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Landing but after not completed lunar mission is primarily All limit a problem design and cases high of reliability of high loads pad are of high performance large cases. of abort oscillations high altitude result in particular. heat the the the boost shield. COMMAND MODULE SERVICE MODULE 364 FT 5-|VB Figure I. module dynamic the pressures. The cover (BTC). The Apollo Spacecraft 2 .NORTHROP VENTURA by the command module fire.and the parachute of the protects upper system command located module crew LEM compartment adapter docking in the part tunnel. motors forward outside around are the Apollo shown spacecraft in Figure Escape and I and the subsystems involved in parachute Module control or include with the Apollo canards Command and the Launch System protection latter (LES) pitch-over apex cover (PCM}. LAUNCH ESCAPE BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER APEX COVER. command requirements. The landings (CM). abort and abort.

and 000 feet feet after can stage ignition. of this design report discuss based recovery on modes. the time 300. of the and system. and motions at parachute (b) medium altitude requirementsi and (c) high loads. abort in maximum parachute The spacecraft system horizontal sufficient of the seat selected emergency emergency landing the escape system. eliminates for proper. normal Module (LES) the Apollo 000 is in the second be the spacecraft booster by escape prior to take-off Above to approximately 300. ejection approach Gemini Early bility in the program. command concept is similar to the Mercury escape and assures The the size It consists module or of a launch with safe (LES) that provides from vertical and separation altitude the booster sequential the booster-fireball parachute deployment. in case used on on-the-pad-emergency spacecraft. for normal it was and decided abort to establish landings._ORTHROPVI_'_TURA The the approach subsequent to systems new paragraphs reliability. parallel details. of an the fireball. Command Service without Landings upon three minimum sequencing pressures the altitude after mission abort abort takes involve place: special problems dependent extensive stringent complex dynamic at which (a) Pad-Abort deployment altitude results and abort causes poses involves axis spacecraft altitude modes. criterias parachute other failure series design and probability. the same This reliacreates requirements mission 3 . redundancy interesting RECOVERY CONCEPT The primary by means parachute modes: launch landing system must after assure completed from safe landing for and two (b) landings crew landing of the (a) landing escape system mission. approaches of vital to testing components. landings (CSM) performed launch the Apollo system.

NORTHROP VENTURA the need of sufficient for the time for failure of a back-up sensing and for obtaining adequate of a when a altitude deployment primary the parachute latter time system in case difficult with malfunctioning one considers system. thrust The and is especially required necessary pad-abort to cope booster tilt-over emergency. failure landing of which A detailed of descent necessary landing. main parachute Deploying emergency more the para- chutes provides parachute chutes simultaneously for faster the stabilization conditions. for the All exist These Mercury be of interest use the to mention parachute the Apollo here as the that only four means man-rated of transporsystems which are. The selection of the particular as on parachutes the is based use on general per- formance chute types characteristics for the Gemini as well and successful of these systems. analysis eliminated probability for of two a fourth the more simultaneous main for paraa failures deploying saves necessity all three time and parachutes altitude and precludes establishes need favorable conditions. providing eliminates CM required both sensor. and primary the besides Gemini use the spacecraft. parachute Again sensor. favorable two drogue deplo)rment are followed two by para- three will pilot parachute provide the of the the Ringsail main for parachutes. Two system ribbon with the selected drogue only back-up need and After for the Apollo command module initial and in Figure and parachutes one parachute mode. and and parachute spacecrafts primary the paratrooper parachute parachute. of these systems back-up PARACHUTE SYSTEM The is shown final parachute 2. para- Mercury parachute landing 4 . concept. It may systems tation. water main chute. for creates disconnect deployed rate an accomplish being deceleration the second stabilization.

