance places restrictions on establishments based on the content of the expression within it. passed a zoning code restricting the location of adult movie stores within the city. manner analysis where a regulation is constitutional as long as it serves a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. it is a constitutional content-neutral regulation.City of Renton v. Citation. park or school. 321 National Endowment for the Arts v. A regulation that is content-based on its face may be considered content neutral if it is motivated by a permissible content-neutral purpose. As a content-neutral regulation it is subject to the time. place. City of Renton (Petitioner). Discussion. Inc. Issue. Dissent. Is this zoning ordinance a violation of First Amendment freedom of speech rights of the Respondent. No. Thus. The Petitioner. Therefore. Inc. Because the ordinance does not ban the adult theaters completely. The Petitioner's zoning code prohibited adult movie theaters from locating themselves within 1.

569 (1998).National Endowment for the Arts v. This law only requires the Petitioner to consider factors of decency. The Petitioner has the ultimate authority to grant funding for projects. was denied a federal grant to fund her performance art after the Petitioner.S. The Respondent. American Library Association. Finley Citation. determined that it might offend the general standards of decency. Is the new law invalid on its face and therefore a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech? Held. Brief Fact Summary. No. The "decency and respect" inclusion criteria makes this a view-point based decision that should not be exempted from the general rule that makes content-based laws unconstitutional. two provocative works prompted public controversy leading to the reevaluation of the project selection process. This law is constitutional as it does not interfere with freedom of speech rights and it is not overly vague." Issue. The Petitioner is a federal agency that provides funding for the arts. It does not mandate that all explicit works be denied federal grants. As a result. Congress adopted a law that made the Petitioner consider the "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse values of the American public. 322 United States v. but cannot approve anything the advisory council rejects. 524 U. Discussion. Finley (Respondent). Therefore. National Endowment for the Arts (Petitioner). Dissent. Facts. In 1989. Inc. it is not an unconstitutional content-based rule. A law is facially valid as long as it does not suppress disfavored viewpoints. . Synopsis of Rule of Law. Applications for these funds are reviewed by advisory panels that inform the Petitioner of their recommendations.

An act of Congress conditioned the receipt of federal funds by public libraries. meaning block material that is constitutionally protected and should be available to the public. The district court held these provisions violated the library patrons' First Amendment constitutional rights. the court recognized libraries cannot segregate item by item all pornographic material on the internet. The plurality found the constitution does not provide a right to the acquisition of information." Facts. All a library patron has to do is ask the librarian to disable the filter." 323 United States v. American Library Association. without making individualized judgments that everything they do make available has requisite and appropriate quality." ‡ The plurality criticized the dissent's argument that filters a have a tendency to "overblock". 539 U. . Inc. The court also rejected the argument that library patrons will not ask for the filters to be disabled because they are embarrassed. American Library Association. ‡ "Because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights. "[I]t is entirely reasonable [ ] [for libraries to] exclude certain categories of content. "it is entirely reasonable for public libraries to reject that approach and instead exclude certain categories of content.United States v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. on those libraries installing filters on their computers to block children's access to certain material. 194 (2003) Brief Fact Summary. The plurality said this problem could be remedied by disabling the filtering software.S. The Act conditioned the receipt of federal funds by public libraries on installing software that will block pornographic images. Congress enacted the Children's Internet Protection Act (the "Act") to combat the availability of internet pornography in public libraries. and is a valid exercise of Congress' spending power. to a library filtering internet material to stop the flow of pornography. without the risk of embarrassment. Does the Act violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution")? Held. The plurality first observed that "Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance to further its policy objectives but may not 'induce' the recipient 'to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional' " The court compared a library's use of judgment in not allowing pornography on its shelves and choosing which works it wants in its collection. without making individualized judgments that everything they do make available has requisite and appropriate quality. Inc. Further. This is the traditional role of a library. As such. Citation. CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution.

which he answered in the negative "[wa]s whether a local library could itself constitutionally impose these restrictions on the content otherwise available to an adult patron through an Internet connection. Neither a rational basis review nor a presumption as to the statutes constitutionality was appropriate. Breyer advocated asking whether "the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the potential 324 United States v. Stevens criticized the "fundamental defects" in the filtering software. it does not have the capacity to exclude a precisely defined category of images." J. For example." The question for J. Stevens concluded that the statute resulted in "a significant prior restraint on adult access to protected speech. § 8: the rule mandates action by recipient libraries that would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech if the libraries took that action entirely on their own. Stevens' dissenting opinion. "the software relies on key words or phrases to block undesirable sites. J." Additionally. Stevens") filed a dissenting opinion. . J. strict scrutiny was too strict of a standard for this analysis. at a library terminal provided for public use"? Further. Stevens observed "[n]either the interest in suppressing unlawful speech nor the interest in protecting children from access to harmful materials justifies this overly broad restriction on adult access to protected speech. J. Souter also faulted the pluralities comparison of internet blocking with libraries choosing which works to include in their collections. Souter. Inc. Ginsburg") filed a dissenting opinion agreeing with J. J. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J." In other words. but also arguing that the Act imposed "an unconstitutional condition on the Government's subsidies to local libraries for providing access to the Internet. As to the "overblocks". an as-applied challenge may be appropriate." ‡ Justice Stephen Breyer ("J. Breyer") filed a concurring opinion advocating the application of a form of heightened scrutiny by "examining the statutory requirements in question with special care".based restriction on communication of material in the library's control that an adult could otherwise lawfully see." Additionally that "it impermissibly conditions the receipt of Government funding on the restriction of significant First Amendment rights. Kennedy also recognized the compelling interest involved in this case "protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors. J. which blocks constitutionally protected speech. there is not much of a case if the library administrators unblock certain sights without much delay." The software both "underblocks" and gives parents a false sense of security and "overblocks". arguing that the Act is an unconstitutional restraint on speech. an act of censorship." ‡ Justice David Souter ("J. Concurrence. If some libraries did not have this capability. Souter felt "the blocking rule [is] invalid in the exercise of the spending power under Article I. However. "[a] library that chose to block an adult's Internet access to material harmful to children (and whatever else the undiscriminating filter might interrupt) would be imposing a content. Kennedy") filed a concurring opinion recognizing that based on the facial challenge before the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court"). Souter") and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J.Dissent. J. American Library Association.

" Discussion. is out of proportion. 325 Near v." Additionally the court "has considered the legitimacy of the statute's objective. it is interesting to read the dissenting and concurring opinions and see what the various justices agree and disagree about. less restrictive ways of achieving that objective. whether there are other. the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve that objective. State of Minnesota ex rel. in relation to that objective.alternatives. It is important to recognize that there is no majority opinion in this case. only a plurality. and ultimately whether the statute works speech-related harm that. As such. Olsen .

United States . In 1927. The press is allowed to publish articles that may criticize the government or other actors. 326 New York Times Company v." Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Petitioner was then forced to stop production. Minnesota passed a law prohibiting the publication of any newspaper. periodical or magazine that was "malicious. Yes." Anyone who distributed such materials was prohibited from continuing production and was charged with creating a public nuisance. Issue. scandalous and defamatory or obscene. The Petitioner.Near v. Brief Fact Summary. State of Minnesota ex rel. lewd and lascivious. In other words prior restraints are not appropriate. is a step towards total censorship of the press. Near (Petitioner). Olsen Citation. However. The government cannot prevent unflattering reports from being circulated simply because it looks bad. Facts. was prohibited from producing any newspaper because he published an article criticizing the local police.S. the Petitioner published several article in The Saturday Press what indicated that the local law enforcement was not "energetically" pursuing the head of the local mob. Discussion. To allow the court to enjoin the activity without providing the publisher an opportunity to show that the matter is true. 283 U. as he was convicted of producing a public nuisance. scandalous and defamatory. A 1927 state law prohibited such publishing activity that was described as "malicious. the government may impose a communication blackout. Is a court order enjoining a publisher from producing a magazine a prior restraint in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of the press? Held. 697 (1931). The government may not censor expression in advance either legislatively or judicially. as long there is an element of truth to the publication. In late 1927. if the item relates to sensitive issues such as national security or certain wartime efforts.

Secrecy in the government is anti-democratic. ‡ Justice Hugo Black (J. Black): The press must be free to publish the news without censorship. United States Citation. ‡ Justice Harry Blackmun (J. United States . There is a heavy presumption against the validity of any system of prior restraint of expression that can only be overcome by a significant governmental justification. the United States (Respondent). No. It is not for the judiciary to overrule this decision. Douglas): The purpose of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) is to prevent the government from suppressing embarrassing information. Brennan): Prior restraint is allowed when the nation is at war. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. ‡ Justice Warren Burger (J. sought to enjoin further publications on the grounds that national security was jeopardized. Facts. it may not rest on the conclusion that the release of information "may or might" compromise security. Brief Fact Summary.New York Times Company v. Is this request for a prior restraint constitutional? Held. Dissent. The Respondent immediately sought an injunction from further publications citing the compromise of national security as justification for the restraint. Issue. ‡ Justice William Douglas (J. Prior restraints are appropriate because of the sensitive nature of the reports. The government has no right to prohibit the reporting of news. 403 U. 327 New York Times Company v. the New York Times (Petitioner). But. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Blackmun): A balancing test should be developed for such circumstances that weighs the right of the press against the Executive considerations. Burger): The danger to national security is a determination that the Executive branch makes. The Respondent.S. The Petitioner published excerpts from top-secret Defense Department documents that chronicled some of the decision-making that occurred during the Vietnam War. The government failed to show sufficient justification for this restraint on expression by the press. even then. 713 (1971). printed an excerpt from a top secret Defense Department document. The Petitioner. The documents were referred to as the Pentagon Papers. Concurrence. injunctions or prior restraints.

but there is no evidence that harm will result to the nation if the reports are published. 328 Nebraska Press Association v.‡ Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart): Some of the documents probably should be censored. Discussion. It might be able to pursue other avenues to prevent future publications. White): The government has not met its burden of proof. ‡ Justice Byron White (J. The majority simply relies on the holdings of the lower courts which prohibit governmental censorship unless the information will compromise national security at a time of war. Stuart . ‡ Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall): It would be a disruption of the separation of powers for the courts to prohibit activities that the Congress has not.

United States .Nebraska Press Association v. The government has failed to meet the burden of showing that the trial will definitely be compromised by the public dissemination of pretrial proceedings. Is this gag order violative of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press? Held. The Respondent is a State District Court Judge who ordered the press to not report any of the accounts of confessions or facts that were "strongly implicative" in a murder trial. 427 U. Gag orders are constitutional only when there is clear and present danger that pretrial publicity would threaten a fair trial. The Respondent. Pretrial coverage will influence the public perception of the evidence. Synopsis of Rule of Law. alternative measures are inadequate and an injunction would protect the accused. 539 (1976). Issue. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. ordered a pretrial gag order on all press coverage of a murder trial.S. Stuart Citation. Facts. 329 Alexander v. There must be a balance between the rights of the press to inform the public and the individual's right to a fair trial. but there are other procedural safeguards to protect a defendant's rights. Stuart (Respondent). Yes.

he was ordered to forfeit his businesses and nearly $9 million in profits. The Respondent. He was convicted of selling obscene pornographic tapes and racketeering. 330 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York.S. No. but remanded for reconsideration under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Petitioner. the United States (Respondent). The stores were shut down because they were related to past wrongdoings. The majority emphasizes the definition of a prior restraint to distinguish it from a subsequent judgment.000 and ordered to pay the cost of trial and incarceration for the obscenity counts. The obscenity convictions were based on the sale of 4 magazines and 3 videotapes. Is the court order to shut down the adult bookstores an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech? Held. ‡ The items were seized as punishment not a prior restraint. Dissent. He was convicted on 17 obscenity counts and 3 RICO violations. The Petitioner owned 13 adult bookstores throughout Minnesota. this action is not a content-based restraint. Discussion. v. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) rejected the argument that the sentence violated Petitioner's First Amendment constitutional rights. owned adult bookstores throughout the state. The Petitioner is free to start another adult bookstore chain once he serves his sentence. 509 U. A prior restraint is an administrative or judicial order forbidding certain communications before they occur. United States Citation. Issue. So. He was sentence to 6 years in prison. In addition. ordered him to forfeit all of his businesses. Brief Fact Summary. 544 (1993). fined $100. Synopsis of Rule of Law. This is an authorization to suppress disfavored speech. Village of Stratton .Alexander v. Facts. Alexander (Petitioner). Inc.

Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton
Citation. 536 U.S. 150 (2002) Brief Fact Summary. A town ordinance required a canvasser to obtain an ordinance prior to going door to door for any cause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The scope of the ordinance is too broad because the village never constrained its application only to "commercial activities and the solicitation of funds" which "would have been tailored to the Respondent's interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud." Facts. Petitioner 1, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. ("Petitioner 1"), coordinates the preaching activities of the Jehovah's witnesses throughout the United States. Petitioner 2, the Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. ("Petitioner 2"), supervises various Jehovah's witnesses in a portion of Ohio including the Respondent, Village of Stratton (the "Respondent"). Section 116.01 of the ordinance forbids " 'canvassers' and others from 'going in and upon' private residential property for the purpose of promoting any 'cause' without first having obtained a permit pursuant to § 116.03." Section 116.03 requires the acquisition of a "Solicitation Permit" from the mayor. The permit was free and all the registrant must do is fill out a form. Upon being issued a permit, its recipient must carry it around to show it to a police officer or a resident if asked. A procedure can be followed to ban solicitation on certain property, despite the fact someone has a permit. Issue. Does "a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate[ ] the First Amendment"? Held. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. Stevens") first discussed various themes gleamed from past cases concerning the Jehovah's witnesses. First, the "value of the speech involved". Specifically, the historical value of "door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas." The court placed the hand distribution of religious propaganda on the same plateau as "worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits." Second, the interest the towns attempting to promulgate regulations had in "some form of regulation" especially when money donations are sought. Third and finally, J. Stevens recognized the importance of door-to-door canvassing to "little people." ‡ J. Stevens recognized and accepted three interests the Respondents argued were served by their ordinance - "the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents' privacy." However, J. Stevens also stressed the importance of the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and "whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve." The majority

331 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton

found that the scope of the ordinance is too broad because the village never constrained its application to "commercial activities and the solicitation of funds" which "would have been tailored to the Respondent's interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud." Instead, the ordinance also had been applied to "noncommercial 'canvassers' " promoting a variety of "causes," both religious and political included. ‡ The court criticized the ordinance because "a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so." It then recognized three unacceptable effects of the ordinance. First, the fact that anonymity was not preserved. Second, the imposition of an "objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views." Third, a large amount of spontaneous speech is banned by the ordinance. ‡ The court then addressed and discounted two other purposes of the ordinance put forth by the Respondent ± the privacy of the residence and the prevention of fraud. Dissent. Judge William Rehnquist ("J. Rehnquist") filed a dissenting opinion stressing how canvassers are annoying, and how burglars and other criminals including murderers often time pose as canvassers. J. Rehnquist argued "a permit requirement for door-to-door canvassers, which gives no discretion to the issuing authority, is constitutional." J. Rehnquist additionally argued that nothing more than intermediate scrutiny should be applied to the ordinance. Discussion. It is interesting to recognize how the dispute in this matter evolved around what applicable standard of review should be applied. The dissent argued that nothing more than intermediate scrutiny applies, implying that the majority applied something more.

332 Thomas And Windy Hemp Development Board v. Chicago Park District

Thomas And Windy Hemp Development Board v. Chicago Park District
Citation. 534 U.S. 316 Brief Fact Summary. A city agency in charge of running certain public places, adopted an ordinance requiring anybody who wished to assemble in a park to obtain a permit before doing to. Synopsis of Rule of Law. [Freedman] does not apply where the "licensing scheme at issue [ ] is not subject-matter censorship but content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum." Facts. The Respondent, Chicago Park District (the "Respondent"), is in charge of running public parks and public property in Chicago. The Respondent enacted an ordinance which obligated an individual to obtain a permit prior to " 'conduct[ing] a public assembly, parade, picnic, or other event involving more than fifty individuals,' or engage in an activity such as 'creat[ing] or emit[ting] any Amplified Sound.' " Applications for the permits were be processed in the order they were received, and the Respondent had 14 days to decide whether to grant or deny the permit. This period can be extended an additional 14 days by written notice. There were 13 enumerated grounds in the ordinance that a permit could be denied under. If a permit is rejected, the Respondent must specify why, and propose ways to cure any defects. If a permit is rejected because a prior application for the same time or place was previously accepted, suggestions must be made for a substitute time and/or place. An appeal is available within seven days of rejection of an Application, to the General Superintendent of the Park District (the "Superintendent"). The Superintendent has seven days to rule on the appeal. The Petitioners, Thomas and Windy City Hemp Development Board (the "Petitioners"), have applied several times to the Respondent to hold rallies "advocating the legalization of marijuana". The Respondent has granted certain of the Petitioners permits, but denied others. The Petitioners filed suit in district court alleging the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. Issue. "[W]hether a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events must, consistent with the First Amendment, contain the procedural safeguards described in [Freedman v. Maryland]? Held. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. Scalia"), wrote for the majority and first discussed how the First Amendement "prohibits a wide assortment of government restraints upon expression, but the core abuse against which it was directed was the scheme of licensing laws implemented by the monarch and Parliament to contain the 'evils of the printing press in 16th- and 17-century England.' " J. Scalia then discussed [Freedman v. Maryland], which required a Board of Censors (the "Board") to review a film prior to its showing anywhere in the state. The Board could reject certain films that satisfied certain criteria. The Supreme Court in [Freedman] observed this scheme "presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech. [T]he censor's business is to censor," and a

333 Thomas And Windy Hemp Development Board v. Chicago Park District

licensing body likely will overestimate the dangers of controversial speech when determining, without regard to the film's actual effect on an audience, whether speech is likely 'to incite' or to 'corrupt [the] morals.' " In response, the [Freedman] court held that any procedure to license films must contain certain procedural safeguards including "(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period during which the status quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision must be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof once in court." ‡ The court found that [Freedman] did not apply here because the "licensing scheme at issue here was not subject-matter censorship but content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum." The ordinance did not grant the Respondent the ability to make judgments about the content of the speech. None of the 13 grounds for denying a permit concerned what the seeker of a permit says. Further, the ordinance was not concerned at all with communicative activity. Instead, only with "all activity conducted in a public park." The purpose of the ordinance was to "coordinate multiple uses of limited space, to assure preservation of the park facilities, to prevent uses that are dangerous, unlawful, or impermissible under the Park District's rules, and to assure financial accountability for damage caused by the event." ‡ J. Scalia recognized that even content neutral, time, place and manner restrictions can violate the First Amendment if the official in charge of granting the license had too much discretion. To ensure this does not occur, the court had required "that a time, place, and manner regulation contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to effective judicial review." J. Scalia then found that this ordinance did not grant the licensing official too much power because the permit may only be denied for the objective and specific reasons enumerated in the ordinance. The licensing decision was not left "to the whim of the administrator". Additionally, that the application must be accepted or rejected within 28 days and if the application is denied, the reasons for the denial must be specified. Discussion. This case offers an interesting discussion about the differences between "content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions" and "subject-matter censorship."

