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.1 Macdonald/Chernoff _.'",\''.l Spring 1995
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The end of the Cold war, has given A~erican ~olfcymaker~
th ortunity and obligatlon, to rethlnk Amerlca s relatlons
wi~hoihe extern~l international world: A wide-ranging d~bate
h developed encompassing the questlon of what to do wlth t~: instituti~ns used to formulate and implement Cold War
olicies One part of the debate has centered on the Central ·intellig~nce Agency (CIA) and what it should do in the future.
proposals range from Senator Moynihan's, which advocates
the elimination of the agency, to those advocating the enlargement of its missions to include economic, environmental and other transnational issues. No consensus regarding the future of the CIA has developed because of this wide range of proposals and the differences in perspectives which underlie them. This lack of consensus has thus inhibited the prospects for a coherent policy response. As a result Congress has held hearings, and recently President Clinton has created a commission to study the relevant issues. This commission, headed by former defense secretary Les Aspin, will propose r,commendations in
1996 as to the future·direction of the CIA.
In order for these recommendations to make much sense, the conceptual chaos resulting from the myriad proposals needs to
be organized in some systematic fashion. Without agreement
as to what constitutes the basic issues, the commission's recommendations will only add to the debate, and not help resolve it. This paper is an attempt to clarify the concepts, as well
as indicate which approach to the CIA seems to be the best way
to protect Am~rican national interests and security in the international arena. The conclusion will be that the CIA will continue to be needed both for national security intelligence
and foreign policy support well into the future.
The CIA--What it is; what it does.
In order to make effective and accurate decisions, government policymakers need ~o have information upon which
to base their decisions. Intelligence agencies are the institutions by which governments get much of the necessary information. The CIA is the coordinating national security intelligence agency for the U.S. government, and its functions and tasks are, or should be, determined by the national security information needs of the policymakers. This is because the primary function of intelligence is to supply the decisionmaker with enough accurate information to affect the decision or policy for the better. However, for the decisionmaker intelligence
is only one of many inputs into the creation of a policy, and
in fact may not be decisive in the ultimate decision. As decisionmaking theory illustrates, policymakers generally do
not make decisions in a totally rational manner. Even if in
an ideal circumstance they are given perfect information via intelligence, the decision. do not necessarily have to be made
in accordance with this information since other factors may
take precedence. Therefore, intelligence as a function of government depends on other issues, both foreign and domestic,
for context and meaning. During the Cold War, the tasks of
the CIA were determined by referring to the dominant Cold War paradigm of a bipolar, zero-sum competition between East and west. Now that the Cold War is over, and no new paradigm has replaced the old, the purpose and role of the CIA have lost focus. In order to provide a clear direction, mission, and purpose for the institution into the next century, the tasks
of the CIA need to be redefined. However, in the absence tf
a dominant foreign policy paradigm, and no useful theory regarding the uses of intelligence, conceptual confusion reigns.
Each observer of intelligence who has contributed to
the debate over the future direction of the CIA uses a framework of assumptions regarding the future international environment and the role of the U.S. within· it. From these different sets
·of assumptions have corne a varied group of proposals for changes in the future roles and missions of the CIA. However, thus
far the debate has been unproductive. The relevant assumptions which help to determine each proposal have in general been left unstated. As a result, policy prescriptions are announced,
and subsequently critiqued without the level of theoretical understanding necessary to resolve the issue successfully.
The prospects for a clear debate are further complicated
by a lack of theorizing about intelligence and its purpose in international relations. While various theories do exist which are relevant and helpful for a more comprehensive and abstract unqerstanding of the field of intelligence, none are intelligence-specific. For example, while knowledge of military theory, international relations theory, communication and information theory, and decision-making theory would be helpful in the study of the intelligence process, none are particularly helpful in theorizing about the use of intelligence. No theory exists which explains the specific conditions under which intelligence can or should be used as a tool of government decisionmaking. As Sheila Kerr points out, it is the lack of this "agreed paradigm for U.S.- intelligence that is widily recognized as the obstacle to progress in this debate."
In part, this lack of theory is a result of the secretive nature of intelligence organizations. Disclosure of their activities will in general be neither complete nor reliable because of the deceptive nature of the enterprise and the continuing need to protect sources and methods. This will
have an impact upon an academic's willingness to study the field since any useful theorizing or conceptual analysis must be backed up by reliable evidence. Additional complications for the creation of intelligence theory arise from the difficulties
of studying a field which is so dependent on foreign and domestic policy for contextual and conceptual understanding. The need
for intelligence is determined by the people who make the decisions. Again, as decisionmaking theory illustrates, decisions are not necessarily made in the most rational value maximizing manner. Also, the policymakers need for intelligence and information depends upon the type of foreign policy pursued. Robert Jervis concurs, noting that "intelligence touches 'on
so many facets of policy that it is difficult to generalize without constructing a t~eory of foreign policy, if not international politics.1I Taken together, this means that any theory about intelligence must take both foreign and domestic considerations into account.
Instead of theory, writers have focused much more on what intelligence does rather than why it does it. These descriptions range from the popularization of espionage to the academic analysis of the four disciplines of intelligence organizations (collection, analysis, covert action and counterintelligence). Descriptions of what intelligence does, however, are not particularly helpful in the present debate over what the CIA should do in the future. These prOjections need a theoretical base in order to provide a better understanding of the underlying concepts which affect the need for and use of intelligence. This paper is an attempt to identify some of
these concepts in order to clarify the present debate, advocate an approach to intelligence, and begin the process 'of potentially creating a theory of and for intelligence.
In order to do this, a form of order must first be brought to the debate. This is accomplished by organizing the specific proposals according to their apparent approaches to the future of the CIA. Six approaches were derived from a survey of the existing literature, and each will be summarily described before the underlying issues are examined. This paper attempts to argue for an approach within the debate by first analyzing and then critiquing the assumptions which appear to form the basis for the variety of opinions. It involves an indirect method
of analysis whereby the critique of the assumptions becomes
the deciding factor for judging between the various approaches. After critiquing each of the four identified underlying issues, the implications of this critique on the six approaches will
be described. As a result of this analytical structure, only one approach will be advocated as the most appropriate to adopt for planning the future roles and missions of the CIA.
