Anglo-Ottoman Rivalries in South West Arabia Prior To and During The First World War: 1906-1919

ANGLO-OTTOMAN RIVALRIES
IN SOUTH WEST ARABIA

PRIOR TO AND DURING
THE FIRST WORLD WAR: 1906-1919
BY
ABDOL RAUH YACCOB
.. r
Thesis submitted to the

University of London for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London
1995
Contents
Abstract 4
Acknowledgements 6
Transliteration 8
Maps 22,27 & 198
Introduction 9
Chapter One: The Ottomans in the Yaman
1.1 Introduction 45
1.2 The Ottoman administration of Yaman 1872-1908 49
1.3 Imamic-Ottoman Relations 60
1.4 The Treaty of Da` än 78
1.5 Imdm Yahyd and the Aden Protectorate Tribes 84
1.6 Conclusion 98
{he
Chapter Two: British Policy in, Protectorate before World
War 1
2.1 Introduction 102

2.2 The Policy of Non-interference 109
2.3 The Withdrawal of the Political Officer 125
2.4 The Policy of Non-interference in tribal affairs 131
2.5 The Policy of Non-interference and the Ottomans 138
2.6 The Policy of Non-interference and the Imdm 145
2.7 Con clusion 149
Chapter Three: The Ottoman Occupation of Lahej
3.1 The Imperial Powers in South West Arabia prior to

the World War 1 154
3.2 The British Operation at Shaykh Said 160
3.3 The Ottoman Movement'Towards the Aden
Protectorate 172
3.4 The Ottoman Occupation of Lahej 183
2
Chapter Four: The Aden Protectorate during World War 1
4.1 The Early Days of War 202

4.2 The Amir of Dä1I' : Nasr b Sayf 207
4.3 The Facili Sultdn: Husayn b Alimad 214
4.4 The Hadramawt 227
4.5 The Àbdali Sultan 238
4.6 Other Protectorate Chiefs 243
4.7 The Ottoman Policy in the Protectorate 251
Chapter Five: Imam Yahyd during World War 1
5.1 Imam Yahyd between the Ottomans and the British

262
5.2 Imäm Yahyd and the Aden Protectorate Tribes 279
Chapter Six: British Policy and Commitments during the

war
6.1 Policy Adopted for the Conduct of War Against the

Ottomans 287
6.2 The Arab Movement Policy in South West Arabia 294

6.3 An Offensive or A Defensive Policy? 314
6.4 Post-war Settlement 325
Conclusion 332
Appendices 366,377 & 378
Bibliography 1 380
3
ABSTRACT
This thesis, entitled "Anglo-Ottoman rivalries in South
West Arabia prior to and during the First World War", deals
with imperial policies and commitments in South West Arabia
from 1906 to 1919. It does not attempt to trace the general course
of Anglo-Ottoman relations in these years.
The thesis is divided into six chapters, an introduction and
a conclusion. The thesis begins with an inquisitive survey of the
literature available on the subject. The first chapter deals with
the Ottomans in the Yaman and their relations with the
YamanIs and the Imdm. The second chapter examines the
change in British policy in South West Arabia from intervention
to non-intervention. These two chapters also trace changes in
the of both imperial resulting from the boundary

policies powers
settlement and its effect on their relations with the Imam and
the tribes in the Yaman and the Aden Protectorate. The third
chapter examines the advance of the Ottomans in South West
Arabia and their occupation of Lahej during the First World
War. The fourth chapter analyses the Ottoman policy in the
British Protectorate and traces the effect of the occupation of
Lahej on the tribes of the Protectorate. The third and fourth
chapters also cover the revival of Anglo-Ottoman rivalries in
South West Arabia. The fifth chapter examines the attitude of
the Imam during the war and his relations with the Ottomans,
the British and the Arab chiefs in the Yaman and the Aden
Protectorate. The sixth chapter analyses the development of
British policy and commitments in South West Arabia during the
4
war. The chapter also considers the post-war settlement in
South West Arabia following the withdrawal of the Ottomans
from the area. The conclusion embodies a review chapter-by-
chapter of the present works on the subject for comparison
with further data, interpretation and analysis.
5
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Association of Commonwealth
Universities for the Commonwealth Academic Staff Scholarship
awarded to carry out my research at the School of Oriental and
African Studies from September 1985 to August 1988. I would
also like to thank the National University of Malaysia for
extending my study at SOAS from September 1988 to July 1989;
and from November 1994 to July 1995 for providing me with the
sabbatical leave in the United Kingdom.
This research would have and could not have been
conducted without the endless assistance and supervision from
Professor M. E. Yapp at the History Department, SOAS to whom I
am extremely grateful, for his patience and advice through all
these years. My thanks also specifically to Professor D. Arnold
and Dr. U. Freitag at the History Department, SOAS for their
assistance in assuring the completing of this study. Without
their help this thesis would not have been completed in the
present form. To others in the Department I would also like to
convey my gratitude notably for providing me with assistance
in conducting this research.
I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge
my appreciation to the institutions which have rendered their
assistance throughout my research, notably the Library of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, the India Office Library,
the Public Records Office, the Library of the University of
Cambridge, the Libraries at the Oxford University, the Library
of the University of Birmingham, the Library of the University
of Durham and the National Library of Scotland at Edinburgh.
6
Last but not least I would like to thank those who made
this research possible notably my friend Sadiq Abu Bakar, my
wife Aishah, my children Ashraf, Najwa, Nazihah, Nadhirah,
Najiah and Ilaf Amanina who are always accompanying me in
my life.
7
Transliteration
The following transliteration of Arabic words in the thesis has

been used :
Arabic character Latin Equivalent
hamzah '
bä' b
tä' t
thä' tha
jim j
hä h
khä kh
dal d
dhal dh
rä' r
zay z
sin s
shin sh
sad s
dad d
tä
za z
àyn
ghayn gh
fä f
qaf q
käf k
lam 1
mim m
nün n
waw w
'
y ZA y
a long vowel äIiü
The words ending in tä' marbütah are spelt with h if they are
single or at the end of the idQfo otherwise with t, for example
Siydsah
Siyäsat Barltäniyah
Siyäsat al-Dawlat al-Ùthmänlyah
8
Introduction
This research on "Anglo-Ottoman rivalries in South West
Arabia prior to and during the First World War", was initially
stimulated by the fact that the so-called official and semi-
official history of the First World War gave an inadequate
picture of British policy and commitments in Aden and South
West Arabia compared to other areas in the Middle East. The
official history of the First World War notably by Sir George
MacMunn and Cyril Falls contains only a few pages on the
operations in Aden. 1 E. Dane, British Campaigns in

and around
the Near Fast, has but 2

a better coverage is rather general.
Other official published documents such as A Handbook of
Arabia, Volume I by the Admiralty, 3A Handbook of Yemen and
A Handbook of Asir by the Arab Bureau, 4 the Geographical
Handbook Series by the Admiralty namely Western Arabia and
the Red Sea, 5 also contain some general information. The single
most important work of this character is the account by H. F.
Jacob, the assistant Resident at Aden 1914 1917 (from

-
September 1917 he was the liaison officer in Cairo representing
the Government India), in Kings Arabia. 6 This is

of of work
I Sir George MacMunn, and Cyril Falls, History of the Great War:
Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine London: HMSO, 1928, pp.
,
221-224.
2 E. Dane, British Campaign in the Near- East London, 1917-19.
,
3 The Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, A Handbook of Arabia
2 vols., London, 1916.1
4 The Arab Bureau, A Handbook of Asir , Cambridge, 1916; Admiralty, A
Handbook of Yemen (compiled by the Arab Bureau) Cairo, 1917.
,
5 Geographical Handbook Series, Naval Intelligence Division, Western
Arabia and the Red Sea, London, 1946.
6 H. F. Jacob, Kings of Arabia: The Rise and Set of the Turkish Sovrantv
in the Arabian Peninsula, London, 1915. Thereafter t5 reterrecL 1 Kings of
Arabia. -. o 43
9
generally reliable but it does present the story coloured by the
views of Jacob himself and Jacob's recommendations did not
always prevail, notably in relation to the Imam of the Yaman.
This inadequate picture inspired secondary works to trace
back through British official records and documents to cover a
during the R. J. Gavin, 1 R. L.

number of aspects of affairs war.
Bidwell, 2 J. Baldry, 3 J. E. Peterson4 F. U. Abäzah, 5 B. C.

and
Busch6 and J. C. Wilkinson? have each contributed to the
knowledge and understanding of the subject and their
contributions will duly be discussed. Surprisingly, however,
important aspects notably the relationship between the newly
recognised Zaydi Imäm of the Yaman and the Aden Protectorate
tribes, particularly before the outbreak of the First World War,
have not been accurately examined. Previous attempts such as
works of J. Baldry and F. Abäzah did not pursue these events in
detail. Gavin has covered the events substantially, but he was
generally convinced that the Imäm continued his intrigues with
the tribes even after the treaty of Da`än. It appears to raise
more questions than the answers on whether the Imam really
attempted to extend his sphere of influence into the southern
1 R. J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule. 1839-1967 London: Hurst, 1975.

,
Thereafter it refers as Aden under British.
2 R. Bidwell, "The Turkish attack on Aden 1915-1918", Arabian Studies
vol. 6 (1982), pp. 171-94. Thereafter it refers as "The Turkish attack".
3 J. Baldry, "al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914", Arabica
Vol. 23 (1976), pp. 156-96; also "British Naval Operations against Turkish
Yemen 1914-1919", Arabica, vol. 25 (June 1978), pp. 148-97.
4 J. E. Peterson, "South-west Aräbia and the British during WW1",
Journal of South Asia and Middle East Studies (JSAMES) (1979), pp.
,2
18-37.
5 F. U. Abäzah, Àdan wa al-siyasahal-BarItanivah fT al-Bahr al-Ahmar:
1839-1918, Cairo, 1987. Thereafter it refers as Àdan.
6 B. C. Busch, Britain. India and the Arabs, Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1971.
7 J. C. Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary
Drawing in the Desert London, 1993.
,
10
part of the country. Another aspect of paramount importance
khe
before the war isABritish non-intervention policy in the Aden
Protectorate from 1906 to 1914. Gavin made a good start by
associating Morley's new policy with Warner and Minto and
comparing it with Curzon's forward policy. A number of
questions remain unanswered- such as, how far did the policy
affect the relations with the tribes in the Protectorate; what
form of relations existed with the Ottomans and the Zayd! Imdm
during that period; and when exactly was the policy of non-
intervention carried out, how firmly did the policy stand before
the outbreak of the war, and how far did the policy damage the
British during the war? These issues can only be ascertained
through examining the discussions which exist on the new
policy at Aden, Bombay, Simla and London.
Also, a number of relatively important aspects during
the war are yet unsatisfactorily researched, namely the Aden
Protectorate affairs during the war. Generally speaking,
inaccurate assumptions on the attitude of the tribes are often
arrived at without consulting individual files on the tribes in
the Aden Residency Records together with the Aden Weekly
Letters. Here, too, issues on the Anglo-Imamic relations and
Ottoman affairs in the Protectorate are not appropriately
revealed. It is far from clear why the Zaydl Imäm moved to
establish relations with the British during the war when he at
the same time remained loyal to the Ottomans.
There are other vital arguments which require further
clarification on British policy and commitments during the war.
Secondary works made considerable attempts, but remain
11
inconclusive due to the reliance on incomplete sources. Some like
Bidwell presents his own suggestions on the British action at
Shaykh Said. The views of Aden, Bombay, Simla and then Cairo
which formed the policy adopted by the Home Government, have
always been overlooked notably on the post-war settlement,
such as Jacob's mission to the Zaydi Imdm. It is doubtful to

_
suggest that Jacob, as described by Gavin, was 'ill-provided
with the means to negotiate', and 'was sent with instructions
that had no great meaning', and his mission was further
described as 'confused from the '

start'.
This research is based mainly on the local records of the
Aden Residency, the records of the India Office and the
Government of India. Apart from the classified individual files,
the Aden Records (R/20/A) include the series of Aden Weekly
Letters (R/20/A/1319) which recorded all important events under
the administration of the Aden Residency particularly at the
beginning of the war. The series also contains the suggestions
and views of the Aden Residency. It should therefore be treated
as the basic source of information for local events at Aden and
its environs during the war. The Weekly Letters (continued
under the files L/P&S/10/295,519 & 610) must be studied in
conjunction with the War Diaries (L/MIL/17/5/3954-3961) in the
Government of India Military Records. These cover operations
at Aden together with relevant political matters from September
1914 until 1919. The Aden Records also contain a number of files
of the Governments of Bombay and India relating to Aden. The
India Office in London has a sizable number of useful files on
1 R. J. Gavin, Aden Under British, pp. 260-1.
12
Aden and South West Arabia, particularly dealing with the
period before September 1917 when Aden was transferred to the
Foreign Office. L/P&S/10, L/P&S/11 and L/P&S/20 are the main
series.
From September 1917 to the end of the war and during its
aftermath, documents emanating from the Cairo Residency
provide basic and useful information on Aden and South West
Arabia. The Arab Bureau in particular provided vital
information on the post-war settlement in Arabia. The Arab
Bureau Papers, together with the monthly news reports of the
Arab Bulletin (FO 882/20) should be studied with records in the
Foreign Office, especially those from 1917 onwards when the
Foreign Office was responsible for political affairs in Aden and
South West Arabia. However, because it was probably not an
transfer, 1 Cairo. Residency to

absolute appears provide more
information than Home authorities notably on the post-war
policy.
The records of the Admiralty (ADM 137/97,899) also
contain information on Aden and South West Arabia,
particularly on naval policy and action in the Red Sea, as well
as the naval commitments in South West Arabia and they
should be explored in conjunction with records from the India
Office and the Foreign Office. The operations in South West
Arabia which involved the co-operation of naval forces must be
examined with the Admiralty records. An attempt to portray
the action at Shaykh Sa'Id at the beginning of the war for
1 Wingate Papers 123/14/15, Earl Curzon replied to Lord Lamington on

the new administration of Aden, The Times, 5 Dec 1917.
13
example, can only be reconstructed with the aid of the
Admiralty records.
The principal source for the study of the higher direction
of the war is the papers of the Cabinet and its Committees.
Unfortunately Aden was rarely discussed at Cabinet level. Its
affairs came before the War Committee in March 1915 in
connection with discussion of the partition of the Ottoman
Empire. It appeared again in 1916 in connection with the Arab
revolt when the question of a proposed offensive from Aden was
put forward for the approval of Cabinet. In 1917, Aden again
appeared before the Cabinet when a proposal was made for the
transfer of its control from the India Office to the Foreign Office
and the War Office. The War Office papers, on the other hand,
contain information concerning plans for, and reports on,
operations at and around Aden. These include copies of the War
Diaries, together with detailed reports from officers in Aden.
Apart from the official documents, there are a number of
private papers which are relevant to this research. The most
important collection is the Wingate Papers at Durham
University. Interesting correspondence in the Wingate Papers is
to be found in the letters from an Arab informant in Aden, Àbd
al-Qädir al-Makkdwi (Mackawee). The material from 1917-19,
when Wingate was in charge of Aden affairs is disappointing.
Other collections by the Viceroys in India notably by Minto
in the Minto Papers at the National Library of Scotland are very
useful particularly for the inside account of the non-
intervention policy including a severe resistance to the new
policy. The papers of the Viceroy, Charles Baron Hardinge of
Penshurst, at Cambridge University Library, on the other hand,
14
Arevery discouraging except for the scrutiny on the episode of
British action at Shaykh Said in the early days of the war.
Disappointing too are the collections by the Secretaries of State
for India, namely the papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain at the
University of Birmingham Library.
The other side of the story, namely from the people who
were involved, who witnessed, or reported on events, should be
treated as a supplement to the official reports and documents.
On the Arab side, writers as Ahmad b. Fadl l

such al-'Abdall,
who claimed to possess first hand materials on the history of
Aden and South West Arabia during that period; 'Abd al-Wäsi'
b. Yahyd al-Wäsi'I, 2a Yamanl historian of the 20th century
and Amin al-Rihänl, 3 Arab traveller who visited Arabia

an
after the war, have to be taken into consideration. Al-'Abdall,
who was one of the family of the Lahej Sultanate, has been well
known in South Yaman as a poet and musician. His book on
Lahej and Aden is very useful as he represents Arab views of
the Aden Protectorate in general and those of the 'Abdalls in
particular. It is important to note his criticism of Jacob's work
in connection with the conduct of the Protectorate chiefs during
the war, notably the Amir of Däli'. Al-Wdsi'I was not only
Yamani but also Zaydi and as he focuses his attention on the
doings of the Imam, his works may be considered as a voice of
1 Ahmad Fadl a1-'Abda1I, Hadlvat al-zaman fi akhbar Mulük Lah{ wa

