INMATE TAMIK KIRKLAND (W95456) Report on Escape April 25, 2011

OVERVIEW OF MCI-SHIRLEY MINIMUM

The MCI-Shirley minimum security correctional facility consists of 314 beds spread across seven housing units. The Mel-Shirley minimum security facility perimeter is defined by non-secure boundaries. Offender movement and interactions are controlled by rules and regulations. In preparation for reentry, a greater degree of responsibility and autonomy is restored to the offender while still providing for

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supervision and monitoring of behavior and activity. Program participation is geared toward the

offender's potential reintegration into the community. Access to the community is, limited and authorized under supervision for program and community work crew purposes only.

103 DOC 513 - DOC INMATE ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY

Per Department of Correction policy, o~ the 11-7 shift at MCI-Shirley. there are two major counts at 11:30 PI)1 and 3:00 am. Officers conducting non-standing counts are required to observe the offender's breathing body, i.e., the movement of the offender's head, face, upper torso or lower torso. Staff conducting the non stand-Up count shall never take for granted that a lump in the bed is an inmate. Staff shall use flashlights judiciously, but shall ensure that enough light is thrown on the inmate to ensure that an actual inmate is being counted. Department policy also requires that hourly counts of inmates be conducted bvthe housing unit officer. In addition to the above, Department policy calls for .minlmum security inmates to be positively identified.

The purpose of 103 DOC 513 is to establish a system of accountability whlch ensures that all inmates are properly supervised and accounted for, according to their security classification, and at the same time, allowing reasonable freedom of movement by inmates. In order to fulfill the Department of Correction's primary mission of detaining inmates, it is imperative that an accurate system of counts be made to ensure around-the-clock accountability of all inmates.' Maximum accountability may be accomplished if all employees enforce policies and regulations concerning control and supervision of inmates in their areas of responsibility.

Inmate Kirkland's release .dates are as follows: Parole Eligibility

Maximum Release Date

CLASSIFICATION OF TAMIK KIRKLAND

Tamik Kirkland W95456 was committed to MCI-Cedar Junction on 11-19~2009 for a governing term of 2 Yz to 4 years for Possession of Large Capacity Weapon without Firearm ID. He has a 2 }Ii to 4 year concurrent sentence for the same offense, as well as two 18 month.concurrent sentences for a Firearm charge and Distribution of Class D. He is also serving 6 months concurrent for Possession/Transfer of Firearm with FID' card and 6 months for Possession of Loaded firearm, Shotgun, Machine' Gun consecutive to the 18 months.

_. He awaited trial at' Hampden House of Correction for more than one year without lncldent, not receiving any disciplinary infractions.

Inmate Kirkland has one prior Massachusetts House of Correction commitment, in which he was sentenced to 2 Yz years - 1 year to serve for Distribution of Class D and 1 year concurrent for Possession Class B. He completed his sentence and his from and after probation. He also served 15 months for the state of Connecticut for Sale of Controlled Substance. Inmate Kirkland has one outstanding misdemeanor legal Issue in New York. New York will notextradlte due to the minor nature of the offense, Possession of Marijuana.

At initial classification, inmate Kirkland scored as medium custody via the Department of Correction Objective Point Based Classification System. He was transferred to MCI-~oncorci on 1/27/10. He adjusted well, participating in the Correctional Recovery Academy, a six month r~sidential substance abuse and :criminal thinking cognitive treatment program, and remaining disciplinary report free. Inmates are considered eligible for minimum custody with an Objective Point Base Score of 5 or below. Inmate Kirkland' was recommended by the institutional classification committee for a reduction in custody level based on his achievement of an Objective Point Base Score of 5 or below; his positive adjustment, having no disciplinary reports since being arrested; program participation; and proximity to release dates.

On 6/1/10, inmate Kirkland wastransferred to MCI-Shirley minimum. His excellent adjustment and program participation continued and he secured employment in the kitchen, completed the Correctional

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Recovery Academy, and was participating in the very selective Green Technologies Program. He was also on the wait list for three other programs: Able Minds, Cognitive Skills Training/Active Listening, and Cognitive Skills Workshop/Problem Solving. He received one minor disciplinary report for not standing for count. . He was recently recommended by the institutional classification committee for transfer to pre-release; the decision was pending final decision by the Commissioners designee.

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4/25/11 7:15 am

7:25 am

7:30 am

7:37 am

8:30 am

8:50 am

9:10 am

9:20 am

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Significant Event

Sergeant Tomas Martinez notified Captain Christopher Wright that initial reports at

Mel-Shirley Minimum Indicated that an unidentified Inmate was mlssing, .

Sergeant Martinez contacted Captain Wright and advised that inmate Tamik Kirkland (W95456) was unaccounted for during the morning count 'procedures.

Chief Paul Oxford and members of.the Department's Fugitive Apprehension Unit (FAU) and Criminal Prosecution Unit (CPU) were dispatched to MCI-Shirley.