Limitations of the Paper
Intelligence relates to so many different aspects of international relations or foreign policy that any analysis of it will be necessarily incomplete. As a result, this is primarily a limited conceptual paper dealing with the reasons for each of the approaches to the future of the CIA. The abstract nature of the subject matter is unavoidable because of the lack of theory, but it hinders possible relevance to policymaking.
For example, policymakers interested in the future roles
and missions of the CIA have focused on a primary concern of tbeirs, the feasibility of the proposed policies aor the future of the CIA given the lack of unlimited resources. These questions of resources, or perceptions of their availability, are also integral to other issues in this paper including the formulation of what constitutes a national security concern. However, the question of resources is generally left out of this paper in favor of an analysis that uses as its criterion
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what the policy should be rather than what it will be. This
is because this kind of normative conceptual analysis needs
to be done prior to policy debates in order to work out the conflicts and policy implications of each position in the abstract before money considerations become involved. In this way the political participants can have a more comprehensive understanding of the issue and thereby make better policy because of it. But the abstract nature of the paper and its focus on issues other than resources decidedly reduces its immediate relevance to the current policy debate.
Another important limitation is the fact that the focus of the paper is on the analytical discipline of intelligence.
In the process, this ignores important questions raised by the covert action and counterintelligence capabilities of the CIA. While these are the focus of much attention within the debate, they are essentially peripheral to the CIA's main mission of supplying information to the policymakers. An analysis of the specific proposals would have to mention such issues, but the general nature of this paper and its focus on the main task
of the CIA allows for them to be disregarded.
A last comment regards the paper's potential lack of comprehensiveness. It is possible that not all the specific voices within the debate can be placed within the specific approaches, and perhaps the four underlying issues do not provide as much of the explanatory power for the differences between
the approaches as one might like. These potential criticisms would be expected. But since the goal of the paper is not
a comprehensive attempt to explain every influence on the need for and use of intelligence, they would be unjustified.
While the conclusions of this abstract limited analysis are of limited use and value to the immediate policy debate, it does accomplish its goal of identifying some of the more important issues which determine the specific positions within the debate.
The initial task is to try to organize the debate according to clear and identifiable criteria. The original impetus is to make the organization of the debate relevant to policy. Thereforel it seems natural to want to organize the variety of propo~als by their· implications for policy recommendations. To do this, specific proposals can be grouped according to whether they advocate a reduction of the CIAls functions, a modification or reform of theml or an expansion
of its roles and missions. Howeverr this attempt to clarify
the debate does little to do so. This is because advocates
with fundamentally different perceptions of the world happen
to coincide on similar policy recommendations. For example, both conservative Cold Warriors and civil libertarians seem
to agree that CIA functions should be reduced in the future,
but for manifestly different reasons to be detailed below. Therefore, the categorization of proposals simply by their implications for policy prescriptions is unhelpful in gaining conceptual clarity.
The organization of proposals by their apparent approaches to the CIA provides a better understanding of the debate. By this method of organization, the underlying assumptions of each perspective and proposal will be taken into account when they are being categorized. In this way the momentary alliances between those with fundamentally different world-views will
be recognized before the inevitable policy confrontations erupt. Policy can then be made on the merits of an analysis of the entire approach, including its assumptions, rather than on an unrecognized momentary alliance between two or more conflicting perspectives.
In reality, each proposal is unique in the specific policy prescriptions recommended. However, similarities exist among the proposals, and as a result they can be grouped by general approaches to the question of what to do with the CIA. Six of the approaches relevant to 'this paper are:
1. An expansion of CGA functions because of a changing, more interdependent world.
-The advocates who take this approach perceive the end
of the Cold War as both an indication of and opportunity for
a restructured international system. While the specific perceptions of what this future system will be like differr
the common emphasis is on the challenge to the sovereignty of states. The indicators used to justify this approach include the recent trend towards global economic interdependence, the related decreased relevance of military force among the great powersl and the diffusion of international power to non-state actors. For U.S. policymakersr this means a need for a great~r range and variety of information and knowledge in order to deal with this diffusion of power and threats to national interests. For the CIA, it means that economic, environmental and social problem areas become potential targets of information gathering and analysis. Similarly, it results in the greater relative importance of transnational issues such as terrorism, narcotics
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trafficking, and proliferation, to the relative detriment to the focus on states.
2. A reduction in CIA functions because of tge potential harm they present to American civil liberties.
-The advocates who.take this approach saw the Cold War
as an excuse for the growth of the power of the u.s. government, especially regarding its domestic implications. According to this perspective, the creation of the national security state during the Cold War led to restrictions of civil liberties, abuses of freedoms, and violations of the democratic processes. Specific criticisms of the CIA include its secret bu~get, the violations of the domestic civil liberties of students during the 1960's and 1970's, overclassification, and the problems
of governmental institutional secrecy in a democracy. Without the justification of the Cold War, the institutions of state power originally created in response to an exaggerated threat, including the CIA, can now be reduced or eliminated.
3. Procedural or structural reforms of ahe CIA in order to
address problems and inefficiencies. .
-The focus of this approach is much less on the substantive implications of the end of the Cold War on the missions of the CIA than on the opportunity it has provided for procedural or structural reforms. It does not question the purpose of the
CIA, simply its effectiveness. This is an appa~ent extension
of the debate prevalent during the Cold War over intelligence failures or imperfections in the intelligence product. The
goal was, and remains, to make the intelligence function of government as effective and accurate as possible. Issues specifically mentioned as requiring reform include politicization, bureaucratization, centralization, coordination, duplication "and the role of the Director of Central Intelligence. In focusing on how to fix these and other problems, this approach leaves the operative assumptions of the overall functions and purpose of the CIA unchanged.
4. An increased CIA role in Qrder to9compensate for the reduced U.s. military presence worldwide.
-Based on a definition of national security interests which remains essentially constant from the Cold War, this perspective sees the CIA as primarily a warning instrument used to identify foreign threats to American iecurity interests. Since the end of the Cold War the American capacity to deal with these threats has decreased, prompting calls for intelligence to compensate. The post-Cold War goal of creating a more mobile and flexible reactive military force capable of dealing with the expected future limited conflicts, combined with the pressures to reduce costs, have led to reductions in troop levels overseas and significant changes in force structure. The result is a smaller military less capable of apprying the same amount of force in the same period of time. In order to give policymakers greater lead time to arrange the appropriate military counters, the
CIA must have a more comprehensive coverage of potential threats to US interests.
