Durkheim's Evolutionary Conception of Social Change

Author(s): Roscoe C. Hinkle

Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1976), pp. 336-346
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4105955 .
Accessed: 17/04/2011 22:51

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and Midwest Sociological Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to The Sociological Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
 The Sociological Quarterly 17 (Summer 1976): 336-346

Durkheim'sEvolutionaryConception
of Social Change
ROSCOEC. HINKLE,The Ohio State University

Using criteria derived from several recent inquiries into the nature of classical social
evolutionismof the nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies,this studyhas endeavoredto deter-
mine what Durkheim'scomprehensiveviewson evolutionarychangewere.Durkheimappearsto
have remainedprevailinglyand persistentlya social evolutionist throughouthis sociological
career.He acceptsthe usual view of classicalsocial evolutionismregardingthe macro-or large-
scale characterof the social unitsundergoingchange(i.e., total societiesor entireinstitutions),the
organismand its changeas exhibitedin growthas an appropriateanalogy,and the comparative
method as the recommendedinvestigativeprocedure(albeitwith a somewhatuniquetechniqueto
insurethe similarityof the social contextsof the items studied).His conclusionat the end of his
careerthat changeis naturallyboth slow and rapidin its rate,relativelylimitedor unlimitedin its
initial scope, and small and large in scale is apparentlywithout parallel.His multiplanal,mul-
tilinear,and arborescentnotion of the directionalityof changehas seeminglyonly one parallel(in
Spencer).Finally,he agreeswith socialevolutionistsgenerallythat the causesof social changeare
prevailinglyinternal,necessary,and uniformin nature.
I
CERTAINLY, the almost unparalleledeminencewhich Durkheimenjoys today as a
founding father of modern sociology, the revival of a general interest in macro-
dynamics,efforts to reformulatean acceptablesocial evolutionismaccompaniedby
an acknowledgementof indebtednessto Durkheimin at least one case, along with
occasionalargumentsthat he was moving"awayfrom evolutionism,"was a residual
evolutionist,or that he seemsto have been an inconstantor inconsistentevolutionist
seem to recommendan inquiryinto Durkheim'sviews on social change generally
and on social evolution particularly.'It is the objectiveof this paperto providejust
such an investigation.
However evident and undeniableDurkheim'sstructuralcontributionsmay be,
change is-as Giddenscontends(1972:41)-the "centralissue informing"all four of
his majorvolumes,though only TheDivisionof Laborin Society seemsobvious and
is commonly so construed. In Durkheim'sown view, the significanceof Suicide
(1951:367-92)is that it studiesa phenomenonwhose increasingmagnitudeor "rising
tide" stems from a morbid or pathological social condition of modern French
society under the impact of abnormallyrapid and extensive social change. The
ElementaryFormsof the ReligiousLife (1968:20,fn)endeavorsto discoverthe more
elementary,simple, and thus primitive(or primordial)componentsof religion, its
origins in so far as the "most simple social condition...[canbe] actuallyknown or
that beyondwhich we cannot go at present."Finally,such basiccomponentsof The
Rules of SociologicalMethodas the notions of social cause and function,the socially

Reprintsof this articlemay be obtainedby writingRoscoe C. Hinkle,Departmentof Sociology,The

Ohio State University,ColumbusOH 43210.
'See Parsons'acknowledgementof indebtednessto Durkheim(1971:102-4,106-7, 114, 125, 127, 138).
Gouldner (1970:120, 130), Lukes (1972:456),and Nisbet (1974:239-56)offer somewhat differentin-
terpretationsof Durkheim'srelationshipto social evolution.
 Durkheim'sConceptionof Social Change 337

