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Appayya Diksita - Siddhantaleshasamgraha (trad 1935)

Appayya Diksita - Siddhantaleshasamgraha (trad 1935)

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166126 > m

Call No.





Accession No,


This book ftioufkl be returned on or before the date last marked below.

Publications of the Department of Indian Philosophy

General Editor:
S. S.











S. S.

Department of Indian Philosophy



129 . Chapter II . . .. 331 IV . .. .. .245 . . . Chapter III Chapter . . .. .387 .CONTENTS PAGE Introduction .. 1 Analytical Table of Contents . . . 67 Translation of Chapter I .. . .


to to The Diksita 's period was given This traditional date was subject even then and has since been subjected questioning further examination. 140. had been bathed in gold by Cinna Bomma. the negative one seeks to show that the traditional horoscope is a piece of guess-work based on subsequent calculation. astronomical data alleged we are not qualified to pronounce. D. JORM. It is based on an inscription iu the temple of Kalakanthesvara at Adayapalam.D. The positive argument. On. III. is far from convincing. presumably collect in that case. See "More about the age and life of Srlmad Appayya by Y. the Pillai is . who had written the jSivarkamanitKpika as a commentary on ^rikantha's Bhasya. 1930. A BRIEF sketch of the life and works of Appayya Diksita has been provided in the Introduction to the Sivadvaitanirnaya. though striking. had received gifts of in 1582 A. but it is unfortunate that no upholder of the traditional view has yet questioned the statement. S [-1 . we have to accept the main contention of the article and accept the antedating by thirty years as very probable. and is a miscalculation at that. The inscription records the building of the temjple by Appayya Diksita. a negative and a positive . since the day arrived at would appear to belong to the cyclic year Pramadica in tho 19th century and not in the 16th this information given to the writer of the article by the late L. 1 2 Published by the University of Madras. there as 1552-1624. 2 The principal arguments are 1 two. Swamikannu . Mahalinga Sastri.INTRODUCTION.

but a few words in one and the same inscription may well make us pause. for he himself is referred to as Appai Diksitar.. teaching of the BMsya. and there is no uniformity about the spelling even of our variation in the course of a Appayya 's name. then Appayya should certainly have attained the zenith of his glory by then.INTRODUCTION gold and lands for teaching the said Bhasya to five hundred pupils and so on it also states that the Dlksita . or re-edification of the temple might have fallen anywhere within this period. nor even as to when the temple was built (or moi-e likely re-built). They are variants of the same name. and it would be much more reasonable to suppose that he was born in But the inscription provides no evidence as to when it was itself carved. was the author of a hundred works sueh as the Nyayaraksdmani and the Kalpatcmiparimcila.'it proves nothing as to the date of the inscription itself. while the first signatory calls himself Appa Diksitar. no doubt. but not devoid of significance. The date mentioned need relate only to Appayya *s 1522 tli an in 1552. It may well have been the pious work of sons and grandsons. for a certainty. even if that too be fixed at 1582 A. especially when there is no certain . If it can be presumed that the year mentioned is the year of the inscription. and it would suggest the considerable interval that must have elapsed between this early mark of royal favour and the The building finishing of his hundred and more works. The word " subsequently (adukkup- pin)" is vague.D. Not even the first signatory can be identified with Appayya. his writing of the Sirarlramani- dipika and perhaps the honour done to him at China Bomma's court.

but a rather marked indication of his not having developed " " any sectarianism (if it may be so called) when he speaks of the Ganga as flowing from the toe of Vi$ruu When' his devotion to Siva develops and he tries to establish the superiority of Siva as identical with Brahman. one of the While show- ing undoubted mastery of the varieties of advaita exhibits very little of his own genius. Indeed. tions Other considera- based on the dates of Appayya's known contemporaries are by no means conclusive. All that is certain is that the best part of Appayya's work seems to belong to the second half of the 16th century. except in the discussion of sarvamukti at the end of the fourth doctrine.DATE OF APPAYYA AND THE PRESENT WORK 3 means of dating the inscription itself. infusing into both the devotion to Siva that came through natural piety. at its face value. as indicating the comparatively early have not yet stage of the author's development. it is earliest. not Samhai-a Kudra. may be taken chapter. the vigorous polemic writer much less do we have the . is There can be no doubt that the Siddhantalesa not the earliest of Appayya's. if also immaterial. for the purpose of his own mental clarification. wo find him elaborately trying to show that there are two rivers Saguiia . We syncretist who blended with such an eminent degree of success the system taught by his father with the system he expounded by royal command. whether he died at the close of that century or in the first quarter of the seventeenth is uncertain. we have yet no trace of his Saiva leanings. For our purpose here. it The prefatory remark that the author is Setting down what he learnt from his father.

This work is posterior to the &id<lhantale$a. topic. 192 of the . vv. and Vacaspati was certainly earlier than the author of the Prakatartha. though rarely out of the mouth of Appayya himself. that there is no injunction at all. the former in vile language for his alleged slavish adoption of Mandana's views. that study of the Vedfmta is an apurva-vidhi. the first In the very first view expounded. the former 'work* is referred to. while that which is worn by Siva on his head is another Ganga.4 called INTRODUCTION Ganga. The order it is not necessarily chronological. that one flowed out of Visnu's toe but the side of fell down Mem straight into the sea. for instance. is that of Vacaspati. criticism thus immanent. is that of the author of the Prakatartlia. though may be so in a few cases. 36 and 37. 3 verse about Sec the Drahmatwkasstava. 35. whose fruitful waters course along different lands bringing joy and plenty everywhere before they finally 3 unite with the sea. in most cases. while the last view. I The tiiddhantdlesa is much more than a catalogue The author's mind has reacted on the views expounded and some evidence of varieties of advaita dodrine. Appayya seerns either not to have had access to originals or relied on a defective m'emory. of it is found in the way he arranges the views on each topic.' but prior to the &wa<lvaitaHirnay<*9 since in the discussion of sarvamukti. The same prefatory the Ganga flowing from Venn's toe is found in the Nytiy<mik$tiniwii too. In some cases. not the latter (see p. The arrangement of the views is so made that. each prior who abused view comes in for criticism from the is exponent of the next.

verse quoted in the fourth chapter is ascribed to the Vartika. Bound as the writers no doubt 4 felt themselves to be by the doctrines of the "mlyam&nai-'ka-rupeu na ni$edho 'vakaavan||" Brahma&iddJii. and is not found stated there in the words used by Appayya. A study of the Siddhantalesa will help to dispel such delusions. It is often said that the Hindu habit of writing commentaries and sub-commentaries on given cryptic texts has not been favourable to originality or the development of thought. and As the literature is vast and much of it is unpublished. as to the nature of the removal of nescience.VALUE OF THE PRESENT WORK Thus Brahmasiddhi are uniformly unfortunate in the matter of both commission and his references to the omission. a view ascribed to the Brahmasiddhi. is not distinctive of that work. any to make out an exhaustive list takes an unconscionable time. p. The attempt present editor has had to content himself for the moment with the little he references. while it really occurs in the A Brahmasiddhi. who derived it from Mandana and did not add to it in any way. and that therefore difference has no place in valid knowledge is 4 pre-eminently Mandana's. the criticism of difference is largely based on the Tattvasuddhi. the view that whatever is cognised is really of one nature alone. 5 6 See Appendix for quotation from Tattvasuddhi. Some attempts has been made to trace Appayya's quotations. has done. 5 But with all this Appayya is fairly reliable as a guide to the views he summarised. in the hope that his further work in post-Sankara advaita will help him to complete the list m the fullness of time. satta. a work later than the Brahmasiddhi and expressly based on it in regard to this topic. yet it is ascribed to the author of the Tattvasuddhi. 58. .

sub-sections. they yet show considerable variation and originality in tackling the various problems in detail. and as to the need for renunciation as a preliminary to Vedanta study. In the early part of the third chapter. to say the least. but of profound logical and psychological interest as well. as in the consideration of the question whether there is a vidhi in respect of Vedanta study. The illusionism that they apparently profess does not blind them to problems on the empirical plane and the solutions suggested display considerable ingenuity. section I an4 sub-sections. two questions are raised as to the competence of the sudra for Brahmankinowledge. And no one who studies the dialectic on difference 8 will imagine that the advaita is a facile intuitionism based on alleged Scriptural declarations and mystic experience. No one who reads the lengthy discussion of the nature and function 7 of psychoses will continue in the belief that there is no scope for originality or progress in Hindu thought. II. devoid of a cogent intellectual background. The treatment of both questions shows how Hindu thought has by no means been static or custom-bound.6 INTRODUCTION Vedanta Sutras as interpreted by Sankara. The questions they solve are not merely of exegetic interest. -section 5 and. Even where the discussion seems to centre round what the Sruti or !ankara said. that therefore he can neither know nor practise the Vedic rites is 7 Chapter I. . Chapter II. While one view holds that the sudra not competent to leam the Veda. it is not without considerable interest to the modern student.

for this. but restricting their scope as far as may be consistent with ancient loyalties. 2-142. but. Chapter III. 9 Similar movements of the other question 9 10 . and 1*422. according . and that consequently he cannot have Brahman-knowledge. but will at best endow him. in the next birth with the body of one of the twice-born castes. of course. the observances for which the sudra is eligible cannot of themselves lead to the required knowledge. but in so far as that knowledge can be acquired otherwise. such as recital of the sacred five letters (pancaksara). But the liberal tendency would not appear to have flourished without check for. he 'has other means open to him. learning the Veda is onl> one of the means to Brahman-knowledge and though this is denied to the sfidra. 2-141. sudra relates only to such Sagiuia meditations as can be learnt from the Vcdanta alone. to another view (mentioned at the close and possibly favoured by Appayya). according to another view. Chapter See Sections 2*14. the III. there is no justification. One may be strongly tempted to see a chronological development in these views as presented by Appayya. See Sections 1*421. knowledge of the Nirguna Brahm'an in so far as it is learnt from the Vedanta is of course excluded. the sudra is welcome to it.REFORM MOVEMfeNTS y that are declared to lead to Brahman-knowledge. the making of gifts and so on the section of the Veddnta Sutras which denies competence to the . We thus seem to find a liberal movement tending to conserve the old prohibitions. may be noticed in the treatment even am'ong the twice-born. 10 . The movement of reaction is almost proportional to that of reform. and knowledge in other ways cannot be said to be impossible. 2-143.

however. as a synecdoche all twice-born castes. but to re-birth as a brahmin. that by samnyasa as for . just as they do not have to learn the Veda by rote from a teacher. The most liberal answer . may proceed to the study without renunciation. Reaction has set in with . brahmin alone seems for the sake of results both seen and unseen. Others. would be ineligible for study. implication may not be justly resorted renunciation. they do not require its result seen or unseen. to this difficulty is to take Scripture to have used the implying is word "brahmin" a reference to figuratively. no less liberal. that study. the brahmin alone is entitled to renounce. have no need to renounce. since . prior existences the devas do not have to renounce. and this it the answer according to the upholders of one view. but their position can be of no help in deter- mining the competence of ksatriyas and vaisyas .g INTRODUCTION to occupy a position of vantage. is not a necessary preliminary to Vedanta study. are eligible for study of a kind. this reformer laid himself open to a flank attack the devas. who cannot devas. whore the student is eligible to renoimce he should certainly do so . they are not bound to perform any karma. renunciation is prescribed as a preliminary to study (sravana) of the Vedanta but according to Scripture. would have is that though figurative to. which no doubt restricted to brahmins. like the widower. In thus exalting the ksatriya and vaisya almost to the level of devas. but ksatriyas and vaisyas. since no karma is enjoined for them. these. will lead not to Brahman-knowledge. hence there is no distinction to be secured result. who arc not so eligible. else even renounce. it was said. its unseen must have been secured by renunciation in .

is now unattained as it were. what Scripture says about certain souls having been liberated in the past is not a delusion. nescience . part of the fourth chapter deals with the conception of release. Release being but the manifestation of one's nature. as there S 12 a single unreleased soul. of less length of time in proportion to their capacity to get rid of nescience. own salvation of Some advaitins do. Universal salvation is more than a possibility. but a own 1 right which. and nothing adventitious. III. being eternally attained. and the belief in re-birth proves a potent weapon against reform. the present bondage of other souls is as real as his own. It is not merely the natural right of all. indeed. The advaitin. and their future release is as certain as his own. But the final removal of nescience is certain. it is a logical necessity. Scriptural declarations of the release of selves as the presentations own certain souls are treated as analogous to the release dreamt of in respect of dream creations. go to the extrem'e of treating everything except of a dream. refusing to admit the existence of other jivas. require a greater or Different souls will. may be last The expected to care for nothing but his which he their is eternally assured. since nescience is essentially indeterminable as real or unreal. course. is So long. the world of experience is for him relatively real. cannot be denied to or withheld from any one.SARVAMUKTI its belief in g permanent hierarchies. however. released or bound. other jivas exist. believing in a single reality with which he himself is identical. But the t average advaitin is not a solipsist .

Such a doctrine. Nor bliss. though with the removal of a particular mirror the reflection therein has merged with the prototype. is not an invention of his own. as long as there are reflecting or distorting media. the release of his brethren is as much to his interest as his own for. he . there is the possibility of reflection. but underlies iSankara's own teaching. but not merger in that which is above both bimba and pratibimba and is the substrate of both these appearances. therefore. but only with the less perfect form known as Isvara. only with what is capable of being reflected. They have It is not that the earliest released souls thus not only the privileges but also the responsibilities of lordship. until the final release of all. we have merger. salvation is not the purely personal concern of each individual as such. but an assured and final realisation of oneness with the Absolute. says Appayya. a bimba as contrasted with a pratibimba. For. whose is this reflections in nescience are the many jlvas. so long as mirrors exist. merely the promise of a lesser degree of become so many Isvaras in the matter of enjoyment. as he seeks to show by a consideration of is . Isvara and jiva. In other words. It is only when by the due exercise of these functions other souls too come to realise their birthright that nescience is once for all destroyed.J() INTRODUCTION is not completely destroyed and there can be no absolute release for any other soul. however far advanced on the path of perfection. There is no possibility of further reflection . can attain oneness not with the Absolute Intelligence. They become identical with the one Isvara and perform his functions of sustaining and governing the world. hence there no more distinction of bimba and pratibimba.

And there required to reconcile their metaphysical conclusions with the insistent claims of individuality. postulating as it does that timelessness can be achieved in time. is of anything outside consciousness. though he cannot but say that release cannot be withheld from' any soul that seeks it. however pleasing as a concept. there no longer aware merged as it is in pure . It is not necessary for the advaitin to say that at any particular point of time all souls will be released.DIFFICULTIES IN SARVAMUKT1 H numerous passages from the Bhasya. Despite its appeal to the populace. continues to be perceived by other It is prima facie absurd to conceive of any time when time comes to an end. The conception among post- can be no doubt that. it is no time for itself. we take happens it for other souls is for granted that the world process will go on and that for the released soul what a psychological change itself. Universal salvation. the most important of which relates to the assumption that the temporal process can come to an end in time. it will be eminently acceptable to monists of the present day who are &ankara advaitins. cannot be real in the sense of what can be adualised in time. though an inevitable metaphysical . seems to be at least as old as Vacaspati. as elaborated by Appayya Diksita. since there is is nothing for it outside of it but time as such not annulled. since bound souls. it is an illogical blend of mutually exclusive concepts of time and timelessness. Two replies are possible. So long as we are concerned with the release of this or that soul. Ultimate release. it. The notion is not free from difficulties.

but at some tiirie it is bound to occur else there is no meaning iu talking of it as a possi- however distant. perfection attained. It may . Viewed from the finite standpoint. that many the sublimation of Isvaratva into Brahman-hood can hardly be contemplated as anything m'ore than a bare possibility. Such a reply is certain to provoke the rejoinder that what is questioned is not the actuality but even the logical possibility. that should also become actual at some time. does occur. and the activities of in the acquisition and enjoyment of karma seem to souls involve so much more of backsliding than progress. And since all sacred teaching it is is for the surely reasonable to teach that what luirelcased. If universal release is logically possible. not the non- temporal Brahmanhood.J2 INTRODUCTION assumption on advaita principles. not be near enough to rouse hope or to instil fear. while for is him who eternally achieves the absolute view-point. what happens to time? Does not your statement conic to this that time at a particular point of it sel f annuls itself ? And is this not bility. is achieved by each jiva through striving and enlightenment in time is lordship (Isvaratva). the path to perfection so beset with difficulties and dangers. The jivas in actuality are so numerous arid of such different is grades of perfection. progress towards absolute perfection may be but asymptotic. need not be conceived as actually attained at any particular time. implied only Transcendence of time is when there are no more souls to be and Isvaratva automatically comes to an end. it And when the very absurdity which is K'ing'criticised? . governed But this is no more than a logical possibility.

But thc-ttt quoque argument. and that the temporal process leads to that attainment. not merely a particular variety thereof. for all advaitins hold that the real is the timeless. For that a soul. and if not. It is irrelethat time continues to exist for the is it whether it exists for itself how came to annul time. it is difficult to can be avoided on any variety of advaita this is soul that is released the temporal process ceases to be . a-temporal Brahman. for the question the released soul. though hardly bo "conclusive. rhetorical'. time has ceased to be. that is to say. the advaitin of whatever shade of thought has to say that finite activities in time cause the attain- ment of the infinite yant to say unreleased soul. Turn which way he will. then advaita should be abandoned.DIFFICULTIES IN SARVAMUKTI 13 Granted that see how it an absurdity. And this is the second reply which the advocate of universal salvation may give It to his critics. time and cause. that though attained it is unattained.. and release (whether in embodiment or on the perishing of the body) is secured in time. by temporal (processes and at a point of The appeal to unreleased souls is as ineffective as the Berkcleyan appeal to other souls and to God to conserve the reality of a world which had first been dissolved into ideas. good works are performed in time. can can only give room to the . know dictory and unintelligible. For any knowledge is acquired in time. And it is a commonplace that this doctrine of reality is based on an extensive critique of categories like space. as it were. by acts in time and at particular point of time. this cessation comes about in and through time . then. to its own annulment. the doctrine. If this conception is contradesire to arises in time.

today. it is .? . When really there released". Assuming the validity of the advaitin 's criticism of whatever is phenomenal. to say nothing of all. the mukta does not see himself as different from others for him there can be no before} is . Eternal damnation rather would seem to be the lot of all of you. for that was in his ignorance. . we cannot see how any of you can be saved. and ignorance has ceased to be. and after he cannot preach. perfect. intelligently speak of the non-existent by constant con. templation of the true and the timeless as the substrate of the fleeting and the temporal. for there is none to preach to he cannot talk of his bondage. the jiva attains that supreme this attainment is called release. including time.J. but there is no justification for calling him a released person on advaita principles. But when the light has dawned. tomorrow my body will perish and I shall be fully conceivably say this. "Yesterday I was not released. andfhe cannot . By constant meditation on the defective nature of the phenomenal and on the one is true Reality identical self which with . is there any distinction of time? l)oes he say.4 INTRODUCTION the advaitin "Despite your vaunted the categories and your insistence tell nott-advaitui to criticism of you are in an impasse as great as any you brought us to. for you condemn time while yet you cannot intelligibility on transcend it". where precedes disembodiment we speak of the jivan-inukta. On your principles. dawn of perfect unshakable realisation it may it or may not synchronise with physical death. timeless and the himself. he has become the .person A may attainment. infinite. I ani released. let us see m'ore closely what happens in release.

If this is the explanation of individual salvation. Whence for the released soul there . but because for him time was not. When we are all released. the . but on the hypothesis of universal salvation there will be no such mind left when the world of time comes to an end . But the appearance nature last only so long as we stand and its illogical over against it as finite spectators bound in nescience. We the world of time coming to an end in time would arouse logical difficulties only on the assumption of a finite mind like ours bound in the categories of nescience . for the no time. for the concepts of time and production would alike have been transcended. shall be conscious only of timelessness. not of timelessness as produced by and in time. it was-. is not and will not be. at death or at a previous instant is purely a creation of our imagination still released soul there is obscured by nescience. is then the difficulty? As we are at present situated. no problem calling for reconciliation the unreleased soul which has problems exists no longer since it too has been released. is and will ever be. for 15 him timelessness alone is real. Timelessness appears illogically enougli to be achieved in and through time.DIFFICULTIES IN SARVAMUKTI timeless. further degree of release to be secured or reseeured at its death but the attainment of release in time whether . it is we who say he was released at a particular time. not because time com- mitted suicide in time. To put it in other words . not the becoming. the temporal process would not appear as such at all. if the body continues he does not cognise it as such it is we who sometimes see it functioning and imagine that there is a . it may be extended to universal salvation too. in his own realisation release has not come to be.

no doubt. wherever possible. this doctrine that he discards certain views of the jiva. the assumption of the timeless. this may be used as a test of Appayya 's own 11 and the In the last resort. feel ourselves forced to stop nowhere short of if. How exactly the latter appears as the finite intelligence former we with our though we are unable to say. . But these are not peculiar to the view of universal salvation. forest does not spare the bamboos that generated The doctrine of universal is salvation (sarvanmkti) Throughout the present work. resort. philosophical pursuit of Logic will. can at best indicate but not grasp the noumenal substrate^ A mere Logic. that is the only doctrine for which his personal preference is clearly indicated. the Logical concepts. We are forced to take time to be an appearance of the nontemporal. time to suicide. that does no violence to commonsense knowledge that arises in time may consume time. which are in and of the phenomenal world. But even in the last we are compelled to liken the transcendence of . and.16 INTRODUCTION concept of tHe transcendence of time presents. 11 difficulties enough. ference is further shown by the statement and defence It is in the light of of it in the &ivtidvaitani'rnaya. than the difficulties in And they are not greater conceiving time to be real. and this preclearly favoured by Appayya. however. lead to the favouring of those concepts which by their coherence clearly Indicate their own fulfilment in what is above Logic. problems like those of time are insoluble by for. even as the fire that breaks out in the bamboo it. relation of Isvara though he says nothing about it where he expounds those views.

245) is supposed to clinch the argument: the released soul feels his continuity with is what he was. if A dilemma (on p. can be treated only as on the* path to release. m which for the case. I. release must be identification wilh Pure Consciousness. however perfect he may otherwise lx*. (Vol. since. Chapter IV. the above question does not arise. But is it not possible Lord to be aware of Himself as continuous with the bound soul. Such a view is maintained by Mandana Misra and mentioned as a possible v*w by Sarvnjfifitman but there is no indication oV Appayya having adopted it unless ii be the mention of it last in hie own treatment of the topic 13 and the accord of ihat view . though release be imminent. The conception of universal salvation is not specifically gaiva. Consistently with the theory above sot forth.. A word may be said about jlvan-nnikti before we pass to a consideration of other topics. and he who has such a conceit. 12 A writer in the Indian Vulture. he cannot be omniscient and hence cannot be ISvara. he may be figuratively spoken of as already in order to hearten those who are much farther released. 13 See sections 1-1 to 1*4. hence.RELEASE WHILE EMBODIED jy attitude towai'ds certain advaita doctrines. in release. S 1-3 . Avhether they square with tfre doctrine of universal salvation/" IV. No. we shall have to hold that the jivan-mUkta is he who has really found release and has consequently no longer any conceit of "I" and "mine" in the body etc. 243- 246) attempts a critique of Appayya's doctrine of release without a clear understanding of that doctrine or itg antecedents. 2. There is talk of sarvamukti as early as Vacaspati. as conditioned. there arc no upadhis. removed from the goal. U' lie he not wholly released. does not feel that continuity. pp. May he not have the knowledge "That which appeared to be bound was Myself"? Is it not analogous to the experience of the ordinary intelligent man who says "That which appeared without Himself being bound? to be in the mirror was niy face"? The dilemma will not hold water.

on tho analogy of the potter's wheel. since there can be teaching through the bodily frame of the released soul. For. and no one else is qualified to teach us . as inspired by the Lord with which that soul has become one. an the further. 1933). section X of the Introduction to Bh&matl Qatusstitri (Theosophical Publishing House. have held garb. that release consists in the attainment of the state of Isvara. They have sought to separate the protective energy of nescience from its obscuring energy and maintained the continu- ance of the former even when the latter 14 See.ti is the need for advaita. The main reason for formulating reliable jlvan-muk. not from mere intellectual cognition. but by Isvara with whom that jiva has become one by intuitive realisation. much less realised? This difficulty disappears on the above view. persons preceptors of certitude froni who can speak with experience. he cannot teach us . while the apparently intelligent r functioning of that body may w ell be due to its control not by a jiva who has a conceit of identity therewith. If the released person lives no more as one of us. tho continued existence of the body for a while may be explained as due to the residue of prior ntonientum. later.* that in the so-called jivan-mukta there is a trace or residuum of nescience and for this residue they have sought various explanations and analogies.lg INTRODUCTION . is removed. Adyar. however. . nothing repugnant to the lordship of the supreme may in in thus actuating a product of maya. how then can advaita be taught. and in certain theistic systems like the Saiva is There Siddlianta 4 it is the Lord himself who to act as the preceptor is acknowledged whether in a divine or a human The majority of advaitins. with what he says.

But the topic has not been treated at any length. misery and happiness. but there can be no gradations of mere non-existence. the mirror. an upadhi.BLISS AS POSITIVE 19 example is the continued perception of reflection so long as a mirror or other reflecting medium is present. says Mandana. at least for the time. is the jlvan-mukta similarly conditioned by upadhis? If so. may be experienced together by a person half immersed in a cool tank on a hot day. such as the smell of garlic in a vessel that once contained V. Further this alleged negative nature 15 16 is inconsistent with the experience of grades 01 See section 2 -42. is not happiness. reflection here is the perception of the due to the presence of a limiting But adjunct. Absence of misery. 15 positive is significant. he who is being tortured in one hell ought to be happy. If mere absence of misery constituted any kind of happiness. as it does. Here again. for the two. because. vis. a work mentioned elsewhere in this chapter without much point. >. he is spared other tortures elsewhere. Chapter IV. The conception marking from nihilistic Buddhism and the Nyaya-Vaisesika. even though the illusion that the reflection is an independent entity has been removed. grades of happiness are is admitted by the advaitin. difficulty applies to all other illustrations. . how can he be said to be " released ?" The same it.. 13. See the Uruhmakajrfa. the discussion would have greatly benefited from a reference to the BraJimasidd'hi of the goal as off advaita. Release not mere characterised as happiness or bliss. it is cessation of misery.

on the other hand. but through realising the worthlessuess of what is desired. and this causes happiness by satisfying and thus extinguish- ing the desire that was the cause of tension and misery . but what is meant is the seeking after the lower. but this is because of our experience in a previous birth. this is intelligible since those veiy experiences condition our present station in life. This might be so.20 INTRODUCTION 1 happiness derived from different objects and through different means. If all that is sought be the cessation of a particular want. impermanent and impure forms of pleasure. desire may cease. is it true that. Very often that which is gained with less tension and effort gives. Mandana replies. it is true that because of our station in life we desire certain things straightaway without knowing that they will cause happiness. further it is truer to say that happiness conditions desire rather than that desire conditions happiness. rpljpatcdly sought after. if enjoyment of the desired object extinguished desire. happiness is proportionate to desire and effort. absence of desire does not equate with happiness. Attachment to happiness has no doubt been condemned. and what is greatly desired and sought may cause misery in the end. but only the object desired. attachment to the Highest which is Bliss is not raga any more than turning away from samsara is . not through enjoyment. it is therefore the extinction of desire and the conse- quent extinction of misery that constitute happiness. say hunger. why should there be the search for rich or tasty food? It may be said that not everything' pleases. us greater happiness. enjoyment becomes a habit and is is And. In such Nor a case. But the reverse notoriously the case. in all cases.

is ATTAINMENT FIGURATIVE ? 21 dvesa. and because we are the identical with the Highest. . The need for constant reference to two planes of thought introduces som'e confusion in the description of the attainment of release. Both modes of speech are And thus we find different schools. Yet others say that in the state of bondage consciousness (cit) alone is manifest. and since in release 17 Sections 3 '1. that even in bondage self is the object of supreme love (parama. of the nature of the Supreme. for the former view is that in truth release justification is eternally attained. that it is like the forgotten golden ornament round one's own neck and that there is but realisation of what already exists. some it were? maintaining that attainment is figurative. It is because the Highest is Bliss. Is it really attained or is it only attained as justifiable. in sotrie measure. though B is essentially such that it does not derive its existence from A. It will easily be realised how far such a notion is from nihilism or pessimism. 3-2. that all creatures are declared to subsist on a fraction of that Bliss. for there is a causal connection between A and B. if when A exists B comes to . 3*32. while others 17 The say that the word is used in the primary sense. Chapter IV. but not bliss (ananda) . yi. prema-'spada) and it is because all finite things partake. be at the very next instant. Some adherents of the latter view hold that though release is not produced (for. 3 -31. it would then be subject to destruction) it is legitimate to speak of it as caused by cessation of ignorance with the dawn of knowledge.

from the absolute point of view. UMtouifS. It is not 18 manifested. however imperfect. release may be said to be attained by knowledge. takes the empirical point of view that bliss. It is worth noting that this last view is rejected by Vacaspati for very that cit valid grounds. recognise that we do have experience of happiness and that for all its imperfection This view too fails to it is yet a fraction of the bliss that is Brahman. not ananda. 15&. 156 . pp.22 INTRODUCTION there is genuine mimif estation of bliss. we seem forced to say in the last resort that. in heaven the perfect round/' But that as a would be to understand the Absolute sum of parts. And since manifestation too is not an added virtue. though eternal. See the Jtfcdmrr/i. It is not that the whole does not exist . it is manifested but partially to us in bondage. p. A fourth view . 40 (7W/). insisted oil true it alone is is a commonplace of by sruti that the self is experienced as the object of supreme love and that there is happiness. attainment 18 JIO is but figurative. is not immediately manifested in samsara and since release brings about such manifestation. derived from the experience essential bliss of the self. but is of the essential nature of the Absolute. to the first view that attainment of release Vacaspati himself inclines and abandon19 ment of transmigration are figurative. it may be really said to be the attainment of the unattained. or results from the addition of parts though eternal. is It may : be urged that from bondage to release there a real progress in that we advance from fractions to the whole "On earth the broken ares.

Difference is perception or by inference. differences not established either by Perception is of the one being subsequently is superimposed all thereon. and so on the reality that constant in these is the true content of perception. As already noted. however. see that the pot is real. 166 (TPB). real. beginning at least as early as Mandana. reference to which is invited. to attain as intuition it it is possible were or abandon as it were." of difference is but superimposed on the single absolute self is thus of cardinal importance and has exercised the minds of muny advaitins. But. When the true content of all perception is thus one. difference too 20 Let us assum'e for a moment that is perceived. We . there is no room for negation or difference. He draws principally on the Tattvasuddhi and the Nyayasudha. For they exist by the super20 The demonstration that the world imposition alone. which being super-imposed are "Even a thousand desired to be either attained or abandoned. indeed. as Vacaspati says. alter the character of the really present snake. Some of Mandana's arguments will be found summarised in the Introduction and the notes to the Bhamatt. of those. rope-cognitions cannot.CRITICISM OF DIFFERENCE 28 ra This "attainment as it were" and "abandonment as it were ' ' are due to knowledge. without dependence on any extrinsic observances. In the case. by the m'ere of the truth. . Then perception would Bnamatl. the former draws its inspiration from the BrahmasiddM. p. Appayya naturally devotes some space to this topic in the early sections of the second chapter. the cloth is real.

the latter to its difference tions. cannot obviously be simultaneous. These must depend on an antecedent perception. inference is based on concomitance of the perceived. it is idle to contend that it subsequently denies as well. from others. affirmatively as well as negatively. that again pro-supposes an affirmation and we are in the old round. for cognition does not arise first and then function it arises . Nor can we say that affirmation is itself negation. when once it has arisen as affirmative. for that would be io urge that the same cognition is born twice over. Therefore. Now negation cannot be the first. which are momentary. unless we admit the primary function to bo affirmative we seem condemned 1o an infinite Granted this primary affirmative character.24 INTRODUCTION have two functions. since it involves the positive knowledge of what is denied and that of which it is denied affirmation (thenisedha-pratiyogin andthenisedha-visaya). positive and negative. since tion. the former relating to the proper nature of what is perceived. of everything else in the world? fication for calling this perception? negation If so what is the justi- is it . For perception is of what is in sense-contact and the negative cognition cognition of everything else in the world obviously includes much that is not and cannot be in sense-contact. difference is not established through percepMuch less can it depend on inference. there is no room for negation too being a function. one must come first. that is absurd in the case of cognitions. as affirming or denying. about which there arises the question whether it is primarily affirmative or negative. These two func- and negation. regress. if negation be said to be the function of another cognition.

occupies the position of sublater with reference to the other two. since it would pretend to prove what it is As for testimony. It holds where the later cannot arise except as contradicting the earlier cognition. inference is no more capable of it. not silver". it. ' ' Where the subsequent cognition can come into being even otherwise and the whole context is governed by what comes first. On the whole topic of this paragraph II. that between positive and negative instance and so on if inference were invoked to establish difference it would be a ease of pet it o principii. The principle of the subsequent sublatiug the earlier is is "This known as the apaccheda-nyaya.SUPERIOR VALIDITY OF SCRIPTURE 35 where perception can establish no difference at all. Further. This is the principle known as syntactical unity with the sense of 21 VeMnta 8Htras t I. then the initial cognition is predominant and overrules whatever comes later. that between probans and probandum and subject. as in " This is silver ' ' and ' ' This is not silver. and. see I: 6 and section 1 and its sub-sections in Chapter S 1-4 . 6ankara in his commentary on the samanvnya-sutra 31 that the harmonious purport of all Vedanta texts is . inference proceeds on a basis of difference. as this cognition arises subsequently to perception like the cognition and inference. non-dualism. it is It is of greater value than other pramfinay since admittedly free from defect. it has been shown by itself based on. 4. VIII. There can be no objection to the superior validity of sruti in matters like the present which are superscnsuous. i.

and this reality is not inconsistent with it. the heat of the hardness of gold. Section &. Chapter II. the weight of stones. these are definitely within the sphere of perception. even if we do not agree with those who hold that there is only such perception of words etc. sentences etc. cooking in the . 3*1. as is common to valid knowledge and delusion.. or even if it be difficult to deny purport we say that smti trespasses into the limited field of empirical reality which we have marked off for perception. there is no need to concede more than empirical reality to perceptual cognition . Chapter II. In the present case. hence the apaccheda-nyaya applies latter is sublated and the the case by the former. sense of softening is impossible in the case of golden grains.2Q INTRODUCTION upakrama-nyaya.. 23 It is not that Scripture overrides perception in every case. being transcended on the realisation of non-difference. we therefore interpret it to mean nothing more 22 23 Sections 1*6. 2*1. 2*2 and sub-sections of 2 '3. Scripture has no application thereto or our denial of the application of sruti may be due to our incapacity to do what we are asked to do by Scripture . and fire. for. as the six " marks of purport are not coincident . . 3' 2 and 3*3. scriptural cognition of non-difference cannot come into being except as contradicting the alleged perceptual 22 cognition of difference . Nor is it that the former cannot arise except in dependence on perceptual knowledge of words. where " float it certainly do not admit its authority " stones contradicts experience saying that We or asks us to "cook the golden grains. In such cases we say that there is no purport in the literal sense of sruti.

in the . its obviously doing somescope. But the view of anirvacanlyakhyati is mentioned and justified in the case of som'e delusions like reflections and dreams. When. tho content of the delusive cognition neither real nor unreal nor a combination of both. perception pretends to declare the nature of ultimate reality. The world of perception is illusory. diction. On any one of these views may be justified our adoption of secondary implication (laksana) for Scriptural passages that conflict with perception. has found favour in the explanation rof certain illusions. According to is this view. however. These are called instances of sopadhika-bhrarmi. to say that it is real and unreal is to violate the law of contrabe what is real at .ACCOUNT OF ILLUSIONS 2? than heating. hence it is something indeterminable arid originated. There is not much discussion of different views of illusion. apprehension of what is elsewhere or what is otherwise. thing outside legitimate. If it admit of empirical usage for the . for rib such thing can be cognised as immediate or cause practical activity if it were real. The view of anyathakayati. and its sublation of sruti is it is IX. something which is were unreal it would not is saitie reason it cannot some other time or place. This view of the creation of the illusory has not been consistently adhered to by the advaitins. but originated at the time. like the flower beside the crystal in the cognition of the crystal as red. it could not be sublated. which seem to be manifestly due to external circumstances.

which apprehends the silver-ness or yellowness present elsewhere.28 INTRODUCTION is explanation of these it is the quality of the upadhi that said to be apprehended erroneously in the pure substrate. is experienced in dissociation from the bile . 25 Vacaspati's explanation of the delusion that a [perceived conch-shell is yellow: "the yellow. Many 21 of the explanations offered by Vacaspati are of this nature.). PP. p. in one way or another. and the other. BMmatL Bhawatl. P. or the colourless shell (in the experience "the shell is yellow"). Now. because of similarity in respect of non-apprehension of non-relationship. yellow lilva fruit' is imposed * on yellowness and shell-ness and one speaks of the yellow shell. so much so that his to commentator. then ignorance being destroyed Sastri's edn. the appositional relation previously seen (in experiences) like yellow mass of gold. . There are - assumed two psychoses in any such explanation. one which appreheuds the "this" (in the experience "this is silver"). 1819 24 18 (TPH). Does the "this" perform this function? psychosis.to remove ignorance." Similar explanations are given of the delusion in dreams and in reflections. Amalananda. the shell too is experienced (but) with the whiteness concealed by a defect (in the sense-organ) . the non-relation of the yellow colour to the shell is not experienced. it is no If it floes. it is the business of a psychosis. 24 25 first psychosis of the If it does not. Kalpatoni. (Anantakn?ga 26 (TPH). This is feels called upon defend him against the charge of maintaining anyathakhyati. which resides in the bile that is in contact with the exceed- ingly pure rays going forth from the eye.

for instance. else there would be no delusion. what is the colour apprehended? It is It is not white. But it runs counter to experience say that the "that" and the "what" are the contents of different psychoses. can be the nature of the psychosis of the shell in the delusion to ' * The shell is yellow the first The whole experience is visual psychosis too is obviously visual. What. Another view says that though ignorance in its obscuring (avarana) aspect. A modus vivendi always interesting. The explanation would be satisfactory. not about the variety of the content. super-adding to by sub-division and adjustment is a cognition of "-thus" or "thus". if a cognition of the bare "this" were possible at any time. From its very origination our cognition is of a "that-what".TWO PSYCHOSES there IN ILLUSIONS 29 is no longer the material cause of delusion . hence there can be no illusion of silverness or yellowness. But can 1 . though it the "that" and the "what" fall apart on reflection and are found to be inadequate each to the other even in what we call true cognition. ' ' there be any visual psychosis which does not apprehend some colour? If not. According to one of these the "this "-psychosis does remove ignorance. it is destroyed that in not destroyed it is it in protective (viksepa) aspect. . Chapter I. We never have a perception of a bare "here" and "now". 27 Sections 5-151 and 5-152. of the cognition of "this" as "this" spite its Hence continues to be perceived as silver or as yellow. but does not take us far in the present instance. but only is about this-ness. At least two al tempts 27 are made to conserve the view of two psychoses.

like bile in the sense- organ. else there would be no second psychosis apprehending yellowness. or like desire. When there is defect. In truth. the indeterminable transformation of nescience. we. and there results a transformation thereof. It cannot be cognition of the colourless. have to remember the other cases of delusions where such a characterless cognition of the substrate is obviously impossible. then. This transformation is a "that-what". as there can be no visual cognition of such a nature. Though delusions involving similarity. but as part of a present content. If it related memory is merely to what exists elsewhere. this view would be identical with anyathakhyati and would fail to explain the practical efficiency of the cognition.3() INTRODUCTION not yellow. and economy would compel us to assume as the cause of illusion what is common to all cases. in the percipient. there is set up an agitation in nescience. whether of the form "The shell is yellow" or of the form "This is silver". as in "This is silver". It is not some other colour. m there would seeni to be some case for admitting an initial cognition of the substrate as a mere "this". the material cause of delusion. and the sense-organ comes in contact with the object. as that is contrary to experience. the "that" being sensed and the "what" remembered. there is only one psychosis. as in "the shell is yellow". greed etc. But the "what" though supplied by cognised not as part of another remembered object. which on analysis is found to comprise a sense-element and a memoryelement. not what is peculiar .

also an article by the present writer on "A Little Known Advaitin". with certain properties such as facing oneself. being located in the mirror etc. and it is under this name that a very imperfect but interesting Ms. Further. Thus both Vacaspati and Padmapada look on the reflection not as to an indeterminable creation but as identical with the prototype. extensively by Appayya and. 28 31 psychological knowledge would not warrant the assumption of a psychosis cognis- Modern ing the characterless substrate. Ill. Vol. superimposed 29 thereon. to clinch diously. and the Vivaranadarpana (see Natocaritran&palca of Nllakajtfha Dik^ita. It is possible in the nature of things that Appayya refers thus to his own father who was his guru and whose teachings he is trying here to set forth compeninstance. that Appayya's father.. vivara$adarpa$ady-aneka-prabhanda-nirmata gilita eva Sri raftgarajftdaSome Mss. in nearly every an argument by stating the final view. the Advaitavidyacarya 28 On the whole topic see section 5*153. 3: "tasya ca paftcamafc sttnur advaitavidy&mukurovarl"). of Nalacaritran&talca refer to the Advaitamukura. was the author of several famous works. Appayya's brother's grandson. Raftgaraja Makhin. Chapter I. 1. such as the Advaitavidytimukura. p. Journal of the Madras University. As against this. but by analysis of the indeterminable manifold given in sense-perception. Balamanoraina Series. is found . the insistence on the uniform adoption of this in explaining all illusion seems have come only from later advaitins. 29 This Acftrya is cited We are also told by Nllakaijtha DIk?ita.REFLECTIONS AS ILLUSIONS to one set alone. X The indeterminable being admitted to be the content of illusory cognition. No. the explanation here suggested by Kavitarkika Cakravarti Nrsimha Bhattopadhyaya would certainly be more in conformity with the advaitin's general tendency to explain the cognition of attributes as arrived at not by an independent psychosis.

Vol. XXI. No doubt in order that there may be a superimposition. the Descriptive Catalogue by P. m'ay well account for the superimposition. in identification.32 INTRODUCTION maintains that the reflection not true that there is is but a creation. first is There p. P. this is probably another for the Vivaranadarpana. name . When the sublating cognition com'es. an Imperfect Ms. It is no cognition of the reflection as something other than oneself. When we create a chimaera in our imagination. residual impressions of past experience are a necessary factor. Mysore. not merely the location of the original face in the mirror. in the absence of any such experience or the impression consequent thereon. Vivaranadarpana. 7064 ot Nandin&gari in the Oriental Manuscripts Library. No one has had in the past a direct visual experience of one's own forehead. but because we have had It runs only to the end or and the material therein gives no room for a positive the pariccheda Of the other work. But there is no rule that superimposition requires as its cause a residual impression of the experience of the Impression from visual experience of other persons' foreheads. S. therefore. other than sight. Sastri. it may seem' impossible to account for the creation of a superimposed forehead in the proximity of the mirror. it denies the reality of the reflection itself. combined with the experience of one's own forehead through senses very object superimposed. Children and other unsophiscated persons look for the reflected face in or behind the mirror. a reference to the VivaranapraMfa. it is not because we have actually had experience of the chimaera. The identification of the reflected face with the original is due to a later mental process. as another book of Raftgaraja's in the available fragment of the AdvaitaMukura. 5206). Is to be found in the Tanjore Palace Library (see No.

should not the former have the properties of the latter? Yet who ever heard of a reflection of the moon being cool. if the reflection is identical with the prototype. as the moon is? For these and other reasons the Advaitavidyacarya has no hesitation in rejecting the teaching of the Vivarana school on this point. for then the jiva too would be illusory and there would be none to be released. how is it and that they do not reach to one who is right behind us cause the apprehension of his face too? Again. reach and apprehend the solar orb. Our Acarya gets over the difficulty saying that S it is peculiar only to the 15 . how is it that these same delicate rays go up against the much stronger rays of the sun.REFLECTIONS AS ILLUSIONS 83 experiences of the several elements which we put together in our imagination to constitute the chimaera. rays of light proceeding from the eyes of the observer are turned back by the reflecting medium'. in reflection. in looking at a clear sheet of water. The advocates of the Vivarana view set up a wholly implausible theory when they say that. how is it that we see reflections of other objects too by the side of our reflected face? If the rays be admitted to reach the other objects as well. Do these reflected own face and nowhere If so. thus causing the cognition of the reflection of the sun? Again. how is it that some rays from the eyes are reflected back while others penetrate the water and apprehend the sandy bottom? If it be said that som'e rays are turned back because they are exceedingly delicate. go back to the prototype face and apprehend rays go straight back to one's else? it. The view that the reflection is an illusory creation offers some difficulties on the view that the jiva is a reflection.

in discause activity here and now. to say whether he definitely accepts here the theory of Advaitavidyacarya or whether he merely states it as a view worthy of consideration. while the present view of reflection seems to go with the rejection jiva." that "silverness" belonging somewhere else is brought over here and associated with silver or silver-ness? We the "this".34 INTRODUCTION view that holds the jiva to be a reflection and that there is no such difficulty on the avaccheda view. It is this uniformity cannot be secured without making out the content of the superimposition to be wholly illusory. and v not because of its "this-ness . seen reason to reject the We . cussing the Cakravarti's view. the "silverness" that belongs elsewhere cannot havB already. what is it that is created cannot say that there is experience only of a "this. we are active in regard to "this". But we have seen in dealing with sarvamukti that he is forced to reject the avaccheda view. What is interesting in this view of reflection is the attempt to affirm one uniform principle in all illusion.. but because of its "silverness". according to which Pure Consciousness is defined as it wsre in the the position which he assigns and the elaborate way in which he explains it. form of the it Prom to in the discussion 1 1 of the view that the jiva is a pratlbimba. Appayya would seem to have considerable sympathy with the view of reflection as an illusory creation. When there is experience of nacre-silver. whether due to an external adjunct (sopadhika) or otherwise. It cannot be that in certain cases there attributes is transference of is from elsewhere. while in others the content worth examining whether an illusory creation. therefore. for. It is difficult.

he uses the analogy of reflection legitimately enough. The latter is translated hero. without fear of denying the possibility of It is by no means certain either that the avaccheda view is inconsistent with sarvamukti. though. II. 40 (Anantakrsna Sastri's edition. i. "This is to be considered here: intelligence is of itself eteraaily released. #. Chapter IV.. following the Sutrakara. on 4. That this jlvatva is an illusory creation any advaitin may admit release. iii. but he may exposition. I. but only for the jlvatva of Pure Consciousness. 31 The point 30 30 makes only a casual reference to evident that to him at least no incon- See the Bhdmati on Ved. p. then. The jiva is not a reflection. 617). illusoriness follows not for the jiva. a "that-what". have. when it is said a reflection. Appayya 's own criticism of the avaccheda view is not quite sound. For . that is illusory.AVACCHEDA VIEW AND SARVAMUKTI 35 1 hypothesis of two psychoses one relating to the "this' and another to "silver". it will be sufficient to postulate the illusory creation not of silver but of silver-ness. 31 See foot-note to the translation of section 4*21. believer in universal salvation. But it is sistency was apparent in holding together the views of avaccheda and sarvamukti. the silverness. though he develops the be likened to a reflection for purposes of And Vacaspati would appear to be a doctrine nowhere and it. a single psychosis of the form "this-silver". it is the "what "-element. also Acyuta Kpftj&nanda's comment. We The "that "-element of this indeterminable "that-what" need not itself be illusory. that the jiva is Similarly. As Appayya himself has shown towards the close of his Pariniala Vacaspati holds the avaccheda view. In the whole experience.

there is the state of the jiva and bondage. no matter whether it be the attainment of Isvaratva or the merger in pure intelligence. when definition by one internal organ m'ay be definition afresh of Pure there is not proved fresh bondage for the jiva that was According to Appayya. this is settled. Nor is it possible to bring about that (fresh bondage) to the released pure intelligence. even of bondage. for there is myself have again reached to transmigrareleased. Our author has evidently a long way to travel before he comes to a this. when of the status of another jiva other bound jiva. the internal as noted by the commentator.* . not reflected But in. since this attainment of the state of another jiva released jiva. And it can do nothing. nescience or its product. the statement 'because of tho coni was formerly bound and then tingence of fresh bondage' intelligence there is. if a multiplicity of souls be admitted. there was bondage prior to release. ot tlio Similarly. through the removal of that adjunct at the time of release. there is not possible the recollection I '1 who was formerly a transmigrator and was somehow tion'.36 of that criticism is INTRODUCTION the contingence of fresh bondage for the released soul. there is removal (also) of the former locus For. released. the alleged contingence It is true that even not at all clear. the attainment of the state of some other jiva having that (organ) as adjunct. on the conjunction of the adjunct of some since there is no contingence of bondage for turn who released. has ceased. there Consciousness by another internal organ but with this . not for that can fresh bondage be brought about. Further. not possible. does not import any defect. even the earlier mentioned attainment Reflection state of another jivji of the nature of a can do nothing (to import u delect into the theory). For. when for the released through conjunction of another internal organ. it would follow that on the a vaccheda view release of any kind is not possible. souls treated as Pure Consciousness defined by. and the organ. dependent on that for that there is attainment (adjunct). as beginninglessly defined or conditioned or defined by an adjunct. And thus that part of intelligence for which. no identity of adjunct as between the bound jiva and the thus. Acyuta is Krsnananda. as dependent on an adjunct.

Though ether is one and indivisible.themselves function as the adjuncts. media possessing colour. . a room etc. odour. by nescience or its it be moved from place is to place 1 consciousness products. it is When a pot carried is from one place to another. there is possibility of sui'vumukti. how can there be reflectedness?" The. the pot alone that m'oved.METIITS OP THE AVACCHEDA vlfiW #f proper appreciation of the avaccheda view. Oij the former diverse is view. view.apparent limitation objects possessing colour in of the impartible ether affords a closer approximation to the truth. the internal organs. are the adjuncts and on the latter view. there and would if reflections are be be none it to The more serious difficulty alleges against the reflection theory is the impossibility of a Reflections are invariably of reflection of intelligence. we treat is it as if defined by a pot. the nesciences . taste and the like. lor the latter is based on the conception of Even on such a ass man's nature eternally tmd essentially intelligence. difficulty is not based solely or if mentioned above that reflection creations. how can there be a reflection of one in the other? As the Bhattas ask "For sound. Which accepted as the limiting adjunct depends on whether nescience is admitted to Jre one or many. as interna^ organs. When neither the prototype (intelligence) nor the reflecting medium (nescience) possesses colour. . ag found in the Parimala. the defined. not the ether how can the pervasive ether In the same way pure were. XL The avaccheda view mainly on the the jiva be a illusory released.

. Such a conception is hardly adequate. where does Isvara come in ? The difficulty seems great on the views which recognise a single locate it in its totality maya or nescience and Brahman. here too may be accepted the view that till the final release consists in attaining the status of Isvara. then. Brahman will be Isvara. hypothesis of a plurality of mayas or nesciences. Creation and destruction generally attributed to Isvara can hardly be attributed to a collective soul. Pure intelligence is Brahm'aii. it will be the jivas.$8 INTRODUCTION it The realisation of this is release or less. . not a serious difficulty for any Hindu philosophical system. is the position of Isvara on the avaccheda view. may be delayed more Since the avaccheda but can never be denied. as defined by those mayas taken collectively. appears as the jivas as undefined it is Such a solution is possible even on the it . parts of m'aya. Akasa as defined by a group of trees is called a forest. would jiva. it Society may conserve can hardly be said to make in a figurative sense. them or destroy them except however. release of all. it is called a tree. since no such . be a kind of collective lie would stand to the jiva in much the same relation as Society or Humanity to individual m'en. Brahman. On this analogy. Isvara. as defined by each particular tree. as defined by them singly. though this is most intelligible on the view that the jiva is a reflection of Isvara. who is Brahman defined by m'aya. defined intelligences are the jivas . What causes real difficulty. view has no objection to employ reflection as an illustration. men and govern them This is. Brahman as defined by maya in appears as Isvara as defined by the many . however.

is that Isvara thus conceived can hardly occupy the same place as the God of religion. be merely a collective soul. for it is of is which is implied by the conception not a difference of degree alono. it does no groat violence to imagine the collective soul as The creating and destroying the material universe. however. This is done by the view which holds Lsvara to be Brahman's reflection in maya. for. As for the creation of the individual souls material world. avidya is distinguished from maya in that while pure sattva is predominant in the latter. more serious defect of the view. since to even are seen be capable in some measure of fashioning their objects of enjoyment. the transcendence is secured in that the collective soul is transcendence is more than the individual. The collective soul is sure to command degree of loyalty even as Society and Humanity. make him almost as helpless as the jiva. while the jlvas are Brahman's reflection in avidya. I6vara could hardly control the jivas. would Such an it who ever heard of one reflection controlling another? Much less . but a certain also transcendent . That God as a more. It is Isvara cannot possible to over-emphasise this aspect of transcendence.GOD IN ADVAITA system admits the creation or destruction of 39 souls. impure sattva is dominant in the former. why movements like the Religion of Humanity can difference never secure a permanent foundation. Such an account would be defective in two ways. Reducing Isvara too to a reflection. but it can command little of religious awo and adoration. God has to be not merely immanent. but the not great enough to constitute a of quality marked this difference as well.

but that it this different from assertion belongs to Brahman. are their Neither Brahman nor may bo treated as the locus. it is yet can be destroyed without affecting the possessor of the gakti. and feels the lack of these perfections. gence there they did not belong to his essential nature he would. then. a plurality of nesciences is also assumed. there is little to be said for that variety of it which holds isvara too to be a reflection. Whatever may be the merits of the reflection theory. we have still to say that a akti of avidya is destroyed when a particular soul is released. It belongs to the jivas. never know of their non-existence. for gakti and its possessor are fundamentally non-different. of course. From this point of view. It is the jiva who suffers from his If finitude. 32 The content of the nescience is Isvara. see fiakti how a one of these being destroyed on the release of each jiva. since this would conflict with their eternal perfection. back. On this view. though this is not to say that avidya itself is destroyed (thus implying the simultaneous release of difficult to all jivas). to the avaccheda view. We the have to say. even in feeling their 32 The assumption of many gaktis for one avidya may reconcile the singleness of avidya with the plurality of the jlvas. on such a view f however. we shall have to turn to som'e form of it which gives Kvara a Coming better position than that of a collective soul. . Isvara Isvara is the content of the nesciences.40 INTRODUCTION can He sympathise or help. while the jlvas loci. This is what it means in other words: for is Brahman as pure intelli- no question of attributes like omniscience. omnipotence etc. that is ignorance like everything else is in Brahman. and since jlvas arc many. The view that nesciences are many and that they arc located in the jlvas would seem to be more suitable. it is simpler to assume a multiplicity of nesciences.

Every nescience is bipolar. their content is in all cases the same Isvara. with Isvara at one end and a particular jiva. and there is merger of that jiva with Isvara. that release until the final release of all is but the attainment with Brahman.GOD IN THE AVACCHEDA VIEW 4j absence. his ignorance. The view. While the loci of the various nesciences are different. this ignorance belongs to him as jiva. he transcends his apparent finitude if he does not realise them fully in his own nature it is because of . further merit of A the present view is that the stressing aspects it avoids the defects of overof God's immanence or S 16 . the embodiment of these is Isvara who is thus the content of nescience. therefore. Jiva Jiva 3 When knowledge comos to any jiva there is realisation of the perfection about which there was ignorance. of the state of Isvara squares even with this variety of the avaccheda theory of the jiva. as contrasted with the jiva who is but the locus. it relates to the perfections which he lacks and which he considers as embodied elsewhere. at the other. But so long as even a single nescience exists the polarity of Isvara-jlva persists. and the jiva that has attained the status of Isvara cannot fied move further and be identi- only when This final merger will be possible the said polarity disappears by the ultimate destruction of all nesciences.

. what is phenomenal indeterminable. He is or net even to the limited extent that they do but for tlieir fundamental identity with the omniscient and omnipotent God. The sub-sections of section 2 '32 discuss the unity or plurality of the jlva and of nescience. 33 while the jivas are not the controllers of the nescience said to be located in 34 them but are under . 33 "mayinam The tu maheSvaram": &vrf. hut also the inspirer of their limited knowledge and activity. 10. more The avaccheda view of the jiva is thus in unison with the essentials of our conception of it God. IV. But at the same time the jiva is ignorant of the Lord. Upa. and Kvara. between his capacities and the Lord's. A collective jiva would be under the influence of collective nuiyfi. for of all the nesciences together He is the wieldcr. constitutes nescience-character tad ev& 'vidyanam avidyatvam. in a sense he the product of nescience. INTRODUCTION God is immanent in this view since He not merely the content of their ignorance. admittedly the no defect in indeed. however. . Is 34 is jlva would not be what he but for nescience. A fuller statement of the other views has been avoicjed In the Introduction. feel is the internal ruler. the difference is great enough to be one of quality.42 transcendence. which. the jivas would not know. nescience. see section 2 31 and Chapter I. 35 For a statement of all views as to the relation of the jiva its sub-sections. while makes room for the doctrine of universal 35 salvation so convincingly pressed by Appayya. lies in how then can he be the locus of nescience? The answer nescience. the life of the jlva as jlva is possible only because his energies are fragments of the energies of the Lord. He is more than any jiva or all jivas put together. That. whereas Isvara is the over- lord of maya. on the contrary. 1 its influence. pointing to the beginnlngless nature of nescience. An earlier nescience produces the jlva who becomes and of the locus of subsequent is This means infinite regress.

io And on this view. thus the Vartikakarapada. while the appearance as distinct from the inert and the non-inert. of ignorance. Is who has . for. there abandonment of the sense expressly too is indeterminable. There is a variety of the pratibimba-vada. in the case of the witness-intelligence non-discriminated from that (ignorance) there at no time whatever the manifestation of difference. hence not the distinction between by Appayya. about the A great of deal of unnecessary refinement was introduced time Such. signified (by those words). the agent. "The self conditioned is. and the cogniser. there Is difference the appearances of intelligence present therein. who has come of to be identilied \vith is. is real. there is but exclusive secondary implication. he has since it will lead to undue prolixity besides serving no purpose. nation from the appearance (abhasa) of the intelligence that called the internal ruler.1LLUSORINESS AND PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY 43 XII. known with wholly being the is illusory* as abhasa-vada. difference Because of the in of the Intellect with each body. is two view noted distinction between jlva and lavara. (see sub-sections of section 5*141. called the jlva. thou' etc. because of non-discrimination the appearance (abhasa) (therein) of the intelligence that is Himself. prevailed and Fortunately the interests of parsimony have repeatedly we find the counter-tendency to assimilate these extraneous Thus the witness-intelligence has been sought to be identified with a form of I6vara or a form of the jlva entities to those already recognised. the following is a translation of what he has to say on the whole topic of tho theories. identical the this prototype. difference in the appearance of intelligence present therein. in respect of the conditioning adjunct together with the is appearance (therein). when the word Brahman comes to have for express significance ignorance together with the appearance therein (ol . for instance. in respect of the words 'That. Chapter I). the witness. isvara Vidyaranya. non-discriminated therefrom hence even the intelligence Is cognised as if different. the abhasa is considered to be while the reflection . and he. the enjoyer. in some views. That is stated in the 8ank$epa6ariraka: 'Again. Because of the nonhowever.come to be identified with ignorance. but mentioned by Madhusudana SasaravatI in tho SiddMntabindu. by ignorance. because of non-discrimiHimself. and because of the non-existence of difference. the cause of the world. The entire choir of heaven and furniture of the earth being reduced to illusion by the advaitin. is the tendency to recognise a kutastha intelligence or a witness-intelligence as distinct from the jlva. who that.. is conditioned by the intellect. and Brahman.

even the intelligence non-discriminated from the appearance is the express significance of the words 'That thou art'. thus says Vacaspati Misra. pure intelligence unconditioned by .' Nor may there is it be said that since bondage is for the appearance alone. hence there whatsoever. Therefore it is only the (defective) appearance of pure intelligence that removal thereof is release. (This world belongs to the jiva alone. And even (of a figu- world cieated (theretrom). as well as the unintelligibility of activity (on the part of the its own destruction. There is no doubt that even the illusory word / is practically its intelligence). is only one possible interalso pretation of Vacaspati's view. Brahmananda's commentary on the introduction to the 117. perhaps a sounder. intelligence as reflected by ignorance defined by the internal organ and its residual impressions reflected is is the jiva: thus the author of the Vivarana. because of the diversity of ignorance. That has been appearance) for said by the Vartikakarapada '. since there is non- abandonment defect of part of what is is expressly signified. p. thou' there is but exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication. It no this view which is called abhamviUa. The prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is isvara. the common world) is recognition because of similarity. the thus the author of the Sankxepasdriraka.viz. Or else. the prototype intelligence conditioned by ignorance is the pure: On these two views. and the nothing irreconcilable. see tiiddhtintabindu. the praMimba-vada* Intelligence It is this view that they call made the content of ignorance is Isvara: and that which is the locus of ignorance is the jiva. Because etc. of the reality of the reflection. is Intelligence intellect in ignorance Isvara. And on this view. there is difference of loci for bondage and release. thus there is is bondage. according to us.44 INTRODUCTION to account for successful practical activity in the world. there is diversity of jlvas. conditioned by ignorance is ivara and intelligence prototype intelligence reflected in ignorance is the jiva. since material causality of the us conditioned by his own ignorance. then the comes to is have individuation for express significance. And for each jiva the world is different. of the jlva's ignorance together with the rative. therefore. but on that view there exclusive secondary implication.. the experience of the self as a transmigrate!''. in respect of the words 'That. while release for pure intelligence. view. : 'This alone is what is evil. TPH edn. diversity of the jlvas is because of the differences of intellect. intelligence reflected in the the jiva. For another. bondage is admitted even of pure intelligence. on this view there is is but the exclusive-non-exclusive secondary implication. for.. as being the substrate The It is this which is the avacchcda-vada. through the channel of the appearance.). while Isvara's causality is BMmati.

what is conditioned by ignorance is is of these. opinion. see section 3 -71. in spite of this three-fold distinction how can it be said that is the truth and that is it is established by Scripture tions. as the principal conclusion of the Vedanta. analogies are not wanting in ordinary experience. eka-jlva-vada. and section 3 72. The not absolutely real how can it tell us pramana. waking experience. similarly in the In the former we have a persistent mental exaltation. then. . vada. The dream of a damsel produces consequences which. Presumably because it is based on a valid means of knowledge. 112 Advaitamafijarl edition). revelation. either is Ivara. that though pramana can never be absolutely real. For such a position. the Advaitavidyacarya holds that practical The efficiency may be even of a higher grade of reality. need for such a view com'es thus.iLLUSORINESS AND PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY 4^ The water of the dream quenches the thirst in the dream. the practical efficiency of the pramana may be that of a higher grade. in the latter ignorance is we have a the jlva. persist in case of a snake-dream. say. Chapter P . But is practical that efficiency limited to the same grade of reality as which is efficient? While some schools incline to this efficient to a limited extent. he who apprehends non-dualism l non-dualism' as the pramatr. are not absolutely real. what called the 118. But now we have revelation as pramana. non-dualism as the prameya. The hostile critic of advaita wants to know how non-dualism is known to be the truth. It is this that they call drsU-srsti-vada" (pp. anything valid about absolute reality 1 The reply would be that though belonging only grade of to the empirical reality. it may yet make known the absolutely real. far from being sublated. ? The only answer is that all these distinc- though existent. its For further information about the subsections.

consequent on fear. The appeal to samsfcara therefore not possible. the cognition of the dream that which accounts for the practical viz. that aspect The fact of too is but illusory and assumptive. and when the for this cognition is no experience as a whole is said to be illusory. it is it be said that even in dream there something content and efficiency .46 INTRODUCTION persistent bodily trembling etc. without distinction. tive more than the cogniaspect of the dream-experience. the dream has more fear than he touched one. but the practical efficiency varies as shown by the grades of happiness and blished It is esta- thus that the practical efficiency of an . here the persistence is explained on the basis of residual impressions (samskara). But immediacy as such cannot adequately account for the practical effects in their gradation.. He that has kissed for it is a fact that the dream is a girl in the dream has more happiness than he who has merely seen one he that has been bitten by a snake in . immediacy may perhaps claim not to be assumptive. this is just the conclusion sought to be established. But where the snake was dreamt of. the trembling and the snake belong to different is orders of experience. experienced. continue even after the illusory snake of waking experience is known to be illusory. If there were not such practical efficiency. The immediacy is who has merely common to all these fear. It is true that trembling etc. why should people desire pleasant dreams and hate unpleasant and dreams ? is Nor may real.. even if such an it appeal is made comes only to this that residual impressions belonging to one grade of reality can produce practical effects of another grade of reality.

