by Henry Braun

This spring the people of Sont.h Korea beo"~me one with the freedom fighters of p.lgGr~a, South Afrioa, East Berlin an.d Hungary. The r-evo L ut tonar-y ov er-thr-ow of Byng~an Rhee has underlined in inl}onf.rover'tible te~rns the n a s ur-e of

that regime brot1~ht into exa st enca by America and supported by U. S. politioal, ec onomd c and r,d11tal-Y aid for the last twelve years.. It was a corrupt, oppr-e as tve regime resting on police t er-ror , .The que st Lon n()wpo:)ud by \s):l~ r,evoJ.t of the Korean students" is: What oftlhe ft.tt,ur9'l Wl11 the conditions for a democratic Korea be establlshe'd? .

The South Korean regime waS the produot ofe.r:t.i und.er ... developed nation caught up in the d:tJnl'lm~,C s of the .phIq

War - a process corspo undo d of Arne!' icau and Ru.ssian deol~~ons as well as the impo.ct of those decisions on the 909i&3.-., political forces of Korean scc revy , Unless the nat·ure ot that process is grasped 'Oy the democrat ic forctls. of tbe

west and a radical break with the past foroedon Amer1.0 ap. pol ioy makers, the 11.k~ly result is the re-etnergenoe Qf the Rhee regime under a difterent name and another a1.sastro~

defeat for Korean democraoy.. . .

Russia's responsibility for the tragic part.ition of Korea and the con aequorrt dabac Le is '!lell known.. Ar:ner:l,ca,'s role, however, is less well known , Secretary of st$.te Herter's statemant of support of the Korean Revel t mus.t

not be permitted to obsoure the nature of that fatal contradiction that has held American policy fast through

the reign of four Amurioan seoretar ias o f Stat 6, duru!g administrations of both Republican and Democratic presidents.

That oontradiction (which at times bordered on political schizophrenia) 1S3 in the attempt to r-ec onoIj.e democratio valuos and a realistic appraisal of Korea's

needs with the realpolitik goal of establ ishing friendly bases of operat ion in the Cold \':ar. once an under standin~ is had of how deeply that contradiction was embedded in American actions in Korea, it will then be aeenhow t.he removal of Rhea only rais6s in a more imperative form the fundamenta.l queetions:Wlll America be c apabf,e of e. radioal break with its past foreign policy? Will the demooratio foroes of8outh Korea be able to mobilize and embark on a line of aotion that will achieve their aim of a demooratio

united Korea, free of both Russia and Amer

As washall aee, the past hl.tory of struggle tor demooraoy oasts an ominous over the likelihood ot an easy ana",r to Although the ropts pt tbe presen\ Korean or

as Amerioan and Russian involvement in rtuL

into the 19th oentury,. tor brevit,'. .' ., our attention on the oruoial years ot Korean development: 1945-1960.

on August 13, 1945, three week.

AIl1erican foroes, Korea was liberated.

On that sUtnller dq tlle JApan •• ,

·Korea. General Abe, met with the 8oo1all.t underground resi.tano. movement, LJ'Uh offered to .turn oVer theaovernment ot .J!lovemel1t inexoha.nge for a sa.te oon4uot Sapenase artny and oiv1lilNl per&OMel.

,:~;i~~~tct~lr ii~:rtie~;~d!11 all of

~ooepted. th~.surren,der ot power by the !'hus, .'. atter 'forty years of Japancuui 00 demoo racy was bo rn in Ko rea.


-, '. In the :ti;hree weeks that. followed, I. proy!

'government pledged to extensive political reform carne into existenoe in eVery 'oe every prov.ince otKorea, north end eou'h parallel. :r,nthis period the Korean whose baokwardness andignoranoe "a. Japanese a...'1..d later by the ,Amerioan.) for democratic organization and adminlstrat

ooali tionoentral 0.omm1ttee in Seoul t.ha't septat1ves of ... more than forty political part #I

of which were COlllmun1st), the People's Republio agovernin.sapparatuacomplotely independent state maCh,.lnery of the Japanese. This took over a host of state funotions and 0 government, . thebaaio principle of which was .. centralization of deoision-makina and. po.110 Police powers were taken over by spontaneously locally autonomous pea.santmiliti& unit.. Thi. note was not ace idental. , In the dElcade as a movementnad considerable influence in Korean tual oircles and among the exploited peasantry

!' "f

In 1929 the ane.rehist movement sp.lit"one seat'ionrb~¢OIlling the terrorist arm of the 'nat1dna.listtl',the other se6tton gOing over to the o:ommun1s;ts. '

The guiding pr tnc 1ple otthe Pe9ple t S ReEJlb;Lle in the Jloonomio 'sPhere ,waS an idea;: 'first ,propagat'sd 1P~ore,a. ~ the 19thoe'nt~Y'p'easant 'movemel1't, of' r,evQlt, the' 'rorrg ';r.z.alt (later known asC1b.undoiky.O ~ • ThJa.1;.l<B.eawas. ~he coopera.t~ ve. In the rural areaa it took' thEr ;;t':ot"'m of: 'ag·rioultural, co,.. opera.tives, oomp,.arable in: all resp:ects to, the co-opa" o,t . the farmers of Nortb. Dakota andWiscot'lsIn. Iri. the indu:atr1~l f6l-ctori,es of ~lle Japanese it, meant the takIng over and.. running of ", ~h~s~ enterprises by." eouricilscifworkers"V'lllen the Amerloan, toreea arriyedin tl1e provihoes Of .. ChO'l+~ . Namdo and Kyungsang Narndo they found the textilE! an d" . machinery plants in many areas in full production under the oontrol anel management of worJic;erst cooperat iv,es.

It was$. delici'ous taste otfreedom..'Phe, priso'z:i. tl'ere empty. of political. prisoners, the Christian seots tre~Oif perseoution f.or the fir.st time in half a oentuI'Y':the~e'lvas

a veritable bloasomlng of political organlz~:t1ontb.at -ccf17ered the entire political apeotrum. ,Mass labor unions'a:nd tarmer assooiations spraJlgup overnight with theuniversa,1 ,dell1fW.d

of land reform and nationalization of in,du£;ltrt un:der

e tloooperat ive-management. tt

At the end, of three weeks the forceeo! KorJilan"~emo,qracy h ad emergedt f.orees strongly imbued with. rerv'011.ltionary:,. socialist Ideasanda. oonoept of poiit leal delllooracy th$.;t bQrderedon anarohist libertarianism. . ...

The Suppression of Demooraoy

Wi th the surrender of Japan the pro bls·m of Korea suddenly appeared on the agenda of the state Department and the American milit.ary commend; A hastily assembled foroe under General Hodge was dispatched to KorG8, with a seto! directives. These vague direotives contained an implicit authoritarian approach to all in'itia1 re1a1'l1008

with the Korean people. .

On September 6 when the American farc·es arrived in Inchon, General Hodgo refused to meet with a delegation ot the Poople's Republio on the basis that the only government he was instructed' to recognize was that of the Japanese.

On this same day tho general looked on as a orowd of Koreans waving hastily made Amerioan and Koree.n flags of weloome

were shot down by Japanese soldier.. The Korean., 1t turned out, were.guill'\Y.qofdleob$J1na m J~aUed a faw. ~;$ f!'tH~~Qr",:'ills.~.prahlblt'4 't.lona and ordered 'the Kore_pso,le ''Go ot the Japanese army.

,.,Several w.eeks later a;grou:p ot future ~ltmder B at K?r$~were &1"_ 'more detail ':tb.e nature Q~tbe1rlllssion.Genera1 0&1'" General MaoArthur) announoed. that one of the missions of Jallitary SQ."ernment in Kore ... as bplwark against oonua_l_.~(2) AS. it turnad .'oommunism tl tlill.:t; VUlI. •. ! to· b •. tnt main oonoern of C:9mmand WE;l.sno'l , •• ausi._ ara,a.n tdle the indigenous c1eaoera.tl\o &8pl,ra,tlon8 South Korea.

E. Gran.~ Me .. 4a,tl fonael" oolonel 10. pation toroes, in his little-publioised work Military GovarnRlent in Korea" bas r • .,.ale4 1n a QpoUl1lented til.coo~1J tlle pr.o~1oal .eanJ.ns in Korea.. 1.'he first Qon.eqUillae was the military an.<:ipol:ttloal lead'M"S to recolnl •• Jitepublic II l.lndar tb.e leadership ofLUub Wom

seoond ."as to .1na,tst tnat '\tire only lovernlurnt :reoognize. or, ¢1e~ withwe.s. the Japanes. at this point had oompletely vard.shed in Tbe first year of the American oooupation

. 4evotad to~prootins theloQalloVerruft8nte Republic It Ud. r.pla9 ing theM with a central

~oroe and o~her ~dmlnlstrative bodies stat Japanese collaborators MGt reliable riSht-1I1ns

(By 1948 twenty-five peroent of the rank andt

Korean National Police ware men who had the Japanese police toroe. fifty-three perc officers were of the seuneorlsin.)(5) This

"forming a bulwark against communism,·1t was e. series otordinances backed up with Ame%' provo at courts that hald over the Korean aanction against CiT11disobed1enca ... tbe Among. theae ordinances (4) were:

ordinance Ili (oot. 30, 1945) raquir all newspapers and publications be 1 andcopiss be aubmitted to the A'MG. after promuJ.ge.t1onof this decree a journalist was arrestod and l~prl suggesting in print that a right-wing appo inted by AMG aa may'or of Sooul was unquali tieq. for his job.)