normal and pathological, the comparativemethod, and the typology of societal

specieshave a particularmethodologicalrelevancefor the studyof socialgenesisand
change.
More specifically, the frequencywith which such words or phrases as "social
evolution, " "collective evolution," "evolutionarytrend," "the evolution of the
patriarchalfamily"and other institutionalforms,the "stagesthat humanitysucces-
sively traverses,"and "particularsocieties"with their "various evolutions"occur
throughouthis variousinquiriessuggestshis adherenceto the tenetsof social evolu-
tion. To assertthat an explanationof a social phenomenonrequires"going back to
its more primitiveand simple form,"accountingfor "the characteristicsby which it
was markedat that time," and then indicating"how it developedand becamecom-
plicatedlittle by little," and finally showing "how it becamethat which it is at the
moment in question" is to pose causation in evolutionary terms (Durkheim,
1968:15). Furthermore,Durkheim certainly did consider his interests in both
diachronic-evolutionarycausation and synchronic functionality, which he ex-
pounded in The Rules, as mutuallycongruentand complementary.
II
A defensibleanalysismust do more than merelycite or considerscatteredpieces of
evidence. It is necessary to examine Durkheim's views on social evolutionism
systematicallyand comprehensively.For this purpose, a device or paradigmof the
recognized,typicalfeaturesof classicalsocial evolutionismis required.Fortunately,
the revivalof social evolutionismin sociologyduringthe 1960'swas accompaniedby
an investigationof the genesis and developmentof the ideas of the older, classical
evolutionismof the nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies.Although both British
and American sociologists have contributed to the delineation of evolutionary
antecedentsand components,the work of the late FrederickJ. Teggartand his stu-
dents has been especiallyuseful.' On the basis of these analyses,a paradigmof six
fundamental features of social evolutionism has been constructed and its
characteristicsconstitute the major criteria for assessing Durkheim'sinclinations
towardthe orientation:the conceptionof the social unit undergoingchange;use of
an appropriateanalogy;a method of study; a particularnotion of rate, scope, and
magnitudeof change;the natureof its directionality;and a causal notion or view of
the modus operandiof change.3Each criterionis representedin the six points below
summarizingthe evidence on Durkheim'sviews toward social change.
1. In accordancewith classicalsocial evolutionism,Durkheimacceptscomprehen-
sive or macro-socialunits such as (total) societies and (entire) institutionsas ap-
propriatefor the studyof social change.But unlikemanyof its adherents-for exam-
ple, Comte-Durkheim conspicuouslyrejects(1938:77, 78, 19) any conception of
'For contributionsof Englishsociologiststo the analysesof the antecedentsof socialevolutionism,see
Ginsburg(1957), Burrow(1966),and Smith(1973).For Americancontributions,consult:Teggart(1941),
Hildebrand's"Introduction"to Teggart(1949),Bock in Cahnmanand Boskoff(1964),andNisbet (1969)
and in McKinneyand Tiryakian(1970).
3Eachof the majorfeaturesof the Teggartiantraditionand Smith'sanalysisareincludedin the scheme:
total socialwholesas the "socialunitsundergoingchange;"the organicanalogyandGreekphysisin "use
of an appropriateanalogy;"comparativemethod as "a methodof study;"continuity-gradualism in "a
particularnotion of rate, scope and magnitudeof change;"direction,cumulation,irreversibilityin "the
natureof its directionality;"and naturalness,necessity,immanence,and uniformitarianism in "a causal
notion or view of the modus operandiof change."
338 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

specific societies as particularsin or representativesof the evolution of mankind,

human society in general, or "a single people" or "single social species," that is,
humanity. Historical development"breaks up. . . into a multitude of fragments
which,becausethey specificallydifferfromone another,cannotbejoined togetherin
a unifiedmanner"(1938:78).?Pascal'sfamous metaphoris untrue.Human societies
cannot be drawntogetherand "joinedlike the identicalsectionsof a straightline in
geometry"(1938:78).Durkheiminsiststhat social realityis constitutedof a plurality
of social species, each qualitativelydistinct from the others.
Unfortunately,other passages from Durkheim'sworks do not consistentlysup-
port his repudiationof a unitarynotion of humansociety.The unbrokencontinuity
of social evolution in The Divisionof Labor,the birth of all societies from "other
societies without a break in continuity," the "stages that humanity successively
traverses,"and the temporalsequencein the typology of societal species from the
"preceding"more simpleto the "succeeding"more complexformslogicallyimplya
comprehensivesocial unity among all concretesocietiesand theirclassificationinto
basic types of species (1938:105,85, 87, 117, 139, 140).
2. Also in concert with conventional social evolutionism, Durkheim finds the
organismand its changeas manifestedin growtha strategicallyimportantanalogyin
his endeavorto studychangenaturalisticallyin large-scalesocial units.That analogy
began with Greek philosophicnaturalismwhich-both in its intital formulationin
hylozoism and its later expressionin Aristotle-construed all objects in nature or
naturalobjects (includingsocial entities) as endowed with a physis or growth-like
tendency to change. Certainly, this view of dynamics anticipatesevolution, for
changestemsfrom internalcauses,"beginsin a seed-likeorigincontainingall poten-
tialities for futurestructure,"is exhibitedin "successiveand denotablestages"like
those in the life-cycle,and achieves"an end or final formthat gives meaningor pur-
pose to the whole process"(Nisbet, 1965:90-1).But the organism-growthanalogyas-
sociatedwithphysisalso anticipatesevolutionin implyingthe appropriatenessof the
study of changein largescale, holistic,or totalisticsocial units;the naturalness,nor-
mality, and necessity of the change process;its relativelyslow rate, limited scope,
and minimallyperceptiblemagnitude;and its continuous successiveor sequential
directionalcharacter.
The organismic-growthanalogyis undeniablyevidentin Durkheim'sanalysis.He
remarks(1938:83)that "the horde is the seed from which all social species have
developed."As is apparentbelow, he accepts the evolutionarynotion of a typical
rate, scope, and amount of change. He refers(1938:138, 140) to the evolution of
social institutionsas "growth"and to theircertainstagesin appropriategrowthter-
minology, for example, "youth". The causes (causal processesor mechanisms)of
change also have the characteristicsof the causes of growth:they are primarilyand
substantiallyinternal,necessary,and uniform. But even this evidencedoes not ex-
haust the documentation of Durkheim's acceptance of the organismic-growth
analogy.'
4Notethat henceforthany particularunidentifiedreferencewith only a date of publicationis to be con-
sidereda citation to one of Durkheim'sworks.
'Society, for instance,is referredto as a social organism,social solidarityis likenedto a spontaneous
consensusof parts of organisms,mechanicaland organicforms of solidaritystem from notions about
organisms,the concepts of the socially normaland pathologicalhave a biologicalinspirationas does
Durkheim'sclassificationof societies into social species. He does use other forms of analogy but the
organic or organismicis probablythe most pervasiveand basic. See Lukes(1972:35).
 Durkheim'sConceptionof Social Change 339