'Adan, Cairo, 1932. Thereafter to as
1$ referred A Hadlyat al-zaman.
2 'Abd al-Wäsi' b. Yahyi al-WAsi'I, Tartkh al-Yaman al-musamma
furjat al-hurnüm wa'l-huzn fl hawädtth wa tdrlkh al-Yaman, Cairo,
1346 AD (1948). Thereafter it refers as Thrlkh al-Yaman.
3 Amin A1-RIhanI, Mulük al-'Arab aw rihlah fl al-biläd al-'Arablyah.
Beirut, 1925. Thereafter 1,5 referrec(/Mulak al-'Arab.
4o as
15
the Imam. He repeatedly praises the Imam and his policy and
administration and attacks those who opposed the Imam such as
the attack he made on the Idrisi. He wrote in the style of
typical classical Muslim historians, recording events year by
year based on the Hijra calendar. It is not uncommon in this
style of writing that the sources of reference are not mentioned,
and this is the case here. Al-Rlhänl's works on Arabia is a
useful source in Arabic on the 20th century. A1-Rlhänl, who
died in 1940, was a Lebanese traveller and an historian. During
his travels after the war in the Arabian Peninsula he met with
the chiefs and notables in the region in order to discover their
attitude and ideas about the events which happened during their
lives. Al-Rlhäni provides his own comment and analysis of the
events which happened but one does not expectAto carry weight
as he was a Lebanese-American, and the information he
gathered was mainly based on hearsay.
It is now necessary to briefly trace the historical setting
of imperial rivalry in South West Arabia. It was the Portuguese
incursions in the coast of South Arabia in the early 16th century
that triggered the setting of foreign rivalry in the area. The
Mamliiks and the Ottomans respectively appeared in the area in
response to the presence of the Portuguese in the Red Sea. It
was or%l
j. Napoleon's military campaign in Egypt in 1798 that
.
reinstigated European interest in the Middle East which gained
momentum throughout the 19th century. Strategic positions
along the Red Sea and the coastal area of South Arabia did not
{he
from this competition. As early as 1799ABritish attempted
escape
to establish their foothold in the area by occupying Perim Island
16
commanding the entrance to the Red Sea. But this was soon
abandoned apparently from the lack of water and food. Only
after Muhammad Àll Egypt

of successfully established himself
dick the
in South Arabia in 1830s, British return to the scene and take-
/I .
Aden in 1839. The atmosphere remained calm notably after
Muhammad 'Al! was forced to evacuate Yaman in July 1840 at
the pressure of European powers. The growth of steam
navigation in the 19th century and the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869, revived the importance of the Red Sea and its environs.
Though the British acquired Aden in 1839, and the
Ottomans returned to Yaman in 1840s, Anglo-Ottoman rivalry
in South West Arabia did not begin until after the return of the
Ottomans in San'd' in 1872. Before the re-establishment of the
Ottomans in the Yaman after 1872, the British had established
direct friendly relations with nine tribes in the Aden
hinterland. These were the Àbdall, the Fadli, the 'Aqrabl, the
Subayhi, the Hawshabi, the Àlawi, the Amlri, the Yäfiì and
the ÀwlagI. 1 The the Ottomans began the

conflict with when
Ottoman Government argued that the Ottoman Sultan's
sovereignty expanded over these tribes on account of the
Ottoman 2 The
former occupation of Yaman. British Government,
however, constantly asserted that these tribes were independent
the Ottomans. 3 Therefore, from 1872 frequent

of onwards
disputes occurred with regard to these tribes, and consequently,
1 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties. Engagement and Sanads

Relating India
to and the Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIII, Calcutta,
1909, p. 100. Thereafter is referredZ`? Collection of Treaties.
2 The Ottomans previously occupied the greater Yaman including Aden
between 1538 to 1630s. cf. John Baldry, "al-Yaman and the Turkish
Occupation 1849-1914", Arabica, 23, p. 156.
3 Minto Papers, MS 12592 (National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh).
17
were.
the British moved to assert that these tribes sunder their
protection. This proposal, which was first made in 1873 by the
Government of India, however, was not sanctioned. But after
the Ottomans moved to support a rival chief against the Àbdall
Sultan at Lahej, and further after their occupation of Jalilah in
the Amir! territory, that the India Office in the autumn of
1885 began to discuss proposals, first, to conclude Protectorate
treaties with the four nearest tribes to Aden (the Àbdall, the
Fadli, the Àgrabi and the Subayhi); second, to conclude
agreements with the Hawshabi, the Àlawl and the Lower Yäfiì,
binding them not to sell their territories or accept the
domination of any other Power; third, to leave the Upper YäfiÌ
and Àwlagi independent; and last to stop opposing the Ottomans
in the Amiri territory. 1 These proposals were not carried out
immediately. It was only in 1890 that Protectorate Treaties were
ratified with the coastal tribes, namely the Fadli, the 'Aqrabl
the Lower Àwlagi, the Quàyti and certain sections of the
Subayhis. 2 For the tribes further inland notably the Ydfiìs, the
Hawshabls and the Àlawis, the Protectorate treaties were
concluded with them only after a completion of a survey of the
country which was made in 1891-92.3
Hitherto the Ottomans were not prepared to accept British
frontiers in accordance with the protectorate treaties with the
tribes. The competition for more territories continued and in
1900, Ibn Näsir Muqbil, an Ottoman gä'immaqäm, occupied a
1 Minto Papers, MS 12592.

2 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, pp. 106-131.
3 Ibid., pp. 141-160.
18
fort in the Hawshabi country. This was followed by another
J4i
conflict on the frontier of the Amiri country ' whichýBritish
considered it to be British territory, prompted the Government,
of India to suggest a joint demarcation. An Anglo-Turkish
Commission was set up and a boundary demarcation was
carried out between 1903 and 1905 which officially ended
imperial disputes over the boundary between Britain and the
Ottoman Government in South West Arabia, though the Protocol
was not ratified until 1914.
The history of Anglo-Ottoman rivalry in South West
Arabia came to a halt following the boundary settlement coupled
with the British new policy of non-intervention in South West
Arabia in 1906 moved by the new Liberal Government in Britain,
and the termination of the Ottoman's traditional claims over the
Yaman at the treaty of Da`än in 1911. The cordial Anglo-Ottoman
relations in South West Arabia came to an end when the war
broke out and a new phase of Anglo-Ottoman rivalries came into
being.
Now, it is necessary to take a look at the locality where
this imperia l rivalry t ook place. The definition of the
geographical area of the Yaman ha d long been a subject of
controversy. The ancient Greek and Roman geographersl had
identified the Yaman as a region in the south of Arabia. The
1 They divided Arabia into three provinces: Arabia Felix which includes
Yemen, Arabia Petrea which includes HijAz, and Arabia Deserta the land
extending north-west from Arabia Felix to as far as the Euphrates. cf.
R. L. Playfair (Cpt. ), A History of Arabia Felix or Yemen Bombay, 1859,
,
p. 3. Thereafter is referrer( /Arabia Felix.
4o ag
19
Arabs, too, traditionally recognised an area in the south of
Arabia or south of Hijäz as Yaman just as they identified Syria
as an area north of Hijdz. This is envisaged in the definition
reported by al-Wäsiì, when he stated that the earlier definition
of the Yaman was the whole southern part of the Arabian
Peninsula as bounded in the north by Najd and Hijdz, in the
south by the Arabian Sea, in the west by the Gulf of Qulzum
(the Red Sea), in the by the Persian Gulf. l This

and east
definition included not only the present Yaman but also Oman.
Al-Wdsiì also quoted another definition, probably used during
his lifetime, according to which the Yaman was bounded in
the north by Hijäz, in the south by the Gulf of Aden, in the
west by the desert (the Empty Quarter), and in the east by Bab
the Red Sea. 2 This definition also includes Aden

al-Mandib and
and the Protectorate but not Oman.
The geographical definition of the Yaman was
considerably narrowed as the ancient kingdom of the Yaman
began to diminish before the advent of Islam. Thereafter, some
Arab geographers eliminated Oman as part of the Yaman. When
the Yaman accepted Islam it was treated as a separate province
under a will (Governor) and this practice continued up to
the end of the Abbasid government of the region. The area of
the country further diminished after the break from the
Abbasids which soon opened the door for perennial struggles
between the Zaydls in the Upper Yaman highlands and the
1 A1-WdsiÌ, TarIkh al-Yaman, p. 8; The Encyclopaedia of Islam, First

Edition, s. v. "al-Yaman", vol. VIII. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1987, p. 1155.
,
2 A1-WasiÌ, Thrikh al-Yaman. p. 8.
20
Shdfi`ls and Ismä'ilis in the Lower Yaman and the Tihämah.
The period from the beginning of the 11th century, however,
saw the whole area of the Yaman once again united under the
banner of the Ayyubids and this situation continued under the,
successive kingdoms of Rasulids and Tahirids. In the 16th and
17th centuries the country was to some extent united under the
Ottomans. The Upper Yaman highlands such as Sa'dah,
Shahärah and IIajjah were, however, under the influence of
the Zaydi Imäms who extended their territory, after defeating
the Ottomans in the middle of the 17th century, to include the
whole country from Àsir to Hadramawt.
The presence of the British -and the Ottomans in the
Yaman in the 19th century considerably reshaped the political
boundaries of the country. The Ottomans and the British were
gradually drawn into competition as they enlisted the
neighbouring tribes into their camps. The Yaman was soon
divided into two spheres of influence: the Ottoman Yaman and
the British Protectorate. The competition ended when the British
and the Ottomans agreed to delimit their boundaries in the
Yaman. The term 'Yaman' in this thesis will refer only to the
'Ottoman Yaman' which included Àsir, while those areas under
the British influence will be referred to as the 'Aden
Protectorate'.
The Yaman is physically divided into two distinct
the Tihämah, l the low tract the Red Sea,

regions: coastal along
1 The term Tihämah was originally applied to the coastal land which
began south of Jiddah and extended to the YamanI coast. cf. Francine
Stone (ed. ), Studies on the Tiharnah. ' th report of the Tihatnah
Expedition 1982 and related papers, England, 1985, p. 1. Thereafter 15
ref, rm4 Studies on the Tihamah.
, ýO QS
?1
En
0
ri
firl
C)
Tibu, `C=ýý ý YI
coo "ý U
O
W
I
. -r
O
n
4
to
O
O
I/ 1 L`,> L`% ý/
O mo
W
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rQ
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td rD
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ýT
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22
and the mountainous region of the interior. The Tihämah is a
level plain, slightly raised inland. It stretches about 240 miles
from Maydiin the north of the Yaman to Bdb al-Mandib in the
south and varies greatly in width, from 20 to 80 miles. The
land is sandy and arid but has few perennial springs and is
watered in some places by mountain torrents which enable the
population to produce vegetables and cereals. Rain is infrequent
in the Tihämah, usually only a few gentle showers, yielding an
estimated 110mm per year, but the heavy dews are usually
sufficient to refresh the parched soil and prevent an absolute
famine. 1 The is for its

mountainous region well-known
fertility and the regularity of its rainfall which forms a
striking contrast not only to the Tihämah but also to the rest of
the Arabian Peninsula.
The fertility of the soil of the Yaman plateau and the
regularity of rainfall has enabled the country to produce
considerable agricultural wealth. Products include those for local
use such as fruits, vegetables and cereals, and those for export,
including cash crops, namely coffee and qät, a small shrub of
which the tender leaves and twigs are chewed for mental
alertness, wakefulness and a pleasant stimulation of the
2 Coffee has been the important for the

" senses. most cash crop
Yaman for centuries. It was always the mainstay of Yamani
exports, a position later taken over by hides and skins in the
early 20th century. France was the premier customer for
Yamani followed by the United States Great Britain. 3

coffee, and
1 Admiralty War Staff, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 144; Playfair,

Arabia Felix 1-2; F. Stone (ed. ), Studies on the Tihamah. p. 4.
, pp.
2 Playfair, Arabia Felix_, p. 2; W. M. Wenner, Modern Yemen- 1918-
i..2., Baltimore, 1967, p. 25. Thereafter is refer[ýd/lodern Yemen.
.
3 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, Vol. I, p. 158.
23
Next to coffee is qdt which was marketed locally or in
neighbouring places such as Aden, the Protectorate, Eritrea and
Ethiopia. 1 Other from

crops are also produced a variety of
vegetables and fruits to cereals such as millet, barley, wheat
and corn. Owing to the fertility of her soil, Yaman is capable of
producing sufficient food. However in the early 20th century,
mainly due to lack of security and co-operation as a result of
political unrest, the country was compelled to import more
than L100,000 2 The

worth of foodstuffs, even in years of plenty.
Yamanis generally made their living from the soil through
farming, plantations or animals, but for those in the Tihdmah,
the sea also supplied their living as fishermen, as markets and
local industries did for those in the towns as traders and
craftsmen.
There are various estimates of the population of the
Yaman, excluding 'Asir, in the early 20th century. These vary
from one to two million of which the British figure of one
is 3 A1-Rihänl's
million probably nearest. estimate of two and a
half in the 1920's is likely the truth. 4 But

million most al-
WdsiÌ's estimate of five million before the second half of the
20th century was apparently an exaggeration as there were
only a little over five million at the first national census made
in 1975. The great majority were Yamani Muslims. It was
estimated in the early 20th century that there were 60,000 to
90,000 Jews, some 1,000 British Indians, and some hundreds of
1 Wenner, Modern Yemen, p. 25-6.