334 City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.

City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.
Citation. 541 U.S. 774 (2004) Brief Fact Summary. A Colorado ordinance required certain adult oriented stores to obtain permits prior to going into business. Synopsis of Rule of Law. "Colorado's ordinary judicial review procedures suffice as long as the courts remain sensitive to the need to prevent First Amendment harms and administer those procedures accordingly." Facts. The Petitioner, City of Littleton, Colorado (the "Petitioner"), enacted an ordinance requiring certain adult oriented business to acquire "adult business licenses". First, the ordinance provides a definition of "adult business". Second, it requires anyone applying for a license to provide certain information about the business. Third, all applicable zoning laws including those specific to adult business must be followed. Fourth, there are eight enumerated reasons why a license can be denied. Fifth, the ordinance requires the city to make a decision within about 40 days as to whether the license should be issued. Finally, a final decision is appealable to the state district court. The Respondent, Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. (the "Respondent"), opened a store in the business of selling "adult books". The store was opened in an area not zoned for adult oriented businesses. The Respondent brought this lawsuit and argued the Petitioner's ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. Issue. Whether "a city's 'adult business' licensing ordinance [ ] meets the First Amendment's requirement that such a licensing scheme assure prompt judicial review of an administrative decision denying a license"? Held. Yes, it meets the requirement. Justice Stephen Breyer ("J. Breyer"), writing for the majority, first found "[a] delay in issuing a judicial decision, no less than a delay in obtaining access to a court, can prevent a license from being 'issued within a reasonable period of time.' " ‡ Second, J. Breyer found for various reasons "Colorado's ordinary judicial review procedures suffice as long as the courts remain sensitive to the need to prevent First Amendment harms and administer those procedures accordingly." First, "ordinary court procedural rules and practices « provide reviewing courts with judicial tools sufficient to avoid delay-related First Amendment harm." Second, judges in Colorado will work to ensure that there are no serious threats of delay. Third, this case is distinguishable from [Freedman], which considered the creation of a Board of Censors to review movies before they were released. J. Breyer observed that the standards that the movies were measured against were subjective, and that if the censorship power was exercised there would be complete censorship. To the contrary, the standards that apply to the licenses here were "reasonably objective, nondiscretionary criteria unrelated to the content of the expressive materials

335 City of Littleton, Colorado v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.

that an adult business may sell or display." Further, the eight enumerated criteria are "simple enough to apply and their application simple enough to review that their use is unlikely in practice to suppress totally the presence of any specific item of adult material in the Littleton community." Fourth and finally, the specific judicial review safeguards do not have to be in the city ordinance containing the licensing scheme. ‡ J. Breyer also observed "[w]here (as here and as in FW/PBS) the regulation simply conditions the operation of an adult business on compliance with neutral and nondiscretionary criteria, and does not seek to censor content, an adult business is not entitled to an unusually speedy judicial decision of the Freedman type." The court found the statute withstands a facial challenge, but specifically recognized challenges still can be brought based on its application, if there is undue delay. Discussion. It is interesting to read this case alongside [Thomas and Windy City Hemp Development Board v. Chicago Park District] to see how the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") applies [Freedman v. Maryland] in two unique factual situations.

336 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
Citation. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). Brief Fact Summary. Congress passed a law prohibiting federal employees from being paid for making speeches or writing articles. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The government may not forbid all employees from being paid for speech when the speech is unrelated to their jobs, just those in high ranking positions. Facts. All federal employees were prohibited from collecting compensation for giving speeches or writing articles even if the subject was not related to their jobs. Issue. Does this prohibition on compensation for speeches infringe upon the First Amendment Constitutional rights of federal employees? Held. Yes. The honoraria ban burdens the employee's right to free speech. The employees seek compensation for their expressions not as government employees, but as citizens. Because this ban focuses only on speech it puts a significant burden on the employee's 1st Amendment rights. The employee is forced to choose between his job and expressing his thoughts. The ban in effect stops speech. Dissent. This ban on honoraria is consistent with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and should not apply only to those above a certain pay grade. Discussion. The law does not prohibit any speech, but by prohibiting compensation for speech, the Congress has discouraged employees from sharing their thoughts. On the other hand, it is important to ban compensation when it could appear that the speaker, in his official capacity, has been improperly influenced by the compensation or has used his position to profit.

337 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
Citation. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Barnette (Respondent), is a Jehovah's Witness who refused to pledge allegiance the United States flag while in public school. According to the Petitioner, the West Virginia State Board of Education's (Petitioner), rule, the Respondent was expelled from school and charged with juvenile delinquency. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to not speak is as equally protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) as the right to free speech. Facts. In 1942, the Petitioner adopted a rule that forced all teachers and pupils to pledge allegiance the nation's flag each day. If the student refused he would be found insubordinate and expelled from school. He would not be readmitted to school until he conformed. Meanwhile, he was considered to be "unlawfully absent" and subject to delinquency hearings. The parents could be fined $50 per day with a jail term not to exceed 30 days. The Respondent asked for an exception for all Jehovah's Witnesses because this pledge goes against their religious belief. But he was denied an exception. Issue. Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individual's intellect and right to choose their own beliefs. Dissent. This legislation is well within the states purview to encourage good citizenship. Discussion. The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long as the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The state has not power to mandate allegiance in hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is something the citizens will choose or not.

338 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

The identity of an author can sway public opinion and reception to the idea. The leaflets did not specifically indicate who the author was in violation of Ohio election law. Some of the handouts indicated that Petitioner was the author. 339 Buckley v. the Petitioner was charged with violating the Ohio code. but not the reasoning. Anonymous writings are not an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent. Synopsis of Rule of Law. There are less restrictive alternatives available. Inc. The Ohio code provides that no one shall write. Ohio Elections Commission Citation. Agrees with the result. Issue. The value of anonymous speech has been recognized throughout history. McIntyre (Petitioner). By not allowing anonymity. Discussion. Does the Ohio law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. ‡ Ohio has not provided sufficient evidence that the identification of the author will help prevent fraud. The Petitioner was fined $100 for violating the Ohio code. 334 (1995). So. The prime example of anonymous political writing can be found in the original Federalist Papers that supported independence. Facts. 514 U.McIntyre v.S. Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner. The analysis should focus on the original intent of the framers and their own actions. American Constitutional Law Foundation. print or otherwise distribute materials designed to promote the election or defeat of a candidate or issue without putting their name and residence or business address on the material. The Petitioner distributed leaflets at a school tax levy meeting that opposed the tax levy. No form of speech is entitled to greater protection than that of Petitioner. Dissent. Political speech is protected. distributed leaflets in opposition to a school tax levy. Often an author will not sign or provide a pseudonym in order to have the idea heard before it is judged. Yes. . Laws requiring disclosure of the identity of the author of political speech are subject to strict scrutiny. the state is suppressing speech that would otherwise occur. Concurrence. but others did not.

Affirm Court of Appeals ‡ The badge requirement discourages participation in the petition circulation process by forcing name identification without just cause. Sullivan . In order to consider a petition valid. the person is less likely to participate in the process. Issue. Therefore. Facts. 182 (1999). This kind of requirement is an even stricter restraint on speech than McIntyre because the circulators are required to discuss the issue at length in order to gain signatures. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Concurrence. Requiring the wearing name badges to identify the circulators is an action subject to strict scrutiny. Colorado requires that all persons asking for signatures wear a name badge and that their address and amount received be reported to the state. Discussion. 525 U. Dissent. addresses and amounts paid to all circulators be reported. Citation. Inc.Buckley v. The disclosure of circulators' addresses and payment amounts slightly infringes upon the First Amendment of the Constitution and should be held constitutional. 340 Rust v. Brief Fact Summary. By providing the identity. Do the Colorado state requirements violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. American Constitutional Law Foundation. this operates as a restraint on free speech. Yes. Citizens may get initiatives on the elections ballots by having persons sign a petition. Colorado requires that petition circulator's wear a badge and that the names. ‡ Listing paid circulators forces paid circulators to surrender the anonymity enjoyed by volunteer counterparts. Protected political speech includes the freedom to remain anonymous while supporting a particular cause.S.

instituted regulations that prohibited federal monies to be used to educate Medicaid recipients about abortion as a family planning option. 500 U. Instead. by definition. v. Brief Fact Summary. Sullivan (Respondent). These decisions are not content-based restrictions on speech. does not infringe upon the right. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In 1988. Family planning counseling does not. Does this restriction violate the First Amendment of the Constitution by prohibiting certain content-based discussions from occurring? ‡ Does the restriction condition the receipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right? Held. include abortion. Velazquez .Rust v. Dissent. Issue. they mandate that the activities be kept separate and distinct from the funded program. Instead. Discussion. The regulations do not require recipients to forfeit rights. By this same reasoning. 173 (1991). No. 341 Legal Services Corp. The government may choose to fund one program at the exclusion of another.S. The government can selectively fund programs without violating the United States Constitution (Constitution). if it believes the funded programs encourage certain activities it believes are in the public interest. The legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right. the Respondent promulgated new regulations that prohibited federal monies from being used to counsel Medicaid recipients about abortion as a method of family planning. The Respondent. the focus is on the scope of the program in question. Facts. Sullivan Citation. ‡ No. These are unconstitutional content-based regulations of speech that place obstacles in the way of a woman's freedom to choose abortion as a means of family planning. prenatal care discussions are also prohibited in these programs.

The Petitioner's mission was to give financial support to various grantees that provide non-criminal legal representation to indigent individuals. excluded the Petitioner's grantees' representation in cases. disallowed the attorneys in its employ to represent clients making certain arguments about the federal welfare laws.Legal Services Corp. Whether the provision of the Act forbidding representation by attorney's employed by the Petitioner's grantees from providing legal services in cases where a challenge to or an amendment of an existing welfare law is at issue." This provision has been interpreted to "prevent[ ] an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is violative of the United States Constitution. The Legal Services Corporation Act (the "Act")." Issue. created the Petitioner. Velazquez Citation. "Where private speech is involved." The Supreme Court of the United States (the "Supreme Court") upheld the law "reasoning that Congress had not discriminated against viewpoints on abortion. promulgated by Congress in 1974.S. however. Various local grantee organizations receive funds from the Petitioner and from other public or private sources. 533 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. Congress refused to allow doctors to discuss abortion.' " The scope of the federal program did not include abortion 342 Legal Services Corp. but had 'merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. violates the First Amendment rights of the Respondents? Held. which in the context of a welfare action "involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation. v. can obtain representation in a welfare action if they are challenging a welfare agency determination "of benefit ineligibility under interpretations of existing law. Velazquez . A congressional statute creating a non-profit corporation to provide legal representation to the indigent in non-criminal cases. v. Kennedy recognized that both parties rely upon [Rust v. J. They argued "the regulations constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination favoring an antiabortion position over a proabortion approach in the sphere of family planning. Sullivan]. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. the provision being challenged. Kennedy") authored the majority opinion. In [Rust]. The relevant portion of section 504(a)(16)." An individual. The constitutionality of this program was challenged by recipients of funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act (the "Act"). the Legal Services Corporation (the "Petitioner") a non-profit corporation. 531 U. even Congress' antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own interest. Synopsis of Rule of Law. and the grantee organizations hire and supervise the lawyers that provide free legal services to the indigent. Congress began a program whereby doctors were granted subsidies to advise their patients on various nuances of family planning. because they did not feel it was an appropriate family planning topic." Facts.

J. If the citizenry objects." J. the lawyers employed and supervised by the Petitioner's grantees were not the government's speakers." "By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts. Th[is] disability is inconsistent with the proposition that attorneys should present all the reasonable and well-grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case. Breyer further observed "[r]estricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys in much the same way broadcast systems or student publication networks were changed in the limited forum cases we have cited. Just as government in those cases could not elect to use a broadcasting network or a college publication structure in a regime which prohibits speech necessary to the proper functioning of those systems. in the end..counseling. and the federal government's ban on discussing abortion ensured the limits of the program were respected. newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position." Additionally. Breyer observed that the Petitioner's program "was designed to facilitate private speech. that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.. ‡ J. the Petitioner's attorney "could not advise the courts of serious questions of statutory validity. They also can be sustained in cases like "[Rust] in which the government 'used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. Breyer also observed "[i]t does not follow . The lawyers representing the Welfare Board are the ones who speak for the government. it is. The lawyers speak for their indigent clients in front of the Welfare Board. Velazquez . the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power. for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea.' " The rationale for this view was that "[w]hen the government speaks. but later decisions specified this. accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy." In the context of §504(a)(16). The Supreme Court in [Rust] did not specifically state that the doctor's counseling activities constituted governmental speech." Further. ‡ These later decisions have held "viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker". not to promote a governmental message. J. Breyer recognized that under §504(a)(16) an attorney would be require to cease representation if "the validity issue becomes apparent during initial attorney-client consultations or in the midst of litigation proceedings." ‡ Based on the facts here. Congress cannot 343 Legal Services Corp. The attorney's advice cannot be characterized as governmental speech and as such this case is distinguishable from [Rust]. it may not design a subsidy to effect this serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary. v.

in ways which distort its usual functioning". but limited. ‡ In conclusion J. Scalia and the dissent found [Rust] virtually indistinguishable in all material respects. and under [Rust] that decision 'does not infringe the right' to bring such litigation. Thomas") joined." Additionally." J. Judge Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. The only way speech is abridged is if the funding mechanism is "manipulated" to have a "coercive effect". Velazquez . Where private speech is involved. and thus controlling. ‡ The majority concluded "[t]he LSC and the United States. the individuals involved are indigent. it only "defines the scope of a federal spending program. Scalia") filed a dissenting opinion with which Judge William Rehnquist ("J. The Constitution does not permit the Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner." 344 Legal Services Corp. Scalia argued that §504(a)(16) does not directly regulate speech. however. and likely would not be able to afford other counsel. v. which indirectly restricts speech." Instead. it "applies a novel and unsupportable interpretation of our public-forum precedents.. although a litigant could obtain other counsel if one of the Petitioner's attorneys had to withdraw.. J. We must be vigilant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge. than an indigent individual could not obtain a replacement attorney. J. J.wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source." Dissent. Scalia further argued that although the majority acknowledges all of this. The attempted restriction is designed to insulate the Government's interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge. J. Where like here the spending program is not universal. Scalia criticized the private versus governmental speech argument that the majority made to distinguish [Rust] and the majority's argument that the welfare funding "restriction seeks to use an existing medium of expression and to control it . Scalia concluded "[t]he LSC subsidy neither prevents anyone from speaking nor coerces anyone to change speech. and is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from the subsidy upheld in [Rust]. J. O'Connor") and Judge Clarence Thomas ("J. Scalia and the dissent argued that the Act is a federal subsidy program." ‡ Unlike the majority. it is extremely hard to prove coercion. Scalia disparaged the majority's argument that if one of the Petitioner's attorney's must withdraw. even Congress' antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own interest. when the government created a public forum with the spending program but then discriminated in distributing funding within the forum on the basis of viewpoint. Scalia observed "[t]he Court has found such selective spending unconstitutionally coercive only once. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. J." Further. Finally. Scalia observed "[t]he provision simply declines to subsidize a certain class of litigation. in effect ask us to permit Congress to define the scope of the litigation it funds to exclude certain vital theories and ideas." J. Rehnquist"). §504(a)(16) does not "establish[ ] a public forum nor discriminate [ ] on the basis of viewpoint.

It is interesting to examine how the majority and dissent construe [Rust] in entirely different ways. 345 Schenck v. United States .Discussion.

Schenck (Petitioner). Synopsis of Rule of Law. the United States (Respondent). No actual obstruction of military recruiting resulted from the Petitioner's actions. 249 U. 346 Frohwerk v. charged the Petitioner with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by encouraging insubordination in the military. "Fire!" in a crowded theatre. However.S. Is the Petitioner's expression of his opinion of the draft protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. 47 (1919). Facts. United States . Brief Fact Summary. The flyer consisted of 2 pages that implored the draftees to "Assert Your Rights" and standup against the draft. distributed mailers that opposed the draft during World War I. The Petitioner. It was equated to yelling. The Petitioner sent mailers to all men that were drafted into the war. United States Citation. No. Because the nation is at war these types of expression encouraging disruption of wartime activities cannot be tolerated. restrictions on such speech are constitutional. the circumstance of the times is what makes this unprotected speech. The Respondent. Issue. It was meant to induce panic and disrupt the security actions of the nation.Schenck v. When speech presents a clear and present danger of bringing about harm that Congress has the power to prevent. Discussion.

Brief Fact Summary. No. 249 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. It is possible that this paper was read by those in military service or subject to service who would react by opposing the war efforts.S. Discussion. Speech that could incite the audience to react negatively to the war efforts may be restricted without violating the United States Constitution (Constitution). 204 (1919). There does not appear to be enough evidence to show that the articles caused a negative reaction.Frohwerk v. The Petitioner. But there was enough dissent in the ranks that the Petitioner was counting on to react to the articles. Frohwerk (Petitioner). Issue. United States . Facts. mutiny and refusal of duty in the military of the Respondent. United States Citation. was convicted of attempting to cause disloyalty. Are Petitioner's First Amendment constitutional rights violated by this conviction? Held. The Petitioner published 12 articles in his own newspaper that denounced the war and military action. the United States (Respondent). He was subsequently convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. The analysis here is based on the intent of the speech rather than its actual effect. 347 Debs v.

Facts. The Petitioner. No. He was convicted and sentenced to 10 years on each count. Issue. Debs (Petitioner). Discussion. 348 Abrams v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Does the Petitioner have a protected right to express himself as he did? Held. was found guilty for attempting to incite insubordination in the military by giving a speech. The theme of his speeches was the benefits of a Socialist society. incidental or not. the Supreme Court believed the danger was very real. is to oppose war efforts. He focused on the indictments of his 'comrades' for helping others evade the draft and the ill effects of war.S. Ohio opposing the war. The decision is based on the analysis of the likelihood or imminence of harm caused by the speech. United States Citation. Although there appears to be very little evidence of either here. 211 (1919). 249 U. Brief Fact Summary. Speech is not protected if one purpose of the speech. the United States (Respondent). The Petitioner gave a number of public speeches in Canton. United States . The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) sustains the charge of attempting to obstruct and obstructing the recruiting service of the Respondent.Debs v.

The Petitioner was born in Russia and claimed to be a rebel who did not believe in government of any form. The Petitioner. using language intended to bring about contempt. The articles were published in English and Yiddish to increase circulation. Can one be held responsible for the unintended consequences of one's speech? Held. 250 U. United States Citation. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. Although this action was not meant to induce panic and disrupt the security actions of the nation. 616 (1919). Unintended consequences of speech are treated as if the speaker intended such a reaction. it is ruled that the authors knew or should have known that these reactions would result and so by default intended negativity. To restrict such speech. Prior cases have held this type of speech may be restricted in time of war. the United States (Respondent). is to shut down the "marketplace of ideas" and free exchange that has been the backbone of our nation's growth. and disrepute of the government. Therefore. New York . The Petitioner published and distributed articles critical of the Respondent throughout New York City. Petitioner was charged with using abusive language about the form of United States government. it was sufficiently negative in nature to cause such a reaction. scorn.S. during World War I. Speech may not be restricted unless the speaker actually intended to cause a disruptive action by the audience. Abrams (Petitioner). 349 Gitlow v. Facts.Abrams v. Yes. Dissent. and using language intended to incite and encourage resistance to the war. Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. was convicted of conspiring with the German government to write and distribute disloyal information about the Respondent.

The current statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of exercising the state's police power. Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner. Gitlow (Petitioner). State statutes are unconstitutional if they are arbitrary and unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the state to protect public interests. In 1919 he published the group's manifesto and prepared for widespread distribution from the New York City headquarters. 350 Whitney v.Gitlow v. California . It is within the state's power to prevent the disturbance of the peace and regulate speech that may incite crime even if the threat of such action is not immediate. The Petitioner is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party. The Petitioner was charged with criminal anarchy because he was an advocate of socialist reform in the United States. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Freedom of speech and press do not confer an absolute right to publish or speak without being held responsible for the results of such speech. published a communist manifesto for distribution in the United States. 652 (1925).S. He served as the business manager for the paper that was run by the organization. A state may not prohibit speech unless it presents a clear and present danger to the public interest. The state may regulate to protect its interests in general welfare of its citizens. New York Citation. Discussion. Facts. Dissent. Issue. No. He was charged with plotting to overthrow the United States government. 268 U. Did the statute prohibiting such activity deprive the Petitioner of his First Amendment constitutional right to freedom of expression? Held.

violence and terrorism to accomplish industrial and political change. Discussion. The Petitioner. 351 Dennis v. 274 U. 357 (1927).S. United States . The Act is not unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of police power. A state may prohibit the organizing of an association that advocates the commission of crimes or unlawful acts of force to achieve goals that are a danger to general public interest. was convicted of organizing a group that would use unlawful acts of force. she was convicted of criminal syndicalism under California statute. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) provides complete deference to the legislative intent of such statutes and assumes a legitimate purpose. California. She attended a conference of this group in Chicago. The Petitioner was originally a member of the national socialist party. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Regardless. the state of California's (Respondent) Syndicalism Act (the Act) violate the First Amendment rights of its citizens? Held. Brief Fact Summary. Speech should only be restricted in the very limited instances of dire emergency. The state was legitimately trying to protect the citizens from becoming victims of a criminal conspiracy. teaches and aids terrorism in the name of political change is expressive conduct that poses a significant danger to the public safety and welfare warranting governmental restraint. Concurrence. The Petitioner then became a member of the Communist Labor Party of America. The state may limit speech that endangers the organization of the government and disturbs the public welfare. Does the Respondent. Being a member of an organization that advocates. At that time. 1919. California Citation.Whitney v. Each person has the right to free speech. the group split into 2 distinct organizations. Facts. No. No danger from speech can be deemed clear and present unless the harm will occur before there is opportunity to discuss the speech. Whitney (Petitioner). The Petitioner was an active participant in the group's activities and claims she did not intend for the group to be used as an instrument of terrorism. but this is not an absolute right. Issue. which was headquartered in Oakland.