_____ g-Ply Sleel Cable a. The drogue are mortar module hang ejected. deployment system is controlled override mode by a fully automatic available redundant system sequencing with a manual discretion.-_ IZZ Parachute Re_fi_g Conical l Texlile Rtser ' t . angle attach points provide At I0.IP.. ordnance neously Chutes apex cover 7. Ribbon One-Step t l_oEue _ _.5-gt-Dia.000 for a command parachutes feet the drogue are disconnected deployed cutters and three pilot parachutes module are mortar at 90 degrees in turn extract to the command the three main vertical.. these The pilot parasequence parachutes.NORTHROP V1Er|llJRA " Back -up I I Ring PiIot Slol Chul* Chute 16.5 by simultaand at is shown in Figure control feet. off of the reaction system A and with the ejection of the apex ringslot parachute recontact between an altitude of 25. The Apollo Parachute System NORMAL PARACHUTE DEPLOYMENT The mission parachute deployment 3.R ACHUTE M B LIES Figure 2. sequence The recovery for landing sequence after completed starts with the turning cover is used cover the of Z9.2 foot diameter and to prevent parachutes removal two module.L _ "- 1-} HI _Deploymenl I I Single Steel _ " g Cable R_ngaail Z-Step Parachute Reefing \ \l L Textile Riser \ " 4-PLy Sleel Zqo _ \ ]TO Cabte 1494 _I_ \ DROGUE ASSEMBLY CHUTE MAIN P ASSF 1-_--_. as back-up at the astronauts 5 .000 to support command individual degrees.

000 ft Figure 3.2-ff-dfa. ._loz ParJchute 0 .e¢ Allitude: Velocity: 25. deployment The primary system The depending again is provided controlled redundant available sequencing as back-up. Co.7 000 Mach r_ _eco_ery Pilot Mor_]r Disconnected _10. the launch pitch over fires and lifts . er Eiected 5tart l Of Deployed }. after CM lift-off. seconds turn-around. abort This parachute deployment sequences prior command The are illustrated in to launch to an altitude of escape motor motor and mode is operational Upon from abort approximately 300. and docking probe separate sequence control with by the time on the by or altitude controlled altitude of recovery the automatic override abort. 6 . the escape followed boost protection cover. CM separation.6Sec l:Z'yro÷Thr_er 7.. and a limited tower. of stability. . an astronaut on pad astronaut.NORTHROP VENTURA Plr_chutes Mortar Chatel Three Chules Deployed Altitude ]_eeftd in Two Stepz DroEue i Chule s T_o Mortar T ÷ DroKue ChuZes At Apex by and Rin_ Time.. 0. Normal Landing Sequence ABORT PARACHUTE DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE The Figure 4.:he CM the canards degree provide off the Saturn horizontal Fourteen booster. J I I / 1 i ! Three Extrlcted Dep|ol'ed Rate Vv -of 29 Main by Piloz Delcent ft/. or low altitude the main can select to override immediately the drogue parachutes and to deploy parachutes as long as the dynamic main parachute pressure and the altitude are within the allowable deployment limits. " f F" ' "I"" / \ . 000 feet. .. mode parachute initiation.

ec C_n_ rds Dllconn_-ct _ ' / Figure 4. LOW ALTITUDE ABORT \_ Abort Landing Sequences PARACHUTE DEPLOYMENT ENVELOPE The primary Figure after 25. automatic mission At an the reentry. region to 40. command of a completed attitude. module motions manual and as low low can result pressures parachutes require this precludes Pad abort deployment or as medium 3._. feet and descends below in stable 124 psf an altitude of approximately deploys The the sequencing in Figure feet system 5). drogue deploy make parachutes the drogue (normal parachutes to do reentry up so. 000 feet. At the of drogue final phase deployment.000 two may operational parachute parachute deployment and main envelope parachute defines the two see module regions 5. 000 astronaut con- altitude if flight ditions it advisable In case in dynamic of the altitude feet drogue abort of high altitude as high above parachute abort as 204 25. deployment I0 to 100 at altitudes psf range.HORTHROP VENTURA HIGH ALTITUDE A_ORT Eject Clnardl |1 Sec IAunch EJCUpe Abort * _'ct Tower Probe T_me BPC + • Dockln| ]4 Sec Deploy |I .000 command psf. at dynamic pressures in the .