It is possible to go a step further and say that far practical efficiency requiring to be explained in the case of the indeterminable. The merely apparent have empiri- and the empirically real may culminate in absolute reality. For. The proposition will not appear so paradoxical if we remember that when we speak of cally real effects effect.THE INDETEHMINABLE ALONE AS PRACTICALLY EFFICIENT 47 experience may belong to a higher grade of reality than that experience. parti ess. there is no contradiction becoming manifest in the highest type of viz. to itself or another not to itself because it has no wants to satisfy. the efficient it were wholly real it from change. Whence would then can there be activity or efficiency? The self alone It is no good is the real. A more fundamental objection to the illusion doc- trine attacks the status of that doctrine itself.. Brahma-saksatkara. it is the indeterminable from alone that can be practically is neither real nor unreal. This interesting argument is developed in the Advaitavidydmukura but does not figure in the efficiency. short of reality it is only that which is neither real nor unreal that can possess practical . since it is non-existent. since there are no others. in time. it XIII. like the horns of a hare cannot be active or efficient. empirically valid experience. though one might have expected there. Is that . efficient. free . unreal. but the manifestation of what is latent And ex hypotJiesi what in its being absolute reality. Efficiency then requires existence. and the self knows no change. we mean not a bare consequent is latent. again. The If be perfect. Siddhantalesa. not to others.

i.4g illusory or not ? least INTRODUCTION If not. it would seem to be begging tho question to say that illusoriness may be of the same grade of reality as the world of ether etc. we have.. illnsoriness. it If illusoriness had been proved. not being real. trifle more subtle. but by other error and delusions. Chapter II. viz. since when nacre is cognised to be such. etc. the illusoriness of the world may then have the same grade of 36 reality as the world of ether it. hence non- dualism on the other hand. and need not be absolute.. If. this doctrine. the is 86 See section 4*61. then the world. would be valid to maintain that that itself may be illusory. The other answer mentioned by Appayya is a We say that nacre-silver is illusory.. thus again non-dualism has to be abandoned. there is conflict with non-nacreity. The present work gives two replies. while the proof is not yet complete about the world of ether etc. at one other fails. One would expect the sublater to have a higher degree of reality than the sublated. viz. when there the right intuition of the substrate of the nacre-silver experience. What denied by us is the and that which denies.. reality of the world. besides Brahman. that too is illusory. is consequently real. . riot On the face of the argument very satisfactory. not is absolute reality. instances are known of error and delusion being removed not by absolute truth. need not bo more real than what is denied.e. both is of which are interesting.. reality. but illusoriness cannot be is proved until there resolved the apparent absurdity of illusoriness being illusory without the content being absolutely real. whose illusoriness is illusory. Further.

seem to be really in an impasse. Other proofs depend on the fact of the world being the object of finite cognition. When there is cognition of not removed. it is difficult to see is When nacre . perceived as nacre. makes out both itself and its illusoriness to be illusory. an obstacle based on the Law of 37 See section 4*52.ILLUSORINESS AS ILLUSORY 49 silverness. in the same way as nacreity is opposed to non-nacreity. the petitio principii is avoided. 37 Here again. concept of illusoriness cannot intelligibly fit in with non-dualism. all the intelli- If the world were apprehended as illusory. however. hence the world. then. The very cognition of the world. and what we are opposing time is the possibility of asserting illusoriness gently in respect of the universe. But all To do these proofs have to surmount the logical obstacle sot up by the critic." is What is actually stated. its nacreity cannot is how be removed that self-evident if not tautologous. is not opposed to the non- silverness of the substrate. not removed when nacre it is its illusoriness is is opposed to the non-illusoriness of the world. The parallel statement would be its ceived as the world. Chapter II. that its illusoriness cannot be removed. its illusoriness would bo opposed to non-illusoriness but according to the critic the world cannot be apprehended as illusory. on its being sublatablc and so on. since Hie . "When the world is perworldliness cannot be removed. The criticism of the allegation that perception cognises a world of difference has been already set forth. We the advaitin justice he has independent proofs of the illusoriness of the world. as nacreity is perceived to be such. which is illusory. 8 17 .

activity (not even cognition) in respect of what is un- known nor can already known . This is the nerve of the argument. Our knowledge itself is a paradox for it cannot be of the unknown. in either case. would make any wo maintained that the subject of the predication of reality The illusoriness of illusion is a is other than real? paradox assuredly. on the contrary. but no greater paradox than the affirmation of the reality of the real. The conclusion that we are driven is perfect. just and mediated. the world must be real if not. discussion in the Advaitavidydmukiira is fuller The and more interesting.50 INTRODUCTION Excluded Middle. and the subject of that predi- cation cannot itself be illusory . But surely nothing can be farther from truth. while absolute experience is impartite. When we predicate "reality" or "knowability " do these qualifications have to apply only to what is Do we not say that itself not real or knowable ? Ueality is real. just as much as that it it is knowable sense if ? And. since there can be no because . it . finite The whole of experience it is finite abounds in such pciradoxes. not both to itself and others. real. that being be said to be of the partly known. does the cognitive activity apply to the known part or the unknown ? In either case we have the same difficulties over again. The difficulty seems to arise from our imagining that a qualification can apply only to something other than itself. if it be in respect of the known. illusoriness is a qualification we predicate . If your illusoriness is itself an illusion. illusoriness itself is . to is not that our knowledge but that it is an imperfect relational appearance of the supra-relational . the illusory illusion must be real. non-dualism is impossible.

like reality" and knowability". illusoriness of the illusion is this illusoriness itself is the probans. do not start proving illusoriness by illusoriness. Illusoriness is no$ . But just as illusoriness may be and the illusory. advaitin said that the illusoriness of illusion is We If the is true. possibility is not inherently absurd since as we " " have said " illusoriness".iLLUSORINESS AS ILLUSORY 51 draw a similar conclusion in perfect knowledge. even the real colour of pot etc. and illusoriness being so cognised is also proved to be illusory on the same the alleged . respect of the illusoriness of illusion. not merely nacre-silver and the like but even real experiences like that of a pot may be substrates of this illusory illusori- ness . illusory? Then. in proving The critic may put . then the critic might argue to the reality of the substrate of the illusion. probans amount to anything for in our final we do not admit the pot etc. ground. that predicate. is an illusion we predicate illusoriness of it . or its colour etc. Nor does inconstancy of the conclusion. to be real The whole world we say is illusory. thus the probans as residing both in the real and in illusions would be inconstant. In any case the appeal to Excluded Middle beside the point. absolutely real. say that of nacre-silver. Our proofs of illusoriness are based on other well known grounds. we say that a particular experience. copresent with a substrate which is illusorily Such an argument proceeds on the assump- tion that we prove illusoriness because of illusoriness and that We this probans if illusory would be inconstant. because of infinite regress. such as being the object of finite cognition . this illusoriness may again be illusory . may be predicated both of itself and others. the difficulty in this way. is illusory.

because it is This possibility is. it too being delusive . hence nothing repugnant to reason in that too being illusory. The former is is is merely apparent (prati- bhasika) while the latter But this difference there is empirical (vyavaharika). . the substrate of illusory illusoriness. because of similarity to nacre-silver in this respect. it is the substrate of illusory illusoriness. within our finite experience we have a difference established between nacre-silver and its illusoriness. for. negatived by Scripture which teaches the reality of the self. it cannot establish it as a certainty. but because. whereas illusoriness no pramana for distinguishing the of illusoriness from illusoriness. We do not say that the self is real because it is unsublatable. It may be argued that if nacre-silver. But there is certainly a possibility. evidenced. self -certifying and self- Everything finite perishes up to the self. because the substrate of illusory illusoriness . as it is an illusion. is illusory. however. To argue back to the self being an illusion the substrate of illusory illusoriness is wholly unjustified. but part of there is it. as the it is witness even of sublation. No doubt. which demands both a witness of and a limit to the process of sublation. established by a prainana. some systems do hold the self. as the substrate of illusory illusoriness. the self too may be illusory. and by reasoning. For we do not say it is that nacre-silver is illusory. but self to be illusory. it is clear that such an argument can at best show the possibility of the self on this very ground. and that belief is illusory according to those who believe in the ought to be an illusion in the same way as nacre-silver. we say rather that.52 INTRODUCTION something outside of this world.

even because it is the self of all. but because it is self-manifest and unsublated. they belong to it as identified with the body. their loci too may be assumptive. etc. His error lay in constituting an independent reality of this solf after eliminating everything that could possibly be its The advaitin uses nearly the same words and appears to follow the same path but he is saved from the final error when he equates the individual with the universal self and identifies it with experience. and hence vary with each jiva as Agency and enjoyership do not belong to pure intelligence. it is not merely because it is unsublated. . XIV. It does not follow that because the body. defined by the respective internal organs. define the one Self. yea. or as transferred to it by superimposition from the body. etc. mind etc.INDIVIDUAL VARIATIONS OF SUKHA &c. are the loci of the above-mentioned distinc. its complement is self -manifestation. mind mind tions. infinite. The self is one. universal. and if we hold that the self is not illusory. even of the doubter.. Non-contradiction or coherence (the two are negative and positive aspects of one and the same principle) is of itself barren as the test of truth. 5$ but the self does not perish. one aspect of it the experience! 1 . they themselves are real for the distinctions being assumptive. Nor because of this is there the contingence of all persons having the same experience of pleasure or pain at the same time for these are qualities of the internal organs. Descartes was fundamentally right when he asserted the impossibility of thinking away the thinker. not with content. which . The self alone is self-manifest . He who dissatisfied is with this explanation of distinction .

The jiva's experiences would thus be shared by Brahman even if they should somehow be compensated in the total . the possibility of explaining the distinction of happiness and misery (sukha . we conceiving plurality find that the latter stands in the way . Apart from the attribute difficulty of together with pervasiveness.vyavastha) disappears Altogether.54 INTRODUCTION (vyavastha) can find no greater satisfaction in the hypothesis of a plurality of selves infinite or atomic. perfection that is it is Brahman. another jlva in so far as non-different from Brahman would share the experiences of the original jlva. he not experience Maitra's pleasure and pain as own body are not less removed from him than Maitra's body? When along with atomicity there is also the relation of . Chapter II.duhkha . Nor does the atomicity of souls offer a way out.pail aijd whole (amsa and amsin) as between jlva and Brahman. every soul is without distinction capable of being in contact with everything an object in the present. How can the atomic Caitra have experience of pleasure or pain or both together in different parts of his body 1 If some T how he may be said to have such since the different parts of his experience. being infinite. thus there would be inter- mixture of the happiness and misery of different even on this hypothesis. why should well. which too is nonr different from Brahman. of distinguishing the experiences of different souls for. 38 98 ji vas See sections 5*2 to 5 '215 and 6-61 to 6-6222. an impression of the past or the unseen potency due to past acts. . For. between part and whole there is a relation of difference cum non-difference.

there is need. however. Chapter HI. on. . that of the Bhamatl. that of the Vivarana. these activities are not proximate (sannipatya) but remote auxiliaries (arad-upakaraka). persist up to the said realisa- tion. The fact that independent fruit prescribed for the various rites does not stand in the way of their subserving knowledge too. The distinctions.RELATION OF KARMA TO KNOWLEDGE 55 XV. have their own make in arriving at that realisation. neither agent nor enjoyei' nor object of enjoyment. For truth taught therein. According to one main school. reflection thereon and repeated contemplation of the for. knowledge of such activities. such acts instil only itself is the result 30 the desire to know. of various kinds is only when such activity is aided by suitable auxiliary causes like hearing the Vedanta. release by knowledge. while. through ihe purification of the self. the two may belong either to different classes of 39 See sections 1-1 and 1-1. the latter results In any case since the subsidiariness to knowledge is only through the channel of purification. renunciation too. the substrate of the appearance of all these distinctions. but Pure Consciousness. Ignorance of one's essential nature being the cause of all supcrimposition and consequent misery. and the activities consequent such as engaging in ritual and so contribution to on the distinctions. according to the other school. as for the performance of karma. The knowledge meant is the immediate. final and unshakable consists in the destruction of that intuition of oneself as identical with the one real that is neither knower nor known.

The is possibility of such contemplation mentioned in the it Prasna TJpanisad and the negation of elsewhere is only apparent. Chapter III. viz. failure to find a skilled preceptor in inquiry into the and so on. maintained by Bharatitlrtha that this is only one of the two paths taught by the Lord.56 INTRODUCTION people or to different stages of life. Yoga is suitable for those who. 2-13. not saguna meditations. 2-11. whose object is the attributclcss in the lower Brahman. sfmkhya and yoga. and its utility may be through an apurva generated thereby or through the 40 seen fruit of securing non-distraction from the hearing (study) of the Vedanta. it 40 is 41 not destined to very often succeeds. his method is hit or miss guess-work. 41 See section 3-1. arc not able to engage Vedanta.. 2. Chapter . being on a par with statements that Brahman is not that which is known. The patli of yoga leads to the same goal as that of sankhya there . The path of yoga is that of contemplation. though from the Vedanta learnt by adhyayana they have a superficial knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and the self. He sets forth armed with ignorance. even guess-work fail invariably. because of dullness of intellect. of the Vedanta would seem to be in any case the indispensable preliminary to realisation. not knowledge. is need for two paths because of difference in the capacity of those interested (adhikarins). The study etc. though of things it with some delay. however.. for. It is. as Brahman. Sections 1*21. but none the less he will succeed. On the face would appear that such a person cannot successfully intuit Brahman. 2-12. III.

It may be that those of keener and clearer intellect are much nearer the intuition. in the light of that experience the intellect too be satisfied secondarily. The vision beatific may come through artistic vision too. the paths followed by others are none the less paths to the one goal. of course. intellectual certitude is not a necessary preliminary to the final realisation. be said that this ascertainment has not been arrived at though intellectual processes. he need not and indeed should not insist that this should be an intellectual The man who trades in concepts is not intrinsically superior to him who trades in sounds and colours. It may. There is assuredly a great deal to be said for this point of view. but the certitude which is given in experience has not been arrived at through the may intellect. it is not the treasured possession of intellectual aristocrats. but that guess is of no value to him or others until it is verified by observation and when it is .CONTEMPLATION OP THE PURE BRAHMAN 57 is What is valuable it about this position the liberalising tendency indicates. no self can be hopelessly far from the realisation of that unity. There is the guess followed by the experience which guarantees the guess. S 18 . But there is room to doubt whether later. happen to make a correct guess. This is all in the true catholic spirit of Hinduism. you are bound to encompass it sooner or no matter where you start from and in which direction you go. If it is true that reality is one and that the jivas are identical of non-dualism is with that one. The supreme truth not the prize of the few . A man may verified we have intellectual certitude. Truth being a perfect orb. despite their circumlocution. All that a true philosopher can insist on is the synoptic vision .

There is no doubt about the need for everyone of these factors. 42 the sole critic of all achievement and that wKere this critic does not function the chances of going astray are much' greater. and that. some holding that deep meditation is the karana. unless immediate. Appendix advaita. The Bhamatl school holds that the final intuition cannot bo is or is effective in destroying ignorance. since no other sense-organ is operative in the it is itself which is process of intuition by contemplation of the truth of 42 realisation To Madhusudana Sarasvati belongs the credit of claiming non-dual to come through the channel of devotion (bhakti). See his Bhaktirasayanam. and seems The view marks yet another stage in the liberalising to derive some inspiration from Bharatitirtha.58 INTRODUCTION and the truly moral man.. the dispute being only about the primacy of one or the other. while others claim that position for the mind or the principal texts of the Vedanta. XVI. The language he employs is strongly suggestive of artistic experience. the intellect. Of special interest in this connection is the discussion as to whether the mind not a sense-organ and whether verbal testimony can of itself generate immediate apprehension. that his particular weapon. But this comes to nothing more than tKe admission of Bharatitirtha that the path of yoga involves delay. translated by P. immediate. Modi. is as through intellectual channels. IB not necessarily farther from realisation than the artist or the philosopher. of . This much. that the immediacy can come only from the functioning of a sense-organ. II. who has lost all thought of himself in the narrow sense. however. viz. M. the philosopher can claim.. also the Siddhantabin&u. About that which is directly the instrument (karana) of intuition there are divergent views.

that the mind is active in mediate cognition too. because contact of sense with object is perception. The admission of mind as a sense-organ would get over this difficulty. but only a new variety of a well-known pramana. In this case. It is not every ear that can appreciate music. since immediacy may be obstructed by a defect in the sense or the object. It is true. . and this is what happens when the mind through contemplation envisages the Absolute. school of thought which insists on deep meditation (prasankhyana) as the direct cause. the trained sense. but only the trained ear. holds that . the perfected mind of the siddha can intuit the Absolute though our minds cannot the need for discipline does not detract from the sense-character of mind. claims writers. If the final intuition is true knowledge one would expect its karana to be a recognised means of knowledge (prama^a) and prasankhyana is not a pramana. This in for extensive criticism even as early as of Suresvara who condemns it in the its Naiska/rmyasiddhi. stand in the recognition as a senseorgan. The Mandana as view came the time strongest if not earliest adherent. however. immediate cognition is not an invariable consequent of the functioning even of the recognised way of its sense-organs. Even granted this character. can have immediate cognition of what we cannot perceive. however. This need not. we recognise no new pramana. is it the mind that is directly the cause of intuition or is deep meditation the cause? Both views seem to find favour with different. the mind must be admitted to be a senseorgan. like that of the yogin. The Vivarana school. as the objectors would say.INSTRUMENT OP INTUITION 59 non-dualism. for.

According to this view.60 INTRODUCTION the principal texts of the Vedanta. are themselves directly the cause of the intuition. there is immediate realisation of the whole party being safe and sound. pp. 5358. M. 43 On with the sub-sections. and that.. the is latter not a sense-organ or the direct cause of immediate apprehension. pp. and we say that the mind is capable of producing that intuition because it is a sense-organ.. though its content be not sensed. though they work through the mind. the Ved&ntaparibhdyd. for the statement "Thou art the tenth" produces no intuition except through the mind. lie. The followers of the Bhamatl view say that this is to beg the question . However final or superior or ultimate this intuition may be. that has already been stated. . 43 46 (Bombay edition with the Sikhdmani) and The Six Ways of Knowing (D. verbal knowledge may of itself be immediate. though there is no senseapprehension over and above what existed already without producing the said realisation. comes to the tenth man and says "Thou art the tenth". The story of itself cannot negative our legitimate criticism contention. 43 and the reply to XVII. Datta). when the stranger starts counting. itself to the The only may direct presence or functioning of mind in mediate as well as immediate apprehension. together the Kalpataru on the BMrrtatl. the whole topic see sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III. ng t driraftgam edition. it is yet in the form of the conditioned it is not . pp. such as "That thou art". In the well known story of ten foolish men who and was started counting themselves after crossing a river every time counted only nine since the enumerator left out in each case.

administered as a drug. how there Absolute ? be release? And failing such realisation. one may as well argue that the final psychosis cannot be destroyed except by blows from a hammer or the like. what is that other agent? the final cognition is impure.DESTRUCTION OF THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS free Q from distinctions of it is itself knower and known though of . has the capacity to annul not merely the rest of the world of appearance. poison. if knowledge. over and above that psychosis is needed. is not denied. is destroyed. When knowledge that destroys appearance is itself of the form of appearance. what is it that figures as the object of knowledge therein? It seems contradictory to assert that the pure is that object of Again. but itself as well. unseen potency etc. Two questions naturally arise out of this position. does it not require another agent for its own destruction? and if so. It is not true that for the destruction of the final psychosis. expels both itself and the poison employed to illustrate this. the fire too dies out. not impartite. how can It is admitted by all schools of advaita that the final psychosis. but to insist on that here would be to argue from illegitimate analogy . The co-operation of time. already present in the system when grass is completely burnt up by fire. the impartite. precipitates both nut when itself and the mud already in the water. called the intuition of Brahman. for they too exist . What appears in a conditioned cognition must itself be the conditioned. can there be realisation of the pure unconditioned mode of If so. Various analogies are The power of the clearing mixed with muddy water. something 1 . this somethingother is undoubtedly required when a pot etc.

but since ignorance is the material cause of the entire universe of which the final psychosis too is a part. We . Thus is final psychosis causes its own destruction. lies is only postponed by a stage. in its allowing for the continuance of the world-presentation for a while. Brahman but the is not the which is inert. Those who are still unsatisfied maintain that what destroys both the universe and the intuition of psychosis itself. much of it may depend on our imaginative interpretation. yet as associated with the final psychosis it destroys itself sun which by yet does so when its does not destroy a piece of cotton rays are focussed thereon through a 44 Another ingenious solution would burning glass. in its own nature. cannot experience what the released souls experience while as for what they say. Chapter III. But the persistence of the world for the released soul (not merely in respect of him and for others who are lookers on and unreleased) seems an improvable and unnecessary hypothesis.62 INTRODUCTION prior to the destruction of the final psychosis along with the destruction of the universe. even after the dawn of the final psychosis. have it that the psychosis directly destroys ignorance alone . not inconsistent with error and them. with the destruction of ignorance this psychosis too is destroyed. intelligence. It should be noted that here too the psychosis is itself the cause of its own destruction. then. even if we admit that those 44 For the whole topic see section 7 and sub sections. the difficulty if any in such a notion Its only merit. . associated with that avoided the apparent absurdity that the Brahmanpsychosis. though indirectly. is Brahman-intelligence Though. just as the delusion. being the substrate thereof.

The second question offers greater difficulties. All that may be wKo make noted Here is that there is no need to bolster up that doctrine by the hypothesis that Brahman-intuition destroys ignorance alone and not the universe. as also the relevant portion of the Kalpataru may also be looked up. The doctrine of jivan-mukti has been noticed earlier. what tion final? the justification for calling this intuiThe reply is that here there is no is awareness of the condition or the conditioning. Between the view which maintains the intuition sfet of pure Brafiman and the Bhamatl view forth earlier. while there is awareness of Brahman alone. how can it be pure and unconditioned ? That which enters into a relation as the content thereof must surely be 1 conditioned by that relation. If Brahman is known as the content of a psychosis. persists even here and what is intuited is not the Absolute. But an awareness of the is conditioned which is yet not an awareness of the difficult. It distinction not unintelligible that such knowledge takes us to the threshold of release. Where the relationing has become so tenuous that it does not obtrude on consciousness. the difference would thus seem to See the 45 BMmatV? p. .THE CONTENT OP THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS gg the statements are really released and not merely on the brink of release. This is its from psychoses of lower grades. 78 (TPH edition). This is the position of Vacaspati Misra who says that the final intuition is of 45 If the relational form the conditioned (upahita). to distinguish from an intuition of pure Brahman. The note thereon. it is ready to be transcended in the fulness of the experience that is Brahman. if condition or the conditioning seems very not impossible.

even the highest knowledge can give only conditioned Brahman. Adyar Library. The truth seems to be this. A palm-leaf manuscript B 33 of the Grantha characters. impartite experience. . The differences of view would seem to depend on the stressing of one or the other of the abovementioned aspects.g^ INTRODUCTION be mbre verbal than real. DC 4. Egmore. palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters. DC 5. xxvi 3. No. B paper manuscript in Devanagari script. A No. cited as No. 4764 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. cited as E2 . A2 . 1. cited as E3 . exists (na 'nyah pantha 'yanaya vidyate). Egm'ore. what is thus known is the pure 1 Brahman. as the fulfilment of knowledge through its transcendence in the infinite. cited as Ex . Adyar Library. xxv 2. Egmore. 1885 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts A Library. so long as one looks for what is apprehended in knowthe ledge. A No. in Ax . cited as No. but when we seek what is to be realised through knowledge. . palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters. 4766 of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. A palm-leaf manuscript B 10 of the in Grantha characters. In the preparation of this edition the following Manuscripts and printed texts have been used. But in any case the path to release is in and through knowledge no other path . since we continue to l6ok for what can enter into the knowledge-relation.

(cited as 7.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. It is hoped to carry on the work of identification and publish a short Appendix at a future date. Adyar Library. The Jivananda Vidyasagara edition. An attempt has been made in the present translation to keep close to the text. Egmore. edition (Advaitamaiijari Series). 65 The Kumbakonam K). Views and quotations have not been traced with as much success as could be wished. 8. Director. The transliteration tries intelligible to by splitting components joined together by hyphens. 10. This has necessitated the use of a double hyphen (=). where a word is broken up solely because the end of the line has been S make the text more easily up long compounds into their 19 . the Curator. The Van! Vilas Press edition. (cited as C). Srirangam (in- complete. The Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition. The Chowkhamba Press edition. (cited as B). though some ways it is very unsatisfactory). The editor takes this opportunity of thanking the Hon. Calcutta. The translation made in the pages of the Pandit is incomplete and in most places it is too much . cited as V. and the Manager. Vani Vilas Syndicate for their kindness and courtesy. The rather elaborate division into sections and sub-sections will prove useful in such a case. in (This constitutes the basic text. of a paraphrase. 9. cited as {).

The The 8iddMntale&a seems to have had more than one commentary. A prose compendium by Vasudeva called the Siddhtintakalpavain. NOTE. thus while The him editor tenders his heart-felt thanks to all the scholars. "ajnanasraya" is ordinarily printed "ajnana-'sraya". an advaitin who lived till recently. it is printed "ajnama-'sraya". advaitin. best known is that by Achyuta Krn&nanda it is found in most . Brahmendra Sarasvati. wrote a verse compendium of this work. Tradition of this Sarasvati.66 INTRODUCTION reached. in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Sada&iva Brahmendra. and another verse compendium by one Gaftg&dhara Sarasvati are also in print. both in the University and outside. who gave their unstinted help. The well known. There is. the Manuscript of a commentary by one ViSvanatha ascribes a commentary to Madhustidana has been found so far. where the end of the line is reached with "ajiia". printed editions of the text. and the latter Veddnta- Tlrtha (I A 10). no trace siddMnta-suktimaftjarL . the former is called SiMMntaletattltparyasangraUah.

as productive of immediate knowledge. : to insist 1 -134 A fourth variety: to insist on the study of the Scriptures in the original. as contrasted with itihasas. as instrumental to mediate cognition alone. Refutation of the above. . in conjunction with reflection and contemplation. Three kinds of injunction. 1 -12 Which of the above three is the sravana- vidhi? 1 -121 1 -122 1 -131 Prakatartha view that it is apurva-vidhi. 1 *137 A seventh variety: to insist on hearing. apurva-vidhi. &c. 1 -135 A fifth A variety to insist on the study of the sruti.ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1-136 sixth variety: to insist on hearing. It is insist a niyama-vidhi one variety. : : 1 -132 Another variety dual texts. to on the study of Vedanta. niyama-vidhi and parisankhya-vidhi. to insist on study of nonon study under a 1 -133 A third variety guru. CHAPTER L 1 ! 3 -11 Nature of injunction in respect of hearing (studying) the Vedanta. : puranas.

creation etc. 1*15 1 *151 There is 110 vidhi at all. 2 *21 2-22 Brahman Is it is the material cause. 1*139 A ninth variety: hearing means inquiry which 1-14 is insisted on for the removal of doubt and error. established by their utility. . 2 '12 All three activities together constitute the definition. Study under a preceptor established otherwise. as certainly productive of immediate know: ledge. It is a parisankhya-vidhi to prevent dis- traction by other activities. each a definition. not by a sravana-vidhi. observed in experience. co-operating with the mind. jlva'? pure Brahman or Isvura or the 2 -221 2 -222 Pure Brahman as upadana. 1 *153 Freedom from distraction established otherwise. Isvara as upadana. 1 *152 Study and adoption of dualist texts can be avoided only by the Lord's grace. 1*154 Exclusion of works in the vernacular tongues secured otherwise.68 1 -138 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS An eighth variety to insist on hearing. 2-11 Definition of Brahnian. 1-155 The need for inquiry &c.

only figuratively. 2 -31 2 -311 Distinction between jiva and Isvara. 2 -3112 Tattvavivetta view sattva is : prakrti wherein pure . predominant is maya that wherein it is overpowered by rajas arid tamas is avidya reflection in the former . Prakatartha view Isvara is the reflection : in the single maya. 2-224 Both are material causes though there is no distinction between maya and avidya. even Isvaratva being posited by himself in himself. Brahman as vivarto-'padana. is Isvara.CHAPTER 2-223 I 9 Both Isvara and the causes. jiva as material Difference between avidya and 2 -2231 maya. . Isvara as the cause of the empirical and jiva as the cause of the illusory world. 2 -23 2 -231 Is not maya the m'aterial cause ? Maya as parinamy-upadana. 2-225 2-226 Jiva alone is the cause of all. 2 -234 2 -235 Maya is only an auxiliary (sahakari). 2 -233 Maya is only dvara-karana. 2 -232 Brahman alone as upadana. that in the latter is jiva. jivas reflections in its m'any diverse parts called avidyas. Maya alone is the upadana Brahman is so . Another variety of the above view. 2 -3111 Isvara and the jiva are both reflections.

the reflection in the impressions of the intellects of all gence. such impressions being pre- sent in maya located in Brahman. in the former view of may secondarily Isvara identical with the denote apposition. Isvara. Reflection in avidya is Isvara. but through sublation. since with Brahman is sition not through appobare non- difference. the substrate of the gross and subtle bodies. beings.70 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 -3113 Prakrti as projective ing it is is is former 2-3114 avidya. : 2-3116 Brahmdnanda view sleep is the blissful self of but the jlva. Appositional designation intelligible. elem'ent the super-imposed and is destructible. reflection in its product. the reflection in the internal organ posited in the kutastha . is the jlva . 2-3115 Citradipa distinction four forms: kutastha. m'aya as obscurReflection in the . jlva. the internal organ. is Jivatva. Explanation of . jlva. Sankepasanraka karma and of criticism of avaccheda view as occasioning destruction of acquired influx of the non-acquired. Brahman the undefined pure intelli- Isvara. experienced as"I-ness". the blissful self of the sleep state described Mandukya. in the latter. Even on the "jlva" kutastha.

jiva the reflection. Example of the artistically worked cloth. maya. one who has the conceit of the dream-bodies m'ode of maya. The identity of the jiva: and this explana- tion is possible even if the internal organ be the adjunct. a 2 -312 Vivarana view Jiva : Isvara is the prototype. Isvara 's antaryamibhava not more intelligible on the internal organ. may be treated as the defining defect of krta-hana etc.. not nal organ. to the uncondi- 2-3117 DrgdrsyaviveJsa includes kutastha under jiva. Avidya.. posited by sleep. i. defined by the is not so defined What is reflected is reonly that portion which is outside the the interflecting medium. 2-313 is intelligence as what There can be no reflection of is Isvara.. empiri- reflection in the internal organ posited in i.e. of which there are three kinds : absolute.e. i..CHAPTER I 71 the Scriptural attribution of sarvesvaratva etc.e. has to be m'et in any case by the real adjunct. 'I' in etc. what is undefined. reflection theory. Adhyatma forms are shown by iSruti as included in the adhidaiva forms to facilitate the passage from the conditioned tioned. the merely apparent. what has no form. cal. There is no conflict .

is the one principal jiva. a reflection of Brahman. but with a distinction. no distinction between the bound and the released the . non-recollection etc. release of etc. due Even here. similar to bodies seen in dreams. assumptive. III. ii. iii. happiness of bodies. as defined by the internal organ etc. Suka 2 -3212 Hiranyagarbha. as of persons seen in dreams. authority of the aphorist in Vedanta Siitra. of Example of himself as Kaunteya's conceit Radheya. 2 -32 Is the jiva one or many? body alone. . is of one to another's difference distinction released. 20 and HI. 2-3211 A single jiva animating one other bodies non-anim'ated. Distinction between bondage and release recognised.72 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS with texts or aphorisms. 2 -3213 A single jiva animates all bodies without distinction . other jivas are reflections of this. no between the bound and the 2 -322 Jivas are many. 2 -314 Brahman itself through its avidya appears to be the jiva and by its own knowledge is released as it were. all bodies are animated. 43 and of the Brahma- bindu Upanisad.

one for each All the nesciences . but is immediately recreated by the surviving nesciences. only a delusive sense of identity. Brahman-knowledge destroys the mind and thence is destroyed the conjunction of ignorance with intelligence. 2-32242 Each nescience creates a different world for each jiva. 3 -2 Possession of knowledge alone.CHAPTER 2-3221 I yg is Ignorance though one has parts. 3-0 3 -1 What is agency? Possession of such knowledge. and removed 2-3222 in part when Brahman-know- ledge arises. is SI 10 . as in an illusion seen by several persons. not in Brahman. as the like jati jati abandons a destroyed particular. located in Isvara. it is fully present in each jlva. in the particular. desire to act and volition as is favourable to what is to be done. such! as favourable to what is to be done. 2-3223 Ignorance resides in the jivas. 2 -3224 2-32241 Ignorances are many. jlva. empirical world avidyas cause obscuration alone and the projection of the merely apparent. 2 -32243 Maya. and abandons some enlightened jivas. together create the world when one is destroyed. the world is destroyed. is the cause of the .

prior to creation memory of everything maya transforms presentation of all things to be created in accordance with the itself into the adrsta of jivas hence knowledge of the . through impressions produced is thereby there past . not through cognition due to psychoses Brahman is of the nature of the knowledge of every- thing but not the cogniser of everything. hence omniscience. Isvara perceives the entire world of the present . form of impressions omniscience is . even the past and the future are related to it as existing in avidya in the . 4 -4 Kaumudl view Brahman 's essential know: ledge manifests everything related to it . for Isvara's adjunct is ignorance associated with the impressions of the intellects of all beings: Bharatitirtha.74 3 -3 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Possession of knowledge of the form " is to be created. '* This 4 -1 Brahman 's oiriniscience intelligible though there is no internal organ as for the jiva . 4 '2 Prakatdrtha view: there are transformations of maya which reflect intelligence . through the manifestations reflected all therein. 4 *5 Vacaspati 's view Brahman may be said to be even the agent in knowledge since : . future. 4-3 Tattvasuddhi view: in the above manner. Isvara sees the world in three tim'es .

the psychosis destroys the ignorance veiling the jiva and . For that relationship the psychosis need not go forth. whose transformation. goes out through the senses to the object and pervades it. tioned jiva is finite and has no relation its with objects. the psychosis. as defined by what is seen. but when the psychosis is related to the object. is conjunction of the jiva with the internal organ. Why does the jiva need psychoses'? Vivarana view: Brahman's jiva's intelligence unlike is not the material cause of not in identity with them and cannot manifest them but (a) there all things. being manifested then. is . (c) Or. associated with this psychosis the jiva (b) Or.CHAPTER 1 75 its that knowledge though in essence not a product 5 -0 5-1 is yet a product of Brahman. and thus the jiva illumines the object. illu- 5 -11 5 '111 5-112 What is The the association with intelligence ? relationship of subject and object. the condicognises that object. . mines that object alone. but psychosis manifests non-difference front the object-definedintelligeiice . there is an indirect relation to the object even for the jlvaintelligence in proximity to the object/ since the psychosis is in identity with this. the jiva.

conditioned by the internal organ. 5-122 The object-defined-intelligence creates a reflection of itself in the proximate part of the psychosis.76 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Direct relation necessary for immediacy hence when there is conjunction between . not with the obj ect-defined-intelligence itself. but as qualified per accident* thereby. for the jiva too there is a conjunction born of a conjunction. 5*123 The is object-defined-intelligence itself is identified with the jiva. analogy of tank water and. . where intelligence. field water becoming one through a channel. 1 souls are finite. but the former considered not as qualified by its being the prototype. 5 :113 psychosis and object. 5-114 Identification with the object secured through non-difference between manifesting intelligence and Brahman- though the jiva is omnihe cognises objects only as present. 5-12 What is the ? manifestation of non- difference 5 -121 The identification through the psychosis of intelligences as defined by the object and by the internal organ. difference from the view (b). with this there is identification of the jiva.

other pragabhavas being seen to capable of continue.CHAPTER 5 -13 1 77 What is the removal of obscuration? If ignorance is destroyed. cannot be obscured by ignorance." 5-13211 Each cognition destroys one ignorance alone. 51312 Object-de&ied-intelligence. when in conjunction with a psychosis. 5 -1321 These modal ignorances too are beginningless. when one ignorance is this destroyed by a psychosis. world too destroyed c !> why is not the 5 -1311 Of a small part alone there is destination as of darkness by a glow-worm. All ignorances do not obscure all things at all times. 5-132 What destroyed by a psychosis is not primal ignorance. illustration from which causes dreams and the sleep experience "I slept well. or a rolling up as of a mat. the ignorances to be destroyed are as numerous as the cognitions. when . or a retreat as of frightened soldiers. as originating doubt 5-13212 etc. . this is the removal of obscuration ignorance need not obscure that wherein it is located. as it destroys one pragabhava alone. 5-1322 They have a beginning. but a mode thereof is its and destruction alone is the removal .

and cognition ignorances that obscure the thing qualified per accidens by the time destroys all it lasts. 5-132133 The essential nature of the object is obscured by that ignorance alone which is removed by the first cognition. 5 -132131 Difficulty in a continuous tion. In the a continuous multiplicity stream of of cognition. the second and subsequent cognitions remlove ignorances relating to the object as qualified by space. drives away the others too in the sense of obstructing their obscuring capacity so long as the cognition lasts. stream of cogni- psychosis ceases. When the 5-132132 Nyayacandrika view: each cognition destroys one ignorance alone. or psychoses is not adeven if multiplicity be . mitted.78 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS latter ceases. time etc. being dependent on primal ignorance destroyed by that knowledge. 5-13213 The cognition while destroying one ignorance. another ignorance obscures the object. therefore even second and subsequent cognitions are the causes of non-obscuration. ignorance re-obscures. the other ignorances obscure the nature of the object only as qualified per accidens by their respective times. arises all When Brahman-knowledge surviving ignorances are destroyed.

since as relating to the already known they are not authoritative. the internal organ.. alone is 5 -1321332 There of only one ignorance. but five or six. 5-1321333 Obscuring ignorance is present in the object alone though modal ignorance is not related to the witness conditioned by . the object and located in the knower in the case of mediate psychoses. since the psychosis does not go forth.CHAPTER I 79 admitted. the illusion is a transformation is as the content of the ignorance located in the knower . and thence comes the " experience "I do not know nacre etc. primal ignorance is so related. there is no harm. the latter destroyed. so that each has some gross time for contentif Even they be instantaneous and thus do not remove obscuration. 5 -1321331 Obscuring ignorance is two-fold located in . there may be not many instantaneous psychoses. are non-different from the intelligence that is the content of primal ignorance. each lasting for some time. and in any case there is non-difference between the mode and that which has modes j as for . since even nacre etc. but another mode of it projects what is not true. even medi ate Brahman psychosis destroys modal ignorance. located in the knower. not the former.

its it does not remove ignorance and do so mtiy be delusive. and subject to recollection of continuity contemporaneously with a continuous stream object. is of cognition of some other Unlike the jlva. the witness. at intervals the kutastha is the The two bodies are manifested by psychoses of the internal organ. by the witness. hence not subject to doubt etc. com- pared to a lam'p in a theatre.. Individuation etc. 5-14112 Kaumudt view: the witness is is some form of the Lord. constantly associated with the witness.8Q ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS the mediate psychosis. they are manifested together with the absence of psychoses. Natakadlpa too distinguishes the witness from the jlva. the witness is the Imtastha. Tattvar pradipika too says that the inner self is the witness as non-different from the In all three views. the kutastha an indifferent spectator. at other times. but not to all immediate cognitions like the witness's etc. perception of nescience 5 -141 Who is the witness ? : 5-14111 Krttastha(Rpa view witness. the Lord is not jlva. appearing to The rule about removing ignorance applies only to immediate psychoses. which yet not the abode .

5-1422 Another view: nescience obscures but the exclusion of the witness. manifested by the witness ? Even by the light that it obscures. In he is known as Prajna. but as conditioned by the internal organ. how are nescience etc. what is the difference between bondage and release $ The undefined nature of Brahman-bliss " does not count. since there is seen unconditioned love for the self. not by the omnipresent nescience. 5-14113 Tattvasuddhi: the witness though really of the constitution of Brahman appears to be of the constitution of the jiva. though is SI II . the jiva as qualified by the internal organ is the cogniser. bliss that is of the is to Even the nature of the witness certainly manifested. in the same way as the this-ness. 5 *14231 If bliss manifest even here. which while really belonging to nacre appears to belong to silver. the same way as Rahu.CHAPTER of causality. I 81 sleep. jiva is the own nature being 5-14122 The jiva is the witness. since " not being defined is not of itself a human goal. the jiva in his indifferent. If nescience obscures the witness. 5-14121 The nescience-conditioned witness. in.

82 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Brahman-bliss. is unsurpassable. obscuraseen only where there is (partial) it is manifestation. 5 -14232 Advaitavidyacarya 's rcpl y analogy of the reflection in mirrors of different degrees : of purity. superiority and inferiority in the happiness may be superimposed because of the purity or impurity of the reflecting intellect. since they do not pass out to make room for . so bliss too is not wholly obscured but only to the exclusion of the particular psychoses of happiness. happiness nor may grades be admitted because of differences in the manifestcrs. the witness is unobscured as intelligence. is 5*1424 Since individuation etc. are continuously presented to the witness. Therefore the witness-bliss is not unobscured. is but as bliss tion is obscured. because undefined. as contrasted with material happiness. you admit the real identity of all forms of . 5 -14233 Bliss certainly experienced as obscured . since . the illustration is not accepted and even if it were. as in I do not know the sense stated by you". the state of bondage as one of clearer happiness would be superior to the free state where happiness is not clear. As intelligence " not wholly obscured.

as transformed into psychoses with the etc. instrument for this cognition. This witness being objects. by the witness as defined by them. but is not cognitive. 5-14243 This psychosis with the form "I" is a modification of the internal organ (not of nescience). forms of 5-14242 Recognition of a psychosis of nescience. 5-15 Removal of obscuration would seem to belong only to psychoses relating to external objects. in sleep. not being guaranteed by any ascertained means of 5 -14244 cognition. recollected? how can they be 5 -14241 Individuation are also manifested. not even this rule. as otherwise the delusion would have no material cause.CHAPTER 1 83 memory-impressions. with the form "I" such as is necessary to explain the recollection of nescience etc. is ' ' ' ' There 5-151 Ignorance about the this-element is certainly removed. recollection is possible. because of the experience "I know myself' the mind itself should be assumed to be the 7 . but not about nacreity . impermanent. Even this psychosis is cognitive. that is the material cause of the . since in delusion the psychosis of the this does not remove ignorance.

hence the distinction in the Sanksepasariraka between the adhis- thana and adhara of delusion. though removed in its obscuring aspect. is The contact of a defective sense as the cause. Nor may be said Cognition of the substrate is a necessary cause in super-impositions depen- " dent on similarity. it is not removed in projective aspect. and . since there can be no visual perception of what is colourless colour is and the white experienced at the time of the delusion. e. 5 -153 Kavitarkika-Cakravarti Nrsimha Bhatto- padhyaya's view: no experience of a psychosis of "this" as distinct from ' ' this is silver ' '.g4 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENT^ delusion. nacre-silver . the distinction between the removal of these two its aspects has to be recognised to explain jivan-mukti and the persistence of the delusion in reflection.g. since its causality is not evidenced. It is not to be assumed of the from the delusion effect. 5 -152 The ignorance of the this-element is itself the material cause. Contact with a not defective sense-organ applies to all cases of delusion and parsimony dictates its it choice as the cause. alone established The cognition of the substrate cannot be the cause of such delusions as yellow shell or blue water.

. according as there is or is not similarity. it is perceived is and hence as silver. since there is the possibility of its being perceived as any other piece of metal.. too for content. since on the same cloth there may ." Cognition of similarity may be a cause only in what is hindered by specific cognition.CHAPTER 1 5 similarity is not a defect in the object. for the cognition of similarity. The unhindered contact of the this-object with a defective sense sets up an agitation in nescience. the absence or presence of the superimposition no need . whose consequent transformation has the delusive content. copper etc.. piece of iron in contact with the sense of touch is A not perceived as silver. by their own presence or absence. not in delusions like the yellow shell . in the neighbourhood of silver. silver etc. the delusive content is experienced as sensory. the object of doubt . or m'ay not be superimposition. and the causes of specific cognition would themselves explain. This sensory nature cannot be explained merely from the sense-contact of the this-element alone. in yellow shell etc. not the this-eleitient alone. since even delusive similarity may cause superimposition and superimposition is not dependent on the nature of the object. the this-elenient alone cannot be . as.

as then both the shell and its conjunction with yellow would be non-perceptual. No law about perception in general in the absence of the ascertainment of a single mode of contact common to samyoga etc. in see view of such experiences as "I blue water/' which cannot be explained by such laws. There no room for a further law about peris ception of specific substances. as then every one should see it plated object. Even if such laws be recognised they should be restricted to empirically valid perceptions. perception of a substance as yellow like a goldNo violation of the sup- and percept ion of silver. This view is not to be confounded with anyathakhyati. for silver present elsewhere (as on the aiiyulhfikhyati view) cannot be perceived here and now.ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS sensed as colourless and is not sensed as white the sense of sight needed for the perception of the yellowness . nor is alone of the bile in the eye. posed causal laws in respect of perception in general. and we admit . As for contact with a substance being the cause of perception of a substance. Nor does the yellow go through rays from the eyes and pervade the object. it is enough i the contact be with that on which substancencss is superimposed.

human 5 -154 Others hold the psychosis with the form of silver etc. silver . the supernot appear in a single psychosis. superimposition of tin timfe as of silver is The nonat the same due to the absence of desire in relation such defects as to the former. they appear in the one witness manifested by the psychosis two the substrate and the imposedneed with the form "this". to be superfluous the witness . it . manifested by the this-psychosis itself manifests the silver superimposed there- on and this psychosis may itself account! 1 . 5-156 The cognition of need not have the is "this" as content for silver there the appearance of conjunction with the thisness of the substance similarly. there may be the appearance of conjunction with the this-ness of the substrate as content . since though the psychoses are different. for the memory-impressions of silve3\ 5-155 View is of two psychoses. cognition of silver. 5*16 Objection: why is a psychosis needed in addition to the witness? Even if it accounts for memory-impressions.CHAPTER its I g7 its indeterminability to explain both perception and sublation. one of the form "this" and the other of the form "This silver/' not of silver alone. etc. for the .

gg ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS need not go forth. only because of direct conjunction with intelligence . is definite- In perceptual cognition there ness. like the distinction between knowledge from verbal testimony and inferential knowledge. in the latter there is a continuance of the desire know. etc. psychosis in mediate cognition there is no observed channel for going forth. for the manifestation of this conjunction there 5-163 is going forth. can it manifest objects. not in other cognition. Objection the psychosis need not go forth to remove the ignorance veiling : . 5 -161 Reply: object-defined-intelligence alone manifests the object. hence only in conjunc- tion with objects. . Individuation are immediately cognised. hence som'e other relation sui generis is assumed 5-162 there. no other relationship may be assumed this relationship is brought about by the going forth of the . Distinction between mediate and immediate cognition may be due to difference in the instrument. where with that a direct relation of identity is possible as in perception. to for the manifestation of this identity there is the going forth. Definiteness results from identity with m'anifested intelligence. for.

Nor can immediacy be added as a qualification of the cognitions . The cognition that removes ignorance mtist have come into being by invariable conjunction with the intelligence that is the is . if it is to remove ignorance. hence locus of that ignorance. even Devadatta's cogniObjection tion of pot and Yajfiadatta's ignorance of it have both the same content and the same locus. viz.. Reply: this would irriply removal of ignorance even by mediate cognition.CHAPTER I 89 the object. this is possible even for psychoses that do not go forth. intelligence as defined by pot so having the same locus does not count in the removal of ignor- ance by cognition but the cognition that is to remove should belong to the same . 5 112 . should have the sam'e locus and content as the : latter. . Reply: cognition. for imm'ediacy cannot be defined as a jati or upadhi. immediacy will be shown to be what ance produced by removal of ignorit cannot be a qualification of what causes that removal. person and refer to the sam'e object as the ignorance. For the sake of this invariable conjunction the psychosis goes forth. as this may be removed even by a mediate psychosis. For us.

I.90 5 *164 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Parsimony prescribes the same locus for the ignorance of the object and the cognition that removes it. Su.. hence the going forth of the psychosis. Brahman has the . as shown in Ved. 5-165 Identity cognition and ignorance established on the analogy of external light and darkness. 5 -166 The going forth ciation is needed either for asso- with intelligence or for the manifestation of the non-difference of the cogniser-intelligence from the 1 Brahman-intelligence manifesting the object. 4. interpreted by the canons of purport. hence the of locus for going forth. 6-0 The non-difference of the jiva from authority of the Vedantas. i.

1 *2 Nydyasudha view perception does cognise : the particulars as real. nor can it be inferred. cloth etc. which are nor is it apprehended through memory. hence assumption of reality . the constant substrate in pot. differences and their correlates are also delusive hence .CHAPTER 1-0 II. no conflict of Scripture- declared non-duality with perception. because they are apprehended only together with the counter-correlates. Id Tattvasuddhi view: perception apprehends bare reality. counter-correlates . is Absence of sublating cognition defect. are but delusive appearances hence. no Differences cannot be cognised through perception. pot etc. since inference proceeds on the apprehension of difference . since there is no memory-impression of its being qualified by the counter-correlate as such. many "of rem'ote in space and time. being delusively presented. How can Vedantas have non-duality for purport? Conflict with perception. The co-presence and co-abseuce of the sense-organ serves only in the apprehension of bare reality. but only as interpenetrated by the reality of the one substrate.

1 4 Such reality as is recognised by perception not inconsistent with illusiveness. for the existence of which in the substrate there is no Scriptural authority. if 1 -5 Even non-sublatedness be apprehended by perception. L -6 Where there is conflict Scripture alone is stronger than perception. yet because of Scriptural declarations of superiority and infeof till riority as to reality. the sublater. for. perception relating to the present alone cannot apprehend non-sublatedness in all three times. 1*3 Sanksepasdrlraka view perception does cognise the reality of the particular . distinction from 1 other attributes of the particular.92 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS in the particular too is superfluous. is of duration Brahman-know- ledge arises. the reality. . is but the worthiness of the object. it follows that the non-sublatedness limited pot etc. but as relating to external objects it has no : authority in respect of the inner sole is self. wherein Scripture alone The imperative in drastavyah indicates not a command. since the is former rises free from as defects and subsequently. Scriptural authority for this. authoritative.

the perception of odour in water or blueness in the ether. Scripture jivya-virodha. why the resort to secondary implication in cases of conflict with perception^ 2 -2 Bhamall view Scripture : is of force only where purportful. and for these. is due in to . Even objects of perception have to be investigated in the light of valid teaching. as in mantras and arthavadas. superior to perception. letters. efficiency. secondary im- plication is adopted. 2-32 The resort to secondary implication " "Cook the golden grains etc.CHAPTER II 3 apaccheda-nyaya.g. no upafor. 2-31 Vivaranavartika view: lack of purport is not the test. e.. defect Free- dom from and posteriority in time constitute the basis of the superiority of Scripture but perception though . or adoption of secondary implication for what is declared in Sruti. not their 2 -1 If 6ruti is reality. the existence of words etc. since purport exists even for what is understood by laksana. perception is stronger where there is no purport for it is Scripture. sublated should have a suitable content assigned to it hence there is assignment of empirical content capable of practical . where they conflict with perception. is what is depended on by revelation. superior.

no suspicion of syntactical unity between perception and non-dualist revelation. of the upakrama-nyaya. 2-323 Reply: syntactical unity needed for application illustration . 2 -3212 Reply Saslradlpika passage explained in : the light of the context earlier obligation not admitted to exist in fact. what is depended on only such cognition of letters etc. perception thus sublated by Sruti is not contentless. 3 -0 Alleged superiority of perception as upajlvya . distinction from cases where the not the apaccheda-nyaya applies. : analogy of the black arid red colours of the cherry shown to be inapplicable. 2 -3211 Objection no sublation in the apacchedanyaya. but has an empirical content. 2 -322 Why should not perception be stronger. 3*1 Reply: in sabda.94 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS inability to perform what is expressly enjoined. hence apaccheda-nyaya alone applies.. 2-321 Explanation of the apaccheda-nyaya and its applicability. on the upakrama-nyaya 2 the. but existence as well. but statements of what are real : at different times. truth-aspect alone which it is is denied by Scripture. as is is .

.. is practically to Brahman-knowefficient and other than the unreal. their reality is neither irrelevant nor contradictory. : 3 '4 Non-acceptance of three grades of reality- and merely apparent conceit of reality in pot. . the universe. and in absolute. negation and Per- counter-correlate cannot co-exist. 3 -2 Capacity at least should exist for sounds to convey their sense. Non-existence may subsist together with its counter-correlate. etc. Defini- tion of unreality. 3-3 Scripture denies the reality. not the existence. This may be recognised consistently with non-dualism. even existence of letters etc. nacre-silver etc.CHAPTER II 95 comm'on to valid knowledge and delusion. till sub! ation of the latter. objected to. may be denied. according to which. empirical . 3-41 Origination admitted of the merely its apparent. as being the countercorrelate of negation in all places and times. of the world. ception has empirical reality for content visaya-vyavastha. even because of associa- tion with tion Brahman and non-discriminaHence negation of therefrom. which persists up ledge. in order to account for immediacy.

as cause of superimposition. need not be of the specific object super-imposed. The reflection cannot be the merely apparent. 3-412 Criticism of the view that reflection is real. the shadow of a substance other . being a variety of shadow. apprehended by rays of light from the eyes. Memory-impression.. as the reflection theory is not accepted. Illusoriness does not result for the jiva. tion . 3 -4111 Vivarana view the reflected face not other than the prototype differences of posi: . 3413 Nor is than darkness nacre-silver too would be real. as then the jiva who is a reflection would also be so. are super-imposed thereon imiriediacy possible for one's own face. etc. 3-4112 Advaitavidyaeaiya's view illusory .96 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS Is origination admitted for the reflection of the face? Immediacy not possible 3 -411 for such portion of one's own face as the forehead etc. conflict within experience on the Vivarcma view. turned back by the mirror etc. : reflection is and different it from the proto- type reference to as one's own face is of secondary import. . one of the three causes of superimposition. such apprehension needed it is since to account for the which is memory-impression.

CHAPTER 3 -414 II 97 What ignorance causes this delusion ? By what knowledge is it dispelled? 3 -4141 Ignorance of the adhisthana. 3 -51 Dreams ance too the product of primal ignor- and removable . but a that sleep is a by the 113 . which m'ay be removed even by another delusion. causes the reflection. by Brahman- knowledge alone merely apparent character due to the additional defect. sleep . persisting in respect of protective energy. sublation of pratibhasika superim'position consistent with non-removal of primal ignorance. true knowledge of the substrate not necessary for the removal of delusion. difference from empirical reality in that for the latter non-generation by a defect is a further condition. viz. knowledge of the substrate removes it when aided by non-proximity of the image. 3-53 Primal ignorance not the mode mode S thereof. 3-4142 Removal merely of obscuring energy is due to obstacles posited by primal ignorance which alone is the material cause of the superimposition of reflection. of ignorance established cause. 3-52 Dream sublatable by waking cognition. sleep..

hence psychosis possible without dependence on external sense. Reply to the first objection. Substrate of dreartfs is intelligence not as outside the body. not the jiva-intelligence which is a reflection thereof. 3 -5422 No psychosis not generated by valid testimony can have undefined intelligence as its sphere. what is obscured is Brahman-intelligence. 3 -541 Objections to dream being super-imposed on (1) undefined intelligence. hence that intelligence is the substrate. a pratibhasika jiva too projected as the spectator of dream's. . but as within it. and no psychosis "I is possible in sleep. the latter recollects the dream on waking. or (2) intelligence defined by individuation in (1) the dream elephant would require a : psychosis of the internal organ to be manifested by ahankara-Vacchinnacaitanya.98 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS delusions in dreams due to obscuration of the empirical world and jiva. because of their spectator being super-imposed on the empirical jiva. not as manifested by a psychosis. as of itself immediate. in (2) there is the contingence of the experience am an " elephant " not "I 3 -5421 possess an elephant.

by reflected therein . others do not cognise at the same time. 3 -6 How to account for the visibility of dreamelephant etc.611 Scripture declaring self-luminosity in the dream-state rules out the psychoses of the empirical senses. 3-612 Internal organ does not fail to be eliminated by above-cited texts. transformation stands as the object of cognition recollection on waking is due . individuation and The substrate is intelligence not qualified. ? 3-61 There are not pratibhasika indriyas. the empirical senses are then quiescent. because that cannot be instrumental to cognition except in dependence on an external sense or because that organ through its . 3 -432 Nacre-silver superimposed on the prototype intelligence.CHAPTER 3 '543 II 99 conditioned. to memory-impressions consequent on . while indriyas are uncognised. for the pratibhasika 'has no ajnata-sattva. as each one can perceive that alone which has his ignorance as m'aterial cause. 3 -. no subtle sense-organs known to exist. hence " the form I 3 -5431 no experience of 9 am an elephant/ is Even nacre-silver super-imposed on the reflection of intelligence defined by the this-element of the nacre.

this too may be dream- delusion. 3-712 Nescience and five others are beginningless not in respect of them is perception . analogous to seeing the nacre- 3-71 D?sti contemporaneous with srsti. hence elimination of other luminaries secured by. silver. 3 -713 What is the basis of the ruti declaration of sequence in creation? . . its distinction from the jiva is not well-known. 3-711 Who posits the waking world? Not the unconditioned self as transmigration would persist even after release nor the . even the elephant of waking experience not an object of the sense of sight. because of reciprocal dependence. conditioned self. the said Sruti. simultaneous with creation. 3 -613 Even admitting a psychosis of the internal organ. Reply the stream of conditioning is beginningless and he who is conditioned : by the earlier posited nescience posits the subsequent nescience.100 ANALYTICAL TAfiLE O# CONTENTS avidya-vrtti or on the destruction of the dream-state. 3-62 Co-presence and co-absence of the functioning of the senses with the dream experience.

is Drti f the created. 3 -72 3-8 Drsti is itself srsti. are illusory like nacre-silver. 3 -82 . identity known through adhyaropa and apavada hence the mention of creation : . discussions as to the sequence assume purport therein for Sruti and have the purpose intended of by Sruti m'aking clear the principles of interpretation. Those texts are autho- ritative since the observances prescribed purify the intellect and lead to realisa- tion of unity with Brahman. the Vivarana illusory in the .. not being sublated in waking. parallel to the attain- ment in dreams. 3-7132 Declarations of attainment of fruit by jyotistoma etc. or different from both the is real and the unreal j or the counter-correlate of that negation in all three times. They are not same way.. Illusoriness of the world though not generated by the three causes thereof. Creation is by Isvara and in the stated sequence. 3-81 Even individuation. etc. removable by knowledge alone. since they are cognised by the witness alone.CHAPTER n 3 -7131 Reply purport of Scripture is identity of self with nisprapanca Brahman. which occurs in the locus of what is cognised. etc.


declaration of the three-fold cause of

super-imposition is a praudhi-


4 -0

How to account for the practical efficiency
of the illusory?



in dreams, practical efficiency is of the
reality as the experience

same grade of





dream expeit is

rience causes effects not sublated in

the dream-damsel ;


that the cognition of the damsel in the



the cause

and that that

is real,

for that too

assumptive nor


immediacy the cause of happiness, since
there are grades of the latter, though none in the form'er; hence practical
efficiency of a higher

grade of reality




Analogy of the darkness that obscures
objects in a dimly lit room, for one who comes in from bright light ; this has the

same practical

efficiency as


4 -41


subserves practical efficiency is bare existence, not reality; no practical







are absent therefrom.

4 -42

Others water-ness


as otheretc.

wise activity in respect of mirage




would be impossible; non-existence of
practical efficiency may be due to various
special causes,

destruction of the

super-imposition by specific cognition; not that which is unsublated in all three
times, but that which is not generated by special defects is practically efficient;

hence, even the illusory
cally efficient.


be practi-


Illusoriness too




illusory illusoriness not opposed to the reality of the world.


Advaitadlpika: illusoriness negates the
oil its


the world; that

which denies

reality, illusoriness,


possess only the same grade of reality as the substrate, the world of ether etc., not
absolute reality.

4 -52


cannot be removed by the intuition

of its


locus negates



nacreity in nacre opposes non-nacreity, while its silverness is not opposed to its non-silverness

opposed to


world is not removed by the cognition of the world and hence negates its non-illusoriness; but Brahillusoriness of the

man 's

saprapancatva is removed by the intuition of Brahm'an.

eviObjection: verbal testimony as the dence for Brahman should be real. Reply even the empirical and unreal


practically efficient; the Vedantas teach Brahman by such terms as "real"







agnihotra etc. texts of non-duality are of greater force; even the validity of

knowledge about Brahman is less than real, as involving Brahm'an-hood which,
as distinct
is less

from Brahman, the

sole real,

than real.

5 -1

Intelligent beings not illusory as else there
will be

none to be released; nor can they be one with Brahman, in view of their

reciprocal difference.


Reciprocal differences due to differences of upadhi.
Difference must be in the
external adjuncts.


not in


Reply of some:

distinctions of happiness

are certainly due to differences in the adjunct, the internal organ, since

they are declared by Sruti to belong to

apposition of bondage and intelligence due to superimposition of the


of the


organ with

intelligence; transmigration of the latter consists in being the substrate of

the superimposition of identity with the knot of individuation ; as for the evils,

so even for reciprocal differences there the conceit of belonging to the self;









only as identified with and differentiated by the internal organ. Others: not the internal organ, but the
reflection of intelligence therein is the locus of bondage; these reflections are diverse.

5 -213

Yet others: the enjoyer is intelligence as endowed with body and organs and
identified with the mind.


the proximity of the internal organ, the real locus of agency etc., agency etc. may be superimposed even on pure intelligence as the locus;


analogy of flower and crystal.



be due to

whose locus is assumptive, external adjuncts; example of the i.e., lamp appearing nearer or farther away.

Which adjunct accounts

for one jiva not

recollecting another happiness etc.?


Difference in the abode of enjoyment is Hie upadhi the hand goes forth to pluck

the thorn from the foot, because of the non-difference of these organs from the

body; no such nondifference as between Caitra and Maitra nor do their bodies belong to a comm'on organism.

6 -2

Difference due to disjoining of adjuncts is the upadhi ; though the mother and the



child in the womb are not disjoined, they are not united as organs of a single

6 -3
Identity or difference of bodies constitutes the upadhi; no difference between the
bodies of youth and old age ; growth not by increase of parts.






internal organ

the upadhi.


Avidyas are manifold, one for each jiva;
hence the non-recollection of one jiva's
experience by another.


Vyavastha not m'ore


on the

basis of a plurality of pervasive selves ; unity of the self favoured by !ruti and


6 -62

Nor can

selves be atomic as happiness or

misery throughout the body would be








Reply: vyavastha not established even
thus Caitra

may recollect Maitra's pain

even as he recollects pain in different
parts of his

6 -6222






non-concomitant with the relation of part and whole or nonconcomitant with iion-difference? Not





since the jlva is said to be a part of Brahman and there would be

confusion between the experiences of the jlva and of Brahman interpretation

of amsatva as similarity together with inferiority; this itself is the relation

between the alleged members of the jlva

and the jlva.



not difference

non-difference: possibility of confusion among the experiences of various
jivas and as between the experiences of the jivas and of Brahman; the diverse


jivas are non-different too in respect of intelligence ; illustration of the members

of an assembly; hence too, since there is not difference iioii-coiicoiriitant with

non-difference there should be confusion.


it is perception of noii'Objection: difference that accounts for recollection.




our view too

it is

failure to

perceive non-difference that accounts for non-recollection.


According to you the Lord should grieve through perceiving His real iion-difference from the jivas; but according to


will not, perceiving the illusori-

ness of misery.

6 625

Objection knowledge which is pervasive may be the substrate of all differences.





experience of happiness


cannot arise in dependence on knowledge; if that be an attribute of

knowledge, diversity should result for knowledge, not for the self.
Difference between Isvara and the jlva not any more intelligible on this view:

Isvara too declared by iSruti to enter into creation and to be atomic.

other texts establish Isvara as

pervasive further He is the material cause of the Universe; hence texts about




secondarily ex-

not secondary explanation apply also to similar texts about the




Objection; the going up of the jlva is mentioned even before the going up of the adjunct, the intellect; departure is

declared even after the release from

name and


Reply: of the jlva too pervasiveness

declared; further for you the material cause is prakrti, not Brahm'an; even if
atomic, Brahman might be the material cause, as the atomic jlva is alleged to be the material cause of happiness and

misery present in a plurality of bodies;
secondary interpretation

possible of



both sets of texts; if attainment is opposed to the pervasiveness of the jiva, it is opposed to the pervasiveness of Brahman too; pervasiveness is the proper nature of the jiva though he is finite as conditioned by adjuncts.