Facts. Douglas): There is no evidence that there is clear and present danger of harm from the organization of this political group. publish or distribute printed material advocating such an overthrow. ‡ Justice William Douglas (J. Ohio . ‡ Justice Hugo Black (J. Issue. United States (Respondent). The Petitioner. Deference must be given to the legislature and its intent in passing such a law. Dissent. Synopsis of Rule of Law.Dennis v. Discussion. The Act violates the First Amendment of the Constitution. was charged with violating the Smith Act (the Act) by organizing the Communist Party of America. United States Citation. The courts are not justified in second-guessing or limiting the power of the legislature. The Act does not inherently violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) either as applied or construed in this case. The Act makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly or willfully advocate overthrowing or destroying the Respondent. Black): The clear and present danger test does no more than set a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. Concurrence. The purpose of the law is to protect the government from violent overthrows. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). which is well within the purview of Congress to legislate. The Petitioner was charged with organizing the Communist Party of America and knowingly and willingly advocating the destruction of the Respondent. The government is not rendered helpless by the Constitution to defend itself from revolution. No. Immediate immanency is not required for a showing of clear and present danger. or to print. 352 Brandenburg v. Dennis (Petitioner). Brief Fact Summary. It is also unlawful to organize or help organize a group to overthrow the Respondent. Does the Act violate the 1st Amendment? Held.

was convicted of advocating unlawful activity in violation of the Respondent. with the Petitioner making references to "revengeance. 353 Chaplinsky v. (2) a likelihood of producing illegal action and (3) an intent to cause imminent illegality. a Ku Klux Klan leader. Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brandenburg (Petitioner). The Petitioner. Discussion." Issue. New Hampshire .S. rifles and shotguns at the rally. 444 (1969). Speech will be protected as long as it does not incite imminent harm to others. 395 U. Ohio's (Respondent). A second film showed a rally with participants gathered around a large burning cross. In the absence of an immediate threat of harm. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. this statute prohibits assembly with others to advocate a described action.Brandenburg v. A conviction for incitement will be upheld only if there is (1) imminent harm. On its face. A film shows the Petitioner speaking at the rally and the existence of pistols. Ohio Citation. The Petitioner invited a news reporter and film crew to join him at a Klan rally in rural Hamilton County. Criminal Syndicalism statute. is this restriction a violation of the Petitioner's First Amendment constitutional rights? Held.

The statute bars words that are likely to cause a breach of the peace. This was narrowly drawn to punish specific conduct within the state power to control. No.S. Wilson . was arrested for yelling offensive words to a city official while on the street. Locals complained that the Petitioner was denouncing all religion as a "racket. "Fighting words" are an unprotected form of speech. The Petitioner." The Petitioner was charged with violating state law that made it a crime to offend or annoy another while on a public street. 354 Gooding v." Fearing a riot would ensue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Fighting words include any situation likely to cause a violent response against the speaker and where the insult is likely to inflict immediate emotional harm. On the way there. The Petitioner was distributing literature about his religious sect one afternoon on a street corner. Issue.Chaplinsky v. a police officer escorted the Petitioner to the local police station. Does this law infringe upon Petitioner's First Amendment constitutional rights? Held. New Hampshire Citation. 568 (1941). Chaplinsky (Petitioner). Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist. 315 U. Facts. the Petitioner encounter the City Marshal and declared that he was a.

Wilson Citation. Paul." "If you put your hands on me again I'll cut you to pieces. this statute is overly broad and unconstitutional as written and applied.S. 355 R. Wilson (Appellee). A statute must be carefully drawn and construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be applied to protected expression. v. Blackmun): The statute is not overbroad and common sense tells us that the name calling engaged in by the Appellee is a form of "fighting words. ‡ Justice Harry Blackmun (J. City of St.V. The Appellee. Is the Georgia law overly broad and unconstitutional? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. was convicted of using opprobrious words and abusive language towards police officers.A. The statute is constitutional. Burger): A statute should be held unconstitutional on its face not because of its previous application. Therefore.Gooding v. The definitions of the words used in the statute include non-fighting words as well as fighting words. Facts. Yes. Issue. Brief Fact Summary. The majority relies on the definitions of the words used as a common dictionary defines them. Dissent." At the time these comments were made the Appellee was being moved away from an army induction center where he was protesting the war. ‡ Justice Warren Burger (J. Minnesota . 518 (1972). 405 U. The Appellee was convicted of using abusive language towards another when he made statements such as "You son of a bitch. the statute is not narrowly construed." Discussion. Because the words include those that are meant to disgrace the listener or that are simply harsh words. I'll choke you to death.

when someone knows or should know that this will result in anger by the victim. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Minnesota (Respondent). The Respondent. chose to prosecute the Petitioner under the Bias-Motivated Ordinance.V. White): The ordinance is unconstitutional because it is overbroad. R.R. Paul.A. Yes.V. Issue. while others are unrestricted. It is a content-based ordinance that does not fall into an exception of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. New York . Discussion. Concurrence. 505 U. Facts. The ordinance prohibits fighting words only as they apply to cases of racial. ‡ Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Is the ordinance substantially over broad and unconstitutionally content-based? Held. v. (Petitioner). Blackmun): The ordinance goes beyond regulating fighting words. Prohibition of the use of fighting words must be uniform across all topics or else the law is an unconstitutional restriction of speech. St-Paul. ‡ Justice Byron White (J. The ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The Petitioner. is a juvenile accused of burning a cross in his neighbor's yard. City of St. the Petitioner and some other juveniles made a cross out of table legs.A. They placed it in the yard of a black neighbor and set it on fire. which made it a misdemeanor to place a burning cross on public or private property. is why the ordinance is held unconstitutional. In 1990. Minnesota Citation.S. Brief Fact Summary. This was done in violation of a city ordinance that prohibits such action. gender or religious harassment. Because of this prohibition of speech in particular areas. Other fighting words that are directed at political affiliation or homosexuality are allowed. 377 (1992). 356 Feiner v.

but he refused several times and was eventually arrested. Brief Fact Summary. then the police may restrict speech. 357 Beauharnais v. Illinois . The Petitioner. but he also made derogatory marks towards some political officials. a neighbor complained to the police and 2 units were dispatched to the scene. Therefore. The original purpose of the speech was to invite listeners to attend a meeting. Later. The facts do not show that a riot was imminent. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Yes. the police had a legitimate interest in maintaining the peace and order of the community that outweighed the Petitioner's freedom of speech. The Petitioner was addressing a group of 75 persons gathered on the sidewalk. Discussion. At that time people were spilling into the street and disrupting traffic. One officer asked the Petitioner to stop talking. New York Citation.S. Facts. Issue. Dissent.Feiner v. was convicted of disorderly conduct for refusing to stop giving a speech on a public sidewalk once the crowd started to get a little rowdy. 315 (1951). The Petitioner intended to incite the public with his words. A person does not have the right to free speech when it will result in a riot. This is just a convenient way for police to censor unpopular viewpoints. 340 U. Was the disruption of the speech to prevent a riot constitutional? Held. The conviction should not be reversed because there was great potential for a riot and the Petitioner defied the police request. When there is clear and present danger of a riot. Feiner (Petitioner).

No.Beauharnais v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Therefore. Does the protection of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause prevent a state from punishing libel towards a group? Held. Illinois (Respondent). 358 Virginia v. The Petitioner was charged with violating this code when he distributed leaflets complaining of the "encroachment. Inc. A state may regulate this type of speech to maintain the peace and order. Illinois Citation. The Petitioner. Brief Fact Summary. was convicted of violating a state statute that outlawed the dissemination of printed racist materials. neighborhoods and persons. The state had a legitimate purpose for forbidding the distribution of racist materials. has a criminal code that expressly prohibits the publishing or presentation of any racist materials by any person. Libel is in the same class as fighting words. Discussion. by the Negro. Libel is regarded as a close relation to fighting words because of the history of racism experienced by the state. 343 U. Dissent. Beauharnais (Petitioner). Racist speech is not protected speech. Black . corporation or organization. 250 (1952). The effects of racist words caused riots and violence throughout the state. the state is justified in prohibiting such activity in order to maintain the peace. Facts." He also attached a membership application for the White Circle League of America. The Respondent. This is a content-based law that should be held to strict scrutiny instead of the weak rational basis analysis.S. harassment and invasion of white people their property. Issue.

consistent with the First Amendment." The speaker does not need to "actually intend to carry out the threat. 1536. or cause to be burned. the government has the power to regulate certain categories of expression." According to [Chaplinsky] and [Brandenburg]. Synopsis of Rule of Law. United States]. including fighting words and incitement. which provides. J. challenged their conviction under a Commonwealth of Virginia statute outlawing cross burning. The Respondents were convicted of violating Virginia's cross-burning statute. 155 L. 343. Cross burning can be banned if it is carried out with the intent to intimidate. O'Connor observes. ‡ May a state ban cross burning if it is accompanied by "an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons"? ‡ Is the Commonwealth of Virginia's statute banning cross burning with "an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons" violative of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution")? Held." Facts. pursuant to [Watts v. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.2-423 (1996)." Certain cross burning fall into the scope of intimidating speech. Instead of prohibiting all 359 Virginia v. writing for the majority held "a State. a cross on the property of another. as well as from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.2d 535 (2003) Brief Fact Summary. Black Citation. "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons.S. Black ." Instead. with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons. Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. However. Additionally. O'Connor"). the First Amendment allows states to ban "true threats". "a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders." Issue.Virginia v. The Respondents.Ed. which "encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. "[t]he First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation. §18. 123 S. it is not appropriate to treat "any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. to burn.Ct. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. a highway or other public place. 538U. including Black ("Respondents"). may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate. ‡ Yes.

But the same act may mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech.' " ‡ Yes. ‡ Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. As so interpreted. ‡ J. and dissented in part. City of St. Souter"). and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning itself. Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. prosecute. the provision makes it more likely that the jury will find an intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case. Scalia") and Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion and argued "[i]n our culture." Here: the prima facie provision strips away the very reason why a State may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate. Thomas") concurred in part. v. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J.V. but that it "would be constitutional to ban only a particular type of threat [such as] 'those threats of violence that are directed at the President. but the majority should not have invalidated the prima-facie-evidence provision on its face. it would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas. The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. an expressive component should not be imputed to the activity in question. The provision permits a jury to convict in every cross burning case in which defendants exercise their constitutional right not to put on a defense. ‡ Justice David Souter ("J. Ginsburg") filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Concurrence/Dissent. cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence. "The Commonwealth of Virginia's statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders that statute unconstitutional in its current form. Black ." As such. concurred in the judgment in part.intimidating messages. It permits the Commonwealth to arrest.A. the majority observed the holding in [R. Paul] did not ban all "content-based discrimination within a proscribable area of speech". And even where a defendant like Black presents a defense." Additionally. The justices were concerned that a "content-based proscription of cross burning [ ] may be a subtle effort to ban not only the intensity of the intimidation cross burning causes when 360 Virginia v. The justices agreed with the majority that a state may prohibit cross burning with the intent to intimidate. Kennedy") and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. Dissent.

V] analogous to those here. a stringent test the statute cannot pass. and concluded cross burning accompanied with "an intent to intimidate" qualifies as the kind of threat that the First Amendment does not protect.V.A. but also the particular message of white supremacy that is broadcast even by nonthreatening cross burning. a content-neutral statute banning intimidation would achieve the same object without singling out particular content.A.A. Stevens") concurred." The justices did not find the facts of [R. v.V.] exception can save the statute as content based. it can only survive if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Paul] case to the facts of the instant fscase before them. and pursuant to [R. It is interesting to examine how the justices apply the [R.] no content-based statute should survive without a high probability that "no official suppression of ideas is afoot.done to threaten.A. 361 Roth v. Discussion." The justices then argued the prima facia evidence provision "stands in the way of any finding of such a high probability here. United States ." Because "no [R.V." Concurrence. City of St. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens ("J.

Roth v. United States Citation. The Respondent." 362 Paris Adult Theatre v. The federal law banning such speech is constitutional as long as the appropriate standard of obscene is used. Slaton . was charged with violating the federal law against obscenity. lewd. Obscene material deals with sex in a manner that is appealing to the prurient interest. the United States (Respondent). picture. This is punishing speech for the resulting thought that it may invoke. Obscenity is "not communication and is without social value. Therefore. passed a law that prohibited the mailing of "obscene. All discussions or depictions of sex are not obscene. No. Issue. Is obscenity protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. or lascivious book. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion.S. sex or exertion. not for the act itself. pamphlet. To be obscene the material must provide no literary or social value and it must have a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. Facts. Obscenity is a type of unprotected speech. 476 (1957)." Petitioner was convicted of violating this statute because he mailed sexually explicit advertisements and a book to requesters. or other publication of an indecent character. Brief Fact Summary. and if it foes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matter. This case is most famous for the footnote describing obscenity as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity. Roth (Petitioner). The Petitioner. the law is unconstitutional. 354 U." Dissent.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In late 1970 it featured 2 films that were described by the state as "hard core pornography" leaving "little to the imagination. Issue. Georgia. California . States may regulate the exhibition of obscenity amongst consenting adults because they have a legitimate interest in the well being of the community. Brief Fact Summary. Paris Adult Theatre (Petitioner). Is the state law a constitutional restriction on obscenity? Held. So. The material is not being forced on individuals they are choosing to watch it. The secondary effects of obscenity are discussed as a negative influence on the community. Facts." The theatre clearly advertises that it exhibits mature adult films to persons 21 years and older. Brennan): A proper test to identify obscenity has not been established. 413 U. The state has a vested interest in protecting the community from antisocial behavior and corruption often associated with the existence of adult movie theaters. This decision encroaches upon the First Amendment right to free speech. 49 (1973). ‡ Justice William Douglas (J. Discussion.S. ‡ Justice William Brennan (J. The Petitioner. Dissent. but no such interest exists within the adult population.Paris Adult Theatre v. 363 Miller v. Douglas): Obscenity is not an exception to the First Amendment. Yes. Slaton Citation. was convicted of violating state obscenity laws for showing pornographic films to adults. this law interferes with the freedom of intellect. States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in obscene material and the exhibition of such material. The state has a legitimate interest to protect minors from being exposed to porn. The Petitioner is an adult movie theatre in Atlanta.

excretory functions. and lewd exhibition of genitals. A state jury convicted him by characterizing the material as obscene. No. The Supreme Court of the United States has traditionally recognized the state's interest in protecting its citizens from offensive and obscene materials. all hardcore pornography is considered obscene. Obscenities are works when taken as whole appeal to the prurient interest in sex. The Petitioner. 413 U. 364 New York v. or scientific value. States may regulate materials that are patently representations of sexual acts or descriptions of masturbation.S. artistic. 15 (1973). Issue. California Citation. Was the advertisement for obscene material? Held. which portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The recipients of the mailer had in no way indicated that they were interested in receiving such material. Only those materials that depict "hardcore. was convicted of violating the section of the California state code prohibiting the distribution of obscenity. Miller (Petitioner)." patently offensive sexual conduct are exempt from 1st Amendment protection.Miller v. Discussion. and which does not have serious literary. political. Petitioner mass mailed advertisements for "adult" materials for sale. Basically. This case specifically defines obscenity based on a local community standard. Ferber . Facts. Brief Fact Summary.

Brief Fact Summary. 747 (1982).S. Use of children in pornographic materials has increased over the years causing the introduction of many state laws prohibiting such activity. was convicted of distributing child pornography in violation of New York state law. It is possible for some depictions of child sex acts to have serious literary. This protection of children is a legitimate state interest that outweighs an adult's freedom to enjoy sexually explicit material. artistic. ‡ The value of showing children engaged in sex is de minimis.New York v. Discussion. Issue. Concurrence. ‡ Distribution of these materials is intrinsically related to child abuse. The Free Speech Coalition . 365 Ashcroft v. scientific or medical value. Yes. Ferber Citation. The prohibition on the sale and distribution of child pornography is constitutional even if the material is not obscene. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Ferber (Respondent). ‡ Advertising and selling these types of materials provide an economic motive to engage in illegal activity. The Respondent was a storeowner who sold material showing children under the age of 16 engaged in sexual activities. 458 U. These laws protect the children from being exploited and abused. The Respondent. Is child pornography a form of obscenity that may be constitutionally restricted? Held. Child pornography is obscene without exception. Facts.

234 Brief Fact Summary. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J. described. 366 Ashcroft v. As such. Section 2256(B) of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (the "Act") is "overbroad and unconstitutional" because it abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech. Kennedy") first observed the Act goes beyond [New York v. of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The Act extended the existing federal prohibitions against child pornography. "which distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit speech because of the State's interest in protecting the children exploited by the production process.Ashcroft v. it had become harder to prove whether actual children were used in the production of certain pictures. Ferber]. California]". Facts. what was being regulated was the sexual exploitation of children. video.S. The Act extends its predecessors scope to "sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced without using any real children. or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression' it depicts 'a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. This provision was not challenged." Under [Ferber]. or appears to be. 535 U. The [Ferber] court recognized "[t]he [Miller] standard. including any photograph." Section 2256(8)(C) prohibited something called morphing which allows the altering of innocent pictures of real children to make it appear they are engaged in sexual activity. The Free Speech Coalition . There are three prohibited categories of speech added by the Act. The Free Speech Coalition Citation.' " Issue. The constitutionality of a Congressional act regulating certain types of child pornography was at issue. like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene." Due to advances in technology. Section 2256(8)(D) "defines child pornography to include any sexually explicit image that was 'advertised. the general requirement that pornography can only be banned if it is obscene does not apply and "showing minors can be proscribed whether or not the images are obscene under the definition proscribed by [Miller v.' that 'is. does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children. Synopsis of Rule of Law. presented. Whether the Act violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution") because it "proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under [Miller] nor child pornography under [Ferber]"? Held. or computer or computer-generated image or picture. promoted. picture.' The prohibition on 'any visual depiction' does not depend at all on how the image is produced. Section 2256(8)(B) of the Act prohibited " 'any visual depiction." The Act prevents the dissemination and possession of these images. the purpose of this section was to "[t]o ensure that defendants possessing child pornography using real minors cannot evade prosecution. film. Congress extended the ban to virtual child pornography." In other words.

just because speech may encourage unlawful acts does not justify its being banned." He argued. Further the restriction is not narrowly drawn because." Specifically. the possessor of the film would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work's redeeming value. and as such "the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard to any judgment about its content. Kennedy argued "[t]his is inconsistent with an essential First Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene. not content of the work. Justice William Rehnquist ("J." According to the "overbreadth doctrine" it is not permissible to ban lawful speech in order to ban unlawful speech. If certain films "that explore those subjects. Further. J." The majority observed that the Act "prohibits speech despite its serious literary. These two themes ± teenage sexual behavior and the sexual abuse of children ± have been the inspiration for various literary works. Finally. The majority recognized." The statute in [Ferber] targeted the production. and found it as an appropriate alternative if utilized for some literary artistic value. Further. artistic. ‡ J. Rehnquist") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia ("J.‡ J. The Free Speech Coalition . Kennedy distinguished this case from [Ferber] because it recognized in [Ferber] the images in question were the result of sexual abuse. that prohibition can and should be limited to 367 Ashcroft v." J. Kennedy rejected the governments assertions virtual child pornography can be utilized by pedophiles to seduce children. The Act would be "unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected expression. Rehnquist would have held "[t]o the extent the CPPA prohibits possession or distribution of materials that 'convey the impression' of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Scalia"). the Act imparts criminal penalties if anyone appears to be under 18. This is despite the fact the idea has been prevalent in art and literature throughout the ages. or scientific value. political. Kennedy also rejected the argument that virtual child pornography "whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct. Kennedy dismissed the government's argument that "the possibility of producing images by using computer imaging makes it very difficult for it to prosecute those who produce pornography by using real children. J. Additionally. however. Kennedy rejected the argument that eliminating the entire market of child pornography necessarily entails eliminating virtual pornography also. "speech within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from it. that many other things can seduce children and they are not illegal. [Ferber] specifically referenced "virtual child pornography" or use of someone who looked younger in its decision." J. the Act attached criminal penalties to the idea of "teenagers engaged in sexual activity". Kennedy recognized the severity of the penalties attached to the Act and how speech can be chilled based on these penalties. contain a single graphic depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition. J." J. Dissent. An age older than what is required to be married in many states.