2 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, Vol. I, pp. 156-7.
3 Ibid., p. 148.
4 A1-Rihani, Muluk al-'Arab vol. I, p. 70.
,
24
Greeks. The Muslims were mainly Zaydis who inhabited the
upper mountainous Yaman, Shäfi`Ys who occupied the lower
mountainous region and the Tihämah, and a few Ismä'Ills in
Jabal Haräz. 1
In the Yaman sectarian differences are marked less by
the dissimilarity of their teachings, than by the geographical
regions that differentiate them. Religious diversity permitted co-
operation on political issues, such as the co-operation in fighting
the Ottomans. 2 Although the Zaydis technically Shl'Is, they

are
are closer to the Sunnis than any other ShIì sects, and they are
often referred to, particularly by the Sunnis of south Arabia, as
"al-madhhab al-khämis", the fifth school of Islamic Law,
because Zaydi fiqh (jurisprudence) is the most proximate ShiÌ
fiqh to Sunni fiqh. It is not uncommon for Sunnis and Zaydis to
intermarry in 3
and mix one mosque.
Sectarian difference was seen. as a general element in
shaping the social and political atmosphere, but this factor was
further outweighed by the tribal system which had
traditionally been a dominant factor in the life of the Yamanis.
1 The Encyclopapdia of Islam, First Edition, s. v. "al-Yaman", p. 1115;

Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 157; Fuad Sarrüf, (ed. )
Mq ataf, vol. 91, (June-Dec. 1937), Cairo, p. 460.
2 Ahmad Fakhrl, al-Yaman: mAdtha wa hadiruhä, Cairo, 1957, pp. 156-
7; al-RIhänt, Mulük al-'Arab, vol. I, p. 126; Abäzah, al-Hukm ai. -
'tlthr, mani fT al-Yaman: 1872-1918 Cairo, 1975, p. 21.
3 Isam Ghanern, Yemen: Political History. Social Structure and gal
System, London, 1981, p. 15; Wenner, Modern Yemen, p. 36; Jacob,
Kings of Arabia, p. 101; R/20/A/1102, Jacob's memorandum 22.1.07;
Muhammad Àbdu'Llih Mddi, Dawlat al-Yaman al-Zaydlyah. nash'atuha
ttwwuruha àlaaatuha, Cairo, 1950, p. 22 (Thereafter 13 refereed +o a5
Dawlat al-Yaman); G. W. Bury, Arabia Infelix, London, 1915, p. 33.
25
The Zaydis had been rulers of the Yaman for many centuries,
but their power was drawn from the support of the tribes,
especially the Zaydl tribesmen namely Hdshid and Bakll and Dhü
Muhammad and Dhti Husayn. The ZaydI tribesmen constituted
four-fifths of the total number of tribes in the Yaman which in
turn constituted over half of the population. There are no
reliable statistics during the early 20th century on Zaydls and
ShdfiÌs in the Yaman. Arabic sources give two-thirds for
ZaydIs and one-third for ShdfiÌs and this estimate seems to
been by the British 1

have accepted officials at Aden.
1 R/20/A/1268, The Resident, Major Gen. H. M. Mason reported the above

figure to the Government of Bombay on 28/1/1906.
26
Y
1
N
ý oý ý' N
c !' T " c
>r-ý Ei
ý' t
ýN "--3 t'i
cn ° °
Pi Z. Qý
0
" cý
!9 _ _
N
c "F cý
cr.
N
FýN
OO
'-r
'T
.
cD
ýý
c
Cp
6ý1
15
27
Meanwhile the area inhabited by tribes under British
protection and influence within the political jurisdiction of the
Resident at Aden was approximately 18,000 square miles. Its
coastlines extended from Shaykh SaÌd opposite Perim to the
borders of Muscat. Near Aden it extended to a distance of 100
miles inland from the sea, but further to the east the protected
tribes (with the exception of Shilir and Mukalld) the Resident
had no influence beyond 15 to 30 miles inland. 1
The chief physical features of the Aden Protectorate,
identical to the Yaman, is the great range of mountains
extending from the west to east nearly parallel to the coast
line. The place where this range is further from the sea is
north/Aden and there its nearest peaks are about 30 miles
from the coast. In the Aden Protectorate, wddis (valleys which
often form oases) too are its main features. Of the tribes, the
Àbdalis, the Hawshabis, part of the Fadlis and the Subayhis,
lived in the oases and in the plain or low hilly region below the
mountains. The remaining tribes were all located in the narrow
valleys or high plateaus among the mountains. The fertility and
the amount of vegetation is far greater in the north than it is
near the coast and generally speaking the further north into
the Yaman the greater is the rainfall and the fertility. The
climate is tropical but rainfall is irregular and scanty, with the
average ranging from only 50mm in the coastal area to about
400mm in the highlands. The coastal area is hot and humid but
inland in the mountainous region the weather tends to be mild.
1 R/20/A/4881, Note on the Tribes of the Aden Hinterland by Captain

Warneford (First Political Officer at Dali'), 1/4/1903.
28
The Aden Protectorate is far removed from being what it is
to bt
often considered ýa barren waste of rocks and sand.
The ordinary means of water supply were springs and
wells. There are A-wp running rivers, the Band and the Tuban,
150 and 100 miles in length respectively and whose sources are in
the Yaman. Neither the Band nor the Tuban ordinarily reach
used
the sea, as their water isAto irrigate the great cultivated oases
of Abyan and Lahej in the plain country near Aden. 2
The chief grain crops of the Aden Protectorate both in the
plains and on the mountains were jowari and bajri, and these
provided food for both for people cattle. 3 The

and products of
the country were marketed locally at Aden, from main cereals
such as durra (dhurah) or dukhn to fruit and vegetables. Coffee
which was grown in the western part of the mountains of Ydfi`
and in the territory of Radfdn was marketed mainly for local
consumption, particularly in the eastern part of the
Protectorate. 4
The population of the Aden Protectorate was estimated at
the beginning the 20th half 5

of century at about a million.
Though mainly Shäfiìs, they were divided into distinctly
individual tribes. Owing to the absence of any central power
comparable to that of the Imdm in the Yaman, each tribe in
1 R/20/A/4881, Note by Captain Warneford, 1/4/1903; A. Ahmad Àll,

"Problems of Development planning in the PDRY in Economy, Society and
Culture in Contemporary Yemen", in B. R. Pridham, (ed. ), Contem oprare
Yemen: Politics and Historical Background, London 1984, p. 12.
2 R/20/A/4881, Note on the Tribes of the Aden Hinterland by Captain
Warneford, 1/4/1903.
3 Ibid.
4 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 187; Naval Intelligence
Division, Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 492.
5 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 183.
29
the Aden Protectorate had its independent territory, jurisdiction
wa3
and tribal leader. The Resident's jurisdiction and authorityLover
only the Aden Settlement, though the Protectorate was politically
under British influence. The Aden Protectorate tribes exercised
their own system nominating their chiefs who appeared under
various names (partly due to the different practice of each
tribe) such as Shaykhs, Amirs or Sultans. In most cases these
chiefs were selected by the tribesmen from among the sons,

1
nephews, others near relations, of the previous ruler.
Politically the power of these chiefs varied according to the
tribe concerned and the strength or weakness of their own
personality. In the states along the coast where the population
was of mixed origin and included a large number of descendants
of black slaves and other persons of poor tribal states, the chiefs
had absolute power and could do what they wanted. But further
inland in the mountain districts where every tribesmen claimed
to be a true Arab lord of his own territory and as good as his
neighbour, the situation was very different. There, especially in
Ydfiì, the form of government may be most accurately
described as a collection of semi-independent communes, bonded
together by a common origin for a common defence. The
tribesmen usually possessed a nominal head, a Sultan or
Shaykh, but the latter could do little except by the consent of
the tribesmen, while the tribesmen could to a great extent do
what they pleased, whether the Sultan or Shaykh gave his
consent or not. Socially all fighting men in the tribe were equal
I R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903.
30
and it therefore often resulted that no villagers or section of a
tribe felt bound by the decision tribe 1

of the as a whole.
Concerning the jurisdiction, both criminal and civil justice
were nominally administered according to the Shariàh. Usually
the criminal powers were in the hands of the ruler of the
state, while civil disputes were either decided by a Qädl or
by 2
arbitrated upon a Sayyid called in by the disputing parties.
The tribesmen had very little education. To many of
them the whole world was contained in their own narrow
valley or mountain top and they had little idea of the extent or
power of any other people than the Arabs in general and their
own tribe in particular. Though there was usually a fagih, or
religious leader, in each of the larger villages or chief towns,
few of the people could read and still fewer write. The latter
art was usually confined to the Sultdns, Shaykhs, and other
higher 3
men of standing.
It may be observed that in nearly all districts were
villages of Sayyids or Ashrdfs, descendants of the Prophet who
lived in separate quarters among tribes and were not part of,
or dependent on, any tribe. They occupied a high social position
in the local Arab community and occasionally wielded much
political influence. They were especially called upon to settle
tribal disputes or arrange a truce or peace. The Sayyid being
ordinarily immune from tribal hostilities they were much used
as emissaries and negotiators. They had their own dependents
and followers among the ordinary Arabs, who assisted in tilling
1 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
31
their lands, or herding their cattle, and who were also
ordinarily exempt from tribal hostilities. The Sayyids, though,
usually large property owners, they received contributions from
the public. Sayyids intermarried with ordinary Arabs to the
extent that a Sayyid could marry the daughter of an ordinary
Arab but an ordinary Arab found it difficult to marry the
1
daughter of a Sayyid.
In nearly all districts and generally in the central villages-
of tribes there were communities of Jews who were generally
concentrated at one place in each tribes territory or district
under the special protection of the Sultan or Shaykh of the tribe
concerned. They manufactured practically all the cloth and
carpets used by the Arabs. They also were the silversmiths of
the country and made knives, swords, and women's
ornaments. They were, however, not allowed to carry arms
nor to own land nor to build towers nor to live in any but
2
their own quarters of the villages.
The tribes in the coastal districts and in the low country
north of Aden usually inhabited mud huts of poor construction.
The nomads lived by their flocks of camels, sheep, and goats
and built temporary huts of straw and branches at each
halting-place. The tribes in the mountains possessed strongly
constructed stone towers, effective for defence, two or three
storeys high and with three or four small rooms with loopholes
on each storey. On the ground floor was a place where cattle
be that family Es were

could put so each and t possessions all

2 Ibid.
32
safely housed within four walls. Occasionally in towers
belonging to Shaykhs or other persons of importance an
arrangement was made for storing rain water within the
tower. 1
Due to the different features of the country and the people
of each tribe in the Aden Protectorate, a brief description of each
individual tribe is relevant for the thesis.
The Àbdali
The Àbdall country, usually known as Lahej (Lahj), was
bounded in the north by the Hawshabi country, in the west by
the Subayhl tribe, in the south by the 'Aqrabl tribe and the
British territory, and in the east by the Fa41I country. Al-
Hawtah was the capital where the 'Abdall Sultan (or the Sultan
Lahej) his family 2 Situated the trade

of and resided, on route
between Aden and the Yaman, Lahej emerged as one of the most
important centres in the region. Furthermore, Lahej is an oasis
of fertile land bounded by the desert wastes on both east and
west. The fertility of Lahej is due to the waters of the river
Tuban through irrigation or flooding during the rainy season.
The. principal crops were red and white jowari, sesame,
vegetables palms and cotton. Most of the products were taken
to the markets at Aden. Fruits were also grown of which two
or three gardens belonged to the Sultan. Lahej contained a mixed

2 F. M. Hunter, An Account of the British Settlements of Aden in Arabia,
London, 1877, p. 155. Thereafter it refers as British Settlement of Aden.
33
population of Arabs, Somalis, Swahilis and Jews. The population
only
of the Àbdalls in 1903 was about 18,000 of which A2,2,000 were
the fighting ' This

men. estimate perhaps can explain,
.
why the Àbdalis were known as the most civilised and least
tribes in South West Arabia. 2

warlike of all
At the beginning of the 18th century, when the power of
the Imams began to decline, the Àbdalls who were formerly
governors of the Imams in the area declared their independence
and captured Aden with the assistance of the Ydfiìs, and held
it until it was taken by the British in 1839.3 In 1915 Àbd al-
Karim b. Fadl b. 'Al! was the Àbdali Sultan. He was a man in his
early 30s and was also very popular with his tribe. He
succeeded his cousin, Sultan Sir 'Al! b. Al; imad b. 'Al! on July
,
13,1915, when the latter died in Aden after be i n9 accidentally
shot by the Indian Infantry during the Ottoman occupation of
Lahej. 4
The Fa¢lI
The Fadli country was bounded in the north by the
HawshabI in the south by the Arabian sea 100 miles in

country,
length, in the west by the Àbdall country and the British
territory, and in the east by the Lower Àwlagi. The Fadli

? he
country was situated 4o the north-east and east of Aden. port of
1
I R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903; Admiralty, A Handbook of

Arabia, Vol. I, p. 510.
2 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, p. 43.
3 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903; Muhammad Anls, al-Dawlat
al-Ùthmnnlyah wa al-sham al-Àrabi 1514-1914
,
Cairo, 1963, p. 225.
4 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, Vol. I, p. 509; L/MIL/17/5/3961, War
Diary, 7/7/1915.
34
Shuqrah was the capital, situated between Aden (70 miles from
Shuqrah) and Mukallä. A considerable amount of coffee was
exported from this port. The country was, furthermore, in a
favourable being the rendezvous

situation - of several caravan
routes from northern and eastern districts and to the transit
1 The land between

dues levied. country is a narrow piece of flat
the coast and the range of mountains running parallel to it.
The wider western part of this plain is called Abyan where
waters of the wädI Yararnis and the wadi Band come out from
among the mountains of YäfiÌ. The area was highly cultivated,
and produced a large quantity of corn and forage for Aden
markets. The country also produced red and white jowari,
sesame and wheat particularly on the highlands.
The total population in 1903 was 12,000 of which 2,000
fighting 2 The FadlIs of the most

were men. were one
powerful and warlike tribes near Aden. The Fad1Is were divided
it is
into various clans and, not surprising therefore that their
Sultän, Husayn b. Ahmad, an old man of nearly 90 years of age,
was unpopular with his tribes notably among the Mardkishah.
His past conduct also coloured his reputation. He was deported to
India in 1877 for nine years after his brother, Haydlyah, who
1 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903; Admiralty, A Handbook of

Arabia, Vol. I, p. 531; JAd Tähä, Siyash Baritaniyah fl janüb al- jazlrah
js 4o
al-'Arabivah, Cairo, 1969, p. 7. Thereafter rejtrred Os Siyasah
Baritaniyah
2 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903; F. M. Hunter, British
Settlement of Aden, p. 156; Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p.
531; Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, p. 52.
The Admiralty overstated when they estimated the Fadli fighting
.-
men at 8,000 when the population was only 12,000. But if one takes an
account from Aitchison which estimated the population at 24,000, the
fighting figure furnished by the Admiralty would no longer be an
overstatement.
35
was then Sultan, was murdered. Haydiyah was succeeded by
Sultan Husayn's son, Alzmad b. Husayn. The latter died in 1907,
and Husayn was accordingly proclaimed Sultan. 1
The Àgrabi
The 'Aqrabis, numbering about a thousand, inhabited a
small country consisting of a strip of barren sandy land west of
Shaykh 'Uthman near Aden. The area extended along the sea
coast from Bir Ahmad to Ras 'Imran. The country was bounded
in the north by the Àbdali country, in the west by the Burhaml
section of the Subayhis, and in the south and east by the Aden
Harbour and British territory. BIr Ahmad was the capital,
5 miles to the 2 The

situated west of Shaykh Ùthmdn. Àgrabis
were agricultural and pastoral. The main crops were jowari
and kirbi which were grown near BIr Ahmad. Some of the
Àgrabis also earned their living as fishermen. The total
population in 1903 was 1,000 most of whom resided at Bir
Ahmad. The 'Aqrabls were formerly part ( afkhädh) of the
Àbdali tribe. In 1770 they became independent of the Sultan of
Lahej. 3 Their Shaykh Fadl b. Àbdu'Lldh Bä

chief was
Haydarah, who succeeded his father in 1905. He was in the
early 30s, and was described as fairly intelligent. His uncle, Àll
Bä Haidarah, an old man of nearly 70, unsuccessfully pressed
his claim to the sheikhship in 1905, but later worked in
harmony the Àgrabi 4

with chief.

tea, vol. I, p. 512; Jaid Taha, Siva sat BarItn nIyah, p. 8.
Arabia, vol. I, p. 512; Jad Taha, Sly äsat Barita nIyah. p. 8.
36
The Hawshabi
The Hawshabi country was bounded in the north by the
tribes of the Radfan mountains, the Àlawi country, and the
Amiri tribes, in the west by the Ottoman Yaman, in the south
by the Makhdümi section of the SubayhIs, the Àbdall country,
and the Fadll country, and in the east by the Ydfiìs. Musaymir
the the Hawshabls. 1 Two the

was capital of main portions of
wtrQ
Hawshabi country: first the district of Harür and al-Raha, and
second the lower Tuban valley and its tributaries the wad!
Àkkän, and the wad! Wazardn, besides a large tract of pastoral
country to the north of the lower Tuban valley. Most of the
country is hilly with little cultivation except in the three river
valleys mentioned. The people owned much cattle, sheep, and
goats. The total population in 1903 was about 7,000 of which
2,000 were the fighting men. The Sultan was Àli b. Mani` whose
family was from a governor of the districts of Harür, under the
Imam, himself independent. 2

who revolted and made
The Àlawi
The country of the Àlawi was bounded in the north by
the Amir's districts of Hardaba and Dubiyat and the Azraql
tribe, in the east by the Radfän mountains inhabited by the
Qutaybi and Dambari tribes, in the south by the Fiawshab!
1 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903; Jad Taha, Siyasat

