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Kevin Silke Lockheed Martin Astronautics Denver Tyrone Jackson The Aerospace Corporation El Segundo Key Words: Reliability program; Lessons learned; Reliability assessment; FMEA; Fishbone analysis; Fault tree analysis
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS The objective of the Atlas Reliability Enhancement Program (AREP) was to improve the Reliability of the Atlas IIA Launch Vehicle without degrading its performance. This objective was achieved by developing an electronically enhanced rocket engine, the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) RLlOE-1, for the Centaur Upper Stage. Less than three years after AREP began, the USAF terminated the program halfway through the test phase of the second developmental engine. Even though the program endedbefore a single RLlOE-1 engine was shipped, a legacy of lessons learned were indwelled in the experiences of the individuals who participated in the program. AREP was the first DoD launch vehicle program to operate under the new Acquisition Reform Initiative, which went into effect in June 1994. Under Acquisition Reform, acquisition processes are supposed to be based on measurable performance criteria. However, not every organization that participates in the development of a new system knows how to define a measurable performance criterion. That was the challenge facing Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) when it came time to implement a process to manage AREP Reliability risk. Knowing what LMA did for AREP provides insight for others wishing to define a performance-based Reliability Program. This paper is based on a technical report written by The Aerospace Corporation. The information in this paper is structured in a manner that facilitates communicating valuable lessons learned that are comprehensible to the novice and useful to the expert. The most frequently asked questions regarding the AREP Reliability Program are listed in chronological order. Following each question is an explanation of the pertinent analytical methods and results.
1. INTRODUCTION The need for the Atlas Reliability Enhancement Program (AREP) was identified in 199 1, following two consecutive mission failures of the Centaur Upper Stage rocket engine. Although the root causes of the two failures were positively identified and permanently "fixed", the incidents initiated a series of studies by the USAF, The Aerospace Corporation, LMA, and P&W into ways of enhancing confidence in the success of Atlas missions. In February 1993, AREP was first started when the USAF Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) awarded a contract to LMA to improve the performance and Reliability of Atlas IIA. At that time, the AREP objective was to enhance thirteen launch vehicle (LN) subsystems, including five functions of the RLlOA-4-1 Centaur engine. But budgetw constraints forced an early suspension of the program. LMA, the USAF and Aerospace worked out a prudent plan for conducting a series of studies to identify an optimal approach for downsizing the program. The studies showed that a significant reduction in the loss rate of the Centaur engine would achieve the greatest improvement in the Reliability of the L/V. Specifically, the studies identified the ignition, control, and chill-down subsystems as the engine functions that could be enhanced to provide the greatest improvement in L N Reliability. These three engine functions became known as the three AREP Initiatives, which would characterize what was designated the UlOE-1 engine (Reference 1). In October 1994, the AREP contract was rewritten to comply with the new Acquisition Reform Initiative, and the program was started-up a second time. Under acquisition reform, the L/V supplier, LMA, had the freedom to choose the methodology fix managing program risk. LMA chose to streamline program risk management with measurable progress criteria. That criteria included timely response to questions that The Aerospace Corporation frequently asks programs that are similar to AREP. These
0-7803-5143-6/99/$10.000 1999 IEEE 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium
2. 5. allowing trade studies of the possible options to define the specific direction using cost-effectiveness measures. Even though LMA was not required by the Air Force to document an AREP Reliability Program Plan. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2. defining design Reliability guidelines. LMA designated a Lead Reliability Engineer as the point of contact (POC) to support all of the AREP teams. identifying and assessing Reliability-related risks. Component. The working group defined the Reliability Program as the series o f tasks that were required to accomplish the following objectives: 1.3 How was the Reliability Program Planned? 8. LMA convened a Govemment/Contractor Reliability Working Group to define the process for allocating and predicting Reliability for the RLlOE-1 engine. This resulted in the following list of tasks and guidelines: a. This primelsubcontractor program plan was based on the concepts found in MIL-STD-1543A. This provided the most realistic estimates of component and subsystem reliabilities. Redundant designs and applicable design and safety margins were to be applied to new or modified components to the greatest extent feasible. Analyze the RLIOE-1 engine test data.1 engine by 7 1%. “The Reliability of the vehicle shall be improved without degrading performance. The AREP contract did not require that a formal Reliability Program Plan be written. and determine the optimal approach for modifying the design of the baseline engine to achieve the allocated loss rate goal for the RL 1OE. The AREP contract contained a single Reliability requirement. 6. and critical items list. 2. In lieu of a formal plan. c. Compare the RLlOE-1 engine predicted loss rate to the allocation loss rate goal to determine if the Reliability Program goal was met. This provided a “real world” baseline against 344 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium .fiequently asked questions facilitated the Customer’s understanding of the capabilities and effectiveness of the AREP risk management activities. By streamlining the AREP risk management process. and providing input to component and system design reviews. Reduce the expected demonstrated loss rate for the baseline RLlOA-4-1 engine by 71% and use that value for the allocated loss rate goal of the RLlOE1 engine. Calculate the demonstrated Reliability of the Atlas IIA based on launch experience up to December 1993. by using a factor derived fi-om the logarithmic ratio of the demonstrated to predicted Reliability for the baseline launch vehicle. 3. Reliability predictions. 7.1 How was the Reliability Program Integrated with the Systems Engineering Process? The AREP Reliability Program was functionally an integral part of the AREP Systems Engineering Integration Team and each RLlOE-1 Component Product Development Team. Construct a bottom-up Reliability model for the RLlOE-1 engine.and subsystem-specific historical flight and ground test data was to be used for calculating failure rates whenever possible.2 How were the Reliability Requirements DeJined? 4. a goal was established by the AREP Reliability Program to reduce the failure rate of the RL 1OE. The objective of process steps 1 through 6 was to produce an integrated AREP Reliability model. FMEA. Adjust the Reliability predictions for Atlas IIA to reflect the flow-down of its demonstrated Reliability. Apply proven techniques for managing the life cycle Reliability risk of the RLlOE-1 engine. such as requiring the Customer to approve the Reliability Program Plan.” This provided a general goal and direction for the program. bottom-up Reliability model. which to estimate the Reliability impacts of the launch vehicle I engine changes.1 engine. Calculate the relative improvement in design Reliability of the RLlOE-1 engine compared to the baseline RLIOA-4-1 engine. which was. Typical tasks performed by this POC included flowing down quantitative Reliability requirements. The component suppliers were to perform part stress derating analysis and part stress failure rate predictions. managing the integration of Reliability engineering tasks within the AREP Systems Engineering Process. LMA and P&W coordinated the creation of an RL10E-1 Rocket Engine Reliability Program Plan. and failure mode mitigation methods to verify that life cycle Reliability risk is adequately managed. b. LMA was able to dispense with many of the formalities in past LIV Reliability Programs. 2. Based on pre-AREP estimates of achievable improvements to the Reliability of the RLlOA-4-1 engine. 2 .