Kirkland was officially declared on escape status.

. Chief Oxford and members of FAU and CPU reported to the Superintendent's Office at MCI-Shirley to brief Acting Assistant Deputy Commissioner Duane MacEachern, Acting .! Superintendent Scott Anderson and members of the command staff regarding the I ongoing fugitive Investigation. Captain McGuiness, Sergeant Martinez and Sergeant Patrick Barrett reported to the MCI-Shlrley minimum facility to conduct lntervlews with staff members and inmates assigned to Unit 10, the unit In which inmate Kirkland was. housed. Mel-Shirley Inner Perimeter Security (IPS) team secured room 16 In Unit 10, took photographs and processed the crime scene.

Lieutenant Michael Kradolfer telephonically contacted the mother of

. inmate Kirkland. was advised that her son irleyand

was now a fugitive. Lt. Inquired of Kirkland's

whereabouts andthe last tIme she had comm with him. d that

she had last spoken. to her son on (4/23/11) while she was hospital

being treated for a igunshot wound. that on Friday night (4/22/11) at

approximately 11:45,. pm, she and r woman were shot In a vehicle as, they

entered the driveway of residence In Springfield, MA. At this I

stated "He was doing so . This must be w~Y he escaped."

Information that Kirkland. had not made any telephone calls using the Inmate telephone system since 4/'J,4/11,.-was 'pressed further on the call Kirkland made to her In the .

hosplta stat:crthat she had been under medication while in the hospital and.

could not any further details of the call, Based on the aforementioned statements

by'_' it appeared that Kirkland may have be~n in possession of a cellular telephone

while In custody at MCI-Shlrley. . :, '

of the Springfield Police Department,_ rwarded a copy of the police report~

After contact with <';"'I"'''''':II"i" confirmed the shooting incident.

Lieutenant Kradolfer notified Massachusetts state Po the Violent Fugitive Apprehenslon Section (VFAS) of the escape

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9:24 am

11:00 am

11:15 am

11:30 am

1:30 pm

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all Intelligence regarding the escape gathered at thls point. Based on the fact that

Kirkland resided In ,to his Incarceration and 'had established ties to

the city of Lieutenant Kradolfer to contact

Sergea VFAS.

Lieutenant Kradolfer contacted Sergeant Information regarding the escape of. was advised that members of the Department of Correction Fugitive Apprehe on Unit (FAU) were en route to Springfield. sergeant_Instructed that the FAU members report to the state Pollee Barracks In Springfield, MA to exchange Information of Kirkland, and to develop a working strategy in furtherance of the fugitive investigatIon. During this tlme period, officers assigned to the Office of Investigative Services Central Intelligence Unit were in the process of gathering all relevant intelligence, both historical and actionable, regardIng Ki'rkland. The aforementIoned intelligence was gleaned from the DOC Intelligence database, the DOC Inmate telephone system, the Inner 'Perimeter Security Un.it of MCI-Shirley, the Springfield, MA Police Department Gang Unit and the Hampden County Sheriff's Department.

An arrest warrant was issued from Ayer District Court and lodged agaInst Kirkland for ! the felony charge of Escape.

A General Broadcast (GBe) and a Be On The Lookout (BOLO) was generated and entered Into the National crlrne InformatIon Center (NCIC). InformatIon was forwarded to the Command Post from the officers conducting interviews at MCI-Shirley'minlmum that' Indicated Kirkland escaped from the facility close to midnight the night of 4/24/11., Additionally, Information was developed that Kirkland's motive for escaping was to avenge the 4/23/11 shooting of his mother In SprIngfield, MA. Also, according to source ,information' ined during the Interview process at MCI~ShirleYI Kirkland's mother was shot 'In retaliation for the actions of Kirkland prior to .hls

Incarceration.

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It was learned that: Klrkland had not utilized the internal telephone system since

4/14/11, but that he did recelvetwo visits on 4/24/11 from an associate from the

Springfield area. ' , '

Personnel from VFAS, FAU"and Springfield PO, convened at the' State Police Barracks in Springfield, MA to review all relevant lntelllgence regarding Kirkland and his associates , and set forth proceedings for the fugitIve lnvestlgatlon at the street level. Several target addresses were identified, as well as neighborhoods and areas of the city to which KirKland would possibly gravitate.

