No.

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In The Supreme Court of the United States
IN RE CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK IN ESSE PETITIONER WITH SCOTUS RULE 20 FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH QUO WARRANTO INQUEST

OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS Jr., DE FACTO JUSTICE ELENA KAGAN, DE FACTO JUSTICE SONIA SOTOMAYOR, DE FACTO SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES NEAL KATYAL AND DE FACTO ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES ERIC HOLDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF VOLUNTARY RECUSAL FROM HEARING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN SCOTUS NO. 10-1170, AND OR THAT EACH IS CHALLENGED IN QUO WARRANTO TO PROVIDE PROOF OF AUTHORITY TO SERVE BY THE VOID AB INITIO ACTS OF BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA II RATHER THAN JOSEPH R. BIDEN WHO MUST SHOW CAUSE TO SERVE.

Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse Petitioner w/o being an attorney 593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281 Brooklyn, New York 11238 Cell-845-901 -6767 ; chris@strunk.ws

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Respondents John-Joseph: Forjone in esse H. William Van Allen in esse c/o 351 North Avenue Hurley, New York 12231 Chief Justice John G. Roberts De facto Justice Sonia Sotomayor De facto Justice Elena Kagan at One First Street NE, Washington, DC 20543. Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito Associate Justice Clarence Thomas Associate Justice Antonin Scalia Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at One First Street NE, Washington, DC 20543. Barack Hussein Obama II at The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington D.C. 20500 Joseph R. Biden Jr. at The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington D.C. 20500 De facto Attorney General Eric Holder U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Ronald C. Machen Jr.
De facto U.S. Attorney for Washington D.C.

United States Attorney's Office 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 De facto Solicitor General Neal Katyal Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530 Solicitor General of the United States Room 5614 Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20530-0001 Solicitor General of the State of N.Y. Office of Attorney General of New York The Capitol Albany, New York 12224-0341 James E. Long, Esq. Bar Roll No. 506898 668 Central Avenue Albany, New York 12206

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Table of Contents Page Petitioner’s Affidavit in support of relief ……………………………...............................1 Respondents Concurring Declaration in support of relief …………………................13 Relief Requested: A Writ of Prohibition with Quo warranto inquest of Chief Justice John Roberts, de facto Justice Elena Kagan, de facto Justice Sonia Sotomayor, de facto Solicitor General of the United States Neal Katyal, de facto Attorney General of the United States Eric Holder, and de facto U.S. Attorney for Washington District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen Jr. in the absence of voluntary recusal from hearing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in SCOTUS No. 10-1170. SCOTUS Rules: SCOTUS Rule 20. Procedure on a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ SCOTUS Rule 33. For petitions with 8.5 inch by 11 inch paper format Cases:

McCreery's Lessee v Somerville 22 US 354 (1824)………………………………………2 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968)………………………………………………..11 United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985) Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing cases)………………... Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425, 6 S.Ct. 1121 (1886). ………………………… . People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 399 (1990) ("An unconstitutional law 'confers no
right, imposes no duty and affords no protection. It is *** as though no such law had ever been passed," quoting People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 394 (1932), in turn citing Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 176 (1911), in turn citing Norton, 118 U.S. 425, 30 L. Ed. 178, 6 S. Ct. 1121). Thus, under the Norton rule, an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio, i.e., void "from the beginning." See Black's Law Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004).

Perlstein v. Wolk, Ill S.Ct., February 17, 2006
Ineligibility of officer is insufficient ground for refusal to administer the oath. People v. Dean, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 438 iii

Failure due to another, where failure to take the oath within the time prescribed is due to the refusal of the officer designated to administer it the office does not become vacant. State v. Kraft, 20 Or. 28, 23 Pac. 663. Oath does not confer office. A candidate without even a prima facie right to municipal office cannot give himself the right to the office by taking the oath. Walker v. Quillian, 118 Ga. 152, 44 S.E. 987. Path—failure to take oath within prescribed time renders office vacant. Douglas v. Essex Co., 38 N.J. L. 214: Branham v. Long, 78 Va. 352; People v. McKinney, 52 N.Y. 374. A person elected to office… who failed to take the oath prescribed by statute, never obtained title to the office. Hayter v. Benner, 67 N.J.L. 359, 52 Atl. 351. Statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1 Number of justices; quorum. The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum. 28 USC §144 Bias or prejudice of judge. Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 453. Oaths of justices and judges. Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: “I, XXX XXX, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice

without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as XXX under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”
28 USC §455 (a) Any justice… of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary iv

facts concerning the proceeding; (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary…has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household. 28 U.S.C. § 459. Administration of oaths and acknowledgments. Each justice or judge of the United States may administer oaths and affirmations and take acknowledgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Writs (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. Washington DC Code Chapter 35 Article 16 Section 3503 Refusal of Attorney General or United States attorney to act: If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the United States, on the relation of the interested person on his compliance with the condition prescribed by section 16-3502 as to security for costs…………………………………………………………………………,4,5,12 United States Constitution U.S. Constitution Article II Section 1 Clause 5………………………………..……...2,3,5 U.S. Constitution Article VII Twenty-fifth Amendment Section 4 (1967)………..iv,2 New York State Constitution New York State Civil Rights Law Chapter 6 Article 2 Section 2...............................

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Questions Presented: 1. Does Chief Justice John G. Roberts have a conflict of interest and not hear SCOTUS 10-1170, must show cause why he is not a material witness to the scheme to defraud by BHO et al. filed in New York State Supreme Court in

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. in the County of Kings Index No. 6500-2011?
2. Does de facto Justice Sonia Sotomayor have a conflict of interest must not hear SCOTUS 10-1170, must show cause why he is not a material witness to the scheme to defraud by BHO et al. filed in New York State Supreme Court in

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. in the County of Kings Index No. 6500-2011?
3. Were Barack Hussein Obama II (BHO) acts Void ab initio because BHO is ineligible for POTUS in conflict with U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5 as BHO’s birth where ever that may have been on August 4, 1961 is to natural father who is a British subject on a student visa married to Stanley Ann Obama? 4. Are de facto officers appointed by BHO to show cause why they may serve without a conflict of interest with Affirmant and SCOTUS No. 10-1170? 5. Must BHO in a Quo Warranto proceeding show cause why he has authority as POTUS rather than Joseph R. Biden Jr. under the 25th Amendment Section 4? 6. Should de facto Justice Sotomayor show cause why having heard seven cases while in the Second Circuit she should not recuse for hearing SCOTUS 10-1170? 7. Would legal malpractice issue as to Chief Justice Roberts, de facto Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Defacto Solicitor, Attorney General and U.S. Attorney would issue if any were to proceed as to the Writ of Certiorari SCOTUS No. 10-1170?

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To the Honorable Associate Justices: Stephen G. Breyer; Samuel A. Alito; Clarence Thomas; Antonin Scalia; Anthony Kennedy; and Ruth Bader Ginsburg supervising the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

IN RE CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK IN ESSE PETITIONER WITH SCOTUS RULE 20 FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH QUO WARRANTO INQUEST
STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ) ) ss. )

Accordingly, I, Christopher Earl Strunk, being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: 1. Affirmant is a petitioner for Writ of Certiorari signed March 9, 2011 by H. William Van Allen, John-Joseph Forjone, Christopher-Earl Strunk and presents this affidavit as a certificate of good faith within the intent and meaning of 28 USC 144 and 28 USC 455(a) 28 USC §1651 for the recusal of Chief Justice John Roberts, and de facto Justice Elena Kagan and de facto Justice Sonia Sotomayor as well as the de facto U.S. Solicitor General Neal Katyal, de facto Attorney General Eric Holder de facto U.S. Attorney for Washington District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen Jr. from participation except as respondent parties-in-interest in an inquest hearing and or in the SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari No. 10-1170 as a matter of personal bias in an extra judicial forum of impropriety in a matter that

AFFIDAVIT – In Re: Christopher-Earl: Strunk Petition Page 1 of 12

may appear before each in the matter of the questionable eligibility of Barack Hussein Obama II to serve as POTUS and of Chief Justice Roberts aiding and abetting the usurpation of the POTUS office along with those similarly situated since January 20, 2009 as a material witness. 2. Respondent John Glover Roberts, Jr. is the 17th and current Chief Justice of the United States (Chief Justice Roberts). He has served since 2005, having been nominated by President George W. Bush after the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 3. Respondent Barack Hussein Obama II (Respondent Obama) was the 2008 Democratic Party candidate for President of the United States (POTUS) without being eligible under U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5, as his natural father, Barack Hussein Obama Sr., was a British Subject with a student Visa at the birth August 4, 1961 by his minor aged U.S. Citizen mother Stanley Ann Obama, and as such according to the SCOTUS opinion in McCreery's Lessee v Somerville 22 US 354 (1824) that explains the difference between a Natural-born and Native-born U.S. Citizen as is to be applied with U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5, Barack Hussein Obama and all the names he uses is not a Natural-born citizen and by his own allegation only a native born-citizen therefore is not eligible to POTUS. 4. That Respondent Chief Justice Roberts before administering the oath of office for POTUS on January 20, 2009, met with the Associate Justices of the SCOTUS, presumably to discuss the pending oath taken by a person ineligible for POTUS. 5. That Respondent Obama being ineligible illegally took the oath of office after Noon on January 20, 2009 at 12:05 pm, and failed to timely take the Oath of office

