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NUCLEAR. FACILITIES t~!> )
Dp~rAbllity of tbe tqulpment is conc.raed. for the piping design ~ere
the supports are to be located. it G.kes a lot of dffferenc,~ and I .150 knOll thn on the liest coast, (~Tt tile nuclear power plantl ~llI1ch 11"11 In
the California site5, for example) and also wherever you ha.~ higher
than .25 9 acceleration It dOls mike I lot of dIfference. We get a IDt
Of complaints about. for example, the shear relnfDrcement In ..;ontaillmants. You don't hive enough roo~ to put In enouqh sheer re\nforc~nt. £l~etrjcal and mechanical equipment Ire controlled by the sel~~ic desIgn loads 1n ~nf eases ,
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Thank you. It 15 approachln!l 5:30. If ,YOU would like to Shy I little langer, of cuurse, you're welcome to stay.
Unknown
~ quution 15 addressed to Ors. Lysmar and l(lpur. One of the
results W~ look for from sailstructure interaction studIes Is the soil forces or pressures to design the structure and the foundations. And ~ometimes the time history of these soil press~res or forces Is not used
in the casfgn, but instead ~n envelope of the .axlmud iofl forces. And
I woula just like to hear your comments. Dr. Lysmer, YDU oentfoned this earlier in yOur t~lk. I'd like ,ou to elpand on the ,ccuracy and the cons~rvatj5m or nonconservatism of this procedure and alternate proce~urt! otner thin ~nveloplng it. or timehistory.
J. l),srer
My ?ne~ious remarks were based on I rather lImited number of cases sInce the computation of dynamic earth pressures by the finite elemtnt method is a relatively new research afla for us. However, as me~tioned preyio~sly, ift some cases where strong stru~ture  structure interactloR occurreq, the earth pressure~ could be very large. say 35 times those predlcterl by the t!onOl\ObeOkabe tlleory. Tllis. to me, means t~.t the simplifiea procedure5 Ir~ not necessarily CDnservatlve even With the factor of conservatism Introduced by the use of envelopes of ma~imum soil pressure
in a pse~dostat;c analysis. .
To 5U~ It up. T do not believe in the current simplified ~thod5 for evaluating t~ effects of dynamic earth pressures and am hoping that our new meenad of computing the ~nt5 on the basement walls will, In due
time, be ~31e to throw some light on the effects of dynamic Birth pressures.
~
rT9ree with ProfessDr l"sJler •.
J. H. I.khs
Tha~' j10u ill. Tnls will bring Session 6 to a conclusion. At this time I «Qulo like to reiterate ~y thanks to all the speakers this afternoon a"~ to t"! interest and entnuslas~ shown by the audIence durin~ the question and answer period. ~91In. on ~eh61' cf the organizers of this Specialtj Conferenet And en bella I f of the IIl1tlear structures and Materials Comittee of the Structural Division of the ASCE. J think you all.
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SUfh:.(_V OF NOZZLe PIPING REACTION CRITERIA
) FDA MECHANfCAL eOU'PMI:NT .
Dr. A. A. MtI,(er
ABSTRACT
The design of • piping system requires knowledge of the reaction force. and moments whIch tan be applied to mechanical equipment by the piping synem. In the cleslgn of a power plant, these reaction forces and moments. are not known until the design of the mechanlear' equipment is nlilarly complete. Some of the ~rea5 in which these reaction forces and momentS are commonly encountered are described.
It is desirable to lay OUt and analvze the piping synlm In the ebrly $tages of the plant design. long before the limiting reactions of the mechilnical equipment have been determined, This can be dona ff $llndard nozzle design practices are incorporated into the design of the mechanical equipment,
Thi5 paper discusses three methods of standardizing nonle design.
• Piping Yield Methad.
• Single forceMoment Method.
• Six· Component Fraction Method.  t:oo etm'5enIT ••. :fI .... o.e..
Wider adaption of the Piping Yield Method is recommended. Those cases for which the Piping Yield Method is not satisfactory are disClJ5sed and specific recommand8tial\s Ire made.
INTRODUCTION
The preparation of purchase spec!ficatlans for plant equipment involves the problem of identifyillg system piping loads which are not usuallv availabl~ at the ti';'e of purc:nas~ The equipment is order lid with an .understanding that either later' reinforcement modifications will be made or the vendor will define the load capacity of the equipment lit the nanles. This approach may result in delavs in equipment delivery, created by negOtiations with the vendor, and piping anaivsis delays due to nozzle reactions being 100 severely limited.
This paper dlscuues soma of the practices now used in the power plant indunrv to deal with these problems and makes recommendations for their use .