True, Durkheim'srecognitionthat "amonghumansocietiesthereare manywhich

are content to remain indefinitelystationary"(1938:109)seems to contradictthe
consistency and ubiquity of change as signified in the analogy. Apparently, he
regardsthese societies as the exceptionsand they receiveno furtherconsideration.
For Durkheim,change is natural,necessary,and normalbecauseit is construedas
growth,whichis natural,necessary,and normal-and becauseit is also construedto
effect adaptation,as requiredfor survivalunderalterable-alteringconditionsof col-
lective existence.
3. Durkheim'sconvictionthat "the comparativemethod is the only one suited to
sociology" and is especially importantfor the study of (macro-) social change is
furtherevidenceof his associationwith social evolutionism(1938:125).Comparison
pervadesDurkheim'smethodologicalprocedure.It is importantin determing"com-
mon" elements in the diversityof forms and for separatingout the "permanent"
from the "transient,"the "principle"from the "secondary,"and the "essential"
fromthe "accessory"(1968:17).Manifestly,the level and rangeof comparativestudy
requireddepends on the nature of the phenomenoninvolved (1938:126-39).Some
social phenomena, such as "social currents,"are relativelydistinctiveof a given
society. Others,such as "an institution,a legal or moralregulation,or an established
custom," exist in several societies of the same species. And still other phenomena
have been received"ready-madefrom preceding[typesor species]of societies"and
thus are common to several types of societies. For each of the three types, a par-
ticular range of comparisonis required,least extended for the first and most ex-
tendedfor the third.It is, of course,comparisonassociatedwith the thirdwhichcon-
stitutesthe genuinegenetic methodand which permitsdeterminationof the "condi-
tions on which [the evolutionary]. . .formation [of elements or constituents]
depend[s]" (1938:139). The establishment of causation requires comparison
(1938:125).
Manifestly, Durkheim'scomparativemethod does differ significantlyfrom the
comparativemethod of classicalevolutionismbecauseit is pursuedwith explicitat-
tention to social or societal contexts, both concretely and abstractly. Any
phenomenonmust be relatedto its context and thus "cannot be understoodwhen
detached from it" (1968:113). Explanation requires generalization but two
phenomenaor two facts cannot be compared(and potentiallygeneralized)merely
"becausethey seem to resembleeach other"(1968:113-4).They mustalso be derived
from societies which are alike; that is to say, they must be "varietiesof the same
species" (1968:114).6 Accordingly,Durkheim argues that a classificationof social
types or species must be developed to facilitate comparison.
Yet he constructshis social types or species by rational fiat ratherthan by em-
pirical inquiry.Becausethe first of his types is irreduciblysimple and homogeneous
and each of the others is symmetrically, step-by-step, more complex and
heterogeneous,the total seriesas envisaged(albeitincomplete)presupposesthe same
parallelism between social simplicity-complexity and temporal primitivity-
modernityas did Comte'sstagesin his comparativemethod.Durkheim'sschemefor
comparisoninvolves an abstractuniversalismmore like Comte's than Durkheimis

