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Аналитический доклад
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Аналитический доклад
российской группы
Международного
Дискуссионного клуба
«Валдай»
eng
рус
4 1. Н
овые тенденции в развитии
ситуации на Ближнем
Востоке
8 2. Сценарии развития
8 2.1. Сохранение переговорного тупика
9 2.2. Функциональный статус-кво
12 2.3. В озобновление палестино-
израильских переговоров
14 2.4. Локальные вооруженные действия
16 2.5. О
дностороннее провозглашение
палестинского государства
16 2.6. У
регулирование на израильско-
сирийском треке
20 3. Выводы и рекомендации
Ближневосточный конфликт: поиски выхода
На фоне ставшейся обычной для состояния цев и эффективно используя в интересах укре-
арабо-израильских отношений напряженно- пления своих позиций в регионе поддерж-
сти сегодня здесь отчетливо вырисовываются ку, которую он оказывает ливанской партии
элементы, способные сильно затруднить и без Хизбалла и правящему в Газе палестинскому
того нелегкие поиски мира. К ним относит- исламскому движению ХАМАС, а также про-
ся провал попыток возобновить палестино- должая развивать тесное сотрудничество с
израильские перегово- Сирией, стал воспри-
ры, растущая враждеб- На фоне ставшейся обычной для ниматься как непосред-
ность между Израилем состояния арабо-израильских отно- ственный участник про-
и Ираном, зависимость шений напряженности сегодня здесь тивостояния. При этом
мирного процесса от отчетливо вырисовываются элементы, его ядерная программа,
проецируемых на него способные сильно затруднить и без независимо от того, есть
интересов «новых» того нелегкие поиски мира ли у Запада и Израиля
региональных игроков, основания подозревать
прежде всего — Турции и Ирана. его в намерении создать ядерное оружие,
рассматривается Тель-Авивом, равно как и
Иран, энергично наращивая свое влияние в рядом арабских государств Персидского зали-
Ираке на фоне начавшегося ухода американ- ва, как прямая угроза их безопасности, уже
1947
2. Сценарии развития
С учетом всего сказанного можно предпо- решение самого Обамы, принятое чуть ли не
ложить, что ситуация на Ближнем Востоке вопреки его позиции). Израиль хочет продол-
может развиваться по одному из следующих жать активное заселение территорий, чтобы
сценариев. добиться для себя преимуществ в затяги-
ваемом им урегулировании. При этом изра-
ильское правительство делает ставку на под-
держку со стороны изменившегося не в поль-
2.1. Сохранение переговорного тупика зу палестинцев израильского общественного
мнения. Требование к палестинцам признать
В пользу такого сценария говорит то обстоя- еврейский характер государства Израиль
тельство, что в настоящее время внутрипо- в качестве предварительного условия уре-
литическая ситуация в Израиле не способ- гулирования предназначено для того, что-
ствует прорыву в урегулировании. Коалици- бы успокоить всех опасающихся появления
онное правительство Б. Нетаньяху, в кото- в перспективе двунационального еврейско-
рое входят крайне правые политики, сумело арабского государства.
добиться снятия американцами требования
о замораживании поселений в качестве пред- В пользу данного сценария работает и то, что
варительного условия начала переговоров, в своем нынешнем составе израильское пра-
которое выдвигали палестинцы (хотя при вительство не расположено идти на уступки —
этом Нетаньяху пытается изобразить это как его сковывает позиция А. Либермана и его
живают тайные контакты с ХАМАС, а в араб- мощный контроль вдоль береговой линии, а
ском мире у него есть не только оппоненты, но также массированные ответы на любой даже
и друзья. Его лидеры встречаются с европей- незначительный обстрел, как здесь считают,
цами, выходят в эфир и начинают подбирать побуждают ХАМАС сохранять перемирие.
слова, они стали принимать существование
временного статуса. Им Принципиальные пози-
удалось прекратить хаос в В настоящее время имеет место опре- ции и стратегия органи-
Газе. ХАМАС не признает деленное нерекламируемое сотрудни- зации не изменились. Это
Израиль, но не отрица- чество между ХАМАС и ЦАХАЛ по вопро- препятствует вовлечению
ет реальности его суще- сам безопасности. Израиль, возможно, ХАМАС в переговоры.
ствования и возможности пытается научиться сосуществовать Проблема заключается
создания палестинского с ХАМАС, пока неофициально и в том, что в ХАМАС
государства рядом с ним. нет всеми признанного
единственного лидера.