5. A reduction in CIA functions because of the reduction1sf threat caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
-This perspective views the purpose of the CIA as primarily focused on traditional state threats to national security.
Given that the largest state threat to American national security is reduced, so should the intelligence functions be reduced.
A maintenance of present functions or expansion of the CIA's focus to broader concerns, not necessarily of national security importance, would distract attention and divert resources away from the greater threat presented by states. Therefore, the
CIA should only perform the functions necessary to the protection of American national security.
6. A substantial worldwide presence for the CIA in order to provide the infYfmation necessary to support an engaged foreign policy.
-This perspective sees the state system as generally unchanged in that states are still the prime threat to American national security. But intelligence is necessary for the policymakers to handle the lesser transnational problems effectively, as well as respond to legitimate national security concerns. Therefore the CIA, as the organization best equipped
to supply policymakers with the needed information, should continue to do so even if the issues are not of national security importance.
The six approaches listed above appear to vary as a result of differing relationships among more fundamental assumptions of politics and international relations. It might be helpful to think of the approaches to the future of the CIA as values of a dependent variable which is implicitly assigned based
on judgments regarding more basic issues. There are four of these issues which, when perceived differently, appear to cause the variations among the approaches. These independent variables relate to the nature of the international structure, the purposes of the U.S. government, the operative definition of 'national security,! and the purpose of intelligence. The interaction of these issues, and their effect on the formation of the approaches, is represented in the appendix.
The following section of the paper will describe each of these four issues and how differences in perceptions of them
will affect views of the appropriate future roles and missions
of the CIA. Based on an analysis of the issue itself, or its effect on intelligence, an argument will be made regarding each one of the four issues. From these conclusions, the approaches with differing positions on these issues can be eliminated for containing inappropriate assumptions which contribute to inferior policy prescriptions.
A. The International structure Background
Nobody fully understands how and why the international system works the way it does. The relationships are too complex for humans to understand, so general international relations theories are created to simplify reality. These theories identify specific variables to be emphasized in explaining or understanding the workings of the system. However, because
they are simplifications, and therefore incomplete representations of reality, the emphasis on different variables can result in different explanations for the same event or situation. This is the fundamental cause of the conflicting perspectives regarding the current structure of the international system.
The dominant theory of international relations during the Cold War, Realism, involved the use of a state-ce¥5ric model
which mayor may not be applicable in the future. The current
move away from this model is based on the assessment that the world is structurally changing by becoming more integrated and interdependent. As evidence that the sovereignty of states
is being challenged, some observers refer to the relatively greater role of transnational actors (for example international institutions and multinational corporations), transnational forces (such as economic interdependence, refugees, environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, terrorism) and the reduced relevance of military force between the Western industrialized powers. If such a structural change is occurring there are legitimate policy implications for governments which either manipUlate or maneuver within the international environment. Essentially, this would mean that the power and sovereignty previously accruing to states is now more diffuse, with the implication that the numbers of important actors on the world stage will increase.
While their opponents in ~he debate concede the existence
of these integrationist tendencies, they disagree that they indicate a structural change. Since the state system still appears to be anarchic, the logic of the security dilemma should be the paramount predictor of state behavior. The fact that some states do not appear to be abiding by such logic can be interpreted as the temporary consequence of the existence of
a relatively benign military hegemon, the U.S., combined with the relatively widespread possession of nuclear weapons. This combination would tend to depress the normal actions of states, given other Realist assumptions. However, since the paramount military dominance of the U.S. will probably be transient, so will the peaceful coexistence currently evident among the developed Western nations. This peaceful cooperation can be seen as a unique exception to historical tendencies, and will probably disintegrate over time. This perspective would seem
to indicate that, given the lessons of history, a continued state-centric focus to international relations would be the
more prudent course for U.s. policymakers.
Implications for the CIA
For intelligence, this debate has implications for the long term estimation of future threats to the security or interests
of the United states. If the international system is undergoing a structural change, the diffusion of power from states to other entities will result in the diffusion of potential future threats to American security. A structural chang$ such as this would require a different kind of intelligence focus than during the Cold" War. The roles and missions of the CIA would have to adapt to this new structure by de~emphasizing state threats and putting a greater emphasis on such issues as terrorism, economics, narcotics trafficking, environmental threats, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. This would require a wider focus for the CIA of the future,
and an increase in its functions from the Cold War.
Criterion for Analysis
Given that neither theory can be proved or disproved with
the evidence at hand, the question of which perspective to apply depends upon a cost/benefit evaluation of the tradeoffs between them. The proponents of a changing structure perceive a world of the future where forces of integration and interdependence have led to the de-militarization and economic integration of the developed world. To assume this structural change, and
to structure policies and institutions accordingly, would maximize national interests if the outcome was as expected.
On the other hand, this has the potential of being enormously costly, and even disastrous, if the assumptions about structural change are wrong. To focus on how intelligence can counter transnational threats to interests of the United states and
help advance foreign policy goals would be to down-play the
long term threats from states which could develop as a result
of the diffusion of technology and the eventual change in power relations. Conversely, the state-centric assumptions would
tend to ignore the potential opportunities while maintaining
a wary stance vis-a-vis potential future threats from other states to the national security of the United states. The big risk with this assumption is that it could result in a selffulfilling prophecy. For example, if the United states does
not try to take advantage of the opportunities which appear
to exist today with Russia, and instead expands NATO into Eastern Europe as a way to ensure future security, this could ultimately force Russians into their own attempts to ensure security visa-vis the West. In other words, to act as if the security dilemma will dictate policies of states in the future may be
to ensure that it will.
For assumptions which affect the future national security of the U.S., a conservative approach which minimizes potential disasters rather than maximizing potential opportunities would be better, given the importance of the issue. The question
of which perspective has the largest costs ultimately is determined by a decision regarding whether the state-system will continue to use power as its medium of exchange in the future. Power and force appear to be inherent components of
social interaction, especially between states. Therefore, the expectation will be resurgent competition and balance of power politics in the future. As a consequence of this asessment, state-centric assumptions appear most appropriate for the formation and focus of American foreign policy, at least for the near future.