BarttEnivah, p. 10.
2 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903. Admiralty, A Handbook
of Arabia, vol. I, p. 512.
37
district called al-Raha, and in the west by the Hawshabl
country. Qash'ah was the capital but Sulayq was the most
important place about 55 miles north of Aden. 1 The

area was
approximately 60 square miles, and often called Suhayb as it
lays in the valley of wadi Suhayb. The crops chiefly cultivated
were red and white jowari, barley, and maize. The land had
little irrigation except from occasional torrents down the river
bed of the Suhayb. Total population in 1903 was about 1,200 of
which 300 were the fighting men. The Àlawl chief, Shaykh Àli
b. Näshir b. Shayf, was a descendent of a sub-governor of the
wadi Suhayb under the Imam. He was described as a middle-
aged man of no particular influence. He succeeded to the
chiefship in 1898.2
The Subayhi
The Subayhis inhabited a coastal area extending from Ras
Ìmrdn to Bab al-Mandib. Am Rija' was the capital. The
Subayhls were loose tribe and they were divided into a large
number of petty clans namely al-Dhubyäni, al-MakhdümI, al-
Mansürl, al-Rajd'I, al-Ruzayql, and al-Athwart. Due to this
division, the Subayhis did not have one common and paramount
chief but they occasionally considered the Àbdali Sultdn as their
3 The SubayhIs were estimated at 20,000. Of all

supreme chief.
1 R/20/A/4881, Notes by Warneford, 1/4/1903; Jad Taha, Siyäsat

BarItanIyah, p. 12.
Arabia, Vol. I, p. 513.
3 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, pp. 47-9; Jäd Tihä, Sivasat
BarItänivah. p. 7.
38
the tribes in the vicinity of Aden, the Subayhis were described
as most nearly to the typical Bedouin in character namely their
high reputation for courage, but were marked by their character
for treachery and love of plunder. 1
The Àwlagi
The country of the Àwlagi was bounded to the west by
the Fadll, to the east by the Quàyti country of the
Hadramawt, but the ports of 'Irqah and Upper Hawrah on its
coastal area were under independent shaykhs. The area,
approximately 1000 square miles was the largest country of the
tribes in South West Arabia. The 'Awlaqls were, however,
divided into Upper and Lower Àwlagl, and were under different
Sultdns. But they maintained close intertribal relations and
united in the event of any aggression from outside. The Upper
Àwlagi was again subdivided, ruled by a Sultdn and a Shaykh.
The Upper Àwlagi Sultdn was Sdlih b. Àbdu'Lläh, who resided
at Midaq a short distance from Nisäb as the capital of the

his
country. He was a man in450s, and had considerable influence
over his tribes. Muhsin b. Farld who resided at Yashbum was
the Upper Àwlagi Shaykh and was described nearly as
powerful as the Sultan. The Sultan of Lower 'Awlaqls was Bü
Bakr b. Näsir who resided at the capital, Ahwar (known by the
from 2
British as Hawrah), about five miles the coast.
1 Admiralty, A Handbook Of Arabia, vol. I, pp. 536-7; Aitchison, A

Collection of Treaties. pp. 47-9.
2 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, pp. 516-528; Aitchison, A
Collection of Treaties, p. 53; Jäd Täha, Siyasat Barltänlvah, pp. 8-10.
39
The Yäfiì
The Ydfiì country was bounded to the west by the
Amirl the Hawshabl, to the east by the Fadll. The Ydfiìs

and
were divided into Upper and Lower YäfiÌ and had a number of
clans. The Yäfiìs owed allegiance to no paramount Sultan but
shared between several powerful chiefs representing each clan.
The most four powerful clans of Upper Ydfi'l were the
Mawsatah (Shaykh Muhsin Àskar as chief), the Dhubl (Shaykh
Sälih b. 'Atif b. Jdbir as chief), the Maflahl Shaykh ('Abd al-
Rahmän b. Qäsim as chief), and the Shayb! (Sultan 'Al! Mauna
al-Sagladl as chief). Mahjabah was the capital of Upper Ydfi'l
where the Sultan, Ùmar Qahtdn resided. He succeeded his
father in 1913 but was opposed by his brother Shcih b. Ùmar.
The population of Upper Ydfi'l was estimated at 108,000 and
15,000 was their fighting men. The chief clans of Lower Ydfi'l
were the Kaladl, the Yaharl, the Sad! and the Yazidl. Qdrah (or
Qähirah) was the capital of Lower Ydfi`l where the Sultan
resided. Their population was estimated at 28,000 and 6,000 were
the fighting 1
men.
The Amiri
The AmIr! country was bounded to the south by the

-
candy
Àlawl the Hawshabi, to the by the YAfiì. Däli`
and east was
the capital, situated 360 miles from Aden. The Amiri were.
1 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia vol. 1, pp. 516-528; Aitchison, $

,
Collection of Treaties, p. 53; Jad Taha, Siyasat Barltanlyah, pp. 8-10.
40
estimated at 6,000 and 1,000 were their fighting men. The Amlri
was also a vague tribe consisting of numerous clans, namely the
Shä'iri, the Sha`bi the Halamin. 1 The the Amiri

and chief of
known as the Amir of Däli` was Amir Nasr b. Sayf. In the
Amiri country there were two principal and distinct divisions of
people: - tribesmen and subject. The Amir had authority only
over his subjects which comprised in part those who were
subdued by arms, and partly the kinsmen and descendants of
the Amirs of Däli` who had been represented for some 300 years
by one particular House. They were the only group who
regarded the Amlr as their liege and master; paid him tribute
and supplied his revenue; and fought for his cause. The other
group is that of tribesmen such as the Shä'iri, the Sha`bI and
the Halamin, who paid neither taxes, nor tribute; could not be
fettered or imprisoned; were either totally exempted from
paying customs duties, or paid these duties only in name, while
in some cases they even shared the duties proportionately with
the chief. Unlike the subjects who had to flock to his standards
when called, some of the tribesmen were bound to answer the
Amir's call, while others were under no compulsion to comply.
Some again were paid for their services, while others of still
more independent standing would come and lend assistance, if
disposed, but terms, 2

on equal receiving no payments.
----------------
1 Admiralty, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 213; JAd Täh&, Siyasat
BarltanIyah, p. 10.
2 R/20/E/289, Monograph by Jacob, 1907; Jad Taha, Siyasat BaritanlKah,
p. 12.
41
The Hadramawt
Politically the Hadramawt was considered to include
only the country of the Quàytl and the Kathiri Sultans
presumably due to the great influence of these two chiefs in the
1 The Kathiris inhabited the hinterland, the

country. north of
Hadramawt and engaged in agriculture, but those who migrated were,
mainly involved in trade. Previously from the end of the 15th
century the Kathiris were the ruler of the Hadramawt, but as a
result of continuous civil war, from 1840s they began to lose most
Lhetr ý4,Q ! he
of1territory including Shihr and Mukalld to4QuàytUS.
4seaportsof
Consequently the area, south of the Hadramawt, towards the
the Quàytis. 2
sea, was now under rule of the
Now, the core and central issue which remains to be

Iý
examined and analysed in this research is the Anglo-Ottoman
conflicts in South West Arabia before and during the First World
War and its relations to the history of the British, the Ottomans
and the Arabs in South West Arabia. Historically, the presence
of the British at Aden from 1,839 onwards and the reappearance
of the Ottomans at San'd' from 1872 drew South West Arabia
into competition. A new phase took place which transformed the
history of South West Arabia in particular, Arabia and the Arab
world in general. Although the French occupied Egypt in 1798,
the imperial conflict between the French and the Ottomans
ended as suddenly as it had started when the French evacuated
1 W. H. Ingrams, Aden Protectorate: A Report on the Social, Economic and

Political condition of the Hadramaut, London, 1937 (reps'. 1939), p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 28.
42
the country in 1801. However, the conflict between Britain and
France notably as a result of the French occupation of Egypt
opened a hundred years of imperial rivalry in the Middle East. 1
Anglo-Ottoman rivalries in South West Arabia, on the other
hand, appeared to continue, with a short break from 1906 to
1914, until the end of the First World War. This is-the scope of
this research. The effect of these imperial conflicts on South
West Arabia was considerable, but generally their imperial
relations remained intact. They resulted, particularly since
1880's, in the division of greater Yaman into the Ottoman Yaman
and the British Protectorate, strengthening further the existing
tribal pattern and practice. The Ottoman Yamanis and the Arabs
in the Aden Protectorate were further divided during the war
between the Ottomans, the British, the ZaydI Imam and the
other. Arab chiefs notably the Àbdall Sultan and Sayyid Idrisi
of Àsir. As a result of the imperial conflicts, the Ottomans and
the British had, even before the war, their own proteges who
accordingly emerged as new leaders after the war. With the
disappearance of the Ottomans in South West Arabia, the British
who then increasingly became dominant in the area seemed to
tighten their interest further by seeking a new formula for a
settlement between all the Arab chiefs in Arabia including those
of pro-Ottomans. They were Sharif Husayn, Ibn Sa`üd, Sayyid

khe
Idrisi, the Quàytl the Imam. On the failure of British initial
and
attempt to propagate their formula, struggles between these
1 P. M. Holt et. al, (eds. ) The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 1,

Cambridge 1970, p. 385.
,
43
leaders became a new phenomen in the aftermath of the war
khe
which contributed to the formation ofhmodern history of South
West Arabia in particular and Arabia in general.
The study of Anglo-Ottoman rivalry in South West Arabia
prior to and during the First World War undoubtedly focuses on
the imperial conflicts in the area. Therefore, it is not difficult to
gauge the scale of rivalry, especially during the war, but it is
not easy to measure the weight of rivalry, merely in order to
assume the degree of imperial commitments involved. On the
other hand, it would be unrealistic to assume that modern
history of South West Arabia was completely dominated by the
Anglo-Ottoman conflicts. However, it would be inappropriate to
deny the scale of these conflicts although they were not

kbe
continuous throughout the period. Therefore, /nature of the
imperial conflicts, 1heir scale and impact on the Arab world, the
imperial policy and commitments involved, as well as a state of
imperial unanimity existed between those years of hostilities
require impartial discussion.
44
Chapter One
The Ottomans in Yaman
1.1 Introduction
The presence of the Ottomans in the Yaman transformed
the history of the Yaman notably when the country was again
linked with other Arab lands and these were governed unitedly
under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. The period was
marked by the revolts of the Yamanis, the Zaydis and the
Shdfi`ls. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of
studies on the history of the Ottomans in the Yaman have
emphasised the theme of Ottoman-Yamani conflict. This chapter
attempts to examine the presence of the Ottomans in the Yaman
underlining the Ottoman imperial administration of the country
and their relations with the Yamanls.
The Ottomans first ruled Yaman from 1538 following their
conquest of Egypt from the Mamlüks in 1517. Yaman was
previously under the Mamlüks who occupied the country in
1515-16 as a response to the presence of the Portuguese in the
Red Sea and it was accordingly surrendered to the Ottomans.
The Ottomans, therefore, without much difficulty succeeded in
gaining control of the greater part of the Yaman and likewise
the Red Sea assuming responsibility for protecting the area from
further Portuguese incursions. 1 The country was then
administratively divided into 7 districts: - San'd', Mukha, ZabId,
Sahlah, Kawkabdn, Tawilah, Ma'rib Aden. 2 During this

and
1 Baldry, "al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914", Arabica,

vol. 25, p. 156; R. B. Serjeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian
Coast, Oxford, 1963, pp. 47-8.
2 Abazah, al- ukm al-Ùthmäni, p. 26.
45
period the Upper Yaman Highlands, the area north of San`ä'
including Sa'dah, Shahdrah and Hajjah, remained in the hands
Zaydi Imdms. 1 This the Zaydis to

of the circumstance enabled
form a potential threat to the Ottoman authorities and the
Zaydis proved to be capable of expelling the Ottomans from the
country in the 1630s during the time of Imam Qäsim and his
Imdm Muhammad. 2In 4he following the

son, years, greater
Yaman, from Àsir in the north to Hadramawt in the south,
remained under the Zayd! Imdms. But less than a century later
the Zaydi Imamate rapidly collapsed into disarray. Tihämah and
the Lower Yaman were declared independent under local
authorities; the south west under the Lahej Sultanate from
1728,3 Àsir and Tihdmah under Sharif Ahmad, A Imdm's
governor of Abü Àrish, from 1730.4 When Carsten Niebuhr
visited San'd' in 1763, he confirmed that the provinces of Aden,
Abü Àrish, Ta'izz and others were independent from the Zaydi
Imams.
At the end of the 18th century, the Wahhabiyah movement
appeared in Najd and the Wahhäbis succeeded in gaining control
over the greater part of Arabia, including Yaman after they
took Mukha in 1804, and they remained there until the arrival
of Muhammad Àli of Egypt in 1819. In 1837 the whole Tihdmah
came under the control of Muhammad Àli including Hudaydah,
Zabid, Mukha Shaykh Sa'Id. 5 The British, fearing

and partly
1 'Abdu'Llah Mad! Dawlat al-Yaman al-Zaydlyah, p. 15.

,
2 Baldry, "al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914",
Arabica, vol. 23, p. 158.
3 Muhammad Anls, al-Dawlah al-'Uthmanivah wa al-sharg al-'ArabI. _
1514-1914, pp. 225-61.
4 Baldry, "The History of Tihamah", in F. Stone, (ed. ), Studies of the
Tihamah, p. 46.
5 Ibid.
46
that Muhammad Àll who was a great admirer of the French,
might extend his influence to seize Aden on his own or in
conjunction with the French and therefore pose a serious threat
to India, took Aden in January 1839.1 The British, now
apprehensive about the safety of their newly acquired
possession of Aden, secured the co-operation of several European
powers, Russia, Austria and Italy, who jointly pressured
Muhammad Àli to evacuate his forces from Arabia and in April
1840 Yaman was evacuated. 2
The withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yaman paved the
way for the Ottomans to return to the country. In 1849 the
Ottomans decided to occupy Yaman as part of their claimed
sovereignty on the grounds of previous occupation. In April 1849
they took Hudaydah and other parts of the Tihdmah from Sharif
Husayn of Abü Àrlsh who succeeded Muhammad Àli at his
withdrawal from the Tihämah. 3 The Ottomans to the

proceeded
hinterland and entered Sand' on July 24,1849, at the invitation
of Imam al-Mutawakkil Muhammad bin Yahyä. 4 In the
situation of being a nominal Imam, one would suggest that the
Imam's action was presumably to look for a support to
strengthen his position as Imam. The Imam was invited to
1 Zaki Kour, "Why the British Took Aden", Middle East International
London, (February 1976), p. 28.
In 1840s the French themselves revived their interest in the Red Sea and
Indian Ocean where they had had great influence in the 18th century.
cf. Gordon Waterfield, Sultans of Aden, London, 1968, p. 137.
vol. 23, p. 161.
3 Muhammad Anis, al-Dawla6 al-'Uthmänivah, pp. 225-6; Arab Bureau,
Handbook of Yemen, p. 40; Baldry, "al-Yaman and the Turkish
Occupation", Arabica, vol. 23, p. 162.
4 Muhammad Anis, Al Dawlah al-'Uthm&niyah, pp. 225-6; Husayn
'Abdu'Llah al-'Amri, Mi'a 'am min tarikh al-Yaman al-hadith,
..
Damascus 1405 (1984), pp. 333-4.
,
47
conclude an agreement whereby he would consent to the
stationing of a small Ottoman garrison in San'd' but the
highlands would continue under his government. The Imdm
was to be considered a vassal of the Porte and the revenues
from the highlands were to be divided between the Imam and
the Ottomans. 1 The Imam, in to have been

return, was
provided with a monthly salary of 4,000 riyals. Soon a revolt
took place at the capital. The Imam was denounced as
treacherous by the rebels notably for his consent to the presence
of Ottoman forces in San`ä', and a new Imam was appointed,
Àll bin Muhammad Àbdu'Lldh, on July 26,1848. And on
August 18 of that year the Ottomans were expelled from the
forced to to the Tihdmah. 2 But the

capital, and retire
atmosphere in the highlands was far from quiet. Imam Àll
was soon rejected and the country was again divided among
rival Imams until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869,
which eventually encouraged the Ottomans, who retained their
foothold in the Tihämah, to secure their position in the greater
Yaman. Following an invitation from the notables of San`ä',
discontented by the alleged incompetence of the Imams, the
Ottomans were able to establish themselves in the central
highlands after 1872.3
I Naval Intelligence, Western Arabia and the Red Sea, pp. 272-273.
2 Muhammad Anis, Al-Dawlah al-'UthmnnIyah, pp. 225-6; Husayn
'Abdu'Llah al-'Amyl, Mi, a4 'Am min tArtkh al-Yaman al- dlth, pp.
334-41
3 Arab Bureau, Handbook of Yemen, p. 40.
48
1.2 The Ottoman administration of Yaman 1872-
1908
After the re-occupation of Yaman in 1872, the Ottoman
Provincial Reform Law of 1864 was extended to Arabia, including
Yaman, but apparently was not put fully into force until a later
date. Even by the end of 1876, when the new provincial system
was in operation all over the rest of the empire, the Arabian
Peninsula least in 1 At date

was at part still exempted. some
after 1872, Yaman was treated as a vilayet (province) and
divided into four sanjaks (districts): San'ä', Hudaydah, Àsir
and Ta'izz. These four sanjaks officially constituted the vilayet
of Yaman until April 28,1913 (19 Rabl` II, 1331) when another
provincial law was issued which excluded Àsir from the
Yaman. 2 It is likely Àsir from 1913

province of most that was
administered as an independent sanjak under the direct control
of the Porte like those of Jabal Lubnän, al-Quds (Jerusalem),
Diydr Banghäzl. 3 The trouble in the

al-Zar and continuing
sanjak of Àsir seems to have been the the

main cause of
change.
The four sanjaks of the vilayet of Yaman were
administered under mutasarrifs (governors of districts) who
1. Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, New

