EN BANC G.R. No.

L-23691 November 25, 1967

ARSENIO REYES, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO NOBLEJAS, in his official capacity as Land Registration Commissioner, and JOSE SANTOS, in his capacity as the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Respondents. ANGELES, J.: chanrobles virtual law library An appeal by certiorari to review the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner dated August 25, 1964 - ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny registration of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership presented to him by herein petitioner. The main issue is, whether or not the period of redemption of properties sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is to be counted from the date of the execution of the certificate of sale by the sheriff, or, from the date of registration of the corresponding certificate of sale issued by the sheriff in the Office of the Register of Deeds concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For purposes of disclosing the law question involved, the following statement of facts lifted from the resolution appealed from will suffice: It appears from the facts of record that the spouses Leonardo Gamboa and Aurora L. Cariaga are the registered owners of the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18230, 18231, 18232, 18233 and 18234, of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. These properties were mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and upon the failure of the mortgagors to pay the amount of the indebtedness upon maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On February 6, 1963, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the sum of P6,010.00 in favor of Arsenio Reyes, the highest bidder, and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff on February 21, 1963. In said certificate, the expiration date of the period of redemption was fixed by the sheriff to be "one (1) year from and after the date of the sale." It should be noted in this connection, that the duplicate of the certificate of sale was not filed (registered) by the sheriff in the office of the Register of Deeds. A copy thereof which was attached to the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership as a supporting paper, was neither entered in the Primary Entry Book for Act 496.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On February 10, 1964, there were presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed on February 8, 1964, by the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes, and a Deed of Sale executed by the Philippine National

Bank as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagee (sic), in favor of the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Register of Deeds denied the registration of the above mentioned documents on the ground that the period of redemption has not yet expired. In support of his opinion on the matter, the Register of Deeds invoked the doctrine laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Salazar v. Meneses, G. R . No. L-15378, promulgated on July 31, 1963, wherein it was held that the rule that the period of redemption in execution sales pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which begins to run not from the date of sale but from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, is also applicable in extrajudicial foreclosure sales of registered land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Claiming that Section 6 of Act 3135, as amended, is so clear on the point that the redemption period shall begin to run from the date of sale, the petitioner, thru his counsel, disagreed with the ruling of the Register of Deeds. Hence, this appeal. As stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the Land Registration Commissioner, upon the foregoing premises, promulgated the resolution appealed from, ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale executed by the mortgagee and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes, who presented the said documents for registration. A motion for reconsideration of the resolution was subsequently denied by the Land Registration Commissioner, hence, the instant petition for review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is the theory of petitioner that in sales of property at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the period of redemption should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale which, he contends, is the express mandate of Section 6 of Act No. 3135: chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 6. In all cases in which the extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections 464 to 466 inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, the Land Registration Commissioner is of the opinion that the above-quoted provision is not the only pertinent and controlling law on the matter, specially when it is taken into consideration that the land involved is registered land under the Torrens system. He maintains, and so held in the resolution appealed from, that Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case together with: (1)

sections 30 to 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of the said Rules and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing (registration) of the sheriff's certificate of sale; and (3) Section 50 of Act 496, with regard to the registration of the certificate of sale so as to consider the land conveyed and affected under the Land Registration Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The ruling of the Land Registration Commissioner must be sustained. Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff in a public auction sale must be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land is situated. This is mandatory requirement. Failure to register the certificate of sale violates the said provision of law and, construed in relation with Section 50 of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land covered by a torrens title because "the act of registration is the operative act to convey and effect the land." So the redemption period, for purposes of determining the time when a final deed of sale may be executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land consolidated in the purchase at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned and not from the date of the public auction sale. To this effect is the holding in the case of Ernesto Salazar v. Flor de Lis Meneses, L-15378, July 31, 1963, where this Court explained at length this principle, as follows: The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by, the appellant in their third assignment of error, which is to this effect: That the lower court erred in not holding that the period of redemption in this case, as far as appellants are concerned, started only on May 26, 1956, the date when the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered. Should we rule to this effect, it is clear that when the appellants attempted to exercise their right to redeem, as judgment creditors of the deceased mortgagor by judgment subsequent to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and when they instituted the present action on October 1, 1956, the period of redemption had not yet expired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the case of Agbulos v. Alberto, G. R. No. L-17483, promulgated on July 31, 1962, we held: The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction that when property brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act is sold, the operative act is the registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not 'take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land' until it is registered (Section 50, Act 496; Tuason v. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna V. Guevarra, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646). Undoubtedly, to be in consonance with this well settled rule, Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides that the duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff who made the auction sale to the purchaser must be filed (registered) in the office of the register of deeds of the province where the property is situated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Garcia v. Ocampo, G. R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959, we held that the twelve months period of redemption provided for in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "begins to run not from the date of sale, but from the time of the registration of the sale in the office of the register of deeds." The entry or annotation on the back of the certificate of title of the property in question on July 18, 1959 (supra) was in accordance with this ruling when it provided that the execution sale was "subject to redemption within one year from registration hereof." chanrobles virtual law library A case similar to the present is that of Gonzales, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 48 Phil. 824, where we held that the provision of Section 32, Act 2938 (Charter of the Philippine National Bank) providing for a right of redemption in favor of the bank's mortgagor "within one year from the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure" should be construed to mean one year after the confirmation of the foreclosure sale, because the sale becomes valid only after the confirmation. Along the same line we may say in this case that the period of one year after the sale must likewise start only from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, because it is only when that the certificate takes "effect as a conveyance" in accordance with Act 496. The above ruling is squarely applicable to the present case which involves also registered land, inspite of the fact that the sale in question is not an execution sale but a foreclosure sale. But it is further argued by the petitioner that the rule should not be applied to this case where there are no third parties involved. He cites a number of authorities,1 to the effect that as between the parties registration is not necessary to bind the immediate parties to a transaction involving registered land. He would then conclude that since the only purpose of registration is not protect the buyer from third party claims, it stands to reason that when as in this case, there are no third party claimants to the land, registration is not necessary and the sale between the parties should be made to take effect from the date of the auction sale. We are not impressed by the argument. Apparently, herein petitioner failed to see the "other side of the coin" and overlooked the doctrine, also well settled, that the registration required by Section 50 of the Land Registration Law is intended primarily for the protection of innocent third persons, i.e., persons who, without knowledge of the sale and in good faith, have acquired lights to the property.2 The same protection to third parties is obviously one of the objects of Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court in requiring that the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff in an auction sale be registered in the office of the register of deeds, for the purpose of the legislature in providing for our present system of registration is to afford some means of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may reach the records and thereby acquire security against instruments the execution of which has not been revealed. Redemption is not the concern merely of the auction-vendee and the mortgagor, but also of the latter's successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said mortgagor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage under which the property has been sold. It is precisely for this reason that the certificate of sale should be registered, for only upon such registration may it legally be said that proper notice, though constructive, has been

