Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9629-2

Thinking “difference” differently: Cassirer versus

Derrida on symbolic mediation

Aud Sissel Hoel

Received: 17 November 2008 / Accepted: 7 March 2009 / Published online: 31 July 2009
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differs in some important

ways from currently prevailing approaches to meaning and signification such as
semiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Cassirer’s philosophy of
symbolic forms offers a theory of symbols that does not amount to a sign theory
or semiology. It sketches out, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational framework
in which an alternative notion of difference takes centre stage. In order to make the
original features of Cassirer’s approach stand out, I will compare it with the approach
of the perhaps most influential differential thinker of our day, Jacques Derrida. The
philosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insights and
concerns of poststructuralism. Yet, there are some critical differences. Rather than
rejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity, and truth on the premises established
by traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses to redefine these concepts through a
radical conceptual reframing. The result is a doctrine that—in Derridean parlance—
neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics, nor tries to resolve them in a
Hegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even though it appeals to origins,
cannot so easily be dismissed as yet another instantiation of the metaphysics of
presence.

Keywords Mediation · Symbols · Expression · Symbolic forms · Language ·

Différance · Universal and particular · Articulation · Concept and intuition ·
Intelligible and sensible

A. S. Hoel (B)
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: aud.sissel.hoel@hf.ntnu.no

123
76 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

1 Introduction

Today, it is a common understanding that symbols and signs are central to cultural
processes. In Ernst Cassirer’s time, however, this was not the case. So, if we take
Cassirer’s pioneering insistence on the indispensability of symbols into consideration,
he can rightfully be regarded as having presaged modern cultural studies. In this arti-
cle, however, I am not going to rehearse these historical continuities. Instead, I will
point out some important ways that Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differs
from the currently prevailing approaches to meaning and signification, that is, from
semiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Indeed, my objective is to
make a case for Cassirer in the present situation, in which the hegemonic position of
poststructuralism is on the wane.
What makes Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms relevant today is that it offers a
theory of symbols that does not amount to a “sign theory” or “semiology”. It sketches
out, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational framework in which an alternative
notion of “difference” takes centre stage. In order to make the original features of
Cassirer’s approach stand out, I will compare it with the approach of the perhaps most
influential differential thinker of our day, Jacques Derrida.
The philosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insights
and concerns of poststructuralism. Cassirer too insists on the indispensability of mate-
rial symbols, as well as the impossibility of escaping the circle of historically con-
stituted symbolic forms. He too advances critiques of dogmatic ontology, of intuitive
knowledge, of monadic philosophies of the subject, and of approaches advocating the
pure immediacy of “life”. Yet, there are some critical differences, and these differ-
ences can be summed up as follows: Cassirer never places himself in an antiposition.
He refuses to give up the classic concerns with objectivity, identity, and truth. Even
though he acknowledges the irreducibly relative and contingent element in all kinds
of meaning and knowledge formation, he never succumbs to relativism, scepticism,
or to the current trend: antiessentialism. He reminds us, instead, that a strategy that
goes from one extreme to the other, say, from transparency to opacity, from vision
to blindness, from presence to absence, from identity to difference, will never solve
the underlying problem. Rather than rejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity,
and truth on the premises established by traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses to
redefine these concepts through a radical conceptual reframing. The result is a doctrine
that—in Derridean parlance—neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics,
nor tries to resolve them in a Hegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even though
it appeals to origins, cannot so easily be dismissed as yet another instantiation of the
metaphysics of presence.

2 Negative and positive notions of originary difference

A thinker like Derrida, who takes the very possibility of “moving on” from metaphysics
as a chief problem, would voice suspicion over Cassirer’s reframing endeavours. Since,
according to Derrida, the traditional concepts belong to the system that generated them,

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 77

“every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics”.1 This is
the case even for thinkers who strive to overturn metaphysics. At the very moment
a critic denounces a system, he accepts into his discourse the same premises of the
system he rejects. This mechanism of simultaneous rejection and confirmation works,
again according to Derrida, by necessity, and there is no way to escape it.
This view of the matter is much in line with the picture drawn by Richard Rorty
through his macro-historical distinction between “systematic” and “edifying” philos-
ophy. Systematic philosophy is “normal” philosophy, that is, epistemology, which is
characterized by its search for objective truth. Edifying philosophy, on the other hand,
is characterized by its protest against the pretentions and overconfidence of systematic
philosophy. The latter category, therefore, comprises movements of thought that are
essentially reactive, that is, intellectual movements that are “parasitic” in nature and
“has point only in opposition to the tradition”.2 For this reason edifying philosophers,
among whom Rorty counts Derrida, tend to “decry the very notion of having a view”.3
In Derrida’s and Rorty’s view, then, any attempt at crawling out from under the
inherited system of metaphysics would lead to nothing but self-deception. Yet, if we
are to follow Derrida, there are better and worse ways of not escaping metaphysics.
This, of course, is where the strategy of deconstruction enters the picture. Deconstruc-
tion, as conceived by Derrida, involves a double gesture. The first phase consists in
an overturning of the binary oppositions of metaphysics, say, by privileging writing
over speech. But as Derrida himself pointed out, simple overturnings alone do not
suffice, since they operate from within the terrain of the system they denounce and
thus end up confirming it. The second phase, therefore, consists of an undermining or
destabilization of the oppositions in question, either by demonstrating the impurity of
the privileged term, say, by pointing to the “writing” within speech, or by disorganiz-
ing the field by introducing “indecidables” that cannot be contained within the given
binary oppositions.4
Like Rorty, Derrida is leery of the ocular metaphors that set the problems of Western
thinking and continue to permeate mainstream philosophical discourse. He rejects the
privilege ascribed to intuition by tradition, as well as the privilege accorded to percep-
tion by phenomenology. Yet, his approach is not merely reactive. Derrida introduces a
highly productive notion of an originary difference, termed “différance”, “arche-writ-
ing”, or “trace”, that is not to be regarded as the simple opposite of the metaphysical
notion of “identity”. Rather, différance is understood to be “the non-full, non-simple,
structured and differentiating origin of differences”.5 Despite this seminal acquisition,
the main thrust of Derrida’s treatment remains reactive in that he tends to emphasize the
negative consequences of this insight, as measured against the metaphysical standard