Ordinance ti:55 (Feb. 23, 1946) requiring three or more per sons gathering tosether political purposes Ilregi ster 11 ,,1 tht.he



'IV >',\

'.' The. suppr.essipnot th~ ;peQP'~ets Repub;l.10 .g.pvernment antt~he'9re~ti'ox\,bt ian ,1lf.o1pJeh~ ;right~w~ gov',ernm,ent.(\ w6uld'lla\1e.mer1te'il o;rlt'iol$m avenin. th~ oa~e of an oocup~~d' enemy;bat1onot,'" ~ sut:Korea. was npt;., an.en~r.n¥ooW).try. It Was a £'1"iel1d1:3' nation wh'o,ae liber'ation atld' Indepcnd.~~oe had·been p~edged' ~Y. bo1ih,. m,u~sia ap.d Americ,a lQ,the. Caip9

, Deolaration of .1949~ .... Amf;lrlca betrayed its pl~st~e •. ,Thus RUlSsla was providetl l:U1 excellent ?Ppo%"tun.l tjf . to ,Step torward as thet1ohampiontf of Korean democra.O:y and. independenoe - to.oome 'out '~suppoJ;'t .o~· the I:,>eQpl'Si S Repub;Lic", ,alg0:Y~l"nment which had l:lanctioned land reform and workex:s!.9qXlt'~ol

of industry durlng:'its 'brief.':~XlstanCeta',gover~~Pl,j~l1tOh

•. wa.s ~ot dominated by tqe communists, although .1t.h~a ~~:pong oommunist leadership 1ncruolal areas 'itt 'Sou,,!!} E:orel:lo_ "

~ • .',ji. "-

But Russta:fihar~d Americal stear of Lyuti,V!ooll.'.ije~t s government .TI?-q~h util izing the struotureo :t']tte ijeO'~le' s Republio in North Korea for it sown purpO,sast. :Ruasia X".Gfused to recogni~e thea.uthorlty df the people's.ReEu~110 in a1 tller N~ rth 'or 8outhKo),"Ga., The ~xpla;ri4t 10n1 . On.~ , hypothe ais is tha;t the RUt;Js ian mdt :tv at ion1n this oas.~\

was similar to the rationale llGhind. the. f'aiJ.U('a ot; ",he ' French C.P; tn 1945-46 to launch a stI"ugglef6r power.' Russia in tho immediate 'aftermath of Vlorld war II Wished

to avert any direot oonfrontation with the west. Another

explanat 10n ~!?t,f~red b¥ on". People' s Rep!~l~~; ~d tl),e independent ~TbJutt9~~ the sta.l1nlats"f!>'«dct' have ~

The 11"0l'1.'CUr;ta.1h drop$>ed. ti1"'a\lI,'l~a' lib. 38th parallel r"9vetlt.l:tefeople" ltepu])Jlo .1t1 .• \l11 Ml"thern half of ... thfSlCOr'ean P~lP.IjUl". ftcll t~u~plq .• or to" it "as subjeoted. \0' in South torea.. In the .. eo-h lb.. dr •• "as destined to beplqed out to the bitter end.

In. th!, f.~rSl. a,et, o9~u.lon, aJ)..(1 ohatUJ.". \he dOliinant n .. 0 t'El. In $~ .•.• '~~. '. hepsQPlet8... n'.Pl1bll0 q. Ulo. kli'. dll1nt-ara'.d 8,8 tbe conserva.tl'V8S 'broktil.,1th 1t t.o tallow \he 1 ... 4 ot

tbe na\1onal1st .leader. floWn 1n by. the 'Q ••.• .l!r Foroe troD ~he1r exile 'ill Cbine.a.nd AmEt1"1oa. ..J:n q_eX" areali, )10 •• 1'.1", 'the people's RepubliC) remained 1ntaot well in\o 194&. Bu' the deteotion. of tbe oonseI"Y$,t1'Ve nat10naliata ot Seoul together with the Amerioan Sll.d Buss.lan. reaporu.e result-.a,

in a momen~e.ryhesita.tioJ\ and d.laorlen.tation of the 1.&4.,.. and the ral}\t and fl1e of tlle People" J!tepublio IU.)"le.eD.t. Look1ng ba.olton thHs perlod, it lsevldent that the tcorean

left lats were largely Wawa.r8 of the danger fro II r1aht.

For example, dur1nS the en~uslastiotturbulent period of the People's Republic, the Kore~ Oommunist party's o.ndidate for the :president .of the People1 S Republio wall none other than syngmatl Rhee. HO\fever. ina 1Iatter of ••• ka

the basio olea'ltage of tbe Korean natlona118t mol'elumt If •• made olear to everyone, a 0. 18aV$&e thatt de .. spite trttquen .. t blurring in the past, was an old one. It ''''UI a d1v1.ion along olass. lines that the ~ 14eolo8Yofltorean nat tonal 1. auco ee ded in obsouring. but. adlvls10n that had been implicit tn the development of Korean soole~.

Korean nationalism first emerge~ ase. coherent poli tioal force out of the Maroh First Revolution of 1919. That rebellion, though quiokly suppressed by the Japanese, resUlted :in theoreatlon of a nKorean provisional ~vern)lent" that "(mt1nto. exile in $langhe.1 and lat~, C.b}lll8~d.ng ..

Though&minated by the popUlar right:"wing' ne.,tiope.;k,lQ:t; leader1 Klm Koo, this government-in-exile, during the

'twent es and tthirties, represented a broad united tront that inol uded even the anarchi sts and nat 10nal ist s 0 f a Marxian-sooialist persuasion. Even the communists entered into relations with it for brief periods. ayngman Rhee, in exl1e in America, though the titular head of this government, had very little influence or even contact with its leading

c iroles •. For Koreans J the Kim.; Koo group was thevo ice and

leadership of ~orean nationalismo.· .

Over the years~ however, nationalist~it.ationand resistanoe in Korea came tooenter in the hands of leftwing nationalists and the communist movement of Kore.a. Both groups established small but tenao ious base s alllong both the peasantry and the inCipient labor movement of Korea.

Al though Korea was (and still is bas ioally) an agr ioultural nation permeated with features of its feuda.l heritage" under Japanese domination a prooess of soo,"al change waS set in motion. Beginning slowly in. that twent ies and then with aooelerating speed in tha .'thir-ties, Japan embarked upon the industrialization of Korea. With the appearance of the first factories and plants, the Korean communt at movement (formerly spl in tared into half a dol4en bickering groups) came together (about 1925) and gained a small but importa.l1t follow:!.ng among the lower classes" A sporadic labor movement uncler communist and SOCialist leadership also came into eXistenc6a It made its power

felt in the SeoUl Eleotric Company Strike of 1925, in the Wonsan General Str:Jke of 1928i and in the nation-wide nationalist disturbances of 19290 The rapid growth of a proletarian Class in the f thirties ia 'indicated by ·'the tact that in 1931 that part of the Korean labor force clasSified as IIfactory workerall numbered 12,000. By 1939 this number had jumped to 730,OOO.(6)

Korean labor struggles and peasant resistance invariably took on nationalist coloringsinoe the management and ownership of Korean industry and important agrio'1l1 tura.l areas were almo st entirely in the hands of the Japanose,

(By 1939, 80 percent of tho total val'ue of Korean property was under Japanose control.) The Japanese also predominated in tho administrative and professional class of Korea with the resu11l that the Korean m1ddleclass that did maneg e to emerge waS a small, feeble aocial group closely tied to the

colonial rulers of Korea...ThUs tht? p."t.~onal Lm Korea i taelf "" .1noontra.lirt to n~tlon&li :'tleoame a movemeni)ot.~bGl()warclasse.

shi.iP of left ... witl.S. int~~l~etuals~ ... '1).1. <j,~b~81 der at ion of tho 'ob milo sirt lon.ot the ~jii!'~ne; .rUl ins oliqu.e thtd~ emerged undar tlVllQ:llan l&~aler sh i p.


Whatever capitalist OlasS existed 1n po Korea was ~ artificial creation brought into rewarding of forme.r Japanese enterprise. Jill a. to :Rhee supporters. Though for the J.rua.jor heavy industry WaS looated 1n N'orthKcrea. BpO'ils in South Korea inoludod the imper bine, maohinery plants and minit\i oonoes. olique of South KOrea that coalesood around r national! st part ias in. 1945 .... 45 was reer-ut ted troll baokward seotions of l\:orean soc lety,: owners, blaok marketeer .gangstera, monoy former Japanese oollaborators and pol.loe this group that tl;tt1le4. to the 019. oJliro leaders and provldr:;d tp,em wlth the organl of their politioal. partt •••

In 1945 the right-wing nationalist •• ere divided into five groups. In the years that leading personalities of these group1nsJ oro forth in and out of pro ... Ehee and Anti-ahae bloo. maintaining a cohesive un! ted front against labor peasant foroes under sooialist and communist 1 The leading components of these groups '!Iera:

1. The Kim .Koo nationalist party: this traditional type nationalist movement" to the left, were not without principlGs or one point during the American ocoup~tion to launch a guerilla war to rid Koraa of ................. _

and Americans. After his assassination 1949, Kim Koo's group, due to a lack or political perspective, fell apart, some servative OPPOSition, others going over from 1945 to 1948 the Kim Koo group was with the Rhea group •.

2. To the surprise of both. the right and. 1 ,

Syngman Rhea, the hero of the old Korean Nationali.'

'Du,n:t, "e1l1eJ"~'.4 a~.,tl1,;\$adero~. ~·'l!<>lst,::irmpq,.r;trMl~ r:1c:h;'Q'1st

pol,l\iiQal to,r.Ae~ , n~~ ~rQ.~ 'tlie;:t .fQtmedr:arq~Qi' . ". pmved

tob~ ,the m.o$tJU,ane~veraQla. Pax7t.y.,,:.'lheil1 (ton .. ' of

~b:o!lute poll~1q~ rpcp',E;lr.peFllti,~~eg. ,th'~Jll: to . " •..•••... ' •.