1 M ACH . Parachute Deployment Envelope The hatched drogue of mortar deployment to 18.Z | 0.'_ i 0. 000 automatic may occur lag and between feet dje to aneroid sensor descent hysteresis.4 [ I 0.000 area main parachute 5.'. The reaction use command system after causes module (RCS).F I0 IIIP. during This abort in pitch.. deployment Automatic region is defined by the crossof the two by means in Figure and simultaneous of the three occurs at main ll._0._ q = _I / PSF DE P [. a I 0.{AI. IC)"C Z /zz. It is interesting chute disconnect to main can to note that during canopy the interval from drogue para- parachute stretch a dynamic pressure increase of Z0 psf occur in vertical descent. opening..l EN T I _" OR_. main parachute deployment loads.K P Z0 lmOYb.NOilTHROP VErIIUR.OY _. IKNTRY RKC. considered and in determining 8 . cases and Main parachutes ejected by deployment pilot parachutes control parachute 10. II A 1 .! I O. motions stabilization roll and yaw. complicates parachute and were causes increases nonsynchronous individual parachute parachute All and these load deployment conditions condition. module deployment. during Use reentry is stabilized active of RCS by a redundant fuel prevents control RCS of a chemically Lack of the parachute command deployment.7 Figure 5.T(3N D.TIT Ui3F_ AR_RT A LTTTUD'_ (1000 FT) R IF'C.000 in abort ascent disconnect parachutes feet. 0.6 J 0.| ENT EN v-_ I _'PE q " IZ4 PF.. .

mission reliability analysis parachute at parachute as well as performed component sequencing attitude and failures. pyro-mechanical command deployment. to be avoided single maximum for recovery minimum stages. etc. due This model to premature between a computerized to lag of action.35 was defined parachute This rule concept to the was supplemented as the project progressed and by a statistical parallel approach and that probability An abort. and that permitted loss the A of crew or failure command modules.t"lORTltROP V1EI_URA SYSTEM APPROACH A defined main A qualitative system system analysis consisting system a third of one at the of one for main drogue start of the Apollo program and two a parachute parachutes drogue as drogue successful parachute. design system factor were possible all components of safety of 1. considering: What is its failure mode? Its probability Its test history? of failure? f . a back-up parachute point failures second parachute reserve without within extent. reliability mathematical reliability and a that included by sensitivity studies. and calculations of the to the contributed reliability all components subassemblies system apportionment for the parachute subsystem. A system not be flight mode probability with less analysis than a concluded "significant" probability that cases where a failure considered occurred as by probability analysis was need applied and sub- a design looking case. and/or Potential to the parachute normal formed one main the primary and landing. module failures due of occurrences extensive of single multiple was and series i'ncluded failures. motions action failures. at each This in a logical system and fashion component. system aerodynamic assessment interference utilized parachutes. subassembly.

_ R_. is obvious. allowable allowable unravnrable mien pa_achule c|u_er load p_rachul_s mixirn_rn maxirn_rn h_&d l0 .r* deplovmen! (Z} (]) (4} Standl Awlume4 Allumed for no drogue chule. _r_l_l?_ a_ m_i_n.) or passive analysis (structure)? it be inspected its failure or impending ordnance. nn I _Z_ nn. rlrnQlle 12 Fli_hl discnnnec! m_. Pdr_chutPn of Parachute _-_s.non (]] Flli_h! Mode h HiKh allit.oonl >_. (system systems I) in comparison to the more deployment II and Ill..% _.-i z. Ree f('d ] C. Is it active (relay.Jde No.0001< t.HII marginal I. mlx|mul'_ CM _vnarfl_¢ allihld<. Table I. cluster Similar to analyze 6. Probability of Parachute Load and Failure Occurrence k_fa i. n_Oi ZD ZM < ZK 000 < Z t nllo ZD ]M < is ID 2M ID _M < Z _. OnO < _ +.._menl t(1) n r) _M _ZK.rl.._p_ and cn_M.onn > Z_. The parachute deployment cluster modes Figure superiority of a parachute with independently conventional parachutes approaches...f_ORTHROP I/IE_TVRA Its complexity Can Gan ? and checked? failure be detected? etc. g. main par_rh.! _O SM > zl.'_oo < Z_ onn! I". Table of which used 1 shows a typical probability were for actual flight modes approaches shown were in deployed 12 different modes various investigated._--_. _.ered _.r_d.lde al Z ab:. Flight M.

the rules results and of this probability design criteria with analysis each case were then used to establish upon with jointly agreed contractor responsible being North American Rockwell agency. 2) The primary and system two consists main of a single with main drogue a redundant parachute parachute drogue serving parachutes a redundant parachute as back-up. T .fT. 'c L. Reliability Comparison of Parachute Cluster Systems DESIGN CRITERIA The ground the prime MSC. failure shall cause loss of crew ll ._ Figure 6._l. and 3) No or single component mission.NORTHROP VEHTURA . Corporation design and NASA and Government Following rules criteria are applied: l) All mission aborts are operational modes._v[N i rret_ _r tlewP¢_E_T w e.._ 11 ii • .e_uw J_' %.