Jersey 1963, p. 158.
,
2 The Encyclopeadia of Islam, First Edition, s. v. "al-Yarnan", vol. VIII,
1987, p. 1155.
Al-Husrl was wrong to believe that no further amendments were made
to change the existing divisions when he referred to the Imperial report
of 1332 (AD 1904) to confirm these four sanjaks as constituting the
vilayet of Yaman. cf. SAti' al-HusrI, al-BilAd al-'Arablyah wa al-dawlat
al-'UthmAnlvah, Beirut, 1960, p. 241. Baldry, however, referring to the
British records claimed that the exclusion of 'Asir took place in 1909. cf.
J. Baldry, "al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914", Arabica,
vol. 23, p. 180.
3 Abazah, al-Hukm a1-'UthmAn1 fT al-Yarnan, p. 104.
490, L-
were responsible to the wä11 or Governor resident at San'ä'.
Each of the sanjaks was subdivided into gadä's headed by
gä'immaqäms and these gadä's were further subdivided into
the of mudirs. 1
nähiyahs under responsibility
The number of the gadä's differed in each sanjak but
they included the important towns. The sanjak of San`ä'
consisted of Jabal Haräz, Hajjah, Dhamär, Yarim, Radd' and
Àmrän. The sanjak of Iludaydah included the gadä's of Zabid,
Luhayyah, Zaydiyah, Raymah, Bayt al-Faqlh, Harür, Bdjil, and
Abü Àrish. The sanjak of Ta'izz consisted of Ibb, Hujariyah,
Mukha, Ùdayn and Qa'tabah and the sanjak of Àsir included,
Abhä, Rijäl Kunfidah. 2

among others, al-Mä' and
Although the Imams relapsed into subsidised obscurity, the
Ottomans did not effectively hold or administer the area north
of the highlands. Areas such as Khamir, Sa'dah, Shahärah and
Najrdn remained independent from the ottoman administration.
The Ottoman effort to hold the oases of the eastern plateau, such
Ma'rib, did in 3 Their

as not result any permanent occupation.
attempts to extend their rule southwards into the Aden
Hinterland towards Lahej, were, however, challenged by the
British at Aden. When the Ottomans sent troops to help the rival
brother of the Àbdall Sultdn, the British immediately reacted by
sending troops to protect the Lahej Sultän. British protection
was soon extended to include other tribes near Aden.
1 Arab Bureau, Handbook of Yemen, p. 48.

2 Jacob, Kings of Arabia, p. 68.
3 Arab Bureau, A Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 40.
50
As a vilayet, Yaman was militarily under the control of
the 7th Army Corps. The 7th Army was not, however, recruited
from YamanIs. The Yamanis were apparently exempt from
military conscription at the time the Ottoman Government
continued the practice of conscripting its Muslim subjects into
the Army Corps for a period of twenty years. The first six
years was active service, called Nizäm, the following eight
years were first (active) reserve as Redifs, and the remaining
six years as Mustahfazah or second reserve army. As regards
non-Muslim subjects, they were exempted but had to pay a
special tax, known as "a1-badl al-àskarl". However, in some
vilayets, Muslim subjects were also exempted, such as the
vilayets of Istanbul and Crete, the Red Sea Islands, Tripoli,
Hijäz, the Yaman itself. 1 In 1899, it was rumoured that

and
military conscription would also be extended to the Yaman
in an attempt to introduce a new administrative programme,

2 The Yamanis
but this was denied by the Minister of War. were
instead recruited for the Gendarmerie (Zaptieh or Hamideh)
service as army volunteers. This practice started following the
appointment of the new wall, Ismail Hagql Pasha, in 1878. They
were normally recruited from the tribesmen especially from the
highlands because of their endurance. A number of the people of
the Tihdmah too were recruited, as well as Sudanese, Somalis
and Ethiopians. Their functions were to convey administrative
orders to the people concerned, to assist the tax collectors, to act
1 AbAzah, al-Hukm a1-'UthmanI. p. 106.

2 R/20/A/1188, O'Conor to Foreign Office, 5/2/1900.
51
as intelligence agents, to keep order in the bazaars, to carry
messages and to escort travellers and convoys entitled to the
protection 1
of government.
The Gendarmerie had a strength of four battalions, with
headquarters at San`ä'. Of the two battalions for the capital,
one was on permanent duty and the other was kept in reserve;
the other two were sent to various places in the vilayet. Those
in San'd' were all recruited from the tribesmen of the
highlands. 2 In
addition there was also a battalion of mounted
gendarmerie, known as Sowari, with a strength of four
companies of which one was at Hudaydah, two were on

one
detached duty, and the remainingAwas at San'd'. The duty
of the Sowari was to escort officials of rank and the ottoman
mail. They were drawn from the Sudanese, Ethiopians and
Somalis. 3
The tax system was felt as a burden by the Yamanis and
led them to rebel against the ottomans. The

eventually
of the collecting of taxes was worsened by the

administration
corrupt practice of the officials. In the Qurayshi country, west
of Zabid, officials were in the habit of levying exorbitant octroi
dues on dates entering Zabid after the usual tithes had already
been the date The tribesmen refused to pay

paid at plantations.
further taxes and troops were accordingly sent to compel
4 Later, during the Imam's the Yamanis

payment. uprising,
1 Bury, Arabia Infelix, p. 167.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
and
4 FO 195/2174, "Report on the Yemen vilayet, administrative
to 31st August 1904",
economic, for the period extending from 1st April
by Richardson, British vice consulate at Hudaydah, 31/8/1904.
52
were forced to pay zakät and ùshr (tithes) and at the same
time they were subjected to other taxes such as octroi dues
levied by the Ottomans.

kkc
The Ottoman attempts to promote, efficiency of the
administration in the province of Yaman by extending the
Provincial Reform Law of 1864 into the vilayet after 1876 proved
unsuccessful. A decade after their return to the province the
Ottomans confronted persisting revolts of the Yamanls initially
in Àsir and the Tihdmah, followed by a revolt in 1891 in the
Yaman highlands led by Imam Muhammad. The principal
justification for this uprising was the alleged misconduct of
the officials in the vilayet coupled with their seeming violation
of Islamic practice that angered the rebels. The name of the
Sultan Àbd al-Hamid had, however, been spoken by the rebels,
including the Imam, with 1

affection.
The Sultan, who according to the Imam was misinformed
of the real situation in the Yaman, could not accept any
justification for revolt. Marshal Ahmad Faydi Pasha was
accordingly sent to the Yaman to subdue the revolt. Although
the Ottomans succeeded in bringing the revolt of 1891 under
control, they failed to secure the vilayet from further
disturbances. The malpractices of the Ottoman officials were
apparently the cause behind it, and this situation became worse
as one revolt followed another.
At the subsequent Imamic revolts notably that of 1905 the
Ottomans were not yet prepared to prefer any other measures
1 R/20/A/1256, Richardson's report, 6/6/1908.
53
than military to promote tranquillity in the country. The
reappointment of Marshal Faydi Pasha in May 1905 to replace
Marshal Riza Pasha 1 who had been in March

office only since
of that year, as the Commander of the 7th Army Corps in the
Yaman with orders to retake San'd' and restore order in the
Yaman indicated that the Ottoman Government would not accept
the loss of San'd' which had surrendered to Imam Yahyä in
April 1904. The continuation of the war not only led to the
collapse of a truce initiated by the Imäm but also indirectly
allowed the persistence of corrupt practices by the officials led
by Faydi Pasha himself. On July 31,1905 FaydI Pasha was
Acting to Tawfiq Bey, 2

appointed as wdli replace which gave
him authority over the civil as well as the military
3
administration.
Faydl Pasha came to Yaman first in 1873 as a Captain and
attained the rank of Major in 1887. He had commanded the force
that was dispatched to the Yaman in 1892 to relieve San`ä' and
retake other towns captured by Imam Muhammad. He then held
the post of wäli and Commander-in-Chief of the Yaman! force
1 General Riza Pasha, previously posted at Tripoli, was appointed

Commander of the Ottoman forces in the Yaman in March 1905 to
replace Tawflq Pasha who had only held the post since 1904. Tawfiq
Pasha was previously a divisional General of the 4th Army corps at
Diarbakir before he was posted in the Yaman. 'Abdu'Llah Pasha had
been the Commander-in-Chief in the Yaman before Tawflq Pasha since
1898. cf. FO 195/2178,4/5/1905; R/20/A/1188,20/7/1898.
2 Tawflq Bey (the w. 51I not to be confused with Tawflq Pasha the
Commander-in-Chief) was appointed as new wa1I to replace 'Abdu'LlAh
Pasha who had been in the post since the dismissal of Hilmi Pasha in
October 1902. He was formerly a palace secretary at Yildiz for several
years and had also occupied the posts of mutasarrif at Jerusalem and
wäli of Konieh respectively for a short period. Just before being sent to
Yaman, he became a member of the "Shurai Dowlat" (State Council) at
Constantinople. cf. FO 195/2174,31/8/1904.
3 FO 195/2198, Richardson's report, 1/8/1905.
54
for a period of seven years until he was relieved in 1898.1
During his tenancy as wäli and Commander of Yaman forces
from 1892 to 1898, Faydi Pasha had taken the opportunity to
accumulate wealth at the expense of the public revenue and it
was said that when he left Yaman he possessed nearly a million
pounds sterling. This practice continued after his return to
Yaman in 1905. Richardson said that it was an open secret in
San'd' that he had not abandoned his corrupt practices and he
had helped himself liberally to the large remittances from
Constantinople, with the same lavish hand that he dispensed
presents to the different Arab Shaykhs and tribesmen
surrendering to him during his successful action in retaking
San`ä' in August 1905.2
It is clear that during his second tenancy as wä11 and
military commander from 1905 to 1908, Faydl continued to
appropriate a substantial share of the vilayet's revenues and to
persist in corrupt practices. In this he was backed by the
mutasarrif of Hudaydah, Àbd al-Wahhdb Effendi. All posts of
gä'immaqäms and mudirs were sold to the highest bidder by
the w511 and the mu tasarrif of Hudaydah respectively and
these provincial officials were expected to remit separately part
of the taxes collected by them to their chiefs at San'd' and
Hudaydah. 3
1 FO 195/2198, Richardson's report, 4/5/1905. In June 1898, Faydi Pasha

left Yaman for Baghdad as Commander of the 6th Army corps. cf.
R/20/A/1188,20/7/1898.
3 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2286, Richardson's report, 6/6/1908.
55
In the Yaman as well as other vilayet., frequent changes
of officials were part of the practice of administration under the
Provincial Reform Law of 1864 in an attempt to improve
efficiency in the administration of the province. Unfortunately
in the Yaman some of the more capable and honest officials
were recommended apparently by the present wäli, Faydl Pasha
to be replaced with corrupt men. For example, Ìzzat Bey,
gä'immaqäm of Ùdayn, a capable officer was replaced by `1zzI
Fathi Effendi, a man of questionable character and antecedents.
Alias Bey, gä'immaqäm of Bäjil, an honest and diligent officer,
was dismissed for remitting the whole of taxes collected in his
Qagd,. into the treasury. Some corrupt officials, on the other
hand, remained in office, such as the mutasarrif of Hudaydah,
Àbd al-Wahhdb Effendi, who had proved to be one of the most
incompetent and corrupt officials ever appointed to the sanjak of
Hudaydah. He remained there for two years without initiating a

1
single reform pertaining to the welfare of the people.
The British Vice-Consul at Hudaydah, G. A. Richardson,
witnessed the prevailing condition of the Ottoman administration
in the Yaman. He stated in June 1908 that
the present regime has driven away the few capable

and honest officials the vilayet contained; internal
affairs are in such a muddle and the conduct of the
officials so glaringly unscrupulous, that one is given
the impression that the Porte sends out, with few
exceptions, exiles and criminals to carry out the
administrative works of this hapless province,
known Felix. 2
erringly as Arabia
1 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2286, Richardson's report, 6/6/1908

2 Ibid.
56
It is not true to conclude that efforts to improve the
administration in the Yaman were not made until the Young
Turks were in power. A number of Imperial Commissions had
already been sent to the Yaman to make recommendations
concerning this issue. An example of this is the special
commission of Reform in April 1905 by the Sultan. I As

sent
a result of the investigation carried out in the sanjak of
Hudaydah, Ibrahim Bey, to sarrif Hudaydah, 2

mu of was
dismissed on the recommendation of Marshal Shäkir Pasha, the
President of the Commission. Ibrahim Bey was quite unfit for
the post: not only was he illiterate, but he did not possess the
necessary administrative ability and tact. Furthermore, he was
3 Surprisingly,
a protege of the former wall, Àbdu'Lldh Pasha.
Mahmizd Nadim Bey a capable officer appointed as the adjoint of
the wälf, a post which was created at the end of 1904, was
replaced by a civil member of the Reform Commission, a protege
of Faydl Pasha. This change justifiably coincided with the
appointment of Faydl Pasha as wälI in the place of Tawfiq
Bey. 4 Likewise, Shäkir Pasha who was a most enlightened, just
and honourable officer, and perhaps the most able officer that
had yet been sent out to Yaman, left for Constantinople on
October 6,1905. It had been hoped that he would have remained

2 Ibrahim Bey, a Circassian, was one of 'Abdu'Llah Pasha's proteges. He
was formerly a brigand chief in the Caucasus mountains before he was
sent to Yaman. cf. FO 195/2174,31/8/1904.
3 FO 195/2198, Richardson's report, 31/1/1905 & 12/6/1905.
4 Mahmad Nadim was well known and greatly respected at Hudaydah
where he was the President of the Commercial Tribunal there for some
time and later at Jiddah in the same office. In 1894 he was nominated
gä'immaqäm of ZabId and then promoted to mutasarriflik of Tripoli. cf.
FO 195/2198,31/1/1905.
57
and been appointed wälf and Commander-in-Chief of the
1
vilayet.
In April 1907, another Imperial Commission was sent
to the Yaman with orders to further inquire into the grievances
of the people of the vilayet and also to arrange a truce with
the Imäm. 2 Consequently, in May 1907 forty Arabs, selected
by the Commission as representatives of the principal tribes in
the Yaman, sailed to Constantinople to place their grievances
personally before the Sultan and discuss the causes of the
troubles and suggestions for remedies. The Imperial Commission
also brought about some reforms in the vilayet. On the
recommendation of the Commission, än Imperial Irade ordered
the release of about one hundred political prisoners and rebels
who had been sentenced since 1905 for participation in the
revolt. This, however, led to great dissatisfaction among the
military officials who reacted by arresting three of the principal
leaders immediately their 3 In the

after release. administration,
the same Commission introduced reform by prohibiting the
further employment of six corrupt gä'immaqäms who had spent
many years in the vilayet accumulating wealth by squeezing
taxpayers. Among these were Muhammad Rauf of Tawllah, his
brother Ahmad Adib, the late gä'immaqäm of Radä', and Shcih
Zabld. 4 In August 1907 Finance

