Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan.

3, 1963 FACTS: Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria Helen a certain amount of money and giving the rest of his estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the partition on the ground that she is deprived of her legitime. Her contention is that the law of California directs that the law of the domicile (Philippines) should govern the will. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary law should apply HELD: The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national law of the decedent. In the present case, the national law of Edward is the laws of California. However, there were two conflicting California laws regarding succession. One is enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does not provide for legitimes) and another is Art. 946 of the California Civil Code (which provides that the law of the domicile applies). SC held that the national law is Art. 946, which is the conflict of laws rule of California. The reason is that In Re Kaufman applies only to residents while Art. 946 is specific to nonresidents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a referback to Philippine laws (the law of the domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime. Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967 FACTS: Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of Texas. He left two wills -- one devising a certain amount of money to his first wife and three illegitimate children and another, leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate children. Before partition, the illegitimate children who are Filipinos opposed on the ground that they are deprived of their legitimes. ISSUE: Whether the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine laws HELD: Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should govern the intrinsic validity of the will and therefore answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since the law of Texas was never proven, the doctrine of processual presumption was applied. Hence, SC assumed that Texas law is the same as Philippine laws, which upholds the nationality rule.

Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because there is no conflict as to the nationality and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and a resident of Texas. So even if assuming the law of Texas applies the domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that governs because his domicile is Texas. Gibbs v. Government of Philippine Islands Facts: Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in California. They acquired lands in the Philippines. The wife died in California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the intestate proceedings instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked the court to adjudicate to him lands acquired in the Philippines not under our laws on succession but because in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon proof of California law. The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on the ground of nonpayment of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of a California wife in a community property is a personal right and even if this was a case of succession, California law would still apply. Issue: is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax? Held: The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that was vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code. It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae. The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by

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virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. However, the argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. However, the court held that it is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated. Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband and the descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. Fleumer vs. Hix 54 Phil 610 Facts:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that the will did not show the following: • acknowledgment by Hix in the presence of 2 competent witnesses • Witnesses subscribed to will in presence of the testator, and of each other Hence, this appeal. Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will? Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. • There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. Due execution of the will was not established: only showed testimony of the petitioner

The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved. Miciano v. Brimo

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Decedent is a Turkish citizen. He left a will stating that he wishes to dispose of his properties in accordance with Philippine Laws. His brother, Andre Brimo opposed the partition. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which states that testamentary successions shall be governed by the national law of the deceased. He was therefore excluded from the inheritance pursuant to a clause in the decedent’s will that anyone who would oppose the decedent’s wish to dispose his estate under Philippine law shall have his share annul or cancelled. Issue: Whether or not the declaration that Turkish laws are impertinent to this case; Whether or not the appellant’s exclusion from the will is valid? Held: 1st issue The oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, the Court finds no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. 2nd issue The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. RULING: Prior evidence already presented to prove the existence of Texas Law. It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time). Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that “the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found”,

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If the court of the forum is familiar of the law Or it is within the actual knowledge of the court Section 1 of the rule provides: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country. the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters. and a certificate of its allowance. shall be filed and recorded by the clerk. China. does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. which is the “national law” of the testatrix. the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy. to which shall be attached a copy of the will. promulgated January 31. G. and probated in China be reprobated in the Philippines? Held: As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy. an attesting witness to the will. However. by the executor or other person interested. Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate insofar as her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are concerned. Province of Fookien. if the same be admitted. Section 3 provides: If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines. in the court having jurisdiction. Thereafter the widow filed a petition for a probate of a will but was later denied when the will was lost after the filing of said petition. No. Private International Law Page 4 . China and thus filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will. We shall not. the petition was granted since there was sufficiency to prove the loss of the will. China. provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law — see paragraph 2. signed by the Judge. recorded. Section 2 provides: When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof. as approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the case of “In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy. and attested by the seal of the courts. On appeal. filed. and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance. at this stage. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. China. In view thereof. supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables (personal properties). There is no proof on these points.R. After liberation. are inadmissible. 1963. such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing. the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. Suntay died intestate leaving properties in the Philippines and a house in China. the Conflict of Law of Texas. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. cannot be deemed and accepted as Suntay v. the court shall so allow it. is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines. and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court. because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings. 2. The order of the municipal district court of Amoy. is a probate court must be proved. duly authenticated. Suntay Jose B. Thus applying the “Renvoi Doctrine”. recorded and probated in the Amoy district court. the law on the point in Rule 78. L-16749. Issue: May a will filed. Silvino claimed to have found a will by his father which was filed. China. and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines. according to the laws of such country. Christensen”. on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. may be allowed. Consequently.shall prevail. discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas. Nota bene: When can foreign law be given judicial notice 1. He is survived by children from the 1st marriage and a child and his widow from the 2nd. Linnie Jane Hodges. Intestate proceedings were instituted. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China objected to by counsel for the appellee.

instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. died in the city of Manila. and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines. This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him. Johnson. Proper rule in taking judicial notice: The proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts. or by someone in his behalf. leaving a holographic will and is signed by himself and two witnesses only." The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship. the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois. The effect of this provision necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. such as the age and mental capacity of the testator. without pronouncement as to costs. therefore. a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States. the will referred to therein cannot be allowed. Held: Emil Johnson was a citizen of the State of Illinois. We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning. he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. The decree appealed from is affirmed. the signing of the document by the testator. it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate. Petitioner contends that the decedent is not a citizen of Illinois and prays to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration. That situation. Issue: Whether or not judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State. United States of America. thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father. and hence could properly be probated here.proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and. Likewise. China. and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive. and without fraud. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters. Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated according to law. a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will. can be annulled. on account of any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. The acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Fisher Private International Law Page 5 . However. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. In re: Johnson Emil H. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy. filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. In the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the United States. Collector vs. that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State. may be likened to or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties. in our opinion. in any other proceeding whatever.

71 entitled "Housman vs. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2. The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8.Facts: This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G." In that Private International Law Page 6 . In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22. the Collector assessed the state the amount of P5. that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41.000. (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52. 1125.147. Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines.875. The refund of the amount of P15.38 per share. Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. California. Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals.500. However.A. 1951. Douglas and Bettina Fisher. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.00.200. 1952. 1951 in San Francisco.000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines. Walter G. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U. The Collector denied the claim.39. 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22. the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court. as a consequence. action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents." August 14. or a total of P16. Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared therein. 61 Phil. and the laws applicable thereto. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210.98 for estate tax and P10.26 or inheritance tax.83.06 for inheritance tax and that. allegedly overpaid. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate. 1952.S. U. pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code.00 in the computation of the estate tax. Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses. they must be alleged and proved. Stevenson. whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence since May 10. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value.000. 471. for the recovery of said amount. and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11. respondents herein. we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson. Pursuant to Republic Act No. should be appraised at P0.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5. except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4.34 for estate tax and P238.000. Section 41. Like any other fact. as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate. the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.000. Inc. Inc. rendered decision : that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G.00. Acting upon said return. 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23.23. Muzzal.259. Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in our jurisdiction? Ruling: It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. 1947. and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210.000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines. filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.S. 1945. (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax. For this reason. Collector. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9. and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2. after hearing.000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.023.604. and 210. The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in pursuance of his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Stevenson. pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4. it had overpaid the government. was accordingly requested by the estate. although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule. In this last return.

we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco.000 as her share. whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. especially Section 9905. his stay here was merely temporary. with a certificate that such officer has the custody. the court made the following findings: According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state. claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them. and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. Rafael Amparo. Issue: whether the estementary dispositions. Accordingly.case. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines. as it was the executor's duly to do. Bohanan Facts: Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. that sometime in 1925. Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court during the hearing of the case on before Judge Rafael Amparo. especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines. (par. The wife Magadalena C. and accompanied. or by his deputy. 2 Art. Bohanan were married on January 30. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire. 41. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator. admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20. old Civil Code. as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. Moreover. and that divorce was granted to him on May 20. 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. however. may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. Bohanan. legal and testamentary successions. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Magdalena C. . if the record is not kept in the Philippines. . Wherefore. . In line with this view. being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules. Says the law on this point: Nevertheless. Hon. the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. The Court of First Instance of Manila. California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted. we find no error. the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence. 1956. the Philippine Trust Company. That is his exclusive personal right. Compiled Nevada Laws was introduced in evidence by appellant's counsel. O. named as the executor of the will. 16. new Civil Code. Ramon San Jose. is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. O. Phil Trust Company vs. which is the same as par. Private International Law Page 7 . — An official record or an entry therein. which are as follows: SEC.00. It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition. or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. Art. which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. presiding.) In the proceedings for the probate of the will. This contention is untenable. (Rule 123). presiding. Bohanan. on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness. in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions. We have. dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project. In the said order. 1922. therefore. the court finds that the testator C. Proof of public or official record. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament. when admissible for any purpose. Bohanan. The law of Nevada. executed by him in Manila. 2. and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death. the foreign law. in accordance with the provisions of the will. 1909. 10. Hon. he was a citizen of that state. it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4. making adjudications. are valid? Ruling: The old Civil Code. is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10.000. expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24.

no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. as in the case at bar. in her deposition dated January 27. 7 Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925. those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Under all the above circumstances. On appeal. the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions. Aside from said statement. no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines. As it were. and their daughter. respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact. 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. its customer service agent.m. Court of Appeals. The two others. who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept. and the passenger has every Private International Law Page 8 . which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. was allowed to board the plane. In Alitalia Airways v. they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918. vice-consul. Zalamea and her daughter. purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines. and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. consul. could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. As aforesaid. can be taken judicial notice of by us. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them.00) Dollars. without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. and authenticated by the seal of his office. the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles. being ranked lower than 22. Thus. the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight. were not able to fly. 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code. already indicated above. Even if the claimed U. Upon their arrival in the Philippines. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines. Zalamea vs. while his wife and daughter. however. with costs against appellants. as it is hereby affirmed. consul general.In addition. Zalamea. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation. a contract of carriage arises. the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator. on the other hand. children of the testator. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations. petitioners checked in at 10:00 a. the other appellants. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. Inc. Code of Federal Regulations does exist. Thus. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea. entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. On the appointed date.S. on a certain date. 34. Petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter. they must be alleged and proved.S. do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Like any other fact. and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada. including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. showing a party of two. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Ruling: That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. Mr. Liana Zalamea. The U. or by his deputy. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a. Gwendolyn Lather. the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners.. must be. 34. at No. we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada.m." Out of the 42 names on the wait list. CA Facts: Petitioners-spouses Cesar C.