Rehnquist") and Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. but that have serious value or do not facilitate child abuse. but uphold the ban on pornographic depictions that 'appea[r] to be' of minors so long as it is not applied to youthful adult pornography. J." Discussion." These justices would have held that the prohibition of virtual-child pornography satisfies strict scrutiny and is not unconstitutionally vague. O'Connor argued that the "appears to be « of a minor" language in a statute should be interpreted as "is virtually distinguishable from" a minor. 368 Young v. .reach 'the sordid business of pandering' which lies outside the bounds of First Amendment protection.. This reading "would not only assure that the ban on virtual child pornography is narrowly tailored. O'Connor disagreed with the majority's holding that the act's "prohibition of virtualchild pornography is overbroad." J." J. but would also assuage any fears that the 'appears to be . American Mini Theaters. Scalia").. O'Connor") filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Protection of the nation's children is a compelling interest.. joined by Justice William Rehnquist ("J. American Civil Liberties Union] to see how the court construes material injurious to minors on the internet. Inc. This case is interesting to read alongside [Ashcroft v.. O'Connor " would strike down the CPPA's ban on material that 'conveys the impression' that it contains actual child pornography. O'Connor does not see how the statute is overbroad because the "Respondents provide no examples of films or other materials that are wholly computer generated and contain images that 'appea[r] to be . of minors' engaging in indecent conduct. of a minor' language is vague. J. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J." Concurrence.

Discussion. This is a time. American Mini Theaters. This law does not restrict the communication of the material. Facts. is not abnormally harsh or unreasonable. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The number of theater licenses were not limited. speech was not prohibited. Content of speech may be used to restrict an activity. The adult movie houses were not to be located within 1. This type of restriction is to be used only with content neutral discriminations. Is a statute that regulates the location of adult movie theaters differently than regular movies constitutional? Held. 50 (1976). although directed at the adult entertainment. Michigan adopted a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult movie theaters and prevented too many to congregate near bars and other regulated establishments.000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" and was to be located more than 500 feet from a residential area. Pap's A. Issue. place. The city imposes restrictions on regular theaters as well. 369 City of Erie v. Inc. . 427 U. This restriction. Detroit. Dissent. Citation.M. Detroit. and manner restriction. Michigan adopted a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult movie theaters. Yes.Young v. therefore. It just limits the location of the message. Brief Fact Summary.S. as long as the speech is not biased by such a restriction.

Pap' A. Concurrence. Discussion. This law was passed to prevent the secondary effects of the activity.M. Preventing secondary effects is a sufficient reason to make a content neutral law. Now. ‡ Justice John Paul Stevens (J. The Respondent. the Respondent seeks a permanent injunction against the Petitioner. 370 Stanley v. passed an ordinance banning nude dancing. the Petitioner passed a law that makes it a crime to intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity. 1382 (2000). To comply with the ordinance. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Ct. Facts. Is the ordinance constitutional? Held.M. Souter): There is insufficient evidence to support the city's claim of secondary effects. Dissent. ‡ Justice David Souter (J. the dancers must wear Gstrings and pasties. Yes. Brief Fact Summary. Georgia .City of Erie v. owns "Kandyland" a club that features totally nude erotic dancing by women. 120 S. Pap's (Respondent)." The Respondent. In 1994. Pap's A. the City of Erie (Petitioner). It is a content neutral regulation and does not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because being nude is not an expression. The First Amendment of the Constitution is violated only when the communicative aspects of conduct are the reasons for the prohibition. Citation. The Petitioner. Issue. Stevens): This law is an example of censorship. (Respondent). Nude dancing attracts other undesirable public nuisances that provide the city with a legitimate interest in prohibiting public nudity. There is no way that dancers wearing G-strings and pasties result in a decrease of the secondary effects of which the city was concerned. operates a nude bar and challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance.

Issue. They confiscated the materials and charged the Petitioner with knowingly having possession of obscene matter. 394 U. California . Brief Fact Summary. Yes. The government is not allowed to dictate to people what they will and will not read. The Constitution strictly protects an individual from such unwarranted intrusion and control. Officers were searching his home when they found 8mm films that they determined to be obscene. Does this law prohibiting possession of obscenity violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Mere possession of obscenity is not punishable under the United States Constitution (Constitution). Georgia Citation. The Petitioner. Stanley's (Petitioner) home was being searched for evidence of bookmaking when officers found obscene films. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution prohibits making mere possession a crime. 371 Cohen v. Facts. Discussion.S.Stanley v. 557 (1969). The Petitioner was being investigated for bookmaking. watch or enjoy.

The Petitioner. Because of this action. California Citation. 372 Federal Communications Commission v. The state may not make a simple display of profanity in a public area a criminal offense. This speech fell within the standard of Chaplinsky. Is the use of profanity a protected expression? Held. If the public was confined to the area and exposed to the profanity. Pacifica Foundation .Cohen v. 15 (1971). To express the extent of his feeling he wore a jacket that read. he was charged and convicted of violating a section of the California code that prohibited "malicious and willful disturbances of the peace or quiet of any person or neighborhood by offensive conduct. They were not "captives" forced to look at the jacket. But. "Fuck the Draft" on the back while walking through the Los Angeles County Courthouse. Discussion. then the state would have a legitimate interest in protecting it. Brief Fact Summary. Dissent. here the audience was free to look away if they felt offended. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Profanity is neither obscene nor is it equivalent to "fighting words. Yes. was convicted of maliciously and willingly disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket with his opinion of the draft on the back.S. 403 U." Issue. The Petitioner was against the Vietnam War. Cohen (Petitioner)." Facts.

The Respondent is the parent company of a New York City radio station that aired segments of George Carlin's 12-minute monologue on "dirty words. The Respondent was given a written warning and threatened with sanctions if anyone else complained. Facts. the words are repeated through common speech. on a Tuesday in 1973. The Respondent. v. The government may regulate the time of day of such broadcasts or prohibit the use of certain words according to the context in which they are used. the Federal Communication Commission (Petitioner). Inc." This included a listing of the words that are not to be used on public airwaves. Pacifica Foundation Citation.m. Issue. This ruling considers the broadcast to be an intrusion into the public space and classifies it as a nuisance. Can radio broadcasts be regulated for language that is indecent. issued a declaratory order warning Respondent of potential sanctions. Broadcasts of indecent material can be regulated according to the context of the broadcast and on a case-by-case basis. This monologue was aired at 2 p. broadcast part of a comedy show that listed the "dirty words" that are not to be used on the radio. There is a proper public interest in protecting listeners from indecency over the airwaves.Federal Communications Commission v. 373 Sable Communications of California. The Petitioner. 438 U. Pacifica Foundation (Respondent). 726 (1978). but not obscene? Held. Then. Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law.S. Brief Fact Summary. Federal Communications Commission . Discussion. A listener wrote to the Petitioner complaining that his young son overheard the words while they were driving in the car.

Discussion. Federal Communications Commission Citation. Where the airwaves may permeate the privacy of a home. The phone company charged users a special fee for dialing these numbers. the Federal Communications Commission (Respondent). Sexual expression that is indecent. but the majority rejects this due to a lack of evidence. 115 (1989). Is it constitutional for the Respondent. implemented "dial-a-porn" as a business and was charged with violating a federal statute prohibiting obscene telephone messages. Special phone lines were installed that could handle large volumes of calls. 492 U. In 1983. The Respondent argues that this regulation is necessary to protect minors from accessing the porn. American Civil Liberties Union . the dial-a-porn requires an affirmative action by the person to receive it. but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). 374 Reno v. Sable Communications of California (Petitioner). Brief Fact Summary. but this regulation is not narrowly construed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. The Petitioner. It is constitutional to ban obscene telephone communications. The fee was spit between the phone company and the Petitioner. to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages? Held.Sable Communications of California. This decision is distinguishable from Pacifica because of the medium of communication.S. the Petitioner started a porn phone line in the Los Angles area. Inc. v. Facts.

However. The regulation is vague because it does not provide a clear definition of indecent and patently offensive expressions on the Internet. It is not clear that both indecent and obscene materials are being outlawed or that one is meant over the other. Often the sites require a link to a related site that the user must engage. Issue. American Civil Liberties Union Citation. 375 Ashcroft v.S. The regulation as written prohibits individuals from posting indecent material on their own computers and ignores the fact that some material may have real value as communication. Brief Fact Summary. A child must have some level of computer expertise in order to engage the sites. No. A regulation may not burden adult speech in order to protect minors if there is a less restrictive alternative available to achieve the goal. American Civil Liberties Union . The regulation is a content-based restriction that is vaguely written. The federal government regulated sexually explicit material on the Internet by prohibiting it unless the website could obtain the user's age verification. it is unusual for a computer user to stumble upon these sites by accident. 521 U. Sexually explicit material abounds on the Internet. Discussion. this regulation suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a right to receive. The most effective means of banning children from sex sites would be through a form of age verification. Facts. Of course. parental controls are available to limit a child's exposure to such sites by limiting access to particular sites. Is the regulation of the Internet for indecent material constitutional? Held. By restricting access to minors. Synopsis of Rule of Law.Reno v. Often this is accomplished through the use of a major credit card to pay for the use. 844 (1997).

taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors. The "[g]overnment failed to introduce specific evidence proving that existing technologies [like filters] are less effective than the restrictions in Child Online Protection Act. the prurient interest. The Supreme Court concluded other less restrictive alternatives were available. writing. an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act. graphic image file. The Child Online Protection Act (the "Act"). or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-. Congress adopted an act criminalizing the posting of material on the web "harmful to minors"." The government has the burden to prove that any alternatives proposed by the challenging party will not be as effective as the challenged statute. picture. The first attempt was the Communications Decency Act of 1996. is designed to appeal to. Kennedy"). describes. Synopsis of Rule of Law." ‡ The district court entered a preliminary injunctions and the Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. or (C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology. The purpose of this test is "to ensure that speech is restricted no further than 376 Ashcroft v. applying contemporary community standards. or adult personal identification number. adult access code. recording.. image. (B) depicts. Material that is "harmful to minors" is defined as: "any communication. political. debit account. The Act imposes stiff criminal penalties and up to six months of prison for knowingly posting for a commercial purpose web content that is "harmful to minors"." Facts. 124 S. and (C) taken as a whole. or represents. Issue. or is designed to pander to. American Civil Liberties Union . in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors. artistic. was Congress's second attempt to criminalize certain speech on the internet.. article. 2783 (2004) Brief Fact Summary. or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast. is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve." An affirmative defense is available if a person can demonstrate they "ha[ve] restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors-. observed a statute that "effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another . an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact. American Civil Liberties Union Citation. Should the Appellate Court have affirmed the district court's granting of a preliminary injunction? Held.Ashcroft v. which was found by the Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") not to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.Ct. or scientific value for minors.(A) by requiring use of a credit card. would find. Justice Anthony Kennedy ("J.(A) the average person. writing for the majority. (B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age. lacks serious literary.

the blocking software lacks precision. the dissent argued that the filtering software does not solve the problem. but found the "[g]overnment failed to introduce specific evidence proving that existing technologies are less effective than the restrictions in [the Act]. it costs money. Scalia") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Judge William Rehnquist ("J. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. not universal restrictions at the source. Justice Antonin Scalia ("J. pornographers may move overseas. Inc. Most importantly. Scalia. J. Scalia found that the Act was the least restrictive means to accomplish Congress's goal." A filter would allow adults. The majority also recognized various reasons why filters are more effective than the Act. filters apply to e-mail not just information accessed over the web. On the other hand. like the majority would have applied the most exacting standard of review ± strict scrutiny ± and would have ensured that the Act was the "least restrictive means" available. O'Connor"). First. The Government did not show that the "[R]espondents' proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than [the Act]" J. J. However. access to speech without having to identify themselves or provide credit card information. J. Discussion. filtering software. a problem with the Act is that the verification procedure can be circumvented by minors. Second. for it is important to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished. Additionally.necessary to achieve the goal. Further. perhaps imposing a similar burden on access to some protected borderline obscene material as well. a potential chilling effect is limited with filters because there are no criminal penalties attached. Third. . adults with children could shut off the feature. Scalia observed "the Act at most imposes a modest additional burden on adult access to legally obscene material. because some pornographic material passes through. If the Act is passed. without children. Scalia construed this issue and found that the status quo included the majority's "less restrictive alternative"." Fourth. Rehnquist") and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. Scalia also criticized the majority's finding that "blocking and filtering software" is "a less restrictive alternative" because he sees the software as part of the status quo and the Act moves beyond the status quo. First. Third. Kennedy recognized that one of the less restrictive and arguably more effective alternatives is "blocking and filtering software. It is interesting to observe how J. it is dependent on children's parents to "decide where their children will surf the web." J. Second. ‡ The court concluded that filter technology was not perfect. 377 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v." Especially since this technology "impose[s] selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end." ‡ The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the Respondents were likely to prevail especially since the record demonstrated various plausible less restrictive alternatives. filters apply to pornography from overseas. while the Act does not." Dissent.

Therefore. Virginia will charge a licensed pharmacist of being unprofessional if he advertises the amount he charges for prescription drugs. Inc. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the First Amendment does not prevent the state from regulating advertisements. then the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the economic well-being and health of the public. the Respondent advocates for disclosure of the prices of drugs. Commercial speech is a form of protected speech that can be regulated to protect the public from deceptive or misleading information. 378 Bolger v. Dissent. (Respondent). If the product does not function as advertised. 748 (1976).Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.S. Discussion. Restrictions on commercial speech should be left to the discretion of state legislatures. Yes. There is a substantial public interest in the content of advertisements. Youngs Drug Products Corp. Issue. The Respondent. Citation. Drug prices vary greatly (up to 650%) by location. Inc. 425 U. Is "commercial speech" protected by the First Amendment? Held. The wording and suggestions will lead consumers to buy or use products. . Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. But. Facts. argues that the state code prohibiting the advertising of prescription prices is unconstitutional. the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.

Discussion. Public Service Commission of New York . Youngs Drug Products Corp. 60 (1983). Is this advertisement commercial speech? Held. All of the mailings are commercial speech. wants to send direct mailings to the public advertising its contraceptives. plus members of the public in general. But. 463 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Respondent manufactures a variety of contraceptives and usually sells to distributors. A federal statute prohibits such activity. Issue. (Respondent). Commercial speech does no more than propose a commercial transaction. 379 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. The Federal code prohibits unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives to be mailed. Brief Fact Summary. now it wants to send an advertising brochure to its regular customers. Yes. Facts. If all of these attributes are present. and (3) there is an economic motivation for disseminating the material.S. Citation. (2) it references a particular product. then it is protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Respondent. Whether the printed material is commercial speech depends upon the existence of three distinct attributes: (1) it is meant to be an advertisement.Bolger v.

Discussion. (Petitioner). 557 (1980). Does this ban on advertisement violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 380 Friedman v. 447 U. the Respondent polled the public to decide whether to continue the ban on the electric companies. It is not appropriate to continue a ban to curb consumption of the electric utility. Once the shortage was over. The Respondent. In 1973. Although energy conservation is important. This is an identical test to intermediate scrutiny. Facts. Public Service Commission of New York Citation. the Respondent ordered all electric companies to stop advertising the use of electricity. Issue.Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. Public Service Commission of New York (Respondent). Rogers . Brief Fact Summary. it does not justify a total ban on all advertisements promoting the use of electric devices or services. Commercial speech that is not misleading and concerns lawful activity may be regulated if the government has a substantial interest that will be advanced through a narrowly drawn regulation. imposed a ban on all advertising by utility companies. The Petitioner.S. Yes. The government has the burden to prove that there is a substantial interest that the regulation protects. v. opposed this ban on First Amendment constitutional grounds. The state determined that it did not have enough fuel to last the winter and needed citizens to conserve. Synopsis of Rule of Law.

1 (1979). Yes. Facts. Texas state law prohibits the use of a trade name by optometrists. v. Rogers Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Inc. 381 Linmark Associates.S. Brief Fact Summary. Texas has demonstrable evidence of public misunderstanding associated with the use of trade names. Township of Willingboro . Trade names are not a form of commercial speech. therefore.Friedman v. The danger of confusing the public is very real. 440 U. misleading and deceptive. Therefore. as they have no intrinsic meaning. Discussion. Texas state law prohibits the use of a trade name by optometrists. Issue. Is this restriction on the use of trade names constitutional? Held. a name that used to be associated with a certain level of quality due to the staff and practitioner may not be the same under the current management and is. The names are sold as part of the business of optometry.

85 (1977).S. The reason cited refers to implied data communicated by the signs that might cause the readers to act "irrationally. "For Sale" signs are a form of protected commercial speech that serves as a communication between homeowner and purchaser. The Respondent. Township of Willingboro Citation. Brief Fact Summary. Inc. The Respondent prohibited the posting of home sale signs because it alleges that the number of houses being sold in the neighborhood was causing the white citizens to leave. Facts. Inc. Rhode Island .Linmark Associates. prohibited homeowners from displaying "For Sale" signs in their yards. Discussion. Issue. racially integrated neighborhood. 382 44 Liquormart. The Respondent has shown no legitimate interest in the exchange of this information. The Respondent claims a goal of promoting a stable. No. Is this restriction on signs constitutional? Held. The restriction bans the free flow of information between buyer and seller." Therefore. 431 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Township of Willingboro (Respondent). the restriction is unconstitutional. v. v.

S. Issue. misleading information from being put upon the unsuspecting public. but applies the Central Hudson test. This ban on advertisements is more extensive than necessary and overly broad. The state prohibited all advertisements of alcohol prices by stores and the media. The state statute prohibiting the advertisements is an invalid restriction of commercial speech. A lawful activity that is not misleading may not be restricted unless there is a substantial government interest being advanced. 383 Lorillard Tobacco Co. Reilly . ‡ Justice Thomas found the balancing of state and individual interests to be inappropriate in this situation because the cited state interest is illegitimate. Discussion. The state defended its legislation when it stated that it would lead to lower prices. Brief Fact Summary. Can a state constitutionally prohibit the advertising of alcohol prices? Held. This ban applied to all stores located outside the state that might advertise within the state. But this statute is a complete bar on all commercial speech. No. and lower prices would lead to increased consumption. 517 U. There is no situation that would justify this statute. Concurrence. All nine justices agreed that the statute was invalid. Rhode Island Citation. ‡ Justice O'Connor agreed with the judgment. v. Restriction of commercial speech must advance a state interest to a "material degree" and be no more restrictive than necessary. Rhode Island (Respondent) passed legislation prohibiting all advertisements of the price of alcohol beverages. however. Inc. 484 (1996). Facts.44 Liquormart. There is a valid state interest in preventing untruthful. Both the retailers and the media were banned from communicating this information. Synopsis of Rule of Law. all differed in their rationale. v.

