People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31

Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

Page 12. which may be enacted into law. and consequences of the law.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Buenviaje Case No. in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble. 37. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine.” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature. 121” does not embrace. No.5 People of the Philippines v. to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses. and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. 121”.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act. Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. 25c. it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. No. scope. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. L-22945 (March 3. Respondent is empowered. 1925) Chapter I. thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill.R. “A bill shall embrace only one subject. d . The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed.46 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v. Footnote No. L-24396 (July 29. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. expressed in its title. 1968) Chapter I. which shall be expressed in its title.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. When there is doubt as to its validity.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. In Section 3 of the same act. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. cannot embrace more than one subject. Footnote No. and lastly. 7a. 203 G. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic. National Power Corporation Case No.R. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. Page 12. d FACTS: Republic Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 37. 8 G.

7675. a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. will be regarded as valid. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor.R. 81 G. Cabatuando Case No. No. d . 1962) Chapter I. L-14542 (October 31.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. Abalos Case No.6 Cordero v. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R. Page 12. which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act. language of such precision as to mirror. LATIN MAXIM: 20a. 37. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. Hon. 1994) Chapter I. No. Footnote No.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. 7675. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. No.R. Footnote No. fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be. 1199. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. L-114783 (December 8. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Act No. d FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII. 291 G. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover.A. Page 12. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No.

148 G.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents. No. in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Commission on Elections Case No. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790.” It does not violate Paragraph 17. with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. No.” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. 14019 (July 26. Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. payable every three months. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790. now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law. section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing.R. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title. section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. 1967) Chapter I. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. It does not violate Paragraph 17. which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province. after payment of a fee of P50 annually. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.7 Ayson and Ignacio v. “An Act amending the Administrative Code. 11 G. LATIN MAXIM: d . it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law. L-28089 (October 25. 13. Footnote No. now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill.’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality. are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government. Page 13. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. is invalid. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. 1919) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan v.51 FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas. which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. which is Cotabato.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. prompted by the upcoming elections. section 3 of the Jones Law.R. and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur.

becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. 43263 (October 31. The controlling purpose of Act No. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1972) Chapter I.8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements. 4122. as provided by Act No. 1935) Chapter I. L-32613-14 (December 27. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly.47 with interest. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. No. and need not recite the details of the Act. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 4122. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage. to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A. to which the Government appealed. 169 G. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature. After applying this sum. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. Page 13.” is valid. HELD: Act No. He pleaded as a defense that the company. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. No. and liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness. costs. entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section. Reyes Case No. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents. He failed to pay some of the installments. with interest. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. Ferrer Case No. HELD: Yes. 4122 is valid and enforceable. 208 G.50 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. ISSUE: W/N Act No. The cases were dismissed. Page 13. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. the latter owed the company a balance of P275. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act.R. Footnote No. had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him. Footnote No. and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent.R. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. 51d . 9d. 1700. 37 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. v.

2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. acquisition. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. and transfer of firearms. which was “an Act to regulate the importation. No. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act.” which phrase is reiterated in Sec.9 Del Rosario v. pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. W/N Act No. At the time of the enactment of Act No.” ISSUES: 1. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. 9d.R. 1780 on October 12. Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. 46a. 230 G. whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. L-32476 (October 20. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title. et al. No. 1 of both Resolutions. and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 51d FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2.” did not include weapons other than firearms. 33 G. HELD: No. and both Resolutions No. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1957) Chapter I. L-9659 (May 29. possession. Case No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. and for Other Purposes. HELD: No. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. 55 FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. 50 . 1907. the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only. and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. Carbonell.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. Page 14. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.R. 36a. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969. Footnote No. Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. use. and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. Page 16. 37. 38a . 37–1 was valid. 37–1. 37–1 was invalid.10 People of the Philippines v. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 1960) Chapter I. ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. 210 G. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title.63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.R. Footnote No. Leoncio Lim Case No. Apolonio Carlos Case No.83 FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant. the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment. the accused in violation of said order. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time. guilty of treason. Although FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 4003. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. No. 204 G. No. HELD: No. FAO No. FAO No. (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail. Leoncio Lim. L-239 (June 30. Page 19. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 1947) Chapter I. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: In March 1954.R. it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it. L-14432 (July 26. trial and judgment of treason cases. the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. Footnote No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No.

R.June 30. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1. 115381 (December 23. 57 G. 1988) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. 1974.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. 2.R. v.11 KMU Labor Center v. ISSUES: 1. 1995. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. Case No.June 30. 1973. availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. 1973. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation. No. 1972. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. 1972. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. Inc. 2. PBOAP. No. the basic law prevails. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. Garcia Jr. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. 68 G. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. 1972. as provided in the Act. HELD: 1. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: Congress approved RA No. Central Bank Case No. 1972 to June 30. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1.June 30. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1. L-34526 (August 9. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. 1973.

84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. Administrative Order No. the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. Thus. LATIN MAXIM: 30. 121158 (December 5. v. So Ching. or any of its rules. the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. 2. 3 as So Ching was contending. L-14740 (September 26. 35. Act No. 2. ISSUE: 1.12 China Banking Corp. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. HELD: Petition was dismissed. cannot amend an act of Congress. 140 G. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. 1960) FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. HELD: 1. plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. On April 28. and its president. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. W/N Administrative Order No. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. Respondent. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. 46a . W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. instead of Administrative Order No. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. Footnote No. CA Case No. They were appealing that Act No. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3. 59 G. No. 2.A. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. No. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company. 1996) Chapter I. 3135 was the governing rule in their case.494.R. Furthermore. of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. After 5 years. 3135 is the governing law. ISSUE: 1. in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent. 1. No.R. The Commission. Page 19. Honorable Estenzo Case No. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees. 1993. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted.40. ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply.

” “corral fees. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees.98 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. 37 . it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. 46c rd FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No.” “meat inspection fees. 120 G. No.R. 1997) Chapter I. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. which has a technical meaning. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. 1981. if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others. L-15807 (April 22. 1963) FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. Since Respondent was reelected. the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees.R.” “and internal organ fees. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. Footnote No. in the issuance of Ordinance No. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. 141 G. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT.” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains.13 Grego v. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. 125955 (June 19. No. Page 23. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31. 24. Incidentally. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. referring only to an appointive position. Commission on Elections Case No. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a. 655. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees. this does not fall under the scope of the term. Municipal of Caloocan Case No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees.

the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. and hence. subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6. On the second issue. No. the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. On the compromise agreement. 85 G. that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price.00. No.00.00 pursuant to PD 42. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v. 73 G. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired. 26. 1990) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25.600. After it expired. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. 49439 (June 29. Reyes Case No. 11a. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. 87047 (October 31. and hence.R.600.400. ISSUE: 1. the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties.14 National Housing Authority v. but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6.000 sq/rn. whichever is lower. . CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy Case No. res judicata does not apply. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof. then from 1982 to 1985. and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases. The petition for Certiorari is granted. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1.R. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments.

All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. No. Pacquing.O. ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. L-25246 (September 12. And E. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. ISSUE: 1. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. 37.D. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). 1995) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victoriano v. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. In 1998. as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution. an “Iglesia ni Cristo”. 115044 (January 27. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. HELD: R. 1974) FACTS: Executive Order No. 6c. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. Felipe G. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union Case No. 2. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. Lim v. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. 40b . It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions. which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.R. Alfredo S. 74 G. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union. ISSUE: 1.O. to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. No. license or permit.A. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution. Then President Aquino issued an E. was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. No.D. 50 FACTS: Petitioner. No. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise. 0. but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.R. provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 44. 169 G. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization.15 Hon.A. Case No. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3.

31025 (August 15. therefore. No. agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land. Footnote No. the ownership would vest in the Defendants. declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. 1929) FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. 55 G. the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included. and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. Tuvera Case No. 1928. 39a . L-63915 (December 29. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule. which cannot in any event be omitted.R. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se. HELD: No. the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. Without such notice or publication. August 13. In computing any fixed period of time. No. Carpio Case No. the Defendants appealed that by that time. 13 of the Administrative Code. HELD: No. and on the day from which it should be counted. the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount. it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. 1986) Chapter I. unless otherwise provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. 9a FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13. The court. 1928. with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. 287 G. Publication in full should be indispensable.159 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v. according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. Page 37. there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”.16 Tañada v.

LATIN MAXIM: 6c HELD: The payment made on August 11. and finally occurred on July 8. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. 161 G.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. the court. and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days. However. On July 10. 56 G. with government as the purchaser. to pay the Plaintiff. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court.17 Guzman v.R. 88 of the CCP. L-17986 (October 21. inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. or to deposit in court. the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof. As a result. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7. 25c . No. in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal. 8223 (March 4. FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court. 2588. v. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided. 1914) FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”. 1912. By various orders of the court. it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec.R. The sale here of the property must stand. 1912. Lichauco Case No. setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. On July 13. Paniaga Case No. there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. On Feb 28. set aside the order of forfeiting the bond. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila. the principal was arrested. No. 1912. the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. The term “month” must now be understood to refer to calendar month. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments.S. 9. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month. 1921 was one day late. it shall be excluded. on application of the sureties. HELD: Sec. 1921) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. as amended by Act No. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday. the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. in this case. the sale was postponed from time to time.

30b. 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. Footnote No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. 124 G. stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 238 G. CA Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The date March 28. Footnote No.R. Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. Andueta. Agrarian Court dismissed petitions. Then. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.R. April 11 and April 12.18 PNB v. claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. 37. 9c. 1970) Chapter II. No. 1969 falls on a Friday. 9b FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 1970) and G. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication.19 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans. 9a. the section would have expressly said so. 11a. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. Moreover. In Concepcion v. L-25326 (May 29. a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. For failure to pay the obligation. the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants. 98382 (May 17. reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. 36a. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises. while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday.R. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity. The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28. the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Page 47. No. L-25327 (May 29. 43 . 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c. respectively. Section 3 of Act No. No. 12a. Hidalgo Case No. Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Page 52. injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. 1993) Chapter I.

2. 24a HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.R. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Footnote No.22 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 149 G. 28. 1911) Chapter II. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro. 13.R. Footnote No. v. property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. 9c. from voting. 6160 (March 21. 11a. did not own property of the assessed value of P500. Eduvala Case No.19 U. LATIN MAXIM: 10. L-41106 (September 22. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. In the statute. 300 G. 37 .20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. No. 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. No.S. If the property qualification is actual/market value. Page 53. Page 52. 1898. 12a. 20a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. 36a. Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations. Navarro Case No. it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. Both qualifications are under a single head. Evidence showed that the Appellants. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. Petition denied. suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. and of the statute as a whole. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. FACTS: Respondent. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. 1977) Chapter II.

Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. A few years later. 1986. Albay.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. No. On November 16. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 203 of the Administrative Code. 25a . 46a FACTS: On March 3.E. In her defense. Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. While it may depart from its source. as well as unjust eviction. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction. On December 17. No. 1934. PD 1517. Page 56. 3899.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. 80223 (February 5. No.20 Regalado v. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Petitioner. 26 G.R. Villar assumed office. 255 G. 3899). Esteban T. CA Case No. said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land. Page 55. L-42293 (February 13. San Diego Inc. amended further by Act. Footnote No. 27 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao. the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. Act No. v.R. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. as further amended by Act No. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code. Yulo Case No. 1993) Chapter II. Shortly thereafter. 1935) Chapter II. De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517. 3899). Footnote No. 1931.

Page 56. 9a FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax. 1953) Chapter II. Page 56. 8. Footnote No. 6c. That when Congress convened again on Jan. Footnote No.R. 1942. were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. David Case No. 671 (Emergency Powers Act). LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 1. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function.33 FACTS: Executive Orders. 98 G. payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public. to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. 1949) Chapter II.21 Araneta v. 7a. No. 84 G. L-6355-56 (August 31. HELD: No. Through the separation of powers. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law. No. L-2044 (August 26. Dinglasan Case No. 24a . such a task must be done by the Judiciary. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v. in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. by the Legislature. said proclamations were also terminated. Sec.

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50

CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56

Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58

KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

in a concurring opinion. Petitioners. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts. the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather. However. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. 47 G. 1990. No. However.30642 (April 30.26 Floresca v. Therefore. Salazar Case No. the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. 92163 (June 5. Furthermore. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically. then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts. Philex Mining Corporation Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and wanton negligence. L. with the exception of Floresca. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. 48 . 17. Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion. applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC.R. Thereafter. 40 G. the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. 46a. recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s Compensation Act. a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. No. 1990) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining operations. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. 40a FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10.

278 G. 65097 (February 20. especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. No. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. Hermosisimo Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1.D.74 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling. the use of “sole” in P. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council.65 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner. Footnote No. the decision against him was invalid. 1716-A refers to police authority. HELD: No. Tanodbayan Case No. 1984) Chapter II. 35 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. 7a. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. 3a. Hence. HELD: No. 7a .R. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No. even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. L-10662 (December 14. 162 G. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee. Page 63.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. No. 6b. it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints. 1956) Chapter II. RA No. Under RA No.27 Manikad v. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone. Cebu. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. Page 67. Footnote No. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council.D. theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent.

Mapa Case No. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. Defendant. Macarandang. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. 30a. L-12088 (December 23. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. 7a.R. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. 35. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. Moro Macarandang Case No. 1959) Chapter II.87 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. 46c . L-22301 (August 30. invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. Page 69. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.28 People of the Philippines v. 24a FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. 211 G. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. 1967) Chapter II. 6c. Page 69. HELD: No. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 213 G. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879.R. No. Footnote No. admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions. No.

100776 (October 28.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. 7a. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. Page 69. the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.R. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. No. 1983. Footnote No.29 Co v. CA Case No. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine.R. 1993) Chapter II. The check was deposited on January 3. 37. should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. 46a FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. 1951) FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1. in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter. 24a. Que v. the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT. 150 G. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. It was dishonored two days later. the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense. 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank. No. postdated November 30. 65 G.91 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. 1984.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check. 43 . L-2934 (November 29. an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. Sometime in September 1948. 2a. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. According to them. Sarmiento Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.

” LATIN MAXIM: d . 1941) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Capiz v. Page 79. 149 G. the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled. Footnote No. “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. and for other purposes.” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.R. Commission on Elections Case No. 37. 56 G. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. Ramirez Case No. and binding to all future owners of the same. d FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years. No. and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner.30 Sumulong v. which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.8 FACTS: On September 15. 48634 (October 8. LATIN MAXIM: 36a. cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874. Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands. No. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties. the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. L-16197 (March 12. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation. Eleven days later.R. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. 1920) Chapter III. 1941. The land involved is a private agricultural land. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No.

D. 109404 (January 22. it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. 9. 1996) Chapter III. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name.D.R.D. pointed.R. organized lawlessness or public disorder.16 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N P. Nos. 9. No. erred in applying P. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P. L-42050-66 (November 20. b2 . An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P. Drilon Case No.D. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. P. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”. Sec.31 Eugenio v. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. Page 76. the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. Purisima Case No.D. Footnote No. 957 will be given retroactive effect. or rebellion. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety. or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of. but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. No.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. insurrection. connected with or related to subversion. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Petitioner claims that the Exec.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. two lots. Footnote No. HELD: No. 1978) Chapter III. Page 81.D. 221 G. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P. 104 G.D. reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. Applying P. viz. “The intent of the statute is the law.

Page 77. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.23 FACTS: The issue is whether or not P. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court. City of Cebu Case No. through its ordinance. Nos.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. Page 82. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.R. Footnote No. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage.D. 25a. declaring that P. which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. 772. ISSUE: Whether or not P. Footnote No. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P. has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. thus bringing the case at hand.D.32 People of the Philippines v. L-14526 (March 31. 1965) Chapter III. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did. the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. Echaves Case No. the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu. According to Respondent.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. 4 G. 36b FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. L-47757-61 (January 28. Hence. both fall within the scope of the power granted. No. 1980) Chapter III. 207 G.22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government.D. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain. HELD: The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. 36b .R.

No. 11e. No reason is shown why. Footnote No. 36b . The Respondent contends. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal. 36b. converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code.” LATIN MAXIM: 11a. Four days after the proclamation. after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the election”. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment). that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the quarterly payment made. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. Case No. “Sec. Aquino Case No. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec.33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Footnote No. Tarlac. 105 G.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. not capacity to assume office. 36d FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion. does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office. The Supreme Court said that.R. 11a. Page 83. TMX Sales. the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. No.28 FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. Page 83. challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. 80 G. 1992) Chapter III. 10201 (September 23. 1957) Chapter III. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. on the other hand. Inc. 9d. Aquino claimed that age requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings. 83736 (January 15.R. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. taking part in the election is meant. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. He appealed that the existence of a semi-colon.

Footnote No. or inserting others when necessary. is covered by Sec. 1918) Chapter III. v. separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country. allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. a citizen of the U. 42a. therefore was not a viable defense.R.” The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court. and in this connection. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will. may be proved. 37. disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”. and which might be proved.38 FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words.34 US. 1913) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. L-8327 (March 28. allowed by the law of his own state or country. 48 . or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. but Petitioner contends that Sec. “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses. The will duly probated. separated by the comma. Sec. No. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens. 519. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. 33 FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Inasmuch as defendant had. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts. Page 86. No. 636. which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject. thus an alien. 25a. LATIN MAXIM: 11e. is covered by Sec.S and therefore an alien. 131 G. of a section being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision. being a US citizen. or heading. Hart Case No. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. 159 G. defendants are acquitted. 26. 636. it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. Petitioner. 12767 (November 16. The epigraph.R.

112 G. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. After conviction. 1933) FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. 1993) Chapter III. No. which are mere catchwords or reference aids. While serving sentence. Yabut Case No. in accordance with Art. HELD: No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself. HELD: No. 85472 (September 27. Judgment was reversed. No. Page 87. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. consulted to remove. or from the Spanish caption. epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the text. not create doubts. Footnote No. 160. d . ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. Mendoza Case No. he was punished with the maximum period for murder.43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. and suggests that the law is applicable only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. 7a FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. According to him. He was consequently charged for murder. L-38076 (November 4. 231 G. 160. They were tried and convicted. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. heading. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. there is no need to resort to the preamble.35 People of the Philippines v. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous. LATIN MAXIM: 50.R. he killed another prisoner.R. his conviction for murder is not different because it involved homicide.

36 People of the Philippines v. 36a FACTS: Defendants. After trial. Subsequently. On appeal.” HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. 1908”. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. and defendant was never in jeopardy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. 1910) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The English and original text says: “on and after March 1. the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. 1761. Art. No.S. Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. 162 G. it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law. 110 G. it shall prevail over its translation. HELD: No. The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party. v. L-39037 (October 30. on the night of March 1. Manaba Case No. Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del primero de Marzo. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English. LATIN MAXIM: 6c .R. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. 32 of Act No. because the complaint was not signed by the offended party. the “Opium Law”. 5654 (August 27. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. Quintanar Case No.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo. because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. 1933) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. in violation of Sec.R. and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter. 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. but it was denied and he was convicted.

No. orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because it is not a real right. 1934) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION McMicking v. But the English enacted by the Legislature. 49 . or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment execution is. it is simply reversed. ISSUE: With these two cases. until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken. strictly. 175 G. is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. China Banking Corporation Case No.49 FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. Act No. which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). 7896 (March 30. No. which it does not harbor. the judgment. only real rights can be registered. v. 40188 (July 27. rent to corresponding years paid in advance.R. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. not destroyed. 496. and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments. However. The only exceptions.60. are a term exceeding three years. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Page 88. which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. 49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. 39 G. Inc. should prevail. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. Sec.666. And likewise. 51 and 52. or the Torrens system. drawn in part from American and English precedents. Even if there was a new judgment. However.37 Employees’ Club. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The preference on Mata was based on Art. 496. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. in the duration of Mata’s judgment. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. Lichauco Case No. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure.R. there was yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17. 1914) Chapter III.

representing the portions bought. 1987) Chapter III. a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter. on the day following the accident. the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. While Art. the Petitioners occupied after the said sales. 8. and unmarried. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. 17 FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12. 9c. HELD: Although there was no written notice. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1961. Footnote No. 11e. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed. if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. De Macabenta v. HELD: Yes. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale. 11 G. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. to the posthumous daughter of the deceased. are still considered dependents under the Act. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 2/5 of the lot. the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. No. 9a.38 Alonzo v. they were lawfully wedded. 37 . ISSUE: 1. 2. Footnote No.54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vda. L-72873 (May 28. not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale. By virtue of such agreements. Page 89. 11d. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death. 12a. despite their obvious knowledge of it. there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice. W/N Art. whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. 1970) Chapter III. LATIN MAXIM: 1. with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. which led to his death 16 days later.R. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Racquel. 1962.57 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. No. W/N there was a valid notice. 156 G. 12a. L-27489 (April 30. However. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8. 7a.R. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. 10. Page 89.

The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company. et al. 290 G. In 1947. and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. represented by his widow.64 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. must. In 1943. 37. such as Plaintiff Company. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Otherwise. 125 G. no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. No. but because Sergio Nicolas died. 1955) Chapter III. In this regard. No. Page 91. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.R. in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction. heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land. 36a. 34382 (July 20. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No. 1983) Chapter III. Page 90. the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants. L-7747 (November 29.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance Company v. Footnote No. 48 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. 11a. 37 . LATIN MAXIM: 4. 9c. said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to public policy.R. HELD: Yes. In the case at bar. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. Therefore. 8. he was substituted by his heirs. Case No. et al. the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor. 38b. HELD: No. 9b. together with the fruits of the land as damages. Footnote No. the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. v. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. Frances. and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. prove legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines. In 1953. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped.39 Tinio.

81. Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. Page 93. he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. Thus. However. Under the provisions of Sec. He now executed a new promissory note. 1462 of Act No.800 to Petitioner. Therefore. Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and sent a check of P1. and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. unlike the previous law. Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1. 154 G. again due within the next three months. the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. As a rule of construction.000 to Respondent. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law. Footnote No. 36a. On the same day. he must give back P11. 9c.R. the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor. 1462 of Act No. HELD: No. representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work. 2711. No. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times. the intent of the framers is clear. 281. and with this note. the Internal Revenue Collector.40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Petitioner filed a complaint.33. Therefore. 1462 of Act No. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. Again. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. one may consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. No. 4. 11a. the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant. when the intent of a law is ambiguous.422. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. 18316 (September 23. 1923) Chapter III. consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports. 2711. which had been paid under protest. 9c. 5b. Engaging in a stevedoring business. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25. the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations.93 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo.800. 37 . Trinidad Case No.800. since only the interest is forfeited.850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15. In a previous law RA 2073.000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15. After three months.71 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. 1922) Chapter III. 113 G. doing business in the City of Manila. which was cashed. 2711. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. Page 91. 28 FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40.R. with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only a month later and with a check for only P600. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation. with its gross receipts from the said business amounting to P242. 19864 and 19685 (October 17. Martinez Case No.000. the sum of P2. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921.000. 2992).

looking at the legislative history of the statute. 36b . Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. a junction of known rivers or creeks. 22a. private or mineral land survey. it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie points. Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping Petitioner’s claims. discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. a kilometer post of public road. L-34135-36 (February 24. was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Consequently. along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling. 297 G. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. a clear disregard of their agreement.” An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. a corner of approved public. 137) provides: “For the purpose of this section. a known public or private structure. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. De Guzman Case No. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. Footnote No. 47 par. 33. or location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands. 2 of the Mining Law (C. 1981) Chapter III. 1915) Chapter III. Nos. a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads. Page 94. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. HELD: Sec. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. Petitioner however.41 US v. 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution.R.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v. Bureau of Mines.102 FACTS: Defendant. b2 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. nevertheless. disclaimed such consent. L-9144 (March 27. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State.R. However. or other government agencies. HELD: Sec. and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. Luna Case no. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records. 31 G. Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey. Page 95. No. Finally. 30a. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid. Army Corps of engineers. 19 and 20 are constitutional.A. Petitioner prospected 183 claims. No.

ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. Footnote No. Petitioner alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 26. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. L-9695 (September 10. PNB Case No. not covered by the said law. 24b. No. 43. Footnote No. RA 390 Sec. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 provides that a guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Page 95. b2 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. 1991) Chapter III. 50.103 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa v. 1956) Chapter III. ISSUE: W/N Art. Vol. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore. b2 . The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians.R. 87416 (April 8. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. 27 G. HELD: No. and is therefore. The Civil Code does not prevail. No. CA Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the Court revealed that the records of Batasan. However. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank.110 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. Thus. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.42 Baga v. Page 96. 17. the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court.R. 88 G. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390.

R. De Guzman. Indeed. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current Petitioner Bank. a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier. He refused to disclose the sought information. Thus. 11e. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. 12a. In other words. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. Page 96. Furthermore.” laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers.R. Case No. 11a. Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. b2 FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the collection of a sum of money. RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec.43 National Police Commission v. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. 30b. Hence. by invoking RA 1405. No. b2 . they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). HELD: No. 185 G. the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. of the Interior and Local Government. 21 G. 38b. 89 includes the members of the PC. 43. 12b. 35. ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force.110 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v. Had it been otherwise. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The trial court declared the said corporation in default. 1973) FACTS: RA 6975. Ortega Case No. otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Jr. L-34964 (January 31. Tan Kim Liong. 1994) Chapter III. 27. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 106724 (February 9. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor.

” LATIN MAXIM: 34. but also the phrase “by itself. when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority. it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. 118910 (November 16. Hence this appeal. Page 96. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code. No. After the hearing. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law. races. Footnote No. association or joint venture” with others or “by itself. Acting CIR Case No.R. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case.111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes. 173 G. HELD: No. 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments. 1961) Chapter III. 67 G. Morato Case No. Inc. It is deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. 15000 (March 29. et al. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes. lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. v. this request having been denied. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B). lotteries and other similar activities.R. No. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. Guingona. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on the automobiles. said court modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. 36b . controlling in the interpretation of the law. HELD: No.44 Mayon Motors v. v. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan. as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery.

R. four hours overtime). as amended by P. Sec.D. Sec. Nos. it being enough that he “cease to work. provides that “when the work is not continuous. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E. HELD: No. 9265 (April 29.O. ISSUE: 1. 1993) Chapter III. 444.. 30a . Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only. known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law. HELD: The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 77 G. Iligan City. and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. 2. Page 101.” and may rest completely. shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted. Footnote No. 72. 48886-8 (July 21. 26 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely. No.45 Luzon Stevedoring Co.R. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.A. shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. 1957) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Customs v. Sec. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only. 1 of C. 25d. v. 34.133 FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest.D. No. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer. Inc. it is obvious that the private ports are not included. 71 G. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree. given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime. as amended by P. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code.

Case No. who were employees of the national center for mental health. Sec.46 Buenaseda v.146 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself. carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. No. Footnote No. 47 G. No. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. v. 40 G. 106719 (September 21. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension.R. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. In response. Page 104. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. LATIN MAXIM: 27. 13(8) of Art.R. L-46908 (May 17. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. Footnote No. and how these statutes are interpreted. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. 1993) Chapter III. Within three months. Page 106. 9 of the 1987 Constitution. 28 FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. while Sec. it is the duty of the broker to do so. 9 . the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission.141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Carolina Industries Inc. the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. Secretary Flavier Case No. 1980) Chapter III. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases. the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense.

The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same.00. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 1951. Gsell Case No. No L-15290 (May 31.00 on Feb. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. 1944 which they sold for P94. 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. They also purchased a lot located in Q.47 Zamora v. HELD: No. 9.C.000. for P68. representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate.149 FACTS: Mariano Zamora.000. bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . 176 G. 282 G. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. R. R. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora.00 on January 19. owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila. 1944. to pay the sum of P235. 1963) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. The injury was attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. for P132. 1916) Chapter III. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora. HELD: Yes.00 and sold it for P75. filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. Footnote No.00 on March 5.000. Page 106.959. No 10765 (December 22. 1951. being of American origin. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable.

7a . 17 G. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action. Posadas Case No. The jurisdiction of a court depends. holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2.075. for lack of jurisdiction. 1956) FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56. returning the sum of P56.R.48 Ossorio v. and Felix Case No. which the Defendant. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. in accordance with law. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. 93 G.203. HELD: No. L-6884 (March 21. HELD: Yes.246. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Rueda Corp. on the ground that the amount of two notes. collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income tax. without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual declaration.125 and P1. was in excess of its jurisdiction. according to the complaint. No. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. v. and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax.59 to said plaintiff. No. the additional income tax for the income from her paraphernal property.72. one against the Plaintiff. not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the complaint.R. L-31088 (December 3. Sta.000. Cruz Timber Co. which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action.

ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act.000 was in force. 7a. the sheriff on January 30. the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with.R. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 8 G. b2 FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. 692 of the California Code. Case No. 1929 and the sale took place on February 19. upon the land itself. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. is valid and sufficient under Sec. 1929. “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof. 1929. 1931) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. Kette and Sellner Case No. posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states. 1930) FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10. to wit. 33637 (December 31. In pursuant thereof. at the market. 32124 (March 27. HELD: Yes. more particularly on the 2nd. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 99 G. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . 9th. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance. and 15th of February. No. No. and on the municipal building of Pasay. and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication. HELD: Yes.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R.49 Ang Giok Chio vs.

LATIN MAXIM: 2b. Page 107. No. Northcott to pay said amount of P12. Due to the failure of J.50 Reyes v. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument. the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid.156 FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. 2252. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. and on June 29. Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office notified the Bank of irregularity. Plaintiff Guerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the Bank of America.000. Co. However. However. in the absence of any special reason justifying departure from the policy or practice. No. Educ. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but was denied. we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. E. neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero. 30587 (December 4.000. Respondent. 235 G. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. or to any of his co-Plaintiffs. He managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US’s own postal statutes. b2 . 9a. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. Therefore. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. 1971) Chapter III. These are also in line with Sec. as amended by Act No. and deducted from the bank’s clearing account the said amount. Rader and J. Soriano Case No. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure. the former endorsed the mortgage deed. b2 FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Guerrero. v. The prohibition contained in said law against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person.R. is substantially the same as that contained in Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 135 G. in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner’s account with the same amount. Northcott.R. Wells Case No. L-22405 (June 30. 1922.

He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees. ISSUE: W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. 29. Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect in the title. Pahati Case No. No. to pay him the sum of P4. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a result. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation benefits under other laws.00 under the WCC. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit. considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610. with legal interest from the date of the decision. 28 G. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No. It is difficult to construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. Sec. L-29019 (May 18. generally. the P3.900. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. 39.000. upon his failure to do so. without deducting the P3. 38b. The claim for damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. 40b . Defendant Belizo was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4. LATIN MAXIM: 17. provincial or municipal government” in Sec.000. 132 G.000. Furthermore. 7a FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6. HELD: Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car. It was also contended that the phrase “or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees. of the national.00 plus attorney’s fee of P600.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC. No. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence. he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for cancellation. 19b.000 as moral damages. L-8257 (April 13. HELD: The resolution of the WCC is modified. 1972) FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan. for P4.900 and pay the sum of P5.51 Cruz v. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car.R.900 which he paid in check. The court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and.

No. 1903. The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become important. it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal. entitled “An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks’ Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange”. v. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601. Moreover. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609. it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to extend the term. Hipolito et al. the budget for 1959-1960. 1989) FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appeal—the preparation of the papers for transmission to the Supreme Court. is a police measure or a revenue measure. The term of the court in which the case was tried expired on May 30.52 Garcia et al.00 for 1959 and P434. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period. Two days after. 19b. it cannot be extended. L-1449 (November 30. Case NO. On July 28. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin. The Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May 21. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. 1903) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESSO Standard Eastern Inc.R. 41 G. which was denied on July 23. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 53 G. ISSUE: W/N Sec. not for the purpose of creating it. HELD: RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country’s international reserve. they excepted to the judgment and presented a motion for a new trial.234.92 for 1960.246. at least two cases had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. 27. 48 FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Petitioner’s claims for refund of the margin fees P102. the language of which is plain and unambiguous. 70037 (July 7. Garcia to Congress as part of. But that period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers. Therefore. As a matter of fact. v. the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions. there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute. 7a . The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk’s office. No. and in order to balance. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt. Moreover. given the physical impossibility to comply with it in many cases. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. which on August 5 was allowed and signed by the court.R. after the right to remove the case has been secured. considering when the law was adopted.

33. or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. In the present case. No. If anyone should be given prior right of entry at all. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided. and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon.A. No. HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". No. validity and operation. and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. it should be the actual occupants who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. C. without the record disclosing in our opinion. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight. or the Special Import Tax Law. Director of Lands Case No. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry was correct. The policy in the disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. 141). but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 36b. to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not. To the contrary. they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner. 1975) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. b2 FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents. L-28329 (August 17. 141. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer.A. it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President. Case No. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . and of facts which affect their derivation. unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other. HELD: No. 1964) FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code.53 Commissioner of Customs v. in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. in cases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupation. 38a. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394. a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes thereon since 1947. 100 G. 102 C. Thus. No. either expressly or by implication. L-15816 (February 29.R. pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 26 G. namely.

Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez Case No. one which admittedly. this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. taxes had been paid for. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office. The Chief of Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation. it was not.R. should be followed unless clearly erroneous. to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner. 32. is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. No. they chose to follow the principle that a public office is a public trust. 92 G. Enrile Case No. ISSUE: W/N Sec. the same can only be filed by a qualified person. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. on the condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. 107 G. Certainly. The Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor. At this time. being a lawyer. However. HELD: For Respondent officials. in April 1932. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. 1931. 1933) FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. is more qualified than Petitioner. 1932. even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes. 42b . such a contemporaneous construction. he was charged for violating Sec. Nos. and being a new position created under RA 4040.R.54 Orencia v. one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate. By September. Hence. while not conclusive. L-28997 (February 22. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23. interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief. he was a delinquent in the payment of P2. who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility. the answer was not in doubt. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and public office. the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. and he has been performing functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as such until RA 4040. Since there was a new legal provision to be construed. Sec. we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. LATIN MAXIM: 2a FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October 16. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions. Respondents filed their answer. and after usual admissions and denials. that Respondent. Under these circumstances.000 for land taxes to the government. among others. has an ambiguous aspect. HELD: No. And in this case. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.

apart from its principal station in Makati. which was in violation of RA 3802. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes. the lots located in Block 330.R. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct. Page 112. under RA 3802. 73603 (June 22. there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is being offered. For mandamus to lie. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation Case No. This is a petition seeking to set aside the ruling rendered. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. there is no obligation of Respondent Corporation. In the case at bar. However. maintain. an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. other stations or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. v. Petitioner’s rights should be well-defined. 1986) Chapter III.180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Global Communications.R. 236 G. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. Page 112. Manila was designated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In 1971. LCH Project 3. Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication. which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest. the price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the lots is at least P120. now NTC.. applicant shall cease its operations. In 1977. aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. Petitioners decided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq m. 266 G. Footnote No. Inc. No. In January 1979. BOC gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu. 36b . In accordance with RA 3208. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. 1 of RA 3802. Moreover. Footnote No. in reference to Sec. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision. L-60548 (November 10. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners. Thus. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.181 FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent. clear and certain. subject to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities. low cost housing for those who are unable to provide themselves with this. 9a FACTS: In 1976.55 Sagun v. and operate. the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes. Relova Case No. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. This can be seen in Sec. 1988) Chapter III. No. before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. HELD: No.

183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. Sugar Central Agency v. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties. 38b. the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. Footnote No. 4. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government. Defendant collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. it is non-extendible. 43 FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. HELD: Yes. HELD: No. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. 6 1927) Chapter III.186 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28. Commissioner of Customs Case No. Page 113. Page 112. the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1year period. The first gives him the privilege of importing. 11d . shipped 5.124. 241 No. wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed or levied upon.42 which the Petitioner paid under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax.56 Asturias Sugar Central v. 27761 (Dec. Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. 37. Collector of Customs Case No. Under the law in effect at that time.” Dissenting Opinion: Historically. 4. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Footnote No. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund. Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid. 5b.416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United States in a wharf on Pulapandan. offer two options to an importer. 24 No. provided the articles mentioned are exported within three years from importation. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act. in and by which millions of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves.629. free from import duties. and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so “would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III.

LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1960) Chapter III. it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. rice. by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act. as amended by RA 983. Thus. Footnote No. such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. be granted to RCA workers and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. v. a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the price of palay. RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. L-22753 (December 18. Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC. RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation. Also.190 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramos v. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. 37. HELD: While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts. 1967) Chapter III. it is entitled to great weight and consideration. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. ISSUE: W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created – for the said obligation. L-12727 (February 29. RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. No. that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB).R. Page 115. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. To carry out this function. 6g. under law. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983. 38b FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for additional compensation for overtime work.57 Manila Jockey Club Inc.193 FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. CA Case No. 11a. Footnote No. HELD: No. Not a matter of right. night work and work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. 164 No. they are merely an office directly under the President. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. 4 of RA 309. unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation. which was possessed with a distinct and separate corporate existence. and corn. and not for profit. 38b . Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. Games and Amusement Board Case No. Page 114. There has been consistent administrative interpretation by the Office of the President as to what may. the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. 253 G.

namely. No. On appeal. possess full and final authority in disciplining. 970 was issued by the President stating that “except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction. 38b FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila. A formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner.R.58 Salaria v. Page 115. suspension. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. 94. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is final.O. 30a.R. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Thus. 267 G. the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. CA Case No. personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. L-28153 (January 28. the President transferred them under herein Respondent. Footnote No. the Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U. Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service Commissioner. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Footnote No. 20c. 305 G. Thus. No.P. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. 9b. After the trial.195 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. 1971) Chapter III. Buenviaje Case No. 6c. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Memorandum Circular No. L-45642 (February 28.193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION University of the Philippines v. and removal of the civil service employees of the University. Page 115. 1978) Chapter III. or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission. 38b . including those of the Philippine General Hospital. Under RA 51 and E.

R. W/N Regulations No.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote. At that time. imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters. cinematographs. 39a FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queen’s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937.70 per seat. No.A. Bureau of Labor Relations Case No. L-43760 (August 21. 128).40 (Sec. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act. 2a. 1976) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Everett v.59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. 120 G. 1939) FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills. 94 is in accordance with law. Inc. contemporaneous construction is given weight. 1458. Company. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec. As such.50. 1&3 of C. 2. the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. etc. CIR. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. Also. the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. During the first Quarter of 1937. No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . The partnership charged admission fees of P0. whose admission price exceeds P0.R. Sec. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. their receipts were P15. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. which they refused to pay. 46505 (November 7. 1458 of the Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. 43 G. 94. The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. No. which is 432. which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. 881. ISSUE: 1. Bautista Case No.41. which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. HELD: Yes to both. They were asked to pay P992.40 but not more than P0. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 1.

1123 has been passed. 1977. 17.00.D. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. P. IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous. In the case at bar. there has been an agreement to a P22. provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60. 1988) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . the same must be declared null and void. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. 1123. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. And also. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted.00 will be given the difference.60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. 2 and Policy Instruction No. Moreover. PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that will retroact from April 1. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. There was no formal agreement on April 2. ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P.00 increase. 1977 regarding the increase. 1977. the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpretation by PAI Management. NLRC Case No. No. 9 are valid.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1. Inciong Case No. IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE). W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. Moreover. No. CBA stipulated a P22.R. on May of the same year. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. ISSUE: 1.D. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. 1977. 62 G. 1977 and was signed on September 7. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. Later. Management argues that since on April 2. IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. W/N Sec.R. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 40c FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. Sec. 2. L-52415 (October 23. PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor supporting the PAI Management. L-50320 (March 30. However. 119 G. 37. 1123 granted a P60. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. HELD: No. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for reconsideration. (PAI) on April 2. At this point.

claiming that the assessed penalties were inequitable. He is qualified to run for local office. 9a. 6b. it is not least to disregard the forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases. waive. and death. The same was the case and decision of the Executive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. one of the qualifications is that he/she who is running should be a “duly qualified elector therein”. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act. waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late payment of remittances. No. However. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. It is sufficient that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. 1969) Chapter III. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain. his hometown. 3a. Footnote No. 293 G. there is no room for interpretation. Page 206. Laurel. The reason of the law is “to develop. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. No. “qualified elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter and need not be register. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. Social Security Commission Case No. he is a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate. they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances. However. 7a. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties.214 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. 1928) Chapter III. therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them.R. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone. Fernando Ma. 11a . 432 of the Election Law. upon knowledge thereof. 316 G.” Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. The conclusion to which was. L-26712-16 (December 27. Nevertheless. 30187 (November 15. “qualified electors” and “qualified voter” the law means what it says. 6c.206 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Yra v. Page 118. it has no legal authority to condone.61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. old age. establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people… to provide employees against the hazards of disability.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. It would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality. sickness. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: Yes. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec. 26 FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan. Footnote No. Abaño Case No. In a previous case contested in the Philippine Assembly.

Sec. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had. 129 G.R.62 Interprovincial Autobus Co. No. bills of landing and receipts were re-enacted.R. Page 120. ISSUE: 1. Page 120-121. The regulations were approved on September 16. b. the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press.222 & 227 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: McCulloch Dick Case No. 1956) Chapter III. CIR Case No.223 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec.. Footnote No. No. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. 9a . The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value of the goods transported. and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. Footnote No. or any penalty in relation thereto. Petitioner asked for a refund and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in their favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Petitioner. assessment or tolls. 134 G. filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. 2113 and Sec. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No. Pursuant to Sec. 4 FACTS: Petitioner.” In the interpretation of reenacted statutes. 2. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation. v. Before the Governor-General gave his order. “When the provisions of Act No. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. 121 and 127 of the Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance. the same provisions of stamp tax. 4. 1924. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax. 2113 were enacted and ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command. LATIN MAXIM: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. L-13862 (April 15. Inc. HELD: Yes. L-6741 (January 31. W/N the Court of Appeals’ decision is erroneous. impost. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18. 3a. The regulation (Sec. 1939. the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. 69 of the Administrative Code. the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. 1918) Chapter III. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.

This principle is not applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. No. Only the tax rate was amended. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. such action is confirmatory to an extent that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. HELD: No. a domestic corporation. Footnote No. 4. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished letters. thus subject to income tax.222 and 224 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Laxamana v. stating that it was exempted from withholding tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code. Finally. 2180 in Sec. Ltd. the incorporation of Sec. Page 121. 38b. the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted. 21 of the Revised Election Code. 1965) Chapter III. 50 .R. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor. 1952) Chapter III.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2180. 9 G. the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. Hence. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions without substantial changes. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. 53 and 54 were “substantially re-enacted” by RA 1065. (CIC).225 FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. L-5955 (September 19. Baltazar Case No. 4 FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. L-19392 (April 14. Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. entered into reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. v. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance premiums and. Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code. paid income tax on the premiums. on behalf of Plaintiff. said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative approval by re-enactment. upon re-enacting Sec.. 1291 and 2343. Also. Footnote No. the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Plaintiffs stated that since Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: Yes. No. 144 G. the Provincial Governor. by virtue of Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office. However. Page 120. A special provision overrides a general one. This took place within the Philippines. Respondent should assume the vacated position. By virtue of Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. the vice-mayor shall assume office. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax.63 Howden & Co. which was taken from Sec.

they must be given great respect. Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts. that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. the tax exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the vetoed Sec. 7 was valid. the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Secretary of Justice Case No. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance. 96700 (November 19. Furthermore. was not subject to item-veto. the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. He relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisions of Act No. Hence. With the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void.D.64 Bengzon v. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. Province of Lanao del Sur Case No. Also. In the present case.226 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NPC v. Thus. 6c FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt status was revoked by P. but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes. 32 G. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. 9a. 1936) Chapter III. 1996) Chapter III. 187 G. 49 . However. but its privileges were only suspended. Note however. It is clear from reading Sec. 3899. 2b.232 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen. and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes.R. including its exemption from payment of RPT.R. 2. 20a. Furthermore. 5b. this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. ISSUE: 1. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status. Footnote No. 1931. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. No. the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. Page 122. 38a. 37. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence. No. 5a. Footnote No. L-42821 (January 18. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges. 3a. Page 121. Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions. HELD: Yes. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to pay. Pangasinan. the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace to gratuities. the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder. W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against.

No. 24a. 1970) Chapter XI. allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. It has a broader scope.R. The validity of OCT No. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 4 of the Constitution. 735 is valid. prescription. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the estate.M. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. The Constitution clearly states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. Page 434. 5b FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. as long as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. upon payment of just compensation. L-21064 (February 18. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 9c. 64 G. Tuason. 26. 1978) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J. 37. improper venue. 8. The question is one of constitutional construction.65 J. laches and prior judgment. The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason & Co.R. v. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova Case No. L-33140 (October 23. Land Tenure Administration Case No. HELD: OCT No.7 FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. 40c . 135 G. Sec. 1914 in Case No. “The Congress may authorize. Tuason v. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Footnote No. Under Art. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. Alcantara vs. 735.M. 735 is valid. No. The law does not distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be. ISSUE: W/N OCT No.

4052. 15 of the Constitution: “The Congress in a joint session assembled. 45459 (March 13. 6 of the Constitution. Commission on Elections Case No. 1 of Art. This proposal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the November 1971 elections relying on Sec. What it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. “An election” only means one. Act. Also. 13. 4 G. 1937) FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 37 . No. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. L-34150 (October 16. who is the Director of Post. 7a FACTS: Respondent. seeks prohibition of such because it violates Sec. Art. Petitioner. Ruiz Case No.R. 1. ISSUE: W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. 1 of Art. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. 1971) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aglipay v.66 Tolentino v. announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. No. 5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old.R. Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election. In this case. HELD: Act No. No.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 36a. no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: There was a violation.” ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. Art. 1. 154 G.

LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R. Resolutions and memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. X. No. This power is exclusive to the legislative. ISSUE: W/N Act No. no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. permanent and substantial. 1990) Chapter XI. only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor General. Footnote No. 7a. Footnote No. No. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet.R. As known. 11g.O. No. 192 G. Sec.O. Abra and the city of Baguio.A. HELD: Art. The Constitution is something solid. 28 . In fixing the price.12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ordillo v. Kalinga-Apayao. Out of the provinces. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone.S. 93054 (December 4. Ifugao.24 FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E. Ang Tang Ho Case No 295 G. No. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. v. the law is dealing with private property and private rights. 1922) Chapter XI. COMELEC Case No. cities. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. 25a. which are sacred under the Constitution.67 U. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “there shall be created autonomous regions… consisting of provinces. it can be derived that the term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. 17122 (February 27. Page 437. E.A. legally and validly constitute a region. Page 435. 53 follows Act No. municipalities and geographical areas…” From this. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. Mountain Province. The provisions of R. Defendant will not be charged.

the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the sense they have in common use. 4 protects those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: “policydetermining. Nos. 4. 13. The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. Page 440 and 450. and their deputies and assistants shall not. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. 9a. Sec. 2545 of the Revised Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein. HELD: No. 177. 12. Sec. this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. and that Respondent’s appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments. Sec. 7. Art. Executive Secretary Case No. one of who is the city engineer. their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. Footnote No. Sec. Mallare Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 39 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which. 64 G. The two provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.68 De los Santos vs. Sec.R. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”. hold any other office or employment during their tenure.R. he can not be removed against his will and without cause. 7. No. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President. 284 is therefore declared null and void. 9-B. until he resigns or is removed for cause. it is clear that Sec. Vice-President. Romero.” Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer “belongs to the unclassified service”. 7. 41. Reading Art. HELD: No. rights and privileges. 1991) Chapter XI. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President. Footnotes No. Pages 443. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. in effect. 83896 (February 22. 1 of the Constitution. L-3045-6 (August 31. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. unless otherwise provided by the Constitution. rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. No.33 and 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Civil Liberties Union vs. According to Lacson vs. E. their deputies and assistants. Art. Petitioner contends that under the Constitution. This is confirmed by the enactment of C. Art.A. the Members of the Cabinet. 1950) Chapter XI. citing Sec.O. Vice-President. b2 . members of the Cabinet. The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated. Furthermore. allows members of the Cabinet. 12 of the Constitution which reads: “No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. all officers or employees in the unclassified service are protected by the above provision. 2. 89 G. but notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case. This runs counter to Art. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. par. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. particularly during the Marcos era. 51 and 71 FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioner’s removal from the same office which would be the effect of Respondent’s appointment. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. 450 and 454. As a contemporaneous construction. 7. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments.