99994. of that aneroids control or active relays functioning functions must as be prevention premature nonfunctioning. deployed and shall deployment DESIGN LOADS An criteria design bined analysis of that not the the parachute maximum at modes. of 1. reliability must 6) Components such designed well as as for or ordnance assemblies devices. attitude and motions at Unfavorable drogue parachute 12 . 7} A minimum factor of safety components load tests. normal deployment drogue reentry envelope parachute but at abort and and main of the design indicates loads with do other parachute com- occur conditions failure The following duced the probability analysis described component previously failures loads: determined and that pro- combinations. parachute s) The be total equal parachute to or better landing than system 0.NORTHF_OP VE_TURA 4) The such probability as loss of occurrence drogue of parallel parachutes extent drogue to be failures be of two shall minimized Failures and one to the such main as maximum loss of one are possible. drogue parachute anomalies design High One altitude drogue abort parachute command module deployment. parachute considered.35 and must be proven load for all structural in ultimate parachute stages s) All parachutes utilize shall active be independently means. maximum of events.

among command of-freedom design normal loads.35 times of anfavorable the design load. are not maximum by the and parachutes caused same mutual here combination agreements that as soon of this necessitates all agencies module an extensive It may analysis be involved. in tests new in parachute stages development. ultimate of i.NORT_fROP VENTUFLA The following maximum main : parachute design loads are produced by combinations High Single Two altitude drogue main abort parachute parachutes main CM parachute attitude deployment due to Differential unfavorable Maximum Aerodynamic resulting at parachute cutter extraction time parachutes differential blanketing in a lag and reefing between lead reefed parachute condition. motions mentioned become for as in three axes important determining a six-degreemaximum occurring on a to be at computer Figure the program 7 shows maximum is desirable the calculated parachute loads" load loads reentry. will withstand is the the need for load that all parachute design load. and combinations load main stages not only affect The the reefed parachute loads of the load reefed but as well. 35 times the Actual compliance ultimate the load test points are shown in Figure 7 to document with stringent test requirements. calculated events and the "design ultimate based calculated combination 1. A proving requirement. 13 . These all subsequent drogue events.

Ill o / / . "" _ . Instrumented (PTV) cylindrical and a parachute deck test vehicle a much besides that duplicated vehicle diameter parachute These but had smaller being substituted.'GRTHROPVENTI_RA 0 / . / 'o MAIN PARACHUTE DROCU_ CHUTE 0 DC MP SUCCESSFUL TEST DROGUE C]IUTE MAIN pARACHUTE 100 DYNAMIC "PR'ES_UBE ZOO q . " _"/ \ 0 o i' /I _ / / . / / / ._o "R /_.H*L''TUOEAeORT 'Tokg_:0":i_ li_ TE I% t_ r / / // /. PSF" 100 Figure 7. problems The design not limit encountered in testing of parachute for both the drogue that cannot command (ICTV) parachute and the main parachute are calculated be obtained module in aircraft drop testswith a free failing test the were test vehicle.DS 2OTi • h . -_ R t. _ / ro H."/ /r% h /J °. Test by the requirements a minimum failures had that all components and parachute stages had to demonstrate factor of safety of I. able to reach permitted test vehicles more ec0nomical descent were that after aircraft drop velocities in vertical to obtain the design procedures were as well greatly as ultimate complicated parachute loads. tests and that component 14 .. Drogue Parachute and Main Parachute Loads DEVELOPMENT ANT') QI]Ai.- _- -%. 35 in vertical to be duplicated in tests.TFTCATION TESTS Testing normally loads values Apollo vehicles Apollo CM of the Apollo parachute system introduces systems..C..---UL"_rMATE /\o.MP.01_ ° o \ . / / % .n.oc.F.

trajec- multiple test programmer parachutes established tests vertical or conditions and main test for individual parachutes vehicle parachute same consecutive An Apollo in of drogue at the prior test mission.NORi'HROlI VI[NTURA Final hardware and qualification a geometrically Important tests were and conducted with similar spacecraft Apollo points end item dynamically modes Figure and boilerplate of the as test test vehicle. to and Figure 8. see specific deployment 5. parachute conditions. a aircraft used boilerplate test vehicles. were selected ICTV's modified Single tories tests and and C-133 and PTV's were was dropped for from dropping B-52 the and B-66 aircraft. Apollo Boilerplate Vehicle Ready for Test 15 . operational envelope. after test is shown boilerplate Figures parachute 8 and 9.