Karmas are practised only till desire for knowledge sists is generated. the suffix expressing desire not primary in this case. the two belonging to different stages." 1-21 Such utility of karnia not inconsistent with the need for renunciation. but the fruit per- generated through removing obstacles and securing favourable conditions for study 1-3 etc. is like the general . go on horse: karma back. even those outside Kdlpataru view asramas (widowers etc. prior to performing karma. is the sole path to the attainment of Brahman. analogy of "He desires to.CHAPTER 1-0 III. karma useful 1 -1 BMmatl view karma useful in generating : desire to know.) are eligible for knowledge. till knowledge is What karmas are to be performed? 1 -31 1 -321 Asrama-karmas. the desire to know inclination for food in the case of one who has become for food. hence not asrama-karmas : . 1 -2 lean through distaste Vivarana view useful in generating knowledge itself . Knowledge indirectly.

making gifts etc. yajfia etc. Practice of . since 1-422 Others: even for the sudra there is competency for such karma as subserves knowledge.g.. the principle of transfer from prakrti to vikrti does not apply here. 1-41 How is it that Janaka is said to have reached perfection by karma alone ? Is it because the path of knowledge is only for brahmanas L i No.CHAPTER III alone are meant. are of use but obligatory rites alone are potent to produce know. instrumental suffix being added separately to each vedanuvacana. e. japa etc. study of the Veda not necessary. dana.. meditation . e. The apasudra section denies competency for saguna meditation or the acquisition of nirguna knowledge through the Vedanta. "brahmana" in- cludes all the twice-born castes. since sacrifice is prescribed in general terms by Sruti. 1-322 Sanksepasdnraka admits the potency of both obligatory and optional rites. 1 -421 The sudra not competent for such karma. even varna-dharmas.. of the pancaksara. Imparting knowledge of Vaidika rites is alone prohibited. he has no knowledge of the Vaidika rites through adhyayana. ledge. as subserving knowledge.g.

ksatriyas and vaisyas are competent for study. securing undistracted study &c. but not in him who seeks knowledge. but samnyasa is not a qualification of their competence. In the -case of the knower who renounces the case of there is no distinction of competency based on caste. 2*12 Apurva from renunciation qualification of him who for sravana etc. 2-14 The brahmana alone being competent to renounce.112 ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS karma subserving knowledge m&y endow the sudra with the body of a twice-born in the next life. 2 -142 Others the brahmana alone competent to : renounce. any more than for those who have attained to the status . is is a special competent 2-13 Utility through seen channels. how can the ksatriya or vaisya be competent for study etc. 2'0 How By does renunciation subserve know- ledge? 2-11 apurva that alone destroys som'e of the sins which obstruct producing an knowledge. ? 2-141 " Brahmana " and vaisya is upalaksana for ksatriya . hence renunciation necessary at least in a past or in a future life. as well these too are compe- tent to renounce.

2-1432 Apurva due this previous sacrifice etc.. leads to hearing etc. there is {permission for such study as will bring about a brahmana body in another life. to apurva itself may lead to realisation even in another birth. hence the niyama-'drsta does not arise. for the restriction is secured with repetition. for the most part. 2-143 Eligibility for study belongs only to him who has renounced. prior to the attainment of the fruit* . of renunciation cannot generate this adrsta. this explanation alone acceptable where no injunction recognised in respect of sravana etc. vaisyas. for ksatriyas and as widowers. for 2-1431 How can study in this birth produce knowledge in another ? Where there are obstacles in the present birth. carried on in this birth what is devoid . not with the bare com- analogy of pounding. the Sutra declares realisation in the next birth. is 2 -1433 The Vivarana view : the above explanation holds even where a niyama-vidhi is recognised. mencement of sravana SI-15 .CHAPTER III H3 of divine beings on the path of release by stages. through the generation of an apurva or niyama-'drsta by hearing etc. in the present birth .

latter signifies sravana etc. suitable for those who. though having a" visible result has also an unseen potency of its own. even such contemplation may lead to fruition analogy of guesses that turn out correct. the path of inquiry is quicker for him who has no . if its being the object of knowledge is well known. are not able to make an inquiry into the Vedanta. failure is to find a skilled perceptor etc. supported by the Bhasyakara and the Sutrakara. 3*0 Bharatitlrtha's view yoga a means to attainment like sankhya. obstacles .. but have a superficial knowledge of the one-ness of Brahman. and the self from the Vedanta learnt by the adhyayana. if Sruti denies Brahman to be the object of contemplation.. it denies its being the object of knowledge too. subserve the attainment of know- ledge in a hereafter. contemplation because of dullness of intellect. such contemplation mentioned in Sruti. 4 -0 !What is the karana of Brahman-intuition ? . the contemplation thereof is also well known from other texts such . Only through this do sravana etc.ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS 2*144 Vedfmta-sravana. and the former signifies : contemplation of Nirguna Brahman. that of contemplation involves delay.

. ledge of the oneness of Brahman and the self being based on the Vedanta. experience. 4 '3 Only the mahuvakyas are the karanas. the mind too cause. is a 5 -1 How can verbal testimony generate immediate cognition? It may do so in con- junction with the concentrated mind. sakti. but not the karana.CHAPTER 4 -1 III Deep meditation (prasankhyana) evidenced by &ruti and by the lover's .' instrumentality of the mind denied by Sruti.. 4-11 Prasankhyana not enumerated as a pramana.g. but laksana. 4-2 The iniml alone is the karana. 4-12 liex)ly: There may be valid postulation of what is not established by a pramana. the success of guess work is due to mere chance and it cannot generate valid knowledge. as causing mental concentration. deep meditation is an auxiliary thereto. The knowe. isvara's maya-vrtti. the intuition of that unity by meditation is certainly well-based. though the content may not be sublated. instrumentality of verbal testin'ony at least in respect of mediate knowledge has to be admitted here by hose for whom mind is the karana intuition of the sense is not through .

Hence immediacy possible 'for happiness etc. jlva in samsara does not realise Brahman. intelligence. 5 -3 Immediacy of the cognition consists in the immediacy of the object and Brahman is eminently immediate. That knowledge. 5 -2 It may do so in conjunction with intense contemplation. tive objects.. 54 Advaitavidyacarya object is its immediacy of the iion-dift'erence from such : intelligence as is helpful to empirical usage in respect of itself . because of obscuration by ignorance. as the m'ind does in the case of the lost damsel. and only for him: to whom it is an obscuring agent does it present difference from the object-defined intelligence. which arises only as in conjunction with its own . ignorance not an obscuring agent for Isvara.ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS immediacy of knowledge necessary to remove error which is immediate. and for Brahman there is no pramana other than the Upanisads. from the respecImmediacy an attribute of not of a psychosis. immediacy of cognition is non-difference of such intelligence. Immediacy is noii-dift'erence from the cognising intelligence. as is helpful to the respec- tive empirical usages. which are witness-revealed.

6-1 Why not pot-cognition etc. are contents of modal ignor- ances alone . primal ignorance can be removed . wherein there smell too . . is no perception of as its modes of ignorance. differences through differences of cognisers. superficial knowledge and sravana all. for the removal of which reflection and contem- may plation are necessary. because of the defect of mental distraction. man-knowledge. for content j ignorance as relating to the inert has to be admitted indirectly. give certitude of existence. remove ignorance about 6 -2 Brahman? Intelligence not the content of a psychosis of the senses. ignorance is not removed. arises thus in conjunction with Brahman-intelligence. destroys ignorance . Modal cognitions dispel modal ignorances which have pot etc. the virtues of these may have been acquired by practice in a previous birth. only by that knowledge whose contents are not the products of that ignorance j or pot etc. the material cause of give Though adhyayana may. though and Brahfrom verbal testimony. if not directly on the strength of observation.CHAPTER III content. this position established on the analogy of sight of sandal-wood. through of content.

6 -5 Objection Even Brahman-knowledge cannot remove primal ignorance. that knowledge alone as aided by the niyama-'purva can remove ignorance about Brahman. as occa- sioned by a svarupa-sambandha exemfrom the cognition of the plified qualified (visista) and from doubt. due to knowledge and ignorance having the same content. knowledge of non-difference is that whose content is intelligence through a special svarupasambandha controlled by special causes . since the : effect cannot conflict with its material cause. difference in the knowledge. conflict even between effect and cause exemplified from cloth and conjunction of cloth with fire doc: . not by modal cognitions touching the bare existence of intelligence. Non-difference is not something over and above intelligence. Reply There is a conflict here. 6 -4 The sphere of primal ignorance is oneness of the jlva and Brahman and can be removed only by knowledge having the same sphere.ANALYTICAL TABLE OP CONTENTS 6 -3 Because of the restrictive injunction about study of the Vedanta. . trine that destruction of the effect is due to destruction of the cause not accepted.

time. 7-3 No undue extensiveness is not assuming other causes in addition. as. 7-2 Analogies of water consumed by heated metal and of grass burnt up by fire. hence they too may be causes of the destruc" tion. (2) analogy of the destruction of a pot cannot establish the need for another cause in the present case. (3) the destruction of the fire-cognition may have an additional cause. (4) destruction even at the moment succeeding its origination is a contingence of the acceptable in the case of Brahman-knowledge. hammer-blows will also be needed to destroy Brahman-knowledge. "removable by knowledge alone as the definition of the "illusory" means "removable by knowledge while not being removable by any accessory of . for (1) need for another cause is not denied in all cases. just as fire which has fuel needs an additional cause for being quenched. in the moment prior to its destruction. Destruction not invariably generated by what is other than its counter-correlate. then.CHAPTER 7-0 III 119 itself How is Brahman-knowledge des- troyed? 7-1 Analogy of the clearing-nut which precipitates the dirt in water and precipitates itself. unseen potency etc. also exist.

74 Ignorance and the universe are removed not by the inert psychosis. the world too is even after the rise of the final psychosis.120 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS knowledge except when conjoined with " knowledge. analogy of the sun's rays burning . . Brahmanknowledge. when focussed through a burning glass thus intelligence removes the final psychosis as well. and this material cause being destroyed with Brahman-knowledge which is along a part of it. prarabdha-karma may account for the continuance of a trace of nescience. . hence the phenomenon of jivan-nmkti. 7 -5 Brahman-knowledge removes ignorance alone. but by the intelligence associated with that. destroyed. because of which there may continue the appearance of a body etc.

is not his final view. nor unreal. It is other than the self. 2 '3 Advaitavidyacarya : removal of nescience is certainly indeterminable. 1?4 Sarvajiiatman : no trace of nescience can . 2 -0 2 -1 the removal of ignorance BrahmaNothing other than the self it is effected by knowledge on siddhi. tion of existence relating to the last instant alone . nor indeterminable : Anandabodha. but it does not persist and hence its material cause need not persist removal is a modifica. like the smell of garlic. and of a fifth mode which is not real. The persistent trace of nescience is an element of the projective energy of primal nescience. is 1-2 It the impression left behind by nescience. nor real and unreal. the conjugational suffix signifies relation to present time etc. 1:3 It is primal nescience itself like a burnt cloth retaining its configuration.CHAPTER 1-1 IV.. the principle "yasmin saty agrimais : What 2:2 ksane yatsattvam" etc. survive knowledge jivanmukti is taught by way of eulogising the injunction to study this . s i J6 .

nescience. prag-abhava too rejected. Non-existence of bliss in transmigration patent to all. though eternally attained. and on the " principle etc. but happiness is not subsidiary thereto gradations not possible in .31 Prag-abhava and pradhvamsa-'bhava not needed to distinguish the past from the future. as it un- of because were. non-existence of misery as goal. this ceases with knowledge. 2 *41 Momenta viness of the removal of nescience does not involve impermanence there is its of release. 2 42 Citsukha : human cessation of miseiy not the goal. analogy of the forgotten golden ornament round one's neck. may be 2 -. but only as subsidiary to happiness. because of ignorance. for when removal is by knowledge. impartite bliss not a production but a manifestation of eter- and the cessation of misery. attained attainment 3-2 is figurative. which posits non-existence of Brahman bliss .122 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS only as attaching to the sense of the stem. a human is 3-1 Bliss.. refutation of pradhvamsa-'bhava as permanent . what results nal. . yasmin saty agrimaksane is " attainment in the primary sense.

. but to the nescience of others. until the final release of all. according to the view in which Isvara is the prototype of which jivas are reflections. not then the is human goal non- obscuration present only with knowledge . hence bliss as the human goal is attained by knowledge. this is removed by knowledge hence the . analogy of reflections in many media. in that variety of it which holds Isvara too to so be a reflection. . difference is superimposed between intelligence and bliss. and so long as these persist. 4-222 Difference from the fruit of saguna meditation no intuition of the iinpartite in .CHAPTER 3 -31 IV bliss in 123 No immediacy for hence it is transmigration . 4-221 The Lord's Isvaratva is due not to His nescience. attainment. 3-32 In transmigration. He will continue to be Isvara. 4-0 Is release the attainment of the state of Isvara ? or subsistence as pure intelli- gence? 4 -1 Eka-jiva-vada can admit only subsistence as pure intelligence. is attainment of the state of Isvara. 4-21 Even on the nana-jiva-vada. 4-22 Release.

section of the third 4-2244 and from the section about the form of manifestation in the fourth chapter. of Isvaratva Impossibility of attainment a is the defect on the view of Isvara as Same defect in the eka-jivareflection. 4-2242 from the amsa chapter. 4 -2245 4-2246 Support of the Bhamatl and its followers.124 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS the latter . no unlimited Lordship. hence no contingence of fresh bondage for those who have become Isvara. 4-223 Ignorance etc. Illustration from the Bhasya on the dahara section of the first chapter. Sutra. 4 -2241 Conformity of this view with Sruti. vada and in the view of absolute difference between jiva and Isvara. Bhasya etc. this is mere acting. do not attach to Isvara though in incarnations ignorant. hence no destruction of ignorance. section of the second 4-2243 from the dream chapter. Erroneousness of the Scmksepasarlraka view that statements about manifestation of Isvaratva are assumptive and made 4-23 for argument's sake. . to suffer He seems to be and so on.

conceived as special powers which come into being for the jiva at his release no contingence of non-difference from . adventitiousness of these attri- butes conflicts with Sruti and Sutra .CHAPTER 4*231 IV 125 etc. when knowledge arises. Apahatapapmatva cannot attach to the jiva in release. satyasankalpatva etc. the assumption of a power is futile. is illusory. bondage 4 -2311 Hence non-difference of the Lord is difficult to avoid. jiva from the 4-23111 Apahatapapmatva. in transmigration sin does attach. . if they are eternally established. 4-23112 No authority for such interpretation of the words. on the dualist hypothesis. Isvara. sin does not cling . even because of knowledge.

. Library No. Library No DC 4764. &S. B 33. Vart. Memorial edition of Sankara's works. B. S.. Mimd. Benares Chowkhamba Press edition Bh. Sutras. . AKS. Oriental Mss. Bhagavad Glta. 1885. Brh. Mem. xxv B.. Jivananda Vidyasagara edition of SLS. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad.ABBREVIATIONS. Egmore Ms: K. G. R. krsna Sastri's edition. Mandukya Upanisad. Adyar Ms. Ap. xxvi 10. Katha Upanisad. Mahamahopadhyaya N. Brh. Chmd. DC 4766. Library Egmore Ms.. C.. Oriental Mss. Advaitamanjaii edition of SLS.bhasyavartika. Oriental Mss. No. No. Ed.upanisad . Brhadaranyaka . Ananta- Apastamba 6rauta of SLS. Adyar Ms. VanI Vilas Press. Egmore Ms.. Chandogya Upanisad. No.

Nrs. PM. Ved. Srirangam edition of SLS. Mundaka Upanisad.127 ABBREVIATIONS. Prasna Upanisad. Vedanta Sutras. Mimamsanyayaprakasa. ( Advaitamafi j ari SB. S&..Sam. SLS.. Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition of SLS. . VPS. Svet.). . Taitt. V. VSS. Taittiiiya Upanisad. .. Taitt. Ut. Taitt iriya Samhita. Patanj all's Mahabhasya.. MNP. Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series. Siddhantabindu edition). Nrsimha Uttaratapamya Upanisad... Mund. TPH. (Contd. Pat. Theosophica! Publishing House. Svetasvatara Upanisad. Siddhantalesasangraha. Sanksepasariraka.Su. Vivaranaprameyasangralin (VSS). Prasna.. Purva Mlmamsa Sutras.


OM CHAPTER Victorious discourse is I. w. is to the it is that. establishing (therein) through arguments. intent only on the establishment of the unity of the self. made known to me by the exposition of my revered father. verily. (3) Now. such positions as require so to be established. 1 is diversified on reaching different (1) -. and is purport the non-dual diversified a thousand-fold on reaching the (numerous) ancient preceptors (who expounded it). in the form "The also See the Introduction. in the same way as the river (Ganga). paid no heed to what is established in empirical usage some of the different conclusions which lie at the base of these (differences) and which have been . which issues the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavatits sole pada. who. there injunction 1 is considered first what kind of an self. which. SI 17 . lands. the auspicious birth-destroying from (the Sutrabhasya) . 8687. Manifold are the ways disclosed by the ancient ones. according to the best of my lights. compane Brahmatorkastava. issuing from the foot of Visnu. has for Brahman. (2) I write this not too extensive work. I here compendiously bring together for the clarification of my mind.

" Here. the restrictively complementary and the exclusive injunction. in the case of one who has learnt (by adhyayana) his own section of and in whom there has arisen the desire to know the Brahman3 self known superficially through the Vedantas the Veda together with its subsidiary studies 2 ." appears to be prescribed in respect of the hearing (study) of the Vedanta. The the in second is that injunction of whose fruit is complementation the unestablished element. The subsidiary studies (angas) prosody. for example. in the absence of an injunction. the basic material of the purodasa (sacrificial cake) hence the injunction is not for the establish. the imperative should be understood as the real purport. are the varieties of injunction the injunction of the novel. there is no establishment in any way by other evidence. though the indicative alone is used . for the sake of knowing that (Brahman-self). such texts. . "He sprinkles the paddy-grains. liturgy." 4 Here. reflected on. the establishment of the pounding of the paddy-grains would come about even as presumptively implied for the production "He of the rice. 2 3 4 are: phonetics. for the purifactory act of sprinkling the paddygrains. 1-11 Three. verily.130 CHAPTER I be seen. respect of what is established in part. Of these. heard. grammar. and astronomy. times. the first is that injunction whose fruit is the establishment of what is not established in any way in all the three injunction. not critically examined. even if there were no injunction. for example. pounds the paddy-grains. In so far as they have been learnt by In all rote.

hence may be said to be "restrictively complementary. there is constant relation of one subsidiary to two principals or of two subsidiaries to one principal. is constantly established even because of the characteristic mark. a particular rite included in the caturmasya. the bridle of the right'". consisting in its capacity to make known the taking hold of the reins. viz. The term niyama-vidhi this literally is means injunction its With much. by same way. (the injunction) in the agnicayana "He takes hold of the reins of the horse with the words 'they seized is . not used throughout. cumbrous. when pounding presumptive implication. but. there not secured distinction from parisankhyft-vidhi. taking hold of the reins of a horse and taking hold of the reins of a donkey. since thus there is an element of non-establishment in respect of pounding. .THREE VARIETIES Otf VIDHI is established 131 ment of that. since in the taking hold of the reins of a horse the hymn "They seized" etc. in the very part. when means).. The differentia of the niyama-vidhi is that It completes it what it is other- wise incomplete. however. however. since rather But the function of complementation should be understood wherever the term "restrictive injunction" is used." Two acts are to be observed in the agnicayana. has the fruit of removing the other principal or the other subsidiary (whichever superfluous in the case) for example. "He sacrifices with the two ghee-portions. that (injunction) has the fruit of comple- menting that element (making pounding the sole 5 The third is that injunction which. Of these. husking with the nails and so on would also be established in there being no distinction in respect of the causality as understood from experience." is This equivalent Is. the injunction 5 is not either for of restriction. since there cannot be restriction without exclusion. or (the injunction) in the grhamedhiya.

. itfo yajati.132 SHATTER i the establishment of that or for the purpose of complementing any non-established element therein but since . 7 but since by transfer even the foremight be established. that (injunction) is for the purpose of removing this (possibility). for the pounding established in part. because of the characteristic mark being non-distinctive. They sbould be performed in this order. The Scriptural directions as to the latter not being complete. they have to be taken over mutatis mutandis from the archetype. since the grhamedhiya has the darsa-purnamasa for archetype. others modelled on them are called vikrtis. that (injunction) is . hymn might. Similarly. be established even in the taking the hold of the reins of a donkey. when. This process of taking over or transfer is 7 The darSa-pftrgamasa consists of two sets of three rites. They are mentioned in this order: samidho tanOnapatam yajati. all of whose subsidiaries are down explicitly and in extenso by Scripture constitute the archetypal (prakrti) rites. not for the purpose of establishing those (portions) or for the purpose of restricting them( as the sole material is for the sacrifice) sacrifices etc. barhir yajati. called atidega. svahakaraxn yajati. This example which conforms (only) to the prima facie view of the section on the grhamedhiya. Of these sets there belongs a set of five subsidiary rites called foresacrifices (prayftjae). Nor may it be objected that even in the restrictively complementary injunction. the ghee-portions are constantly established (for it) even by transfer 6 hence the injunction there its . the part that 6 is non-established laid is made Certain rites. is cited in the view that an example may be cited (for the present purpose) from anywhere (whether prima facie view or final view). To each yajati. for the purpose of removing this (possibility).

which are the other means established in part. as therefore. . it is proximate hence. it would not be possible to exclude husking with the nails and so on. 1-12 Of the three kinds of injunction. tion is and in that. from injunction. is non-proximate. while for Vamadeva. therefore. which originates in dependence on that (restriction) and is what is not enjoined. even for him. that (demand for a means) is satisfied. which are obtained by presumptive implication resulting to the . the restriction. no discrimina- possible exclusion. quently there is obtained also the removal of husking with the nails etc. in ordinary experience. For. when a proximate of which kind is fruit is possible. whose nature it is to complement the non-established element. who has heard (studied). the exclusion of others. as present in the pounding that is enjoined. and. the fruit of the restrictive injunction.RAVA1*A-VIDHI AS APURVA-VIDHI 133 that conse- up. in the absence of the restrictive complementation pounding. thus distinguished. comes first. like the author of the Prakatartha say thus an injunction of the novel. in respect of the hearing (study) of the Vedanta being the cause of the intuition of Brahman there is not the evidence of co-presence and co-absence . that (complementation) alone is admitted to be . there being no distinction (between them) effect between restriction and in their having the removal of the rest as the fruit. therefore. as present in not appropriately the fruit. Indeed. since it (the hearing) : 1*121 not established (otherwise).. the injunction of hearing (study) recognised to be? this is is Some. that (intuition) does not arise for the most part. for.

resemblance to other sacred teachings). Therefore. In the Bhasya too. partially. The question is whether of three auxiliaries mentioned in the Sruti.e.. which is the third for him who has that (knowledge) . yet. (in the following words) "In the case of mauna. since g Le. For. there is not etc. in the " section There is the injunction of some other auxiliary. is it is the non-established (otherwise)".. as in the case of injunctions and the like. even in the case of the hearing (study) of the science though. as in the case of a childlike state and panditya. that hearing (study) in general is the cause of the intuition of the thing that has to be heard about. it may be doubted that. The . Religious Duty inconstancy." it is only an injunction of the novel that is recognised in respect of hearing (study). balya. 9 positive both in and in the negative instances. the auxiliary to knowledge. though here there be no means of specifically. causality may (yet) be established at least through generality (i. injunction of the novel. and thus there is inconstancy both 8 ways. apprehended from (study) of other sacred teachings. the whole section should be studied in the BM$ya. of music seen to result the intuition of there is its object.134 CHAPTER 1 present in the womb. other than the first. though he has not heard (studied). The final view is that they are all enjoined as auxiliaries. in which case... Nor is the hearing there a general rule. from the hearing (study) of the section relating to ritual etc. an injunction alone is to be recognised. this is certainly an etc. the injunctive term being explicitly used In relation to that alone. denoted by the word : panditya. the probans 9 not constant to the probandum. apprehending the causality there be admitted causality of the intuition of the sadja note etc. For a proper understanding. since.. there is injunction of any. that arises. pancjitya and mauna..

While certain advaitins hold that this mediate cognition becomes immediate by long uninterrupted contemplation pursued with faith. there can diate. said that. defined as a means of valid knowledge whose content is an immediate object. though at first it is not realised. another school holds that even testimony can give immediate knowledge. Mauna is is taken to be it is enjoined. however. see Chapter III. as being a means of esta- knowledge relating to Brahman. it may be thought there is no novelty. balya is a child-like state. in niaintaining the immediacy of knowledge through verbal testimony. but study of the Vedanta. which. because of distractions. have not yet attained to pre-eminence of knowledge.SRAVANA-VIDHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 135 1-122 That the hearing (study) of the Vedanta is the cause of the intuition of the eternally immediate not non-established. hence the word "partially" indicating that the injunction is for those who. as the sole pramftna for Brahman. but pre-eminence of knowledge. indeed. where the object is immeBrahman being the eternal. For a fuller discussion of these views. is ordinarily supposed to give us but mediate cognition. meaning the state of a muni. since. Nor may it be established. because novel and non-established otherwise. the causing of the intuition (of that object) is settled that for that It is for that purpose. not established of that hearing (study) the causing of that intuition consisting in the certitude of existence. there may be blished causality in respect of a superficial realisation consisting in an intuition of Brahman in a general way. that there 10 is the commencement of that (topic). can be removed only by immediate knowledge of the kind perception gives us. like inference. should be taken to mean not "silence". Panditya is not mere learning. be no question as to its immediacy. . Mauna is the third auxiliary for him who possesses the other two. Brahman. all-pervasive sole reality. in spite of the absence of an injunctive word. 10 Nescience. which is realised as immediate. is Brahman it is (Vedanta study). Since the injunction for him who already possesses that (knowledge). does give intuition of Brahman. Sabda. is the sphere of verbal testimony alone. which is to be desired for the sake of the there is word mauna. though with this much.

for. since it may be doubted that like the sense of touch (present) over and above the sense of sight in the perception of the pot. there is no injunction of the novel. it I removal of nescience. which is of the nature of knowledge of the words of the Vedanta as it subjected to inquiry. Nor is there the afore-mentioned inconstancy both ways.136 CHAPTER for. in the com- " mentary on the section Repetition (is required) because of the teaching more than once. though not by sight. remembers other births. the inconstancy in the co-presence is not a defect." in the words 11 If inconstancy really ruled out the causal efficiency of gravana. that it is the cause of that (certitude of existence). inquiry in general is being established that the cause of the ascertainment of inquired into and that the means of knowledge relating to Brahman is the cause of the intuition of that. because of (the result) being established. not even through express statement would there be possible the knowledge instru- mental to that (removal of nescience). 11 And even the inconstancy in co-absence is not a defect. (study) in the intuition of Brahman. there is some other means over and above hearing 12 And thus. not even an express statement in the form of an injunction of the novel could establish that efficiency. the fruit being possible because of hearing (study) in another birth. there is no inconstancy in the co-absence. Otherwise. . in the case of him who . because of being blind. just as it is possible for one to perceive the pot by touch.. 12 In the case of Vamadeva it is possible to imagine some other cause of intuition such as the might of austerities performed in a previous birth. inquiry) while.g. being due to lack of the auxiliary (e. Hence it is that. what is is established of hearing (study). causality being sublated even by inconstancy.

repetition is taught of hearing (study). For.RAVAtfA-V*DHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 137 " Hearing (study) and the in intuition. vistara on PM XI. 14. i.. which culmirest. dealing with tantra. cp.e. when told by some one of some subtle peculiarity there not apprehended by himself. In the ing) sarvausadha. it is indeed 1* that there is no established in the Tcmtralaksana repetition.. even so. in order 13 I. however. having heard in the case of the jlva. there were an injunction of the novel. a person might. nate in the production of rice". which is for the sake of the intuition of Brahman. the principle of the pounding in the darsa-purnamasa applies (to it)." pounding is prescribed for the purpose of the purification of the mortar that is to be placed near. he pounds it . apprehended by the mind as "I". Therefore. since it has no visible result. then he places it near. this is certainly a restrictive injunction. are (processes) and have a visible result. since. S 1-18 . all the herbs needed in the sacrifice. the principle of serviceability to many by a single application or functioning. that it is of the nature of attributeless Brahman-intelligence propounded by the Vedantas apprehended through adhyayana. which indeed culminate which have to be repeated like pounding etc. proceeds to employ that same sense of sight with concentration in order to know that. because of its having a visible result. as a lamp is of service to many who surround it. just as a person who sees 1-131 something with the sense of sight. 14 The eleventh chapter of the Pilrvamlm&wsG. If. like the pounding of the (mortar contain13 this would not fit in. agnicayana. in the words "Having filled it with all the herbs. in the absence of that. of this.

he becomes sorrowless"." doubt that it applies to the mind that is not concen- trated. the term "self" has for purport the non-dual self. that other. for. "When then.e. here. As for (the text) "Not attaining (they 15 it is possible to return) together with the mind. in that case it might be doubted that since. I sometimes proceed to employ therein the mind alone with concentration hence. for the sake of the knowledge instrumental to release. the engaging in . as seen from a consideration of such topics as "That which is all this is this self. " "By it is the and "But seen by the concentrated 1-132 " Or else : from such Scriptural declarations as he sees the excellent one. .138 to CHAPTER that. in order to secure purport- fulness for the restriction as to the hearing (study) of 15 Which seems to rule out the activity of the mind in the appre- hensien of Brahman. hence there may be a restrictive injunction in respect of the hearing (study) of that Vedanta whose purport is the non-dual self. there is the possibility of the delusion that release results from the knowledge of the self as different (from the Lord) . the Lord. since it is also declared in Scripture mind alone is it to be perceived intellect. optional)." It is not indeed an invariable feature of (restrictive injunctions as) a class that there is a restrictive injunction only where a real alternative means is established. he attains His glory. there would be partial (optional) activity even in respect of the hearing (study) of other sacred teachings consisting in an inquiry into the self as different (from the Lord).. know the hearing (study) of the Vedanta would be partial (i.

complement- ing the unestablished element. for. and therefore no restrictive injunction would apply. because of the partial establishment of what may possibly be considered an alternative means. through the hindering impurities being removed by the unseen potency (resulting from) the restriction. even . Or else: immediate knowledge of Brahman. the partial is it that there is a restrictive non-establishment of the means desired to bo enjoined cannot be avoided (otherwise) for even with this there . is Nor with the dawn of knowledge the non-removal of nescience unintelligible. viz. con- 1-133 sisting in the certitude of (its) existence. as much as through that (carried on) under instruction from a preceptor. the non-existence of obstacles being needed everywhere (as a cause). rather injunction where. results the fruit of that (injunction). is possible from inquiry into the Vedanta. there would not exist any real alternative means for that (intuition). the non-removal of that (nescience). it has to be admitted of that hearing (study) of the Vedanta that by that alone can be accomplished the intuition of Brahman. inquiry conducted without instruction).. but the unseen potency (consequent on) the restriction as to the hearing (study) of the Vedanta under instruction from a preceptor is of service in the removal of nescience through destroying impurities texts . consisting in the certitude of (its) existence.AS NitAMA-VIDHI 139 the Vedanta. even as accomplished by a learned man merely by his own efforts. being obstructed by the non-existence of that (destruction) does not remove nescience and remains equivalent hence (the to mediate knowledge.

one continues to perceive reflections so long as there are reflecting media and the objects reflected are proximate to them. from a preceptor) would be 10 One may know that reflections have no independent reality and that they do not exist in the media. since there is partially established the inquiry into the Vedarita through one's own (unaided) effort alone.140 CHAPTER is specific 1 where there intelligible because perception (of the object). for. in order to attain that intuition of the certitude of (its) that since even by the injunction to approach a preceptor.. . the (present) restrictive injunction is futile. let this be a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study) under instruction from a preceptor. because of the possibility tive injunction to learn (otherwise) of apprehending one's own section of the Yeda from the written versions (thereof). the exclusion of the study of written versions the restrictive injunction even as to learning by is rote (under instruction futile. because of the Otherwise. there is Brahman. which is subsidiary to the learning by rote. there etc. which consists in Nor may it be objected existence. even by the injunction to approach. in spite of this knowledge. there is no contingence of the futility of the latter. Thus. in "For the sake of the knowledge of that. hence. the approach to a preceptor being subsidiary to hearing (study). he is certainly to approach a preceptor". in the same way as there is a restric- Scripture by rote under instruction from a preceptor. is of hindrance by an external adjunct. there can be no injunction at all as to that (former) . former. secured the exclusion of inquiry without a preceptor. since. like the non-removal of the delusion of a 10 reflection. when there is no injunction as to this (latter).

17 works in know the non-dual through is the vernacular tongues. there again. yet. since. Nor is there the non-establishment of that even not to speak a barbarous tongue". in the section on the darsa-pur^amasa. and hence the fruitfulness of the restrictive injunction is intelligible. for some reason. there may be. This is exemplified in the new moon next sentence. as explained in the section about the agent (in sacrifices). who. with reference to the full and sacrifices and the prohibition of the utterance of falsehood* . 17 rite is A prescription or prohibition rite. a prohibition for the sake of the rite. even transgressing is the prohibition which desires to for the sake of a human goal. whose purport is the non-dual self. Though. for. does not exclude a fresh pres- cription or prohibition of the same in the interests of a particular rite. there the possibility of his engaging himself therein. it is kratvartha. The fact that there is already a prescrip- tion or prohibition. the prohibition of the utterance of falsehood. "Utter no falseis hood". for the sake of a human goal. and who. thus the prohibition for the sake of the indeed admitted to be fruitful. for him who transgresses even this accep- ted prohibition in his desire for the proper completion of the rite. may serve human good it is generally or the interests of a particular In the former case. engaging in the utterance of a falsehood. because of dullness in the learning of the sacred is from such prohibitions as "He teaching. puru&rtha. Or be a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study) of the Vedanta. in the case of him.jSRAVAlSTA-VIDHl AS NlYAMA-VIDHI 1-134 there being a partial establishment of the hearing (study) of works in the vernacular languages. there is. feels that the hearing (study) of the is Vedanta not possible (for him). in the latter. let there else. which is puruartha.

Thus say the followers of the Vivarana. cannot transcend its settled capacity. (studied). Just as the sense-organ. For him. in the Bhasya on the section is In any case this is As "There the injunction of some other auxiliary partially" etc. since verbal testimony. such as sentences from the manuals of ritual and the instruction of friends. similarly. subsequently performed reflection and contemplation." yet generates recognition because of the co-operation of the memory impression . let there be this restriction (to . though incapable of generating the cognition whose sphere is the element of "that-ness. puranas and (other) works of human origin based on the Vedanta therefore. if it be a restrictive injunction. certainly a restrictive injunction. that there is an injunction of the novel.142 1-135 CHAPTER t Or else. whose purport is to state partial non- even establishment. M36 For him who has heard from the verbal testimony there arises at first mediate knowledge alone as free from doubt. for the statement. because of the presence in abundance of who has these special auxiliaries. just as there is the restriction "By hymns (mantras) alone should be called up the memory of the objects connected with the hymns ". (here) there is the possibility of the partial establishment even of epics. because of the partial establishment of what is based on those (hymns) .. that is in the view that there is partial non-establishment. from that alone arises immediate knowledge. as is made clear there by the construction of the word "partially" even in the aphorism. however. the Vedanta). being of such a nature as to generate mediate knowledge (alone).

it gives rise and necessary is. since it is thus. reflection and contemplation. say som'e of those (followers of the Vivarcma) Thus not through the hearing (study) of the Vedanta. because of the co-operation with intense meditation which is settled to be capable of that (generation of immediate knowledge). in this work. there is a restrictive injunction as before (in respect of the study of Vedanta). but only through the mind because there is the Scriptural text "By the mind alone intuition of is . the These would not seem to have understood the true doctrine of the of Vivararia. according to themselves capable which the major texts of the Upaniads are of generating immediate knowledge. while. it generates immediate knowledge. the generation of immediate knowledge stands to reason. similarly in the case of verbal testimony. in respect of the texts of the Vedanta. when it is defined as the instrument of knowledge co-operating with intense meditation. reference to the Bh&wa Is always to Sa&kara's Commentary. restrictive Injunction as to the obligatory exercise of inquiry. The present is school holds that there no injunction of the novel. since it is established in experience that verbal testimony gives rise to mediate that.SRAVA^A-VIDHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 143 which has that capacity. as aided What is possible by contemplation. a knowledge and to immediate knowledge. . 19 Here. like the internal organ of the bereaved lover. the self 18 is the mind purified by the sacred teaching. as in the immediate presentation of the damsel con- templated intensely by the bereaved lover. therefore. established of verbal testimony that of itself in respect of its own content it generates mediate And knowledge. The Brahman 1-137 is it to be perceived" and because there is the statement 1 in the Bhasya * on the Gita: "the instrument for seeing . as elsewhere. though of itself incapable of generating immediate knowledge.

the study of that (science) is useful as an auxiliary to the sense-organ that generates the intuition of that (thing) others. whose object is the removal of the superimposed reciprocal non-discrimination among the notes heard. it is settled that. equanimity etc/* Hearing (study). Only for the sake of immediate knowledge is there a restrictive injunction in respect of hearing (study). such as sadja. alone 1-138 is there a restrictive injunction thus say some. but in co-operation with the mind which is the instrument. where there is a science whose object is the removal of super-imposed non-discrimination in respect of a thing which is manifest.. Nor is there the contingence of an injunction of the novel on the ground that its being for the sake of that (immediate knowledge) in that form (i. for. by the sense of hearing in co-operation with the study of the science of music. there is the immediate realisation of their true nature free from reciprocal confusion. hence. is for the sake of mediate knowledge free from doubt hence.e. " because of the statement of the fruit (The self) is to be seen.144 preceptor's CHAPTER instruction. in conjunction with the mind) is not established ." And its being for the sake of that is not directly. . neither mediate nor immediate knowledge . however. for the sake of that . thus say 1-139 For hearing (study) which consists in a special mental psychosis of the nature of inquiry into the principles favourable for the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedaiita texts about the non-dual Brahman. . I calmness. because immediate knowledge is not recognised (to result) from verbal testimony.

then. and since it is (study) that desire to it is admitted of the injunction to hear the basis of the aphorism about the? enjoins the obligaappropriate to treat as hearing know (Brahman). admitted of the absence of obstacles that it is anywhere the cause of the effect hence. the author of the Veddntaparil)hti$a accepts tatparya as a cause of valid knowledge from verbal testimony. as a channel (to And if Brahman-knowledge) is unintelligible. knowledge of purport that it is instrumental to the 20 and it is not knowledge from verbal testimony. such " as delusion as to purport for. hut explains the Vivara^akara's position (p. see also VPS. Brahman-knowledge were generated by an extraneous cause consisting in inquiry. it is (study) that inquiry alone. Nor may it be said "Let Brahman-knowledge be the fruit of the inquiry itself either through the ascertain- ment of the purport or through the removal generated thereby of obstacles consisting in human failings. it is not admitted of the . S 119 . 255) on the ground that the latter understood tatparya to mean "heing pronounced with a desire to cause the cognition of that". for. since this is the fruit of means of valid knowledge like verbal testimony.6RAVAtfA-VIDHI AS NIYAMA-VIDHI 145 in respect of Brahman is the fruit. in respect of knowledge. 176. for the validity of that (knowledge from verbal testimony) 20 See the topic in the fourth varnaka of the Vivarana. (study) be but knowledge from verbal testimony as qualified by the purport determined by inquiry of the aforesaid character. pp. either of the two serving . which toriness of inquiry. for : Nor may it be said " Let hearing that Brahman-knowledge is appropriate as the fruit". an injunction is unintellb gible. which consists in a mental activity of the nature of the acceptance (of the principles of reasoning) and rejection (of false principles). 176.

As for the text (The self) is to be seen". the cognition comes to us as valid. not extrinsic.. there would at intervals be the is For him who contingence of engaging in other activities. many parts of its validity is See further. the fulfilment in Brahman signified in . who follows Kum&rila in this respect. for. 21 Therefore. which has the fruit of removing that (distraction). by the word "brahma-samstha (being well-established " in Brahman) consists in not having any other activity and in the Atharvana text "Know that alone. Susruta etc. for instance. in the same way as for him who is engaged in the study of the works of Caraka. 291297. thus say the followers of the Scwksepasanraka. that is but mere eulogy (of the self) as worthy of being seen. not the statement of the fruit of hearing (study) . the VeMntapartoMfa pp.14ft CHAPTER I there would be the contingence of being extrinsic. in the is an exclusive injunction. there is a restrictive injunction as to the hearing (study). by inference from practical efficiency. 1-14 engaged in the hearing (study) of the Vedanta for the sake of Brahman-knowledge. only for the sake of removing human failings through the ascertainment " of purport. other activities are According to the advaitin. consisting in inquiry. the " text (The self) is to be heard". It is than those which enter into the original cognition not made is it known. hence. . is Chandogya text "He who well-established Brahman attains immortality. for the sake of medical knowledge. validity does not require to be produced or revealed by any factors other itself." it is restrictively laid down that not having any other activity is the means to release since the word "tisthati" preceded by "sam" signifies fulfilment. nor produced by the repeated contact of the sense-organ with the object perceived. . give 21 up all other forms of speech". the self. intrinsic.

" 'The self is to be heard' etc. hence.Ad PAKISANKHYA-VIDHI 147 explicitly prohibited. there is admitted a restrictive injunction in respect of contemplation. or it may be an exclusion. let "Up him spend his time may it there Nor in reflecting on the Vedanta. merely because of the partial establishment of what is not instrumental to that . an exclusive injunc- tion for the exclusion of that (activity) does not stand to reason . when there is establishment in conjunction not instrumental. he does not attain that" there since. there would be no engaging in contemplation.) may to The hearing (study) that is laid down as relating the self in "The self is to be heard" in the same way 1-15 . The purport of the injunction there (in possible. an exclusive injunction whose fruit is the exclusion of that (asadhana) is is even with what Thus say some who adhere to the statement of the Vartika. no establishment in conjunction with hearing (study) in respect of a single result. ' ' be a restriction. on that principle. we devote ourselves to the supreme self. since. since. and in the words of the commentary thereon "in that case where. for. yea. of any such other ' ' activity not helpful (of itself) to is Brahman-knowledge. helpful in the intuition that removes nescience. by the non-perception of the not-self. up to his death. in the aphorism "There is the injunction of some other auxiliary" etc. and there is the text of the traditional code to his sleep. because of the predominance of the perception of difference. for is a restrictive injunction him who has accomplished hearing (study) and imagines that what is to be achieved has been achieved even by the mere knowledge through verbal testimony.. be said (they urge) that.

And its having that fruit is established even in experience. is CHAPTER t simply knowledge of the self. of natural activity. and no other means is established tion (with this) .148 as reflection etc. For the same reason there is the exclusion of inquiry accomplished by one's own efforts. the approach (to a preceptor). after the refutation of an injunction in respect of knowing the self. the assumption of an unseen channel does not stand to reason. from the objects is to (passage of the) Bhdsya beginning then. that is . there is the whatsoever. since when a seen channel (of instrumentality) is possible." If hearing (study) were the inquiry into the purport of the Vedanta. nor the realisation of Brahman. then. there were no injunction to learn by rote. the approach to a preceptor enjoined for the sake of knowledge culminates in the goal of knowledge only through Though there be no injunction the inquiry into the Vedanta under instruction from a preceptor. whether optionally or in conjunchence there is no scope there for any M51 as to inquiry. are there texts like 'The self : "For what purpose. of the three injunctions. as generated by revelation and ceptor. its fruit would be only the removal of obstacles consisting in delusion and doubt as to the purport. we say. however. not the removal of any other obstacle. hence in respect of that.. through the ascertainment of the purport. heard' which have the appearance of injunctions? For the purpose of turning one away. then. there is no injunction the instruction of the prethat in the aphorism about harmony (of the texts). If. but is not of the nature of inquiry into the purport. Hence it is be seen.

the restrictive injunction as to learning by rote is fruitful. even in respect of the text (The self) is 22 23 Which would have Igvara-'nugrahad to be ruled out by the restrictive injunction. that inquiry into the Vedanta. and that with this much there is the admission delusion as to of a restrictive injunction in "(The self) is to be heard. a restrictive injunction as to . would not for the sake of that (knowledge) make a channel of learning by rote. hence there would not be established the exclusion of the study of written versions . be said "For him who 1- 152 purport is sometimes there may be the engaging even in the sacred teachings of dualists. other means. Cp.. consisting in pronouncing (the texts) in the manner pronounced by the lips of the preceptor. 22 Nor its is it even the case that through the removing (delusion as to purport) there would be the engaging even therein. seeks the inquiry into the Vedanta for the sake of removing delusion as to Nor may it etc. for. since it is not enjoined for the sake of knowing the letters (alone of the Veda). in the case of him who is devoid of the faith in non-dualism that is gained (solely) by the grace " 23 of the Lord.NO VIDfll AS TO SRAVAtfA 1 49 enjoined. is fruitful". in the case of some one. KhanQanakhandakhtidya.yatej[ maha-bhaya-krta-trana dvi-tragam yadi . whose purport is the non-dual self. v. since there too there inquiry into the Vedanta through constructions acceptable to them hence. 25: ea puinsam advaita-vasana) j5. there is not the removal of that (delusion) hence there is not the establishment of any ." for. hence. para 163. in the case of that (dualistic teaching) which is of itself the cause of delusion as to purport.

for. this sense is obtained that the knowledge of the meaning generated from the Veda apprehended through learning by rote is what culminates in the fruit. in the case of him who has not renounced. while. the exclusion of other activities is not possible. because of the construction acceptable to is the adversary. the delusion possible that the purport is an injunction to inquire into the self that has a second. whose purpose is the comprehension of the sense. not that (knowledge) which is . in is the case of him. since the restriction to Nor may obtained even from proximity. a restrictive injunction is possible as to Vedanta being the content of the inquiry. it cannot be the content of an injunction. M54 be doubted that though there be no injunction in respect of inquiry. which being wellBrahman. for. even because of the Vedanta is the force of the restrictive injunction "One is to study one's own section of the Veda". in view of this other text enjoining renunciation. who has renounced. engaging in other pursuits. as prompted by delusion. the teaching of the exclusion of other activities through the text "(The self) is to be enjoins established in renunciation together with heard ' ' would be it futile. the exclusion of that established by the Scriptural text "He who is wellestablished in Brahman attains immortality ". further. since there are objects of exclusion like works in the vernacular tongues . 1-153 Nor does it stand to reason that it is an exclusive injunction for the purpose of the exclusion of other activities . for. cannot be restrained even by hundreds of injunctions.150 to be CHAPTER t heard ".

by is Of Brahman. as in the case of arthavada (eulogistic or condemnatory) passages having the semblance of injunctions. an injunction is recognised in respect of hearing (study). reflection and contemplation. since there is non-injunction in respect of hearing (study). known for release. from which these . that 2-11 the Scriptural text "That. verily. an injunction is not required . panditya and mauna . and hence. preceptor Vacaspati.DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN 151 generated from any 'other cause hence. that reflection consisting in recalling reasonings favourable to the establishment of the object and contemplation is consisting in the repetition of the cognition of that (object) are causes of the clarity of comprehension of the object. in respect of them. the object of inquiry. And thus. there vernacular works etc. like the inquiry into the section about ritual. that inquiry is the cause of the ascer- tainment of the purport of what inquired into. is no establishment for " There Nor may it be said that in the section is the 1-155 injunction of some other auxiliary ". for. signified by the terms balya. in respect of Brahman that is the sense of the Veda and is to be . there is the empirical usage of injunctiveness (in respect of them). merely as producing excellence of activity (in respect of them) through praising (them). the inquiry into the section about Brahman too has for its basis the injunction as to learning (one's own Veda) by rote thus say those who follow the position of the . sustentation and destruction of the world. these are establishedl in experience. the definition has been stated to be the causality of the creation.

the destruction of all and so on are mentioned separately as marks of Brahman thus says the author of the Kawmudi. since is does not attach to any other (except Brahman) capable (of itself) of being the definition. characteristic j 2-12 Others. qualities The non-dual Brahman cannot have any not a real qualification which are real. like world. is Hence. true. Hence it is that in such sections as "The eater (is Brahman). . if this be it said. sustentation and destruction of the world. there is Brahman. because of " the mention of the movable and the immovable. however. is declared of that (Brahman) alone. in order to make known material causality. but is never- theless able to give us a glimpse of the nature of that subject. like the king in respect of the sustentation of the kingdom. It necessarily falls short of what it qualifies. (but) in respect of the potter in respect of the creation of the pot. this definition but single. And thus.152 ' ' CHAPTER I beings originate etc. Of the creation. qualifies per accidens 2 * the non-dual Brahman as that which is without which is differentiation the material 24 and the efficient cause. the causality of creation (vieana). each of which is independent of the others. but is only an ctccidens (upalak?a^a). this is certainly a three-fold definition. the control of the creation and sustentation of the world . and in respect of its sustentation. etc. the causality even of each one. the efficient cause may certainly be other than the material cause" in order to remove this doubt. say thus: since causality of creation and causality of sustentation are common to the efficient cause (too). as there would be loss of non-duality. shown the dissolution of the world in " Let Brahman be the material cause of the its creation.

the effect which is non-different from the cause is a transformation. is in the form of the jiva ? Here. as of Primal Nature but it is characterised by being illusorily transformed . which is of the same grade of reality etc. through nescience into the form of the universe of ether That change. who hold that by the combination of atoms is something new and previously non-existent 26 Recognised by the Sa&khya. change. as the thing. is transformation. 2G does it consist in transformation. S 120 . produced. which is of the same nature as the cause. festation . : (of the world) and in the BJiasya thereon. is transformation. in such statements self ether originated. or in the form of the Lord (Isvara) or Now. the effect. immutable intelligence. what is not of the same grade of reality is illusory manifestation. since in the aphorism about the origination etc. is an illusory mani. some of the followers of the Sanlcsepasarlraka 2-221 say thus the pure (Brahman) alone is the material cause. as by the primal atoms.PARItfAMA AND VIVARTA 1 53 2-21 And the material causality of Brahman. And of causality as " From the 25 thus. does not 25 nor consist in origination. " Of the Naiyfcyikas. the pure Brahman recognised as the 2-22 material cause. material causality is declared to be the definition of the Brahman that is to be known. of the nature of the non-dual. which even without being non-different from that (cause) is yet difficult to state apart from that. what is of a different nature from that is illusory manifestation or. such is the distinction between transformation and illusory manifestation. or.

who knows everything in detail. in such sections as Hence " it that in the BMsya. from (i. brahma the Veda).. however. however. is the Lord (Isvara) and associated with maya. that the saman. because of the qualities of that being declared" and "(That which consists of mind etc. were the material cause." and which is is is consequent on being the material cause of all. intelligence as such. it is said that all. all brahma. to the exclusion of the jiva. common to the jiva and the^Lord. all flavours. teristic If. being the self of texts as which is is declared in such Scriptural is " That alone is the rk. that is all odours. a charac- mark of the Lord.e. to the exclusion of the jiva. The one within (the sun and the self). that is the uktha. in the Scmksepasariraka Even the refutation of the material causality of the associated is (Brahman) with the view of refuting the . 2-222 The followers of the Vivarana. think thus because of such Scriptural texts as "He who knows : all generally. whose austerity this is of the form of knowledge. the material cause only that form of as qualified by Brahman which omniscience is etc.e. all desires.. name.154 CHAPTER like I words the "self 1 " whose expressed sense is what the is associated (with nescience) signify (here) only secondary implication in respect of the pure (Brahman). that the yajus. him proceed (i. that (being the self of all) would not be the characteristic mark of the Lord. that actions. form and food is the earth) ". is is here what Brahman) because of there being taught well known everywhere"..

Hence text causality for both it is that in the digits Scriptural 27 If "Even thus. maya. for. in respect of (the jlva them there is material and the Lord). is rather is He to be distinguished from the latter. as a definition of the Since the universe of ether of is etc. that is associated with maya.igVARA AND jiVA AS MATERIAL CAUSES 155 27 material causality of what is qualified by maya. the Lord the material cause. as distinguished (from maya) . . it is said of the material causality of the world that it is present in the (expressed) sense of the causality defining per accidens the impartite intelligence that is present with that (Lord). . is the material cause. Since. omnipotence etc. The secondary 28 the implication of both terms is the pure Brahman. though present in the Lord is capable of moon hence the statement of that Brahman that is to be known. however. while the expressed sense of "Thou" is the apparently finite jlva. even in that (work). is a transformation 2-223 located in the Lord. since in respect of secondary implication there is no difference between the two terms and the reference to the term "That" would in that case be futile. material would pertain in part to the qualification too.. The expressed sen. in respect of that. In the text " That thou art " the expressed sense of " That " is Lord characterised by omniscience. these sixteen isvara qualified by maya were the material cause. isvara. when upadanatva predicated of Him. but not as associated with maya.~ 8 And thus.se is understood here. This is causality what is said to be refuted in the Sank$cpa$&riraka. the internal organ maya are products of the subtle elements produced by the jlva's nescience in conjunction with the gross elements which arc the evolutes of the maya located in the Lord. etc. as the bough (defines) the word " That ". but does not have for purport the refutation of the material causality of intelligence in the form of the Lord. at the close of the first chapter.

the Lord the material cause in respect of that. the distinction if between the two Scriptural texts cited would be unintelligible . 2-2231 Just as. are transformations of the nescience located in the jiva. Nor is it the case that the gross elements too. while the Scriptural text "Gone are " refers to the cognition of a dull the fifteen digits a knower of the truth dies. towards " the is person. in another text Gone are the fifteen digits to their elements. in view of that aspect of them which is the product of nescience. thus say those who maintain a difference " " between maya and nescience (avidya). at the time of release from the body for it and sink into the person. that the Scriptural text the digits by knowledge refers to the vision of him who knows the truth. is a transformation of is maya located in the Lord. in view of that permanent aspect of them which is not removable by that (knowledge) and consists in the transformation of the gross elements that are products of maya. reach the enlightened one. removable by knowledge. they are destroyed by knowledge. there is shown their resolution into their respective material causes. because the internal organ etc. denoted by the word " digit "... did not enter into the internal organ etc. the mind etc. the persons near liim think that his body etc. in the BM$ya on the section about the resolution of the about the destruction of digits. too are resolved person. for discrimination is clearly established. because the universe of ether etc. the products of maya. since. similarly. the jlva alone is the material cause in respect of that. when .156 of the seer. CHAPTER that t go shown of the vital air. that.

and places and in different ways.e. earth etc. the mind and all the organs. in the Even among those who maintain their non-differ- 2*224 ence. earth which is the support of all" Brahman alone is the material cause of the entire empirical world. some say thus: though of the universe of ether etc. though one with the Impartite intelligence. in the prati- through being their material cause... of the internal the jiva alone is the material cause. 2-225 water. and in the Vivarana. the Lord is the material cause. fire. hence organ it is etc. (This is so because of the following reason) is . ether. there is yet distinction essentially (vyavastha) in respect of objects (karma) cognised at different times 29 I. on the that part of the treatise which shows how for the jiva. air. . yet. there is shown the super-imposition of the internal organ etc. the prima facie view being that. y karmavyavastha. in the case of the jiva. and. the connection with the internal organ etc. thus say some of those who maintain a difference between maya and nescience. Because of such Scriptural texts as "From this proceeds the vital air.. pot etc. in the case of the intelligence that is Brahman. but the jiva (is the material cause) of the merely apparent dream world. in the section "There contingence (of transformation) of the whole or conflict with the Scriptural declaration of (Brahman) being without parts".I&VARA AND JIVA AS MATERIAL CAUSES into 157 same way as a pot that is destroyed. if Brahman be the material cause of the world. the connection with on the jiva alone...~ there are mentioned. that in the Bliasya on superimposition. because of the cognition of (their) identity with the jiva. though not connected therewith.

because of the Scriptural text Know may a to " be prakrti (the primal cause) and because of the persistence of the inertness of is maya in pot etc. as also the intelligibility of the persistence of both attriis namely. is the cause of all. ' ' 2'23 Now. r 2 226 -Che J iy a himself being. or on the transformation of it in part there would be the contingenee of conflict with the Scriptural declaration of (its) being without parts.. etc. the author of the Padarthatattvmirnaya says. it is established as the final conclusion by the aphorism "For. cognised to be the material cause of the world. in Brahman is (also similarly) intelligible thus say others. Nor is material causality a mere matter of terminology in the . thus too say some. is maya how (then) 2-231 Brahman the material cause? Here. is the material cause. the intelligibility of both texts.158 CHAPTER 1 transformation of the whole of it in the form of the world there would be contingence of the non-existence of Brahman over and above the transformations. even so (it may be in the supreme self)". as transforming itself. reality and inertness. Of these. that sees the dream. there are variations. the creation of ether . with the doctrine of illusory manifestation in view. and nescience. as illusorily manifesting. like the seer of dreams. Brahman and maya are both the material cause. like the creation of the dream world of many forms in the jiva-self. Brahman. that. without any destruction of its own nature. just as in the (jiva-) self.. and hence there butes. he who posits in himself everything like lordship.

there are the statements "Non-otherness means non-existence as distinct from Brahman. for. in the case of the immutable." which belong (respectively) to the Bhasya and the Bhamati. Brahman. by non-otherness we do not declare nondifference. for. for the world. The author of the SmksepasariraWa. as between nacre and silver. there is iionfrom the real Brahman through (its) illusory manifestation. and from the inert ignorance through transformation. since. independent causality is . accepting even the aforesaid teaching. mention another definition common to both illusory manifestation and ti'ansf ormation material : 2-232 causality is from itself. because of Scriptural texts like that about origination (arambhana) ". in the form "the pot is real. being in itself the cause of the origination of the effect. 2233 says thus : Brahman alone is the material cause . since there is no distinction even there in respect of the definitive characteristic of material causality.BRAHMAN NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE WORLD 159 case of the substrate of illusory manifestation. Some.. however. there is no conflict in accepting merely apparent non-difference. the acceptance of non-difference would be an unwelcome conclusion. because (in the (its) comm'ents) on the aphorism "Non-otherness therefrom." and "Indeed. the purport of those two statements being the denial of non-difference of the same grade of reality as the substrate. viz. there is experience of apposition. differcnce the generation of an effect non-different And. however. and deny of the world non-difference from Brahman." Nor may it be said that. namely." "the pot is inert. but we deny difference.

which (parts) 30 cause. That is to say. and "Of that. says thus: Brahman. 2-234 Vacaspati Misra. which is indeterminable primal cause of associated with intelligence as such. because of such Scriptural texts as" This Brahman has neither an earlier nor a later. maya located in it the jiva. it is said thus in the Prakatdrthavivarana: beginningless. even the subsidiary is a 31 ft Not Intelligence as delimited or as reflected or as the prototype of reflection. 31 reflection of intelligence therein is (that) is maya. . it (Brahman) is figuratively the material cause such material causality alone is intended .160 unintelligible. however. hence maya merely an accessory.. to be declared in the definition (of 2-31 Brahman). since there is seen in the pot persistence of the softness maya is . not Brahman. as of the clay (itself). neither an outside " etc. is the material since of itself illusorily manifests itself in the form of the world. is Now. this. there is neither effect nor cause " but. the the Lord. (of the clay). though not the cause. is yet present in the effect. as being the substrate of maya. that has been made the content of the cause. says thus: the energy maya is alone the material cause. not a subsidiary cause persistent in the 2-235 The author of the Sidhantamuktavali. the material cause of the world. effect. who is the Lord. however. the reflection of intelligence in the limited innumerable parts even of that (maya). not the material cause. and who the jiva ? 2-3111 To the beings. the is locus of inertness. CHAPTER I the subsidiary cause the subsi30 diary. . etc.

1 that. and are called nescience (avidya). distinct forms are established by the Scriptural text "It creates the jiva and the Lord as reflections. made up of the three constituents.RELATION OF I&VARA TO jfVA 161 are endowed with the obscuring and projecting energies. however. the experience of conjunction with ignorance. is whose sattva is over- (consequently) impure. The one primal cause through the predo. (that reflection) is the jiva. hence it is that though it is associated with intelligence as such. it is said that the reflection in maya is is the Lord and the reflection in nescience is the jiva.2-3113 minance of projection. postulating this distinction between maya and nescience. In the Sanksepasariraka. called maya and is the adjunct of the Lord through the predominance of obscuration.nescience is the Lord. jiva. (it is thus) : of the 2-3112 3* two primal cause. what is principally constituted of pure sattva. following the Scriptural text "This jiva has the effect for adjunct. rajas and tamas. not overpowered by rajas and tamas is maya powered by those (two) and . nescience . 8 1-21 . common to both the jiva and the Lord. itself is. the reflection of intelligence in the internal organ is the 32 Sattva. it is called nescience or ignorance and is the adjunct of the . and itself becomes maya and nescience (avidya) ". in the form "I am ignorant. not for the Lord is set Lord such a distinction between the jiva and the forth in some (works). however. ." is for the jiva alone. In the Tattvaviveka. the 2-3114 Lord has the cause for adjunct/' it is said thus : the reflection of intelligence in.

i. in the above-mentioned views of the jiva and the Lord as varieties of reflection. in the same way as what is defined (thereby) hence. the Lord.. (iii) the what is reflected undefined ether at large.e. the jiva is possible may be but intelligence as defined for. the reflection. the water- together with the clouds and stars in the water located in that (pot-ether). and which are inferred (to exist) in the region of the clouds. exists as the substrate of is the intelligence which both the gross and the subtle body. In the CitradTpa.e. because of their effect. defined thereby . in the same way as of ether by a pot.162 jiva .. similarly. the ether : though in fact one alone ether.. intelligence defined as the jiva. is the pure intelligence which 2-3115 is attained by the released. rain. nor may CHAPTER it I be said that since the definition of intelli- gence by a substance. there are (i) the i. .fold division of intelligence is assumed (in the following is way) for example. yet four-fold. however. there is not this defect in the reflection-theory. the leaching of a three fold division into jiva. immutable (intelligence). because of the difference here and hereafter between the parts of . as (i) the pot(ii) the ether defined by the pot. what is reflected in the watery parts of that (cloud). there would be the contingence of the destruction of the (karma) acquired and the influx of the non-acquired. and a four.e. is not differentiated by the incoming or outgoing of the adjunct. Thus. i. ether. namely.e. i. that is in the position of the prototype. and (iv) the cloud-ether. which are of the form of dew. namely. Brahman. that exist in the ether at large. and pure intelligence is abandoned.. the internal organ.

as between the internal organ and ignorance coloured by the impressions of the intellect. i. superimposed on the element whose form of untainted bliss is obscured by nescience. Hence it is that. the jiva. the undefined and (iv) the tord. which are of the nature of the is the general element and the superimposed that is the special element.e.. the four kinds the " appears I ". the " I " which is of the nature of the superfeeling of substrate that imposed special element. the intelligence reflected in the internal organ posited in that (immutable intelligence) and associated with transmigration. as in the case of "tins" " " ness" and I myself act silver-ness. feeling " other-ness " counter-correlate of and of the nature of the substrate that is the general element. And said in this is another : peculiarity of what as is of that (Citradlpa) intelligence.. (iii) Brahman.. in the form empirical usage relating even to another person. e.." in the present.e. and thus. It is. among which nacre. since it is " Devadatta himself goes.I&VARA AS A REFLECTION t 165 and stands unmodified like an anvil. the intelligence reflected in the impressions of the intellects of all beings that exist in the darkness of maya which abides in that difference (Brahman) . . and the appearance together of the feeling of "one-self" " I the feeling of ". being variable. Thus. intelligence. (ii) the jiva." there is in distinctive 1 etc. is. like silver on the immutable (intelligence). i. since one person cannot have the empirical usage "I" in respect of " " another And the of oneself is the person. indeed. i. there is shown the between the jiva and the Lord through differences in adjunct.

how is there non-difference from. the cognition is 33 of post-ness removed. similarly. but in the view of sublation. removed without residue/' in the Vivarana etc. by the cognition of the immutable Brahman-nature. . then. for men of the world. indeed. If the denotation of the "I"." there is removed the superimposed nature of the denotation of "1"$ for. the jlva. And the distinction between through the teaching them is clear in the Brhadaranyaka. but the sublation of the prior cognition of the post. so by the cognition 'I am Brahman/ the cognition of ' I ' is. And the if. that it perishes in the wake of the perishing of the adjunct. there is. verily. rising from those elements. the imperishable Brahman? (The reply is) this apposition (\ve teach) : is not in the view of non-difference. non-discrimination between the immutable (intelligence) and the jlva. there really no post.. is this self" in respect of the it is immutable (intelligence). " As a mere mass of sentiency. be perishable.164 6&APTB& t even because of reciprocal super-imposition. and through the teaching 4 'Imperishable. in "I am Brahman. when it is what is intended is not the non-difference of the was two as such. perishes even in their wake" in respect of the jiva. Of one of the terms in the appositional relation. that imperishable. there is the statement of the Naiskarmyasiddhi " : As in ' What was a post is a man' the cognition of the post (is removed) by the cognition of a man. let word "I" denoting the jlva have the immutable 33 iaid "the post is man". in the manner mentioned this be apposition in the view of non-difference. ' ' What Just as by the cognition of manhood in was (taken to be) a post is a man".

can Igvara who is also conditioned by vasanas " have the experience I am omniscient?" These may not be unanswerable. a 7 mere mass of sentiency. for. blissful. and for that same reason even universal agency etc. even in that (Upanisad) immediately after that (text). are intelligible. who is has for adjunct the impressions of the intellects of all beings. for. how are we to questions: (1) account for the experience "I slept soundly"? If the "I" here belongs to the subsequent waking stage. having all things for their content. how can " I am omniscient"? there be the experience This reply raises other if there is no experience of "I" in sleep. and in the case of him. however. which in waking is gross and perceptible. . the conditioning is not by the impressions ol all the intellects of all beings.iSVARA AS A REFLECTION (intelligence) cation. as well. he is omniscient. omniscience. But in sleep it is subtle. since 165 imposed. As to for the the Lord who is said to be comparable cloud-ether and a reflection in the im- pressions of the intellect. as established in the Mandukya text " Having sleep for his abode. what 34 is also mediate. it is declared he the internal ruler. is Nor may it be said that ontniscience not experienced in the case of any one who is conditioned by the impressions of our intellect. The denotation of "I" is what is conditioned by the internal organ. should not one be similarly able to say "I was omniscient"? (2) If he who is conditioned by vasana cannot have the experience of " I ". being of the nature of an impression. one in form. the enjoyer of bliss '. hence there cannot be immediately experienced either that or what is conditioned thereby. impressions being mediate. thus there being no experience of the "I" in sleep. he is qf the nature of the bliss of sleep. seeks to go deeper.. " He is the Lord of all. is for purport through secondary implithis (latter). he is the cause of all origination and absorption of beings"." The reply given in the text. which is not supercapable of non-difference from Brahman. but no reply is indicated in the text or commentary.. is conditioned thereby 34 The objection is "How is it that no one experiences in sleep 1 am omniscient/ if conditioning by the impressions of the intellect accounts for omniscience?" The reply one would expect is "Because in the case of each individual being.