Concepcion. 3. the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. and that would be reclusion perpetua. 8 of the Constitution mandating that “during their continuance in office. Meer. Footnote No.R. LATIN MAXIMS: 1. Endencia vs. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. Fox. 78780 (July 23. 217 G. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. the minimum and the medium. Footnote No.e. 6c. 1989) Chapter XI. 8 of the 1987 Constitution. David confirmed Perfecto vs. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. The penalty for murder under Art. Page 446. HELD: Yes.R. Muñoz Case No. even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution.69 People of the Philippines vs.” ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods. contrary to the provision of Sec. 10. No. to wit. No. and Bernas). Meer. Art. b1 .42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Nitafan v. their salary shall not be decreased”. 1987) Chapter XI. In the case at bar. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that “…any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal. Page 447. to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable. LATIN MAXIM: 3. that is. which does not follow the Masangkay ruling. Sec. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i. 20a FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries.46 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. as the alter ego of the people. L-38969 (February 9. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfecto vs. 10 Art. HELD: No. 190 G. income taxes are part of the diminution of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”.

that six members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives”. L-49705-09 (February 8. Lopez. Respondent’s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari. L-10016 (February 28. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. Consequently. Cuenco. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. 286 G. Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. 1957) Chapter XI.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aratuc v. Footnote No. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department.62 FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel. Respondents alleged.R. the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. even in a doubtful case. Page No. “if the judgment of the court. No. This highlights the 1973 Constitution’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. 1979) Chapter XI. The Supreme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. Then. the other Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. it may be rejected. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. HELD: No. COMELEC Case No. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon nomination of the Citizens Party. Page 452. 6b. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners. 9a. and Primicias.70 Tañada v. 25a .R. errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari. Footnote No.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a. however. 1973. et al Case No. Lopez. and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET.” Hence. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. 19 G. 451. is mandatory. 11a FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa. 9b. HELD: No. No.

Petitioner’s confession is admissible.71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. 23. 35. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. 7. The prohibition is for public policy purposes. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. ISSUE: 1. Yes. 159 G. 38a. The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation. within 2 months before the election. Conversely. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. Art. Art. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible. During the trial. 1972 is admissible as evidence. L-37201-02 (March 3. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. 15. 1973. HELD: 1. Footnote No. HELD: No. Sec. 59 A. his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. Art. W/N Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days of such vacancy. 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. 1975) Chapter XI.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb. 2. Page 457. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. 36b. 46a . On the other hand.M. 50. 2. such confession is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution. 1973. No. 9a. 15.R. Nos. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtoto v. On the one hand. b FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. to prevent “midnight appointments” – which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary.79 FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections. 20 Art. the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. the appointments were void. Sec. Manguera Case No. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake. and to be informed of such right…. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. which occurs only once every six years. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days. 17. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. 8. who has not been informed of his right to counsel. but this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections. 20. 98-5-01-SC (November 9. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan.

by such argumentation.80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Co v. as a natural born Filipino citizen. children born of Filipino mothers before January 17. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. They need not perform any act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 9a. No. Footnote No.82 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. Nos. Under of Art. 4 Sec. Upon the capture of his co-accused. 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. 42a . 106 G. Accordingly. when he was only 9 years old. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. 1996) Chapter XI. Jr. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. Yes. he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30.. 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative). Electoral Tribunal. 66 G. 3 of the Constitution.72 Filoteo v. waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should. 2. 2. 1982. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.R. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: 1. who was born on June 19. be admissible. No. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution. Page 457.R. HELD: 1. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively. even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. he was pointed out as the mastermind. 46a FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr. 5a. elected representative of Northern Samar. Footnote No. 1 par. Jose Ong. Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened). W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father. without the presence of a counsel. 1991) Chapter XI. When Petitioner was captured. 2. On May 30. Page 457. it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. 79543 (October 16. Sandiganbayan Case No. ISSUE: 1. House of Representatives Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 8a.

73 Sarmiento v. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Nos. Mison Case No. The word “also” in the second sentence of Sec. 39a. 7 only provides for the appointment. ambassadors. 16. for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Page 458. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trading”. Sec. Art. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. other public ministers and consuls. 7a. 80519-21 (December 17. b FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. HELD: No. 112371 (October 7. 24b. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988. Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. No. Footnote No. 277 G. ISSUE: W/N Sec.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Domingo v. 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the requirement of CA approval.R. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of the first group. 24a . 1987) Chapter XI.R. 1998) FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 37 G. and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. Commission on Audit Case No. 16 Art. by the President of “heads of executive departments. 32. ISSUE: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle. 16 Art. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle.

3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business. Page 124. notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term “public service” introduced by Act No. 112 G. 76 G. 13 of Act No. Moreover. 82511 (March 3. 36b . 1932. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. 3316. Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar. ISSUE: 1. Public Service Commission Case No. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and. 1992) Chapter IV. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. Public service is a service for public use. No. 13 of the Public Service Law. Respondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in Sec. 1932) FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. Also. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers.R. ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 3108 by Act No. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. On May 9.74 Globe-Mackay v. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. NLRC and Salazar Case No. On appeal. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. Footnote No. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the intent either. she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. although it is not a common carrier.3 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Luzon Brokerage Co v.R. HELD: The omission from Sec. justify her dismissal. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use. L-37661 (November 16. thereby. the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No.


People v. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President. 1962. the penalty of death shall be imposed. 1962. G.R.76 Aparri v. the Board approved Resolution No. 6c FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm.D. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense. Petitioner’s term of office is deemed expired. his rights. and authority must cease. the Board approved Resolution No. 1866 states that. He was convicted of 2 offenses. Court of Appeals Case No. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. Page 124. On January 15. but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). etc. Tiozon. 115008 (July 24. Barros. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31. 1960. Tac-an. Nos. the term of office is not fixed by law. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P. L-30057 (January 31.A. People v. which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art. 1996) FACTS: R. HELD: No.D. Caling. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. R. “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm.A. No. 15 G. HELD: 1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. but by the Board. 1984) Chapter IV. It does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. Quijada Case No.” ISSUE: 1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. The word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term. duties. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . Footnote No.R. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. In this case. On March 15.

among other things. 4517. No. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning. Page 125. Dept.77 Baranda v. 77 of P. and imprisoned. Lot No.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: RA 7309. “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. Footnote No. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused. Gustillo Case No. 109445 (November 7. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. he is not. whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. ISSUE: 1.D. he does not fall under RA 7309. Office of the Secretary. convicted. 2. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son. However. 11a. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. The Court. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment. a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. HELD: No. 30 G. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that.5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basbacio v. Thus. on appeal to the CA. he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1988) Chapter IV. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot. due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta. …” 2. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. 1994) FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land. 25a . What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1.R. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. of Justice Case No. Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. In the case at bar. If the instrument cannot be registered. L-81163 (September 26. No.R. stating the ground therefore. after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired. G. unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment. He forgot the 1st par of Sec.

Tayabas. no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment. Yulo Case No. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. it is mandatory. Later in his service. acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice. et al. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1. HELD: Yes. Joint Venture was disqualified after the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder. Tayabas. Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated. ISSUE: 1. petitioners were suspended from office. extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality. Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project. 43575 (May 31. he was transferred to Perez. regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation. Page 127. 7a . one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex. directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. G. Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. NPC Board approved.R. 1935) Chapter IV. 288 No. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35. 3899.11 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC’s Mindanao project. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. but for reasons not on record. a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information. 2. 124067 (March 27. Socrates v. Urban Consolidated Constructors. The lowest bidder. v. evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Mariano. 1934. No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. assigned to Alabat. his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence. Sandiganbayan Case No. shall be suspended from office. Footnote No. with the consent by the Philippine Commission. Sandiganbayan. not thereafter. 7a Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. No. Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in “one way or the other. subsequent to the approval of Act No. Under the act. the committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding.78 Segovia v. The judge of First instance. Gen. Luciano. The project was eventually cancelled. 5a. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect. Therefore. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission. 1933. were “downgraded” thereby ineligible as bidders. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tanada v.” For this. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it.

where the law is clear. ordered Petitioner to stop operating. 46a. authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. 6c. Belen Cabrera Case No.R.R. though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases. 1987) G. L-3629 (March 19. 49 . 36b FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communications system. circumvent. L-68729 (May 29. No.D. National Telecom. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. which replaced the PSC. Petitioner. claiming that public convenience did not need another ice plant. opposed Respondent’s application. in applying the law. HELD: Yes. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest. and not just specific provisions. Petitioner was created under RA 2036. Plus. 32 of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony. to be able to operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. Com. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. Atty. they need such certificates to validly operate. Thus. the Respondent. After which. Under EO 546. radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. Respondent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. P. the reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. the delegation is unlawful. Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon. 30. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. and Samar. owner of another ice plant already in the same area. Mindoro. Under it. However. recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC).79 Eliseo Silva v. In 1980. 8a. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. Respondent. because it didn’t have a certificate of public convenience. Sec. HELD: No. 129 G. 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates. after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by Kayumanggi. which is necessary under EO 546 for any public service to operate. no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. No. 146 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Petitioner claimed that under the law. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. governed by the Public Service Commission. or interpret the law any other way. Although Sec. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 7a. the Commission nor the Court may not disregard. you have to look at the entire Act.

Sec. vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. HELD: In Diaz v. full blood brother of their father. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. No. IAC. legitimate. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”. In the process. Thereafter. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual. 84240 (March 25. Additionally. L-61236 (January 31. 992. 217.R. Thus the law is clear. which states that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. P. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes. but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-employee relations. Hon. 1691 amended Sec. 1992) Chapter IV. adopted or spurious children. Pascual-Bautista Case No. BP 130 amended the same section. However.16 FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance.R. 36b . who died intestate without any issue. acknowledged natural. the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. 7b. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 7a. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 198 G. Page 127. can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. 7a FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual. But again P. Eisma Case No. They may have a natural tie of blood.80 National Federation of Labor v. respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MAXIM: 1. they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.D. No.D.” Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. 1367 amended Sec. this Court ruled that “Art. In the Labor Code. 6c. Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. 84 G. ISSUE: W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

” LATIN MAXIM: 5a. exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. No. HELD: In People vs. 1976) FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.R. the death penalty had been abolished and hence. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. Footnote No. which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms. HELD: Yes. 19 (1). Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. Amigo Case No.16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 1996) Chapter IV. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1). Page 127. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659. Muñoz. 7b FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years. and to pay the costs. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. At the time of appellant’s apprehension. and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 201 G. the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. Art. Santayana Case No. 116719 (January 18. the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. L-22291 (November 15. 115 No. LATIN MAXIM: 46a . Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879”.81 People v. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS.

18 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santiago v. Art. 2.A.82 National Marketing Corp. 127325 (March 19. No. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed.. Page 129. Miguel D. it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 1969) Chapter 4. the sum of P7. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Page 127. considering that in the order of things. HELD: NO. Tecson Case No.. so that ten (10) years of 365 days each. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). 1955 expired was considered to be December 21. it could have provided for a subtitle therefore.R. No. it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. 184 G. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. 1960 and 1964 being leap years. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1996. L-29131 (August 27. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. No. 1965. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution.26 FACTS: On 14 November 1955. the primacy of interest. or hierarchy of values. from December 21. If Congress intended R. or an aggregate of 3. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. 7b FACTS: On December 6. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA. 13 of our Civil Code. on statutes. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from December 21. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint. 90 G. However. "When the laws speak of years . (NAMARCO) v.R. The complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2. Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. HELD: NO. Footnote No. expired on December 19. which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. the month of February in both had 29 days. 43 . unlike in the other modes of initiative. and on local legislation. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Case No. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial case. 1960. Commission on Elections.650 days. On 21 December 1965. 1955. Footnote No.200 plus 7% interest until the amount was fully paid until May 25. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. et al. 1997) Chapter IV. 1965.

Commission on Audit Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Page 133. During construction. HELD: No. it was highly inequitable for the Court to compel the Petitioner. even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. 170 No. W/N the contract was null and void. 2. HELD: No. Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4. his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day. 9a. ISSUE: 1. the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase. 39c FACTS: On July 15. 1986) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mario R.35 FACTS: On January 25. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor.R. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. 1983. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. L – 54718 (December 4. the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. The school accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a witness to the contract. which was approved by the Minister of Education. 95398 (August 16. Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. to shoulder the construction cost of the building. Consequently. 1991) Chapter IV. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the approval of the Minister of Education. Also. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality. but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. Also.83 Villanueva v. No. who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968. 12a . For this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. and that assuming it was effective. 1980. Petitioner. as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Leyte. COMELEC Case No. which was being utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The chief accountant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. Footnote No. 9a. Melchor v. entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of one of the school buildings. 177 G.

on Oct. From this period. For this reason. Petitioner refused to comply. asking Private Respondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. Court of Appeals. So. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. to vacate the premises and remove his house. 1956. 649. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. 9c. No. 096. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. 50 HELD: No. 11 months and 24 days elapsed. HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. 11e . 1958 and April 14. 11a. Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the Torrens system. 38b. City of Manila Case No. 26. Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. 1963. Footnote No. the Court issued two more writs on May 6. the original owner incorrectly declared the size of the land. the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 – 1910. Petitioner paid the taxes. 11d. Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. Page 134.84 Mateo Casela v. 6. Petitioner was awarded P1. 1964. Thus. 9a. 1970) Chapter IV. and Exequiel Magsaysay Case No. 1959.R. and interest of P2. from 1901 – 1907. 1914) Chapter IV. Consequently. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 11. Apparently. Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes. 17. 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. the time during which the writs of execution could not be served. FACTS: In 1907. L-9337 (December 24. he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. a period of 6 years. 86 G.R. 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. the date when Private Respondent’s motion for execution was filed. From Dec. 1963 and another on Feb. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision dated Oct. 26. the Petitioner filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales. only 3 years. Instead of obeying the writs. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was time-barred. No. 50 G. fees. Hence Private Respondent’s motion for execution was not time-barred. 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory.38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Jesus v. 43. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. or a period of 3 years.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-1910. Page 134. to Dec. Footnote No. 11.82. L – 26754 (October 16. He also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution.41 FACTS: Petitioner was ordered. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. Soon after.

HELD: No. 83 G. Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allowance. 1988) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Morales v. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 513 if there are other adequate remedies available. the application was not a strict rule. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. The increase was set at May 1. 1977. LATIN MAXIM: 8. No. amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. L-48848 (May 11. that action should be finished first. The purpose of the PD is to protect wages and income. L-34428 (December 29. Sec. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion.R. On September 27. 9a. Moreover. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . as well as the rules issued on the same day. ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. therefore. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. No. 42 FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. their recommendations will be respected by the courts. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such incapability may happen anytime within the year. 45 G. the company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. 2. the company was able prove their financial situation by giving financial statements. Paredes Case No. 1930) FACTS: In April 1977. While the Motion was still pending. ISSUE: 1.R.85 Federation of Free Workers v. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. No. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. 1977. Inciong Case No. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3 of RA 7166. 9. Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 2. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 36b. 12. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Guia v. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. 37. they should be allowed adoption. 30 G. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections. Par (d) Sec. members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. 1992) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. COMELEC Case No. 36a. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. 26. 104712 (May 6. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large.R. L-8639 (March 23.86 Prasnik v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Republic of the Philippines Case No. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. 8a. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children. 125 G. b2 . 37. 335. No. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila.R. No. 11a. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. 9c. 39b FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not.

R. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 2. L-29755 (January 31. of RA No. constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 1989) Chapter IV. the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent.500. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 276 G. 5185.87 Salenillas v.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sarcos v. 6d. Angeles. Surigao del Sur. Castillo Case No. 42a FACTS: Petitioner. the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2. to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. Petitioners’ contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. No. was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent. Footnote No. 48 FACTS: On December 4. 36b. 26. the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. the elected Mayor of Barobo. And on the basis of such administrative complaint. With regard to prescription. the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. l969) Chapter IV. For foreclosure sales. 1973. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. 7a. 5. 9a. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 9b. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. ISSUE: 1. 27. 6c. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. Page 136. Court of Appeals Case No. The act.119 of the Public Land Act. 49 . 78687 (January 31. otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”. 68 G. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. Page 135.R. For failure to pay their loan. vs. No. Footnote No.

6a. Footnote No. so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolished. v. petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 2. 49 FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. 69 G. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. No. l993. 6c. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. Despite their explanation. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Comendador v.R. the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may be referred to them. NLRC Case No. tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. 9a. the right to peremptory challenge was revived. a new doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. On May 10. l993. a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. l993. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. Page 142. R. But when the same was lifted. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine. Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters.88 Ala Mode Garments. De Villa Case No. Renato S. Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner. l989. Inc. 61 FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders. 3. l997) Chapter IV. 10 . Footnote No. However. and then required to submit written explanations as to their absence. l993. 5a. 93177 (August 2. LATIN MAXIM: 1. In connection with their prosecution. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. On May 6. On May 5 and 6. all the line leaders did not report for work. the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. The reason being. 7a. the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6. No. 7 G. 122165 (February 17. 1991) Chapter IV. Page 138. ISSUE: 1. ISSUE: 1. During their trial. they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner.

After the death of Felix Matabuena. Footnote No. it is not the letter. 7 and 11 of same RA.R.69 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez & Sons. Cervantes Case No. the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby. the court did not engage in judicial legislation. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. Footnote No. under Sec. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. However. Under the rule of statutory construction. Later the two were married. said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.76 FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Customs. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code. Page 143. No. the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and imposed additional duties. 36a . Page 144. Petitioner. however. 172 G. The court. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. 151 G. Provision says that “the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. 9a. Thereafter. 16a. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. The duties were paid and the shipment released. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. 1971) Chapter IV. Inc. 9c FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. sought the nullification of the donation citing Art. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.89 Matabuena v.R. there is indeed a disparity between Sec. During this period. Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. L-9274 (February 1. In this ruling. his sister.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. 11 of same Act. v. No. the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. L-28771 (March 31. ‘the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. It merely rectified an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the Legislature. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. To support this. HELD: Yes. 16c. 1957) Chapter IV. HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written.

11d. 36b. 2. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. Thus. in respect of which no interest could be charged. 37 FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. No. it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper since there is no showing that. this evident typographical error. such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion. 11d. Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Statutes should receive a sensible construction.R. Moreover. … it may if there is no other plain. a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Having been paid and received by mistake. 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July. if uncorrected. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. No. the said section in the California Code reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”. 1989) FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount. 12b . However. “there is no plain. Footnote No. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. On its face. In Spanish. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund. of Internal Revenue v. 222 of Act No. arguing that it was more than what was properly due. as provided by law. which arises from the moment that payment is made. 36f. such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. 9d. L-7806 (July 12. 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. L-28502-03 (April 18. Since the amount of P221.R. 36d. 1912) Chapter 4. 1964. 36a.” The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. 143 G. Phipps Case No. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 11a. On August 10. However. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221. 994 with interest. 1961 to April 18. the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts of law”. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construction. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. which.90 Lamb v. 27 G. 1964. ISSUE: 1. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. 1964. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5. 12a. 11e. Spanish translation of said Sec. It protested the computation of interest. and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum. ESSO Case No. Page 144. 11a.78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Com. 8b. 12a. claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment. would render the law nonsensical. 1960.” ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due.

since the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property. Page 149. Jose. Footnote No. Villanueva Case No. and even applied to its maximum degree.97 FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to property in amount of P2. According to Accused. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. LATIN MAXIM: 5. 38 HELD: Yes. It must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property. 116 G. 11d. “Institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”. from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”. 11a. R. The case was considered beyond the court’s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. 12.91 People v. There is absurdity in Sec. held that jurisdiction was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court.636 fine for the damage to property committed. 1961) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Also. 106 G. The Labor Code provides that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how to compute it. R. Duque Case No. 2 but Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. 2 of Act No. 11 . and if the same be not known at the time. Sec. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance. L-15014 (April 29. 100285 (August 13. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 3326 provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. 15. a similar case. POEA. it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace.362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2. The Justice of Peace. which also declared itself without jurisdiction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. ISSUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. Angeles et al vs. since such fine cannot be less than the amount of the damage. a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. if given jurisdiction. Moreover. 1992) Chapter IV. FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency.

LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Page 152. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule.R. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger. 8b FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. No. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute. 112170 (April 10. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50. 1996) Chapter 4. and in favor of the accused. 15 G. 11h.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman. 9c. 36.A. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal.92 Bello v. Footnote No.112 FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance. Likewise. 11a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court. No.A. L-38161 (March 29. had to attend some personal matters. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state. Sec. he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez. They dismissed the petition. No. 142. 11a. Oscar Perez. At the Office of the Ombudsman.A. No. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court. Court of Appeals Case No. 11g. it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”. which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. 9d. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cesario Ursua v. Court of Appeals Case No. R. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. 12. C. 12a. He was charged and convicted for violation of C. 41a . Sec. 306 G. 9e. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. HELD: Yes. 3 as an analogous provision.

and secure the benefits intended. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The drafters of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situation. HELD: No. 19a . LATIN MAXIM: 11a.R. and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school. he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention. it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the entire period of residence.114.93 Paat v. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pritchard v. 245 G.D. HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. Court of Appeals Case No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. Footnote No. 95 G. citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery. Republic Case No. page 156 FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the aforementioned provision. He insists that only the Court can do so. 68a. 111107 (January 10. No.16. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed. equipment… which are illegally used…” ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. L-1715 (July 17. 36a FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for exemption. No. 1948) Chapter 4. 705. 68 of P. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object.R. suppress the mischief.

in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws. Footnote No. the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. 1967) Chapter 4. China Bank responded by invoking Sec.R. Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. 1997) Chapter 4. stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal.94 Salvacion v. 245 G. 43. Galido then asked for reconsideration.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. 91 G. considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh. ISSUES: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 2. stating Art. as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. In order to pay for moral damages. which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment. where foreign investments were minimal. As. there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. L-28396 (December 29.114. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation. 39 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. Footnote 126. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election.R.16. page 159 FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed. LATIN MAXIM: 15. some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424.18. Comelec Case No. No. vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. However. 14. Central Bank of the Philippines Case No. page 156 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Demafiles v. 10 of the Civil Code. a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. garnishment or any other process of any court. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. 3. such is the law and stood firm on the policy. 21. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. 35. No. it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. In light of this. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit. Hence. 94723 (August. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427. justice would be undermined. No. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis. shall be incompetent to act on the said body. 26 . 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank. HELD: RA 4970 reads “the first mayor. 2. the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent. since there is a possibility of fraud. the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees.

subdivision and instrumentality of the government. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. No. 38a. 7. despite past decisions. Respondent Court however. The killing. including every government owned or controlled corporation. be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years. No. 56 implements the said provision. Juco Case No. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense.” ISSUE: 1. If the crime was frustrated murder. 2.R. Furthermore. Nos. 119407 (July 7. 86 G.” Clearly. 48 . and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of persons”. 118940-41 and G.D. L-64313 (January 17. the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. Private Respondent was terminated. Mejia Case No.” While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that “The civil service embraces every branch. would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. driver.95 National Housing Corporation v. The 1935 constitution’s section 1 article 12 states that “A civil service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder. the Labor Code states that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: • “Sec. 26. or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 43. when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things. 7a. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall. cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping. P. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service. when the owner. and not frustrated murder. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 807 Sec. HELD: The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder. agency.R. Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken. whether it is homicide or murder. 1997) FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner. 24. 14. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. In addition to this. 111 G. 26. 38b FACTS: Sec. decided in favor of the Private Respondent.

The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. 20a. 1969. 1949. filed an application on January 30. regardless of age. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua. 23 G. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Respondent Corporation paid the tax. 43. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. 37 . that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.R. No. which took effect on Jan. imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. 20b. 11e. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent. however. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. R. 60 G. 38b. the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law. Footnote No. 49 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. 1992) Chapter IV. 88979 (February 7. 7125. 1989 with Respondent Administration.96 City of Manila v. Inferentially. 1981) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chua v. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. 20a. casual and emergency employees. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447).146 FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18. temporary. imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: • Sec. which. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Case No. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. denied the same. HELD: The petition is granted. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular. but protested the Ordinance. L-37251 (August 31. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. effective beginning the third quarter of 1972. Page 164. Coverage. Civil Service Commission Case No. No. 1. the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. 2. 12a.