Thus on the 29th of the same month. Venezuela. Vs. the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied. Dela Rosa Facts: On July 12. consul. will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption. 1961. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible. A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law. grandfather of William Gatchalian. According to the weight of authority. and sought admission as Filipino citizens. 1960. and interest thereon amounting to US $400. 1990.000. or state. vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer. and expenses of litigation. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits. With respect to proof of written laws. was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute. A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. On July 6. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and law is credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. Like any other fact. Inc. its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue. thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. Ltd. a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. At this juncture. said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages. Board of Commissioners v. Inc.. was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. Wildvalley Shipping Company. the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200. The vessel proceeded on its way. they must be alleged and proved. arrived in Puerto Ordaz.000 cash bond. consul general. and with the seal of his office. As a result of the blockage. a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Santiago Gatchalian. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law. Ltd. the laws of a foreign country. CA Facts: The Philippine Roxas. the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. Felixberto Serrano. private respondent herein. Subsequently. was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Branch III against Philippine President Lines. Wild Valley Shipping Co. when a foreign statute is involved. costs. then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Issue: Private International Law Page 9 . If he does not. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. On August 15. 1961. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port. a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. the Malandrinon. On June 27. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. to load iron ore.. arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was granted on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. Willian. Issue: whether or not Venezuelan applicable to the case at bar? Ruling: It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. an official pilot of Venezuela.right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. then twelve years old. parol proof is objectionable. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked.00 plus attorney's fees. it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs. In the absence of pleading and proof. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute. and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation. he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. for the written law itself is the best evidence. The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River.

(10a) The forms and solemnities of contracts. Laws relating to family rights and duties. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative. whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. However. of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner.Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen Held: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. In Moy Ya Lim vs. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. Thus. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding. the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party. and valid there as such. polygamous. their acts or property. the provisions of this Code shall govern their relations. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. the following rules shall prevail: 1. the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. viz: We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency. or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. Doctrine of processual presumption Civil Code Art. and those which have. as a material issue in the controversy. Art. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. the law of the country where it is stipulated. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court. (19a) If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner. wills. this Court declared that: (e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. shall also be valid in this country. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid. a Filipino as legitimate child. 16. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]). 17. public order. the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. 15. Prohibitive laws concerning persons. and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Private International Law Page 10 . 124. 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof. Commissioner of Immigration (supra). (11a) Art. or to the status. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father. in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship. An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. even though living abroad. intestate and testamentary successions. whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad. for their object. (9a) Real property as well as personal property is subject to Art. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country. If the husband is a citizen Art. 71. except bigamous.

Arroyo on August 29. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list. Art. without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property. intent to stay 2." SEC. and if the revocation takes place in this country. 819. 829. 815. 818. (39) Section 46. expiration 4. SEC. Art. 816. release 2. or a specific part thereof. or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice. 2003 SECTION 1. 25 What attestation of copy must state. (1325a) attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. if there be any. Rule 132 Sec. (n) Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly. by naturalization 4. 9225 signed into law by President Gloria M. the attestation must state. by a person who does not have his domicile in this country. that the writer of the statement in the treatise. when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. or according to the formalities observed in his country. The Private International Law Page 11 . — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence. Declaration of Policy.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. (733a) A revocation done outside the Philippines. (n) Art. physical presence 3. When a Filipino is in a foreign country. Art. law. even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. by subrogation and cession how to lose a nationality 1. or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal. deprivation 3. 2. executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines. (n) The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides. the laws of the husband's country shall be followed. or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. 1039. by birth 2. natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have Art. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n) Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. renunciation domicile 1. under the seal of such court. or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. by repatriation 3.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. in substance. he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. conduct indicative of such intention Rep. periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history. Short Title. register. is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made. Commercial lists and the like. periodical. either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. 3. — A published treatise. (669) Wills. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the Philippines. or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time. Art.2. that the copy is a correct copy of the original. (26a) Rule 130 Section 45. (40a) How to acquire nationality 1. prohibited by the preceding article. periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. as the case may be. or a witness expert in the subject testifies. or in the same instrument. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Act No. science. Learned treatises.

Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided. That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by. . and/or are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. below eighteen (18) years of age. 5. otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens. Article V of the Constitution. Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. after the effectivity of this Act. . . 7. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective. and 3.This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation. . and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. Effectivity Clause. SEC. or extended to. whether legitimate. 1973. at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. 1. SEC. make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 8. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and. SEC. become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. b. That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. decrees. Republic Act No. Derivative Citizenship." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who. of Filipino mothers.The unmarried child. SEC. 2. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. those who: a. 6. 4. SEC.All laws. Separability Clause. 4. and 5. Repealing Clause. Those born before January 17.If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid. ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. Private International Law Page 12 . 9189. orders.reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I ___________________________. Philippines: The following are citizens of the 2. illegitimate or adopted. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1. . solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines. 3.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: 1.

However. (10a) Art. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. These provisions are without prejudice to venue under the Rules of Court. the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. 2a. to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. 50. or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons. intestate and testamentary successions. Section 5. to have renounced it. Section 3. 1039. Private International Law Page 13 . 99. Art. 66. unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. (13a) Art. to provide Art. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Sec. Art. or to the status. There being no express stipulation and if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing. NCC Art. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. 2710) Payment shall be made in the place designated in the obligation.4. themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage. Section 2. Art. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. (40a) When the law creating or recognizing them. before a marriage license can be obtained. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. In any other case the place of payment shall be the domicile of the debtor. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3). they are deemed. (1171a) Art. even though living abroad. Laws relating to family rights and duties. Section 4. under the law. (n) For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations. 1251. Act No. 51. (9a) Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. 16. unless by their act or omission. Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after he has incurred in delay. it shall be necessary. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (41a) No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition. the additional expenses shall be borne by him. 15. the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was constituted.

Act No. it does not recognize dual allegiance. Article VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law. 160869. Thus. May 11. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court Held: R. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. Act No. then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. and if the revocation takes place in this country. Issue: Whether R. 58. 829. Petitioner argues that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. No. 9225. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic.A. Cases: AASJS vs. 5. Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. by a person who does not have his domicile in this country. Act No. 9225. dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. 2007 Sec. from Section 3. the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. Act No. Moreover. Rep. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title. 3.A. On its face. no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. (n) taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic. the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se. until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress. or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made. when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. 9225. Act No. The court held that that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Datumanong G. A. Plainly. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of Art. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent. the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5. The fact that the applicant their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. but with the status of naturalized citizens Private International Law Page 14 . the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship in order to prevent the Justice Secretary from implementing R. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance.Art. Section 5. but not those under Article 75. RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. (7a) A revocation done outside the Philippines. What Rep. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. For its part.R.

I. 29. provides that: "The following cannot adopt: xxx xxx xxx (4) Non-resident aliens. the Court has jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years. Pursuant to this theory. REPUBLIC 7 SCRA 962 Petitioner Marvin G. They had been in the Philippines before. The court inquired from Fiscal Veluz. Hashim. and Chan Po Lan. 1955)". Nov. likewise. Ellis in Banger. perhaps. 1960. Four or five days later. is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws. which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. California and is married to Gloria G. Gonayeb v. Private International Law Page 15 . II. Maine. Fleumer. nonresident aliens – the Court cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status. not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties. 305. 1959. L-6897. 55 Phil. hence. all Chinese Nationals. judicial to rule department. Since adoption is a proceedings in rem. Gmur. Issue: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines. xxx xxx xxx This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. on November 22. Baby Rose was born on September 26. Barretto Gonzales v. likewise. in the year 1961. Art. 713-714). in general. Cousine Hix v.who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their a naturalization. That sometime in the year 1937 Miguela was legally married to Sy Ing Seng. Mr. Under the Philippine’s political law. who represents the Solicitor General. who are foreigners. Pampanga where both lived at that time. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. p. it would be premature including for this the Court. she being a citizen of the Philippines. to exact. United States. Vol. Recto v. 67. on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. a Filipino citizen. if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition. Being without issue. 851. which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system. 58 Phil. the Court have. under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal status. Vol. Chan Po Lan was legally married to Cu Bon Piao. 1959. Until this is done. but not over the status of the petitioners. a Filipino citizen. or. mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. to be declared a Filipino citizens. 855. 30 Phil. and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based — involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum. The Conflict of Laws by Beale. ELLIS V. is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by nonresident aliens. a native of San Fransisco.). At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14. in 1953. he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base. Congress was given but also over the res. Maddela 27 SCRA 702 This is a petition to have the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat. in Angeles. no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction. petitioner Marvin G. Ellis. Harden. Republic v. This. pp. even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v.". and that the petitioners have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizens. the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution for unwed mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family. 42 Phil. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition to the petitions of both to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his opposition. and Mrs. 22. Gonzales. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Both are citizens of the United States. 15 adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Held: Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines — and. 86. petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. p.

Judicial recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner. and thus secure recognition of her status Filipino citizen. no need to prove the qualifications. and a remedy. 1960). their status. Otherwise. (Tan v. Held: The Court cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions instead. the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat and Chan Po Lan were declared a Filipino citizens by marriage and the Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card. the law permits the acquisition of a given status. It is as an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy. or a legitimate child. if the decision of an administrative agency on the question of citizenship. Such a procedure could be availed of Petitioner. the Court emphasized the administrative procedure that needs to be followed in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration. there appears to be no valid reason why such finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases. where the same issue is involved. Burca v. However. and make a pronouncement relative to. 57 Yale Law Journal. Republic 51 SCRA 248 1st case: Burca not granted citizenship because such power is granted under the executive branch. or single. no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married. although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. is affirmed by this Court on the ground that the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. the general public and the courts themselves. Issue: Whether or not a person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial declaration of citizenship. In Moy Ya Lim Yao. Moya Lim Yao: alien wife deemed ipso facto Filipino citizen as long as no disqualifications. Res Judicata Reexamined. Held: Under Philippine laws. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is a Filipino Citizen. Private International Law Page 16 . Thus. The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it. for instance. Issue: Whether or not a court may grant a judicial declaration of citizenship. the court may pass upon. legally demandable and enforceable. such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.As such. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies. which is affirmed by this Court. the said court have found her to be married to a Filipino citizen and to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizen enumerated in the Naturalization Law. Republic. L-14159. that the courts may pass upon. and make a pronouncement relative to. Under Philippine laws there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. which imply a given right. such as naturalization by judicial decree. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Clear. Burca motion for reconsideration: Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case which reversed that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte declaring her a citizen of the Philippines. their status. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties. granted or sanctioned by law. including the Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of the fact that the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for compliance. an act or omission violative of said right. April 18. At times. 345). It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy.

becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Commissioner 41 SCRA 292 Facts: On 8 February 1961. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1. the decision on the matter shows constitute conclusive proof of such person's citizenship. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon. it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival.00 to undertake. is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings. among others. that where citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency. she could not speak either English or Tagalog. was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim. Rosa. with the act participation of the Solicitor General or his authority representative. Likewise. Except for a few words.Wherefore. Held: Lau Yuen Yeung. an alien woman marrying a Filipino. with a Filipino name except one. she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Thus. On the date of her arrival. As the laws of our country. who dies during the proceedings. provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. She could not name any Filipino neighbor. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to nativeborn Filipinos. after a fullblown hearing. there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos). The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. both substantive and procedural. Hongkong. After repeated extensions. but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship.000. an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen. the Court declared it to be a sound rule. unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. Asher Y. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law. Moy Ya Lim Yao v. and this finding on the Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority Private International Law Page 17 . Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation. Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great-grand-uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino. in another case or proceeding. a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. as a material issue in controversy. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. or sisters-in-law. after the expiration of her authorized stay. as the case may be. Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961. in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof. native born or naturalized. stand today. On 25 January 1962. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings. But it is made clear that in instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case proceeding.