This being how can we reconcile the statement of his lordship over all and so on? Thus.. he is the Virat self. as conditioned by maya. made stiff with starch. the blissful being mentioned in the Mandukya is the jlva. (adhyatma) and pure intelligence.166 2-3116 in the Brahm&nanda. however. (adhidaivata) and the personal Four forms. there are four states even of the single artistically worked cloth. are established in the Citradlpa. the product of the nonit is maya and the adjuncts produced by quintuplicated elements. It is thus: the internal organ. then. the naturally white cloth is washed. the supreme self devoid of pure. which. said to be of the nature of cognition (vijnanaHe himself. on the cessation of the karmas that bring about enjoyment in waking etc. the product of the . and coloured by the use of colours . when there is awakening. he is the Lord. be blissful. the cosmic . thus. as conditioned by the collective subtle body. the jlva. in the state of sleep. abode" etc. who has that adjunct. because of association with sleep. because of karma which brings about enjoyment afresh. quintuplicated elements. earlier. he is Hiranyagarbha as conditioned by the collective gross body. with the illustration of the artistically worked cloth. thus there . it is said that. is having an adjunct in the state of absorption. the cosmic three of the above For example.e. patent). becomes solid (i. There are two sets of three forms with attributes of the supreme self. marked by the application of what is of the nature of ink. (text) said to He alone is set forth in the Mandiikya "Having sleep for his so. is maya). similarly.. is absorbed in the form of sleep.

"This self Here. even so. (intelligence) is here said to be blissful.. of a nature like to that of the cloth that supports the picture. these. as Visva. Taijasa. for the embodied ones superimposed on the supreme self. (expe- rience) cognises the external" Therefore. Visva etc. (next) for of convenience in the attainment of the the quarter. As for the personal (adhyatma). . Visva is that which in waking has conceit in the text individual gross bodies. because of (their) similarity in respect of having adjuncts which are (respectively) gross.ISVARA AS A REFLECTION are four states even of the single supreme sell And in this supreme self. Taijasa. it includes Virat etc. in the Visva etc. being divided into Visva. . which is in the position of the artistically is what is in the position of the picture the entire universe. there are posited likenesses of the intelligence that is the substrate which go by the name of jivas. in "He who seated in waking and so on. and these. and Prajiia. when the internal organ is absorbed in deep sleep. the Mandul\ya has four quarters" begins with the difference of four states.Prfijna is the witness of bare ignorance. of the nature of Brahman withrelation to the world. subtle and more subtle. it is of three forms. through the merger of each earlier quarter (in the next). the movable. Just as for the men in the picture there are delineated likenesses of clothes. migrate. Prajiia and Turiya in the case of this self that appears in the sake fourth out experience of the "I". (and thus it) establishes the quarters. and that Of Taijasa is that which in dreams has conceit in the individual subtle bodies.. consisting of the immovable and worked cloth.

is the empirically real (jiva) though the product of maya. waves and bubbles. There. there is ihis difference that the immutable (intelligence) set forth in the Citradlpa is included in the jiva-aapect and the 33 teaching of only a three-fold division of intelligence is adhered to. though what defines is to is assumptive. indeed). in this. persists as long as there is empirical usage. it is said that since. there is the statement there of the all. is the merely apparent 35 36 Into pure intelligence. that. jiva and the Lord. there is positing of one on another. (self). which is of the nature of a particular state of the maya that in dreams stands obscuring even that (empirically real jiva). . the one defined 30 is the absolutely real jiva. as absolutely real. Of these.. 2-3117 In the Drgdrsi/aviveka. That Which has the conceit of "I" in the dream-body etc. attributes of that (Lord). The likeness of intelli- which gence (which appears) in the internal organ posited in the maya which stands obscuring that (absolutely real "I " because of jiva) and which has the conceit of getting idientified with the . By mftyft. however. posited by sleep. the jiva is three-fold. empirically real and merely apparent. for. internal organ. being non-assumptive. such as rulership over been explained by the Bhagavatpada in the commentary on (the Manditkya-kdrikas of) it Thus alone has Gaudapada. that be defined. is non-different from Brahman. for. on the analogy of Hie sheet of water.168 CHAPTER I with the intention to declare the inclusion of the unmanifest Lord in the blissful (one) denoted by the word Prajiia.

crooked etc. not tli rough both of them being reflections. occurring in the reflection. 169 on waking. straight. thereof. on the analogy of prototype and is do the freedom of the Lord and the dependence of the jiva on Him stand to " But reason. what can produce the non-existent difference between the self and Brahman?" it is taught of only a single ignorance that the condition of the difference between the jiva it is and the Lord.. is the place of distinctive that is a in manifestation." Of ignorance. say thus: 2-312 by the traditional code "When the ignorance that generates difference is absolutely destroyed. cessation even for the jiva that is the seer . there is. in the absence of two adjuncts. it being impossible for both to be reflections. what in the position of the prototype is the Lord. Only when this is the case. along with the dreamworld. And the aphorism (the creative activity reflection in ordinary experience. The followers of the since Vwarana 37 y however. as the mirror 37 is for the sun's light that The verse comes from the 12? . as in the world" in. the difference between the jiva and the Lord is through their being prototype and reflection. of also the fits Lord is) mere sport. in the manner stated in the Kalpataru: "Just as a man plays with the changes. Here too. Thus have been shown these differences in the views of those who maintain the Lord to be a reflection. the reflection is the jiva. the particular transformation of ignorance. even so does Brahman with the jiva the changes reflection in the jiva. which is of the form of the internal organ.I&VARA AS THE PROTOTYPE (jiva) for.

through the might of yoga. either another defined jiva or another (variety of) intelligence called the immutable. is this self " though there 38 is cessation of its condition of being a Sutras. and different and above the from both the declaration jiva and the Lord. over jiva that is a reflection. by the might of yoga. Hence of) ignorance being the adjunct. on tho removal of its adjunct. verily. in the Bluwya etc. in order that there may be connection with release. which is of the nature of a refleel ion. ns delimited by the internal organ alone as the adjunct. The Ved&nta . Nor may it be said that. for. for so it is shown (in " Scripture)". were the would be jiva. the yogin's control of a host of bodies unintelligible. the yogin's internal organ attains the pervasiveness capable of manifestation in a host of bodies. for. since. there can be no connection with release. port. bodies. that for the jiva. The Scriptural has this for pur"Imperishable. for what is defined by that (internal organ) the control of a host oC bodies stands to reason. Nor with this is there the abandonment of (the view all-pervasive.170 is CHAPTER I too the empirical usage of that (jiva) as having that (internal organ) for adjunct. there need not be assumed over and above that. Since. difference from the prototype is alone superimposed. of the internal organ which like the sense of sight is certainly different for each body in the host of. if intelligence. there is described the creation. in the reflection. on the ground that for tho jiva. thereon. that is real in respect of its own existence . entrance is like that of a lamp. hence. in the 38 The penultimate section of the sacred teaching.

Even' the view that letters are reflected in (the audible) sounds does not stand to reason. is the sound of ether. delusion. (a medium) which is much more is this so.. colourless. the sun's rays pervading the expanse of the sky are reflected in water. The echo too is not a reflection of the according to the doctrine of quintuplication. for. In 2-313 the case of what is not conditioned by colour. existence in the midst of modifications is declared of the Lord 40 (very) proximity of the jiva. 39 40 and hence it cannot be the finite self. the sounds of the drum. Even the example in of the reflection of the sky does not stand to reason. is . is but the Lord that by the texts "He in the who the prototype for.. the internal organ etc. their imposition on letters is intelligible through mere proximity. The Lord's coatrollership Is exercised not from a distance.THE AVACCHEDA VIEW reflection. while the echo alone earlier sound. over and above that (jiva) and called the immutable. water etc. through being the internal ruler thereof. The term "cognition (vijnana)" here means the controlled. alone. in the case of attributes of sound like high pitch. Others. are sounds of the earth.. but in the very presence or proximity of what is . the sea etc. its existence does . The intelligence defined by the jiva's adjunct. a reflection does not stand to reason. (sound) being the manif ester (of the letters). the empirical usage that the sky is when reflected is grounded on mere for. 17 i not perish it does not have for purport (the existence of) another intelligence. even stands in cognition" 30 etc. however. and hence there is no evidence for the assumption that sound takes on the reflection of letters. prefer the (following) view.

the existence in two forms in one " For. only of the intelligence not within the adjunct.e. for. when they are That the letter manifested by the echo need not be a reflection. Nor may it be said Since thus . not like the reflection of the ether or light defined by the cloud. which like the pot-ether is defined by the internal organ. is Even the echo in the . ' ' the intelligence that is within the world is defined in its entirety in the form of jivas. the letter is not the reflection of a previous letter echo. however. is there reflection 41 even when under is to say. as etc. reflection therein is not possible. . even on the reflection place is intelligible. is there seen the reflection therein even of what is within the water. that reflection in that (adjunct) may be declared. even like the original audible 41 sound. since the reflected ether is seen even while there does exist the natural ether present in the water. which letter. Verily. for the Lord. Therefore. the jlva-self)' etc. by the respective internal organs as adjuncts. but not the reflection of the whole.. is the jlva what is not so defined is the Lord. hence there ' would be contradicted the declaration of existence in the midst of modifications as internal ruler. of the face water.172 reflection of CHAPTER I any other sound. in lie who stands in cognition (i.. in water. who is of the nature of intelligence devoid of that definition. the intelligence. of the portion within that. intelligibly be the manifester of the letter. on the reflection-theory. form of a for. theory. there would be existence outside the world alone. Nor. on the it is analogy of the moon in water .. manifesting a caused by an audible sound may.

. who is conceived as identical in several lives. 173 Therefore. the prototype-character would belong only to not within that (adjunct) hence what is of the nature of the prototype could not exist in the midst of what is . on the view that the jiva tion be parity of defect on the a reflection in the internal is a reflec- in nescience. when the internal organ moves here and there. there would necessarily be difference of the of this (and thus) defect (for both theories). at the times of agency and enjoyership there is the contingence of the destruction of the acquired 42 (karma) and the influx of the non-acquired. in respect of the reflection in water. in respect of the reflection in such adjuncts as the internal organ. hence there is parity (between the two theories) in the failure of the text about the internal ruler to harmonise with (the conception of) the Lord.. too. yet. since there has Even to be declared the reflection in the internal organ of that portion of intelligence which is not within (the adjunct) itself and is proximate to it. so. and the absence of identity between one limited space and another is urged as an objection to the use of that analogy for the jiva. because of the difference in the prototype. then. because of the difference in the portions of intelligence defined by the internal organ here and there. Hereby is refuted (the objection) that if the defined be the jiva. in this life and in a future one. the is internal organ which moves about here and there the cause 42 That is to say. reflection there Nor parity may it be is said: "Though there view that the jiva is organ. modifications . on the reflection-theory. and that. definition is understood on a spatial analogy. as in the case of the cloud-definedether etc. of this.THE AVACCHEDA VIEW outside.

even on the definition theory. . there is no contingence of difference in the reflections.174 CHAPTER! of distinctive manifestation here or there. it is possible to admit that the jiva is what is defined by nescience 43 and. on that analogy. in order to remove such . in the aphorism " But since not apprehended (any medium) like water. there is not that nature (of being a reflection) ". there is stated the impossibility of reflection. like the moving bright light above the mass of clouds in the case of the reflection of that (mass of clouds). in that for a single jiva there is agency in one place and enjoyership in another place. even on the view of the internal organ as the adjunct. for. since there is no motion for nescience. since. water as capable of generating a 43 44 is apprehended being at a reflection." " Hence it is there is the analogy of the reflections of the sun and so on ". just as in there is the case of the sun that has colour. there is not this defect for. conflict Nor on the definition-theory is there with the Scriptural and aphorism "As this one resplendent sun becomes differentiated in manifold ways in the water. it is possible to remedy 41 that defect by recognising as helpful (thereto) the identity of intelligence in fact and the identity of the text defining adjunct. defects as the destruction of the acquired. Destruction of tfce acquired karma etc. since there too. so this shining unborn self creates in the bodies different forms through adjuncts. . as (there is) for the internal organ. the identity of the jiva in 'fact has to be resorted to." For. in the very same way. whicli succeeds immediately on the aphorism cited. Not by the internal organ.

Therefore. because of (this) necessity. there is the experience of increase. and the definition-theory alone is accepted " by the Scriptural text alone is As when a pot is moved. because of the declaration of difference". so too is " and by the the analogy of the jiva with the ether " aphorism (The jiva is) a part. the jiva is what is defined. decrease etc. not the ether enclosed in the pot. there is not similarly in the case of the omnipresent self anything at a distance from reflection . decrease the case of the concomitant with that (adjunct) and of the nature of superimposition. it capable of generating " that. the pot moved. and decreases as it were with a decrease of (the volume of) water. the aphorist himself states the purport of those (texts) to be but the definition-theory. as defined by the internal organ etc. and in the aphorism immediately succeeding The experience of increase and decrease is because of being within (limiting adjuncts). and. adjuncts. definition through the internal organ etc. . happens of necessity. similarly. there no conflict . it is within since. since thus there is accord etc. between the illustration and what is is illustrated. and consequently it the experience of its increase. thus there of both (the illustration and what is is accord illustrated)". concomitant with (that of) the water in is of the nature of superimposition.THE AVACCHEDA VIEW 175 distance from that (sun) and (itself) possessing colour. in that just as the sun which is reflected in the water increases as wore with the increase of (the volume of) water. in the case of the omnipresent intelligence.. self. and moves as it were with the motion of the water.

it is brought up in the family of hunters. Brahman alone. like the deity perceived in a dream. together with the attributes of omniscience etc. have no jivas. but. 2 32 2*3211 Now. R&dliil being the wife of the charioteer of &n<J the foster-mother Karna. That thou art ' ". is this jiva one or to the many? Some. . here. taught in the BMsya on the BrJiadaranyaka that. in ignorance of his true status as the son of Kunti. on the analogy of the prince because of nescience for. is an assumption of the jiva. was brought up by a charioteer. adopt the unity of the jiva and say thus: the jiva is one. " and it is said in the Vdrtika Just as for the king's son. migrates. however. condition of the jiva. hold thus: the jiva is neither a 5 reflection nor the defined. the world posited by the ignorance of that (jiva) for that (jiva) there is empirical usage as long as there is nescience. even so for the ignorant self (there ' release) because of such texts as thus. And since it is only by Brahman. who though born to the Sun-god and Kunti. is the condition of being a hunter ceases. and therefore. 45 The son of Kunti. it is only one body that has a jiva. and. others. as in the case of dreamnperception there is is . this state of ignorance is what is designated in the text as the condition of Radheya. it is for the untransformed Brahman itself that there is the . the Lord too. like the bodies seen in dreams. like KaunteyaV condition as Radheya. . is released. who hold view mentioned just before. through its o\\n knowledge..176 CHAPTER I 2-3U Others. that there is the positing of the entire universe. on regaining his memory. through as having attained the condition of the jiva its own nescience. Karna. through its own nescience.

the sole reflection of is Brahman. because of having His desires (already) realised. is to take it to mean that the many bodies are "differently" animated. view of a Others. even the assumptive. of uka occur to this (view) is to be effected solely in the continuous torrent of the dream-analogy. not the jivn. who is more than the jiva. because of the difference of Hiranyagarbhas in each aeon. one by Hiranyagarbha and the rest by his reflections.EKA-JIVA-VADA 177 not even the distinction between the bound and the released. not gaining mental faith in this sole (animated) body and a sole jiva. S I 2? . perhaps. however. there creation of the world merely in sport." which teach thai Hie Lord. like the release etc. and 2-3212 thinking that there " But (the Lord 9 is) with such aphorisms as more. a better inter46 (sajivani) . however. which are of the nature of reflections of that (Hiranyagarbha). of persons other (than the dreamer) in dreams. and are subject to transmigration etc. One is tempted to disregard this and take "saviSesa" with "vadam" so as to mean "distinctive view". there is are distinctive (saviSesa) in that they are all animated so says the commentator. because of the unity of the jiva. 2-3213 others. is alone the creator of the universe. (the creative activity mere sport. however. and the washing off of the mire of all objections that may is release etc. are apparent jlvas. adopt the 4 (following) view of a single jiva with many distinctive is "' bodies: Hiranyagarbha. thinking that. the distinction from the other eka-jlva-vada being manifest. there is no fruit for Him. and that though. because of the designation of is conflict " difference/ is) But as in the world. similar to the apparent clothes put on the bodies of human beings sketched on an artistically worked Yet cloth. The bodies pretation. the principal jiva. others.

for. resort to the view of many jlvas. among the devas. conditioned by the might of yoga. . since it is from the embodied. however. is enlightened. the remembrance of the happiness etc. prefer the (following) view of a single jiva bodies without distinction: a single jiva alone controls all bodies without distinction. 2322 here the Still others. it is settled that difference of . in spite of the difference in bodies. who in too there is parity are dissatisfied. since there is not seen the remembrance of the happiness etc. is but one. no (we reply). apprehension of objects at a distance. sinco the non-existence of distinction is hence there bondage and release and non-accord with the Scriptural text between "Tie who. yet.178 CHAPTER I nothing to determine which Hiranyagarbha is the principal jiva. 2-3221 some say thus: though ignorance. nor (animating) is many there the contingence of the remembrance of one another's happiness. through the admission as adjuncts of the jiva. thus just as (there is remembrance) in the case of the different parts of a body. and only the destruction of that is release. which has the pure Brahman for locus and content. of the admission of the persistence of a trace of ignorance in the state of release while embodied. and hence that is not an like the instance (to the contrary). he alone " " becomes that and with the Blidsya on the section If it be said that it is denied. and obtain the distinction of the bound from the released. of another birth. because Of these." which teaches the release of the bound. of a host of bodies is. however. body is the cause of the non-remembrance of that in the case of yogins. of the internal organ etc.

. Yet others. it is "knot". there is the rise of the understanding of Brahman. separately Absence of conjunction with the I. the "this" (the object) and the "not-this" (the subject).. by the rise of the removed. say thus ignorance does not have pure intelligence as locus. say thus: just as. the mind.e. while in other adjuncts it persists as before through (its) other parts. elsewhere it remains as before. in the view of 2*3222 some Logicians. since for the presence of ignorance in intelligence the determinant is the mind.JIVA-MULTIPLICITY ANb UNITY OP AVIDYA 179 ignorance has parts. through that adjunct. but has the jlva for locus and Brahman for content. when by the rise of conjunction with removed. when. and that (ignorance) : 2*3223 being. the determinant of the presence of the absolute non-existence of pot on the ground is the non- existence of conjunction with the pot and hence the absolute non-existence of pot which exists in association 47 is not in association with many places possessing that with some places. ceases in part. however. in tho manner declared by the Scriptural text u The knot of 50 the heart is cut ". is not in 40 association with some when. Others. like generality in 47 48 the particulars. 49 50 Farts of intelligence. since a superimposition on intelligence and is of spoken of as a a compound nature. it realisation of is Brahman. however. similarly. the mind is only the association and non-association with ignorance that constitute bondage and release. the ignorance that exists in association with pot that non-existence is 48 parts of intelligence. hence that itself. By "heart" it is is here meant the internal organ. in some adjuncts. pot.

. 2'32241 On is this view. as for the cloth when a single thread is destroyed. it The phrase "enumerative cognition" has been taken over from Kuppuswami what Sastriar's is hardly satisfactory. abandons some one for whom knowledge (abandons) a has arisen. by the other nesciences thus say some. this 2-3224 Still is the distinction. produced by the respective Primer of Indian Logic. it is effected by the nesciences of all. like (the origination of) another cloth by the other existing threads. common to all the rest. there is destruction of the several threads. others. his nescience is destroyed. and like the duality which. universe of ether 51 Prof. by whose nescience is the world effected? If this be asked. establish the distinction between bondage and release only by admitting a different nescience for each jlva. there is the creation of another world. since there no determining consideration. in others it resides as before . even at that time. S. then. is produced by the 51 the respective (individual) enumerative cognitions. (the reply is). this alone is release. in the view of the Logicians. and the persistence and removal of that (individual nescience). on world common to him.180 CHAPTER t realised in all the jlvas which are reflections in the internal organ. as they appear. is intended is this: the notion of duality arises not in but in dependence on a subjective dependence on things. as generality destroyed particular. : 2-32242 Like the merely apparent silver produced by the respective (individual) ignorances. etc. desire to enumerate the things. however.. and is on a par with a cloth caused by the release of one (person) . When.

they are of service in bare obscuration and in the projection of the merely apparent nacre-silver etc. there is only the delusion of identity. hence the agency of Brahman is but the possession of knowledge favourable to the effect nor is there this contingency in the case of .MULTIPLICITY OF AVIDYAS (individual) nesciences. thus say others. Others." "He desired. desire to act and volition as is favourable to the 3-1 (production of the) effect." that (agency). 3-0 Now. consists in the possession of such knowledge. which different from the host o 2-32243 nesciences located in the jivas and is (itself) located in the Lord. is different for each individual. however. the statement in is the Vivarana that the jiva the agent in respect of . as in the system of the Logicians. is since that. is (The topic of) material causation together with what is related directly and concluded indirectly. as for the nesciences of the jivas. is Maya alone. : thus say yet others. not an effect being of the nature of and thus. . there be needed another desire to act and volition. of what nature is the agency? Some say thus: because of the Scriptural declarations "That saw. there is the contingence of infinite regress. say thus : if in order to explain 3-2 agency in respect of the desire to act and volition. knowledge too. as (in saying) in respect of nacre-silver itself (is seen) " The silver seen by you that by me too ". is the cause of the universe. Brahman." "That of itself made itself.

there is contingency of agency for the jlva as possessing such knowledge of the substrate as is favourable to the " this is a continsuper-imposition. 53 are in accord (with reason). for. genee of the acceptable. . while the physical world etc. since it is of the jlva that agency is declared in respect of the dream-world. in the case of to dreams and other such delusions. say thus: agency consists in the possession of knowledge which is favourable to the effect and is of the nature of a consideration that it is be created. while a smile does require effort. is (His) smile.. The position has no support either from modern psychology or from the text of the Kalpataru. yet he is said to be the agent. he creates chariots. the assumption of this school (and of the commentator) a glance requires no effort at all and is of the nature of bare is that knowledge. this has been explained thus by the commentator 54 : " agency is merely figurative. nor may it be said nacre-silver.CHAPTER happiness 52 I and the statement in the Kalpataru that since they can be produced by a mere glance. by the Scriptural text * horses and roads: he.. is the agent' ". ether etc. even Now. It may not be objected that the jiva does will the means to happiness. what is denied is volition whose sphere is the internal organ. but does not will them. since. 53 $4 Sa&kara. for. indeed. as in ' the plough 52 The jlva has knowledge of happiness etc. this is intelligible only on the view that agency requires the possession of favourable know- ledge alone. it is not merely the possession of knowledge favourable to Ihe effect. The position thus set out by the commentator is unacceptable to the modern psychologist. however. 3-3 Yet others. the material cause of happiness etc. Here too. since through the channel of Hiranyagarbha it has to be produced with greater effort than a glance. as the witness thereof. are (His) glance.

in the manner mentioned. since for Brahman there are transformations of The author of the adjunct maya. which take on the reflections of intelligence. as the witness of the impressions of all contents." omniscience. there is omniscience. establishes omniscience thus since. how does Brahman 's omniscience accord (with reason). however. is immediately known through the flashes (of intelligence) reflected in that (maya). even through the authorship of the Vedas. there being no internal organ as for the jiva ? 4*1 In reply to this. there is cognisership through association with that (adjunct). which results by implication from this very agency in respect of the creation Brahman 's of the entire universe. there is omniscience for Him.3 . therefore. and that. Prakatartha.BRAHMAN'S OMNISCIENCE supports the cow etc. The author of the Tattvamddhi. though existing in the three times. however. its because the universe./ since (the jiva is) the efficient cause of the appearance of chariot etc. is established in the section " Because of being the sacred-teaching-source ". says 4-2 thus: just as for the jiva. there has been already shown the view of Bharatltlrtha and others that the Lord is He whose adjunct is ignorance in association with the impressions of the intellects of all beings having all things for content. since knowership itself is impossible. : 4. similarly. Now. because the transformations of its adjunct the internal organ take on reflections of intelligence.

without a second there has to be declared the absorption of cognitions through psychoses. for Brahman too. there is omniscience for. If " This it be said being the case. which are preceded by that (seeing). in accordance " one " with the restriction in alone. future. and in respect of the gross elements etc. The author of the Kaumudi. and hence cognition relating to future things is intelligible. since. in the form of impressions. association with that is intelligible since they exist. that is of the form of the first transformation of maya. and since. in the same way as of the gross elements. like a sketched but unfinished picture painted on the wall of nescience but His omniscience is not through cognitions through psychoses. in the form of cognitions of all objects. instrumentality in respect of that (transformation). all else shines " . even in the case of the past and the . transformed.. and since as possessing impressions produced thereby. there results. prior to creation. there is established the cognition of maya is past things. there is the contingence of the non-existence of Brahman's omniscience at that time and consequently the contingence of the non-existence of creator ship in respect of the seeing. because of conflict with the restrictive . Scriptural text after it " That alone shining. which has that (maya) as adjunct. for Brahman there . in accordance with the unseen all potencies of the jivas. says thus: since even by the knowledge that is Brahman's nature everything in relation to that is manifested. remembrance is intelligible. prior to creation. as witness thereof.184 CHAPTER I perception of the entire existent world is possible for Brahman. however.

like the Lord. without requiring a psychosis? 5-0 To this Brahman's everything. Brahman is certainly of the nature of knowledge relating to all. manifests everything associated with itself . for. hence there is no conflict whatever even with the text "He who is omniscient" which declares agency in respect of the generation of knowledge preceptor Vacaspati Misra. s i-*4 it is not associated . yet that (knowledge). though in its own nature not an effect. not (so) the jfva's intelligence. not the knower of all. for Him. why does not the jiva too. ment of texts " Though Brahman even by the intelligence that is His own nature is the manifester of everything in association with Himself. in its nature as 4-5 defined by what is cognised. even the Scriptural text. as not being the material cause. true. it is said thus in the Vivarana : 5-1 intelligence as the in with identity being material cause of everything. there hence it is is that not knowership of the nature of agency " Because of in section the it . is still.BRAHMAN'S OMNISCIENCE 185 would be only being of the nature relating to of knowledge all. yet. manifest objects even by the intelligence which is of his nature. an effect of Brahman. though omnipresent as having (the omnipresent) nescience for adjunct. not omniscience consisting in the knowership of all". the agree- has been said by the commentator that oognisership is a characteristic mark of the jiva. "He who is omniscient" has to be construed only in the view of His being of the nature of knowledge. : thus says the Now.

though by nature not associated likie " with particulars horse. he is manifest . nescience hence he does not manifest objects because of the association with a psychosis in respect of a particular object. Or else. is as having the internal organ for adjunct. goes out. the obscuration being removed. are not manifestable by the pure intelligence of the jlva. it (the jiva's intelligence) manifests that object. in the when form of a psychosis. manifest . I (with those objects) which is Just as the generality cowness. Just as grass etc. because of absence of association. Or else.. as associated therewith. the transformation of the internal organ. is yet not himself. (the jiva's intelligence) has that object for the sphere (of cognition). then.. though by nature not associated with objects. through channels like the eyes. though' omnipresent. because of being obscured by . and pervades the object. there is manifested the non-difference from Brahman's intelligence as defined by the object associated with that (psychosis). the jlva therefore. extends up to the object quickly in the form of long rays of light like the rays from the sense of sight. finite . is yet associated with a particular possessing a dewlap. though pot etc." omnipresent. though not combustible by pure fire. it stands to reason that they are manifestable by that (intelligence) in association with a psychosis of the internal organ. are yet combustible by fire in association with an iron ball. similarly. he does not manifest pot etc. the jlva. the jiva.186 CHAPTER . through the channel of the psychosis. but when. And thus. is yet associated with the internal organ.

the going forth of the psychosis is required and there is manifestation of that object alone which is in association with that (psychosis) hence. To this some say that the relation is only that of object and subject. then. go forth. or for the sake of the removal of obscuration. but. is in conjunction with the object. say thus: if the psychosis were determinative of the relation of object and subject alone. when the psychosis. even by a psychosis it is not possible to bring about identity or conjunction as between the jiva-intelligence and the object-intelligence. what of these views. for that ( jiva-intelligence) too. (little-ktoowingness) of the jlva is On the first present jlva. parviscience intelligible. even when it does not would . however. hence . or for the for sake of the manifestation of non-difference from objectthere alone (defined) intelligence. the sake of association with intelligence. Others. there results through the channel of that (psychosis) an indirect relationship. therefore. the determination of that by a psychosis of the sense. not bring about undue extension hence there is the contingence of the futility of the admission of its going forth . And thus. which has attained with the jiva-intelligence proximate to the identity object. that (view) is not acceptable. in the case of the omniis the association with an object dependent on a psychosis ? For.FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHOSIS and manifests that object alone. even the . both of which are already established and devoid of activity.

consisting in the psychosis. there of the hand) conjunction between the body (an effect and the tree (a non-effect of the hand). through the manifestation of the non-difference of the intelligence. born non-effect. say thus: since seen for happiness etc. is in contact with a tree. 56 acceptable but the production of identity with the object. which is a non-cause. with the object. an effect of jiva-intelligence. because of parity of reasoning. however. 56 From the conjunction of the psychosis. which is not such an Inferred as between the jlva. just as from the conjunction of a cause and a noncause there results the conjunction of an effect and oi' . direct association is required in the case of objects (of) immediate (experience) .188 CHAPTER! this (relationship) alone is what is acceptable as the association with intelligence. which is as the association with intelligence is A section.. . the tree a non-cause. even for the jlva. there stands to reason. \vho is the material cause of that/' 3 there occurs a conjunction (with the object) a conjunction (between psychosis and object) for. The body being an flvayavin is the effect of the avayava (hand). direct association with intelligence that immediacy is only in the case of what is in is immediate. the admission even of the conjunction of a cause and a non-cause from the conjunction oi an effect and a 5. as iso defined. says thus: what is conditioned by the internal organ and manifests the 55 As a substrate of the illusory presentation in the form of the psychosis. which object. therefore. 5-113 Yet others. and the The illustration runs thus: when the hand is effect. when the psychosis is in conjunction with the object. because of their conjunction.114 non-effect. there results a definition (of the jlva). the hand is is a cause. however. since. a conjunction is sought to be a cause of the psychosis.

that the first view is (based) on the omnipresence of the jiva. though the jiva.. and thus. the nature of the jiva is brought about (for that Brahman-intelligence ) . does he manifest objects. is the manifestation of non-difference . like (the identification) of the waters of the tank and the field through a channel. viz. and thus. reason) . say thus: the manifestation of non-difference is not the identification of Brahman. from the Brahman-intelligence that has been with is identified the object. a superimposed relation is the determinant. the second on its finitude. since there is certainly this difference between the two. if in that he could manifest objects. Now.FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHOSIS object. (jiva) form in proximity to all objects. nor is (with there thus confusion with the second is also in accord view (as to the function of the psychosis). conditioned by the internal organ. being common there could not be the distinction of immediacy for different persons. since by the identification (with the jiva) through the psychosis. on the second view. Others. the final view that. as omnipresent. yet the jiva manifesting objects is intelligible. and hence only in that form of his. 5122 . in the immediate experience of objects. is though the object- defined Brahman-intelligence alone what manifests the object. '1 what is the manifest ation 5-12 of non-difference Some say defined thus: the identification of the object- 5-121 and internal-organ-delined intelligences through a psychosis. that (form) to all. however.

That is. there being no conjunction for Brahman at that time with that object. from the original. there exists that relation (of object is 57 and which superimposition) 57 . since there is not for it. viz. since their identification is impossible so long as there exists a distinguishing adjunct. and if by the psychosis-produced manifestation of non-difference there result the nature of the jlva for the object-defined Brahman. the psychosis-conditioned intelligence be valid knowledge of the object. cognisership of that would be impossible and there would result non-existence of His omniscience. the superimposed relation would not be the cause of the immediacy of the object".. Rather is it that the object-defined Brahman-intelligence causes in the proximate part of the psychosis associated with the object a reflection that manifests the object. because of their non-difference. like a mirror (in the case of a reflection). a superimposed relation with the object. with the jlva. who is in the position of a reflection. these in the positions of knower. nor may it be said If by the internal organ. for. and thus is intelligible even the non-confusion among the intelligences defined its psychosis and the object. then. since in the psychosis there is reflection only of that intelligence which is the substrate of the defined by the object. non-difference of the reflection in the psychosis is the.190 CHAPTER is 111 i which the position of the prototype and is objectdivfined. and hence there is the identification of that reflection with the jlva . as for the intelligence that is the substrate of the object. means of being respectively " knowledge and object known. the intelligence that substrate of the object .

say thus if ignorance be destroyed in part. yet in nature as intelligence characterised per acdclens by that (being the prototype) there is identification. through knowledge in the part defined by the object. there is. Others. destruction in part as of total darkness by the light of a glow-worm etc. the contingence of the non-existence of obscuration 58 ttie Not a relation of superimposition in respect of a reflection. or a rolling up as of a mat. though there it difference (between and the jiva) in its character its as (really) qualified by being the prototype. because of the non-existence of the : 5- 1312 material cause. some say to this in its that of the ignorance which obscures intelligence 5*1311 entirety. preceding view. through a direct relation is but the intelligence which is in the position of the prototype and is is the substrate of objects. since that continues as before. even by the cognition of the pot there would be removed the universe grounded on ignorance. when once removed. what ? is it it that is said to be 5-13 the removal of obscuration If be said to be the destruction of ignorance. objects. Now. nor conflict with Brahman's omniscience. however. as on. if this be said. thus confusion between the jiva and Brahman. in the nature of prototype. this is the removal. which alone is the manifestation of non-difference nor is there . there is . there could be no fresh origination (of obscuration) there hence. . say thus: what manifests 5-123 58 of superimposition.FUNCTION OF THE PSYCHOSIS Yet others. however.. on the third view. or a retreat as of a frightened soldier. then.

Therefore even of the ignorance that obscures intelligence in its entirety. say thus: what is experienced " in the form I do not know the pot ". and. Rather nature of a particular mode another ignorance. by the cognition understood that even while located in the intelligence " I that is manifest in the experience of ". not possible. an how does the non-obscuration of that (intelligence) stand to " I am ignorant/' it is reason ?". having pot-defined intelligence for content . 5-132 Yet others.192 CHAPTER I even at other times. hence. of the of primal ignorance. when that is . retreat and rolling up are impossible. in the case of what is nonactive. in the form "when there is knowledge of the pot. the removal consists only in its removal of the nature afore-mentioned is nature of not obscuring the object-defined intelligence. since this (latter) which has pure intelligence for content ledge of 59 that removable by the knowcannot be of that (intelligence) is is it and character. . the ignorance of the pot is removed " is not primal ignorance. removable by cognitions of particulars like the pot. the destruction of that alone is the removal nor thus. is there the contingence of the non-removal of obscuration by other cognitions. 69 I. stands located in the object-intelligence. hence. like the cloth concealing object. destroyed by a single cognition. for.e. as in opposition to the knowledge of the pot. and as removable by that (knowledge). which stands associated with the psychoses having the " In respective forms (of the object) . there is nonobscuration of that (jlva) by that (ignorance).. however. nor may it be objected the case of ignorance which.

These ignorances. because of being endowed with the obscuring and projecting capacities. hence. the (defect of) non-removal of obscuration certainly continues as before ". they ignorance. $1-35 . similarly.MODAL IGNORANCES since it is 193 admitted that as many as the cognitions are the ignorances removable by them. like primal ignorance. certainly a mode of ignorance experienced in the period of deep sleep. has a beginning. since there is " I I did not know seen the reflection slept well. in respect of a pot. the manifestation of the object would be impossi- ble . in the case of the subsequent cognitions. anything/' when the internal organ since these etc. even other waking life. ignorances obscuring the intelligence defined by that (pot). : and Sleep. are. are merged. since they are (of the nature of) ignorance thus say some.5-1323 lessness. there would be the destruction of all Now. all 00 because of the absence of any and because without the destruction off it. which' are of the nature of 5-1321 modes. the view of beginning. is quiescence of the thus say others. is of the nature of a particular mode of ignorance. like primal ignorance. two (modes of ignorance) arise only when there in karma that causes enjoyment have a beginning. even the state of deep sleep is. even by the cognition that arises first. which obscures the empirical world and jiva 5-1322 projects the world and jiva in the dream. 60 As to which ignorance is to be destroyed by which cognition. therefore. it may " be said On ignorances about determination. of the nature of a mode. beginningless.

and though there exist other antecedent many non-existences. 5*13212 Others. another ignorance obscures." say thus: when a particular ignorance obscures. and though there exist other ignorances. which remain without obscuring. as capable of producing doubt etc. similarly. and all (ignorance) does not obscure all the time. there is the (ignorance) alone. then by the cognition of that. as in the case of the relation of . though other antecedent non-existences what is exist. even by the removal of that (primal ignorance) their removal is intelligible. because of the specific cognition (of the object). because of futility. when a single cognition arises.. and hence for. a single ignorance alone ceases. which are of the nature of obscurations of that (object). rather is it that when the obscuring ignorance destruction of that destroyed by a psychosis. however. only a single antecedent nonexistence ceases.194 5-13211 CHAPTER I To are this some say thus just as even though there : antecedent non-existences of cognition. there is the manifestation of the object. there is not that obscuration which is of the nature of the entirety of the non-existence o'f specific yet. are dependent on primal ignorance which is removable by that. and when a single cognition arises. cognitions. there is manifestation of the object. and when there is a cessation of that psychosis. holding that " the immediacy of obscured is self -contradictory. even by that there would not be the removal of those ignorances though not directly opposed to that (realisation). when a single cognition arises. these. nor is when this is the case is there the contingenco that at the time of the rise of Brahman-realisation.

61 first cognition. and effect in maintain the pre-existcnce. their dependence on that (primal ignorance) is recognised. as of the nature of particular modes thereof. since even then it exists (then) in a subtle form/' 02 make the following assumption. object there just as in a place where many persons are gathered together. causing fever of a dangerous kind. through removal When ignorance is destroyed. obscuration does not stand to reason. . unlike the NaiySyikas. it be said that. so long as the cognition lasts. it is only for the sake of this. as not removing obscuration. however. while destroying one ignorance. evil. the thunder that falls on some one's head drives away others too. the relation of ignorance to the self is also destroyed therewith and does not call for another lagent of destruction. it Yet others. Now. this being the case. since prior to the origination of the is nothing to be obscured. or just as the medicine that 03 cures sannipata. as a general rule. of the 63 the cause. in the case of a continuous stream of cognition. A combined derangement of the three humours of the body. while remedying one (too). evil and the subjugation consists in counteracting the obscuring capacity. since obscuration in its entirety has been removed even by the and subjugation. In a subtle form. drives similarly cognition. that. subjugates other ignorances away another as well. are satkaryavadins.SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS IN A CONTINUOUS STREAM 195 01 ignorance and so on. all (of it) certainly obscures all the time nor may . holding that "since is of 5-13213 the nature of ignorance to have a content. there would be futility for the second and subsequent cognitions. 62 The Vedantins.

in conformity with the definition common to whatever maintains antecedent non-existence. but if at the time o the cessation of a psychosis another psychosis arises. there is f ruitiulness. as does the darkness subjugated by a light. . contingence of the non-manifestation of the object because of the possibility of obscuration even on the 64 If an expiatory rite is performed. there is no misery. however. it follows that non-obscuration is the product even of the second and subsequent psychoses hence. is the product of that (other). 5432132 The author of the Nyayacandrika. that that of existence of which there is existence when there is another at the previous instant and of which there is non-existence in the absence of that (other). says thus by a particular cognition. when the light goes out. though what happens is but the perpetuation of the antecedent non-existence of misery. there is not their futility. there is misery. there is but destruction of a particular ignorance. gated by obscures again. but not the subjugation of other obscuring ignorances as well.196 5-132131 CHAPTER I though subjuthe psychosis. the ignorance that has been subjugated remains in that condition alone. as each destroys a single ignorance nor is there thus the . is The empirical usage of the causal concept in such cases based on the definition of causality here is formulated: that of which there existence etc. 04 viz. even in : the case of the second and subsequent psychoses in a continuous stream of cognition. . and thus.. as does darkness when another light conies in at the time one light goes out. and thus. and is antecedent non-existence beginningless. To this they say thus: ignorance. Hence the performance of the rite is said to be the cause of the non-existence of misery. if it is hot performed. on the cessation of that. yet.

for. whose object is to produce rain. ignorance . second and subsequent cognitions are those whose objects are qualified by space. not a vi6e?ana. hence there is no unintelligibility whatever even in the removal of ignorances by the second and subsequent cognitions of a continuous stream. but since this temporal qualification by itself cannot be accomplished by a rite and may occur independently of the rite. the fruit of the Kariri (rite). 65 66 I. and thus.. differences are but qualifications per accidens. however. obscure the nature (of things) as qualified per accidens by the respective times.e. because of the destruction of the ignorance obscuring the object at that existing ignorances being such as obscure the object at other times (alone). on the analogy of the Kariri rite. the time during which each cognition lasts. The if cognised. and cog- knowledge.RELATION OF TIME TO THE FUNCTION OF COGNITION rise of 197 ignorances which are of the nature of modes.. what is intended is no doubt rain immediately. and hence do not enter into the constitution of the objects. there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the manifestation of and because of the other the object at that time. not in some distant future. which (cognitions) do not have for content the subtle differences among the various times. like the proximity in time in respect of rain. particular cognition arises. (say thus) it is only the ignorance 5-132133 removable by the first cognition that obscures the bare existence (of the object) but what are removed by the . it is an upalaksana. : 66 Some. nitions destroy all ignorances that obscure the object as qualified per accidens 05 by their own times. when a time. the respective times are but qualifications per accidens in respect of pot etc. difference between each instant in a continuous stream is not these differences in time were really attributes Of the object. could not be removed by the cognition not aware of the hence the attempt to show that temporal temporal differences. the objects of ignorance. time and such attributes.

if at all. perceptible) time has been removed even by the first cognition. But the Naiyayikas and the Vedantins rightly recognise what is called the " specious present " as containing a residuum of the past and a foreshadowing of the future. 68 no differences of it is 67 The later cognition destroys. 153162. cognitions and ignorance have but the qualified for objects. that to last for that period.. is momentary and too subtle to be perceived. . Perception.e. possible even for the psychosis. If it be the case with some forgetful persons that there is seen obscuration of existence in the form ". in the form "I do not know where he is now" arid so on. 23 et. which is of the nature of the certitude of existence and removes ignorance.. the ignorance qualified by the time intervening between the lapse of the earlier cognition and the coming into being of itself. of the ignorance qualified by the subtle tim'e other than those of the earlier and later 67 cognitions. " I do not know seen. For a further exposition of this view. pp. Nor may it be said " This being the case. how can it destroy ignorance as qualified by that time? This is the objection* 68 I." for in the case of a continuous stream. be so in their case elsewhere. the removal is impossible by the second and subsequent cognitions which do not have that (time) for content. scq). while. Most of the difficulties met here are due to the conception of present time as a bare instant. it has been said. this. for the second and subsequent cognitions of a continuous stream. see the Vedantaparibtuift and the SikhtimaQi commentary thereon (p.198 CHAPTER it I Hence is that when there has once arisen the perception of Caitra. since ignorance as qualified by gross (i. when (an object has been) once seen." but only the obscuration of the qualified. let it even in respect of what was once . On the subject of temporal perception and the "specious present." see Indian Psychology. there is not experienced the obscuration of existence in the form "I do not know Caitra.e. the period of the entire cognition. there would not be the removal of ignorance. since arises first. Since thus the cognition does not have that time for content.

though the content of inference etc. there is no probativeness. since for the second and subsequent psychoses. each lasting a long time. since it m'ay possibly be of the nature of five or six psychoses. as having for object only a thing already known. in the case of the hill and the fire not remove obscuration. probativeness does not consist merely in non-sublation of content. " inference is the means of valid knowledge as (there is seen the empirical usage) "in respect of fire. there is the contingence of the probativeness of inference in respect of both. . there is no harm even if they do not remove ignorance. since. whose object is to make known the exclusion of nonexistence (from it). it is not the object of knowledge for any means of valid knowledge. it is intelligible that they may have contents differentiated by such qualifications as gross time differentiating . there is no harm even if they do Indeed. thereon. for. by the witness that.SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS NON-PROBATIVE 199 psychosis are admitted. Therefore. for there is not seen the empirical usage " in respect of the hill too. there is no probativeness. as for psychoses like contemplation.. even if that were admitted. inference " is the means of valid knowledge and it is said in the Vivarana in the case of ignorance (directly) established . and are the content of inference. Nor is this a contingence of the acceptable . which are and non-cognised. them one from another and even if it be admitted to be of the form of a succession of many psychoses rising at* each instant. there being no (respectively) previously cognised distinction as to non-sublation. for the second and subsequent psychoses.

I do not know the meaning experienced in the form of the sacred teaching" its removal is experienced " ignorance immediately after the teaching of that (meaning). there is seen the projection of a size contrary thereto. and since for what is is located in the object there can be no conjunction with the manifestation " I do not know this.. for. since there is no going forth of the psychosis.. in the case of the is not removed. i *- 5-1321331 in reply to this some say thus: the ignorance that obscures objects is of two kinds. the delusion) .e. there is necessity even . Now. and is assumed because of the product (i. hence it is that for the Vivarma (passage) "in . there is not even this rule. though the particular size is understood from the testimony of a reliable person. since for is person material causality is not possible in respect of the projection associated with the object. in respect of the tree at a distance.200 CHAPTER I since the removal of that is admitted only in the case of probative psychoses. does not remove ignorance if this be said . and since. as in inference) since it does not go forth. one is located in the object. (it follows that) even when the ignorance present in the object present in the person for. the other is located in the person and is known from what the experience located in the " I do not know this ". a mediate psychosis (though probative. for both kinds (of ignorance) and thus." which of the nature of the witness. in the case of the mediate (cognition). is of the nature of the material cause of the projection associated with rope etc. there is certainly the rem'oval of the ignorance .

similarly. what is expressly stated in the Tattva&ipana only the non-removal of ignorance. though a particular mode be removed. there is may it be said: "for what is located in the person transformation into the projection present in the object is not possible. the whole universe is an illusory manifestation of Brahman which has been made the content of the ignorance located in the jiva. and by a mediate psychosis. in respect of the size of the tree at a distance. yet 69 The word "not" has been introduced in square brackets in the translation to . no such assumption is necessary on the hypothesis of illusory manifestation. in the doctrine of Vaeaspati. for. since. say thus ignorance located in the 5-1321332 person alone. is what obscures : 1 no evidence for an ignorance which is over and above that and is present in the object. that ignorance resident in the object would have to be treated as a material cause of the projection. 70 It is only if the concept of transformation (pariijRma) is adopted and a pariQ&ma-k&rana looked for. there it is sleep).. nor objects ..IGNORANCE AS SUBJECT-LOCATED AND OBJECT. Sl26 . it is intelligible that nacre-silver etc. or. are illusory manifestations of Brahman made the content of the 70 ignorance located in the person." is susupti said in the Tattvadlpcma that the is is [not] removal of (not) removal of the ignorance 00 present in the object of that (inference etc. etc. then. the mutilated quotation in the present tion with the is work makes sense only in conjunc- commentary.)" meaning " there / Others. when ignorance is removed by mediate cognition. however.LOCATED 201 inference (lit. if it were possible. but because inferential knowledge it too is knowledge and because of the use of the words "tad-vi?ay&-'jfi&na" is inferred that the removal of some other ignorance (purusa-gata-'jnana) is meant. the projection of a contrary size would not be possible".correspond to the negative particle in the original texts. like the film in the eye.

say thus: because of its according with the intelligibility of the transformation others. nacre must be the product neither nor of ignorance located in the subject. 5*1321338 however. only not know this .. though for ignorance in the form of modes there is no conjunction . even if there that only the of ignorance in general. the unintelligibility of the manifestation of ignorance because of its nonis conditioned by the and the impossibility of (its) being internal organ. it is 71 there would be the defects. Yet into nacre-silver only the ignorance present in the object that obscures it. etc. through another mode (of ignorance). which is in conjunction with that (witness) . nor may it be said that if that be the case. even in the case of nacre etc. but of ignorance located in the nacre.202 CHAPTER I the projection of a contrary size is intelligible. there no contradiction in their being experienced as the content of that (primal " I do ignorance) and the evidence of the perception " is exhibited in the Vivarana etc.. in the context of establishing primal ignorance . while the be admitted the distinction experience of ignorance as embracing particular objects in such forms as "I do not know nacre. . since they are nondifferent from the intelligence that is the content of is primal ignorance. yet the manifestation I do not know " is nacre certainly intelligible in the case of primal ignorance." is the 71 tion.. for. viz. conjunction with the witness that " with the witness. it If nacre silver is to be conceived as the product of a transformaof. removed by mediate psychoses for. in the form " I am experience ignorant".. is the content of primal ignorance. like a cloth that covers the object.

there being non-difference between modes and that which has modes. this is the first explanation. . who is spoken of over and above the jlva? To this it is said thus in the Kutasthadlpa: the 5-14111 the substrate of the immutable 72 intelligence. there is no detriment to the rule that immediate if not admitted. or because of the identity in fact between the witness-intelligence and the object-intelli72 gence. in con- junction with the former tbo.NATURE OP THE WITNESS 208 content of the modal ignorance. individuation and its attributes of pleasure. and since primal ignorance is in conjunction with the witness. modal ignorances are also in such conjunction. yet. the removal of ignorance be said. not even this rule.. viz. though mediate cognition does not remove ignorance. the mediate psychosis of the nature of certitude of existence. no. the perception of nescience etc. pain is etc. the experience of its removal thereby is intelligible as a delusion conditioned by non-experience caused by the obstacle. is which is Since there non-difference between primal ignorance and its modes. whether because of the conjunction of primal ignorance with the witness. for immediate cognition alone is admitted to remove ignorance as a No\v. The witness-intelligence is in reality non-different from the object-defined intelligence. Now. there is rule. who is this witness. it is intelligible that even the modal ignorance present in the object may have the witness for content. this cognition in the nature of a psychosis does remove obscuration. this the second explanation. being of the nature of the witness. therefore. modal ignorance located in the is latter is. in the case of the perception of nescience.. since.

In ordinary experience too. along with the non-existence of psychoses. individuation etc. 73 since it directly sees the two bodies that define itself. in the case of that (jiva). as Devadatta Yajfiadatta are external to each other. why the immutable?". for the jiva. through identification with the jiva by reciprocal superimposition the 74 immutable is proximate to the jiva. which is the through womb (as it were) of the reflection of intelligence constituting the jiva." is contemporaneous with continuous cognition of some" for so I was certainly perceiving long be doubted how. .two bodies. are not the sphere of doubt etc. there could be empirical Nor may it usage. memory etc. for. the agent let the jiva intelligence itself " in empirical usage. Though for the jiva there are psychoses which manifest the two bodies. and there is the recollection in the case of the individuation thing else this. 74 to say. but in the intervals. they are manifested. Hence it is that being always in conjunction with the manifestation. worldly 73 and Scriptural. is not external to the jiva. by the immutable intelligence alone. for. In the latter case. in the case of what manifested by the immutable.. is said to be the witness. and since it is free from modification. yet the two bodies which are certainly manifested to some the time by the all-pervasive immutable) intelligence as defined by themselves. fested by one could not serve the other's empirical usage or what is mani- memory. indifferent and The gross and the That is subtle. are (also) extent all manifested psychoses-cognitions which go forth at intervals from the internal organ.. Nor may it be said be the witness. the character of being a witness is well-known to consist only in indifference and knowledge.

of the nature of indifferent manifestation. as declared in the Scriptural text " Witness. is mentioned as distinct from the jlva. In the Ndtakadipa too. pure and free from gunas ". fruit. and hence the character of the witness. The witness thus distinguished from not belong to the constitution of the jiva does either. of the nature of individuation by the appearance of intelligence. It is thus: in the theatre (the illuminates without distinction the 7 master owner of the show). as possessing manifold changes. the intellect is comparable to the danseuse. the enjoyer of the fruit of karma. the witness is shown as distinct from the jiva. the audience and the danseuse.WITNESS AS OTHER THAN THE JIVA 205 spectatorship is impossible. even when individuation which is etc. by the example of the " The lamp present lamp in the theatre. the jlva. further. are absent. of the nature the substrate of the jiva-delusion consisting in individuation qualified by the appearance of intelligence. is the witness. of the immutable intelligence. Brahman but is . that which illuminates all these and shines in sleep etc. objects are comparable to the members of the audience. and illumines even in their absence. since though existing close to that (jiva) they are free from that (joy and grief) .' Similarly.. the other looks on without eating. in the text "Of the two one eats of the sweet " the witness. since he possesses joy and grief produced by the conceit (of ownership) in the perfection or imperfection of the enjoyment of objects. is qualified comparable to the master who has a conceit (of ownership) in the dance. is impossible. intelligence.

it is said that since in the case of the Supreme Lord. the omniscient. the qualifications pure. as the knower of the jlva's ignorance etc.206 intelligence untouched CHAPTER I by the distinction of jiva and the Lord thus : is it said in the Ktitasthadlpa. however. the pure Brahman. in the section about deep sleep and departure. concealed in all beings. which mode there are not such attributes as causing the world.. but a mode of the Lord. because of non-difference from the jiva. 76 The effect is the body. In the Tattvapradlpikd too. then. he is proximate to the jlvaj and in sleep etc. is called without gunas ". it is said thus: because The of the Scriptural declaration of divinity etc. . as manifesting the etc. 5-14112 In the Kaumudi. all-pervasive. the supervisor of (all) action. while the Lord. is proxi- omnipotent cause of the world. pure. persent in the jiva. of such attributes as causality (of the is immediate. the abode of all things. and the cause signifies the organs (the indriyas). it is ascertained that what is taught by the two Scriptural 75 The witness. when there is quiescence of 70 the effect and the cause. who knows continuously the jlva's engaging in and desisting from activity.. is remote from the jiva.. who is the inner self of all. himself being indifferent j and he. and. it is he who manifests the ignorance ignorance present in the jiva and is called Prajna. without gunas would be unintelligible. " the witness. the inner self of all. How. gets to be the witness. as not being the abode 75 world). in one divine being. intelligence. associated with maya and endowed with attributes. in mate to the jiva. can the Lord be the witness? The answer is that the witness is not the Lord. what the witness is but some particular form of the Supreme Lord.

mounted by the Prajna self" as he. goes forth making a great noise. embraced by this Prajna self. in ordinary character of being a witness experience too. because of being directly the spectator. even." on the principle of the section of (the persons in) the cave. this view alone : is esta- 5-14113 Wished by the following statement just as. through getting identified with the internal organ. as for the hymn etc. the hymn Two birds etc.WITNESS AS A MODE OP 1SVARA texts 207 embraced by the woman he loves. for. even so. In the Tattvasuddhi too. Some. is apparently of the constitution of witness. this (ascertainment) too has the witness for purport. indifferent manifestation. however. is the Supreme Lord. so this person. knows nothing " He outside nor anything within ". and that is directly possible only for the jiva. knows nothing outside nor anything within. say thus: the nescience-conditioned 5-14121 jiva alone is the witness. since the jiva. " Just as different from the jiva in the states of deep sleep and departure. hence service in the empirical usage of the jiva's happiness etc. though delusion really included in the constitution of the nacre. has for .. in the " This is silver". the who is certainly of the constitution of Brahman." that teaches the character of being the witness in the case of Brahman.. its apparently of the constitution of the jiva. is in himself " The one divine being indifferent. with reference to its condition as " the jiva. the this-element.. though subject to the imposition of agency etc. the is well known to be spectatorship without agency. who is of the nature of unattached. is silver.

but not in his form as conditioned by omnipresent nescience.208 CHAPTER I purport both the jira and the Lord 77 . since. in respect of the internal organ etc. and thus. the latter cannot be said not to eat. 78 The jlva meant hy the Painffi-rahasya-brahmaya is the reflection of intelligence In nescience. or because of the impossibility of that (perceptual relation). which are to be manifested by Ihe witness. when the witness is non-different throughout. . the witness is the Lord in the jlva-condition. because of the witness being different for each person.. there being no difference in the conjunction with the witness that manifests one's own internal organ. in the manner explained by the Painyirahasya-brahmana cited in the commentary on the section of the cave. by another person. through difference in the internal organ. as there is contingence of the perceptibility of one person's internal organ etc. hence. whether because of the non-conjunction of one person's internal organ etc. there 78 conflict whatever. with another person's witness. or. the jlva alone is the witness.. so that there is no need to identify the bird that does not eat with the Lord exclusively. there is difference in the cogniser for. the . it has for purport both the jlva and the internal organ. the non-manifestation is intelligible. therefore. however. the former is unattached and indifferent and hence may be Identified with the witness without contradicting Scripture. 79 In the case of other persons' internal organs etc. nor is there non-contingence of this. it is as conditioned by the internal organ that the jlva is the witness . difference in the cogniser is of no avail. since the internal organ exists in a subtle form 77 79 That is to say. say thus: true. 5-14122 is no Others. not in the internal organ..

and since in sleep. the witness conditioned thereby certainly " exists even then. if. as an adjunct) is the witness. like the blueness of the lily. what is conditioned by that organ. obscuration by ignorance. is unavoidable. for the witness of the nature afore. pp. ignorance obscures intelligence only to the 5-H22 exclusion of the witness-intelligence. 81 Rahu not seen except by the light of the luminary which It obscures (in eclipses). of these. how. nor may it be said since the internal organ-conditioned. See the Kalpataru. like Rahu. is the cogniser. he is not the witness . SI 27 . 80 the adjunct being acceptable to the final position. difference (between cogniser and witness) is intelligible " what is in the form qualified by the internal organ is the cogniser. the redness^ though not natural to the crystal." (internal Now. the adjunct lasts at least as long as the effect. manifester of nescience. what does not persist is either an adjunct (upadhi) or qualification per accident Of the advaitins. 421 (AK8).51421 mentioned. the crow may is not remain there till the house is reached. effect is (upalak?ana) . 420. then. but when Devadatta's house is indicated as that which has a crow sitting on It. individuation etc. when we say! "bring the red crystal". lasts till the crystal is brought. though there is no cogniser. ness exists. is there the manifestation of nescience. some say nescience is manifested by the light obscured by itself.WITNESS AS JIVA MANIFESTATION OF NESCIENCE 209 even in sleep. 81 obscured ? If this be asked. the wit- their difference should necessarily be for the difference between attribute and declared". by what is (itself) that. the internal organ and 80 its The distinction is thus: what persists in the an attribute (vie?ana). not so the upalak^ana. which is the In fact. that obscures intelligence in its entirety.

for.) all the time with unobscured manifestation. and there is the Vwarana statement "There by 5*14231 is certainly manifested happiness characterised being the abode of supreme love. . obscured. which is not manifest in the state of transmigration. is manifest. there the contingence of non-distinction between release . is not of itself a 83 The human goal. no for. it is nature of bliss. the is undefined Brahman bliss. and hence there is distinction if this be said. . the latter is different from the former. there is the contingence of the manifestation even of the bliss that is of its essential nature. immediacy and reciprocal difference.210 CHAPTER I attributes. then. . wherein difference posited. the absence of the difference. Hence it is. as a reflection from the prototype. erroneous cognition or doubt. no a contingence of the acceptable. however. Be this so if and the state of transmigration. because of the conjunction of these (nescience etc. because of this being postulated in confor- mity with experience. If. bliss of the witness is experienced by the different jlvas. though the is 82 bliss of the witness. that they are not the sphere of ignorance. If it be said that if the witness-intelligence be unobscured. differentiation be an essential characteristic of tho bliss we experience. Now. which as reflected in nescience constitutes the bliss of the witness. The former aspect is present even now. our bliss should be radically different from Brahman-bliss. this experience has two aspects. there is no defect." is happiness be manifest even now. 83 while the mere immediacy of bliss exists even now. but in both cases the difference is assumptive. for. which is posited in the self. in respect of the self there is seen unconditioned love due to the manifestation of the (that is not a defect) . as for the latter. is 82 From the bliss that is Brahman. the element of undefinedness in bliss not a human goal. in bondage.

in the case of bliss. for. there is .. is it is not very clear. stands to reason . the description of the hundredfold superiority of each succeeding stage beginning with human If this be said. when the passage is obstructed by relation to a bright mirror etc. If it superiority and inferiority are be said that Scripture declares the progressive superiority of each later stage beginning with human bliss. the bliss of the witness. consisting in degrees of manifestation as conditioned by differences in the manifesters.. the possession of superiority and inferiority. the psychoses of happiness. and Brahman-bliss being in the final position. which is but one. when the passage is obstructed by relation to the palm. who is it that says Scripture does not declare it? But it is said that it cannot be justified on since in the case of the view of non-dualism.MANIFESTATION OF HAPPINESS OBJECTIONS Now. bliss from material objects bliss culminates in Brahman-bliss. since the common to sleep. no . fact identical according to impossible. a crystal and a mirror. such as the palm (of the hand). the sun's light. Now. as in the case of water running in deep places. in the case of the sun's light. though one. as conditioned by differences in the manifesters. experience of its beingfc surpassed whereas the undefined Brahman-bliss is unsurpassable. there are seen degrees of manifestation. which shines (but) not clearly in the sky without relation to the palm etc. for. which spreads everywhere. since in the AnandavalU. if this be said. the defined in bliss of the witness is surpassable. and since is happiness from material objects there . no . the illustration is not admitted. there is greater manifestation because of intensification.



even greater manifestation than in that (other case), because of intensification and because of the addition
of the brightness of that (mirror); hence there are not admitted here degrees of manifestation as conditioned by the manif esters; 84 and, if the illustration

spreading in the sky, undefined bliss would be not clear, while of the
since, like the sun's light
bliss defined

were admitted,

by the psychosis of happiness there would

be greater manifestation, as of the sun's light defined by the palm etc., the state of transmigration itself would

turn out to be more desirable than release. Hereby is refuted even the view that bliss, though manifest in the
state of transmigration, yet, being disturbed



cognition and its impressions, disturbed by a stiff breeze,

like the light of the




it is



not clearly manifest, the absence of that


manifest as

it is

for, if the

distinctionless essential bliss be manifest, therein is not possible an excellence which, because of the defect of





not manifest, but attaches to (i.e., is the state of release. Therefore, the

assumption that the bliss of the witness does not stand to reason.