. Bengzon. Concepcion. the resolution appealed from should be.P.. J. concur. J. therefore.. and considering all the foregoing. and Reyes.L. that the date of sale mentioned in Section 6 of Act 3135. Only after the lapse of the twelve-month redemption period from the date of registration of the certificate of sale and in the absence of any redemptioner within the said period. may the deed of final sale be executed in favor of the purchaser who may then consolidate the title of the property in his favor. Consequently. J. Sanchez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Dizon. . JJ.. certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned.J. the simultaneous registration of which documents was sought by herein petitioner even before the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered. should be construed to mean the date of registration of the. as amended. with costs against herein petitioner.. Zaldivar. C. We have to declare that the Land Registration Commissioner was right in ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. as hereby it is affirmed. took no part. We have to conclude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE. Castro and Fernando. Makalintal.served unto possible redemptioners contemplated in the law.B.

-versusRIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). . TREASURER. and MENDOZA.. Promulgated: August 3. The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows: J. Chairperson. Civil Action Q-04-53522 for Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. National Capital Judicial Region. ALL QUEZON CITY. YU.: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated December 6. in SP. ALVIN EMERSON S. 2010 x----------------------------------------------------x DECISION PERALTA. JJ. J.Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila SECOND DIVISION CITY MAYOR. ASSESSOR. Respondent. 171033 CITY OFPresent: and CARPIO. No. NACHURA. ABAD. PERALTA. Branch 101. CITYG. 2005.R. Petitioners. Quezon City.

On June 10. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. Meanwhile. 2004. Upon payment of the tax delinquencies. Yu was adjudged as the highest bidder. secured by a real estate mortgage of properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 1998. respondent filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[3] before the RTC. Included in the properties that were auctioned were two (2) townhouse units covered by TCT Nos. On February 10. pursuant to Section 78 of Presidential Decree (P. respondent filed before the Office of the City Treasurer a Petition[2] for the acceptance of its tender of payment and for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of redemption in its favor. or one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale on February 10. and other costs of the subject properties with the Office of the City Treasurer. on May 30. the real estate mortgage was later foreclosed and the properties were sold at public auction with respondent as the highest bidder. among other things. . 2004. The corresponding Certificates of Sale were issued in favor of respondent on August 4. interest. Quezon City. that it had until February 10. The spouses Roberto and Monette Naval obtained a loan from respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. 2004. respondent tendered payment for all of the assessed tax delinquencies. 2004. Consequently. N-167988. respondent¶s subsequent tender of payment was also denied. In 1998. on June 15. Alvin Emerson S. 2004. he was issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property. However.D. the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. an auction sale of tax delinquent properties was conducted by the City Treasurer of Quezon City. and N-167988. N-167986. Undeterred. Petitioners contended. However. 2005. the certificates of sale were allegedly registered only on February 10. within which to redeem the subject properties.) No.The facts are undisputed. N-167986 and N-167987 and the parcel of land covered by TCT No. N167987. Nevertheless. the Office of the City Treasurer refused to accept said tender of payment. 2003. For these delinquent properties.

464 has been expressly repealed by Republic Act (R. Aggrieved. The Honorable Court committed grave error when it sustained the validity of the actions of the City Treasurer with respect to the auction sale of the properties subject of the petition and its unlawful refusal to accept the redemption price of the properties subject of the auction sale contrary to the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. contrary to law. C. since P. No. No.) No. in relation to Presidential Decree No. The order of the court effectively denied petitioner its right to due process. The Honorable Court committed grave error when it summarily denied the petition for Mandamus filed by herein petitioner during the hearing on the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction without conducting a hearing or trial on petition for mandamus. 91-93. 464 and not the issues/grounds raised in the temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction nor on the issues raised in the petition for mandamus. . The principal action subject of the petition for mandamus is the annulment of the auction sale. B. inclusive of interests on the basis that it was exercising the right of redemption within the period provided by law. respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] questioning the Order. Alternatively.D. 464 as basis of the reckoning period in counting the one (1) year period within which to redeem the subject properties was misplaced. arguing that: A.A. 464 and the Local Government Code and DOF Assessment Regulations No.D. 2004. the RTC opined that respondent¶s reliance on Section 78 of P. 7160. petitioner sought the right to consign the redemption price. 7-85. or the Local Government Code. In denying the petition. the RTC initially denied the petition in the Order[4] dated December 6. The Honorable Court ruled only on the repeal of Presidential Decree No.After the parties filed their respective pleadings.

The legal and factual question of the validity of the notice of the auction sale cannot be summarily dismissed without hearing and ruling on the allegation of lack of notice and fraud raised by petitioner in its petition for mandamus. E. premises considered. the above-captioned petition for mandamus is hereby granted.D. so that the delinquent registered owner or third parties interested in the redemption may be notified that the delinquent property had been sold. and that they have one (1) year from said constructive notice of the sale within which to redeem the property. No. 2005. Accordingly.A. the petition raising the following arguments: I . contrary to due process. No. the RTC ratiocinated that the counting of the one (1) year redemption period of tax delinquent properties sold at public auction should start from the date of registration of the certificate of sale or the final deed of sale in favor of the purchaser.D.[6] On December 6. 7160 did not amend Section 78 of P. Hence. the public respondents are ordered to accept the petitioner¶s tender of redemption payment. the RTC rendered a Decision[7] granting the petition. SO ORDERED. to issue the corresponding certificate of redemption in the name of the petitioner and to cancel the certificate of tax sale issued to the private respondent. 464. The RTC was also of the opinion that Section 261. the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE.[8] In granting the petition. The Honorable Court committed grave error when it denied petitioner its right to consign the payment of the redemption price of the properties sold in auction sale without a determination of the factual issues of the case. R.