For commercial speech to come within that provision. 533 U. 525 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. Yes. For commercial speech to come within that provision. but instead a reasonable " 'fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Synopsis of Rule of Law. If both inquiries yield positive answers. we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial." ‡ The court recognizes that only the last two factors are applicable here. and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. The [Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. O'Connor") writing for the majority begins by laying out its framework for analyzing commercial speech under [Central Hudson]. The analysis involves four elements: "At the outset. 'This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture. Next. Reilly Citation. If both inquiries yield positive answers. v. Next. we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. Massachusetts placed restrictions on various tobacco related advertising. v.' " The fourth step requires "asking whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. Does Massachusetts' statutory scheme violate the Supreme Court of the United States' regulations of commercial speech? Held. The third factor "concerns the relationship between the harm that underlies the State's interest and the means identified by the State to advance that interest. it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.S.. and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. It requires that 'the speech restriction directly and materially advanc[e] the asserted governmental interest. Federal law regulates cigarette advertising so that is not at issue here. . rather. v." The restriction need not be "the least restrictive means". Issue. The state of Massachusetts passed certain regulations banning the advertising of smokeless tobacco products and cigars. Public Service Commission of New York] analysis involves four elements: "At the outset.' " 384 Lorillard Tobacco Co.Lorillard Tobacco Co.." Facts. Reilly . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.

Additionally. these regulations would constitute nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers." Dissent. the means chosen may be insufficiently related to the ends they purportedly serve." "Second. J. Thomas") filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment." J. O'Connor concluded "that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use. [but] I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys. The effect would be that "[i]n some geographical areas. J. O'Connor observed that the Food and Drug Administration found "[t]he recent and very large increase in the use of smokeless tobacco products by young people and the addictive nature of these products has persuaded the agency that these products must be included in any regulatory approach that is designed to help prevent future generations of young people from becoming addicted to nicotine-containing tobacco products. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. Ginsburg") and Justice William Breyer ("J. Thomas would "subject all of the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny and would hold that they violate the First Amendment. the majority "disagree[d] with petitioners' claim that there is no evidence that preventing targeted campaigns and limiting youth exposure to advertising will decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. O'Connor concluded "[o]ur review of the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided ample documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars." Concurrence. Judge Clarence Thomas ("J. O'Connor argued." The court made similar observations about the underage use of cigars. concurring and dissenting in part. "[t]he broad sweep of the regulations indicates that the Attorney General did not 'carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed' by the regulations. it unduly restricts communications that are unrelated to its policy aims. that the regulation did not satisfy the fourth prong of the [Hudson] test. J.‡ As to the third factor.' " As such." 385 Lorillard Tobacco Co." ‡ J. Stevens discusses how statutes restricting speech can be invalid for two different reasons. Stevens") filed an opinion joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ("J. J. The court observed. "First. Thomas states "I join the opinion of the Court. statute[s] may be so broadly drawn that. the fact that outdoor advertising included advertising visible from outside a store and the fact that advertisements of any size are banned." ‡ J. Reilly ." The Supreme Court criticized the substantial geographical reach of the regulations. Breyer"). v. strict scrutiny is appropriate. however. whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 'commercial. while effectively achieving its ends.

386 New York Times Company v. Sullivan . This case offers a very good example of how the [Central Hudson] factors are applied.Discussion.

A public official must show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements made against him are false and were made with actual malice. Issue.000. Can a public official bring suit against critics of his official conduct? Held. the New York Times (Petitioner) ran a full-page advertisement describing the plight of black students in the South and the "wave of terror" they endured at the hands of the public official. Free speech encourages democracy and abandons the repression of a monarchy. The Supreme Court of the United States discusses the importance of preserving speech as the currency of social change.New York Times Company v. 387 Gertz v. Public officials cannot recover because the media does not agree with his actions and chooses to publish unflattering reports.S. A lower court awarded damages of $500. Even if a thought is unpopular it cannot be squashed. This is the whole point of the Constitutional Amendment to protect speech and critical of government. Specific events were enumerated along with a request for donations. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Brief Fact Summary. Welch . In 1960. 376 U.00 to Respondent for the injury caused to his reputation. Alabama. he supervises the police and fire departments of the city. Sullivan (Respondent) is a Commissioner of Montgomery. Facts. A newspaper is being sued for publishing a full-page advertisement that was critical of a public official in Alabama. No. Sullivan Citation. 254 (1964). Actual malice requires the speaker to know that the statement was false or that he acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Discussion. In his official capacity.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. ‡ Justice Brennan: The proper test for determining defamation against individuals is the same as articulated in New York Times. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting individuals from defamatory statements made by members of the press. Facts. Brief Fact Summary.Gertz v. Discussion. a "Leninist". People are not at the mercy of the press unless they are a public figure or official who can fight back. 388 Dun & Bradstreet. Welch Citation. Greenmoss Builders. A magazine attacked the reputation of an attorney by publishing false accusations and attacks of his character. ‡ Justice White: Libel should remain an unprotected class of speech.S. Respondent ran an article. Respondent implied that Petitioner had a criminal record. However. Does freedom of the press provide privilege against liability for defamation of individuals who are not public officials or public figures? Held. v. Issue. which accused Gertz (Petitioner) of being the "architect of a frame-up. and a "Communist-fronter" for bringing suit against a local police officer who killed a child. Inc. In the article. Dissent. each state may define the appropriate standard of liability for defamation to a private individual. No. but he made no effort to verify any of the statements published. Welch (Respondent) is a magazine publisher who warned his readers that a national police was being developed that supported Communism. 418 U. Private individuals involved in matters of public concern may recover for actual damages if they prove that defamatory statements were actually false and negligently made by the speaker. Inc. 323 (1974). .

plus $300. However. it requested the names and addresses of the five recipients of the report. 749 (1985). Inc. But Petitioner refused to divulge this information or do anything to correct the problem. Dun & Bradstreet. No. a private individual may be awarded damages even when there is no matter of public concern if he proves that there was a false statement and that it was negligently made. Absent actual malice. but its validity could have easily been checked. Falwell . When Respondent learned of this error. (Petitioner) is a credit reporting agency. 389 Hustler Magazine v. Brief Fact Summary.00 actual damages..000. The private information that was shared was false. Citation. v. Respondent was harmed by this oversight and deserves to be compensated and protected from future harm.S. Greenmoss Builders. Inc. Respondent should have been allowed to collect damages as this ruling does not violate the First Amendment. Issue. (Respondent) had filed for bankruptcy. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. A credit reporting agency erroneously reported the bankruptcy of a company to its lenders. Was the credit report a matter of public concern? Held. It sent a report to five lending institutions indicating that Greenmoss Builders.. 472 U. A jury awarded Respondent $50. Inc. Inc. The test from Gertz should have been applied here to overturn the jury award. Dissent.000.Dun & Bradstreet. Facts.00 punitive damages.

S. Can a public figure recover damages for emotional harm caused by a parody? Held. Parody is a form of communication that purposefully pokes fun. Falwell Citation. The New York Times standard for public figure defamation must be applied in this situation. "ad parody ." Petitioner drafted an alleged interview in which Respondent admits to drunken incestuous encounters with his mother in an outhouse. invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Public figures can recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress if they can show false statement of fact and actual malice. it takes a component of one's character and exaggerates it to the point of distortion. The ad portrays Respondent as a hypocrite and a drunk. Facts. No. 390 Cox Broadcasting Corp. 46 (1988). Discussion. 485 U. Instead.not to be taken seriously. It does not express a malicious falsehood. Cohn . Brief Fact Summary.Hustler Magazine v. The jury awarded Respondent damages. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Hustler Magazine (Petitioner) ran a parody advertisement that featured Falwell (Respondent) talking about his "first time." Respondent sued for libel. which poked fun at a well. A magazine published a sexual parody. Issue. v.known evangelist and attacked his morals. At the bottom of the advertisement page is a statement. This type of speech is protected.

Court proceedings are public record. Cohn's daughter was raped and killed in a brutal attack by six assailants. He chose to broadcast the victim's name on the local news as part of his report on the case. Is it unconstitutional to hold a member of the press liable for the public disclosure of private facts? Held. Public records are available for inspection by the media. 391 Florida Star v. the case was set to go to trial. The public relies on the media to inform them and research what the individual does not have time to do. Cohn Citation. Facts.J. As a result. B. It would be contradictory to allow the media to review public records but not report the information because it is about private persons. Synopsis of Rule of Law. There is no liability associated with public disclosure of private facts when the information was lawfully obtained from public records and is truthfully reported.Cox Broadcasting Corp.F. 469 (1975). 420 U. v. Discussion. No. Cohn (Respondent) subsequently sued for invasion of privacy. Issue.S. A reporter disclosed the name of a murdered rape victim against the deceased's family's wishes. and they are free to publish the facts gathered as a result of their research. A reporter for Cox Broadcasting (Petitioner) learned the name of the victim from the grand jury indictments filed with the court. Brief Fact Summary. Five of the Defendants plead guilty to rape and one plead not guilty. .

Dissent.Florida Star v.J. Citation. There is no public interest in publishing or identifying the victims of crime. In the police report Respondent was identified by name and the report was placed in the police station press room. 392 Bartnicki v.S. then the state may not punish the publication of this information. Is there an invasion of privacy when information is truthfully reported from public records? Held. B. There is no legitimate state interest in the censorship of the media to protect an individual's identity. Discussion. No. A newspaper reported the name of a crime victim against her wishes. Brief Fact Summary. significant state interest in doing so. B. (Respondent) was a victim of a robbery and sexual assault that she reported to the police. Issue. Florida Star (Petitioner) is a newspaper in Jacksonville that runs a section of "police reports" in its paper. 524 (1984). 491 U.F. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Therefore.F. Petitioner prepared a brief based on this report and named Respondent in its paper. Respondent should be compensated for Petitioner's conduct. Respondent alleges negligence by Petitioner for printing her full name. If truthful information is lawfully obtained about a matter of public interest. Vopper .J. Facts. This conduct may be punished only when there is a narrowly tailored.

Yocum found the tape in his mailbox shortly after the interception and recognized the Petitioner's voices. The contents of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone communication were repeatedly disclosed. the parties to the collective bargaining negotiations accepted a non-binding arbitration proposal generally favorable to the teachers. Vopper (the "Respondent"). (PAUSES). were involved in contentious collective-bargaining negotiations throughout 1992 and 1993. The Act was promulgated by Congress to "to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications. the original version of the provision most directly at issue in this suit.. ‡ Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the "Act"). really and truthfully because this is. Really." In 1993. placed a call on her cell phone to Kane. a radio announcer critical of the union. the union's "chief negotiator". Mr. The Petitioners." "Subsection (a) applied to any person who 'willfully intercepts . is the statute relevant to this matter. The negotiations were greatly covered by the media. Yocum"). Kane said "If they're not gonna move for three percent. to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication. (UNDECIPHERABLE). subsection (d) applied to the use of the contents of illegally intercepted wire or oral communications.' Subsection (b) applied to the intentional use of devices designed to intercept oral conversations. between the teachers at Wyoming Valley West High School and the school board. To blow off their front porches. the head of a taxpayer organization opposed to the union's demands.. any wire or oral communication. Subsection (c). 514 (2001) Brief Fact Summary.." Facts. or endeavors to disclose.. "[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. was intercepted and played on the radio.Bartnicki v. The Respondent. we're gonna have to go to their. Bartnicki. you know.S. A cellular telephone call between two individuals involved in a contentious debate between a teacher's union and a school board. Kane and Bartnicki (the "Petitioners"). their homes . Synopsis of Rule of Law. knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection. which was intercepted. 532 U. we'll have to do some work on some of those guys. During the conversation.. The Respondent obtained the tape from Jack Yocum ("Mr.' The oral communications protected by the Act were only 393 Bartnicki v. Vopper Citation. played on his show the intercepted tape of the cellular telephone call. applied to any person who 'willfully discloses. The individuals responsible for the disclosures did not play a role in the calls interception. Vopper . uh. In May 1993. and subsection (e) prohibited the unauthorized disclosure of the contents of interceptions that were authorized for law enforcement purposes. but knew or should of known that the interception was unlawful. this is bad news. Another radio station played and a newspaper also printed the contents of the tape.

As to the first. Stevens then agreed with the Petitioners that both the Act and the Pennsylvania state statute are content-neutral laws of general applicability." ‡ The majority then observed that punishment for the publication of information that is true "seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Further. the Respondents access to the information on the tapes was lawfully obtained. the court 394 Bartnicki v.. Third. ‡ J. but subsequent Amendments increased the scope to cover these types of transmissions. Vopper . "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information. nor is it justified by reference to the content of those conversations." The majority observe." The majority found the government's second contention much stronger than the first." Additionally that. but not necessarily an individual who innocently obtains the intercept. "[a]lthough there are some rare occasions in which a law suppressing one party's speech may be justified by an interest in deterring criminal conduct by another. First." ‡ J. J. Stevens then examined three facts that distinguished the case before it from other cases brought under the Act.'" The original 1968 statute did not apply to the monitoring of radio transmissions or cordless telephone communications. Second. "the interest in removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations".those 'uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. those two interests justify penalizing the interceptor. accordingly "the basic purpose of the statute at issue is to 'protec [t] the privacy of wire[. Issue. Here." Although strong. absent a need . Second. Stevens then recognized two interests the government puts forth for validating the statute. No. electronic.' The statute does not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations. First. Stevens") writing for the majority first talked about Title III of the Act. may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?" Held. the subject matter of the discussion on the tape was a matter of public concern..] and oral communications. although the information on the tape was unlawfully obtained by an unknown third party. J. of the highest order. "the interest in minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted. the Respondents did not participate in the illegal interception. Stevens observed "it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a lawabiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a nonlaw-abiding third party. Justice John Paul Stevens ("J. Privacy of communication is a very important interest and "fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech. "Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully. this is not such a case.

O'Brien . Rehnquist") filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia ("J." Additionally." However. Rather." This flows from the fact that "[O]ne of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy. J. Breyer stressed the content of the Petitioners' conversation and that it threatened the safety of others. J. the Court's holding does not imply a significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. J. The months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public concern. J. the Petitioners were both "limited public figures". in my view. J. and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Rehnquist criticized the application of strict scrutiny to "content-neutral laws of general applicability". J. and respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern." Concurrence. Thomas"). Rehnquist criticized the majority's position arguing that it "diminishes." Dissent. As such. rather than enhances. intermediate scrutiny. Breyer wrote separately to "explain why." In other words. the purposes of the First Amendment. the dissent advocated contentneutral regulations being sustained if they "further[ ] an important or substantial governmental interest. Discussion. Instead.concluded "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. Breyer joined the Court's majority opinion because he "agree[d] with its narrow holding limited to the special circumstances present here: (1) the radio broadcasters acted lawfully (up to the time of final public disclosure). thereby chilling the speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon electronic technology to communicate each day. Scalia") and Justice Clarence Thomas ("J." J. and (2) the information publicized involved a matter of unusual public concern. Stevens concluded "we think it clear that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. Justice Stephen Breyer ("J. namely. 395 United States v." Additionally. Breyer thinks was it important to stress the "[c]ourt does not create a 'public interest' exception that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting general rule. it finds constitutional protection for publication of intercepted information of a special kind." ‡ As such. a threat of potential physical harm to others. Breyer") filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. Justice William Rehnquist ("J. O'Connor"). It is interesting to read the majority and dissenting opinions alongside one another and try to see whether the application of strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. "the law recognizes a privilege allowing the reporting of threats to public safety.

No. 396 Texas v. 2) is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. O'Brien Citation. Is the federal regulation prohibiting the burning of draft cards an unconstitutional prohibition of "symbolic speech"? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress has a legitimate interest in preventing the destruction of draft cards as they are used as an identification card and proof of registry. Respondent burned his draft card while standing on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse." Issue.S. O'Brien (Petitioner) was prosecuted for burning his draft card. and 3) does not restrict speech any greater than necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. Several FBI agents observed the act but did not arrest him. Johnson . Respondent was eventually convicted of "willfully and knowingly destroying by burning a Selective Service Form. Selective Service Cards serve as identifiers and a tracker of potential military members. When speech and non-speech combine in the same course of conduct. The regulation is justified if it (O'Brien Test): 1) furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. Facts. 391 U. 367 (1968). an important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech justifies incidental limitation on speech.United States v.

It was political expression that may not be squashed by statute. It is concerned with the image expressed by the act of burning the flag.Texas v. 491 U. Issue. This means is rather inarticulate and not worth protecting. During the protest. we spit on you. 397 Buckley v. demonstrators chanted. 397 (1989). The state is concerned with preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity and respect. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Valeo . Meanwhile. white and blue. "American red. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. only Respondent was charged with a crime. The government may not prohibit expression because it disagrees with the message." Of the 100 demonstrators. Dissent. he doused a United States flag with kerosene and set it on fire in front of the Dallas City Hall. Johnson (Respondent) was convicted for burning the American flag. Facts. ‡ Justice Stevens: Preserving the symbolic value of the flag is a sufficient governmental interest to support this restriction of speech. ‡ Justice Rehnquist: The statute is Constitutional because it limits only one means of communication. Respondent demonstrated at the 1984 Republican Convention in Dallas.S. This interpretation of the act itself transforms the act from conduct to a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. Yes. Is flag burning "symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment? Held. Johnson Citation. The burning was meant to communicate Respondent's feelings regarding the government's leadership.

a donation is conduct.Buckley v. There is a federal regulation that limits the amount of money an individual can give to political candidates. Discussion. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Facts. On the other hand. 424 U. Shrink Missouri Government PAC . Is the regulation an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech? Held. On the other hand. State regulated the amount citizens could contribute to political campaigns. Spending of money is speech because it is used to disseminate political thoughts. By limiting contributions the government is preserving its interest in the integrity of the system of democracy. the regulation limiting political expenditures places substantial restriction on a person's right to engage in political speech. This interest is sufficient to justify the effect on the First Amendment right of contributors. 398 Nixon v. It also imposes an overall donation limit. But it has a high probability of showing impropriety on behalf of the candidates. Issue. It is a measure of support and does not result in direct political communication. 1 (1976). No. Restricting campaign expenditure is an unconstitutional restriction of political speech. Valeo (Respondent) claims that the state regulation is limiting political conduct while Buckley (Petitioner) believes that the federal regulation is limiting political speech. Valeo Citation.S. Brief Fact Summary. But limiting contribution amounts is constitutional because donation is conduct and not speech.

The donation of money is a property right and not an exercise of free speech. Bellotti . A state statue limits individual political contributions. Issue. Dissent.000. Shrink Missouri Government PAC Citation. The holding of Buckley still applies today. Yes. Facts. Ct. Brief Fact Summary. ‡ Justice Thomas: Campaign contribution limits should be subject to strict scrutiny. No actual evidence of corruption need be present.00 depending upon the office and the size of the constituency.00 to $1. The Missouri state statute limits the amount of individual political contributions from $250. The state claims that its interest is in preventing corruption.Nixon v. Concurrence. Are state limitations on political contributions for state political candidates constitutionally valid? Held. The danger of corruption by large dollar contributions is sufficiently plausible to satisfy heightened scrutiny of the First Amendment infringement. The mere perception or suggestion that it is possible is sufficient to meet the governmental burden of a legitimate interest. ‡ Justice Kennedy: This decision has forced the development of covert speech and elaborate schemes to avoid the detection of contributions. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 120 S. 399 First National Bank of Boston v. Discussion. 897 (2000).

Is the state regulation of corporate speech constitutional? Held. Brief Fact Summary. The majority improperly substituted its judgment over the state legislature and drastically departs from prior decisions. They do not otherwise control or drown out the voices of individuals. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 435 U. No. Committee for Industrial Organization . Issue. It is unconstitutional to restrict corporate speech to items that are "materially affecting" its business. 400 Hague v. Bellotti Citation. Dissent. 765 (1978).First National Bank of Boston v." Petitioner wanted to publicize a view of a constitutional amendment that would allow state legislation to impose graduated tax on income of individuals.S. The Court reversed the state supreme court. The government may not restrict the topics of speech for corporations. A corporation should not be treated differently than private persons. State prohibits corporations from spending money on promotions that will endorse or oppose local referendums. The First National Bank of Boston (Petitioner) is prohibited by state statute from spending "for the purpose of influencing the vote on any question that does not affect the corporation directly. Facts. Discussion. The corporation may freely discuss government affairs.