3. and taking the 1. and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto. The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country. a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country. If the person naturalized shall. a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted. finally. return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided. or two years in any other foreign country. renunciation of oath of allegiance incident thereto. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. and 4. or is commissioned in. By having been declared by competent authority. That the rendering of service to. she acquires his nationality. by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country. Nota bene: There are two laws. 2. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: 1. the armed forces of said foreign country. Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Commonwealth Act No. at the time of rendering said service. or commission in. the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b). Section 18 of said law provides that: A naturalization certificate may be cancelled by a competent judge on any of the following grounds: a. 473. That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country. states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided. the armed forces of a foreign country. By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization. That the fact of the person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was fraudulently or illegally. with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. however. obtained 2. By naturalization in a foreign country. No. These are Commonwealth Act No. the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided. shall be considered prima facie evidence of his b.decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. upon her marriage to a foreigner if. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided. The Private International Law Page 18 . which govern the Loss of Philippine citizenship. or acceptance of said commission. 63. or accepting commission in. 6. 5. unless subsequently. 473. The former applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens and the latter applies only to naturalized citizens. within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificated. By rendering services to. or the acceptance of such commission in. or said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided. That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to. In the case of a woman. he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen. By express citizenship. shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to. That the Filipino citizen concerned. shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: 7. As stated in Commonwealth Act.

the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China. government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention taking of said oath. pursuant to Republic Act No. 3. petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality. 5. However. through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. This provision. As a consequence. potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen. Oh Hek How v. marriage to an alien would not automatically divest a person of his citizenship. that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince. however. The main reason why a decision in a naturalization proceeding is not res judicata is because such is not a judicial adversarial proceeding. 2639. according to the Constitution. except that. 473 provides. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise. as a citizen of the Philippines. use or enjoyment of a right." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality. that before the naturalization certificate is issued. because. On that same date. a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines." inter alia. However. Held: First issue: The order of February 9. 2nd Issue: It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien. thus. not by those of the Philippines. the petitioner shall "solemnly swear. 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final and executor. • Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. Similarly. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the Private International Law Page 19 . franchise or privilege. unless he or she performs certain acts or omission which would result to the loss of his or her citizenship. "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural- 4. does not repatriate those who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same. before acquiring Philippine citizenship. he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties. The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February 9. where Philippine history. is not retroactive. which our laws do not permit. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law. Republic 29 SCRA 94 Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. otherwise. A certified copy of the decree of naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior and the Bureau of Justice. 1966 (oathtaking) had not — and up to the present has not — become final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. estoppel or laches cannot apply to the government in action for the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization. however. Issue: Is the oath valid? Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China. since it is a known principle that the government is never estopped by the mistakes on the part of its agents. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public high school recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen. In his certificate of candidacy. claim that respondent is an alien. Poe was a Filipino citizen. in the 2004 national elections. Ronald Allan Kelly Poe. having been born outside of a valid marriage. Board of Commissioners v. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country. Comelec 424 SCRA 277 Facts: On 31 December 2003. followed the citizenship of their mother.. married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. 1990. and his father. according to Fornier. when the Philippines was under Spanish rule. stated his name to be "Fernando Jr. his parents were foreigners. were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. On August 15. arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. grandfather of William Gatchalian. Allan Poe. confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. and that San Carlos. then twelve years old. Pangasinan. Santiago Gatchalian. the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated. if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired. a Spanish subject. the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200. Willian. if acquired. 1960.000 cash bond. during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light. would thereby extend to his son. so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. In support of their position. Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870." Tecson v. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied. Santiago's children. Poe. petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth. including Francisco. and sought admission as Filipino citizens. On June 27. being the son of Lorenzo Pou. Hence. Felixberto Serrano. also known as Fernando Poe. Allan F. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs. Victorino X. And even if Allan F. initiated. (FPJ). his place of residence upon his death in 1954. filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. The 1935 Constitution. such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Private International Law Page 20 . That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou). in the absence of any other evidence. William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother. representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. on 9 January 2004. Held: Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old. he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. his mother." or "Ronald Allan" Poe. 1961. Bessie Kelley Poe. Similarly. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship. There being none. (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed. father of respondent FPJ. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and. a Chinese national. likewise in China. Petitioners. was a Spanish national. Poe. Allan F. Fornier. was an American. he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ. it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. Thus on the 29th of the same month. FPJ. could have well been his place of residence before death. Jr. Dela Rosa Facts: On July 12. petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok.

respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens who became as such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Referring to marriages contracted abroad. . Thus. . in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12. 472. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative. he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. Thus. 30 Phil. in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship. viz: We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. the community of property during marriage. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt. this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary. every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage. 46 [1915]). 1960.Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen Held: In Miciano vs. Yam Ka Lim vs. . and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]). 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. Rule 130). . GURRAY Facts: • This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union." (Emphasis supplied). Commissioner of Immigration (supra). as a legitimate child of the latter. there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco. and valid there as such. this Court declared that: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Nota bene: for Gatchalian In Moy Ya Lim vs. Philippine law. Francisco. Collector of Customs. following the lex loci celebrationis. shall also be valid in this country . Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases. the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party. hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Art. Collector of Customs. the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid. Brimo (50 Phil. 34. Finally. the legitimacy of children. foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. The testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages. birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. as records indicate. unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated. In the case at bar. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. the authority of parents over their children. as a material issue in the controversy. 36 Phil. and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court. . there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The fact is. 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding. NUVAL VS. Lim and Lim vs. 867 [1924]. whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata. adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Private International Law Page 21 . a Filipino.

his birthplace. The rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union. having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the general elections of 1925. by virtue of which he was registered as an elector of the said precinct. • Gregorio Nuval filed. 1 of Balaoan. due to the high cost of living in that municipality. he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna. require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they perform they official duties. with costs against the petitioner. 1928. and neither be nor his family has lived in it. included. a petition against Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said municipality. La Union. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to 1928. Issue: Whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the Private International Law Page 22 . His children studied in the public school of Luna. he made it appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. had lived in the municipality of Balaoan. Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place. alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June. Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna. 1928. Balaoan. On February 23. declaring him resident of said town. My correct and new address • • • is Poblacion. 1928. Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna. where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality. in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria. and on the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph. 1927. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours. In January. 1922. his wife and children who. which was accepted on the same day. and there he passed the nights with his family. which was dated January 15. went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents. which has not yet been completed. Province of La Union. municipality of Luna.upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others. not being a qualified voter of said municipality and he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code. up to that time. where he had voted in the general elections of 1922. 1928. Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan. On February 1. Norberto Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated. he obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20. On that date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan. he applied for registration as a voter in Luna. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31. In the year 1926. also by telegraph. alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. 1928. to which Norberto Guray was subject as such municipal treasurer." and in order to be registered in the subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1928. Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto asking that Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previous to the election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be eligible to an elective municipal office. In order to qualify and be in a position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925. Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes. and on April 14. Province of La Union. in order to be able to give an account of their acts as such treasurers at any time.

In his will. copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and made a part hereof. 145. was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody. 1931. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will.657.001. 1932. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 1931. bank deposits and other personal properties. who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the present case. par. he needed not only the intention to do so. duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5.he made a statement that: Arthur G. Palmer another letter. 1931. In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts. and the other sum of P40. That on November 4. 1931. coupled with actual residence in the place Private International Law Page 23 . he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris. and the same was.) Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and acquired another in Balaoan. India. Palmer through her attorney. an American citizen. 1931. Province of La Union? Ruling: It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state. 28). the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. 1933. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. after hearing. Bender. in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna. 1931. making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13. Y. an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1. and for such purpose. Ida M. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila. the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return.. India. So far as this record shows. That on December 3.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. August 15. That on July 14. Palmer. a citizen of the United States of America. Manila. on February 18.' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place. That on January 21.47.767. 71." (People vs. 1931. the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by Ida M.019. • • • • • • • Ruling: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile. he bequeathed all his property to his only sister. by virtue of which will. That on July 22. the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the court its report. Moody. 1931. That on February 24. hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and Testament . • • • • • • • That on September 9. Ida M. a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. 1931.. residing in the Philippine Islands. but also personal presence in that place. United States of America.1931. a petition to the will of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody. 144 N. came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta. p. both parties introduced oral and documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. but his personal presence in said municipality. bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609. 1931 to June 30.000 on July 22. 1932. . That subsequently or on April 10. he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law. All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. he left no property of any kind located anywhere else. in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna.41 covers the assessment for income tax against said estate. POSADA Facts: • That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta. 1928. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50.75 on January 19. 1931. VELILLA VS. there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile. Moody. .general elections of June 5. S. on February 18. 1931. "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile.

hence. Ujano with whom he has one son. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country. Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant. or for reasons of health. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and. 95 Phil. with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode.chosen. Commonwealth Act No. the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.1987 for the • Ruling: The court a quo. that he voted in all previous elections. because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Prospero. on the ground that he is a green card holder. Pangasinan. 890). Such being the case. the court affirm the judgment of the trial court. to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18. including the plebiscite on February 2. 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. 63]. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor. REPUBLIC Facts: Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. either for business or pleasure.A. but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. no matter how long. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He returned to the Philippines on November 10. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: • These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective. he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing his present petition. UJANO VS. is his domicile. a permanent resident of the United States of America. was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor.S. who is now of legal age. who is presently a citizen of the United States of America. Pangasinan. Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao. has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines. In the present case. not of Bolinao. After hearing. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service. though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. in denying the petition. This Private International Law Page 24 . first. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence. petitioner. made the following comment: "One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization' [Section 3(1). Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao. In his answer to both petitions. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U. He receives a monthly pension from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal. one's home. In other words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. He is married to Maxima O." CAASI VS. 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization. because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Ilocos Sur. second. A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently. 1988. the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent.

prior to the local elections on January 18. such as a country residence and a city residence. The important thing for domicile is that.ratification of the 1987 Constitution.R. from an elective office to serve that community. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. It stands to reason therefore. 1988. MARCOS vs COMELEC Private International Law Page 25 . Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Held: So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases. did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo. In his petition. (residence and domicile. As these concepts have evolved in our election law. domicile can exist without actually living in the place. private respondent contended that Mrs. A person can have two or more residences. and the congressional elections on May 18. Ruling: Despite his vigorous disclaimer. G. filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.1987. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. for purposes of election laws are synonymous…) The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter. his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines. what Issues: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States. inspite (sic) of his green card. On the contrary. the COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that: The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. • After hearing the consolidated petitions before it. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code. (p.S. Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Pangasinan. the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U. that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. Residence is acquired by living in place. Omnibus Election Code). 1995. on the other hand. 12. 84508). No.S. there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Residence in the civil law is a material fact." Therefore. he was issued by the U.A." Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8. even if residence is also established in some other place. Without such prior waiver. there be an intention to stay there permanently. referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. Based on that application of his. he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Rollo. 68. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. once residence has been established in one place. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there.