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as administered by Respondent Chief Justice Roberts. 6. The Oath mandated by the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Clause 8
(1)

was botched in its delivery by Respondent Chief Justice Roberts who said the oath incorrectly, while Respondent Obama paused and gave Chief Justice Roberts an opportunity to correct it. The Chief Justice Roberts said it wrong a second time, in another way. Then Respondent Obama repeated the incorrect first version of the oath; and because the oath was incorrect, the next day, at 7:35 pm in every report Affirmant could find, Respondent Obama and Respondent Chief Judge Roberts repeated the oath in private on January 21, in the White House Map room. 7. That Affirmant Petitioner is the only person in the United States of America (USA) to have duly fired fired fired BHO on January 23, 2009 (see Exhibit 1) served by registered mail; thereby rendering BHO the USURPER to the POTUS; and as Petitioner is now entitled to characterize BHO as. 8. That Respondent Obama was fired on the grounds that he had admitted that he was not eligible for POTUS by the admission that his natural father is a British Subject on a student visa, making BHO a Native-born citizen at best if born within the full and complete jurisdiction of the USA, we do not know; and therefore, BHO is ineligible to be the administrator / trustee of Plaintiff’s private account at the U.S. Treasury as required by U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 clause 5, that as

Article II Section 1 Clause 8. Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

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a Replevin matter pending to be resolved in the District of Columbia along with all BHO’s acts as the Usurper from January 20, 2009 heretofore are void ab initio (2). 9. That May 20, 2009 Affirmant provided due notice to then U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor for Washington D.C. and present de facto Attorney General Eric Holder, shown in Exhibit 1; and that Respondents Holder and BHO forced the de jure U.S. Attorney of Washington DC to resign in order for the Usurper to replace that U.S. Attorney Office with the present de facto U.S. Attorney for Washington District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,; and together Respondents Holder, Machen and Katyal act in concert for the Usurper without responding to Affirmant’s application for a Quo Warranto inquest with DC Code Chapter 35 Article 16 Section 3502. 10. That Affirmant is the interested person required with DCC Chapter 35 §163503: meets the condition (2) that the Usurper’s demurer Letter of August 2009 (see Exhibit 2), in which Respondent Obama pleads the special general issue of

separation of powers doctrine; and that as a matter of law did not deny the facts
presented in the petition shown as Exhibit 1, and in that Affirmant - fired the Usurper on January 22, 2009, making his dual allegiance issue at birth with a

Ab Initio - prep. Latin phrase meaning "from the start"; literal meaning being something done 'from scratch'. In legal parlance it stands from: 1.) if any legal agreement is void ab initio then it stands null and void from the very beginning of its intended existence and not just from the instant its declared as void. 2.) if a person enters onto someone's private property (real estate) by authority of law but later maltreats that authority then he becomes a trespasser ab initio.
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majority age British subject father on a student visa an undisputed fact, and as a matter of law is not eligible for the Office of President contrary to U.S. Constitution Article II Section 1 Clause 5, a copy of the Petition Memorandum annexed; meets the condition (3) the law requires a declaratory judgment as to the finding on those facts only absent further discovery; and (4) that Affirmant with DCC Chapter 35 §16-3544 is ready for the inquest and Affirmant waives a jury for a bench trial. 11. That Respondent Obama’s appointments of Respondents: Eric Holder, Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, Neal Katyal Ronald C. Machen Jr. among others are a nullity and void ab initio. 12. Affirmant has a duty to make this petition to protect a judicial right against any waiver that may without application accrue; and that Affirmant has a direct injury ongoing here in Brooklyn New York involving de facto Justice Sonia Sotomayor as a 2nd Circuit Judge that from no later than 2004 since January 20, 2009 with Chief Justice John Roberts and Sotomayor are material witnesses to the Complaint filed by Affirmant in New York State Supreme Court in the County of Kings with Index No. 6500-2011 in the matter of a scheme to defraud Plaintiff along with those similarly situated as voters in New York state filed on March 22 2011 (see copy of blue back page Exhibit 3); and duly served upon Respondents Obama and Biden on Thursday March 31 2011 by a third party server whose affidavit is herewith (see Exhibit 4), and as with the questionable appointment of de facto Justice Elena Kagan is sufficient cause for their consideration with 28 USC §144 and §455 to recuse from hearing the SCOTUS petition No. 10-1170, and in which