obtained approach the the by the dynamic same by Ultimate parachute first reefed dynamic parachute pressure.tlme test vehicle. by reefed stage at the always approaches was length solved of independent the weight or by starting This problem the increasing reefing. • had It was a pronounced found during not these only but tests on the that drag the wake area also of the test vehicle parachute load effect of the on the drogue dynamic in the wake of the forebody surprisingly 16 . at a high loads of the fails to produce pressure value ultimate end of the of the in subsequent first reefing point.NORTItRCP VE_ITU RA Figure 9. Apollo Boilerplate Vehicle After Test PARACHUTE LOAD TESTS Design and multiple load drogue and ultimate load and of the tests main were conducted using with ICTV's stage single and can This stages since PTV be parachutes loads deployment parachutes test vehicles. of both decreasing a combination methods.

CZ< I._tion BIP PTV !CTV Veh_cl_ Command M._du_r P_rac_r Trot Ve_icle C_lindrical Te_t _. 4 r_ r. data It was that found can be meteorological the on-board coordinated telemetry testing measurements... improvements with an accuracy obtained. equivalent for the command It was impossible This test to predict requires parachute not only test proper loads load with the desired methods and and accuracy but of 5 percent.8 Diameter (FT1 ------_-Con f_Ru ration _ i D_s{_. This is indicated the drogue by the data in Figure drag I0 which the shows dynamic wake for load not only and in test vehicles C K and the dynamic typical drag parachute force areas. loads to be ICTV taken or PTV into account are to predict predictions behind module.S and Dynamic Load for Various Forebodies 17 . Drogue Factor Parachute C K Drag Area CD. notably data have an turbulent load area increases These obtained fluctuations the load what factor.N_RH_ROP VEI_IJRA factor various factor decreases thus order to load C K. nar_t¢ L_cl Factor ].q i S.'ehicle Tvpl_a| Time [_4d Tra¢.Z t D [] 14 Drag Area CD$ (FT 2) _00 IZO I 1 ' 0 l° I "rime I LO i I II. accurate instrumentation instrumentation measurements. The the parachute but traces. also proper prediction parachutes conditions on-board and range through programmer time accurate with delays. ]. approaching cent. requires and notable evaluated that the technology before test data can 5 per- of parachute be predicted._ Figure I0.

when was resultant with a in results loss of 4 to 7 percent of ]. to determine if space environment. in the A be neglected of safety load extensive strength of an degrading equivalent tests factor higher are introduced load. temperature elastomers. 18 . exposed affect nylon. group All these to assure or monitored benefits a reliability as engineering in order of test maximum failure.Torr. ° after and established as for reentry spaceflight found nor_nal to 140F shield strength factor ultimate of the test that the from parachute temperature around The working ejection the hot main air flowing streaming the packed cannot parachutes. well independent assessment success ENVIRONMENTAL TEST Extensive primarily cycling No high would tests vacuum. on or vacuum-temperature pyrotechnics and for dacron th_ Apuilu for the with and when metals. the vacuum temperature for It was apex cover along profiles as nylon specified were well main pa_achuL_ drogue follow-on increased the heat Detailed parachutes landings. strength to a vacuum system. The tests form test laboratory environmental documented in numerous reports. and main degradation was encountered -A of i0 . were and performed high dacron.35. included main single parachute second tests stage were reefing combinations.NORTHROP VENTURA FAILURE TEST Component and series drogue failures parachute failures by as that were and as main well duplicated parachute as other in tests failures.