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CONVENTIONAL PIPING STRESS LIMITS
A better understanding of potential pipIng reaction forces may be obtained bV examining the stress limits' for ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III sarety class piping. ~!y Cla~.!_~stems contain a small number of pipe to nozzle connections. The majority of nuclear plant piplngnoule reaction problems. therefore. occur in Safety Class 2 and Class 3 systems. Typical piping moment·stress equations. uwal allowable Stresses. and per cent yield strengths for the Class 2 and 3 systems appear in Table 1.
The moments MA~ Me. Me shown in Table lore for weight loads. occasional loads. (safety valve. seismic inertia. etc. I and thermal expansion loads, respectively. These rromenu are all evaluated by the Square Root Sum of Squares (SRSSI method. As an e)(ample. MA." ,JMA./· + MAl + MAZ2. The quantity 0.151 considers stress intensification effects due 10 elbows. reducers, etc. For' purposes of this discussion. the O.75.i factor can be replaced with 1.
The QuantitY Sh in Table 1 represents the piping allowable stress in the "hot" condltidn: For a majority of nuclear plpe applications Sh is' constant for temperatures of 650 F .Bnd below_ A comparison of Sh with ASME II t yield strength. Sy. appears in Table 2_
Inspection of the equations given In Table 2 and Ihe Sh to Sy relationships given In Table 2 shows the following.
1. Only a small percentage of the yield strength Is used for deadweight load in Equation 8.
2. Equation 9 is the basic requirement for many controlling normal and upset plant condition loads required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lNRC) ln Regulatory Guide.IRG) l.4B or in ASME Code Case 1S0S. It is desirable to use as much allowable stress as possible for this requirement for efficient use of piping material. This equation indiclites that the maximum stress limit can vary from 0.71 Sy to 1.08 Sy for carbon steel and stainless steel.
3. Maximum stresses permitted in EquDtion 11 range from 1.33 Sy to 2.26 Sy for carbon steel lind stainless steel. This large allowollble stress range Is actually a range of secondary stresses. These stress ranges are permitted by the ASME III
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PIPINC REACTION CRITERIA
code because the thermlll 8JCpansion loads creating 8 moment Me are ISsumed C41pable of "shaking down" to an elastic rlnge of 2 Sy. This concept can lead to minor I<!cal distortions (usually occurring at elbows) which are quitl acceptable in piping systems. This assumption cllnnot be made as easily for component designs, because potential piping system thermal expansions of sevllral inches may concentrate in il waak, yielding component she1l.
4. ~tressas created by axial and shur forces Ire neglected. This is because the piping system is assumed to have sufficient bends for thermal expansion such that only bending stresses Ire significant.
In summary. the above results Indicate thollt pipe bending stresses are permitted to approach yield strength for occasional loads (Equation 91. and that. when thermal expansion effects are (XInsidered. the pipe bending stresses ar. permitted to I~ceed yield strength (Equation 11).
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NOZZLE REACTIONS FOR VALVES
An actlve safety class valve, al defined in RG 1.48, must operate during a faulted plant event such as the Safe Shutdown. Earthquake. Acti\le safety class valve~ must demonstrate operabilitY with Faulted Condition noazle reactions per RG 1.48. Acceptable analysis techniques to demonstrate this capability are currently being diseusscd in Code and Regulatory committees.
ASME 111 Paragraphs NB·, NC·, and NO:3500 now have general requirements for stronger valva nozzle connections than the attached piping. Integral support lugs usually are not provided on safety clasS valves. The piping connected to the valve has to satisfy ASME III Paragraphs NB·, NC·, and ND·3600 piping stress requirements which are considered the limiting case for nonactive valves.
NOZZLE REACTIONS CREATED BY SAFETY VALVES
Although the same ASME 111 strength requirements in Paragraph NB·, NC., and ND·3500 lIPply to Safety Valve nozzles, this only guarantees that the valve body will be adequate for thrust reaction loads. When the reaction from an open discharge system Safety Valve is delivered from tha valve into other equipment such as a pressure vessel, the effect 01 thrust loads on the vessel stresses must be considered.
ASME Code Case 1569; Appendix II of ANSI 831.1,1 and NRC RG L67 indicate" increased emphasis has been placed on Safety Valve reaction loads, in both the piping systems and on component reactions. This activity recognizes that the Safety Valve can deliver a large sustained (i.e., primary) load, and that the ellocts of multiple simultaneous valve discharges, with adverse sequencing of different valve openings, must be considered. These code and regulatory requirements also impose dynamic load factors of up to 2.0, the stresses from which will not be permitted to exceed the allowable bending and membrane stress values of ASME 111. These stress values are similar to Equation 9 shown in Table 1. Therefore. increases may be required'in the nozzle reactions to account for the above Code and Regulatory requirements.