7160 means that the counting of the one (1) year redemption period of tax delinquent properties sold at public action shall commence from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. it merely made reference to Section 78 of P. 7160. 464 was not repealed by R. 464 was not repealed by R. that the RTC did not rule that P. branch 101. the RTC erred when it took cognizance of it when it rendered the assailed decision.D.The regional trial court. No. branch 101. promulgated pursuant to r. including section 14 thereof. 464. otherwise known as quezon city revenue code of 1993. No.d.A. Petitioners insist that.a. whether the period of redemption in a realty tax sale in quezon city [h]as to be reckoned from the date of ANNOTATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF sale pursuant to paragraph 7. decided a question [of] law contrary to law and jurisprudence when it raised the following issues which do not conform to the petition and answer filed by the parties: a. No. paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 for the first time in its memorandum and that its failure to invoke the said provision in the petition for mandamus does not preclude respondent from invoking it in the later part of the .D. No. whether or not the respondent is entitled to the protection of all the provisions of quezon city tax ordinance number sp-91-93. Conversely.A. 7160.a. Respondent maintains that it has not altered its cause of action when it cited Section 14 (a). No. 7160 known as the local government code of 1991. 7160 and when it concluded that the phrase ³from the date of sale´ as appearing in Section 261 of R. decided a question [of] law contrary to law and jurisprudence when it decided that section 78 of p.A. among other things. quezon city. No. 464 was not repealed by republic act no. sp-91-93 or from the date of sale pursuant to section 261 of r. Paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 was not initially alleged in respondent¶s petition and was not used as basis for its filing. 7160. since Section 14 (a). b. quezon city. section 14 of quezon city tax ordinance no. respondent argues. II The regional trial court.D.[9] Petitioners argue that the RTC erred when it ruled that P.

7160 or the Local Government Code. a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. .[11] From January 1.D. 464. However. 7160 repealed P.D. 3. 632. 231 as amended.[10] From the foregoing. Presidential Decree No. Repealing Clause. No. stating that he had redeemed the property. since the passing of R. respondent contends that the RTC correctly ruled that it had timely exercised its right to redeem the subject properties. Presidential Decree No. thus: Sec. and Presidential Decrees Nos. and such payment shall invalidate the sale certificate issued to the purchaser and shall entitle the person making the same to a certificate from the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy.A No.D. the proper basis for the computation of the real property tax payable. 78.A. repealed P. Section 534. 559 and 1741. including penalties or interests. The issue of whether or not R. reads: SECTION 534. Its repealing clause. 464 provides for a one-year redemption period for properties foreclosed due to tax delinquency. 7160. No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.proceedings. or in his absence. Section 78 of P. No. 526. 752. the owner or any person holding a lien or claim over a tax delinquent property sold at public auction has one (1) year from the date of registration of sale to redeem the property. Redemption of real property after sale. ± xxxx (c) The provisions of Sections 2. 558. any person holding a lien or claim over the property. the delinquent taxpayer or his representative. the costs of sale and the interest at the rate of twenty per centum on the purchase price. if applicable. ± Within the term of one year from the date of the registration of the sale of the property. Presidential Decree No. 464. Section 3. Jurisdiction thrives to the effect that R.A. 381. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. such is no longer controlling. must be R. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code has long been laid to rest by this Court. and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. 1992 onwards. 7160. No. 436. 477. Ultimately. No. 1939 regarding hospital fund. and 4 of Republic Act No. shall have the right to redeem the same by paying the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy the total amount of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption. A. No.

the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein. as previously provided by Section 78 of P.D. the delinquent real property shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest therein who shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest therein who shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof. 464. From the date of sale until the expiration of the period of redemption. which provides: Section 261. ± Within one (1) year from the date of sale. the pertinent provision is Section 261 of R. interest due thereon and expenses of sale.Inasmuch as the crafter of the Local Government Code clearly worded the above-cited Section to repeal P.A. 464. No. the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein. No. No. the property shall be free from all lien of such delinquent tax. plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month on the purchase price from the date of sale to the date of redemption. as explicitly provided by Section 261 of R. Consequently. or his representative. 7160 was to supersede P. shall have the right to redeem the property upon payment to the local treasurer of the amount of delinquent tax.[12] From the foregoing. No.A.D. No. upon receipt from the purchaser of the certificate of sale. 7160. Verily. it is apparent that in case of sale of tax delinquent properties. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued by the local treasurer or his deputy. including the interest due thereon. R. and the expenses of sale from the date of delinquency to the date of sale. No. shall forthwith return to the latter the entire amount paid by him plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month. the period of redemption of tax delinquent properties should be counted not from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The local treasurer or his deputy. it is a clear showing of their legislative intent that R. 464. has the right to redeem the property within one (1) year from the date of sale upon payment of the delinquent tax and other fees. but rather on the date of sale of the tax delinquent property. Redemption of Property Sold. As such. as regards redemption of tax delinquent properties sold at public auction. or his representative. . 7160.A.D. 7160 is the general law applicable. No. Thereafter.A.

if .Nonetheless.A. 7160 which provides that the one year redemption period shall be counted from the date of sale of the tax delinquent property. the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein. Section 14 (a). Paragraph 7. No. is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only. No. xxxx Verily. R. pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5. with a view to giving effect to both.A. S-93. as the term is generally understood. including interest due thereon. the Code provides: 7) Within one (1) year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry. At first glance. and the expenses of sale plus interest of two percent (2) per month on the purchase price from the date of sale to the date of redemption. A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. having emanated only from R. therefore. SP-91. if possible.[14] In the present case. A special statute. this provision runs counter to that of Section 261 of R. among other things. Article X of the 1987 Constitution[13] and R. the procedure in the collection of delinquent taxes on real properties within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City. Where there are two acts. S-93 is a special law. SP-91. 7160 is to be construed as a general law. No. No. enacted City Ordinance No. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued by the City Treasurer. 7160 and with limited territorial application in Quezon City only. A general law and a special law on the same subject should be accordingly read together and harmonized. the ordinance is explicit that the one-year redemption period should be counted from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry. providing. one of which is special and particular and the other general which. There is. 7160.A.A. the government of Quezon City. a need to reconcile these seemingly conflicting provisions of a general law and a special law. shall have the right to redeem the property by paying to the City Treasurer the amount of the delinquent tax. or his representative. while City Ordinance No. otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993.