A -, , ADleri.().anI.eaa~a 'henD;:eo,a~ary,!ena,ev.~n. ;J .... HJI!]l{'!

o rig :It\~ .. 411 fa ~I . 'lt~i.,ee.l. thf·:.;J. an,cUs;irffs. :~;~l . D. ·1 £,h·!eCL't;;J.1C ,t.BJ1r\r'q.t ... t'h,. Rhee. 'fU~oup>is ,pe.st. r1Uustrated ~r py1Jn.r~''l'a,i. :a.n.~portan,~'i1halt;.~ ~ee "s' .

later l'n the SOuth Korean governmerit~ . In ,a. po,l !C:j;~~ing

with opponents who had denounced him as afasc is J Pyun wrote: JlGrant that KOcrea .. is, tend.ins: :toward. ~"SP ism to offer atfect.lve resistanoe: to Communism, who is tojfea.r ... ,K:ore~ Fe.sc ism' except her would-beconquero r?" . And on ~f>t~~f' '. o~ce.s1on in' ·.plead.ing fop a postponement of rElpre~el'ltfl.'t,tVe

dt:'hpocre.cy, he wrote: ... .'

l1l'Vhy cal).we. not wait for a co upf.e <;>f years? •• The idea that hUJllansoolety ..

should consist of the leader and the le~_I •. ., is ineradicable from the Korean mind., .

Demolish this rallying point and you ~'lJ1l1

have an unworkable Korea. It is un~

desirable to h ave our president hassled ..

into a nonentity by a dlvided,turbul.ent

House at the very f irat stage of our

national renaissance. ',IVe earnestly re-

quest our American bretliren to swallow

tIlis rather undemcc r-at Lc .pill for poor

dear Korea's sake .. II

3. To. the right of Pyun Yung Tal we.s an outr1,ght fasc 1st movement edby General Lee Bum Suk. Rhee.did trust the general and made several moves to check h~er bitions. But Lee Bum Suk's dovot ion to Rhee never' we.v:ered. On more than one occasion his terrorist organizati'on, I

rendered Rhea invaluable service. .

4. A small group of genuine Ohristian dGm.ocratf3: a~-:hered to 0. program of parliamentary democracy" Dur l;ng tho occupation, the Kim Kyu Sik group funct ioned asRhe~' s , left wing, teetering at times on the brinlc of a.coalition with the soCial democrats. Later this political foroe reappeared as the liberal minority wing of the conservative OPPOSition to Rhoe.

5. Initially an important r or-co , tho wealthy landlord party had their cohesion broken by the lend ~.e..6e"'!:''''' pushed through by American pressure. This act hO,wev-er 1d not destroy tho group. As individuals their w9D,lth went into grain speculation and black market activities. Their pol.itical allegianoe to Rhoe remained firm.


It. "as only.a. matt.er .' of .t~ •• betore . the ... ,roup. ;t~'$ther into ttwo'r'fsll'.wil\S l,roUP. ~'. on. ,Snpo •• r 'and one

;!lroU'I, of J>O"er.me.8oo1«1ho ~ .. 1\r pt 'b... .ala

insd by' ... '6b~ ••. ~;a.ot.~~,or .... 1ud

olfnEllt8' . f!Ii(lf:bl." 1$ a

'inS tl~ol. .... .... ..... ••• of

~ltlt.bElratlon?t ... t)1" •...•....... I .'Ire

j'" shadowed' bl •. ~etoro..o tth.:·lett. What

desperately nee~ed was 'time.. And th18 \fal ..... ~ ... -

¥f'de d by A111 er:~o a •

... ' ~lh. ' .1945 th.,..... •. l'O .. ·' .. : ..•.•.. l ·! .. ·'. f..O~.' ••...... 1./$1' · bt.·. ·ko. reo a pr " tCUI a

lfBtireeomp1expi:o.t~e.! .... fhetlOst 09m.plloatttll

.. ~!~rn,18ht a.Pl'/.(At'~.e .9t .. mAs •. supper': tor LT- ...... ~,."""'.,.

!};~i~!::t!r~=::~i:~ AO~:f;ni~~~ an~rlanl.i.t

!he sooial.ls,al~k.d.·a O()bfusive part1 orlani ~oroes under-Vlent .ao?n.tant tra;.ent,t ion and iii~~'''h.r again. Th! eo.unists 'II". also .ub~.ot prooess, altho_h·:Palt Hun Y'Ul1&'. C.p. wal ."entual.ly to give a se1'tI$Qt·i cohesion to the eo_unl.t.

At the. 'lme . of' the torl1ud ion at the people'. evan the oOllUllun1f~t s l,aok&4. & oentraltsed orlan1 •• t groups o.f oo.llmunt$tr;J 111 dlft&r-ent 100$01 •• op ..... ted pendently of .one .allqther _The strlk1ns PO"" of sooia11sts and eOlllm11.1.nlsts ~ested dur1n& thi.per organ1zatians that were MOr&Or less the cr ... 'ilon workera and fermers of Korea.


:1nd. ....

P'or"emotitamon$ thase'll~re tho .wi_apr.ad of

the .people' sRepublio ~ wllosehartd$ aotual et.te )"ested in some :region.s late into 194$", When, \h. array succeeded :in. br-eaklns the power ot the Peopl.it. Republio (7) these oommittees fraotured 1nte LyUb'. Demeorat Party and other leftist partiEuI. Md Into lfarmers' ASl$oo1.a:llon ot whi:oh the dQm1nanttoroe was CQtntnl.lni at s. Thssecond mass organisation "e.. the

'Unio.n mo.vement :in the oities under oommuni.t 80C

leadership •. BY' 1947 this laber movement had Bp.llt trade 'Unionf!3deratlons, eaoh ·of whioh. nambe,red hundrod thousand wor-kers. one under antl-etallni8t ship, the other under Stalinist leadership.

Theugl;l. vastly oomplioated by the existence and "communist sifoperatins independently ot arQ" ganization together with a host of minor labor parties, the main lines of leftist party orIent_at the years 1945-47 were as follows:

1. With the dissolution ef the people's Republio

gevernment, the main boqy of sooialists tOlotber


l¥un loon HS)"'iQlp.sopJ..e,t.,$,RepUb11o;an;Partr. Af't.et-":,"1'f1~ dl;s1ntesratlonot :an,.,tlJl, ... fat"sd a1Tt&mpt at a uni tedfrdn.'t gt a;.l1!le:t't1stperties'1n Ausust' 11946 •. seotionsof ,this' part .. ?(PP1 .... ,~t, t .. 0.. jO ..... 1.n .• th. .. a·. :.d .. i~s ident' '. Y'enan"JI.Soo lalls~". 'party whil.t;! the resto.AUle out .'Under th.e labIa ofthe"Socla1

De~oor:$.tt iJartJr ••

2,., ~~ •. ·~Nf,itw People r s. Party II under tl\ie leaae.t~hip 9f Pa.k.)~~ t,tn o()nst:1~l;tted the origina.l 'fl"',ferl··a;h Party,f1the'1' len.der~1p o adr-as of whioh were left ... wing na.tiona.l:t$ts, .. soo ialists, andOOIlll7l'unists who had eitha!' passed thl"'ougl:j. MaoT$.:s TPng's Yenan or had sympathiz~d with the Chinese, oommupJ,.st movement 'in the past. This party oonta.ined a gre.atr 1many' Marxist and sooialist groupings who shared a sense of pol it teal diVision from orthodox Stalinism.Ih August 1946 this. party split into,the South KoreanL'abor Party and the Diligent Laboring People rs Party. 'lh'e former adhered to an "orthodox Marxist" line, the latter beoame known as a "moderate socialist" party.

3. The more or less orthodox Stalinists came together under Park Hun Yung t s Communist Party. But even this party was not free of dissension. Several years later the leadership of this party was liquidated by the North Korean Stalinist regime for its questioning of Russiarthegemony ..

At this point we come up against the extraordinary nature of the Korean lIcommunist" in 1945. Korean e ommund at a were divided into half a dozen faotions: There were nyenan communists, II tlJ.(oI;JOOW oommunistsll as well as some strange, indigenous hybrids. For exempi.e , there were two oommunist dominated poli t 10al part Le s who se event ual division into separateorgani.za.tions was 'ba.sed on thE) old dispute as to which sooial class, the proletariat or the peasantry" was:

to play the predominant role in the revolution in the underdeveloped co unnr-Le a, Othar oommunists proved rest ive under the subordination of the Korean revolution to the needs of RUssian foreign polioy. In 1947 a C.P. group under the leadership of Cho Bong Ahm,a one-time member of the Far East Bureau of the Comintern, broke from the oommunists to go over to the socialists. As an indication of the unortho dox nature of Koreanoommunism. there wa.s the declaration of the important Cholla Namdo C.P. leadership which announced as it s purpose the establ ishment of . Ita democrat icaommunist govornmontsimi.lar to that of the

Un! ted states, but geared to the bene! 1 t of the working people. II (The appear-ance at this samo timn of virulent anti-American, rabidly pro-Russian C",P. statements in other regions rulos out any Idachiavellion explanlltion.)

Thero is every indication that during the years 1945- 47 .,Amerioa, by simply rafrnin1ng from giving direot and


lrl.dlreotsu'x:>port totrbe r1&btiats. ,;palanoe ·of power \0 those. aool&llat rorc e s ge.nu1nell 008itted .. 1;0 a .... ..,

ot'at 10 Korea. :r..yVhWoOJl HftUIlS up asstJ.ssinat ion atbt: .... r ()'f 19"

every sign of his non"" ° ouun iatr ,. posit ion. In e:ny oase, the failure attempt to form a united front of tbe 1 olearly underl1n,d the taot of the ItOnI,J

the Korean. left. sut Amerioa chose _._." .. ""'"

right ist s a:qd to ianore the terror and toward the 8001&118t stdObl"lltla.n I:.LmllDg

the polioe andp.olitio$lpartle.\1n~ ship.' one lraa1ooon.equ~o. ot thl. the damor a1 t_t 10n of the independent was the foroin8o~ the here1;i,oal oo.muni.' the arms 0 tthe orthodOX S1ut.llnist 8.

The road to power for the Ioreen Smooth one. Amerioa was not Russia. with the brut$l oonslstenoy of its .rival Rhee o11que an.d 1ts Amerioan friends demoora:t.1o oritios mside and outs1de of

o 1roletlh. Bau;iatenoa to the roushabod KQrean rightis1is ooourreq. evenwlthln the Amerioan Army Com.mandin Korea, "hiob attempts to steer a middleoourae bet".en lett. The det enders of the AUG and the

e en po tnt to the land retornpushed tests of the Rhea party, to ill-fated Lyuh Woon Heung' s group into a ooalition " Kitn Koo bloo, and to effort.s at restra1nlns of the right in the attempt to preserve a demo or-at; 10 forms ..