В Израиле сдержанность ХАМАС относят ско- Структура организации не дает возможности
рее за счет новых мер обеспечения безопас- Машалю или Ханийе принимать решения
ности. Строительство радарного купола, укре- единолично. Решения принимаются на уров-
пление и защита приграничных поселений, не трех существующих основных структур —
2005
Население 2
7683,9 тыс. чел. 3935,3 тыс. чел.
Плотность населения
348,1 чел./кв. км 632,7 чел./кв. км
ВВП 1
195,4 млрд долл. 6,6 млрд долл.
ВВП на душу населения 1
мание у обеих сторон, что нарушение статус- 2.5. Одностороннее провозглашение пале-
кво способно повлечь неприемлемый ущерб. стинского государства
В то же время эксплуатирование угрозы со
стороны Израиля необходимо движению для Поскольку переговоры с Израилем не ведут-
дополнительной легитимации. Сейчас гра- ся, а общая ситуация не внушает оптимиз-
ница с Израилем очень спокойная, и руко- ма, все чаще раздаются призывы к одно-
водству Хизбаллы незачем идти на риск, стороннему провозглашению палестинско-
что, однако, не исключает неожиданного го государства и его признанию в качестве
и непреднамеренного развития событий. полноправного члена ООН. Палестину уже
Поймет ли Израиль в случае нарушения признало несколько латиноамериканских
статус-кво, что оно было непреднамерен- государств, готовятся к признанию другие.
ным, трудно сказать, и не исключено, что он Сторонники этого сценария есть и среди
может дать вовлечь себя в очередной раунд европейских политиков. Суть дела состоит в
противостояния. преодолении асимметричности конфликта.
dÍÉÑÆÐÑÏÇÉÃÁÆÓÍÉÌÌÉÁÑÅÁ
ÍÔÒÔÌÝÍÁÎ % мусульман от населения
>90% 70-90% 50-70%
Мусульмане в мире
в % по отношению к общему числу жителей
Азия
60
Африка
20
Другие страны
20
202 867 174 082 160 945 145 312 78 513 78 056 73 777 73 619 34 199 31 993
Индонезия Пакистан Индия Бангладеш Египет Нигерия Иран Турция Алжир Мароккo
Источник: Pew Research Center, 2009
23 октября 1998 г.
Подписание при содействии
США Уай-риверского
меморандума,
регламентирующего, в
частности, осуществление
передачи палестинцам
оккупированных территорий
4 сентября 1999 г.
Эхуд Барак и Ясир Арафат
подписали в Шарм-эш-Шейхе
2 сентября 2010 г. меморандум, в котором были
Переговоры Биньямина Нетаньяху и согласованы новые сроки
Махмуда Аббаса в Вашингтоне. За ними осуществления
последовали еще три встречи на высшем предусмотренных прежними
уровне. Переговорный процесс соглашениями
приостановлен 26 сентября, после того как промежуточных мер,
израильский премьер отказался продлить намечено проведение
10 месячный мораторий на строительство переговоров о постоянном
поселений статусе палестинских
территорий
Декабрь 2008 г. – январь 2009 Ноябрь 2007 г. Январь 2001 г. 13 сентября 1999 г.
Операция Израиля в секторе Международная Закрытые палестино Возобновление официальных
Газа «Литой свинец». конференция в израильские переговоров о постоянном
Фактическое прекращение Аннаполисе. В переговоры по статусе
переговорного процесса декларации по проблемам
между палестинцами и итогам окончательного
израильтянами. Пауза в конференции статуса. Сторонам Июль 2000 г.