2005 to redeem the subject properties. Paragraph 7. Applying the foregoing to the case at bar. a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws.A. theories. since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of the general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the rule. the counting of the one (1) year redemption period of property sold at public auction for its tax delinquency should be counted from the date of annotation of the certificate of sale in the proper Register of Deeds.[17] Points of law. Otherwise. Hence. Paragraph 7 of City Ordinance No. from the date of registration of the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property on February 10. 7160.standing alone. Section 14 (a).[16] To harmonize the provisions of the two laws and to maintain the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the owner¶s right to redeem his property. would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act. respondent¶s failure to cite Section 14 (a).[15] More so. the law protects the original owner. City Ordinance No. its tender of payment of the subject properties¶ tax delinquencies and other fees on June 10. 2004. S-93 in its petition for mandamus does not preclude it from invoking the said provision in the later part of the judicial proceeding.´ Consequently. when the validity of the law is not in question. and it was manifest error on the part of petitioners to have refused such tender of payment. The issues in every case are limited to those presented in the pleadings. redemption should be looked upon with favor and where no injury will follow. Therefore. it is also worthy to note that in cases involving redemption. issues and arguments should be brought to the attention of the trial court to give the opposing party an opportunity to present further evidence material to these matters during judicial proceedings before the lower court. The object of the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of the claims or defenses of both parties. specifically on the exercise of the right to redeem. Finally. to mean ³one (1) year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry. the special must prevail. No. it would be too late to raise these . SP91. was well within the redemption period. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the owner¶s right. SP-91. S-93 should be construed as to define the phrase ³one (1) year from the date of sale´ as appearing in Section 261 of R. 2004. respondent had until February 10. In giving effect to these laws.

When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below. but on the contrary. petitioners cannot feign ignorance of a law that it has promulgated in the exercise of its local autonomy. Respondent also reiterated the applicability of the provision to his claim of redemption in its motion for reconsideration of the Order initially denying the petition for mandamus. A party cannot. Nor can it be allowed to deny the applicability of Section 14 (a). which it in fact did by filing an Opposition[20] to the motion for reconsideration. to the attention of petitioners. Since the inception of the petition in the lower court. Paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993. Civil Action Q-04-53522. the Decision of the RTC in SP. SP-91. S-93. DIOSDADO M. or the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993. even buttressed its claim.issues during appeal. Citing the appropriate provision of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 did not alter this. he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal. the petition is DENIED.[18] As early as in its Memorandum to Serve as Draft Resolution. Petitioners were given every opportunity to counter respondent¶s allegations. dated December 6. premises considered. on appeal.[19] respondent had brought Section 14 (a). SO ORDERED. respondent has not changed its preposition that the one (1) year redemption period shall be counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale and not from the date of sale of the subject properties. because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. WHEREFORE. Furthermore. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: . 2005. Subject to the above disquisitions. Paragraph 7 of City Ordinance No. while at the same time invoking that it has strictly adhered to the Quezon City Revenue Code when it conducted the public auction of the tax delinquent properties. change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. is AFFIRMED.

RENATO C. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO EDUARDO B. CARPIO Associate Justice Second Division. ABAD Associate Justice . CORONA Chief Justice ROBERTO A. I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court¶s Division. NACHURA Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court¶s Division. Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13. Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson¶s Attestation.ANTONIO T.

.-x DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. Petitioner.... .FIRST DIVISION NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY.........: ....... G. J. Promulgated: April 20.R... C.. Respondents.* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. BASA. and VILLARAMA............... JJ. JR.J...... 149121 Present: PUNO... Chairperson.. LUZ BASA and EDUARDO S.. No.. JR.... 2010 x. AUGUSTO BASA. BERSAMIN.....versus - CARPIO.

the sheriff¶s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the owner¶s duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the respondents.10 secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. pursuant to Act No. 1990.2[2] Spouses Basa did not pay the loan despite repeated demands. San Francisco del Monte. located at No.. 1983. 30 San Antonio St.4[4] On April 16.This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Amended Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 27. as amended. Quezon City. On April 19. 1988. on August 9.5[5] . filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriff¶s Office in Quezon City. 3135. the NHA. 1991. 287008 and 285413. 2000 and its Resolution dated July 19. the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder.3[3] After notice and publication. To collect its credit. 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration of the National Housing Authority (NHA). since the titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were among those burned down when a fire gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on June 11.827. spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA the amount of P556.

1992. the redemption period expired.8[8] On June 18. Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession.On April 16. ordering spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject lots. 1993. A Writ of Possession10[10] was issued on March 9. on April 24. 1992. This compelled NHA to move for the issuance of an alias writ of possession on April 28. The said petition was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an Order9[9] dated August 4. NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession.11[11] Respondents anchored . and the same was inscribed by the Register of Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA under Entry No. however. NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership7[7] over the foreclosed properties. 6572/T-287008-PR-29207. 1992. on June 2.6[6] without respondents having redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter. 1993. 1993 by the RTC. The writ. 1992. remained unserved. respondents spouses Basa and Eduardo Basa. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction).

among others. which gives the debtor/mortgagor the remedy to petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession be cancelled. Thus.13[13] Respondents likewise insisted that even assuming arguendo that the foreclosure sale were valid. as amended. to declare the foreclosure sale null and void. they were still entitled to redeem the same since the one-year redemption period from the registration of the sheriff¶s certificate of foreclosure sale had not yet prescribed. De la Rama. respondents asked the RTC. written notices of foreclosure were not given to them. In the said petition for intervention.160. and to cancel the Writ of Possession dated March 9. thereby denying them the opportunity to ventilate their rights. Reyes15[15] and Bass v.14[14] Citing Bernardez v. and notices of sale were not tendered to the occupants of the sold properties.00. 3135.said petition for intervention on Section 812[12] of Act No. then there was no effective registration and the one-year redemption period had not even begun to run. respondents averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was a nullity since notices were not posted and published. and not on the certificate of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds. 1993.17[17] Since the sheriff¶s certificate was only inscribed on the owner¶s duplicate certificate of title.16[16] respondents theorized that the instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in the custody of the civil registrar. . to allow the respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties in the amount of P21.