parachute the spacecraft tests two parachute included normal and use reentry of either variation drogue Two in drogue parachute. with positive create rear oscillations and the hot possibility shield. Only a single giving the parachute maximum Parachute failure. huLi_o_al qualification data altitude with abort tests dupiicated CM deployment and good trajectory tests were representative Attempts attitudes to obtain motions. deployment command the the coupled drogue command main type module parachute thruster the pilot parachute deployment. tests deployment latter high mode altitude one duplicating aborts. divergent coupled system. parachute type successful. to obtain low time second immediate than limit one drogue high representative aborts using main parachut_ two and altitude sequence in one test. and of contact last but not parachute increase heat 19 . pressure at main a condition parachute in a near All load load in a higher The two low opening. override test duplicated main case initiated parachute that resulted parachute dynamic deployment. duplicated pressure in these Two at parachute tests tests in order covered minimum The with deployment. dynamic was used loads. PARACHUTE SYSTEM DETAILS Numerous parachute deployment. interesting The with design details requirement are contained in the Apollo parachute necessitates angles module risers in CM reliability large and of independent oscillations.NORTHROP VENTURA QUALIFICATION TESTS Seven boilerplate This qualification test vehicle three altitude and drop the tests were conducted end with or item with the Apollo system. drogue main p_rachutes with for drogue an parachute astronaut parachute drogue deployment. tests without in qualification was not entirely introducing due to the non-spacecraft links successful difficulty of instrumerLting actual S/C hardware. The between least.

by using four the for cables small swagged risers.<: .... DROGUE PARACHUTE MORTAR ASSEMBLY The four parachute installation of the two bays drogue is shown end parachute in Figure in steel mortars Ii. j.. .. +. shown risers in Figure and are electrical not part of spacecraft -_ :=-_.___ +-f.NORTHROP VE_... .... ." riser module damage mentioned to contact The ply with need the heat shield in case of command radii was oscillations.+.. +'.].-:...._ t.+.. + Figure II. .:. ++_P.-..-+.:. .]._. so-called to avoid "flower'pot.++]...+-.+ .:_-_.+.:_ _1'( ._ ++. +...+_A _ ... ..+-.'+.:. +_. approaches shape retention. I... All which in one drogue are of the compartment main means were parachute of the selected parachute to the steel hot CM cables and by risers cables As due attached previously. strain steel cable bending solved the steel into The gages common white attached fittings strings to the for both drogue iI are and main parachute leads to equipment.+..: ! [ -+ ....+.+_N K + _-_!_.._... _._+ + | /" ]r_#+P_÷".+_x+: _ ._C +_.. ..-+ +.._.. +:++:.. "._+"+ . .. %..++ _ . Drogue Parachute Bay 2O ..#+_+..+....TURA weight without an accompanying cluster storage increase loads and resulted in compartment in novel design volume or for allowable parachute parachute packing.:.

cartridges bet_veen each see the Titanium steel All flower cable mortars firing and individual Figure 13.NORTHROP VENTURA Figure cable kinking without 12 shows and riser the mortar assembly orifice secured risers which design. the in urethane stretch deployment kinking Command the steel light foam the motions to bend disintegrates pre-wound during and risers releasing module risers tension. Drogue Parachute Mortar Assembly Zl . sealed requiring symptomatic CARTRIDGE R F. and are the then and incorporates In order risers cast the an unusual riser under foam. without steel storage both cartridge ends are to prevent are coiled tension Upon twisting the by the ends. tubing helped to minimize and dual hermetically used. may cause roll over pot collar with are are lead in abrasion Surrounding this problem.STR [CTOR OFFSET X ORIFICE "0" RING COVER NIGER A_E_(BL¥ Figure 12. drogue the parachute flower the pot steel deployment resulting cables.

gas pressure aluminum This design temperature reasonably tion loads level constant within expanding tube limits. high. and mortar maintains reac- allowable 22 .NORTHROP VENI[UFIA Figure 13. characteristics shown in the orifices pressure orifices typical eroding and the as compared left hand as seen in Figure corner in the Previously 14 produce diagram. burn away upper curve of Figure right hand pressure-time orifice allow has more brass gas and aluminum the inserts mortar which The progressively insert results the mortar keeps in a to enter of the tube. muzzle the and mortar hybrid for the of the and used the The be tolerated the the CM eroding velocity loads developed drogue that maintained without Designs are required parachutes increasing of standard reaction hybrid 14. ful cartridges. Steel Cable Protection MORTAR ORIFICE DESIGN The parachute could not increase size and in CM weight by weight produced and the resultant forces An increase upon in drogue firing orifice heavier more powerthat was reaction structure.