2. it continues to be the same until replaced by a new one. Guray. 3. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. “Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. that she had not been physically examined because she refused to be examined. Harden 100 Phil 427 Facts: Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional services wherein the latter Private International Law Page 26 . 4. bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. the Court held that "the term residence. she constantly goes home to her domicile. In Co vs. Negros Oriental. Defendant did not submit herself to the examination and the court entered a decree annulling the marriage. In the case at bar. 5. Prior to this: The civil code provides that the wife follows the domicile of her husband. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent. Quirino. this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law. among the grounds that the defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law." Larena vs. is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place. regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. A Person cannot have 2 domiciles. HELD: The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete. yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases. A physical examination in this case is not selfincriminating.has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. As long as the Domicile was not lost. JIMENEZ V. Faypon vs. . She is not charged with any offense . coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. REPUBLIC 109 PHIL 273 FACTS: 1. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. but also personal presence in that place. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Marcos did not overtedly abandon her domicile since even if living in Malakanyang. . In Nuval vs. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with Remedios Canizares. Recto v. the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file an answer. 6. The court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. 7.

Harden agreeing to a share of a lesser amount. was to defeat the claim of the former for attorney’s fees. (see. that the terms of said contract are harsh. by way of contingent fees. under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs.engaged the services of the former as her counsel against her husband for a claim in their conjugal property. S. the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S.. the second objection is. It is a basic principle that status. 554. nor purports to give. Jur. vs. 176).. The Court awarded Mrs. The contract neither gives. Harden previously filed for divorce against the Mrs. Ballentine. c that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce. which sanction divorce. Mrs. “in the United States. inequitable and oppressive. FUSTER 29 PHIL 606 FACTS: Gabriel and Constanza were married in Spain. and Mrs. Harden.) Such is. 93 Phil. Appellants assail the contract for professional services as void. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States. 30 C. Harden cannot bind the 2. good customs. Harden. For the same reason. and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr. public order or public policy. p. mainly. or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. is not contrary to law. Spain. the wife instituted a petition for divorce here in the Philippines against the husband.. he prayed that the court grant him the necessary fees. that Mrs. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce. likewise. one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida. Harden merely bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay. Mr. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. both parties executed a contract for their separation wherein the wife returned to Spain and has agreed to be supported by the husband to be paid in Madrid. is given universal recognition. Mrs. upon the grounds that: (See 5 Am. but. the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees.. In short. inasmuch as Mr. and it is only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned. BARNUEVO V. allegedly in violation of Articles 1305. or by the intent of the parties thereto. 475). c that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees. Later. Harden and herein Appellee. their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by the laws of the United States. Eventually. Harden in the conjugal partnership.. Harden alleged that the purpose of the said instruments. 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. By virtue of said contract. personal or real. also. the contract of services. once established by the personal law of the party. untenable. for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. Harden. ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife.. neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Private International Law Page 27 . 13) of Professional Ethics. Constanza later followed. Appellee counsel for Mrs. Harden an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis expensae. and Mrs. to our satisfaction. 2nd ed. Therefore. were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein Appellee. settled. Manila Railroad Co. between Mrs. that their aforementioned agreements. executed by Mr. The third objection is not borne out. provided such contracts are not in contravention of public policy. 3. and acquired real and personal properties. 540. p. Gabriel went to the Philippines. Law Dictionary. either by the language of the contract between them. Subsequently however. conjugal partnership without her husband’s consent. for which reason. Dy Buncio & Co. Thereafter. Drinker. and Appellants have not done so. Moreover. 276. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. in and to her aforesaid share. the law to be applied by Philippine courts in determining their capacity and status is their personal law. 359 et seq. What is more. Held: The first objection has no foundation in fact. The husband opposed the petition on the grounds that: 4. she entered into an amicable settlement with Mr.” a. Harden ordered her counsel to vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein.) 1. aliens can sue and be sued in our courts subject to Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their status and capacity. pursuant thereto. Ulanday vs. et al. The last objection is based upon principles of equity. it has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. likewise. morals. 195. However. 45 Phil. 20% of her share in said partnership. A few years however.J. for the circumstances surrounding the case show. to the Appellee any right whatsoever.

) The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. because these courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain. could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking. in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate itself. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. although a Spanish subject.. since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration. as to the allowance for support. which was what he had to demonstrate. in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. in the Philippine Islands. Issue: Do Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the petition for divorce? What law should apply in construing the term pesetas? Held: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain. and any children they may have. although Spanish Catholic subjects. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants. that this being so. and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. In deciding the case. Rep. Private International Law Page 28 . without proof to the contrary." p. Defendant. to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent. a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts. . He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan. 3 Phil. it plainly appears. De la Rama. and Ibañez vs. who must record them in the registry of Spanish residents. since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila. decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant. one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which. As the Court upheld: The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. according to his own law of persons. had kept open house. the agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated." (Torres Campos. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. he had constantly resided in the said Islands. for. (Benedicto vs. the complaint. It has been established that defendant is domiciled in the Philippines. extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in March. nor was it to be fulfilled. All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene. in China. 5 Phil. or of any other place in the Philippine Islands. husband was unable to prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it." while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages. On the contrary. irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. that during this not inconsiderable period. However. Otherwise. or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code. we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven. they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein. where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein. 108. Ortiz. 325). Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain. "Elementos de Derecho International Privado. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country. although he won his case. 1909. was a resident of these Islands. "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts. which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing the defendant. should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. the authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce.b. as well as their spouses. would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them. As held by the Husband: "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. should they be married. the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts." From this provision. the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction. in order to preserve the Spanish nationality. Rep. because. and as to the divorce.. because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found. to whether he transfers his domicile. shall be required. or in that where the plaintiff resides. . . as the law of their personal statute. 34.

That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation. Sections 300. cannot apply since this affidavit was never presented in proof. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. Emmanuel. he left for the US where through naturalization. DECEMBER 22. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. never received by the trial court. November 23. LLORENTE V. 1998 and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan. then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made. Soon after. also intervened. all the property of the marriage. California. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco. all surnamed Padlan. QUITA and Arturo T. with which conjugal partnership is known to be inexistent. she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children." not being specific. Ricardo. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. However. The court held that no dispute exists as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. . Lorenzo died.A. Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. which later on became final." If in the contract the word " pesetas. and obtained a final judgment of divorce. 124371. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts.S. QUITA V. Upon his visit to his wife. and which has never been subjected to any cross-examination. . U. Consequently. An appeal was made to the Private International Law Page 29 . Ruperto T. She married thrice thereafter. John Riley. Before the proceeding could be terminated. On 1972 Arturo died. Zenaida and Yolanda. named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition. was never received by the trial judge. Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. Llorente filed a divorce in California in which Paula was represented by counsel. He left no will. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. he became a US Citizen. Alexis. shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings since the trial court was not able to completely ascertain petitioner’s citizenship. and cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. and actively participated in the proceedings. now in force in these islands. indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies. says article 1407 of the Civil Code. PADLAN GR NO. Respondent Blandina Padlan claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan. Thus. Nota bene: Van dorn: ang bana ga laot sa wife since under Philippine law. They were not however blessed with children. The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce. he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. Padlan. With respect to their property regime. and Claro. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. both Filipinos. was ambiguous.The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. since no proof has been submitted to this effect. which was never submitted as proof. claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo. the Foral Law presented by the husband in an affidavit. . The Court maintains that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law. Padlan. Issue: Whether or not petitioner could inherit as the surviving spouse of Arturo? Held: Case remanded subject to determination of petitioner’s citizenship. 2000 FACTS: FE D. ON PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL The court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. they’re still married. 124371.

1. Lapse of 2 years without news or since the receipt of last news Private International Law Page 30 . As stated in Article 15 of the civil code. 4. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action. may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation. and 4. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. the former judgment must be final. even though living abroad. Furthermore. Art. there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law. 15. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines.Court of Appeals. even though living abroad. ISSUE: Nota bene: The following are the requisites of res judicata: 1. subject matter and cause of action. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies. First. or to the status. When can be declared: under civil code – a. Court of Appeals. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. the issue be identical. whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Laws relating to family rights and duties. she and the deceased. there is — between the first and the second actions — an identity of parties. intestate and testamentary succession. Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula.” (emphasis ours) 5. the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Personal status – legal position of an individual in a society Capacity – power to acquire and exercise rights Incidental to personal status Foreign laws regulating the person’s status and capacity are to be disregarded where they are political or penal in character. there is no such thing as one American law. a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. or to the status. Absence – a special legal status. and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question. Second. if one The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. Laws relating to family rights and duties. it is a judgment on the merits. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. 3. “Art. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. 2. Legislative jurisdiction – authority of the state of his nationality or domicile or where he may be physically present to promulgate laws affecting his status. provided that they are valid in their National Law. 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. “However. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. Judicial jurisdiction – the authority of the court to hear and determine the cause of action Beginning of personality – conception provided subsequent birth End – death Other questions of status Likewise. (FRDSCL) Whether or not national law shall apply? RULING: “Art. 16. is not in his domicile and his whereabouts is unknown. 3. which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties. his National Law allowed divorce. 2. 15. it is essential that: 1.

Those who have rights over the properties 2. polygamous. and those which have. status. Spouse b. 2. 1987 Constitution Marriage. NCC Art. he died and left a will which disposes of his properties in the Philippines. XV. is the will now if probated in the Philippines valid? If an 18-year old foreigner. is such marriage valid? Family rights. their acts or property. (11a) Art. Conflicts problems respecting an individual’s name and extent of protection against abuse of his name Right to use a title of nobility is determined in accordance with his national law 3. to provide themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage. The duties of Who may declare: a. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties. Cambodian law provides that age of majority is 16. for their object. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country. wills. and valid there as such. 17. the capacity to dispose of real property is governed by the lex situs while the capacity to succeed is governed by the national law of the deceased. supposing. 2. or to the status. condition and legal capacity of persons accompany a person even when he moves to a foreign country. shall also be valid in this country. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Private International Law Page 31 . considered inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Prohibitive laws concerning persons. the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Juridical capacity – the fitness to be the subject of legal relations. even though living abroad. 1987 Constitution The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. (19a) Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. Art. 66. 71. MARRIAGE Art. Capacity to act – the power to do acts with legal effects. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country. Relatives who will benefit in intestacy d. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. 75. Question: A 16-year old Cambodian inherited real properties from the Philippines. it is acquired and may be lost. and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. before a marriage license can be obtained. as an inviolable social institution. the age of majority is 21 goes to the Philippines and gets married. Art. (9a) The forms and solemnities of contracts. is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Heirs c. or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. Art.b. public order. Lapse of 5 years if absentee has left someone in charge of the administration of his properties Art. (13a) All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. Nota bene: Under Philippine law. Minority CAPACITY 1. it shall be necessary. Sec. duties. except bigamous. where in his country. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. II Section 12.

(As amended by Executive Order 227) Article. consequences. 5.the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 2. imam. 4. 3. or in the office the consul-general. or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general. 2. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect. chapel or temple. and valid there as such. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians. (56a) All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court. 26. consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. during a military operation. in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consulgeneral. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting Private International Law Page 32 . It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41. Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned. 10. 5. shall also be valid in this country. or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (n) FC Article 1. in the church. (75a) Art. 8. (57a) FC Art. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32. 7. except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with FC Art. (4). 35. as the case may be. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: 1. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. by: 1. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31. Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction. consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. Those solemnized without license. Any priest. Art. 3637 and 38. Any consul-general. rabbi. in the absence of the latter. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1). consul or vice-consul. and not elsewhere. 3. 4. except those covered the preceding Chapter. (52a) Marriage may be solemnized Article 29 of this Code. (5) and (6).

