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: Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause. Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Issue: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non -impairment clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA) Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.
only one of the many provinces affected approved the issuance of an IFMA. it would be absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the local government before the requirement of the national government seeking approval from the local government can be applied. Held: NO. 43 converted into an IFMA. Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. PICOP RESOURCES . Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA.R. ALVAREZ v. not because the local government has control over such project. landslides or even climatic change if the project is not properly regulated. not because the local government has control over such project. but because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. and deserve to be adequately compensated when these resources are exploited. G. Section 26 states that it applies to projects that "may cause pollution. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision. Issue: Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP¶s application for IFMA conversion. and extinction of animal or plant species. but because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again. PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP¶s application for IFMA conversion. Indeed. INC. and who likewise have a stake in the resources in the area. J. Ho wever. 162243. December 3. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law. HEHERSON T. PICOP filed a petition for MANDAMUS against DENR Sec Alvarez for refusing to sign and execute the IFMA contract. PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned. climatic change. 2009 Chico-Nazario. rangeland. No.: Doctrine: The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law. depletion of non-renewable resources.HON. ." The local government should thus represent the communities in such area. the very people who will be affected by flooding. or forest cover. loss of crop land.
more weight should be given to the documents relating to its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of business. Hence. and thus. The documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessor¶s office. . the presence of the cadastral map. No. . which was approved by the Director of Lands. 2009 Peralta. the conclusion is inevitable that it is the former¶s certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is controlling. the presence of the cadastral map. absent any finding of abuse of discretion. absent any finding of abuse of discretion. the same should be controlling in the absence of proof that such document is invalid or inaccurate. Issue: Which between the documents presented by the parties carries greater weight in proving its claim? Held: To this Court¶s mind. 038 -00315. the y properties involved in the controversy are those covered by Tax Declaration Nos. which was approximately 10 years before the controversy in hand developed. Batangas. 03800316. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN G. Resolution No. This Court shares the view of the RTC. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor. Specifically. Facts: The controversy has its roots in a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan. the conclusion is inevitable that it is the former¶s certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is controlling. which was approved by the Director of Lands.BARANGAY SANGALANG v.R. 1986. December 23. 159792. 75-96 was subsequently passed recognizing that the areas which are the subject of a barangay dispute covered are within the territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Sangalang. whereas the documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land management bureau. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor. J. Said map was approved on March 17. and 038-00317. both situated in Lemer . should be given more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessor¶s office. It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government agency tasked with the survey of lands.: Doctrine: To this Court¶s mind. should be given more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessor¶s office.
Facts: A parcel of land was sold to spouses Alfonso with an annotated Deed of Restrictions. 91-39. 94-179. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance and need not comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing. G. July 7. through its Sangguniang Bayan. alleging breach of contract RTC . Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that Muntinlupa Resolution No." According to the HLURB. Muntinlupa Resolution No. However.R. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the property into an institutional area. The authority of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel of land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of Ordinance No. ET AL. The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted Resolution No. Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25. TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration and while pending. AAVA filed with the RTC an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso.THE LEARNING CHILD. Ayala Alabang. AND SPS. Phase V. J. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment Held: No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 134269. Series of 1991). INC. 2010 Leonardo-De Castro. the issuance alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO v. passed Resolution No.: Doctrine: While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers for the courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute. which states that the property shall be exclusively used for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory school. CA affirmed with modifications. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION. and this approval should be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was the MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. Block 1. SPOUSES ERNEST AND ALMA ARZAGA. adjusting the description "Lot 25. spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC) which was later expanded to include a grade school program. Furthermore. 12. the Municipality of Muntinlupa. there would be no violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same entity which committed the error. The Municipality of Muntinlupa. Phase V. rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA. while it is true that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. Block 3. it should be noted that the HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area. . TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President which held that Muntinlupa Resolution No. and therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public hea rings. No.