A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore.R. ISSUE: 1. a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. 1980. Footnote No. 50 FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. Page 170. On May 7. Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. 116 G. L-55230 (Nov. v. 1989) Chapter IV. Page 169. 2. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however. Teresita Payawal Case No. the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently. Upon knowledge of this. Regino Veridiano II Case No. FDA approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building).171 FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. gave rise to the closure ordered by the FDA. Petitioner contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC.R. Before such order was promulgated. ISSUE: The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drugstores. No. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. LATIN MAXIM: 20c. 38b . 1988) Chapter IV. 280 G. 29. wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription. RULING: The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore.164 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Richard Gordon v. 8. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. No. 20c. the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction). 84811 (Aug.97 Solid Homes Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Footnote No. the Mayor however did not.

37. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. 1966) Chapter IV. Footnote No. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no. which can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. Such action was. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. 3a of RA2264). 25 of Act No. HELD: In the interpretation and construction. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. Footnote No. was abolished.R. 37. done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. 2747. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. 20a. S. the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. 38b . Section 49 in relation to Sec.178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. which were repealed by Act No. 205 G. directly or indirectly. No.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 1921. 1922) Chapter IV. Concepcion Case No. then held by the Petitioner. The legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. wherein the Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. No. The question raised is purely one of law. 6b. petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. 2938. 35 of Act No. however. ISSUE: 1. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo Case No. Further. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. 19190 (November 29. it is not void. such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try. a co-partnership. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not.202 FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the ’60-’61 salary appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. 9a.98 Eufronio Llanto v. Petitioner came to the court on mandamus. L-21905 (Mar. 2938 approved on January 30. 32. convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law. The position. en C. 31. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense. 49 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion. Page 171. 155 G. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act.R. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? 2. Page 176.

99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo
Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205

Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.” Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b

100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe
Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25


Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a

FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits and render the ‘option’ under the law meaningless and nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: “There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage” ISSUE: W/N the words “products of the Philippines” excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43

102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut
Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)

Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the transfer of Appellants’ empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50

FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43

. respectively. Page 188. Manila Herald Publishing Co. 30. 1951) Chapter V.103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. Inc. In People vs. 163 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Malanyaon v. L-56028 (July 30.51 FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit. but if he is acquitted. 722). superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides. The case was dismissed due to his death. in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45.52 G. The Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. 25a. Footnote No. 12263. Footnote No. 160 GR No. HELD: Yes. Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor.. in case No. 36a.1981) Chapter V. 12263. docketed as Civil Case No. managing editor and reporter. and Printers. a daily newspaper. Inc. No. Salico (84 Phil. Respondent Judge declared that the suit. should do was intervene in Case No. He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency. against Aproniano G. of the Daily Record. 11531.. al Case No.000 damages. “Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co. was "unnecessary.000 bond. HELD: No. is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. 7a. " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. 11531. and while the case was pending. Lising et. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court. he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension”. Borres. 36b FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation. editor. asking damages aggregating P90. Inc. Inc. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff. the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. unlike the right to bring a new action. 25a . Ramos Case No. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. Page 188. the right to intervene. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. L-4268 (January 18. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No.. and Printers. R. With the filing of this suit.000. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused.

R. 7a. R.53 FACTS: Petitioner was accused. b . In 1945. aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. No. It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. The fiscal invoked Sec. which disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from applying for probation. Lopena Case No.A. ISSUE: How should the word “previously” be construed? HELD: The word “previously” refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. ISSUE: W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that “residential lots” are included in “agricultural lands”. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. he has not yet been previously convicted. the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution. Footnote No. 2a. Only a single decision was rendered. L-69810-14 (June 19. Page 190.60 G. 48 FACTS: Petitioner. Footnote No. 30a. the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed C.104 Rura v. 1985) Chapter 5. Page 189. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense. an alien. 5a. 1947) Chapter 5. bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted by the war. 139 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Krivenko v. 9a. Hence. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa. for under the Constitution. No. which includes residential lands. LATIN MAXIM: 1. he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. he was guilty on each of those dates. the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of “public agricultural lands”. 25a. L-360 (November 15. 139 G. Register of Deeds Case No. Soon after. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his record. In addition. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision. The trial court denied his application on the belief that since the crimes were committed on different dates. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural. HELD: Under the Constitution. only agricultural lands may be alienated. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down. tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. 9 of the Probation Law. No.

32 of Art. they should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word “immigrant” is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. Serye 1993. other than a nonimmigrant. the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum.R. etc. No. Respondent Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. 109 G. a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. ISSUE: W/N the word “immigrant” only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. 11a.R. HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum (Sec. L-7785 (November 25. 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v.105 Chang Yung Fa. v. etc. 36b FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. No. 9c. Page No. 111511 (October 5. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and referendum." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. 50 . A review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. 192 FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C. No. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be limited to two years. 10. COMELEC Case No. 1993) Chapter V. Case No. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines. the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Gianzon.A. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Government Code of 1991. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiative. VI of the Constitution). and De la Cruz. Also. RA 6735. 7227. 9a. et al.67. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its definition. Footnote No. Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. Petitioners contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”. 19 G.

” He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional. While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the fishpond. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the ordinance is constitutional. 12a.R. 197 FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. after hearing should provide otherwise. 6c. “The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision. order. ISSUE: 1. its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words. Page No. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. Footnote No. And obviously. and on such terms as it may deem just. or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders. logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. HELD: Yes.73. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. Accordingly. order. ruling. 2. after hearing. decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court.” The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same.R. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. the Government never shared in the profits they generated. 218 G. 1974. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award. an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent. As the actual operator of the fishponds. on motion.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. Sec. ISSUE: 1. No. Page No. 1988) Chapter V. L-45302 (July 24. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness.81. award. Footnote No. 1990) Chapter V. L-44143 (August 31. No. dela Paz Case No. ruling. 31. 180 G. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. 1 Ordinance No.106 Motoomull v. It is therefore. The law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. 195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. the word court refers to the trial court. shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3. Quezon. Nazario Case No. or the court on motion. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case. 36a FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes worth P362. order. 37 . order. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. should provide otherwise. he comes within the term “manager”.

HELD: Yes. HELD: Yes.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC. he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. 49 FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. 24b.982. 1988) FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. 26 . 74917 (January 20. However. 26. No. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction. Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial. LATIN MAXIM: 6. No. Philippine Clearing House Corp. Equitable Banking Corporation Case No. 1992. 1993. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC’s jurisdiction. its operation extends to “clearing checks and other clearing items.” Clearly.R. 84332-33 (May 8. 1996) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. after PD 1990 had taken effect. 25b. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28. 106 G. the term “checks” refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities. 25a. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.R. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. 12 G. Evangelista Case No. Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. including nonnegotiable checks. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23.107 People v.

whether agricultural. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds.R. in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed. 905 (February 12. month. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. 1958) Chapter V. Page 199. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. 308 G. leaving a last will and testament. 1. 7a . year. 261 G. 1895. stating the place. residential or mineral. Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: “The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses.108 Robles v. 26 FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan. La Union on December 4. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Footnote No. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land. most importantly that the hour is not stated. Book III. HELD: Yes. Lopez Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same.90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Velasco v. Chapter I. including mineral lands. L-12560 (September 30. mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties. day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud. No. et. No. 1903) FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Petitioner who was to extract. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. Upon violation of the terms of agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 6d.” (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such formalities aren’t met. we should not distinguish.R. shall be void. Case No. Title II.. al. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code. HELD: Yes.” (art 695) “Any will. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land. the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Oliva v. is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not subject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. No. No. namely: food products. the property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent.A. and should abide by the conditions of the times. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent. Page 200. but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. claiming that under C. b. Footnote No. 39a. 1951. HELD: No.109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. not two (2).R. Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. 119 of C. Gimenez Case No. 1961) Chapter V. Therefore. the land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale. No. it was also provided that: “Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost. transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors … shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.A. 1969) Chapter V. L-23196 (October 31. poultry feed. 50. the law must be seen in its entire context. 119 of C. Plaintiff offered to repurchase. the Exchange Tax Law. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those Petitioner imports.R. HELD: No. 191 G. and industrial starch. 29. Inc v. he was entitled to repurchase the land. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act. under RA 720. cattle.A. Feb. 4 1963.96 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class. transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601. the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer. LATIN MAXIM: 1. not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent.” The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. Footnote No. vitamin concentrate. No. the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. L-14787 (January 28. No. 30a. The “stabilizers and flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. Under such law. 5 of RA 720. therefore. they should be unified. LATIN MAXIM: 26. Page 199. as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title. b2 . Petitioner. 141. 38a. On May 31 1963. 67 G. No redemption was made within that time. For every importation. it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. In July 30. the Court had already decided that Sec. Because such items will be used for toothpaste. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan. 36 FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. Lamadrid Case No. books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. However. 141 of Sec. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec.

3a.99 FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employment. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan. LATIN MAXIM: 26. which was granted. No. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 38b FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. the employee cannot avail of the privileges under the Social Security Act.110 Escosura v. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. 26. would be to enable the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. fell ill. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian. However. L-72005 (May 29. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. having been enacted for the welfare of the employees. During the pendency.97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine British Assurance v.R. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. 2b. 1987) Chapter 5. Page 200. 1962) Chapter V. the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. Intermediate Appelate Court Case No. Case No. 234 G. Footnote No. the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. 100 G. Footnote No. Welfare and Retirement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation. San Miguel Brewery. The Social Security Act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. Page 200. Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer.R. cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. 36a . 5. Respondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay. Inc. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its Health. The rule therefore. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. No.

13 of Resolution No. Sec. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person. No. Footnote No. B2 FACTS: On March 22. insulted and humiliated him. one does not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.100 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilar v. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10. No. HELD: Yes. but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Court of Appeals Case No. 26. b2 . 1962) Chapter 5. 242 G. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. 24a. and should have either won or lost. 1992. 1995) Chapter 5. 7a.111 Ramirez v. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”. 115245 (July 11. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. 251 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Thus. the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign.R.100 FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. 9a. As a result. 11a. Page 201 . not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. R. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same. Footnote No. he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. Commission on Elections Case No. 7a. 37. having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. Three days later. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”. Where the law makes no distinctions. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. respondent and filed a criminal case. in a confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest. Sec. Page 201.000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14. 9a. 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. 1984. HELD: No. R. Roño Case No. 1987 to July 22. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. Court of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 38 G. he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan elections. v. 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Footnote No. 28. R. should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.290. 68709 (July 19. No. Later. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. He was not successful in the said elections. 1985) Chapter 5. 1998) FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. 5a. 116356 (June 29. 9c. he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association.106 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Eastern Shipping Lines. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14. Despite repeated demands. Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 36b FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorney’s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between January 14. No. Inc. Page 203 . 273 G.112 Sanciangco v. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member.18. Administrative or Executive Acts. 7a. Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint. The Court’s holding clearly debunks Petitioner’s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. Court of Appeals Case No. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. 37 49 .

7a FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Barbers Case No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other.113 Castillo-Co v. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above.A. placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months. 7a. Martin Case No. No.R. Footnote No. 214 G. Page 204. ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. The items purchased were “reconditioned” instead of brand new and included other irregularities. HELD: Yes. Director. and disparate meaning. The word “or” is clearly disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. G. and Jesus Guerrero.A. The word OR in C. C. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction. 15b . LATIN MAXIM: 6c. different. HELD: No. They are two separate offenses. Gonzales III. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. L-33487 (May 31. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension. No. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.110 FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. Emilio A. specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. Each act possesses its own distinctive. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. 129952 (June 16.R. No.A. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union. No. 1971) Chapter 5. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 37.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Case No. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Casino gambling is authorized by P. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. 158 G. 9c.D. 1994) Chapter V. On the assumption of a conflict between P. Pryce Properties Corp. Case No. In Basco v. 37. 11e. 49 G. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. 24a FACTS: PAGCOR. No. 38. Inc. 1896. leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. 130 FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. Amusements and Gaming Corp. No. Under the LGC. Phil. 15a. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority vote. like the other prohibited games of chance. must be prevented or suppressed. the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.R. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC).. 1869. the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling.. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. religious elements. 7a. 1869 and the LGC.” Since the world “gambling” should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. Bell Telecommunications Inc. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtajas v.114 GMCR v. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling and other prohibited games of chance. created by P. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid.D. 111097 (July 20. and even the local officials angrily denounced the project.D. 50 .R. Page 208. this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. ISSUE: W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. 126496 (April 30. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. women’s and youth groups. Footnote No. 28. Various civic organizations.

28. it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries in general. and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons. HELD: The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. 11a. in relation to Art. Footnote No. 43 FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel. imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it to the company’s plant in Manila. 224 G. 9c. It has also been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. under Art. 11d. 72 G.. L-17663 (May 30. all of which have a common characteristic. or libel. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation. Page 210. 25a." The accused delivered false. No. 28. The Tax Court held that the term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Radio as a means of publication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver. Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. 1962) Chapter V. may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec. In granting the exemption.R. Philippine Acetylene Company Case No. 211 FACTS: Charles Butler.R. namely. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co. manager of Respondent Company. Santiago Case No.115 Commissioner of Customs v. 358 of the Revised Penal Code. malicious. while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. LATIN MAXIM: 11h. 1971) Chapter V. 353. 135 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. Inc. of the same Code. b2 . and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. 355. which is any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated. L-22443 (May 29. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. under Art. their permanent nature as a means of publication. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture. and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and general definition. Page 136. No.

par. The scope of par. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. 28 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation. gift. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. HELD: No. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration. 3 “all money claims of workers. Footnote No. NLRC Case No.R. 211 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Miguel Corp. v. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery. 45 G. Footnote No. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled “Modified Grande Pasteurization Process” and claimed entitlement to the cash award. 3 refers to “all money claims of workers. Inc. 1988) Chapter V. said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. Page 137. the spirit of the law is preserved. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications. said contest is not a gift enterprise. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement…” While par. 19650 (September 29. 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. Page 211. overtime compensation. 80774 (May 31. Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief. and (3) prize. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. HELD: No. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. Palomar Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 28. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid. There being no element of consideration in said contest. 36e .). or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot. The unifying element of pars. 2 (terms and conditions of employment). (2) chance. SMC denied utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner.” it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. ISSUE: W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law. 272 G. 1966) Chapter V. Hence.R. Par. par. No. Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. par. 1 (unfair labor practices). 4 (household services). enterprise. 36b. 138 FACTS: Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. chance.116 Caltex (Phil. or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. v. 5 (prohibited activities).

fire. results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea. and misfortunes…” The trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. enemies.R. Plaintiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Perils… of the seas. What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. ”to set the conditions” means the right to prescribe rules and conduct. rovers. Sec 6 of R. thieves. in the ordinary course of events. 122 G. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy.” The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils. A loss which. Union Ins. The rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25. pirates. Page 213.… barratry of the master and mariners. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. and misfortunes” are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract.117 Gotiaco v. from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. The phrase. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. 31. not against perils of the ship. No. the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not judicial. Thus. 114 G. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. losses. 1919) Chapter V. 1986) FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap. Footnote No. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. 141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it.R.A. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. L-41315 (November 13. men of war. 13983 (September 1. or from the negligent failure of the ship’s owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea. and of all other perils. Oil Industry Commission Case No. HELD: No. 36 . 30. Of Camilon Case No. jettisons. the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. losses. Soc. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company. The words “all other perils. No.

158 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. similar to the immediate family member. the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment. Footnote No. it is within the purview and coverage of RA 623. Inc. No. Hard liquor. Private Respondent. both retired and in active service.118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises. Migrinio and Tecson Case No. business associate. 38 . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as “Ginebra San Miguel”. 36b. Applying the rule in statutory construction. Inc. and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative. 123248 (October 16. the 350 c.” ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board. 29 FACTS: Acting on information received. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. the term “subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife. referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. was unable to produce his supporting evidence. Thereafter. although regulated. a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c. relative. an agency of the PCGG. dummy. a retired lt. Court of Appeals Case No.R. HELD: No. is not prohibited by law. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law..” and “Ginebra San Miguel” stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner’s liquor product bearing the label “Sonny Boy” for commercial sale and distribution. colonel. for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. 1997) Chapter V. as amended. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700. because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. 257 FACTS: La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office. which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income. without La Tondeña’s written consent. pursuant to RA 6231. together with his supporting evidence. ISSUE: W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700. 30. or nominee in EO 2. Hon. HELD: The words “other lawful beverages” is used in its general sense. LATIN MAXIM: 28. Page 217. 26. 43 G. agent. vs.c. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel. white flint bottles with the mark “La Tondeña. and in violation of Sec. of the Philippines vs.c. despite several postponements. hence.

119 Commissioner of Customs vs. Nino Case No. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. 1993) Chapter III. which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife. the rule must give way. 48886-88 (July 21. ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband. Footnote No. Page 220. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. The trial court ruled that. such that if the intent is clear. 71 G.172 FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond. the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. Page 101. using the principle of ejusdem generis.133 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION United States vs. the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. 2301 of the same code. In this case. dirk dagger. kris or other deadly weapons. and are not as stated by Respondent Court. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Footnote No. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. HELD: No. provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of this Act. Nos. He was prosecuted under Act No. Sto.R. 29 . The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent. among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 302 Chapter V. 1780. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. HELD: Yes. Court of Tax Appeals Case No.

This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade. business. and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations. Footnote No.175 Rep. HELD: No. Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--. G. L-15045 (January 20. operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R. L – 35376 (September 11. 29 FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No. 263 G.be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain.120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. wholly or partially. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. v. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. Page 221. not interpret it. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. undertaking. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. industry. the job of the judiciary is to apply laws. which are directly or indirectly.R. No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. 7a. Social Security Commission Case No. otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. 32 . or which are pursued for profit or gain. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. 30. 1961) Chapter V. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. Estenzo Case No. 1980) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities. HELD: No. The Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable.

ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. The liabilities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement. 18. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent. 97 G. Almost 1 year later. 45a . 9351 (January 6. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabilities or obligations of the decedent. 1899.R. Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. which was promulgated on December. Page 223. Footnote No. he is considered an acknowledged natural child. Rafael and Josefa.121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Case No. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. 180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Empire Insurance Co. 35. Petra and Pascuala. No. v. but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. No. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. Pascuala. Vicente. Rufino Case No. Footnote No. 1979) Chapter V. Since Vicente was born in 1905 after the said law was enacted. Aurea. Page 223. G. Petra had 2 legitimate children. The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the estate of Francisca. 68. LATIN MAXIM: 29. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. HELD: Yes.R. 130 G. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. E. L – 38268 (May 31. Petra. 49 FACTS: Vicente A. 30a. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child. 1915) Chapter V. 181 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. and had begotten a natural child by a priest. and Aurea have since died. repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void.

199. Furthermore. R. L-11931 (October 27. Ilocos Norte. 200. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. Flor Case No. 1958) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acosta v. 187 FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said office? HELD: No. 1905) Chapter V. Also. He and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adoption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. Page 224. 5 G. Footnote No. No. Art. Art. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisition of citizenship. However. not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Galang Case No. was entitled to the office of Municipal President of Laoag. Nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he. G. (3) since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter. 2122 (September 13. it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. as the case may be. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. No. or for any other reason. LATIN MAXIM: 30a . 49 of a special law that provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it. (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter. the children are now considered as Filipino citizens. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. now held by Defendant. and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals. Art. the children are considered Filipino Citizens. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office. as a result of said election.122 Ching Leng v. The petition was later granted. R. the right to bring such action. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag. 254 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of the said enumeration. Art.

1950) Chapter V. Footnote No. which did not include the Petitioner. 732. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. cannot be determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. Council.R. 55 G. Thus. LATIN MAXIM: 30 . LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: On August 29.” The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony. Attys. Subsequently. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590. asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio. Lerum and Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. is not included in the enumeration. will. Bucana and Poblacion. Thus. in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana. City Treasurer of Davao Case No. Page 225. Sec. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao. Among these were barrios Agdao. there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City. 146 G. 1962. declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city. declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance. L-2783 (November 29. the assailed order is affirmed. 1968) Chapter V. Under Sec 1. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz’s testimony? HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was correct. Page 225. L-25811 (April 3. No. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City’s Treasurer. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Barrio v. the City of Davao passed Resolution No. barrio Poblacion.123 Lerum v. contract or other written instrument. or who is interested “under a deed. pursuant to RA 2370. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said barrio. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. also called barrio Central. the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Footnote No. amending the charter of Davao City. 3 of RA 3590. 193 FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354. which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case. No. Cruz Case No. as provided in Sec. R.

Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. No. Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. Page 225. 44 FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court’s judgment declaring Ordinance No. No. 3. RA 2264 confers on local governments’ broad taxing authority. Footnote No. Fernandez Case No. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax. are owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. 1968) Chapter V. Thus. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that “no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax”. City of Iloilo Case No.L-31364 (March 30. Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. By virtue of the ordinance. as provided in the Tax Code.824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964.R. 1979) Chapter V. 197 FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental. such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumerated therein. 312 G. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 5.124 Vera v. Footnote No. 55 G. etc. 5. 30. the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3.R. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under Sec. Tongoy. No. Yes.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva. before the inheritance has been passed to the heirs. 2. 20c. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government.254. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent created by law. 193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villanueva v. 42 . Par. Page 226. No. which should not apply. 4. the city was able to collect P5. No. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3. ISSUE: 1. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority. penalties. 11 as illegal. L-26521 (December 28. The Petitioners. LATIN MAXIM: 27. even without its having been presented under Sec. the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. 30. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. which is not among the exceptions listed in Sec. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed. the ordinance is valid. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. 1. 35.

primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. co-Petitioner. L-43182 (November 25. Talens asserts his position was not covered by the said act and. his position is not among those expressly declared by law as highly confidential. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. because of lack and loss of confidence. Court of Appeals Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydetermining. Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service. Page 226. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes. Besides. 1983) Chapter V. on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. the Respondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. Talens. through Administrative Order No. Footnote No. Hon. Mr. 3. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. to said position. Talens’ termination was illegal.D. Cruz-Paño. despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office. terminated the services of Respondent. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Talens. 270 G.R. In a motion for reconsideration. In addition. 968) Sec. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. 30 . where the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits. the mayor of Caloocan. Page 226. No. 36b FACTS: Petitioner Samson. 9. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Samson v. he can only be removed for a cause and after due process. No. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision. 1986) Chapter V. as Assistant Secretary. Liwag. 275 G. it would have included them in the enumeration. as enumerated in the probation law (P. Footnote No. the legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated. for otherwise. declaring the order null and void. Cruz-Paño Case No. the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders disqualified to avail probation. being permanently appointed.R. 200 FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. The nature of functions attached to a position determines whether such position is highly confidential. L-55130 (January 17. and that Santo To was not a penitent offender. and appointed Mr.125 Santo To v. He is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge.

113092 (September 1. since this is a criminal case. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD. No. the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company.R. The 1987 Constitution treats the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently from each other. 30. Footnote No. Page 228. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 228. Furthermore. which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development. 1564.D. 11g. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. 48 . On October 18. 1988. No 100970 (September 2.D. Since P. Villalon-Pornillos Case No.500. Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. 27. HELD: No.000. by interpretation or construction. Martin Centeno.126 Finman General Assurance Corp. saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. the latter denied the claim. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company. and the latter solicited P 1. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15. be extended to others. penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. it was contended that Centeno violated P. this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result. However. chairman of the group. 30 FACTS: In 1985.” ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters. 1994) Chapter V. Court of Appeals Case No. Moreover. 1992) Chapter V. approached Judge Angeles.D. this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. vs. The term “charitable” should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for “religious” purposes. 107 G. President of Tikay. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court.R. Footnote No. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. 54 G. 25. 202 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centano v. it may not. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. 203 FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries. 11i.