1 Derrida (1978, p. 281).

2 Rorty (1980, p. 366).
3 Rorty (1980, p. 371).
4 Derrida (2004, pp. 39–40).
5 Derrida (1982, p. 11). However, since originary difference is a non-simple and differentiating origin, “the
name ‘origin’ no longer suits it” (Derrida 1982, p. 11).

123
78 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

of identity.6 In other words, he tends to emphasize the ways that the differential play
constantly disappoints and frustrates our referential ambitions.
Like Derrida, Cassirer claims there to be constitutive differential structures—
the symbolic forms—at work in the midst of human meaning formation. But the
conclusions he draws from this observation are very different from Derrida’s. Cas-
sirer operates from a different set of basic assumptions. He does not set out to over-
turn metaphysics, and his strategy is not one of deconstruction. For this reason, he
never resorts to the iconoclastic gestures used by Rorty and Derrida.7 Cassirer’s
writings are replete with visual metaphors. Rather than renouncing intuition alto-
gether, he introduces another kind of “vision” that is no longer to be seen as the
opposite of discursivity. Rather than simply replacing referral with deferral, he intro-
duces a new concept of identity that in fact requires the intervention of “foreign”
formative principles. By putting symbol, concept, and intuition into a new and hith-
erto unheard of constellation, he opens the way for a positive notion of originary
difference.

3 Essence and symbol

Cassirer’s fresh take on the problem of symbolic mediation is due to the way that he
strikes to the core of the problem: tradition’s definition of the symbolic in terms of
substitution and thus as something external to identity or essence.
The traditional way of framing the problem of knowledge invokes the notion of
a perfect or divine intellect, which is able to present “originals” or “things in them-
selves”. Immanuel Kant famously contrasts this divine or “archetypal” intellect to
human understanding, which is characterized by its limited and finite nature. In con-
tradistinction to the pure vision or intuition of the archetypal intellect, the human
intellect is claimed to be “discursive” and dependent on “images” or bodily percep-
tions.8 As pointed out by Cassirer, Kant believed he had mastered the idea of pure
intuition by defining it as a mere borderline concept.9 This move does not suffice, how-
ever, if we are to make a positive account of the formative achievements of the human
intellect. For in this way Kant retains the idea of a self-identical, self-sufficient, and
pre-existing object of knowledge—even if only as a negative standard towards which
we strive in vain. Human understanding is thus determined negatively through what it
lacks, through the ways that it is not able to meet the divine standard of pure intuition.
Even Kant, then, who was the first thinker to truly acknowledge the formative powers
of the human intellect, seems to focus chiefly on the negative consequences of this
insight. That is, he tends to focus on the way that the “thing in itself” forever will
remain out of our reach, rather than on the insight’s positive side, namely that “the

6 It remains negative, despite the fact that Derrida affirms these consequences rather than lamenting them
(Derrida 1978, p. 292).
7 Rorty, for instance, urges us to “get the visual, and in particular the mirroring, metaphors out of our
speech altogether”. He finds support in Derrida’s writings, which he characterizes as “meditations on how
to avoid these metaphors” (Rorty 1980, p. 371).
8 Kant (1987, pp. 292–293; Sect. 77).
9 Cassirer (1955, pp. 112–113).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 79

genuine objectivity of knowledge is based and guaranteed in the free spontaneity of

the spirit”.10 If we, like Cassirer, are to follow this latter line of thought, we have to
recognize that the very notion of a “thing in itself” is a “fallacy in formulation, an
intellectual phantasm”11 that precludes an adequate understanding of the processes
involved in knowledge and meaning formation.
In addition, and even more pressing in the context of this article, Kant’s antithesis
between the archetypal and the discursive intellect does not leave room for a positive
account of the formative power of symbols. Cassirer puts it thus: “From the stand-
point of this antithesis it would seem to follow that the richer the symbolic content of
cognition or of any other cultural form becomes, the more its essential content must
diminish.”12 This is to say that the divine standard of pure intuition introduces a scale
for which the infinitely deferred endpoint would be the complete coincidence with the
object. A perfect medium, then, would be a medium that transcends itself or effaces
itself in front of the object and thus permits a true communion with it. The result is,
again to borrow a term from Derrida, an “onto-theological” notion of mediation against
which particular symbols could be valued according to their degree of “presence”.13
The formative power of symbols, then, is conceived of as something that removes
us from the primal source of being, as something that cloaks and conceals the true
essence of things more than it unveils it.14
As we can see from the above, the problem of symbolic mediation touches on funda-
mental philosophical questions concerning identity and truth. According to the tradi-
tional account, essences are conceived of as self-identical, immaterial, and atemporal
givens, compared to which any material symbol would always emerge as derivative
and secondary. Cassirer, on the other hand, insists that symbols partake in the very
constitution of the object as an object. Approached from its positive side, this thesis
is indeed radical and rich in its implications.