двустороннем диалоге Махмуд Аббас и удалось приблизиться Трехсторонний саммит в
завершилась в мае 2010 г. Эхуд Ольмерт к наиболее Кэмп-Дэвиде при участии
началом непрямых контактов подтвердили продвинутым Билла Клинтона, Эхуда Барака
при посредничестве США решимость вариантам решений и Ясира Арафата. Закончился
выполнять свои территориального провалом: сторонам не
обязательства в вопроса, проблемы удалось достичь компромисса
рамках Иерусалима и по главным вопросам
«дорожной карты» проблемы беженцев урегулирования
Расклад сил
в парламенте и правительстве Израиля
Кнессет 18-го созыва
Кнессет (парламент) — высший законодательный орган Израиля. Формируется из 120
представителей сроком на 4 года
Ликуд 27
Наш дом – Израиль 15
Правящая Авода 13
коалиция ШАС 11
Яадут ха-Тора 5
Еврейский дом 3
120
Кадима 28
ХАДАШ 4
Другие Национальное единство 4
партии РААМ–ТААЛЬ 4
Национально-демократический союз 3
Мерец 3
Правительство Израиля
Премьер министр — Ликуд 14
Биньямин Наш дом – Израиль 5
Нетаньяху Авода 5
(партия «Ликуд») ШАС 4
Кабинет министров Еврейский дом 1
сформирован правящей Беспартийные 1
коалицией 31 марта 2009 года Всего 30
них политических отношений. Для Израиля нии Голанских высот, разве что продолжать
и США имеет значение то, что Сирия поддер- требовать их возвращения в качестве предва-
живает связи с Ираном, Хизбаллой и ХАМАС, рительного условия. Необходимо также учи-
дает убежище террористическим, как они счи- тывать, что без палестино-израильского уре-
тают, элементам. гулирования прогресс на
сирийском направлении
В настоящее время со сто- Без палестино-израильского урегу- мирного процесса вооб-
лирования прогресс на сирийском ще невозможен, посколь-
роны сирийского руковод-
направлении мирного процесса вооб-
ства не отмечается сколь ку Дамаск не хочет остав-
ще невозможен, поскольку Дамаск не
либо заметного стремле- лять палестинцев один
хочет оставлять палестинцев один на
ния возобновить пере- на один с Израилем.
один с Израилем
говоры. С точки зрения
Дамаска, позиции Обамы Иран, который стремит-
становятся все слабее, в ся более активно воз-
Израиле складывается сложная ситуация, действовать на ближневосточную ситуацию,
переговоры с палестинцами в тупике, а, сле- организует поставки больших партий оружия
довательно, у Сирии нет оснований занимать и, прежде всего, ракет арабским оппонентам
активную позицию по вопросу о возвраще- Израиля. Сирия, безусловно, зависит от иран-
ской поддержки, однако она могла бы осво- имному отчуждению между двумя странами.
бодиться от этой зависимости, если бы США Оно обусловлено, как уже отмечалось, не
заняли более благожелательную в ее отноше- отдельными просчетами той или иной сто-
нии позицию. Провалившиеся попытки обви- роны, а стратегической линией правящей в
нить в убийстве бывшего премьера Ливана стране Партии справедливости и развития во
Р. аль-Харири официальных сирийских пред- главе с Р. Эрдоганом на укрепление позиций
ставителей убедили Дамаск в том, что против Турции в мусульманском мире и проведение
него и в дальнейшем будут предпринимать- политики, обеспечивающей им широкую под-
ся подобные провокационные шаги. Но без держку все более исламизирующейся части
улучшения отношений между Дамаском и турецкого общества.
Вашингтоном условий для начала перегово-
ров не будет. Несмотря на обмен визитами Посредничество Турции в непрямых кон-
между двумя столицами при Обаме, амери- тактах между Сирией и Израилем с мая по
канского посла в Дамаске по-прежнему нет. январь 2009 г. прекратилось из-за нападения
Израиля на Газу в декабре 2008 г., в ходе
Новая, проарабская ориентация политики которой была разрушена индустриальная
Турции, по мнению западных и израильских зона, создававшаяся при участии Турции. В
лидеров, лишает ее статуса «честного бро- результате Анкара вряд ли сможет занимать
кера». Отношения Анкары с Тель-Авивом в нейтральную позицию, позволявшую ей в
последние годы постепенно ухудшались, но прошлом выступать в качестве посредника.
стали особенно напряженными после высад- Это в определенной мере скажется и на пер-
ки спецназа на корабль флотилии «Свобод- спективе израильско-сирийских переговоров,
ная Газа». Даже принесение извинений Изра- создав дополнительные препятствия для воз-
илем и выплата компенсаций пострадавшим рождения мирного процесса на сирийско-
не меняют тенденции ко все большему вза- израильском треке.
3. Выводы и рекомендации
Тулькарем
ИОРДАНИЯ
ставителя квартета на влиятельного и опыт-
ного российского политика, пользующегося
доверием и уважением у всех конфликтую- Рамалла
Палестина
Россия США
ЕС ООН
ИЗРАИЛЬ
Analytical Report
by the Russian Group
of the Valdai
Discussion Club
eng
Despite the efforts of the international Quartet of intermediaries and the Obama
administration, the search for a solution to the Middle East conflict has reached yet
another impasse, and the restoration of a lasting peace in the region is increasingly
viewed as a near impossible task. In that light, it seems necessary to revise current
approaches to the problem and return to some previously abandoned ideas that
may now help move the process out of deadlock, as well as develop new initiatives
that could lead to its resolution.