The case of General Lee BUm auk 01 pressures and oounter-pressures operat ins c ommarid , General Leat a favorita ot both and General MaoArthur, had initially been both American funds and m1litary advisor. of a fasoist youth organiZation which waa pro

nucleus of a Korean army. When the fasci.t organization beoame too notioeable and when 1t .a. olosed that its major aotivity oonsisted ot torrorl

attaoks not only upon the oommunists but on l ... (~OIUlUIn

moderates as well, some saner heads in the


suo<Hlede"<f in 1:1a..rlng Amerioan sponsorship withdrawn illGt,"the organlza.t ion disbanded.

on,bn~l.ot ,the ,tew .6:doas~onswhen the AlIG suo ossas.<!l in of.:tendyl@.~ ",r.£~lltis~a"t1+e Cl~r1,!~~~" SCle2f?,e414~nit,Q.r'· e!.f~,ffJ7f 19 ~,.qttote'cl, ,all ~tlX"asea .~~~neman ,Rhe,e. tot;h~ ef.fect ·tht't:t.he hfa4.tla~,· ~reeml.7ntw:Ith t'heS;ta.-tle Depa.rt,In"e'llt. V!'h1:ch we.::illi,fa.r1?,eY:b!l(l wha.t "is JQ:ldwnb,y Ap1~"o.a.p. authori~;les .tp "K01"6a. N What~s oicr'uc'is,l 'importance 1nthe fi.ri.<al.e:va1ua-

t ~.C'n of the, American ef !'o.rt s an KOl'sawas the natureo! the st~t,e apparat).:ts n{lat A:n~i'ica brought into exl.ststloe1n South Korea -'a pbllde dcmin,lited st,ructure, the centralization'and bureaucratic complexity. of ,hIcI?- surpassed even

that of the Japanese government in Korea. .

The repressive nature of the AMG-created Korean police-judicial system was most Clearly revealed in the experience of t};1e labor movement of South Korea dUring the YSf:!rs 1945-47. During these Y(ilars over 8,000 trade .

un icn Lat s were arrested by the polioe emd over 160~ 000 wor'kers (8) were dism:tl3sed from the5.r jobs" ac t s wllioha in effeot, amounted to the puraing ot the worlcing force of not cu Iy its leaders but its militant r anlc and file as well.

The prisons were emptied by Lyuh Woon Heung in 1946.

By 1948 the~r were oric e again crowded with politioal

pr i soncr s •. Regarding thi s per iod, the .Ycz.ic'2. o,f '!{O~-Ea, an anti-communist nationalist journal published Tn Vias .!nBton D.C., was to writo!

If As long as the vicious activit.ies of the cruel reaction1ries go unchecked there 1 s no immediate hope for l~orsan freedom - but only chaos and violence ••• At the early stag e of oc cupatdon , the Command a1 i en{:tt ed the so-called leftists b~' ignoring them In favor of the r'e ac t t on er Lca , The moderates are luke warm toward the half-hearted attitude of tho Military Government towards them. The reactionaries are hostilo and bitter because South Korea was not turned over to them ••• Instead of taking the bull by the horns and figh ting lntell igently,

the Command seems to be frozen by it s communist phobia." (9)

The endresul t was a government under the leadership of syngman Rhea, Pyun Yung Tal and General Lee Bum Suk.

The inclusion (due to American pressure) of' the s!'cialist, Cho Bong Ahm,ln the cabinet of tho H.O.K. for' a ahort period of time did little to hide the cold truth regarding tho natura ot tho regime; for when Cho Bong Ahm e.s Minister of Agriculture becamo too energetic in carrying out the


provisions of tbe land reform he ... s q:r.dokll Rhee.

The final &o.t of MerlQa. il). 1'!ne la.woh1Qa Repu.blio of Kor$a was not .tthou\a .diequ.let1n& South Korean BOolel'1staalon& wlth r1sht.w1na leaders had. up to 1948, favored immediate lndeperu1anc •• Together they went out into t);u.~ streets to t. 1945 announcement of ajotnt SOviet.~erioan over Korea agreed upon by Washington and period of up to five years. ft (park Hun Ytma'il

Party was alone in. its defan$' of \h. trust •• the prospeotor independenoe finally arrived, '1 t b eo ameevident tb .. t pert '1 t ion of thelr na' likely, the South Korean 1100 ialists and the leader, Kim Keo, dre" baok in fear of tbe

on November 5, 1947 the Politioal and Commi ttee of the U.N. referred a rEllolution, General Assembly oal11n8 for eleotioo8 to of Korea not later than Maroh 31, 1948 and for

of both occupation powers. This re&olutloo,

the General Assembly November 14, 1947, the Soviet U.N •. delegate, Jianiulsk3', for it.er

the Ruasian proposal tha.t. the General

'with representatives of both South reaching a dec islon a$ to~lie future of Korean delegation, to its o,l"'edlt,pl.e .. 4ed w sta.t e Department to aooept the Russian propoea.l

that the basis of the, last Soviet o'b3eotlon to dependence 'be removed. The Amerioan StAte ject ed the South Korean pl ea to ino1 ude the Korean people in the General Alu!Semb1y "impraoticable due to la-Oko! time., "(10)

The U.N •. sponsored elaot ioos in South 1948 brought a Violent reaotion from both left and the important party of the right-.

Ko o , Together, the left and right oalled the U.N •. eleotions out of the justified tear

holding of the elect ions would make dat it

their nation into Russian and Amerioan Dr. Rhee, on the other hand, urged supper

The U.N. election that was to oreate the Korea turned out to be a bloody one , on U.S. Army in Korea announoed that 323 person •• er

during the ten days preoeding the flotion.And

Commission, . itself, in 1tsaecond report 81. "experienced considerable diffioulty1n left-wing organizations, oertain of whoso were found to be either in prison or undor'

l •

on some form. ot pollee surveillance. tt The ohairman ot the U.N. Oommission stated that right-wing activi ty (Dr. Rhea's tollowers) was "strong II and "blatant. If (11)


!'h$J boy;ootf1r a1mad.et'pre1\l'16nting 'thA it:lna1; pa~!:~'fbll of Ko.X"oafail$io..Tbe police wereable t, "'iurn outen' ov:arJ:.. whnlming' ... majority 'toad-at tu;eir ballc!is tor tbe r1gh\iEft r&ro:up~s'upporting'ayngtnnn Rhee. UoN., Commiesions,bn'blhe b'a"s1s,O'f a,s~ot check o~ voting booths on eleotlohdays~ gave th:elrs. ~p of approval to the South Korean elections, while, notlt'lgin minority reports. "evidence of minot'; ifl' .... trlngem ent, and pre-election: vi'o~ence. If It has always! b,een the oont.ent·ion of South Korean opposition leader.s tbatthe U.N. teams' tecbniques.of .observation were such that everyday police terrori~ation Qt· the peasantry was inav! ta.bly glossed over.

In the two years preoeding the outbreak of the Korean War the Korean people felt the full brunt of the repressive nr.t ur-s of the Rhee Clique. Rhee's opponent on the right, Kjm Koo, suffered the fate of Lyuh Woon Heung. He reoeived a bu.llet in the baok of the head. The assaSSin, a. young RUK Army lieutenant, was aerrt enc ed to life imprisonment, only to be released after ona year by Rhea and promoted

to the rank of Colonel (a lesson that was not. lost on the ambitious gunmen of Rhea's Liberal Party). Throughout 1949 and early 1950 Seoul's ... \Vest Gate Prison resounded with . gunfire as leftist leaders and intellectuals were brought before Rhea' s firing aquade , Rhee was rapidly moVing toward a complete pollee state when his horrified American sponsors blew the whistle"

In a sharply worded statement Dean Acheson expressed his displeasure over Rheets deCision to postpone the spring elections of 1950, and pleaded for the holding at the elections with a minimum of police interference. Rhee gave in and the elections were held. This election resulted in

a minor setback for Rhee. Several of hi s strongest supporter a were defeat ed and a sizeable number of oppo at t ion member a were elected to the Nat 10nal Assembly. But thi s viotory came too late. On June 25 the armi es of North

Korea launched their invasion of the south, leaviPg no choice tor the Korean people other than the one between Stalinist totali ta.rianlsm and the corrupt, reactionary regime of Rhea.

" To Antal" 10 .. '. _bal"ras.en't,· the .at" !f!~!'1:8aled the. alrloatdi ••• trou8 .&okot ,tae Rhea reg lm..ROKA.'r'ml $01 dial" s, Jli1nt into battle w'lth theory: "I el1. social statue 1M Their inability to oro"ught near p~iO to Amerio~ military ~~anl~.i .dPrllpingof mll1:icbna ofdoll.ars of 11111t&1'7 ~ult sSoutbG.t. black.ark.' by ICIt otf Jl$Xlt offioia.l.cUd no \bUlI', t,o. Inspire .trioe

,i.;ill .. th.e abi11t7 .• 'tt~ai\'f.,.d.·Jtooar17 on the 1114, .. '1.1_

e .wo rl d. ta;t.be.bu;t.b. "'luaan1c.tcu.r 11 oei:ved 8upporttr<>m1mp~)'lr.~'1 •• 4 ."'lone Amerioan soldiers embarkinsfor d:ut.1 in regarding the popula.r1iy of theOom.unilt 0 ~~th Korean people. To .aye any\h1.JlQ ou;, of 4Ib&ole required an all-cu' ettorton the pat't IOrge8 of tbe U.S ..