or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I. a difference lies between suability and liability. and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment Held: The general rule spelled out in Section 3. Petitioners also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment Already Issued. SIMEON P. they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. DUMDUM. BULACAN v. entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles. J. immunity of the state from suit. in the event that respondents claim is validated. These statutes only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. March 22. be ¶ subjected to writs of execution and garnishment ² unless. the Municipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit. However. 2010 Peralta. G. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract. As held in City of Caloocan v. despite having made several deliveries. since the property of the municipality may not. of course. which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Execution may not issue upon such judgment.The writ of attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises. which vests local government units with certain corporate powers ²one of them is the power to sue and be sued. Facts: Respondent. Chapter 2. because statutes waiving non -suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. doing business as KD Surplus was contacted by petitioner Ople Respondent had . Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the action was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially. the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially. the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not.R. invoking among others. where consent to be sued is given by general or special law. Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Ople allegedly did not heed respondent¶s claim for payment.: Doctrines: Be that as it may. as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party. Allarde. Thus. JR. Be that as it may. HON. the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment. Title I. there has been a corresponding appropriation provided by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects . Otherwise put. 168289. No.THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY. Issue: Whether as a municipal corporation. a difference lies between suability and liability. . Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
May 12.000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area. The exemption above pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands.A. Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed of two or more islands. v. such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at least 2. "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2. ET AL.000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code. ET AL G. The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2. No. R." Issue: Whether Dinagat Islands is exempted from the land area requirement Held: No.RODOLFO G.000 square kilometers.12 square kilometers. Moreover. Respondents instead asserted that the province. J. 180050. is exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR). The exemption under Sec461(b) pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. 2010 Peralta. which is composed of more than one island.000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area. or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802. 9355.R. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. Facts: When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3. or when the territory of a province is separated by a chartered city or cities.000 inhabitants. ETC. NAVARRO. There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous. and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace." was declared NULL and VOID. it had an official population of only 106. . Republic Act No. No. 2006.: Doctrines: The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2. Hence. otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating.951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO). which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250.
rendering the law and the province created null and void. 180050. As the law-making branch of the government. May 12. cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept thems elves within the limits of the Constitution. otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was held unconstitutional for failure to satisfy the land area and population requirements and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating. Facts: Republic Act No. and determine whether illegality attached to the creation of the province in question. ETC. "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.A. the acts of the Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting into law R. No. Issue: Whether petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity Held: NO. The Court cannot tolerate such nullity to be in existence. Article X of the Constitution. while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers. any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10. 2010 Peralta. so only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a province." was declared NULL and VOID.RODOLFO G. Where the acts of other branches of the government go beyond the limit imposed by the Constitution. The Court. it was the Legislature that imposed the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. . 9355. indeed. No. hence. it is the sacred duty of the judiciary to nullify the same.R.: Doctrines: No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government Code. OSG now contends that since the power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature. while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers. ET AL. No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government Code. J. 9355 should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA. v. NAVARRO. The Court. ET AL G. The Constitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province. cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution. To abandon this duty only because the Province of Dinagat Islands has began its existence is to consent to the passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. so only the c riteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a province. and determine whether illegality attached to the creation of the province in question.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. J. then President Marcos issued EO 756. as if they were one law. the congruent application of which the courts must generally presume. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G. petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of laws should be made clear and express. Aside from the fact that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by construction.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. Facts: With the issuance of PD 1071. an officer of petitioner. filed a July 16. June 22. seeking from petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength of Section 6 of Executive Order No. COA Comm. they ought to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them. Romero. . said officer ruled that Executive Order No. as it is an established r ule of law that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together. it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence ± interpretere et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi. 756. 756 was a special law issued only for the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner corporation. 2010 Perez. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. On February 18. to wit:"Moreover. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. Thus. 756 was simply an incentive to encourage employees to resign or retire at the height of petitioner¶s reorganization. 756 is an additional alternative to existing genera retirement laws l and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans Held: No. authorizing the reorganization of PITC. 2001 request. if diverse statutes relate to the same thing. RA No. Habitan issued the assailed ruling. President Marcos issued Executive Order No. otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine International Trading Corporation. 183517. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No.stating that Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioner¶s employees did not include allowances outside of the basic salary.R. No. Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance retirement plan by any government agency and government-owned or controlled corporation other than the GSIS. 1983.: Doctrine: Section 6 of Executive Order No. Time and again. said decision went on to make the following pronouncements. 87.
Corral of Tiwi formally requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwiand its barangays where the NPC¶s properties were located relative to the payments already made by NPC to Albay. 2010 Del Castillo. The subject contract provided.000. that respondent and Atty. Province of Albay. representing Tiwi. . petitioners¶ next contention that the subject contract should first be ratified in order to become enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily fail. As the sole bidder at the auction. July 9. Facts: National Power corporation (NPC) is liable for unpaid real estate taxes on it s properties located in the Province of Albay.00 was only an ³earnest money´ and that the total amount to be collected from the NPC was still being validated. and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes.R. 171873.MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI. Prescinding therefrom. the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. the law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit. No. The said properties were sold at an auction sale conducted by Albay to satisfy NPC¶s tax liabilities. nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization. Under the particular circumstances of this case. the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. Issue: Is Mayor Corral authorized to enter into the contract of Legal Services? Ruling: Yes. The law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit. entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where the former agreed to settle its tax liabilities. opined that the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized and established NPC¶s realty taxes. this prior authorization appears to have been given by the council in good faith to the end of expeditiously safeguarding the rights of Tiwi. there is. Albay acquired ownership of said properties. REPRESENTED BY HON. The abovequoted authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate.: Doctrine: Pursuant to Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of te LGC.763. BETITO G. In the instant case. Carpio. Mayor Naomi C. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Court¶s Decision in National Power Corporation v. On its face. thus. the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. The NPC and Albay. ANTONIO B. Mayor Corral. Governor Salalima replied that the request cannot be granted as the initial payment amounting toP17. As correctly held by the CA. among others. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal Services. He further clarified that the sharing scheme and those entitled to the payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under the law. NPC may remit such share directly to Tiwi. execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. MAYOR JIAME C. and there is no allegation to the contrary. and respondent and Atty. J. Pursuant to Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC. The Office of the President. through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts. VILLANUEVA AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TIWI V.
In Section 2. It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of P2.949 officials and employees of the province.: Doctrine: The President¶s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is in conformity with the policy of standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758.000. the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as provided under Administrative Order No. the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.760.THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL .000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1. ZAYCO v. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount ofP100. neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. the President enjoined all heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the President¶s prior approval.000. The Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care Health System Incorporated (Philam Care). Issue: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3. the President¶s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. J. REPRESENTED BY ITS GOVERNOR ISIDRO P. Thus. including a local government unit. . 182574. G. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President.´ Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. 2010 Carpio. Then President Joseph E. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules. Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating P4. no government entity. After a post audit investigation. petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to ³government offices/agencies.000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1. Ruling: Yes. is exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel. and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. The COA ruled that under AO 103. Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental.949 officials and employees. as well as their respective governing boards. THE COMMISSIONERS.000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has rendered at least one year of service as of 31 December 1993. 103 (AO 103). No.R. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President. This is distinguished from the President¶s power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. ET AL. including government-owned and/or controlled corporations. September 28.
Gross Neglect of Duty. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G. This is with regards to the construction of a two-classroom building with fence for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion area would no longer admit high school freshmen starting school year 2002-2003. Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of Condonation shall expand to cover coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding term. the 2004 elections having mooted the case. R. and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer¶s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex. This was done without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding. Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. J. Grave Misconduct. and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. supersede a pending administrative case. The Office of the Ombudsman dropped the mayor and Coleta. respectively of Tagkawayan.: Doctrine: The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. When the people elected a man to office. it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character. April 23. No. if he had been guilty of any. and Mayor Vicente Salumbides III were administratively charged with with Dishonesty.SALUMBIDES v. 180917. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. indeed. . Facts: Salumbides and Glenda who were both appointed in July 2001 as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer. On the other hand. Quezon. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. both elective officials. 2010 Carpio Morales. Ruling: No. appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. the re-election of a public official may. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. as respondents in the administrative case. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
v. such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009. Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP). Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities. No. explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10. as amended by RA 9009. and Jerry P. August 24. the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009. Ruling: Yes. To be valid. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. denied the respondents' first motion for reconsideration. Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power. ET AL. including the Cityhood Laws. denied the respondents' second motion for reconsideration. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10. again by a majority vote.R. each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws). and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. Treñas. Article X of the Constitution. the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded. On 31 March 2009. Article X is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform. 177499/G. 178056. Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. by a majority vote.R. in due course. City of Iloilo. ET AL. the Supreme Court En Banc. However. On 28 April 2009. REP BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. Accordingly. COMELEC. In enacting RA 9009. No. City of Calbayog. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution. No. 2010 En Banc Doctrine: The clear intent of the Constitution particularly Section 10. The classification criterion is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities."In other words. The Cityhood Laws. 176951/G. TRENAS. struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10. .R. even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. the Supreme Court En Banc. by a split vote. in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason. The Supreme Court En Banc. G.LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHIL. Issue: Whether or not the subject 16 Cityhood Laws is a violation of the Constitution. assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation.R. 9009.A.R. No. No. 2010. August 24.A. COMELEC G. These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP). Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R. Issue: Whether or not the subject 16 Cityhood Laws is a violation of the Constitution. and Jerry P. substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. in their judgment. 176951 February 15. No. 9009. City of Calbayog. Facts: This is a motion for consideration of the case. League of Cities of the Phil. et al.R.. Indeed. and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. The purpose of the enactment of R. and they should never declare a statute void. When the LGC was amended by R. increased from P20 million. was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. Ruling: No. G. unless its invalidity is. legislative power embraces all subjects. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million. In fine. City of Iloilo.R. 178056.LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution. 177499/G. COMELEC. 2011 En Banc Doctrine: The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. either expressly or impliedly. beyond reasonable doubt. . Indeed. Vs.A. is necessarily possessed by Congress. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. Any power. the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law. No. No. deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition. and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. Therefore. rep by LCP National President Jerry P. exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance. 9009. assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws. except as limited by the Constitution. et al.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. Treñas. the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. It cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R. 176951/G. Trenas. No. Without doubt. No. and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged. unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws).
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