Members of the VFAS, FAU, the Springfield Police Department, the United States Marshals Service and the Massachusetts Parole Warrant Unit began to actively pursue all actionable leads associated with Kirkland. Surveillance was conducted on numerous addresses and locations, knock and talk procedures were conducted at several addresses and physical searches for Kirkland were conducted at residences. During this time" information began to develop from Various street level sources that indicated that

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6:00 pm

4/26/11 7:00am

1:10 pm

4/30/11 1:00 pm

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gang level violence was expected to escalate due to the escape of Kirkland and his expected return to Sprlngfleld. In addition to actively pursuing Kirkland, fugitive , Investigators were also attempting to locate the individual, who visited Kirkland hours

before he escaped. /'

Members of the VFAS and ,FAU conducted a consent search of a residence in Springfield, MA. During the commission of the search, cooperation was gained from a person residing In the residence. The aforementioned person (Identity withheld for security purposes) advised that he/she had recent telephone contact with Kirkland while Kirkland was incarcerated. This person advised that the telephone contact was via a cellular telephone that Kirkland was in possession of at MCI-Shirley. This person advised that he/she had not had any contact since Kirkland had escaped from custody and did not know of his whereabouts. The person dld provide the 'cellular number that

Kirkland was utilizing while at MCI-Shirley. '

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Command Post duties at Milford Headquarters continued, concentrating on all relevant Intelligence which was furnished by DOC's FAU and the Springfield Police Department Gang Unit. Duringthis time, VFAS Troo nducted an extensive investigative analysis of the cellular telephone of Kirkland. Twelve family members or assoclates of ! Kirkland were Identified. Telephone records were subpoenaed citing I exigent circumstances (I.e., potential vlolent acts by Kirkland.)

Command Post personnel forwarded the Command Post chronology, KIrkland's visiting records and Inmate telephone listing to the Hampden County District Attorney's Office.

Lt. Kradolfer was contacted by VFAS Sergeant advised that Tam~k Kirkland was in police custody. Sergea

approximately 11:45 am, Klrklimd engaged In a shootout Trooper and a Springfield Police Officer in a driveway' Springfield.

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DOC'S INVESTIGATION INTO KIRKLAND'S ESCAPE

Interviews Were conducted of staff and inmates at MCI-ShirleY,'which raised the following concerns about possible policy/procedure Violations.

Inmate Kirkland's Dormitory

Staff conducting the 7:10 am count on April 25,' 2011 discovered a dummy made from inmate clothing in inmate Kirkland's bed. Information obtained lndicates Kirkland fashioned the dummy sometime after the 11:30 pm official count, and left via the third floor window onto the fire escape of the dorm sometime around midnight.

The officer conducting rounds that evening reported that he saw "living, breathing flesh" during each of his accountability checks throughout the night. Based on the interviews, however, we believe that the officer has violated numerous DOC policies and procedures. He has been detached pending an administrative hearing. Based on the findings of that administrative hearing, DOC stands ready to terminate.

Additionally, the Department learned through interviews that the supervisor failed to observe and document one hourly census count, as required by procedure, failing to ensure that staff w~re observing living, breathing flesh during their rounds. This information is being pursued administratively. Based on the findings, DOC stands ready to pursue immediate disciplinary action.

During the course of the evening, it was also reported that Kirkland had possession of a contraband cell phone, which he used to accomplish his escape. The Department was able to track Kirkland's cell phone activity via subpoena of the cell phone telephone number, enabling the Department to ascertain inmate Kirkland's location when he made· subsequent phone .calls from the same cell phone. The data confirms that Kirkland had absconded as early as 12:17 am on April 2S, 2011 by placing him miles from MCI· Shirley.

The Department also received information that the inmate's cell phone may have been provided to him by an employee of a DOC vendor, who is alleged to have had an inappropriate and intimate relationship

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with inmate Kirkland. These allegations are being actively investigated, and the vendor employee has been barred from all DOC facilities. Should these allegations be sustained, the Department will refer the matter to the District Attorney's Office for criminal prosecution, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Law c. 268, sec. 21A.

DOC'S AFTER ACTION ASSESSMENT TO ADDRESS IMMEDIATE SECURITY CONCERNS

The Acting Deputy Commissioner for the Prison Division conducted a final security review with senior management staff at MCI-Shirley. He toured the facility, including Cottage 10, where the recent escape occurred. Based upon his discussions with staff and his observations, the following operational changes

, were made to address the Department's concerns with the proper surveillance and containment of the housing units:

Since the escape, the Department has added a second perimeter patrol to the minimum security site on all three shifts to ensure that any unauthorized movement outside of the housing units is detected.

The Deputy Superintendent and the Director of Security at MCI Shirley, have met with all shifts concerning the proper methods for conducting counts and rounds in the minimum security facility.

The Department will direct its Inner Perimeter Security team at MCI-Shirley to conduct more targeted searches tolocate and eliminate contraband entering the facility.

The Department is exarnlnlng ways of enhancing security measures at its minimum security facilities, consistent with applicable fire safety codes, to better contain the inmate population during evening hours.

CONCLUSION

Inmate Kirkland's escape was due to staff procedural errors and staff misconduct, and was not the result of systemic failures. His escape was triggered by an external incident involving the shooting of his mother. The Department had no knowledge of this shooting incident at the time of Inmate Kirkland's escape. No changes in DOC policies or procedures are required. If DOC policies and procedures had been adhered to, inmate Kirkland's escape on 4/25/11 may have been prevented.

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