4 Symbolic function and symbolic forms

Whereas Rorty enlists Kant among the “mainstream philosophers” who approach the
problem of knowledge and meaning in terms of mirroring, Cassirer contrarily empha-
sizes those aspects of Kant’s thought that break with this line of thinking. In Cassirer’s
account, Kant brought to theoretical philosophy a “revolution in method” by virtue
of the way that he reconceived the relation between cognition and object as generally

10 “Selbst bei Kant schien der Schwerpunkt der Lehre mehr in dem, was sie als negative Konsequenz
in sich schloß, als in ihrer neuen positiven Grundeinsicht zu ruhen. Als Kern seines Gedankens erschien
nicht sowohl der Nachweis, wie die echte Objektivität der Erkenntnis in der freien Spontaneität des Geistes
begründet und in ihr gesichert sei, als vielmehr die Lehre von der Unerkennbarkeit des ‘Dinges an sich’”
(Cassirer 1956, pp. 184–185).
11 Cassirer (1955, p. 111).
12 Cassirer (1955, p. 113).
13 Writing, for instance—conceived as it traditionally is as a “mediation of mediation”—would, when val-
ued on the basis of this standard, be understood to involve a “fall into the exteriority of meaning” (Derrida
1997, p. 13).
14 Cassirer (1955, pp. 112–113).

123
80 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

understood until then. Rather than starting from the object as given, Kant began with
the law of cognition. This move amounted to a break with traditional identity phi-
losophy, since it allowed him to replace the “postulate of a unity of substance and
origin” with a “purely functional unity”.15 The cognitive function is thus accorded a
primacy over the object. As a result, human cognition is allotted original formative or
constitutive powers.
Kant does not, however, realize to the full the positive implications of this insight
into the primacy of the function over the object. For one, he continues to talk about
knowledge and determination in terms of “subsumption”. Moreover, focusing as he
does on the negative consequences, he is compelled to postulate a fixed set of privi-
leged forms, the so-called “categories”. Whereas Kant conceives of the categories as
the pure forms of cognition itself, Cassirer identifies the constitutive powers of under-
standing with the human capacity for using symbols. The cognitive function of Kant
is thus replaced by a more general “symbolic function”, and Kant’s critique of pure
reason is transformed into a critique of culture. So, while Kant envisioned a uniform
direction for every genuine process of determination, the symbolic function of Cassir-
er splits into a variety of particular “symbolic forms”. Each and every symbolic form
is understood to take its own specific direction and thus to allow for its own particular
region of thought. Along with the function of scientific thinking, then, we find other
functions, such as the functions of linguistic thinking, mythical and religious thinking,
and artistic perception.16 And in each and every field the principle of the primacy of
function over the object assumes a new form and requires a new explanation.17
From Kant’s perspective, for the categories to be able to perform their determinative
function, they must be conceived of as self-thought first principles. That determina-
tive principles could be derived from experience would, of course, be unthinkable.
But Kant also rejects a third possibility, a “middle course” that would involve princi-
ples being “implanted in us” by a creator. In Kant’s view, admitting such implanted
principles would only be to give the sceptic exactly what he most desires.18 Cassirer’s
symbolic forms are historically constituted and thus not universal and necessary in the
Kantian sense. In fact, they come close to Kant’s implanted principles, except for the
fact that they are implanted by human beings themselves, which, again in Kant’s view,
would render their epistemic value even more questionable. Cassirer, however, insists
on the epistemic value of the symbolic forms. The reason why this “third course” of
Cassirer’s emerges as a possible position at all has to do with the way that he reframes
the very problem of the one and the many, that is, the problem of how to conceive of
the relation between the intelligible and the sensible, between the universal and the
particular, between concept and intuition. And Cassirer’s most original contribution
turns precisely on the role that he ascribes to symbols when it comes to correlating
these allegedly heterogeneous and incommensurable factors.

15 Cassirer (1955, p. 77).

16 For some reason Cassirer here switches to “perception” when he mentions the symbolic function as
instantiated in art (Cassirer 1955, p. 79).
17 Cassirer (1955, p. 79).
18 Kant (1929, pp. 174–175; B167–168).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 81

To Cassirer, being “symbolic” always implies being more than something merely
material. Moreover, the “spiritual”, “logical”, or “ideal” aspect of the symbolic is
always expressed in and through something sensory. This should not, however, be
taken in the representational sense, as a material sign “standing for” immaterial con-
tent. Rather, Cassirer conceives of the relation between the sensible and the intelligible
aspects of the symbolic as an inner relation, that is, as interwoven in a way that cannot
be accounted for in terms of the binary oppositions of the metaphysical tradition. The
same is true of the way that he conceives of the relation between the universal and
the particular. In Cassirer’s view, the fundamental principle of cognition is “that the
universal can be perceived only in the particular, while the particular can be thought
only in reference to the universal”.19
Kant, too, goes very far when it comes to integrating the sensible and the intelligi-
ble. The whole of his doctrine, however, is predicated on the basic heterogeneousness
and incommensurability of these factors, which are assumed at the outset by the way
that Kant states the problem of cognition in terms of the “two stems” of sensibility
and understanding.20 Cassirer’s notion of symbolic form is designed to transcend this
opposition, and the result is a reconceived notion of conceptuality that incorporates the
intuitive factor. Thus conceived, the intuitive is no longer the “other” of the discursive,
and the notion of symbolic form comes to designate a “mode of seeing”, a specific
constitutive “sight”:
Each of the different kinds of “seeing” define by themselves their own order of
the “seen,” whereby the seen and the viewpoint, the perceived and the ideated,
the “present” and the “representative” can always be shown as one in the other,
in correlative connection, interwoven with one another.21
A particular symbolic form establishes a specific context of meaning; it opens a specific
ideal horizon for possible determinations, a particular order of objectivity. Cassirer’s
symbolic forms, then, are both necessary and contingent, both infinite and finite. Even
if implanted, a particular symbolic form provides a constitutive viewpoint or measure
that makes the ideation as well as the particularization of phenomena possible. It is
infinite in the sense that it potentially comprises everything, yet finite in that it always
approaches phenomena from a particular perspective.