From Mer 1oa' " po int of 'Vi." there .... element.. The Bu •• ien ... dlreoted CoaUlll.' mlUlY of thoa. wbo at the outbreak of tbe ..,. G.ollUaunl_~ Asth.wardraMed OD br1Da

la:biQcQ; to KQrea,.ore than one Korean tox;oeaard ~b&war a8 abl __ r on \he »on-oomnnm. t$tlnte 11.otut18 .otS.oul supported NQrth Korea andEHl up re,rettl1n8

Dissident elem"8;ll;t$ in 1;:11.. Nor-tlb KoreM dur ing the war. Popular .support for the n .... I!'IIk_"!IJIIPI

evan began to wane ~ong the lower ola ••••

(The refugees fr.oll\1 thenortb had a to te 11 the ir b:ro ther s of lit e under Co_uni rale .. ) Hunger, Buffering, bombardment contrlbutedto

apathy and,indift·erm.oe ot .ide seemen'. Mora l!Ulid more the Korean p.ople Ode tc little at st~e in the oonfliotbetween

In the meantime the struggle 'tuJt •• en opposition oontinued. Despltepol1oe and Bene

ferenoe, oonservative independents and tbll around Cho Bong Ahm: made some abo" ot alaotions. Thi,s wa.s· tollowed, he.evar,by'

of the minority opposition members of tbe Hat

and by renewed ac t s of repression on tJb. police and terrorist organiZations. S1x 1952 eleotion, the labor movement of south Korl a new blow. A defeated strike at the Cho.en Textl1

pany resulted in the <i1 schar-ge of 600 .<u·k ... _ aft-

purge of the South KOrean trade union 1


"erE:) replao 9'dby dle'-hardlUlee men.

The eXistanceof such atrugglef,l together wi t11. facesavins, Amarican mediation 0'£' the ruthlessn(9ss of the l,1bee regime gave '9m6 ~all hope to the' oPPQsi tion~

In. 19$$'peace' cams to Korea, a peace that le~t,f,1ftY th':)Us~d homeles~ C!111dr'(m begging it} the. stree,ts,a peaoe th,,,~+. left Bo~th Korea ravaged and prostrat,e, anunea;sy

a:"'l;,~ stice that offared the social tstlS and demccr-at e ot S;:;l.1th Korea a desperate second chanc e in their struggle

for d emccr acy ; ,

The~rug~~Agat,~st the Rhee Dictatorship 195~-1959

Few Americans Oan imagine what agony and effort went

· into rebuilding the parties of opposition. They wore corit:r.ually harrassed by police terror and government interinronce. They were built in an economy tha:t (despite the o.l.:'lions of dollars of Amsr-Lc an foreign aid poured into it) co~stantly teetered on the brink of collApse. With great aucr t r t c e e tho socialists on the left and Christian domo-, c~ats on tho right weat out into the streets of the cities and t,he villages of the countryside to embark upon thoir strllggle against tho Rhee rag tms • With the approach of the f ir st postwar South I\orean e Lcc t ton , they were finally ready for the first real test of strength.

In the spring of 1956, the political oomposition of

the opposition was as follows: The major oppo s Lt Lon party to Dr. Rhea's Liberal Party was the D0mocr~tio Party under the Loader-sh t p of Patrick H..:mry Shinicky. The Demooratic Party is a conservative, pro-oapitalist party wh t ch includes bovh old rightist clements and dedicated bourgeois liberals. He. 7/ ev er , tho leader of ita r igh t VI ing, Cho ugh PY·l.l!lg ok, in ccr-ver eat Ion e with the author in 1956 declared that his cro':.lp had "no pr-cg r-amat Lc differencea with Rhee's party, II tltnt "only per sonc.l lty issues ecpar e.t ed them from the

ar',Je gr-o up ; II that "given Rhea's removal, the two parties noul d mcr-g e , II

The liberal wing of this party, however, und~r the

1 ndor sh t p of Roman Catholic intellectuals took a strong at and against Rheol a suppression of civil liberties and tho corruption a nd economic r eac t i on of Rhee's administrat 10n. It was in the Catho110 leader s of this group and th ir spokesman, Sh1nicky, that the o ppo a.I td on to Rhea

bccnm 0 sh ,o.rply fOCUS5Wd. It was Shinicky f s 01 eo t ion s1 og an,

.1. o~t .... 11:vlJ\& this .. q t" .... t bro.' •• , _ •• relIt •• , oM et .iN _.wea ar •• ~..,.c I\Bfl~ ~ J)8epl.e.

Tbe seo.1'1 ••• ~or "',pc a'Ui1.ou pertf ..."'. 1001allst, Progreative Pany, then new11 or,anl the leadership of 0110 Bona Al'uI. In I~S6 I. 's 1-.ui_,II

cOl\posed of remnants of L1'Uh "oonS ' I tUlU~t!11"

independent 1I001a11·lIts who hd f,ollo.. the 1 of . iU. Koo sovernment 1nOh1na. and a sroup of .x ... cc_uni.'. -0 had broken froln Stalini_ in 1946 ... 47. ft ••• 1 •• <1.1" ......

men of wide politloal experienoe, wltb 48o&d •• of . lA

labor and peuant IIOv •• ent. beh1nd tb... l'tu\tllr 1ftt , ...

level was hiah, and their. ,,1n ot "e __ •• facing ICor.a. .. a. $Dbe,. and reall.tle. their

perspective w ... a 4emocrai.io 8001&11., Kore. •

thlrd-oamp,neutra.llst po.ition 1n tdl. 0014 party organization in 1956" •• operatlns __ ,. ••• 1-1 conditions that toroed. the .ajor1t10.f it. IUI.b .... oonoeal their aoolalist affiliation. .."er\belfu'tII,

manaced to funo'l •• N· ...... p rptl11.D& ( .... 1' •

. pell0. 'error &4.tr.") eVW .... lie. _'flU. _d

vetina the Rh •• p.r-tr in ."'ain ·lOu\bern 01\1 •• by A

2 to 1 maJority.

oommuni., i' _oult l>enote4. waa 001111'1.'111 credited ..n4 n11 a ... po11'io&l terre. 1n South lor ..... ptOOe$8 tha' reacbed It.oompletion in 19" •. In \bal,.", 'then.tura of. the BuaalM pup,et atat' .al _4.rl1n.4 "

It. aweeplq pv, •• t tIl'lor.an OOlllmltrl &1_.,

entire).,. 11qtl1date. the popular lndlleDOU f>f

the lCoreaQOomeunl.' Pat'ty, k\oludlna a.war un!~.r·. and wart 1m. 1 ... 4.1' a . of the eallber of Hun suns Yup, Le. ltq Gook and t1a be. The 0,,,, Rhee in 19&6 .at en _tl-Qouunl.' oppol.l\1oft OOlIDe soaialists on the lett and Cbrlat18n 4 __ "*,,, on.

The oppoaltlon parti •• weI'. prepared .lui uain.g mass action 11\ 'he .tr •• '. of 'be olt,S. •• comba.t police tnt-erl ..... nae 1n \he eleotlorul. In thl

aca.ttered V. 111.,88. of the pea.ant..,.,. ho •• ".r.. pro".d

in a signifioant nla'ber orr.sion. \0 b. po •• r-l ••• ." .. !lul'

'Rhea's centralized mobile poltce,.ar.,.

As. theelect-iondre" n.ar a trqio blow .... opposition by the daath or the popular 8blnlok;r a ... _"" .... fore the president tal. eleotion.Addl4 \0 poll(u. tnter-

ferenoe in orucial rural areas, tht. luarant •• d Yictor,

of Rhea. Thus the e1e'otion thattb.e oPpollltlon 1 • be_

lieved woUld break the back ot the Db •• 10"41 ... _.,\ with Rhea secure 1n power oomplate with the publio gratulat10nsand endorsement of then l\Iierloan state, John Foster DUllea.


'rhe,.t,~~~\"~~dthe . poor of the 0 1tyot $eoUlat,tb;t$ tbl.,w~~!t'lf"':~17_.".lq:$ive~mOrl~t:ra.t :'E1~.(f)t tbi,~f,;,.

~~;; ~,,' '.',!~o~:*. . ~'ll :t~",tune~~

":~."'~iJ" :~"" '" ",lti s~ar4' t1~tlonalZ18t,.·

arrlVed.$eoa llto ,otten thoU8!iUtdQdi~eo'ea~,l.~'h;{ng throl,)gll the 01ty behifid the t'W}aral hElorse, they~aElQi:il1p

,~, I.~ontl~ tbe poliee barrioade before1ib.e prEUil1.~en.t!al p;flU.~Q:e.ou~1n~. theelogan, "Down with f,hePth~,ehDl.Cttatorshlp!1f pn that, ralp.y ep.r!ngevenlng as the unarmedepoWfa F,ectreated before ihe murderous flre of the polioe, oarrying" Wilththem their dead and wounded,. the cry rang out in, the etree:ts of Seoul: .twa will t"eturn tSomeday we march on Kyuns Mu Dal again tit

In July of that same year (1956), a few short months after the Kyung }4U Dai riot, the opposition members ot the National Assembly walked out into the street in a demonstration against police interferenoe in provine ial e1eotions. The government threw an armed co r-don around the center ot Seoul, oleared the streets. and alerted pol it10ally re. liable army units for movem~nt into Seoul. This demonstration endedwlth some seventy elected representatives

of several million. Korean people being attaokedby the professional thugs of the Anti .. Communist youth League. Several representatives were pistol-whipped and't,hen. arrested by the po110e.

American Oomplicity

American leaders were not ignorant of these:8vents

that led up to the revolt of this spring. Nationu Assemblyman Kim Sun-fae was beaten to his knees in front of the Amerioan Emba.ssy and hauled aws:y to jail in an open jeep

with the teet of the police chief ot Seoul restIng on his head. It the American leaders could not r-eccgnt.se the meanlngot the events on their doorstep, then certainly

they could have given credence to a worried Arner Lean A:rmY

G-2 Intelligence report of that year which disclosed that

the sympathies of important segments of the ReX Army were

one hundred peroent behind $hinicky and other leaders of

the opposition. If nothing elae, they could have given careful oonsideration to the words of an American official ",ho resigned his position with the American government in seoul in protest over the administration of American economic aid in South Korea.