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I'U'ING REACTION CRITERIA
SPEC!AL COMPONENT NOZZLE REACTION CONSIDERATIONS
Main Steam TurbInes
Main steam turbine and condenser eonnectlons often do not involve ASME III "fety class piping. HDwever, special loading on the piping (e.g. turbine tripl is evaluated for Safety· Analysis Report commitments. Usually the turbine manufacturer develops his own stress analysis .techniques. These techniques oiten have special suspensionsupport reaction Stability restrictions. I t Is current practic, to provide detalled : piping reactions to the turbine manufacturer to justify his nozzle shell, bearing, and suspension systems. Certain "'ow tuned" turbine foundations are designed with sufficient flex ibllit.,. to require consideration of elanic movement at the "anchor" conneetlens of larger steam lines.
Safety·Related Ucotrng, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVACI Equipment
Safety·related HVAC equipment il given' Safety Classification 2 or 3 by NRC requirement!. but much of this equipment is not covered Under the ASME III Code. Connecting piping to this equipment Is covered by ASME 111. Later discussion in this paper lNJicates that the nozzles on this equipment have very small al1ow~ble· reaction forces and moments. These forces and moments are not t~o stringent because thermal expansion is not a significant consideration. However. special support requirements may be need.Cld for connecting lines.
Open Discharge Safety Relief Valve Reactions
In many cases open discharge Sarety Relief Valve reactions are absorbed by component nozzles. In some cases piping design pr~ctice may dictate placement of one or more Safety Relief Valves near a component nozzle, anticipating that· the nozzle will provide an "anchor" for thesa reactions.
I f the Safety Relief Valves are not sentinel valves, (whic:h are intended to discharge a low temperature "trickle" flow) very real sustained thrust loads will relult. These thrust loads are particularly of concern when low set pressure valves having large brlflces are used. Low prenure Safety Relief Valves have associated twisting moments creating reactions which are usually absorbed by relatively thin walled· vessels. If multiple Safety Relief Valves are Installed on a component, the possibility of all the vilves discharging simultaneously must be considered •.
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STANDARDIZED PIPING REACTION METHOOS
Three methods of determining standardized pipe reaction limits at the component bid evaluation stage are describad below. The ·'piping·vleld" method is an extreme case where the component is given $ulficientHrength to fuliV yield the connecting piping in bending at the nozzle. The singleforce·moment fraction method and its expanded variation. called the si)(·component·fraction method, specify component restrictions about the x, y and z aXBS shown in Figure 1. The actual complelC piping reactions in the fraction methods are then limited during pipe design effort bV use of a simple equation which is based on the component reectlcn limits.
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A • p
METAL 'AREA OF
PIPE  INt
Zp .. SECTION MODULUS OF PIPE  IN3
PLANE OF
SAFE END /r4~" X
OF COMPON ENT 1'::;:Z~:;:;~~ NOZZLE
COMP9NENT
FIGURE 1. PIPE·NOZZLE COORDINATE SYSTEM
PIPING REACTION CRITERIA
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"'PIPING·VIELD" METHOD
In extremely high seiSmic applications, or conditions where piping reactions can attain severe magnitudes 01 thrust and moment, a set of limiting yield moments defined in Equations lA. lB. and Ie and in Figure 1 have been used. The applications in Equations lA, lB, and Ie ilre not covered by the ASME 111 Code or
current' NRC regulations. .
Axial Forcl! limit in V Direction' In Figure 1
11 AI
Bending Moment about )( and z Axes in Figure 1
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Torsiondl Moment about V Axis
(IC)
Using equivalent ASME III safety class 2 and 3 stress criteria, the Me moments li.e., x, z axes of Figure 11 are aligned with the planes of principal eurva~ure o(the component at the nozzle centerline. The nozzle barrel below the plane of the pipe shown in Figure I is made significantlv Hlffer than the pipe and as short as practical, The component shell at the nozzle barrel intersection is then analyzed fbr separate applications of the loads in Equations lA, lB. and lC (including separate applications of moments MSY for 9ach of the x and Z Ixe5). Each load application includes design pressure P and limits component shell mllmbrane stresses to Sh' Shell membrane stresses plus bending strenllS. under this condition, are limited to 1.5 Sh'
Inspection of Equation 1 A indicates that the thrust load FAy is only 50 per cent of the groS! cress section yield force of the attached piping, Although this thruH load is but a fraction of the full yield force, the results of this equation have been found acceptable for even very tightly routed piping systems. When this yield method concept is used there Is no significant concern ebout x lind z shear forces in the nozzle configuration in Figure 1. The resulting compo",.ent shall and nozzle barrel will be stiff enough to develop elastic resistance to shear forces of the same magnitude as F Av' The moment Mev is I full "lastlc hinge moment and Mt i ••
plastlu torsional condition at the pipe and nozzle connection in Figure 1. y
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The desi9n strategy with EQuations 'A, '8, and lC Is to design the component shell to conditions which are mare slIIIera than the piping can actually generate rather than lIIIalu;tll specific piping reaction loads on the aqulpment. For ASME III SafetY Class 1 piping, fluid thermal transient secondary stress ranges and peak stress erflJcts are evaluated assuming a closed end pipe condition. From a commercial standpoint, this gives the purchaser a component shell with 8KcBssively conservative specifications, but eliminates a potentially costly schedule delay resulting from piping analysis interfaces In the plant design process. Many nuclear power plant components have been built to thl criteria of Equations lA, , B, and' C witt! equal or more severe QAIOe f~br1cat1on controls than required by ASME III.