Application to the Approaches
The application of this more conservative assumption to the intelligence debate is fairly simple. As is best illustrated
by looking at the chart, Approach #1 is the only one which appears to assume a changing international structure. As a result, it proposes changes to the CIA which correspond to these perceived structural changes. This assumption, while perhaps
not yet proved mistaken, would be an unwise basis for policy planning, particularly for the CIA. The intelligence institutions are needed for both threat perception and foreign policy support. states may not appear to be much of a threat now, but to restructure the institutional early warning system towards current priorities would be to court unnecessary risks. This is not to imply that the restructuring of intelligence targets is wrong, just premature given the present uncertainties. Therefore, Approach #1 can be rejected for using an inappropriate foundation for its policy prescriptions regarding the future
of the CIA.
B. The Purposes of the U.S. Government Background .
How one defines the purposes of a state will affect the perception of its appropriate functions. In the case of the United States, the Constitution is the defining document for
the existence and purpose of the national government. The preamble to the Constitution states that three of its purposes are to "provide for the common defense,H "promote the general welfare,1I and IIsecure the blessings of liberty." These appear
to be both legitimate and distinct goals for a democratic government. However, they turn out to be vague and normative precepts once the attempt is made to realize them. The perpetual problem for the U.s. government is that the means used to approach these ends are not necessarily compatible.
In the attempt to achieve the accomplishment of greatest welfare/ perfect defense, or ultimate liberty, the institutions and processes necessary to do this will impede or cause the modification of the realization of the others. For example,
the attempts to IIprovide for the common defense II in times of danger invariably lead to the constraint of liberty to some extent. The selective service registration, security checks, rationing and prior restraint on the publishing of materials
are only some of the state-imposed restrictions which periodically occur in times of perceived external dangers. Therefore,' in the conversion to reality these normative principles must be prioritized in order to create the desired balance among the tradeoffs. However, different prioritizations of these fundamental purposes of the U.S. government will lead to competing judgments about the validity and justification
for government institutions, actions and policies. As a result, un l.e s s- a general consensus exists as to which goals to emphasize, any policy chosen will result in conflict and disagreement.
The determination of which priority structure is more appropriate is exceedingly difficult to make on the level of principles. This is because each explicit purpose of the U.S. government is legitimate, and policies supporting each are necessary. Therefore, the judgment must be made after taking the specific issue and its context into consideration. For
this paper, this is how the prioritization of these issues create conflicting perspectives regarding the power of government and the relative importance of external versus domestic considerations.
While America' has a long and valued tradition of distrust of government, the twentieth century has led to a massive centralization of power in the American federal government.
The growth of the domestic power, especially during the 1930's, was an effort to use government policies to help provide for the general welfare of the people. Similarly, the growth of
the international power during the 1940's resulted from an effort to "provide for the common defense." However, once the immediate reasons for this growth of power were de~lt with, the benefits
of the centralization of power appeared to outweigh thei~ costs to individual freedoms. As a result, these policies were
reta~ned, and the power of the federal government grew accordingly.
This tendency to retain power is a partial explanation for why the CIA was created in 1947. Po1icymakers did not want
to lose the benefits 'of centralized intelligence when World War II ended. Their intention was to maintain a warning capability neces~~ry to prevent major strategic surprises such
as Pearl Harbor. However, the desire of government officials
for more power sometimes conflicts with the peop1e's perceptions of the need for such power.
Implications for the CIA
The initial trepidation about the retention of this capability was from those worried about the domestic implications of1~he creation of an American secret intelligence organization.
The explicit external focus of the CIA mitigated these concerns to some extent, and they were reduced even further by the perception of an increased threat from the Soviet Union. A general consensus grew regarding the need for a centralized intelligence institution to help provide for the common defense, overriding the concerns of the potential threat to civil liberties. However, by the mid-1970's the consensus as to the benefits provided by the CIA was over, a by-product of the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the revelations of the Church Committee. These events, in combination with actual active domestic violations of civil liberties, helped to exacerbate
the traditional American concerns regarding strong governments and the1gerception of their proclivities to abuse the democratic
system. As a result of these concerns, Congressional oversight
of the American intelligence community was strengthened by the institgtion of congressional oversight committees in 1976 and
1977. During the foreign policy environment of, the 1980's
defense concerns again became paramount, causing the anxieties about the CIA to become muted. However, they quickly resurfaced as a result of the Iran-Contra revelations. While the implications of this event on intelligence were being examined and debated, the Cold War endea.
When the main mission and primary justification for the CIA disappeared, the basic American concerns about excessive government power re-established themselves. The result has
been a policy conflict between two camps with competing views about the appropriate prioritization of the purposes of the state. This tends to result in a debate in the policy arena between advocates for domestic or international primacy as the way to satisfy national interests. Conservatives, who tend
to emphasize the role of the state in common defense over the promotion of the general welfare, have begun to try to dismantle the domestic aspects of government power. Liberals, on the other hand, emphasize the power of government in promoting the general welfare over common defense, and have already attempted to dismantle the security apparatus of the U.S. government by trying to reduce defense budgets in order to accomplish a peace dividend to spend on domestic issues. Meanwhile both refer
to the imposition of government power on civil liberties ,and freedoms as a justification for their attempt to reduce
Criterion for Analysis
There are two primary questiQns which need to be answered
in order to judge whether the civil libertarian critique embodied in Approach #2 is accurate, and therefore appropriate to use
to reduce the scope of the CIA's functions. The first is whether there are enough legitimate threats to the security of the United states to justify the functions of the CIA as an institutional part of the government's attempt to achieve a "common defense." The second is whether the negative impact of the CIA on the liberty of Americans outweighs whatever benefits it provides.
As to the first question, the basic point of these critics is the exa~~eration of the current threats to American security
interests. While civil libertarians agree that an intelligence
capability is necessary for the effective creation of policy, they conclude that it has negative domestic consequences on 18 the freedoms of individuals and the health of the democracy. Their argument, therefore, is that while intelligence is necessary, it is not needed as much as some advocate. Because
of this, they emphatically oppose the expansion of the ~9finition.
of national security issues into non-traditional areas. They
believe this exaggeration is being done in order to retain the national security state created during the Cold War, which was itself built by exaggerating the Soviet threat. This belief has a long history in the U.S., for as James Madison wrote,
lilt is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is
to be charged2bo provisions against danger, real or pretended,
from abroad." As a statement of the tendencies of governments
to expand and retain power, this may be true. However, a certain amount of skepticism seems justified regarding any conclusions which claim the axiomatic exaggeration of dangers to ~tate security and interests. While recent trends do appear to indicate the reduced relevance of military force among the Western industrialized states, this trend does not necessarily ensure the security of the u.i. to external manipulation, coercion, or attack. For example, until a defensive counter
to nuclear missiles is developed, the U.S. will continue to
be vulnerable to attack, and therefore coercion. Also, lesser threats to national interests such as terrorism or narcotics trafficking, while perhaps not critical to the continuation
of the state, are enough of a concern to the welfare of the people that government mechanisms must exist to deal with them. Therefore, with substantial, unexaggerated threats apparent
to U.S. interests, the CIA appears to have a justification for an extensive range of functions in the post-Cold War world.