The flowed-down demonstrated Reliability of the RL lOA-4.5 What Methods were Used to Estimate the Demonstrated Reliability? 2. Test data would be used to veri@ the accuracy of the predictions and ensure that the program goal had been achieved. The selected methods are addressed in greater detail in the following sections. This ratio allowed the “marriage” of demonstrated and predicted Reliability data.3 13 was calculated fiom the logarithmic ratio between the Duane model and the vehicle Reliability prediction model.9683. Using the binomial distribution. as of the selected program cutoff date of December 1994. e.9884. The objective of this process was to produce an integrated AREP Reliability model to quantify the difference between the design reliabilities of the RLlOA-4-1 and RLlOE-1 rocket engines along with the changes in the vehicle subsystem predictions. and assembly levels. the demonstrated Reliability of Atlas IIA was calculated to be 92.221). using the following formula: 13.g. Each of the methods that were selected either supported quantifying the expected-demonstrated Reliability (e. a demonstrated-to-actual ratio of 6. E P&W used an independent methodology to assess the demonstrated reliability of the RLIOA-4-1 engine. the RL 10E-1 engine met its design Reliability goal because its mission critical loss rate was 71% lower than that of the RLlOA-4-1 engine.6 What Methods were Used to Estimate the Relative Improvement in Design Reliability? P&W estimated the RLlOE-1 engine mission loss rate to be 0.g.2y24) x 100% = 71% Therefore.221 losses p e r 100 missions 2.. Based on 13 mission failures in 80 Atladcentaur flights. P&W yielded a demonstrated Reliability of 0. Baseline = = - In (0.924 (down from 3. Folding P&W’s engine-level 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 345 .9683) 3. and Fault Tree Analysis). the selected methods provided high confidence in the assessment of the RL1OE. with full cooperation fiom design engineers. 2. Substituting the appropriate values into the above formula yields: %FR = ( 3*223. To determine the relative improvement in the AREP vehicle Reliability compared to that of the baseline Atlas IIA vehicle. per the formula: %FR = where: %F R [ x 100% = = = % reduction in AREP engine mission loss rate Ep Baseline engine demonstrated mission loss rate AREP engine expected demonstrated mission loss rate EA To estimate the demonstrated Reliability af Atlas IIA at the vehicle. was based on the relative usefulness of their outputs in achieving one or more Reliability Program requirements or goals. a conventional Duane model was built. MIL-STD-1629A Failure Mode. with an engine mission being defined as one engine operating over two burns. But LMA needed a relative Reliability improvement factor for the engine to apply to their Duane Reliability model for Atlas IIA. For the subsystem and assembly level estimates.. subsystem.1 engine was 0. They calculated the corresponding mission loss rate..4 What Rationale was Used to Select the Analytical and Empirical Methods? The rationale for selecting an analytical or empirical method for use in the AREP Reliability Program. This engine Reliability improvement factor was calculated by taking the ratio of the RLlOE-1 and RLlOA-4 mission critical loss rates. to ensure the mitigation of potential failure modes and that new and modified components would operate properly with all of the unchanged subsystems. For the vehicle-level estimate. Effects and Criticality Analysis. Relevant Technical Performance Measurements (TPMs) would be used to monitor the progress of the Reliability Program. including the RLl OA-4-1 engine. and realistic allocation of the vehicle-level demonstrated Reliability to the subsystems and assemblies. Failure mode assessments were to be performed as early as possible. fiom among the many methods available in the field of Reliability Engineering. and applying a 90% confidence bound. LMA applied the Duane Reliability Growth Model (Reference 2) along with standard reliability predictions. the Reliability prediction process in Figure 1 was applied.d. They calculated the RL 1OA-4-1 mission loss rate based on 2 failures in 166 Atlas and Titan engine missions. and MIL-HDBK-217 failure rate models) or supported qualifying the mitigated design risk (e.1 engine’s design Reliability and its impact on the Reliability of the Atlas IA I launch vehicle.1%. Together. MIL-HDBK-189 Duane Reliability Growth Model.