Bey, qd 'i mma qä m at a
Commission was sent by the Sultan under the presidency of
General Sabit Pasha to supervise the finances of the vilayet of

2 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2254, Richardson's report, 27/4/1907.
3 R/20/A/1256, Richardson's report, 30/5/1907.
4 Muhammad Rauf had already been imprisoned by Husayn HilmI Pasha
for some 10 years and was released in 1905 by FaydI Pasha and was
appointed gd'immaqlm at TawIlah. cf. R/20/A/1256,30/5/1907.
58
Yaman. The Commission proved impotent owing to the
obstruction of Faydi Pasha, the wäli and Commander-in-Chief
and the indifference of the Constantinople authorities. All
authority, in matters of finance, vested in the Commission by
virtue of an Imperial Irade, was taken away from General
Sabit Pasha by Faydi Pasha who instructed the General not to
incur any expenditure without express orders from San'd'.
Yawar Effendi, who replaced Sabit Pasha, was powerless to act
owing to the attitude assumed by the wäli, who reduced the
power of the Finance Commission to that of an anomalous and
meaningless body in the vilayet. 1
The move for improvement in the province of Yaman
continued after the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Richardson
believed that when the Constitution of 1876 was restored,
further reforms in the province would be introduced under the
new administration, and this is certainly the case here.
Negotiations with of the Imdm and the IdrIsI continued to
dominate the episode of the new Ottoman administration in the
Yaman (a development which will be further dealt with in the
following discussion).
----------------
1 R/20/A/1256, Richardson's report, 6/6/1908; FO 195/2236, June 1908.
59
1.3 Imamic-Ottoman Relations
Opposition to Ottoman rule in the Yaman began earlier in
other areas than in the Imam's stronghold of the highlands. At
Abhä in 1882, the Ottomans were cut off from the coast,
followed by 1 These
an attack on them at Luhayyah. oppositions,
however, were typical of tribal resentment which left no major
injurious effect on the Ottomans. Only in 1891, with the first of
a series of Imam's uprisings, did a real threat to the survival of
the Ottomans in the Yaman begin. The ostensible reason for
Imam Muhammad's rising against the Ottomans in the Yaman
was apparently religious. This was revealed in the Imam's
letter to the Mufti of Hama, Muhammad Effendi al-Hariri, in
replying to the latter's advice, given probably at the instigation
of the Sultan. He stated
But our object was in no wise worldly supremacy,

no ultimate bodily comfort and luxury... but we
have seen that the officials were not giving Allah His
due nor respecting His Laws, nor those of Prophets
of Allah, but they had rather set up to themselves
a religion that was offensive to the sight of Allah
and antagonistic to His Laws, committing every kind
of transgression, and leading to the participation
therein [of] all those of our people who came in
contact with them, violating Allah by the drinking
of wine, obscene relations with males, and every
kind of fornication; they have oppressed the weak,
insulted and degraded the noble, until posterity was
corrupted and the word of Jews and Christians
rose high and the Kurds and Ethiopians ruled the
people. They have discarded every regard for the
faithful, and lost every feeling of benevolence
and pity towards the Muslims. Therefore, seeing
that the will of Allah was unavoidable, we have
invoked His help, and putting our trust in Him, we
began earnestly the fight, acting thus in accordance
the command Allah the high. 2
with of most

vol. 23, p. 168.
2 R/20/A/1256, Imam to Muftl of Hama, 20/10/1905.
60
The religious issue adopted by the Zaydl Imams, notably
by Imam Muhammad and his successor, may have been
primarily inspired by Zayd! doctrine, which went back to Zayd
bin 'All bin Husayn who rebelled openly against the Umayyad
after the events of Karbala', declaring for the Book of God and
the Sunnah of His Prophet, the preservation of the Sunnah, and
the abolition of the bid'ah (innovation). Fundamentally,
therefore, the Zaydis and in particular their Imams were
strongly inspired to rise up against any unjust ruler. This
element, however, is not uncommon but was shared by other
groups among the Sunnis in the Yaman notably Sayyid Idrisl
who also fought the Ottomans for religious reasons apart from
personal and political interests.
The Zaydl Imams may also have felt 'that they could not
/more
tolerate an the loss of their position as temporal and
spiritual leaders of the Zaydis as a result of the actions of the
Ottomans. Since the occupation of San'd' in 1872, the temporal
role of the Imäms of the Zaydls was denied notably when the
power to appoint officials and judges was taken away from
them, and the Imdms were further restricted from ruling over
the tribesmen. They were also prevented from collecting zakat
eliminating, therefore, their religious claim and naturally
diminishing their influence as spiritual leaders. Instead the
Imdms and their family were paid a monthly salary of 3,000
1 The limiting Imams

riydls. of the authority of the to a position
1 Muhammad b. Ahmad 'Isä, al-'AgIlI, Min tarikh al-S ulaYmn nl aw

al-'Arabi fl al-tärIkh, vol. I, Riyadh 1958, p. 53.
,
61
similar to that of local religious leaders as opposed to their
intended ideal position as Zayd! Imams induced them to rise up
against the Ottomans in the name of religious duty as Imams.
In addition to the religious issue, the Imams made a
conventional claim to the territory of their ancestors in the
Yaman. This claim not only led them to oppose the Ottomans in
the Yaman, but also the IdrlsI in Àsir and the British proteges
of the Aden Protectorate which the Imams regarded as part of
their greater Yaman. Besides the issues of Zaydis doctrine and
their territorial claims, the malpractice of the Ottoman officials
in the Yaman give the final impetus to the uprising of the
Imams of the Yaman. However for a number of occasions, the
Imams were under pressure from their followers, notably the
Zayd! tribesmen, the principal Shaykhs and the Imam's
advisers either to lead an uprising against the Ottomans or to
decide matters concerning the future of the Zaydis in the
Yaman. Therefore the Imam must act in accordance to the
wishes of the community who selected him as Imam. Whereby
the slightest inclination on his part to depart from the mandate
specified by the community would be a signal for his fall and
disgrace, and leading towards the election of another Imam.
When Sayyid Yahyä, Imam Muhammad's son, was elected
as Imdm in June 1904, he continued in his father's footsteps in
opposing the administration of the country by the Ottoman
officials. Richardson, British vice-consul at Hudaydah, reported
that Sayyid Yahyd's accession to the Imamate was notified to
62
the and also his intention to continue hostilities. 1 During
wäli
his stay at San'd', Richardson found that it was an open secret
that the new Imäm would give the Ottomans considerable
trouble after the departure of Àbdu'Lldh Pasha, the former
wdll and Commander-in-Chief Preparations were also made to

.
organise a general revolt throughout the mountainous districts
of the Yaman, the home of the Zaydis. The main strength of the
Imäm was drawn from the Zaydl tribesmen. This time the
tribesmen were more willing to support the Imäm. They
badly through droughts famine in 1904 2 which

suffered and
directly affected their livelihood. They were also discontented
over taxation during these hard days, and this induced them to
support the Imäm as their new leader.
With the support of the tribesmen, Imäm Yahyd moved
towards San'd' and succeeded in subduing the Ottomans in April
1905. Accordingly, the Ottoman authorities were demanded to
sign the capitulation resulting in the surrender of the capital to
the Imam. All troops and Ottoman officials, including the wall
and Commander-in-Chief, were permitted to leave for
from the Imdm for their 3

Hudaydah, under a guarantee safety.
Richardson reported that besides the surrender of the city, the
capitulation also included the following:

2 In July 1904, Richardson described the appalling condition of the
country during his visit to San`ä' when he stated that "the severe hand
of famine has left a very lasting impression on the agricultural
population and the villages and towns present sad spectacles with their
swarms of hungry and starving men, women and children. The average
mortality from starvation at Menakha, in the district of Haraz is about
15 daily, but is much greater in the neighbouring villages. I am
informed that 2,000 deaths from the above cause occurred between Ibb
and Ta'iz during the past few months". of. FO 195/2174 28/7/1904.
3 FO 195/2174, Richardson's report, 20/: 2/1904.
63
1- The permanent withdrawal of the Ottomans from Hajjah.
2- The surrender of Tawilah, Hajjür, and, it was believed,
Manäkhah and Taìzz.
3- An armistice to be proclaimed for a period of one year.
The Imam made a further move by proposing to
administer the whole mountainous districts of the Yaman where
the Zaydi element was predominant, to pay in return an annual
tribute to the Sultan and to maintain at his own expense a
garrison of 5,000 Ottoman troops at San`ä'. It was also suggested
that the Sultan should receive a deputation from the Yaman for
the purpose of presenting their grievances against the misrule of
the Ottoman 2
officials.
Although it was unlikely that the Ottomans would accept
either the capitulation of San'd' or the Imam's proposals,
negotiations for peace with the Imam proceeded. On June 8,1905
Mahmüd Nadim was accordingly sent to San'd' to conduct
negotiations with the Imam for the purpose of reaching an
3 Mahmad Nadim did not, however, see

amicable understanding.
the Imam personally. He was met outside San'd' by a
representative of the Imam and was escorted to Rawdah, a
town about five miles north of San`ä', where the Imam resided
at that time. Written communications passed between them for
nearly a week. The Imam was personally in favour of a
peaceful settlement but he could not carry with him his
advisers and the principal Shaykhs. In his last proposal, the
1 FO 195/2198, Richardson to G. P. Devey, Jiddah, 16/5/1905.

2 Ibid.
3 FO 195/2198, Richardson to Devey, 12/6/1905.
64
Imam offered to return San'd' to the Sultan and to desist from
further rebellion on condition that the towns of Damar, Yarim,
Ijajjah, Tawilah, Kawkabdn and Àmrdn would be given to
him. 1
The Ottomans were not yet prepared to abandon these
areas to the Imäm, and orders were issued for a general
movement against the insurgents. On July 16,1905, Ahmad
FaydI Pasha, who was in charge for the relief of San'd', with
six battalions of Albanian troops had made a first advance in
the direction of San'd' and occupied a village called Bayt al-
Mahdl, 2 And
about six miles northwest of Manäkhah. on August
29,1905, only four months after the surrender of San'd', the
Ottomans in the 3
succeeded retaking capital.
In a letter to the Àbdall Sultan in July 1905, apparently to
raise sympathy or possibly to seek support for his action, the
Imam spoke about the violation of the truce by the Ottomans
We ousted them [the ottomans] from San'a. we

...
fixed a truce for one year during which there
should be no fighting and both parties should have
peace without any defiance or violation of the
terms. When they, however, reached the place to
which they had agreed to retire, they reverted to
their former deeds admixed with truth and
falsehood. They commenced to violate the terms they
have concluded and the undertakings they had
to, and to commit evil. 4
agreed
After his successful campaign in recapturing San'd' in
September 1905, a new Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal
Ahmad FaydI Pasha led an army of 10,000 in the middle of

2 FO 195/2198, Richardson to G. P. Devey, Jiddah 1/8/1905.
4 R/20/A/1268, Imam to 'Abdall, 16/7/1905.
65
November that year towards Shahärah, in an attempt to crush
the Imäm there, where the majority of cannon, rifles and
ammunition captured from San'd' had been kept. However, due
to the inaccessibility of Shahärah because of its mountainous
features, and the constant counter attacks from the Imäm,
Faydi Pasha decided to abandon the 1

campaign.
The renewal of the military operations of Faycii Pasha
against the Imäm both in retaking San'd' and in attempting to
capture Shahdrah, in defiance of the truce, undoubtedly affected
the attitude of the Imäm towards the Ottomans. The Imdm's
resentment towards them was conveyed to the Àbdali Sultdn.
In September 1906, the Imäm wrote to justify his action
claiming that the Ottoman officials were responsible for
renewing a state of war in the Yaman. The Imam, on the other
hand, spoke about the good treatment accorded by him to the
Ottoman officials during his successful campaign at San`ä'. He
stated:
When they reached their destination however, they

violated the terms concluded with us and had no
respect for the firm connection they had
undertaken. But this was not all for they stretched
their necks towards our country. They collected
their shattered forces and advanced with a large
army, the time of whose discomfiture was near at
hand. They advanced to near Shahara and re-
kindled the fire of war which God had extinguished.
What took place was unparalleled in the annals of
the past.... They retreated when they saw that
their concentrated forces would be annihilated.
When we gained power over the officials and
... (in them
regulars the army) we treated all of with
kindness for the sake of the Sultän of Islam. We
accepted peace from them in the best manner,
secured them safely and despatched them, their
families and their baggage with honour and respect.
I R/20/A/1256, Richardson's report on Yemen, 22/7/1906. In opposition to

this account Baldry quoted from al-Kibsi, "Imam and Yaman
Independence", (A. U. B. thesis) that Shaharah was retaken. cf. Baldry,
"al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914", p. 177.
66
We personally rose when we heard that something
approaching breach of faith was committed by some
Arabs (against the Ottomans) and we inflicted on the
offenders the condign punishment ordained by the
God. 1
glorious
After the failure of the Ottomans to annex Shaharah in
November 1905, a more determined diplomatic initiative was
undertaken perhaps to justify the existing military measures. A
number of negotiations followed which were initiated by the
Ottomans with the aim of coming to terms with the Imdms. In
July 1906, the Grand Sharif of Makkah deputed a commission,
consisting of Sharif Hamzah, gä'immaqäm of the former Grand
Sharif of Makkah, his son Sharif 'A'id and Àbd al-Rahmän
Ilyäs, one of the most distinguished ùlamd' of Madinah, to
Yaman to persuade Imdm Yahyd to come to an agreement and to
Muslim blood in the Islamic 2 The mission

save name of unity.
undertaken at the request of the Grand Sharif,

was apparently
but in reality it was executed at the express command of
the Sultan. In August the delegation arrived at Hudaydah with a
to the Imam to come to terms with the

message persuade
Ottoman Government and to abandon his hostilities towards
them. The Imam to have stating his wish

was reported replied
to hostilities the ottomans and his

not continue against
to to the bloodshed. But, the Imam

eagerness put an end all
n
said, he was not free to make the decision of his own
ar uably
to be guided by the wishes

free will in such matters as he had
him The Imam

of the community who had selected as Imam.
1 R/20/A/1268, Imam to Àbdall 16/9/1906.

,
2 FO 195/2224,8/9/1906; Baldry, op. cit., p. 177.
67
also declined the offer of a position in the Yaman under the
Ottoman Government with a residence at San'd' similar to that
held Makkah by the Grand Sharif. 1 The Imam, furthermore,

at
accused the administration of deliberately misinforming the
Sultan Islam in Yaman. 2 The Imam

of of the real situation the
insisted that the basis of any understanding with the Ottomans
should commence with the withdrawal of the troops to
Manäkhah, in accordance with the treaty signed at the
San'ä'. 3 The Imam to

capitulation of was apparently prepared
negotiate. In his counter request, the Imam made it clear that
he wanted to administer under the suzerainty of the Sultan, the
mountainous part of the Yaman that formerly belonged to his
ancestors, paying tribute to the Ottoman Government. A small
4
Ottoman garrison would also be allowed to stay at San`ä'.
After the failure of the religious appeal, in October 1906,
the Ottomans took another move by authorising a delegation
selected from officials in the Yaman to discuss with the Imdm a
permanent peace. The Imam agreed, presumably after failing to
secure a friendship treaty with the British by which he had
hoped to obtain a supply of arms either to protect his position or
initiate 5 He sent his representatives and a few of

a new revolt.
his principal followers to Raidah about thirty miles north of
San'd' to meet the Ottoman delegation, which consisted of
Mahmüd Pasha, second member of the Reform Commission,
N.
1 R/20/A/1256, Hussein 8/9/1906.
to Sir/, O'Conor,
2 Baldry, op. cit., p. 177.
3 R/20/A/1256, Richardson to Dr. Hussein, 6/11/1906.
4 R/20/A/1256, Richardson to Dr. Hussein, 6/11/1906; FO 195/2224,5/9/1906.
Cf. al-WasiÌ, Tarlkh al-Yaman, pp. 207-210.
68
Mahmüd Nadim Bey, the adjoint of the wäli, and Ahmad Bey,
one of the secretaries of the Yaman! vilayet. The main
objectives of the delegation were to persuade the Imam to cease
hostilities, to arrange for the rel ease of the Arab hostages held
by him and to return to the Government the military s tores
taken from San'd'. The result of the negotiations was kept
secret but it was not fruitful. 1
The failure of the local delegation of October 1906, led to a
deputation of an Imperial delegation. This was also apparently
as a result of pressure from the w511 Faydl Pasha who had
threatened to resign if his urgent requests for money and more
troops did not receive attention. This resulted in the Sultan
despatching an Imperial delegation from Constantinople in April
1907 with the aim of patching up matters with the Imam and
his followers. 2 The Commission, consisting of Muhammad As'ad
Effendi as president and two members, Generals HddI and Sabit
Pasha, arrived at Hudaydah on April 2. The Commission was
also accompanied by Col. Sayyid Muhammad Khubanl, a native
of San'd', who had been resident at Constantinople. Although the
Commission was given very wide powers to deal with the
Imam, it did not reach an agreement as the Imam repeatedly
demanded his autonomy in the Zaydl districts and the
evacuation of San'd' in accordance with the capitulation of
San'd' in April 1905 3 the Commission

and presumably was
not yet given authorization to discuss the matter. The
Commission left for Constantinople on May 29,1907.
1 R/20/A/1256, Richardson to Dr. Hussein, 6/11/1906.