In early 1957, Charles Edmunson,. a one-time editor of [ortun! magazine and Pub1io Information Officer of U.S.I.S. in Korea., reHiisned his post end subsoquently published two

, .

In em art~ol. 1n th.~.tloaot~OV. ,\)&8180'£ his eJtP~r1eneeB 1n:ai. rar kl\. " warned of the d[)ljgere of the C.I.A. orlan! ... ' Dulles. Mr .... Edi.lUllSOn wrote:

liThe aeoret operat ion. ot tnt.ll agents can eas11y be manipulated \0 pub~ic opinion aocording to the .labe. ot those in charge ••• It should never

gotten th'atsuch a .huge and l ... luultl

secret ~enoy as the C.I.A. continUing potentlal. dallier government."

Koreans were "ell aware' of the in"o C. I.A. in the internal. pollt 10.1 of South position otthe C.I.A. in ,Amerloan organization is beyond tbe oontrol of critioiam. 1hls was no seoret to Korean ••

Mr. Edmunson's revelations regardina tbe ecenomae aid in south Korea threw into sharp esseneeot Amerioa's role in Korea. In an Roportar of oct" 31, 1957 t Ir. Edmunaon put hi. the crux of the matter in his dieu::russlon of vh to the 50 million dollars worth of:tertl112sr year to the South Korean government as of the Inter-nat ional Oo-Operat ion Admini


U.N ....

"The fertilizer 1s given to the rem

governm.ent. whioh sells it to Korean for hwan •. whioh . are supposed to go economic aid ,and defense funds.. The reveals that less than thirteen per the 16cal currenoy owed t.hese turu18 WllUI actually paid in. Most of the seven per cent went into political funds or was lost through graft.

"Meanwhile, the Korean pea8.ant paid his fertilizer not the reasonable pr agreed to by the American authorities

the Korean government or +3,,72 pound bag but a n average of two or

o_l.J:',. t:b~ 'lb:d''''~'Ut_~

.l1<>'J .•.. U.~.$;i: A:r'mY' o:p floetr"· ,1Ji:l:p·.b':EJet' Eb . •

~lJtpq$tng t.tt lEt of: ···tlni t eQ"'N~t 1onac·,Qc~ :mander •. in Ko3:':e'a.J. • This ma.~$';s flP:~r.d~~jl .autbori~Yo LTite . A~ ,Mil EfJ. w;. 1;1. ,.q:j>iR~~i,

arw Eto tion th'a. t:tnj[gh~Q ~n9 e1;v~l;IJ;,Y'..4.~·;,)

please the leaders of Korea.fSl ar"J~" iI].;r' ..

IIPre s tdent.Rhe e, f.urtbermQre ,:1.AI. J'" i.ifXFf shrewd propagandist wlthpowerf.ul fi'$en"p in both houses of Oongress and.8Jl1QIlS: lI!~Y new apaper- s and new s magaz ine S'" tp failing to report many easent'\lliLl faots, about the aid program in Korea, the . Amerioan press must bear some of the blame for the situation as it nowexlats.

For example, oertain Amerioan na~spaper$il'

and magazines who se reporter a saw copies

of the ICA report scoring irreg\.\lariti'6l;!

in the distribution of fertilizer did

not print tha·s"hory .• u

This poM te ignoring of t;he oorrupt ion of., tee Rbea olique meant little to the Amerioan people other than the usual fleao:lng of the Amerioan taxpayer" bu.t to the Kl')rean people it meant far more. In 1957 it meant that over three million Korean farmers during the cr-ue ial pre.h~vest months waraforoed to subsist on bark., grain hnsks and grass roots.

Rhea, it shoUld be noted, did ac o ep t some Amerioan advioe aimad at improving the er r te ianey of br,anohes of

hi s government.. The Nat tonal po11oe of the Rhae reg tme "ere generously supplied with Arneriean automat io weapons, U.S. Army maohine guns and America n adVisors, Its leadership cadres benefited oonsiderably from training Visits to the schools of J. Edgar Hooverfs F .. B .. I. and to that model foroe of law and ordar ~ The p~liee Department of

Chicago t Illinois.

However'c·'W'i$t1 <.lOnt roll1nS·.··~.".l.eo' Ion.

pol it 10 al ors_l::sers ,"'o,md ruralareasortto Ie' terrorized areaS, the to po int to the $180'10n

Chang. to the 'V'loe la.tm~i'l

Ki Poong as proot the ¥'WciClIi""""

bl i thely ignor~ the t &ot Ohang was fOl"'oed .by' Rhee t s po11o'e-b~ftd • __ • seolusion otbt. home.

The strollS. ahc:nl1n8 by

of 1956ta.iled to 1mpro". a.ot ion of Rh...anQ hi .. polloe

of the anger of the people oontrol OVer that part of oontrolled ... thesix'y-f siating of the "1111 ... were taken to sas ih. over the elected boctS ••• en a

W!.:th tn. approach ot 1958" Dr. R'h.e$ noo •• d.din torce that r.ut.ln.d hi. mo.' ene.my ... the $00 tal <1_oor .. t the aoquiescenoe of tbe rilht u

Party I who eb.ar.d :Dr'1I D •• 'a the entire lead.erlhip of the Party Was arre$ted~d sooialist leaderl of south "oontaot and ooopera.tlon filth. fA The socialist movement waa, 1n

Prior to hls exeoution, the prison with tanks, barbed

infantry battal ion of the BOlt preventing a "Oommuni8t Progressive Party leader. Olo

A few weeks before the movement the author reoeived an a young Korean SOCialist; who Ip'.oke

his party in the oomins Nat;ional Progressive PartYt he wrot;e .• pl the winds and openly emerge out openly running more oandidate. in morc fore the Korean war. fI 11th the polte

seoreta.I:'Y of St'ate. Herter. a (APril~9, l'9P.P) re,tbt',~mand to the Rhee govequnent is to, be welcomed.,el.on:$ wlt.l1.phe 1ndignanteditorlals of the Amerioan ptess., ,:apt th'e:.JP.d1g-

~:!!O~e~; :~~~~~ b~l t~!O i:::~p~~~ii~nl~d:~~.~~~d

~leotlons; 1 t would .:hav;e been weloomed ~n 1?56. wb.en the Progressive Party ~{\,a smasbed; 1t woll1.d have ,been we}.P9med dur lns the 195,8 el.e.qtiol},s.;, it would ha.v;e been. weloqnj'~,~', in the winter of 1959 when o"ppoe1t10n members ot .~h.e Na'tJona.1 Assembly were again dragged out tn the streets to btf platolwhipped by offioers ot the National Polioe; it woUldha.ve been weloomed betore, dur1as ~ lmmedlatel~ after the eleot10ns ot this a,pr1ng ..

The Amerioan attitude to the Korean events of 1958 i~ best typified by the reaction of two of the important opinion moulders- on the Amerioan ac sne, Acoording to

Time magazine of Hay 12" 1958, despite tfminor rural attempts at voter lnt 1midation ••• freedom of the franoh1 sewa~ reg 1s ... tared • ., .. 1 t Was olear that a two-party system wa~ beg$,nn1ng to tak~ hold ••• polioe harrassment of a.I'l.t1-g~ver,nment polltlo1ans nas slackened ste~dl1y.1I

An editorial of the HSt York !1msiapPlaUd1ng the trl:utlph of democraoy1n Sou h Korea sa d; "There. will continue to be a maJor1ty government. and there w1l1 oontinue to be an effeotive opposition ••• the basis of the ballot is SO \1nd ,. as it should be. This 1s a government

by con.ant of the goverened. If

It 1s imposslble to overem.phasize the extent of Amerioan whitewashing of the Rhea regime and the de11berate ooverup of the taot.s about Korea. The only publioat 10n to glve my ext.en.slve ooverage to the suppression of the

"tateart soc ial dE:lmoch~a.ts~d tbe~alptif,somaent ot their lea.ders. and to raise it.s smUl v010e in protest .A. the