There are times when the component shell obviously cannot be made stiff enough to absorb reactions from relatively large nozzles le.g., main steam outlets occurring in a relatively thin secondary system shell of a PWR steam generatorl. These problems can usually be Identified by the vendor at the time the order is placed and his exceptions to the specified loadings at spacific nozzle locations can be resolved by usiniJ one of the other methodS discussed below,
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PIPING REACTrON CRITERIA
SINGLE FORCE·MOMENT FRACTION METHODS
Standard nuclear plant Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and balance of plant speCifications hav, been requiring nou,l, reactions Fa and moments Mo about the x, V, z axes shown in Figure t In their component purchase specifications for pumps, vessels, an~ unks. They will then guarantee to the vendor that the purchtser's piping reactions will not exceed FI, MI about the same Figure 1 BKes as shown In Equation 2 and Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. SINGLE FORCE·MOMENT FRACTION PIPING REACTION CRITERIA
FI + MI <
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(2)
Typical values of Fo and Mo under Normal and Upset conditions appear in Equations 3A and 3B below.
Fo Mo
347 A P lib) 289 Zp Ift·lbl
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The quantities in these equations are normally increased by 8 ractor of 1.2 for . faulted condition~. Further manipulation of Equations 3A and 3S Indicates that an SRSS pipe stress of GOO psi Is being allocated for thrust and shear loadl, while 6,000 psi is being predicted for combihed bending·torsion moments.
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Discussions with NSSS vendors and comparison with other formulas used by component suppliers indicates that Equations :2 and 3 have general applicability to ASME III Safety Class. and Balance of Plant IBOPI equipment piping reactions with moderately sellere seismic requirements (4.5 9 horizontally and :I g vBrticallyl. These equations should be used with caution if open discharge Safety Relief Vallie reactions are delivered to the component via the piping system.
PIP INC kEACTION CRrl'ERJA
SIX COMPONENT FRACTION METHOD
A special case of Equation 2, which will be called the six·component.fraction method. Is sometimes used as a standard vendor offering. In this arran,,~ment, the vendor declares the maximum reaction components fa. ft1• • .. ·M2 which can be appljed to each nozzle and restricts the purchaser's pipe reactions to '1' '2  .. fS as
shown 'in Equation 4 and Figure 1. (
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Where:
I, .. axial force Irom the pipe reaction in the y direction  Ib '2 = shear .force from the pipe relIction in the x direction  Ib '3 .. shear force (rom the pipe reaction In the z direction  Ib f4 • bending moment from the pipe about the x axis  ft·lb . 'S '" bending moment from the pipe about the z a'xis ..:. Itlb
,·S .. torsional moment from the pipe reaction about the y axis  ftlb
fa :& vendor's maximum allowable load in the y direction",: Ib
't I = vendor's maximum allowable load in the jC direction  Ib
ft2 .. vend or's maximum allowable load in the z direction  Ib
M, .. vendor's maximum allowable moment about the x axis  ft·lb M2  vend or's max imum allowable moment about the z axis  ftlb Mt = vendor's maximum allowable moment about the V axis  't·lb
Equation 4 can also be expressed in terms of allowable stresses (e.g., '1 • a~ial $tress in y direction from pipe. fa = vendor's maximum allowable stress in v direction,ete.]. Other equation forms could be used which might contain nonlinear powers of f I/Fa .. _ .. f6/Mt or other stren parameters la.g., principal stress or stress intellsit·/I. In general, Ei variables would have to be considered at every interface section.
A typical SIlt of values for fa and M1, M2 which might be used by 8 manufacturer of small and medium sized heat exchangers appears in EQuatIons SA and 58 below.
fa .. ttl • tt2 .. 100 Do M," M2 .. Mt .. 300 Zp
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TYPiCAL NOZZLE REACTION RESULTS
A theoretical group of components with 6·inch Schedule 40 carbon steel noules are evaluated bV the three standardized methods of Equations 1, 2, and 3. Other cases including a safety valve reacting on a component and a 5·inch'HVAC cooler nozzle are also evaluated. The results of these evaluations are summarlzed in Table 3. To retain consisrencv with all results. the following assumptions are used.
1. Design conditions (excluding HVAC equipmentl of 230 psig pressure Bnd temperature of 650 F.
2. Internal pressure membrane stresses in the pipe are neglected.
3. The nOlzle Is loaded separately with its maximum force or moment for the results in Tables 3 and 4.
Safltty Val~e Results
The Safety Valve is a typical 6 by 8 valve having a large orifice commonly used or\ low pressure open discharge systems. Its thrust load F can be evaluated in preliminary design stages using the valve orifice area and blowdown theory.2 For saturated steam systems, Equation 6 applies.
F .. 1.26 Pset AD
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Design nozzle reactions FO and MD applied to the component are obtained by applying a dynamic load factor DlF and use of a moment arm .to to obtain [he moment.
FO "' IOLFIF MO • t D FO
Design Thrust Design Moment
(7) (8)
The parameters !rom a typical Sa!ety Valve installation in a piping system are:
AD" 12.174 in2, DLF· 1.6, tD = 2ft. Pset· 230 psig
The design reaction forces IIsing the above data are FO = 5645 lb, MD • 1 t 291 It lb. Results of this loading are shown in Table 4.
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HVAC RUlulU
Ae~rdlng to one reputable manufacturer, a typical safety·related HVAC cooler water box has the following reaction limits on a 6·inch non Ie.
Fy .. 900 Ib Clltlal loreel
Fx .. Fy • 450 Ib (shear force)
Mx .. Mz ,. 900 h·lb
My '" 450 h·lt! (torsional momentl
The coolers normallv operate in a temperature range of 45·55 F and have a design pressure of 150 psig. The results from these reactions are summarized in Table 4.
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COMPARISON OF RESULTS
The hjghest force and moment reactions occur for the "piplng·yleld" criteria method as shown in Table J. HVAC equipment has the smallest force Hnd moment reactions as indicated in Table 4. There Is no signlficantdHference between the stl!,dard plant loads pf EquatIon 3 and the heat exchanger limits of Equation 5.
The open discharge relief valve thrusl loads are significantly larger than the slIndard plant loads in Equiltion 3 and than the heat exchanger loads identified in Equatiol1 5. These loads are also known to I greater degree .of certainty since the valve is usually sized early in the plant design stage. As these loads are significant. separate treatment is justified.
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NUCLEAR FACILITIES'" .
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made based on the abolle observations.
1. Tne pip! yield criteria.of Equation 1 should be incorporated by the ASM E ([I Code and NRC regulations. Under present code limits, the use of yield criteria in the pipe will create a code violation of allowable stress at the nozzle/pipe interface. Code wording is needed to permit this description as a design condition rather than an imposed operating load.
2 Safety 'Ialve open dischargl1 system reactions from piping systems should be called out separately' on component purchase specifications. The component supplier often is requested to supply a vessel with a number of penetrations and may not be told if any of them are to support a Safety Valve reaction. Inspection of Tables 3 and 4 Indicates that these reactions are potentially much larger than "standard practice" commitments.
3. The piping support analyst should use more finite ~tiffneSf mod~ling at anchor points having small nozzle reaction limits. Piping stress results using rigid assumptions at noazles connecting to components with small reaction limits, such as turbines with fow tuned foundations aOO HVAC equipment, may be overly conservative from both the piping and component standpoints. Component manufacturers should provide stiffness data at all noll Ie connections to assist the pipe support enalyst in this task.
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ACKNOWl.E DGEM ENTS
PIPING REACTION CRITERIA
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The Iuthor wishes to thank the following people for their assistance.
P. Christensen M. Decker
G. F. Hausenbauer Dr. J. D. Stevenson W. G. Knecht
REFERENCES
General Electric Company
Carrier Air Conditioning Company Struthers Nuclear Ind Process Companv Case·Western Reserve University Anchor·Darling Valve Company
1. ANSI 831.1· Power Piping Code, with Addends to Summer 1975,
2. F. J. Mo~dv. "Fluid Reaction and Impingement Loads:' Structural Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities, Volume 1, December 1973.
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