Contents
28 1. E
merging trends in the Middle
East
31 2. Scenarios of development
31 2.1. Diplomatic deadlock
32 2.2. A functional status quo
34 2.3. T
he resumption of Palestinian-Israeli
talks
36 2.4. Local armed conflict
37 2.5. T
he unilateral declaration
of a Palestinian state
38 2.6. S
tabilization on the Israeli-Syrian
track
41 3. C
onclusions and
recommendations
The Middle East Conflict: In Search of a Solution
The habitual tensions in Arab-Israeli relations could change the existing balance of power in
are now matched with circumstances that could the region.
seriously complicate the already difficult search
for a lasting peace. These include the failure At the same time, there have been more calls for
to restart Palestinian-Israeli talks, the growing Israel to support the plan for a regional zone free
hostility between Israel and Iran, and the peace from weapons of mass destruction, thus increas-
prosess’s dependence on the vested interests of ing the prospects for peace. The lack of a positive
new regional players, above all Turkey and Iran. change in the Arab-Israeli peace process on both
the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian tracks
Iran is now seen as a direct party to the conflict could make Iran’s active position in the region
in light of its aggressive expansion of influence attractive to Arab countries in which the people
in Iraq, from which the United States has started see their government’s approach to the problem
to retreat, as well as its support of Lebanon’s as a compromise or even a betrayal.
Hezbollah and Gaza’s Hamas movements and its
promotion of closer ties with Syria. Iran’s nuclear Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdo-
program, which the West and Israel suspect is gan, Turkey, which has traditionally positioned
aimed at the creation of nuclear weapons, is itself as a defender of NATO’s southern flank, is
seen in Israel and some Persian Gulf countries attempting to reintegrate itself into the Middle
as a direct threat to their security – one that East with the Palestinian problem as its justifi-
1947
cation. This effort could be fueled not so much Japan and China’s interest in the Middle East
by the ideology of the ruling Justice and Devel- has grown: both countries seek stability in the
opment Party (JDP, or AKP in Turkish), as by region, but are not yet sufficiently involved in
a desire to leverage the situation to accelerate diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution.
Turkey’s entry into the European Union.
Although he has done much
On the other hand, Turkey’s to revive peace talks, Presi-
The habitual tensions in Arab-Israeli
true intentions could stem dent Barack Obama, who
relations are now matched with circum-
from its weariness of use- has tried to put U.S. policy
stances that could seriously complicate
less attempts at rapproche-
the already difficult search for a lasting toward its Arab partners
ment with the EU and a peace and Israel on an equal foot-
desire to achieve its main ing, could not make a sus-
geopolitical goal: becoming tained effort to advance the
the most influential force in the region via its eco- peace process because of changes in the domes-
nomic successes and a leader of the Muslim world. tic situation of the United States. Republicans
This could naturally be compounded with the prevailed in recent congressional elections, and
fear of losing Muslim voters dissatisfied with the as a result, Obama will be able to proceed with
country’s strategic partnership with Israel, whose an active Middle East policy only if he is elected
policy is sharply criticized in the Muslim world. for a second term and given a free hand.
However, it is very difficult to gauge his pros- is that the responsibility for failing to sustain
pects for re-election. The U.S. president is facing the peace process now lies with Washington and
strong resistance from Republicans, the Israeli Barack Obama personally, even as it has become
lobby, and other political adversaries who are one of the biggest blows to his reputation.
using his new policy on Israel to undermine his
political standing at home. The idea of holding an international Middle East
conference in Moscow, which was advocated by
Countries in the region and beyond were sur- Russia and supported by Arab countries as well
prised when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin as several European countries, does not hold
Netanyahu rejected recent U.S. proposals, embar- much promise and could damage Russia’s inter-
rassing Obama, who had said he would mediate national standing if pursued.
the problem if Israel stopped building new settle-
ments in the West Bank. Obama later withdrew Under these circumstances, there has been a shift
his proposal, demanding instead that Palestinians in the respective positions of the Quartet mem-
and Israelis unconditionally bers. The EU has adopted
resume direct talks. Arab Republicans prevailed in recent con- a new approach to some
countries saw that change gressional elections, and as a result, aspects of the conflict, with
as a sign of Obama’s weak- Obama will be able to proceed with an some EU countries now
ness and inability to force active Middle East policy only if he is demanding that the block-
Israel into making conces- elected for a second term and given a ade of the Gaza Strip be
sions. As a result, countries free hand. ended and that the number
in the region are reevaluat- of negotiating countries be
ing the U.S. president’s personal standing as well expanded. Public support in Europe is growing
as his administration’s ability to promote peace for the idea of unilateral declaration of a Palestin-
in the region. ian state as soon as the relevant state institutions
have been strengthened in the West Bank.