'x~~t'loEUl soo1aliat,Xlellsp~per abQr t1,,(13) In an

~~~Qle(14) deal~·w1th. f,he' .' ..... .: .O'r\aq Asaembly .180- .{,Jt~.a'f Lab¢r 4ot1Qnput !~~tl\!ra.dt,~.na3.1.81. of \hl ". r~an . situatio~ tor the.l!)et;).i~1t 9t '1~llev.ra1 thousand ~t1pan' reader,. ; ()Q,.Pl' •• ~t;ffD1~ll'l! 1nto soutJ1 Korea \0 the nands of XOt"$a,n tnt~lleotW ••

;:,~",~ -' ii, '~,,: ' "!; -" ,,' ._, ,.' '"

The attentlB:n 6t'tne M~b~Ytot~bd ane.lyatoen\ered on the nature of tne deadlook • .h· eli mee held the oppollltioo. The opposition oould not break through the polioe oontrol of the rural areas. Til1s taot, together with the inereasing. anger pf t~e~mpoveri~ed._ ... exploited Korean people. pointed t,oward. a.revolul.1,o~ 8t!);.1u.t1on to the 1m .... passe of Korean demooraoy. In the same issue ot that publioation a sooialist writer went on to emphasize not oX\ly, the neoessity of a revolutionary 9vertbro" of. t.he lUle,.§l ;regime thro~h a smashing o'fthe ·t'«'ban nerve cere

of~he National polioe, hut also It.feAsibility IP

;t,h.~ p re aenc e on the scene ·of the foroes of AllUiJrioa. and ~ussia.

tn early 1959 the first publio oall tor reyolutlon was made. in South Korea. In the Seoul neflspaper,

Hyans §hirunun. the oall for revolt appeared in an. ar e

flj Ohoo. Yo Han. ostensibly a disoussion of hrdinand A.. Hermant s (of Notre Dame unlversit,r) tbEh'VY of t.be t.yranny of the majority, theartlo1eended withthetollow1q words:

"Politioal logic bases the prino 1ple of the majority on toleranoe, magn.animity end persuasion. A true majority, of oourse, 1. not expressed solely by eleotion.. If eleotions are not capable of determining a true majority there may be another "sa o.f doing it. It is the way in which a true majority is deoided by force!.. and that 1s What we oall a revolution. 'Ina key to grasping the 'substanoe of the current orlsis may 11e in this point. ft (15)

I.n short,an the question of the Rhee reglme, tbere

.as a. world of ditterence between the edltor's i,1rIe

ll\B.gaZ ina and the New Ior~ 'lilaes and..... the Amerioan .$00 iali at s.


What oo cur'r-e'd thl;~ April in 'the 'streets (it ;the'do1t1es of South Korea waS n.ot~silllplythe outb:r'EM.ko,rspc~tan:e:i)us mo b violence 0 The r8l\~ and flle soc ialists, th~ f?ung, Roman Catholic democrats, the peasant men and·wo·m,an,,'tche laborers and poor of the towns and cities, were prepar.ed and united in. their determination. to win. out , M<1w.han they ware once again denied their democratic r1ghts.they embarked upon the only course left open to them. Led 'by the students» they marched unarmed into the fire of· police barricades to try to win What the Amerioan leaders and the United Nations with allot their power had been either unable or unwilling to give them - political demoorao.yi.

The oirO'lJl1\ste.no9S surrounding the st:u<1ent .. .led rebell ion indioate both its strengths and weaknesses as well as .,the dlJ'llers tao. in.g thedemooratic tereea of Korea in the per lod ahead.

The first point to be noted is the deep roots of the rebellion among the lower olass of Korean BOO iety. In the city ot ).Iasan. for example, it was not the students who in tho d.ec isive encounter broke the power of the police b but r.a:t.her a mob ·0'1 work1ngols,s8 women~ And in seoul the victory of the students was ,assured not by Mr" Herter' B statoment, but by the oonscript peasant soldiers of the

15t.h ReX A:n.ny Division. sent into seoul under orders to su.ppress the revolt. the soldiers surrendered their tanks

to the students and rerused to fire upon the rebels.. It

was after this event that the Amerioan Ambasa~d.or oal1ed upon Rhea to break the unhappy news to him thathewaa f1nished ..

The orIgin of the student revolt 1n the so ut herl) 01t1es ot KwangJuj Maaan and Pusan 1s signifioant. In a aenae , it was inevitable that. given the outbreak or a revolutionary struggle by the Korean people, It should

begun in the towns and oities of the t.o southern provinces ofCholla. Halldo and l\rungsang Namdo. For during the Itset hundred year. otKorea' a history these two



~p:r'pv1rt~es nave been the hlrthpla.oe 'of e"ery Korean mass ,x,mov:~:tUent of prote,e;t. epd 1;6vo1 t,. It w~s ):lere tha.t 1n 1859 ibel"9 emerged the lIlJi;l$sia.n10 na.tive re11s,ion that ,oame to

l,JiI§ D(lwn ali! ChUp!19Ro~,'1.ia.is movement ra.isedthe ory for

an end to oppression by alien oonquerors, equality for women, and soc ial justice. It was here tha.t the Ch,riatlans !o1:il1l'd;,¢.evoted o.onverts and tb.a.t,the. Japanese were met 911 th peais,a.l'lt:~·,resistan~e$ovements.. It was here that the strong pr'e~!lorld. ~'Ja;r I !{or-san anarchi st ll),ovement flouriShed.. In ;the. rtt:wenties and 'thirties the ~,rean oommunist and lett .... 11110$' nat ionallst tno.vement s reoeive(1 their strongest support t:l7C1Ymt.he iInpove:r'1shed l.owercl~ssa~,1nthls area •. These two,provinoe,s Welre in 1958, at the time of its bruta.l

,su.,ppression~ the stronghold ot the sooial demoorat iomovEI. ment of So 11th Korea. ~d of the trade union movement.

i Bull the pred.om.inance ot the student. in the leader ... ah.tp pfthe revolt in seoul and other decisive area. lnt. to a dlsturbing faot - the dlsorganizedstate ot labor farmer organizations as well as the absenoe of a political party able and willing to sieze theinit1a.tlve. 'The one

,ol:Lticalforoe with lta organization and press pre.uaently int'act is the c onaer-vat ive Democratio party.. This party 1. under oontrol of its extreme risht wing andi1ia rank.

bemg swamped with the masS desertion of politioiAnS trom :Rhee" s Liberal Party.. E.verything points towards it. emer ...

g enc e as the party of the same element a whioh rul rea

under the Rhea policeata.te.Of ccuraa, the liberal minor1ty might split;. and forma nGW party. But sucb a party would, judging from past programatl0 statements of Korea's "liberals," offer little hope to the poor of the 01t1a.

and the impoverished peasantry ...

, There are slgns that the students remain

of 'the conservativ.e oPPosition to Rhea and doubly of the most likely ally of that group- America. fight ing in SeoUl the students devoted one of the ir ma •• attacks to the attempt to destroy a sta.tueof General Arthur. Aft·er the collapse of the Rhea government coneer'vat.tv e s held a mass funeral oeremony to honor student dead. An American Army band and an Amer with flowers-in-hand participated. The students of voted in favor of a boyoott of the oeremony. spite the talk of Herter1s "breakU with the policies ot hi. dec e seo.r , the Korean students wera well aware of th mean 'Of Eisenhower's visit to Frano.o Spain aa well as his

intended ViSit, before the revolt,to syngman a.

Amerioan foreign policy does not make radiO ft. easily. Many of the students realize that the temptat will remain strong for Amerioa to baCk any group or It man who offers the s11ghtest prospect of preventing the


It"Qq,.nt.' revol t from developing into So r.evo.lut lonary teroe camparabl e to Lyuh Woan Heung t a Peopl et s RepUbl~9 movement ot 1945.~··

The American state Department and the U.)l'.'t,a':j~·~(FfjJet can easily carry out the student demand tor "t·ree'El·l.C' ....

t ions wi t.h c iv11 liberties for !\ll pol1"iical,Pe.t'tl'$i .

But the question remains whether America would.,iB reappearance ot a Korean Socialist movement dedioa"~oia re-united. neutralist Korea, tree of both Russian ect American influenoe. SUch a. Korea would InevltablY'mJe~ a demooratio socialist Korea. ... an almost certain rav:ol·u.1ilonary faotor in the status quo of the Far East. AA Imaginaitive Amerioan foreign policy woUld welcome such an 'alter'l'l.a:1I1ve. But. ,,111 the leaders ofeitber the Democratic or Republioan parties be oapable ot breaking tree of their realpolitik mystique to embrace and to work for such an a1 ternetts,lIfe? This 1s a question which Mteric.an llberalsmust be prepared to anner in the coming period.

The responsibility plaoed upon the Korean studeats is

a heaVY one. It is quite possible that in Cholla Narado and IYnna.ana Namdo the revolutionary and sooialist sentiment ot thoa. provinoes wl11 raiae the politioal consciouaneS's to a level at whioh the stUdents .ill realize that the natural ally in their struasle to aohi eVe the ir demoorat io aspiration. 1. a aootalist movement representing the interests or labor and the peasantry. In seoUl. however. it is almost oertain. that tneranks ot the student rebels .111 be ,plit by m etfort of various rightist leaders to gain their

alle; lance. There are indioations that both these

prooe~use8 are underway in the respective areas.






Deapita the res1gnationof Rhee an uneasy truce exists in South Korea. The oaretaker government of Huh Chung has given 1ts tentative promise to the stUdents that in three

IS on t.i:U!r ttaenew eleotions .111 be held. In the meantime, t.heeit.atty. balanoe at power rests in the hands of the Kore.lIUl army. The new government has clamped martial law on many ot the "trouble sp,otsllot South Korea. It 1s an unoertain period. The torces ot the right and left w111 IUU1euver tor a foothald. A8 Korea mcve s off the front pase• «t American ne •• papers a cloud at obscurity w111 d~u,cend upon the day-ta-day events in Korea. Therefore