Regarding the costs of a substantial CIA presence, the criticisms leveled against the CIA are only a small part of
the liberal civil libertarian objections to the national security state. Many governmental institutions form the basis for this kind of state, and each performs different functions in the establishment, maintenance, or application of government power. For this paper, the CIA is defined as the institution used to centralize and analyze the information resulting from external
surveillance. This centralization is necessary for the application of government power. Part of the problem of the
CIA is that through the operations directorate it gets involved in the application of state power externally, and this becomes the 'focus of many who oppose such actions. However, because
of the limitation of this paper to prim~rily the analysis function, the question of the morality and constitutionality
of covert actions are not dealt with here. As a result, the civil libertarian objections to the sustained level of CIA functions becomes by necessity more subtle, based on the implied costs to liberty and democracy at home.
Most of the criticisms leveled against the CIA today are
very similar to those of the 1970's. Examples include the erosion of democracy and accountability resulting from the secret budgets, and the corrosive effect on civil liberties from restrictions of the first amendment and due process rights of government workers purportedly necessary to maintain current levels of classification. The apparent basis for these criticisms is the perception that the policies of the United States as a constitutional democracy, should be determined,
or at least approved of, by an informed population. The implication of this is that the more secrecy which exists, the less that government policies will be determined by the will
of the people.
The criticisms which result from this perception have been countered by others, most notably in a CIA publication put out in 1987. Articles within it refer to the necessity of secrecy, even within a democracy, and the provisions made ever since
the country was founded to ensure that such secrecy would serve a legitimate purpose and yet not be abused in the process.
However, the most effective counter to charges of the CIAls negative effects is the public oversight provided by the creation of the congressional oversight committees. To allay the fears
of those worried about the potential abuse of state power, and the potential for the subversion of democracy via secrecy, elected representatives of the people oversee the agency in
order to provide a modicum of public accountability. The rationale for this is that as long as there is some indirect public accountability, the potential abuse of the power of the state and the negative implications for the working of the democracy will be controlled, although not eliminated. An example of the effectiveness of oversight is the fact that Oliver North ran the Iran-Contra deals through the National, Security Council rather than the CIA. This illustrates that as long
as the will for abuse exists, it can happen, but maybe not where controls such as congressional oversight are in place.
From an analysis of these charges and countercharges, it appears as if this liberal civil libertarian critique is based on an ideal conception of democracy where excessive state power and secrecy hinder its effective functioning. However, reality necessitates the compromise of ideals. As John Warner documents, limited secrecy in decisionmaking and policy implementation
has been a part of the American experience since the Revolution. This appears to be the result of the need to create policy in
a world where power politics is played by experts who are not necessarily accountable to·their own people. If secrecy is necessary for effective policymaking on certain issues, the question may be how much secrecy is too much.
As illustrated above, there appears to be a substantial need in the government for information which the CIA can provide. Since much of the benefit from intelligence comes from the fact that it is secret, an effective intelligence capability seems to require secrecy. The existence of congressional oversight provides the institutional attempt to ensure the prevention
of abuses. Whereas civil libertarian concerns are valid, they appear exaggerated as a result of their pursuit of idealized perceptions of rights and democracy Given that in a dangerous world rights will not be unlimited and democracy not perfect, the need for intelligence and the protections which exist to control its negative side-effects seem to provide enough of
a justification for substantial worldwide CIA coverage.
Application to the Approaches
While in principle domestic primacy ~nd concern for liberty is a legitimate prioritization of the purposes of government, the retention of substantial CIA functions appears necessary to prevent harm from coming to American national interests.
The concern about excessive government power in general is also legitimate and quite necessary. However, in the case of the
CIA it could become a hindrance to effective performance. Given the.level of protection which now exists to prevent CIA abuses, the civil libertarian critique appears unnecessarily alarmist. Therefore, the civil libertarian approach exemplified in Approach #2 is an inappropriate basis for the planning of future CIA missions.
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'National security' is a term which has dominated American foreign poliZ¥ planning and strategic thinking for approximately
fifty years. During that t.Lme , a general consensus existed
as to the threat posed to American interests by the Soviet Union. Despite this, debates on how to achieve national security flourished. These debates revolved around differences in perception230f resources and the priority of specific
interests. Now that the single overriding threat is gone,
so is the one constant in the equation. As a result, post-Cold War estimations of what constitutes a national security issue are extremely diverse.
For this discussion, three categories will be used to differentiate between these varied definitions of 'national security.' These categories are based on an implicit comparison to a generic Cold War formulation for determining national security issues, and represent three tendencies. The first enlarges the definition of 'national security' to include
. non-traditional issues such as environmental degradation, economic issues, human righz~' energy policy, deficits, or other
issues of domestic welfare. The essential cause of this
enlargement appears to be an expanded view of the numbers of American interests vital to the future and worthy of major
c. Definition of 'National Security' Background
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main purposes of the U.S. government, or any state, is to "provide
for the common defense." However, the problem of how to achieve national or state security in an ana~chic self-help system has troubled policymakers for centuries. The calculation of what
is required for ensuring national security becomes a very complicated combination of many variables, including national interests, threats to t~ese interests and the amount of resources available to counter these threats. What makes this calculation even more difficult is that both the determination of interests and threats, as well as the evaluation of their relative importance, are essentially subjective.
For one thing, interests and threats must be prioritized because of the existence of limited resources, and this prioritization can be as idiosyncratic as any other. Additionally, the considerations of relative importance which determine prioritization are not based on a single factor.