Two system stage.. that disreefing introduced The reefing details the in allowable for by the the three a two-stage An additional main as the reefing main complication had failure time on the requirement premature requirement parachutes. to the two second for the reefed as well for parachutes against first against a reliability and of the lines main main are to disApollo of the are with premature of both The and will resultant shown each line severance lines is stage have result mechanical in Figure having its of one required has only that 15. was The parachute the first man-rated in CM made parachute weight without system an that equivalent system was to be increase loads parachutes.. - AUGk¢_NTOI' LEGEN|> STAN_D _D ( FIXED} Ol_ IFICE .rtORTHFIOP VE_TURA _ODY A. parachute used cutters. a reefed Mercury parachute. stage proven of the second in destruction 23 _ . Analysis reefing line second tests not cutters. IDZ_L TUBE _ P_ESgU_ E CURVE / STA_/t_Ai_D ¢)PTF_CE HYI!_ID ORIY|CE \ P_}. or first individual line to disone premature of the of two not the reefing Rupture disreef parachute line with separation stage.FORF_ AND AFTEF US_ Figure 14..SC_E CI. the parachute. Mortar Orifice Details MAIN PARACHUTE REEFING SYSTEM Project used increase mandatory introduced protected reef.RVF_ V'% ORZFIC_ (a_:. drogue design reefing set will reef reefing rupture parachute.

MAIN PARACHUTE RETENTION SYSTEM The segment and the and main must parachute maintain deployment their highly bags form part of a truncated throughout cover after cone storage and reentry.- .:J/" /)_ \\ _ \\--- DRA_'ST_r_C "N Y'-. V STAGE I] REEFING LINE _ _' _" STAGE I REEFING LINES -_-_.NORTHROP EI'_TLIRA. opening./. this draw the second length the avoids problems worked of stowing without securing during reefing system malfunction all development qualification tests. compressed gap between form mission packed the in order parachute development to assure necessary cycle a specific for heat the hard the apex during and protection main During packed parachutes experienced 24 .. ' " " "_ _. a draw approach This and stage first and reefing stage line is gathered line. . RACH DUAL REEFING RING Figure 15. Main Parachute Reefing Mid-gore reefing is used on all parachutes with the cutters were developed The string with slack of the the both part same first of the stage second as lines passing through the same ring with string stage lipe." f/ .

film. compartment of polyethylene Vacuum The bags sealing is maintained in the command on three module are restrained retention system flaps. 0245 ib/cubic truncated by combined wooden layers bays The cone is maintained and vacuum former.NORTHROP. The growth in a parachute form of 0. daisy chain retainers sides. 25 . connects The directly to the deployment bag itself incorporates bag without several layers intermittent of dacron deployment felt for heat protection. This concept transportation its shape is shown in Figure Apollo has proven holding capability in several flights. The parachutes parachute. with for a period packing and of one year storage pressure of the bag in a with two parachute see Figure 16. Figure 16. plastic film. Main Parachute Retention System The large presses shaped required are for packing in Figure of the main 17.VE_TURA a Z5 percent This resulted weight increase and a 6 percent pack density decrease in allowable inch. without volume. ready in for into the conical vacuum storage bags shown in the wooden or storage former sealed with ]8.

Main Parachute Vacuum Storage 26 ._ORTXROP VE_TURA I % Figure 17. Parachute Packing Presses :il Figure 18.

approach landing the the complex requirements for the Apollo and the out- broad engineering for the spectrum reliability parachute required system. loads. are The emergencies._Kc the boLe. and a resultant without reliability of parachute A and deployment systems and or requirements.riot. systems. of the aerodynamic decelerators of these prediction volume.NORTHROP VENTURA GONC LUSIONS The Command The Apollo Module Parachute from with weight than System time prior is capable to Lake-off of safely landing the Apollo mission. . redun- to completed space ability to cope all conceivable and 3 g's volume. of future spacecraft This spacecraft standing spacecraft paper landing describes system. development of this man-rated 27 . combined must testing preeconomy parachute cede any Development methods or improvements landing in weight. and a maximum full system parachute dancy.. in scope unprecedented complexity and skills in parachute of NASA and was MSC._f adcquaLe loads and difficulty ine'_hods for in design propc_'if a}_alytical stresses systems. major prcdicLing and C_:_. minimum to less Landing force equivalent Parachute accept increase changing engineering development North outstanding basic design characteristics proved flexible of the Apollo enough to System. increase envelope volume a substantial in recovery parachute approach required in command and load velocity module weight. the joint engineering and Northrop efforts to meet and American A Rockwell major performance development schedule the lack requirements.

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