285413 and 287008 a year earlier. and 3) granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondents that ordered NHA to refrain from selling or disposing of the contested properties. It pointed out that the RTC. Since said order had already attained finality. had already ruled that respondents¶ right of redemption was already gone without them exercising said right.18[18] It countered that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted validly and made in accordance with Act No. 1992 since the certificate of sale was inscribed on their TCT Nos. . 8] of Act No. 1990. 8] of Act No. 3155´. Admission of the ³Petition in Intervention. 1992. etc. 3135 as evidenced by the publication of the Notice of Sheriff¶s Sale in the Manila Times in its issues dated July 14. The pertinent portion of the order reads: After examining the record and following precedents x x x this Court hereby orders: 1. 1995. 21 and 28. the ruling therein could no longer be disturbed. 1991.NHA opposed respondents¶ petition for intervention..20[20] NHA maintained that respondents¶ right of redemption had long expired on April 15. the RTC issued the first assailed Order21[21] with the following directives: 1) granting the issuance of the alias writ of possession which allowed NHA to take possession of the subject properties. On January 2. 2. via its Order dated August 4. or on April 16. 2) admitting the Petition in Intervention and ³treating the same as the petition to set aside sale mentioned in [Sec. The issuance of an alias writ of possession. mentioned in [Sec.19[19] NHA also said that respondents had been furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff¶s Sale as shown at the bottom portion of said notice.´ treating the same as the ³petition´ to set aside sale. 3155.

The order partly provides: . the RTC made the justification that if the NHA was not restrained. In the second assailed Order24[24] dated September 4. 30. Lastly. its agents and/or any other person acting under its command.000. San Antonio Street. the RTC denied NHA¶s motion for reconsideration reasoning that the admission of the intervention was sanctioned by Section 8 of Act No. NHA asserted that the writ of possession was issued as a matter of course upon filing of the proper motion and thereby. after a BOND in the amount of P20. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. As to the grant of preliminary injunction.m. NHA stressed that another reason why the petition for intervention should be denied was the finality of the Order dated August 4. 1992 declaring respondents¶ right of redemption barred by prescription. the court was bereft of discretion. Quezon City. pending the termination of this proceeding and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court. 4. 3135 pertains to the original petition for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and not the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession.22[22] NHA filed a motion for reconsideration23[23] assailing the RTC¶s Order insofar as it admitted respondents¶ motion for intervention and issued a writ of preliminary injunction.00 had been duly filed by intervenors. NHA argued that respondents should have assailed the foreclosure sale during the hearing in the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. 1995. 3135.3. Setting the hearing of the petition in intervention (to set aside) on March 17. the judgment which may be favorable to respondents would be ineffectual. to desist and refrain from selling or in any manner from disposing of the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. and not during the hearing in the petition for the issuance of an alias writ of possession since the ³petition´ referred to in Section 8 of Act No. ordering movant National Housing Authority. San Francisco del Monte. 1995. 287008 and 285413 and located at No. at 8:30 a.

before final judgment. . and the assailed order of January 2. the petition is GRANTED. do or continue the doing of the act with the intervenor asks the court to restrain. thus: WHEREFORE.27[27] The Court of Appeals defended its affirmation of the RTC¶s grant of the alias writ of possession in NHA¶s favor by saying that it was a necessary consequence after the earlier writ was left unserved to the party. the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 1995 denying the petitioner¶s motion for reconsideration. 1995. 3135. It further explained that NHA was entitled to the writ of possession as a matter of course after the lapse of the redemption period. 8 of Act No. 1995. a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. 2000. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision26[26] dated February 24. It declared null and void the assailed orders of the RTC dated January 2. NHA filed on November 24. Likewise declared NULL AND VOID is the second assailed order of September 4. Let an alias writ of possession be issued and executed/implemented by the public respondent without further delay. the movant NHA may. The admission of the intervention is sanctioned by Sec. to the extent that the said orders admitted the petition in intervention and granted the issuance of the preliminary injunction. otherwise or if no preliminary injunction is issued. because. ACCORDINGLY. but it upheld the grant of the alias writ of possession. in favor of the NHA. and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards which may grant the relief sought by the intervenor. 1995 is declared NULL AND VOID except for the portion directing the issuance of an alias writ of possession.The motion is without merit. And. 25[25] Undaunted. 1995 and September 4.

Respondents then concluded that their right to redeem the properties against NHA¶s right to the writ of possession must be threshed out in a hearing of the case on its merits. 2000. in view of the various issues raised. It also observed that the grant of the preliminary injunction by the RTC was uncalled for as it would effectively defeat the right of NHA to possession. 3135. Also. reconsidered its earlier stance.28[28] They alleged that since they raised the issue that their right of redemption had not prescribed. said fact should have changed the whole scenario such that the issuance of a writ of possession ceased to be summary in nature and was no longer ministerial. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. in its Amended Decision. The Court of Appeals believed that the only recourse available to a mortgagor. With regard to the RTC Order dated August 4. as amended. 1992 granting the writ of possession which.As to the RTC¶s admission of respondents¶ petition for intervention. the appellate court opined that it was improperly and erroneously made. respondents would like the Court of Appeals to treat the petition for intervention not only as an opposition to the issuance of the alias writ of possession. became final and executory. but also as a proper remedy under Section 8 of Act No. a summary procedure provided for under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. respondents argued that said order did not constitute res judicata so as to bar the filing of the petition for intervention since the said order was not a judgment on the merits that could attain finality. It declared that the period of redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been registered or annotated in the original . the Court of Appeals. in a foreclosure sale is to question the validity of the sale through a petition to set aside the sale and to cancel the writ of possession. in this case the respondents. On November 27. the latter having been entitled by virtue of the grant of the alias writ of possession. according to the NHA.