In general, the criterion used to determine importance in international relations is power. Power, however, exists in three generally accepted forms: economic, political, and military. While military power may be the final arbiter of disputes, it is not always the most relevant in an analysis
of international relations. Therefore, the determination of the importance of an interest or the strength of a threat may be based on anyone of these three forms of power, or any combination thereof. As a result of these complexities to the formulation of a definition of 'national security,' opinions as to the requirements of national security will be extremely varied.
federal interveDtion. The second category is essentially a status quo position, one that does not redefine 'national security' despite the end of the Cold War. The third category contracts the determination of national security issues back to more fundamental ones, such as the physical defense' of the
territory of the United states. .
Implication for the CIA
Since the statutory mandate of the CIA is essentially national security intelligence, the proposed roles and missions of the CIA represented in the ~ix approaches will tend to correspond with perceptions of which issues are threats to the national security of the united states. Whether national security issues should be the exclusive mandate for CIA functions will be dealt with in the next section. What is important, however, is the fact that many will perceive CIA functions to have national security implications. They will decide which functions are appropriate for the CIA based on their perceptions of future American national security concerns.
Criterion for Analysis
In order to determine which of the three national security formulations is more appropriate in the post-Cold War world,
an explicit focus on the military form of international power will be used as the criterion for judgment. This will be done because of the distinction between national security and national welfare. The former implicitly involves the governmental goal
of defense, while the latter embodies the alternate goal of providing for the general welfare. Since .the foreign policy
of a state is geared to both, it must include political, military and economic considerations. By contrast, national security policy at its core involves the defense of the territory and population of the state. Despite the fact that political and economic considerations are important and perhaps even vital
to its achievement, they can be put aside for the sake of this discussion. The resulting military determination of appropriate national security concerns wilf be admittedly incomplete as
a comprehensive definition, but will be enough to decide between the three post-Cold War definitional tendencies.
As already mentioned, international relations takes place within an anarchic self-help system, where the final arbiter
of conflict is war. In order to achieve security in this type of system~ a state must be militarily capable of winning the next war. This requires military planning and national security policy to be involved in the issues which would be expected
to help the country prevail in the next most likely war .. Howeve:, w~Sfare and the means required to win it have changed over t.i.me ..
As the destructive power of war grew with the impact of technological and sociological developments, the incentive for policymakers to prevail also grew. This has resulted in centuries of progress in warfare and the enlargement of issues necessary to win the war. In the beginning, limited warfare was the result of limited means applied for limited ends. In order to win a limited war, almost all that was necessary was
a slightly better military than the opponent. But limited wars
.. .."..____.._ -_ ._."--"".- -~"
developed into the mass wars of the Napoleonic period, and into the total wars of the twentieth century. War had become an all-out societal effort to win, involving almost the entire conversion of the country to th~ war effort. This required
the centralization of power in order to rationalize the society, including the economic, transportation, education and patriotic potential of the state. In other words, the military preparation required to win involved the transformation of the country into essentially a national security state. But now that the Cold
War is over, no major industrialized state expects to fight
a total war in the near future. This may be because of the economic benfits of integration, the presence of nuclear weapons, or some other factor. Nevertheless it seems as if warfare, 26
at least for the major powers, is back to a limited concept.
The U~s. underwent this transformation to centralized power in the early part of the twentieth century, and helped win World War II because of it. However, the u.s. did not de-centralize afterwards. The perception of the global Communist threat centered in the Soviet Union quic~ly emerged. This resulted
in forty years of societal readiness to transition to total
war. Now that the Communist threat has receded, no threat requires the centralization of power and rationalization of SOCiety that was necessary to prepare to win the Cold War.
As a result, many are now trying to dismantle this centralization of power in the federal government.
The U.S. is the pre-eminent military power in the world today. While legitimate military threats may develop over time, there is not much chance for a total war in the foreseeable future. Therefore, aspects of international relations which had national security implications during the Cold War are
no longer as relevant. A good example of this are third world relations. While some perceived the periphery to be vital in
a zero-sum global struggle against Communism, the end of the Cold War takes the national security component out of these relations. It is this contraction from global military interests to regional ones which has resulted in the restructuring of
the American military forces towards winning the next most likely war, a limited one. Ergo, national security policy is now concerned with fewer and lesser threats than it was during the Cold War.
Application to APproaches
The application of this conclusion to the relevant approaches is more complicated because the analysis of the issue affects more approaches than the other three do. Since the analysis affects Approaches #3 and #4 differently, each will be dealt
As to Approach #3, this critique is not a direct attack upon its foundations. This is a technician's approach to intelligence calling for greater effectiveness and efficiency. While these are laudable goals for intelligence agencies, it ignores the substantial changes in the policy arena caused by
the end of the Cold War. It is in not dealing with these changes that this approach becomes inappropriate. The adoption of this
approach would result in the reform of the institutional structure and processes of the CIA, but based on Cold War assumptions of the need for national security intelligence.
It is entirely possible that if the need for and use of intelligence changes as a result of the end of the Cold War, the proposed reforms would be inappropriate or inadequate to handle such substantive changes. In not dealing with these changes, and by implication retaining Cold War assumptions of national security issues and their derivative intelligence targets, this approach is inappropriate as a first step in the post-Cold War CIA reformulation.
Approach #4 also appears to assume a constant definition
of 'national security, I but here the assumption is more integral to the approach. By not taking the end of the' Cold War into consideration while deciding which interests deserve the attention that corresponds to national security concerns, this approach would set the United States up to oppose all threats
to its interests at the same r~te as during the Cold War. The criticism here is not about the potential for over-extension, but about the level of concern that each potential threat would be given. While it is important to warn policymakers of potential threats to American interests, the end of the Cold
War allows for the opportunity to focus on the more vital interests, including the national security interests. A reduced military cqpability does not justify an increased intelligence presence if the national security concerns, which are nominally the focus of such attention I are similarly reduced. Any waste of resources or efforts upon problems thought to be of national security importance which are in fact extraneous to national security increases the chances for a real security concern to
be overlooked or downplayed. Therefore, Approach #4 would provide an inappropriate foundation for the future missions
of the CIA.
D. The Purpose of Intelligence Background .
Intelligence has been justifiably referred to as "the world's second oldest professionu since the need for information appears to be a ubiquitous aspect of human organization. As some writers have endeavored to detail, the covert collection of2~ntelligence
has existed throughout history and across cultures. However,
in detailing where and when intelligence organizations and functions existed, these writers have left unexplored more fundamental issues. These issues include the conditions under which intelligence is necessary as compared to preferable, or the differences between and similarities among the types of information pursued. It is these types of issues which will help decide the need for and use of the CIA in the future.