No. when they were deposited by registered mail. the papers were actually received by the court on September 24. 9c. Footnote No. they filed for an appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that same year.261. filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days. wherein the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Avila Case No.127 Escribano v. Petitioners filed their appeal just in time. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. 2. However.R. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. 101 G. De Aquino Case No. Rule 27 Sec. Thus. Notified of the decision on September 7. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. 1953) Chapter V. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22. Page 229. The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. 12a . 11d. L-30375 (September 12. 205 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manabat v. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. when they were actually received by the court. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. the Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal was late and dismissed it. ISSUE: 1. Page 229. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 11e. Thus. 1951. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. HELD: Yes. 37 FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1. 12.74 plus interest for usury. 161 G. L-5558 (April 29. Footnote No. or Sept 24. 208 FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation. 1978) Chapter V.R.

30a . Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make no sense if possession of a fan knife. March 29. Nos. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.R.128 Gomez v. was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. HELD: No. 32441. “balisong” or clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. the bladed weapon he was carrying. the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. would be punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. 48468-69. Plaintiff should not have his license restored. Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. 1930 Chapter V. 1989 FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. The subsequent Opium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or remove said prior laws. 126 G. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Case No. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. Page 229. 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. which is less lethal than a bayonet. CA Case No. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored.209 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Primero v. the prohibition against fan knives. 115 No. November 22.

142 Oct. No. Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio members.R. Case No.129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc. the same should be made extensive to the whole. 9c. 229 FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board members or are merely ex-officio board members. Judge Roldan. HELD: No. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Page 234. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing with the trial. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. the rule in the interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found in a law. 46825 (October 18. denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas. Moreover. 36b. 33. CFI of Laguna. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board.” This ruling is in conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. the Petitioner. but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision. 1939) Chapter V. 6d. There is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they are automatically made ex officio members of the board. 23. LATN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. During the trial. Footnote No. 1987 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Roldan v Villaroman Case No. which held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process. 262 G. b2 . Respondents then instituted a certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner. LATIN MAXIM: 1. impugning the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas.

6d. Director of Prisons Case No. 37. and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent. except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. 78585 (July 5.” and (b) “previous association with the enemy. No. other than those provided in Clause 20.130 Herras Teehankee v. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities. within 3 years from the date of the contract. along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case. 1989) Chapter V. 170 G. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. Petitioner contends that P. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved. and infrastructures”. HELD: No.D. but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable. 35. improvements. she was detained by said Government under that charge. and since the language used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject. but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. Hon. And under the same charge during all the time referred to.R. Page 234. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. 1944. which is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction. 231 FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale. The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities.D. 42a FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. 7a. making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. improvements. she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. HELD: Yes.R. 33 . the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. L-278 (July 18. 26. and infrastructures for the lots. is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 11g. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled. 38b. was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29. Page 234. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case No. pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. No. 230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Antonio Mapa v. and. To hold that the People’s Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all.” When she.D. except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law. 122 G. 12a. no further written commitment was made by the developer. Footnote No. Footnote No. The word “and” is not meant to separate words. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Japanese. 1946) Chapter V. P.

They hold these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign. as Appellees contend. and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. L-22161 (January 21. 24a.” ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. 25. 1921) Chapter V. Teodoro Tamani Case No. 7a. the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous.R. 240 FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14. he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. HELD: Yes. 37 . 155 of the Administrative Code. 6. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They invoked Sec. 34 FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judicial District. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13. Footnote No. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso. forty-eight days from July 24th. The power to appoint lies on the appointing officer. The word “appointed” in the proviso should be given its meaning in the ordinary sense. but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. No. Nonetheless. No.R. which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. retire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late. 9a. the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment”. 1963. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District. should mean “the nomination or designation of an individual”. which states that “nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district. L-22160 and G. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. 38 G. L-16808 (January 3. The concluding part of Sec. On February. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. 12a. Fermin Mariano Case No. and thus. 1963. Hence. Upon receipt of a copy of this order. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis. 1963. effective July 1.R. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10. 227 G. No. “provided”. appointee’s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. 7a. 1914. 9c. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state’s separation of powers. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis of Sec. 232 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Andres Borromeo v. HELD: Yes. Page 236. 1920. his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1. the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. not 47. Footnote No. 1963 through the counsel’s wife.131 People of the Philippines v. which was denied. 1974) Chapter V. 8a 11g. Page 234. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. although it did not start with the usual introductory word.

6. Footnote No.000. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12. and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 109328 (August 16. and not to other sections thereof.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. LATIN MAXIM: 1. as a general rule. 251 FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. is given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislation. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations.000 to P18. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program.R. the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants. 280 of the Labor Code. 20 G. the latter provision. Page 240. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees. Pangasinan Case No. this provision does not apply to them.48.R. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000. HELD: No. the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. The provision calls for casual employees. 2 of Art. Once that “project” is done. Footnote No. their services will no longer be needed. 43. L-34024 (April 5. Moreover. as the NSC and NLRC ruled. Moreover. 1. No. 1994) Chapter V.) In Mercado. 33 FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of P18. vs. whether a proviso or not. Sr. NLRC. NLRC Case No. b2 . P350 of which was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city government. Since Petitioners were considered project employees.00.132 ALU-TUCP v. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business. 1978) Chapter V. but more so because provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone. 2 G. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but the Respondent City refused. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees. The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached. City of San Carlos. Page 240. 250 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arenas v. 33. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. should be strictly but reasonably construed.000. exceptions. the proviso in par.

228. however. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i. According to the Code of Civil Procedure. because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. Footnote No. Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. Page 243. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and obligations to the Defendant Corporation. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. In order to mortgage these properties. No.R. while Zoilo’s mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed the mortgage.e. 266 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ALDECOA v. she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. 126 30 Phil. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Case No. etc. 115852 (August 25. the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause. VI. Isabel Palet. 292 G. The President had certified S. and to mortgage certain real properties of her sons." in Art. No. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716. 1915) Chapter V. The said firm. and in so doing. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903. LATIN MAXIM: 49 . No. 1994) Chapter V. Secretary of Finance Case No. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment.133 Tolentino v. (March 23. confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. LATIN MAXIM: 33 FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs. At the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents. was heavily indebted to the Defendant corporation. In other words. printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. 272 FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. was a general partner in the firm. Page 245. there is no longer a need to be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. has been constitutionally passed. Aldecoa & Company. an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor children. Footnote No. 1630 did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readings were done on the same day. Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid.

Bello. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving police service and personnel.134 Ocampo v. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 88 G. L-39419 (April 12. maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted her husband. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 189 of the Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. On March 17. 36b. Aisporna. 6c. L-32293 (January 24. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent. Sec. and that she did not receive any compensation. No. 8 FACTS: On September 11. 2 of the same section. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. however. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. Page 248. 36c. 1982) Chapter VI. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aisporna v. and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. On appeal. 6 G. and not separately and independently. ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec. 189. Mrs.R. 6d FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. 1969). and commission of a felony. 189. a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment. Court of Appeals and People Case No. Roberto Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts. HELD: The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. which is considered as a wholesome assemblage. 28. the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the ordinance was to attend a birthday. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. The power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the policemen. Footnote No. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. The term “agent” used in par. 189 is defined in par. grave abuse of authority. 2 to the agent in par. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions wherever possible. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Hon. Sec. 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for the same grounds. 228 which fixed curfew hours. Buenaventura Case No. According to Commission v. 37 . 9c. 1 of Sec. 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 36d. No. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act (September 8.

37 . HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Sec. 1 of RA 4200. 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. 1991) Chapter VI. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. Inc. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. 32 and Sec. However.R. contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. 79. Intermediate Appellate Case No. Footnote No. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 20 FACTS: Atty. Furthermore. the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. 1 of RA 4200. When complainant Pintor called up. Laconico called the Appellant. held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. there is no conflict between Sec. No. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. Page 249. that is. No. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. 75222 (July 18. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. 36d. b2 FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature.R. 249 G. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation. L-69809 (October 16. 48. Atty. 29. Also. 1 RA 4200. HELD: No. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device. the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. 108 G. 11g. That same day. Page 252. In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. 36a. 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. 30a. v. Rufino.135 Gaanan v. Footnote No. Under the circumstances. 1986) Chapter VI. 36c. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment.

El Hogar Filipino Case No. in whose favor the loan was made. No. an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. in using the word “void”. 152 G. 1993) Chapter VI. the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond. 6d. in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. Lopez and Javelona. 36a. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that. 223 of the Labor Code. 000 and posted a cash bond of P100. HELD: No. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond. Page 251. The intention of the legislature must be ascertained. 000 and a surety bond of P50. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word “void”. 1925) Chapter VI. not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law.R. did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. No. as used in the Usury Law. Page 251. 136 G. Footnote No. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION JMM Promotions v. 25a. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof. 12a. L-22678 (January 12. Footnote No. 109835 (November 22. 37 FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. NLRC Case No. 37 . The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. 223 of the Labor Code.R.136 Lopez v. 21 FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. They contended that the court erred in holding that the word “void”. From the very context of the law. as compared with the whole. El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale.000. the legislature. 7a. as used in the Usury Law. as required by the POEA Rules. as required by Art. sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious.

After the issues were joined.300 for support for her and the children. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. Footnote No. L-9667. Page 252.000 for herself and said children. As such. as amended. to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: No. Footnote No. as amended by Act No. except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. being a special law having special contingency not dealt within Sec. it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art. 147 G. However.R. 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lichauco vs. No. A recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one another. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. 50 . the determination of the custody and alimony must have been given force and effect. 1762.R. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. 1762 of the Administrative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. has been repealed by the implication in Sec. 38b. 1762. HELD: No. the legislature’s intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. L-19628 (December 4. 103 of the Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 3052. 1762 of the Administrative Code. 1762 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec.137 Araneta v. 1922) Chapter VI. 36a. (July 31. 36a. a monthly support of P5. however. and P2. Apostol Case No. Page 252. provided it did not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal separation case. which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. a monthly allowance of P2. Note. 3052 – Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec.000 as attorney’s fees. Sec. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. 36d. and the return of her passport. and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. while Sec. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. The judge refused to reconsider the order. No. 36c. Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure the custody of their three minor children. 27. Sec. 1770. is of a general nature. the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. 23 FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. Concepcion Case No. 17 G. Sec. 1762. 1762. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect. P300 for a house. 37 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. 1770 of the Administrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. 1956) Chapter VI.

the latter is paramount to the former and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135. which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist. However. Page 256. 36d. 4 mos. 38a. which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively. Palmon Case No.R. No. LATIN MAXIM: 36c. 31 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. L-2860 (May 11. Page 257.138 Cassion v. 40b. 35 FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. Sec. the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction. while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874. the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. 1950) Chapter VI. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan.R. 1 day – 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Banco Filipino Case No. thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. LATIN MAXIM: 9. 1951) Chapter VI. No. Footnote No. 87 of RA 296. 220 G. 38b. L. 51 G. 37 . known as the Public Land act.3540 (July 30. Before the arraignment of the accused. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months. 50 FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period – 2 yrs. Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years. the CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. Hence. Footnote No. as when general and special provisions are inconsistent. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial.

57 G. Plaintiff asserted that since the insolvent had been declared as such. 1921) Chapter VI. rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every other. as posed by Prof. In an earlier case.R. during the Constitutional Convention. Footnote No. which is not under the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9. “Sedition” should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Page 257. ISSUE: 1. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law. 20b. and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of said Defendant.139 Chartered Bank v. 37. 2. 17222 (March 15. Maximino’s father then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. insurrection. Aruego.” Art. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Castañeda and Balao Case No. HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include “sedition. W/N Proclamation No. 36d. 179 G. No. 36f. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Montenegro v. 39 FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff. the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. Quirino issued Proclamation No. 1952) Chapter VI. 36c. while Art. 7 only provides invasion. which is “imminent danger of invasion. the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger. Moreover. Footnote No. Page 258. all civil proceedings against him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. every section. 36e. Sec. insurrection or sedition. Also. Imperial and National Bank Case No. 15a. 60 of the insolvency law. Thus. L-4221 (August 30. the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition. Pres. b2 FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law. 60 as stated in the other provision of the same law.R. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. insurrection or rebellion. Three days after. and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. b2 . No.

14. 12a. 36b.140 Arabay Inc. in excluding gasoline. 1996) Chapter VI. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paras v. inoperative or nugatory. 2264. (a) and par. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term. but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. 196 G. L-37684 (September 10. No. interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. distributor of gas. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. diesel fuel oils. 74 of RA No. lubricating oils. Page 259. HELD: No. 25b. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 2 of RA No. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress. Thus.. Footnote No. oil and other petroleum products. 1975) Chapter VI Page 259. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax. 37. determines its construction. COMELEC Case No. The spirit. 38 . 11d. 7160. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance. who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline. 27. no recall may be instituted. rather than the letter of a law. v. contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. 20a FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras. Since Sec. and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated. (b). 16 G. deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. and petroleumbased products. is entitled to a refund. 123169 (November 4. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. Footnote No. no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context. 11e.R. to a refund. Arabay Inc. In interpreting a statute. with the exception of gasoline. The evident intent of Sec.R. 50 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. meaningless. as provided in par.

Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately. but during the period of amendment in the Senate. 188 G. originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market.60 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago. 2.R. ISSUE: 1. 32. Page 262. LATIN MAXIM: 1.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Niere v. Kintanar Case No. 2a. not only in Bago City. which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to vendors. 21 is without authority to appoint the city engineer. maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person. Branch II Case No. but also those coming from other municipalities. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership. under Sec. No. the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec. entity.R. 2. 9711. it could have easily re-phrased Sec. L-30324 November 29. 6d. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment. L-33169 July 30. 1982 Chapter VI. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that by public market. it is a substantial amendment. Since the city mayor under Sec. Private Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City. 40c FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 29. whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. HELD: 1. NO. or corporation other than the local government. this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines. House Bill No. Footnote No. 1973 Chapter VI. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. No. 21 of said RA.141 Javellana v. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not. After the enactment of the Decentralization Act. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. who. NO. Bago City. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not. 30a. it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. 21 of RA 4858 (the City Charter). If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city department. which became RA 4585. Footnote No. shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments “all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 21. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. 138 G. Page 262. b2 . 38b. 21 of the City Charter to that effect. CFI of Negros Occidental.

LATIN MAXIM: 6c. After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. he went to the United States to further his studies from the year 1947-1950.R. ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. Section 7 of C. he filed for naturalization. to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. No. 1950. Then Petitioner sold the land. No. Court of Appeals Case No. 11a. Republic of the Philippines Case No. The grant made by Act No. 37 FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted. is required. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources. Negros Oriental n October 6. Hence. if included. Later. 2. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. had to be postponed. 43 . of Chinese parents in Dumaguete. the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. 25a. 1951. and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. 9a. originally scheduled to take place on July 12. the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. 1951. 1360. 176 v. No. in order to unravel the legislative intent. distinct from lodging or boarding. he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13.142 Uytengsu vs. would defeat the policy of legislation. No. 307 G. Residence indicates permanency of occupation. Footnote No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. 7. HELD: 1. or temporary occupation. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used interchangeably. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which. 6c. Forthwith. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. as amended. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. Page 263. 36b. On July 15. 37. No. the original date of hearing the case. in strict legal parlance. not legal residence or domicile.R. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila. 1927. Hence.L-41012 (September 30. 63 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born.R. 1976) Chapter VI. In the case at bar. 2. 165 G. notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. No.A. a meaning distinct and different from that of the other. 1954) Chapter VI. each has. Footnote No. Page 264. which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. together with all the improvements. ISSUE: 1. L-6379 (September 29.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Lodge No.L-41001 and G.

12a. Lastly. or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal. 5. the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21. Footnote No.2 As stated in Art. 37 . does likewise. Footnote No. 37. the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and. 1974) Chapter VI.A 183. provides in its Sec. particularly a procedural rule. alter. No. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. At this stage. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. 7 of Rule 123.L-23800 (December 21. unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. 14 of the City Charter. give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art. Marave Case No. No. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City. a separate and independent civil action for damages. Page 266. 2 of Sec. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec.5 of the 1973 Constitution. Repeals by implication are not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. The very next day. appointed Respondent Florentino to the position. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 265. increase or modification of substantive rights. 1960. 14 that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18. purportedly under Sec. 33 of the Civil Code. Thus.L-27760 (May 29. On the strength of Par. 12 of the Pasay City Charter. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. 67 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abellana v. there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution. ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Such interpretation. as amended. 49. 3 G. in the case at bar.R. the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm. 1965) Chapter VI. which found Petitioner guilty as charged.143 Almeda v. RA 2709 amended Sec. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI. it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. 14 of R. in turn. 1947). Florentino Case No. literal construction of the law is not favored. 50 FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge.R. X. 12 of RA 183. par. 71 FACTS: RA183. 10 G. Sec.

or a local dialect. this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec.R. Footnote No. The Naga City government. 38b ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Yu Cong Eng. on the other hand. 317 G. 2309 of the Admin Code. 1976) Chapter VI. 6d. tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication. There is a presumption against implied repeal. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. No.144 Yu Cong Eng v. LATIN MAXIM: 37. a Chinese merchant. RA 2264 only applies for entirely new tax provisions. City of Manila. a subsequent provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax.R. He and other Chinese merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law. Spanish. Trinidad Case No. it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English. Agna Case No. If two laws can be harmonized. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year. 38a. It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. LATIN MAXIM: 1a. 9c. No. 37 . This liberal interpretation is reasonable and it upholds constitutionality. or have a duplicate in any of these languages. Page 268. or a local dialect. 78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Naga v. then the Courts shall do so. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. L-20479 (February 6. 83 FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a language other than English. 11e. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in Chinese. 2309). it did not. was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. 1925) Chapter VI. where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts written in Chinese. 63 G. Footnote No. ISSUE: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. Sec. L-36049 (May 31. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. claimed that under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264). Page 267. Spanish. pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec.

1916) Chapter VI. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. 118 G. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional? HELD: It is unconstitutional. and not just the areas constituting the new province. including the parent province. were not included in the plebiscite. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authority and that this legislation was not for the public good.R. 112093 (October 4. ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and for the public good. The parent provinces. but the final bill only limited it to the latter. The plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively composing the new province. 37 . Municipality of Binangonan Case No. which will get also affected. and not just the new areas. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units. Page 268. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Government v. 84 FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte.145 Tan v. COMELEC Case No.R. LATIN MAXIM: 12a FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional barrios. No. No. Footnote No. facts need not be stated to prove it. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in all units affected. 152 G. L-10202 (March 29.

Hence. m. L-7234 (May 21. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. Bartolome. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed. Civil Code). the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. It turned out. the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. Macario sold the 405 sq. 26. 107797 (August 26.R. Venancio. the term month used in Art. 91 of the RPC. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. 13 of the CC. Hence. the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. 2. 1144 of the same Code? 2. Art. 46a FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers. HELD: 1. instead of the civil/calendar month. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Thereafter. total area of Lot 26 to his son. 90 and Art. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28. 6c. and a sister. Hence. however. 2. W/N there was a double sale. No. an “extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs of Enrique. 26. information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M. out of the 749 sq. and a 149-sq. 1996) FACTS: On July 27. and Macario. Art. or from the day following that in which it was committed. HELD: 1. mts. a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions.R. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done. the law has always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. Art. 38b. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10 years. an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. which consisted of the aforementioned lots. done with evident bad faith. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. resort must be had to Art. Tomas. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. m of Lot 26. 1953. that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. Court of Appeals Case No. therefore. There was no double sale. Marcela. Venancio sold Lot No. Eventually. No. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. & 27). Thus. In accordance therewith. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code. Anselmo. 1953. mts. W/N the term “month” in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed. G. as held in previous cases. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail. 1144 of the CC prevails. 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salvatierra v. 2. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition). ISSUE: 1. 105 G. His estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25. 1391 of the new CC or Art. 13. Del Rosario Case No. 7a .146 People v.

36. one of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec. during her lifetime. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Footnote No. W/N the will is valid 2. 31581 (February 3. Ravina and Ravina Case No. Accordingly. it would be logical to suppose Sec. Footnote No. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency.147 Pasno v. Page 273. Davao and Iloilo. and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof. 199 G. 2. mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. No.R. C & C Commercial Corporation. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. 37. 38b . Two laws are being considered in this case: C. a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and testament. During the pendency of the case. and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. Page 274. 38a. an erroneous date will not defeat a will. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term “government” found in RA 312. NAWASA Case No. HELD: 1. Yes. 1930) Chapter VI. ISSUE: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term “government” under RA 912. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage. 35. No.A. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. 104 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C & C Commercial v. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. However. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. local material should be given preference whenever available. practicable and usable. 138 and RA 912. The CFI ruled in favor of the special administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempted from RA 912. 107 FACTS: Labitoria. 1 of RA 912. HELD: Yes. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis. 1967) Chapter VI. 38b FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila. 42 G. works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First policy). L-27275 (November 18. a special administrator of the estate of the deceased was appointed by the court.R. which should give preference to local materials that are available. The said law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced materials is in relation to the “construction or repair work undertaken by the Government. When Labitoria died.” NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term “Government” as used in the said law. No. practicable and usable.

Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise. 1966) Chapter VI. v. while the other as the law of a particular case. However. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill. Footnote No. Agusan. considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do so.R. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. Where there are two statutes. heat.148 Butuan Sawmill. HELD: No. Page 279. unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. 1919) Chapter VI. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light. Inc. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation. 168 G. the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms. the earlier special and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the general as a general law of the land. LATIN MAXIM: 37. the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. 14205 (September 30. the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11. v. No. Inc. No. d FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congress in 1913. City of Butuan Case No. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a private contract. On the other hand. Butuan Sawmill. LATIN MAXIM: 25. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter. On the other hand. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. Where the general act is later. L-21516 (April 29. and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran. supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts and circumstances. Respondent maintained that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950. Page 277. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Railroad Co. Inc. 50. unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. together with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. 41 G. HELD: No. Footnote No. 50 .R. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have modified or altered the charter. Rafferty Case No.

To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. and that if the landing was made. is an alien of East India who is afflicted with trachoma. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Footnote No. 9. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power is to insure the free.R. Page 277. orderly and honest conduct of elections. COMELEC registrar of Casiguran. L-61998 (February 22. People of the Philippines Case No. 1606 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. either tacit or express. 87 G. must be favored over provisions of P. which deals specifically with election offenses. 50 FACTS: The complaint alleges that R.” while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punishable under the same Code. officer. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent. prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the COMELEC. The word “permit” implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner. Sec 184 of the Election Code.D. 41a. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to investigate. was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. 37. Almond Case No. 1906) FACTS: The Petitioner. 2 of Art. 48 . to the landing of the alien. HELD: Sec. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan. 11e.W. Almond. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power “to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officers. agent or person in charge of the vessel. At the same time. ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. No. 1983) Chapter VI.149 De Jesus v. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 2517 (June 2. and. HELD: No. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. the Court of First Instance (now RTC). 157 G. Sec. coincidentally. R. it was made without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent. No. master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan. 38.

ISSUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the contemplation of the law. Page 289. v. Estapia Case No. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing near a grove of buri palms.S. 298 G. 28 FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting. Page 290. in violation of Sec. 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. 23 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. 37. including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue.150 US v. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. 48 . LATIN MAXIM: 25.R. He had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position. Footnote No. No. 1917) Chapter VII. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. 294 G. No. HELD: The term “cockpit” as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants.R. Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent. Abad Santos Case No. Footnote No. 12262 (February 10. 1 of Act. No. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. 12891 (October 19. The prosecution argued that the term “cockpit” should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. 480. 1917) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 41a. unless the law clearly so provides. 48 FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5.


any legal provision. franchises or privileges. The offended party’s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. Page 291. 47027 (February 4. 6c. The very title of Act No. Private complainant Regina Guafin. 1941) Chapter VII. The trial court erred. legitimate. the common-law wife of the Appellant. would fall within its scope.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. natural or adopted brother or sister. No. Nos. Footnote No. Padilla Case No. No. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C. 4 of Act No. 15 of the RPC encompasses only “the spouse. no other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. HELD: 1. franchise or privileges. 1 of the same Act applies punishment provided therein to “all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enjoyment of a right. of Act No. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. The scope of the relationship under Art. a German citizen. No.R. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts. 30 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. Sec. 12 years old. 4. It is contended. 108. franchise or privilege. ascendant. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C. 108. 4 of C. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.A.” Under Act No.” HELD: Yes. 138. is guilty of violation of C. 1998) Chapter VII. illegally.S. however. 138. No. the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. One of such legal provision is Art. 138. and criminally evaded the provisions of Art.A. 113 G. as well as any alien profiting thereby. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Atop Case No. holding that his common-law relationship with the victim’s grandmother aggravated the penalty. 138 may be prosecuted under C. is the granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos.A. 2. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights. 108. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. Footnote No. a Filipino citizen. ISSUE: 1. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: Appellants Padilla. 202 G. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed.” Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused. 138. 9a .A. and to death for the third.152 People v. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. and relative by affinity in the same degrees. and Von Arend. No. 2. 124303-05 (February 10. which requires Philippine or U. acting jointly and conniving with each other.A. Page 290. voluntarily. No. entitled “An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights. descendant. that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter.