For the RLlOE-1 engine. instructions.. so as to influence its design Reliability and mitigate or eliminate the potential failure modes. reconfiguration. LMA estimated that the RLlOE-1 engine would reduce Atlas IIA mission failure probability by relatively 21%. controls. which is why the RLlOE-1 engine was included in this assessment as well. deductive process of a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) in identifying the potential failure modes with the compensating feature identification of the FMEA process. repair or preventive maintenance). P&W performed the standard Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) process illustrated in Figure 2 . which is based on MIL-STD-1629A (Reference 3). The analysis identified failure mode detection methods and compensating features to prevent. LMA performed an in-house developed type of failure mode assessment known as a Fishbone Analysis. LMA has found the Fishbone Analysis process to be advantageous in capturing system interaction and integration effects. replacement. The Compensating features included design features. The compensating features are documented on separate Disposition Forms which relate back to the fishbone diagram through the indentured numbering scheme.g. For the overall Atlas IIA vehicle. referring back the P&W FMEA for engine component compensating features and documenting separate dispositions for system issues. 2. The failure modes are documented using compact Cause and Effect diagrams (hence. tests. providing unique ID numbers for all of the fishbone diagram elements. operational corrective actions (e. Baseline Atlas Reliability Model Scaled Baseline Atlas Reliability Model P&W Assessed Engine Improvement Percentage (71%) I 1 Baseline Engine Failure Rate and Startup Failure Probability Reduced by Improvement Percentage I Figure 1. the name “Fishbone” Analysis. special inspections.1 What Methods were Used to Assess the Potential Failure Modes? Several methods were brought to bear in assessing the design risks. The Fishbone Analysis approach combines the top-down. AREP Reliability Modeling Process 346 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium . minimize or control failure effects. or other provisions. The objective of the FMEA was to identify and evaluate each mission critical failure mode of the engine.Reliability assessment into the vehicle-level Reliability model. LMA Reliability estimates also showed that the goals for all three AREP Initiatives had been met. All of the credible failure modes of each new AREP component design were analyzed to determine the consequences of those failures on the engine system operation. as the example in Figure 3 illustrates) rather than Fault Trees. as nothing more complex than an “OR” gate is required for these diagrams.
-.-._.-__Effects Analysis ode And --...6 / B.-.i Figure 2. B.ZPump mal duetoCDV 1 Improper thermal conditioning prior to MESZ due to.__.4 .__ ______ D F a i l u r e M --..-. I Leak B torch igniter suppiy port J a Gedrhox inability to transmit power Oxidizer pump back of adequate head rise due to.. -.._._..--. B..-.-- ..-...I Incorrect TCV whedulc of adequate ..1...l. -. Example Fishbone Diagram 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELlABlLllY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 347 .-..1.Z Incorrect CDV schedule .l Improper thermal conditioning prior to MES 1 due to4 Turbine lack of adequate power .-.--..Due to Centaur Propulsion Subsystem Failure of Turbopump Due to .-.-.. Figure 3._..- FMECA Planning Groundrules/Assumptions 1 Determine Potential Failure Modes Failure mode models System Safety Analysis Critical Items List Software Hazard Analysis Supportability Analysis Quality Planning Demonstration Testing Risk Management t FMECA Database Methods L. FMEA Process Flow FishboneNo: B I S March 1996 Originator: M Malinowskl & T .i Performance System Definition Functional models 4 Inputs To Other Tasks Change Process and test plans Drawings ._.
percentages Identify failure signatures (combinationsof software variables) used to initiate each detection and accommodation method I Ensure there are no conflicts among failure signatures andor outputs for detection and accomodation methods Figure 4. Table 1 compares the relative likelihood of RL10E-1 engine failure. P&W defined a design for the FUlOE-1 that incorporated an improved ignition system. new Electromechanical Actuators (EMA’s) controlled by an engine mounted Digital Electronic Rocket Engine Controller (DEREC).1 engine is U not always lower than that of the RLlOA-4-1 engine. which required software to detect the failures and reconfigure the system operation to accommodate those failures. Thus a Fault Tree Analysis resulted. Fault Detection & Accommodation Assessment Approach There was one additional analysis used to assess the design risks. as outlined in Figure 4. The RLlOE-1 electronic controller utilized a significant degree of redundancy in its design.Identify Fault Detection and Accomodation (FDA) Ensure all FDA modules in Software Design Document (SDD) are referenced by Validate €TA by ensuring all failure modes identified as redundant in the fault tree have effective detection and accomodation methods (and inverse.8 contribute most to the incidence of engine ignition failure: the Ignition System. Should any of these common cause failure modes occur prior to or during launch of the Atlas IIA. This list was used in evaluating all of the failure mode analyses to ensure that the possibility of common cause failure modes had been addressed and mitigated. particularly the Pre-launch Cool-down Check Valve (PLCDV). the non-actuating parts cf the valves. fiom concern about the lack of a formal method to verify that the Fault Detection & Accommodation (FDA) software for the engine controller could manage the fvst and second occurrences of faults within the RLIOE-1 engine. The FTA was used to identify all of the failure modes for which accommodation was possible. and the actuating parts of the valves with associated plumbing lines. an objective examination of the possible common cause failure modes shows that the relative likelihood of failure of the E 1OE. Having identified the apparent weakness of the RLIOA-4-1. due to common cause failure modes. 2. Several steps were then taken. to review the FDA methods to ensure that all of these failure modes were adequately addressed and that there would be no conflicts among the detection and accommodation methods. However. with that of the RLlOA-4-1 engine. a mission critical failure might be the outcome. for all single point failures) I . What were the Sources of Reliability Design Risk? P&W performed an exhaustive study to identify the sources of reliability design risk for the lU1OA-4-1 engine. and a simpler Propellant Flow System. Three functions were found to 348 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium .
1 and RL 1OA-4.Less cold sensitive plumbing lines 2. The AREP Reliability Program TPM was defined such that analytical progress could be confirmed and potentially deficient areas that could jeopardize meeting the Reliability requirement could be identified. Relative Likelihood of RL 1OE. or comparing the number of failure modes exercised by test versus the total number identified. This report describes evaluation criteria that are based on the assessment of process control indicators and the degree to which they are implemented as part of the supplier’s way of doing business. Although the test program was not completed. most of the measurable enhancement features of the engine were verified by test. However. The evaluation criterion that was applied to the AREP Reliability Program was derived from the then recently released Rome Laboratory technical report. “A Quality Process Approach to Electronics System Reliability” (Reference 4). 2. comparing the number of implemented critical item dispositions versus the total number recommended.Fewer plumbing lines Lower . such as.9 How were the Reliability Predictions Verified? Although full development testing of the RLlOE-1 engine had not been completed when the program ended. Figure 5 shows the profile of the calculated percentages of design Reliability improvement for the RLlOE-1 engine.Battery assembly unchanged No change .10 How was Reliability Risk Management Progress Measured and Monitored? Cause Failure Contamination Mistimed Command Fluid Leakage Fluid Blockage Excessive Vibration Over-Powered Under-Powered Over-Pressure Under-Pressure Over-Temperature Under-Temperatwe electrical parts Higher . For AREP. a Bayesian Analysis Method was used to combine the test data with the Reliability model results to ensure that the program goal was still achieved. To this end. a Pre-Test Declaration was written defining the conditions that would make a failure non-relevant. the identification of process control indicators was combined with an experiencebased conjecture that relates process quality levels with controlled actuators Lower .DEREC controlled actuator timing Lower . the tests were highly successfbl in verifying reliable engine operation with the M1 authority. The expected demonstrated Reliability f a the AREP engine was calculated iteratively with the progress of the design definition to measure the degree of success achieved at meeting the Reliability requirements.More heat sensitive electrical parts Lower .27% to 1. In retrospect.1 Engine Failure Compared To program compared to the RL10E-1 Reliability requirement. there were other TPMs that could have been used to track AREP Reliability Program progress.Table 1. The one consensus fact was that AREP was a Demonstration and Validation Phase Rocket Engine Program. this verification would have effectively required that the test program be completed without any relevant failures charged to the engine given the relatively small test 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 349 . Each member of The Aerospace Corporation evaluation team had to apply an evaluation criterion that did not direct the activities of LMA.EMA The difference between the demonstrated failure rate of the baseline engine and the predicted failure rate of the RLlOE-1 was the only Technical Performance Measurement (TPM) criterion used f a monitoring the progress of the AREP Reliability Program.67% between SRR and PDR resulted kom the downsizing of the AREP objectives. For verification of the numerical Reliability requirement. The RL10E-1 engine was scheduled for 134 test firing during four phases of development testing. 2. Only two phases of the development test were completed.EMA controlled actuators Higher .Fewer plumbing lines Higher . digital electronic control and fewer valves. The rather significant reduction in the delta Reliability improvement of the engine fiom 4. There were no prior success stories to refer to for guidance in evaluating the program.1 1 What Criteria did The Aerospace Corporation Use to Evaluate the AREP Reliability Program? Acquisition Reform was a brand new concept when AREP started in 1994. Since this was a development test program.Battery assembly unchanged Lower .More electrical Parts No change . this required defining criteria on the relevance of any test failures to a flight configuration.
DEMONSTRATION& VALIDATION PHASE RELIABILITYANALYSIS & RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION CRITERIA Reliability predictions are based on Customer's experience with the performance of existing comparable equipment.. Reliability models are based on FMEA. which is conducted to identify critical functional failure modes.. the AREP Reliability Program had a quality factor rating of 1.0. Definitionof design/applicationcriteria is complete. Fault detection and accommodation approaches are defined but not related to critical parameters and functions. Expected operating environment including maintenance is defined and is traceable to Customer's mission description. etc.. Analyses are not updated with design change data or development test results. One or two key system reliability parameters (e. Analyses are updated with design change data and development test results. Analyses are updated with design change data but not all development test results are included. etc. Analyses are updated with design change data and development test results. Reliability models are based on FMEA. Lessons learned data are available (e. derating. environmental sensitivity.the types and phases of risk mitigation activities to arrive at the evaluation criteria in Table 2. and developmenttest results are not included. which is the highest rating for a Demonstration and Validation Phase Rocket Engine Reliability Program. Lessons learned data are not available. etc. This can only be achieved through careful planning and tracking of the Reliability Program activities. which is conducted to identify critical items and functional failure modes. Fault detection and accommodationapproachesare not defined. which is conducted along with other faulWailure analysis methods to identify critical items and functionaVhardwarefailure modes. Expected operating environment including maintenance is defined and traceable to Customer's mission description.g. Analyses are updatedwith incompletedesign change data. manufacturing process. Reliability predictions are based on comparisons to current performance of existing comparable equipment. Several key reliability parameters are not defined and engineering rationale for expected improvements is weak. Processing of critical items is tracked and proper disposition of each item's risk is verified. Reliability models are based on FMEA. derating.g. fatigue. false alarm rate. Definition of design/application criteria is incomplete. Reliability predictions are based on comparisons to current performance of existing comparable equipment..). life. AREP Reliability Program Evaluation Criteria. etc. environmental sensitivity.. derating. Lessons learned data are available (e..g.g. CONCLUSION Based on the evaluation criterion that was applied by the Aerospace Corporation.) Expected operating environment including maintenance is not traceable to Customer's mission description. LMA and P&W did show that Acquisition Reform was indeed a value-added concept that could be implemented with the highest quality results. Expected operating environment including maintenance is defined and traceable to Customer's mission description. Fault detection and accommodation approaches are defined and related to critical parameters and functions. which is conducted along with other fault/failure analysis methods to identify critical itemdparameters and functionallhardware failure modes.).) are not defined. etc. fatigue.g. Lessons learned data are partially available (e. Although AREP was terminated prior to verifying the flight Reliability of the RL10E-1 rocket engine. Such a high quality factor translates into a high level of confidence in the analytical and deterministic results produced by the program. All key system reliability parameters (e. etc. manufacturing process. environmental sensitivity. life. Clear engineering rationale is provided for all expected improvements.g.) are defined. Reliability predictions have limited relevance to current performance of existing comparable equipment. Reliability predictions have no relevance to current performance of existing comparable equipment. Expected environment including maintenance is not traceable to Customer's mission description. Table 2. manufacturing process. false alarm rate. Only a few key reliability parameters are defined and engineering rational for expected improvements is weak. Definition of design/applicationcriteria is complete. Reliability models ate not based on FMEA.). derating. Definition of design/application criteria is complete. Processing O critical items is tracked but proper disposition of each item's risk is f not verified. 350 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium . Lessons learned data are available (e. Processing of critical items is not tracked. FMEA or similar analyses not conducted to i d e n t i critical functional failure modes. Clear engineering rationale is provided for all expected improvements. Fault detection and accommodation approaches are partially defined and not relatedto critical parameters and functions. No key reliability parametersand design/application criteria are defined. 3. environmental sensitivity.