An important observation not emphasized enough in the literature is the distinction betwisn the military and political types of intelligence information. In order to make effective decisions, both political and military leaders need specialized information about the potential opposition or situation. Therefore, each requires a different type of intelligence focus. The military tends to need information about the capabilities
of the enemy in order to plan for appropriate counters. The political leadership, on the other hand, tends to require information about the intentions of other leaders in order to create the policies which best achieve their states national interests. However, it appears that the need for this information is not uniform. Whereas tactical intelligence appears almost mandatory for effective military operations,
the same cannot be said for political decisionmaking. Perhaps this is because the stakes of losing military operations tend
to be consistently higher than for general policymaking. Therefore, an implicit connection between intelligence and the effective use of military force exists in the United states. This leads to an underestimation of the political benefits pf covertly collected information for general foreign policy formation and implementation. "Thus, it fosters the perception that the main purpose of intelligence is primarily the military function of threat perception and warning regarding national security issues.
This tendency is borne out through study of the American experience with intelligence. Whereas the emphasis is usually placed on the existence of intelligence functions during the country's major wars, including the Cold War, there is little written about the peacetime use of secrecy and intelligence
in foreign policymaking. This may be because historically no major intelligence institution was created for foreign policy support. There appear to be three possible explanations for this.
The first explanation is American exceptionalism and moralism.
Perhaps best illustrated with Stimson's admonition that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," this perspective emphasizes thigbasic moral component of American foreign,
policymaking. It implies an American unwillingness to play
in European-created power politics. As a result, the U.S. would use spies when wars and national ~ecurity hung in the balance, but otherwise eschewed such amoral means.
A second explanation is the one which perceives intelligence as being primarily concerned with the security of the U.S.
When security is threatened, intelligence capabilities are expanded. But any other functions would distract attention
and divert resources away from the primary goal of threat perception and warning.
Both of these interpretations would perceive the CIA as created in an attempt to prevent strategic surprises in an era
of total wars. With national security concerns almost universal, policymakers would get the information they need as a by-product of the security-oriented focus of the agency.
By contrast, a third explanation for the lack of an institutionalized intelligence function is that for most of
its history the U.S. did not have the kind of foreign policy which needed intelligence support. A primarily disengaged policy does not require the information that an engaged policy would. Therefore the only times the U.S. did need a structured intelligence function was during wartime.
This interpretation would perceive the creation of the CIA
in 1947 as the necessary institutionalization of an intelligence function needed for the support of an engaged foreign policy worldwide. The exclusive mandate for national security intelligence would be seen as a misinterpretation of the intelligence function caused by the recent total war military experience of the policymakers.
Implication for the CIA
In the last section, the conclusion was reached that national secur i ty concerns are fewer since the end of the Cold War.
This has an impact upon the debate over the two aspects of intelligence. If the CIA is seen as a national security intelligence agency primarily used for threat perception and warning, its functions should pe reduced relative to the reduction in national security concerns. But if the attribution of an exclusive national security focus to the CIA was a mistaken interpretation of the purpose of intelligence, and policymakers desire intelligence for policy support as well as threat perception and warning, then the CIA should have a similar capability as it did during the Cold War.
Criterion for Analysis
Without any theoretical basis for the use of intelligence, it becomes difficult to decide which of these purposes should
be the appropriate emphasis for the use of American intelligence in the future. In order to make a judgment, a model of the need for intelligence is necessary. The one which is used is based on the executive power model of government. Although
it has not been empirically tested, it provides an explanation for why intelligence organizations exist in some cases, and not in others.
The basic premise is that the threat or use of force is a regrettable but inherent consequence of social interaction. Force, -however, must be applied discriminately in order to
prevent unforeseen and unwanted consequences, such as grudges or backlashes, from developing. Therefore, information must be sought explicitly in order to use force accurately and appropriately.
On a state level, this use of force has both internal and external components. The internal component is part of the state's obligation to maintain order. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the national level intelligence organization used to ensure that the force of the state is applied internally in a discriminate manner. The external component is a bit more complicated.
The executive power of government is the power of the state focused externally. It has two primary functions which can • be described as offensive and defensive. The defensive goals involve attempts to prevent the international environment from dictating events to the state1s disadvantage. The offensive goals, on the other hand, involve attempts to shape the international environment towards the state's advantage.
For a state, the use of intelligence agencies is the most effective and efficient way to provide leaders with the information necessary to use force effectively and accurately, regardless of whether the force is to be applied internally or externally, or for offensive or defensive purposes.
For most of its history the u;s. has had a foreign policy that was pri~arily defensive in nature. It was protected by
the oceans and the British navy from most of the influences which would have mandated greater engagement with other powers. This disengagement was broken up by periods of war, where the military need for intelligence became overwhelming. However, when the wars ended, the u.s. resumed its traditional sporadic use of intelligence. After World War II, however, policymakers made an intentional decision to shape the international environment to the American advantage. This shift to an offensive goal necessitated the creation of an intelligence agency to fulfill the information requirements of the policymakers. This conclusion can be reinforced by Harry Ransom's comment that "Foreknowledge is of primary importance
to those ~80 would seize the initiative in international
affairs." So the United States created the CIA with an
exclusive national security focus. However, it was the fact
that the worldwide American engagement coincided with the completion of a total war that caused the perceptions of national security needs to appear so large. This gave the impression
that intelligence could focus exclusively on its threat perception and warning function while supplying policymakers
with all the information they required for effective policy formation.
Now that the Cold War is over and the likelihood of total war is so low, the information required to ensure national security does not require the same worldwide intelligence capability. However, lesser transnational threats to national interests which are not very amenable to the application· of state power, such as terrorism or narcotics trafficking, are
legitimate concerns to policymakers accountable to the people. Nevertheless if the U.S. remains engaged globally, then policymakers need information in order to apply their economic, political, or even military force accurately and/or effectively, as the executive power model illustrates. Because of this continued global engagement, the U.S. must retain a centralized institutional intelligence function in order to supply policymakers with both the national security and policy support information they need.
Application to Approaches
Approach #5 assumes the main purpose of the CIA is to engage in threat perception and warning. According to this view, extraneous concerns would distract attention and divert resources from national security information needs. Therefore, it calls for a reduction in CIA functions to cover only those with clear national security implications. While the threats to national security concerns do need to be watched in this still dangerous world, this perspective disregards the legitimate information needs of policymakers who are using or threatening to use force to shape the international environment. This perspective focuses too much on the military function of intelligence, and not enough on its political functions. As long as American policymakers plan to remain globally en~aged, it appears that the CIA is
the singular institution capable of handling both the political and military needs of policymakers. Therefore, despite the reduction of natonal security concerns since the end of the Cold War, it should retain most or all of its Cold War capabilities to collect and analyze information. Any call for a reduction would be to limit the American capability to use force internationally. Therefore, Approach #5 can be rejected as the basis for the planning of future CIA roles and missions.
Part 5 Conclusion
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the beginning
of the end of the Soviet Union. The end of the cold War soon followed, and the·leaders in Washington have had five years
to contemplate the impact of this on their policies. However, policies have been decided on in the meantime. Decisions are sometimes made regardless of lack of consensus or even understanding, and the academic analysis comes later. The roles and missions of the CIA had to change given the reduction in importance of its main target. The big question was what the CIA should focus on next, or even if it should exist in its present form. From recent congressional hearings it appears
as if these questions have already been answered. The problem
'for academics is that the fundamental answers have been classified.
However, certain conclusions can be drawn by analyzing the contrasts between earlier congressional hearings and more recent ones. The hearings in the spring of 1992 had more questions than answers. Senator David Boren, the sponsor of the
legislation under discussion, admitted his proposals were ~
strawmen proposed more to elicit discussion and analysis than create a consensus. One of the main points subsequently brought out was the connection between the need for intelligence and
the type of foreign policy pursued. As Frank Carlucci pointed out, . Huntil our foreign policy goals become clearer, we won't know which (intelligence) needs have priority.H
This is the crucial point for this paper. Three of the underlying issues identified in this paper (the international structure, the prioritization of the purposes of the u.S. government, and the definition of national security) are determinants of foreign policies more generally, as well as intelligence policies. In deciding one way or another on these issues, this paper has implicitly argued for a certain kind
of foreign policy, as well as .the approach embodied in Approach #6. For a more comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of
the need for intelligence, the next step may be· to match specific foreign policy scenarios with the types of intelligence called for in each. Once the connection to types of policies can be made, it would be possible to identify intelligence with general international relations theories. Despite the current lack
of intelligence theory, it might actually be possible to eventually create one.
Frank Carlucci came to the conclusion that in an era of uncertainties regarding the potential direction of the foreign policy of the U.S., it would be best to maintain a flexible . intelligence capability. By 1995 it appears that this is what the policymakers have attempted to accomplish with the CIA.
For a policy decision made in an era of uncertainty, flexibility appears to be an extremely sensible goal. However, sensible
does not mean correct. This paper argues for a CIA which maintains as its primary goal the prevention of strategic surprises. In order to accomplish this, the primary focus should remain on states which have the potential to affect American
national security in the near future. The secondary function
of the CIA should be to supply the decisionmakers ~ith the information they need to carry out the foreign policies of the United states in the most effective way possible. This is an important function, but it should remain secondary. Former
DCI James Woolsey used the example of the peacetime use of the military for other purposes, including humanitarian ones, to illustrate the present growth of CIA functions into non-traditional areas such as environmental concerns. He stated that in an era of reduced threats the excess capacity of the
CIA can be used elsewhere. It can, and in fact should be used for policy support as long as those in charge make sure that
the resources and attention are kept on the CIA's main mission of national security intelligence.
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1 The speech by former defense secretary Les Aspin does a good job of laying out what questions his commission will be looking at.
2 Kerr, 324.
3 Jervis, "Intelligence and Foreign Policy.", 143.
4 Again, this is detailed pretty well in the Les Aspin's speech; but it is also in all of the hearings to some extent. 5 Alterman, 49. He uses a form of this type of policy relevant organization.
6 This approach is primarily derived from aggregating the proposals of Boren and Turner ("Intelligence for ••• ").
7 This approach is an aggregate of the proposals of Halperin and Woods, Raskin, and Weiner.
8 This approach is an aggregate of the proposals of Gates, ott, Wines and Bruemmer.
9 This approach, rather than being the primary one of any author, is developed from mentions in Bruemmer and Cordesman. 10 Approach #5 is taken from its primary proponent, Codevilla. 11 This approach is a variation on the combination of Berkowitz and Goodman, and Carr.
12 See Jervis, "The Future of World Politics" for a good description of the problems of prediction.
13 Garnett, 64.
14 Again, see Jervis "The Future of World Politics" for a description of prevalent expectations of the future.
15 See Huntington's article entitled If No Exit: The Errors of Endism." for another opinion as to why prudence may be the best policy for the future.
16 See Goldgeier and McFaul for a greater exposition on the prospects of integration for the developed world.
17 This emphasis on the purpose of the CIA is~entioned in
the speech by Les Aspin, and within the.U.S. Senate hearings in 1992 by Ray Cline, page 116.
18 Jeffreys-Jones, 23. Ransom, 30.
19 Jeffreys-Jones, 198.
20 Gries, 77.
21 Halperin and Woods, 141. Raskin, 777.
22 Halperin and Woods, 129. Rask~n, 782-784. Weiner, 30. 23 Halperin and Woods, 141. Raskin, 784.
24 Alterman, 54.
25 This publication is the Extracts, and the best summary article inside which counters the civil libertarian criticisms is by William Webster.
26 This article by Warner is a good description of the use
of governmental secrecy throughout American history. An interesting side note is that he specifically mentions how Halperin has lost in both the legislative and judicial arenas in his pursuit of the civil libertarian goals.
27 Jordan, 3.
28 From Gaddis and his description of the debates over strategy during the Cold War.
29 See Deibel for a more detailed look at what the future American interests may be.
Examples of writings which focus on the €nlargement of national secrity issues include Rowlands on the'environment and a section in Jordan on economics, p. 285-311.
This is primarily from Dyer for the progression of warfare; though Brodie contains a good description of the progression of technology. The collectionof readings in Paret also
give a good description of the advances made in warfare
These descriptive historical writings include those by Singer, Deacon, Dvornik, starr, and Haswell. Showalter, 15-19.
David Boren during the united states Senate Hearing 1992, 162.
Testimony of Frank Carlucci, United States Senate Hearing 1992, 254.
Testimony of DCI James Woolsey, United staes Senate Hearing, 10 January 1995.
34 35 36 37 38
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