5 Dimensions of meaning: expression and exposition

Like Kant, Cassirer is critical of empiricist explanations of perception in terms of

“dead” sense impressions, which—considered by themselves—are fundamentally
alien to meaning. We need to recognize that this “unmeaningness” of sensations is
a “mere fiction of psychological thinking”.22 As sensory experience, perception is
always formed perception, which is to say that it is always already meaningful. But

19 Cassirer (1955, p. 86).

20 Kant (1929, p. 61; A15/B29).
21 Cassirer (1996, p. 51).
22 Cassirer (1957, p. 195).

123
82 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

just as perception cannot be explained by reference to a “purely quantitative accumu-

lation or associative combination of perceptive images,” it neither can be explained
by a “reduction to purely discursive acts of judgments and inference”.23 According
to Cassirer, perceptual meaning is a “living totality”. And in order to account for it,
one needs to probe into a level of meaning not found in Kant—a “lower” level that
Cassirer refers to as the “world of expressions”.
Cassirer distinguishes between different modalities of meaning. “Expression”
(Ausdruck), which is regarded as the most basic modality, points to the fact that percep-
tion always comes pregnant with meaning. By virtue of its own immanent organization,
perception takes on a certain nonintuitive meaning, a kind of spiritual or intelligent
organization. This is to say that perceptual phenomena always come as inscribed into
some context of meaning. Expression is, in Cassirer’s view, a “phenomenon of life”,
which is to say that humans participate in it by virtue of being living creatures. In his
discussion of Jakob von Uexküll, for instance, he comes close to Merleau-Pontean
ideas of embodiment.24 Cassirer distributes the phenomenon of expression among the
living in a rather generous manner:
The phenomenon of expression seems to be a genuine primary phenomenon of
life that extends down to its lowest grades and levels. Even the plant kingdom
seems to participate in a way in this phenomenon.25
According to Cassirer, then, expression is to be regarded as a primary phenomenon. It
is only in and through expression that the world of meaning and significance is opened
for us.
As far as human beings are concerned, Cassirer’s insistence on expression as a phe-
nomenon of life should not mislead us into conceiving of it as a “natural meaning”,
that is, as an “essential” meaning that is given before, beneath, and thus independent
of symbolic formation. To avoid this implication, Cassirer is reluctant to put too much
emphasis on the part played by the body in human meaning formation.26 In the human
world there is no such thing as “pure” expression. What we perceive is always already
transformed and articulated by some symbolic form or another, which is to say that to
humans, “pregnance” is always already a “symbolic pregnance”.27
These symbolic transformations attest to the workings of a second modality that
Cassirer refers to as the “expositive function” (Darstellungsfunktion),28 and for which

23 Cassirer (1957, p. 202).

24 Cassirer (1996, pp. 42–45). In fact, Cassirer’s notion of expression seems to have influenced Merleau-
Ponty’s approach to perception. In Merleau-Ponty’s seminal Phenomenology of Perception, for instance,
there are numerous references to Cassirer’s works.
25 Cassirer (1996, p. 39).
26 “The concept of mankind is defined for it not by any specific, identifiable structural features, but through
the comprehensive totality of mankind’s achievements. The totality of these achievements can in no way
simply be read off from mankind’s “organization”, such as from the organization of the brain and the nervous
system” (Cassirer 1996, p. 43).
27 For a discussion of symbolic pregnance, see Cassirer (1957, pp. 191–204).
28 Cassirer also introduces a third modality called “pure significance” (reine Bedeutung) that I will not
discuss in the context of this article. For a brief presentation of the three modalities, see Cassirer (2004,
pp. 259–264).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 83

the workings of language are the most obvious example. Human significance tran-
scends expression in that it always involves some kind of productive setting of the
phenomenon. In fact, Cassirer maintains that the expositive function brings objects
into being in the sense that it transforms the phenomenon into a recognizable entity
and inscribes it into an ideal context that points beyond the situation here and now.
The expositive function introduces a “logical factor”, and this logical factor is, in Cas-
sirer’s account, the “Open Sesame” of the characteristic human realm of meaning: of
the cultural worlds of language, art, myth, religion, and science, as well as of the ideal
worlds of significations, conceptualizations, determinations, formalizations, theories,
models, facts, and fictions. Human existence, then, is characterized by the way that
it continuously transcends its biological starting point and thus removes itself from
a mere natural existence. Human significance, therefore, cannot be reduced to the
expressive factor alone.
Even if deemed constitutive, the symbols that are introduced by the expositive func-
tion do not, in Cassirer’s view, create their significations out of nothing. As pointed out
by Merleau-Ponty (with explicit reference to Cassirer), the expositive function “rests
on a certain groundwork”.29 Meaning, even if unspecified and fleeting, is always
already there, in and through the phenomenon of expression. In the human world of
meaning, however, symbolical exposition is just as primary. Human expressions are
always already symbolically transformed and articulated. So, just as significance can-
not be derived from or dissolved in expression, expression cannot be derived from or
dissolved in significance. Human meaning, then, is always already “double” and can-
not be contained within the traditional opposition between “nature” and “culture”.30
It is always and irreducibly both (and thus neither).
The implication of this is that humans are forever cast out from the “paradise”
that is characteristic of a purely organic life and being.31 Cassirer does not, however,
lament this debarment. Rather, he conceives of it in terms of a liberation from organic
barriers. Besides, even though he appeals to “origins” (human signification is made
possible by and thus in a sense “originates” from expression), he does not conceive of
this origin as a source of “truth”. On the contrary, it is only through the enunciating
focus introduced by the various symbolic forms that meaning comes into itself. For
this reason, there is no use seeking or longing for a “true” meaning before or beneath
the circle of symbols. If it were possible to step outside of the circle of mediations
(which it is not, in Cassirer’s view), one would not find “true life”, a true human

29 “It is true that the ‘symbolic function’ or the ‘representative function’ underlies our movements, but
it is not a final term for analysis. It too rests on a certain groundwork. The mistake of intellectualism is
to make it self-subsistent, to remove it from the stuff in which it is realized, and to recognize in us, as a
non-derivative entity, an undistanced presence in the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 124).
30 “But although the sensuous character of expression and the logical factor of signification cannot be
separated in the actual reality of language, the purely functional difference between them remains unmistak-
able. Any attempt to dissolve expression in signification or to derive one from the other genetically remains
in vain” (Cassirer 1957, p. 111).
31 (Cassirer 1985, p. 73) and Cassirer (1996, p. 45).

123
84 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

existence in its unutterable richness and fullness. One would find, rather, the dull and
narrow world of a purely sensuous existence.32

6 Cassirer’s deictic notion of language

What is meant, then, by symbolic forms being “originary” and “constitutive”? In what
sense do the symbolic forms bring the object into existence? In this context the term
“existence” is taken in the meaning of “the stepping out or stepping forward from the
flowing constant series of appearances”.33 This is to say that the symbolic forms work
as constitutive “indicators” or “signposts”. The function of naming, for instance, is
exemplary in this respect. In naming a phenomenon, it emerges as something identical
and persisting. The name serves as a “‘centre’ of objectivity, in which all changing
existence is drawn together and to which it is related”.34
The view of language that follows from this approach breaks markedly with the
views associated with identity philosophy. In Cassirer’s account, the function of lan-
guage is no longer understood in terms of copying or representation but rather in terms
of articulation and focus:
Not by shining its light evenly on all parts of the perceptual world, but by collect-
ing it in certain focal points, language creates a “centering,” an organization of
this world. Whatever falls in this way under the beam of language emerges as a
gestalt from a relatively undetermined background. This distribution of accents
and the partitioning off of a “foreground” and a “background” provide the intel-
lectual articulation of the world as we represent it, and of which the spoken
articulation is only an outer expression.35
Not very surprisingly, scepticism has followed the representational accounts of lan-
guage like a shadow.36 Measured against the divine standard of pure intuition, language
appears as a defective instrument of knowledge. And, as a consequence, the critics
of language have tended to pay attention to all the possible ways that language fails
to represent. Empiricist approaches, for instance—which Cassirer criticizes explic-
itly—regard it as a deficiency that language cannot represent reality in its individual
fullness. Language has only a limited amount of names at its disposal, and in the
place of the rich and endlessly diversified perceptual contents it provides nothing but
meagre general terms. As shown in the quote above, however, this alleged deficiency
is, under Cassirer’s treatment, transformed into language’s greatest strength. And yet
again he emphasizes how the latter approach, which conceives of language in terms
of a differential deixis, provides an alternative to the traditional copy theories:

32 Cassirer (1956, pp. 199–200). For a further specification of the differences between a human and a purely
organic existence, see Cassirer (1996, pp. 61–64).
33 Cassirer (1996, p. 72).
34 Cassirer (1996, p. 72).
35 Cassirer (1996, pp. 72–73).
36 Cassirer (1949, p. 877).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 85

This provides the foundation for the interpretation that does not simply accept
the given as a sum of elements that are similar in nature and in value, but which
divides them up into the relatively important and relatively unimportant, into
“typical” and “coincidental” qualities.37
In Cassirer’s approach, then, the common names or general terms of language are not
to be seen as insufficient substitutes or convenient abridgments, but rather as enti-
ties serving a far more superior function, namely a genuine synopsis of the spirit, a
condensation of meaning through intellectual articulation.

7 Symbol, sign, and trace

Cassirer’s thesis of the primacy of function and his emphasis on relations seem to
anticipate the differential definition of signification that is at the heart of semiological
structuralism. And so, it has been maintained that, had it not been for his unfortunate
choice of terms, he would certainly have been recognized as the founder of philosoph-
ical structuralism.38 To my mind, however, Cassirer’s terminological choice is neither
unfortunate nor incidental. Indeed, my argument is that his choice of the term “sym-
bol” in preference to the term “sign” points to a systematic philosophical difference
between the two approaches when it comes to the way they understand and explain
symbolic mediation.
Ferdinand de Saussure’s choice of terms is just as carefully weighted as Cassirer’s.
One of the primordial characteristics of the linguistic sign, as defined by Saussure,
is its arbitrary nature. This is to say that the bond between the two elements of the
sign, the “signifier” and the “signified”, is unmotivated, that is, not based in a “natural
connection”. Saussure goes on to contrast the semiological concept of “sign” with
the concept of “symbol” as traditionally conceived (he uses the pair of scales that
symbolize justice as an example of a symbol). Symbols, he claims, are never wholly
arbitrary; in symbols one always finds residues of a natural connection. According to
Saussure, then, systems of expression “that are wholly arbitrary”, such as language,
“realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process”.39 He concludes,
therefore, that the thesis of the arbitrary nature of the sign weights against the use of
the term “symbol”.40
Derrida’s move from semiology to “grammatology” consists in a radicalization of
some of the key features of Saussure’s structuralist account, such as the thesis of the
arbitrariness of the sign and the differential definition of meaning. Whereas Saussure
regards these two qualities as correlative, Derrida goes further by maintaining that the
latter lays the foundation for the former.41 This is, in fact, what Saussure himself comes
close to saying when he treats meaning in terms of linguistic “value”. The notion of

37 Cassirer (1996, p. 73).

38 Caws (1988, p. 16).
39 Saussure (1959, p. 68).
40 Saussure (1959, p. 68).
41 Derrida (1997, p. 52).

123
86 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

“value” is introduced to emphasize that the difference constitutive of significance is

a primary difference, that is, the very source of linguistic meaning, and not only its
secondary effect:
Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language
there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies
positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are
only differences without positive terms.42
The implication of this is that language emerges as the domain of articulations.
Thought, considered apart from language, “is only a shapeless and indistinct mass”.43
Derrida seizes on this notion of an originary differential structure, of “arche-writing”,
“différance”, or “trace”, as the source of linguistic meaning or value, and he even takes
it further by generalizing it into a universal condition for meanings of all kinds:
The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to
saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace
is the differance which opens appearance and signification.44
Derrida’s account of originary difference, then, precludes any notion of “natural” or
“motivated” meanings and significations.
Even if, in Derrida’s account, originary difference has always been at work, Western
philosophy has never acknowledged it. It has, rather, tried to neutralize the differential
play “by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed
origin”.45 It has, in other words, tried to reduce the play by ascribing to the structure a
centre that governs the structure while itself escaping it. According to Derrida, how-
ever, any attempt at arresting the play of differences is futile, since differential play is
irreducible—even within the limits of the system itself. Whereas Saussure envisions a
static system of signification that, due to its stasis, allows for positive signs regardless
of the negative character of their constituents,46 Derrida renounces even this notion
of self-identity. He goes on to claim that residues of the metaphysics of presence are
left in Saussure’s account in and through his very use of the term “sign”. Throughout
its history, the concept of the sign has been defined as “as sign-of, a signifier referring
to a signified, a signifier different from its signified”.47 This is to say that the concept
of the sign, by its very definition, has been determined by the opposition between the
sensible and the intelligible. By insisting on a rigorous distinction between signifier
and signified, Saussure leaves open the possibility of thinking a signified independent

42 Saussure (1959, p. 120).

43 Saussure (1959, p. 111).
44 Derrida (1997, p. 65).
45 Derrida (1978, p. 278).
46 “But the statement that everything in language is negative is true only if the signified and the signifier
are considered separately; when we consider the sign in its totality, we have something that is positive in
its own class” (Saussure 1959, p. 120).
47 Derrida (1978, p. 281).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 87

of the constitutive play of signifiers.48 To avoid this eventuality, Derrida replaces the
term “sign” by the term “trace”, which is meant to denote a structure “which does not
let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present”.49

8 Dynamic differences

There is a strong affinity between the accounts of symbolic mediation as set forth by
Cassirer and Derrida. This affinity has to do with the fact that both thinkers make a
“Kantian” move to the conditions of possibility of knowledge and meaning, while
simultaneously acknowledging the impossibility of making such a transcendental
move—at least in the form in which it was conceived by Kant himself. The aspect in
Kant’s thought that both thinkers take hold of and develop further, is the principle of
the primacy of the function over the object, as presented above. The “revolutionary”
potential of this principle has to do with the way that it replaces the metaphysical
opposition foundational to modern epistemology, the opposition between subjectivity
and objectivity, with the transcendental correlation of the two factors.50 It breaks with
the substantialist approaches of tradition and opens the way for dynamic and relational
approaches to knowledge and meaning. Cassirer and Derrida show adherence to this
principle in their move from “forma formata” to “forma formans”,51 in their emphasis
on the processual character of meaning formation, and, on the whole, in their over-
arching concern with the very formation of form, with the conceptuality of concepts
and the structurality of structures.
For all that, one of the main difficulties and ambiguities associated with Kant’s
transcendental turn has to do with the fact that, as pointed out by Cassirer, the new
approach was expounded in the language of eighteenth century faculty psychology.52
Kant draws on traditional classifications of the human “faculties”, and for this reason
his own concepts of “receptivity” and “spontaneity”, of “sensation” and “understand-
ing”, constantly threaten to degenerate into the very metaphysical oppositions that his
own critical acquisitions were designed to overcome. Even if Cassirer and Derrida
make a “Kantian” move to conditions of possibility, their constitutive structures are
not “transcendental” in the same sense as Kant’s atemporal categories of understand-
ing. Being symbolic or semiological in nature, the constitutive structures of Cassirer
and Derrida are themselves historically constituted. As pointed out by Geoffrey Ben-
nington in the case of Derrida, however, this should not be taken as a mere “histori-
cizing or culturalizing relativization of the transcendental.”53 Rather, the constitutive
structures of Cassirer and Derrida could be conceived of as “quasi-transcendental.”

48 “The maintenance of the rigorous distinction—an essential and juridical distinction—between the sign-
ans and the signatum, the equation of the signatum and the concept, inherently leaves open the possibility
of thinking a concept signified in and of itself, a concept simply present for thought, independent of a
relationship to language, that is of a relationship to a system of signifiers” (Derrida 2004, p. 19).
49 Derrida (1997, p. 66).
50 Cassirer (1955, p. 158).
51 Cassirer (1985, p. 43).
52 Cassirer (1957, p. 194).
53 Bennington (1993, pp. 280–281).

123
88 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

Yet, the emphasis on historically evolving symbols and signs brings them at such a
great distance from Kant’s transcendentalism that they are better considered as “post-
Kantian” thinkers. They also differ from Kant in conceiving of the primary, constitu-
tive structures as differential structures, that is, in realizing that the primacy of function
amounts to the same as a primacy of difference.
Both Cassirer and Derrida, then, insist on an irreducible symbolic mediacy at the
heart of human meaning formation. If we take a closer look at how they conceive of
the mediating function of symbols, however, their approaches quickly start to diverge.
The crucial difference between the two is that whereas Cassirer conceives of the sym-
bolic function as phenomenologically grounded in the world of expression, Derrida
precisely rejects any such attempt to ground the play of signifiers in a more “primor-
dial” level of experience. In Derrida’s account, the instituted trace is, as we have seen,
not only conceived of as that which makes signification possible but appearance as
well. In this way Derrida, as pointed out by Martin C. Dillon, effectively “disenfran-
chises perception as an origin of sense”.54 In Derrida’s account, sense or meaning is
reduced to signification, that is, to an effect of a purely negative and differential play
of signifiers. The result is a stance on symbolic mediation that Dillon has denomi-
nated as “semiological reductionism”. This reductive motive in Derrida’s thought has
to do with unspoken presuppositions he inherits from the very logocentric tradition he
reacts against. It is the same presuppositions that impel him to focus on the negative
consequences of originary difference. In the remainder of this article, then, I will try
to show that if one lets go of these presuppositions, as Cassirer attempts to do, a very
different and positive notion of originary difference will result.
In asserting the irreducibility of symbolic mediacy, both Cassirer and Derrida
ascribe a constitutive function to cultural inscription. This is to say that, in some sense
or other, symbolic intervention brings the object into existence. However, whereas
Derrida seems to regard the instituted trace as a prerequisite for the perceptual phe-
nomenon or meaning to arise at all, Cassirer regards it rather in terms of a further
determination of a phenomenon that is always already given—if only in a fleeting
and yet unspecified state. Contrary to Derrida, then, Cassirer does not consider the
signifying function to be self-subsistent. It is, above all, this idea of a self-subsistent
signifying function, combined with his logic of supplementarity which makes Der-
rida conceive of any act of referral as an endless deferral. As pointed out by Dillon,
the referent, conceived of as the “other” of language, is thus left as epistemologically
empty. The signifier and signified appear as “opposed poles” that are “separated by the
prohibition of a bar that cannot be lifted”.55 In Cassirer’s account, however, the sym-
bolic forms are not understood to supplement their target. Rather, they are understood
to intervene in an always already organized phenomenon by establishing a measure
against which the phenomenon is articulated further. In the latter account, then, the
constitutive forms retain their epistemic function, their power to reveal—even if the
“revelation” in question is no longer taken in the absolutist sense of the metaphysical
tradition.

54 Dillon (1995, p. 12).

55 Dillon (1995, p. 13).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 89

As mentioned above, Derrida is very clear that simple overturnings only confirm
the systems they renounce. This notwithstanding, he seems to resort to this strategy
in his criticisms of intuition. The “vision” of the metaphysical tradition is replaced by
“blindness”—a productive blindness, to be sure, but still a blindness.56 The problem
with iconoclastic gestures such as these, however, is that they only serve to strengthen
the metaphysical oppositions between the sensible and the intelligible, between intui-
tion and concept, between subject and object, rather than undermining them. So, even
if they seem radical in terms of their implications, strategies of overturning are not
radical enough, since they leave the underlying system untouched. Cassirer’s more
quiet-mannered strategy of reframing is in fact the more radical, since it leaves none
of the traditional oppositions intact.
To both thinkers, the notion of “play” is important and internally correlated with the
notion of difference. However, their different starting points make them conceive of
differential play in quite divergent ways. In Derrida’s account, the notion of differential
play designates the constitutive play of signifiers, which makes signification possible.
But since this play consists of a constant movement of supplementarity, differential
play is also what makes signification impossible. Derrida opposes “play” and “centre”,
and introduces play at the points in which tradition seeks foundation: Play replaces
presence, origin, and reference. Due to the necessary “detour of the sign” (Derrida,
1982, p.9), meaning and signification are always the result of the substitutional play
of signifiers. Meaning never gathers itself into a synthesis, rather, it spreads, dissem-
inates. We can lament this play or we can affirm it, but there is no way to reduce or
neutralize it.57 Cassirer, on the other hand, who does not conceive of the workings
of symbols in terms of supplementation, takes a very different approach. To Cassirer,
“play” (Spielraum) has to do with the way that the symbolic opens an ideal realm and
thus “frees” human beings from the narrow limits of a mere organic existence. It also
has to do with the way that the expressive world of human beings is shot through and
through by ideal horizons and vectors. And most importantly, it concerns Cassirer’s
understanding of the very process of determination. Cassirer conceives determina-
tion, not in terms of a pre-given centre or origin, but rather in terms of an active and
interventional centring or accentuation, on the relational (and thus differential) model
of figure and ground. This is to say that determination requires the implantation of
a viewpoint that works as a constitutive principle of relevance, a guide, or a point
of orientation. Thus conceived, determination is seen as a double-edged process: It
differentiates only through a process of integration, and it integrates only through a
process of differentiation. As a result, “identity” and “difference” are no longer con-
ceived of as opposites but emerge as internally correlated factors in one and the same
process.
The main problem with Derrida’s account of originary difference is that he contin-
ues to retain the metaphysical interpretation of identity as a negative standard against
which he measures the work of différance as well as the possibility of meaning, knowl-
edge, and communication. The critical comment Cassirer directed at Kant would be

56 See for instance Derrida’s discussion of vision and drawing in Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait
and Other Ruins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
57 Derrida (1978, p. 292).

123
90 Synthese (2011) 179:75–91

just as valid here if directed at Derrida: It does not suffice to make the divine standard
into a mere borderline concept. It is, more than anything, this negative standard that
prevents Derrida from developing a positive notion of originary difference. The nega-
tive standard inflicts not only his understanding of identity but even his understanding
of the symbolic: Measured against the divine standard, human understanding emerges
as finite and limited. It is symptomatic, therefore, that Derrida conceives of finitude as
a lack that is in need of supplementation. It is the sign, or more precisely, the play of
signifiers, which supplements this lack.58 But the supplement not only adds to what
is in need of supplementation, it also supplants it. Thus, as we can see from this, Der-
rida’s definition of the symbolic remains entirely negative, not only in its workings
(language is understood as a system of differences without positive terms), but even
in its very justification for being (the task of the symbolic is to supplement a lack).
In a characteristically roundabout and backwards manner, then, Derrida ends up con-
firming that the symbolic will always remain exterior to essence. This is, of course,
very far from how Cassirer conceives the matters. He refuses to retain the negative
standard of divine intuition, even as a borderline concept. And he acutely observes
that the definition of the symbolic and the essential as mutually exclusive factors con-
tinues to be a major source of confusion. In Cassirer’s account, symbolic interventions
do not supplement anything. Their workings could rather be understood in terms of
horticultural metaphors: They are spliced onto the phenomenon to form a graft; they
are implanted into the “ground” of sensibility and make the phenomena grow beyond
themselves; they are rooted but always transcend their point of departure.

References

Bennington, G. (1993). Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cassirer, E. (1944). An essay of man: An introduction to a philosophy of human culture. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Cassirer, E. (1949). ‘Life’ and ‘Spirit’ in contemporary philosophy, In: P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The
Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, Vol. 6 of Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, LaSalle, Ill.,
(pp. 855–880). Translated by Robert Walter Bretall and Paul Arthur Schilpp. Originally published
in German 1930.
Cassirer, E. (1955). The philosophy of symbolic forms, Vol. 1: Language (R. Manheim, Trans.). New
Haven: Yale University Press. (Originally published in German 1923).
Cassirer, E. (1956). Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften, Wesen
und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs (pp. 169–200). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
(Originally published 1923).
Cassirer, E. (1957). The philosophy of symbolic forms, Vol. 3: The phenomenology of knowledge (R.
Manheim, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press. (Originally published in German 1929).
Cassirer, E. (1985). Form und Technik. In: E. W. Orth & J. M. Krois (Eds.), Symbol, Technik, Sprache:
Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1927–1933 (pp. 39–91). Hamburg: Felix Meiner. (Originally published
1930).
Cassirer, E. (1996). The philosophy of symbolic forms. Vol. 4: The metaphysics of symbolic forms. New
Haven: Yale University Press. (Originally published in German 1995).
Cassirer E. (2004). Das Symbolproblem und seine Stellung im System der Philosophie. In: B. Recki
(Ed.), Aufsätze und Kleine Schriften (1927–1931), Vol. 17 of Gesammelte Werke, Hamburger
Ausgabe (pp. 253–282). Hamburg: Felix Meiner. (Originally published 1927).
Caws, P. (1988). Structuralism: The art of the intelligible. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

58 Derrida (1978, p. 290).

123
Synthese (2011) 179:75–91 91

Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and difference (A. Bass, Trans). London: Routledge. (Originally published
in French 1967).
Derrida, J. (1982). Différance, Margins of philosophy (A. Bass, Trans. pp. 1–27). Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. (Originally published in French 1968).
Derrida, J. (1997). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
(Originally published in French 1967).
Derrida, J. (2004). Positions (A. Bass, Trans.). London: Continuum. (Originally published in French
1972).
Dillon, M. C. (1995). Semiological reductionism: A critique of the deconstructionist movement in
postmodern thought. Albany, NY: State University of New York.
Kant, I. (1929). Critique of Pure Reason (N. K. Smith, Trans.). Hong Kong: Macmillan. (Originally
published in German 1781).
Kant, I. (1987). Critique of judgment (W. S. Pluhar, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. (Originally published
in German 1790).
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge.
(Originally published in French 1945).
Rorty, R. (1980). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Oxford: Blackwell.
Saussure, F. d. (1959). Course in general linguistics (W. Baskin, Trans.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
(Originally published in French 1916).

123