When Obama came to power, the international
Quartet of Russia, the United States, the EU, and Russia has not yet abandoned the idea of orga-
the UN stepped back and recognized the leading nizing an international conference in Moscow,
role, if not the monopoly, of the United States in but the plan should be adjusted according to the
the Middle East peace process, while simultane- circumstances currently surrounding the con-
ously acknowledging the diminished potential flict. For example, the agenda of the conference
for other members of the Quartet to influence could focus on multilateral talks regarding issues
the process. The only advantage of this situation that have a chance of being successful.
2. Scenarios of development
Considering all of the above, we can put forth Meanwhile, Israel wants to continue building
several scenarios for the possible future of the settlements to ensure that it reaps the advantages
situation. of a protracted peace process, while banking on
public opinion at home, which no longer favors
the Palestinians. The demand that Palestinians
recognize the Jewish nature of Israel as a pre-
2.1. Diplomatic deadlock condition for resolution has also been advanced
to appease those who fear the emergence of a
Negotiations may remain deadlocked as long as binational Jewish-Arab state.
the political situation in Israel stays the same,
and in its current condition, it is hardly condu- The current stalemate is also largely the result
cive to breakthroughs. Netanyahu’s coalition of the Israeli government’s unwillingness to
government, comprised of extreme right-wing make concessions – an attitude confirmed
politicians, was able to secure the retraction of in the positions of Foreign Minister Avigdor
American demands for a new settlement freeze Lieberman and his nationalist Yisrael Beit-
as a Palestinian condition for resuming talks einu (“Israel Is Our Home”) party, observant
(Netanyahu claims that the Obama administra- believers, and the ideology of the Likud itself.
tion withdrew the demand of its own accord). However, this does not mean that Netanyahu
will not change his approach; at stake is his trol and lay a solid foundation for the declaration
ambition to go down in history as the politician of a Palestinian state.
who settled the conflict on conditions favorable
for Israel. The hope for this possibility lies in part with
Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayad. Under
Division in the Palestinian movement is play- his command, the burgeoning Palestinian secu-
ing into the hands of Israeli politicians opposed rity forces are increasingly coordinating their
to negotiation, and perpetually foundering Pal- activities with the Israeli army, and there is
estinian-Israeli relations evidence that such coor-
have been further under- dination could reach new
Division in the Palestinian movement is
mined by the dysfunctional levels. The Oslo Accords
playing into the hands of Israeli politi-
political systems of both signed on the issue initially
cians opposed to negotiation, and per-
governments. The Israeli proved impracticable, and
petually foundering Palestinian-Israeli
prime minister is trying to only now is such coopera-
relations have been further undermined
preserve his weak coali- tion between the two sides
by the dysfunctional political systems of
tion government by gloss- both governments being realized for the first
ing over strategic problems, time.
while the Palestinian nego-
tiators have lost legitimacy after the government’s The current coordination of their efforts largely
split. Mutual mistrust and a lack of progress on reflects both sides’ interest in limiting the influ-
the way to a resolution have created a vacuum ence of Hamas and other radical movements in
and encouraged the search for prospects beyond the West Bank, which pose challenges to both
the traditional two-state solution. parties.
and therefore can be viewed not as an enforced At the same time, Hamas is gradually changing
unilateral concession but as a mutual contract. its phraseology. Many countries maintain secret
According to Hamas, hudna need not be limited ties with Hamas, which has not only opponents
in time but may last for years, until a new genera- but also friends in the Arab world. Hamas lead-
tion of politicians takes over. ers are meeting with European politicians, have
gone on air, and have started choosing their
Moreover, Hamas representatives have said words more carefully, even admitting their pro-
they are ready to accept a settlement if PNA visional status. They were able to put an end to
President Mahmoud the chaos in the Gaza Strip.
Abbas (Abu Mazen) nego- Hamas has not recognized
According to Hamas, hudna need not be
tiates it, but only if it gets Israel, but it does not deny
limited in time but may last for years,
a majority vote during a its existence or the possibil-
until a new generation of politicians
referendum involving all ity of creating a neighboring
takes over
Palestinians, including Palestinian state.
refugees. Although such a
referendum will certainly bury any solution of Israel thinks that new security measures will
compromise, some experts see Hamas’ position force Hamas to become more moderate. In Isra-
as a retreat from its formerly rigid ideological el, it is believed that the development of the Iron
stance, which excluded any agreements with Dome air defense system, the strengthening
Israel, although its rhetoric has remained quite and protection of border settlements, a power-
severe. ful control system along the coast, and massive
responses to any shelling, even minor incidents, and Gaza residents may export and import many
have encouraged Hamas to keep the truce. of the goods they need. On December 9, 2010,
Israel decided to open additional corridors on
However, Hamas’ principles and strategy have not the Gaza border. Thanks to the efforts of Egypt
changed, which prevents it from participating in and the Israeli army, the torrent of arms deliver-
peace talks. Another setback is that the organiza- ies to Hamas has been reduced to a mere trick-
tion does not have a single le. Hamas has also been
leader capable of garnering Hamas has also been furtively cooperat- furtively cooperating with
universal recognition. Its ing with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the Israel Defense Forces
structure prevents leaders on security issues, indicating that Israel (IDF) on security issues,
Khaled Mashaal and Ismail could be quietly trying to learn to coex- indicating that Israel could
Haniyeh from making uni- ist with its neighbor be quietly trying to learn to
lateral decisions, which coexist with its neighbor.
must be undertaken at the
level of Hamas’ three main structures – in the In this case, the status quo could become a func-
West Bank, in the Gaza Strip, and in the Palestin- tional situation that could be seen as a transition
ian diaspora in other Arab countries (primarily period in preparation for holding talks and sign-
Syria). This complex political system complicates ing agreements. However, these goals cannot be
decisive changes in the organization’s fundamen- achieved without international assistance.
tal ideology while placing further obstacles in its
path toward relevant policy changes.
the U.S. administration has downgraded Israel’s involved in corruption, fraud, money launder-
status in U.S. foreign policy priorities. ing, and abuse of public trust. If the investiga-
tion launched against him is successfully con-
Netanyahu is not likely to do the bidding of tinued, he may have to leave the government
the United States or any other international in six months, allowing for the possibility of a
mediator. Even if he decides that a compromise new coalition.
is worthwhile, his ability to maneuver will be
limited by the positions of the right wing and Since the Israeli Labor Party (Avoda) has all
the religious parties and politicians comprising but left the political stage, Netanyahu will have
his coalition government, in particular Foreign to invite Kadima, a centrist party with more
Minister Lieberman. The foreign minister’s strict moderate views on reconciliation, into the new
and uncompromising attitude has already helped coalition. Kadima could then provide Netanyahu
him consolidate a considerable part of the Israeli with a scapegoat for unpopular decisions, giving
electorate around his political agenda. him a freer hand despite his rigid ideological
positions.
Although a significant portion of Israelis share
Lieberman’s ideology and political approach, If this does not happen, right-wing Israelis, who
his reputation is another matter. Often regard- were always willing to settle across Palestine
ed as a mafia boss, Lieberman is said to be without any concern for the Arab population, will
have to admit that if Israel annexes Palestinian 2.4. Local armed conflict
lands, it will become a colonial empire and thus
not a democratic state by definition. This scenario cannot be ruled out considering the
position of radicals in and outside of Hamas and
Sentiment in support of annexation has lately Hezbollah. A strike at Gaza in response to the
grown stronger in Israel, but the idea of direct bombing of Israel – either by Hamas or Islamic
and open annexation of the West Bank now looks Jihad – is fully possible. However, neither side
like a completely anachronistic position. Some seems to be interested in starting a new large-
ultra-right Israeli politicians have suggested cre- scale military operation.
ating a state where Palestinians will be gradu-
ally granted citizenship. For the predominantly
Strangely, this concept is in Since the Israeli Labor Party (Avoda) has Shiite Hezbollah, relations
line with the approach of a all but left the political stage, Netan- with Iran are of strategic
growing number of Pales- yahu will have to invite Kadima, a cen- importance, but are not in
tinians, who would opt for trist party with more moderate views on themselves likely to push
a single binational state in reconciliation, into the new coalition the movement’s leaders
which they would dominate toward reckless action. In
society demographically fact, Iran itself is not inter-
and, eventually, politically. ested in a regional conflict – its true interests
lie in continual pressure on Israel rather than a
Given the above, we can assume that Palestin- large-scale conflict with an unpredictable out-
ian-Israeli talks may be resumed but are unlikely come.
to be stable. The agenda for such talks requires
great compromise and a high level of motivation The current policy of deterrence between Hez-
on both sides, which is so far lacking. bollah and Israel has taught both sides to regard
a disturbance of the status quo as a possibility for
The deadlocked talks and the failure of the policy unacceptable losses. On the other hand, Hezbol-
pursued by Abu Mazen and his colleagues give lah is taking advantage of an Israeli threat as an
Hamas a chance to bolster its influence along impetus for further legitimacy.