To this the Advaitavidyacarya says thus: just as when the very superior white light which is but one is
mirrors possessing different degrees of impurity, because of the different degrees of impurity of the adjuncts, the inferiority of whitereflected in




superimposed indifferent degrees on the
is to say,


we have

in the alleged examples, cases not of

delimitation, but mechanical intensification.















becomes the

of the witness, as reflected

in the internal organ,

and becomes the


material objects, as reflected in that psychosis of the internal organ, which is of the nature of

happiness associated with different degrees of purity, consisting in superiority and inferiority of the element
of goodness (sattva), caused by the contact of different objects under the influence of merit acquired in a



then, because of the defect of degrees of

impurity in the adjunct consisting of the constituent darkness (tamas), inferiority is superimposed in different degrees (on that one bliss) hence, in bliss,

though manifest in the state of transmigration, there



satisfaction, since
it is

of inferiority,

through the superimposed degrees surpassable; on the rise of know-

ledge, since all superimposition of inferiority ceases


the superimposed surpassability is lost, there is the accomplishment of what was to be accomplished; this
distinction being intelligible, the bliss of the witness,


manifest as the sphere of unconditioned love, certainly unobscured.


Others, however, say thus: bliss, though m'anifest, " in me certainly obscured, because of the experience
not, it is not manifest"; since even in one


it is

and the

same witness, differences of aspects posited by nescience are possible, there is no conflict between non-obscuration
in respect of the intelligence aspect and obscuration in respect of the bliss aspect and since the manifestation

of the essential nature (of

Brahman) does not remove




(of bliss)


conflict in the obscuration

when that

(essential nature) is manifest



is seen only in respect of what is manifest, " I do not know as in the sense stated by you." Nor

be said that, in that case, there is experienced! the obscuration of the specific, alone as defining the unobscured general form; for, it would be an undue


extension for the obscuration of one to appear as what defines another. Nor may it be said that (here) what
controls (that appearance)

the relationship of the

generic and the specific and that consequently there is no undue extension ; for, since there is no relationship
of the generic to the specific other than that of the pervaded and the pervader, there is the contingence

that the ignorance which obscures smoke would be " ?8 Thereexperienced in the form I do not know fire.

fore, that

by which ignorance appears as

defined, that



obscured; hence ignorance

consistent even

ignorance, just as it obscures intelligence to the exclusion of the witness element, even so it obscures bliss too only to the exclusion
of what have been appropriated by the various psychoses of happiness. This alone is the removal of obscuration
in the case of bliss

with what



from (material)




removal of obscuration,

the removal

of outer

Obscuration can be removed by psychoses alone, not by the

essential self-manifestation of intelligence; for the latter co-exists with



superimposed thereon.


Tor, fire and smoke are in the relation of pervader and pervaded



the only relation between the generic and the specific;


Ignorance of the specific


determine the obscuration of the generic,

then ignorance of the pervaded (smoke) should appear as ignorance of the pervader (fire) but this is absurd*



darkness at dawn, comes in increasing degrees, under the
influence of different psychoses due to different causes.







essential bliss

from (material) objects, as among the (various) blisses from (material)
and the
the witness-intelligence being unetc. there:


In any


obscured, the manifestation of individuation

certainly not in dependence on a psychosis this is



(to all the positions).


how is there recollection of individuation


etc., since impression, which is of the nature of cognition in its subtle state, is impossible when cognition exists,



production by the witness,


is eternal, is


some say thus: individuation, which. is 5-14241 manifested by the witness in association with always itself, is manifested by the witness even as defined











psychoses having the various pot etc. for objects hence, because of the non-eternality of this (witness), the

production of impressions
objects like pot.

is possible,

as in the case of



indeed no rule that the

production of an impression which has oneself for its sphere should be by the witness only as defined by a
psychosis having the form of oneself; for, if that were the case, an impression with a psychosis for its sphere there would be the contingence of nonbeing impossible,
while, because of the contingence of infinite regress, the (existence of a)

remembrance in the ease of a psychosis,




psychosis having another psychosis for been refuted through the refutation


sphere has


But, when by intelligence as defined by a

psychosis something is manifest, by that psychosis there is the production of the impression whose sphere is that

this alone is the rule.


thus, even cogni-

happiness etc., which are psychoses of the internal organ, are manifested by the non-eternal witness

defined by themselves, in the same way as the sparks proceeding from the red hot iron ball (are manifested)

by the

defined by themselves; hence, the production of impressions even among these (psychoses) stands

for the views, stated in the (following " verse of the) Kutasfhadipa Intelligence present in the cognition with the sole form of the pot, would manifest
to reason.


the pot alone; the known-ness of the pot is made manifest by the Brahman-intelligence ", that cognition which is an attribute of the object is manifested by

Brahman-intelligence as defined by the object, and the view stated in the Tattvapradlpika that cognition, desire etc. are manifested by the eternal witness, of the

nature of undefined pure intelligence, even according to those two (views), association with psychoses should necessarily be declared, since intelligence is of the nature of the immediacy of what is in association with 87 hence, because of the existence of a non-eternal itself;
form', as associated

with those (psychoses), there



According to both views, there

immediate experience of known-

ness, or of cognition, desire etc.; this

immediacy would not be possible

but for their association with intelligence; hence there
intelligence should be admitted.

association of

Intelligence with psychoses; and, as so associated, a non-eternal

form of





in ^intelligibility whatever impressions in respect of them.




Others, however, recognising the psychosis of "I ", postulated in order that nescience, with the form


may result recollection of nescience etc.,


even during sleep, explain (through that) the impression whose object is the "I". Nor on this view is there
the unintelligibility of the recollection of the object


contemporaneous with the continuous cognition of another (object), in the form " for so long I was
certainly perceiving this" for, like the contemporaneity of happiness and misery through the difference of what

defines (them),





conflict in the


raneity even of two psychoses; hence, even at the time of the continuous cognition of another (object), the
succession of psychoses of nescience with the
is possible.

form "I"

the form

others, however, say thus: the psychosis with 5-14243

but a psychosis of the internal organ; but like the psychosis of contemplation etc., it is not



cognition, since



not generated by the settled cause (cognition) ; indeed, such means of valid
it is

perceptual knowledge as the sense of sight are not possible there nor inference etc., since the recollection

of individuation

knowledge of

him who is deviod of the inference etc.; nor is the mind the

seen even in

instrument (of valid knowledge), since for that which is the material cause (of the psychosis), instrumentality

not settled in any case whatever.



be said

' '


happiness as defined by the foot


with misery as

defined by the head.

8 1-28




even the recognition of the object




would not be



no; though, in respect of the I-element, the

nature of cognition does not belong to it, it is of the nature of cognition in respect of the element of that-

by the impression which is settled to be the instrument of memory; in the same way as between mediacy and immediacy, validity and invalidity,
89 present in a cognition through differences of aspect, there is no conflict even as between being a cognition and

ness, as generated

not being a cognition.

however, say thus: even the psychosis in the form "I" is certainly cognition, because of the
Still others,


"I know myself"; nor


there impossi-

of an instrument, since, in conformity with experience, instrumentality too is assumed of the mind


the internal organ.

5 '* 5

This being the case, a rule about the removal of obscuration results for those immediate psychoses alone which have external objects.
not even this rule, since, in the case of " this " does nacre-silver, the psychosis in the form not remove ignorance, as, otherwise, because of the non-

Now, there


existence of the material cause,


the creation of silver

would be impossible.

If this be said

to this they say thus

form "this" there


though by the psychosis in the removed the ignorance about the

The cognition "The

hill is fiery" is

immediate In respect of the

hill and mediate in respect of the fire; similarly, in the delusion "This is

silver", the cognition is valid in respect of the this-element

and invalid in

respect of the silver-element.






this-element, since ignorance about the specific element, nacreity etc., is not removed, that itself is the material

cause of silver; for, there is experience of the superimposition of silver when there is ignorance of nacreity

and of the non-existence of that (superimposition) when there is knowledge of that (nacreity etc.) and 00 " of the Bhasya on in the Vivarana on the explanation

superimposition, material causality, in respect of the superimposition of silver etc., is declared of that

ignorance alone whose co-presence and co-absence are
experienced; for this very reason, there is made in the Sanksepasarlraka the distinction that the nacre-element

the support, the this-element the substrate, that the content of ignorance together with its elaboration is the

support, and that what appears superimposed in the intellect, as of a particular form though not (really) of
that form,

the substrate. 01

Others, however, say thus: for the silver, which is " this is silver," as identical with cognised, in the form
the this-element, the material cause is only the ignorance of the this-element; and of that (ignorance), though the obscuring capacity alone is removed by the psychosis
in the



continuance together projecting capacity; hence there is no impossibility in its being the material cause; in the superimposition of a tree as upside down as reflected

form "this", there

the Paftcapddika.

91 If ignorance of nacre be the material cause, the delusion should be of the form "nacre is silver", not "this is silver". To meet this objection there is the distinction made between the substrate and the support, the latter merely underlying the superimposition, and the former appearing

even though there is the removal of obscuration that comes into being immediately after the intuition of the substrate in its entirety. only in the case of the contact with a defective organ. there is admitted the material causality of ignorance as conjoined with the projecting capacity alone. thinks that.. as distinct from the delusive psychosis. .. however. 5-153 Kavitfirkika-Cakra varti Nr simha Bhattopadhyaya. evidence. viz. since therefrom results the causality in respect of superimposition. Nor may it be said " Contact is not what pervades : everywhere. As "this" and "this is silver . that too does not pervade the superimposition of pot 92 etc. the non-creation of silver etc. there is not at all. that the cause is of superimposition the cognition of the substrate in its generality. whereas the appearance of the substrate (in the cognition) pervades even the superdelusion imposition of individuation etc. " this . prior to the creation of silver. since there is no evidence in respect of this Nor is this the (latter) being the cause of that. on the self-luminous inner self ". prior to the perception of . in the absence of contact with the substrate. since.CHAPTER in water 1 and in the superimposition of the world that continues in release while embodied. It is thus: a psychosis in the form "this". for. is not established in experience. since there is Nor may it no experience of a duality of cognition. 02 be assumed from the effect. as distinct from the delusive " a psychosis in the form psychosis "this is silver." the inquiry as to whether it has or has not the capacity to remove ignorance is baseless.* for.

such as is common to the obscured and the unobscured. since there exists the obscured natural luminosity of the intelligence defined is by that (nacre). Nor may it be said " In respect of superimposition : in general. whose sphere is the colourless Brahman that is the substrate of that (perception).. then. contingence of the superimposition of yellow shell . there is no pervasion of the merely apparent superimpositions of yellowness on there is .. let there be the above-mentioned special cause". the explicit manifestation of the substrate (is the cause) hence there is no undue extension. prior to the superimposition.. even then there the contingeiice of superimposition. only in the case of superimpositions like silver. be the cause of superiniposition. in order that there may be the etc. there is not. is the colourless substrate such Nor may it be said " Even am'ong the merely apparent. manifestation in general of the substrate is the cause*. even is substrate) prior to the contact with the this-element of nacre. visual cognition (of what is) unconditioned by colour being impossible. even thus. is impossible.NO SEPARATE THIS PSYCHOSIS pot etc. and the cognition of the whiteness present in the shell etc. since . the possibility of a psychosis whose sphere as the shell etc. while the natural luminosity (of that obscured. appropriateness in the causality of the general in respect of the general. in that case. in the superimposition of the merely apparent. if mere manifestation of the substrate. and of the specific in respect " of the specific for. the shell. blueness on well-water and so on. being non-existent at that time. 221 a visual psychosis. for.

because of parsimony. is and that is not based on a defect in the object. in the superimposition imposition of silver etc. dissimilars there is superimposition. supernot dependent on similarity. as a defect of the object. for the manifesta- tion of the substrate. 95 Let the cause of that alone be the cause.. on the principle of the cause of that alone (being the cause). causality in respect of all merely apparent superimpositions in general. constituting the similarity to silver etc. for. since water really colourless.222 CHAPTER I prior to contact. should necessarily be said to be the cause. 94 Here. since there is seen the imposition of a dark rocky surface on the 94 distant expanse of the waters of the ocean. it is possible to explain even the occasional nature of the silver-super03 imposition from this alone . the cognition in general of the substrate. Nor does it stand to reason to say. hence. there does not result causality in respect of superimposition. similarity of colour is alone the cause. why it occurs at certain times. dependent on that (similarity). for. Nor may it be said that is similarity too even between there is a cause. not at others. if the contact with defective organ be alone the cause. why that other cause in the middle? . there is the contingeiice of the superimposition of that silver on a cinder. 05 that the causal 93 That is to say. whether in general or specifically. it will necessarily have to be said that the cause of that superimposition is the contact with a defective organ. though not a cause in other colour etc. and when for this itself there results. when the delusion of similarity. consisting in the cognition of the substrate as qualified by a particular But now. as on nacre.

Nor may it be said "It is only on pure water. its be declared only in the superimposition of silver etc. silver cannot be superimposed on . at other times too. there would be the contingence of that superimposition thereon. because of impossibility (of the said causality). not on cinder etc.. which are obstructed by specific cognition 90 (of the substrate). and there is parsimony (in the assumption of causality) in the case of the cognition of similarity itself. but not because of dependence on the cognition of similarity". that there is the superimposition of blueness. when there is specific cognition of the nacre as nacre. ascertained that that superimposition does not conform to the nature of the thing. otherwise.SIMILARITY AS CAUSE OF SUPERIMPOSITION 223 aggregate of the cognition of similarity may be the cause of superimposition for. (but) conforms to is the existence or non-existence of the cognition of similarity.. yet since the superimposition of that is seen on that form of it it (the cloth) fashioned by scissoring. merely as a bright white substance. which are not obstructed thereby. not on a pearl: like this distinction. that the causal aggregate of a cognition is the cause of a thing. even because of the nature of things. not it. for.. but not in the superimpositions of causality may yellow shell etc. The reply of similarity is : is even on the view that the cognition the cause of superimposition. though on a piece of cloth as such there is no superimposition of being a lotus bud. there is (also) the distinction that there is the superimposition of silver on nacre. it is not seen anywhere . And in the case of what are obstructed 96 E. though itself white and present in a white silver vessel..g. by specific cognition.

the causal aggregate of the specific cognition should also be said to be an obstruction. then. the cognition of nacre being absent at the time of the superimposition.224 CHAPTER I there being the rule that the causal aggregate of the obstructing cognition is also an obstruction. there is no superimposition of etc. the cognition of similarity. hence. for. ... no . what (is the object) of the assumption of causality in the case of the cognition of similarity? It is thus: when. in respect of cinder etc. all distinctions being intelligible even from this.. " By me there is the admission of the non- existence at that time of the causal aggregate of the cognition of nacreity. but if by you there be such an admission. silver. there is not the superimposition of that (silver) . because of the existence of that (causal aggregate).. contact with the sense of sight.. since there exists the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of there is its dark colour etc. 97 it would be the story of returning a mere The existence of this causal aggregate at that time is Assumption on the part of the objector. which is the cause of the superimposition. even on nacre when there is such contact with the sense of sight as pervades the dark portion etc. 97 there is the contingency of non- superimposition. because of the obstruction by the defect. (but) when there is contact with only that portion which is similar (to silver). viz. If it be said that because of the existence even then of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of nacreity. there is superimposition. because of the absence of that (causal aggregate). the nonexistence of that causal aggregate must be stated even by you.

for. it is non-established of that (cognition of similarity) that it is an obstacle to the causal aggregate of that (specific cognition) . there is not the cloth.. in respect of which there larity with other metals. hence. because of the defect which (nacreity). when the tactile sense alone te operative and there is no perception of colour. no. which manifest Similarly. may be simi- S 129 . there is non-existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of a white watery expanse etc.. which manifest the wateriness at a distance. why should 98 That That is to say. there is that superimposition. because of the non-existence of that (causal aggregate) in that form of it fashioned by scissoring. and because of non-attention to what apprehends the waves etc. 99 is to say. the non-existence of that causal aggregate should be said to be either because of obstruction by such defects as distance or because of non-attention to what apprehends 98 the dark under-side etc. Now. because of the non-existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of its dark colour. and hence there is the superimposition of dark rocky surface etc.SIMILARITY AS CAUSE OP SUPERIMPOSITION to the toll-gate at 225 break of day".. superimposition of being a lotus bud etc. to the sense-contact.. causes the invariable superimposition of blue colour on the waters of the ocean. 09 thus. if this be said. In the spread-out because of the existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition of extendedness. even when there is seen the glitter constituting the similarity to silver. nacreity being cognised immediately on drawing near. on a piece of iron felt with the hand.

in the case of the merely . the psychosis in the from the effect. but in some cases where there etc. the psychosis) . even as arising from is it Nor to be that (contact). though there is cognition of similarity. and though. that does happen. there is not any contact prior to that (origination). the object "this". for superimposition) ? If this be asked. for. yet the apprehension of that too by the sense of sight is intelligible even because of the contact with the object "this". in the silver which originates at the same time as the cognition and exists only as long as the mere appearance.e. in " this respect of the psychosis ". which is is declared by us that the content is a transformation of nescience as agitated by contact with a defective organ and is contemporaneous with itself (i. it the silver... not to be assumed assumed from (its) cause. excludes copper that superimposition too might come into being.226 CHAPTER I there not be the superimposition of silver.. (we reply) but. there is imposition of silver there is no harm cases a superimposition does not originate. hence. doubt . the locus with which that (silver) is identified.. etc. like the nonorigination of superimposition sometimes on nacre because of the jion-existence of defect in the cause only the supereven if in some etc. as in a treasury . is abundance of silver. since the not required (according to you. it becomes the sphere of etc.. the unhindered contact with. in some cases. because of the non-existence of the causal aggregate of the specific cognition that cognition of similarity is . for. form " this " is Therefore. where there is the superimposition of many.

there is the contin^ gence of non-requirement of the sense of sight. that (silver) is not object of the sense of sight. of the shell mere without colour. that is ' illumines (the silver) itself ". rather. even in the absence of the contact of itself (with the senseorgan). since sense-contact. subsequent to the psychosis by that. its being an object of a sense-organ is not admitted. Nor may it be said " Even because of the sublater. there is superimposed the conjunction alone with the shell. it is. nor in the apprehension of yellowthere that requirement). for. nor is it originated an by contact with a defective organ. in the delusion of the yellow shell. '. for. which is a cause of cognition. apprehension by the sense of sight is impossible.THE SENSE-ORGAN apparent silver. in that case. (is ness Nor may it be said: "Yellowness is not super- imposed as such. but in respect of the experienced yellowness of the bile present in the eye. there is the IN DELUSION 227 experience of visibility in the form "I see the silver with the sense of sight". if that be the case. since in what is imposed. is not settled to be a cause of an object. as being generated by the psychosis this \ which manifests the intelligence that sight. the non-existence of contact. simultaneously with the ' psychosis this '. hence . since. since ' this generated it is superimposed . on the witness manifested by that (psychosis) as for the experience of its being an object of the sense of merely through the indirect dependence on the sense of sight. there is no requirement of the sense of sight in the apprehension of the shell. and manifested by that.

of the yellowness of the bile present in the region of the eyes. up only when apprehended close by. there is the superimposition of relation there. and in the case of the others (not affected by bile) there is- no apprehension (of yellowness) being proximity others to yellowness For. the apprehension who . Nor may it be said: "That yellowness. there is the contingence of the cognition of yellowness. if that be the case. there is. hence. conjunction with the witness manifested by the psychosis in that form is possible. for. but of that (yellowness) which has gone forth together with the rays from the eyes and pervaded the object. a superimposition of relation on the shell. as in respect of what is covered with gold. if that be the case. as in the red cloth made red by the dye. there is the contingency of the non-perceptibility conjunction. because of a defect. there even in the case of those close 7 by/ place their sense of sight in the neighbourhood of that (affected) sense of sight. like the bird which has flown high in the sky. in respect of a shell seen by an eye affected by bile. can be apprehended at a distance. being manifested thereby is impossible in their case further. there is not admitted a single . not being conjoined to the witness manifested by a psychosis having the form of the yellowness of the bile present in the its even of shell and region of the eyes. for others too.228 CHAPTER I there is the requirement of the sense of sight for the experience of the yellowness alone ". psychosis yellowness. for." for. whose sphere is the shell conjoined to Nor may it be said: "It is not admitted that.

the superimposition. is the content of and hence should be admitted its being the object of the sense of sight.THE SENSE-ORGAN IN DELUSION 2JJ9 of that (yellowness by them too) cannot be avoided thus too. even because of the contact with the substrate. the 100 That is to say. at night by moonlight. it made clear that only the taste of bitterness. in the superimposition of blueness on the pure river . in the case of the infant who has not (yet) lasted bitterness. by the words of the PaucapGdika. . e#. 100 of the superimposition of blueness. which of a sensory nature. bile present in the tongue. for. the non-utility of the sense of sight could not be avoided (in any way) further. whose sphere is the substrate in conjunction with blueness. if there be not admitted in these cases a visual psychosis. as otherwise the functioning there of the sense of taste would be unintelligible. and in the superimposition of blueness on the sky. water flowing on the exceedingly white sandy surface. the . and consequently manifestation by that (intelligence) is impossible in the case of the water. there being no psychosis whose sphere is the bare substrate. its sensory nature is not due to its being experienced along with something else. appearance of bitterness in what is sweet has for its is is cause the impression of experience in another life. there is no manifestation of the object-intelli- gence. which. since it is not possible to declare the superimposition of what is (perceptually) expe- rienced. whose sphere is that (substrate). arises simultaneously with the psychosis of the sense of sight that psychosis.. Therefore. and in the superimposition of darkness on red clothes. without colour. which proclaim that. in the cited cases is superimposed as such.

it is impossible to establish in any other way (except the one mentioned) the experience of being an object of the sense of taste Silver too as an (in the ease of that bitterness). since there is no need for the sense of taste even indirectly. " of contact common For. must be admitted bitterness being an object of the sense of taste. In the case. however. there being no single mode to conjunction etc. there would be violation of the law apprehended about different effects having different causes. of the superimposition of bitter taste. Nor may it be said " If the silver not in contact be an object of the sense of sight. for. even because of contact with the sense of taste affected by bile. that in respect of the perception of substance the conjunction with that (substance) is the cause. there arise is whose sphere simultaneously the superimposition of bitter taste and the taste-psychosis whose content is that alone hence . such as that in respect of perception in general the contact of object with the sense is the cause. and that in respect of the perception of silver conjunction with silver is the cause. the first law is .. in the bitter taste manifested by the intelligence manifested by the psychosis which is generated by the tactile sense and whose sphere is the substrate. when.230 CHAPTER t blueness superimposed thereon etc. object of the sense of sight being intelligible even in the " same way. since for the substrate and the superimposition there is not apprehension by the same sense-organ. by the psychosis which is generated by the tactile sense and the substrate. there is manifested the intelligence defined by that. the experience " I see is not to be sublated.

as on the admission of a general relationship of cause and effect between seed and sprout. being set aside by (considerations of) prolixity. some cases even on what is not capable of conjunction and is not a substance and. because of (both) these. relates to cases where. Even the principle that where the general is the cause of the general. the third law is non-established. there is undue extension in that the there the contingence of the perception of one substance from the conjunction with a different one. on the admission merely of the general law that. other than the general relationship of effect with the and cause. is 231 the locus The second law relates to that which of substance-ness from an empirical point of view. as in the case of darkness according to 101 the superimposition of substance-ness the Logicians. in respect of perception of substance. in the of the merely same way as of the this-ness (present in the substrate) conflict . The postulation of a special relationship of effect and cause. therefrom cannot be established any special (otiose relationship of effect and cause. there is no second law. the specific is the cause of the specific. since. there is the contin- gence of the origination of a different sprout from a different seed. is 101 The Naiy&yikas hold that darkness is not a substance. the cognition of substance-ness is admitted to be due to the superimposition even of that present in the substrate. . apparent silver. conjunction with substance is the cause. in the form of the second law. which is and) comparable to the fleshy protuberance on the goat's neck. in the case is possible in . Nor may it be said that even here.SUGGESTED LAWS AS TO THE CAUSE OP COGNITIONS non-established.

not in respect of delusion. if this is the case. contact with the object is the cause and so on. Nor may it be asked " If the sensory nature : of the merely apparent be admitted merely because of the . are restricted to empirically valid contents. it is established. that the content of delusion is indeterminaas the unintelligibility (otherwise) ble. which further. explanation would be impossible unless laws. as otherwise undue extension could not be avoided even if the third law were admitted. since the assumption is -possible even of this restriction that the cause in respect of valid knowledge. there is no contingence of any settled law. Further. does there result the view of (erroneous cognition as) cognition otherwise. is not otherwise explicable. though primarily apprehended. in respect of perception in general. which .. in the case of the silver devoid of identity with the intelligence manifested (by the psychosis) and is present in some other place. there would be no harm even if a settled law were violated here for. and there is the contingence of contact is the superimposition here of that silver alone which is not in contact and is present in some other place for. immediacy is unintelligible is . CHAPTER the I law is admitted that in respect of the perception of various substances conjunction with the respective substances is the cause". the violation of Therefore. in the case of the experience " " I see this silver/' "I see the blue water etc. Nor.232 for. . through such considerations of cognition and sublation. such as that.

because of causes like the non-existence of human defects such as desire (in relation to tin). there is admitted by me even the non-origination of a psychosis whose content is that (tin). and because the production of the impression whose content is silver is intelligible even by that " this "-psychosis. as to the existence or non-existence of the removal of ignorance even there. yet there is not then the superimposition of tin. the second psychosis (of the form) " silver has the superimposed silver for content. because by the witness even by that (psychosis in the form "this") the manifestation is possible of the silver superimposed on that. one psychosis 5*155 . accept a psychosis in the form ". and think that the psychosis in the form of silver is futile. which manifests the witness that as manifestated illumines it. though there is no distinction in the perception of the glitter common to tin and silver. only one sense-generated the silver in identity with the psychosis whose sphere this-element prior to that there is no psychosis in " this the form ". " this Others. since the cognition of the substrate is the cause 5*154 of superimposition. at the superimposed even there time of the super- imposition of silver.NO SILVER PSYCHOSIS 233 contact with the substrate. hence the inquiry is not to be made there is Therefore is . however. why should there not be the visibility of tin too which is at some other time?". it does S " this " (of the form) cognitions. and for that very reason. ^ of two is On the view the cause of the super" this is imposition. at the time of the superimposition of nacre-silver.

"the locus" being the cognition of the this-element. the conjunction of silver and this-ness is the sphere of the silver-cognition. have for its sphere merely what is superimposed. superimposed cognition of and thus. if even because the locus of content. in the case of its cognition too. in "the locus of its identity". has the "this-ness" for content. since. 5*156 Others. the this-ness too." it is experienced to have for content the silver that has been identified with the this-object : thus say some. there is intelligible the manifestation of conjunction with having for content the this-ness present in the substrate. even so the nescience present in intelligence as defined by the cognitive psychosis whose content is the this-element is trans- formed into the illusory cognition of is silver. however. its identity has its " this-ness" for it should it content nor may conjunction for be said that. without the this-element. like the psychosis of the this-element.234 not. but there not. . nor may it be said that since. like silverness. "it" in "it should have" refers to the illusory cognition. in the form " I cognise this silver. since the cognition of the this-element. there would be no undue extension . "its" refers to the illusory cognition. which is the counter-correlate of that (conjunction) should be said to be the content of that (cognition) for. CHAPTER 1 however. and with this much it is possible for the illusory cognition to have the conjunction (of "silverness" and "this-ness") for content. say thus: just as the nescience present in intelligence as defined by the this-element is transformed into the form of silver. since there is taught have 102 The question is whether the illusory cognition should have "thisness" for content. 102 . and hence that too is not to be admitted as having the "this" for content. which is the locus of the illusory cognition and is in a relation of identity with it. like the manifestation of silver as in conjunction with the this-ness present in the substrate. a nonsilver. the answer is that it need not.

the admission of the psychosis going forth stands to reason. mediacy and immediacy. as in the case of mediate cognition. Nor in that case is there the unintelligibility of the difference between is intelligible. that (difference) is intelligible even because of the difference in psychoses due to the different instruments. which are .GOING FORTH OF PSYCHOSIS in the TO MANIFEST IDENTITY 235 possibility Vivarana on the Bhdsya about the and (of superimposition)the rule about the substrate the superimposed appearing in a single cognition. in spite of difference of psychoses. some say thus in the case of perception. there should be declared (their) being the content of a single psychosis for. of residual impressions whose contents are pot etc. the 5161 intelligence. what (is the use) of the psychosis? Though it be Now. is alone the manifester of the object. witness manifested by the psychosis in the since form "this. in respect of the fire etc. the admission of its going forth is futile . since where a relationship of identity is directly To this : possible. the manifestation of all needed for the intelligibility of the production etc." things is 516 intelligible even because of the clarity of the witness. in the case of mediate cognition. it is impossible to . assume a relation sui generis or some other (relation) hence.. as between knowledge from verbal testimony and inferential knowledge. for the sake of the manifestation of that (identity). since. for. the manifestation of pot etc. which as the substrate of the object is defined thereby.. too even by the witness as defined by a psychosis that has not gone forth. there is admitted the manifestation of both in the single .

such as is capable of copresence and co-absence in the same way as the senseorgan. however. is Indeed. the of that (intelligence). fragrance etc. and there not being cognised any channel for the psychosis to go forth. 5-1 62 Others. there not through verbal testimony . misery intelligence. even if taught a hundred times by a trustworthy person. it is intelligence only as defined by the psychosis that has not gone forth that is presumptively admitted to have the object for its sphere through a relation sui ye tier is. and since even if they existed their relation (to what they signify) would not have been apprehended is by the hearer.. since. since the desire to know persists even after that. as compared with what are understood by verbal testimony and inference. in the " " it be Nor is it?" definiteness as in is what how sweetness etc. and consequently in etc.2o6 remote. Which are directly conjoined to immediacy is settled. there is not. such form understood by perception. since Though be understood from there are no words expressobjected: the sweetness of the ing particular sub-classes such as mango. happiness. establish the going forth of the psychosis as for the manifestation etc.. of the mango. there being no other way. yet. M63 Yet others. cause of immediacy is intelligence only as conjoined with the object. respect of pot too. in respect of the particular taste. the CHAPTER conjunction of 1 the psychosis being impossible. a (certain) definiteness experienced. in respect of individuation. however. explain thus the going forth : of the psychosis in what is understood by perception. in may general may verbal testimony.

sweetness. and the reply that not even perception can give us this cognition. is . this distinction us is the existence of a but they cannot tell us more mango. in 104 the there particular class is not of is the contingence desire to made the the persistence case of the know (even in the of perception). specifically what it is. is made the content only in its own nature (as generality). 103 " hence the desire to know for. indeed. definiteness capable of removing the desire to know. we know. to know in the stands to reason".. Therefore. since even by perception . from the statement that mango there is a particular sweetness excelling there is all else. the particular class of the attribute. This statement does not. because there non-authoritativeness. because of identity with manifested intelligence which of one consistency of immediacy. and make known there the particular present elsewhere.TO CREATE DEFINITENESS AND REMOVE JIJNASA 237 the understanding of sweetness as defined by particular distinctive classes hence the persistence of the desire . That say. all that particular variety of sweetness in the 104 What the objector seems to require for the removal of jijnasa is a cognition of the particularity of the particular class. Nor may particular present there it is it the contingence of be said " Even the makes known in its general nature as a particular. and since some other particularity present content. is to testimony 103 there is indefiniteness words can tell . but that the sweetness has a particularity. for. but not as particularised. leave out the particular (sweetness) present therein. not the particular sweetness. in what is apprehended by perception. because of the non-existence of that in what is known through verbal is etc. in other words. understood even the particular subclass (of sweetness) present in it. there is.

undue extension continues as before. Hence it is that for happiness etc.238 is to CHAPTER I be accepted. which is present in the object-defined intelligence and obscures it. for. known by the witness. Now even with this the statement made that the going forth of the psychosis is for the sake of the removal of the ignorance obscuring the object. though known by psychoses due to verbal testimony. (reflection etc.. not gone forth. and there is definiteness when that (ignorance) is removed subsequent to that there is indefiniteness. Nor may it be said: of Yajiiadatta's there is the contingence of the removal ignorance of the pot by Devadatta's cognition of the pot. ignorance is not removed prior to reflection etc. by a psychosis which has In that case. for. that does not stand to reason.. while both having the same locus is not the ground of their opposition (such that one can remove cognition and the ignorance present (respectively) in the denotation of '!' and the object-defined intelligence have different loci (and are the other). since there exists (the feature of) their having the " same content. even if there be admitted the going forth of the psychosis on the recognition that the opposed so that the ground of opposition between cognition and ignorance is their having the same locus and the same content. there is definiteness for Brahman .). since the yet cognition removes the ignorance)". intelligence . there would be no undue extension even if there be admitted the removal of the ignorance. since. because Devadatta's pot-psychosis and Yajnadatta's ignorance the of the pot come to have a single locus.

hence. " present in the object. " I see the staff. even by mediate If it be said that immediacy too is an in the visual cognition staff". for.WHAT IS IMMEDIACY ? 239 defined by the pot. (generality) be present in respect of the element of the staff too. " This is a person who had if a whose content to is a person qualified by a staff that brought mind by memory-impression. object in respect of a particular person there is the contingence of the removal of no. even though there is and there the (consequent) no experience (of immediacy). To this they say thus: if the going forth of the psychosis be not admitted. having the same locus is not needed. attribute of the cognition that removes (ignorance). for. only a separate ground of " When opposition has to be stated in the form ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a particular person. memory-impression be assumed to be a mode of contact and there be admitted an assumptive immediacy because of (the is cognition) being generated by sense-contact (underis stood thus). what is that immediacy? It is not a generality." in the form If. there the contingence of the recognition . ignorance cognition. stated as If it " When be said that that (ground) has been ignorance obscures a particular and so on. hence. the very ground of opposition between cognition and ignorance could not be determined. even in that (element) there is the contin- gence of the removal of ignorance present in the object. contingence of the experience of immediacy in respect of that element too. that (ignorance) is to be removed by that person's cognition of that object".

render into English. S. brought to mind by inferential knowledge and knowledge from verbal testimony. since there is not apprehended any common property ration itself is defining the generation. in the perception of the pot qualified by heaviness etc. further. if such (defining properly) were apprehended. sense-genedifficult to apprehend in many cases. pp. 24. Immediacy and non-existence cannot be present in the that itself being primarily cognised would intelligibly 105 its same locus. there is over-pervasion of the attribute-element. witness. if. For. unless the locus is defined in different ways for the two predicates. it could not be a generality existing non-pervasively. jati". no such adjunct 106 determined by him. by assuming knowledge of the probans etc. and. though mediate in respect of that element. because of the rule that generality exists pervasively. since there is not determined any special defining Nor adjunct. yet because of the non-existence of any other instrument (of cognition). but by a relation sui generis or some indirect relation. since it is be said to be generation by the not pervasive of perception by the it and since. Kuppuswami jati. there be no immediacy in respect of the staff-element. even if there were not this rule. being undefined. is This is difficult to it Prof. 25.240 CHAPTER I of that (immediacy) even in inferential knowledge etc. See A Primer of Indian is related to the particulars not Logic. no. to be a mode of contact. Sastriar defines it as "an attribute which not a Unlike the by inherence (samavaya). If senses.. that (immediacy) could not be a generality.. . if and he who asserts their co presence should state the defining adjunct is any. however. through the capacity of the accessory that brings to mind. 1015 is it 106 this (immediacy) an upadhi. generation (of the cognition) belongs to the senses alone.

107 If it be said " what is acceptable to you as immediacy. and that in respect of the immediate element in what is generated by the sense as aided by associa- no generation by contact. since the Brahman- knowledge. and (this is refuted) also because (origination by sense-contact) is not common (to all cases of immediacy).e. inherence in what is conjoined (sarjiyuktasamav&ya) and BO on. the material cause of all. presentation through association being present even in inferential knowledge. there is common to other means of knowledge as well.. no. to the several modes of contact recognised by the Logicians. there should be admitted viz. that is of the nature of immediacy. that (immediacy). Hereby is refuted this doubt too. and it would not be proper to assume in the case of sense-generation. which is it not capable of being perceptually experienced. 107 108 See Chapter III. which " knows is He who declared in the Scriptural text " the self crosses sorrow and is invariably conjoined to Brahman. S 1-31 . which is so capable (of being experienced). let that be for me too ".WHAT IS IMMEDIACY ? 241 be of the nature of immediacy. no (single mode of contact) being common to conjunction etc. to be shown even there. which is (thus) tion. for.. the consequence of the removal of ignorance and hence cannot be an attribute of the cause of its removal. I. association. that immediacy consists in generation by sensecontact. since. is not a mode of contact. which is to be taught in connection with the ascertainment of the immediacy of 108 is. Therefore. the locus of primal ignorance. in the manner knowledge from verbal testimony. is what causes the removal of primal ignorance. sections 5*1 to 5*4. conjunction (saipyoga).

5-164 Others. and invariability of conjunction with the intelligence that is the locus of ignorance should be said to be the attribute of the cognition that removes (ignorance). in order to explain conjoined with that. is there the contingenee of the capacity to remove ignorance even for the verbal cognition about the nature of the veins (nadis) and the heart for that (cognition) . because of the capacity of the respective sense-contacts. the going forth of the psychosis should be declared. the veins or the heart. say that the going forth the psychosis is established because of conformity to . the ground of the comes to opposition between cognition and ignorance be determined in the form: "When ignorance obscures a particular object in respect of a particular person. the going forth of the psychosis is fruitful. of. for. however. 5-165 Yet others. say that. the opposition between cognition and ignorance. there does not result (for that cognition) the coming into being as invariably Therefore. if this is the case. And thus.242 CHAPTER I the rule that psychoses of the senses. yet since verbal cognition is possible even without conjunction with the object. however. that is removable by his cognition." Nor. arise only in conjunction with the intelligence as defined by the respective objects. there may result though by chance conjunction with either object. since it is established by parsimony that the ignorance present in the object is removable by cognition in the same locus. which relates to that object and comes into being as invariably conjoined with the intelligence that is the locus of that ignorance.

Now. what evidence has it? 6-0 That it has the Vedanta for evidence has been bells. 4.. harmoniously lead to the non-dual Brahman. however. I. non-different from the inner self. yet there is need of it either for the sake of association with intelligence or for the sake of manifesting the non-difference of the cogniserintelligence from the Brahman-intelligence manifest- ing the object. examined with the marks of purport such as the unity of the initial and concluding passages. How this is the sense (of the Vedantas). loudly proclaimed as with the pealing of All the Vedantas. ga&kara'a Bha$ya on Vedn &#. say that though there be no need 5466 of the going forth of the psychosis for the sake of the removal of obscuration. END OF CHAPTER ONE . which is manifested by the psychosis. in the chapter on harmony.THE VEDANTA AS EVIDENCE FOR NON-DIFFERENCE 243 the illustration that external light is seen to be capable of dispelling external darkness only where there is the same locus (for both). this non-difference of the jlva from Brahman. Some. that has been elaborated in the sacred teaching itself. i. 100 for fear of prolixity 109 it is not set forth here. whatsoever.


there is apprehension through perception. real. that being opposed to perception etc. And constant in pot thus perception too is but is which favourable to the establishment of non-dual Brahman " If it be so. no (we reply) for.. there would be of the nature of reality. no (we reply) for. while for the imposed silver-element there is presentation through delusion.. Now. just as in delusions. To thus : the author of the Tattvaswddhi replies perception apprehends neither pot. in forms like " The pot is real ".j their reality. and the presence and absence of the sense-organ are exhausted therewith. ? If this be asked. Now (it may be said) the illusoriness of the world cannot be made known by Scriptural texts and reasoning. that being opposed to perception etc. not perreal. the this-element. ilhivsoriiiess is understood of the . as their substrate. concomitant with ception the presence or absence of the sense-organ ". j. cloth etc.. how can the Vedantas harmonise in respect of the non-dual Brahman. but bare reality etc. even so admitted that everywhere there is apprehension of bare reality through perception and it is . apprehend the reality of pot etc. perception only of the form of the form the pot is real'.CHAPTER II. as being of the nature of an illusory manifestation of Brahman. the substrate. 1*0 world known through perception etc. If this be said. through the Scriptural texts and reasoning of the arambhana section. for ' ' ' . which. nor this..

for. though sublation be seen. from those which are other (than these) of difference. . no (we reply) for. time. be said that. is doubt as to its being a man and so on.. the if it . " being remote in space and time. Now. thus: pot is etc. the basis of that which are cognised immediately after the operation of a sense-organ. are cognised as certainly different from everything else. apprehension through along perception is not possible . which qualified is For. difference all a relation. which is difference does certainly appear. not being subject to doubt or invariably cognised with the counter-correlate. even thus. here admission itself is baseless. and cognition of a relation has for is content the relata and determined by cognition of all the relata. that is not (so) . since no doubt or error is then seen in respect of that difference of pot etc.246 CHAPTER II that the functioning of the senses is in respect of this alone. in the same way as recognition for the element of that-ness ". If it be said Let the knowledge of difference be of the nature of memory. there Where in respect of post etc. there is being 1 no residual impression of the element of by the counter-correlate. while the presentation of different things like pot is through delusion. even there. since no sublation is seen as there (in the case of the delusion). And even of counter-correlates which are not in contact. there is the possibility 1 error. for. since it is dependent on recollection for the countercorrelate element.. in the same way as things remote in space It is and (admission). the very incapacity of diverse no things like pot to be perceived.

even for the element of being qualified by the counter-correlate. for. Then. since inference is sphere of which (inference) cannot set out in the absence of the knowledge of difference. is a thing ". in the absence of the perception of both relata. for. there 2 incapable of being but appearance. of the nature of all Since perceptual cognition of counter-correlates is impossible. even should impressions be possible. in the case of many of these. there is self-dependence would result. cognition of difference cannot be even of the form of memory. There- fore.DIFFERENCE NOT ESTABLISHED (element) is 2 . the the being qualified by the counter-correlate of difference. as for the clement of difference. hence. (the defects of) what is (already) established and so on. where. g47 Nor is there the present in difference of an possibility of that impression as the conclusion " The inference in the form golden hill is a countercorrelate of difference because it . there cannot be impressions either. for the counter-correlates is perceived. hence. this really a supplementary argument. presence (of probans) in the subject etc. not having been perceived before. being qualified by that cannot be perceived. it If be said " no (we reply) . probandiim. perception of the relation is impossible. "being qualified by the counter-correlate" cannot be the object of an impression. the knowledge of their difference is needed to dispel the knowledge of their non-difference. is . for. the delusion of non-difference in respect of the inference cannot set out. where the counter-correlate is unperceived. let there be perceptual character". prolans. because of establishing subject. for..

being the material cause of the world is accepted by all. have to be assumed in pot etc. because of conflict . ' which of the nature of reality. however. whose content is what is external.. however) since that (Brahman) is devoid of colour etc. is favourable to the establishment of non-dualism. which apprehends distinctionless bare reality. in consequence. there would be -prolixity in the assumption of reality even in pot etc.. which is invariably cognised in the same cognition as those (countercorrelates). however. (the cognition) pot is real" and so on is blended with the reality of the substrate. says thus " : though pot etc. (while. there no authoritativeness characterised by making is known the truth. ' . " hence there is no conflict. are the content of in the same cognition as delusion alono. the appearance " " and so on is intelligible even as interpot is real penetrated by that. perception. because of absence is of contradiction. which are invariably cognised difference. no (we reply) what is said by Scripture about the thing. should not (the cognition) pot is blue and so on be blended with the blueness of the substrate?". since for : perception etc.. therefore. there is not. consequently. are sensed. alone there difference (between the two cases). yet. difference. etc. blueness . is thus 1*3 The learned author of the Sanksepasarlraka. 1-2 The author of the Nyayasudha. and pot etc.. when.248 CHAPTER II delusion . . says thus though perception has the property of apprehending the reality of pot etc. If it be asked Why thus.

any suspicion of the sublatioii of Scripture referring to non-duality. because of its being unknown.. since that. in the case of pot which are the contents of perception etc. And. for. seeing -is not.. it lays . ignorance. even if there be not understood its inferiority to the means of valid knowledge applying to Brahman. enjoined. is not the sphere of an injunction but. Since Brahman it is which as is self- luminous has the possibility of manifestation. That. That content of valid knowledge. with that. content of ignorance. th<jre not the property it is of not being known. not admitted to be the content of alone. which apprehends the reality of pot etc. which makes known what is unknown. or of the form of s 132 . Some.. down the restriction that being the object of valid knowledge is appropriate to the self alone. indeed. By the words "to be seen". is etc. because of the cognition of its recurrence. which is dependent on the means of valid knowledge. is to be seen" etc. means of valid knowledge. which makes the only what gives knowledge known the truth and is a means of valid knowledge.NON-AUTHORITATIVENESS OF PERCEPTION &c. say thus: on the view that 1-4 perception. however. the reality apprehended thereby ends up by being " either of the form of the genus reality ".. since in respect of the inert there is riot the act of obscuration. verily. in " The self is the form worthy of being seen ". is a etc. and not to anything else. (Brahman) alone is the It is for that reason that too restricts valid knowledge to the self Scripture alone in "The self. of that. is valid. indeed.

refuse to admit. therein.. from the text pranas are real. say thus: though reality whose nature is unsublatedness be apprehended by perception. since there can be by way no superiority or inferiority or littleness of content. synecdochically indicated . Nor may it be said "Let unsublatedness alone be the reality apprehended by perception ".250 CHAPTER II . this (self) is the reality ". Even those who maintain spatial illusoriness do. however. because of " the cognition of spatial and temporal relation in Here and now the pot of the pot etc. " The yet. which are the spheres of such expressions as "King of Kings. the fprana in respect of reality of the nature of unsublatedness. even if this (distinction) were possible in some other way. is real". by the mention of the principal one. etc.. 1*5 Others. Cupid among Cupids". And this is not in conflict with its own illusoriness. for it is not possible to apprehend through perception. that there is no sublation of this (cognition) in all the three times. or of the form of the existence because of the cognition of the denial of " that existence in The pot does not exist ". in the case of pot not their existence nor their relations. particular spatial and temporal relations. which apprehends the present alone. indeed. there can be no superiority or inferiority all unsublated for except by way of being time and being unsublated for a little while. and temporal nor generality etc.. as in of extensiveness the case of the properties of rulership and beauty. that would but end . but (only) their unsublatedness. there is cognised superiority and that inferiority as between the reality of Brahman and of the entire world. of these.

(as required) . seen to be like a surface. appre- hended by perception. because of its very nature (jati) this statement of the traditional Code have for content what can be known from the Vedas alone. superiority belongs to verbal testimony M Nor does alone. therefore. since the former is free from defect and subsequent (to perception). Yet others. (section) " Among by the principle of the apaccheda and because it is said in the traditional Code those three (perception. of conflict with of perception. inference and verbal . the glow-worm it is said. till there is Brahman-knowledge hence. which is tainted with the suspicion of defect and comes into operation first. say thus of the two. is of the nature of unsublatedness. ness. that. in the section on witnesses. while the declaration of the superiority the Veda is appropriate only in respect of 1<liat sense of the Veda. SUPERIOR AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE 351 in the (distinction of) superiority stated. because of unity of sense and inferiority here with other Scriptural declarations of the world being sublated by Brahmanknowledge. there can be no suspicion.. though there is conflict it is Scripture alone that is stronger than : perception. even of what is .. for. seen by perception. however. in that ease. which apprehend (respectively) the illusoriness and the reality of the world. the reality of pot etc. without putting faith in the perception. there is no conflict with the Scriptural declaration of illusori. where conflict with perception is suspected. In the Naradasmrti too. testimony). it should be " Ether is investigated by valid teaching and so on: like a fire. Scripture and perception.

to make an investigation even knowing objects after investigation. one does not swerve from righteousness/' Nor. sound alone is the quality of ether. of the blueness that 3 is but up above. in the case . by the perception of the absence of the cognition of blueness for one 3 who has approached that (place in the horizon) where the ether seemed to touch the earth. therefore. its non-cognition. it is intelligible that the appearance of proximity to the earth. distance. could the perceived blueness of ether be refuted by perception Nor does that sublation result from the ascertainetc. in such a case. it also possible blueness is seen at a distance. in the absence of the revealed teaching that. near by is produced by the defect of proximity. on the strength of intelligible that the blueness of the . at which place there was the cognition of blueness while the person was at a distance for. the proper procedure is not to deny having that attribute. since for.252 there is CHAPTER II no surface it is in ether . since blueness is not cognised in the ether near by. though not wherever the substance its is cognised. like the non-cognition of what is enveloped in mist it is experience. but to recognise the non-pervasive existence (avyapya-vrttitva) of that attribute. Nor is there sublation ether exists non-pervasively. ment is is that. of the five (qualities) beginning with sound. but this expectation may be set aside where a quality is seen to be present in a substance. nor is the glow-worm fire . proper in respect of an object seen by perception. the cognition of that (blueness) at a distance produced by the (to defect infer) of that. further. is due to the defect per- The attribute of a substance would normally be expected to vade the entire substance. .

being for the most part reciprocally related. in the case of odour etc. (which appear to touch the earth). possible for those like us to discrimi" nate through perception. existence. attractiveness. that is to be understood to belong to earth alone. the superiority of revelation to perception is indubitable.. in which defect is suspected. not the quality of water etc. appearance. because. . in is suspected.. but not in the case of the ether which up above. earth etc. " Brahman and the world being reciprocally related in the relation of material cause and effect. . the position (of perception) is equal (in the two cases). stars etc. form and name the first three are of the nature of Brahman. is there corrected by revelation. indeed. it is not.. thus.. 4 further. the presentation of the attribute of one in the other is possible. distinction has to be predicated only with the help of such revealed texts as "If some unlearned ones say that odour is cognised in water. hence in perception. as in the case of the clouds. the presentation of the attribute of one in another is possible. the latter two are of the nature of the world". since. present in such loci as water. then. NEED FOR CORRECTION BY SCRIPTURE 253 of distance. : as conjoined with water qualities like and air. it be said that tlic perception." Among connate odour. distinction has to be made the help of revelation. Nor thus 4 The cognition to of blueness may be illusory in the case of the ether is which seemed really touch the earth. in the form Odour is the If quality of earth alone. which are cognised as intermixed with earth etc. here too. in the manner mentioned with which defect by the sage: "There are five aspects (of being).

Now. for the word "sacrificer". 5 for. which is by revelation as a means of valid dependent on the perception of (alone) the existence-aspect of letters. in "The strew is the sacrificer. because.254 is CHAPTER it there conflict with that on which it (verbal testimony) is dependent. words and sentences. . sentence-split would result. there is destruction of their truth-aspect. in sacrifice " He is to with the soma. and through this difference in functions. for. in the case of the (otherwise). in the case of the soma. there would have to be understood instrumentality to what is desired. in both the sacrifice. (called) it is thus answered in the work It is the BMmati. indeed the perception of words and sentences and their sense. if revelation be superior to perception.. in and instrumentality to the sacrifice.e. should be possible for the superior revelation to disregard this (conflict) and establish the non-difference of the sacrificer from the strew and the non-difference of the soma from the sacrifice. 2-2 If this be urged. cases (of implication).." secondary implication need not be assumed in its reference to the strew. is Scripture that 5 I. " the possessive implication (i. similarly. even though there it is conflict with perception. construing them as referring to different objects. on which 2*1 it is not dependent. knowledge. "with the sacrifice possessing soma" need not be assumed in order that there characterised by) may not be the conflict with perception (which results) when the construction has to be said to be appositional.e. purportful of greater force than perception.

in same way as Where well. which are channels to the sentence-sense. If it be said that if they had no purport. but one complex injunction. but he Is also told how it is to be done. for This is called a vigista-vidhi. which is a channel to the eulogy (or condemnation). in qualifications like the soma. for. an injunction he is not merely asked to do this or that. And the 6 this is the qualification of the saman. With lie who " the revati desires (rks) is of this very to cattle treat the varavantlya (saman) " sacrifice therewith as is the agnistoma-saman and seen to be authoritative in respect of the nature of the qualification (viscsana). Here. by since instrumentality to valid restricted to knowledge is purportful testimony alone. the illustration shows that Scripture respect of may be authoritative even in what is its purport. the rite. which is is based on the revati-rks. which the sacrificer desires not merely heaven hereafter. no (we reply) . is no purport in respect of their sense. of the injunction can be only one. qualified. such as the possession of forms deities. not established in ordinary experience. the said restriction is not established. in which case there would be sentence-split. any more than (there is purport) in the word-senses. but cattle here as he is enjoined to employ the revati-rks sung with the of the varavantlya saman. rite The purport itself.PURPORTFULNESS OF AUTHORITATIVE SCRIPTURE not all 255 for mantras and arthavada Scripture (eulogistic or condemnatory) passages. though that is not the sphere of the purport (of the text). there . there would not result from them (even) what is not in conflict with other means of valid knowledge. indeed. Thus. . the varavantlya. but the qualification of the has also to be made known in this case by the prescription since. and we have not two injunctions. it is not established in experience. since the visista-vidhi (agnistut). however. unlike the soma plant or not strictly curds.

without (this qualification) being the purport. split would result. in order not to conflict therewith. if is no purport in respect of the sense which it is is a channel to the praise. like the curds prescribed in (achieve what he desires by) sacrifice with curds ". for the text be whose purport but the injunction of the qualified (visista-vidhi). if sacrifice the purport be admitted that a non-different from the qualified (thereby) is soma material and prescribed. authoritativeness has to be declared even in respect of the nature of the qualification. whose purport is the praise of what is prescribed.256 case. there since. consequently is perception that case. then. since. its there is establishment would have to be sought even from the text whose purport is the injunction of the qualified. sentenceThus. the text CHAPTER II would be authoritative in respect only . reciprocal dependence would result. there would qualification through that. And is there is no purport in respect of that (qualification) there be purport in respect of both. in that when the qualification is known by implication there would be the injunction whose sphere is the qualified. for. injunction of the qualified. while when the there is that (injunction). is a different signification the text sacrifice assumed in their whose it In by) " He is to (achieve what he desires is with the soma ". stronger than those. for eulogistic passages too. in the . implication of Therefore. of the prescription of the sacrifice as qualified by that nor is there implication of the qualification by the injunction of the qualified. since what is not established in prescribed ordinary " He is to experience.

though the injunction " Cook the golden grains " has for its purport the declaration of it is : In the Vivaranavdrtika. so ag S expressed 133 . there is resort to possessive implication in that case. yet. which apprehends the difference between the sacrifice and hence. there is admitted of the word " Cooking " a secondary implication in respect of heating alone. so as not to conflict with that (perception). Brahman. since the non-difference of the " sense of the word Thou " from the expressed sense of the word " That " conflicts with perception. by the six kinds of marks beginning with the harmony of the initial and concluding passages. not the interpretation otherwise of Scripture. are of greater force than perception. however. yet. whose purport is non-duality. Truly. however. in primary sense of an act culminating in the origination of a difference in form and taste. for. there cannot result a sense opposed to the perception. since. as made known the soma plant. therefrom results sublation of perception itself. The Scriptural texts of non-duality. cooking as relating to the golden grains.SCRIPTURAL SUPERIORITY NOT DETERMINED BY PURPORTFULNESS. 257 same way as for the (other) qualification the varavantlya (saman) based on the revati (-rks). so as not to conflict with that. (similarly). connection with cooking. in the case of the golden grains. conflicts with its " That thou art " the purport be though for the text the declaration of non-difference between the jiva and perception. so as not to conflict with that. taught thus 2*31 the superiority of Scripture to perception is not through its being puiportful. hence. from a revealed text devoid of purport.

the injunction. and that there is an intermediate purport in respect of that sentence-sense. Where the syntactical unity is like that of a word (padaikavakyata). the objects (signified) . not that of a word with a sentence) for.CHAPTER II not to conflict with that. even for texts like The strew is the sacrificer ". "vayu is the swiftest deity" as a sentence is but equivalent to the word "praise-of-vayu (vayuh-praSastya)". there does . there the superiority of Scripture ? because of freedom from defect and 7 In the syntactical unity of a sentence with a ^entence (vSkyaikavakyata) the first sentence conveys a novel significance. the syntactical unity (here) is that of a sentence (with another sentence. syntactical unity is as of a word (with a sentence) having been established by the Vivaranacarya in " the Nyayanirnaya. How then is : is The reply . the present view contends that even a eulogy is complete in itself but for the fruit. Even case of injunctions of subsidiaries like the prayaja. as for the text about the prayaja etc. As against this view of the BhOmati. and what they mean can be expressed in each case by a word: e. exist purport in respect of the intermediate syntactical connection. there is admitted secondary implication (for both words) in respect of intelligence distinguished (from the expressed senses of both in the case of eulogistic texts.g. for them too. while knowing their respective senses. purport this is not admitted (to be) solely where the 7 . and secondary imfplication admitted only so as not to conflict with perception. even sentences apparently complete convey no novel significance. are certainly known not as subsidiary to another for these. because of the use (they should have) hence. there is subsidiariness to another (cognised later). for. complete in itself but for the expectancy of fruit. there is a possibility of the primary is sense being the purport. as in the words).. . hence its construction as one unit with the latter sentence. intermediate .

though sublated by Scripture. That Scripture as such is superior to perception. as in accord with practical efficiency. perception of nacre-silver. because of the cation later on of the apaccheda-nyaya. but posteriority appli- would rather seem to be the sense intended. of the nature of cognition itself. as in the view of dtmakhyati.. . And thus. which has been diverted from making known the truth. the general rule is departed from. since there cannot be contentless cognition. should somehow be shown to be possible by the assignment of a suitable content. 9 I.e. in order to remedy this. Hence it is that perception. " " though sublated by the perception This is not silver common to all. and unreal. is justified by the assignment of empirical content capable of practical efficiency. but there is not assumed as the content. silver that is remote or within or merely of the perception.NIRDOgATVA AND PARATVA OF SCRIPTUftB 2 59 8 posteriority in time. But perception. in opposition to that 9 (experience). and the Scriptural text itself is otherwise interpreted in the manner declared in the section 8 In time The word "paratva" may mean merely supremacy. is yet justified in conformity with experience by the admission in front of us of elaborate? Why The (indeterminable) silver associated with nacre. all (for that perception) . consequently. justification is not possible by the admission of a merely apparent content if sublated by " The strew is the sacrificer there text persists till . is the general rule. the Scriptural would be no content at ". because of conflict with non-dualist Scriptural texts. which apprehends the difference of the strew from the sacrificer. Brahman-knowledge.

But how 10 11 the justification of the content being some" There are here no possible. hence. in the case of is Since the strew cannot literally be the sacrificer. non-enjoyership etc. the perception there by the six-fold marks Thus. though not absolutely real. implication to. what the similarity which conditions the one being spoken of as the other? It is the fact that each is instrumental to the achievement of the sacrifice. there is secondary implication (recognised) for the Scriptural text. be taught in respect of the expressed sense of the word "Thou" the nature of Brahman as qualified by omniscience. as in the case of (conflict between) non-dualist 710 Scriptural texts and perception. which..g gO CHAPTER il relating to "the achievement of that (sacrifice)/ Nor. the assumption of duality. . if by the text That thou art there is justified ' ' ' ' of non-omniscience. in order to remedy this. perception is provided with a content. while to the pure (being) distinguished from that (individuation) belongs the nature of the indifferent Brahman. for.. " grains etc. baseless . by partial abandonment is distinction that enjoyer- secondary resorted ship etc.. in order to remedy this. adopting the belong to what is associated with individuation. " Thus. 11 By is practically efficient. is it possible here to justify perception by the admission of absolutely and empirically true contents for Scripture and perception (respectively) . it is not possible to declare absolutely true identity of the sacrificer with the strew by a single eulogistic passage opposed to a multitude of Scriptural texts whose declaration of the illusoriness of all except Brahman of purport. entirely would be enjoyership etc. even in Cook the golden there being a possibility of perception being wholly contentless.

there is no sublation whatever of the is of Scripture. soma. v. in that case. Make not conflict with perception. golden grains is ". same way as mere heating. of this is 26i superior. And thus. hence. achieve what desired with the soma sacrifice)" etc. VI. the resort to secondary implication is not in order to conform to perception. 18 as established by the apaccheda-nyaya. Nor may it be said that it is the conflict with perception of what is considered to be that which ought to be performed. in the injunction bright the lunar orb ".. which is no interpretation otherwise. 4955. is an accessory. there 12 there is no contingence at all of a failure to distinguish Scripture. Reference . though in respect of the lunar orb. superiority only because of that (incapacity). to PM. Cooking. the brightness. in the primary sense. in the same way as a sacrifice to which the material. 13 The may be made principle is explained in the succeeding paragraphs. but because of incapacity to perform (what is primarily signified by the words). "Sacrifice 2-32 with the soma (i.e..DUE TO INCAPACITY TO PERFORM differents whatsoever ". nor can a somasacrifice non-different from it (soma) be performed by any one. cannot indeed be performed in the case of the golden grains. " Cook the in Or else. therefore. the resort to secondary implication Therefore. 12 There is such a failure on the view that it is purport which condi- tions the superiority of Scripture. the latter is different from the former. which is spoken of in other words as "incapacity to perform" in the for. does " . there is seen incapacity to perform . (between the two cases). which is considered to be what ought to be performed.

262 2-321 CHAPTER II Now. as having no other by content. there is arises the cognition of expiatory rite if the pratihartr lets go." such a difference letting go) . on looking at the Scriptural text "Should the udgatr let go. perception should be sublated non-dualist Scripture. this (earlier cognition) is sublated by the contrary cognition. and the same sacrifice should be recommenced/' there waist cloth). the earlier perception of the reality of pot etc. yet the sacred teaching which gives rise to the earlier cognition of obligation to perform an occasioned rite has scope where there is letting go by the udgatr alone. a simultaneous letting go by both. (each succeeding the tucked up a letting go by the udgatr. similarly. if. In the jyotitoma. looking at the Scriptural text "Should the pratihartr 77 let go. then. Though in the case cited is the earlier cognition of the obligation to perform an occasioned rite is sublated by the subsequent cognition of the obligation to perform another occasioned rite. the whole of the sacrificial fee should be given. then. however. an obligation to perform an occasioned by the udgatr letting go later. the sacrifice should be concluded without any fee. or the letting go by the udgatr is subsequent (to the other's or there is . which arises on . and relates to the obligation to perform another ex- piatory rite occasioned by the pratihartr letting go. sublated by the subsequent Scripture-generated cog" nition of their illusoriness. among those who go round (the fire) for the sake of (the ceremony priest called) the holding him who goes before by if bahispavamana. how does the apaccheda-nyaya apply here? The reply is (as follows). it would be baseless.

which is wholly sublated where there there is subsequent act of letting go. when there is (that) occasion. in respect of pot there applies the perception sublated by Scripture. is 3. even in respect of that it obtains an empirical content and has its purpose fulfilled. hence. hence. has to be performed in a different way. 14 Brahman that is known in (This is said by some) : in the course of even a 2-3211 single sacrifice. 2-3212 According to the commentator. etc. since they . empirical and merely apparent. are certainly two cognitions of colour and red colours of the cherry nyaya is both valid. for. in the section about letting go. this. the apacchedanot an example of the sublation of the earlier . when. originate in succession. longs to what is 14 of Obligation to perform besubsidiary. there are obligations to perform diffe- rent occasioned rites due to different occasions occuring in sequence the two cognitions of obligation. . here too. just as in the case of the sacred teaching connected with the earlier act of letting go.THE APACCHEDA-NYAYA 263 (between the two cases) should not be suspected. like the in the case of the black fruit. that has to be performed in one way before the rise of is : " This indeed the occasion. all it is possible to say that perception has scope as relating to the reality of cognition. And the expiatory rite. . no need to look for some other content further. cognition by a subsequent (one) hence it is that in the Sastradlpika.. there is this statement: the meaning of the sacred teaching about the occasioned rite the sacrifice. argument grades of is for the benefit those who refuse to recognise three reality absolute." This is not (sound).