6Certainly,Durkheimregardedhis studyof the Australianprimitivesocietiesas complyingwith the re-

quirementfor the use of the comparativemethod:they"allbelongto one commontype"or species,which
is organizedon the "basis of clans" (1965:96).But consult Gouldner(1970:120,130).
340 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

aware or would desire.7Whetherhis own version of the method really rejectsthe

implicationof the "directionof humanevolution in general"as a classicalpractice
entailed is also less certain than Durkheimimagined(1938:125).
4. Throughouthis career,Durkheimadheredto the characteristicview of social
evolutionismthat change is naturallyand normallyslow in its rate, initiallylimited
in scope and small in amount.Underthis circumstance,the social equilibriumis not
likely to be fundamentallyor drasticallydisturbed.Adjustmentto minorvariations
can be achieved more easily. Rules can be more readily modified. According to
Durkheim (1965:291),the "common conscience is constitutedvery slowly and is
modifiedin the same way." Whatconstitutesan appropriateadjustmentto the slight
shift in the conditionsof existencewill be ascertainedspontaneouslyif the relations
are repeated,if variationand gropingdiminishand generalityand crystallizationin-
crease, and if uniformityand consensusgraduallyemerge as the "True nature of
things" becomes apparent-for all of which the passage of time is essential
(1965:368-9,377).
In evolutionarytransformation,the segmentaltype of structureloses "more and
more ground as societies develop" (1965:187).Local customs "join together and
unite" little by little, and later, partitionsin social life "lose their cohesion, [and]
become progressively effaced. . ." (1965:187). Standing alone or nearly so at first,
mechanical solidarity "progressively loses ground and . .. organic solidarity
becomes, little by little, preponderant"(1965:174).
Conversely, rapid, less limited, and large-scale social changes tend to dis-
equilibraterelations.Anomie resultsas rules become indefinite.Old ones lose their
obligatorinessand new ones have not had sufficient time to acquire support. A
"society cannot change its structuresuddenly"(1951:369).Indeedfor Durkheimin
his earlier career (1951:369), any "grave and rapid . . . alteration must be morbid,"
abnormal,or pathological.Social changeis normallyand naturally"a successionof
slow, almost imperceptible modifications. . ." (1951:369).
Only later(duringthe last decadeof his sociologicalwork)did he actuallyconsider
a rapid, accelerated,leap-by-leaprate of changein perceptible,moreencompassing,
large amounts, which occur "only when society is passingthroughsome abnormal
crisis"or a beneficentbut abrupttransition(1951:251-2)-perhapsfrom one species
to another. Involving a "creativefermentor effervescence,"such change is not a
mere alteration of "shades and degrees"but a transformationof kind or quality
(1968:241). The whole society undergoes a revolution, renewal, or creative
reconstruction(e.g., the birth of Scholasticismin the twelfth and thirteenthcen-
turies,the periodof the Renaissanceand Reformation,the FrenchRevolutionin the
eighteenth century, and the Socialist upheavals of the nineteenth century
[1953:91-2]).
5. Like the classical social evolutionists,Durkheimdid construechange in such
large-scaleand enduringsocial unitsas (total)societiesand (entire)institutionsas ex-

7Both Durkheim'sconception of a taxonomy of societal types or species and Comte's notion of

humanityor the humanrace(in general)-both of whichareemployedfor construingthe empiricalmul-
tiplicityof human societiesas a generalizedsequentialunity-are similarlyabstractrationalfictionsor
constructs.Comte is commendablyexplicitin acknowledgingthe derivationof his own procedurefrom
Condorcet'srationalfiction"of supposinga singlenationto whichwe mayreferall the consecutivesocial
modificationsactuallywitnessedamongdistinctpeoples"(Comte, 1893,11:69).Whethera singleunitary
concept(as in Comte'sandCondorcet'scases)or a multipledifferentiatednotion(as in Durkheim'scase),
each is equally a rationalabstractfiction or construct.
 Durkheim'sConceptionof Social Change 341

hibitinga directionalitywhich is generallyand broadlylinear.Such directionalityis