with the fraught possibility of moderate Pal-
estinians losing power in the West Bank. The Their border with Israel is currently quiet, and
rise of Islamic radicalism can be prevented only Hezbollah leaders have no need for unnecessary
by active steps taken to resolve the Palestinian risks, although the possibility of unexpected
problem, which is no less important now than developments cannot be ruled out. If a viola-
fighting Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. tion of the status quo occurs, it is difficult to say
2005
alienated by the solution and excluded from the What followed was the protracted interim period
political process. of the Oslo process and the rivalry between the
two tracks. After Rabin’s assassination in 1995,
Therefore, this scenario would be likely to result Shimon Peres again became prime minister and
in the consolidation of jihadist movements and tried to revive the Syrian track but lost the
the weakening of moderate Islamic organiza- election. Netanyahu reaffirmed his readiness to
tions, which would be particularly dangerous for consider the Syrian track and even attempted
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. to move ahead, but the two sides have failed to
agree on details regarding the border.
Date of establishment
Population2
7,683,900 3.94 million
Population density
348.1 per sq. km 632.7 per sq. km
GDP1
$195.4 billion $6.6 billion
Per-capita GDP 1
$28,600 $2,900
One also must note that progress on the Israe- ily discard that dependence if the United States
li-Syrian track is impossible without a resolu- showed a more benevolent attitude toward its
tion on the Palestinian-Israeli track, inasmuch inclusion in the process.
as Damascus is unwilling to abandon the Pal-
estinians to a one-on-one conflict with the The failed attempt to blame the assassination
Israelis. of Rafic Hariri, the prime minister of Lebanon
from 1992 to 1998, on Syrian officials convinced
Iran, which has been more actively attempting to Damascus that similar provocations would be
influence the Middle East peace process, orga- staged against it in the future. Only an improve-
nizes large deliveries of weapons – in particular, ment in U.S.-Syrian relations could create the
missiles – to Israel’s Arab opponents. While conditions necessary for negotiations, and
Syria depends on Iran’s assistance, it could eas- although both sides have exchanged diplomatic
202,867 174,082 160,945 145,312 78,513 78,056 73,777 73,619 34,199 31,993
Indonesia Pakistan India Bangladesh Egypt Nigeria Iran Turkey Algeria Morocco
Source: Pew Research Center, 2009
Chronology of direct
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations
October 30 – November 1, 1991 September 9, 1993 January-August, 1993 September 28, 1995
The Madrid Peace Conference An exchange of letters Secret Palestinian- The Interim Agreement
on the Middle East involving the between Yasser Arafat and Israeli talks in Oslo on the West Bank and
Arab states and Israel. Palestin- Yitzhak Rabin. The Palestine Gaza Strip is concluded
ian participants attend as part of Liberation Organization (PLO) in Washington
the Jordanian-Palestinian renounces terror, Israel and
delegation the PLO recognize each other
September 4, 1999
September 2, 2010 Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat
sign a memorandum in Sharm
Talks between Binyamin Netanyahu and el-Sheikh agreeing new terms
Mahmoud Abbas in Washington, followed by for interim measures under
three more top-level meetings. Negotiations previous agreements and plan
were suspended on September 26, after the talks on the Palestinian
Israeli prime minister refused to extend the territories’ final status
10-month moratorium on settlement
construction
December 2008 – January 2009 November 2007 January 2001 September 13, 1999
Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in The international Closed Palestinian- Official final-status talks resume
the Gaza Strip. Effectively puts conference in Israeli final-status talks.
an end to the negotiating Annapolis. In the The parties converge
process between Palestinians July 2000
declaration on the over the most
and Israelis. This pause in results of the sophisticated solutions A three-way summit at Camp
bilateral dialogue leads to the conference, to the territorial issue, David hosted by U.S. President
start of U.S.-brokered indirect Mahmoud Abbas Jerusalem’s status and Bill Clinton and attended by
contact in May 2010 and Ehud Olmert the refugee issue Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
reiterate their and Palestinian leader Yasser
determination to Arafat. Ended in failure: The
fulfill their road parties fail to reach a compro-
map commitments mise on the main issues
Alignment of forces
in Israel’s parliament and government
18th Knesset
The Knesset (parliament) is Israel’s supreme legislative body. It consists of 120 members elected
for a four-year term
Likud 27
Yisrael Beytenu (Israel is Our Home) 15
Ruling Avoda (Israeli Labor Party) 13
coalition Shas 11
Yahadut Hatorah (United Torah Judaism) 5
Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home) 3
120
Kadima 28
HADASH 4
Other Ichud Leumi (National Union) 4
parties Ra'am Ta'al 4
National Democratic Assembly (Balad) 3
New Movement - Meretz 3
The Israeli Government
Prime Minister Likud 14
Binyamin Yisrael Beytenu (Israel is Our Home) 5
Netanyahu Avoda (Israeli Labor Party) 5
(Likud) Shas 4
The cabinet of ministers Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home) 1
was formed by the ruling Non-party members 1
coalition on March 31, 2009 Total 30
visits over the course of the Obama presidency, the regional strategy pursued by Prime Minis-
the Untied States still refuses to send an official ter Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party
ambassador to Syria. to strengthen Turkey’s position in the Muslim
world and win the support of Turkey’s increas-
By inducting its own pro-Arab policy, Turkey has ingly adherent Muslim population.