897. 80 as amended. Footnote No. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par. HELD: No.” thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part.153 People v. 68. namely. LATIN MAXIM: 37.77. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. misappropriate. 209 No. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public or private. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age. did willfully. the sum of P13. to pay a fine. that he “willfully. No. 1959) Chapter VII. and as such. Upon arraignment. ignoring the Appellant’s minority. 11e. misapply. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. Page 293. he thereby admitted. to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification. L-2873 (February 28. he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. embezzle. from said funds. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. RA 47 which amended Art. was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. Footnote No. 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. not only his guilt. 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years. to indemnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. misappropriate. as it now stands and Art. L-13371 (September 24. 68 of the RPC. When he entered the plea of guilty. in that. Page 292. has given rise to the controversy. 2 of Art. The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the crime. 38b . Garcia Case No. the sum of P13. 41a. and to pay the costs. LATIN MAXIM: 7b. 68.” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison. 1950) Chapter VII. but also all the material facts alleged in the information. 2. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. 41 FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. the Appellant pleaded not guilty. accountable for the funds collected and received by him.77. benevolent or charitable institution. HELD: Yes. par. 2 of the RPC. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence.897. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer. but always in the proper period. from said funds.R. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. 223 G. and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof. Salazar Case No. 43 FACTS: The lower court. par. He was sentenced to be imprisoned.” ISSUE: W/N the Appellant. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk.

154 People v. Terrada, et. al.
Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42

US v. Toribo
Case No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48

FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48

FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, “An Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle.” It appears that in the town of Carmen in Bohol, there aren’t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the State’s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37

155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49

Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52

FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isn’t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient that they had “actual” knowledge. Statutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC
Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office…or within six months immediately preceding or following an election.” ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily “to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government.” Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a

157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.
Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64

FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43

FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43

158 Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43

FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person. HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43

160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Although separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43

FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institution’s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an “independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor’s tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contractor’s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43

117. On the other hand. 1929) Chapter VII. In case of doubt. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. 84 FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. 8-72 was null because P.D. 43.D. 167 G. 141 of Sec.08.283. 30264 (March 12. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. Footnote No. their debt even decreased to about P12. HELD: Yes. 197. No. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. 197 of same law. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. 1991) Chapter VII. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to P17. Page 301. under par. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null and void. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree.D. Footnote No. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as “manufactures of wool. 213. they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. They applied for tax amnesty under P.R. 23. 26 . the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. not otherwise provided for. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909.” Upon appeal. L-69344 (April 26. 50 FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1. HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par. because Revenue Regulation No. 84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v.R. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. 621. vehicles for use on railways and tramways. Insular Collector of Customs Case No. the particular enactment must be operative.D. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty.161 Manila Railroad Company v. LATIN MAXIM: 8. 213 and 370. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem. manufactures of wool.000. Under par. If Revenue Regulation No. not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P. and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. Page 301. however. 256 G. Due to this.

The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. HELD: No. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. v. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. b . 85 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. 8th Edition. 108524 (November 10. including distribution. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages. hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. insulating oil is different from insulators. Under Sec. Under Sec. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. The law frowns on exemption from taxation. Manila Electric Company Case No.R.162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders. 85 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Inc. Page 301. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. Department of Finance Secretary Case No. 3 G. 42a. Page 301. HELD: No. b RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. 1994) Chapter VII. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. 1977) Chapter VII.R. L-23623 (June 30. although copra is from coconut. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. thus it is not exempt from VAT. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. Footnote No. Brady. 103(b). The Supreme Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. No. and 80% of the coconut plant is edible. 43. copra was classified as a food product under Sec. copra per se is not intended for human consumption. 103(a). Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91. it is not an agricultural food product. In fact. 82 G. No.

370 took effect.D. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor. or the operator. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. 1956) Chapter VII. 1(a)(4) of P. the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D.D.D. 27 FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a fiscal or special prosecutor. the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive conjunction “or”. 370. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P. The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. lessee. 370. Where the disclosure was not voluntary. L-8755 (March 23. but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward. HELD: The law refers to “gross receipts” and not “gross income”. No. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. Respondents argued that they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available under P. In the instant case. 104 G. the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are subject to the 20% amusement tax. 1988) Chapter VII.163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. 7a. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. Manila Jockey Club Inc. Case No. 370 which declares tax amnesty. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec. the White Cross. 102 FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth.D. singly and not all at one and the same time. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers. Castañeda Jr. Page 304. the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage of P. 97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. or operator. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Case No. No. This clause is plain demonstration that the “gross receipts” refer to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charged. the lessee. 68 G. Page 306.R. L-46881 (September 15. Footnote No. are corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P. 43 . 25a. thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor.D. as the case may be. the PCSO.R.

7a. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23. 9d. 259 G. Page 306. Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains. it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into flour and sold in 1959. 1907) Chapter VII. It is a remedial statute.170. v. b2 FACTS: In 1957. HELD: No. 175 G. Sec. Petitioner prays that the word “land” in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean “land including buildings and improvements thereon”. nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.R. and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law. Footnote No. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article. No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. 27.R. in the determination of the value of such finished article. L. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 43 . Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. the law must be taken as it is. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted.55. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Flour Mills.25602 31 (February 18. 1970) Chapter VII. it is disregarded in Act Nos. While some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification.164 Zamora v. 103 FACTS: Act No. Footnote No. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. City of Manila Case No. 123. Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case. part of which was not used in the business that year.17 because materials purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. 82 and 551.275. ISSUE: W/N the word “land” should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon. Page 306. 9f. providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. In 1958. No. This rule is not without its exceptions and limitations. but the cost of wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative intent. 3433 (March 2. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37.

7a . Footnote No. we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore. 190. said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. cannot be admitted to probate. it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. 618 of Act No. L-14322 (February 25. Sec. notwithstanding noncompliance with Art. HELD: Yes. Art. The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law. as amended. 117 G. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law.R. however. 106720 (September 15. but not its probate. On appeal. otherwise it is entirely void. 7a. No. and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. 618 of Act No. 1994) Chapter VII. for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. Page 309. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. 5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy Case No. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. Page 309. cancellations or insertions. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. 117 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late Annie Sand. In case of alterations. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. but not its entirety. which she shares with her father’s other heirs. 6c. 61 G. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. No. Thus. and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will.165 Ajero v. 9a FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu. HELD: No. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will. correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the house and lot. It was also opposed by Dr. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. 1960) Chapter VII. Court of Appeals Case No. the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The CA. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate. requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses. which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. 190.R. the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. 814. citing Sec. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed. This requirement is mandatory. as amended.” Accordingly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property.

123 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lazo v. The Petitioner contends that the phrase “action already commenced” employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. and damages. L-17750 (August 31. 1 G. as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. we cannot agree. Pending this.” and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. 2. On his way home. 123 FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for overtime work rendered. HELD: 1. On June 18. 2. 70 G. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual.R. Footnote No. Page 310. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was “separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants. W/N the scope of the term “action” falls under RA 1994. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code. and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement.166 A. the Petitioner rendered full duty. In the case at bar. because the reliever did not come on time. With this limited and narrow interpretation. Defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff. For injuries sustained.L. LATIN MAXIM: 9a . His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. 1962) Chapter VII. HELD: No. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. 1986.D.R. the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. 1990) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office. No. v. he claimed for disability benefits under P. ISSUE: 1. Borja Case No. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P. Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. Page 310. 626 but was denied by the GSIS. 626 was valid. it is significant that the liberality of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists.D. it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off. 78617 (June 18. he met an accident and as a result. But. regular homeward route. Footnote No. Inc. he sustained injuries. Ammen Transportation Company. No.

167 Villavert v. It is renewable at her instance. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. 9d . neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the lease. 1987) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. The prohibition is general. Without such law. Page 310. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P. The applicable law on the case is Art. 9a. and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. L-48605 (December 14. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Petitioner dismissed the two Respondents. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC which affirmed the denial. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abella v. who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic. Footnote No. No.R. 313 G. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. Moreover. employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts. including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. as amended. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights. It was stated in the said case that “the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land. the worker’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.” The court further stated that the purpose of Art. NLRC. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. HELD: Yes. 284 of the Labor Code. HELD: From the foregoing facts of record. 1981) Chapter VII.R. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. with the GSIS. Page 310. because when she leased the farm land. computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. 2 G. it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert. During the existence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier. The court held such contention untenable as the issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. for another ten years. which she opted to do. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. 71813 (July 20. No. 626. in Negros Occidental for a period of ten years. Hacienda Danao–Ramona.D.

a logging company. 40b FACTS: Nazario Manahan. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. The claimant. However. 1981) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. 79 G. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. No. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment. Jr. Moreover. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC.and ulcer-like symptoms. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manahan v. the case should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. 9d. According to Art. Again she was denied by the GSIS. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. HELD: No. 124 FACTS: Petitioner. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. herein Respondents. thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. L-64204 (May 31. L-44899 (April 22. it is well settled that in case of doubt. 9d. 221 of the Labor Code. it was still paid.” The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even though the payment was late. Footnote No. the widow of the deceased. HELD: Yes.. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. The latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made. Page 310.R. The security guards. died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. Footnote No. ECC. 1985) Chapter VII. he was treated for Epigastric pain. “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters. Bernabe. 36 No. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment. GSIS denied such claim.168 Del Rosario & Sons v. filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation. the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be applied. 40b . Page 310. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. 9a.

ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which.169 Liwanag v. 40 . 12a. the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation. who was killed in the line of duty by criminals. The purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. 125 FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy. 75 G. No. Altar Case No. reasonably and liberally for the employee and dependents. 279 G. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded.40 to the claimant in lump sum. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard. 36. The net produce was to be divided equally. L-12164 (May 2. 1949) Chapter VII. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. However. and one of them happens to be insolvent. though not specified. Footnote No. for the reason that instead of receiving 60% of his total share. No. which declared the contract illegal as against public policy as contemplated in Sec. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 38.R. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary. Page 310. the compensation should be divisible. 7 of the Tenancy Law. HELD: No. it should be construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. L-1916 (April 30. Art. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. 7 of the Tenancy Law. Page 310. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sibulo v.494. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases. 36. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. other provisions of law show how their liability is solidary. entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent. 7 of the Tenancy Law. owner of first class agricultural land. It was taken to the Court of Industrial Relations. Footnote No. they claim that because the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partners. which he argues to be an exhaustive list.R. 9d. which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3. HELD: No. the award would only be partially satisfied. 9c. which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. The contract was disapproved by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. 1959) Chapter VII. 9c. The WCA should be construed fairly. Petitioner claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Sec. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. the liability of business partners should be solidary. are similar to those expressly mentioned. Being a remedial statute.

127 G. which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reform’s decision. 12. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only “permanent partial disability”. The Petitioners appealed to the CA. which ordered his reinstatement. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. Footnote No. But assuming that they were. No. 32. the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. The application was supported by a physician’s certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total disability. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the suit was a share tenancy agreement.” The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. So at the age of forty-five. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. L-44570 (May 30. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform.170 Guerrero v. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. 11b. Footnote No. he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. especially the humble rank and file. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to “income benefits” under the GSIS retirement program. 168 G. Page 310. the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. Page 310. At the course of his employment. 126 FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. No. the decisions lost their validity. Pending appeal. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Court of Appeals Case No. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability.1986) Chapter VII. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vicente v. He shared 1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. 38 FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. 85024 (January 23. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. 1991) Chapter VII. the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. 12a . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Afterwards. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court.R.R. Later the Petitioners ordered Benitez out. the Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant.

1954. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body. 43 . As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect. et al. L-8975 (June 29. 283 G. she had several pregnancies. No. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. HELD: No. 128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Corporal v. 1994) Chapter VII. An hour later. there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. 83 G. No. v. she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a “hilot”. that is to say. Her husband. filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. But said agency denied. 131 FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co. During the course of her work. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. as later amended by RA 1081. Manila Hotel Company Case No. Footnote No. she suffered complete abortion.R. Art. Page 311. herein Petitioner. brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel Co. Footnote No. when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. On her 4th pregnancy. she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. LATIN MAXIM: 46a FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of his wife’s death was non-work-related. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. as amended by RA 611. HELD: No. 15 days before they were separated from the company. 266 of the Administrative Code. 86020 (August 5. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits. approved on June 15. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative Code. On her 5th pregnancy. 1954.. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No.R. 1957) Chapter VII. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Page 311.171 Tamayo.

17905 (January 27. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. always susceptible possible challenges. 37. 71 of Act No. Also. Moran Case No. should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance. Under this. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed. it makes no exception. the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. 46a. HELD: The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court. Page 320. Moran. 74226-227 (July 27. When the decision was published. Hence with regard to Art. 216 G. 22 and 7 of the RPC.R. as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. However as the deed was registered on May 26. Footnote No. Art.172 People v. The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones. 222 G. 168 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. Furthermore. 48 FACTS: On June 1983. as stated in People v. Nos. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. 167 People v. ISSUE: W/N Act No. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. it was increased to 6 months. it is also presumed that the purchaser has examined the instruments of the record. 1923) Chapter VII. which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 1961. the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. the SC contends that Art. Page 320. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. LATIN MAXIM: 48 . a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is the one to be adopted. This should also apply to criminal cases.R. Furthermore. 1922. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. Footnote No. When the statute makes no distinction. 22 should still apply to special laws. 1989) Chapter VII. Reyes Case No. in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes. HELD: Act No. the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed. 7. pursuant to Sec. No. 3030. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code.

No. 37 G. as amended by RA 6389.A.A.173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. and P20 per minor from January 16. due to the lack of funds. 186. Footnote No. in case of ambiguity.A. the judgment of the lower courts is modified as. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension. Petitioner expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844. and RA 3844. the difference of P75 plus P22. which should all be construed together.A. GSIS approved his retirement gratuity under C. one under its provisions and another pursuant to C. as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds. No. 38b . 1982) Chapter VII. 1971. 186. 1971 up to December 31. Bautista Case No. However. and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein. 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each minor. 173 FACTS: Respondent Gasilao. Later.50 per month for his wife. as amended by RA 6389. HELD: No. 1968. But.A. Page 321. effective December 18. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao’s pension. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C. No. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1975) Chapter VII. it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. 1969 up to January 15. Page 322. a veteran. 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the government. sent a letter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department. Sec. as amended by RA 1616. No. as amended by RA 1616. There is nothing in RA 3844. he was awarded with the full benefits of RA 65. that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits. for P100 a month and an additional P10 per minor. increased to P100 from June 22. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. and then P100 plus P10 per minor. No. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision. The difference from June 22. all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should. RA 5753 was approved. 1957 up to August 7. 186. 1971. an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms. 1971. as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim for gratuity under RA 3844. from June 22. 1957 to August 7. No. 9 and RA 1920. 186 and in the light of its provisions. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms Case No. HELD: Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. After finally complying with all the necessities. 40b FACTS: Petitioner. Footnote No.R. as amended by RA 6389. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an employee. 1955 at the rate of P50. No.A. L-36153 (November 28. be construed in relation to C. on June 22. as amended by RA 6389. 170 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Legaspi v. starting from December 18. L-37867 (February 22. the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes. 1969. failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1968. 145 No. Granting such pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and only after January 15. Conrado Estrella. 1969 to January 14. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22. 186. on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under C.

However. 1438 was published in Vol. in the same manner as it has done since 1978. 30. No. 1986. This is definitely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that. 174 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Re: Application For Retirement Under R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 128 A. 1989) Chapter VII.D. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security. No. ISSUE: Which version of P. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. 60 A. P. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA).174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years. and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. 1 dated February 25. 177 FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). as amended by P.D. 1 of RA 910. retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. 40b FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termination of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino. No. 1438 which was published in Vol.D. 09-9-019-SC (October 4.” They fall into three categories: XXX 2. pursuant to Proclamation No.A. 42. Footnote No. more so. Britanico of the IAC Case No. 41 provided that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. COMELEC). HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. Page 323. 30. Footnote No. in Vol. Justice Britanico served the government for 36. 74 of the Official Gazette. resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. No. 74 of the Official Gazette.M. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. No. 1990) Chapter VII. should have rendered “at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both. BP 129). 1438.23 years. 1438 must be followed. of which 10 years. which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement. 6484-Ret. 40b. not only for those who have retained their vigor but. requiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. As provided in Sec. plus 3) longevity pay (which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 1. for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. 2 months. the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement benefits with their lifetime annuity. being remedial in character. 74 of the Official Gazette. The basis was the copy of P. (May 15. No. 43c . Page 322.D. GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary.M. not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. Since 1978 however.

R. Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. id est courtesy resignations. Paredes and Gerochi. No. 11b . the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day. 9e. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. According to the Rules of Court. Footnote No.D. 178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramirez v. namely Pineda. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. 181 FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges. integrity and dedication to the public service. Montecillo. The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it. 9d. Footnote No. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect. 6789-RET (Jul 13. there are ample reasons behind each grant. the defect in the appeal bond. Pineda Case No. 1962) Chapter VII. 130 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. Page 325. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately.175 Re: Gregorio G. even if indeed 2 sureties were needed. No. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. The CFI dismissed the complaint. 132 A. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal bond. 1146. 29. 9e. L-19183 (Nov. Moreover. the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court. HELD: Yes. it would suffice that the court approves such. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the SC. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. it did. as amended. 1990) Chapter VII. a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties.M. The judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases. Furthermore. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Page 323. Arrieta Case No. de Lara. The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. 42a FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. 37. it should suffice. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges. Montesclaros. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P. HELD: No. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period.

1988) Chapter VII. Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial justice. 63 G. Footnote No. No. He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes. Hamoy Case No. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated.176 International Corporate Bank v. 1290 of the Civil Code. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her other obligations to Petitioner. alterations. which was granted. Private Respondent made a money market placement. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest. fortified by jurisprudence. private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. 1987) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. the Respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. Meanwhile. mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided. Footnote No. 35 No.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. and/or additions. The debt of P6. she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement. L-77154 (June 30. 30. 9d. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. 9d. 18b . The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed. applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. Page 326. in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures.R. 18a. 11b FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. Thus. The court issued a writ of execution against Petitioner’s property. 181 FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner’s predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. Such bond was therefore rendered without force and effect. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Del Rosario v. Page 326. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves. L-6970 (Jan.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible. HELD: Yes. By such rigidity.

181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gimenez v. 22(b) of the Interim Rules.177 Lacsamana v. The 30-day period fixed by P. L-73146-53 (August 26. HELD: No. Sec. awards of decisions of any court. 1984) Chapter VII. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. 27 FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. 5b. Securities and Exchange Commission Case No. The Court rules. Repeals by implication are not favored. It is an administrative agency. that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. Page 326.D. Page 326. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 37. save in exceptionally meritorious cases. may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). HELD: Yes. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA. 902-A was modified by Sec. 22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. the organic law of the SEC. L-68568 (December 26. 7a. resolutions. 52 No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case. Footnote No. 902-A. 181 FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC. thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review. Footnote No. The SEC denied their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. is still in force. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. 38b .D. However. for the guidance of Bench and Bar. The SEC ruled that the 30-day period provided for in Sec. The SEC is not a court. a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as follows: … (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision. 39 of the Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final order. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 69 No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 24a. 1986) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 6 of P.

Jugo Case No. Due to unfortunate circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy. Case No. 1936) Chapter VII. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. 9a. HELD: Yes to both issues. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petitioners. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. 36 G. The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. There was substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff’s office the Defendant’s counterbond. No. LATIN MAXIM 6d. 187 FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue.178 Blanco v. In lieu of such bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Internal Revenue). Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. “… The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace …. With such. L-44970 (March 31. 6d. L-832 (October 14. The fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner’s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. Footnote No. Page 327.R.R. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none. Page 326. 9d . the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office. HELD: Under Sec. 183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case and Nantz v. 49 G. 7a FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with. On the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with the requirement. No. 1946) Chapter VII. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perfected. the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements.

Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. Raymundo Case No. on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. or assignee as such. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Under the Rules of Court “the court may. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. 65 G. Page 327. Mirasol and Nuñez Case No. Page 328. 192 FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her brief. Any ordinary creditor. HELD: Yes. HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property. 41 .R. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. 1920) Chapter VII. having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9d FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale. 1936) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief. L-45155 (July 31.179 C. 14881 (February 5. to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. 91 G. No. No. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. Footnote No. which had been effected in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana).R. 189 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Javellana v. was attacked in this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in other litigation.

Page 328. was not accidental and. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured.000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec.R. Petitioner. 156 G. 34 G. Page 328. 192 FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3. 1961) Chapter VII. binding itself to pay the sum of P1.180 Del Rosario v. father of the insured. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. Equitable Ins. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured. 30a . L-16138 (April 29. Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head. as used in insurance contracts. Inc. Case No. as indemnity for the death of the insured. the father of the insured. and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation.000. unexpected.000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage. LATIN MAXIM: 3. ISSUE: W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or disability caused by accidental means.. which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Case No. 1963) Chapter VII.” HELD: The terms “accident” and “accidental”. independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. not covered by insurance. left.000 to P3. Part I of the provisions of the policy. The failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1.R. with his head hitting the rope of the ring. Footnote No. have not acquired any technical meaning. Footnote No. Capital Ins. & Surety Co. intracranial. Inc. 1. ISSUE: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario. causing Eduardo to fall. L-16215 (June 29. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy. Simon de la Cruz.. No. filed a claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. therefore.000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De la Cruz v. filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1. 38 FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. caused by his participation in a boxing contest. and Casualty Co. 25a.000. No.

a resident of Pampanga. Page 330. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue. or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Fighting his way out of the factory. 9c FACTS: Plaintiff. a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory.R. Under ordinary circumstances. Page 328." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. L-28742 (April 30. Case No. express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand. the term "may be" connotes possibility. 7a. As the terms of the policies are clear. Footnote No. Hence. Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec. b . 1961) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. which issued to him personal accident policies. L-16138 (April 29. HELD: No. Plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies. However. On December 24. Footnote No. which is not disputed on appeal. permission or possibility.. which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found. All that was found by the trial court. an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant. was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Capati v. 1982) Chapter VIII. No. a resident of Naga City.181 Ty Vs. 46 G." In addition. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. 25a. the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. 8 FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. Inc. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. 156 G. Ocampo Case No. No. it does not connote certainty. 1953. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct. First National Surety & Assurance Co. the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. 2(b).R. opportunity. among which being the eight above named Defendants. at the election of the Plaintiff.

17 FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private. they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory and permissive in nature. On 1968. 1968. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 36b undated memorandum of FACTS: In the trial of People v.182 Chartered Bank v. not merely directory. the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in the information. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. National Government Auditing Office Case No. Footnote No. 36a. except in the cases determined in Sec. Figueroa Case No. No. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full. 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Guiao v. regardless of location. 1954) Chapter VIII. After the reinvestigation. Page 331. 9a. No. 1 is mandatory. L-38513 (March 31. 1987) Chapter VIII." effective October 1. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only. and two new accused were included. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. Gopez. the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. Sec. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons. must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila. 58 G. Page 333. an amended information was filed. 2 of this Act. namely. “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. 1968. Footnote No. 121 G. Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano.R. 2709 states that.R. the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders.” A perusal of Act No. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1. involving the installation of a new postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks. 25a . 9a. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier. L-6481 (May 17.

117188 (August 7. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Director of Lands v. 1997) Chapter VIII. Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. 1997) Chapter VIII.R. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. Page 334. 25a. continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision.183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. Court of Appeals Case No. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. 102858 (July 28. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. 95 G. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. it was found that the applicant had been in open. Hence. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”. Footnote No. However. HELD: No. 36a. v. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. Thus. HELD: It is mandatory. Court of Appeals Case No. as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision. No. b FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. No. 38b. During the pendency of the said petition. 9a . Page 334. 153 G. he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. Footnote No. Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory.R. Later. 23 FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. Inc.

30b. 1997) FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. 51765 (March 3. Agana Sr. the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. 25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Planers Bank v. L-35910 (July 21. in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum.000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Page 335. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. 1978) Chapter VIII. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional". The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents’ preferred shares HELD: Yes.” After receipt. 7a. No. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption. stated that. the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same. Footnote No. Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. 6b. Salvador Case No. Furthermore.184 Bersabal v. No. the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. 133 G. and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. Case No. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. 34 G. an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of P8. R. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion. 36a . Respondent Judge.R. “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock. the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may".

Considering the multi-million profits of the company. therefore. 9d.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning. 121 G.D. Inc. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P. 2 of P. 39c . L-63318 (August 18. Transportation and Communications as mandatory.D. unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. v. Thus. 217 should be reconsidered. but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. HELD: Yes. Inc. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent. 217 deals with matters so alien.185 Phil. 30b. Petitioner states that SIP schedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and. illegal and baseless. 6d. Consumers Foundation. 1984) FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. 24. 94 G. 217 which provides. the consumers and the government itself. No. which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said Section 2. L-63318 (November 25. 217 to the then Department of Public Works. the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. LATIN MAXIM: 8b. No.D.. the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must". NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No. HELD: Yes. 36. Hence. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable. “The Department of Public Works. the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec. v.R. Consumers Foundation . Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated .. 11b.D. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Nat’l Telecommunications Commission Case No. P.R. 12a FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. 9f.

93 G. The modifier. A. If there was any repeal. sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. 18. al. which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.”. The lower court sustained Respondent company. and accordingly. 2 of RA 304. the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304. the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. it was by implication which is not favored. it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds.O. 34 FACTS: Petitioner. There is none in this case. No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed. Albay for 1) abuse of authority.O. and 2) dishonesty. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made. Petitioner further contends that A. His basis was Sec. 50 HELD: No. to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders.O. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. No. 32 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Berces v. No. for whose benefit the same have been issued. with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. 33 G. The first sentence of Sec. 26 . FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi. 6. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case No. Page 337. According to Petitioner.A. “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years. the rule is not absolute. LATIN MAXIM: 25a.” In other words. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 112099 (February 21. 530(f). citing Sec. No. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds. L-4712 (July 11. the word “shall” is imperative. Respondent mayor was convicted. acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. HELD: No. it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.R. Footnote No. However. Sec. Page 336. No. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. 18. Guingona. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. 26. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. Footnote No. 1952) Chapter VIII. The Office of the President stayed execution. the governing law is RA 7160. 1995) Chapter VIII. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. In the absence of an express repeal. suspended in both cases. RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or directory.R. 6 of A. ISSUE: W/N R.” It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay execution. No. et. depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found.186 Diokno v. 25a. that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent. can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes. the interest to be charged. Case No. 67(b) of the LGC. It is true that in its ordinary signification.O. 7160 repealed A.

an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. HELD: The CA erred. LATIN MAXIM: 9d . resulting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. No. Page 337.R. L-79094 (June 22. 1988) Chapter VIII. v. an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation. et al. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Because of the word “shall”. the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. Petitioner appealed to Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Under Art. 37 FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Footnote No. 223 of the Labor Code. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. Upon the hearing. issued and made out check No. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed. Inc. Court of Appeals Case No. the Bouncing Checks Law. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides. Page 337. the rule is mandatory. he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. thus in violation of BP 22. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioner’s stoppage of operations. Despite the reduction granted. 1998) Chapter VIII. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. 81 G. Also. National Labor Relations Commission. Footnote No. Case No. and on appeal. 26 FACTS: Petitioner. the Appellate Court. prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal. 123669 (February 27. No. Sec. He was convicted by the trial court. 48 G. LATIN MAXIM: 25a.R. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fule v.187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing. and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice. Alleging serious business decline. HELD: No. Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days. in its language. Therefore. Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to work.

Footnote No. statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. 1983) Chapter VIII. he is barred from doing so under Art. Therefore. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted. the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption. recovery of collection. 174 G. 1954) Chapter VIII. In jurisprudence. the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation … and results in the recovery of collection of revenues …. “In order to entitle an informer to a reward. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been falsely declaring their gross earnings – on the basis of a parity rate of P2.” Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation. 335 and Art. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.R. Virata Case No. Inc. which led to further investigations and. 335. Despite Art. 338 should be considered in relation to each other. Now the Petitioners seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies – as provided by RA 2338. legitimated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Further. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt.R. However. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that “those who have legitimate. HELD: No. Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confidential Information. an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo. 338 which states that “a step-child. Page 338. or natural children by legal fiction” cannot adopt. L-44004 (March 25. 338 meaningless and a surplusage. wants to adopt her children by her first husband.188 McGee v. L-5387 (April 29.00 – defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. 9d . consequently. a company which is not included in the Confidential Information. HELD: Yes. acknowledged natural children. While Art. Inc.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a FACTS: Confidential Information No. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Penid v. Footnote No. by the step-father or step-mother” can be adopted. 101 G. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child. According to Sec. invoking Art. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. 4 of RA 2338. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. Page 337. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. Republic Case No. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Art. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In addition. No. it must be noted that Art. under the laws of statutory construction.00 to US $1. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings. However.

HELD: 1. 40b FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. filed as of the date of mailing. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 43 . 110170 (February 21. and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail. Festejo Case No. L-2327 (January 11. 9d. Page 342. The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. as provided by the Constitution. when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. 64 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballots which would have made him win. W/N the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed. 124 G. No. No. 63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pimentel v. Page 342.R. Footnote No. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. Appellant’s name in the 59 ballots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor. Footnote No. ISSUE: 1. 96 G. Within the 5-day period to appeal. Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. 2. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. 1994) Chapter VIII. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any “notice of appeal” from Petitioner. member of the provincial board or councilor.189 Pahilan v. Camiguin. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.R. he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. 1949) Chapter VIII. No. is able to read. HELD: No. it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. 9c. et al. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. Petitioner filed a “verified appeal” brief. Tabalba. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor. Case No. 7b.

Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment. under the date of December 1. which amounted to P3.190 Roxas v. the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of Casamayor. in the name of Petitioner. 1914. under Homestead Patent No. TCT No. No. 1918) Chapter VIII. Furthermore. the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 75 FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the petition of Baltazar. received by them on December 25. 141. applying Sec. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during November. 75 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Serfino v. OCT No. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes. was not given during the time fixed by statute. and not Sec. 1839 was issued by said office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and void from the beginning. 43 . Page 345. the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. 1915. Rafferty Case No.1676 hectares situated in Sagay. the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. On the same day. sent Plaintiffs notice. In the latter part of 1913.A. 1987) Chapter VIII. was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. Casamayor sold the land in favor of Nemesia Baltazar. requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. under protest. which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. 145 G.R. Upon registration of said patent. 1914. Court of Appeals Case No. The city assessor and collector of Manila. It was finished in all respects on February 15. HELD: No. In 1945. Negros Occidental. 121 which governs sale to corporations. No. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. 44139. OCT No. Footnote No. TCT No. 264 G. 1914. consisting of 21. No. 118 of C.000. His attempted notification on December 25. Since the grant was more than 5 years before. 28985. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. 14-R. 19 FACTS: A parcel of land. L-12182 (March 27. 40858 (September 15. which did not present the documents for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. HELD: No. Baltazar sold the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central. thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Building for the year 1915. Footnote No. The city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. Page 345.R. In 1951. LATIN MAXIM: 37b. Apparently. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title.

The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. 26419 (October 16. As a minor. Footnote No. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. 1953. amounted to P13. ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent. to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. HELD: No. 39a . LATIN MAXIM: 28. Commission on Elections Case No.R. 897 (RA 897). petitioner was obliged. Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Leyte. for election purposes. including interests. Private respondent Montejo. 137 G. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. 7a. 119976 (September 18. by virtue of Art. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident. Hence.59. such corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. Although Mr. she did not lose her domicile of origin. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. Therefore. HELD: Yes. petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban. In spite of the being born in Manila. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Romualdez-Marcos v.983. out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. Parenthetically. it is retained until a new one is gained. 1995) Chapter VIII.191 Quijano v. No. 37. filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with respondent COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. once acquired. when she married then Congressman Marcos. 1953 when RA 897 was approved. Page 347. R. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14.84 FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved. when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20. No. 110 of the Civil Code. 6c. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. G. Marcos has different places of residence. Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20. 1 FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. As domicile. The loan was to be released in installments. and even if he had designated one.000 for his outstanding obligation.

the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. Salvani Case No. The doctrine in Portillo v. L-32181 (March 10. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within three months after filing. 5b. 9a. this provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. 1929 declaring appellee Portillo the winner. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Appellee Portillo. filed an election protest on July 9. 1930) Chapter III. However. 43. Court of Appeals Case No. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. 1948) Chapter VIII. No. 14 FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. 247 G. Decision was rendered on August 15. Sec. Page 101. HELD: No. his nearest opponent. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. lost and filed an appeal thereafter.192 Portillo v. b2 FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court. 2. Page 332. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 243 G. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction.R. Footnote No. One year having already elapsed. Salvani should be abandoned. 7b.R. 39b . 45. No. 7a. Footnote No. L-2581 (December 2. 18b. 1928. 130 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Querubin v.

4007. Footnote No. or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. 1 thereof amended Sec. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress. No. Furthermore. Private respondent then filed for ejection citing “personal cultivation” on March 7. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception. By virtue of this law. The legislation involves social justice. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. 46b FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. No. whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners.R. a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the President.R. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so. Page 89. 1971 removing “personal cultivation” from the grounds for ejectment. in enacting RA 546. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10. 9c. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 46. RA 546 was approved and Sec. 1984) Chapter III. but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. 189 G. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. Carpio and Carreon Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 138 G. 46a. 1951) FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation. In the case of Camacho vs. however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitled to social justice. to abolish all the pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof. 59 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salcedo and Ignacio v.193 Nilo v. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. L-4495 (June 6. HELD: No. 49 . imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. 4007. 1968. L-34586 (April 2. to rule against the small landowners would be thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. Court of Appeals Case No. Art.

A. the CA applying Sec. RA 3843 was passed. 1988) Chapter IX. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts.. Footnote No. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 49 FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter carrier. 1988) FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. HELD: No. Upon appeal. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. Sec. HELD: It is valid. 46e . They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. 6389 eliminated this ground. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts.R. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution. Pending the case. R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.” thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. Page 355. 4 of the New Civil Code. 9c. held that the landowner’s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. Inc. 14 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gallardo v. L-23771 (August 4. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co. 78 G. In applying Art. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application.R. 46. but made it “in lieu of any and all taxes. Borromeo Case No. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive. RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. 7 of RA 6389. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. heat. 7 of RA 6389. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code. it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. and power. L-36007 (May 25. No.194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. No. instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. The newer law. granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. 50 G. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding.

46c. No.R. Filipinas Compaňia de Seguros Case No. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of Tax Appeals. Page 134. the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. unless the contrary is provided. Petitioner assessed against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. and on January 1953. petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement. and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise.195 Cebu Portland Cement v. In every case of doubt. an insurance company. CIR Case No.” it certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. laws have no retroactive effect. HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. HELD: No. 1960) Chapter IV. 15 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Footnote No. Respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. 46c. 76 G. 46e FACTS: Respondent. 14880 (April 29. While the purpose of the amendment. which imposes the new and higher taxes. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar.R. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955). ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale of graduated rates. unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. considering that RA 1612. No. this took effect on August of 1956. Footnote No. was engaged in business as a real estate dealer. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. As a rule. 41 FACTS: The case involves petitioner’s claim for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955. expressly provides that said Act shall take effect upon its approval. Page 355. producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax. 1968) Chapter IX. however. 46e . it also protested the payment of the ad valorem taxes. was not only to “accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms. as mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill. Since 1952. 52 G. 20563 (October 29.

ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future. Court of Appeals and Passion Case No. 344 of the RPC. pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. Footnote No. HELD: No. 36886 (February 1. Page 351. otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Santos Case No. in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. No. Lachica married the victim. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted. 7 of RA 6389 since.R. 1992) Chapter IX. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect.490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. Ana. 36(1) of RA 3844. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Footnote No. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. Page 363. 73 FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. However. Art. LATIN MAXIM: 20. 46e . Conscience and good law justify this exception. 126. LATIN MAXIM: 48 FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity. However. Magdalena de Ocampo. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. 140 G. L-36378 (January 27. 29 G. 46b. Pampanga containing 18. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. No. 1932) Chapter IX.R. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. HELD: Yes. 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Balatbat v.196 Laceste v. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.

LATIN MAXIM: 11b. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act. L-7140 (December 22. Page 266. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect.R. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff by the defendant. 46e . 1946 to March 14. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C. Zeta Case No. HELD: No. 20. Footnote No.R.197 People v. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 401. Case No. The lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. 1955) Chapter IX. the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1. 72 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Jose v. 271 G. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. 1951. 46e FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre-war loan with defendant. Furthermore. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. 104 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. 232 G. Page 369. No. No. HELD: Yes. Footnote No.A. 1955) Chapter VI. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 20. L-7766 (November 29. No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. Where a statute was amended and reenacted.

both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. 764 [19461. HELD: No. 1946) Chapter IX. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs. 111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause. 77 Phil. On appeal. 226 G. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a. Ruled in Alday vs. a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. No. the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. BP Big. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. as principal defendants. Camilon. and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case. Sumilang Case No. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss.198 People v. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11. L-49187 (December 18. L-68043 (October 31. 46e FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. as appellants. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . HELD: Yes. 1983. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Footnote No. 129 is now in full force and effect. Sumilang. 97 G. However. those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners. Based on the records.R. No. Being procedural in nature. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills. "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed. denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. Page 371.R.

petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Inc. intimidation. 78 G. 1 of P. while being informed of P. LATIN MAXIM: 45a. Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that “after prosecution has rested its case. otherwise known as the Anti– Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land. 86675 (December 19. 1989) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ocampo v. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. 89 G. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner. exemplary damages.D.R. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner. No. Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. Sec. No. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court. (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. Court of Appeals Case No. 772. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Sec. 1989) FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages. Court of Appeals Case No.199 MRCA. 15. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence. 772.” ISSUE: 1. 7960 (December 8. 46b . 2.D. HELD: Yes on both counts. HELD: Yes. v.R.

cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art. No. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws. 223 of the Labor Code. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Footnote No. 1991) Chapter IX. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aris (Phil. 90501 (August 5. No. Footnote No. Page 372. and the contested provision “is then a police legislation”. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action. v. 33 of the Civil Code.R. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 1990) Chapter IX. 91856 (October 5. 315 G.) Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 46e . being without malice. HELD: Yes on both counts. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 119 FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. HELD: Yes. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. 223 of the Labor Code. Court of Appeals Case No. 46e FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec.R. respectively. reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 21 G. Page 372. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.200 Yakult Philippines v.

or. ISSUE: Whether Sec.R.R. Page 12. No. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 61 of Act No. 1281 prevails.201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. No. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. 1915) Chapter I. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. L-8243 (December 24. No reference is made in Act No. 1990) Chapter IX. 926. ISSUE: W/N P. Municipality of Binalonan Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec. Cebu.D. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan. Sec. lands claimed by the Government. Court of Appeals Case No. Footnote No. Cadastral Act (No. Page 373. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P. During the pendency of this appeal. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Government of the Philippine Islands v. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. entered into a compromise agreement. v. of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 12 of P. Pangasinan on two parcels of land. 61 of Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands. Footnote No. 61 of Act No. Act No. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. 25 G. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings.D. 117 G. 1281. at most. However. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. 61 of Act No. subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City.D. HELD: Act No. 9 mining claims overlap.D. Cebu. 926. 1281. 61 of Act No. 44 FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City. 7(a)(c) and Sec. HELD: P. L-54305 (February 14.

et al. No. Then. HELD: The Court held that E. 1980) Chapter IV. overtime pay. Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5.909. a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP. In its appeal to the NLRC. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director’s authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage. Court of Appeals Case No.R. ECOLA.O. 128(b) of the Labor Code. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Briad Agro Development Corp. 38b. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. 46e . This was clear from the proviso: “The provisions of Art. Footnote No. therefore. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. No. the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. v. Case No. the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands. 217 of this Code notwithstanding…” The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction.202 Development Bank of the Phil. which NLRC dismissed on the strength of E. 83225 (June 29. and dela Cruz. It is. HELD: Yes. 111 amending Art. dela Serna. v. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. 92 G.369. a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. 30b. without the knowledge of the DBP. were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. 39 G. amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85). 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay. 9. E. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. 217 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. by force of Art.30. However.R. among which was Sec.O. L-28774 (February 28. by RA 3147. night shift differential pay. 13 of RA 85. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147. 13 of RA 85. RA 3147 was enacted.O. 1989) Chapter IX. 13. by amending Sec. However. Page 376. legal holiday pay. 13 of RA 85. 136 FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. Hon. Page 175. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice. Footnote No.

instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. Furthermore. 797 was passed. For convenience. Duata and the Court of Appeals Case No. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessitated. No. 21. Santos denied the spouses’ ownership. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar. Art. Andres. 1955. Upon appeal. Months after. National Labor Relations Commission. the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage under Art. Footnote No. another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. and in order to secure the payment of the loan. it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned.203 Erectors. When private respondent returned to the Philippines. a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. Jr. Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. On August 3. v. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent.D. 140 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v.O. 104215 (May 8. 134 FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. in this case. HELD: No. E. 46e FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. Gaanan and Aguilar. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial court. LATIN MAXIM: 35. Inc. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N E.O. vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad.O. private respondent Duata. L-20901 (August 31. 46c. 37. these were P. Footnote No. No. The lot was purchased by Santos. 1965) Chapter IX. intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. 46a. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase. and Burgos Case No. 1996) Chapter IX. 99 G. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hon. the title was issued in Santos’s name. the daughter of the Duata spouses. Page 376. 17. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. in executing the said private document. plus his contractual bonus. No. 274 G. 37. he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him. 46e .R. 1691 and 1391. HELD: It is a mortgage.R. Page 377. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E. claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document.

442(d) of the LGC of 1991. Case No. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. v. Sr. 353. Page 312. is also curative statute. safety. contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations. and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant. good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health. 46e . 133 FACTS: President C. Macapagal.O.R. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. 442(d) of RA 7160. in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. 5 and 6.O. among others. they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law. No. 103702 (December 6. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E. to be devoted to banking purposes. peace. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. It was then attacked of its validity. Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. LATIN MAXIM: 46e. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres. 27. 182 G. Page 381. Quezon v. 193 G. No. Garcia. 1994) Chapter IX. Footnote No. Sec. 5 and 6. 1979) Chapter VIII. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Quezon. 5 and 6.O. issued E. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone. Footnote No. Resolution No. 27. as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Mendez. L-24670 (December 14. 2 of RA 1515. ISSUE: W/N the E. creating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec. as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality.204 Municipality of San Narciso. HELD: Yes. 174. 150 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ortigas & Co. Then by virtue of E. Feati Bank & Trust Case No.R. and any attempt to apply Sec. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power. The latter refused to comply. 6c FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. issued by President D.O.

By May. 1965) Chapter IX. or all”. In this case. 237 G. Moreover. Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process. the choice is left up to PNB to decide. 144. No. HELD: It would have applied. L-46095 (November 23. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. 35 G. PNB filed a case against all 4 signatories. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. As the statute shortened the period of action accrued. 7-A of C. However. otherwise it shall be barred forever.A. Manuel Barredo passed away. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased debtor. Page 372. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed.R. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors. 46e FACTS: On January 1963. before the case was decided. Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. 144. Art. L-17566 (July 30. which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. No. 1216. Court of Industrial Relations Case No. Page 387. 3 FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 7-A of C. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish. Footnote No. To require PNB to go against the estate would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art.A. 9c . 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. Asuncion Case No. 6.205 Billones v. it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from their accrual. Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo.R. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. as amended by RA 1993. as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. or some. Footnote No. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M. No. 1977) Chapter X. 6. increase of modify substantive rights. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Thus. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims.

Act 4054 was amended by RA 34. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 1988) FACTS: In 1946. HELD: Yes. Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits should be followed. However. producing retroactive effect. 7 G. the petition was denied because P. 8 of Act 4054. 22a. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy’s petition for probation. the former prevails. 25a. However. 968.D.D.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a.D. laws concerning this issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore. 1990 was promulgated after P. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren’t. 9a. Petitioner then filed for probation alleging P.6 grams of marijuana. Because of this. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been “sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years” are excluded from the benefits of the Probation Law. 49 FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.D. it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that “this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants… The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating. 90 G.206 Ongsiako v. During liquidation. 43. 49 . No. Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of Sec. In the past. 36a. 1990 had repealed P. People Case No. This act provided that the palay would be divided equally by the 2 parties. 79010 (May 23. Gamboa Case No. later that same year. Because P. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial. Where the law is clear and unambiguous. Moreover. 7b. 1950) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Amandy v.D. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Ongsiako insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect. 968. 7a.R. 6b. HELD: No. 968.R. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect. No. no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation. L-1867 (April 8. it must be taken as it is. he was given a sentence of six years and 1 day (the minimum time for his offense).

D.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners.R. Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC. 38b FACTS: On several occasions. Footnote No. Footnote No. No. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Diu v. interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6.55. 5b. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. otherwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. 197 G.227. Page 391. 114 of Act 496.207 Parras v. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. 2. Land Registration Commission Case No. 28 FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office. Private respondents in their Answer. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P. of the latter law. and (2) another for P12. Sec. 9a.0000. 1995) Chapter X. When the parties met. but private respondents failed to appear. otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". 1508. private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7.R.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. L-16011 (July 26. while admitting indebtedness. Court of Appeals Case No.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case. It must be noted that P.862. 410(b) and 412 respectively. LATIN MAXIM: 4. No. Nevertheless. 1960) Chapter X. Page 390. ISSUE: 1. 36b . W/N petitioner can be exempted. 96 G. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. they failed to reach an amicable settlement. 115213 (December 19. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991.D. LATIN MAXIM: 11. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication. the sum of P57. 32. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sec.

166 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mecano v. the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. Footnote No. as amended. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 38b. HELD: Petition was granted. Springer Case No. No. as amended by Sec.R. ISSUE: 1. Commission on Audit Case No. 1992) Chapter X. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. 1921. 2. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). 176 G. W/N Sec. 49 . 2822. 119 G. 38b FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. HELD: Yes. however. 1990.D. two from the legislative and one from the executive. expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 45 FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. 32. L-26979 (April 1. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine Government.208 Government v. it ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. However. 4 of Act No. three members of the government appeared. the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareholders. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company. and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Footnote No. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. During the election of directors.” LATIN MAXIM: 30a. 37. 1927) Chapter I. 103982 (December 11. 2 of Act No. 173 of the Labor Code. as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. Page 38. on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. No. 2705. However. 699 of the RAC … whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government. 30a. as amended by P. Sec. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. 9a.R. is unconstitutional and void. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Page 395. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7. The second sentence of Art.

The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ynchausti & Co v. 1048 of the Administrative Code.209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. sought to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement.R. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor’s reports. 4. when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together. 49 FACTS: The petitioner. was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be committed to an asylum. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 20 G. 9c. It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. No. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. 2614 being specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. Thus. 1312 of the Administrative Code. 174 G. which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel. Sec. a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business. 50 . any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. 2614 was not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code. No 12330 (January 25. 2614. par. this should be done. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. of the Penal Code.R. one Chan Sam. 1917) FACTS: The accused. Art. Likewise. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. On the other hand. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal. Stanley Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Concepcion and Lee Voo Case No. 49. The converse proposition equally holds true. Act No. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict between Act No. In issuing the order of release the respondent judge relied upon Art. 33281 (March 31. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 8. The Philippine Legislature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs. none is presumed to be intended.

P. 451. The Education Act of 1982. No. where Sec. However. 11338 (August 15. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the United States Congress. 44 G. and object of both. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P. under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P. 1916) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fabros.D. 25. the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture.R. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No. 49 FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in Sec. R. Whether or not an Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by an examination of both statutes. v. et al.D. LATIN MAXIM: 4. and thereafter. while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. 164 G. 451.D. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. purpose. 3(a) of P. which was granted to them. Tantoco Case No. 1987) FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school. there was a repeal. Then Minister of Education Jaime C.S. 70832 (December 18. entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232. Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations.D. 25 valid. and in the light of the reason. which the Court thereby lifted. 451. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisions relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. Under P. 39b . Laya Case No.D. No. Hence. HELD: That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. v. The Government appealed.210 U. relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. HELD: Yes. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that Act No.

The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. and this is certified by the National Economic Council. 1931) FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano. against which they may enforce their credits. In order to effect a repeal by implication. both such proceedings and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds. the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate.211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. the former from their commencement. we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of the insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. Tan Lua. 16 G. At this. refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. she appointed her son to manage. which was registered with a Torrens title. No. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. v. although with a common objective. Inc. series of 1964. the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration. The assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. 30756 (September 22. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. et al. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land Registration Act. The two laws. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter. 61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Brias de Coya v. 70. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. 39a FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors. according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property. thru a government agency which the President may designate. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. sell and encumber her properties situated in the Philippines. Feliciano Case No. No. 1965) Chapter X. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has been made. 39a . pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law. hence there was no repeal. wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice.R. 127 G. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. Page 399. is legal and valid. Case No. It was approved. thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. L-24022 (March 3. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties.R.

50 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. During the hearing of the libel case Cruz. (the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense). Subido Case No. ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand. Endaya Case No. Petitioner. on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice. 360 of the Revised Penal Code. As is clear from his well-written memorandum. In an Administrative Order. a negative response. L-23894. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. appointed Manuel D. L-31711. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jalandoni vs. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance. general in character as to its terms and application.212 Villegas vs. was thus repealed by implication. Mayor of the City of Manila. Respondent still tried the case. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828. RA 5185. No. Footnote No. No. There was. (January 24. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code. A subsequent statute. disapproved the appointment. 62 FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R.R. (September 30. a 1908 decision. saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. HELD: No. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22. Respondent. 49 . Footnote No. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. through counsel manifested in open court that under Art. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. as noted. 4 of the Decentralization Law. to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Sec. Respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. Page 411. 314 G. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category. series of 1968. 1974) Chapter X. the provisions of Art. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1971) Chapter X. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer.R. directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer. 9. HELD: No. 137 G. 1963. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. Petitioner. Reyes. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Sec. 9. and not by Sec. basing his action.

ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No.978. 83583-84 September 30. The Court of Tax Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P. 79 G. sooner or later. Footnote No. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subsidize the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit.303. and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. respectively. 9 FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974. HELD: Act No. 231. While we generally do not favor repeal by implication. Nos. Act No. 49 . for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by subsequent statutes. 2710.R.D. it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistency. 2710 should be applied in the case. Page 400. Case No. Negative statutes are mandatory. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. using RA 1435 as basis. Tuazon Case No. It is inevitable that. when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. then the proviso in Sec. the later must be given effect. The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide application. The respondent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery. Footnote No.50 and P424. ISSUE: W/N Act No.R. 1920) Chapter X. No. the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the miners because they are not directly convenienced. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon conviction. HELD: Yes.213 CIR vs. 436 and 711. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachronism. L-14957 (March 16. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause.64 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Valdez v. representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils. motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations as a mining concessionaire. Page 388. 111 G. 1991 Chapter X.33. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation. 2710 should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 49 FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife.

No. LATIN MAXIM: 1 FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. Sec. it is entitled to respectful consideration. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner. In December of the same year.O. 1905) FACTS: In 1919. L-34581 (March 31. According to Standard Oil Co. No. The court however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is. 49 . Grove Case No.R. 13 of G. wherever he may be in the Philippines. Castro. Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. 2. much less the archipelago. Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. LATIN MAXIM: 4. Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. No. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. only part of the price was paid. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting parties. a justice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest. L-2340 (December 21. so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run throughout the province.214 Estate of Mota v. 42 G. Concepcion Case No. On the last sale. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. ISSUE: 1. HELD: 1. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission. discharging the petitioner from detention. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. In 1920. 58. Due to contrary provisions. but it is not conclusive on the courts. the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish law.R. vs. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. were illegal and void. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. 2. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. 1932) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Torrente v. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property. 155 G. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the Philippines.

HELD: Sec. 10. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant’s act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. hence it was presumed valid. were charged with the violation of Sec. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a. Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution. A subsequent statute. 47. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. al. Page 33. himself an aspirant for the office. HELD: The vote was indecisive.R. Bohol. 2175 was no longer operative. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. 195 G. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. 200 G. The accused. the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque. No. legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. 49 . L-34854 (November 20. 148 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. Page 142. Sec. 39 of the ATL. which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. 61 FACTS: Respondent Fr. the supreme law. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the two. Footnote No.215 Pamil v. 1978) Chapter I. 37. 32. No such repugnance is discernible. et. Footnote No. Seven believed Sec. The petitioner. 7c. allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her consent. The ALRC suspended the ATL. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. tenants of Fernando. L-26551 (February 27. 43 FACTS: Almuete. Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Though the five were a minority. 7a.R. The section also admitted no exception. therefore there can be none. Also. Sec. Almuete Case No. 30a. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. ISSUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. 1976) Chapter IV. Teleron Case No. there was no longer any law punishing the act. No. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). 49 Minor Five: 6c. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. filed for Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Sec.

ISSUE: W/N Act No. On the other hand. 2625(d) of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment of Act No.216 Smith Bell & Co. The defendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares. L-33318 (December 20. 13(a) and 14 of C. implied repeal of statutes is not favored. 226. under both statutes. No. 71 G. 146. No. A general affirmative act will not be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. Furthermore. v.R. the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual. it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressly repealing Sec. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void.A. 2407 of the Administrative Code. 50 FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec.R. 148 G. 1972) FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 2625(d) the Administrative Code. No. If the legislature intended its repeal. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lechoco v. 3422. joint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. 38b . exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. LATIN MAXIM: 37. HELD: Authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. LATIN MAXIM: 37. Civil Aeronautics Board Case No. 3422 repealed Sec. L-32979-81 (February 29. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were. Municipality of Zamboanga Case No. Under RA 776.

38b. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplinary cases. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service. The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Villegas v. the construction will be against such repeal. 50 . 171 G. HELD: No. instead of to the President. suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. L-29827 (March 31. 4 of the Decentralization Act be given effect.R. 37 FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila.R. L-24012 & L. 172 G. No. Subido. 1965) FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other body.24040 (August 9. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Subido Case No. then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila. 1973) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villegas v.217 Villegas v. petitioner ignored the provision that the City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act. Enrile Case No. RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila. which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner. 5a. Furthermore. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled. HELD: No.

R. No. Page 406. 87 of Act No. 100 FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. HELD: No.” The executor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. 301 G.S. Sec. Page 411. 1916) Chapter X. 82 because of the clause in Sec. 171 G. He posits that Act No.” ISSUE: W/N Act No. having died before the testator so as to pass to the heirs.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 5939 (March 29. No. The construction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. 11 . then Sec. Nacianceno Case No. 758 would have no value and might as well have never been written which is an absurd interpretation.218 U. 1911) Chapter X. 82. 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “When a devise or a legacy is made to a child… and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator. Footnote No. 82. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act No. The petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. Footnote No. 38b FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 77 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Marin v. 2238 provides no penalty thus. Act No. 11002 (January 17. v. Repeals by implication are not favored. but the testatrix did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. 82 continues in force. Palacio Case No. leaving issues… such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done… unless a different disposition is required by law. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No. Act No. 87 of Act No. 18 that states “all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed.

No. Averia Case No.” shot Lozano during the performance of duty. 49 W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat. commenced a seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. 37 FACTS: Petitioner. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. the Acting Collector of Customs. Chief.O. .R. An altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. L-71855 (January 20. 1012 that it is only the “operational supervision and direction” over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal government. the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner. Philippine Constabulary Case No. “with deliberate intent and with intent to kill. The allegation that P. L-22526 (November 29. 1040.D. Page 412. 27. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. 194 G. Page 413. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than just the interest of a public official. 1966) Chapter X. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clear and precise provision of E. Footnote No.O. 20c.R. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act. 1040 is inaccurate. On the same day. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pacis v. Marges. Yes. 309 G. and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon. It has also caught the Supreme Court’s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the boat owner. 20c. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 4. No. Petitioner contends that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P. Anacorita. 1850 was repealed by E. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1988) Chapter X. The fishing boat therein was transferred to the Provincial Sheriff. No. HELD: 1. Averia. Under E. the alleged boat owner. 1040 & 1012. It is specifically stated under E. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. ISSUE: 3. 2.D. 105 FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules.O.O. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. filed a Civil Case for replevin alleging that the boat was stolen. it is the exercise of “administrative control and supervision” over units of the INP that was transferred to the President.219 Velunta v. HELD: Yes.

239 G. act or omission. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures. Footnote No. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compromise. AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent.” LATIN MAXIM: 6a. HELD: Yes. In Sec. It specifically states that “In the event of bankruptcy… of an employer’s business. 49 FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its remaining employees. thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. 1815 of the Civil Code. No. ISSUE: W/N Herman’s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement. appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. it mentions that whenever a party has. Page 414. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. et al.M. 108 FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Radio Inc.R. intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief. Two years after.R. 110 of the Labor Code provides for “worker preference in case of bankruptcy”. Cruz. 80593 (December 18. 1927) Chapter X. 107 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. Page 414. by his own declaration. 1989) Chapter X. Case No. any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding… such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. 123 G. Sec. HELD: No. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB. AMEX did not appeal but PNB. ISSUE: W/N Art. Hence. this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the employer. 26802 (July 15. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later expression of legislative will than Art.) agreed to merge. The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay. and Radio Corp. Radio Corporation of the Philippines Case No. No. it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of the traffic department. San Andres Development Corporation. Art. 49 .220 Herman v. as mortgage-creditor. his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wages. he cannot be permitted to falsify it. Footnote No. The petitioner herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.

50 . P. Page 413. 73 G. the same having been scheduled in May 1997”. hence. from income tax. ISSUE: 1. 1992) Chapter VII. 8 of the Constitution provides that. 81 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. Soon after. LATIN MAXIM: 1. R. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law.A. LATIN MAXIM: 1.A.D. No. 2. 10. Sec. Page 300. No. 10. Furthermore.R. Art. Subido. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposits previously given by P. which shall be determined by law. HELD: Yes. including all the retirement benefits given to officials and employees of private firms. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983. HELD: 1. such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. 1959. 105 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. R. 43.A. Footnote No. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away. 6679. W/N there was a violation of Art. Footnote No.D. The COMELEC’s basis is R. should be the one followed. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. 8 of the Constitution.D. 49 FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income. 1959 is a general law. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P. The deletion in P. Also in Villegas v.R. P. and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax. 95022 (March 23. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from income taxation. What the term of office of barangay officials is. Commission on Elections Case No. 5a.D. Court of Appeals Case No.D. the Supreme Court in Paras v. except barangay officials. 10. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can’t be deemed to be applicable to the employees’ trusts. 20a. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. ‘The term of office of elective local officials. 127116 (April 8. Sec.221 David v. Sec. 8 of the Constitution. it can’t repeal a specific provision impliedly. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in character can’t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. 9a. 2. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA 4917. Petitioner contends that P. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 1997) Chapter X. No.D. shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. 85 G.

notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 118 G. as amended. 108 G. the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case. “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Airlines Inc. respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. the employee must be reinstated to his former position.R. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. HELD: Yes.D. opining that P. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. the prosecution rested the cases. 9 and 10 of Art. after which period. P. No. 34 of RA 265. as amended by CB Circular 383. Case No. which provide that. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this court. 13 of the 1987 Constitution. If the suspension is otherwise extended. v.” ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject criminal case. Three years and six months after his suspension. At the time the order was issued by respondent judge.D. 1998) FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P. a law will always be presumed valid.R. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days. the respondent judge dismissed the case again. After presenting the evidence. Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality. Thereafter. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. The said resolution likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action taken by PAL. also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the RTC presided over by respondent judge. PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. 13b . respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. HELD: Yes. in relation to Sec. Leachon. Upon his reinstatement.D. A month after. 50 FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265. Jr.222 People v. 114307 (July 8. 108725-26 (September 25. 772. ISSUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension. No. 772 was still effective.

RA 1937 and 1125. and Jasaan. Case No. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods.223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does.D. 3570. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247. operate and maintain an electric light. the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Villanueva.R. 231) and pursuant thereto. demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P. 50 FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. and 6020 to install. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction – on the basis of the Judiciary Act – and not the Bureau of Customs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company. however. 127 G.D. whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. No provision in P. In case of conflict. vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws. on the other hand.R. Inc. the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 19. heat and power system in Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan. the Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of “all taxes of whatever authority” except 3% tax on its gross earnings. 31 G. Customs took custody of the shipment. HELD: No. special laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . 45355 (January 12. Opol. A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Joya v. Lantin Case No. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment. L-24037 (April 27. 1967) FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247. However. 3570 and 6020. No. No. The Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental. Also. provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.

The special law must prevail. 16. L-8500 (February 27. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition. grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. the latter prevails. demolished the houses of the six petitioners in this class suit. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120. it is the district health officer who should remove public nuisances. the City Engineer of Manila. under RA 409. 9 G. he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. No. whereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila. on the other hand. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. while Act 1120 is a special law. Aquino Case No. which are contrary to the Civil Code. has jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120’s full conveyance of the property to the widow. HELD: The City Engineer. was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Art. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: Respondent Aquino. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines.224 Arayata v. When a general and a special law are in conflict. Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code.R. 147 G. the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. 701 and 702. because their houses were “public nuisances” built on public streets and river beds. No. His widow. Sec. v. et al. 1928) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sitchon. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited. herein petitioner. disposition. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances. the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. argues that RA 409. Respondent. Joya as administrator. L-28067 (March 10. Joya Case No. 1956) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots. and transmission of friar lands. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. The Civil Code is a general law.R. and he started paying the Government for such.

which is more specific. Tormo. 2. Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife. being the guardian. 9c FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F. Subsequently. which still subsists. all surnamed Bellis.. Tormo. 1039 provides that the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent. in intestate or testamentary successions. Art. which is claimed to be conjugal property. A special guardian. Bellis Case No. referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. Relying on Art. al. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership. 32280 (March 24. who became mentally incapacitated. M. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law). filed a motion. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. which is general in character. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent. 14 G. 16. 1930) FACTS: Amos Bellis. et. 16. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children. No. was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. in the inventory of her property. 2. Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. Art. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. ISSUE: 1. the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements.R. Philippine Trust Co. praying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belonging to his ward. Thus. It is thus evident that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals. her undivided half of the conjugal property. which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wife’s property. As further indication of this intent. and Art. L-23678 (June 6. par. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Procedure. HELD: 1. HELD: Texas Law should apply. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. which did not provide for legitimes. After the execution of the decedent’s will. said half of the conjugal property. 1967) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Trust Co. a citizen of Texas USA. cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same. No. v. 123 G. which was later granted by the Court. the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . died. Macuan Case No. The defendant.. No. par 2. and 2) the Civil Code. the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children.225 Bellis v.R. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. LATIN MAXIM: 6b.

barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages.755.R.R. the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. 1991) Chapter X. 44007 (March 20. the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. L-7280 (January 20. it has already prescribed. No. American President Lines. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 153 G. Court of Tax Appeal Case No.00. Footnote No. Ltd. 50 . 75 G. and thus. 8.226 Tan Liao v. 50 FACTS: Private respondent. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circumstances. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner’s assessment without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of the goods. for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935 Constitution. HELD: No. and thereby. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal effect. pursuant to RA 808. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The legislative franchise was valid. 115 FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of P92. a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of the goods. USA to the port of Manila. Relying on the ruling in previous cases. with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York. the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and the corporation. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. No. HELD: Yes. the former being a special act while the latter is a law of general application. which included a tax exemption from the payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on its real property. Case No. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with Sec. Page 415. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed. Art.

LATIN MAXIM: 37. 242 must yield to P.D.D. granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes whereas P. 116 FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Page 415. No. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. the City Budget of Manila questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action. Footnote No.D.D. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies of the government including GOCC’s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. XXV Case No. However. Jr. HELD: Yes. v. 38b. Presiding Judge RTC Br. a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law.D. conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. On the other hand respondent invokes P. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez. 87 G. Also. The City Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. 72477 (October 16. 87119 (April 16. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power. Regardless of their date of passage.R. Petitioner contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case pursuant to P. HELD: No. Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984.227 NPVC v. claims and controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. 1991) Chapter X.R. since repeals by implication are not favored. P. 50 . No. 150 G. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes. cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. Civil Service Commission Case No. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city.

R. Case No. 1998) FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner. who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. 110 G. 9a. FACTS: Petitioner. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R.A. the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 50. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. 50 HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court. the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan. When vouchers were submitted to the mayor. which is claimed to have repealed Sec. L-16950 (December 22. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondent’s acceptance of the case for the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. . 36d. Pascual. 32. Valera Garcia v. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 75 of RA 926. His reason was RA 1551 has repealed Sec. Sec. 118 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case No. the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics.228 Manzano v. 122068 (July 8. Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts. Lastly. et al. LATIN MAXIM: 37. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. he did not want to approve them. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel. 1961) Chapter VI. Page 277. 80 G. Also. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. which is a law of special nature. was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed. No. Municipal Trial. No. the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor.R. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. Footnote No. Nueva Ecija. However. b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 38. otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. RA 1551 however. a junior typist civil service eligible. HELD: No.

Page 420. 40b. 49. Moreover. 49. 11a. Footnote No. b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 50 . and d) the ordinance would violate P. L-41631 (December 17. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes. 126 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Bagatsing v. Ramirez Case No. 1976) Chapter VI. 50 of Ordinance No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C. 17. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. fees or other charges” in particular. et al. Page 268. No. 548 and the Public Service Law. 28 G.A. L-23305 (June 30. No. 4986 is FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No.R. No. 11a. illegal. 7a. 83 FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. entitled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila. c) Sec. so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts. and For Other Purposes. the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code.” Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. Footnote No. and null and void.229 Lagman v. the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic. In regard therefore.” ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional. Case No. “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated.D. 4986. City of Manila. the Local Tax Code controls. ultra vires. 141 G. HELD: No. RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.R. 7522. 1966) Chapter X.

the maxim rules. Common error sometimes passes as current law. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. but so the law is written. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate. Communis error facit jus. Dura lex sed lex. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Regula pro lege. Things thus standing. 9. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. 7. Jus ars boni et aequi. does not by lapse of time become valid. Equity never acts in contravention of the law. 3. Law is the art of equity. The intention of the party is the soul. In default of the law. Ratio legis est anima legis. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 8. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. What is good and equal is the law of laws. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. sed ita lex scripta est. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Optimus interpres rerum usus. The written word endures. Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum. The law may be harsh but it is the law. 4. It is exceedingly hard. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Verba legis non est recedendum. OR DEPARTURE FROM. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law.230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Latin Maxims Chapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. Chapter III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. Speech is the index of intention. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Contemporary construction is strongest in law. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO. Littera scripta manet. The best interpreter of the law is usage. no explanation is required. si deficit lex. . Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. When the language of the law is clear. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. B. 5. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION 2. That which was originally void. Index animi sermo est. Hoc quidem perquam durum est. Animus hominis est anima scripti. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit.

and not the intent to the words. cessat et ipsa lex. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. When the reason of the law ceases. the judgment is the same. ratio autem generalia. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus. 15. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. Benignus leges interpretandae sunt. ) 16. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. 10. the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. Where there is the same reason. though the heavens fall. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. Like reason doth make like law. debent inservice. non e contra. Cessante rationi legis. cum de corpore constat. An argument drawn from a similar case. Lex injusta non est lex. 17. Where there is ambiguity. 14. Let right be done. statum generaliter est intelligendum. Quando verba statute sunt speciali. Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. ibi est eadem legis disposition. Concerning similars. exemption from rigid application of law is implied. Surplusagium non nocet. Nemo est supra legis.231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. so that their spirit and reason be preserved. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Falsa demostratio non nocet. Nobody is above the law. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. 13. De similibus idem est judicium. the law itself ceases. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat. That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. it should be read as the general expression. 11. Verba intentioni. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man’s work. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ubi eadem est ratio. inest haec exception. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent. False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. ruat coelum . An unjust law is not a law. The letter kills but the spirit gives life. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. When the words used in a statute are special. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Fiat justitia. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret. Qui haret in littera haret in cortice. . Ibi quid generaliter conceditur. si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. or analogy. but the purpose of the law is general. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. prevails in law. Laws are to be construed liberally. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. No power must be above the law. that nothing shall be contrary to law and right. there is the same law 12. quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Where anything is granted generally. Legis construction non facit injuriam.

Where the law does not distinguish. The law does not intend the impossible. Verba mere aequivoca. the rule is dissimilar. Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum. 21. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given. be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. Where there is a right. Verba artis ex arte. Noscitur a sociis. Ubi jus incertum. Ex necessitate legis. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit. Ubi jus. What cannot. 26. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. 27. Of the same kind or specie. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. the position of the defending party is the better one. prohibetur et per obliquum. 22. Summum jus. 19. Extreme law is often extreme wrong. In eo quod plus sit. By the necessary implication of law. Where the parties are equally at fault. summa injuria. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio.232 18. Chapter V – INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. . Ejesdem generis. C. talis intellectus preferendus est. An action does not arise from fraud. A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used. IN GENERAL 24. A general statement is understood in its general sense. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 23. The greater includes the lesser. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. there is a remedy for violation thereof. the courts should not distinguish. simper inest et minus. Ex dolo malo non oritur action. B. Of things dissimilar. Jus summum saepe. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. The law does not require an impossibility. In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis. IMPLICATIONS 20. ibi remedium. there is no right. 29. by law. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice. Where the law is uncertain. summa est militia. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. A thing is known by its associates. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according to their common and ordinary sense. ibi jus nullum. 25. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. Cui jurisdiction data est. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo. General words should be understood in their general sense. When jurisdiction is given.

Of the same matter. Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful.Times have changed and laws have changed with them. or let each be put in its proper place. Mutatis mutandis. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. 34. de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere. A person. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Argumentum a contrario. The express mention of one person. Referring each to each. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. . The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by itself. 39. With the necessary changes.233 30. B. 37. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Injustum est. Pari materia. PROVISOS. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. . The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Chapter VI – STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Reddendo singular singulis. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. . nisi tota lege inspecta. C. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. 33. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. 31. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. 32.

Lex de futuro. The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty.A new statute should affect the future. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Laws should be construed as prospective. Nullum crimen sine poena. 44. judex de praeterito. Potior est in tempore. for Janus has really no place in the laws. non respicit. IN GENERAL 46. IN GENERAL 40. There is no crime without a penalty. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received. Favorabilia sunt amplianda. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41.234 Chapter VII – STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chapter VIII – MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending. Salus populi est suprema lex. 48. et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in legibus. Chapter IX – PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES A. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. He who is first in time is preferred in right. not backward. the judge for the past. there is no penalty without a law. B.Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. An act done by me against my will is not my act. Leges quae retrospciunt. Lex prospicit. potior est in jure. The law aids the vigilant. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis. . non ad facta praeterita revocari. 43. Renunciation cannot be presumed. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. odiosa restringenda. nulla poena sine lege. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. not the past. Follow the law strictly. nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. 42. There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. The law looks forward. . The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. The law provides for the future. Strictissimi juris. not those who slumber on their rights. . Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. Nullum tempus occurit regi. not retrospective. Renunciatio non praesumitur. Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. B.

REVISION. The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red). REPEAL 49. The law does not concern itself with trifling matters. Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. De minimis non curat lex. it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often happens. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur. Generalia specialibus non derogant. 50. Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato. BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C.235 Chapter X – AMENDMENT. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est. aut quod plerumque fieri solet. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. When matters are obscure. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. . LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently. and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.

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