496 (1939). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Parks. New Jersey . No. Facts. People have the right to use public spaces for any lawful purpose free of government restraint. Committee for Industrial Organization Citation. and public streets have always been recognized as legitimate places for community gatherings and communication. Hague deliberately excluded and removed all agents of Respondents from Jersey City. 401 Schneider v. sidewalks. The ordinance is void on its face.S. Brief Fact Summary. any restraint on public speech that occurs in such a forum is unconstitutional. Petitioner. Can city regulatory use of its property to restrict speech? Held. Issue. Discussion. Committee for Industrial Organization tried to organize a labor union. City prohibited the distribution of labor union leaflets on public sidewalks. Petitioner also prohibited the distribution of informational leaflets. Respondent. Therefore. 307 U.Hague v. Affirm the holding of the lower court.

a Jehovah's Witness is charged with canvassing without a permit. place. A citizen has the right to distribute information to others on the public streets. There are three separate cases when regulations prohibited the distribution of handbills to members of the public on the street or sidewalks. . As long as the distribution of pamphlets is peaceful the government has no legitimate interest in prohibiting this form of communication.S. Perry Local Educator's Assn. Are these city restrictions constitutional? Held. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Los Angeles code prohibits the distribution of pamphlets to people on the sidewalks and in cars. 308 U. Facts. 147 (1939). 402 Perry Education Assn. A traffic jam or blockage of walkways is an important interest that may be significant enough to partially regulate the time.Schneider v. Petitioner was picketing a meat market and passing out pamphlets explaining the union's position. New Jersey Citation. v. Petitioner was distributing a meeting notice to "Friends of Lincoln Brigade" where speakers would discuss the war in Spain. but it does not support a complete ban on speech. and manner of the communication. Irvington. New Jersey requires prior permission to distribute pamphlets to the public. Issue. No. There are other less restrictive ways to prevent littering. Petitioner. Milwaukee has a code similar to Los Angeles. Discussion.

Facts. The school district has no constitutional obligation to allow Respondent to access the mailboxes. On the other hand. An agreement limited access to district mailboxes to Petitioner only. A public forum includes such public places as parks and sidewalks. Perry Local Educator's Assn. Perry Local Educator's Assn. 403 Police Department of the City of Chicago v. (Petitioner) is the union for teachers in Perry Township. A teachers union was denied access to school district mailboxes to distribute informational brochures. 460 U. The regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling interest and narrowly drawn to be constitutional. manner restrictions) must be narrowly tailored to achieve a significant governmental interest while leaving alternative channels of communication available. Is school district required to provide access to internal mailboxes to Respondent? Held.S. All communication may not be prohibited in such areas. Citation. The mailboxes are not a public forum. No. 37 (1983). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. The government may reserve a forum for its purpose as long as the regulation is reasonable and not an effort to suppress views of its opponents. content neutral regulations (time.Perry Education Assn. Mosley . Perry Education Assn. place. v. Brief Fact Summary. (Respondent) as a competitor was denied access to the mailboxes Issue.

92 (1972). and manner restriction. Is selective exclusion of picketing from a public place constitutional? Held. During school hours he picketed by himself with a sign accusing the school of discrimination and using racial quotas. The protest was always peaceful. Once a forum becomes public the government cannot prohibit speech there based on its content. 408 U.S. Issue. Then the City of Chicago passed an ordinance prohibiting picketing next to a school. The ordinance is a content-based prohibition and not a proper time. Mosley Citation. Discussion. The ordinance is defective because it discriminates based on the nature of the picket. v. No. Synopsis of Rule of Law. place. 404 Hill et al.Police Department of the City of Chicago v. A city had an ordinance prohibiting picketing next to a school. Mosley (Respondent) is a postal worker who picketed a high school in Chicago for seven months. orderly. It operates as a censor of what is publicly acceptable expression and what is not. Facts. Brief Fact Summary. and quiet. Colorado .

Is the statute a constitutional regulation of the speaker for protection of the "listener"? Held. 2480 (2000). v. The state interest in protecting access and privacy are unrelated to the content of the speech. Brief Fact Summary. 405 Ward v. Time. and manner restriction of speech is justified when it is content-neutral and places minor restriction in a broad category of communications. It is content-based and needs to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. 120 S. Yes. Discussion. Hill (Petitioner) provided "sidewalk counseling" by medical facilities that performed abortions. ‡ Justice Scalia: The majority agrees with the regulation because it limits pro-life speech. It applies equally to all persons regardless of the message. The state has a regulation that prohibits picketing within 100 feet of a healthcare facility entrance. place. ‡ Justice Kennedy: This is a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny. Facts. Rock Against Racism . This regulation places a restriction on the place of speech and not the speech. It specifically limits speech in front of healthcare facilities. Dissent.Hill et al. Colorado statute regulates picketing conducted within 100 feet of the entrance of a healthcare facility. This places a minor restriction on the place of speech in regards to an unwilling listener. Picketers cannot come within eight feet of another to pass out a pamphlet. Issue. Ct. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Colorado Citation. The state has a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from unwanted confrontations.

Dissent. Brief Fact Summary. In an effort to maintain the quietness of the area. Volume control is not a burden on speech. Rock Against Racism Citation.S. The city has a legitimate interest in keeping the sound from permeating the surrounding residential and other quiet areas. Yes. the city has imposed a restriction on all performances to use specified amplification equipment and staff provided by the city. Central Park contains an amphitheatre that is next to Central Park West and a quiet relaxation area of the park. manner restriction that does not discriminate based on content. Florida . Synopsis of Rule of Law. But. 781 (1989). Facts. Is the city's restriction of amplification equipment Constitutionally valid? Held. place. This is a proper time. Discussion. This regulation is not narrowly tailored and the majority has abandoned the requirement that a regulation be the least intrusive means of achieving the goal of quiet. Government regulation of a public forum does not have to be the least restrictive alternative. Issue. it must still be narrowly drawn and not substantially burden the speech. Sheep Meadow.Ward v. 406 Adderley v. 491 U. A content-neutral restriction does not need to be the least restrictive manner of accomplishing a goal. Pock Against Racism (Respondent) is a sponsor of a rock concert who challenges New York City's restriction on the volume of performances on Central Park.

Adderley v. Florida
Citation. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Brief Fact Summary. Adderley (Petitioner) was arrested for demonstrating on the grounds of the local jail. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The state has the power to preserve the property under its control for the use for which it is lawfully dedicated. Facts. Petitioner was convicted of trespass with a mischievous intent or purpose. She along with thirty-one other college students marched to the local jail to protect the arrest of some students the previous day. They also were expressing their distaste for segregation of schools and the jails on Florida. Issue. Were the arrest and charge unconstitutional restrictions of Petitioner's First Amendment right to free speech? Held. No. The sheriff had the right to remove persons from jail property when their presence interfered with the operation of the facility. Dissent. Protesting at a jail facility is the form of communication available to the masses that may not be of the means to access newspapers or political powers. Therefore, this regulation is a form of censorship of the common people. Discussion. A jail is a non-public forum. It is designed to house criminal convicts and suspects, not to serve as a place for political protest or demonstration. Historically, the jailhouse has not been open to the public for the purpose of communicating ideas. The sheriff asked the demonstrators to leave because they were disrupting the jail, not because he disagreed with the message of their speech.

407 Greer v. Spock

Greer v. Spock
Citation. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). Brief Fact Summary. Respondent, Spock was a presidential candidate that wanted to enter a military base and distribute campaign literature. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Military bases may constitutionally regulate speech because they are not non-public forums. Facts. Fort Dix is a military post located in New Jersey. Generally, it is open to civilian visitors. However, there is a local regulation that precludes speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature. Respondent and some of his running mates sent a letter to the General in charge of the base announcing their intent to distribute campaign literature to the recruits living there. The General denied the request for access citing the regulation. Issue. Is the regulation of speech on a military base constitutional? Held. Yes. The base is governmental property devoted to the training of soldiers; it is not a public forum. Dissent. The main purpose of the base does not preclude it from adhering to the mandate of the 1st Amendment. Discussion. The majority relies on the specific purpose and use of the military facility. It is not open to the public for all purposes and serves primarily as a training base for soldiers.

408 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights
Citation. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Brief Fact Summary. Lehman (Petitioner) is running for political office and wants to advertise on the public transit system. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Public transportation advertising space is not a public forum and may be regulated as long as it is not arbitrary. Facts. The City of Shaker Heights (Respondent) operates a transit system. Inside each transport area there are advertisement cards available for rent. Respondent frequently sells the space to local commercial entities. But it refused to sell the space to Petitioner for campaign promotions. Issue. Does a public transit system have to accept paid advertisements from political candidates? Held. No. The Respondent may limit access to advertising space to avoid the appearance of favoritism and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience. Dissent. The advertisement cards are a public forum that cannot discriminate amongst speakers. Concurrence. Just because a utility is publicly owned does not make it a public forum. Discussion. The majority declares the advertising cards to be part of the commerce of the transit. But, the city has a responsibility to prevent the citizens from being subjected to political speech while they are trapped in the cars. Furthermore, to avoid favoritism Respondent would need to provide access to all political campaigns. This could become an overwhelming endeavor to fairly supervise.

409 United States v. Kokinda

United States v. Kokinda
Citation. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). Brief Fact Summary. The United States (Petitioner) prohibits the solicitation of contributions on postal property. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Solicitation is a protected form of speech subject to a reasonableness test. It may not be barred simply because the public official opposes the speaker's view. Facts. Kokinda (Respondent) is a volunteer for the National Democratic Policy Committee. She set up a table on the sidewalk outside a post office where she intended to sell books and solicit contributions for the organization. Issue. Can the government regulate this form of protected speech? Held. Yes. This type of speech is disruptive to the activities of the post office. Dissent. This is a public forum and the regulation is not a proper time, place, and manner restriction. Concurrence. The regulation is an appropriate time, place, and manner restriction. The sidewalks are the same as regular public forum sidewalks. Discussion. The sidewalk at issue here, is not a traditional public forum because the sidewalk runs just from the parking lot to the post office. The sole purpose of the walkway is to assist patrons to get from their cars to the building.

410 International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
Citation. 505 U.S. 672 (1992). Brief Fact Summary. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., (Petitioner) was prohibited from distributing religious literature in a public airport. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Airports are not public forums; therefore restrictions need only be reasonable. Facts. Petitioner participates in an annual "sankirtan" which is used to generate funds for the religion. Lee (Respondent) was the commissioner of the port authority in charge of implementing and enforcing the state regulation prohibiting solicitation in public airports. Issue. Is an airport a public forum such that a regulation prohibiting solicitation in it violates the United States Constitution? Held. No. This ban on solicitation is reasonable to prevent travelers from being interfered with unduly. Discussion. The airport is not traditionally thought to be a public forum. The main purpose of the airport is to provide a place where people can embark upon their travel. They have no other choice than enter the airport and walk within it. To avoid Petitioner, travelers would have to walk around or find alternative means of travel. This infringement upon travel is a significant interest of the government that requires a degree of monitoring activity.

411 Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes

Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
Citation. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). Brief Fact Summary. Forbes (Petitioner) was running for political office and was denied the opportunity to participate in a television debate. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The First Amendment does not compel public broadcasters to provide access to programming for third parties. Facts. Arkansas Educational Television Commission (Respondent) decided to broadcast a political debate amongst the top congressional candidates. One hour was allotted for the debate in a question and answer format. Respondent acquired enough signatures to be on the ballot after Petitioner issued the initial invites. Respondent requested that he be allowed to participate, but Petitioner still refused. Issue. Because the government owned the television station was it obligated to open the debate to all candidates? Held. No. Although the speech was subject to the scrutiny of a non-public forum, the television station still had the right to exercise journalistic judgment and limit the participants. Dissent. The television station created a public debate forum in which all candidates should have had access. The majority decision gives the state the power to eliminate the unpopular views without proper constitutional justification. Discussion. The majority gives deference to the journalist to decide what to include in the programming. Respondent was not banned from the debate because of his views. Instead, he was not invited because there was a lack of public interest and support of his candidacy in general.

412 Parker v. Levy

Parker v. Levy
Citation. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Brief Fact Summary. Levy (Respondent) is an Army physician who is being court-martialed for making disparaging statements about the United States' involvement in Vietnam. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline renders certain military regulations permissible that would otherwise be prohibited by the United States Constitution. Facts. Respondent is the Chief of Dermatological Service at the United States Army Hospital at Fort Jackson. While examining enlistees for combat readiness he would often express a negative sentiment about the war in Vietnam. Particularly, he stated that black soldiers should not fight or join the military because they were subject to discrimination in their own country and were being the first to be killed in Vietnam. Furthermore, he claimed that the Special Forces lied to the soldiers and were murderers. Issue. Is military regulation of speech constitutionally valid? Held. Yes. A commissioned officer of the military has the responsibility to act in accordance with and support the efforts of the military in time of war. Dissent. ‡ Justice Douglas: The First Amendment was meant to protect the speech of military as well as civilians. The ruling here allows a complete censorship on all forms of speech not just that which could be disruptive. ‡ Justice Stewart: The military regulation is too vague to upheld as constitutionally valid. Discussion. The military has the authority to limit speech and opinion of leadership conduct. By encouraging soldiers to be disobedient, Respondent could have disrupted war efforts and derailed the objectives of the military.

413 Thornburg v. Abbott

Thornburg v. Abbott
Citation. 490 U.S. 401 (1989). Brief Fact Summary. A prisoner was denied access to publications from the outside and challenges the constitutionality of such a regulation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The government may restrict the speech of a prisoner as long as the restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Facts. The Federal Bureau of Prisons allows wardens to reject incoming publications that might disrupt the security of the prison or otherwise encourage criminal activity. The warden may not reject material simply because of its sexual, political, religious, or repugnant expression. Issue. Is this restraint on incoming publications rationally related to a legitimate and content-neutral governmental objective? Held. Yes. This regulation is valid under the reasonableness standard of scrutiny. Dissent. This censorship prevents inmates from communicating with the outside world and infringes upon their First Amendment rights. Discussion. The goal is to maintain order within the prison system. Certain publications could incite violence simply by being in the hands of an inmate. The warden reviews each piece for its potential to incite the group and discarded accordingly. However, this classification is never based solely on the content of the publication.

414 Shaw v. Murphy

Justice Clarence Thomas ("J. The Petitioner. but he nonetheless investigated and sent a letter to the inmate suspected of assault. [Turner] does not allow "an increase in constitutional protection whenever a prisoner's communication includes legal advice. " 415 Shaw v. according to prison policy. 223 Brief Fact Summary. Additionally. Thomas concludes that [Turner] does not allow "an increase in constitutional protection whenever a prisoner's communication includes legal advice. 532 U. The letter." Finally." Issue. The Respondent worked as an "inmate law clerk". After his review. A prisoner wrote a fellow prisoner a letter containing legal advice. Safley] restrictions on prisoners' communications to other inmates are constitutional if the restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The prisoner who wrote the letter was punished by prison officials for doing so. Safley]? Held. he provided legal assistance to other prisoners.. Robert Shaw (the "Petitioner") reviewed the letter." Construing whether communications containing legal advice necessarily implicates content and is not appropriate. to abuse both the giving and the seeking of [legal] assistance. "even [if the court] were to consider giving special protection to particular kinds of speech based upon content. was intercepted. was incarcerated at the Montana State Prison. Murphy Citation. "[a]lthough supervised inmate legal assistance programs may serve valuable ends. Thomas") drafted the majority opinion and observed "[u]nder our decision in [Turner v.. The Respondent. the Petitioner cited the Respondent for various violations of the prison rules.." Facts. A hearing was conducted and the Respondent found guilty of violating certain prohibitions. Murphy ." Further.Shaw v. "prison officials are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in prison management." Any expansion of First Amendment protection for prisoner legal advice "would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration. The Respondent assisted a fellow inmate accused of assaulting a correctional officer. The Court of Appeals overruled the hearing office and found "inmate-to-inmate correspondence that includes legal assistance would receive more First Amendment protection than correspondence without any legal assistance." The rationale for this conclusion is that the [Turner] factors do not allow valuations of content. it is 'indisputable' that inmate law clerks 'are sometimes a menace to prison discipline' and that prisoners have an 'acknowledged propensity . only "the relationship between the asserted penological interests and the prison regulation.S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. "[W]hether prisoners possess a First Amendment right to provide legal assistance that enhances the protections otherwise available under [Turner v. Kevin Murphy (the "Respondent"). Prison rule forbid the Respondent from working on the case. No. In this capacity." J. we would not do so for speech that includes legal advice.

416 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District .Discussion. It is interesting to recognize the differences between the First Amendment rights of prisoners and other individuals.

Des Moines Independent Community School District Citation. Issue. When Petitioner arrived at school he was told to remove the armband or be suspended. this was designed to erase all opposition to the war speech in the schools and was not related to any legitimate purpose. 417 Bethel School District No.S. Dissent. Yes. He took the suspension and did not return to school until after the protest period ended. 393 U. Fraser . Synopsis of Rule of Law. Clearly. Students are persons worthy of constitutional protections both while in school and out of school. Student speech may be regulated when such speech would materially and substantially interfere with the discipline and operation of a school. Discussion. 403 v. Tinker (Petitioner) was suspended from school for showing his support of the anti-war movement.Tinker v. The students are not wise enough to support or reject a cause. It is best to leave the order of education to the administrator's judgment. The wearing of the armband was singled out of all other symbolic speech engaged in by the student body. Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner was a high school student who joined his parents in protesting the Vietnam War. Facts. The form of protest was to wear a black armband for a period of two weeks during the holiday season. 503 (1969). Is symbolic speech by public school students protected under the First Amendment? Held. There was no evidence that the wearing of the armbands caused any disruption of any class or school function. New Year's Eve 1965.

He described his friend's attributes by using sexually explicit metaphors. Kuhlmeier . However. the speech exceeds the permissible limits for this situation. Discussion. Concurrence.S. a school assembly. Because the speech was explicit in nature and required some explaining to the younger students. Although a teacher reviewed the speech. The remarks by Respondent were not disruptive to the school's operations and should not have been sanctioned. The speech was not lewd. Issue. one teacher complained that he had to interrupt his regular class to explain and review sections of the speech. Dissent. A student gave a nominating speech in a general school assembly that described another candidate with strong sexual metaphors. Respondent chose to do it anyway. The Court held that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial issues in schools and classrooms must be balanced against society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Brief Fact Summary. they were content neutral. Is a high school student's lewd speech protected by the First Amendment? Held. i. Schools may determine that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject the speech to sanctions.. Fraser (Respondent) gave a speech nominating his friend for a student body office at the school assembly. Furthermore. 403 v. Respondent was subsequently suspended from school for three days. After the speech. 478 U." Here. 675 (1986). and the speaker was warned against giving the speech.e. No.Bethel School District No. it disrupted the school's daily activities. The student's interests were unrelated to any political viewpoint. Fraser Citation. 418 Hazelwood School District v. the majority determined that the role of schools is to teach socially appropriate behavior and speech. Facts. It is within the school's sole discretion whether and how to punish such speech. the student's First Amendment rights were outweighed by the school's interest in outweighing vulgar and lewd speech. Synopsis of Rule of Law.

419 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. 260 (1988). he objected to two of the articles scheduled for inclusion and decided to print the paper without the articles. The school has a vested interest in protecting its image and the educational activities of the students. A school may exercise great control over school-sponsored publications that students and members of the community might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. The school is allowed to consider the emotional maturity of the audience when choosing to suppress certain forms of speech. The advanced journalism class was responsible for writing the school paper. Kuhlmeier Citation. The school principal always reviewed the page proofs prior to printing. The school administration had the right to control the style and content of student speech when it is included in the school's expressive activities. On this occasion. Did school officials violate the students' First Amendment rights by deleting two pages of the school paper? Held.S. The parents of the students did not consent to this article. ex rel. 484 U. Patterson . it is not forced to promote the expressions of the students simply because its sponsors the event or medium used. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. No. Usually 4. State of Alabama. One described the pregnancy of students and included specific sexual content while the other discussed the impact of divorce on students in the school. Dissent. The articles were not proven to disrupt the operation of the school in any way.Hazelwood School District v. Discussion. Preserving the school's educational image is not a legitimate reason for eliminating the articles. Brief Fact Summary. Facts. Therefore.500 copies were distributed to the school and members of the community. A school principal censored a student newspaper by removing some of the articles prior to publication.

this will limit Petitioner's members' ability to advocate their beliefs. ex rel. Can the state compel disclosure of the membership list of the NAACP? Held. Southworth . Facts. Brief Fact Summary.National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. 420 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Disclosure of the list will subject members to adverse consequences including economic. Freedom of association to promote beliefs is insured by the Fourteenth Amendment and is protected by adherence to strict scrutiny of any regulatory interference. In essence. and it will dissuade others from joining the organization for fear of retribution. State of Alabama. Petitioner was ordered by a court to provide a full membership list. 449 (1958). No. Synopsis of Rule of Law. physical and other forms of public hostility. 357 U.S. it asserts that this list is protected and that it may assert the personal privacy interests of each of its members. Additionally. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP/Petitioner) was ordered to produce a membership list by the state court. An association may assert the rights of its membership when the rights of the individual members are tightly interrelated to the interest of the association. including names and addresses. Petitioner claims that disclosure will serve as a restriction on lawful association of members that can only be justified by a compelling state interest. Patterson Citation. Issue. Although Petitioner agreed to provide a list of its officers and paid staff members. Discussion.

it appears that the financial support for groups is based on majority vote of the student body. Instead of demanding support the Respondent is requesting exemption from speech. Discussion. Synopsis of Rule of Law. including those engaged in political or ideological speech. Here. Southworth Citation. Can Petitioner implement a mandatory student activity fee? Held. Southworth (Respondent) is a student at the University of Wisconsin. Respondent objects to the speech of some of these groups and does not want the fee to be used in such a manner. Because the funding program is content neutral the students have a protected right to exclusion. The other twenty percent supports registered student organizations.Ct. Eight percent of this money supports the student health services. The First Amendment permits public universities to charge a student activity fee to fund a viewpoint neutral fund program for extracurricular student speech. Petitioner may implement the fee payment system to support the educational mission and to foster a healthy environment of debate. 421 Roberts v.50 per year from each student. Use public forum analysis in this case because of the similarity in circumstance. and to maintain the student union. Facts. a free exchange of ideas. However.Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 1346 (2000). Brief Fact Summary. Yes. the funding of particular groups must be viewpoint neutral to be constitutional. College students are challenging the use of mandatory activity fees to support organizations that they do not support. Issue. 120 S. athletics. United States Jaycees . This runs afoul of the United States Constitution because it blocks the unpopular views from being treated the same as the majority views. The University of Wisconsin (Petitioner) collects $331.

Then in 1978. 422 Hurley v. United States Jaycees Citation. The Minnesota chapter argues that the by-laws violate the Minnesota Human Rights Act that prohibits discrimination. the Minneapolis chapter began admitting women as regular members. Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston . associates cannot vote. or general personal liberty. Local Jaycees were threatened with expulsion from the national group because they allowed women to hold full-time membership. Synopsis of Rule of Law.Roberts v. Respondent is a large organization that is not selective of its participants and does not have the characteristics worthy of constitutional protection. Discussion. These groups tend to be small and highly selective in decision-making. and congeniality of the group. Facts. selectivity. In 1974. Brief Fact Summary. policies. 468 U. The United States Jaycees' (Respondent) objective is to promote the growth of civic organizations for young men. purpose. Members are men between the ages of 18 and 35. No. But large business like organizations do not embody the constitutional protection of personal liberty interests. Associate membership is available to older men and women. Issue. The statute interferes with the organizations infrastructure but is justified by the compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination. Government may infringe upon the right to associate when the regulation serves a compelling state interest that is unrelated to the suppression of ideas and cannot be achieved through any less restrictive means. However. 609 (1984). An association is protected if it involves items related to family such as marriage.S. or participate in leadership training. education of children. the national group threatened to revoke the local chapter's membership because of the overt violation of the organization by-laws. But the national group refused to acknowledge their membership. Respondent already allows women as associate members. Irish-American Gay. Does the state statute violate the freedom of association rights of Respondent? Held. hold office. Some of the relevant factors to use in determining whether an association will be immune from some regulation are the size. so this does not represent an overly burdensome change.

Irish-American Gay. Until 1992. but was denied the right to march in the city's St. Hurley (Petitioner) denied the request and Respondent obtained a court order for inclusion. A gay rights group requested permission. Since the parade was privately organized. The lack of a concentrated theme does not lead to a forfeiture of this constitutional protection of speech. Patrick's Day parade. the city permitted the group to use the city seal. Discussion. Since 1947. Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (Respondent) was formed and requested access to march in the parade. 423 Boy Scouts of America v. No.Hurley v. Petitioner had the right to choose the parade's message and participants to the exclusion of others.S. Issue. Irish-American Gay. Is state law requiring inclusion of gay rights marchers in a privately organized parade constitutional? Held. Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston Citation. Patrick's Day parade. provided printing services. Facts. a private organization. In 1993. has received a permit to run the St. Brief Fact Summary. Dale . In 1992. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Parades are a form of expression because the march intends to convey a message and is not just movement of people from one location to another. 557 (1995). and direct funding. 515 U. The parade composition represents the organizers choice of expression. the South Boston Allied War Vets Council. It is beyond government power to control the speech of private individuals or organizations when the organization does not agree with or believe in the message conveyed. Respondent was again refused access and subsequently filed suit. The government may not compel a private speaker to alter its message to include generally accepted views.

This law forces Petitioner to approve a message to which it does not agree. Freedom of expressive association is violated when a regulation significantly affects the organizations ability to advocate its viewpoints. Yes.Boy Scouts of America v. This purpose is expressive conduct that makes Petitioner and expressive associations. The majority ruling creates a constitutional shield of prejudice. Great deference is given to the organization in determining whether a regulation infringes upon its expression. In fact. Dale Citation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. Petitioner's oath and by-laws make no specific mention of the organization's attitude towards homosexuals. Petitioner would be endorsing a message it clearly opposes and be impairing its freedom of expression. Dale (Respondent) had his status as a troop leader revoked because he is gay.Ct. To be an expressive association an organization must engage in some form of expression. Later that month he received a letter from Petitioner revoking his adult membership citing the forbiddance of homosexual members. 424 Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company v. Discussion. Petitioner seeks to instill and instruct young boys in making choices based on the scout oath. He was interviewed for a local newspaper article that identified him as a gay leader. Expressive associations are protected from forced membership. Brief Fact Summary. By accepting Respondent. Does New Jersey law forcing Petitioner to admit homosexuals as members violate its First Amendment right of freedom of association? Held. Facts. While a freshman at Rutgers University. Such a regulation is an unlawful restraint on the association and the characteristics of a "clean" life that it supports. 120 S. Dissent. Respondent was an Eagle Scout and a troop leader when his membership was revoked because the Boy Scouts of America (Petitioner) learned that he is gay. 2446 (2000). it encourages scout leaders to send curious boys to others for sex education questions. Respondent was a scout until he turned eighteen when he went away to college. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue . Petitioner clearly opposes homosexuality and believes that it is at odds with a "morally straight" and "clean" lifestyle. Respondent became openly gay and was the co-president of the gay rights group on campus.

the use tax was amended so that the first $100. Furthermore. Brief Fact Summary.Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company v. The state imposed a special use tax on certain newspapers. 425 Cohen v.000. In 1971. Issue. Yes. Discussion. By doing so. Is tax of ink and paper unconstitutional restriction of free speech? Held. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue Citation. In fact. the law is an unconstitutional restraint of the press. this regulation has encouraged the growth of the press by allowing smaller papers to join or remain in the market. This resulted in a $4. The use tax has been less burdensome than the sales tax and does not hinder the freedom of the press. Facts. Without a proper justification for this particular tax application. Differential taxation of the press is prohibited unless the state has a compelling objective that cannot be achieved without it. Use tax is facially discriminatory as it focuses only on certain publications. This treatment is unconstitutional because it gives the state extra power over the targeted taxpayer and effectively censors the press. 460 U. Cowles Media Company . The sales tax exemption results in a penalty for only a few of the very large papers. Minnesota's tax violates the First Amendment because it singles out the press and targets certain newspapers. the state has singled out the press for special tax treatment. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the state legislation imposed a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink while the sales tax exemption was continued.00 annual tax credit for each paper.S.000. Minneapolis Star (Petitioner) publishes a morning and evening paper. 575 (1983). Petitioner represented nearly two-thirds of the total amount collected. Dissent.00 of ink and paper used per year were exempt. Then in 1974. From1967 until 1971 it was exempt from the general state sales tax. no explanation is given for why this alternative tax was implemented instead of applying the general sales tax.

663 (1991). When the articles were published. Discussion. General principles of law are applicable to the press under the United States Constitution even though they have incidental effects on data gathering and reporting. Cowles Media Company (Respondent) agreed to this term but later found that the charges were dismissed or vacated. Likewise. Promissory estoppel is generally applicable to all citizens of Minnesota including the press. laws are not subject to a higher level of scrutiny when applied to the press than would apply to other persons. Dissent. Petitioner insisted upon anonymity. Hayes . They may not engage in criminal activity and expect immunity for their actions by claiming an infringement of freedom of the press. Synopsis of Rule of Law. News reporters are still required to adhere to the law when pursuing a story. Issue. In exchange for these documents. 426 Branzburg v. The promise of confidentiality is not as important as the exposure to the news and the prevention of censorship due to the general application of the law. 501 U. Petitioner was fired from his job. Is the press exempt from basic contractual law for breach of promise of confidentiality? Held. Petitioner was a Republican gubernatorial campaign worker in 1982. Brief Fact Summary. Cohen (Petitioner) provided documents to the media on the promise that he would not be identified as the source of the information. The documents indicated that the subject was charged with unlawful assembly and convicted of petit theft. He offered documents to the press relating to competing candidate. Respondent chose to run the story anyway and used Petitioner's name as the source of the data. Cowles Media Company Citation.S.Cohen v. The press should be exempt from liability associated with researching the news. Facts. No.

He authored an article describing the production of marijuana. There is no restraint on speech or publication caused by this law. But. To force identification is to restrict speech because informants will be less likely to speak when they know they will be exposed.S. If one knows something. Discussion. Facts. Branzburg (Petitioner) was a staff reporter for a daily Louisville newspaper. The integrity of confidential relationships remains as they always have been except when the interrogation involves criminal activity by the source. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Pappas (Petitioner) televised a speech given by a Black Panther leader from their headquarters. No. The United States Constitution does not support the notion of an idle bystander to a crime. Brief Fact Summary. Concurrence. Dissent. v. 427 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. News reporters may still safeguard sources by appropriate use of a protective order or a motion to quash the subpoena. Petitioner promised not to reveal the processors but was subpoenaed before a grand jury to reveal the sources. The right to confidentiality must be recognized in cases when an informant is required to gather the news. Two different reporters refuse to answer grand jury questions. Federal Communications Commission . which required the identification of their confidential sources. 408 U. Petitioner was given unrestricted access to the facility in exchange for agreeing not to disclose anything he saw or heard while there. The article ran in the paper and included a picture of hands processing hashish. there is no restraint on speech at all. News reporters are not exempt from appearing before a grand jury and answering questions. He refused. then he is obligated to aid justice. Is it unconstitutional to require news reporters to disclose the identity of their sources before a grand jury? Held. The reporter has a right to a confidential relationship with the source that is supported by public interest in the marketplace of information. Reporters are free to publish whatever they choose. Hayes Citation. when confidentiality is essential to data capture. 665 (1972). He was permitted to report on an anticipated police raid. He was later subpoenaed and refused to testify. Issue.Branzburg v. and when absence of constitutional protection of the relationship will deter publication of information.

Facts. 367 (1969). v. Because of the limited space. It is constitutional to obligate radios' licensees to provide time and attention to matters of public concern.S. The most important consideration is the right of listeners to be informed and exposed to the "marketplace of ideas. those who are licensed have a greater duty to give time to all viewpoints equally and not censor what is unpopular. Can the government require the press to provide equal rebuttal time to victims of personal attacks made during prior broadcasts or publications? Held. Issue. when it implemented the Fairness Doctrine. 395 U. The Fairness Doctrine simply enforces the obligation to the community that is owed by one who is granted a license for a limited publicly beneficial property." 428 Miami Herald v. Brief Fact Summary. A radio station was forced to provide free airtime to a book author whose character was attacked on the air. This was refused. Yes.Red Lion Broadcasting Co. During one broadcast the speaker commented that the author of a book about Barry Goldwater was fired from a job for making false statements. Discussion. Respondent determined that the comments were a personal attack and that Petitioner must give the author rebuttal time. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Broadcast frequencies are limited commodities that require government regulation to control. (Petitioner) operates a radio station that aired the "Christian Crusade" series. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Requiring broadcasters to provide rebuttal time for personal attacks is constitutional. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC/Respondent) required radio and television stations to discuss public issues and present each side fairly. Federal Communications Commission Citation. Therefore. Tornillo . and stated that he worked for the Communist party. The author felt personally attacked and demanded free airtime to reply. licenses were not issued to all who requested one.

S. tuning the paper into nothing more than a passive conduit for communication. Infringing upon the editorial functions of a paper is unconstitutional. Is it unconstitutional to require a newspaper to grant a politician criticism reply space? Held. Respondent was a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in 1972. The Miami Herald (Petitioner) ran two editorials in two weeks that were critical of Respondent. Discussion. The result of this statute is a financial penalty for publishing material that is critical of an individual.Miami Herald v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Respondent demanded rebuttal space and was denied. 429 Richmond Newspapers v. Yes. 418 U. Facts. The function of the editor is curtailed. Issue. Tornillo (Respondent) requested space in the paper to respond to editorials that ran the previous two weeks. This could lead to political censorship for fear of financial retribution. Respondent brought action under the state statute of "right of reply" that guarantees candidates conspicuous space in the paper to reply to attacks o character or official function by the newspaper. Brief Fact Summary. However. 241 (1974). Tornillo Citation. responsible ownership cannot be legislated and is not mandated by the United States Constitution. Most television and newspapers are owned by one company. Virginia . which is leading to the monopolization of the airwaves and encourages censorship. This statute impedes the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The government may not compel equal rebuttal access to print media on behalf of political candidates.

Facts. The prosecution voiced no objection and left it to the discretion of the court.Richmond Newspapers v. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Criminal trials must be open to the public unless there is a persuasive. Yes. hostility. It ensures that proceedings are fair and not prejudiced by partiality. There is no provision of the United States Constitution that prohibits the closing of a trial when all parties agree to such action. A murder suspect was tried four times in the same court. The right of public attendance of a trial is not enumerated by the Constitution but it is. clearly the United States Constitution meant to maintain and protect that practice." The right to speak about trials would be quashed if arbitrary courtroom closures were allowed to occur. the counsel for the defense asked that the press be removed from the courtroom. Dissent. Brief Fact Summary. Historically. Issue. criminal trials have been open to the public. recognized as a First Amendment right. It also allows the community to heal by proving an outlet for "concern. Discussion. 448 U. The trial was then ordered closed to the public. This right is guaranteed by the First Amendment as an important aspect of freedom of speech. 555 (1980). and emotion. At the beginning of the fourth trial. 430 Pell v. Virginia Citation. Concurrence. nonetheless. Procunier . articulated interest in closing them. A courtroom was closed to the press during a murder trial.S. Because there is a grand tradition of public trials. Is the right of public and press access to criminal trials guaranteed? Held.

This regulation improperly restrains the press from reporting on governmental conduct. In this case. Facts. inmates could communicate via mail with the press. Dissent. Is it unconstitutional to prohibit the media physical access to prison inmates? Held. The information sought can still be acquired via alternative means of communication. The state legitimately limits visitors to those who will be helpful in the rehabilitation of the inmate. 817 (1973). Therefore. Members of the press were denied access to interview prison inmates in a face-to-face format.S. Procunier Citation. KQED . Issue. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Discussion. The First Amendment does not guarantee the press special access to places not generally open to the public.Pell v. 431 Houchins v. No. The state interest in maintaining security of the facilities outweighs the right to speak to the press especially since there are viable alternative means of communication. Brief Fact Summary. All requests to interview inmates in California prisons were denied. Pell (Petitioner) challenges the constitutionality of the California code prohibiting press interviews with prison inmates. 417 U. The press has no right of access to prisons or inmates beyond what is given to the public. the freedom of press is not denied in any way. The right to speech includes the right to communicate to any willing listener including members of the press.

but stated that Respondent was entitled to injunctive relief. The concurrence agrees with the judgment. the press needs to use cameras and sound equipment to accurately describe the jail conditions.S. the amount of public access to jails is a policy issue that should be decided by the legislature and not the courts. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. Houchins (Petitioner) is the Sheriff of Alameda County and controls access to the county jail. 438 U. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution does not confer a greater right of access to information on the press. The media is equivalent to any member of the general public. The report included a statement by a psychiatrist that the jail condition was responsible for the prisoner actions. Respondent requested permission to inspect and photograph the facility but was denied. As the substitute for the majority of the public. A television station was denied access to a county jail where an inmate committed suicide. Does the press have a constitutional right of access to a county jail that is greater than a private individual? Held. 432 . The jail purposefully denied access to all to eliminate all first hand reports of conditions in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The press has no greater constitutional right to access penal facilities than any member of the general public. Furthermore.Houchins v. No. The existence of the constitutional violation should not have been decided as a right to access question because both the public and the press were denied equally. Issue. They have alternative sources of determining the conditions of the penal facilities in the state. KQED Citation. But Petitioner established tours of the facility that was open to the public. Although the press serves as the "eyes and ears of the public" it does not enjoy unlimited access to information. At the time there was no formal policy regarding public access to the jail. Not all areas were viewed and no recording devices were permitted on the tour. KQED (Respondent) operates a radio and television station. Respondent reported that a county jail prisoner committed suicide. Limiting access does not infringe upon the freedom of the press to communicate or publish. Facts. Dissent. 1 (1978). Concurrence.

Seeger . First Amendment: Religion 433 United States v.CHAPTER X.

The Petitioner first claimed conscientious objector status in 1957. Whether the definition of "religious training and belief" in Section 6(j) of the Act is constitutional? Held." The court concluded "Congress. or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. Daniel Seeger (the "Petitioner")." The Petitioner stated "he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his 'religious' belief." As such.' He cited such personages as Plato. sociological. 380 U. "[T]he test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Seeger .' " The Petitioner's claim for conscientious objector status was denied because it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being". and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity 'without belief in God. "exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. except in the remotest sense." The term " religious training and belief" is defined as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. or philosophical views. The scope of the phrase "Supreme Being" in a conscientious objector statute was at issue.United States v. that his 'skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God' did 'not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever'. in using the expression 'Supreme Being' rather than the designation 'God. 'rather than answer 'yes' or 'no". Seeger Citation. Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (the "Act"). "This vast panoply of beliefs reveals the magnitude of the problem which faced the Congress when it set about providing an exemption from armed service.' was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political. It also emphasizes the care that Congress realized was necessary in the fashioning of an exemption which would be in keeping with its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among religious beliefs. that his was a 'belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes. The court first observed it was very hard to discern Congress's intent in using the phrase "Supreme Being". but (not including) essentially political." Facts. "the test of belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and 434 United States v. Issue. The Petitioner.S. considering there are so many different religious sects viewing god in so many different ways. 163 (1965) Brief Fact Summary. that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open. sociological. was convicted in district court for the Southern District of New York of refusing to serve in the armed forces.

meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.' " Discussion." "Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' and the other is not. Ballard . 435 United States v. It is interesting to recognize how religious beliefs are defined when it comes to conscientious objector status.

Ballard (Respondent) was charged with defrauding the public by practicing a religion that he knew was false. Is Respondent being unconstitutionally persecuted for his religious beliefs? Held. This includes freedom to believe and freedom to act. Ballard Citation. Issue. Religion is determined by the sincerity and depth of the belief. Facts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. If this religion were subject to such a trial. The charge indicated that Respondent knew that these claims were false. it is not the role of a jury to determine its veracity. then all organized religions would need to be treated similarly. Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. The government cannot prove that Respondent knew something was false when it opts to separate religious sincerity from verity. Although Respondent's religion seems incredible to most. He claimed that he had supernatural powers to heal the sick and diseased. Yes. Respondent was convicted of using the mail to defraud the public. He organized a religious group. 78 (1944).United States v. Discussion. 322 U. Dissent.S. Smith . Brief Fact Summary. 436 Employment Division. The First Amendment protects the right to choose and practice a religion of the individual's choice. Just because a religious doctrine cannot be proven does not mean that it is not a religion and not protected by the United States Constitution. not by whether it is true or false.

437 Sherbert v. Respondent. Dissent." Issue. Respondent then filed for unemployment benefits but was denied because of his "misconduct. The state may not prohibit acts simply to eliminate a particular religion. Oregon prohibits possession of controlled substances without a prescription. This goal outweighs any incidental religious ceremonial use of peyote. Discussion. Brief Fact Summary. Free exercise of religion includes the right to believe whatever religion one chooses. Facts. Smith (Respondent) was denied unemployment benefits because he uses peyote as part of his religion. Concurrence. Can the state criminally prohibit the religious use of peyote under the Free Exercise Clause? Held. Synopsis of Rule of Law. On the other hand. 872 (1990). Yes. Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. This state law is tied to a legitimate. Verner . It was not designed to impede upon the religious practice of the Native American Church. nondiscriminatory laws and regulations. The fact that Respondent's religious ceremony has been outlawed is an unconstitutional restraint on his right to practice his religion. The majority narrowly defined free exercise. 494 U. Peyote is on the list of controlled substances. compelling state interest in eliminating illegal drug use and its secondary criminal effects. The state must have the power to generally enforce laws regardless of religious beliefs or else it will lead to the development of an elaborate scheme of exceptions with no rule. The law is applied to all citizens equally regardless of religious belief. a member of the Native American Church was fired from his job for using peyote as part of a religious ceremony. religious beliefs do not excuse individuals compliance with the law. Free exercise of religion does not preclude adherence to valid.Employment Division. Smith Citation.S.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. or order.S. Petitioner is being penalized for practicing her religion. but cannot be intended to quash the practices of a religion. the state may regulate expressions that pose a serious threat to pubic safety. Respondent determined that Petitioner was not eligible for benefits because of her Saturday restriction. 374 U. Facts. She later filed for unemployment because she unable to find a job that did not require Saturday work. peace.Sherbert v. A state may not deny unemployment benefits to a citizen because her religions convictions require an observance of a day of rest. Sherbert (Petitioner) was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays. To be valid this regulation would need to survive strict scrutiny analysis. Petitioner was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays. Petitioner is forced to choose between earning a living and practicing her religion. She is forced to forfeit benefits because she refuses to sacrifice her religious conviction. This will include actions that manifest a religious belief or doctrine. Discussion. City of Haileah . The majority ruling means that a state is obligated to provide financial support. 438 Church of the Lukumi Babala Aye v. and provides an exception based on religion. Dissent. Issue. Brief Fact Summary. This may violate limits on state entanglement with religion. the Sabbath of her religion. Generally. Is the state restraint on unemployment benefits constitutional? Held. Verner Citation. 398 (1963). No. The disqualification for benefits burdens the free exercise of religion.

The city passed an ordinance outlawing animal sacrifice for religious purposes. The Free Exercise Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of a particular religious belief. safety. The ordinance was developed in response to community outcry against the practice of Santeria. Petitioner leased land from the City of Hialeah (Respondent) to build a house of worship. and welfare of the community. The Church of the Lukumi Babala Aye (Petitioner) practices the Santeria religion wherein a principal form of devotion is animal sacrifice. Discussion. In 1987. Synopsis of Rule of Law. No. The law here is not neutral on its face. 508 U. the animal is cooked and eaten. But when the law targets activity because of its religious nature it will be held invalid unless there is a compelling governmental interest and it is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Facts. City of Haileah Citation. Davey . Is the city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice constitutional? Held. Later. The animals are killed by severing the carotid arteries in the neck. and the city council passed an ordinance prohibiting all animal sacrifice for religious ceremonies citing a danger to the public health.S. The community objected. 520 (1993). The goal of the ordinance was to prevent the practice of Santeria in the city. It includes explicit reference to sacrifice and religious ritual. The interest in preventing cruelty to animals could have been achieved through alternative means than a complete ban on this religion.Church of the Lukumi Babala Aye v. A law that is neutral and generally applicable does not have to be justified by a compelling state interest. Brief Fact Summary. Issue. 439 Locke v.

forbid students pursuing a degree in devotional theology from access to the funds." As such. Issue. where hostility towards religion was manifest. 158 L.Ed." The majority concluded "[t]he State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scolars.S. Synopsis of Rule of Law. He chose to attend a private Christian college in an attempt to become a church pastor. 1307. and in accordance with the state constitution." Unlike the [Lukumi] decisions.__. Rehnquist disagreed with Judge Antonin Scalia's ("J. is not violated when a state creates a scholarship program. 440 Locke v. A state created a scholarship program." J. Davey Citation. 124 S. a state did not have to "also fund training for religious professions. ‡ No. violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. __U. Rehnquist") writing for the majority observed "an exclusion from an otherwise inclusive aid program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Scalia") dissenting opinion and found that just because training for "all secular professions" were funded. ‡ Does the lack of access to funds from the state of Washington's Promise Scholarship Program by students pursuing a degree in devotional theology.2d 1 (2004) Brief Fact Summary. J. Rehnquist believed "the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits.Locke v. Rehnquist observed how the state of Washington solely chose not to "fund a distinct category of instruction" not impose "criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite." Dissent." The Court of Appeals held the state of Washington improperly "singled out religion for unfavorable treatment. Washington's "exclusion of theology majors must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest". The Respondent in this matter was awarded a Promise Scholarship. did not allow students to "use the scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional theology. Davey . in accordance with its state constitution. Justice William Rehnquist ("J. and does not allow students pursuing "a degree in doctrinal theology" access to the monies from the program. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (the "Constitution").Ct. The state of Washington. under the [Lukumi] decisions." J. Facts.

Specifically. Scalia filed a dissenting opinion with Justice Clarence Thomas ("J." Discussion. It is interesting to compare this decision. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter . arguing that the [Lukumi] decisions and this case are irreconciliable. 441 County of Allegheny v. that the majority sustained a "public benefits program that facially discriminates against religion. Thomas").‡ J. with the Supreme Court's previous [Lukumi] decisions and examine how the majority and dissenting judges construe the decisions.

Religious holiday decorations were displayed on some of the city's major governmental buildings. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter Citation. ‡ Justice Stevens: The Establishment Clause prohibits displays of religious symbols on public property. However. Discussion. Dissent. The plurality of religious displays only acknowledges the holiday season. Issue. Brief Fact Summary.County of Allegheny v. Government may not endorse a particular religion. The crèche is unconstitutional because nothing detracts from its clearly religious meaning. Facts. Endorsement is determined by the context of the use of religious symbols. But the constitutional problem is not solved by the state celebrating each religious holiday. Synopsis of Rule of Law. the menorah's presence next to a Christmas tree presents a holiday theme and not just a Jewish holiday specifically. ‡ Justice Brennan: A display that maintains its religious meaning violates the United States Constitution's requirement of the separation of church and state. The effect of the displays is measured by whether a regular citizen could perceive the display to be an endorsement of a certain religion or a disapproval of others. Are the government displays of religious symbols constitutional? Held. It does not specifically endorse one religion over another. Valente .S 573 (1989). A crèche was placed on the staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse. 442 Larson v. and a Chanukah menorah was placed in the grounds of the City-County Building next to a Christmas tree. 492 U. Concurrence.

456 U. Larson (Petitioner) was responsible for the implementation of the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act (Act). Certain charitable organizations were required to provide a financial disclosure statement while others were not. In 1978. The Establishment Clause requires legislatures and citizens to treat all religions with the same respect and deference they afford their own. the 50% rule was instituted that required all religious organizations receiving more than 50% of all contributions from non-members to make a full financial disclosure each year. The 50% rule is arbitrarily drawn and based on three flawed premises: 1) when members contribute they will supervise solicitation activities carefully. Brief Fact Summary.Larson v. Does state statute discriminate amongst religious organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause? Held. Freedom of religion would not exist if the state were allowed to provide favorable treatment to certain religions. Discussion. 2) membership control is an adequate safeguard against fraudulent activity. This Act regulated charitable organizations that receive funds from the public. Kurtzman . Yes. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Issue. Facts.S. 228 (1982). 443 Lemon v. Under the Establishment Clause one religion cannot be preferred over another. Valente Citation. and 3) the need for public disclosure increase with outside donation amounts.

The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state "sponsorship. and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. a statute must have a secular legislative purpose. Brief Fact Summary. and must not excessively entangle church and state. and other instructional materials. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and religion. The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems." 444 Rosenberger v. The state reimburses parochial schools for certain expenses associated with the education of its children. Kurtzman Citation. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the institution benefited. financial support. Synopsis of Rule of Law. No. and the resulting relationship between the government and church. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the cost of teaching secular subjects? Held. must not advance or inhibit religion. 602 (1971). textbooks. 403 U. Discussion. Issue. the nature of the aid given. Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.S. To be valid.Lemon v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia .

Did Respondent violate the First Amendment by refusing to authorize payment for the printing of a religious student magazine? Held. Discussion. it would have never been recognized as an official student organization. However. Brief Fact Summary. Respondent's denial of funding to Petitioner is viewpoint discrimination because the guidelines of the fund do not exclude religion as a subject matter. Facts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Viewpoint based restrictions are not proper when a university allocates funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. Issue. When the government creates a forum for speech it may exclude a class of speech based on content if the limitation preserves the purpose of the forum. Respondent refused to pay the printing bill for the publication of the group's magazine because Respondent deemed it a religious activity. A student group challenged the University's decision to stop paying its printing bills because the group expressed religious views.00 to help support the cost of student organizations. By prohibiting viewpoint discrimination this holding does not infringe upon the Respondent's right to speech. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia Citation. Each semester every undergraduate student is charged a mandatory fee of $14.Rosenberger v. More importantly. Petitioner was never classified as a religious organization. But viewpoint discrimination is not permitted when the speech would otherwise be included in the limited forum. Rosenberger's (Petitioner's) group was recognized as a registered student organization. 515 U. A registered student group may submit its bills to the University of Virginia (Respondent) for payment as long as the organization is not classified as a religious or political group.S. No. 819 (1995). If it had been. Doe . 445 Santa Fe Independent School District v. The state may not exercise viewpoint discrimination even when the limited public forum was created by the state.

Facts. Pre-game invocations are not "private speech" because they are authorized by government policy and take place on government property at a government-sponsored event. The state cannot force sponsored religious activity on its citizens by forcing them to choose between attendance and their own constitutionally protected rights. The prayer content. 446 Engel v. Discussion. Ct. A group of public high school students are opposed to pre-game prayers before football games. 2286 (2000).Santa Fe Independent School District v. Brief Fact Summary. Vitale . Issue. Santa Fe (Petitioner) developed a policy that authorized two student elections. The school policy has a plausible secular purpose that should be deferred to and not discarded as the school district voters see the legitimacy of this purpose. There is no clear separation of church and state as required by the United States Constitution. Yes. By creating the policy. One was held to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered before the games. the speaker. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 120 S. and the second one was to select a student prayer leader. Respondent has a significant level of involvement that makes it clear that Respondent encourages the practice of religion. Doe (Respondent) includes a number of current and former students both Mormon and Catholic who oppose prayer before each football game. Dissent. Delivery of a pre-game prayer forces the audience to participate in religion. and whether to have a prayer were all supported by school policy and endorsed by the school administration. Doe Citation. Does student lead prayers at public high school football games violate the Establishment Clause? Held. They are not the type of forum discussed in Rosenberger because the pre-game activity is not open to indiscriminate use.

" As a result of that policy." Issue. many people left Great Britain and came to the United States to practice their religion. freely. our parents. The prayer read: "Almighty God.S. Vitale Citation. "[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance. Black") first recognized that the Respondent's adoption of the Board's prayer was indisputably a religious activity. J.Engel v. This prayer was recommended by the State Board of Regents (the "Board") and made part of their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools. we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee. J. If a student did not want to say the prayer. Yes. Students in a certain school district were encouraged to say a nondenominational prayer prior to classes each morning." Facts. and we beg Thy blessings upon us. Justice Potter Stewart ("J." Dissent. Second." The majority observed "the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. Vitale . they could remain silent or leave the room. New Hyde Park. New York (the "Respondent"). our teachers and our Country. Stewart") filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the brief nondenominational prayer did not violate the United States Constitution (the "Constitution"). the Board of Education of Union Free School District No. that the prayer was denominationally neutral. and legislative powers over the State's public school system. Did the Respondent's adoption of the Regent's prayer violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution? Held. "There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer. executive. Black found support for his decision in the negative experience the British had when attempting to establish a "Book of Common Prayer. 370 U. required the School District's principal to encourage all student classes to say a prayer every morning. Further. J. Synopsis of Rule of Law." J. Justice Hugo Black ("J. not the governments prescribed religion. Black found that the New York state law allowing for such a prayer to be said in school "breache[d] the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State. Black also found it was irrelevant that students did not need to participate in the prayer and could remain silent or leave the room. Stewart could not see "an 'official religion' [being] established by 447 Engel v. 9. The Respondent." The Board was created by the State Constitution and had "broad supervisory." If a student did not want to say the prayer they could remain silent or leave the room. 421 (1962) Brief Fact Summary. Also.

letting those who want to say a prayer say it. Stewart argued "that to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation. J.traditions which come down to us from those who almost two hundred years ago avowed their 'firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence' when they proclaimed the freedom and independence of this brave new world. Stewart argued that "[w]hat each has done has been to recognize and to follow the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual traditions of our Nation-." J. 448 Lee v. Instead of advocating an "official religion". Stewart argued that these prayers in school are appropriate because political branches begin their sessions with a prayer and when the President of the United States takes their oath they refer to God. Weisman . This case illustrates how different justices' view whether certain religious activity is really the advocating of an "official religion" or something short of that." J." Discussion.

but to do so is to forfeit the social benefit of celebrating this educational achievement. A school official organized the event. Lee (Petitioner). Facts. Rhode Island are allowed to invite members of the clergy to provide invocation for middle and high school graduations. Concurrence. Since the ceremony is mandatory the state held participants hostage to the activity and forced quiet respect if not approval of the prayer. Clearly. 577 (1992). A graduation ceremony requires student attendance. Issue. Helms . Weisman Citation. Weisman (Respondent) objects to the practice of having clergy provide prayers at high school graduation. invited a rabbi to deliver the graduation prayer.Lee v.S. and even provided prayer guidelines. The student may choose to skip the ceremony. Brief Fact Summary. 505 U. A school may not compel a student to participate in a religious activity. School principals in Providence. Prayer at graduation has a long history. Conducting prayers at public high school graduation violates the Establishment Clause. The district involvement in the prayer is so strong that it has created a state sponsored and directed religious activity in a public school. invited the religious speaker. Dissent. Does it violate the Establishment Clause to allow clergy to provide prayers at graduation? Held. Prior to his arrival the principal provided basic guidelines for the content of the prayer. Government pressure to participate in religious activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion. a school principal. 449 Mitchell v. Yes. Discussion. the United States Constitution does not mean to eclipse this practice. Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Simmons-Harris . as it was here. 120 S. A School aid program provides federal funds to support parochial schools. The aid provided could have easily been used in the instruction of religion and for religious purposes. Concurrence. Chapter 2 does not indoctrinate religion or define the recipient by religion. and 3) have impermissible content. neutral. Indoctrination occurs when such activity could reasonably be attributed to the government. Facts. Currently 41 of the 46 private schools receiving aid are religious schools.Ct. The program does not advance religion nor does it provide aid with a particular religious content.Mitchell v. It must be offered to all schools without regard to religious affiliations. distributes money to state and local agencies to lend educational material and equipment to pubic and private schools. The government may provide aid to parochial schools as long as the aid does not 1) have the effect of advancing religion. 2) result in governmental indoctrination. The Federal school aide program. There are insufficient safeguards within the program. Some of the materials covered include library services. The program requires the aid to be used for "secular. Brief Fact Summary. Discussion. No. Issue. Does the government violate the Establishment Clause by providing instructional material to parochial schools? Held. Chapter 2. 2530 (2000). Synopsis of Rule of Law. and non-ideological" materials. The key factor for determining this is neutrality of the application of a program. Dissent. Helms Citation. computer hardware and software. 450 Zelman v. The program has built in safeguards to prevent the support of religious programs by limiting aid to "secular and neutral" equipment.

Besides religious schools. Rehnquist recognized two lines of Establishment Clause cases. that rejected establishment clause challenges. and the second. fifty-six private schools participated in this program.' " The only school district that fit within this category was the Cleveland City School District. where true private choice is involved and "government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals. J. This district was comprised of some of the worst performing schools in the nation. direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their choosing" is entirely neutral with respect to religion and does not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). in turn. Simmons-Harris Citation. A program that "provide[s] aid directly to a broad class of individuals. those cases where a government program provides "aid directly to religious schools". direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their choosing. Over three thousand seven hundred students participated in the program. 536 U. Does a pilot program established by the state of Ohio. 153 L.Ct. in turn. The state of Ohio enacted a Pilot Project Scholarship Program (the "Program") to provide "financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been 'under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district by the state superintendent. No. who. Simmons-Harris .S. to provide families with children educational choices. The first. 122 S. the Supreme Court "focus[ed] on neutrality and the principle of private choice. Issue." In these three cases.Ed. [Mueller]. 2460. The Program provides tuition aid to qualifying students to "attend a participating public or private school of their parent's choosing. this program also includes community and magnet schools. and 96% of them enrolled in religiously affiliated schools." Synopsis of Rule of Law. J. J. not on the number of program beneficiaries attending 451 Zelman v. who. Rehnquist first observed that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." During the 1999-2000 school year. [Witters] and [Zobrest]. violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution by "advancing or inhibiting religion"? Held.Zelman v. minority families. Facts. 604 (2002) Brief Fact Summary. Of those fifty-six schools. Rehnquist") drafted the opinion for the majority." The majority then discusses three cases. 639. At issue is the constitutionality of a program in the state of Ohio providing "financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been 'under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district by the state superintendent. Rehnquist observed how these cases involved "challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals. precludes states from passing laws having the "purpose" or "effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. Judge William Rehnquist ("J. forty-six (or 82%) had a religious affiliation. and comprised mainly of low-income.

"[t]he program permits the participation of all schools within the district. 452 .religious schools.' I think it is worth elaborating on the Court's conclusion that this inquiry should consider all reasonable educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to parents. concurrence and dissent analyze the statistical data relied upon in this case. Souter") filed a dissenting opinion relying on [Everson] which states "[n]o tax in any amount. Second. Concurrence. J. Rehnquist then concluded the Ohio program "is neutral in all respects toward religion.e. marks a dramatic break from the past. religious schools are given no financial incentives to accept students and the program gives parents the choice to choose secular schools. any parent of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District." The program "confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion. can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions. and how their interpretation of the data leads to drastically different conclusions. although the Court takes an important step. large or small. O'Connor") filed a concurring opinion and makes two independent observations. O'Connor also criticized the Respondents for not focusing on "how the educational system in Cleveland actually functions". i. Justice David Souter ("J. J. Dissent. Discussion." Further. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. First. It is interesting to note how the majority. Souter vehemently criticizes the majority's analysis of the "neutrality" and "free choice" aspects of the Ohio program." J." Additionally. when considered in light of other longstanding government programs that impact religious organizations and our prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence. whatever they may be called. I do not believe that today's decision. Souter goes as far as to accuse the majority of ignoring [Everson].. given the emphasis the Court places on verifying that parents of voucher students in religious schools have exercised 'true private choice. especially in ignoring how parents could send their children to community schools." J. or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. religious or non-religious. Additionally.

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