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Affirmant is a petitioner therein also being effected and must be excluded from hearing the matter of a writ of prohibition with quo warranto inquest too. 13. That Respondents Chief Justice Roberts, de facto Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, as well as the de facto U.S. Attorney for Washington DC, de facto Attorney General Holder and de facto Solicitor General are material witnesses to the malice by Respondent Obama. 14. That Affirmant has conferred in the petition herein with Petitioners Van Allen and Forjone in the SCOTUS petition No. 10-1170 and that both state hereafter agreement with Affirmant’s allegations and demand, state by their declaration attached, and have designated that Affirmant support this motion to recuse from hearing the Strunk et al v Thomas J. Spargo et al Petition for Writ of Certiorari SCOTUS No. 10-1170. 15. That Affirmant heard credible allegations during the 2005 confirmation process for Chief Justice Roberts that surfaced that John G. Roberts is possibly a member of OPUS DEI the secular organization established by the Jesuit Order in 1928; and the allegations are that John G. Roberts is a member of Opus Dei that was the subject raised during the confirmation proceeding were never answered: http://www.charm.net/~profpan/2005/07/is-judge-roberts-opus-dei.html 16. In the context of such disturbing unanswered allegation during the 2005 confirmation hearing, which is bad enough in itself, in that the OPUS DEI member oath is to exclusively serve the Vatican State over any other commitment or allegiance, Affirmant was also notified of the disturbing posting by agents of

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Congressman Ron Paul at http://dailypaul.com/154751/slush-fund-of-top-politiciansfound-at-vatican-bank-obama-clinton-roberts-legatus-split (3) 17. That on February 3, 2011, Affirmant confronted the outrageous posting by agents of Representative Ron Paul to either retract the allegation otherwise

without support or investigate the claim, as Mr. Paul is on the House Banking Committee with subpoena power to investigate accordingly; and that to date there has never been a response to what Affirmant requested as follows quote: “Ron Paul duty to authenticate the allegations or remove the post Submitted by Chris Strunk on Thu, 02/03/2011 - 16:20. Mr. Paul Sr. as a member of the House Banking committee having been a Presidential candidate in 2008 has a duty to advance an immediate investigation of the allegations included herein the "Slush Fund" post. Especially since Media reports from the 2008 campaign cycle (supported by actual fines levied by the FEC against BHO and his finance committees) allege that BHO had received large sums of campaign funds from foreign sources during the campaign that were never reported.

Slush fund of top politicians found at Vatican Bank, Obama, Clinton, Roberts? Legatus split! Submitted by ACinMA on Wed, 01/19/2011 - 21:22 in Politics & Law What do you think? Slush fund of top politicians found at Vatican Bank, Obama, Clinton, Roberts? Legatus split!
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Slush fund accounts of major US politicians identified and seized at Vatican Bank (Rome). Connection established with Daniel Dal Bosco RICO indictment, which cites Giancarlo Bruno, Silvio Berlusconi & Ban Ki Moon. On Wednesday 5th January 2011, it emerged that US establishment-related slush fund accounts had been located in, and seized from, the Vatican Bank in Rome. The source of funds for these accounts in almost every instance was found to be the US Treasury. Beneficiaries of the covert Vatican accounts include Barack Obama, Michelle Obama and each of the Obama children, Michelle Obama’s mother, all the Bushes and the Clintons, including Chelsea Clinton, Joe Biden, Timothy Geithner, Janet Napolitano, several US Senators, including Mitch McConnell, several US Congressmen including John Boehner, several US Military Chiefs of Staff, the US Provost Marshal, the US Judge Advocate General, the US Supreme Court Chief Justice, John Roberts, several US Judges, the Pope, and several cardinals. Big money was found in each of the accounts. Cont: http://seeker401.wordpress.com/2011/01/17/bob-chapman-newsle...

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Further allegations that Chief Justice Roberts and others within the Congress and Executive also maintain an account is terribly troubling especially since many of those listed are active supernumeraries of Opus Dei and as such makes those members that are also in government service and elected officers agents of the sovereign Vatican State a huge conflict of interest. It is my understanding from actual testimony of Vatican Bank representatives that the Vatican Bank's IOR is a limited depository institution, that is not open to the public in the sense that the depositors are essentially limited to Vatican State employees, members of the Holy See, religious orders, and persons who deposit money destined, at least in part, for works of piety. However, it has been proven in the Federal civil case GEORGE DALE et. al. v. EMILIO COLAGIOVANNI et al. (SDMS) 3:01-cv-00663-WHB-LRA, that there was the use of the Vatican Bank / IOR as a straw-man for conducting money laundering and insurance fraud in the United States. That the deposition of Thomas A. Bolan on July 19, 2004 (see http://www.vaticanbankclaims.com/dale.pdf ) shows that the Vatican Bank and IOR cooperate with investors as a straw-man to conduct business for persons who deposit money, "at least in part" for works of piety - are proven in the civil case to fit money laundering and other RICO predicates that form a corrupt enterprise; and were they involved in financing the BHO 2008 campaign is a serious international scandal up with Oil for Food and the BCCI matter of money laundering associated with the collapse of Franklin National Bank in the early eighties. Mr. Ron Paul must respond immediately to this post and to the followup letter of demand to be sent registered mail. Sincerely yours, Chris Strunk ( chris@strunk.ws )” 18. In support of clear and convincing evidence of why Respondent Obama, and defendants in the Complaint shown on the caption with Exhibit 3, John S. McCain and Roger Calero are not eligible for POTUS either, because of dual allegiance or birth in a foreign nation outside the full and complete jurisdiction of the United States of America, and why most lawyers do not get the natural-born-citizen and dual allegiance matter that is an ongoing matter of malpractice. Affirmant based upon information received, believes that with the exception of Tulane University, which offers an option because Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction –adopted from Affidavit in re: Christopher-Earl: Strunk Petition Page 8 of 12

their French roots, all other law schools teach the common law of England. 19. That every state of the several states, except Louisiana, has adopted the common law of England by constitutional provision or statutory act. As such, all attorneys learn the common law of England. That presents a big problem; the United States has never adopted the common law of England. While many terms used in the constitution were also part of the common law of England, there was no such thing in that law regarding a natural-born citizen. The closest was a naturalborn subject. As such, these attorneys conflated the two terms. 20. The people who really knew what a natural-born citizen is were those who dealt with foreign relations. –After all, being identified as a natural-born citizen really doesn’t have any distinct purpose while within the U.S., save that of being President. It does, however, have great importance in terms of foreign relations. 21. In regards to U.S. Foreign relations: A natural-born citizen, being born on U.S. soil, of parents who were both citizens, means that no other country can obligate you to allegiance. By the Law of Nations, the law voluntarily adopted by all civilized nations in order to resolve disputes, no other country can require you to join their military. Those who are born of parents who are not citizens acquire the condition of their father by inheritance of blood. –Even if born on U.S. soil, they have, by jus sanguinis, a dual character. They can be claimed by two countries. 22. Chief Justice John Jay knew what he was doing when he suggested to General Washington that only a natural-born citizen should hold the position of Commander-in-Chief. It was the only way that no other power could legally require

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the services of the President, as seen provided by BHO with dual allegiance. 23. As early as 1862 representative John Bingham acknowledged congressional plenary authority over citizenship and the constitutional restraints on those powers, stating: “ All from other lands, who by the terms of [congressional] laws and a compliance with their provisions become naturalized, are adopted citizens of the United States; all other persons born within the Republic owing allegiance to no other sovereignty, are natural born citizens… [There is] no exception to this statement touching natural-born citizens except what is said in the Constitution relating to Indians. 37 CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE 1639 (1862).” 24. The Representative Bingham’s statement is significant because it confirms congressional plenary authority over citizenship and that the doctrine of which Rep. Bingham again in 1872 confirms. “Mr. BINGHAM. If the gentleman will only let me go on I will answer all his questions. As to the question of citizenship I am willing to resolve all doubts in favor of a citizen of the United States. That Dr. Houard is a natural-born citizen of the United State there is not room for the showdown of a doubt. He was born of naturalized parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, and by the express words of the Constitution, as amended to-day, he is declared to all the world to be a citizen of the United States by birth.” And further should we consider Rep. Bingham’s testimony reliable? Here is what Justice Hugo Black (a former U.S. Senator from Alabama) said in 1968: “Instead of relying on this kind of negative pregnant, my legislative experience has convinced me that it is far wiser to rely on what was said, and most importantly, said by the men who actually sponsored the Amendment in the Congress. I know from my years in the United States Senate that it is to men like Congressman Bingham, who steered the Amendment through the House, and Senator Howard, who introduced it in the Senate, that members of Congress look when they seek the real meaning of what is being offered. And they vote for or against a bill based on what the sponsors of that bill and those who oppose it tell them it means.” -Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 Supreme Court 1968…” Affidavit in re: Christopher-Earl: Strunk Petition Page 10 of 12