1 t 1. neee.Bary to paycl OS8 attention to two poll tical event. which have occurred in the last few weeks.

'ft.. r

,} f ,'Thie f{rat· isth~' attempt df,tl't"ei ,editorial writers of Time magazine to build up the i.mage of a oe"oandidate for ~role of an enli.ghtened strongman O''! South Kor-e.. For

·i~Mr·;ltJ..uce' s braintru.st, the. hec.o oft}le •. Korean students' l\~v.p;1. tfs :Gep.er~l;..SollSYo" Ohi~.Ch1~rofstaff ~.t the KO,,~~I¥l.A,rlt1Y~:. Acc~.tdip.s t~( .. 1'tma nt~Biz,1n.eiof May 9, "lbee fQ:~Sp.t; .8tlll~e .thi'ere,i! .. 1t', '~9It'tje'en!'or one man:

G. e ... n ..... :e .. r~.l, ... ; Song, Yo dhan:~.,.: .: "';·I1·.· 'Th. e •. ~ .. fi.ttte ... a ... oooUttt goes o.n.to .1". el~1ifj G~neral Son~' a ,yet sion of", . e . over th row of iUlee: ~o ..

~n8 ,;th;rough a sertes ot c,dnfer.$o6eS with Rh8!8 brought about Q1:Q~$s,ignat ion. :rri, the tu6e-$6RS ~ergiont the general reLfJ1A~d,tq fire' upQ.~ th,e stucis,nt$ Qec~:U8'e heltbel ieved. the

f ~J'tudel}:t.s' demanda,\\Verejust .. i, .

. f. 'Tti.e;Luce p1.11n1ca.tion fai!eto int:orm its readers that ·<~I}.t~pr,"l 20 whil,e, the fi,ghting st!llraged 1n the streets

:. J~tSequ:t, Gonera.! Song publ101y i1owed' ~hat h1s troops "would. crush .!£}3_ further~\ltibr.ealbiSwt,tboYt merol .• "(16)

, The general. s words were uly reoorl!ed oyoorr"6spondmt s

Qt:~hl:l,UPI. AP anc:l Reuters n~ws ~eno~es. Moreover, 'e;Lementa~f the, 15th Rei. division. ~der direot oommand of , ~~.did fire o,il. :the st,udents ~d d~iattempt to restore !lorder. If on the 'basiao! heiWs deaps. chasof the three J)~Wfi ag snc Ls s c 1ted above .• the ~ ,ranO\800 Qhron,1,.?~.! of

: .~priJ. ~'. report~d: . t. .', .. ,

. "In the capital oi'tt¥ (aeoul}troop$ quickly cleared most street's a.n:d reatored a hrood~nipeace ••• Tba lS'th'ROK Division bro:ke up.daylong. rlot,sof;'s.;'udents who at 909, po lnt besJeged. Rh.El!3 ~ltis ltl$nslon •• "

,~ut in northeaa}.ern a~oul .. , ,aeilter of resistance against Rh'SElts r.;ibaral. Party t hundreds of def1ant demonstrators still r'oamed , Army tanks and t.ruckloads of soldiers moved on that seotor this

morning. Ti '

~Vhat happened when those tanks and soldiera met the students that morning? What happened to General SOng' a Vow to crus~,the revolt I1wi tho'U.tmeray? f1I V'fhat caused the 'f1.BO'l,lt-J·ace, on the part o.f Gener'aI SOng? That evening an

ABOr~dio 9e>rreapondent 'speaki.ns directlJ tromSeoul re'porte;d that the: event s whichha:q. t,ranspired tIl the 01 ty tbe.t da,y could only be compared to the February Revolution

'in the, RUssia of 1917. 1'n that the &Q1<1i9r$ were openly trat~rnlziI}g with the rebel stUdents" It "a6 the retusal otthe I;"anH; andf1le soldiers 'of tne 15th BOX Division to tire on the stu<;lent s that bX:-ough t about General SOns t e overnight change of heart, {md noth1ng else! 'When the dust" clea~ed from the confrontation of the student8 and the 6U'my" the stud~nts found, that not oply had General

. Song come out oJil: "their side, II, but the entire body of

The mass desertion t~ .•• iQ: ••

maneuver of tho Rh~eoJ.i9.u. 'Ihe next step'lvaf» ta:k6~,'i1' that day a oomp~'.t ." ~.t( $();

a Buddhist teflrpl.'ln6t+~u1/·t·.

to reorganize t.h~ lat.

terence ot

of General r·b':tm.~·.·····Df.mni.!1i!i'J11ll!··i

labor, peand l&oo1allat ·organlza.1;liXll$r" out'lawed Progressive Party ot eho Bona Abm.

en aooount in 'the Hew 'tort<:' esot .&Qt~f! .'" .. QUD,

to.ld. ::tih~t.qohpu.bI{o assam es violated amergan9,

1_ ~.ot'e$· •• tit. ..'; ( .....,.

p~i!a 1_d 61 eo t$bl'ls .. tbt'&$.eJB •. ~~ a\lfaf" 1tl. ,obvious that General Song 1s t~_l~ s\eps"bb b_pr'fjr

the, • ~o~pt"ar:f1 PJo11.ti0al foroe thal .1gbt be an ..•..... _ ..• i •• · •••

of the Udent ••... Butt!t 'lstU:lllke17 tbed.lbB.e'G~er.'i; ;W,,.

8000.ed in prevent inS the formation of a. 8(),e1a1111:1\~ pe.rt, .. such an overt t of polltl.Oal repression would ~.ot.$Qoth.e

. the he.ted e attba 81'f1dent$ nor a;ta:, th.eu~erV!(!):~.

of t.. state :p.epat'tm~tto:keeplnthe

Ie: of stUdents.

_&gag t as n$w ... found.h&ro w111 bearWa1roh:l.1lI In

lod! fQr with the reappearanoe of the .itOrean at m01r&IJt'ent 'on the soene the battle 11nesln.1l'3l$

(OJ for KoretJln d_oor~oy w111 onO$ qain 't.)l\$'gln t:o form.


in korea, t1 York,

~t)~ ~~. tli: .. ,:::)' ;: , _ ~ , ."_ '0 '_ "

all ~rejen.. of Korea, II (PublioA,fta1rs

Wash~,~ont D.O., 1950,) pp 58 .. 70, oontams the

~lt,a~.:'~i;fil~'$ )~~j!,.!t~'~(;Ulsf,LQl'J' .9i( tl;lll' qrd"inanilea ,issued by ;"Ni"~i (~ 11n ~~f::ea,.:~!

Ho'tl,.:, It~ye~:Q.p~~nt ot:Trade Unionism til Korea,'" lan' a.rtic.1Ett ,1n".;tn~Qp'llngang ,Eoonomio Review,. July 1956. (Seoul. Korea). Prof.",'}!akt,s figures are from the "year Book of Korean Eoonomy, fI published by the Bank ,tKore,., (rEtElJ;~ulnJi., ,

iLiThe pr,ooes~ "o·;! ,t,be ' bX"~~k\4P ,of the people's Republio [L;'.'V;~lie!Q 'in c;l1}fr~jer;-:~x+t, BrQV;~i(l~H!la and o1t1es. In some

,oases the presenoe of the Ainer10ans on the soene "as suffioient to mobilize the dormant oonservatives within the people's Republio to break with it. In some reg ions. howe,ver, the peopl e r S Republio and the ir militia, the Ohlanderi, were not dislodged until military force was brought to bear upon them.

(8) Tak, H.J (I, Ohung ang Eoonomic Review. July 1956 ... In oonsidering Prof. Takts startling disclosures on what happened to the labor movement of Korea under Amerioan rUle, it should be noted that prof. Tak is a staunch ant i-communist and pro-Arner rc an in his sympathies.

(9) "Yoice of Korea,l1 Aug. 15, 1957. Washington, D.C.

(10) Louise Yim, t1My Forty Year Fight for Korea, "PP 272 ... 7:3. (Louise Yim was a member of the South Korean delegation to the U.N.)

(11) "Yoiee of Korea, rl March 20. 1948.

rem agr' did not sutter trom impoverishment ot t ..... u.u."

Consequently, North -. ...... _ ....

ut ilized to A g"at extent

indep en dent landowner s and' aurpl us under .t_te Qontr;ol.

(13) Labor Aotion, J4q 16. 1956., New .. ... . ... t 10n was at the time the organ ot tbe ••.•

SoOiali.'. Leas." ue,. an organisatlon .. wh10h Joined the Sooiali8t party - Social Feder.t 10 ••

(14) Labor Ac\lell. June _ .. , 1958, New Tork. (15) .. _ York TSa •• , March 1, 1959.

(16) 8:m rranciecQ Chroniole, April eo, 1960.

-19 •. §Ol:e~. and Th§J1r. O"lfure." Ronald

.s 0",. . rltj uri •. ~t$ ls an exoel~ent over~ 1.,

introduction to Korean hi,tory ana oUlture that even to h'le$ upon the political situation ot 1945 ... 1950

. . f'ftre, I~~," Harvard OniverS.ity pres ... ,

t • TIl. i •. ' e mostoonois8 Alld1nval.uable

aouroe aline with both Rus.ian and Amerioan po11c16Sin Korea as well a. the nature ot tbe reslmes ot North and go utb Korea. •

..JI.iJle::.~w~,".a· U~.~J..W=iiI~~ii$\~~~~~~~tII if

sro.n resa,o UIl\'I. a y, New ork,

OrlginallJ submitt.ed as a Ph.D. thesls, this l1ttle.t.l publiol.ed work provides a wealthotmater1a1 in the taft of detaUed &Ooount. ot the operat ion ot the AIG in the province of Cholle. Hamde. It 1a in aotuality tbe onl,y lIO\lr'oe that d,eals to attI extent .ith tbe people' s Repu~110 of 1941,

'1:0 wr:i te: ')?ay 4fea: Spciu1i st',:Ps:,:rtX.:-SDF

19'{.8 "California, 8t'., . i,1' ,

:6er$:,eley; Califo

" ,"

Pl"~lf\! 'je;wii0ulk orders ·Oi:('· ,25 o ep i.e sor

single co:pies- .... 25¢ e&ch.plu.s

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enclose cost, :dfpalit!>l'et6~) 'pllSJ§s ]}ostage handling wi tn your,~rder. , '

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Request Date: 22-MAR-2011 Expiration Date: 31-MAR-20 11

ILL Number: 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

ILL Number: 4459332

Call Number: 0 -610 AtL. 13£~: ·'1

Format: Monograph

Author: Braun, Henry.

Title: Behind the Korean revolt /

Pub. Place: [Berkeley, Calif.?] : East Bay Socialist Party-SDF: Young Peoples Socialist League, [1960?]

Borrower: TEXAS STATE VNIV -SAN MARCOS - Interlibrary Loan

Patron Name: Wright, Jonathan Patron e-mail:

Service Level:

Delivery Method: Library Mail

Request Notes: FAXIARIEL:512-245-3002/Ariel OCLC Req. Ex. Source:


Need By: 20-APR·2011

Verification Source: <TN:2390 19><ODYSSEY: LL>OCLC

Supplier Reference: IllmllUlllmllllllmlllllllllll~lllllllIl

Supplier Reference: ILLNUM:75402032 Local request number; ILLNUM:75402032 Owned By: UD 1

Printed Date: 22-MAR-20 11

TGQ or OCLC #: 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

TGQ or OCLC #: 75402032 10: TXI ISBNIISSN:

Address: 64 SA Tvia

TEX press/ AlkekL ibmryllnterlibraty Loan/Texas State University-San MarcosJ601 University Drive/San Marcos, TX 78666

Service Type: Loan Max Cost: USD50 Payment Type: IFM

Copyright Info:

Requester Symbol: OCLC:TXI

Return To: ILL SHIELDS LIBRARY! UNIVERSIrv OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS 1100 N.W. QUAD I DA VIS CA 95616·52921 U.S.Ai ARIEL: I FAX 530-752-78151 shieldsinterloan@ucdtlvis.edU

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