to wit: ACCORDINGLY. the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. the instant petition. . such as sale of real property. the Court of Appeals deemed it proper to allow respondents to intervene. the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24.copies of the titles supposedly kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were earlier razed by fire. which the Court of Appeals denied in its July 19.29[29] Unfazed. unless the same had been annotated on the certificate of title. in the entry book is insufficient to treat such document as registered. Taking its cue from Bass v. Thus. The dispositive part of the amended decision decrees: WHEREFORE. Our decision dated February 24. NHA filed a motion for reconsideration. the Court of Appeals went on to say that the entry of the certificate of sale in the owner¶s duplicate of the titles could not have been sufficient to register the same since anyone who would wish to check with the Register of Deeds would not see any annotation. In its memorandum. entry made on the owner¶s duplicate of the titles cannot be considered notice that would bind the whole world. NHA tendered the following issues: 1. De la Rama where the Court purportedly made a ruling that entry of a document. 2001 Resolution.30[30] Hence. is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the petition DISMISSED. 2000. 2000 is DENIED for lack of merit. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF THE SHERIFF¶S CERTIFICATE OF SALE IN THE PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS AND ON THE OWNER¶S DUPLICATE TITLE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF LAW ON REGISTRATION. Having been deprived of their right of redemption.

2. II WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT.32[32] On the procedural aspect. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to respondents. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF BASS VS. DE LA RAMA HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED. offered the following as issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE RESPONDENTS¶ INTERVENTION AND GRANTING THE EQUITABLE WRIT OF INJUNCTION THEREBY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION. respondents question NHA¶s alleged failure to include in its petition copies of material portions of the record such as pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required under Section 4. such declarations were not in accordance with the rules which require that a verified pleading must state that the affiant had read the pleading and that the allegations therein were true and correct based on his personal knowledge and not only to the ³best´ of his knowledge.31[31] Respondents. on the other hand. Respondents also pointed out the purported defective verification of NHA in view of the fact that it merely stated that the one verifying had read the allegations of the petition and that the same were true and correct to the best of his knowledge. .

They firmly believe that for the sale instrument to be considered as registered. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. it could not be blamed for the non-registration of the sale in the original copies. The legality and validity of the disputed registration on its duplicate copies of the sheriff¶s certificate of sale. NHA faults the Court of Appeals¶ reliance on Bass v. NHA insists. 1988. are backed by this Court¶s ruling in Development Bank of the Philippines v. where it was allegedly ruled that the primary entry alone of the transaction produces the effect of registration so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation. but not to those in the custody of the register of deeds is justified as the latter were burned down. De la Rama since the ruling therein stating that entry and annotation of a sale instrument on the owner¶s duplicate copy only as insufficient registration. NHA refers to Land Registration Administration Circular No. In contrast. was already abandoned in Development Bank of the Philippines v. NHA says that the inscription of the sheriff¶s certificate of sale only to the owner¶s duplicate copies. 3 dated December 6. . this Court made a favorable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No.33[33] where purportedly. respondents submit that annotation of the sheriff¶s certificate of sale on the owner¶s copy is inadequate to propel the running of the redemption period. entitled ³Entry and Provisional Registration of Instruments Pending Reconstitution of Title´ which allegedly authorized all Registers of Deeds to accept for entry and provisional registration instruments affecting lost or destroyed certificates of title pending reconstitution of the original. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. the inscription must be made on the reconstituted titles. NHA stresses that the annotation and entry in the owner¶s duplicate certificate of titles of the sheriff¶s certificate of sale are sufficient compliance with the requirement of law on registration.As to the merits. 1529. Thus. To support this.

namely. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. They are of the persuasion that the ruling in DBP pertains exclusively to the unique factual milieu and the issues attendant therein. Inc. which ostensibly is not the bone of contention in this case. v. Additionally. Court of Appeals. We dwell first with the procedural issues before the main controversy.Respondents disagree with NHA¶s opinion that Bass v. Respondents also assail NHA¶s citation of Sta. whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting their petition in intervention. Ascribing NHA¶s inaction to have the burned titles reconstituted. They cite Barican v. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which partly provides: . Respondents contend that the instant petition is dismissible on the ground that NHA failed to attach pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required under Section 4. Intermediate Appellate Court35[35] as the authority to this argument. De la Rama was superceded by Development Bank of the Philippines v.34[34] According to them. but not to the instant case where Bass purportedly applies. said case finds no application to the instant controversy because the issue involved in the former was whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale or the registration of the certificate of sale. and not in the instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition which is limited in scope. respondents assert that such neglect should not be used as a justification for the non-inscription in the original titles of the certificate of sale. Ignacia Rural Bank. Respondents reiterate that the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for by NHA before the RTC is no longer ministerial since it raised the issue of whether their period of redemption has already expired. respondents insist that the question of whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the inscription on the owner¶s duplicate copies is a factual and legal issue that is appropriately adjudicated in a hearing on the merits of their petition in intervention.