launch vehicles. and has published several papers on Reliability analysis and management techniques. Previously. he has worked for Hughes Aircraft Company. Van Lerberghe. Technical Performance Measurement for AREP Reliability REFERENCES 1. “Enhanced Reliability Features of the RLlOE. Mr.1629A. 1981. fault tree analysis. Washington D.C. 3342 & 72. His technical skills include creation of software for specialized solutions to Reliability and statistical problems. Kevin Silke (Presenting Author) Lockheed Martin Astronautics P. he initiated procedures to integrate Reliability Engineering with the System Engineering Process. M41987 El Segundo. Department of Defense..Jackson@aero. Effects and Criticality Analysis. Emdee. Previously. and Monte Carlo Analysis.58 Demonstrate CDR SRR PDR Time + Qualification AREP Milestones Figure 5 .” Rome Laboratory. “Reliability Growth Management. event sequence analysis. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.O. He has over ten years experience in Reliability Engineering and Risk Analysis and has degrees in Electrical Engineering and Business Management. CO 80201 Phone: (303) 977-9577 Fax: (303) 977-4373 E-mail: Kevin. BIOGRAPHIES Tyrone Jackson (Correspondence Author) The Aerospace Corporation 2350 E. and NASA operated high-energy ground research facilities. 1980.55 ’ *% 1. Box 179 Mail Stop B2100 Denver. L.1 Engine”.. He has almost twenty years experience in Reliability Engineering applications and research. common cause failure analysis.” MIL-STD. R. H e is a member of the IEEE Los Angeles Chapter and has served on AIAA and SAE G-11 subcommittees. he worked for General Dynamics and Safety Factor Associates. Kevin Silke is the Lead Reliability Engineer for the Atlas Program at Lockheed Martin Astronautics. R. El Segundo Blvd.I Analysis Analysis Analysis UpdatedAnalysis As Necessary To Support Design Changes i L b 1 % = 4. W. Foust. Proceedings 1997 International Astronautical Federation Symposium.Silke@LMCO. TRW.27 ’ Anticipated Updates I ’ % = 1. 1999 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 351 . pp. His risk assessment talents include Reliability modeling and Reliability data analysis. November 1993. “A Quality Process Approach To Electronic System Reliability: handbook Procedure. Jackson received a BSEE degree from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1980.org As a member of the technical staff in the Reliability and Quality Department of The Aerospace Corporation. and General Dynamics. “Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode. Inc. He has spent his entire professional career in Reliability and Risk Assessment of spacecraft.” MIL-HDBK-189. failure/success database development. 3.C. Mr. At each of these companies. M. Bayesian data analysis. 2. uncertainty analysis. Tyrone Jackson is responsible for evaluating contractors’ Reliability analyses and advising system program offices on cost-effective management of Reliability Engineering activities. RL-TR-93-209. CA 90245-4691 Phone: (310) 336-6170 Fax: (310) 336-6914 E-mail: Tyrone. Washington D. He has developed a number of Reliability software tools. 4.com Mr. J. Department of Defense.
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