Nyayaratnamala: teaching. . cial fee is to be seen (to apply) As for the statement cited from the astradipiM. : this is the meaning of the sacred teaching in the case of the rite which is not characterised by a subsequent by the udgatr and is act of letting go is characterised by the pratihartr letting go. indeed. whose nature cularising the content This has. just as the sacred teaching about the ahavamya (as that into which all should be offered) relates to all 15 oblations so too the other than the oblation in the hoof-mark. in the words : " Therethough fore. fire. it is said: established ". been said in the " The restriction of a sacred is general and settled. that occurs towards the close of a passage declaring the sublation of the earlier obligation. 15 As a general rule.264 CHAPTER is II the earlier act of letting go by the udgatr. however. In the validity for the particular sacrifice alone. If this were over-ridden by the But by admitting its general rule. the cognition of the earlier expiatory rite. the general principle is restricted Without being nullified. thus defined. sacred teaching " Should the udgatr let " relates to go a rite not characterised by a subsequent act of letting go by the pratihartr. is called sublation of and the established In analysing the " sublation of the " " That being so. for. all oblations should be offered in the ahavamya avamedha. by partiso on. there is the injunction to make the offerings in the hoof-marks of the horse. the same " even where the udgatr lets go. the gift of the entire sacrifi- a subsidiary. it would be entirely purportless. is not a subsidiary in a rite characterised by a whose occasion subsequent act of letting go by the pratihartr.

e. Let be the conventions of the Mimamsakas. i. its purport is a mere reflection on the assumption " though it would have to be performed in a different way. prior to the rise of the occasion. there is no sublation whatever ". Hence. i. it is not an object of v&licJ knowledge. it is not like the blackness of the cherry. this has not been generated even earlier.. but its not that prior to the rise of the subsequent is occasion the obligation occasioned earlier existed in fact.e. since that is not lost even subsequently. without the occasion having arisen. what a defect in the 16 rite. like the priof blackness of the cherry. SI-34 . does it consist in being that by the non-perfor- mance of which there would be a defect in the rite. which Is destroyed by its subsequent redness. Nor Nor is it the possibility of the fruit accomplished by 17 volition. for the subsequent (cognition). because of being sublated. there would result conflict with earlier passages of the context. 17 Tligrefore. however. where there purport is not the rise of the occasion ". for. for. on the analogy of the black and red colours (of the The reply is what is this obligation which could be removed by the origination of an obligation in cherry) ? : respect of a subsequent occasioned rite? It is not the capacity of the earlier occasioned rite to be accomplished 18 by volition. is Where the conflict in admitting two obligations in succession. for. in the event if its non-performance. becomes false..THE APACCHEDA-NYAYA 265 originated. nor causes (does it consist) in being a subsidiary. therefore.

This is 'now he arrives at it. it is not possible either for the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go to be a subsidiary to the (main) rite. what is of the nature of non-existence as a (abhava) cannot originafe anything. has not feature". the latter class too contributes to the apurva. defect in the rite too may be treated mode of prior non-existence.g. such as rice-grains by sprinkling. is a specific kind of cause . the pervaded). whether (remote) as contributing to the . Edgerton's equivalents. in order to maintain (therefore) that they are of the very nature (of the rite). and it is only there that its nonobservance is a cause of defect in the rite therefore. in . or proximate (as contributing to the due 10 performance of rite itself). The word "niyama-viSe^a" would mean "a specific invariable The commentator specifies this feature further as an effect (vySpya. which cannot be originated. through being accessory in the place to something proximate. though purifying the material. 18 ultimate fruit. defect may still arise from some is left other cause. (even) prior to the rise of the sub- sequent act of letting go.266 is CHAPTER II while a of the nature of a specific kind of effect subsidiary. . but e. or for to be the cause of a defect in the rite. 182-192. 18 its non-observance it Truly. See MNP (Edgerton). the rite occasioned by the earlier act of letting go is a subsidiary. nor is nonobservance the pervader of the defect for even where there is need for that expiation alone and that is performed. of the may be either remote (aradupakaraka) or proximate An example of the former is the offering of the which contributes first fore-sacrifice (prayaja) to the invisible (apurva) result main sacrifice. Nonobservance may be related to defect in the rite as originating it or as pervading it or as pervaded by it. the third possibility alone 19 and that is here considered. Subsidiaries (sannipatyopakaraka).. neither of these can be (merely) occasional. they have to be particularised thus in the case of the rite not characterised by an act of letting go : occurring subsequently and contrary (to the earlier act). the case of a rite characterised by another subsequent act of letting go. literally. though not implausible. are not those usually accepted. sections.

why should not perception itself be of greater force than revelation. not subsequently. so many four- . or other attribute. different senses passage "Prajapati gave is a eulogistic passage /analogous to parakrti referring to this Thus. is baseless. nor does is stand to reason. the "As many horses as one receives in gift. on the principle of the section about the 2-322 (superior force of the) initial passage. not subsequently. the initial a horse to Varuna" (as . Therefore. while a distinction is intelligible between the two contrary teachings about the act of letting go. that a certain thing is pervaded by another thing' for a certain the cause (of that other) for a certain tim'e. since the cognised syntactical unity would be destroyed should there be (in the course of the passage). what is apparently an act of Prajapati) . capable of coining and going. since there is no evidence (for this). in the same way as in the case of the sacred teachings about ( the offering of obligations in) the hoof-mark and (in) the uhavanlya fire. Nor may it be assumed that what is called obligatoriness is but some is time. hi the first instance by it the intellect of the donor is turned to (the performance of) a (as his duty consequent on the gift) combination of words in the concluding passage sacrifice . 2-323 there (the whole passage) should be understood to lead to one sense alone. since at its origination it And has nothing opposed to is it? The reply is: where syntactical unity cognised. here. to no contrary has arisen. the statement about the origination of two obligations in sequence.CONFLICT WITH THE UPAKRAMA-NYAYA 267 been seen anywhere. now.

the sense of the nic. they were construed as heard (i. not the principle rises only as unsublated. reciprocal syntactiwhich has thereto. since (for these words). without taking into account the earlier existent statement of its use. there recognised as inevitable optional performance even there (in the use of the cup). And thus. though earlier existent. since there no suspicion of syntactical unity between non-dualist revelation and perception. since it cannot arise in any other way. (as said in) has not arisen. cannot occur without sublating the earlier ". hence not here is the superiority of the earlier existent.e. Hence it is that the statement about the non-use of the sodasin cup is admitted to make known but since for both there is its own sense. . hence the superiority of the initial passage. however. And in generating the knowledge of that sense. is no difference of content. literally) in order to maintain the syntactical unity. it and it is only as in accord therewith that (the later sentence) derives its own existence . there the sentence Where. the capacity (of the former) is to make known its own sense without taking into account the latter.268 CHAPTER II potsherd-sacrifices one is to offer to Varuna" conveys a sense opposed thereto. is unhindered. cal unity is not cognised. (the causative suffix) is 20 interpolated. since the later 20 So that "receives" means "causes to receive". if . the later. and has a sense opposed its certainly make known own sense . the (cognition of this) contrary has already arisen. the principle " The earlier of apaccheda alone applies. they would not attain syntactical unity with that (opposite). does come into existence without taking into account the earlier existent..

is that which is depended on by the revelathat sublation illusoriness tion teaching illusoriness . world. there is seen valid 21 knowledge through the words therefore. hence there is no conflict with that which is depended on". . Here. the sublation of is that which the earlier by the later is proper.SUPERIORITY OF PERCEPTION AS UPAJIVYA 269 of (the superiority of) the initial passage. Nor may it be said "Though by the Scriptural texts about illusoriness the reality-aspect of letters. The advaitin goes one step further and says that perception which is wholly delusive is yet depended on by the valid verbal testimony as to non-duality: thus the commentator. in valid this : To 3-1 . this alone is what is depended on. words etc. since the earlier is not depended on by the later. there is no denial of the existence-aspect (of letters. then. a sound heard which is common to both the valid and the 21 "vr?abha" delusive hearing. because of a defect of hearing. in the form of not teaching the opposed to that (perception). the superiority it is of perception. whatsoever. by such Scriptural texts as " There are here no differents is taught the non-existence of the even in the existence-aspect. which is what is depended on. be denied. hears " bring the vrsa " as "bring the vrsabha" and so on. words etc. words etc. Now. Hence it is that even in ordinary experience the earlier existent perception of nacre-silver is sublated by the teaching of a trustworthy person. hence it is of the revelation is proper.). perception. for. Of the two sacred teachings about letting go. but the hearing as is defective and delusive. cannot be avoided.. Both words mean the same thin& "bull". even thus. as apprehending the existence of letters. however. what causes the valid cognition of "bull" is. since 3-0 depended on. " there some say thus even for him who.



knowledge through verbal testimony, only such perception of letters, words etc., as is common to valid knowledge and delusion, is needed; consequently, nondualist revelation depends only on the perception of letters, words etc., not the valid knowledge thereof; and thus, even though the existence of letters, words etc., be denied, there is no conflict with what is depended on.

Others, however, say thus: though, in valid knowledge through verbal testimony, the establishment of the existence of letters, words etc. be not needed, yet
since valid knowledge does not arise

from a sound that

has not (the requisite) capacity, there does exist the

need to establish the existence of capacity. Even in regard to this need, there is no conflict with what is depended on for, though denied by the Scriptural text " There are here no differents ", there is recognised

the existence of the universe, which persists up to Brahman-knowledge, accords with practical efficiency,

from the unreal; else it would follow that perception and other empirically valid means of


knowledge are contentless. Nor may it be asked" How can the world gain existence, despite the denial of the existence-aspect, since denial, if it did not remove its counter-correlate, would be self-contradictory?"; for, " this is silver " in conformity with the two cognitions

and "

this is not silver," in the case of nacre, there is

admitted, of the non-existence of the superimposed in the substrate, a capacity to put up with the existence
of a counter-correlate, which persists till sublation and is different from the unreal. Hereby, (the view that) for the world; if denied in respect of its existence, there



would be but unreality as for the horns of a hare, is refuted; for, there is difference (from the horns of a hare) because of the recognition of an existence that is
removable by Brahman-knowledge (alone). Nor may " If of the it be said: superimposed there be denial in
the substrate, in respect of existence, the denial of it elsewhere, in respect of existence, would follow of itself;
hence, because of the contingence of its being the counter-correlate of negation relating to all places and
times, its unreality would be difficult to avoid; for unreality is defined only in this way that unreality consists in being the counter-correlate of negation

relating to all places and times, a definition of that in any other way not being possible "; for, by those who

admit of the unreal that

it is

the counter-correlate of

negation relating to all places and times, there cannot be given as evidence, in respect of its being so, either perception, since all places and times cannot be per-

no such revelation is cognised; hence, inference alone has to be offered as evidence; consequently, that, which in that inference
ceived, or revelation, since

has to be said to be the probams of exclusion from the real, that itself, being cognised first (as compared with
the other mark),


intelligibly define unreality.

Others, however, say thus the purport of Scriptu" There are here no differents whatsoever " ral texts like


the negation of the world in respect of reality, not in respect of existence for, if a negation in respect of existence did not remove (that) existence, it could not

be the negation of that, while, if it did remove that (existence), there would be conflict with perception.




it be said that since reality too is established such perception as " The pot is real ", negation is by not proper in that respect too for, in order that there

Nor may

may be no conflict with Scripture, it is intelligible that perception may have for content empirical reality consisting in an appearance of reality. Nor, this being
the case, is there the unintclligibility of the negation of the world in that respect, since in the world there

no possibility of the absolute reality present in
for, just as in


but the cognition of the appearance of silver that constitutes the possibility of real silver and consequently there is negation
it is


of that
that ",

hence it is that in "This is not " This is not my cow, but only that




He who is

present here is not Caitra, but (the one) in the room", of that which is denied, reality is understood elsewhere

but the cognition of the appearance of reality that constitutes the possibility of reality, and consequently, the negation of that is intelligible. Theresimilarly,
it is

fore, since there is not the suspicion of the denial of the

existence of letters, words, capacity





with what





others, however, do not accept three grades of consisting of absolute reality in Brahman,

empirical reality of the nature of an appearance of reality in the world, and a merely apparent reality
inferior even to that, in nacre-silver etc.; for, even because of interpenetration by the absolute reality of the substrate, Brahman, the conceit of reality in pot etc.,

and in nacre-silver etc., is intelligible, and hence there is no evidence for assuming an appearance of reality.



thus, since in the

world there


no cognition of

and since, even from the cognition of that in Brahman which has been identified therewith, the possibility of that (cognition) in respect of the world is

through non-discrimination (of the world

from Brahman), there

negation of the world in respect of reality, neither conflict with what is depended on nor the negation of that of which there is





be asked: "If no appearance of reality 3-41 be admitted in the universe other than the absolute

Nor may

reality present in Brahman, for what reason is there admitted in nacre the origination of an appearance of

other than the silver at a distance



where) ?"; for immediacy being impossible in the case
of what

at a distance

and not in contact (with the

sense organ), in order to account for that (immediacy) that (origination) is admitted. delusion caused by 3-411 reflection, there should be accepted the origination of an appearance of the face, in the mirror, other than the face


thus, even

where there


on one's neck; for, in respect of the face on one's own neck, though immediacy is possible for the portion defined by the nose etc., there cannot be immediacy for
such portions as the eye-balls and the forehead, while in the delusion caused by reflection there is seen immediacy
for such portions as the eye-balls. Nor is there the contingence of the acceptable in admitting the reflection as other than the image for, the jiva too that is a reflection of Brahman being different therefrom, there

would be the contingence of illusoriness for that
3 J-35






thig the followers of the

vivarana say thus:


on the face on one's neck

that, because of the defect,

viz., the proximity of the mirror as an external adjunct, there occurs the superimposition of being present in the mirror, facing oneself, and difference from the

assumed the of a face on the mirror, because of superimposition prolixity (of assumptions) ; because there is sublation of the relation alone, in the form "The face is not in
(original) image; hence, there is not to be

the mirror", while, if it were another illusory thing, there would be sublation of its existence in the form




not the face " and because there



of non-difference from one's

appears in the

own face in the form " My mirror ". Nor is immediacy

impossible for the substrate, i.e., the face on one's neck; for, there is admitted the rule that the rays of l%ht

from the eyes obstructed by an external adjunct are turned back and apprehend the (original) image, like
growth in one direction, grows in another) for, if that rule were not admitted, there would be the contingence of a visual

a creeper


(which, obstructed in

delusion of reflection (even) in the case of primal atoms and in the case of gross objects though hidden by walls etc. Nor may it be said " There is the rule that visible

only of what is not hidden, is and of perceptible form, not of anything else"; gross for, since the grossness and perceptible form of the image can be of use in the settled way of generating

delusion of reflection

visual cognition, use in any other

it is

unintelligible to


further, if

assume (their) an interposition like

could serve here as an obstacle evep without



preventing the conjunction of the obstructed rays of

from the eyes (with the image),

then, in the very

same way, even in the case of pot-perception etc., there is the possibility of its being an obstacle, and it would follow that contact with the sense of sight would as

to be

the cause

(of visual perception).



by those who maintain the superimposition of an illusory face on the mirror, in order that there may result the memory-impression included

prior superimposition), experience (of the face) has to be established only by the assumption of the apprehension of one's own face





by the rays from the eyes which are sometimes turned back (by a reflecting medium). Nor is the memoryimpression intelligible even with the prior experience (of the face) as defined by the nose and other such



with this




imposition of the reflection of the eye-balls
unintelligible; further,
it is difficult

to predicate prior

experience in any way, where in the water of a tank there is superimposition of the reflection of an unseen

person seated on the top of a tree by the side of the tank. And thus, it has necessarily to be said of the rays of


from the



obstructed by an external adjunct,

that they reach the (original) image

and apprehend

The interposition


an obstacle


supposed to obstruct contact

of the object with the sense-organ.

If the wall serves to obstruct visual

perception, but not as obstructing the passage of rays from the eyes to the object, then, the passage of the rays would be immaterial, and sensecontact would fail to have causal efficacy in perception.



The three causes are memory-impression (sainskara), defect and sense-contact (samprayoga) or cognition of the substrate





on the strength of the (experience) of the effect, (we have to say that) the capacity to reach the image and apprehend it belongs only to those which are obstructed by a mirror etc., not to those which are

obstructed by a rock etc. ; for those, which are obstructed by the not too pure copper etc., there is not the capacity
specific configuration of the face, of the defect of relation to an impure adjunct; because

apprehend the

since in the case of those (rays)

which have reached

an adjunct and have turned back, there is not the same obstruction by the sun's light, as in the case of those (rays) which desire to reach the sun direct, in looking
at the reflected sun there is not the


inability as in

looking at



where there

contact with


adjunct like water, though some (rays) obstructed by
the adjunct get (back) to the image, some apprehend the sand

within that (water in making such assumptions.



there is no defect


au *hor of the Advaitavidya, however, states thus the view of the Preceptor Vidyaranya and others, who admit the illusoriness of the reflection and maine


tain three classes of jivas.


reflection in the mirror,



clearly seen

by the bystanders

to be different

from and similar to Caitra's face, is certainly different therefrom and illusory in its own nature, like nacresilver in relation to the silver in one's

own hand.


there conflict with the cognition of non-difference from the image, in the form " face appears in the


24 The view summarised here has a superficial similarity to that of modern science about the reflection of the rays of light; but the similarity

not fundamental.




in the mirror "

for, because of conflict with the clear cognition of difference, duality, facing oneself etc., the cognition of non-difference is impossible and the talk of "My face
; ;




of secondary import like the talk of face as one's own face. Nor may it be

with the cognition of non-difference, the talk of difference should not itself be of secondary import for it is not possible to deny,

doubted why, because of

the unsophisticated), the delusion pf another person in the reflection, leading up to such practical activity as the desire to avoid or

in the case of children

be said that since even prudent persons are seen to have recourse to the mirror etc., in order to know the special features of their own faces,


Nor may


the cognition of non-difference too leads to practical activity; for, this recourse is intelligible even because of

the knowledge of the special rule that the reflection, though different, has (yet) a form similar to that of
the image. As for the statement that the sublation ' The " face is not there is only of the conjunction of the

face (with the mirror), not of the face, that is not " This is (correct) ; for, it would follow that even in

not silver

the sublation is only of the identity of silver with the this-object, not of the silver. And if

superimposed by way of identity on the this-element, (the statement) " This is not silver "

because silver

the sublation certainly of the silver as identical and

not of the identity alone, then, since the face is superimposed on the mirror, as in conjunction with it, (the " The face is not there " is the sublation statement) certainly of the face as in conjunction, and not of the

which is agreeably cool as nectar. to assume because of this that the rays from the eyes obstructed by the adjunct reach to the (original) image.278 CHAPTER It conjunction alone .? if obstructed and turned back by do not get conjoined with the eye balls etc.? them. (the assumption. while is that some rays from the eyes pass through unobstructed. if they (the con- Or. that is no defect. how can it be that. why should there not be satisfaction for the eyes. how can it be that. indeed can in conflict with experience. conquer the host of (solar) rays. thus there is parity (between the two cases). others. as in looking at the moon. be that on contact with water. there is no distinction in respect of (sense) contact with the (original) image. leads to much it How. . there is no means in of assuming immediacy for the (original) image. again. any more than the proli- xity of the assumption of the appearance of silver (in nacre). they Or. which are so exceedingly delicate that they are obstructed even by conjunction with water. that (ordinarily) obstruct the whole body of rays from the eyes. in both cases) being based on evidence. since even in looking at the moon's reflection. can it be that those which are obstructed by conjunction even with water are not obstructed by conjunction even with rocks etc. respect of one's Where there is delusion of reflection own eye-balls etc. 25 and enter the solar orb situated in their midst? Again.. As for the statement that there would be prolixity in assuming superimposition in the case of the substrate too. reflected) get 25 In the attempt to see the sun directly. through the manifestation of coolness look(in ing at the reflection) ? How.

). to the grossness and perceptibility of the (original) image. gross and perceptible form. in effect. on the strength of the that for what is settled to be a cause etc. is settled to obstruct which. is It is thus : since visual super- seen only in the case of that which has an unconcealed. What is the assuming.REFLECTION AS SUPERIMPOSITION 379 joined with them (the eye-balls etc. there would be the contingence of the delusion of visual reflection in the case of what is concealed and is devoid of a perceptible form and so on. which the perception of a concealed substance by intercepting the contact with the eyes. and in the case of an obstructing substance like a wall. they do not perceive what is thus in conjunction ? It is seen that even by a defect (where one exists) the apprehension of the specific aspect alone is in (sense-) contact. there belongs causality even in respect of the superimposition of the reflection of their locus. it is to be assumed that it (the obstructing substance) obstructs in no other way even is of the reflection of what conflict in this. however.. in the superimposition concealed. but not the appre- hension even of the very existence of the substrate that the view. there need not be assumed anything in conflict On with experience. in some cases. there is causality etc. is understood to function by reaching (to their objects). on the analogy of the sense of touch and so on. for imposition which causality is settled in respect of the perception of their locus. elsewhere too? is Hereby refuted (the statement) that if the rays from the eyes obstructed by the adjunct be not admitted to reach to the (original) image. that the reflected face is a superimposition. . is obstructed.

those (rays) obstructed thereby apprehend the face of him who is by one's side . for. one looks with eyes straight at a mirror. that even the colourless may. when an impure mirror a fair face is reflected as dark. there is the contingence of the said defect only on the acceptance of that (turning back and reaching to the image). even if one's face be not turned backwards. in the very same .280 CHAPTER II Further. since the fair colour of the (original) image. colourless. Similarly. abandoning any principle regulative of the turning back of the rays from the eyes obstructed by the adjunct. in the case of ether. on the analogy of the delusion that the shell is yellow hence. Therefore. is though yet of no service in the visual cognition. be the object of a delusion of visual reflection. the rays from the eyes which are obstructed thereby go up and apprehend the prototype sun. without turning one's eyes sideways. as qualified by the darkness of the though of itself adjunct mirror. similarly. as in looking at the sun directly. one looks face downwards on the water. even in the case of what is concealed behind one's back. existent. the visibility of the prototype face has to be maintained only as qualified by an imposed colour. for. would be difficult to avoid. without turning one's eyes (towards the object). only the view that the reflected face is in its nature a superimposition is more . when. How? When. visibility is admitted as qualified by super- imposed blueness. the apprehension by those (rays) obstructed by the adjunct. it is admitted that the going (back) is only to where the (original) image in is. it would be difficult to avoid (this). way.

the superimposition of the specific form of the face is in conformity with the proximity of the (original) image. however. This. Nor is there a weakness here too in respect of the memory-impression (needed as a cause. ruby etc. the superimposition of particular faces in mirrors is intelligible merely through the memory- impression of the experience of faces in general. certainly real. what called the shadow of a body and so on is only that darkness which. the superimposition of the specific form of a person is with the unseen potency which in conformity the cause of what is is auspicious or inauspicious. (his) experience of release Brahman. the memory-impressions of the experience of persons in general.. As mirror is for the view of some that the reflection in the etc. comes into being in those places. when by particular members (of the body). light that is pervasive is obstructed in some places. is the difference: in dreams. Indeed. there would be the contingence of illusoriness even for the jlva that is a reflection of be so in the case of the jlva (looked upon) as a reflection. being a consequence) of prior experience for.. like the dream superimposition of an unseen person merely through . here. however. 3-412 is being a variety of shadow cast by the face. that is not (sound). though it is intelligible. for. which are of Nor is that nature intelligible in . Nor its is it a defect that.REFLECTION NOT A SHADOW 281 acceptable. yet since the jlva (that is Brahman) as defined is real. S I -36 case of the reflections of pearl. And shadowness of the nature of darkness is not appropriate in the white or red colour. if the reflection be in nature illusory.

whose parts are closely packed. in How. redness and yellowness. how is it possible to explain the reality of the reflections of cognised at a single mirror of small size? numerous faces. 3*413 Now. low or prominent. again. there is no cause of the like nature present in the mirror and in contact with 26 Darkness (tamas) it is the MImamsakas and Vedantins. which is be said that) if the shadow of the nature of a reflection cannot be of the then. (we ask) will this other substance be associated with such cognized properties as the peculiar colour. when a mirror. large in size. the nose etc. as in the case of darkness . size and substances. (it may be another kind of substance. is recognised as an independent substance by since it is cognised directly as possessing blue colour.. which are devoid of shadows of the nature of darkness. 2fl if this configuration and with the property of facing oneself? be it Or. can there be within it the origination of another substance possessing many parts. without being mixed up. since the assumption of another substance is intelligible when there is non-inclusion among the recognised nature of darkness.282 CHAPTER II the case of the reflection of the sun etc. On the first (alternative). which arc the same time. continues to remain like that. not included among the substances enumerated .. though by the Naiy&yikas. ? Further. hence its (alternative). is in vain. will it' devoid is of these? On the latter not possible through this other substance to explain the cognition of the reflection as associated with the particular colour etc. let it be said. assumption however. in the origination of a reflection possessing many colours like whiteness. like the jaw.

it would be intelligible to assume some cause capable of originating in the nacre. let nacre-silver too be real.and say that nacre-silver is unreal. the glitter of nacre. (we say) because of the sublation established in all cases. only as an illusion ". 27 28 As.. 27 Why then 8 (follow) the maxim of (cooking) half the gourd. the face appears there. musk etc. for example. would there be for the nacre seen as silver the contingence of liquefaction when thrown into the fire. while the reflection is real? Nor in that case. which continues even as before. The other half being left to grow. and some cause has to be assumed capable of originating that kind of reflection without conflicting with continuance as before of the mirror and its parts ". as (there is) for (real) silver . for. there too. the non-existence of the capacity to liquefy in nacre-silver is intelligible in the same way as the non-existence of heat or sweet smell in the reflection of fire. and it is to lay down a rule in the case of that silver that apprehended by a sense-organ (only) in cooperation witli a cause which is considered to be a defect. If this be said. it stands to reason that not ip. admitted by silver. in the mirror. . the silver that gets to be identified therewith. it may be said nacre: silver is not real. the cognition of large size and similar cognition of lowness and prominence are but delusions. then. is Now. because of the sublation all. For. then. (It may be said) : " In the case of reflections. in the form "The face is in the form " This not the mirror. which are only of such a size as to be fit to abide in the the (reflecting) adjunct.^REFLECTION NOT REAt it. the silver appears but as an illusion ".

g. . there is capable of co-presence or co-absence (with it).. it must be due to the presence of obstacles to the removal thereof. however. in the case of primal ignorance. which arises even after the full cognition of : the face). though (this is so). and cognition of the substrate in co- operation with the removal of the proximity of the (original) image to the adjunct.. 20 for Others. though dispelled in its aspect of obscuring energy. by such is the removal of the obscuring capacity alone . nor is the cognition of the substrate in its specific aspect the dispeller (of that delusion) . in the case of modal 29 That is to say. if . while being stand to reason. the contenillusoriness too does not tion that the reflection is real is unsound. such obstacles are projected by primal nescience and they will cognitions. there of primal ignorance. by Brahman-knowledge. and not due to the inherent capacity of knowledge to remove the obscuring aspect alone. since for the ignorance of the substrate. persistence is possible in its aspect of projective energy. continue to exist for anything short of Brahman-knowledge. II Therefore.that (ignorance) itself is the material cause . say thus: it is not natural to leave out the aspect of projective energy cognition and dispel the aspect of obscuring energy alone for. any ignorance which causes (it) or any cognition which dispels (it). yet. is the dispeller of that (delusion) together with its material cause. therefore. 3 414 Now > the contention of i* s not demonstrated (for it) as in the case of nacre-silver. and by the cognition of nacre etc. the ignorance which obscures the substrate is not the material cause (of the the substrate (e.284 the reflection too is CHAPTER but unreal. where the projective aspect is not removed. for. 34141 ^ tllis some ( say ) in the suP erimP osition * reflection. superimposition).

. yet. there would not be the delusion of reflection. is dispelled. the aspect of obscuring energy alone were dispelled. to the mirror. there the contingence when would once ignorance 31 failure of a material cause for subsequent reflections. Nor is there parity of the said 30 defect even here for. disappear.e. or that Caitra's face is not in the mirror.. different forms of psychosis do overcome primal aspect of obscuring energy. is to That say. Nor that (persistence) determined by the presence of an obstacle to the removal of the aspect of projective is energy. they do not dispel its aspect of projective energy otherwise. primal the material cause of the superimposition of reflection. in respect of external ignorance alone is . but the mirror too. in dissolution even of the empirical projections present those places. even prior to the proximity (coming about) of the (original) image to the adjunct. there would be the contingence of the. if there be proximity of those two. in those ignorance in its parts of intelligence which are defined by the respective objects. . in respect of the protective energy there would be the contingcncc of its persistence for all time. consisting in the proximity of the (original) image to the adjunct for. hence it would follow that at that time. Therefore. . then. (yet) because of the non-existence of the material cause. Caitra's face. 31 Nor. there should necessarily be the removal even of the aspect of projective energy. 30 I.REFLECTION CAUSED BY PRIMAL IGNORANCE ignorance. when it is understood through perception that there is no relation of the (original) image. not merely the reflection. if the reflection is the is product of primal ignorance. things. though.

what is determinative of empirical reality is non-generation by a defect in over and above nescience . hence.. Nor may merely apparent character " it be said When this is : the case. and since the present case there does exist a defect over and above that. since the cognition of the true nature of the substrate has for content what is opposed to the superimposition of reflection which has that (ignorance) for material cause. it has the capacity to remove that (superimposition) . even on the view of modal ignorance as the material cause. 33 hence. 32 it has to be accepted that merely the super- Between removal of the superimposition and non-removal of For ignorance and the cognition. 33 . for. since its obscuring energy has been removed by an earlier cognition of the substrate. it is intelligible that. is (its) intelligible. viz. which is aided by the removal of the proximity of the (original) image and the adjunct.286 of its CHAPTER It empirical reality. for. failing to remove the superimposition of reflection. in co-operation with the absence of obstacles. there is no conflict. though that (cognition) has not the capacity to remove igno- rance about Brahman. since that has not the capacity to remove the 32 primal ignorance ". primal ignorance. there is failure of a common content. yet. there would be the contingence of even that cognition of the substrate. the proximity of the (original) image and the adjunct. it (the obscuring energy) cannot be removed by that cognition of the substrate whicK belongs to the same time as the absence of obstacles.

by Brahman-knowledge that has the remove its (the dream's) own material nescience thus say some. even in the superimposition of dreams. seen in dream's are : 3-53 sublated on waking ". or 3-51 on intelligence conditioned by individuation. which is " it the cause of dreaming and waking is said by the Preceptor that both the dreaming and waking worlds are products of one ignorance. that (dream-superimposition) is the product of primal ignorance and hence is sublatable only capacity to cause its merely apparent character is only because of generation by a defect. such as sleep. 35 and since (in the words) " That darkness of ignorance is called sleep. (but) devoid of modal ignorance. . 35 This is the witness-intelligence. however. waking cognition and That is to say. it is devoid pf modal ignorance.DREAM CAUSED BY PRIMAL IGNORANCE 34 imposition of reflection 287 is it what is removed by that be that this superimposition is removable only by Brahman-knowledge that has the capacity to remove (also) the ignorance that is the (cognition) . because there is seen in the Vivarana (the passage) " since it in the nature of ignorance. it is conditioned by individuation. As for the contingence of empirical reality (for the reflection). let material cause of (the superimposition) itself. merely the projective energy of ignorance. : Others. Or else. is Thus. over and above . that answered on the ground of its being generated by a defect over and above nescience. as the locus of the psychosis of pleasure.. like 34 is opposed to bondage ". since there is superimposition on undefined intelligence. pain etc. say thus because of the statement " in the Bhdsya These chariots etc.

hence its merely apparent character is only because of being sublated by cognition other than Brahmanknowledge.. and by whom' such incidents of the waking world as the death of his own grandfather are always experienced as of one un- . who is of the nature of a reflection. I am a am a son of Devadatta".e. (say) thus: not primal ignorance. the snake delusion). who is veiled by primal ignorance. Yet. am a man. which of the form of sleep. as well as the waking world seen by him. when there is the quiescence of the karma that brings about enjoyment is in waking. waking cognition has the capacity to remove -the superimposition of dreams. just as by the cognition which has the capacity to remove the ignorance that is its material stick. who has in respect of himself without the . but a distinct mode of primal ignorance. removal is seen even by the delusion of a . which has not for its sphere the true nature of the its substrate and has not the capacity to remove the ignorance that is its material cause. who is the spectator of the waking world. can remove the super- imposition for.288 CHAPTER II because of the experience of the illusoriness of dreams by one who has woken up. the empirical jiva. however. arises as veiling both the empirical jiva. and which. in the case of the superimposition of the rope-snake. cause and 3-53 is of the true nature of the substrate. Nor may it be asked how the cognition. (that) is the material cause of the superimposition of doubt or error such conceits as " I brahmin. the spectator of the waking world. which arises immediately after itself (i. I dream world. others. Nor is there no evidence for sleep being a mode of ignorance for.

there tion of the subla- dream world. is positions stated earlier. for. in dream too. Nor thus. both the or 3-541 intelligence on intelligence as conditioned s 137 by . if for him there were no obscuration by something at the time of dreams. which arises at that time and obscures the empirical world and jlva. there would not be the recollection " I experienced an elephant in the dream ". there is no undue extension even in admitting the recollecempirical jlva's tion of the (former's) experience. when consciousness is called up by karma which is brings about waking enjoyment afresh. too. that is the material cause of (the dream) itself. the jlva And thus. Nor may it be said that there being thus the sublation thereby even of its spectator. for. then. which has the capacity to remove the ignorance of the form of sleep. only by the cognition of the nature of the empirical jiva. that there superimposition of the dream world on undefined Now. along with that of the dream world.DREAM CAUSED BY MODAL IGNORANCE 289 obscured form in respect of himself because of his long association therewith. it is only for sleep that there is established the nature of a specific mode of ignorance. as in the state of waking. is there the contingence of the non-existence of a spectator for the world. there is a merely apparent superimposition of the spectator. there would be the contingence of the non-existence of such delusions as "I am a tiger. the merely apparent jiva. I am a sudra. since the merely apparent jiva is superimposed on the empirical jlva. I am a son of Yajnadatta" and of such (other) delusions as that of his grandfather being alive j therefore. because of the jiva too being veiled.

) therefore. there cannot be manifestation by that. who is conditioned by individuation. " I there would be the contingence of (the experience) am an elephant" an elephant 3-5421 as of "This is silver". on the second (view). . in the case of the is internal organ. which are superimposed on the percipient.. since there no space body) corresponding to their perceived dimensions. and the sense of sight etc. not as outside the body.. having no freedom (of action) outside the body. (while).290 individuation.e... since than that of the witcannot. yet. which 36 The witness. without dependence . though the internal organ. for. but only as within it. there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in the undefined intelligence. 80 occupy elephant etc. a psychosis whose sphere is the external thiselement of nacre and so on. is the percipient.. independently of relation to a psychosis of the internal organ happiness etc. And thus. the rise of a psychosis is impossible. on any sense-organ etc. like be manifested by that. not on the percipient. a possible of itself (i. in order to originate. Hence it is that absolute illusoriis ness is declared of the dream-elephant (in the etc. has need of the sense of sight etc. . being quiescent. psychosis (which) within the body is free. or of "I possess " as of "I am happy ". hence the difference from the experience of happiness etc. superimposed on undefined Intelligence. in waking. : Here.. some justify the first view (thus) intelligence undefined by individuation is accepted as the substrate of the dream world. on dream they ness space other conditioned by individuation. hence. do the first (view). on the first view. CHAPTER not the II stand to reason. in dependence on the relation to that (psychosis). but the dream cognitions are.

that is present in intelligence manifested in the psychosis of the internal organ within the body when when there is the association of defects like sleep.". For the same reason there is this statement of Bharatltirtha in the is Vivaranopanyasa: just that is as. after stating thus that the immediacy of the substrate needed by the superimposition cognised as immediate .DREAM SUPERIMPOSED ON UNDEFINED INTELLIGENCE 29 1 manifested by the psychosis of the internal organ within the body. Hence it is that. while the psychosis in the form I is seen to rise only in intelligence as ' ' defined by individuation etc. being the substrate. there is (first) the verse " : The delusive cognition of objects in the form of immediacy comes about in dependence on a substrate cognised as immediate by the mind or of sight. the nescience. its substrate is that intelligence which is of itself immediate and is undefined by individuation etc. present in intelligence as defined by the thiselement of the nacre manifested by the psychosis generated by (sense-) contact. in the Sanksepasariraka. is illusorily transformed in the form of silver. similarly. in dream too. may illusorily transform itself ijti the form of the universe. in waking. say thus: undefined intelligence not the substrate of the dream world. the origination is not possible of a psychosis whose sphere is undefined intelligence. in co-operation with the memory-impressions of diverse objects called up by the unseen potency 3*5422 (adrsta) (of past karma). however. the nescience. For. except as based on verbal testimony. as manifested is by a psychosis. for itself or by the sense of it is so cognised in dream. Others. delusion etc. Therefore.

it is ascribes various colours it Nor may admitted that Brahman-intelligence alone is obscured. the experience "I see an elephant" would not have been explained. being superimposed on intelligence undefined by individuation. which is cognised by the mind. the dream-elephant etc. is. there is no manifestation of it in the absence of a psychosis. 87 37 If non-difference between the cognising intelligence and the substrate intelligence were not thus manifested by a psychosis. even intelligence in the absence of its substrate. For. which is a reflection (of the former) in nescience. there is. because of the instrumentality of the mind. . there is for the cogniser-intelligence too the empirical usage " I see this ".292 CHAPTER II (comes) sometimes of itself.e. the delusion which to it such as whiteness/' be said that since the whole of intelligence undefined by individuation is veiled. yet. because of the force of immediacy. Just like the delusion of silver etc. the immediacy of the substrate is cited as resultsuperimposition.). is immediately cognised of itself. though undefined by individuaAnd thus. because of the manifestation of non-difference effected by the psychosis of the internal organ etc. by the " immediately succeeding verses: Here. so in the ether too. tion. The word "etcetera" after "internal organ" includes the possibility of the psychosis being a transformation of nescience (avidya-vrtti) B uch as has to be postulated for the cognition of sleep. which arises invariably at the same time (as the superimposition) and has for its sphere the substrate (of the superimposition). not obscured... visual forms etc. in dreams. the content of the sense of sight (i. sometimes by a psychosis of the external organs. sometimes by a psychosis of the mind.. the dream being imposed on undefined intelligence. in what is cognised by the sense of sight. while the jlva-intelligence. delusion arises ing of itself in dream repeatedly only as with (such) form.

38 thus say some. . therefore. justify the second view thus: saying that intelligence defined by individuation is the substrate. however. not by another jiva. as in the case of happiness etc.DEFINED INTELLIGENCE AS THE SUBSTRATE Yet in others. the same is the case with delusions. and justify the failure to cognise by others on the ground that what has some one's ignorance as its material cause perceptible by that one alone.g directly or through the channel of the cognition of the substrate. 3. Some (others) . however. not The experience of happiness etc. g. they were superimposed on the universal intelligence hence the need for defining the substrate aa reflected intelligence. is that is the substrate . there is the psychosis for. but this would if be unintelligible common to all experients. is in the case of the superimposition of nacresilver. since that is needed. rather. admit the superimposition 3.5433 of that even on the prototype intelligence. 543 1 gence of experiences like " I am an elephant Thus. even nacre-silver is imposed on that reflection of intelligence which the nacre and is defined by the this-element of present in the internal organ of which is . it is not admitted that individuation enters into the substrate-aspect as its proprium. it that intelligence alone which is conditioned by individuation and is of the nature of a reflection therein. if it were superimposed on the prototype intelligence which is defined by the this- element of nacre and is common to all. is cognisible by the experiencer by others. . there is not the contin". there would be the contingence of the non-existence of failure to cognise by others. the experience of 38 alone. the experience of visibility is justified either Now.

there . though the sense-organs of waking life are quiescent. and this. Nor is it possible to say even of the empirical sense-organs that they go forth from their respective orbs. and if it (the tactile sense) were located in some one part (of that dream body). cannot pervade the entire dream body which 30 is (sometimes) of greater dimensions than itself. only such part of the tactile sense as is within can function.294 CHAPTER It visibility in the case of the dream-elephant and so on. which are parts of the subtle body. Hence it is that there is refuted even the suspicion of the explanation that in dreams. does not pervade even the whole of the percipient's body or other similar bodies. there exist subtle senseorgans. of course. etc. for. at the time of dream (sleep). which are 39 The tactile sense is pervasive of the whole body. . devoid of empirical spatial properties suitable to itself. which exists in the interior of the body. uncognised reality would have to be predicated. but since dreams are experienced within the lody. there is declared of them quiescence consisting in the absence of functioning. as of the dream body and objects. it is manifestation possible to predicate a merely apparent of the senses too. in respect of the reality of the senses which are super-sensuous. it could not explain (the dream experience of) cold touch in all parts. is no reality except as cognised while. generated by immersion in the water of the dream. since for the merely apparent. envisaged in dreams. locate themselves in the dream body and apprehend their respective objects . if at all. not how 3-61 is that to be justified? is: The reply in order to justify this. within and without. the empirical tactile organ. further. to say nothing of bigger bodies like those of elephants..

sublated. psychoses of the sense of sight then. Therefore. in the section (The self is the) agent. since thus elimination (of all organs) is not secured. this person is selfFurther. as in waking. because of intermixture with luminaries like the sun and because of (the self) functioning through psychoses of the sense of sight etc. in waking. (the text) " teaches the self manifest -luminosity of the self with reference to the dream state. i.NO SENSE-FUNCTIONING IN DREAMS of service in the empirical usage of Taijasa (the intelligence of dream-consciousness). for. even there. organs of waking " Here. in the Tattavaprar dlpika 40 it is said that since that (internal organ) stands its authoritattveness. if even dreams there be assumed functioning through etc. and that the sensory nature of dream objects is due to these. the self- 3-611 luminosity of the self is difficult to discriminate. the internal organ remains non-quiescent. it in the Nyayanirnaya that the internal organ is is 3-612 said not instrumental to cognition except in dependence on some other organ like the sense of sight. in dreams. otherwise. there are not known any subtle sense-organs other than the senselife. .e t . In respect of . (If this be said). the in word " here " would be futile. though there be assumed the quiescence of the sense of sight and so on. since the sacred teaching (about rites) is purportful". 40 Now.. consequently the cited Scriptural text would be affected. " For. since. there can be no discrimination of self-luminosity. not so. its self-luminosity would be difficult to discriminate. since it is always self-luminous.

let the internal organ) whereby one sees there be even in dreams.e. Nor with this is there non-establishment of for. the elephant seen in the dream. " In sleep. . it cannot. ". here too. Nor. for its sphere. therefore.296 CHAPTER II as the object of cognition. on the view favoured by the .. happiness etc. as organ apprehended being always superimposed as identical with the jlva.. (in the words) manifests ignorance. the recollection is intelligible.. would be unintelligible for one who has woken up to recollect etc. because of the memory-impression generated by the destruction of the dream state that is the conditioning adjunct of the intelligence that manifests the dream-elephant etc. at that all time. the internal elimination. in dreams." that in sleep there is no transformation of nescience. only the nonexistence of the functioning of the sense of sight etc. the recollection by one who has woken up is due to the memory-impression generated by the destruction of the state (of sleep) which is the conditioning adjunct. be the instrument of cognition. what Vedantaliaumndl. its "I" distinction therefrom is not well known from the view- point of ordinary experience. for. 3-6 13 is ^r dreams e * se ' Because ^ such Scriptural texts as " That sattva (i. that is intelligible through the transformation of nescience settled (to exist) in sleep while. through its transformation in the form of elephant etc.. having the dream-elephant etc. is but essential intelligence as conditioned by that state . in the manner mentioned in the Kalpatam. a psychosis of the internal organ. elimination (of organs) may result in either of these two ways. if the internal it organ did not function in dreams.

in dream too. of cognition (drSya) since. with the opening of the eyes and so on. there is cognised 3-62 the concomitance of the experience of elephant etc. in the case of the dream-elephant delusion. like the experience eyes". 5 1-3$ . even though difficult to accomplish as it were. this too may be some delusion. is the elimination of whatever may be an object the exclusion of the internal organ is not necessary. nothing else Therefore. there being 41 the certitude that whatever is well known to be the seen is capable of being manifested by the seer. as in waking. cannot maya accomplish. either concomitance with the sense of sight etc. is but a Now... by whose might the chariot cognised in the dream is in an instant cognised as a man and that again in an instant as a cat.. that superimposes on the experience of the dream-elephant etc.. which is of the nature merely "I see dream the silver with my of the witness.. confounded with the seer.. in dreams. especially when transformed in the form of sleep. is needed for the sake of elimination. not when they are closed. that is generated by What is needed . or a psychosis that is concomitant with that.. being functioning in any case impossible. and so on. the of the sense of sight etc. it is from the empirical point of view.SENSE-FUNCTIONING IN DREAMS DELUSIVE is 297 needed for the sake of elimination. indeed. so that when the eyes are open there is experience of elephant etc. it is only the waking experience of elephant 41 etc. while for the percipient there is no recollection of conflict between the earlier and later? Therefore. for. What delusion. if this be said. though there is parity in respect of the cognition of the concomitance of co-presence etc. the experience of visibility etc.

etc. it is if assumptive. cannot be said " This is the . one admits of the whole world of waking Now. the world would persist. creation who maintain that perception is (drsti-srsti-vadins) accept. who even in release there exists the posits without the need of any other for. it in the case of the stream of positer and posited. some say thus: he who is conditioned by the earlier posited nesciences is he who posits the subsethis To quent nesciences. not the dream experience of elephant 3*71 etc. Not the second. And since. creation contemporaneous with perception. for the whole world of waking. only as in the case of dreams.. however. the establishment of the person who posits has to be declared even prior to the assumption of that (nescience). since instruments. and there would be non-distinction from the state of migration. since the cognition of the concomitance of the perception of pot sight.. justified by them.. Those. is not an object of the sense of sight. with the contact with the sense of which (concomitance) is irreconcilable with the etc. since the uncognised reality of what is assumptive is unintelligible. and they say that even the waking experience of elephant etc. non-existence of pot basing oneself on (the view of) perception as creation.CHAPTER n the sense of sight etc. for. since nescience has itself to be posited. who is he that posits it ? Is it the unconditioned self or the self conditioned by nescience? that Not the person first . is prior to the perception.

. even so. as in the case of nacreinappropriate.. of nescience to intelligence* nescience. posited in dreams. What 42 A continuous stream has neither beginning nor end. the distinction between what has a beginning and what has not a beginning is intelligible. is in some part posited as already some (other) part. 42 Nor " Since beginninglessness is admitted of be said is is nescience. the difference between jiva and I6a. reality certainly beginningless. thus. otherwise. just as the tower etc. 43 With its consequence that the object. in waking too. and the relation . v:here. 3. it m is 3. hence. its sequence which are cognised from Scripture alone ? No one at all.712 not admitted that perception is creation. the distinction between what has a beginning and what has not a beginning would be unintelligible ". who is he that posits.. assumptiveness. even of ether etc. one arbitrarily assumes a beginning and says "This is first" the opponent can show that it is dependent on another and that on another. in respect of these. should exist prior to and independent of the cognition. in the case etc. according to this school of advaita jlva.VADA first". silver. as cause of the cognition. with this. not merely because of the indefiniteness of a continuous stream. in part) otherwise. and this no defect in what is recognised to be strictly like a stream. 299 there may it not the defect of infinite regress. 44 are: The six beginningless ones. some (part) of what is to be posited is posited as with a beginning and some (other existent and. as originated at that time. pure intelligence.713 their creation. Now. Isa. 43 44 are Others. say thus: nescience etc. thus involving infinite regress. Hereby is explained even the distinction between effect and cause. however. however. but only in respect of the (rest of the) world other than these. it is only thus that infinite regress can be is a defect.

this is loudly proclaimed in the Bhdsya etc. about the order of if and would. Ved. II. self. SH. not because of (their) being the purport. . as the jyotistoma." Not in vain (we reply) for. be is vain.. II. ' i the attempt relating to made ether 45 in the quarters (of the Sutras) air 46 and the vital to remedy the reciprocal conflict among so on. for the sake of understanding the principles (of interpretation). It has indeed been said " in the iSastradarpana: Assuming that the Scriptures have purport in regard to creation. but that identity of is not (really) so. there is in Scripture the mention of creation and destruction. ill. is on a par with the attainment of fruit produced by observances taught by 45 46 Ved.. as instrumental to that comprehension..300 basis then. that (attempt) sets out on an assumption (that Scripture purportful in regard to these). of them). 8&.7133 The attainment of fruit by such observances taught in Scripture. since they have the Brahman and the self for purport ". there in be no purport (in respect . the Scriptural texts about the creation of ether that (creation) etc. (It may be said) Then. Know Since the comprehension of Brahman devoid of connection with the universe comes about through superimposition and (subsequent) removal (thereof). this has been said here. 3. ir. CHAPTER II have such Scriptural texts as " From the ether originated"? 3*7131 (then) that they have as basis the identity of the self and Brahman devoid of connection with the universe.

that the creation of the universe is contemporaneous with perception. as understood from perception Nor may it be . when corresponding means said in respect of each object the of knowledge turns up. since there is no evidence of the difference of the seen from the seeing. in the original works. viz. however.. also because of the traditional Code "The wise ones declare this world to be but of the nature of cognition. in regard to Brahman. of the view that perccption is creation is that which is thus shown in the Siddhantamuktavatt etc. for the Scriptural texts about the jyotistoma etc. The universe is created by the Supreme Lord in the order shown in Scripture and is certainly endowed with non4 cognised reality. however. And since. truction etc. of defective vision. in .. others. is to be seen. who gain no peace of mind on either variety of the view that perception is creation. : " If thus there be no assumptiveness for the world. ' ' 3-72 preceptors. there results the perception of that (object).: perception itself is the creation of the universe. des(then). and which has practical efficiency.3 prefer the view that perception is of the created. for that (universe) which has origination.. are deluded and see it as having an obj ective nature. which is the position that perception is creation supported. This is one variety of the view that perception is creation.VADA 301 Scripture in dreams. there is purport. through the channel of the purification of the intellect. there is no non-authoritativeness (for them) the elaboration of this and other ways. as understood from Scripture. Another variety. Some 3.

thus. is not 48 The word "upadhi" here is will not be. is substituted for sense-contact. the 40 attempt made in the Bhasya. in its specific from dream-delusion. 48 on the view of reality. there is difference (of the present view) therefrom. what is referred to as knowledge when it is said that the illusory is what is removable by knowledge alone. 3*81 Now. yet there is admitted (for it) illusori- ness. hence. the locus of whatever is superficially cognised. this is (jfiana). the world is denied in relation to all three times that it was not. Brahman and is used in the sense of locus (adhikarana). in its general nature. like nacre-silver etc. since is not... there. it is the counter-correlate of such negation* The translation of "pratipanno-'pftdhi" follows Krgp&nanda's commentary. the tika and the Vivarma to show the threefold cause is in respect of their super- imposition in vain.. defect. hence. the preceptor Citsukha says even for individuation etc. hence. Cognition nature too. merely apparent nature is 47 Cognition of the substrate.. since the latter is absent of the substrate fully. or cognition of the memory impression and 47 substrate. . though there be not (mere) contemporaneity with the assumption. CHAPTER reality alone li would have been admitted. In Brahman. even for individuation and its attri- butes. or being the countercorrelate of the negation in all three times that is present in the locus of what is cognised. removes delusion. consisting in removability difference of nature by knowledge alone. illusoriness of the said nature results. : If this be said. 49 The "tikft" in this context is the Paftcapadika. or from both the real and the unreal. etc. memory impres- sion and delect." it for. generated by the three causes (of superimposition) consisting in sense-contact. as for ether though there be no assumptiveness. there would not be illusoriness of the said nature in the universe.302 etc.

It is possible. how is there practical efficiency for what is illusory by nature'? reply. The preceptor Ramadvaya says thus this (attempt to show the three-fold cause) is only an argument on an assumption (of the opponent's view) for. however. intelligence were the instrument of valid knowledge.. that perception is creation and that perception is of the created. of the accomplished with the water is waking experience. Now. they are cognised 303 by 3*82 the bare witness (intelligence). As in dreams we Now.PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ILLUSORY acceptable. etc.. of that real? 50 : The author of the Advaitavidya. The reply on either interpretation consists in pointing out that practical efficiency is in no case absolutely real. the practical 41 nature of bathing etc. says. illusoriis 4-0 ness admitted. Practical efficiency of the same grade of reality (as the experience itself) exists without distinction in both thus say some. however. the Brahman-self". . it is clear that this : is an extravagant argument (praudhi-vada). like nacre-silver. but corresponds to th$ grade of reality of the experience. since on both the views. thus: for dream objects. which establishes the three-fold cause there. accomplished by the dream-water etc. but a further affirmation of the objector. there would result contradiction of the postulation of the Vedanta as instrumental and so on hence. there is not merely such 60 4-2 The to take the statement about the translation follows the commentary. contrasting it with the dream content. water of waking experience to be not a question. evidence for the non-dual substrate. But what is efficiency. if from the " For intelligence which is the passage beginning with : . is certainly unreal. since.

304 CHAPTER II practical efficiency as is sublated by waking.. is possible. for. even immediately on waking there is seen the continuance of those together with mental satisfaction. in a dream. real psychoses of the sense of sight etc. there being experienced different grades of happiness and different grades of fear. fear etc.. fear etc. and that that (immediacy). is certainly real. though gene- rated by a dream content. for him whose senses are quiescent. the cognition of the dream-damsel which produces happiness real . in the is case of the damsel.. the rise of happiness. aversion to the dream which is not of that nature. Indeed.. and And like which it is cognition. unsublated by that (waking). are of the nature of psychoses of the internal organ. and in the serpent's contact with a vital spot as .. there seen the generation of happiness. quaking of the body etc. the snake etc. and that that (cognition) is certainly that too. Nor may it be said that the mere imme- diacy of that content produces happiness. being of the nature of the witness. for. no sublation is experienced immediately on waking. Hence it is that for creatures there is desire again for the dream whose sphere is the object that produces happiness. for. etc. as in touch as contrasted with sight. in the touch of the hand of the damsel as contrasted with the touch of the foot. on the contrary. Nor may it be said that etc.. it is concluded that they are certainly real even before (waking). For the happiness. but since. of dreams.. are not possible. superimposed on established to be merely assumptive. which is of the nature of such is is psychoses as sight and touch and the witness of the dream world. fear etc.

fear etc. by that (darkness) in respect of that (person) there is seen the (darkness) there is obscuration of pot etc. (say thus) : in such practical 4-41 efficiency as tence of water drinking and bathing. on the view of the author of the Tattvasuddhi and others (like him). and is seen by another person present there. darkness is 4-3 assumed by one who has just entered a room. since for that (reality) there is neither causality nor the determinant of that (causality). what (is the use) of it ? Nor. and re-obscuration when that is taken away: thus too say some. even for the water of the mirage. since there does not exist the to its generation 3 139 . there is not the (alleged) contingenee. it is the bare exisetc. Similarly.. that in the water of the mirage and so on. Others. in waking experience.. for this seen such practical efficiency as is appropriate to well known darkness. where there is a light which is capable of illumining pot etc. not the reality thereof. this being the case. is there the contingenee of such practical efficiency as is appropriate to well- known water etc. are generated by different grades of the assumptive sight. touch etc.. nacre-silver etc. for For.PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ILLUSORY 395 contrasted with a non-vital spot. however. the class water-ness etc. that serves. does not exist and that consequently the designation of the " water " is due delusion with that content by the word by a memory-impression of the former experience of what is so designated. it must be said that in dreams too the respective grades of happiness. the removal of that when a lamp or the like is brought in. for.

and there would be the contingerice of the class. and predicate This is for practical efficiency. in because of the non-superimposition of hot touch etc. since even there the On the view of does exist. in the case of the merely apparent. the non-existence of practical efficiency here and there is intelligible.... . that brings about the respective practical efficiency. will serve the purpose. cooking etc. specifically. the kind of reality that is sought to be claimed to account it is here suggested that a lower degree of reality 52 I. 51 which 52 is in conflict with Scripture and is impossible of apprehension through perception 51 etc. in some cases because of the destruction of the superimposition.e. water-ness etc. when the substrate is known some (other) cases because of the destruction of the superimposition alone by the cessation (even) of the general knowledge of the substrate. and is of the nature of what serviceable to practical efficiency.. and in some (other) cases (still)..306 CHAPTER II class water-ness etc. 4 42 * those who. where by the sense of sight there is the superimposition of fire etc. as otherwise there would be conflict with the delusion designated as qualified by that. and in some cases. non-existence of activity in respect of that (delusion) on the part of those who need water. that cause burning. on red beads etc. if there has to be stated something which excludes the water of the mirage etc.. root and all. .. adhere to empirical usage of the same class as that which was formerly seen. it is is possible for one to give up unsublatability in all three times. those texts which declare the illusoriness of the world.. some kind of practical efficiency has to be recognised further.

since practical generated by special defects efficiency is possible even in what is illusory. when. in the manner stated by you. world be since. if illusoriness as real. .g. there an attribute of the 4-5 would be loss of the non-duality of Brahman. not real. absolute Since Brahman's reality is not admitted by us. Hence too is refuted (the view). And that negates the reality of the substrate (of which it is an attribute).ILLUSORINESS OF THE ILLUSORY serviceability to such practical efficiency as is appronot priate to silver etc. (illusoriness) too should be said to be but illusory consequently. defects of be for the is world's reality... is certainly illusory. illusory illusorinot opposed to reality ? : To this it is said thus in the Advaitadlpika illusori- 4.51 ness consists in having the same nature as the world of ether etc. which negate non-potness etc.. the world .. 53 therefore. there the sense-organs. 53 E. it does not negate the non-connection with the world. And in an attribute negating an attribute opposed to itself. in is . connection with the world does not possess the same grade of reality as the substrate (Brahman). that if illusoriness is empirical. that the illusory connection of Brahman with the world is not opposed to ness is its (real) non-connection. that . only of the silver-ness etc. not of absolute reality for. pot-ness etc. which and not merely apparent. it is established for both disputants that what is determinative as the possession of reality of the same grade the substrate. whence the loss of the world's reality.. opposed to that. Now.

the identity with silver. the invariably of that sense of verbal testimony which is of the same grade of reality as the capacity. there is seen the distinction that. that is a negator of the attribute opposed to itself . which of the same grade of reality as the substrate. and if authoritativeness consisting in non- establishment is . while. And thus. since the world's illusoriness. in that very thing (nacre). since that can be removed by the intuition of Brahman. or of a real object through such statements as those about the agnihotra. reality should be predicated of the capacity of verbal testimony. and of the authoritativeness of cognition through verbal testimony .308 CHAPTER . empirical. which have empirical capacity . though assumptive. hence. it is not the negator of (Brahman's) non-connection with the world. which cannot be removed by the intuition of its locus. opposed to non-nacreity. that attribute which cannot be removed by the intuition of its own locus. it would be absolute reality for. is. for. in nacre. the identity with nacre. it is cannot be removed by the intuition of the world. As for Brahman's connection with the world. for. certainly the negator of (the world's) reality. there cannot be the establishment of an empirical object through the statement of an untrustworthy person. 4-52 is is the substrate too should invariably be Or else. empirical. if illusoriness. which is removable by that (intuition of the locus) is not opposed to non-silverness. 4^53 Hereby is refuted the following view understood from verbal testimony be : " If Brahman real. which has merely apparent capacity.

i. even the world of ether may be Because. practical efficiency having been established even of the empirical. Brahman-hood. consequently.. duality necesetc. and in thus passing beyond the one absolute real. and since even where they do exist they are in conflict with the stronger Scriptural texts about the non-duality of Brahman. because of the existence . viz. . therefore.c. of a real object over sarily exists . because difference (from statements about the agnihotra etc. 34 in the same way as the authoritativeness of the pot-cognition is associated with non-pot. by such words as 54 Validity consists in being that experience whereiji for what has Brahman-hood.. and above Brahman. it becomes less than real. because. since it is associated with what is other than that. Now. in the Vedanta whose purport is Brahman. the establishment of the real Brahman even from what has empirical real ".. the reality of the content would be inconsistent and thus. though illusoriness may be established of the 5-1 non-intelligent world of ether etc.EMPIRICAL VALIDITY & CAPACITY OF ABDA 309 sublation of content be unreal. illusory. and because illusoriness is intelligible even of the authoritativeness of the knowledge of the real Brahman.) in that that (reality) is not established. Brahman-hood is cognised as the predicate.. Therefore. capacity is possible because the reality of Brahman is " real " established from the existence of such terms as . it is. the illusoriness of the whole world etc. is made firm as adamant. is intelligible since such terms do not^exist in the texts about agnihotra arid so on. associated with something over and above Brahman. the rule about the sense of verbal testimony and its capacity having the same grade of reality has no authority. on the reasoning stated in the arambhana of ether section.

on the advaitin's interpretation . does certainly result from difference in the : external adjunct. which has to be explained through differences in the locus.. all these are in the mind " Vijnana (i. since for these. firmness and the absence of it. purpose. no (says the non-dualist). Desire. is "modification" of speech. which are reciprocally different.. does not result from the admission of difference in something other than that. 5-211 To this some say thus misery etc. since. that being the way in which the characterised by the Chandogya. faith and Scriptural texts as the absence of it. Nor can the earlier mentioned non-difference of these from stand to reason. 5-21 Now..310 CHAPTER 55 il arambhana. doubt. even though there be differences in the external adjuncts. since it is established by the distinctions of is happiness. the distinction of happiness. If this be said. intellect. on their non-difference too. viz.3 etc.e. how (can there be) the distinction? Indeed. Nor is their difference not established. since their non-difference is not lost. modesty.. it does not stand to reason that there is harmony (of the of intelligent beings. the nonintermixture of conflicting attributes. since illusoriness is impossible in the case are to experience release. the mind) performs the world Of it.e. who Vedantas) in respect of the non-dual Brahman. " the internal organ. since by such keenness of alone/' and 55 I. non-difference from the one Brahman Brahman impossible. misery 5. fear. that distinction is intelligible even because of differences in the external adjuncts.

" in the rope feared are found texts of Scripture and the traditional Code. this being the case. absolute indifference is this " declared in the case of intelligence. for. which is the locus of fearfillness and it is in this view alone that there . for. the "not-this" and the and the "this" appear to cross and get tater-twined. the conceit of the self as the locus the conceit of evil is intelligible.. for Individuation. the substrate of I-ness. 50 which is the locus of bondage like agency. . for. with intelligence. such as "As if contemplating. like agency. the experience of the attributes of that (organ) as in apposition with intelligence is intelligible. Nor. while by such Scriptural texts as " Unattached indeed unattached is is He Who is person". it is admitted that his transmigration consists only in being the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the knot of individuation. " This is to be the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the snake. is there conflict with the experience of the apposition of bondage. even with this. as if moving" and " The self ' confounded by individuation thinks ". and indeed unaffected ". Nor may it be said that. like etc. the subject object. if the internal organ be the locus of bondage like agency.SUKHA-DU9KHADI-VYAVASTHA sacrifice ". the intelligent one would not be the transmigrator . it is that alone 31 1 which is declared to be the locus of all evil. so that there is superimposition of either on tl^e other. the internal organ being superimposed as identical with intelligence. is called the knot of the it is there that the strands of the self and not-self. ' I am the agent Nor may self there are 56 it be said: "Since in one and the same superimposed the respective internal heart.

of the respective internal organs. the distinction of the happiness. the locus of bondage is the reflection of intelligence in the internal organ. by attaining identity with the respective internal organs. which has attained superimposition of identity. which declares the intelligent one alone to be the locus of these.. 5-212 Others. there are such distinctions from the . is different in each (individual's) internal organ. there is the conceit of (their) belonging to the is self.312 CHAPTER II organs. Hereby refuted (the objection): "Though happiness. different and since this. which is unreal. through difference. which are the loci of diverse happinesses miseries. even of the reciprocal differences is of which there therein. there does not result distinction in enjoyment consisting in the experience of happiness and misery (by different persons at different times)". which self's is of the same is kind as the experience of evil. does not result even thus ". hence. misery and etc. which. misery etc. a conceit in the self.. which is (original) image. say thus since the inert cannot intelligibly be the locus of bondage like agency. for. that there is experience of the happiness. yet since the experience of these is is of the nature of the witness and since that one. for. is differentiated through the differences of the respective internal organs. misery etc. and the distinction in that (enjoyment) intelligible. are attributes of the internal organ. it is only for that witness. just as in the case of the host of evil present in the internal organ. that distinction too is intelligible. however. (and) because of the aphorism "(The self is) the agent. : because the sacred teaching is purportful ".

while release is for the pure . however. The others. man merely as man. say thus: in the text wise ones declare him to be an enjoyer who is conjoined Yet with the body. is assumptive. this recognition is not sublated. the difference. 57 " " follows the explanation vigistasya 'natirekat viita-'ntargata-vigesyasya kevalad anatirekad ity The man with the staff is recognised to be non-different from the arthaft. which. as (intelligence) defined by the internal organ. therefore. since this reflection of intelligence is superimposed on the absolu- tely real jiva. as qualified or as npt 57 The translation of of the commentator: qualified. which (reflection) is the locus of agency. locus of bondage. therefore. his bondage is reflection of intelligence. who is conjoined with the body and the organs as auxiliaries and with the " 5-213 mind. there is distinction (because of these latter differences). while (the substrate included in) the qualified is not other (than that pure one). the organs and the mind. is essentially identical with mere man. for. is real in its essential nature and persists admitted to consist in being the substrate of the superimposition of identity with the in release. agent Nor. the substrate in the cognition of the qualified-man-with-the-staff." enjoyership is declared of that intelligent being. happy and miserable. the bondage present in the qualified does not fail to attach to the substrate (visesya). thus the superimposed be the there the contingence of bondage if and non-agent. is and release having different loci.SUKHA-DUSKHADI-VYAVASTHA as learned 313 and unlearned. SI 40 . the same man. for. by way of identity. Nor is there a difference of locus (for bondage and release) in that bondage is for the (internal organ) qualified. since through differences of the internal organ there are differences in what is qualified thereby.

there is however. there cannot be a distinction among conflicting attributes in another (thing) . See the . say thus: if the distinction among conflicting attributes has to be explained by difference of locus alone. there is seen in the tree the distinction between conjunction and the absence thereof.314 5 *214 Still others. and perceiving what is high or low. similarly. on the intelligent being alone. Nor. according as we are thinking of the base or the top of the tree. The difference of the adjunct. intelligible is distinction unintelligible. Nor may it be said that because of differences in one (thing). even on the intelligent being. merely through the external adjunct of the nature of the base or the top. through differences in the adjunct. such diversities as perceiving or not perceiving sound. whether that be the internal organ or what is qualified thereby. base or top. 59 According to the advaitavedftnta. viz. for.. since on the analogy of the redness of the crystal. then. accounts for the distinction between conjunction and non-conjunction. that is even because of differences in the external adjunct. 5-215 A few.. the element of fire becomes the sense of sight. because of that being one. and so on. the respective ear-cavities of various persons. there are. say thus: let admitted the superimposition of another agency etc. for. 58 it is also seen that in the case of the ether which has become the 59 sense of hearing. the sense-organs proceed from the various elements. pleasant or unpleasant. however. CHAPTER II the pure intelligent being be the locus of bondage like agency.. the element of ether becomes the sense of hearing. because of the proximity of the locus of agency etc. that 58 The same tree is botli conjoined and not conjoined with a monkey.

but " adjustment " should be understood where suitable.. " has been used throughout. a mirror. and of a lamp (it is admitted) among such attributes as that being nearer or farther away. 61 The illustration is not very clear. since it is 315 let there be influence of not admitted anywhere that only that difference. appear in front of where it really is (paurastya) or behind where it really is (paScatya). fairness. . experience the pain defined by the foot tion of the ". the pressing of the finger.e. i. it should be determined When is thus it is 60 which the adjunct that accounts for the jivas' nonrecollection of one another's happiness etc. because of the adjuncts.gUKH A-DU#KHADI. roundness or length. as defined by the hand.V YAVASTHA has been distinguished (from adjuncts). which has a non-assumptive locus. since there is not the cognition "I. distinction is admitted and a sword. but this seems to be what Is meant: when the finger is pressed against the eye-ball. through differences 61 posited by the adjunct. while the pain defined by the foot is not 6-1 recollected as defined by the hand. while. can effect the 60 distinction. is there operathe thorn that has run into How. for. positing of difference. tion . possible to explain distinction as due to the influence of adjuncts. the foot? 60 This operation of the hand is is not due to a Vyavastha " the same word distinction both distinction and adjustment consequent thereon. among such attributes of the face as darkness. through differences posited by such adjuncts as a gem. viz. the pain defined by the body is recollected as defined by that. a lamp in front seems either to advance or to recede. hand to remove then.. some say thus: the non-difference and difference of the abode of enjoyment constitute the adjuncts that account for recollection and non-recollecHere.

the recollected pain defined by Caitra 's body defined by Maitra s body. and the two bodies of the mother and of the (being in the) womb are so (disjoined). there is not the contirigeiice of the operation of Maitra 's body to remove the thorn that has run into . since there is no nondifference between the bodies of Caitra " and Maitra.316 CHAPTER II recollection (of the pain) as (belonging to the self) defined by the hand. as between the organ and the organism. the word "vi$lii?ta" is more carefully defined in the next sentence. (the operation of the hand) is due to this recollection. there is no defect. is there the contingence of the recollection of the mother's 62 for what are happiness by the one in the womb. And thus. 6-2 Others. are not disjoined (vi61i?ta). rather. there is no difference. the foot and the body. intended by the word "disjoined" are those which do not enter as organs into a single organism. since there does not exist even an abode of enjoyment consisting in an organism common to both (bodies) therefore. To meet this objection. the pain defined by the foot is recollected as I have (of the self) defined by the body. since. this being the case. in this case. Nor may it be said that recollection is is understood (to exist) even where there disjunction. Thus. say thus what accounts for nonrecollection is the difference of disjoined adjuncts. . however. 62 The upadhis of the child and the mother. in the form a pain in the foot". Nor. Caitra 's body. nor ? is is not recollected as it as defined by another organism common to both the bodies. even if for that (self) defined by the hand there be : admitted recollection of the pain defined by the foot.

since there is recognition (of the body as one). Nor may difference of body be suspected even as between infancy and youth. without the increase of parts. by yogiiis and those who remember (other) births. however. " Now. and looking through the eyes in their own severed heads. Yet others. same body. as because of the recollection of what occurs in another body. even there. there must necessarily have . non-recollection being accounted for as a general rule by the (cause) set forth (by us) is not nullified. Nor may difference in that be understood because of difference in size. occurred either swooning or death therefore. the attaching of more than one size is intelligible through difference in time. that kind of statement opposed to perception has for purport the . differences of base so. in the case of the for. since. just as by and top in the case of the same tree. say thus: the identity and 6-3 difference of bodies constitute the adjuncts that account for recollection and the absence thereof. with weapons held aloft in their arms. there is no . there is not the contingence of defect existent. when the head was cut off. For the same reason. there are seen (respectively) recollection and the absence thereof.SUKHA-DUtfKHADI-VYAVASTHA 317 because of the (following) statement of the Bharata: "Lo! even (headless) trunks. felled down (their) enemies". praise of the excessive enthusiasm of combatants. for. on the a fortiori principle. and even if it be a praise of the having for content special persons endowed with such power. the head and the trunk are such as can enter (and had entered) as organs into one organism further. in the views stated arid to be stated. in the case of the experience of infancy and another existence.

declare the distinction bet- ween recollection and non-recollection (to result) through the non-difference or difference of the internal organs. 6-5 Some. 6-61 Here some say thus the aphorism) 77 "A in the section (beginning with part. and the parts that arrive later do not attach to the body as it exists already. and contracts simultaneously with the veiling of it j by him who follows this (view of expansion and contraction). there is not admitted the view of the creation (of the effect) from the primal atom onwards (by accretion) and on the . which are the adjuncts for the differences of the jlva.. difference in size. the of the body is intelligible through maya. even growth without the increase of parts. however. if this be said. no (we reply) for. the light. spreads out simultaneously with the lighting of the lamp. a difference of body is necessary .318 CHAPTER II " a difference of size. view of (the 6-4 Still others. " And etc. no. it is (that enjoyment is) " If it from attachment to a the same ". because of its entry (into other . in the same way as (that of) the body exhibited by magic. effect being an) illusory manifestation. however. and declare the distinction between recollection and non-recollection (to result) through the nondifference or difference of that (ignorance). which is . hence. And this view has been explained earlier. adopt the manifoldness of ignorances. because of the teaching of : diversity . (there are) the is " Since the unseen potency even in the case of resolve be said following aphorisms: not restrictive ". if there pervades the central hall of a story. (specific) locality.

all selves being all-pervasive. this be said. not for others . being the conjunction with the mind. to belong to some one (self) alone. these and such others are distinct (for the different selves) hence. Nor is there the restriction that the body to that originated by some one's unseen potency belongs one. if . there is originated there is pain for Caitra. parity in the unintelligibility of the distinction (in respect of enjoyment). the resolve *I shall the cause is attain this fruit'. for him alone there is pain. there is no difference (among them) as to the entry into Caitra's body? Nor is there the distinction that he. why is pain not generated for other selves too. " if. it is not possible to restrict the body. resolve etc. it certainly unites then with other selves too. the volition that is favourable to the act originating unseen potency. even on the view of different selves. the mind unites with some one self. indeed. which originated by no . that is originated in the proximity of all the selves. by the thorn that has run into Caitra's foot. It is thus: when. (the experience of) one and the same self through differences of adjuncts. when com'mon. When. for. not to others. for. in the manneir of Kanada and others. (is the reply) . since even for unseen potency restriction has not been established. though the mere union with the mind is common. from this alone may result the restriction of unseen potency ".REPUTATION OP PLURALITY OF SELVES. following these aphorisms and the commentary thereon. how can that unseen potency originate in some one alone? "Now. whose body the thorn has pierced and so on. distinction be not admitted in bodies as well) . then. since. in order to originate that unseen potency.

. " as (said) before. selves. that is not (so) for. there may be the distinction among happiness. then. are seen even for the former . happiness..320 CHAPTER II (conjunction) is common (to all selves). Now. Therefore. on (the view of their) pervasive- unseen potency &rayas sa eva Prade6a. in respect of the mind. only particular loci in them are subject to bondage hence. even if the solves be different. locality. that is not when Maitra arrives at the very locus. "Now. which is eternal and conjoined to all selves. if distinction make out. the conjunction of the mind becomes itself non-common ". is here used in the sense of the locus of the etc. belonging to the self: atmano yah pradeSo 'd 'tra prade6a-6abda-'rthah. distinction is not established even for them. mind. be but atomic. distinction is not established. misery etc. And in explaining it somehow. there is not (the occupation of) that particular locus in Caitra's body. hence. it is not possible to restrict the . Caitra has enjoying happiness etc. and explain it on that (basis) alone. which left after (so).. because of conformity to Scripture and because of parsimony.". since cognition with one's own mind is the cause of resolve etc. . as the property of any one alone. for other . the distinction is certainly difficult io explain. since. into certain bodies there enter the loci specific to (unseen potency etc. 6-62 is " Let the not easy to 63 selves. selves the 03 though the selves are pervasive. for. Nor because of particularities of unseen potency does there result for particular relationship of property and owner. for. even of that unseen potency. of) other selves too. misery etc.. it is proper to recognise the unity of the self.

there is difference the distinction of happiness. Since jivas have 04 parts. etc. on the analogy of the light of a lamp.REFUTATION OP ness ". JIVA'S ATOMICITY 321 Not so. if the selves be atomic. as also To this it is said (in reply) in the Advaitadlpika: 6*6221 even thus. misery etc. the jivas are certainly atomic.. misery from the Lord. common to the head. would be unintelligible.. there is no unintelligibility whatever in the simultaneity of the happiness. head or foot. in the same way as Caitra's 64. or in the is diversity of enjoyment of the yogins. there being no confusion among the jivas. the rise sometimes of happiness in all the parts (of the body). happiness etc. because of their atomicity. feet etc. and "The hundredth part of the point of a goad ". is indeed atomic ". " has been loosely used to refer to the . difficult to For. since cognition. who have entered a multiplicity of bodies. and because of the explicit declarations of atomicity in such " This self. in conformity with the traditional Code "Drona a part of Brhaspati". avoid Caitra's recollection of the happiness or misery present in Maitra. how does the distinction result? it is which is The word " smrti an itih&sa. who is pervasive. have the property of pervading localities extending beyond their locus.. bind. whom these two. hands. merit Scriptural texts as and demerit. Though they are atomic. a statement of what (some) moderns assume: because of the declarations of going up. there is no non-cognition of happiness in all parts (of the body). And thus. which (happiness) is (yet) located in the hand. for. Here is 6-621 departure and return being unintelligible otherwise.





or misery present in

form " There is pain in the foot, but a pleasant feeling in the head". The difference of his members from the jiva, Caitra, is

members of

himself, in the

not, indeed, distinct
for, there

from that of Maitra (from Caitra) necessarily difference of the members from

the jiva, in the case of those who, in animating a







(themselves from one body) and passing on to another; and difference cum non-difference is admitted by you, as between the members and the whole.

be said that pure difference accounts for non-recollection. The purity of the difference

Nor may

should, indeed, consist in non-concomitance with the relation of member and whole or in non-concomitance

with non-difference.
taught to be a

Not the


being such Scriptural Brahman, by


for, the jiva

and aphorisms as "He is, " An eternal part indeed, a member of the Supreme ", of myself (having become a jiva) in the world of jivas,"
traditional Codes

"A part, because of the
the jiva and

teaching of diversity," there is the contingence of confusion of enjoyment, as between

Brahman. 05

respect of



be said) the jiva
in the


not a




same way in which the

members of the

jiva are in respect of the jiva; being a
the jiva are related as the whole and a

Brahman and


pure difference is non-concomitant with this relation; therefore, there Is
not the condition which accounts for non-recollection; hence the possibility of confusion between the enjoyments of the two. The relation of aipSa

and amgin


of course,

assumed by the advaitin

for argument's sake





(but) figurative


consists rather in being

inferior while being similar to that (other), as "The orb of Jupiter is a hundredth part of the orb of the

"; if this be said, (we ask) what other than this is membership in the principal sense which belongs to the members of the jiva in respect of the jiva and which
00 introduced into the body of what accounts for nonrecollection? It is not the relationship of creation as


(there is) for threads in respect of cloth, since the jiva is beginning-less; nor is it a relationship of locality, as (there is) for pot-ether etc., in respect of ether at large ; nor is it that of being a piece, as of pieces of stone broken

with a chisel; for, being atomic, (the jiva) has no If it be said that localities and cannot be broken up.

to be different


(yet) non-different



it is to

be considered a member, no (we reply) ; for, in that case, there is the contingence of confusion of enjoyment

between the jiva and the Lord and among the jivas themselves for, among these, which are in themselves

admitted by you, because of (their) being intelligent further on the view of you, who maintain difference cum non-difference as between
different, non-difference too is

an assembly and

even reciprocal non-difference among the jivas included in a single

members, there


assembly, since through the non-difference of (another from) the assembly non-different from oneself, the nondifference of oneself too
to avoid;

(from that other)

is difficult


for, the rule that

A lf





made a

constituent of."
is non-different

A, a


of the assembly


in turn ie non-different from another member, B; therefore, different from B,







that which is non-different from another



from that other



admitted by you who say

" If for

conjunction etc,., and for the genus there be location in more than one, then, because of the non-difference of
the quality from what has the quality and so on, even for cloth etc., non-different from the conjunction that

non-different from pot, there would result nondifference from pot." Nor is there any other nonis

between members and the whole, which accounts for recollection even in the midst of difference,

other than the non-difference based on such attributes


to other jlvas as similarity in respect of being



or in respect of being included in one (if there were such non-difference) its

mention could be intended, to avoid undue extension; for, if that were the case, it would follow that that alone
should be distinctively mentioned.
it is



be said that

distinctive of the non-difference between
to be based


and the whole not

no (we reply) for, it difference is based on similarity of attributes etc., since, as between the jlva and its members there is similarity of attribute in respect of being intelligent and so on,

on similarity of attributes is the case that their non-

(membership of) an assembly, both when they (the jlva and the members) are defined by a single body, and when there is a gathering together


since there is

of a plurality of bodies (animated by different members of a yogin's jiva). If it be said that though there may

be another non-difference based on similarity of



IB to say,





non-different from B,

which again

is non-different


C, is non-different







the non-difference between the jiva and

members, based on the relationship of members to the \vhole, is not based on that (other similarity), no

(we reply), since there are not two non-differences between them; for, in your system, when the locus is identical, plurality is not admitted whether of difference
or of non-difference, either through difference in the counter-correlate or in the form of it. 69 Therefore,










Even by

this is refuted the second alter-

native too; for, if difference non-concomitant with non-difference accounted for non-recollection, then, since, in the manner stated, there, is, in your system,

non-difference too between the jiva and Brahman, and among the jivas, undue extension would be difficult to

the perception of non-difference that accounts for recollection, in its absence, there is non-recollection; since the non-difference of oneself



it is

from oneself and from one's own members is perceived, there is recollection of misery etc., for him who sees that since non-difference from other selves though it may

perceptible to him, there is not the recollection of their misery etc. in the case of him, who remembers other births, since there does exist


perception of non-difference from the self of the earlier existence, there is recollection of incidents therein since

for others there



not that (perception), there such things are thus consistent






defines the counter-coirelateness (pratiyogitva).

this be said,



even on the view of the self as one, because of the ignorance that obscures its being the self of all, there is not for Caitra the perception of non-difference

from the

self of




since all distinctions are



because of

the admission


differences in the self, in conflict with Scripture, is


Nor even thus can the distinction be supported by you who maintain the reality of the world; for, there being necessarily for the omniscient Lord the perception of the real non-difference from other jlvas, when
the jlvas are miserable, there is (for the Lord) the " I am miserable ". In contingence of the experience

our system, however, the Lord, though perceiving
transmigration in the jlva non-different from Himself, like the impurity in the reflected face, yet does not
grieve, because of the certitude of (its) illusoriness;

hence there


not that contingence.


this so.

Let not difference as among members

be the substrate of hands, head, feet etc., and of .the plurality of bodies (animated by a single jiva) since

for the lamp of the self there is the indestructible pervasive light of knowledge, that itself may become
If this be said, no (we reply) ; for, of the experience of happiness and misery, which, like knowledge, is an attribute of the self, origination

the substrate of

all ".

in dependence on knowledge is impossible; therefore, there is the contingence of the non-existence of diversity of enjoyment through differences of limbs

hands and


in the case


through differences

of the organism, of bodies, in the case of



him who









admitted that experience of happiness and misery and so on is an attribute of knowledge itself and not of

then, through their diversity, though difference

m'ay result for knowledge, which is an attribute of the self, difference does not result for the self; therefore, it

not possible through diversity of enjoyment and so on to negate the non-difference of the self; there is also
the abandonment of the view that, because of the the







consequently delimited for each body, there is not the contingency of the confusion of the attributes of all,
as on the doctrine of its pervasiveness

and on the

doctrine of

Therefore, the explanation of distinction by admitting the atomicity of the self does not stand to reason.


Nor even does
difference of that

the establishment thereby of the 6-6261

( jiva)

from the Lord stand to


the view of you, who say that, because of the Scriptural declaration of going up etc., and the express Scriptural declaration of atomicity, the jiva is atomic, it would follow that even the supreme (self) is atomic,


because of the declaration of entry in such Scriptural texts as "Having created that, He entered that itself ",


"The two

He, who, having entered the people, rules them ", and entered, dwelling on the highest sumtnit,"

and because of the express declaration of atomicity in the Scriptural text "The small one, this mantra self,
within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice or a grain " of barley whence then the establishment of difference




between the supreme (self) and the jiva through (their)
pervasiveness and atomicity (respectively)


Now, (it may be said), the all-pervasiveness of the supreme (self) is established because of such Scriptural " declarations as All-pervasive like the ether and
" and " Greater than the sky, greater than heaven ", and because of being the material cause of the
entire universe; therefore, the Scriptural texts about

His atomicity should be understood to be for the purpose
of contemplation or (made) in the view of the difficulty of apprehending (Him) and the Scriptural texts about

entry are to be explained as relating to adjuncts like the body. Nor may it be doubted that even the
Scriptural texts about the jiva's going up etc. may be supported as relating to the adjunct, the intellect ; for,
(in the words)


after ",

" That (jiva) going up, the prana goes the going up of the jiva is mentioned even

as prior to the going


of the intellect, which is (here}

called the prana there is also the Scriptural declaration of departure, even after release from name and form, " (in the text) Thus, the enlightened one, released from

the Shining Person, who is higher than the highest ;" there is also cited the illustra-

name and form, reaches

naturally the locus of the text) "Just as a well laden waggon motion, (in

tion of the waggon, which

goes creaking, even so this embodied self goes forth

mounted by

the intelligent self".

If this be said, that is not sound (we reply) ; for, pervasiveness is declared even of the jiva in such'
Scriptural texts as



verily, that great




consists of knowledge/'

" Just


when a pot

is carried,

the pot alone


carried, not the ether enclosed
to the ether "; since,



even so

the jiva


in your system, material causality in respect of the world belongs to Primal Nature alone, there is not for


the material causality of the world



the material causality of the world is possible for it, though atomic, in the same way as the jiva's material
causality of the happiness and misery present in a plurality of bodies (animated by itself) ; for these two

reasons the pervasiveness of that (Brahman) is not established by that (material causality); if for the Scriptural texts about its entry there be assumed
reference to the body as the adjunct, in the case of the Scriptural texts about the jiva going up etc., it is
possible to admit

reference to the intellect as the

adjunct; since in the

" Five-fold activity

commentary on the aphorism



difference is

taught (of the prana) as of the taught between the intellect and

prana because of difference in their products,
intelligible that


when the intellect-conditioned jiva goes


first, the prana goes after it; the Scriptural declaration of the attainment of Brahman after release from

name and form
the case of


opposed to pervasiveness as much in
attained, as in the case of the

Brahman, the


Brahman has

In the system of him who maintains even after release from material name and form,

to be attained as associated with a nonmaterial world, form etc., since even for the jiva who attains there exist non-material body, organs etc., there

no opposition

to the declaration of the attainment of

Therefore. for. there is not established attaches to both Brahman and the distinction between Brahman and the jiva. whose purport is the identity of Brah- man and the self. because of the illusoriness of the non-intelligent world and because of the nondifference of the world of intelligence from Brahman. then. the explanation of the Scriptural texts making out the difference of the jiva from Brahman is in some such way as that pervasiveness belongs to the jiva in his own nature and finitude to his form as the conditioned by adjuncts. because of proximity to the jiva. it is Brahman possible to establish entry as natural too. as pervasive and atomic. natural locus of motion. . should be said to have for purport a single form of entry. the . Therefore. since intermediate texts have to be interpreted in conformity with major texts. the one word "entered".330 CHAPTER II Brahman (by the jiva) as conditioned by these if by the mere citation of the example of the waggon. END OF CHAPTER TWO. in " The two entered the cave for ". this (explanation) is clear in Bhasya etc. there should result natural motion for the jiva. no conflict whatever in the harmony of the Vedantas in respect of Brahman that can be attained there is by knowledge alone. the desire to establish difference thereon has to be left far behind. In our system. since in the system of others. which the jiva. the natural locus of entry.

on Sarvdpeksa says "Calmness. through the acquisition of knowledge. equanimity etc. O Great Sage." Now. in the traditional Code. because of the Bhasya on the which means ledge.e. III. 27. in the attainment of is Brahman. have been declared to be knowledge and karma/' that karma too is a means of attainment. by gifts. the followers of the BMmatt view say (thus) its utility is H in respect of (generating) the desire to know. by sacrifice. which is to be desired? No . (but) " No other (there is) the Scriptural declaration path (is known)" etc. why should it not be useful in respect of the knowledge (itself). because of the text "This the brahmanas desire to know. by penance. further. are proximate to knowledge.CHAPTER 111. by the study of the Veda. how can the attainment of i-o Brahman be through knowledge alone? True. then. Now. when it is said. the saw-suffix.. (a process) analogous to the attainment of a golden neicklet worn round the neck. because of the sense of the suffix signifying desire). What. section and (i. nothing other than know- ledge can be instrumental to the attainment of the eternally existent Brahman. being related (directly) to know- commencing with while sacrifice etc. because of these reasons. which is a means of attaining Brahman. that kind of traditional Code signifies the need for karma (only) indirectly. "The means of attaining that. iv. (they say this). but forgotten.. the utility of karma? : Here. are (comparatively) . by fasting.

which are means of knowing Btahman. because of obstruction by the defect of sins accumulated in (prior) existences without beginning. in the nature of a turning towards the attainment of Brahman. for the sake of the desire to know. . are applied (i.CHAPTER III know. medicine is So too. if there is no (such) desire.. will lead to activity in respect of hearing (study) etc. has a desire (for the Veda). hence. directed) to the desire to know. during many prior existences. a desire. the desire to know exists already. because there is the defect of disordered humours.e. in order to remedy that (leanness). reply). and knowledge (as the means thereto) yet. generated by obligatory and expiatory rites practised without a desire for fruit. which will lead him etc." external means. has. of the nature of a turning to food. to activity in respect of it. who If this be said.. then. if he. which bring about a leaning towards enjoyment of (sense-) objects. no (we has become lean because of distaste for food. for the person. and that knowledge is the (for such a one) there is desire. has. as . does not arise. being related (only) to the desire to Now. who prescribed to cure that disease. but there is not generated in him that taste (for food). gained faith in respect of this sense (of Sruti) that Brahman is of the nature of unsurpassable means of attaining that. due to intense indigestion . it is not meet to hold that sacrifice etc. . which (latter) is instrumental to knowledge hence. bliss. since there would be no performance of sacrifice etc. there cannot result any desire for the desire to know. by virtue of the clarity of intellect. He. such taste. for the sake of the desire to know. who practises sacrifice etc.

are understood to relate only to the of desire. he desires to kill with a knife.e. karma this being so. for a person subject to desires.. established by (a consideration of) such . contemplated.. in respect of renunciation consisting in the abandonment of karma. too. that is are directed) to knowsignified by the stem (in the word apply (i. that the instru- mentality taught by verbal testimony relates only to that which is taught by verbal testimony to be the object In such wordly usage as "He desires to go on a horse." the means... texts as " He who desires heaven " etc. So. say thus the rule. be -sought. (and) the prescription of these is intelligible. result the practice of knowledge. that. vividisanti). even though he has faith in Scriptural authority. there right up would then be contradicted. follow the Vivarana." is to Hence. in such Vedic usage as "That by going etc..KARMA INSTRUMENTAL TO KNOWLEDGE 333 in the same way as there is a leaning to prohibited acts. "That is to be reflected on. as a consequence of the removal of the obstruction. as established by the Scriptural " declarations like Only by him who has renounced is . that of the two the sense of the stem and the sense of the suffix the sense of the suffix is of greater Those. is a general rule of greater force than this is the . in the case of the prescription signified the imperative suffix.special rule. however. its subser- of Now. ledge sacrifice etc. that (taste) is brought about through sacrifice etc. hence. the object of the desire signified by the sansuffix. there to the would dawn vience to knowledge. verily. who : force. such as horse etc. is to be desired to be known".

are abandoned) after securing the desire for knowledge. to be the cause. calmness (non-activity) is said till. said in the Naiskannyasiddhi: thereof.. after that. no (we reply). karma is said to be the cause . indeed." their object and even as clouds. in the .e. both from ploughing and not ploughing. the growth of rice etc. thus. for the same person. on the view that karmas subserve knowledge." there is practice of karma intellect. securing fication for the intellect through is its puri- a leaning towards what within. therefore. even though they are quiescent (i. which is a channel (to knowledge). thence follows renunciation admitted the rise of knowledge from both karma and the renunciation It is. this view r disappear.." is Before the seed there is If this be said. viz.CHAPTER that to III known. there is the rise on the purification of the of a leaning towards what is within (i. achieve at Even on the view that karmas subserve knowledge. there is ploughing. who has attained yoga. reflection and contemplation. through the attainment of an activity. "Karmas. sown. karma is practised only up to (the generation of) the desire for knowledge. the end of the rainy season. like- wise in conformity with the saying "For the saint.e. results no ploughing. who desires to attain yoga. which lead up to the fruit when accompanied by cessation of unhindered hearing (study). . yet there is a rule (understood) that they generate knowledge by securing the means. form of a desire thus is to know. it is asked "What is the difference between to the desire for and that of subservience knowledge?" this (we say) is the difference. If. the self)..

of their subservience to the desire for knowledge. "This. the term it is 1 The reference know" etc. they achieve their On object even with securing an intense desire capable of generating activity in respect of hearing (study) etc. there is used.INSTRUMENTALITY OF ARAMA-KARMA excellent preceptor. Now. Veda " said by some by the words "study of the duties of the student are indicated . hence. Hence it is 2 that in the Vedanta Sutra " Even (for him who is not desirous of release) the life (is karma of his own order of enjoined". of what karmas the Scriptural text cited? 1 is the application taught by 1-3 the To this. is compulsory) since to Bffc. it is : 1-31 similarly. . it is the duties of the various orders of life that alone serve (to bring about) knowledge. a view founded on the traditional Code " Of him for whom these eight and forty purificatory ceremonies" etc.. 22. the brfchmanas desire to 2 HI. there is generate knowledge. in respect of karma (which is) for the sake of know" karma of his own order of life. IV. this subserve purification consisting in the removal of impurities and the endowment of (good) qualities no necessary rule that they is on the view that karmas which secures capacity for knowledge of the self. 32. hence. 4. by the words by penance. 335 the view. however. by fasting". the duties of the house-holder. by the words and by gifts" and the duties of the " forest-dweller. iv. "by sacrifice ." ledge. .

iv. viz. that is caste as well. 4 . iv. their competency for the means of knowledge. even of the acts of those. and (that it is) not (intended) to establish the utility of the karmas practised by them (in this life) in respect of 4 knowledge ." Nor may it be objected that this section is intended to establish. for. are outside any order (of life). as such. 38. who. however. 36. which are duties pertaining to caste. (not to a particular order of life. 3 III. who being outside sacrifice etc. hearing (study) etc. are useful in respect of knowledge (as for) the " karma of his own order ". performed in prior existences. the karma of his own order of life (is compulsory) since it is enjoined ". that even japa (prayer) etc. is 3 " established in the section Even for those outside like etc.. that being seen.. it is explicitly said in an aphorism of that section. III. in the aphorism expression .336 1-321 CHAPTER III In the Kalpatarn.. for. In this used to imply the duties of (one's) view it is said: "Utility in it respect of knowledge exists even in the case of duties other than those pertaining to the orders of life.. it is said thus : it is not the duties pertaining to the various orders of life that alone serve (to bring about) knowledge. "Even (for him who is not desirous of release). "And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special acts/' and in the commentary thereon. widowers orders (the of life). in the ease of widowers any order have (yet) had the desire for knowledge aroused in them by etc.. the utility in respect of knowledge. (there is competency for knowledge). in the caste).

This serves as the archetype (prakrti) on which are some modelled other (vikrti) rites. there may not be assumed. the possibility of assuming any utility other than that settled in the archetype." whose utility is settled in the archetype (the prakrti rite). The subsidiary rites of the vikrtis have to be obtained by transfer (atideSa) from the prakrti. however. except where explicitly prescribed. hence. however. only to obligatory (rites).INSTRUMENTALITY OF ALL OBLIGATORY RITES 337 (belongs).. a principal rite is enjoined together with its full complement of subsidiaries. 5 It may be said that though obligatory rites and optional rites (for may have different specific results of their. yet there be assumed some fruit common to both. Such a contention is answered in the next sentence. are transferred (to a vikrti rite). only through the transference of their utility as settled in the archetype.. other than that obtaining in the archetype. own. are related to the modelled rite by transfer. in that case. so that both may subserve knowledge. i. The subsidiaries. there is no distinction in (the denotation of) . In the Sanksepasanraka. their utility is not assumed after their transfer..e. indeed. even so. the words " sacrifice " etc. viz. needed by knowledge. any utility in respect of knowledge common to v both obligatory and optional rites. the diminution of sin. not the fruit of karma performed for a desired Just as. sacrifice etc. Their fruit. In cases. there is 1-322 declared the application of both obligatory and optional rites for. besides what (fruit) is settled for obligatory rites. however. when subsidiaries.3 . particular ends) 6 Rite may be broadly divided into principal and subsidiary. Here. end. is. such as heaven etc. diminution of sin. whose (in the Scriptural text). there is not. utility is settled in respect of the archetype. 6 5 no utility may be assumed for them. of sacrifice etc. R I 4. enjoined in the case of knowledge.

to the pursuit of knowledge). if through their utility (in the former). though not (already) settled. are) understood by the (use of the) (sacrifice). however. it is established in the beginning of the tenth chapter (of the Purva Mimamsa"). the injunction (in if by gifts" etc. it Further. there . down (and not obtained by assumed as (which Why. if knowledge therefrom be otherwise they be not otherwise established. be admitted that there is an injunction rites. diminution of sin from (the performance of) sacrifice. It is only in the acceptance of this principle that in order to secure (an occasion for) the commencement (of the discussion) of the nature of sublation. that (the subsidiaries) of the archetype are related to the modelled rite. "by the obligatory rites and the rise of established. Where. utility is posited after the relation of a thing (as a subsidiary). who it inquire into (the regulations for) sacrifices is admitted that. should this not be common to all obligatory and optional rites. utility has to be posited later. general name even though this be not settled as necessary to support the application (of sacrifice etc.. utility.. as in the case of subsidiaries primarily laid transfer).) would be futile. in sacrifices etc. is to be posited in conformity with the nature of the thing which is applied (as a subsidiary). only in respect of obligatory because of there being no (other) settled utility. there is (already) settled. only where are related (as subsidiaries to the vikrti) through things their utility fixation to the fruit (in the prakrti). then.338 CHAPTER III are primarily enjoined directly by Scripture. then. in their case. as primarily understood? Even by those etc.

there is no need to suspend the injunction common to obligatory and optional rites. " it may be said. as "By karma alone did Janaka and others attain perfection " 9 They do Now.OPTIONAL RITES TOO INSTRUMENTAL 339 would be no distinction obligatory and optional rites). knowledge necessarily comes about.. the injunction is purposeful. otherwise. the channels (of knowledge). viz. then. hence. even in the case of obligatory rites. in general. when there is this injunction.'' (To this we say). even thus. the destruction of the sin that is an obstacle to the rise of knowledge. and Hence. by the use of the word brahmanas " in the text about desire for knowledge. Now. since the origination of the service needed by knowledge is not settled (as the f rait even) (between of obligatory rites . which is an obstacle to the rise of knowledge but. and the unseen potency which secures the attainment of an excellent preceptor and hearing (study). competency for . how not refer to the practice of karma as subservient to " knowledge. it is difficult to avoid a pres- cription common to obligatory and optional rites. there being no distinction in the matter of positing utility that is not settled.. as understood use of the general term ("sacrifice"). obligatory rites being performed with a view to knowledge. reflection have to be posited. it is not established in particular that it removes the sin. for. etc. Though it is otherwise established of obligatory rites (that their performance is) the cause of diminution of sin. purity alone (would result) the rise of knowledge . . from the is it possible to support such 1*41 statements of traditional Codes. are but unsettled as fruit. being (thus) not invariable.

the "king" thus prescribed as a qualification of the sacrifice. is attach.e. and the desire for knowledge. even so. for the performance of karma. If it did BO would prescribe. for.. " the use of the word brahmana " in the text about the desire for knowledge is impficative of the three (twiceborn) castes. since no not a king can accomplish a sacrifice that is to be performed by a king. "Let the king who sacrifice is desirous of absolute ". the injunction the uddeya. injunction).340 CHAPTER ni karma as subservient to knowledge appears (to exist) only in the case of brahmanas. the person desirous of knowledge. brahminhood. ." which enjoins competency in respect of him who desires knowledge. "Let him who desires knowledge practise karma. two independent qualifications. this means "Let him who is desirous of absolute empery sacrifice with for the rajasuya which is to be performed by a king". 7 and would thus suffer from the defect of v&kya-bheda or sentence-split." Nor is it proper to take the word "brahmana'' as indicating a special kind of competent person. for. it must be said of the karmas practised by Janaka and others that they directly serve (to bring about) release. since there is no distinction in respect of the competency of all (these) for knowledge of the self. the injunction about the rajasuya. here too. empery with the rajasuya prescribes competency him who desires absolute empery. " The use of the word ' brahmana here implies ' all twice-born persons. enters by presumption (arthapatti) into the body of qualifications of him who is competent (to sacrifice). Hence. in the capacity of the agent. a qualification cannot attach to the subject (of the 7 Now. in the paraphrased (iiijunctive) form. Not so. the one who I. As the venerable author of the Vartika says.

(the text) leads up to the (sole) competency of the brahmana. Even this (we reply) does not stand to reason. which are established elsewhere as competent for persons of (all) the three castes. so. a qualified agency results even from the mere proximity of the word "king".NOT EXCLUSIVELY COMPETENT 341 " brahmana " prescribed as the agent in sacrifice etc. For. the same duties performed). and which are etc. and that there is no injunction in respect of respect of those sacrifices etc. already established. Hence. (for the sake of knowledge). sacrifice etc. because of the two-fold marks". . if. which is a supplementary reference to the sacrifice etc. only in (have to be which have been already enjoined elsewhere (than in connection with knowledge). Even this is not intelligible. On the view (Now. yet performance by a brahmana results even from the mere proximity of the word " brahmana Hence. there would result the defect of sentence-split. and a prescription relating to fruit. it is established in the Stitra "In any case. in the case of sacrifice ". that. though the "brahmana" is not pres- cribed as the agent. one understood two prescriptions a subsidiary prescription of an agent. For... in that one text. here too. in the text about the desire for knowledge. it may be said as follows) which holds that there is no prescription of the king as : agent in the text about rajasuya. there is an injunction relating to special fruit. in order that there may be no sentence-split. not already established. enters by presumption into the body of qualifications for him who is competent (to sacrifice).

for these reasons. who there cannot result for him. it is " " to imply the preferable to take the word brahmana is which entire range of those competent for knowledge. Thus say some. on the ground that there is competency for Vaidika rites for him alone. the hearing (study) of the words of the Scripture etc. range of those competent be implied. since desire for knowledge may occur even Now. wherein is discussed the Vedanta study and is decided on adversely to the ftttdra. It is not possible to restrict this compe- tency by the mere proximity of the word " brahmana. it is proper that competency should belong to (all) the three castes. as a means (to release). then. if the entire to the sudra. however." not conjoined to a prescription. in respect of karma subservient to knowledge. as already established. desire for that (knowledge) cannot . If this be said. say thus: there is competency for karma subservient to knowledge even in the case of the 8 The section of the competency of the gatra for Ve&Qnta Sutras. for. because of traditional Code "Give not knowledge to a sudra ". devoid of adhyayana. hence. him 1422 Others. there would result competency for him too. who has studied his section of the Veda by adhyayana and has knowledge of knowledge is generated thereby. . result. no (we reply) . there cannot be for competency for knowledge. is .342 CHAPTER III prescribed as subservient to knowledge of the self for which persons of (all) the three castes are competent. competency for denied in the apasudra section 8 in respect it of the sudra. even a superficial realisation of the glorious might of knowledge hence.

performance of agnihotra etc. Or there being no means for him to know even the duties of his own caste. gifts etc. in the case of (all of) which competency for all castes is explicitly Further.. there is no need to combine the study of the Veda (with these other means). 64. for. and (the performance of) penance. placing the brahmana foremost " declaring competency for (all) four castes in respect of hearing epics. who has realised the might of knowledge from the puranas etc. gifts which are means for the diminution of sin.. yet there can be competency for the incantation of the Pancaksara. of the gfldra for these mentioned in HUrtta Smrti. since there is the traditional is it Nor Code "Discourse unto the four castes. even for him (sudra). The commentary on the latter explains the by Gautama term as . that prohibits the imparting of knowledge (only) about agnihotra and other rites. For. As for the traditional Code " Give not knowledge to a sudra ".. as subservient to knowledge. not in the three-fold sacrificial is The competency II. which are not useful for his observance. sacrifice. there can come about the desire for knowledge. 9 These seem to be sacrifices offered in the fire. though there cannot be for him the study of the Veda.COMPETENCY OP THE UDRA 343 sudra. household to fire. 9 of incapiations. and paka-yajnas. and since widowers and others are permitted the practice only declared. that desire for knowledge does not come about for the sudra. study of the Vedas. w. 11-14. puranas etc. which is the mantra-raj a-vidya. gifts etc. and referred in Chapter X.. since the instrumental suffix is used independently in the case of each of the means. there would result non-authorielse.

. the cleansing of the hands ro and feet. the denial of competency is improper. the support of servants. there is no possibility of competency (therefor). It cannot negate the sudra 's desire for the knowledge of the Attributeless. for alternative explanation is that. not the (all five acamana. rite. is 10 the case of what view. not prescribed. freedom from anger.344 CHAPTER III tativeness consisting in non-observance for the texts " The sudra is a fourth which specify his duties thus caste he is once-born (not twice-born. " that section denies preceptor. competency for meditation on Brahman as endowed with attributes (saguna) and for the hearing (study) etc. : . An some. purity. some the only purificatory ceremony (for him. service of the higher castes. of the Yedanta as the means of knowing the Attributeless. hence. have ceremonial purposes. other than the desire for Nor it. according to . like Gautama mentions this women. bathing for gGdras consists in washing the hands and feet. the ceremonial sipping of water) kinds of) sraddhas. as the view of some.. since. but without any mantras. who is devoid of the purificatory viz. " thus Nor does the apasudra case section become contentless. which is according 10 . like the others) his (duties are): truth. while Gautama holds that they should bathe. fiudras. as the approach to a consequence of such texts of the " traditional Code as Neither is there sin for a sudra. being content with a wife of his own performance of (caste) . not thrice. upanayanfy in known subsidiary to knowledge. nor is he fit for any purification. In the of the sudra. in his own the duty of sipping once. since that desire is prompted by the attractiveness of the subject and in .

S I 44 . of knowledge by the three higher castes of the meditation on that which is endowed with attributes (sagunavidya). whose is This analogous to the practice fruit is release by stages.". since it may subserve through creating (in another birth) the body of a person of one of the three (higher) castes fit for the hearing (study) of the Vedanta. knowledge will not arise.. which consists in the hearing of puranas etc. puranas etc. in respect of the understanding of epics. that there regard to is 110 no competency for sudras (in 11 " And there knowledge) through the Vedas. his practice of the karma subservient to that end would be futile. the words "it is settled" etc. even though the practice of karma subservient to knowledge about. commencing a fresh sentence. is shown by the Bhagavatpada in the concluding words of the commentary on (Sutra 38 of that Since.COMPETENCY OP THE SfJDKA 345 may it be said that since hearing (study) of the Vedanta does not come about for him. whose purport is the unity of the self and Brahman. puts in a full-stop after "legends etc. it is settled. consequently. The punctuation of the present text seems preferable.. there would be no point in including the second sentence in the quotation. is conflict in the siidra practising karma subservient the rise to knowledge. however. and that. moreover. If this punctuation be adopted. there is the of) the apasudra section Discourse unto the four castes/ traditional Code : " * declaring competency for (all) four castes. though he has no competency for the may come hearing (study) of the Vedanta. if the sense of this paragraph is to be conveyed with adequate force. since it (the meditation) 11 The punctuation. which is adopted in most printed texts and is followed by Thibaut. For. competency in respect means of knowledge.

however. quiescent" etc. renunciation as understood by the wojxj . is attainment of knowledge. not even the suspicion of the inconstancy of unseen potency (resulting) from renunciation. let it be that through the purification does renunciation (samnyasa) serve that (end) 2-11 karma subserves knowledge of the intellect... fit for the rise of (the higher) knowledge. even while being house-holders..CHAPTER III subserves release through the creation of pure divine bodies (deva-sarira). there does result for the sudra too competency for karma subservient to knowledge. in what way ? (thus) since the sins that obstruct the rise of knowledge are infinite. knowledge). life. there is 2*12 Others. tise And thus. for content Since. Hence. their attainment of knowledge is due to renunciation in a prior life. tranquil. renunciation too subserves that end (vi^. in the same way as karma. who prac- there healing (study) etc. all those who are 2*0 Now. only through . who attain knowledge. some are removable by : Some say the practice of sacrifice etc. : declare its subservience to knowledge (thus) in the text "Calm. therefore. for those house-holders. the word " brahmana " in the text concerning the desire for knowledge has established to be competent for knowledge. but only after attaining renunciation. in another life. As for those like Janaka and others.. the purification of the intellect. some are removable by the unseen potency from renunciation hence. in the case of knowledge. not in this in the intervals of karma.

For these reasons. that. If the non-indolent.. those who desire to overcome transmigration and those who desire to know the unity of the self ". let the brahmana having acquired understood for the ascetic . for. eligibility is ' ' from the earlier words they lead a life of mendicancy" further.NEED FOR RENUNCIATION 34? "quiescent" is included in the four means to knowledge. which the third in relation to balya and panclitya". when there is a visible channel (of utility)... (say) thus: since it is said in the Viv aroma. it is said in the Varlika. however. "Renunciation. an unseen (channel) should not be assumed. panditya" etc. only for those who have abandoned activity without any residue. even though stationed in other orders of life (but that of the ascetics). should .. a restrictive injunction has to be admitted. the unseen potency from renunciation is a special qualification of him who is competent for the ' means to knowledge such as hearing (study) of the Vedanta. for those is is who possess knowledge.. "There is competency for what comes at the end of the Ihree Vedas..e. intelligent. in the intervals of karma. being a subsidiary to others. in the commentary on the aphorism sahakary-antaravidhih. heroic man can attain to hearing (study) etc. there prescribed mauna (excellence of knowledge). it is declared: "For those who possess i. in the text "Therefore. consists in the generation of hearing (study) free from any other activity . for.. ie. Yet 243 hearing self (study) its etc. that hearing (study) etc. produces knowledge subservience to of the as fruit".. then. for ascetics. its knowledge etc.

in other texts it is implicative of the three (castes). the use of the word "brahmana". "Let the brahmana rise above ". (for) these four orders (of life) are for (all) the three castes ". But those who have not renounced may occasionally gain knowledge even in the intervals of karma. " Let the brahmana renounce ". there results competency for renunciation even for ksatriyas and vaisyas. ksatriya or vaisya. because of the use of the word " " (brahmana in texts about renunciation. how is there practice of the hearing (study) etc. on both these views. Hence that in the Vartika itself. some reply (thus) else. which makes no distinction (of caste) supported by the traditional Code "Let him renounce from the house (-holder's order). let life. there is no prescription of renunciation for ksatriyas and vaisyas ". of the Vedanta by ksatriyas and vaisyas? For. this out. 2-14 Now. . and because of the saying in the Vartika: " For the reason that the word brahmana is used in the text to make known the specially competent person.48 CHAPTER hi be brought about only by holding to the ascetic's order 12 among the four orders of life. be he is and brahmana. such as Let brahmana attain non-attachment". after the expression is of the 12 view of the Bhasya in the verse (above turbed study Renunciation does have the visible result of securing undisand so on. from the text one renounce even from the student's or order of from the house (-holder's) or the forest (-dweller's)". therefore. : M41 "Or If this be urged. renunciation is competent for the brahmana " the (alone). there is To rule a niyama-vidhi as to renunciation.

however. (Further). This is how these coming about of the practice of hearing for those (two castes). as established by other texts. and though the word not used in the prescription of renunciation cited from . the word " " brahmana is used in more than one text prescribing " brahmana " is renunciation. while in the absence of conflict. . Others. the latter is to be disregarded. (none the less) relates to the brahmana in the text "He who wears no sacred thread it at the stage of renunciation. how is he a brahmana ?". in conflict with the view of the Bhasya. in accordance * with the principle of the virodM-'dhikaram. though non-existent. his is there is shown in the succeeding verse there own view ciation that Vartikakara's) competency for renun(the even that for ksatriyas and vaisyas: "For the reason Scripture the renunciation of all the three (castes). 1 only that sense of the traditional Code should be apprehended as does not conflict with Scriptural texts. the use of the word 'brahmana' is for the purpose is there declared in of implying establish the (all the three)' 7 . brahmana alone for.SOLE COMPETENCY OF THE BRAHMANA TO RENOUNCE 349 cited) about special competency. a sruti in support of smrti may be inferred. which assumes competency for the brahmana alone.. (study) etc. As for the saying of the Vdrtika that renunciation is competent for all. renunciation is for the say thus : competency for 3. have for purport the declaration of competency for 13 The maxim is to the effect that where there is conflict between gruti and smrti. without distinction. it does not.142 the Jtibala-sruti. that relates to the renunciation of the knower .

2*143 Yet " words others. in the case of those dependent on that (renunciawho have attained the nature of divine beings by saguna meditation. however. to lay etc. since for divine beings there is no possibility of engaging in karma. which (renunciation) made by one liberated (even) while embodied. in the next verse. for. on the strength of what may one lay down rules of competency in respect of renunciation?" the practice . competency for hearing (study) etc. iii CHAPTER respect III of the renunciation by the dis- knowledge. being blished. that is to say. declares . hearing (study) etc. there has necessarily to be predicated non-dependence on renunciation for hearing (study) etc. is not dependent on that Thus is upheld the practice of (renunciation). On the view that renunciation etc.. restrictive rules about competency are denied only in the case of the renunciation of him who tressed one who desires knows. Scripture being well-estaor ending in Brahman. which brings about release in stages. verily. Thus. by those two (castes). there cannot result for them renunciation consisting in the abandonment of that (karma). for. renunciation is of hearing (study) subsidiary to etc..350 all.. of whom. For. only for brahmanas for ksatriyas ami vaisyas. is down a rule that all hearing (study) tion) .. say thus: he. after the dawn of the knowledge " If of Brahman: knowledge which cuts at the root is of all competency be attained. it is is needed for hearing (study) not possible. in the He who is well-established in Brahman attains immortality ".

in the said section. 351 fixed therein. And this being well-established in Brahman does not come about for those who remain without renunciation. there is.e. this is on the principle enunciated in the Bliasya on the section antara ca'pi tu taddrsteh : "Further. is in the principal sense . yea. because of indicatory marks" that their eligibility is non-principal. there is no eligibility in a principal sense . as in the case of widowers etc. an however. as will bring about knowledge in another body. For these (castes). because of distraction due to the performance of duties prescribed for each one's order (of life) hence. makes any one who seeks it eligible for hearing (study) etc. is the other (i.NON-ELIGIBILITY IN THE PRINCIPAL SENSE OP THE KATRIYA ETC. in whose case there is no prohibition as for the sudra. right up to sleep. for hearing (study) etc. devoid of renunciation. for. who do not belong to any order of life. rather. for. it is made clear by the aphorist himself in "Better it can than to this... he whoso mind not directed to the enquiry (into Brahman) is said to be dead". in the principal sense. knowledge. in other orders of life. "Spend thy time in reflection on the is Vedanta. him there is eligibility. permission for such hearing (study) etc. which has a visible result. for ksatriyas and vaisyas. aiwake or asleep. constant enquiry is prescribed in such texts of the traditional Code as " Going or standing. even by the mere absence of prohibition". Nor may it be . for hearing (study) etc... because of eligibility merely in a nonprincipal sense.. belonging asrama). which consists in not engaging in any for other activity. Nor be said that. the eligibility recognised for widowers etc. right up to death".

. and so on. 14 is not their eligibility at all for hearing (study) but the fact of their acts favouring knowledge. practise hearing (study) etc. eligibility in the principal sense is admitted for those (divine beings) even in the absence of renunciation. because of the authoritativeness of the teaching which prescribes saguna meditation as producing release by stages.. because of absence of renunciation.352 objected that what is CHAPTER III mentioned etc. " Because of the decla- ration of non-return". the not engaging in any other activity results of itself in their case. there would be eligi- bility only in a non-principal sense for divine beings hearing (study) etc. and it would necessarily have to be said of those who. hence. in order to be capable of renunciation. after having attained divine bodies through saguna meditation that too. by those who are sense. for the same reason. that is opposed to the already cited BMsya on that section. (It may be objected that) if there be eligibility in a non-principal sense for ksatriyas and vaisyas. in respect of brings about release in stages. the inquiry into the 14 a non-principal Vedanta has to be undereligible in Through some apflrva result . This too may not be said .. who attains the world of Brahma does not return again". hence. for. then. for the purpose of know- ledge. since for divine beings there is no distraction through karma to be practised. 1H431 Now. there would be conflict with such texts and aphorisms as " He. that they should be reborn as brahmanas. for. to the effect that knowledge has a visible result.

other subsidiaries inculcated by the sacred teaching is the object of an apurva-vidhi. like the adrsta. 15 which brings about remembrance of another Like the inquiry into the NySya &c. it ascetics is who " determined (however). may not be said for.) undertaken by those eligible in a non-principal sense. can it serve towards the attainment of knowledge in another birth? It is not. remote indeed is the possibility of the causation of that in another birth. it generates an apurva leading up to the result. if " there is no active obstruction. this may even in the case of that (hearing etc. and it is proper to hold that that (adrsta). on the view that hearing combined with the . because of obstruction by a variety of prarubdha-karma. the hearing (study) undertaken even by are eligible in the principal sense has but a visible result. indeed. (Now). in the same way as the unprescribed inquiry 15 into other sacred teaching. This too. realisation being a visible result. or. on the view that it is the object of niyama-vidhi. the obstruction being its fruit in another be so. does generate birth.POSSIBILITY OF FRUITION IN ANOTHER BIRTH 353 taken for the purpose of the visible result of understanding the sense of the statements (therein). it produces the adrsta conse- quent on the restrictive complementation (niyama) . S I 45 . then. removed. that being seen that this (hearing). in the section Even here. proper to hold that the inquiry of to-day is the cause of the realisation on a different day of what is inquired into. how. which does not generate its fruit in this birth.

e. . injunction in respect of hearing (study) etc. cannot generate the adrsta. tion). 16 earlier. for the sake of knowledge. with subservience to knowledge in another birth hearing. since even that hearing (study) which is performed in the wake of renunciation does not generate any unseen potency. the intelligibility of its subservience to knowledge in another birth? For.. the functioning of means of knowledge in one birth is the cause of realisation in another birth.. links up the hearing (study) effected by it. the fact that. whence. performed . in the absence of an adrsta to link up. ihen. 2-1432 The reply is: the hearing (study) that has to be performed by him in whom has arisen the desire to know. The very same apurva viz. That is to say. which inculcated by Scripture is . through the apdrva of sacrifice etc.354 birth. devoid of the subsidiaries here. as subservient even to knowledge in another birth in this there On the view that there is no is nothing unintelligible. is prompted by the apiirva generated through the former practice of sacrifice etc. which is at their root. devoid of renuncia- (i. viz.. and links up the inquiry.. knowledge. functioning up to the stage of the fruit. which (practice) generates the channel. where there are obstacles. CHAPTER rouses III impressions belonging to a former existence. there is undue extension (of principle) in recognising that. though he be qualified but in a non-principal sense. it causes knowledge in another birth alone has to be explained 16 only thus. however. the desire to know..

does not.POSSIBILITY OF FRUITION IN ANOTHER BIRTH : 355 2-1433 The preceptor. a means to the is fruit. for the most part. which ought be repeated restrictive till to the attainment of the fruit . says thus this is the only explanation possible even on the view of there being a restrictive injunction (in respect of hearing etc. the unseen potency consequent on the generated by that (much of hearing). restriction to hearing (study). consequent on the restrictive complementation. confonpity to. if the restrictive complementation were secured even with the bare commencement of hearing (study) or pounding. might be considered to arise. that has to be accomplished by the exclusive practice of hearing (study). in such a case (indeed). Since it is only as characterised by repetition that hearing. 17 however. prior to the origination of that thing which baseless. prior to the attainment of fruit by the repeated practice of hearing (study). even with that would be secured the observance of 18 the teaching of restrictive complementation. in the is same way as pounding.e. arise. I. For.. be accomplished by the bare commencement of the hearing (study). 17 J.) for. hence it would follow that even though it were not repeated there would be no defect. which generates the un- seen potency consequent on that restrictive complementation. the talk of the is accomplishment of that restrictive complementation Further.8 Vivara^a-'carya. even is complementation which prior to the repetition of hearing (study) till the attainment of fruit. the unseen potency. . . the means to the fruit. verily. characterised by The repetition until the attainment of the fruit. cannot.

Nor may it be objected that there is no . in the Dliyanadipa. one obtains the fruit*bf eighty krcchras". the subservience to two ends is intelligible. is is to the attainment of knowledge. state which is reached by sankhya. Because of the force of (such) statements. say thus to the hearing (study) of the Vedanta. the attainment of knowledge is through the channel of the practice of the means hearing (study)." Hence. in the same way as the ceremonial kindling of fire. hearing (study). which serves to purify the fire. Bharatitirtha. even so is the/ contemplation of the Nirguna Brahman. reflection and contemplation. serves that latter purpose too. on the : From the daily authority of such statements as this hearing (study) of the Vedanta. is only through the might of the unseen potency generated by daily hearing (study). 30 ^Thus. however. denoted by the hearing (sravana) and aided by reflection etc. the subservience of the means. in the same way as the sankhya. There being agreement among all in this matter. denoted by the word yoga. declares yet another means to the attainment of knowledge. reflection etc. that is reached by yoga too... and gained through serving a preceptor. there belongs the origination of an unseen potency of its own. yet because of being enumerated among the ceremonies which purify a man. to knowledge in a hereafter. conjoined with devo' ' : tion. Thus. though it has a visible result.356 2-144 CHAPtER in Some. viz. There are seen such statements of Scripture and the tradi- "That cause is to be " That comprehended through sankhya and yoga ". as the following: which word a means the inquiry into the Vedanta. tional Code.

which are effect and cause. which is commenced for the purpose of determining the attributes to be contemplated (in different meditations). . contemplation is He. in the words ' ' designated as the object of sight. even in the case of the Nirguna. are confined to the same object. in the quarter (of the Sutras) relating to the combination of attributes. as shown in the aphorism.. in other Scriptures like the Tapanfya. seeing and contemplation. for. the Katha-valli etc. there is combination of positive attributes like knowledge. This sense is recognised by the author of the Bhdsya and others in the section on the object of sight (Iksati-karma). in the Saibya-prasna of the Prasmpanisad. "Bliss since they belong to the subject". is the object of contemplaeven in the text about contemplation. (as shown) in the aphorism "But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the imperishable (aksara) are to be comprehended. that is who that tion sees the (Supreme Person. again. (Hiranyagarbha). not anything else. in the next text about the fruit of contemplation. The contemplation of the Nirguna is elaborated even elsewhere. this has been explained ". and of negative attributes like non-grossness etc.. "He Brahman. For. The Nirguna syllable OM of the three matras : taught of the Nirguna alone. who contemplates the Supreme Person with this very " etc. resting in the city". that. as in the case of the upasad.. Further.CONTEMPLATION OF THE NIRQUtfA contemplation at all of the Nirguna. etc. on account of the equality and of the object being the same. it is shown by the aphorist himself. who is higher than this collective soul itself. bliss etc.

through the practice of the contemplation. homogeneous Brahman qualified per accidens by bliss etc. 7 preceptor skilled in explaining the principles (of interpreting Scripture). since Its being the object of knowledge is known from other texts." without detriment to the attributelessness (of Brahman). an intuition of the contemplated attain by Nirguna Brahman. because of dullness of intellect or failure to obtain an eminent . the text about not being known signifies not being really an object of knowledge (over against a subject). since contemplation is thereof well known from the Atharvana-sruti etc. Of which many are not able even . and Nirguna at all. through the Veclanta stages to .. verily. is combination is of attributes like what is contemplated : not the no (we reply) for. even the text about Its not being an object of contemplation signifies its real nature (as not an object over And thus. if it be said that. in accoragainst a subject) " dance with the text. Brahman. having obtained a superficial understanding of the unity of the self and learnt by adhyayana. then. they for whom. If it be said that. follow that It cannot be the object of knowledge either. other than what is known ". non-grossness etc. " Know that alone to be Brahman.58 CHAPTER 111 Now. even without an inquiry into that (#edajuta). not this which is contemplated here". because of the " text It is. do not result. then. no (we reply) for. those persons. the Supreme Brahman is not the object of contemplation. it would . where there bliss. because of the text Now. to hear' hearing (study) etc... contemplation is possible in the form "I am that impartite. if it be said that.

ascertained from preceptors whose knowledge extends only to traditional practice . at the time of fruition.. . is brought together. the intuition of its own content. this (contemplation) is declared in the Prasnopanisad of its observance. in the same way as the contemplation of the small ether within the heart etc. holding firmly. witness. and in other works like the Panclkarana. VasistJia. . and is to be performed in dependence on the teaching of contemplation alone. . > not ignorance or its products. in the writings of sages. but " For the present context. five On being asked by one cowries in one's hand "How who conceals many copies are there?".. if a person replies "five cowries". Even thus.CONTEMPLATION OF THE NIRGUtfA 359 of Nirguna Brahman. and the teaching of the mode which lies scattered in many branches (of the Veda). etc. the emphasis is on the word . in the same 19 This work. "I am the self. in codes like the Brahma. even in the absence of basic evidence in the nature of knowledge of the particular number which should be the basis for framing the answer. etc. yet. which the contemplation of the Nirguna generates. (that reply) of the nature of an arbitrary supposition yet happens to be true. in the same way as the teaching about agnihotra sdtras. the I am Brahman itself". attributed to SaAkaracarya. starts with premising an inquiry into samadhi and ends with saying that samadhi consists in remaining rooted in non-difference. even contempla- tion may in some cases lead to true knowledge. brought together) in the KalpaOn the analogy of the illusion that does not fail (is to accord (with experience in practice). contemplation of Nirguna Brahman does not stand in need of the the indubitable object as basic evidence which discriminates of the nature (contemplated).

on both of these views. and as contemplation succeeding reflection in the path of sankhya. intuition of the absent adored one.360 CHAPTER III way as the contemplation of the small ether etc. hence the path of sankhya is the better alternative. this exists as contemplation from the very first in the path of yoga. through the channel of hearing (study) etc. further. however. in the sections "Up to death. " there is the text Thereupon he perceives that partless one contemplation is settled to be the instrument in the love-lorn swain's by contemplation". the intuition of Brahman . necessarily relates to a true content. deep meditation not being enumerated among the means of valid knowledge. for then too it is thus seen There is option. what is the (specific) instrument for the intuition of 4-1 Brahman? Some say that it is but deep meditation consisting in the repetition of a cognition. the difference (between for the person devoid of obstacles. Now.. Through contemplation. and non-different ".. for. the results being (in Scripture) ". in the case of those who contemplate the small ether is etc. hence the path of yoga is the inferior alternative. moreover. Nor is it that there is no evidence of its being instrumental to the intuition of Brahman. it through deep meditation there is is intuition of the 4-11 Saguna Brahman that contemplated. Now. (the intuition comes) with delay . : This. even like the intuition generated through means of knowledge like hearing is (study) the two) etc. however. " admitted that as (identical with) themselves.. for. the intuition of Brahman comes about soon.

validity is intelligible. . for. only) in the manner of the crow causing the fall of the palm-fruit for. of supposition. like the activity of contemplation.. It has indeed been said by the author of the Kalpataru " The immediate cognition : Brahman of Brahman generated by deep meditation generated by contemplation of the knowledge generated by Vedanta texts does not become delusive 21 because 22 of the strength of the basic means of Nor knowledge. there is agreement (between the two cases) in respect of non-sublation of content deep meditation on cither of the paths is based on the understanding of the identity of the self and . as in the case of that modification (vrtti) of maya. being a mental act other than cognition.DEEP MEDITATION AS THE KARAtfA 36 1 generated thereby cannot be valid knowledge. the Vedanta texts. that which is not based on valid evidence cannot be valid knowledge the activity . Nor can validity result through the non-sublation of the content. I. whether subto inquiry or not. even the intuition is based on means of valid knowledge. as in the case of the supposititious knowledge of the particular number of cowries. 20 ISvara is on the analogy of the said to be omniscient. even where the not sublated. 20 further. Him. maya 21 A vrtti of is therefore postulated and the postulation is valid. validity is not admitted of content is it. as in the case of desire. 22 Like the love-lorn swain's intuition of the absent adored. though not based on 4-12 established means of knowledge. Not so (we reply) . which happens to accord (with fact. which belongs to Tsvara. S I 46 .e. and jected hence. There must be a vrtti for vrtti of the internal organ for the jlva. resulting from the Vedanta.

I am all. because of such texts as " This subtle is mind".. be understood by the seen by the concentrated intellect" self is to for.' this is supreme world enjoyment). an inference based on practical efficiency. For. not revealed by something other than that. "(This) etc. Deep meditation. there is " the saying of the Bhdmati: The internal organ. (i. . 'all "He thinks (in dreams) Moreover." negation of the respective Even in the text " (Becoming) pure of the 23 The Vedantins. however. " of a nature opposed text to the dream-world" his etc.CHAPTER is III there the contingence of validity being extrinsic.e.g. is of service as an auxiliary to the mind.. unlike the Naiyayikas. e. Others." the instrumentality of the mind is accepted even in the intuition of Brahman in dreams. say thus: the mind alone is the instrument of the intuition of Brahman. there is settled of it instrumentality in respect I ". aided by maturity of contemplation of the sense of the text. 24 In the Upani$adic text "That thou art/' . which is the means of the knowledge of the cogniser etc.2 ". It is taught to be thus even in the following words of the Pancapadikavivarana: " Of the internal organ. in the this is but myself. manifests in the case of the immediately experienced denotation of the thou 24 its being the denotation of the 4 that.* through adjuncts. 28 for. hold that the validity of a cognition is self-revealed. there being no other instrument (active) then. of the valid knowledge consisting in the psychosis in the case of the conditioned self. the purity of the basic (means of knowledge) is considered only for refuting (the possibility of) exceptions 4. however.

on the rise of the intuition of Brahman.. however. however. in such texts as verily.3 declaration of release while embodied (jivaiimukti). of itself the instrument. and (3) because of the declaration of Brahman as knowablo " through the Upanisads alone. " To him. only the major texts of the Upanisads are instruments for the intuition of Brahman. immediately after instruction by the preceptor. " Those who have well ascertained the purport of Vedanta lore " etc. for its instrumentality in respect of knowledge not settled anywhere and the instrumentality of the mind itself as aided by deep meditation being intelligible even in the case of the intuition of the adored by the is .THE MIND AS THE KARANA intellect 363 through clarity of knowledge. for. say thus: (1) because of the 4. darkness". in the text That person " propounded in the Upanisads etc. for the intuition of Brahman is instrumentality to denied by the text " That its ". all mind ia . for him there is delay only so long (as he is not released from the body)". this". which is not thought by the mind (text) relate to the Nor does this immature mind. "He shows what is beyond "That person knows who has a preceptor. not the mind. Yet others. contemplation is accepted only as the cause of mental " concentration signified by clarity of knowledge". it is not proper to assume another is) instrument of knowledge (whose instrumentality not settled. thereupon he perceives that partless one by contemplation ". (2) because of the declara- who knows tion of the non-expectancy of say) contemplation. lover and so on.. in the text any other (instrument. Deep meditation is not.

. as established by the text " By the mind alone to be seen ". cannot be set aside. even those who maintain the instrumentality of mind have to admit of verbal (intuition of testimony that it is instrumental to the mediate cogni- tion of the non-particularised (Brahman) . for. this (other) text should be said to have for purport the denial of instrumentality in respect of that (intuition) for verbal testimony. by the text) "That which is not expressed by speech' '.364 CHAPTER III " That understood in the complement of the text by which the mind. through its primary significance consisting in the comprehension of the sense expressed by the word. in confor" That from which words return mity with the text together with the mind. he the the declaration of the instrumentality of the mind by Bhasyakara in the . for. since concentration thereof is needed even in the generation of intuition through verbal testimony. Nor may it be said that the instrumentality of the mind too. sees with the mind. they say." be objected that the instrumentality of verbal testimony too is denied in respect of that Nor may it Brahman. hence there is not opposition to its instrumentality in respect of that. through secondary implication consisting in what is related to the expressed (sense). its account of (usage) is seen in hears with the mind" this "He etc. for. is thought. the instrumental case (in "by the mind") is intelligible even on it is being a cause (not the distinctive cause). failing of attainment ".

To itself this some say thus: verbal testimony. the generation of not consistent with verbal it 5. cognition be not originated even from verbal testimony. it may immediate cognition testimony whose nature is be said. the mind. when in conjunction is Presumably the view that of the vrttikara who comes in for criticism so often in the &<lrlraka-*bh&$ya t .. there is the authority " of sacred teaching (here too) He who knows the self crosses sorrow".. however. cannot cease in the absence of catory ceremonies laid down immediate cognition of the locus (the self) since in respect of Brahman propounded in the Upanisads no other means of knowledge can apply.IMMEDIACY OF COGNITION THROUGH SABDA gloss 365 on the Gltd is set forth to express a view different (from his own). 25 Now.1 is to generate mediate cognition. when favoured by (the presence of) the mirror. which has attained concentration on Brahman through the host of impressions generated by the repetition of the cognition preceded by the hearing" of and reflection on the sacred teaching. this is assumed in the same way as that the oblation made in the fire consecrated by the purifiin the sacred teaching generates an unseen result. does give rise to immediate cognition. establish it thus. the superimposition of agency etc. for. in conformity with what is seen it is seen that an intuition of the lost : 5 2 . if immediate . which is immediate. even thus. Others. impossibility of release would follow. viz. damsel 25 is generated by the mind. though devoid of capacity (therefor).

sions.). And thus. though by itself it is not capable of (creating) anything external. Nor does the immediacy of the object consist in its being the content of immediate cognition. Nor does immediacy result for merit. as effected by the psychoses. and since . 5. for 'they while it imperceptible.since 110 other explanation (of that immediacy) is possible. it consist in the non-difference (of the object) from the intelligences of the respective individuals (who cognise) thereisnoiion-pervasion (of the definition) in respect of any case. nondifference from those (individual intelligences).3 others. is admitted only of a perceptible inert substance that there is immediacy when there is non-difference from (merit etc. there being no distinction in respect of their being posited in the witness. hence. and . for the pot is.ggg CHAPTER III with intense meditation. however. stands to reason.) are intelligence.. . so as to involve reciprocal dependence rather does . intelligence outside tive from the intelligences of the respec- individuals. posited in the intelligence outside. there because of the manifestation of non-difference of the etc. are non-different therefrom. being posited in the witness. since (Brahman) all is ever non- different from the intelligences of persons. since the internal organ and its properties (pleasure. as in conjunction with contemplation. say thus what is called the immediacy of cognition consists in its having for content Yet : an object which is immediate. pain etc. in the same way as the internal organ and its properties like cognition. the generation of immediate cognition even by verbal testimony. demerit and impres.

at the stage when it is defined by a psychosis whose sphere ia non-different therefrom. from the respective objects. since self -luminosity is denied to be that which consists in having itself. not psychosis-revealed. immediate ". on the latter view. happiness etc.. . like the attribute of being inferential knowledge. for. not. immediate in nature.. not of a psychosis. i. 27 Because immediacy is an attribute of intelligence. for content rather . being witness-revealed. tliis immediacy is an attribute of intelligence alone. an attribute of the psychosis of the internal organ. could never be Immediate. Hence it is 27 that there is immediacy in is respect of the witness whose nature 26 All objects being superimposed to illumine always on intelligence. of the happiness which is of the self's nature. of cognition consists in the non-difference immediacy of the intelligence. even The Advaitavidyacarya. the particular object. the declaration of immediacy of the knowledge of Brahman through verbal testimony stands to reason. they are yet they are not always immediately present. however.e. it does not cover the cognition.IMMEDIACY OP COGNITION THROUGH ABDA 367 (knowledge from verbal testimony) has for content an immediate object as stated by Scripture itself in the " That " immediate Brahman" in the text words Brahman which is direct. however. thus) just as in the case of respective objects immediacy of the object consists in the nondifference from such intelligence as is favourable to (is it : 26 even so the empirical usage in respect of itself. And thus. favourable to the respective empirical usages. says thus : the 5-4 immediacy of cognition does not consist in (its) having an immediate object for content. hence the qualification "favourable to empirical usage in respect of itself.

Nor is this contra- whose nature by the experience (of immediacy) . is unduly wide. it is intelligible that that experience has for content the immediacy present psychosis. in the psychoses of the senses. no (we reply) for. the manifestation if for. for the content-intelligence obscured by ignor- ance there is no manifestation of non-difference from the non-obscured psychosis-defined witness-intelligence . the immediacy (here) declared in the case of the cognition and its object. Hence that though. there 28 Either for the heart Is etc. there is in fact non-difference of the jiva from Brahman.. or for the mediate by & verbal psychosis etc. ignorance investing the content-defined intelligence .. from is to objects).. (knowledge) some time a conjunction .. of the non-difference of the psychosis-defined intelligence from the content-defined intelligence could If this be urged. whose sphere the heart etc. both being within the body). . . in the intelligence as defined by the Now. hence. in the stage of transmigration. of the nature of intelligence defined which are mediate.CHAPTER happiness (resulting III etc. in respect of pot etc. as applying to the psychosis. verbal knowledge having for its sphere the heart etc.. viz. as also the content there of be at that perchance. hence there it is is no 28 possibility of immediacy. for. a mediate psychosis is not capable of removing the not be avoided. (which are within the body and do not require the going forth of a psychosis). and of the intelligence which dicted is illumine the happiness of the nature of the self. of the psychosis and the content (as there may well be. cognitions.

29 for. knowledge as such (not immediate cognition) would be what removes reply) 29 . (cognition of) the difference from its own locus. Now. 30 Hence it is that. be brought about by the removal of the ignorance present in the intelligence defined by its own content. which is an obscuring agent in respect of a particular person. Maitra's ignorance. it could not be what brings (the immediacy) about the removal of ignorance. 30 intelligence. there is the difference effected by obscuration due to ignorance. there being for Brahman too no immediacy of the jiva. since ignorance is not an obscuring agent in respect of Isvara. which consists festation of non-difference doifined in the mani- between intelligence as by the psychosis and as defined by the content. difference whose counter-correlate which is the locus of that ignorance. I the object-defined S 47 . for (of the knowledge that removes ignorance) this very On ground of the existence of difference effected by is obscuration due to ignorance.IMMEDIACY OP COGNITION THROUGH SABDA is 369 no immediacy thereof. That is. the ignorance. brings about in respect of that person it alone. when by Caitra's cognition his igno- rance of the pot is removed. If this be no (we ignorance. does not bring about in Him (cognition of) difference from the jiva. consequently there is no unintelligibility content-intelligence of Caitra's experience of the immediacy of the pot. which has not been removed. brings about the difference of the (from himself) in respect of Maitra alone. if thus immediacy. said. Nor thus does there result lack of omniscience (for Brahman). hence. for.

and and in the case of one who has as to reflection conquered mental distraction by the practice of reflection etc. no (we reply) for. there would follow the futility of reflection If this be said. because of the resolution of difference grounded on that (ignorance). removes ignorance. since for. that (ignorance) being removed by him who has performed the hearing (study indubitable knowledge through verbal testimony for of the Vedanta). which. sense-cognitions since are of this character. of all. the defect of mental distraction.. indubitable knowledge be present as the result of hearing (study). though etc. arises only as in conjunction with its own content. and its immediacy. because of the excellence of its cause. with the removal of ignorance these are quite intelligible. its capacity to remove ignorance. because of the obstacle. the (realisation of the) .370 there is CHAPTER III the qualification that that cognition alone. the practice of the content of the restrictive injunctions contemplation is fruitful . arise only as in conjunction with its content. Brahman-intelligence which is the material knowledge. why Vedanta learnt through repetition (adhyayana) ? Nor may it be said that that is not what removes ignorance. since thus. And Brahman- though arising from verbal testimony. does. in the may removal of this (obstacle). in a former existence. should there not be immediacy through the removal of primal ignorance even by the knowledge of that (Brahman) generated by the Now. . ignorance is not removed. it is not of the nature of certitude of existence even thus. thus. cause viz. when arising..

there cannot result therefrom removal of ignorance 6-1 concerning Brahman.. there cannot result therefrom the removal of primal ignorance. even thus. Nor may it be said that though the psychosis. for. Nor may it be said that when. by the psychosis with the form of pot etc..COGNITION OF POT &c. in the same way as through the knowledge of Brahman? Nor may it be said that. through the knowledge of pot etc. if it were not (the content). can be no obscuration in respect of what is inert. since it has not the form of impartite bliss. of such psychoses of the intellect as "'the pot is real ". then. in the case of him who has performed contemplation. consequently. or bliss-ness is not present there as a impartite-ness intuition . the intelligence defined thereby shines forth as reality even by selfmanifestation and that this (intelligence) is not the content of a psychosis in the form of pot etc. AND IGNORANCE OF BRAHMAN 371 is immediacy of Brahman through the bare teaching (certainly) to be recognised. which has a different content.. Now. it is admitted that Brahman as reality is the content. Verily. since that (knowledge) has not Brahman for content. while ignorance would have for content the intelligence defined thereby. there could not be the removal of that ignorance for. in the form of pot etc. for. for. by the knowledge. that form is absent even from the generated by the Vedanta. knowledge \vould have the pot for content. why should there not be removal of ignorance concerning Brahman. have for content the intelligence defined thereby. the pot is not the content of ignorance since there . ignorance relating thereto is removed..

whose nature is settled to be the bringing about of the removal of ignorance. for.. when there does exist other knowledge too. in even the settled cause (of removal) consisting in having the same content as the ignorance though the defining element defined is of the nature of nonis desired to be removed there be posited. Nor not possible to effect may it be said that since defined intelligence. is and that consequently there the form of pot etc. which the content of primal it ignorance j if this (too) were posited. . psychosis in the form of pot whose content etc. modal ignorance should be said to have for content the non^posited intelligence. . as (otherwise) there would result detriment to the Vedantas having an impartite sense consisting in the generation of valid knowledge whose sphere is not the relational Nor may it be said that there is a restriction as to the removal of that (primal ignorance) that knowledge alone which is generated by the by Vedanta. contingence of the removal of primal ignorance by that (modal knowledge) cannot be helped. is the has not for content that which ignorance. viz.. and even the which removes that (modal ignorance) should necessarily have that (non-posited intelligence) for content hence. even on this view. is posited intelligence.. would be inert like pot etc. for. it the content of primal is the true. what . the cognition of pot etc. is but posited. which is the content of primal ignorance.872 CHAPTER III mode. it is any such even the restriction. and could not be the content even of modal ignorance... undefined intelligence. consequently. not for the psychoses.

Nor may etc. arises. becomes. obscuration is dispelled. not the self within ". is intelligible even because of the latter having pot etc.SENSE-PSYCHOSES CANNOT GRASP BRAHMAN. like the pot itself. for content.. since. . of the nature of self -luminosity and reality. that has for purport the being known may be known by all in a figurative sense by the psychosis (in the form) of pot etc. qualification "Him who is propounded in the Upanisads ". are also the content of ignorance. while the non-manifestation of that (pot etc. ignorance of the pot is destroyed ". in "I know not the pot by cognition of the pot. for it is taught by such texts as His form does not stand within the range of vision. that it is incapable of being perceived by the sense of sight etc.. therefore they perceive what is without. the function it of obscuration being absent. for for. perceives him with the sense of sight ".) it is be said that there (in the case of pot not meet to recognise ignorance. in the words " the pot is real ". "The selfexistent forced the senses outward. content. since modal ignorances are experienced to have pot etc.) is intelligible even because of the . when the psychosis in the form of pot etc. Nor is there conflict with the statement " The nature of Brahman being settled of the Vartika to be such as ever " cognitions whatsoetc. 373 6-2 To is this the preceptor replies thus : intelligence not the content of a psychosis generated by the sense " of sight etc.. for. And the dispelling of obscuration by the cognition of the pot etc. the object of empirical usage. in the same way as primal atoms etc. there is also the . pot etc. and Brahman... no one .

a content of primal ignorance at all but the respective inert things are the contents only of the modal ignorances located in the defined intelligence as. since in the manner constitutes stated pot etc. yet being indirectly the content of admitted. in that for the luminosity of intelligence as defined by the inert there is obscura- ignorance is tion by ignorance. which what causes removal of that ignorance. otherwise.374 CHAPTER 111 obscuration of the intelligence that should reveal it and is detfined by it. . the capacity for such empirical usage as "It does not exist. the contents of primal ignorance too. it is the having of that as content by a cognition. other than its own effects. for. for. 32 is Or else. there should be the removal of primal ignorance even with the intuition of pot etc. . in the manner indicated. on the strength may be of the result (we conclude that) effective-ness in the removal of that (primal ignorance) belongs to that (knowledge) alone. intelli- though conjoined to the eternal luminosity of gence. that which is obscured by ignorance directly or indirectly. 32 The content of primal ignorance. being directly the content of ignorance is denied of the inert. since we see from the event that it is not removable by any know- ledge short of that. and primal ignorance can be removed by Brahman-knowledge alone. which has for its content what other than the effects of that (primal ignorance). 31 Nor does it follow from this that. though. and that thence results for the inert. the content need not be the same in all respects. is Brahman. for. it is enough that there should be some identity of content. if the intelligence of 31 For knowledge and ignorance to be opposed. the inert is not . it is not manifest ".

the word " revealed " signifies only what is conjoined with illumination. in the case of what is 33 which As defined by colour and again as defined by smell. in another way by its .THE INERT (i. if that (intelligence) be not manifested.e. through a psychosis of the sense of sight. while.colour and in a third way by its configuratiin. intelli33 the properties of a gence cannot exist twice over. and from the non-manifestation of that (intelligence) there would follow the nonrevelation even of is colour etc. there would follow non-manifestation even of the existence and colour of the sandal-wood. Nor may it be said that because of the manifestation of the intelligence defined by the existence and colour of sandal-wood. the latter is not revealed for. for. . in the same way as nacre-silver (is revealed) by the intelligence defined through the this-element of nacre. associated with a psychosis of the nature of smell. these (properties) are revealed even by the intelligence defined by the substance which is their locus. so too of intelligence. which are pervasive of the whole of . because of the non-manifestation of intelligence defined by the smell. IS THE CONTENT OP MODAL IGNORANCES 375 defined by) a piece of sandal wood be manifested by a psychosis of the sense of sight. from the manifestation of that (intelligence) there would follow the revelation of smell too. cannot each define intelligence separately. their locus.. while. 34 since any more than they can define ether separately . Nor is there any restriction that smell is revealed in that intelligence alone. single substance. 34 Ether is not delimited in one way by the smell of the pot. these two are revealed. in the absence of a psychosis of the nature of smell. there would result immediacy even for the smell associated with that.

in the same way as. and consequently. is which of pot. nor does it follow that they should remove primal ignorance (as well). there is no immediacy for any other content for immediacy is admitted only for those is . that it should remove primal ignorance for. therefore. in the case of the psychosis in the form "I". removing modal ignorances. not for another. there is no unintelligibility whatever in psychoses with the form of pot etc. whose content is the jiva. Therefore. even in the absence of a psychosis with that form. even thus. the assumption of non-revelation would be self-contradictory. through differences in the content as through differences in the cogniser. when there is for Caitra a psychosis in the form intelligence. which are not obscured. even so. Nor does it follow.376 CHAPTER III conjoined with unobscured illumination. there is removal of the obscuring ignorance for him alone. there removal of the respective obscuring ignorances alone. that it is not conjoined to smell. recollection "I am he " has but for content the quali- fication of the self-luminous intelligence by earlier and later temporal properties. (and) it is impossible to say of the manifested the material cause of smell. the . because hence. modal ignorances having thus the respective inert things as contents. along with* the qualification . differences modal ignorance have to be predicated of the one intelli- gence. of their nonof difference from intelligence. through the psychosis in the forms of the respective contents. content of that but the non-intelligent element associated with the self-luminious intelligence even the is . and consequently revelation of the content (pot) for him alone.

since primal ignorance has that non-difference for its sphere hence. which is generated by the Vedanta alone. 35 . signified by the text about the obligation to hear (study). however. the non-difference taught by the means of knowledge. that. have for content intelligence as defined 6-3 by the respective objects. its content. removes unhindered the ignorance about Brahman hence. which is generated by texts like " That thou art " and 6-4 pertains to the non-difference of the jiva from Brah- man. in conjunction with the unseen potency due to the restriction. removes primal ignorance. were other than intelligence. it is that knowledge of Brahman. there is no possibility of its removal by the cognition of pot etc.RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTION OP VEDANTA STUDY 377 intelli- of it by the internal organ. heard in order to restrict (the means) to " in conformity with the restrictive the Vedanta injunction of the Vedanta. there is the statement to be '. duality would result. say thus: that knowledge alone. and hence. which has for sphere the bare existence of intelligence. it Nor may be said that if therefore. intelligence itself is non-difference. say thus: it is said in the " Vdrtika All means of knowledge being possible (in the case of fruit ' Brahman). Not the non-difference of jiva-intelligence from Brahman- intelligence. however. admitting that psychoses with the form of pot etc. there is no possibility of its removal it is . Others. that. by the cognition of pot etc. it has not gence for x Some. S I 48 . . which makes known the truth. 35 and that.. because of its being the locus of the of all means of knowledge.

30 when we speak of the " knowledge of non-difference". the substrate and their relation. yet. but in respect of mode. " This that pot" has the pot for we of the existence distinguish knowledge of non-difference from knowledge of intelligence. and Thou Though respect of having for sphere the qualification. in respect of pot etc. under the control 37 on the two of special causes. which are the expressed senses of " there is no distinction in ". Whether as between doubt and supposition.e. the is a knowledge 36 I. substrate and their . 37 Consideration of the incompatibility of apposition between the expressed senses. not in respect of content. or again. or between knowledge and knowledge of the qualification. the which is property of being knowledge as qualified.378 CHAPTER III consequently. rather does the knowledge of nondifference consist in having intelligence for content through a special relation sni generis. We respect of content. doubt is different from the arbitrary supposition "This has the property of a post as well as that of a man. such as the reflection " " That substrates. declare a difference in its sphere. difference ascertained in respect Similarly.. the cognition of pot etc. other than the comprehension of an aggregate.. indeed." (in neither 38 case) is there of content. such as the knowledge of the qualification (as qualification) . and resort to secondary implication by abandoning part of the expressed sense. for the knowledge as qualified. (but) through a special relation sui generis. under the control of special causes. which has that too for (intelligence) for its sphere. consists in having for its sphere those very three. has non-difference do not. 38 as qualified relation.

Cognitions of nonexistence and similarity are linked by relations sui generis to the locus and counter-correlate with the locus . And thus. such objects as pot could never be cognised. content.. with the counterthere is correlate (there is another special relation. it is possible to maintain reciprocal distinction as between knowledge of non-difference (and knowledge of intelligence as such). in the case of psychoses which are conjoined with their contents by a relation sui generis. and this alone constitutes the knowledge of its nondifference. when it is not possible to establish a difference" in respect of content.. which is a modification of the internal organ. if it were in a relation 39 of identity. in these and other ways.KNOWLEDGE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OF NON-DIFFERENCE 379 content through a special relation sui gmeris . since they are not identical with the psychosis. the latter too would become contents of the psychosis. for there is not ascertained any non-difference other than this. viz. there are assumed secondary distinctions among relations sui generis. the relation of support and what is supported. viz. through the assumption of secondary distinctions even in the settled relation sui generis. the relation of content and cogniser of the content. it would follow that the internal organ is the content of tha psychosis with the form of the pot etc. differentiated from the knowledge generated .. conjunction and 39 (as relations) in respect of the identity being too wide content. viz. since it is not admitted of Brahman-knowledge that it has for its sphere some relation called non-difference. a special relation sui generis. by the mere word "pot" etc. there is no detriment to the impartiteness of the sense of the Vedantas. else. Even so. since it psychosis were in a relation of bare conjunction with the is in such conjunction even with the eye-ball etc. If the .) the relation between correlate and counter-correlate.

and not from the conjunction with fire for. threads etc. since even in the burnt cloth. threads too being burnt in that case. for. the . which is the non-intimate cause. Nor may it be said that conflict be not seen elsewhere according to the teaching of thfe on the conjunction (of the cloth) with parts being disjoined 10 the desfire. what is effective in the removal is con.80 6-5 CHAPTER III Now. for the effect. in the is 40 The reference nature of destruction. caused by knowledge and ignorance having the same content. the parts thereof. if this be said. is no evidence for the assumption of disjunction of parts and the like. . below the dyads or dvya^ukas. are indestructible. Nor does it stand to reason that. as between conjunction (of a cloth) with fire and the cloth.. there does exist here such conflict. while disjunction of parts is not . primal atoms. no (we reply)..since lower down41 there is no destruction of parts. for though such between the effect and the cause. the burning of the cloth being seen to be simultaneous with that of the filament. there seen as in the case of a pot pounded with a hammer. for. there is no such conflict with its material cause. the removal of primal ignorance by Brahmanknowledge stands to reason as little as by the knowledge of pot etc. truction of the cloth results only from the destruction of the conjunction. such conflict is seen even as between the effect and the cause. the destruction of the cloth results from the destruction of the intimate cause. flict consisting in not suffering the continuance of that. there is seen the continuance of the earlier configuration. it not proper to assume a sequence. while.<?. 41 /. is to the Nyaya -Vaige$ika teaching about the for. further. further.

. Brahman-knowledge superimposed on the self. Others. however. even so. cite here the example of the burnt up a heap of graps* 43 fire that has there any restrictive rule that destruction is generated by something other than the counteris Nor 73 correlate. while removing the That is to say. which If the this be powder while water. cite. after removing by combustion what can be so removed. since there would be undue extensiveness in the generation of destruction by the counter-correlate alone. yet others. there being no other destroyer? knowledge. while removing the whole of the universe superimposed earlier. the fire. dies out and removes itself. however. in respect of the removal of 7-2 oneself after the removal of others. removes itself as well. just as asked. how could it be destroyed.DESTRUCTION OF THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS 381 case of those parts. some sa(y thus of the clearing nut mixed with causing the precipitation of the mud : 7-1 already conjoined (with the water) causes its own precipitation as well. since there is no ground (for such a rule). this Brahman- 7-0 the destroyer of ignorance with all its developments. heat. and since there is inconstancy in such destruction as that of the fuel-less fire. Nor may it be said that. the analogy of water consumed by the heated metal 42 . destruction should be said to result only from the conjunction with fire. Now. removes itself f<& well. Even thus. 42 43 The water. let this be is so.

for. the destruction of the knowledge even of pot etc. There is no undue extensiveness in the sense that no other cause would be needed even for the destruction of pot etc. Nor does it (undue extensiveness) help to establish the need for another cause even respect of the destruction of BraJiman-knowledge. for non-requirement of another cause is not declared in respect of all destruction. would need no other cause. destruction of fire which ha^s no fuel again. as on that analogy it should help to 111 establish even the need for hitting with a is hammer. even so. though for the destruction of fire which has fuel a visible cause such as sprinkling water is needed. that is to say. unseen potency. that is not needed for the . . that is not needed for the destruction of the cognition immediately preceding sleep. though for the destruction of knowledge which does not remove primal ignorance there is need for another cause. another cognition. though for the destruction of u waking cognition there 44 is needed another special quality of a contrary nature. and that. yet for the destruction of the knowledge which does remove (that ignorance). 44 Of the soul. even in the case of such destruction as of the fuel-less there are other causes such as time. the Lord's desire. on the analogy of the destruction of the pot. that (cause) not being needed is intelligible..CHAPTER III some other cause should necessarily be fire. for. undue extensiveness is not understood (by him who urges that as a defect here). . Nor there undue extensiveness in the sense that because of agreement in respect of being destruction of knowledge. stated.

and. this is a contingency of the acceptable the entire universe . it is admitted that that (knowledge) which is included in that (universe) is also consumed even then. there no opposition to the destruction of Brahmanknowledge too being generated by other causes like time. after the removal of the entire universe. if a cause other than knowledge be needed here (for destruction). since illusoriness that (definition) is is admitted to consist in . is the solitary residue. unseen potency or the Lord's desire. removability by knowledge alone for the meaning of removability by knowledge. what is admitted is not that. on the analogy of the destruction of the fuel-less fire. whether as the relation between intelligence and nescience or as an independent substance. in the moment prior to the simultaneous consumption of all. there is the removal of Brahman-knowledge. while not being removable by any accessory not conjoined with knowledge.DESTRUCTION OF THE FINAL PSYCHOSIS 383 Nor is there undue extensiveness in the sense that if another cause be not needed. existence does belong to time. Nor may it be said that. has but this purport. there would result the non-illusoriness of Brahman- knowledge. whether as the grace of the Lord or as a special quality of the internal organ. . the analogy of the fire that has burnt up what was to be burnt up is certainly appropriate. for. further. and to other (such causes). Therefore. even the text "No other path" etc. there would be destruction even at the moment succeeding its own origin for. to the unseen potency. . superimposed on Brahman being consumed at the very moment succeeding the rise of that (knowledge).

cannot remove that. the intuition of Brahman.5 whatsoever in the destruction of : that. what removes it is. 45 while rooting out the entire universe. which is included in that universe. etc. is not what removes ignorance and the universe based thereon for.. illumination. its destruction results from the destruction of its material cause 46 . Ignorance. that analogy Thus. yet. cities etc. however. say thus: Brahman-knowledge.384 7-4 CHAPTER III Some. just as fire while burning up villages. . as for the universe. thence alone the destruction of Brahman-knowledge too. because of the rule that ignorance is removable by .) is intelligible. burns up that faggot too. . however. its removability by an inert psychosis is not possible . hence there is no unintelligibility 7. when conjoined with a is to burning glass.. there the saying of the wise: reveals grass burns it "The sun's light. which is of the nature of a psychosis. associated with some one faggot. its capacity it to remove that (ignorance is etc. associated be applied here". in its own nature. the luminosity of intelligence associated with that (psychosis) though.. even so the luminosity of the impartite intelligence. rather. as associated with the psychosis of the nature of the impartite. Brahman-knowledge Others. since there is direct opposition only as between knowledge and ignorance. which also. for. say thus removes ignorance alone. as the witness of that ignorance etc. with the final psychosis. Nor would the illusoriness of the universe 45 46 That is to say. is capable of removing that (psychosis) as well .

And etc. the existence of prarabdha-karnm being itself impossible. there may persist a trace of nescience. for. because of the obstruction due to prarabdha-karma. it is generated by the destruction of ignorance. though the removal of the universe is generated by knowledge. whether directly or indirectly. If. the universe too were directly removable by the intuition of Brahman. the appearance of the body etc. that (karma) cannot be an obstruction to the removal of (all) trace of nescience. the intuition of Brahman. be unintelligible. which (trace) is the material cause of the persistence of prarabdha-karma and its effect. the appearance of a body even after the rise of the intuition of the truth. it is intelligible that. which in turn is generated by knowledge. END OF CHAPTER THREE. it is recognised that illusoriness consists in removability by knowledge alone. for. where there exists its opposite. thus is intelligible in the case of one for.POSSIBILITY OF JIVAN-MfjKTI 385 . like ignorance. who is released while embodied: even after the rise of the intuition of the truth. S I 49 . this would not be intelligible.. if it be not removable by knowledge not directly for.


e. on the analogy of the burnt cloth (which retains its configuration). this trace is persistence of which there Some say that it is an element of the projective by the release while embodied? of nescience.CHAPTER Now. Sarvajnatman. hence. and that Devananda's teacher was rethlnanda. 1-3 The preceptor. VII. 144-146.* cannot be the persistence even of a trace of ignorance. which persists in the vessel which contained garlic. of the Pramanalak$anam. sufficient to the SaAkara. the present body etc. that the author's parama-guru was Devananda. Vol. Suresvara. 301. what is IV. on the rise of the intuition that is opposed to it. not gankara. (even Others say that 1-3 after being) cleansed. Nowhere does this approximate SureSvara is no is incorrect. mentions this (following) too as a view: there 1. pp. Sarvajnatman.. the sacred teaching about release while embodied 1 is only for the According to a writer in the IHQ. But the construction is tortuous. M energy of the primal nescience endowed with both obscuring and projective energies. a work of Sarvajnatman's. tradition. It would appear from a Ms. SureSvara. II. comparable to the smell of garlic. it is the impression left behind by nescience. See Travancore . the expression in the text should be rendered as "the preceptor of Sarvajfiatman" i. Archaeological series. Yet others say that it is but primal nescience itself which persists. this (element) being the cause of the persistence of prarabdha-kanna. 1 however. while the information about there Sarvajnatman's guru was one Devesvara and warrant for equating him with Sure^vara.

being existent. the said definition applies in that where there is knowledge. that (knowledge) is sought. since. the cause of evil. except perhaps. though (such removal is) of the nature of the self.388 CHAPTER IV purpose of eulogising the injunction to hear (study) and so on. the removal of nescience. there is. nescience. there is the non-existence 2 The commentator. what is this removal of ignorance? It is but the self. there the absence of that (other). which (removal) is of the nature of the self. in that impressions on the latter view cannot bind. the next instant there is the removal of nescience. as set forth in the this view. for him who has perf oiined contemplation. in the absence of that. says the author of the Brahmasiddhi. Acyuta Kr9ananda. for. that (latter) is what effected by that (former) j" for. may continue for a while even after the rope is known to be but a rope. by the mere rise of the intuition of Brahman. BrahmasiddhL . since that (self) is eternally existent. its impressions may persist. Nor is there futility of knowledge. there to the definition is " When oil the existence of another at is is the next instant. in the absence of knowledge. Therefore. while in the absence of that (knowledge). for. 2-0 2-1 Now. according the existence of one. is in substance that of Ma$(}ana Migra. further. seeks to make out that. is Avhat is effected by knowledge. the removal of ignorance with all its effects and its 2 impressions. evil too would continue . when. on though avidya is destroyed. there is no purpose in the sacred teaching setting forth release while embodied. just as trembling etc. Such a view which is indistinguishable from that of para 3 2.

since the indeterminable has a beginning and has.NATURE OP AVIDYA-NIV1JTTI of that. there is no evidence for the persistence of that (removal) . in the words "will be originated" or "originated". nor indeterminable. like nescience (itself). ignorance for its material cause. Hence it is that just as there is the usage in the present tense "is originated" only in reference to the first instant of that origination. because of contradiction. consisting in (the presence of) correlate. is . so that there would follow. ledge. there is the usage of the present tense in "is later. rather : is it a mode other than the above-said four modes thus says Anandabodha Acarya. even in the persistence of its material cause. as non-duality The removal 2-2 would (otherwise) be abandoned. ignorance. ignorance. and the possibility of its removal by knowrelease. it is intelligible that removal too a modification of existence relating to the last instant alone. earlier and referred to as belonging to the future or the past. there is persistence of its material cause. for. as (then) that could not be effected by knowledge. The removal of nescience. for. real and (yet) unreal. which. nescience. nor of a nature. Nor is there the contingence of non-release because of the rule that where there is persistence of that (removal). viz. is 2-3 certainly indeterminable. That is not real. its 389 counter- of nescience is certainly (something) other than the self.. as well. nor is it unreal. as a rule. even so. just as origination is a modification of existence relating to the is first instant alone.

body torpid with constipation and when an effort is made to rise. however. since for the operation of the nature of effoii. as attaching to the operation.$90 CHAPTER is IV 7 ' removed. which is favourable to the sense of the stem and is signified by themselves. which. in the words "will be renioved" or "removed". there would result the usage "is (being) originated". even in reference to a pot already origi- nated.. selves. the subject of the act of origination. on the second (alternative). the conjugational suffixes signify the sense of relation to present time etc.. If. no (we reply) . thus. since the pot. is referred to as belonging to the future or the past. though rising may not occur. for. the removal were to persist. there would (still) result the usage "it rises". then... for. the pot long since reduced to dust. earlier and later. if this be said. on the first (alternative). or the sense of relation to since there is no relation to present time in the case either of the subject of the act of destruction. in the flatulence. as attaching to what is the subject or object of the sense of the stem and is the locus of the number expressed by (the suffixes) them- present time etc. perishes. . as attaching to the sense of the stem. let it be that these (suffixes) signify the sense of relation to present time etc. there is not the above-mentioned defect of undue extensive- ness. viz. even in reference to a pot long since destroyed. so Now. belongs to the present tim'e . destroyed in reference to the last instant alone of the removal. there would be the usage "is now destroyed" and on. or in the case of the operation favourable to the destruction thereof.

for its locus.. rising. even without its removal. the sense of the conjugational suffix the relation of present time etc. and is the inference to the time not perceived. is special configuration in the potsherds distinguishing them from the shards of a jug or basin. the pot has been for the usage in the locus of destruction. then. suffix and is favourable to the sense of the stem. which is called destruction. being has the like origination a modification of existence.REMOVAL AS A MODIFICATION OP EXISTENCE 391 which time. is is signified by the vis. when the heap of potsherds has hpen removed or when. if destruction should be permanent. respect of the ground that it is in the words " On this ground... since from that possible of a destruction which belongs is when the hammer its falls.. then. there is not seen any correlate. counter-correlate for locus. there is relation to present Therefore. . it would be difficult to avoid the usage "is (being) removed" even in the case of the pot long since removed. why should there not be the perception of that (non-existence) ? If it be said that the destruction of pot etc. broken by a hammer etc. there be recognised a variety of non-existence. that. sense of the stem alone hence. which has that (pot) as counter- And if in the case of a pot permanent and has the ground etc. there does not result from is which persists subsequently and of the nature of a non-existence resting in the same this a destruction locus as the counter-correlate. is to be inferred from the special configuration of the pot- sherds etc.. and which. like (the usage) " On this ground. As destroyed ". as attaching to the .

like the " " in the case of a counter-correlate of pot etc. that which the the basis then. there were admitted a permanent destruction. (present) in these.. absolute non-existence as related to distinct it on times and need not be assumed to have destruction for content. and so on. it would have to be said of the property of being destruction if being for even etc. is intelligible as having for content the locus of the counter-correlate. since even the usage of the non-existence of the pot prior to its origination has its If function fulfilled by absolute non-existence. define basis thus. analysable (indefinable). as based . as 3 It is that they are unthat the property of it is of the be not a persistent mode of non-existence. let that too not be. there would be no antecedent non-existence either". would be ? basis it of and later in regard to time Let have for sphere usage some unanalysable (indefinable) attribute. of the nature of non-existence. that. as it is liable to removed by the pot being brought back. earlier its time what. in the case of tho pot that was taken away. as conjoined to a modification of existence. like after the as destruction to its is of the pot. usage pot being taken the noja-existence. 3 it be said "This being so. . intelligible on the away.392 CHAPTER IV the pot has been originated ". it will no longer the be possible is to prior time of antecedent as as time which the non-existence is and of subsequent destruction. Nor is it being destruction is certainly analy sable. as for the usage of the non-existence of the pot on the ground. . 2-31 Now.

That it is thus with antecedent non-existence too has been elaborated elsewhere. would be baseless. consequently. of that too there would be another antecedent non-existence. on the same principle. in respect of the pot. there would thus result the assumption of uiievidenced infinite destructions and antecedent non-existences. which is the antecedent non-existence of destruction. as the antecedent non-existence of destruction. there is not antecedent noiK existence earlier . it would follow that the pot is its own destruction. Nor is it possible to define the property of being destruction in any other way without involving self-dependence. for. there 4 The pot is originated and it is non-existence. even for the destruction of antecedent non-existence there would be another antecedent non-existence. non-existentiality of the nature of the seventh category for it would follow that even in respect of the antecedent non-existence of the pot. Therefore. there its would 4 result the property of being is it own destruction. when it exists. in the middle alone. Nor that there is intended . nor subsequently is there nonexistence due to destruction. S 1 50 . Nor it that is the destruction of antecedent non-existence some.NATURE OF PRAGABHAVA Ac. hence. there would result nonexistence of the property of destruction. if the latter be taken to be originated non-existence. of that too there would be some destruction. 393 nature of originated non-existence . thing other than the counter-correlate in that case. and thence it would follow that the usage in the case of the pot. belongs to the period subsequent to that of antecedent non-existence. the antecedent non-existence of destruction too would be other than the countercorrelate.

since it is other than both happiness and the absence of misery. it does not persist in release. defect in its being indeterminable: thus says the Advaitavidyacarya. present in the instant immediately succeeding the rise of the intuition of Brahm'an hence. The If this be said. because it is of itself the human goal. 241 Now. hence. says thus even : the non-existence of misery in release is not of itself the human goal. The preceptor. Citsukha. not. it is as subserving these that it (the removal of ignorance) is acknow- ledged to be accomplished by knowledge. And thus. release would not be a permanent human goal. others . endowed with modifications of existence in the nature of indeterminable origination. since in every case the non-existence of misery subsidiary to happiness.. there is no . the removal of nescience too is a modi- fication of existence. (we reply) deluded art thou. as being the nonexistence of obstacles to the manifestation of the is happiness that alone is of is of the nature of the the self. sustentation and destruction. if thus the removal of nescience be momentary. indeed. but the manifestation of im'partite bliss and the destruction of the misery of transmigration result on the destruction of the nescience which obscures the impartite bliss and causes the misery of transmigration. however. happiness all itself human goal.394 is CHAPTER IV for a time the superimposition of pot etc. consequently. removal of nescience is acknowledged to be accom- plished by knowledge.

for the sake of some very superior happiness. there. therefore. the absence of misery is not an intrinsic human goal and cannot of itself prompt the removal.. nor do the facts require such cumbrousness. while happiness is desired as subsidiary thereto. activity is seen in respect of blame-worthy acts like (prohibited) sexual intercourse. though accomplished with long-standing misery. if the non-existence of misery contemporaneous with the momentary happiness were the human goal. When it is of instrumentality to happiness. experience of misery for a long time 5 is intelligible. for. superiority and inferiority are established in and consequently. even if momentary happiness be the human goal.HAPPINESS ALONE THE HUMAN GOAL when it is subsidiary thereto . the experience. which is of the nature of an existent. content of desire. and. viz. assume (besides) that what prompts (the removal) is knowledge of instrumentality to what is desired. the experience of long-standing misery for the sake of that would be unintelligible. possible to define the cause of the removal as knowledge it is uneconomical to define it as instru- mentality to what is desired. in order to cortipre- hend the prompting to activity in respect of the means thereto. Nor is there parity of defect. for. this being more prolix by the introduction "G " Nor would the of being the content of desire. though for a moment. possible even for the knowledge of the instrumentality are to happiness to be the cause of that (removal). it is not proper to assume of the non-existence of misery that it is of itself the human goal. reverse position follow that the non-existence of misery is alone the intrinsic human goal. for. . in the case of happiness. introducing the new element. which generate momentary happiness.

hence.396 while. were. though eternally attained. because of obscu- ration by ignorance.3 Others. superiority and inferiority are not possible. in release. is. like the 34 being of the nature of the inner (self). however. as the basis of that (cognition) . hence. 3. like the forgotten golden ornament round one's neck. is yet. and. made non- Now. there is established for all the cognition "For me unexcellable bliss does not exist' 7 . there is at the being attained of that (bliss) . the projection of all evil being got rid of. there persists. undefined bliss. which. it is not manifest "j hence. the next instant existence of one. 011 the removal of that (nescience). consequently. it is only the attainment of undefined bliss that is of itself the hum'an goal. it too ceases. exhibits objects of a nature contrary thereto . posited non-existence of the bliss of Brahman. on the removal of nescience. in the state of transmigration. in conforaiity with the definition "when. while obscuring that. as long as nescience persists. by nescience. hence it becomes an existent as it object not achieved. is eternally attained! True. Therefore. subsidiary to happiness. even the removal of the misery of trans- migration removal of nescience. it is attained as were. because of being a based on that. whose nature it is to be capable " it of the empirical usage does not exist. its attainment is figurative: thus say it some. on the " etc. in the CJHAPTER IV case of the non-existence of misery.. say thus: in the state of transmigration. undefined bliss.

immediacy does not consist many . non-difference from the intelligence favourable to empirical usage in respect of itself. not secondary or figura- tive). is And thus. because of the might of ignorance. say thus let it be that : imme- 3.IS ATTAINMENT FIGURATIVE ? 397 is certainly primary (in sense. since the element of non- obscuration the truth. as for immediate is 7 cognition through a psychosis. Yet cognised others. that is not the ' ' goal. however. Even thus. there would result immediacy. attained by Some others. say thus: since is what is not 3-31 not a human is goal. of the nature of the 1 since that is which ever non-different from the happiness of the nature of the self. is through the knowledge which self. it present only when there is intuition of stands to reason that the human goal.33 diacy consists in any non-difference from intelligence favourable to empirical usage. though real (even then). there is superimposed the difference of intelligence from bliss. for. knowledge. that does not exist even in release' 6 For. . there no immediacy for undefined bliss. however. in the same way as the difference of the jiva (from Brahman) . hence. which is non-different therefrom. rather (does it consist in) non-difference therefrom! of is an object that not obscured. in the state of transmigration. human Nor may it be said There is immediacy even then. for the smell too of pot. and since. when there is the manifestation of intelligence as defined by pot. the is immediacy of unexcellable happiness. in 6 There being no psychoses at that stage.

the Lord too a variety of reflection. there 1-21 is but subsistence as pure intelligence. on the rise of knowledge for him. is there the attainment of the state of the Lord (Isvara) subsistence ? Or is there mere as pure intelligence is (as ? This has to be discriminated.398 CHAPTER IV the state of transmigration. which is the . on is is the view Even thus. where there are reflections of one in many external . there is no immediacy of undefined bliss. for the released one there but subsistence as pure intelligence. because of the resolution of external adjuncts on the rise of knowledge. jlva. there is resolved the entire world of difference. (the whole of which is) posited by the ignorance of that one ( jlva) follows) : The reply . 4-1 on the view of a single jlva (alone). . therefore. there is immediacy for consequently there is for it the property of state being accomplished by knowledge. however. the produced by the of persons like persists. on the removal of ignorance. for him who has turned away from the of the jlva. being resolved. Now. such as the distinction between the jlva and the Lord. prototype (of which jiva and the Lord are reflections) for. the universe produced by his nescience is dissolved. any more than there is immediacy of the intelligence of one person for another person. the difference of intelli- gence from that (bliss) bliss . the Lord. the world of differences. that such as yet between nesciences jlva and other that. the view of many rise jivas is admitted and a distinction is recognised between the though on the bound and the of knowledge for some one. When released.

the intelligence defined by that same body may get associated with another internal organ. The jiva is pure intelli7 gence as defined by the internal organ etc. The view that mukti it applies only to jivanmukti. for. is LSvara-bhava-'patti is restated in the Siv&dvaitanirnaya. Though this association vanishes in release. with that disappears the distinction of what It is pointless to suppose that another is defined. One may say that it is the body which defines intelligence. assumes that the jiva is intelligence as defined by the body alone. attach to intelligence as defined by the internal organ of the released jiva.. as on the view of (the jiva as a) definition (of pure intelligence). when there has been release intelligence) as defined in a particular way. i f 4. hence. 7 This position is neither clear nor sound. the DIksita himself seems to have veered round to avajccheda-vada. When this is realised. When there is release of what is defined by one internal organ. and (for when another internal organ attaches to it as so defined. 115-120) where. Because of the association of the internal organ with intelligence thus defined. consequently there would be the contingence of fresh bondage for the released. That is why on the view of many jlvas. And by the time he came to write the Parimala. . surely the jiva that is bound afresh (sic) cannot be said to be the very jiva that was released. whereas it is intelligence as defined by the internal organ as well. there is no reason to hold that the jiva now bound is the one that disappeared. the attainment some(i. there would be contingence of fresh bondage. as also the jiva in the form of defined intelligence. the internal organ as what defines has defines and what internal organ may Should bondage result from the contact of intelligence with another internal organ. was released. this statement about the avaccheda-vada does not recur.e.RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OF BRAHMAN adjuncts. (pp. it is meet that the reflection therein should subsist as the prototype alone. times even of the nature of another reflection that is a jiva. hence fresh bondage. Such a view has at least two defects: And even where the body persists and defines. there is bondage. for. see the last paragraph of tfce on I. in release. the attainment of the nature of another reflection possible. on the resolution of one adjunct. the view of (the jiva as a) definition is not supported. the nature of Isvara) is not If that were possible. it here. however. would be difficult to avoid.

the Lord's lordship and characterisation by such attributes as possession of desires which come true are not produced by His own nescience. since is flawless. 4*221 Nor is lordship over all. until the release of all. similarly. when the one Brahmanintelligence is reflected in the many adjuncts. there do exist the nesciences of other persons then bound. another name for nescience. without reflection.e. which occasioned by the proximity of other mirrors. 10 He rather should all this be recognised to be produced by the nesciences of bound persons. on the removal of one mirror. nescience. which come there true. for. characterised by such attributes as possession of desires unintelligible. actual or possible. that the jiva is a reflection. since even then the face is not rid of the property of being a prototype. agency in respect of the possession of desires all. When there are reflections of one face in many mirrors.CHAPTER 4-22 IV the view.. attainment of the nature of the Supreme Lord. however. the reflection therein 8 subsists but as the prototype. there is recognised for the released one. while the Lord is in the position of the prototype and On pure intelligence is common to both. though there no nescience for him. Lit. characterised by omniscience. when on is the rise of knowledge in one reflection its adjunct is thereby resolved. These attributes are manifestations of nescience. not as the mere face. Truly. free 10 from afljana. is since for the is released no. it must necessarily be that that reflection subsists as the prototype.. 8 9 I. lordship over all. which come true and so on. .

of the entire universe .. since. grounded thereon since the obscura. there bliss. SI SI . in all respects". yet theirs is not the unlimited lordship. where this idea is made clear otherwise in the twice. even. damsels etc.RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OF ISVARA'S STATUS 401 4-222 Nor does from the there follow non-difference of release saguna meditation. in all respects. The word occurs in the form "nissandhibandhana". wholly. not removed. on the principle " enunciated in such aphorisms as With the exception of impartite For them there the world-operations. who have attained the state of the Lord. (the Lord) being the topic (where those operations are referred to) and (souls) not being proximate (to that context)" and " And on account of indication of equality in respect of enjoy- ment alone ". " in the manner in which one fruit of respective that" and so on.. Since for those who contemplates contemplate the saguna there is no intuition of the impartite. sentence. 11 all this belongs. in such texts as resolve is in this world. organs. 6). in the Nai$karmyasiddhi (sambandhokti to II. they are also capable of creating by their mere resolve resplendent bodies. to subserve their enjoyment. This is not adopted in the present translation. however. is no manifestation of is equality with the Supreme Lord in respect of enjoyment. etc. there is neither the removal of nescience nor the resolution of individuation tion is etc. The Candrika and Sarartha explain it as "free from sublating cognition (badhaka-pratyaya-r&hita)". 18 and III. for those who meditate on the saguna. destruction to the released. there is declared " As a man's union with the Lord. great 11 The word "nissandhibandha" is mean "sarvatmana. so shall he be on leaving this". characterised by freedom in respect of the creation. explained by the commentator to It occurs once again later.

unrestrictedly free. Ardent Saivas. Another proof of 8LS being an Visnu. for. In such works Visnu appears not as the Saguna Brahman. the release of 4*2241 This view alone the is in conformity with Scripture.. on the view that the Lord is the prototype. Therefore. the First. in order to uphold the rule made by Himself as to the non-futility of the curses of sages. Visnu who came in hot pursuit did not respect the laws of sanctuary but killed both Bhrgu's wife and the asuras.402 therefore fruit of is CHAPTER IV the distinction (between release and the saguna meditation). like an actor. Hence the incarnations. 4-223 or i s there the contingence of fresh bondage for the released. we are told that Tgvara put up with the curses so that the words of righteous indignation from his well beloved sages might not be falsified. early work of our author's] . since ignorance. if they attain the state of the Lord. and to create faith somehow in the curse of Bhrgu etc. but as just inferior to him.) by the Lord. It is thus. association with misery and so on are ]tf declared for the Supreme Lord in such incarnations as Raghunatha . (of Scriptural 12 In the Brahmanda Purana is narrated the following story: in a protracted battle between the devas and the asuras. that has for purport only the acting of these (ignorance etc. without an equal or superior and so on.. however. tTie Supreme Lord. where Bhrgu's wife gave pressed them sanctuary. 12 otherwise. Here. Bhrgu who saw this on his return was exceedingly wroth and cursed Visnu to be born on the earth in various forms and to suffer. in the chapter on the (Vedanta-) BMsya harmony etc. Sutra. the latter being hard took refuge in the hermitage of Bhrgu. there would be with the Scriptural declaration of His being eternally released. see in this incident a proof of the inferiority of And Appayya takes up the same position in works like the Rdm&yariasdrasangrahd. there is no flaw conflict in the released till having the status of all.

purposes which come true". which comes immediately after (the teaching of) the meditation on the small ether. Brahman). is neither elemental ether nor the jlva. small is the ether within that". "As large as this " It ether is.. in the words " the self free from sin " self etc. as stated in the text " He who moves about happy in dreams. because of the two reasons. that the self". as stated in the text "The person who is seen in the eye is the self". reposing and at perfect rest. griefless. he a is the self ". so large is that ether within the heart ". (Then) in the discourse between Indra and (ii) Prajapati. deathless. there is introduced the be taught and is associated with the eight qualities beginning with freedom from sin. earth and so on. Then there is the teaching of the jlva who in waking is is to which present as the seer in the eye. as stated in the text "When man being asleep.. but the Supreme Lord. is manifested in his own form.RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OP ISVARA'S STATUS texts). sees no is dreams. abode. free from old age. (i) is the self free from sin. and the property of being the support of heavens. because of what follows Here it determined that the small ether mentioned in such texts " there is the of in this as Now. the small lotus. 403 is is there is the section " The small (ether ". the subsequent " Both heaven complementary texts which proclaim and earth are contained within it ". who has attained the dream-state. possessing desires which come true. who has attained the sleeping state. as soon as he has approached the highest light j . thirst-less. and who has passed beyond the three states. viz. hunger-less. city Brahman. arising from this body. as stated in the text " That serene being.

Brahman the content of the first This doubt being raised. through the mention of their respective defects. Consequently. IV he is " Hence. it is said " in each recurrence This itself I shall explain to you " further hence there is no room to object that the jiva . who gives this explanation. for. in the absence of that. the eight qualities beginning with freedom from sin exist in the jiva too. because of the express m'arks of the jiva such as dreaming. while recurrence. that the jiva ascertained in the fourth recurrence is that whose true nature has been manifested through being released from bonds. For. not that tainted by the difference incidental to the state of all transmigration. possession of purposes which come true and go on would be inconsistent even in release. the m'ention of the three states is for the understanding of their subsidiariness to the teaching of the fourth recurrence. The aphorist. that is not determinative of the small ether being the Supreme Lord. by the aphorism "If be said that from the subsequent chapter (the jiva appears to be meant) that (which is referred to there is the jiva. for. and. in so far) as its true nature has become manifest ". is the content of the second and subsequent recurrences is alone.404 CHAPTER the highest person.. in the recurrences 9 (of the teaching) "He who in dreams' etc. if the . such properties as the possession of purposes which come true are sublated in this (latter state) . clearly declares that for the released (soul) expounded in the fourth recurrence there is attainment of the state of the Lord. it it is taught.

the true nature of the " 4-2242 Even in the chapter showing the absence of conflict texts or with reason) 13 (among section (it is thus). . butes. what is opposed thereto. from his experience of the miseries of transmigration. to perform evil causes those. In that there is the statement of an objection " If the jlva be admitted to be a part of the Lord.. because of such texts as "He.. there would not be gained any answer to the objection raised. who are understood to be in the relation of the helped and the helper. is because of the declaration of differe- introduced for the purpose of establishing the relationship of part and whole. that non-absolute form of the jlva. aversion and the rest.RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT Otf IVARA'S STATUS 405 enumerated eight properties existed even elsewEere than in the Lord. established by nescience. is attained through knowledge. verily. in (the Supreme Lord. : there would be experience of misery for the 13 Lord Chapter II of the S&tras. he wants to lead up from these worlds. possessed of the properties of freedom from sin etc. The commentator (Sankara) too states very clearly that for the released there is attainment of the state of the Lord endowed with attri- commentary on) that aphorism: "Hence. whom he wants to lead downwards. being respectively the agent in various acts and he who causes the performance of various acts. . enjoyership. united to manifold evil by the dissolution of that. The "A part. attachment. tainted by the flaws of agency. to perform good deeds he verily causes those. then. whom deeds ". as between the jlva rence " and the Lord. viz.

in dreams. from Him. . (Scripture) indeed declares There. the aphorist creator says. and thence. 4-2243 etc.. which is 14 15 Lotfd. the commentator explains the view of that aphorism thus: " That. yet.. established in 15 The the is illusoriness of the dream-world section: " In the intermediate place. again. and by the answer which accepts the non-confusion effected by the relationship of prototype and reflection. of whom that is a part. made manifest) . hence. made clear in the this (statement of objection) By Bhdmatl Lord. foot or some other part. there creation. Supreme. for those who have attained that. in the aphorism " But by meditation on the that which is hidden (is that".406 too. that. it would follow that perfect knowledge is fraught with evil ". the commentator has is made it clear that for the released there attainment of the state of the Even in the chapter which deals with the means 14 is (it is thus). creatorship in respect of the dream-world is not possible for him. in the CHAPTER IV same way as in ordinary experience. though the possession of purposes which come true and so on pertain to the jiva because of non-difference from the by the defect of nescience. better than that would be the prior state of transmigration. proceed bondage and its opposite ". there experience of pain for Devadatta. by the pain present in thfe hand. III. is there will result greater misery. it being doubted if the jiva is the of the illusory dream-world. since they are obscured Chapter 7.e. indeed.

J6 Chapter IV. In respect of the Scriptural text " is manifested in his Even 4-2244 own form" whose content is the released one. and includes omniscience and lordship over all. (it is) not (manifested) naturally By their recognition of the manifesta- tion of the possession of purposes so on. which come true and clear that for the (properties) which serve in the creation of etc.. . there the desire to know in what form the manifestation intended to be described. who." (we are told that) this is the view of Jaimini: manifestation is in that form of Brahman 1 (the description of which) begins with freedom from sin. on the removal of the obscuring film in all beings ". is 407 manifested in some beings alone. ends with possession of purposes which come true. rejoicing with women or vehicles" etc.. dreams Lord. because of the reference etc. (as seen) etc. is is In the aphorism " In the form of Brahman (thinks) Jaimini. free from sin" and the making known of lordly powers in " He moves about there laughing. playing. In the next aphorism "In the nature of intelligence alone. just as the power of clear vision is recovered by the potency of medicine. thus another view is (says) Audulomi ". attain perfection by the grace of the Lord. having their ignorance dispelled by strenuous meditation on the Supreme Real..RELEASE AS ATTAINMENT OP ISVARA'S STATUS obscured. both these have is made it released there attainment of the state of the Supreme in the chapter about the fruit 16 (it is thus). . that being the nature of the self. from the reference in " That self.

since the true nature of the self is understood to be intelligence alone. because of the reference to and the existence of the qualities mentioned earlier. from such texts as "Thus. who interprets the three aphorisms in the sense mentioned.408 CHAPTER IV introduced that. What the aphorist says about the embodied one. since. a mass of intelligence alone ". The author of the Bhdmatl too and those whe came after him adopt in this sense alone the group of aphorisms supported by Scriptural texts and the above cited statements of the revered commentator.. there is absence of conflict. so (thinks) Badarayana ". though from the view-point of truth (the released self) is intelligence alone. there is the possibility of the above-mentioned host of properties which are understood from the reference etc. and since therefore there is no conflict between the two Scriptural texts. and are wholly of Hie nature of maya. yet from the empirical view-point of the person in bondage. 4-2246 stand to reason to say of this extensive host of aphorisms and statements from the commentary it Nor does supported by Scripture that it is an assumption for argument's sake. the aphorist says there is no conflict (between the above two views). this self in that form alone. that his lordly powers. says this) and by the commentator. manifestation is verily. being obscured by ignorance. it is clearly recognised that for the released (By the aphorist who there 4-2245 is the attainment of the state of the Lord. but is has neither inside nor outside. it view " In the aphorism stating the final Though be thus. in the manner stated in Sanksepar ' i sarlraka. .

REFUTATION OP DVAITA VIEW OF RELEASE 409 are manifested by contemplation. for reasons already mentioned. the " author of the Kalpatarw says: What is reflected in maya is not (that which is) attained by released ones". if that were so. would belong to the jiva (too). even is As for what 4-231 then there from the possibility of the properties of freedom sin etc. that. (thinks) Jaimini". stated by som'e dualists that though because of difference being absolute there is not in release the attainment of the Lord by the jiva. mentioned by the the text " laughing. in so far) as its true it aphorism "If nature has become manifest ". playing. Therefore. in the case of (1) the qualities of freedom from sin etc. they could not be distinctive marks of Brahman. Thus. consequently. in the aphorism "In form of Brahman. since it has necessarily to be admitted that for the released there is attainment of the state 4-23 of the Lord. and (2) the laughing etc.. the impossibility of this is itself the defect in the view that the Lord is a reflection. further. The same impossibility constitutes the defect in the view of a single jiva and in the view of absolute difference of the jiva (from the Lord). since freedom from sin etc.. there is conflict with the be said that from the subsequent chapter (the jiva appears to be meant) that (which is referred to there is the jiva. present in the jiva. which are . as for the Lord. there does not result an answer to the (stated) objection. and that thus there is is no contradiction that is absurd. 152 rejoicing". hence. is stated only as an assumption (for argument's sake)".

in (the aphorism) "On is having approached (the light).. and (2) with the freedom from sin etc. as " In stated in the aphorism the form of intelligence etc. there etc. There. therefore. . alone" there would also be conflict with the (the aphorism) having approached (the supreme light).. in respect of in (the aphorisms) "But by supreme. that they are obscured in bondage and manifested in release.410 CHAPTER IV considered even by the opponents to be the sense of the word "etcetera" in "because of the reference etcetera" (of the same aphorism). not through some (adventitious) attribute. it is word "own" signifying one's established that the manifestation intended to is be declared only in one's own eternally established form. there would be conflict (1) with the denial of an adventitious form in release. there is manifestation (of the self's own nature) " etc.. those properties being real. because of the use of the self. that released jivas are but intelligence alone. there would be conflict with the recognition by the " " aphorism stating the ifinal view Though it be thus 1 etc. On the view of difference. indeed... in section beginning with "On the text " (He) is manifested in his own form manifestation in some adventitious form is not declared. it cannot be said that it is his own. that which is hidden (is meditation on the made manifest) " etc. for. there would be conflict with the mention (of these) as of the nature of Brahman. of that adventitious form in which he is mani- " fested. were adventitious to the jiva in release. manifestation " supreme declaration. there would result the futility of the words "in his own". Further if this freedom from sin etc.

consequently. . unrestricted possession of desires true. And Lord thus. that itself is obscured in the case of the jiva. drove it.REFUTATION OF DVAITA VIEW OF RELEASE 4H be said that from the subsequent chapter is referred (the jiva appears to be meant) that (which to there is the jiva. which is (yet) obscured. to evade paying toll. because of the non- which come manifestation of non-difference from the Lord. the fields and by-ways in the Uark. thus. the statement that taught by Scripture. Nor is opponents that there is. 17 17 The story behind the maxim off into is that a carter. hence they should be said to be eternally established. the absence of sin always. even non-difference of the jiva from the is difficult to avoid. as luck would have found himself approaching the toll-house at break of day. it is the story of (the carter who turned up . the illusoriness of bondage is difficult to avoid. and the eternally established possession of desires which come true is obscured for the transmigrating person would not tit in. Nor in the case of him who is in fact always devoid of sin dom from is sin is. that the Lord's eternally established. but. some non-futile purpose. Eternally established free- indeed. in so far) as its true nature has it and " If become manifest" . there the possibility of a relation to sin or a relation to agency and enjoyership based thereon being absolutely real. in the staite of transmigration. rather has it to be explained thus alone. not being presented as his. at) the toll-house at break of day. since there is is no reality for the bondage which opposed to their non-difference besides. recognised even by the as persistent in the state of it transmigration and as having something for its sphere.

there is not the contingence of non-difference 4-23112 so ( from the Lord. . at that time.28111 CfiAfTER IV be said. freedom from sin consists not in the absence of sin. aphorisms this must be supported. for. the origination of that (sin) is acceptable. who Therefore. release of all. it is established that by conform to the cited Scriptural texts and viz. . the assumption of a power those is in vain.412 4. obstructs the The power that 9 generation of sin cannot indeed. that. even because of the might of knowledge. that 18 is qualified cornea into being by unrestricted lordly powers and is Which not eternally established. That ever after the rise of knowledge. even the possession of purposes which come true is to be defined 18 as of the form of a power. even when one performs acts that cause sin. there is non-clinging. Even from being declared (by the non-clinging of sin in release too is intelligible hence. sins. similarly. is shown by the aphorism On the knowledge of this.. in the stage of going round in the migratory cycle. be assumed for the sake of non-origination of sin. till the all released jivas attain perfectly is and in respects that which not opposed to their real nature is as bare intelligence. not through this being eternally established is there the contingence of the illusoriness of bondage. hence. but rather in the possession of Now. (there are) the non-clinging and destruction (respectively) of " subsequent and earlier Scripture)". this this. ' xve r P^y) 5 ^ 01< > ^lei e is no authority for assuming such a souse fur the words. and the state of the Supreme Lord. consequently. it may a power that obstructs the origination of sin.

and is the manifestation of (still) unexcellable bliss. head. . may that be looked upon with grace by scholars skilled in tradition 1 the examination of right X3)-. END OF CHAPTER FOUR OF THE ASTRASIDDH&NTALE6ASA$QRAHA. there is a son known as Appa (1). after having studied all the works. (2). HERS ENDS THIS BOOK. the learned preceptor. in ways other than those of the (respective) final positions. has written this compendious exposition of the rudiments of the different final positions (of advaitins). the the Visvajit sacrifice enjoined (in the son of the performer of the SarvatoScripture).CONCLUSION 413 (all of) and a host of other attributes suitable thereto which are produced by the nesciences of the persons in bondage. following Scriptural basis as well as tradition. mukha-maha-vrata. If there be anything here erroneously set down by me. To Ranganija Makhin. the devotee of Him who wears the performer of moon on His Diksita. made clear to him by a He mere portion of the (preceptor's) constant skill in clear exposition.


ERRATA Read attempt another's in manifested revati-rks of aradupakaraka sannipatyokaraka through gabda-'rthah to be known Sank^epagarlraka Jabalaavuti .

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