1994 Order of the Quezon City RTC ordering the reconstitution of the said titles. the November 27. it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the petition. Family Foods Manufacturing Co. ² The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies. if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment. Thus. copies of the transfer certificates of title of the disputed properties. Ltd. with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner. x x x. and the June 13. The same conclusion was arrived at by this Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. 2000 Decision. thus: As held by this Court in Air Philippines Corporation v. and the July 19. and such material portions of the record as would support the petition.SEC.36[36] when it was faced with the same procedural objection. In its petition. 2000 Amended Decision. or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third. or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof. NHA attached the February 24. a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required. 4. .. Contents of petition. This Court finds that NHA substantially complied with the requirements under Section 4 of Rule 45. and shall x x x (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original. 2001 Resolution all of the Court of Appeals. Zamora: [E]ven if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition.

and have been made in good faith. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. Verification. the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming that . The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct. 4.37[37] To achieve this purpose. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. are not speculative or merely imagined. resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. information and belief. ± Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule. verified or accompanied by affidavit. speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.´ or upon ³knowledge. Without a doubt. shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. In fact. the dismissal is unwarranted because the CA records containing the promissory notes and the real estate and chattel mortgages were elevated to this Court. after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses. Section 4. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on ³information and belief. Contrary to respondents¶ assertion. must be avoided. we have sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of the case.´ or lacks a proper verification. We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits.Nevertheless. Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just. even if the pleadings and other supporting documents were not attached to the petition. NHA¶s verification conforms to the rule. pleadings need not be under oath. A strict and rigid application of rules. the ends of justice would be served better. In that way.

it being sufficient that the affiant declared that the allegations in the petition are true and correct based on his personal knowledge. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija40[40] where the Court listed cases where the transaction or instrument was annotated not on the original certificate but somewhere else. registered with the Register of Deeds the sheriff¶s certificate of sale in its favor. said transaction was entered in the primary entry book.38[38] The General Manager of NHA verified the petition as follows: 3.39[39] A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. However. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the best of my own personal knowledge. as to the merits of the case. The main issue before us is whether the annotation of the sheriff¶s certificate of sale on the owner¶s duplicate certificate of titles is sufficient registration considering that the inscription on the original certificates could not be made as the same got burned. In that case. DBP. The affiant confirmed that he had read the allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on his personal knowledge.the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the affiant's personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The addition of the words ³to the best´ before the phrase ³of my personal knowledge´ did not violate the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7. After it had paid the required fees. This prompted DBP to commence reconstitution proceedings of the lost titles. following the extrajudicial foreclosure sale where it emerged as the highest bidder. Now. Jurisprudence is replete with analogous cases. Four years had passed before . the annotation of the said transaction to the originals of the certificates of title could not be done because the same titles were missing from the files of the Registry. Of foremost importance is Development Bank of the Philippines v.

The Court disagreed with this posture. When DBP sought the inscription of the four-year old sale transaction on the reconstituted titles. During the war. the Court reviewed the relevant jurisprudence starting from 1934. the holding was that entry of an instrument in the primary entry book does not confer any legal effect without a memorandum thereof inscribed on the certificate of title. since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. Considering that DBP had paid all the fees and complied with all the requirements for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. being in doubt of the proper action to take. particularly in Government of the Philippine Islands v. however. survived only for a little while since ³later cases appear to have . referred the matter to the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority by consulta. the Court declared that mere entry in the primary book was considered sufficient registration since ³[DBP] cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found. annotation on the primary book was deemed insufficient registration. however. the Court observed that there was apparent departure from said ruling since in Bass v.the missing certificates of title were reconstituted. it was the Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those To buttress its conclusion. documents.43[43] the prevailing doctrine was an inscription in the book of entry even without the notation on the certificate of title was considered as satisfactory and produced all the effects which the law gave to its registration. The Court noted that before the Second World War. Aballe.´42[42] If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation. the latter resolved against the annotation of the sale transaction and opined that said entry was ³ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved.´41[41] In other words.44[44] DBP noted that Bass v. the Acting Register of Deeds. De la Rama. De la Rama.

Bass46[46] and Potenciano v.. Bass. respondent presented the sheriff¶s certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds who entered the same certificate in the primary book.´45[45] These later cases are Levin v. Dineros. Potenciano and DBP.47[47] both of which involve the issue of whether entry in the day book of a deed of sale.49[49] the respondent was awarded the foreclosed parcels of land. provided the requisite fees are paid and the owner¶s duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.50[50] Before the RTC could issue a TRO. and presentation of the owner¶s duplicate certificate of title constitute a complete act of registration. Thereafter. is equivalent to. petitioners in that case filed a complaint before the RTC with a prayer for the issuance of an ex parte TRO aimed at preventing the Register of Deeds from registering the said certificate of sale in the name of the respondent and from taking possession of the subject properties. or produces the effect of. even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title.applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the day book. One of the main issues raised there . registration to voluntary transactions. payment of the fees. The preliminary injunction was questioned by therein respondent. In the recent case of Autocorp Group v.48[48] Simply. Court of Appeals. A sheriff¶s certificate of sale was thereafter issued in its favor. respondents¶ resort to Bass v. the RTC issued a TRO directing the Register of Deeds to refrain from registering the said sheriff¶s certificate of sale.e. even if the registration fee was paid only the following day. A preliminary injunction was thereafter issued as the TRO was about to expire. Four days after. i. De la Rama is futile as the same was abandoned by the later cases.

Such entry is equivalent to registration. had been rendered moot and academic by the valid entry of the instrument in the primary entry book. NHA presented the sheriff¶s certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds and the same was entered as Entry No.51[51] Indeed. 2873 and said entry was further annotated in the owner¶s transfer certificate of title.53[53] A year later and after the mortgagors did not redeem the said properties.52[52] In the case under consideration. to prevent the register of deeds from registering the subject certificate of sale. petitioner¶s prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction. the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation. The Court thus once held: Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration. so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds. as the act sought to be enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act. whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one. Injunction would not lie anymore. so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation.was whether the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary book was equivalent to registration such that the TRO and the preliminary injunction issues would not lie anymore as the act sought to be restrained had become an accomplished act. thus: In fine. respondents filed with the Register of Deeds an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership54[54]after which the same instrument . The Court held that the TRO and the preliminary injunction had already become moot and academic by the earlier entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book which was tantamount to registration. and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.

protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising. Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted as early as July 15. and does not. It was not NHA¶s fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of title which were supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar. and not to similar cases. surely. is a result that is neither just nor .´ this does not mean. In fact the Court there continued with this pronouncement: To hold said entry ineffective. as respondents insist. just as the Court did in the past cases. Levin. the Court ruled that ³in the particular situation here obtaining. since the same were burned. That. in DBP. NHA followed the procedure in order to have its sheriff¶s certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates of title. as does the appealed resolution. amounts to declaring that it did not.55[55] Just like in DBP. thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. There would be. annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it refers is entirely proper and justified. Potenciano and Autocorp.56[56] NHA did everything within its power to assert its right. There is nothing in the subject declaration that categorically states its pro hac vice character. While it may be true that. 1988. it was fairly reasonable that its acts be given the effect of registration. no reason not to apply the ruling in said cases to this one. therefore. hence. or transactions made. that the ruling therein applies exclusively to the factual milieu and the issue obtaining in said case.was presumably entered into in the day book as the same was annotated in the owner¶s duplicate copy. what the said statement really conveys is that the current doctrine that entry in the primary book produces the effect of registration can be applied in the situation obtaining in that case since the registrant therein complied with all that was required of it. For in truth.

absent any statement thereof to such effect. since the one-year period of . Court of Appeals. by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. that the registrant is under no necessity to present the owner¶s duplicates of the certificates of title affected.57[57] What is more. thereby demonstrating that the said ruling in DBP may be applied to other cases with similar factual and legal issues. viz: Petitioners contend that the aforecited case of DBP is not apropos to the case at bar. Allegedly. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.58[58] the pertinent DBP ruling was applied. the bank not only paid the registration fees but also presented the owner¶s duplicate certificate of title. xxxx Like in DBP v. as the transaction sought to be recorded is an involuntary transaction. as we held therein. We find no merit in petitioner¶s posture x x x. in DBP. We hold now. is a sheriff¶s certificate of sale. as the act sought to be enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.59[59] Moreover. Injunction would not lie anymore. 1529 be asserted as warranted by its terms. xxxx x x x Such entry is equivalent to registration. respondents¶ stand on the non-applicability of the DBP case to other cases. the instrument involved in the case at bar. in Autocorp Group v. contravenes the principle of stare decisis which urges that courts are to apply principles declared in prior decisions that are substantially similar to a pending case.60[60] Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered. for purposes of primary entry.can. the redemption period accruing to respondents commenced therefrom.

62[62] This is so because foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the party who questions it. 1990. 1992. 21 and 28. The rule is that it is the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite who has the burden of establishing such fact.64[64] It also claimed that an Affidavit of Publication of said newspaper was attached as Annex ³B´ in the said comment.61[61] It must be noted that on April 16. without respondents having redeemed the properties. 1991. except for their bare allegations.66[66] From all these. NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. NHA stated in its Comment to Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene that it had complied with the publication of the Notice of Sheriff¶s Sale in the Manila Times in the latter¶s issues dated July 14. As regards respondents¶ allegation on the defect in the publication and notice requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. . the redemption period expired.63[63] Here. on April 24. 1992. respondents have lost their opportunity to redeem the properties in question. which right had long been lost by inaction. the same is unavailing. the sheriff¶s certificate of sale was registered and annotated only on the owner¶s duplicate copies of the titles and on April 16. Clearly. it would tend to show that respondents¶ aspersion of non-compliance with the requirements of foreclosure sale is a futile attempt to salvage its statutory right to redeem their foreclosed properties.65[65] NHA also said that respondents had been furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff¶s Sale as shown at the bottom portion of said notice.redemption is reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. In addition. In fact. respondents failed to present any evidence to support them.

. such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. there is no reason for the non-issuance of the writ of possession. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered. upon the filing of such petition. who shall execute said order immediately. collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six. as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six. A writ of possession is an order directing the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. and the court shall. and in each case the clerk of the court shall.67[67] Section 7 of Act No. order that a writ of possession issue. furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months. 3135 provides for the rule in the issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage. or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act. 7. the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated. upon approval of the bond. or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law. to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated.Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds were done validly. to wit: Sec. to give him possession thereof during the redemption period.

for failure of the mortgagor to redeem.72[72] As such. the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession. the instant case does not even come close to the . Intermediate Appellate Court.69[69] The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer¶s name.73[73] To accentuate the writ¶s ministerial character.68[68] Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. the court granting the writ cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The judge issuing the writ following these express provisions of law neither exercises his official discretion nor judgment. respondents resort to the ruling in Barican v.This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title.74[74] Believing that the instant case does not come within the penumbra of the foregoing rule. the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. the Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.71[71] The writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond.75[75] Unfortunately for them.70[70] Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.

There. is entitled as a matter of right. . UOB. Moreover. however. thus. to the issuance of the writ of possession. as purchaser. We have considered these equitable and peculiar circumstances in Cometa and Barican to justify the relaxation of the otherwise absolute rule. which actually involved execution of judgment for the prevailing party in a damages suit. the subject properties were sold at the public auction at an unusually lower price.76[76] the Court refused to apply the ruling in Barican v. Similarly. Intermediate Appellate Court77[77] and Cometa v. this Court does not see any compelling reason to veer away from the established rule. to the issuance of the writ of possession. None of these exceptional circumstances. These circumstances are not present in the instant case. while in Barican. attended herein so as to place the instant case in the same stature as that of Cometa and Barican. in Fernandez v. reasoning that: In Cometa.78[78] two cases which are exemptions to the stated rule. Espinoza. the ruling in Vaca v. Just as in Fernandez. the Court deemed it inequitable to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in the auction sale considering that the property involved was already in the possession of a third person by virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage even before the purchaser could register the sheriff¶s certificate of sale. there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed within one year from the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. as the purchaser at the auction sale in the instant case. Also. the mortgagee bank took five years from the time of foreclosure before filing the petition for the issuance of writ of possession. Court of Appeals is on all fours with the present petition. the mortgagee bank acquired an absolute right.cited case. Instead. Intermediate Appellate Court. the auction buyer therein unreasonably deferred to exercise its right to acquire possession over the property. In Vaca.

SO ORDERED. this Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the annotation of NHA¶s sheriff¶s certificate of sale on the duplicate certificates of title was not effective registration and in holding that respondents¶ redemption period had not expired. 2000 is SET ASIDE. BERSAMIN Associate Justice . WHEREFORE. CARPIO Associate Justice LUCAS P. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.In fine. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson ANTONIO T. TERESITA J. premises considered.

VILLARAMA. Article VIII of the Constitution. REYNATO S.MARTIN S. PUNO Chief Justice . I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court¶s Division. JR. Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful