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  • 1. The thesis will highlight the genesis of the J & K dispute between
  • 2. Kashmir's fate is still locked in the story of India's partition in 1947,
  • 3. Despite fifty seven years having gone by, and a number of proposals
  • 4. The dissertation will be covered in the parts as given in succeeding
  • 5. Part I – Why the problem persists. This part will focus attention on
  • 6. In the last 50 years, India and Pakistan have failed on all fronts
  • 7. Part II – Review of the Geo-Political Situation and Implications for
  • 8. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Unstable Security System
  • 9. India’s Reactive and Limited Attitude. India’s bottom line on
  • 10. While Pakistan has been very vocal in expressing its views in all
  • 11. Differences also abound within Indian policy circles on the future
  • 12. United Nations (UN) Resolutions: Kashmir. A few months into the
  • 13. The UN resolutions on J&K are flawed in many respects. There is no
  • 14. The UN resolution of April 1948 had also suggested a plebiscite for
  • 15. Demographic Characteristics. Contrary to most reports in the
  • 16. Fifteen per cent of the state's Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu
  • 17. The support for secession in J&K is thus largely limited to the non-
  • 19. The problem between India and Pakistan persists because what was
  • 20. The Siachen Dispute. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves
  • 21. Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic'
  • 22. The Pakistani view is based on several factors. First, Siachen is a part
  • 23. The Tashkent Agreement. The Tashkent Declaration of 10
  • 24. After the signing of the agreement things began to deteriorate. The
  • 25. The 1972 Simla Summit. The Simla Treaty, popularly known as
  • 26. Water War: Sharing of the Indus Waters. “Issues of Kashmir and
  • 27. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed at Karachi by Field
  • 28. Obviously not enough, Pakistan feels that it needs to have physical
  • 29. Both India and Pakistan have been quick to use the post-11 September
  • 30. Pakistan, for its part, has sought to use its broad cooperation with the
  • 31. This operation was another major development in the region that
  • 32. The US and the West were forced to condemn the attack and were
  • 33. The presence of US troops in Pakistan in the war against terror, has
  • 34. Contrary to the Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of
  • 35. The manner in which terrorist activities are being committed all over
  • 36. Clash of US-China interests in the region is a high probability with the
  • 37. The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan, at China's
  • 38. For China, Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the
  • 39. The network of rail and road links connecting Pakistan with
  • 40. The extent to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and
  • 41. A recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s tribal regions or Federally
  • 42. The Pentagon sees China's efforts to defend its interests along oil
  • 43. This mountain outback has been split into five districts, viz. Gilgit,
  • 44. Over the years, especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972,
  • 45. Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy. Apart from the historical,
  • 46. Political Situation. The political situation in J&K has been stable ever
  • 47. The APHC, which is a creation of the Pakistani ISI in 1993, does not
  • 48. Internal Security Situation in J&K
  • 49. Development Activities. A number of development activities have
  • 50. Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link. A new beginning in linking the state
  • 51. Mainstreaming the Local Populace. Militancy has in a way, been
  • 52. As part of the Army’s campaign to win the hearts and minds of
  • 53. The manner in which peace overtures across the border have
  • 54. The Chenab Plan. Musharraf has been keen on what he describes as
  • 55. Comments. The Chenab supplies 30 billion cubic metre or 17 per
  • 56. Furthermore, accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would
  • 57. The Andorra Model. Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of
  • 58. Demilitarisation and Self Governance. Following the non-
  • 59. President Musharraf has on 23 June 2006 again suggested that
  • 60. Comments. Demilitarisation, then self-governance, followed by
  • 61. The Neelam Plan suggests that India should stick to its present
  • 62. The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested
  • 63. According to the Neelam Plan, the Northern Areas of Gilgit and
  • 64. In an attempt to broaden the Kashmir dialogue process, Prime
  • 65. India wants an iron-clad process since its soldiers dominate most of
  • 66. During the last fifty-seven years a lot of demographic changes have
  • 67. Notwithstanding the above, if the option of plebiscite was to be
  • 68. On the other hand, if the people of the state are given only two
  • 69. In the last two decades, there has been a change in the Chinese
  • 70. Moreover, by the late 1980s, China's own territorial disputes with the
  • 71. Besides the above, the very foundation of Pakistan is based on Islam
  • 72. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes,
  • 73. It is clear that a long-term strategy is required to resolve the J&K
  • 74. Furthermore, a deliberate attempt has to be made by India to de-
  • 75. The recent spurt in terrorist acts is a calculated attempt to create terror
  • 76. Revival of insurgency in Baluchistan, serves the interest of both, India
  • 77. India’s policy of meeting its internal security requirements has not
  • 78. The need for support of the citizenry, intelligentsia and the people as a
  • 79. India’s dealing tactic with the APHC also needs a review. Though
  • 80. For Track I dialogue to succeed, India and Pakistan must pursue
  • 81. Pakistan. For Pakistan, learning to live with the Kashmir problem
  • 82. India. India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away
  • 83. Resolution of the Siachen dispute would act as a catalyst to resolving
  • 84. A recommended strategy for resolving this tangle could be an
  • 85. With the India-US nuclear deal almost through, a radical shift has
  • 86. China is fully aware of the growing potential of India and it is for this
  • 87. It is a fact universally acknowledged that a democratic polity is best
  • 88. While sympathy and support for the Kashmiri people is fairly
  • 89. Kashmir has been changed forever by more than a decade of conflict
  • 90. A solution can also emerge in due course of time against the backdrop
  • 91. The conflict of today can be swamped by a tide of goodwill and
  • 92. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased
  • 93. In resolving the J&K issue, the option of a limited military venture
  • 94. India needs to clearly spell out its counter terrorism strategy /
  • 95. Perception Management and Public Information. A well planned
  • 96. The media that has a great reach today, should be used as a ‘Force
  • 97. Option 1. Give impetus to the nationalist movement in Baluchistan
  • 98. The implications of this option are the following:-
  • 99. Option 2. Adopt a neutral model of self governance that would be
  • 100. The Pros:-
  • 101. The Cons:-
  • 102. Option 3. Follow the present line and maintain status quo. Contain
  • 103. The implications of this option are the following:-
  • 104. Recommended Option. Option 1 is not recommended due to the
  • 105. Furthermore, with the situation in Waziristan and Afghanistan
  • 106. At present, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy at


INTRODUCTION General 1. The thesis will highlight the genesis of the J & K dispute between

India and Pakistan to the present situation. In doing so, the research would dwell on the following:(a) Why the Problem persists and reasons for the stance taken by

both countries. (b) (c) (d) (e) 2. Review of Geo-political situation. The Proxy War by Pakistan and the existing ground realities. Initiatives taken to resolve the dispute. The Recommended Strategy.

Kashmir's fate is still locked in the story of India's partition in 1947,

when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. The first war between the two countries was fought within months of their independence, while their armed forces were still under the command of British officers. Kashmir was divided, and remains divided, between the two countries.

(ii) There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution, but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Hypothesis 3. Despite fifty seven years having gone by, and a number of proposals

discussed, long outstanding issue of J&K remains unresolved. What is at the root of this problem and how best can it be tackled.



The dissertation will be covered in the parts as given in succeeding

paragraphs. 5. Part I – Why the problem persists. This part will focus attention on

the background of the problem, the stand of India and Pakistan on the issue and the reasons that have led to the creation of the policy and strategy of Pakistan towards Kashmir and India’s response to it. It will also examine other reasons that have been responsible for aggravating the problem, preventing it from being permanently resolved. 6. In the last 50 years, India and Pakistan have failed on all fronts

whether it is border problem, trade or diplomacy. Things aggravated after the nuclear tests. It was expected that there would be a substantial outcome

(iii) of the Agra Summit, but nothing much came out of it either. The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s accession at independence still exist. Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, institutions remain weak, and the last fifty five years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs about India’s hegemonic intentions. 7. Part II – Review of the Geo-Political Situation and Implications for

India and Pakistan. This part will include the implications of 9/11, Op Enduring Freedom, attack on the Indian Parliament and likely Pakistani reaction and policy for the future. It will also cover the implications of the US presence in the region, for India and Pakistan. 8. The events of 9/11 and December 2001, have made the world realize

the true extent of terrorism. Besides this, the end of the Cold War and the emerging world order, have had a tremendous impact on the dynamics of international relations, creating new equations that have effected the geopolitics in the region. 9. Part III – Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and the Existing Ground

Realities. This part will include the aims of proxy war, its reasons as against a conventional war, the strategy employed, and its political, diplomatic, economic, military and psychological effects. The manner in which the

Thereafter. Through this two-part strategy Pakistan has partially succeeded in forcing India to commit a large chunk of its military to combating the ongoing insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1990. and the demilitarization proposal of Pakistan. it is intended to trace the reasons for the “change of heart” of President Musharraf in viewing the Kashmir problem. economic." in which Pakistan-based militant organizations are doing Islamabad's bidding in Kashmir and also in other parts of India. and secondly. Indians call this policy Pakistan's "proxy war against India. the Neelam Plan. In this part. 11 Part IV – Peace Initiatives. the manner in which. and logistical support to Kashmiri militants in an apparent effort to coerce India into an agreement on Kashmir as per Pakistan's terms. This part would also include involvement of the world forum to include USA and China.(iv) Indian security forces are reacting to the situation in J & K. the Andorra Model. and the actual ground realities would also be covered. covert military. Firstly. overt political and moral support to the Kashmiri population which Pakistan calls a struggle for self-determination against the "Indian yoke". both India and Pakistan have gone about it would be discussed to include the Chenab Plan. . Pakistan's Kashmir policy has been based on two elements. 10.

there used to be just one line that emanated from the government. is now occupying attention. there is hope that an uneasy truce will remain in place. On Kashmir. Although a rapid resolution of the Kashmir dispute is unlikely in the foreseeable future. 57 years of intense propaganda at home and abroad has made it almost a reflex reaction of most Pakistanis . given the geopolitical situation. Musharraf's 21 October 2004 plea to the Pakistanis to think out of the box has largely succeeded. This is now a thing of the past. discussing various possible solutions to the Kashmir problem. to join India or Pakistan. Pakistan and the Kashmiris. This part will include a wrap up of all recommendations. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which . Part V : The Recommended Strategy. Ever since 21 October 2004. The issue is being discussed everywhere and by all who care about these things. with no likelihood of its revival. other than the UN resolutions. that should be palatable to India.(v) 13.a UN supervised plebiscite that would give only two options to the Kashmiris. 14. 15. It can be said that it was Musharraf who killed Pakistan's traditional stance on Kashmir. no other solution is likely to have a lasting effect. Apart from a politico-diplomatic settlement of the problem. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes.

For Pakistan. tourism.(vi) there is no permanent cure. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India. Indian leaders have damaged their own credibility by attributing almost every incident of violence in India . will likely help more moderate elements in Pakistan's government win domestic support for reconciliation with India. Positive acknowledgment by the Indian government of the actions taken by Pakistan. If India wants an end to terrorism coming from Pakistan. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. As far as Kashmir is concerned. one way is to engage Islamabad in India's fight against terrorism. CONCLUSION 16. travel. it means lowering the level of violence in the state and taking a series of reciprocal measures that give relief to the locals caught in the crossfire. This means opening up in the matter of trade. investment. transit. What it means is ending the mindless hostility of the past and entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. combined with an institutionalized mechanism to verify each other's claims.

(vii) to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. . cynically employing the Pakistan bogey to cover lapses of the Indian security apparatus.



Kashmir's fate is still locked into the story of India's partition in 1947. There have been nearly 40 official proposals for a solution. Given the latest peace initiatives by both. India and Pakistan. INTRODUCTION General 1. IT EXEMPLIFIES INDIA’S UNIQUE UNITY IN DIVERSITY. when Pakistan was carved out as a home for Indian Muslims. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY. it appears that Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is now firmly set on the road to .JAMMU AND KASHMIR IS THE CROWN BENEATH WHICH LIES ALL THAT THE INDIAN NATION – ONE OF THE WORLD’S MOST ENDURING CIVILISATIONS – STANDS FOR : THE VALUES OF SECULARISM. 2. and nobody has suffered more in the process than the people of Kashmir. but not a single plan has yet been acceptable to all parties. Nothing divides India and Pakistan as Kashmir does.

threaten to disorder and derail the peace process. . Review of the Geo-political Situation. By now it should be clear to Pakistan that its proxy war will not succeed under any circumstances and that it would be in its own interest to renounce this path and seek mutually beneficial co-operation with India. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the various options open and recommend a strategy to resolve the J & K dispute. internal and external. Preview 4. and vested interests. Aim 3. Recommendations. The dissertation has been covered in the following parts:(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Why the problem of J&K persists. Peace Initiatives.2 normalcy .though this may remain elusive for a while as spoilers. Conduct of Proxy War by Pakistan and Ground Realities.

divides the two parts. a 222.236 square kilometres region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent. and by Afghanistan in the northwest. the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of J&K. A border called the Line of Control (LC). Kashmir. The eastern area of Kashmir comprising the northeastern part of the . agreed to in 1972. by Pakistan in the west.3 CHAPTER I : WHY THE PROBLEM OF J&K PERSISTS J & K : LOCATION OF KASHMIR VALLEY PAMIR KNOT 350 KMS KASHMIR VALLEY : AN ARTIST’S IMPRESSION GREAT HIMALAYAN RANGE SHAMSHABARI RG SHAMSHABARI RANGE KARAKORAM INDUS ZOJILA BARAMULA GREAT HIMALAYAN KASHMIR VALLEY URI SRINAGAR POONCH LADAKH ANANTNAG PIR PANJAL RANGE JHELUM CHENAB ZANSKAR PIR PANJAL LC UDHAMPUR Geography 5. while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. The region has been dubbed "disputed territory" between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. is surrounded by China in the northeast.

April-June 2005.4 region (Aksai Chin). On this logic. this applied to the provinces only and not to the princely states1. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. The British supported this view using the legalistic argument that their relationship with the princely states was based on the treaties with them. The Pakistani projection that J & K being a Muslim country. However. came under the control of China since 1962. therefore found ready acceptance internationally. Jinnah and the Muslim League favoured the decision being taken solely by the ruler of each state. their rulers could decide which country to accede to. though partition of the country was effected on the basis of religion. In the case of the latter. the 1 S K Sinha. . Whereas the Congress wanted this done in a democratic manner on the basis of the wishes of the people. Present and Future.” USI Journal. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and the Pakistan-controlled parts. Genesis 6. particularly during the Cold War period. after the lapse of paramountcy. The origin and genesis of the J & K imbroglio is related to the partition of the country on the basis of religion. p 182-199.

launched a tribal invasion of J&K on 22 October 1947. 8. the dispute has dual purposes. J&K should have rightly gone to Pakistan 7. the imbalance in institutional strength. Jinnah being impatient. Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K. It was only on 26 October 1947 that Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession merging the state with India. and the development and fostering of a national psyche that believes it is under siege. it served to unite an otherwise fractured polity. This demolishes the belief that being a Muslim dominated state. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Unstable Security System. it was an ideological struggle against India and its ambitions. On the other. On one hand. Pakistan is of the view that the day the Instrument of Accession was signed. the ruler had fled to Jammu and was therefore not in control of the happenings in the valley.5 rulers should be free to decide the future of their states. could not decide for sometime. and so entered into a “Standstill agreement” with Pakistan. However. this created a mess for Pakistan. Thereafter. However. have led it to see Kashmir in uncompromising terms. the atrocities committed by the tribesmen alienated the Kashmiri people making Pakistan lose out on both accounts. Furthermore. Since it has both ideological and . Pakistan’s internal divisions and weaknesses. politically and militarily. Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity.

Differences also abound within Indian policy circles on the future shape of a possible solution. 10. the Indian attitude has been that of indifference till the situation went out of control. has therefore been to evict Pakistan from its illegal occupation of territory. including territories presently under Pakistani and Chinese control. Where Pakistani diplomacy has succeeded. in keeping with the provisions of partition.the state of J&K is an integral part of the Indian Union. Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir has become rigid and unyielding. India’s bottom line on Kashmir has remained unchanged over the decades . which unfortunately has been feebly articulated and has few takers. and any settlement of the crisis must be effected within the confines of the Indian constitution. The unfinished agenda of partition according to India. 11. India has always been driven by polite diplomacy. India’s Reactive and Limited Attitude. to the increasingly apparent shift in official policy . Maharaja Hari Singh. In brief.6 nationalist implications. 9. from support for incorporating into India all of J&K. India’s response has been reactive and very limited. and has not been able to respond in the correct manner. While Pakistan has been very vocal in expressing its views in all regional and world forums. neither of which is easily compromised. to the territorial status quo. India insists that the UN resolutions were redundant as the State had been acceded to it by the then ruler.

the UN passed a series of resolutions. However. the UN could not pass any resolution concerning Kashmir because the Soviet Union began using its right of veto against any of these. The resolution of April 1948 demanded from India and Pakistan for a cease-fire and complete cessation of hostilities. A few months into the war that started after partition. United Nations (UN) Resolutions: Kashmir. The UN resolutions on J&K are flawed in many respects. 12. The cease-fire line or the LC was to be a temporary boundary till the matter was resolved according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. after 1957.7 for recognition of the LC as the international border. 13. The cease-fire was effected by the end of 1948. Any movement forward on Kashmir is also made more difficult by the lack of a national consensus in India on how the conflict within Kashmir and with Pakistan should be addressed. From April 1948 to 1957. India remains publicly opposed to any international involvement in the dispute. and the State was split into Indian Kashmir and POK. . Sensationalisation of terrorist acts by the Indian media. India brought the matter to the notice of UN Security Council. acts as a further hurdle to arriving at a general consensus. There is no denying the fact that these were influenced by the West’s perception that partition being on the basis of religion. J&K being a Muslim dominated state should have gone to Pakistan.

J&K is not a state where only Kashmiri Muslims live. with India being allowed to retain some force to maintain law and order. 45 percent population). of Jammu: Dogri. There are three distinct geographical regions . Shina and various dialects and mixed languages are also spoken by different ethnic groups within the state. social.8 14. political. this was never to be as Pakistan did not vacate the area and as a result. . The large-scale changes in the diplomatic. The primary languages of Ladakh are Ladakhi and Balti.e. Sikhs. The UN resolution of April 1948 had also suggested a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir after it would be vacated by Pakistan. In addition. However. Furthermore. Demographic Characteristics. and 3 percent Buddhists. Punjabi. 3 percent of the state's total population have been driven out). and of Kashmir: Kashmiri. Pahari. and 3 percent of the population). Contrary to most reports in the media. Jammu (26 percent area. 15.Ladakh (with 58 percent of the area. and Kashmir (16 percent area. military situation over the years have rendered the UN resolution on Kashmir of 1948 obsolete. multi-religious state with 64 percent Muslims. Gujari. of which over 90 % of the region's minorities. i. 33 percent Hindus. the referendum could not happen. 52 percent population. Christians and others. It is a multiethnic.

Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession. The reason that many believe separatism to be a widespread sentiment in J&K is because this dominant section has succeeded in completely drowning out all other voices in the state.9 16. approximately 13 percent are Shia Muslims. . They are non-Kashmiris. J&K: Self Determination.india_resource. and by and large stand behind J&K's association with India except for a few in Doda district. knowing fully well the fate that awaits them there.com. and has the ability to cripple the normal functioning of the 2 www. They are strong supporters of association with India and have demonstrated this by organizing Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front) to assist the security forces in surveillance of terrorist activity2.tripod. The support for secession in J&K is thus largely limited to the non- pastoral Sunni Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley who constitute 22 percent of the state's population. 14 percent of the people in Kashmir province are the pastoral nomadic Gujar and Bakarwal people. Dr Maharaj Kaul. Fifteen per cent of the state's Muslims live in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh. Of the state's 49 percent who reside in the Kashmir province. Shia Muslims do not wish to have anything to do with Sunni-dominated Pakistan. (or about 1. October 1999. 17. This segment of the population dominates the politics of the state.9 million people).

2 5 .649 BUDDHISTS .96.940* 62.5 0 0 .1.236 1.236 1.1. If the UN too accepts this.278 51.00.0 0 0 3 0 . The plea of Pakistan that as J&K is a Muslim dominated state.943 46.7 5 0 1 .917 REDUCTION DUE TO MIGRATION OF APPROX 3 LACS KASHMIRI PANDITS.00.11.0 0 0 OVER ALL% 7 6 .10 society in Kashmir province.184 336 1.969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD D E M O G R A P H IC P A T T E R N (P O K ) A S P E R A V A IL A B L E D A T A T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N T O T A L P O P U L A T IO N IN P O K .917 ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN POST ONSET OF TERRORISM TOTAL POPULATION .0 0 0 18.90.2 .0 0 0 (1 9 4 7 ) .406 10 * 50 90 KASHMIR 2.5 9 PUNJABI K A S H M IR I DARDS C H IT R A L I BALTI TOTAL .969 47 3 OVERALL% 34 2 1 63 CONTD 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .5 0 0 .83.72. there would be no justification for the presence of another 110 million . DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERN PRE MILITANCY TOTAL POPULATION . ONE CRORE AND 70 THOUSAND JAMMU KASHMIR LADAKH JAMMU KASHMIR 30 70 JAMMU HINDUS .649 BUDDHISTS .33.14.435 27.07. either by inaction or insufficient action against Pakistani infiltration and terror or.72.69.940* 51.406 3 * LADAKH 50 97 KASHMIR 2.0 1 .929 LADAKH 6.MUSLIMS .5 0 .5 1 .0 0 0 3 .33.5 0 .95. by sabotage.11.940* 5.90. it should be given to it.MUSLIMS .435 27. In that case.1.29.1 5 .0 8 .07.313 SIKHS .8 3 .14. worst still.2 8 . implies the theory that Muslims cannot stay with the people of other religion.69.943 LADAKH 6.5 9 3 2 .3 4 . 0 0 (2 0 0 0 ) 3 4 L A C S A N D 5 0 T H O U S A N D NORTHERN AREAS P A K O C C U P IE D K A S H M IR 10% 90% POK 14 % 1 7% 14 % 5% 50% NORTHERN AREAS 8 7 .1 1 .95.313 SIKHS .5 0 0 8 7 .184 336 1. P A K IS T A N I PUNJABI SETTLERS HAVE OUTNUM BERED THE SO NS O F T H E S O IL .7 5 0 6 . it implies acceptance of the ‘Two-Nation’ that Muslims and Hindus must live separately.3 5 .

while Pakistan and Bangladesh have driven out most of their non-Muslim population. Ideally the UN Security Council should have overseen this and ensured that the issue was resolved permanently. Bulgaria-Turkey. Germany-Czechoslovakia.11 Muslims presently in India. The problem between India and Pakistan persists because what was natural after partition of a country. but have instead been allowed to stay on only because India being secular does not accept the ‘Two-Nation’ theory. BosniaSerbia. should have been sent to Pakistan. the exchange of population. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 India-Pakistan agreement that concluded the war in Kashmir. there were always exchanges of population. The cases of Greece-Turkey. Croatia-Serbia. The CFL ran along the international India-Pakistan border and then north and northeast . are recent examples where full-scale exchanges were organized along with partition. who according to the principle of partition in 1947. Presently. even after their homeland was created. In fact. 20. never took place. 19. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid1980s. that is. Muslims are still in India. it is unnecessary to partition a country if the population is not to be exchanged. The Siachen Dispute. In other cases of partition elsewhere in the world. Poland-Germany.

The last two 3 Indian Express. not India. The Pakistani view is based on several factors. in vague language that is the root of the Siachen dispute. located near the Shyok River at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. the mountaineering and trekking expeditions sought permission from Pakistan. . 22. 21. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 9842. 25 April. and then north to the glaciers. the Owen Dixon report 1950. Siachen is a part of the Baltistan region of PoK. Second. submitted to the UN. This is what led India to Operation Meghdoot and the Army occupying the Saltoro Ridge. There were reasons to believe that later in 1984 they would have moved into Siachen and presented India with a fait accompli. Siachen became a dispute with Pakistan starting a 'cartographic' aggression owing to erroneous American maps. and then by the Pakistan government permitting mountaineering and trekking expeditions into this region from its side. First. the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. 2006. that the CFL extends to the terminal point. NJ 9842. The Pakistanis base their view on American maps. located Siachen in the Northern Areas3. Third.12 until map grid-point NJ 9842. Both sides agreed.

13 reasons are the Karachi Agreement 1949. represented by Premier Kosygin moderated between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan. 23. The day after the declaration. The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was a peace agreement between India and Pakistan after the 1965 War. The Tashkent Agreement. The agreement was criticized in India because it did not contain a no-war pact or any . After the signing of the agreement things began to deteriorate. The Soviets. The problem therefore. 24. Indian Prime Minister Shastri died of a sudden heart attack.and were disappointed at the return to the status quo. A meeting was held in Tashkent in the USSR (now in Uzbekistan) beginning on 04 January 1966 to try to create a more permanent settlement. and the Simla Agreement 1972. persists. Even during the Suchetgarh meetings between the two militaries in 1972. when it was agreed that the LC would not be unilaterally altered. the LC beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated. In Pakistan many civilians felt that they had won the war though Pakistan had suffered more casualties and territorial losses . Peace had been achieved by the intervention of the great powers who pushed the two nations to a cease fire for fears the conflict could escalate and draw in other powers. where the ceasefire line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated.

The agreement laid down the principles that should govern their future relations. the Prime Minister of India. The treaty was signed in Simla. 25. the President of Pakistan. It is significant that the Cease-Fire Line was changed to the LC during this summit. The Simla Treaty. The treaty has been the basis of all subsequent bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. . by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. seeking to adhere to the status quo by all means. popularly known as the Simla Pact or the Simla Agreement. was signed between India and Pakistan on 02 July 1972 following the 1971 India-Pakistan War. The agreement was therefore nullified. It also conceived steps to be taken for further normalization of mutual relations. and Indira Gandhi. though it has not prevented the relationship between the two countries from deteriorating to the point of armed conflict.14 renunciation of then guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. The 1972 Simla Summit. This was not merely a change of nomenclature but a consequence of an agreement.

revealed General Pervez Musharraf in his dissertation while attending the prestigoius course at the Royal College of Defence Studies. Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in J&K. 27. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. • IMPLIED THAT LC IS INVIOLABLE.IN J & K. “Issues of Kashmir and Indus are intertwined”. and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and Baluchistan. the then President of Pakistan. “ ….” 26.NEITHER SIDE SHALL SEEK TO ALTER IT UNILATERALLY…. 1971 SHALL BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES …. • DID NOT DELINEATE BEYOND NJ 9842.4 It is asserted that the main reason behind Pakistan's demand for Kashmir has very little to do with sympathy for a political cause. It is a real estate dispute for strategic reasons. MARKED ON MAPS AND RATIFIED. the then Indian Prime Minister. THE LINE OF CONTROL RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE OF DEC 17. Options.. 4 www. and a lot more to do with water. .15 SIMLA AGREEMENT 02 JUL 1972 • RETENTION OF TERRITORIES. on 19 September 1960. J&K is a source of Pakistan's water and food security. London. • LC DELINEATED.BOTH SIDES FURTHER UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THIS LINE…. Thus.strategicforesight. Water War: Sharing of the Indus Waters.com. In order to prevent a conflict between its Punjab and Sindh. and Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.

Jhelum and the Chenab).16 The Treaty however. The treaty also does not allow either country to opt out unilaterally. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. Ramananda Sengupta. the Geneva Conventions and the Indus Water Treaty make such an action illegal today. Unlike April 1948. it explicitly prohibits linkage between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. 5 in. Under the Treaty. the Ravi. The Indus River rises from Mansarovar in Tibet and its principal tributaries are the Sutlej. even though the fact remains that India controls the headwaters. the Beas. The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej. The treaty has survived all the wars since then.rediff. In fact. when India stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from every canal flowing into Pakistan. the waters of the Eastern Rivers stand allocated to India and those of the Western largely to Pakistan.” . is effective from 01 April 19605.com. the Chenab and Jhelum. Beas and the Ravi) and three Western Rivers (Indus. for a month.

Increased tensions over water will exacerbate or intensify overall tensions. The Baglihar dam project located on the Chenab River in Doda district in the Jammu division. making resolution of security issues even more difficult. virtually ensures a still deeper and volatile nexus between water and Kashmir in coming years. .17 28. because then the headwaters would continue to remain with India. Today India and Pakistan are both faced with rapidly escalating problems of acute river resource scarcity. Pakistan’s mounting water insecurity. is presently the focus of intense diplomacy between India and Pakistan. Pakistan feels that it needs to have physical control over the concerned headwaters to ease fears about India's potential ability to turn a huge chunk of its land into desert. This is the prime reason why Pakistan is not agreeing to the LC becoming the formal border. creating a more favorable environment for interstate conflict. Obviously not enough.

The Indian position and her viewpoint on terrorism was much better understood now. and more importantly. and to make the case that it has a right to pursue extremists operating from Pakistan exactly as the US and its allies have hunted down al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. to gain some leeway for maintaining the general policy of adventurism that seeks to bleed Indian resources in Kashmir.18 CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 11 September 2001 29. . acknowledged by the USA. has sought to use its broad cooperation with the US on operations in Afghanistan. 30. Both India and Pakistan have been quick to use the post-11 September “war on terrorism” to their advantage. and Pakistan’s shady support to the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorists was exposed to the world. Pakistan. India has attempted to portray the challenge in Kashmir as purely a matter of combating terrorism. for its part.

The US and the West were forced to condemn the attack and were now willing to include India in its war against terror. US Presence in Pakistan 33. As a result. has had a significant effect on the politics of the region. The presence of US troops in Pakistan in the war against terror. India’s tough stance and diplomatic offensive put Pakistan under pressure and on the back foot with regard to her Kashmir policy. This operation was another major development in the region that helped India greatly in its endeavour to counter the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan across the LC. USA will apply pressure on Musharraf to live up to his promise of not supporting terrorism. Pakistan was forced to crack down on radical Islamic groups in the country. It also led to the closure of militant training camps in Pakistan. Attack on the Indian Parliament : 13 December 2001 32. Pakistan was forced to give support to the USA.19 Operation Enduring Freedom 31. causing rifts in its society. which is . This was acknowledged as being invaluable for the success of the operation. in total contradiction of its long-term support to the Taliban. though the ones in POK were still operative. international pressure was applied on Pakistan to act against the perpetrators.

However. Presently there are 59 6 South Asia Intelligence Review. though under different names such as Jamaat ud Daawa for the LeT.20 what India wants. on 12 January 2002. Cross Border Terrorism in India 34. No 34. Though most of the groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy. . 07 March 2005. “The Jehad Lives On”. operating freely and advocating jehad. This would keep Musharraf under pressure locally as it is resented by fundamentalists. with changed names and identities. it could fructify resulting in tangible inflow of military hardware and economic assistance. resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before. after the initial crackdown. the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Contrary to the Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan. Harkatul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). The jehadi groups were banned in two phases. the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. Vol 3. However. a cursory glance over the activities of four banned militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business. as Pakistan-US relationship develops. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Amir Mir. and 15 November 20036.

it is bound to interfere with the latter’s hegemonic intentions in South and West Asia.religious sentiments. Since April 2006. and four in Gilgit-Baltistan7.21 training camps still operational. terrorist activity in J&K has regained impetus. . the idea being to give the movement a local colour. 01 August. with 27 being in Pakistan. Clash of US-China interests in the region is a high probability with the entry of the latter in Baluchistan. the latest one being the Mumbai blasts of 11 July 2006. are now targets of terrorism. 35. 2006. No longer confined to J&K. economic infrastructure and ethno. suggests a different hue and change of strategy in the proxy war in India. While China is constructing the Gwadar port to ensure its energy requirements for the future do not disrupted by the US. The manner in which terrorist activities are being committed all over India. designed to create mayhem throughout India. Internal Situation in Pakistan and its Implications on Regional Politics 36. with the focus now on targeting tourists and civilians. Terrorist modules have surfaced within India with mentors still across the border. the involvement of the Pakistani government. This confrontation that could convert into a new Baluch 7 The Pioneer. The “jehadi flavour” is missing and targets being selected are state objectives. suggesting very clearly. 28 in POK.

The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan. which makes it 725 kilometres further away from India than Karachi. is to Indian pressure. laid the foundation for Gwadar port. nudged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. at China's doorstep. In March 2002. Construction of Gwadar Port by China 37. Gwadar is situated 725 kilometres to the west of Karachi. Wu Bangguo. For China. which handled 90 percent of Pakistan's sea-borne trade. along with the Taliban problem in Waziristan. Chinese vice premier. About 60 percent of China's energy supplies come from . and could indirectly effect the J&K issue as well. Gwadar's strategic value stems from its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. For Pakistan. 38. will influence the geo-politics of the region. the value of Gwadar's distance from India becomes evident if one considers how vulnerable Karachi port.22 insurgency. and so provides Pakistan with crucial strategic depth vis-a-vis India along its coastline.

39. The other "pearls" in the string include facilities in Bangladesh. would provide Beijingan opening into Central Asian markets and energy sources. The port and naval base in Gwadar is part of the "string of pearls". China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea. . in the process stimulating the economic development of China's backward Xinjiang region. Cambodia and the South China Sea. The network of rail and road links connecting Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian republics that is envisaged as part of the Gwadar project and to which China will have access. Myanmar. and China has been anxious that the US. in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests. could choke off these supplies to China in case of a conflict with Taiwan. Thailand.23 the Middle East. According to its "string of pearls" strategy. which has a very high presence in the region.

Nawab Bugti. April-June 2005. The Gwadar project is bitterly opposed by Baluch nationalists who see it as yet another example of Pakistan's Punjabidominated ruling elite siphoning away Baluchi wealth and resources without this backward region or its people gaining. with the latest in being the killing of Baluch leader. Baluchis are desperate to be recognised as autonomous people. The government's Bansal. and to gain self-determination. The extent to which Pakistan and China are able to reap economic and strategic gains from the Gwadar project would depend on the challenges to it from within their borders.24 The Baluch Uprising 40. No 2. Strategic Analysis. A recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan’s tribal regions or Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province) is a cause for great concern for the US and her allies in the War on Terror. The Waziristan Problem 41. Insurgency revived again in 20048. Alok. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”. 8 . The tribal area of North Waziristan has seen an increase in clashes between Pakistani forces and pro Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The Pakistani army has led many incursions into the region. Vol 29.

Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and many of his senior colleagues and jihadi cadres have been given sanctuary in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. 42. the infrastructure has remained undecimated so that Pakistan could use them to protect its strategic interests. This increasing influence of the Taliban could result in its revival and would worsen the situation in Afghanistan and J&K as well. Taliban’s organizational capabilities. the fundamental coalition of the NWFP. The Taliban is intact under the protection of the ISI. which has enforced its rabidly conservative code as had been the vogue in Afghanistan when Taliban ruled that country. Impact on US Interests 42. The Pentagon sees China's efforts to defend its interests along oil shipping sea lanes as "creating a climate of uncertainty" and threatening "the safety of all ships on the high seas". and the ISI. the latest being a peace deal between it and Musharraf. it would result in a deadly convergence of interests in a . The Taliban is being funded by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).25 writ has been forcefully replaced by that of Taliban. Think tanks in Pakistan are of the view that as China’s power in the region will multiply with the completion of the Gwadar project. The Amir of the Taliban.

Therefore. The Northern Areas have no status.5 million inhabits a vast area of 72. With Waziristan already under the grip of the Taliban.26 delicate geo-political area. They are ruled directly from Islamabad through a Northern Areas Council which is headed by Pakistan’s Minister for Kashmir Affairs.495 square kilometers. This mountain outback has been split into five districts. in order to facilitate China 9 The Dawn. 2005. only time will tell. As to how Pakistan handles this. . They are neither a province of Pakistan nor a part of "Azad Kashmir". the internal security situation in Pakistan will implode if a CIA and possible Indian backed impetus is given to the Baluch uprising. there is a possibility that the US could attempt to disturb the peace in Baluchistan by putting a damper on growing Chinese presence there9. Karachi.700 sq. appointed by Islamabad. normally a retired Pakistani army officer. Ghizer and Ghanche. Gilgit. miles to the Chinese through an agreement on 02 March 1963. whereby the Kashmir issue would then become a back burner. 13 January. The Northern Areas 43. A population of 1. is the local administrative head. Skardu. The reason why the Northern Areas have been kept by Pakistan is because of its unilateral ceding of 2. in order to keep Pakistan engaged and in constant fear. Diamir. viz. A chief executive.

73 per cent of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region. especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972. is vulnerable for conversion to a separatist movement. Kargil in 1999 added to the discontent in the region. is drawn from the Shia sect hailing primarily from the Northern Areas. Over the years. The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. Since 1988. Unlike the rest of Pakistan. The situation in the Northern Areas is therefore very delicate. reducing the indigenous people to a minority. radically altering the demographic profile of the area. 44. Large numbers of Sunnis have been brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle down in Gilgit. and being in a volatile state. which was primarily used for these incursions and suffered the maximum casualties. the Northern Areas has witnessed sectarian violence that has claimed a number of lives. the Northern Areas have a Shia majority. .27 to build the Karakorum Highway providing overland link between Beijing and Karachi. successive Pakistani Governments have sought to amalgamate these areas into Pakistan by declaring them "federally administered territories".


and municipal elections being held peacefully. It was also imperative that the ‘jehadis’ initially ‘bred’ for Afghanistan. always be in consonance with Pakistan’s demands. it is apparent that nothing fruitful will materialize as APHC members continue to remain. which is a creation of the Pakistani ISI in 1993. with parliamentary. Political Situation. The political situation in J&K has been stable ever since ceasefire was declared on 26 November 2003. The APHC. as before. be engaged in Kashmir lest they turn on Pakistan. does not represent the entire state of J&K. under the threat of elimination by the ISI. (a) LC Fence. Internal Security Situation in J&K. that commenced in 2003 and was completed by . Even in the trouble torn district of Kupwara. All these conditions were catalytic in starting the proxy war by Pakistan. 48. The stance adopted by the APHC will therefore. polling in the municipal elections was 87 percent. Ground Realities 46. With the completion in construction of the 750- kilometre LC fence.29 surplus of military wherewithal for Pakistan to pursue the aim of seeking revenge for its defeat of 1971. Even though Mr Manmohan Singh is talking with them. assembly. 47.

while 516 militants are known to have infiltrated. while 231 militants infiltrated. In the face of unabated counter terrorism operations by India. Development Activities. A revamped and motivated police organisation now exists in the state. there ahs been a profound effect on the levels of cross border infiltration into the state. 976 were eliminated. The LC fence has helped reverse the earlier losses. (b) Coordination between Government Agencies and Local Though the menace of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) Populace. in 2004. (c) Role of the State Police. For instance. Being entrusted with new responsibilities that involve faith and trust. militant cadres have become easy prey. the force is now fully motivated and geared to take on their tasks effectively. A number of development activities have been undertaken both. by the state government and the security forces in the form of Operation Sadhbhavana. The number of schools and colleges that . the local people have become more confident and are forthcoming as far as cooperation with government intelligence agencies and security forces are concerned. still exists. in 2005. 917 were eliminated in the state. ever since the ceasefire has come into effect. Similarly. and with a drop in sustenance from across the border.30 October 2004. 49.

Mainstreaming the Local Populace. due to the shutting down of . have all given a face lift to the state. While it took 25 years to link Pathankot to Jammu in 1972. Militancy has in a way. Jammu-Srinagar Railway Link. The railway link with the mainland is bound to have a profound effect on the psyche of the locals. However. Similarly. Similarly. militancy forced them to move out to other parts of India. for education. A new beginning in linking the state to the mainland is the planned Jammu-Srinagar railway link. is expected to be complete by 2010. The line within the valley is almost complete and this portion is expected to get operational by 2007. completion of the Old Mughal Road by 2009.31 have been opened in the last four years has been more than the total from 1947 to 2002. the proposed link from Udhampur to Qazikund in the Valley. to mention only a few. removing the fear of being alienated from the rest of the country. Earlier Kashmiri traders were not known to leave the state for selling their wares. economic projects such as the Baglihar Dam. and four laning of the JammuSrinagar National Highway. the Rupees 1500 crore Asian Development Bank project over three years. another 21 years. and thereon to Udhampur only 56 kilometres away. been instrumental in assisting India in mainstreaming the local population of J&K with the mainland. 51. 50.

APHC TALKS WITH THE CENTRE IN PROGRESS. The interest shown by the local youth during recruitment rallies is proof of the fact that militancy is on the decline. . a number of educational and general awareness tours for school and college students have been conducted. SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL LOK SABHA ELECTIONS SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF NATIONAL WINTER GAMES. As part of the Army’s campaign to win the hearts and minds of locals. CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES LAUNCHED. LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS BEING RESCUED FROM TERRORISTS. NATIONAL HIGHWAY 1A OPEN 24 HOURS. parents were forced to educate children in other cities of India.32 schools and colleges. 52. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THE RISE. INDICATORS OF NORMALCY SANCTITY OF CEASE FIRE MAINTAINED.

Agra ends in disaster as Musharraf tries to make Kashmir the core issue. (c) (d) May 2001. are as follows:(a) February 1999. EVENTS OF SEP 9/11 AND GULF WAR II HAVE MANIFESTED IN A YEARNING FOR PEACE THE WORLD OVER. Kargil incursions by Pakistan lead to total breakdown in diplomatic ties. July 2001. The manner in which peace overtures across the border have progressed. THE NATION HAS RETAINED ITS BALANCE AS ALSO THE RIGHT TO FIGHT BACK SUCCESSFULLY. Peace Overtures 53. THIS IS A DEFINING MOMENT FOR BOTH INDIA AND PAK. Lahore-Delhi bus service takes Vajpayee across the border with the first comprehensive peace package. . (b) July 1999.33 CHAPTER IV – PEACE INITIATIVES MOMENT OF RECKONING BLED BY THE PROXY WAR (WAR OF A THOUSAND CUTS) LET LOOSE BY OUR ADVERSARY. Vajpayee invites Musharraf for Agra Summit.

(f) November 2003. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf sign joint statement in New York. India accepts ceasefire the next day. Musharraf proposes dividing Kashmir along religious lines and distributing between India and Pakistan. (l) September 2005.34 (e) May 2003. Musharraf asks India to demilitarise certain regions and asks for self governance in J & K. (g) January 2004. Proposes unilateral ceasefire on 23 November. signs joint statement. Vajpayee goes to Islamabad. Srinagar-Muzaraffarabad bus service inaugurated. (h) September 2004. Composite dialogue restarted. Vajpayee again extends hand of friendship to Pakistan. . Musharraf invites himself for cricket match to India. Peace process restarts. with the APHC is boycotted by the latter. (k) April 2005. Musharraf says UN resolutions on Kashmir were redundant. (m) January 2006. Spurt in terror attacks in India makes New York meeting between Manmohan Singh and Musharraf a non starter. (n) February 2006. First Round Table Conference called by PM Manmohan Singh. (j) October 2004.

MOST OF THE OIC COUNTRIES VOTED AGAINST THE MOTION. Foreign Secretary level talks take place on the sidelines of SAARC scheduled for end July 2006. a partition of J&K along the flow of this river that matches . Second Round Table Conference between Delhi and the APHC is boycotted by the latter. Manmohan Singh proposes peace. (q) 11 July 2006. ”THE FIVE DECADE OLD INSISTENCE ON HOLDING A PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR IS NO LONGER A TERM OF REFERENCE CARVED IN STONE” PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF DECEMBER 2003 Initiatives by Pakistan under Musharraf 54. ONLY 88 OUT OF 191 SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION. The Chenab Plan. IN A VOTE CALLED BY INDIA. Musharraf has been keen on what he describes as the Chenab Plan. IRRELEVANCE OF UN RESOLUTION IN NOV 2003. Amritsar-Nankana bus service inaugurated. ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE RAISED BY PAK. security and friendship with Pakistan. Serial bomb blasts in Mumbai.35 (o) March 2006. (p) May 2006.

The entire valley with its Muslim majority population. Options. would have to forgo all its claims to PoK. which includes the 10 www. . Comments. Losing Chenab to India would thus mean drastic reduction in water supplies to Sindh. Sindh receives water only from the enhanced Indus River. This would then warrant a major rearrangement of the irrigation network in Punjab. as well as the Muslim areas of Poonch. Doda and Rajouri in Jammu. it would dry up Sindh. which clearly explains the reason for Pakistan's insistence on making Chenab the basis of the international border and including parts of Jammu and not merely the Kashmir valley.000 sq km of area. Furthermore. if India loses the Kashmir Valley and in retaliation blocks the Chenab. and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. would be brought within Pakistan’s borders. with the inclusion of Ladakh which lies north of the Chenab River. The Chenab supplies 30 billion cubic metre or 17 per cent of the water flows in the Indus System in Pakistan. 56.36 its communal faultlines10. under its jurisdiction.strategicforesight. accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would have to part with approximately 32. Compared to Punjab. Therefore.com. Pakistan would be called on to accept Indian sovereignty over the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the State. India. 55. which is already on the brink of a water crisis. In turn. which is boosted up by the Chenab-Jhelum combine.

the defence and foreign affairs would be the joint responsibility of India and Pakistan. Jhelum and Chenab would come under Pakistan's jurisdiction. Applied to the Kashmir Valley. Rajouri. Kupwara. The Andorra Model. Andorra is a co-principality of the Bishop of Urgel (Spain) and the French President. Budgam. Srinagar. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's claim over these districts is that the catchment areas of all the rivers important to Pakistan Indus. 58. Musharraf suggested demilitarization of selected areas in the Kashmir Valley as essential for 11 Guardian. This model suggests a semiindependent status for the Valley11. Following the non- acceptance of partition of J&K on ethnic lines. but the whole entity would become a demilitarised zone. Andorra has near autonomy with its own constitution and currency. Pulwama. 57. Baramulla. There would be no change in the present LC. Doda. excluding Ladakh and the area under China and Pakistan. . Poonch. 22 January. and the Gool Gulabgarh and Reasi tehsils of Udhampur. France and Spain both share responsibility for its defence.37 districts of Anantnag. that is giving away 57 per cent of the total land area of J&K. Under a 1993 agreement. 2002. Demilitarisation and Self Governance. The Valley’s borders would be soft enough to allow movements of both Indians and Pakistanis in and out of it.

59. Times of India. stating that that selfgovernance and demilitarisation of Kashmir could be an interim arrangement under which the people of Kashmir could get a sense of 'being masters of their own destiny'. give self governance to its people with a joint management arrangement on top13. . 2006. 13 February. His proposal was for India to withdraw troops from the sensitive towns of Srinagar. His suggestion was to demilitarize Kashmir. Daily Excelsior. Chairman APHC has also supported this view. means handing over the Kashmir Valley on a platter to Pakistan. Pakistani trained militants are well entrenched in these areas and the moment the Indian Army vacate these. Umar Farooq Mirwaiz. Comments. 2006. they would be in full 12 13 14 The Tribune.38 furthering the peace process. 60. Baramulla and Kupwara. 23 June. and that Pakistan would join India to ensure that no incidents of terrorism take place12. followed by condominium or joint control. 09 January. then self-governance. 2006. as sticking to traditional positions was no solution and the idea of self-governance could provide the way out14. President Musharraf has on 23 June 2006 again suggested that demilitarization is the only option to resolve the Kashmir problem. Demilitarisation.

and then runs west till it meets the Jhelum north of Muzzafarabad. The Indian Government also reacted promptly by categorically rejecting Musharraf's suggestion. 2006. The Neelam Valley is a 144 km long bow-shaped deeply forested region that makes up much of what Pakistanis call Azad Kashmir. 15 The Hindu. The Neelam River enters Pakistan from India in the Gurais sector of the LC. The Neelam Plan suggests that India should stick to its present position of complete and equal integration of J&K into India and from that position could envisage shifting the LC to the west and north along the Neelam River.J. While the Chenab plan is based on the bigoted principles of division along ethnic lines. the Neelam Plan is focused on clamping down on terrorism and prevention of religious clashes in India. also disagreed with this proposal as the terrorist infrastructure across the border was still intact. so that the Northern Areas become independent. The Chief of Army Staff. India’s Response : The Neelam Plan 61. General J. The rest of PoK could then join Pakistan.Singh. 62.39 control. asserting that it was a “sovereign” decision to be taken by New Delhi based on the security situation and could not be “dictated by any foreign government”15. 14 January. .

invited all separatist and non-separatist groups for a round table conference on 25 February 2006 in New Delhi. The independence of Gilgit and Baltistan to the north will bring about a closure of terrorist training and coordination camps in Gilgit. The plan would also be appealing to the US. India had made it clear that the APHC was not the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and therefore. Kargil and Drass. the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan.rediff. Though the round table conference was a success. for actions against China. Astore. a number of leaders did not participate. This would bring about a demilitarisation of the Deosai Plain and thus effect a natural stabilisation in places like Siachen. it will get direct access to the Deosai Plain. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Skardu and the Deosai Plains area16.com.40 63. In an attempt to broaden the Kashmir dialogue process. will become a free country. it had initiated a broad dialogue in order to reach the hearts and minds of the people of the state by including groups outside the electoral process as well. The Second Round Table conference was held in Srinagar on 24 16 in. Latest Initiative by India 64. “The Neelam Plan”. to find a solution to the Kashmir issue. as being a strategic location. Arindam Banerji. . According to the Neelam Plan.

The Indian Army has confirmed that first disengagement of forces from present locations would take place. This too would be only after joint authentication of the AGPL which would then be made public both nationally and internationally.18 Is Plebiscite in J&K an Option? 66. It would then be extremely difficult to dislodge them from these positions. that can ultimately pave the way for demilitarization. India wants an iron-clad process since its soldiers dominate most of the heights. Talks are now centred on the specific grid references to be followed.41 and 25 May 2006. During the last fifty-seven years a lot of demographic changes have taken place.” 18 Times of India. The Army is justifiably concerned that Pakistani troops might move into the positions vacated if some sort of joint authentication does not take place before disengagement. Terrorism Update. 21 April. 65.satp. This too was boycotted by the APHC due to a threat from the Hizbul Mujaheddin17. the most notable one being the expulsion of non-Muslim 17 www. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir. New Delhi. .org. 2006. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute. to be followed by demilitarization.

and the people were given three options .com. 22 May 2005 . were to have a referendum under truly neutral supervision. 67. thus making it impossible to determine who is now eligible to vote for the plebiscite as an original Kashmiri inhabitant. there were negligible Muslims in 1947. presently there are no non-Muslims left. join Pakistan or be independent -. There have also been large-scale infiltrations of Muslims into traditional the Buddhist area Ladakh and the Hindu areas of Jammu19. On the other hand. 68.42 communities from POK by Pakistan. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. The majority could very well go with India. because the separatists would split the vote between proPakistan and pro-independence groups. In 1992. all Hindus from Indian Kashmir were also forcibly expelled by militants who had infiltrated from Pakistan.join India or join Pakistan . Pakistan has changed the demography of its occupied area in Kashmir by resettling large number of Punjabi exservicemen and Afghans from the North-West Frontier Province. Notwithstanding the above. This did not happen only in POK. The original people of Kashmir have long since left. if the option of plebiscite was to be exercised and the undivided state including POK and the Northern Areas.join India.the results could be shocking to votaries of secession. if the people of the state are given only two choices . Dr Dipak Basu.the majority vote could still go in 19 Bose66@hotmail. In the Northern Areas too.

Going by simple arithmetic. Moreover. by the late 1980s. and some sprinkling of support for Pakistan from other Muslim groups in the state. Even if provisions were made in this for erosion of support for India as a result of the current turmoil. Views of China 69.43 India's favor. If the 1. By the early 1980s. Therefore.8 million and Northern Areas is 1.5 million.9 million Sunni Muslims of the Kashmir Valley.2 million. Having shown its preference for bilateral talks to resolve the dispute. This has much to do with its own internal compulsions. it still gives India a vote of 6. as relations between India and China improved by the end of the . China's own territorial disputes with the South-East Asian countries over the Spratley Group of Islands led to military clashes. China could not deny the same principle in the case of Kashmir. of the 12. POK's is 2. J&K’s population is 8. there has been a change in the Chinese Kashmir policy.6 million and leaves Pakistan with 6. the results of the referendum would be too close to call. the new thinking in China developed an anathema for the word ‘self-determination’. lest it be applied by the West to the case of Tibet.5 million.8 million people in the undivided state. and all of POK and Northern Areas vote for Pakistan. 70. In the last two decades.

There are reports of Uighur Muslim terrorists getting trained in Pakistani camps. In fact. 2006. 20 The Hindu. therefore. Besides the above. 27 February. China has already protested to Pakistan on this issue. the very foundation of Pakistan is based on Islam and therefore is a source of religious terrorism. Besides. . The rise of secessionist tendencies in its Muslim province of Xinjiang also made China aware of the dangers of ‘self-determination. Muslim fundamentalism is on the increase in Central Asia. will only lead to more problems in the adjoining more vulnerable Chinese province of Xinjiang20. China advocated bilateral talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. after the break-up of the Soviet Union. 71.44 1980s. Any support to Pakistan on Kashmir.

A similar thought has been echoed by President Musharraf recently when he stated that UN resolutions on Kashmir . ARMY RETURNS TO THE BARRACKS TO ATTEND TO ITS PRIMARY TASKING.45 CHAPTER V – THE RECOMMENDED STRATEGY RESTORATION OF NORMALCY NORMALCY IS THE POINT WHERE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION UNIMPEDED AND STATE POLICE ASSISTED BY CPOs IS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER. General 72. which you can keep under control by taking shots of insulin but for which there is no permanent cure. The analogy that fits Kashmir best is that it is a problem like diabetes. The moral of the story is that both India and Pakistan must learn to live with the problem of Kashmir until such time that some cure is invented or discovered. This line of thinking is probably closest to what India has in mind and perhaps the only way to make a paradigm shift in bilateral relations.

People to people contact on both sides of the LC. a deliberate attempt has to be made by India to de- hyphenate itself from Pakistan. other than with the establishment. This has to be comprehensively addressed on all fronts. There have been some major achievements of the dialogue process such as continuation of the ceasefire and movement across the LC. leaving it far behind. a clear message should be conveyed to Pakistan to stop meddling in Indian affairs. India must endeavour to project itself as the leading power in the region. With this as the backdrop. economic. are given in the succeeding paragraphs. Long Term Proactive Strategy 73. Furthermore. The strategy hereafter. must be realistic and cannot be evolved in an ad-hoc manner. India must get on with its development plan on all fronts to include defence. It is clear that a long-term strategy is required to resolve the J&K dispute. with the aim of delinking from Pakistan. social and military. has been restored. 74. and needs to be evolved from India’s national aims and objectives to protect core values.46 were redundant and independence was not possible. . political. not to get intimidated by smaller countries like Pakistan. In doing this. the ingredients of a possible strategy to resolve the J&K dispute.

New Delhi. normalcy and even talk of greater autonomy in J&K. India and the US. if India were to reverse the peace process. 19 July. In reciprocation. 76. Global developments in the foreseeable future are likely to leave Pakistan behind and development is an essential answer to terrorism. which would then act as an economic and military deterrence. it would be like rising to the bait and gifting a cause to the “jehadis”21. and will use every trick in the book to subvert the peace process. 2006 . Revival of insurgency in Baluchistan. India must therefore learn to get its act together as the “jehadis” fear development. allowing Pakistan to extract its pound of flesh. The idea is to defeat 21 The Tribune. There would be international pressure on India to pull back from the brink. The recent spurt in terrorist acts is a calculated attempt to create terror by striking targets across the country. This should not throw India off stride as striking at soft targets is not difficult and is imminent in the future as well. It should therefore not evoke knee-jerk protests that detract attention from the main task. The India-Pakistan hyphen would get restored again. serves the interest of both. India should enhance its economic and military capabilities so as to widen the gap with Pakistan sufficiently. One such strategy could be covert support to the Baluchis to give further impetus to their cause.47 75.

The “Bhagidari” campaign that means equal partnership. 78. equipment and ethos. in which both.g. POTA forthwith. The people of India have . the government and the people meet halfway to solve problems. India’s policy of meeting its internal security requirements has not succeeded so far. revive. and at the roots of terrorist ideology – fundamentalists. intelligentsia and the people as a whole. must be conveyed to the general public through awareness campaigns. in combating the menace of terrorism in all its forms. narcotics / drug trade. needs to be emphasised upon. the people have to understand that they have to reciprocate in the correct manner to the State. it must adopt proactive policies to confront terrorists militarily. the state police and para military forces in training.48 Pakistan in every manner so that it is forced to come to the negotiating table on India’s terms. It must also modernise and enlarge its intelligence network. It needs to move from a policy of appeasement and accommodation to firm action. Domestic Strategy 77. India must ensure a crackdown on radical outfits. and identify and punish all those whom the ISI has been able to plant in its strategically important organizations. social evils and sources of terrorism e. As citizens. The need for support of the citizenry. For doing this.

social workers. For Pakistan. cross border train and bus services. Attitudinal Change 81. Both forms of dialogue are being currently implemented. This quality needs to be channelised and made use of in the correct manner. What it means is .49 shown tremendous unity in times of crises. but need to be given more emphasis to. Pakistan. intellectuals. so as to get rid of this menace and hurdle permanently. the APHC is basically an organization meant to appease Pakistan. Endeavour must therefore be made to win over members of both faction of the APHC by whatever means possible. learning to live with the Kashmir problem does not mean giving up the search for a solution. For Track I dialogue to succeed. thus leaving little space for manoeuvre for the military establishment. Unfortunately. India and Pakistan must pursue relentlessly the Track II and Track III forms as well. India’s dealing tactic with the APHC also needs a review. India must exercise the option of moving “into the Pakistani society”. 79. should be encouraged. Though claiming to represent the people of Kashmir. A liberal visa regime permitting exchange of student delegations. it is only after an incident happens. however. and availability of medical services in India to Pakistanis. Track II and Track III Diplomacy 80.

Resolution of the Siachen dispute would act as a catalyst to resolving the major issue of J&K. demilitarization of the Siachen region would be deemed to be the best possible CBM implemented by India so far. If successful. India. and any settlement would help to move the J&K talks forward. the present deployment of troops of India and Pakistan. The Siachen issue feeds into the peace process. India’s willingness to discuss the issue and the initiation of a process that facilitates confidence building should provide Pakistan’s leaders with the necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war and to continue the peace process. 82. Resolution of the Siachen Dispute 83. infrastructure development and energy-related cooperation with India.50 changing its attitude and ending the mindless hostility of the past. there are good military reasons why the Army insists that before any relocation takes place. entering into a more cooperative and beneficial relationship with India. but it also should provide Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful option. It should not only maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy. India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy war. travel. However. tourism. in other words the . This means opening up in the matter of trade. transit. investment.

but cannot let go of the Chenab river over which India has total control.51 AGPL. Options. Expansion in India-US Relations 85. Considering the severity of its internal water situation with regard to its Punjab and Sindh. India being the upper riparian State. to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan. Water needs to be managed as an economic good and thus it is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives from both countries22. a radical shift has obviously occurred in American perceptions. Pakistan can do without the Kashmir Valley. is demarcated both on ground and maps. The plan. will always be on the winning side in the water-war. Resolution of the Indus Waters Problem 84. would involve a creative solution to the political dimension of the conflict in J&K. only then is any redeployment possible. A recommended strategy for resolving this tangle could be an integrated development plan for the conservation of the Indus Basin. Unless the two sides agree where the line lies. With the India-US nuclear deal almost through. This deal has therefore marked a new phase in India-US ties. since no pre-conditions are being insisted upon.com.strategicforesight. The requirement now is for India to break away from being cast in the 22 www. .

diplomatic and economic strategy to apply pressure on Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue. It is also seeing India being tied up with the US in a long lasting relation that could jeopardise its monopoly and lead to its containment in Asia. adequate care must be taken to ensure that improvement in India-US relations does not accentuate the India-Pakistan problem. Full advantage of this must be taken by India to exert pressure on Pakistan by China as well. As US is China’s biggest trading partner and India too is developing as a potential market. it is unlikely that China would attempt to harm this developing relationship with India. Once India-US relations expand. China is fully aware of the growing potential of India and it is for this reason that it has stated that if the two countries were together the 21st century would belong to Asia. At the same time. India must therefore take advantage of this relationship and skillfully institute a combination of a political.52 same mould as Pakistan. give sudden impetus to the J&K problem. Development of India-Chinese Relations 86. . India would be well on the road to becoming a major power in Asia. There is a possibility that Pakistan. could in a bid to highlight its existence in the region. way ahead of Pakistan.

If a society is not free. conversely. the politically dominant military and the religious parties are the strongest proponents of claims to the state. Pakistani military continues to dictate the Kashmir policy. While sympathy and support for the Kashmiri people is fairly widespread in Pakistan. 88. political and cultural development of a nation. a democratic transition in Pakistan would likely improve the prospects of a substantive and sustainable dialogue between Pakistan and India on all contentious issues.53 Return of Democracy in Pakistan 87. is the most effective instrument for the social. providing also for the preservation and strengthening of the identity of the various ethnic. economic. Participatory government. where the people choose their own representatives and leaders. It is a fact universally acknowledged that a democratic polity is best equipped to enable the people to fulfill their aspirations and govern their own destiny in an atmosphere of freedom. People are the best arbiters of interstate disputes. religious and racial communities that constitute today’s nation states. and for their will to prevail. . there could be developments that would destabilize the region. democracy and respect for human rights are the best recipes. including Kashmir.

intelligentsia and religious institutions. There should be realistic psychological and information warfare so that the will of the anti-national elements is suffocated and the hearts of the populace are won. Efforts must be made to upgrade communication systems so that television and telecommunication spreads to remote and border areas. A solution can also emerge in due course of time against the backdrop of political and economic trends in the world.54 Economic and Social Repair of Kashmir 89. Economics is competing for space and politics. With the birth of the European Union (EU). national boundaries in Europe have lost their importance and wars appear to have become an anachronism there. and promote moderate and secular polity by media. and address the outdated education system of Madrassas by quality modernisation. The endeavour should be to spread the fruits of development in the state. In the . Revival of SAARC 90. multinationals have mushroomed that are not inhibited by national frontiers. which are currently under constant reach of Pakistan propaganda. Kashmir has been changed forever by more than a decade of conflict. In the era of globalisation.

to strengthen the organization through cohesion within the region. To realize this dream would imply a conscious effort on the part of the members of SAARC. The conflict of today can be swamped by a tide of goodwill and harmony tomorrow. thereby making no cuts in the existing favourable force level and pro-active military stance. India should always adopt a strategy of 'dissuasive deterrence' vis-a-vis Pakistan. Through unity would come peace and prosperity that would in all probabilities also solve the Kashmir issue. SAARC can become a more vibrant version of the EU. which demands a mix of deterrences. Developing a Credible Military Deterrent 92. 91. The use of military power for coercive diplomacy has increased tremendously these days.55 modern cyber age. Economic synergy leads more often than not to the solution of disputes. To ensure this effectively. including political differences. makes it imperative to resort to enhanced use of military as a sharpened instrument for political purposes without an armed contest. . constantly increasing its strategic space the world over. making it one solid entity. and India in particular. India must maintain highly capable conventional armed forces. both nuclear and conventional. Given this scenario. This significance of the armed forces. national borders have lost their significance.

An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan. India needs to clearly spell out its counter terrorism strategy / doctrine. electronic intelligence. as also modernisation of data processing and dissemination. A reorientation of armed response is required so as to launch proactive and specific surgical military operations. This should encompass human. In resolving the J&K issue. Strategy to Tackle the Proxy War 94. India must also learn to call Pakistan’s bluff in so far as the nuclear bogey is concerned. The aim of military operations should be to create a secure and suitable environment. economic and political issues can be addressed effectively. both external and internal. technical. the option of a limited military venture confined to only the LC portion of the state. by undertaking ‘Hot Pursuit Strikes’ across the LC and into POK. this would become particularly relevant if Musharraf gets assassinated or overthrown. . conveying appropriately that Pakistan faces possible annihilation if they ever make this mistake.56 93. The evolution of a superior intelligence system is imperative. so that social. A reactive response is not the answer. In Pakistan’s turbulent politics. should not be lost sight of. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms.

Public information techniques must be spruced up to counter false propaganda generated by agencies close to the militants. It should be the “positive content provider” of the achievements of . The media that has a great reach today. SIG INTERCEPTION. should be used as a ‘Force Multiplier’ to shape public opinion and to counter false propaganda. ANTI IED AND DF DEVICES HEPTRS FOR RECCE AND EXPEDITIOUS DPLY OF TPS INF BNS( HOME & HEARTH) VILLAGE DEF COMMITTEES OPTIMAL UTILISATION OF FORCE MULTIPLIERS ED. A well planned psychological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the civil populace. IMPORTANT TENETS FOR CAMPAIGN PLG SVL. The media must be taken along as a ‘weapon’ of the state and not of the terrorists. TRACKER AND GD DOGS PSEUDO GANG IKHWANS AND OTHER SURRENDERED TERRORISTS GHATAKS Media Strategy 96.57 95. Perception Management and Public Information. must be launched by security forces. Operation Sadhbhavana should be pursued relentlessly for developing infrastructure and spreading awareness. Youth in the impressionable age group of 12 to 18 years must be the target of all psychological campaigns. MD.

. Apply the “water-war card” and threaten drying up Sindh. Gains achieved due to India’s conventional superiority can be used as a bargaining tool to settle the J&K issue permanently.58 the security forces and government apparatus in the state. China would get sucked into the J&K issue. This would invite severe international criticism. the media must project the true colour of militancy. India’s stand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council would get that much weak. Options Available for Resolving the Issue 97. 98. Option 1. Exercise the military option and resolve the dispute militarily. Give impetus to the nationalist movement in Baluchistan and support the Shias in the Northern Areas. (d) India would get branded as the perpetrator of instability in the region. The implications of this option are the following:(a) (b) (c) The peace process would get derailed. in keeping with the Neelam Plan. Abrogate the IWT of 1960. US influence may not be readily available due to Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror. Rather than highlighting human right aberrations by the security forces. Attempt must be made to change the alignment of the LC.