And here is what Henry Fletcher (who established the Minnesota Law Review) had to say in 1919 about citizenship and allegiance as published in the Atlantic Monthly – (1919) “OUR DIVIDED COUNTRY” by Henry J Fletcher: “Our country furnishes many examples of that curious phenomenon, double allegiance. All persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are declared by the Constitution to be citizens. This is true of the children of non-naturalized aliens domiciled here. But the children of aliens have the same nationality as their parents, according to the laws of nearly all foreign countries, and such children are therefore subject to a double allegiance. In this way, if a German living in this country chooses not to accept the citizenship which we so generously urge upon him, his children born here may, when they grow up, disclaim their American citizenship. A young man born here of alien parents may, if he goes to Europe for study, be forced into the army, and the United States will be powerless to protect him, even though he intends to return and reside here. Even if the alien father be naturalized here, the minor son born here before the father's naturalization, if he returns to his father's native country, is liable to be seized and compelled to perform military service, and his American citizenship will prove to be a mere fiction. If a German domiciled here is so attached to the memories of the fatherland as to refuse the proffer of American citizenship, and his children while growing up are diligently nurtured in the same sentiments of loyalty, they cannot be relied on by the United States in time of war as Germany and France are now relying on their subjects at home. If in addition to this consciousness of divided allegiance, there are family ties and expectations of inheritance in the old country, it is clear that the Americanism of such persons, considered as an asset in time of war with Germany, must be charged off as worthless, if it be not an actual liability.” CONCLUSION IN SUPPORT OF RELIEF This petition shows that the writ of prohibition and quo warranto inquest will be in aid of the Court’s appellate or original jurisdiction in that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. Affirmant has read the foregoing petition for a 28 USC §1651 extraordinary writ of

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IN RE CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK IN ESSE PETITIONER WITH SCOTUS RULE 20 FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH QUO WARRANTO INQUEST

Exhibit 1

593 Vanderbilt Avenue, #281 Brooklyn, New York 11238 Christopher-Earl: Strunk © in esse

…the District Code, in proper cases, instituted by proper officers or persons, may be enforceable against national officers of the United States. The sections are therefore to be treated as general laws of the United States, not as mere local laws of the District. Being a law of general operation, it can be reviewed on writ of error from this Court. American Co. v. Commissioners of the District, 224 U. S. 491; McGowan v. Parish, 228 U. S. 317. The next essential decision is in Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 at 546 (1915), the Supreme Court interpreted the role of the AG and US attorney as follows: The District Code still treats usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. It permits those proceedings to be instituted by the Attorney General of the United States and by the attorney for the District of Columbia. By virtue of their position, they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of official responsibility, can institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper. But there are so many reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with litigation over his right to hold office that the Code not only does not authorize a private citizen, on his own motion, to attack the incumbent’s title, but it throws obstacles in the way of all such private attacks. It recognizes, however, that there might be instances in which it would be proper to allow such proceedings to be instituted by a third person, but it provides that such “third person” must not only secure the consent of the law officers of the government, but the consent of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia before he can use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings. Further, in ANDRADE v. LAUER, 729 F.2d 1475, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 384 (1984), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that the defacto officer’s doctrine does not prohibit “collateral attacks” of official actions based upon a public officer’s lack of eligibility. These are not quo warranto suits to remove the official, they are civil suits to challenge a specific action of that official. In the Andrade case, the plaintiffs were Government employees who lost their jobs to “reduction in force” ordinances which cut whole departments from the Government budget. The plaintiffs sued alleging those who did the cutting were not Constitutionally qualified to make such decisions in that their appointments violated the appointments clause of the US Constitution. The DC District Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing other than to bring a “direct attack” in quo warranto to remove the alleged usurper. But the DC Court of Appeals reversed and said the plaintiffs, who had suffered real injuries, could bring such an action on a case by case basis if they could prove their injury in fact (being fired) was caused by a Government official who was not eligible to serve. Further, in UNITED STATES of America ex rel. STATE OF WISCONSIN v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 248 F.2d 804 (1957), the US court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, provided an on point discussion of quo warranto in the district courts: There have been submitted to this court only two instances in which original quo warranto jurisdiction has been specifically conferred upon federal district courts. The

The Honorable Jeffrey Taylor U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, United States Attorney's Office 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 Re: U.S. and ex rel. Strunk v Barack Hussein Obama in esse Subj: NOTICE of Verified Quo Warranto Complaint with Title 16 Chapter 35 of The District Of Columbia Code in its entirety The Honorable Jeffrey Taylor I, Christopher-Earl : Strunk © in esse, relator, am the interested-party in the above referenced matter and hereby demand that your office institute a proceeding against in the name of
the United States against the individual Barack Hussein Obama in esse (a/k/a Barry Soetoro) who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully exercises, a franchise conferred by the corporate United States office of the President (POTUS) for failing to prove eligibility as a natural-borncitizen with Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5 of the united States’ Constitution as a matter of first impression. That Relator’s original Verified Complaint is attached herewith, with the proviso that relator will use the duplicate to demand a jury trial on the issues of fact and decision on question of first impression with the District Judge in Strunk v DOS et al. 08-cv-2234 by Cross Motion to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on or before June 1, 2009 if within seven days your office has not responded in the affirmative, nevertheless will go to the District Court as of right. Relator refers your Honor to what the Supreme Court of the united States (SCOTUS) held as instructive:

The seminal SCOTUS case which has interpreted the Quo Warranto statute is Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915). The opinion serves as a thorough education on the history of quo warranto as well as the proper statutory interpretation. According to SCOTUS, Newman at 552, the statute applies to any public office: The Revised Statutes declare that the District of Columbia shall be the seat of government, and “all offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia.” The Code …provides that the… court shall have jurisdiction to grant quo warranto “against a person who unlawfully holds or exercises within the District a . . . public office, civil or military.” It was probably because of this fact that national officers might be involved that the Attorney General of the United States was given power to institute such proceedings…

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revised statutes of 1878 vested jurisdiction in these courts of proceedings brought by the United States Attorney for the removal of persons holding office contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Rev.Stat., Sections 563(14), 626(14), (1786). This Act was repealed in the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1168. In 1901, Congress specifically authorized the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to issue quo warranto in the name of the United States. Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1419, Title 16, Section 1601 of the D.C. Code (1940). However, this grant is strictly limited and is confined solely to situations involving franchises and public offices held within the District of Columbia. There is no other specific statutory provision vesting original jurisdiction in the district courts in quo warranto actions.
Furthermore, before the Quo Warranto statute existed there is a precedent for a sitting, voted in, sworn in, Senator, Albert Gallatin was thrown out of office in 1793 for being constitutionally ineligible to be a Senator, not having the 9 year requirement as a U.S. citizen. The full congressional link and the procedure they used follows:

5. The nature of my injury caused by the Usurper is the subject of my response in opposition to a partial dismissal as to the Usurper now in default and whose actions are void ab initio, and that the Defendant DOS answer to my complaint there demands further discovery with production of documents and interrogatories, and that this action is intertwined and inseparable. I would be more than willing on or after June 1, 2009, to elaborate on this demand with an expanded memorandum that would also encompass the respectable work of the attorney Leo Donofrio, Esq. of New Jersey, Dr. Orly Taitz, Esq. of California, Mario Apuzzo, Esq. of New Jersey and John D. Hemenway, Esq. of Washington District of Columbia as none represent relator. However this is the required statutory notice of a pre-existing intent required of me. On a personal note of great importance to me, I am a natural-born citizen of two married natural-born born citizens that makes me eligible to become president, however my son when reaching 35 and having resided in the USA for 14 years at election may not be a natural-born citizen because my wife at the time of his birth in New York was not a citizen and as such because there is no interpretation as to the nature of Article 2 Section 1 Clause 5 is a matter of first-impression dear to me and is effecting my liberty now onward. Your immediate response to this urgent matter is warranted and by way of a copy the additional parties-in –interest listed below they too are duly notified. I may be reached during the day at (845) 901-6767. Sincerely yours, Dated: May 20th, 2009 Brooklyn, New York /s/ Christopher-Earl : Strunk, in esse _________________________________ Christopher-Earl: Strunk © in esse

http://books.google.com/books?id=qkMFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA223-IA8&lpg=PA223IA8&dq=Albert+Gallatin+ineligible+Senator&source=bl&ots=GO4Ii8iPv7&sig=NVpzF 2CVNYUnIWYpNdjESd9gvYA&hl=en&ei=YIiwSaOeOteitgfYiIHEBw&sa=X&oi=boo k_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA221,M1 Relator in consideration of the above referenced SCOTUS and other decisions comes forth here with a direct not collateral attack upon the usurper intransigence who after all is in esse and merely poses as the corporate administrator POTUS. The Usurper as an individual in esse only has it in his interest to regain his corporate office were the issues of fact adjudicated. 1. That relator is the sovereign employer of the POTUS who exercises authority over my personal grant of power of attorney permission given to administer the united States of America (Inc.); 2. Relator duly fired Barack Hussein Obama in his corporate capacity for cause on January 23, 2009 after he took the oath of office by timely return of the offer of contract wishing no contract thereby revoked power of attorney due to his failure to prove eligibility as a natural born citizen; 3. That Barack Hussein Obama in esse usurps that office and presumably wishes to have a Quo Warranto forum to prove his eligibility to be able to return to the corporate office capacity as evidenced by the fact he simulates the corporate POTUS duties. 4. Further as to relator standing, as the particularized injury different than the general public, is evidenced by the related FOIA case where I complaint of injury and as a result of irreparable harm caused by the Usurper personally not only the particular speech injury and informational injury, but according to the opposition counsel I am to be sanctioned for something which as of right under statute I am entitled too and having been wrongly withheld by the POTUS Executive while under the Usurper.

Attached: Verified Quo Warranto Complaint with Demand for Jury Trial and Decision on Question of First Impression with exhibits Cc: The Honorable Eric Holder U.S. Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 Barack Hussein Obama in esse c/o The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20500 president@whitehouse.net, AskDOJ@usdoj.gov, dc.outreach@usdoj.gov

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Case 1:08-cv-02234-RJL

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IN RE CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK IN ESSE PETITIONER WITH SCOTUS RULE 20 FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH QUO WARRANTO INQUEST

Exhibit 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26,2009
Mr. Christopher Strunk Unit 28 1 593 Vanderbilt Avenue Brooklyn, New York 11238

Dear Mr. Strunk:
Thank you for contacting the office of President Barack Obama. The President appreciates your taking the time to voice your concerns and opinions. We would like to be of assistance to you; however, due to the separation of powers, it is not within our authority to become involved in legal matters. You must resolve this issue through the judicial system. Please be aware that you can visit www.usa.Pov or call 1-800-FEDINFO for information about Federal Government assistance. We hope your concerns are resolved to your satisfaction. Again, thank you for your correspondence. Sincerely,

..

F. Michael Kelleher Special Assistant to the President and Director of Presidential Correspondence

IN RE CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK IN ESSE PETITIONER WITH SCOTUS RULE 20 FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH QUO WARRANTO INQUEST

Exhibit 3

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS Index NO.:
Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse

------------------------------------------------X
Plaintiff,
-again&NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS;JAMES A.
WALSH I Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA 1 Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, Deputy Director STANLEY ZALEN; ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, RUTH NO EM^ COLON, in their Official and individual capacity; Fr. JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Fr. JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.; PETER G. PETERSEN; ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.; SOEBARKAH ( a k a . Barry Soetoro, a.k.a. Barack Hussein Obama 11, a.k.a. Steve Dunham); NANCY PELOSI; DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTYOF NEW YORK STATE; R ~ G E R CALERO; THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J. BRZEZINSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN 111; JOHN A. BOEHNER; THE NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; THE NEW YORK STATE COMMI?TEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE PARTY; STATE COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; . PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAMA FOR AMERICA; OBAMA WCTORYFUAQ MCCAIN WCTORY 2008; MCCRTN-PUN PTCTORY2008;; John and Jane Does; and XYZ Entities.

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Filed: March 22,20 1 1

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SUMMONS

Defendants.
X

VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Dated:

March 22,2011 Brooklyn, New York
Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse plaintiff 593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281, Brooklyn, New York 11238 (845) 901-6767 E-mail: chris@strunk.ws

IN RE CHRISTOPHER EARL STRUNK IN ESSE PETITIONER WITH SCOTUS RULE 20 FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH QUO WARRANTO INQUEST

Exhibit 4

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