Law applicable. — provisions of Title shall Private International Law Page 33 . the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage. whether of the full or half blood. Art. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: 1. breach of contract to marry. 6. Art. up to the fourth civil degree. Its nature. and Between brothers and sisters. or his or her own spouse. except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses. apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree. 3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child. support and maintenance. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child. the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. party as to the identity of the other. Art.6. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning. . with the intention to marry the other. (82) PD (1) The this 1083. 180. consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation. 5.chan robles virtual law library (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. Between step-parents and step-children. Nature. rights and obligations between husband and wife parental authority. divorce. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. killed that other person's spouse. or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter. betrothal. 2. 36. (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code. — Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. 7. and Between parties where one. paternity and filiation. 38. and the properly relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce. (81a) Art. Application. 9. 2. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate. Art. and Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 4. Between adopted children of the same adopter. at the time of the celebration. A marriage contracted by any party who. 14. guardianship and custody of minors. Art. whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: 1. 37. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter. — The provisions of the Revised Muslim Code 13. 8. claims for customary dower (mahr).

2. before its effectivity. d. 35. c. except those covered the preceding Chapter. and Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: 1. 15. — Art. Legal b. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians. when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. (53a) formal 1. (53a. A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title. A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41. and Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. under Muslim law. except as stated in Article 35 (2). one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff. demanded of her that she perform unchaste Private International Law Page 34 . marriage are: The 3. (n) Art. Essential No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are compiled with: a. and Stipulation of customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons. GOITIA VS. and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino. 35 (2) supra Muslim Code. 1915. 4. CAMPOS RUEDA Facts: The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7. criminally and administratively liable.Penal Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married in accordance with the provisions of this Code or. Mutual consent of the parties freely given. requisites of 6. unless these essential requisites are present: 1. Those solemnized without license. 3. 2. requisites. and A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. capacity of the contracting parties. 5. Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38. 5. 3. may contract marriage. That the defendant. 4. Essential and Formal Requisites FC Art. Art. 55a) Art. Art. 2. Authority of the solemnizing officer. 2. where they lived together for about a month. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. No marriage shall be valid. (54a) Art. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other.

since that date had continually on other successive dates. However. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make . The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration. but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12. as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1961. a village leader. that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio. it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole. made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife. a Filipino Citizen. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage. relief in some way should be obtainable. who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part. she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. the plaintiff. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife. Whereupon. Where the wife. in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. Marriage is an institution. VIVO Facts: The Board of Special Inquiry No. that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas.that they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision. nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term. that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members the latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Private International Law Page 35 . 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. but composed entirely of a new set of members. and obligations. petitioner initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari. so long as it continues. the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. but the same was denied for lack of merit. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. are such as the law determines from time to time. notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same. the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one.and lascivious acts on his genital organs. the same Board of Commissioners. her face and different parts of her body. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband.The reciprocal rights arising from this relation. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community. among others. Issue: whether or not that the wife may claim for support against her husband outside of their conjugal abode? Ruling: marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her. duties. 3 rendered a decision finding. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature. and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. duties. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty. that the defendant. that on June 28. It is a new relation. who always spurned them. may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy. and none other. that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. the rights. Petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang. and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights. China . an obligation. and that. But it is something more than a mere contract. which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. WONG WOO YIU VS. With these principles to guide us.

it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23. the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children.000 which is now being claimed by two parties . Issue: whether or not that the marriage is valid? Ruling: there is no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929. and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912. 1919 and left property worth nearly P100. Persons Private International Law Page 36 . But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. ADONG VS. then in 1937. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law. and a village leader is not one of them. although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935. that said Board further held that. or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412. 1935 and 1941. Philippine Islands on August 5. cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Even if we assume. the same is not one of those authorized in our country. and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court. 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936. coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship. Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia." the Board of Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. then in 1939. even if true. that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China. CHAONG SENG GEE Facts: Cheong Boo. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters.(1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985. (FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation.Blas was without basis in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship". that in an affidavit dated August 9. In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929. Section 2). and lastly in 1941. Thus. even though living abroad. it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929. a native of China died in Zamboanga. and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan. This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. an instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. a justice of the peace. Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein. Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased. A marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid ? Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid? RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid. Such being the case. therefore. we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. it is clear that petitioner's marriage. he should share in the estate as a natural child.

or (c) that the absentee should have been generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the time of contracting the subsequent marriage. where they were married on the following day before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality. said marriage being said to be subsisting at the time respondent married Maria Ching. among others. it is first necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact. This as for public policy. then in order that the subsequent Philippine marriage could be valid. of living in her husband's company and of following him to wherever he transfer his domicile or residence. (FOR PERSONS) Sec. 1946. been declared an absentee nor generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the time he married Maria Ching. 606. Bulacan. section 2). promises and cajolery. 1946. On the other hand. marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. while in the first it will be valid without this limitation.) But as already adverted to. the complete absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes sections 29 and 30 of the Marriage Law inapplicable. CO HEONG Facts: It is alleged in the petition. 3613. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life. that respondent. Fuster. that up to June 21. 612. If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven.” A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a socalled matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines. Bulacan. asserts that on June 21.) CHING HUAT VS. in the absence of counterpresumption or evidence special to the case.. 3613. De la Rama. and that ever since respondent has had the minor Maria Ching under his custody in Malolos. section 30 [b]. which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. 1946. 34). “save upon proof so clear. to Plaridel. to leave the parental home and to elope with him in the night of June 21. Issue: whether or not petitioner still retains his right to the custody of his minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching? Ruling: the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria Ching before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel. among other things. they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being. persuaded and induced her by means of trick. whose articles 44 to 78 were. she became emancipated on that same date (arts. Respondent. (Yañez de Barbuevo vs. said Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old. in his answer. strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. and alleges that the essential requisites for such marriage were complied with. (Act No. to be in fact married. the wife has the duty. by article 48 of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870. he and Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching were legally married before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel. in either of which last two cases the subsequent marriage will be valid until declared null and void by a competent court. and are now partly. The reason is that such is the common order of society. and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. 29 Phil. 314 [1] and 315. in force in the Philippines (Benedicto vs. it would have been necessary either (a) that the Chinese marriage should have been previously annulled or dissolved: or (b) that the first wife of respondent should have been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the respondent having news of the absentee being alive. taking advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather. 3 Phil. is undisputed. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision. should not be impugned and discredited. This emancipation brought about the loss by the father of the parental authority that he claims. Civil Code). the courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. and has restrained her at her liberty. said minor had been living with and had under the custody of petitioner. after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage. that the said minor is his legitimate daughter. IV of the Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands. Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21. Bulacan. nor in those stated in section 29 thereof for the reason that the alleged prior Chinese marriage has not been established. section 29 [a] and [b]. As to retroactive force. Bulacan. 1946.dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed. neither of whom was included in any of the exceptions mentioned in section 28 of the same Act.. It is also beyond question that marriage was contracted by a man much over 16 years old with a girl 15 years old (Act No. It is further alleged that respondent had been previously married in China to Gue Min. Petitioner further avers that Gue Min has never Private International Law Page 37 .

In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari.S. The accused interposed an appeal. It is also perhaps true. Dee Tim also presented a witness. a Chinaman of 52 years of age. 1893. Maria Lao and Jose Lao appeared claiming to be the legitimate spouse and son of the deceased. 65 U. Ty Cong Ting. witnesses. a Chinaman. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. for the same reason. To support her contention she presented a number of Private International Law Page 38 . Without this marriage being dissolved. Ty Cong Ting was. and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs became necessary. living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his double marriage. (Article 69. their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. GONZALES 167 SCRA 736 LAO AND LAO V. Maria claims that they had been married in the Philippines on June 24. Gaines vs.PEOPLE V. Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1. who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony. On the other hand.. Based on a preponderance of the evidence the Court was convinced that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith. Maria Lao presented marriage certificates as proof. accused’s subsequent marriage was void for lack of requisites necessary under Moslem law. where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man. Evidently he was attempting to keep the information. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the manner and form in which they were celebrated. until he had passed to that bourn from which none returns. which he was quite able to do. depending upon his interest and convenience at the particular time. Issue: Who is the legal wife? Held: It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions. that she and Yap Siong were joined in holy matrimony on the 14th day of September. at the time he testified as a witness. swore that he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China. she must be acquitted. During the distribution of his estate. Civil Code. in accordance with the laws of China. that of the chief of the tribe to which she belongs is an indispensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other. title 13. It has been established by the defense. would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. 1903. to the effect that the consent of the bride's father or in the absence thereof. Dee Tim likewise presented a certificate of marriage and that it was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of bigamy. 32 years of age and a lawyer. Hennen. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. section 96. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. Jan Peng. DEE TIM 45 Phil 739 (1924) Facts: Yap Siong died intestate. However.)c YAO KEE V. Held: Marriage among Moslems is a fact of which no judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular case. Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong. Mr. DUMPO 62 Phil 247 Facts: Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and practice of the Mohammedan religion. partida 4). They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of the other marriage. 553. without the prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the contrary. an Imam or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans. the legal attorney of the Chinese Consul General in the City of Manila. having all the essential requisites. believing that each was his sole and separate wife. it is alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as husband and wife. It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage. Las Leyes de Matrimonio. state that Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. and the form of proof issued for the purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not given his consent thereto.

2005 HELD: • • • Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts. the lower court’s decision was set aside declaring petitioners as the acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego. On appeal. Finding merit in the petition. 5. a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage. herein petitioner. October 5. evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance. She. 7. They have in their favor their father’s acknowledgment. REPUBLIC V. However. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom. and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood. 4. Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.FACTS: 1. Sy Kiat. 269. • • ISSUE: • Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom? custom on marriage not only because they are self serving evidence. uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule. California. 2. Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven. should be required of a foreign custom. but more importantly. and consequently. sought reconsideration but it was denied. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. The same evidence. Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that “a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. died in Calooocan City where he was then residing leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.) filed a petition for the grant of letters or administration alleging that they were the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the legitimate children. Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego . through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an. the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom. No opposition was filed. Ozamis City. Sometime in 2000. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al. if not one of a higher degree. The Republic. A few years later. Private International Law Page 39 . In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of the deceased since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China.) alleging that they were the legitimate family. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. a Chinese national. 1981. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or Facts: On May 24. according to the rules of evidence. 6.” The law requires that “a custom must be proved as a fact. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego. Petitioners are natural children. legally binding and obligatory. 154380. 3. the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. [Article 12. it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another. namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact. the court granted the same. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. [See Art. as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China. Stanley and her child by him currently live in San Gabriel.. ORBECIDO GR NO. In 1986.