lost its status as an honest broker, according to
Western and Israeli lead- Turkey rescinded its
ers. Turkey’s relations with Progress on the Israeli-Syrian track is mediation of indirect talks
Israel have gradually dete- impossible without a resolution on the between Syria and Israel,
riorated over the last few
Palestinian-Israeli track, inasmuch as which lasted from May to
Damascus is unwilling to abandon the
years, with tensions culmi- January 2009, when Israel
Palestinians to a one-on-one conflict
nating as Israeli marines attacked Gaza in December
with the Israelis
raided a Gaza-bound aid 2008 destroying industrial
flotilla in May 2010. Israel areas that had been devel-
has apologized and offered financial compensa- oped with Turkey’s assistance. As a result, it is
tion for its indiscretions, but Israeli-Turkish unlikely to remain neutral. To a degree, this will
relations continue to be increasingly alienated. influence the future of Israeli-Syrian talks and
However, the true impasse has not been caused create additional obstacles for any future Syrian-
by individual failures on either side but by Israeli peace process.
3. Conclusions and
recommendations
Despite a pessimistic assessment of the situation, a more active player in the process. One of the
there are some measures that could be taken to advantages Russia maintains is good relations
lead both sides out of deadlock, provided that with both Arab countries and Israel. Russian-Is-
they are taken without delay. raeli relations reached a new level when the two
nations cancelled mutual entry visas and signed
The concern of the EU and Russia over a lack of their first agreement on military-technical coop-
progress in the Middle East is growing. Twenty- eration. However, one must keep in mind that
six former European politi- Russia’s capabilities in the
cians have called upon the process remain limited.
The political failures of the U.S. in the
EU to propose a clear and Middle East do not mean that the United
comprehensive plan for States should withdraw from the proc- There are no grounds for
resolving the Palestinian- ess. On the contrary, the international developing fundamentally
Israeli conflict, including a Quartet should act together to revitalize new solutions. Over the
timeframe and coordinated and expand their role years, as active and not
conditions for its imple- entirely fruitless efforts
mentation. have been made to resolve
the Middle Eastern conflict, new plans and politi-
The political failures of the U.S. in the Middle cal mechanisms have come and gone. The cur-
East do not mean that the United States should rent goal should be to put these plans into action
withdraw from the process. On the contrary, with due account of the new realities at hand.
the international Quartet should act together to
revitalize and expand their role. Meanwhile, the The mandate of the Quartet must necessarily be
conditions are ripe for such joint actions, and expanded, and perhaps China and India, as well
Russia should make use of its position to become as relevant regional players should be engaged
Jordan
done in a way that would be acceptable to all
sides. At least part of the way should be covered
Ramallah
jointly with them. The principle that “nothing Jericho
European United
Union Nations
ISRAEL
while to hold an international conference on and diplomats but also the people. There are
multilateral issues in Moscow. extensive opportunities and initiatives for such
rapprochement advanced “from below,” as well
Multilateral peace talks could be held concur- as proposals for financing the process by interna-
rently with the talks between Israelis and Pal- tional institutions and non-governmental organi-
estinians if U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East zations. All party nations must develop coopera-
Peace George Mitchell makes way as intermedi- tion at the level of civil society and cause a shift
ary. The resumption of a multilateral track could in standard attitudes in order to move beyond
also attract attention to peaceful Arab initiatives, stereotypes. Any peace process should include
which is vital for key Arab players. an educational element to promote a culture of
peace. Before politicians sit down at the negoti-
But above all, it is necessary to encourage ating table – or along with them – we should lay
humanitarian relations in the Middle East peace the political groundwork for respect between the
process, so that it not only involves politicians Arab world and Israel.