59 (e) High probability of the water-war leading to a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. (d) The LC would be made ‘soft’ to enable citizens of the two sides to travel freely without any passports or travel documents. Communication is being included so that both Kashmirs do not feel landlocked. (c) Both. This may seem utopian. would continue to control their parts of J&K. and could be modeled on the following lines:(a) (b) Demilitarise on an incremental basis from both sides of the LC. foreign policy and communications are concerned. 100. Adopt a neutral model of self governance that would be acceptable to all three parties . This would be disadvantageous to India. The LC would continue to exist but could then be termed instead as the Line of Cooperation. the aspirations of the people of Kashmir would get taken care of. Pakistan and the people of both Kashmirs. The Pros:(a) Granted autonomy. exists.India. India and Pakistan. but only so far as defence. but is not impossible. (f) It could lead to a situation where third party mediation may become necessary. Option 2. 99. .

There is a possibility that with a “soft” LC and the Kashmir Valley being Sunni dominant. acceptance of the proposal would imply loss of real estate. making its candidature for a permanent in the UN Security Council stronger. which . (d) A settlement of the J&K imbroglio would remove the threat of nuclear war from the sub continent. it would be a tremendous gain.60 (b) If successful. 101. (c) India would emerge as the benefactor. The Cons:(a) Considering that J&K was acceded to India. sectarian violence could spill over from neighbouring POK. it would lead to stabilizing of the situation in the sub-continent. This has been possible to a great extent. For Pakistan. (d) If the Taliban gets revived and stabilised in North Waziristan and Southern Afghanistan. As a sizeable portion of the 140 million Muslims in India are Shias. there is no stopping this evil from engulfing the whole country in the years ahead. by her borders being secure. (b) India has been consistently maintaining its secular identity so far. (c) There is no guarantee that Musharraf would be able to rein in the militants. especially cadres of the Taliban and Al Qaeeda. it could turn its focus onto J&K.

there is no surety of the plan being completed successfully. in India the political environment being extremely dynamic. Fissures within the Pakistani military and the ISI. Given the kind of suspicion that governs India-Pakistan relations. the military would always have a role in all policy decisions. His presence to see the plan fructify is therefore questionable. could put an end to this proposal. In present day coalition politics. a possible change in government could derail the entire process. It is therefore unlikely that Pakistan would agree to . this could become a major constraint. The Pakistani military establishment has never wanted anything short of liberation of Kashmir. (e) The proposal would have to be implemented over a period of time. (h) Implementation of the proposal in one state of India. Similarly. (f) Musharraf has survived two assassination attempts already. would trigger off similar claims from states in the grip of secessionist movements. (g) Even if democracy returns in Pakistan. act as a wedge between Pakistan and the area illegally acceded to China. (j) Positions held by Indian troops in the Siachen Glacier region.61 with a soft LC could once again come into the grip of a secessionist movement.

(c) The India-Pakistan hyphen does not get restored. Contain Pakistan and through a “wait and watch” strategy. 102. (b) The above message is conveyed from a position of dominance. Attempt reining in of the APHC. not to meddle in Indian affairs. Encourage maximum people to people contact across the LC through Tracks II and III diplomacies.62 authentication of these actual held positions on ground and map. Apply the Indus water strategy discreetly. 103. Stoke the problem in Baluchistan and the Northern Areas. Continue covert support to the Karzai regime. Support the move for restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The implications of this option are the following:(a) Sends a strong message to Pakistan. Give top priority to mainstreaming the local populace. alternately. Pursue relentlessly. giving a clear message at the same time. see how its internal security situation develops. sideline it. Option 3. a synergised counter insurgency plan in J&K in order to contain militancy. as is warranted of a regional power. Follow the present line and maintain status quo. Continue dialogue and CBMs with Pakistan. Demilitarization by India would thus not be possible. that terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled as a pre-requisite. .

(j) It would give time for the economic drive. it would be a lesson for other states in India facing secessionist movements. (h) The option increases the chances of Pakistan imploding as a consequence of mis-management of its internal security situation. . if any. the issue of J&K would become a back-burner. The Will of the people will begin to prevail paving the way for a return to democracy. (e) Military eliticism and invincibility of the Pakistan Army would get threatened. in the future. for strategizing a solution to the J&K problem. Though it could lead to instability in the region. not to take the government lightly on these issues. (g) It enables consideration of the global scenario post US elections of 2008. (f) (g) Chances of reining in the APHC. to fructify. mainstreaming and face-lifting efforts undertaken by the J&K government. The problem of the Northern Areas would get adequately highlighted in international forums This would become an issue for India to counter Pakistani claims to J&K. (h) Finally. are better.63 (d) The problem of J&K can be tackled on terms favourable to India and would not result in a compromise on territorial integrity.

64 104. Recommended Option. Option 1 is not recommended due to the

instability it would cause in the region. The US war on terror, would also not permit this. In cases of extreme provocation, however, it would be necessary to resort to a certain amount of “arm twisting” of Pakistan, for which this option should not be ruled out. Option 2, though ideally suited to solve the problem permanently, is plagued with a number of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. It also implies loss of real estate by India and giving away the Kashmir valley on a platter, as it being Muslim (Sunni) dominated, would automatically identify itself more with Pakistan and tilt towards it in the years to come. 105. Furthermore, with the situation in Waziristan and Afghanistan concerning the Taliban, being very unstable, the time for Option 2 is not correct. This option would in any case, take at least five years if not more, to stabilize, by when the geo-political situation in Asia could change as has been discussed already. It would therefore be worth the while to “wait and watch” and hence the strategy proposed in Option 3, is recommended.


106. At present, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy at the national level. The core of the issue is that India needs to respond efficiently and rationally to the emerging challenges. It is difficult to see any

65 light at the end of the tunnel as there are no easy answers to this intractable problem. A sustained political campaign must be immediately launched to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Kashmiri people, assuage their feelings of hurt and neglect and restore their bruised and battered dignity. The Sufi tradition of tolerance and liberalism, for which Kashmir is well known, should be encouraged to bloom unhindered by the diktats of radical Islam. The people of J&K need to be convinced that their future lies with India. Above all, public opinion must be mobilised to express the nation’s solidarity with the Kashmiri people in their long drawn out and courageous struggle against Pakistan-sponsored proxy war.

(11,905 Words)


100 80 60

(15 AUG 05) 2003

84 81

40 20 0

44 37 35 22

45 34
20 13 36



1999 – LOK SABHA 2004 – LOK SABHA 2005 - MUNICIPAL

250 200




2005 2004
105 109 93 90 60 131 131 89 66 76 61 67 96 112 103 95 77 127 108 99 96 82 72 68 69 75 64 54 140 118 86







400000 350000

376729 388115
400000 382157 375293

150 100 50
99 70 67 53 61 49 41 36 FEB 69 72 52

300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 111912 72591 27356 191164

300000 250000 200000 149920 150000 100000 50000 0 114366 119037 110793 173334 153314



1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
















(15 AUG 05)

2002 (194) (66) (64) (18)

1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0



10 11 10






47 45


2003 2004 2005



885 597

2003 2004 2005
1 8 71 4 8 1 8 2 1 6 6 1 3 7 8 5


5 3 5

4 8 3 4 8 8

2 4 0

2 2 9 1 5 7 1 0 3 6 3 5 3

2 4 8

2002 2003

(1088) (900) (1067) (454)




2004 2005






(15 AUG 05)

OWN CAS 2001-05
1200 1000 800
2003 2004 2005
956 642 639 336

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 OVERALL ARMY CPOs/PMF
0.7 0.5 0.7 4.5 3.1 4.8 6.7 5.4 7

430 189

600 400 200 0

222 207 163 85

FATAL 2001 2002 2003

NON FATAL 2004 2005


10. 1998. Mishra. New Delhi.” USI Journal April-June 2005. Legitimacy and Conflict in South Asia. South Asia : From Freedom to Terrorism. Security and Separation in India. Chadda. Ethnicity. 5. New Delhi. Terror and Containment. 8. Guardian 22 Jan 02. April-June 2005. 14. 13. 1998. New Delhi. S K. “Path to Kashmir will be Ardous. 15. but Uneasy Truce will Hold”. K P S. Sucheta Ghosh. Strategic Insights Volume IV. 2003. The Tribune 13 Feb 06. Maya. Issue 7. Mitra. Ajai Sahni. Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region. Sreedhar.BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Vol 3. Manish. Vol 29. Shashi B. Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir. Present and Future. 3. Bansal. No 2. Santhanan. 2. South Asia Intelligence Review. Sinha. Subrata. Daily Excelsior 09 Jan 06. 2003. 2001. Taylor. New Delhi. Sahai. No 34. . Times of India 23 Jun 06. New Delhi. Strategic Analysis. 07 March 2005. 6. “The Jehad Lives On”. Omprakash. “Jammu and Kashmir: Past. New Delhi. Sudhir Saxena. July 2005. Dietmar Rothermund. Matt. Alok. 4. Indian Express 25 Apr 06. Amir Mir. 11. Gill. 7. K. 12. 1997. 9. “ The Revival of Insurgency in Baluchistan”.

The Hindu.india_resource. in.rediff. www. Demands for a Plebiscite and Secession”. “J&K: Self Determination. 2006. 01 August.16. . 23. 26. 19 July.com. “Options”. Dr Maharaj Kaul. Karachi.rediff.satp. 17. 13 January.com.com. New Delhi.com. The Hindu 14 Jan 06. in. Ramananda Sengupta. Bose66@hotmail. The Dawn.strategicforesight. 24. www. The Tribune. www. Terrorism Update.com. October 1999.tripod. 20. 22 May 2005 19. 2005.org. “The Neelam Plan”. 25. “Can India Stand a Third Pakistan”. 2006. 27. Arindam Banerji. “Indus Water Treaty not under threat: Pakistan. The Pioneer. 27 Feb 06.” 22. “Prime Minister suggests five-point programme to build a new Kashmir”. Dr Dipak Basu. 21. Times of India New Delhi 21 Apr 06. 18.

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