The latter may object only on valid. from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In view of the foregoing. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection. Furthermore. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. 73. PERSONAL RELATIONS and compelling reasons for the exemption. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger. the court shall decide. dishonor or material injury upon the other. but later on. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. Mutual rights and obligations. it should be construed according to its spirit and reason. the injured party may petition the court for relief. In case of disagreement. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. and moral grounds. Art. 34. in the absence thereof. Held: Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason. the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. occupation. disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. (110a) Art. and 2. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid 2. 69. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and. we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. However. CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE 1. VI. business or activity without the consent of the other. 70. (111a) Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession. (117a) Muslim Code Art. — 1. the court shall decide whether or not: 1. Private International Law Page 40 . at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature. serious. The objection is proper. supra Family Code Art. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. observe mutual respect and fidelity. so long as they come within its spirit or intent. that is. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. 2.The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms. a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. and render mutual help and support in accordance with this Code. The court may Civil Code Art. such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. 15. such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. In case of disagreement. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. The husband and the wife are obliged to live together. and Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter.

(1325a) Art. — 1. However. if he has not delivered the proper sum. according to its social standing. (1315a) If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner. His income is sufficient for the family. Rights and obligations of the wife. a. and the husband shall be bound to reimburse the expenses. By contract executed before the marriage. or their marriage is void from the beginning. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: a. The wife shall dutifully manage the affairs of the household. 4. acquire any property by gratuitous title. 35. 4. the husband may object. In case of disagreement on this question. the parents and grandparents as well as the family council. 15. exercise any profession or occupation or engage in lawful business which is in keeping with Islamic modesty and virtue. 117. 5. 3. 2. 118. or b. The husband and the wife shall inherit from each other in accordance with this Code. If no agreement is still arrived at. The conjugal dwelling is not in keeping with her social standing or is. The court may exempt the wife from living with her husband on any of the following grounds: 1. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. the property Private International Law Page 41 . the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family. and c. the wife retain ownership and administration of her exclusive property. supra Art. if any. and 2. (n) Art. b. without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property. the following rules shall prevail: Art. the laws of the husband's country shall be followed. and take such measures as may be proper. Unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage settlements. provided: Art. for any reason. Rights and obligations of the husband. The wife shall be entitled to an equal and just treatment by the husband. The wife cannot. 36. 6. Her dower is not satisfied in accordance with the stipulations. The wife shall have the right to demand the satisfaction of her mahr. Art. The husband and the wife shall have the right to divorce in accordance with this Code. The wife may. However. whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad.His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 124. not safe for the members of the family or her property. shall be consulted. but they are not married. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the Philippines. except from her relatives who are within the prohibited degrees in marriage. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife. PROPERTY RELATIONS Civil Code: Art. with her husband's consent. If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner. the matter shall be referred to the Agama Arbitration Council. without the husband's consent. counsel the offender to comply with his or her duties. By custom. 1. By the provisions of this Code. 2. 144.3. if the husband refuses to give his consent on the ground that his income is sufficient for the family according to its social standing or his opposition is based on serious and valid grounds. the provisions of this Code shall govern their relations. She may purchase things necessary for the maintenance of the family. 2.

(n) Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. without the consent of the other. 147. rites. The duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be complied with by the ship captain. or practices of any church. even with the consent of the parents. (n) In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations. Those solemnized without a marriage license. For purposes of this Article. Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: 1. work or industry. Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81. the share of the party in bad Art. properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an airplane during a voyage. (n) Art. and shall be owned by them in equal shares. in the absence of a chaplain. 7. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith. 77. Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83. 75. Art. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. (n) Family Code: Art. 4. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. during war. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. 80. (n) No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who. Art. save marriages of exceptional character. desire to marry each other. or by the commanding officer of a military unit. airplane chief or commanding officer. and female respectively. until after the termination of their cohabitation. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. 74. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. (23) 2. 6. Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82. 5. Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male Private International Law Page 42 . Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common. or religion it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. Number 2. Art. being unmarried.acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages. have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. sect. 3. The official. In the absence of proof to the contrary. their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. 76.

38. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article. Dissolution of Marriage 1. their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. VII. In all cases. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes. guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party. in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other 3. 66. and By custom. Annulment Civil Code: Art. time of the celebration of marriage. Art. freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. it shall be necessary. If one of the parties is validly married to another. (144a) Art. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country.faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. By the provisions of this Code. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. Regime of property relations. Family Code Art. Private International Law Page 43 . How governed. (13a) All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed. In the absence of descendants. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (19a) Art. by the general principles of Islamic law and the Civil Code of the Philippines. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. and valid there as such. shall also be valid in this country. such share shall belong to the innocent party. That either party was of unsound mind. — The property relations between the spouses. 148. 45. shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of property in accordance with this Code and. 37. That the consent of either party was obtained by a. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants. except bigamous. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one. the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. in a suppletory manner. such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. polygamous. or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. — The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: contract. c. In the absence of proof to the contrary. in that order. By contract before or at the b. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents. to provide themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage. unless such party after coming to reason. 71. unless after attaining the age of twenty-one. his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. 2. before a marriage license can be obtained. existing at the time of the marriage: 1. property. (144a) Muslim Code: Art.

The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent. Concealment of sexually transmissible disease. or Concealment of drug addiction. or That either party was afflicted with a sexuallytransmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. Art. For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45. and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. existing at the time of the marriage. who had no knowledge of the other's insanity. the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 4. fraud. 47. intimidation or undue influence. freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses. (n) Private International Law Page 44 . (85a) 2. within five years after the discovery of the fraud. within five years after the marriage. 46. For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: 1. unless the same having disappeared or ceased. (86a) Art. by the same spouse. with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud. fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor. 6. the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45.4. (88a) 4. unless such party afterwards. she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. rank. age of twenty-one. 5. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: 1. (87a) 2. within five years after attaining the Art. or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity. 48. such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. by the injured party. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude. within five years from the time the force. That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other. 49. health. regardless of its nature. or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane. Art. intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased. by the injured party. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph. by the injured party. 5. For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45. at any time before the death of either party. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. 3. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage. 3. at any time before such party has reached the age of twentyone. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character. That the consent of either party was obtained by force. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.

2. the same shall not affect third persons. 4. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent. (n) Art. shall be delivered in cash.chan robles virtual law library Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (n) Art. unless the parties. In the partition. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner. a common child. the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. 54. the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated. 50. In said partition. Sexual infidelity or perversion. 3. had already provided for such matters. by mutual agreement judicially approved. the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage. 53. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: 1. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2). 52. shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. 6. otherwise. 55. the custody and support of the common children. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article. computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court. Art. otherwise. or connivance in such corruption or inducement. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation. partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses. even if pardoned. whether in the Philippines or abroad. (3). but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent. 7.Art. to engage in prostitution. property or sound securities. Art. Art. the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. or a child of the petitioner. and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes. 8. the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in 5. (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. Private International Law Page 45 . Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years. a common child. or a child of the petitioner. 51.

RECTO VS. 4. and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. five hundred pesos (P500) monthly. where he has since remained. Of this union four children were born. Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. — 1. Accordingly. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. observe mutual respect and fidelity. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger. Private International Law Page 46 . the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court. a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 34. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of 2. GONZALES VS. and render mutual help and support in accordance with this Code. and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. The court may counsel the offender to comply with his or her duties. . RODRIGUEZ Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan. Absolute Divorce ROEHR VS. supra Art. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner. 3. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19. Negros Oriental. The husband and the wife shall have the right to divorce in accordance with this Code. Nevada. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts? Held: Yes.9. 27. In order to take effect. For purposes of this Article. 17. (9a) 2. HARDEN (supra) Civil Code: Art. 1919. the injured party may petition the court for relief. both being represented by attorneys. or 10. GONZALES Facts: Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of Manila. this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity. 15. Supra Muslim Code: 45-55 supra Art. whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children. The husband and the wife are obliged to live together. — Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more than one wife but one wife unless he can deal with them with equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic law and only in exceptional cases. Art. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands. dishonor or material injury upon the other. By a husband. therefore.chan robles virtual law library The husband and the wife shall inherit from each other in accordance with this Code. married a Filipina. and lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. a German citizen. Mutual rights and obligations. legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. Negotiations between the parties. and take such measures as may be proper. betook himself to Reno. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the parental custody.

17. does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation. jurisdiction. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. 1958. Later on. 24. the newly-weds were already estranged. 15 of the New Civil Code. condition and legal capacity or persons. On July 30. shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country. recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Philippines. their acts and their property. and the decisions of this court. of the New Civil Code which reads: Prohibitive laws concerning persons. Philippine law. except it be for a cause. Moreover. • Private International Law Page 47 . under the NCC then now in force. Article 9 thereof reads as follows: The laws relating to family rights and duties. the last part of which reads: . It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands. 1955. public order. Vicenta married an American. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. Vicenta left for the US and filed a verified complaint for divorce against the Pastor in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty. Vicenta. On the record here presented this can not be done. She now lives with him in California and has begotten children. 2710. For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State. for their object. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355 Facts: • Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano on Feb. TENCHAVEZ V. and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. of Art. and those which have. after his departure from these Islands." A decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. or to the status. As of June 1948. in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed. entirely mental in character. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce. She was then subject to Philippine laws under Art. and those intended to promote public order and good morals. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. Issue: Whether or not that the divorced acquired in Nevada is valid here in the Philippines? Held While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. like her husband. clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Russell Leo Moran in Nevada. Defendant. especially in view of the 3rd par. reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. their acts or property. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court.these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage. Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta and her parents in the CFI-Cebu. was still a Filipino citizen. . the prohibitive laws concerning persons. 1948 in Cebu City. will be recognized in this • HELD: • At the time the divorce decree was issued. And article 11. . the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country. She acquired American citizenship on August 8.

however. The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No. At the time of their marriage in 1904. but his legal residence within the State (Cousins Hix vs. supra. but the case was dismissed without the court passing upon the merits thereof. (Barretto Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez. JAVIER 95 PHIL 579 • Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31. • • • enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court. the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court. 1922. However. ARCA V. wherein she sought to compel the defendant to pay her a monthly pension of P500 as alimony or support. Fluemer. The lower court dismissed the complaint and declined to accord validity to the divorce obtained in Reno but found that Hilaria Sikat had forfeited her right to support because she had committed adultery. After a few years. 2710. Arca lived with Javier’s parents. That our divorce law. a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens. and to pay them attorney's fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to the court below. Act No. is too strict or too liberal is not for this court to decide. At such time. 5398 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. and believing that the first two divorces were valid. Javier. the present action was instituted by the plaintiff-appellant to obtain the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.) The allotment of powers between the different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation. 55 Phil. United States of America. On June 1. in 1933. 50 Phil. this did not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant a divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status. clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. since 1929. Plaintiff-appellant had made her choice of two inconsistent remedies afforded her by law: (1) to impugn the divorce and file an action for support. And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers. Nevada.) This was not a proceeding in rem to justify a court in entering a decree as to the res or marriage relation entitled to be Issue: Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire jurisdiction of both spouses and effectively Private International Law Page 48 . • Javier and Arca got married in Manila. and (3) that the defendant did not have the means to pay the allowance sought. 1953. filed another action. supra. The facts are not disputed. sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC. is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. and Cousins Hix vs. civil case No. he went to Reno. She chose the first remedy when she filed her action for support. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Nevada. because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. (Gorayeb vs. due to strained relations with the latter. SIKAT V. 851). She lost the case and should take the consequences. Hilaria. In 1929. not of legislation. of that year. 1934. Nevada. CANSON 67 PHIL 207 • • • • • • • • • Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage and lived together as husband and wife until 1911 when they separated. 2710. 26. he obtained an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. During the same year the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her spouses. an enlisted US Navy personnel left for the States 7 years after the birth of their first born. he went back to the Philippines. • Javier got married the 2nd time but was subsequently divorced. Held: • It is not. This judgment was not appealed and it became final. remarried the 3rd time. and on October 8. he became a naturalized Filipino citizen. The action is predicated on the existence of a final decree of absolute divorce rendered by the court of Reno. Hashim. The legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. John Canson was an Italian citizen but on February 27.• Therefore. Thereafter. Javier filed a case for divorce in Alabama against Arca alleging abandonment. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion. she left and transferred to her hometown. Canson interposed three defenses: (1) adultery on the part of the plaintiff: (2) absolute divorce obtained by the defendant as decreed by the court in Reno. Arca made her reply claiming among other things that she never abandoned her husband and that their separation was due to a physical impossibility which justifies her separation if the husband moves to ultra-marine colonies. United States of America. or (2) uphold the validity of the divorce and sue for a liquidation of conjugal partnership. The divorce however was granted. Fluemer. 2710 and has been upheld by this court.

Gmur. ed. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case. 47 L. They had 3 children. 366. and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. and after which bore two children from which the last childbirth caused Leona her life. The heirs of Leona from the first marriage and the second now claims the Estate of Samuel to which Ana Ramirez opposed since Leona is not a recognized natural child. and Ernesto. and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. Private International Law Page 49 . and there is nothing to show that she had acquired. 855. Leona was married to Kauffman. born to their parents in lawful wedlock. She informed Kauffman that she no longer wished to stay with him to which the latter obtained a divorce in France where Leona was in default. Gmur 42 Phil 855 Federico. after the divorce got married in London. and they are therefore entitled to participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother. 851. Whereas Ana Ramirez was the latter's widow to which they had no children. (See Note to Succession of Benton. 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. a permanent domicile in the City of Paris. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. his residence must be bona fide. plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country. R. and with no intention of remaining. but this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County. and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false.. Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland to recuperate her health. to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial forum. she fell for a Dr. Leontina. It follows that. 14. for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila. It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status. Held: The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown. Mory to whom she had a child. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands by person domiciled here. for failure to answer. if she had survived the testator. 856). The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed by the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the courts of the Philippine Islands. 82 Phil.. Andrews. Fluemer.rendered a judgment in rem when it granted divorce to Javier? Held: • • • • • No. (Ramirez vs. his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. It is evident of course that the presence of both the spouses in that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a divorce from each other. It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status. the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant. The evidence shows that the decree was entered against the defendant in default. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction. or had attempted to acquire. With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children. (Andrews vs. Later.. one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. S. to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial forum. While it is true that Salud R. it is enough to say that they are legitimate children.. and with no intention of remaining. his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State. Leona.. Elena. Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel Bischoff. and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit. A few years later. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. 55 Phil. Ramirez v.) It follows that. 188 U. A. his residence must be bona fide. 59 L.) But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith.

reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas. MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO FACTS: Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . . Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . On March 26, 1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila. On September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A. Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957. Trinidad questioned the levy on the property since the property in question was her paraphernal property. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal? RULING: There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void. In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of coownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the • Facts: • Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a US citizen; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972; after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot 2 children; Alicia filed for divorce in Nevada; the parties were divorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 18, 1983 Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the RTC-Pasay, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal property. VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139

Held:

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 13, NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondents from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Court said that “Ours is not only a court of law but also a court of equity.” The Court could not turn its back on its citizen when the foreign national itself benefited from such divorce decree; Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband who is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations under the NCC cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal properties. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be observed.

PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA

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174 SCRA 653 • Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".

established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000 FACTS:

Issue: WON the adultery case be sustained even though there has already been a finality of a divorce decree. Held: • The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation. ISSUE:

Whether or not national law shall apply? RULING: “Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

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“Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law. “However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” (emphasis ours)

Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven; Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner; Held: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding? At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal principles; Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, Philippine courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. In the case at bar, Respondent only presented the divorce decree; Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country. However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is

Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are valid in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. GARCIA V. RECIO October 2, 2001 • Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian in Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they got divorced in an Australian family court. • On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He later married Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City. • Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. • While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to obtain a divorce decree in Australia. Trial Court declared the marriage dissolved based on the subsequent divorce decree obtained by the respondent. Issues:

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through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In the case at bar. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. But divorces are of different types. Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party Private International Law Page 53 . Ozamis City. She. 1994. Fortunately for respondent. who was then a naturalized Australian citizen." This quotation bolsters the Court’s contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. On its face. Based on the above records. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. had he duly presented it in court. Hence. thus by virtue of such waiver. compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. October 5. it may turn out that under Australian law. appearance is not sufficient. The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. Finding merit in the petition. Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. 2nd Issue: Is Respondent capacitated to remarry? legally concerned. sought reconsideration but it was denied. In 1986. Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. they must be alleged and proved. the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. 154380. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12. and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. herein petitioner. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution. although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. The Republic. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. Stanley and her child by him currently live in San Gabriel. Who has the burden of proving a foreign law? Respondent has the burden of proof. The first kind terminates the marriage. 2005 Facts: On May 24. ORBECIDO GR NO. REPUBLIC V. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. California. Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. the Court cannot conclude that respondent. However. while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. Like any other facts. he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. or at the very least. there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M." It is a well-settled that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. A few years later. case was remanded to the court a quo for further determination of legal capacity and to receive evidence to determine if bigamy has been committed. After all. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. 1981. is deemed admitted as evidence. No opposition was filed. this matter was not objected to by the petitioner. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. the court granted the same. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. Sometime in 2000.kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Legal Separation Art. even if pardoned. 99. Private International Law Page 54 . The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 2a. (n) 2. 2710) TITLE II LEGAL SEPARATION Art. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. that is. petition for legal For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code. so long as they come within its spirit or intent. (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner. or a child of the petitioner. (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent. or a child of the petitioner. but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. (9a) Art. we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who. it should be construed according to its spirit and reason. 5. For purposes of this Article. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner. and 4. (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation. (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion. or An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 3. a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent. or connivance in such corruption or inducement. at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens. but later on. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of. (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage. Act No. unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Civil Code: Art. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. a common child. a common child. A separation may be filed: 1.The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. 55. Furthermore. whether in the Philippines or abroad. disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature. one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. to engage in prostitution. In view of the foregoing. (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years. the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. Held: Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason. 97. 56. (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner. (Sec.

No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied. as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy. (108a) Art. liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (101a) Art. and (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. In any case. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. During the pendency of the action for legal separation. The court. (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation. (103) Art. and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside. (104a) Art. 64. a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse. but the marriage bonds shall not be severed. (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation. 61. in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses. which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2). unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final. (105a) Art. subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code. (106a) Art. but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: Private International Law Page 55 . 59. (102) Art. the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage. 67. 66. After the finality of the decree of legal separation. 63. After the filing of the petition for legal separation. shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. 65. or (6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (n) Art. Alienations. even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation. (107a) Art. (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse. Moreover. 57. if still pending. despite such efforts. 60. (100a) Art. the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings. (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. 62. that reconciliation is highly improbable. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (n) Art. 58. If the spouses should reconcile. the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

4. The guardian. 71. Non-resident aliens. when the penalty imposed was six months' imprisonment or more. The following cannot adopt: 1. (4). the father's decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. After due hearing. 2. Personal law: status/legal capacity – 2. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 108a) Capacity to Remarry Art. the court shall. lex loci contractus rule Substantial validity – governed by: of Civil Code: Art. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 339.(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime. in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized. 5. (174a) Art. paragraph 1 • Consular Marriages – consul granted by the accepting country where such consular office was located to solemnize marriage and Children (Parental VIII. A person who has already been adopted. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Nota bene: Formal validity – law of the place celebration. legitimated. A married person. Those who have legitimate. without the written consent of the other spouse. with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. In case of disagreement. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. 26. (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. — (1) The father and the mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate and acknowledged children. their addresses and the amounts owing to each. Parents Relationship) Private International Law Page 56 . without the consent of the other spouse. or natural children by legal fiction. (2) The mother shall exercise parental authority over her children born out of wedlock. Who exercises. and (3) The names of all their known creditors. A married person. Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations. except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1). 3. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified. before the final approval of his accounts. 2. 15. 335. but the court 1. 3637 and 38. lex loci celebrationis:  National law of the parties exceptions: • Family Code Art. acknowledged natural children. (5) and (6). with respect to the ward. and valid there as such. 3. supra Art. (n) Muslim Code: TITLE V Parental Authority CHAPTER I Nature and Effects Art. 6. take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. adopted: The following cannot be 1. unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a. 26. shall also be valid in this country. in its order.

and obey their parents always unless the latter cast them into disbelief. — Every parent and every person exercising parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the children are respected. CHAPTER II Custody and Guardianship Art. it shall devolve upon the father and the nearest paternal relatives. 75. when the best interests of the children so require. and punish them moderately. 78. — (1) The care and custody of children below seven years of age whose parents are divorced shall belong to the mother or. and their duties complied with. unless the second husband is related to them within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity. 72. discipline.may. or abandons them. the widowed mother who contracts a subsequent marriage shall lose parental authority and custody over all children by the deceased husband. 74. Duty to parents. (1) The father. Art. Parental authority nontransferable. shall stay with the mother. — Parental authority can neither be Private International Law Page 57 . (3) The court may deprive a person of parental authority or suspend the exercise thereof if he treats his children with excessive harshness. 77. and (b) The power to correct. Art. Extinguishment of parental (1) Parental authority terminates upon the death of the parents or the child. Art. Art. Art. — The following persons shall have authority to act as guardian for marriage (wali) in the order of precedence: (a) Father (b) Paternal grandfather. the father or the mother shall give a bond to be approved by the court. educate and instruct them in keeping with their means and represent them in all actions which shall redound to their benefits. with respect to their unemancipated children: (a) The duty to support them. 73. Effects upon person of children.chan robles virtual law library Art. the sister and aunts. (2) Subject to Article 78. appoint a general guardian. imbue them with religious and civic attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace. — (1) Children shall respect. the son. Duty to children. (2) The court may appoint a guardian (wasi) in the absence of one who is natural or testamentary. (2) The unmarried daughter who has reached the age of puberty shall stay with the father. Effects upon children. 79. — property of Art. If the property is worth more than five thousand pesos. In their default. and shall be consulted whenever practicable by all members of the family on all important questions. in her absence. or upon emancipation. and shall particularly by precept and example. the paternal grandmother. — renounced nor transferred except as otherwise provided in this Code and the general principles of Islamic law. Guardian for marriage (wali). (c) Brother and other paternal relatives. . authority. under the same circumstances. 76. Care and custody. or in his absence the mother. have them in their company. to the maternal grandmother. shall be the legal administrator of the property of the child under parental authority. gives then corrupting or immoral orders and counsel. The minor above seven years of age but below the age of puberty may choose the parent with whom he wants to stay. revere. — The parents have. (2) Grandparents are likewise entitled to respect and reverence.

(c) Paternal grandfather. 171. in his default. the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines. 258a) Art. provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. except in the instance Private International Law Page 58 . Guardian of minor's property. fraud. 80. (d) Paternal grandfather's nominee. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. whichever is earlier. Art. (n) Art. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage. that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. (255a) Art. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth.chan robles virtual law library (e) The court. — The following persons shall exercise guardianship over the property of minors in the order of precedence: (a) Father. in a proper case. Legitimacy of a child may impugned only on the following grounds: be provided in the second paragraph of Article 164. unless otherwise provided in this Code.(d) Paternal grandfather's executor or nominee. Art. even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. violence. If the husband or. all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded. or . the child could not have been that of the husband. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. 163. 165. if the husband or. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife. provided. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate. (256a) Art. (261a) Art. (259a) Art. or undue influence. (n) Art. (b) Father's executor or nominee. which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife. or (c) serious illness of the husband. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs. or (e) The court. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. 166. and three years if abroad. 164. or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination. 168. (263a) Art. intimidation. 169. (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible. these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. 170. the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake. (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register. 167. any of his heirs. (55a.

within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother. (273a) Art. Legitimated Children Art. were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. 210. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children. the father's decision shall prevail. Illegitimate Children Art. 180. except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. 211. in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support. (275a) Art. their ascendants. (270a)chan robles virtual law library Art. (2) To receive support from their parents. (313a) Art. In case of disagreement. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. Art. parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral. (274) Art. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who. 175. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. 209. 178. 179. 174. or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. In these cases. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights. (262a) Chapter 2. and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) Chapter 4. (272a) Art. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom. Except for this modification. or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. 173. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children Private International Law Page 59 . The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. 266a. mental and physical character and well-being. 267a) Art. (269a) Art. 177. in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (264a) Chapter 3. 182. and in proper cases. 181. In the absence of the foregoing evidence. 172. the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Proof of Filiation Art. (289a) Art. (n) Art. in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames. or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. their brothers and sisters.(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173. at the time of the conception of the former. (265a.

except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. In case several survive. (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests. and (3) The child's actual custodian. and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health. especially the choice of the child over seven years of age. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. 217. in a criminal case. The school. In case of absence or death of either parent. the one designated by the court. 218. over twenty-one years of age. taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article. (n) Art. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school. self-discipline. (n) Chapter 3. Substitute and Special Parental Authority Art. over twenty-one years of age. the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent. (2) To give them love and affection. companionship and understanding. judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. (n) Art.are under parental authority. 214. parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. integrity. (311a) robles virtual law library chan Art. advice and counsel. (2) The oldest brother or sister. 214. studies and morals. instruction or custody. to testify against his parents and grandparents. No descendant shall be compelled. unless unfit or disqualified. (355a) Art. unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. 220. In case of death. In case of separation of the parents. industry and thrift. substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. stimulate their interest in civic affairs. Chapter 2. (349a. protect them from bad company. selfreliance. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations. supervise their activities. abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated. recreation and association with others. entity or institution. (315a) Art. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company. 351a. 129. entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision. parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes. 212. orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance. educate and instruct them by right precept and good example. unless the parent chosen is unfit. The parents. (6) To demand from them respect and obedience. as provided in Art. absence or unsuitability of the parents. shall exercise the authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children. to support. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children Art. (314a) Private International Law Page 60 . 216. its administrators and teachers. In case of foundlings. and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian. (349a) Art. and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means. or the individual. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary. the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. 354a) Art. unless unfit or disqualified. 215. inculcate in them honesty. 213. (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials. the same order of preference shall be observed.

(317) Art. the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50. in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.000. 229. However. (2) Upon the death of the child. the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court Art. and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority. (318a) Art. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents. to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. 323a) Art. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment. 222. in their absence or incapacity. entity or institution exercising parental authority. (322a) Chapter 5. (316a) Art. or the guardian is a stranger. 224. in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a) Art. In case of disagreement. 223. if the child resides in a foreign country.(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances. (327a) Art. the individual. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority Chapter 4. unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides. In any case. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. 228. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires. but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income. unless the owner. or (3) Upon emancipation of the child. the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children Art. Private International Law Page 61 . 226. the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a) may determine. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger. Upon proper petition or at its own instance. or when the circumstances so warrant. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education. 227. or a parent has remarried. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. the father's decision shall prevail. 221. the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. 225. parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child. if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault. either of his choice or appointed by the court. and (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. irrespective of the merits of the petition. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel. for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. grants the entire proceeds to the child. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child. The parents or. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) Art. or.

this Court granted the same in a decision dated September 12. Sy An. Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. Finding the petition for adoption proper. even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the Filipino father. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. Galang 57 OG 2312 “In Ching Leng the provision in the 1935 Constitution stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to legitimate children. 1950. I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal wife. If the degree of seriousness so warrants. So Buan Ty. The illegitimate child. or the welfare of the child so demands. (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority. 233. 232. 1955. (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose. (2) Gives the child corrupting orders. Galang which involved the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman. petitioner Ching Leng addressed a communication to the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration of the said minors be cancelled. The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial court’s decision are as follows: After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated May 2.(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (n) Ching Leng v. Comelec)” The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong Seng. even as they were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine. The Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. In no case shall the school administrator. (n) Art. Victoria Ching Liong Yam. declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the adopter Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and obligations provided by law. all minors and admittedly the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An. (Bold underscoring supplied) Private International Law Page 62 . cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. (330a) Art. counsel or example. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. (Tecson V. the framers did not attempt to change the intent of this provision. 1950 granting his petition for naturalization. No. he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. (327a) Art. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted. (3) Compels the child to beg. Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An. Nevertheless. Ching Liong Ding. such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty. the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. a Chinese citizen. teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (33a) Art. On September 29. 231. 230. or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.

There is nothing in the record which shows or tends to show that she had not adopted him in good faith. Dy Jiongco. include adopted children. May 12. our fundamental law clearly refers to legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. a legitimate child. unless the context of the law and its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Section 1. 1952). the Court held: It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child". Marcosa S. vs. born of a Chinese father and mother. Republic. not that of the illegitimate father (U. the term "children" could not possibly refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by legal fiction. pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code. and Ng Hian a boy of 16 years of age (the petitioner herein) were on board. De Leon. 46 Off. are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV. being the stepmother of the said Ng Hian. The Court categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only. despite the circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. otherwise. Petitioner petitioned for habeas corpus in the CFI. A woman. Dy Jiongco. Ng Tio a female of the age of 9 years. Thus the present petition. Dy Jiongco. It is also true that the said Marcosa S.. the petitioner herein and also one called Ng Guan. it is generally understood. for. 3652-3654. at least is the father. The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation before us. She swore positively that she had adopted him. Whenever. Marcosa S. as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law. 16. "and "those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines. the place and time of birth of the child would be immaterial. illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Until the fact is denied we must accept it. and do not include the acquisition of the nationality of the adopter. Ng Hian. Dy Jiongco. Ng Hian v. the court held that: A Chinese merchant domiciled in the United States has the right to bring into Private International Law Page 63 . In the case of Ex parte Fong Yim (134 Fed. 1953).. Gallofin v. adoption gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter". Dy Jiongco. The Chinese wife of Juan Uy Tue died while the petitioner herein. married Marcosa S. Ng Tio was admitted but Ng Hian was not. Santos Co vs. before his marriage with Marcosa S. 1915 the steamship Tian arrived at the port of Manila. when the Constitution provides that "those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines. as well as the meaning of children "whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under the Constitution. However.In Ching Leng. Feb. L-4693. when the adopter. we have already seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264. to refer to legitimate children. the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock. 29 Phil. 335336. was a very small child. as. Collector of Customs appealed. 938). That Juan Uy Tue (Ng Chion Tue). 52 Phil. used in these provisions. they are now being sought to be given the status of legitimate children of said appellant. Held: It is true that the petitioner. Republic. Issue: Whether or not the minor children of a deceased resident Chinese merchant have a right to enter the territory of the Philippine Islands. That fact is not denied of record. together with two children. had never been in the Philippine Islands before. Juan Uy Tue. Dy Jiongco. The question whether or not Marcosa S. the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or children" in Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. by adoption. Similarly. Gov’t of the Philippines. Gaz. Dy Jiongco could bring Ng Hian into the territory of the Philippine Islands as her adopted son has been discussed by the Federal Courts of the United States. Serra v. and not to illegitimate children. 287. L-4223. Dy Jingco was his stepmother. The Board of Special Inquiry refused the right of each child to enter the Philippine Islands. subdivisions 3 and 4). Serra v. Collector 34 Phil 248 • • • • • • • • • • • • On 30th of October. after a rehearing. for instance. Thus. Marcosa S. Moreover." who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age of majority". Rep. In fact. Although. for instance. for. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is. the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes. 544. had been married to a Chinese woman with whom he had some children. supra. Thus. however. Ng Hian. 332. It appears that Ng Guan was residing in the Philippine Islands at the time of the presentation of the present petition. a Filipina born of a Filipina mother and a Chinese father was married to a Chinaman by the name of (Filipino name) Juan Uy Tue. adopted him and was bringing him to the Philippine Islands to study. Ong Tianse. Quimsuan vs. Ng Tio was the daughter of the brother of the said Juan Uy Tue. Ordoñez. after the death of his Chinese wife. 543. Republic. that the father of the little girl had given her to Marcosa S. 70 Phil. CFI granted entry to petitioner.S. (Chinese name) Ng Chion Tue. for all intents and purposes. by legal fiction.

In this case. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. to petitioner. Recio. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan. but that the rights and obligations of children adopted and recognized as such are similar to those of natural children. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). As a general rule. Accordingly. the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German Court. collusion. open to investigation . fraud. a German citizen. The Court held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.g. Jr. provided Private International Law Page 64 . such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. In fact. Romillo. where it is shown that the adoption was bona fide. Ibay-Somera. the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children. Court of Appeals. a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the In Garcia v. ROEHR VS. the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus. 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. the question whether the adoption is a genuine one is a question of fact. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment. RODRIGUEZ Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. want of notice to the party. However.this country with his wife minor children legally adopted by him in China.Blankenese with the custody of the children granted to the father. They had two children. Negros Oriental. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg . .20 and Llorente v. a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure. to wit: SEC. legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16. 50.. on custody. the Court consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction. having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing.19 Van Dorn v. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has the parental custody. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts? Held: Yes. e. and that the children have lived as members of his family and have been supported by him for several years. where the Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country. In order to take effect. . save for the issue of parental custody. therefore. in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. must still be determined by our courts. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Effect of foreign judgments. Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. The court further said: Of course. The Supreme Court (of the United States) having decided that a Chinese merchant domiciled in this country has the right to bring into it his natural children. thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing. (b) In case of a judgment against a person. married a Filipina. it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39. divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. The evidence shows that the practice of adopting children in China is very common. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam. such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court. In this jurisdiction. . but the legal effects thereof. or clear mistake of law or fact. Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39. .The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country. that it takes place substantially without legal formalities. as distinguished from actions in rem. I think that the same decision is authority for the proposition that he has the right to introduce his adopted children. but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction. care and support of the children. Under these circumstances I can see no difference between the legal status of adopted children and of natural children. Respondent Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. Section 48. even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding.

it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. Exam is on Wednesday 630 to 830 Coverage is from start to parents and children Private International Law Page 65 . The proceedings in the German court were summary.justness of the claim of a party and. In the present case. as such. is subject to proof to the contrary.

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