evidentin his acceptanceof a trendfromprimitive,simple,rudimentary,undifferen-
tiated, and segmental types of society to modern, complex, elaborated, differen-
tiated, and organizedtypes or speciesof society.Yet, he explicitlydisavowsany rigid
uniplanal,unilinearand rectilinearview (a la Comte) for a multiplanal,multilinear,
and arborescentconception which he regardsas manifest in his own typology of
societal species (1938:19, 78, 118, 120).
Nevertheless,the confidenceof his opposition which is expressedin TheRules is
underminedby other passages in the same work and in the later The Elementary
Forms.In the latterand latest of his monographs,he refers(1968:13-21)to primitive
and modernsocietiesin a varietyof termsbut so interrelatedas to suggestcontinuity
on and within the same plane. Even in TheRules, he claims (1938:134,105, 84-85,
138-40) that "Social life. . . is an uninterruptedseries of transformations,""all
societies are born of other societies without a break in continuity,"and that the
societal species are derivableimmediatelyfrom one another in a gradation from
simplicityto complexity(simplepolysegmentalto compoundand doublycompound
polysegmental)such that the formerare the "preceding"and the latter"succeeding"
societal species. Furthermore,Durkheim'smethodologicalprescriptionsfor assess-
ing the directionof changein a given social phenomenonas it presents"moreor less
or equal complexity"at the given stage in the currentsocietalspeciesin comparison
with the same stage in precedingspecies-and thus can be said to progress,regress,
or maintain itself-tends to place all societies in the same series and on the same
plane (1938:139-40).Consequently,both his comments and his analyticalpractice
contradicthis professedrejectionof the uni-recti-linearityof the directionof social
evolution.
6. Finally, Durkheim concurs with the view of social evolutionism that social
change stems from a modus operandior causal mechanismthat is immanent,neces-
sary, and uniform. He (1938:121)is unmistakablyexplicit in his assertionthat the
"causes of social phenomenaare internalto society" itself. Presumably,he means
that social phenomenaexist sui generisand that the causes of social change reside
within society itself, especiallywithin the characterof its internalmilieu, and par-
ticularlyits substratum(1938:116).Furthermore,the causes are necessarybecause
they reflector correspondto the very natureof the social milieu and the conditions
of collectiveexistence.As Durkheimremarks(1938:97),social life tends to involvea
correspondencebetween the internaland external social milieux. Finally, a set of
causes is uniformin that it exists and has a determiningand correspondingeffect so
long as and wherevera particularstructureof social relations (i.e., a particular
milieu)endures.The same set of causestends to persistinvariablythroughtime with
the same effect becauseit (1938:117)"can expressonly one single nature."It is the
substratumespeciallythat providesthe constantsourceof the causalbond;the con-
comitant conditions for assertinga causal explanation.
What this declarationmeansis that presenteventsof social life originatein (or are
caused by) the present state or condition of society. The "principalcauses of
historical development"are to be found "among the concomitantcircumstances"
and not in the past (1938:117). Patently, the "stages that humanity successively
traversesdo not engenderone another" (1938:117).A sequence of stages is only
historicalor chronological:agiven stage is not itself the cause of the followingone.
In Durkheim's view, a sequence of stages must be linked to a particularsocial
342 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

species,whichis characterizedby a commontype of internalmilieu,especiallya sub-

stratum,and particularlythe mode of compositionof the social aggregates.Contrary
to Nisbet's argument(1974:251-6),Durkheimdoes believethat the substratumof a
particularspecies contains an organismic-maturational-growth tendencyexhibiting
a sequence of stages from "youth" to "decline"(1938:139-40).
Undoubtedly,Durkheim'sviews also involve distinctivefeaturesof his own, em-
bodying as they do notions of (causal) pluralism,emergentism,and differential
potency. To indicatethat the primaryor determiningcauses of social evolution are
internalis still to admit that other causes which are externaldo exist, even though
they may become influentialonly through "the intermediaryof the internalsocial
milieu" (1938:117).Furthermore,social phenomenathemselvescan be separated
into three distinguishablebut interconnectedvarietiesdependingupon their relative
crystallizationand fixity (Lukes, 1972:9-10).Each has its own distinctivecausal
significance,providesa basis for and sets certainlimits within which the next level
arises and operates.Most crystallizedand fixed are the phenomenaassociatedwith
society's morphology or substratum,especially the kind, number, and mode of
combination-concentrationof the major constituentsocial units. Apparently,it is
generatedthroughassociationin relationto the externalconditionsof collectiveex-
istence(i.e., the biophysicalenvironmentand other societies)to whichit is adapted.8
Deriving from and expressive of the nature of the substratum,the second or
normative-ideationaldomain, which is especially reflected in a variety of in-
stitutionalized rules, is also relatively crystallized and established-though
presumablyless so than the firstrealm.Durkheimleavesno doubtthat the collective
representationsof this domainbecome"partiallyautonomousrealities"(1953:30-1).
In turn, the third level arisesfrom and operateswithin the limits set by the second.
This last domain of social currentsembracesboth the somewhatmoreconstantcur-
rentsof opinion and the more variabletransitoryemotionaloutbreaks.Of the three
levels, it is relativelyuninstitutionalizedand uncrystallized.Nevertheless,Durkheim
regards the first level, the collective substratum,as possessing a unique causal
primacy or determination.
This primacyis evidentin the accountof multiplecausesof socialevolutionwhich
is providedin TheDivisionof Labor.Durkheimdividesthe causesinto primaryand
secondarycategories.Primarycauses are apparentlythose causes which are first in
their significanceand potence,are social, and also original.Secondarycauses are of
lessersignificanceand potency,may be social but of derivativecharacter,or may be
non-social (and thus exterior) but still operate only through social causes. His
analysisof primarycausesproposesthat the concentrationof population(via growth
of cities, especially through immigration)and the increase in the number and
rapidity of means of communicationand transportationcombine to diminish the
spaces separatingthe basic social units or segmentsand to increase,therefore,the
moraldensity,whichoccursbecausethe social interactionof membersfromthe units
of society is expandedand intensified.Such increasedmoral density heightensthe
strugglefor existenceand it, in turn,is resolvedeventuallyby occupationaldifferen-

8Althoughsocial phenomenado not originatebecausethey may have usefuleffects, the majorityof

them must "combinein such a way as to put society in harmonywith itself and with the [external]en-
vironment"or effect "a correspondencebetween the internaland externalmilieu. . ." (138:97, 96).
Manifestly,Durkheim'sconceptionof functionor the "useswhicha phenomenonserves"presupposesa
Darwinian-Spencerianperspectiveultimately(1938:64,61).
 Durkheim's Conception of Social Change 343

tiation and specialization(divisionof labor).Of all the adducedprimarycauses,the

morphological changes producing changes in moral density appear to be most
crucial. Yet, Durkheimsuggests that all factors, both primaryand secondary,are
necessary.Only whenjoined togetherin the appropriatecausalbond do they become
sufficientto produce the effect, the division of labor.9
Through his career, Durkheim apparently adhered to the view that social
evolutionarychange was typically and normallyslow, gradual, and small scale in
character,as can be exemplifiedby his analysisof changingrules in relationto the
division of labor in emergingorganizedsocieties. The milieux of such societies are
complex and unstable.Accordingly,some "breakof equilibrium,or some innova-
tion is alwaysbeing produced"(1965:333).Specializedand mutuallydependentoc-
cupationsalreadyexist. Rules are evidentlygeneratedas membersof these different
occupationsinteractdirectly with one another and respond to what have become
"general, constant conditions of social life" (1965:366). Because some of their
responsesare "very conformableto the natureof things," they "are repeatedvery
often and become habits" (1965:366).As these habits acquire force, they "are
transformedinto rules of conduct" (1965:366).A "certain sorting of rights and
duties. . .is establishedby usage and becomes obligatory"(1965:355).(Note the
adaptiveallusionsto "conditionsof social life" and the "natureof things"as signify-
ing the existing conditions of collective existence).
Yet, Durkheim'slater writings, especiallyhis "Judgmentsof Values and Judg-
ments of Reality"(in 1953)and TheElementaryForms,indicateboth the possibility
of and causalmechanismsin morerapid,comprehensive,and largescalesocio-moral
change. Precipitatedby some great collectivecrisis,upheaval,or shock, this type of
changeproduces"creativeeffervescenceor ferment."Durkheimuses the term "col-
lectiveeffervescence"(or "ferment")to referto the causalprocessby whicha certain
maximal frequency,range, duration, and especiallyintensity of association or in-
teractioncreatepsychicchangein the society.Out of the increasinglystrongersensa-
tions induced,passions aroused,vital energiesreleased,and the emotionalwarmth,
enthusiasm,and exaltationengendered,a new consciousnessof the whole develops.
Egoismand the commonplaceare excluded;men see more and differentlythan they
do in normal circumstances;they feel transformed.The new life which has been
awakened is portrayedin new collective representations.Society itself is morally
recreatedby a reformulation,reformationand redefinitionof the very "idea. .. of
itself" (1968:470).
To declarethat such changesare not merelyalterationsof "shadesand degrees,"
quantitativechanges,is to suggestthat they are qualitativechanges,changesof kind
or type. Presumably,they signify a transformationof the basic form or genera of
society (e.g., from segmentalto organizedtypes) or perhapsonly a transitionfrom
one species to another (e.g., from simply compounded to doubly compounded
polysegmental).[See pages 10 - 11 above and LaCapra(1972:209).]Unfortunately,
9Causedprimarilyby increasingmoraldensitywhicheventuatesin a heightenedstrugglefor existence,
the divisionof labor is pursuedby society"becausethe course...previouslyfollowedwas. . . barredand
becausethe greaterintensityof the struggle,owingto the moreextensiveconsolidationof societies,made
more and more difficultthe survivalof individualswho continuedto devotethemselvesto unspecialized
tasks"(1938:93).But, presumably,the secondaryfactorsexplainwhy such other outcomesof material-
moraldensityas emigration,colonization,suicide,resignation,or crimeare not extensivelypursuedand
why the divisionof laboris the preponderant,effective,and necessaryoutcome(1965:286:1938:93).For a
generalexpositionof Durkheim'scomplicatednotion of a cause-effectbond, see Alpert(1966:80-111).
344 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

Durkheimhimselfis not entirelyexplicit.Once createdout of effervescence,the new

collectiverepresentations(in this case, new values or ideals),whichas a categoryin-
itially originatedas an effect of the social milieu,now seeminglybecomea cause and
affect the milieu. Just what the relationshipof the precipitatingcrisis is to altered
conditions of existence in the excitation of "collective ferment"is not explained.
Durkheim, however, did refuse to accept an explanationof accelerated,more en-
compassing socio-moral change that is stated only in terms of adaptatation to
physical-organicconditions of survival(1953:91,93).
III
Analysis of the most extensiveexpositionof collectiveeffervescencein TheElemen-
tary Forms revealsthat Durkheim was preoccupiedin that workwith the problemof
the origins of social phenomenaand confirmsthe generalconclusionof this paper
that he remained prevailinglya social evolutionist until the end of his career.
Although collectiveeffervescenceappearsrecurrently,in this last monographof his,
as the culminationof participationin riteswhichfunctionto maintainor perpetuate
the fundamentalsymbolism(or religion) of Australiansocieties, it is actually the
basic cause of the evolutionaryorigin of the most elementary,simple, fundamental
form(s) of religion, if not also of society itself. (See the paraphraseof Durkheim's
main investigativeobjectivein TheElementaryForms,(see sectionI above).To insist
that Durkheim'sconcernwith causal analysisentails an identificationof what was
evolutionarilymost elementaryor simpleis not to deny the equal necessityof func-
tional analysis.Once most social phenomenahave originated,they must "combine
in such a way as to put society in harmonywith itself and with the environmentex-
ternal to it" (1938:97).Manifestly,both modes of inquiryare required.But it ap-
pears that recently some sociologists have endeavored to deny that he was an
evolutionistmerelybecausehis expositionof a givenfeatureof the six majorfeatures
of social evolutionismis somewhatvariantor particularisticwithoutexplorationof
implicationsfor the general characterof the given point or its relations to other
general featuresof evolutionism.'0
Certainly,this analysisdoes not deny that social evolutionistshad theirdistinctive
views. Durkheim did diverge from Comte in disavowingthe unity of all human
society and the uniplanal,unilinearand rectilineardirectionalityof its change. But
he also agreedwith others(for example,Spencer)in the appropriatenessof studying
changein such large-scalesocial units as (total) societiesand (entire)institutionsand
in the characteristicmultiplanal,multilinear,and arborescentdirectionalityof the
changesexhibitedby such units. Perhapsthe most conspicuousand significantvaria-
tion from classicalsocial evolutionismcame in Durkheim'slater life when he seems

"OGouldner's argument(1970:120,130),for instance,that Durkheim'suse of the comparativemethod

representsa "moveawayfromevolutionism"ignoresthe factthat Durkheim'sdistinctivedevicefor insur-
ing the comparabilityof the contexts of items studied is a societal typology which itself presupposes
evolutionarydifferentiation.
Although Nisbet's more recentcompactstudy of Durkheim(1974) certainlyrecognizesDurkheim's
developmentalismor social evolutionism,Nisbet seems to have been misled in his interpretationof
Durkheim'srejectionof geneticcausalityin the sequenceof stages.True,Durkheimdid not construeone
stage as generatingthe nextone (Nisbet, 1974:252-5).But he apparentlydid conceiveof the substratum-
on which the stages of a given species of society depend-as endowed with an intrinsicorganismic-
maturational-growth tendency(Nisbet, 1974:252-4;see Durkheim,1938:139-40).
 Durkheim'sConceptionof Social Change 345

to have acceptedbothslow, limited,small-scaleand rapid,encompassing,and large-

scale social change as virtuallyequally likely and natural.
Generallyand pervasivelyDurkheimwas a social evolutionist:His basic substan-
tive concepts (e.g., the sui generis notion of the social and society, social
morphology, the internal milieu, collective representions,the socially normal and
pathological,the typology of societal species,moral rules and institutions,anomie),
his ideas of social causesand social functions,his defenseand use of the comparative
method, and his conception of the fundamental and unifying problem for
sociological inquiryare all basicallyand inextricablydependenton and interwoven
with a broad theory of social evolutionarychange. Similarly,his specificinquiries
into the divisionof labor, familyand kinship,suicide,religion,punishment,occupa-
tions, the state, contract, education, morality, and knowledgeare cast in terms of
social evolution.1
Durkheim was persistently a social evolutionist throughout all of his major
works-from his earliestDivisionof Labor,through TheElementaryForms,and up
to and includinghis contributionsafter 1912on the notion of civilization(1971:808-
13), a reviewof Wundt'sElementeder Voelkerpsychologie (1909-1912:50-61),and his
articleon sociology for the San FranciscoExposition(1964:376-85).Certainlyhe did
not regardany of what might today be interpretedas his own distinctivevariations
from the generictenets of classicalsocial evolutionismas sufficientlysignificantto
warrantthe rejectioneitherof the termor substanceof a social evolutionarynotion
of social change.
Perhaps the main obstacle to the recognition that Durkheim was a social
evolutionist-as much a social evolutionistas he was a functionalist-resides in the
fact that he is envisagedfrom the perspectiveof recent sociology ratherthan from
the socio-intellectualcontext of his own era. His rise to eminencein contemporary
American sociology is associated to a considerableextent with the ascendanceof
structuralfunctionalismin the 1940's,whichoccurredafteran earlier(1920's)period
of vigorous assault on the tenets of classical social evolutionism.Presumably,his
(then)contemporaneousrelevancyand his assertedidentificationwith functionalism
would have been compromisedby the admissionthat he had insistedon both func-
tional and causalexplanations,with the latterintrinsicallyevolutionaryin character.
But within the last decade and a half, Parsonshas developeda social evolutionism
from the foundationsof structuralfunctionalismand has acknowledgedDurkheim
as one of the influencesin his formulation(1971:102-4,106-7, 114, 125, 127, 138).
Thus, belatedlyit should now be possible to recognizein Durkheimthe mutually
congruentassumptionsof social evolutionismand functionalismin generalwhich
Smithhas only recentlyanalyzedso lucidlyand cogently(1973).

"ConcerningDurkheim'sevolutionaryinterpretationof institutions,consultLukes(1972:chapters8,
13, 19) and Wallwork(1972:chapters4, 5 [particularlypp. 130-40]and 7 [especially,pp. 186-90]).
346 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
REFERENCES
Alpert, Harry
1966 Emile Durkheim and His Sociology.
New York:Russelland Russell.
Bock, Kenneth E.
1964 "Theories of progress and evolution."
Pp. 21-41 in WernerJ. Cahnman and
Alvin Boskoff (eds.), Sociology and
History. New York:FreePress.
Burrow,J. W.
1966 Evolution and Society. London:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Comte, August
1893 The Positive Philosophy. Volume II.
Harriet Martineau (trans.). Lon-
don:KeganPaul, Trench,Trubner.
Durkheim,Emile
1909-Reviewof WilhelmWundt,Elementsder
1912 Voelkerpsychologie.I'Annee sociologi-
que 12:50-61.
1938 The Rules of Sociological Method.
SarahA. Solovay and John H. Mueller
(trans.).New York:FreePress.
1951 Suicide.John A. Spauldingand George
Simpson (trans.). Glencoe, Illinois:Free
Press.
1953 Sociologyand Philosophy.D. F. Pocock
(trans.).Glencoe, Illinois:FreePress.
1964 "Sociology." Pp. 376-85, Jerome D.
Folkman(trans.),in EmileDurkheim,et
al., Essayson Sociologyand Philosophy.
New York:HarperTorchbooks.
1965 The Division of Labor in Society.
George Simpson (trans.). New
York:FreePress.1
1968 The ElementaryForms of the Religious
Life. Joseph Ward Swain (trans.).
York:FreePress.
1971 "Note on the notion of civilization."
Benjamin Nelson (trans.). Social
Research38(Winter):808-13.
Giddens, Anthony
1971 Capitalismand Modern Social Theory.
New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
1972 "Introduction:Durkheim'swritings in
sociology and social philosophy."Pp. 1-
50 in Emile Durkheim, Selected
Writings.New York:Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Ginsberg,Morris
1957 Essays in Sociology and Social
Philosophy. Volume I. London:
Heinemann.
Gouldner,Alvin W.
1970 The Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology. New York:BasicBooks.
Hildebrand,George E.
1949 "Introduction."Pp. 3-30 in FrederickJ.
Teggart (ed.), The Idea of Progress:A
Collection of Readings.
of CaliforniaPress.
Berkeley:University
La Capra, Dominick
1972 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and
Philosopher.Ithaca, New York:Cornell
UniversityPress.
Lovejoy,ArthurO.
1960 The Great Chain of Being. New
York:HarperTorchbooks.
Lukes,Steven
1972 Emile Durkheim:His Life and Work.
New York:Harperand Row.
Nisbet, Robert A.
1965 Emile Durkheim. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:Prentice-Hall.
1969 Social Change and History. New
York:OxfordUniversityPress.
1970 "Developmentalism: a criticalanalysis."
Pp. 167-204in John C. McKinneyand
EdwardA. Tiryakian(eds.), Theoretical
Sociology. New York:Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
1974 The Sociologyof EmileDurkheim.New
York:OxfordUniversityPress.
Parsons,Talcott
1971 "Comparativestudies and evolutionary
change."Pp. 97-139in IvanVallier(ed.),
Comparative Methods in Sociology.
Berkeley and Los Angeles, Califor-
nia:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Smith, Anthony D.
1973 The Concept of Social Change.
Boston:Routledgeand Kegan Paul.
Teggart,FrederickJ.
1962 Theory and Processes of History.
Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.
Wallwork,Ernest
1972 Durkheim: Morality and Milieu.
Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversity
Press.