2 Ibid.
3 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2254, Richardson to O'Conor, 27/4/1907.
69
The Ottomans were subsequently trying to bypass the
Imam, presumably to win over the Imäm's followers or to
divert their allegiance from him. At the instance of the
Commission, an Imperial Irade was promulgated on April 28,
1907 inviting the inhabitants to select their chiefs and
shaykhs in order to place their grievances personally before the
Sultan, to point out the causes and offer suggestions. Accordingly
about forty Arabs, selected by the Commission as
representatives of the principal tribes in the vilayet of Yaman,
for Constantinople. 1 This Yamanl delegation can not be

sailed
considered as representative of the opinions of the Imam,
although its Zaydi. element must have obtained the consent of
the Imam, to proceed to Constantinople. 2 San`ä' and other Qadä's
including Àmrän, Dhamär, Jiblah, Ta'izz, Harrdz, Abü Àrlsh,
Zabid and Hudaydah sent delegates, but there was no
representative from the Imam as he neither replied nor sent
his delegates. 3 The by the Imam,

own mission, as anticipated
was fruitless. But the return of the delegation had a calming
effect in the Yaman and the Zaydi force which had been
threatening San'd' and Mandkhah withdrew. 4
In September 1907, at the request of the Sultan, another
move was made by the Sharif of Makkah to attempt to subdue
the Imam. A delegation consisting of four muftis representing
the four madhhabs: Hanbal!, Hanafl, Mäliki and Shdfiì, who
resided at Makkah and four other ùlamd' from Makkah and
1 R/20/A/1256, Richardson to O'Conor, 30/5/1907.

2 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2254, Richardson to O'Conor, 9/8/1907.
3 R/20/A/1256, Richardson to O'Conor, 30/5/1907.
4 Baldry, op. cit., pp. 179-80.
70
one from Madinah was sent to the Yaman. Their duty was
to tour the vilayet, to advise the people to remain loyal to the
Caliph and to renounce their allegiance to the Imdm, who was
described an impostor and a rebel, whose acts were contrary to
the laws of the Prophet. 1 The delegation also addressed a letter
to the Imdm, warning him against his rebellious and defiant
behaviour towards the Ottoman Government during the past
years. They informed him that if he tendered his submission,
the Sultdn was prepared to grant him a monthly allowance and
accord him a status similar to that of the Sharif of Makkah.
They further requested him to release all the Arab hostages and
Turkish prisoners at Shahärah. They also earnestly advised
him to desist from his illegal attitude in demanding tithes from
the tribesmen in the mountainous districts, as they had already
to pay taxes to the Ottoman 2

such authorities.
The Imam in reply, stated that he was not a rebel, but on
the contrary that he was loyal to the Sultan. The local Turkish
officials, he added, owing to their abuse of authority and the
oppression of the poor agricultural classes, were responsible for
his action in waging war, and for the bloodshed that had
3 A second letter then to the Imam by the

resulted. was sent
deputation to remind him of the severe chastisement awaiting
him unless he submitted in good time and to rebuke him for
having described himself as Commander of the Faithful. When
they left the capital, no answer was received from the Imam
1 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2254, Richardson to O'Conor, 18/9/1907

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
71
and the outcome of the mission was likewise unsuccessful. 1 The
Imdm had for some time been inactive against the Ottomans
despite his rejection of both peace missions sent from
Constantinople to arrange a settlement with him. This inaction
was likely due to his engagement against his rival, Sayyid
Hasan al-QdsimI al-Dahyäni. 2
The restoration of the Constitution of 1876 in 1908 brought
new hope for the Yamanis. In November 1908, the Ottoman
Government sent two notable Yamanl Shaykhs, Shaykh
Muhammad Muzaykir and Sharif Àbdu'Lldh bin Hasan al-
Mutawakkil, 3 to Yaman, to the Imam. Their duty to

see was
persuade the Imäm to send his deputies to Constantinople to
present his claims before the Central Government with a view
to bringing about a permanent peace in the vilayet. Accordingly,
three notables of great influence with the Imäm and the
tribesmen, Sayyid Àbdu'Lläh Ibrahim, QädY Ìzzi al-Shargl and
Sayyid Muhammad al-Shämi, were selected by the Imam to go
to Constantinople. 4
1 R/20/A/1256 & FO 195/2254, Richardson to O'Conor, 18/9/1907

2 About three months prior to the death of Imam Muhammad he
was affected with a stroke of paralysis in one of his upper
extremities. According to the precepts of the Zaydi doctrine, the person
selected to fill the post of Imam should be sound in every limb.
Subsequently, a notable of Sa`dah, Sayyid Hasan al-Qaisimi al-Dahyani
claimed the Imamate, but had not sufficiently strong followers at the
.
time to back up his pretension. However, following the death of Imam
Muhammad in 1904 the Dahyanl had openly asserted his claim, and had
been able to hold his own in the Sa`dah district against Sayyid Yahya.
Al-Dahydnl had been supported to a certain extent by the Ottomans at
the instance of FaydI Pasha with a view to reducing the power of
Sayyid YahyL. During the greater part of 1908, the new Imam,
Sayyid Yahyd was in conflict with al-DahyanI. Cf. FO 195/2320,
Richardson to Lowther, 1/3/1909.
3 They had been in exile on the island of Rhodes for several years,
presumably due to their involvement during the previous uprising.
4 FO 195/2320, Richardson to Lowther, 1/3/1909.
72
The Imdm wrote to Aden (on March 20,1909) to inform
the British authorities that his delegation to the Sublime Porte
was "to disclose the facts of circumstances, to prevent the
shedding of blood which lasted so long as its duration of time
required, to put an end to fights and battles, to recover to our
possession all that possessed by our ancestor the family of
Imam, to aid and substantiate the magnified law of justice, to
forbid the evil and wrong and to establish the Shariah of our
Prophet. "1 In an interview at Aden, the Imdm's emissary,
Sayyid Muhammad bin Àll disclosed that the Imdm had made
,
a request to the Porte to be independent in his own country and
to be allowed to continue to occupy the territory which he had
taken from the Ottomans. The Porte, he anticipated, would not
to the Imdm's demand. 2 It later that

agree was obvious no
satisfactory understanding materialised as was expected by the
Imäm's emissary.
In December 1908 or most likely in March 1909, however,
a new move took place when the Council of Ministers in
Constantinople discussed the possibility of implementing further
reforms in the Yarnan. These included the replacement of
corrupt officials; the reorganisation of the police; prevention of
malpractice in the collection of taxes; an increase in the number
of schools and the detaching of the sanjak of ÀsIr from the
Yaman vilayet. These proposals were not immediately put into
effect; some of them were only carried out in 1911.3
1 R/20/A/1268, Imäm to Aden, 20 March 1909.

2 R/20/A/1268, notes on the interview with the Imam's emissary,
24/4/09.
73
Furthermore in March 1909, the Council of Ministers made
another proposal i. e. to delegate the civil and religious
administration in the district of Sa'dah to Sayyid Yahyd in
their attempt to arrange the settlement with him. The proposal
presented by the Council of Ministers was apparently difficult to
realise due to the influence of al-Dahyäni, a rival to Sayyid
Yahyä, in Sa'dah, which was his stronghold. Besides, the
proposal did not provide for the exclusive autonomy of the
mountainous districts north of Mandkhah (including San`ä' and
Ta'izz) under the Zaydi Imäm. It was also necessary to take
into account the consent of the Shaykhs and other notables at
Shahdrah or in the Häshid territory to the arrangement. On the
other hand, if the proposal were simply accepted by Imäm
Yahyä, it would assuredly lead to his dismissal by his
followers, the immediate Imam. 1

and appointment of another
Richardson observed that there were numerous other factors to
be considered in any final settlement. For instance, should the
Turks decide to modify, however slightly, their present status
in the Yaman highlands, five or six Imams would present
themselves without loss of time to lay claim to various districts
of which their tribesmen were in possession and in occupation
and which had been absolutely independent of the Imam at
San`ä', up to the advent of the Ottoman army in the Yaman,
under General Mukhtdr Pasha in 1873.2 Richardson believed that
the changes in Constantinople, particularly after the deposition
of Sultan Àbd al-Hamid in April 1909, would bring fresh hope.

2 Ibid.
74
He stated that:
Saiyid Yahya and his followers are no doubt aware

of the fact that the best chance of obtaining for
themselves a form of autonomy in the highlands of
the Yemen lies in the establishment of a
constitutional government in Turkey. A complete
change now in the administration of Ottoman
affairs, specially marked by the removal of Abdul
Hamid, whom they perhaps, considered the worst
enemy of self-government or of any sort of
independence, must bring with it fresh hopes. 1
It may be observed that this is rather a change of the views of
Richardson towards the Imam and the Zaydis. Hitherto the
Imam and his followers were reported to have been pro-Sultan
as they had blamed Ottoman officials and not the Sultan for the
misfortune prevailed in the province.
Although the new Central authorities at the capital were
not yet prepared to accept the Imam's request, the replacement
of Faydl Pasha with Hasan Tahsin Pasha was very much
welcomed by the Yamanis, and the wall was described by the
Imam's emissary, Sayyid Muhammad bin Àll as being very
friendly to the Imäm. 2 The Imam to Aden to

accordingly wrote
inform the British authorities of his good relations with the
Ottoman Government, 3 presumably to his

revoke earlier
approach for British assistance during his fighting with the
Ottomans. But the improved relationship between the Imam and
the Ottoman officials was short-lived when Hasan TahsIn was
replaced by Kämil Bey, mutasarrif of Ta'izz. In May 1910 a new
unpopular wäli, Muhammad 'Al! Pasha arrived at Hudaydah.

2 R/20/A/1268, Imam to Aden, 24/4/1909.
3 R/20/A/1268, Imam to Aden, April 1909.
There is no further evidence either from British documents or Arabic
sources namely al-WasiÌ to support Gavin's information which proved
the negotiation of 1908 between Hasan TahsIn Pasha and the Imam was
considered as a settlement. cf. Gavin, op. cit., p. 239.
75
Malpractice again became rampant following the appointment of
the new wäli and this in itself inevitably provoked a fresh
revolt.
In 1911 Imdm Yahyd led another revolt which, according
to al-Wdsi`l, was provoked by the bad conduct of the new wall,
Muhammad 'All Pasha, which caused discontent amongst the
This coincided with the the Idrisi in Àsir 1

people. revolts of
of the Zaräniq tribesmen. 2 The first the

and manifestation of
new revolt under Imam Yahyä was the appearance of armed
bands in the vicinity of the capital on or about January 12,
1911. Simultaneously with the operation, the rebels seized the
town of San'd' from all sides in great strength, and cut off all
communication with Mandkhah and Ta'izz to the south, and
the towns in the 3

also with garrisoned north.
However, at the end of April 1911 the revolt in the Yaman
highlands under the Zaydi Imam collapsed, almost as suddenly
as it had commenced. This was partly due to the lack of support
and co-operation from the tribesmen who inhabited the
agricultural districts lying between Hujaylah and San`ä'. They
were tired of the prolonged internal strife and were busy
attending to their fields, which had received plentiful rains
during the previous year. Imam Yahyd had therefore been
obliged to have recourse to the warlike mountainous tribesmen
1 'Asir had been in rebellion for centuries under the leadership of khe
AshrAf1) bü 'ArIsh long before the appearance of Sayyid Muhammad
Idris in 1900s. During the revolt of 1904 in 'Asir, a large number of
officials including the Mutasarrif and Military Commander of 'Asir were
killed. cf. FO 195/ 2174, "Quarterly Report on the Yemen vilayet,
administrative and economic", by Richardson, 1904.
2 The Zaranlq country is in the vicinity of Hudaydah and the tribesmen
had for a considerable period previously refused to pay all the taxes to
the Ottoman authorities. Also they pillaged the caravans en route to
.
Bayt al-FagIh, for,, considerable time. cf. FO 195/2174, "Quarterly Report
on Yaman", by Richardon, 1904.
3 FO 195/2376,18/1/1911,16/2/1911, & 12/4/1911.
76
of the north and north-west of San'd', such as Häshid and
Bakal, Dhü Muhammad and Dhü Husayn with whom he had
overrun the country. Other tribesmen, on the other hand, had
been reluctantly compelled to take sides with the Imdm owing to
their having previously rendered up hostages as a guarantee for
tendering him support in his cause the Ottomans. 1

against
The revolt of 1911, although less successful than that of
1905, had little effect on the strength of the Imam who did not
incur heavy expenses during the operation. In a letter to the
Àbdali Sultdn during the course of his reconciliation with the
Ottomans, the Imam vigorously stated that "this was not
because of weakness or impotency that happened to us but for
the sake of preserving the blood and preventing it from being
shed in fighting.... "2 Nevertheless since the collapse of the
revolt, sympathy towards Imäm Yahyd from a considerable
number of influential sections among his followers deteriorated.
Furthermore, there were signs of alienation from him and even
of open revolt against his authority. These factors played an
important part during his negotiations with the Ottomans and
undoubtedly forced pressure on him to make the best of any
bargain offered by the Ottomans. The move to reconcile with the
Imdm was, however, initiated by Ìzzat Pasha and it was
mainly in response to a new threat by the Italians when Tripoli
was attacked in September 1911 that a compromise was finally
reached.
I FO 195/2320, Richardson to Lowther, 12/6/1909.

These hostages, numbering over 400, represented nearly every tribe in
the mountains north of Manäkhah and Taìzz and were taken from the
Shaykhs and headmen in 1903 during their several visits to Sayyid
Yahya, announcing their allegiance on his succeeding to/Imamate on the
death of his father, Imam Muhammad
.
466-
2 R/20/A/1256, Imam to 'Abdall, 5/9/1911.
77
1.4 The Treaty of Da` än
Secret negotiations between Ìzzat Pasha, the Commander-
in-Chief and the Imdm apparently began in June 1911 and in
September 1911, an agreement was finally concluded. The treaty
was signed by both parties in a place called Da`dn north of
Àmrän on Wednesday, October 18,1911,1 and the terms of the
settlement were apparently accepted in principles by the Cabinet
at Constantinople and in 1913 the treaty was ratified by the
Sublime Porte.
G. A. Richardson, the British Vice-Consul at Hudaydah,
outlined the terms of the settlement as far as he was able to
ascertain them. Imdm Yahyd agreed to renounce his claim to
the Caliphate, to drop the title Commander of the Faithful
assumed by his predecessors and himself, and to style himself
simply Imäm of the ZaydIs. He further consented to release all
Arab hostages, the guarantee of his authority in securing the
assistance and co-operation of the Zaydi tribesmen. The Imam
further agreed to liberate all the Ottoman prisoners, and also
renounce his right to collect zakät within the Ottoman
jurisdiction. 2
The Ottomans, for their part, agreed to support Sayyid
Yahyd against all possible rivals to the Imamate in the future,
to permit him to reside at Kawkabdn, and to grant him an
annual subsidy of LT 25,000 from the revenue of the vilayet.
Ottoman civil law would be entirely abrogated and would be

2 Ibid.
78
replaced by Islamic Law in the seven highland Qadä's of
Àmrän, Kawkabdn, Dhamdr, Yarlm, Ibb, Hajjah, and Hajjür.
The Islamic law in those districts would be administered under
the Imdm. The Imäm would nominate the Qädis in those Qadä's,
to the the Central Government. 1 The

subject approval of
Ottomans also undertook the granting of a monthly subsidy to
nearly every shaykh of any importance in the mountainous
districts and to provide a similar allowance to the ùlamd',
fugahd' and sädät throughout the Yaman. 2
However, the principal terms reported by Richardson
were not all spelled out in the text of the signed agreement
reported at Aden and Cairo, notably the abandonment of the title
Amlr al-Mu'minln and the financial subsidy to the Imdm and
others. Presumably the treaty was not yet available to him, the
terms of settlement he reported being merely earlier drafts of
the treaty. The Richardson version should not, however, be
neglected as it contains points of mutual understanding between
the Imam and Ìzzat Pasha which led to the signing of the
agreement. Important differences between the Richardson
version and other versions and between other versions of the
treaty exist which can be seen from the texts of the
3
agreement.
The text of the treaty of Da`dn appears in different
versions: Richardson's account, versions of the Aden Records
and the Arab Bureau of Cairo, and a number of Arabic texts

2 Ibid.
3 Cf. Appendix 1, p. 367.
79
reported by al-Wdsiì and others. The Aden Records version
appears to be the most authentic on the grounds that it was a
translation from the Arabic text handed over to the Residency
by an Arab Shaykh. Unfortunately the Aden Records do not
contain the Arabic text for us to scrutinise even further.
The Public Record Office on the other hand, has the text of
the treaty which was recorded by the Arab Bureau, Cairo. How
the Arab Bureau came to possess the treaty is a matter of
speculation since the Bureau came into existence only in 1916.
Examining the text of the Arab Bureau, it seems possible that it
is a summary of the original, reported to the British Consul. It
contains, however, complete terms of settlement. When
comparing it with the Aden version, one can detect an error in
interpreting the original text. For example article nine (9), of
the Arab Bureau version, states "The Government will nominate
an officer by the name Mubasher (Inspector General) to inspect
the judges who travel about in their districts and villages, and
are likened to moving courts. " The Arab Bureau translated
Mubasher as "an Inspector General" to inspect the judges. In
contrast, Aden refers to them as "assistants" as quoted: "the
judges appointed in the circles and districts can have
trustworthy assistants for them in order to serve them in the
management of their affairs, to safeguard them and to bring
before them the litigants, " This article clearly contradicts

...
that of the Aden Records and also of al-WdsiÌ which spells out
in plural "muhäfizin" and "mubdshirln" rather than
"mubasher" in singular.
80
A1-Wdsiì is the only source for the Zaydis and other Arab
writers. It is unfortunate that al-Wdsiì does not state the
source of the treaty. Again comparing it with the Aden version,
al-Wdsi`Y's account, does not appear to be complete. For instance
article ten (10) is a repetition '-.oJ article six (6)1. Meanwhile, the
Ottoman text was not referred to in any of the Arabic sources
available or in the British archives. Presumably the original
text of the treaty was in Arabic.
The treaty of Da`än marked a turning point in the history
of Imamic-Ottoman relations in the Yaman since the
reoccupation of San'd' by the Ottomans in 1872. It eliminated all
the principal sources of friction and discord between the
Ottomans and the Imdm. Moreover the treaty recognised the
Imam as temporal and spiritual leader of the ZaydIs which
provided him power to appoint and dismiss judges in the Zaydi
districts as well as the authority over waqfs and taxation. Also
the treaty granted other demands made by the Imam, namely
the implementation of the Sharl'ah.
Imam Yahyd must have been extremely pleased with the
terms of the treaty for he achieved the position of his
predecessors in securing the highlands of the Yaman for the
Zaydis, though he was less successful than Imam Qäsim and his
son who successfully released the highlands from the Ottomans.
Imam Yahyd must have thought of removing the Ottoman
completely from the highlands if not from the Yaman. But if so
time now was against his design, for the IdrisI and the British
i. al-Wäsi'I, Tarikh al-Yaman, pp. 236-239.
81
firmly strengthened their position in Àsir and Aden
respectively. For strengthening and stabilising his position in the
highlands, and further to regain the Zaydis' influence in the
Tihdmah notably by repulsing the Idrisi in Àsir, Imam Yahyä
required support from the Ottomans. For these reasons and
other considerations, Imam Yahyä at the understanding of the
settlement, approved the presence of the Ottoman wä11 and
troops at San'd'.
Imäm Yahyä's pleasure with the settlement can be seen in
his letter to the Àbdali Sultdn on 19 November 1911, describing
the admirable personality of Izzat Pasha, whose behaviour and
conduct had won his heart, and so led to the mutual
understanding between them. Izzat Pasha also appeared to have
won over the majority of Imdm Yahyä's staunchest supporters
at the beginning of the negotiations. The Imam stated that Izzat
Pasha was "unique amongst the famous officials of Government
or perhaps the exceptional individual... From his manners we
realised that he was truthful in his speech and faithful in
action and regardful of matters conducive of honour to Islam
and Muslims and pleasing to the Eternal God; he facilitated most
of the matters around which we hovered and the greatest
wishes we were anxious to acquire and obtain. "1 This
expression appears to be genuine. The Imam remained loyal not
only to one particular official but to the Ottomans in general, as
he abided by the treaty which was ratified later, in 1913. For
example immediately after signing the treaty the Imdm released
500 Ottoman prisoners.
1 R/20/A/1257, Imäm to Àbdall, 19/11/1911.
82
For the Ottomans, the treaty of Da`än relieved them from
the internal disturbances of the YamanIs in order to face a new
external constraint, that of the Italians. Even in ; ý- - early 1911,
there had been discussion in the capital on a new solution to the

news betr
vilayet. TheA"Sabah" published an article inviting the Minister
ofAInterior to study the problem and suggesting that Yaman and
Àsir should be governed through the local chiefs: the Imam in
the Yaman highlands and Sayyid Idrisi in Àsir. It appears that
the move of the Ottomans to reconcile with the Imam was
mainly in response to a new threat by the Italians when Tripoli
was attacked in September 1911, and as the Ottomans were not
prepared to send simultaneously troops to Yaman and Tripoli.
The revolt of 1911 cost the Ottomans some three or four million
Turkish pounds to bring an army of 10,000 men to the province
with a proportionate number of guns and a considerable
quantity of stores and ammunition, and to maintain that force
in the field during the four month campaign-1
1 FO 195/2376, Richardson to Lowther 12/6/1911.
83
1.5 Imäm Yahyä and the Aden Protectorate Tribes
After their successful occupation of San`ä' in 1872,
attempts by the Ottomans to expand their influence in the
direction of Aden resulted in a direct clash with the British who
had been predominant in the area since 1839. Thereafter both
the Ottomans and the British gradually adopted a policy of
drawing the independent tribes to their camps. This resulted in
the formation of the Ottoman Yaman and the Aden Protectorate
respectively. The division between the tribes controlled either
by the Ottomans or the British did not end their existing tribal
patterns and practices, which included their cordial inter-tribal
relations and their disputes. Apart from the initiatives of the
Imperial Powers themselves, the inter-tribal disputes were
further aggravated possibly by their support and instigation.
Inter-tribal disputes therefore occurred frequently which
resulted in the boundary settlement. The boundary delimitation
officially defined the spheres of influence of both powers in the
Yaman and supposedly, eliminated their past disputes amongst
tribes and, put an end to the inter-tribal disputes themselves.
The new boundary, nevertheless, was unacceptable to the
Yamanis, particularly to Imam Yahyd, since it was created to
suit the needs of both the Imperial Powers. In fact when Imam
Yahyd took office in 1904 he did not recognise the boundary of
the new Yaman. This attitude of his was understandable since
neither the former Imams nor the Zaydi representatives were
84
present during the boundary settlements. Imam Yahyä,
furthermore, considered both lands, the Ottoman Yaman and
the Aden Protectorate formerly as having belonged to his
ancestors. The whole country from San'd' to Aden was once
Imamic and the Imam's vicegerents were the ancestors of the
chiefs and rulers within the British Protectorate. The Amir of
Däli` and many families on the hill of Jabal Jihäf held sanads
from the Imam.
Therefore, it can be seen that Imam Yahyd had a claim to
extend his influence over territories in the Aden protectorate. At
the beginning, the Imamic relations were confined to a certain
area at the border within the British sphere of influence which
included Bayhän, Ma'rib and Saba', but later extended to a
wider part of the Protectorate including Ydfi`Y, Hadramawt and
other eastern countries of the Protectorate. The contacts
between the Imam and the tribes were first reported to Aden to
have taken place in 1906.1 To Gavin the years between 1902 and
1906 saw the Imamic forces briefly appearin5 on the
Protectorate frontier, the year 1908 marked the beginning of

-
the Imam's occupation on the border of the Protectorate, and in
1909 the Imam occupied Ma'rib and brought Bayhän within
his influence. 2 However, the Imam's movements

range of
became specifically known to the Residency only in early 1909,
when Sharif Am Muhsin, Sharif of Bayhän, a stipendiary chief,
reported that an officer of the Imam, leading a party, had
1 R/20/A/1102,1/7/1906.
Rather form of relations with the Protectorate tribes notably the Imam-
Àbdall friendship relation was established earlier in 1905 when a secret
treaty was concluded. Cf. Gavin, op. cit., p. 241.
2 Gavin, op. cit., pp. 240-1.
85
arrived at Ma'rib and hoisted the Imam's flag and he
anticipated that they would encroach upon Bayhän. But at this
moment, the Residency did not consider the Imam was ready to
be adventurous and regarded the Sharif's report as a probable
bluff in order to obtain British protection which had been
times in the 1 A few days later, two letters

refused several past.
dated March 8 and 9, from Qädl 'Atiq of Bayhän, a British
correspondent, reported further details of the movements of the
Imam in the vicinity of Bayhän. It appeared from the report
that the AmIr of Ma'rib, Àbd al-Rahmän b. Qdsim, the
Muqaddam of the territory of Habab, Sayyid Àbd al-Karim and
the alderman (ra'Is) of the wadi Bayhän, Sayyid Dar`dn and
many other notable persons of the district of Saba' went to see
the Imam on January 23,1909, acknowledging his suzerainty
and requesting him to send some of his men to their country.
Accordingly, the Imam deputed Sayyid Ahmad b. 'Al! Bäkir b.
b. BQ Bakr b. Shcim Hadramawt 2 with

Al; imad al-Shaykh of
two letters from the Imdm and himself to the Qädi reproaching
him for befriending the foreigners and asking the QädI to
devote himself to his cause. The Sayyid also wrote on behalf of
the Imäm to the Shaykhs of Masàbayn tribe desiring them to
he arrived Ma'rib. 3
meet the Sayyid when at Saba' and
It can be seen from the letters of the Imäm and his
emissary, Sayyid Ahmad b. BQ Bakr, that the Imam made an
1 R/20/A/1257,4/3/1909.
2A learned man of Hadramawt who was domiciled in the Imam's
country since 1904. He was described by Q&di 'Atiq as "an elderly men, a
diplomatist, well versed in magic arts" and knowledge of Arab
character. Cf. R/20/A/1257, QadI 'Atlq to Resident, 9/3/1909.
3 R/20/A/1257,9/3/1909.
86
attempt to extend his influence over the province of Yaman
which included parts of the Aden Protectorate through his
religious appeal but made no attempt to introduce troops into
these areas.
Due to the alleged movements of the Imdm in the
territories of Ma'rib and Saba', which were on the British side
of the border, and Bayhän, which was protected by a treaty,
the Residency immediately responded by writing a letter to the
Àbdall Sultan on March 29, asking for confirmation of the
incident and at the same time suggesting he should write to the
Imam to advise him against interfering with the tribes which
were within the British sphere of influence. On April 2,1909,
the Àbdali Sultan replied to the Residency after interviewing the
Imam's delegate, Sayyid Muhammad 'Al! Sharif, confirming the
visit of Sharif Husayn bin Àbd al-Rahmdn of Ma'rib and his
for assistance from the Imäm. 1

request
The Àbdali Sultan wrote to the Imam in a different form
from that proposed by the Residency as he saw it might
displease the Imam if he mentioned the British territory at
Bayhän, Ma'rib and Saba' (a claim based on the frontier drawn
between the British and the Ottomans), due to the present
hostile of the Imam towards the Ottomans. 2 On June 6,

attitude
1909, the Imam replied to the Àbdall Sultan stating that he had
abandoned the expedition intended against Bayhän as a mark of
respect to the Sultan. However, the Imam still claimed that a
1 R/20/A/1257, 'Abdall to De Brath 2/4/1909.

2 R/20/A/1257,3/4/1909.
87
certain area in the east of the Protectorate was part of the
Yaman province and was inhabited by the tribesmen of Yu'rub
and the descendants of the pure family of Sayyids, and he was
still determined in the future to send an expedition to Ma'rib,
Bayhän, Mas'abayn and Harb with the hope
to introduce reforms and set right the evils

prevailing in those parts. These Arab clans have
become heedless to the commands of the Lord and
forgotten the law given by God as part of their duty,
so much so that their actions are not only opposed to
the original laws but they have fallen into utter
corruption. We require nothing of them except that
they should worship God and adhere to the Shari'a
of Lord God in word 1
and action.
The letter of the Imam to the Àbdall, was an indication of
his determination to carry out jihäd for implementing the
Shariàh and to obtain the submission to his authority of the
tribesmen and the descendants of Sayyids in part of what the
British claimed to be British and British protected territory. But
he withdrew the plan for the time being in respect to the advice
given by the 'Abdal! Sultan. Accordingly, from June 1909, the
Residency did not hear of any further interference by the Imam
in the Protectorate. It was not until after the conclusion of the
treaty of Da`dn in October 1911, that the claims of the Imam in
the Aden Protectorate again become evident.
Thus at the beginning of his Imamate he was reported to
have been in communication with a number of chiefs in the
Aden Protectorate. These communications were initially aimed
at extending influence over these areas, thereby obtaining
support from the tribes in his campaign against the Ottomans.
1 R/20/A/1257, ImAm to 'Abdall, 6/6/1909.
88
In spite of the treaty of Da`än in 1911, which terminated the
fighting between the Imäm and the Ottomans, the Imam,
probably seeing more influence in prospect, continued to extend
his authority over some of the tribes who formerly adhered to
his predecessors when opportunities arrived. Basically, it was
the religious duty of the Imäm to guide his fellow Muslims in
their religion, even in a territory outside his authority, and
often he was asked to do so by the tribes, but the Imam
appeared also to continue to search for support of his own
claims. Imam Yahyd seemed to be more determined to extend
his influence over the southern part of Yaman than his
immediate predecessors, as they had confined their activities to
the Zaydi highlands.
However, at the beginning it was unclear to the Residency
at Aden what were the details of the Imamic overtures in the
Protectorate and they could not understand the motives of these
movements, particularly after the conclusion of the treaty of
Da`dn. As early as November 1911, the Residency received news
from Shaykh Zayd b. Sälih al-Hurayb1,1 a YdfiÌ Shaykh, that
the Imam had requested any Arabs who were in possession of
any previous Imamic documents which entitled them to be
legitimate vicegerents, to present themselves before him. The
YäfiÌ Shaykh wrote to the Residency apparently for advice,
though also clearly intending to bargain with the British,
mentioning that he and other YdfiÌs were holders of such
1 One of the minor shaykhsunder the Mawsatah in Upper Yafiì and

subordinate to the Mawsatah Nuqaba'. He had for a long time asked for
a stipend and a rifle but was rejected. He had been in the habit of
getting liberal presents suitable to his rank whenever he paid a visit to
Aden. He went over to Ottomans at Lahej after July 4,1915. Cf.
R/20/A/1257.
89
documents which entitled them to stipends, clothes and
expenses if their claims were well founded. ' This followed

was
by a report from the ÀbdalI Sultan that he had received a letter
dated January 24,1912, from the Imam's emissary, Sayyid
Muhammad 'All al-Sharif in which the Sayyid informed the
Sultan that he had received orders from the Imam to send
letters to all the tribesmen and chiefs to surrender to the order
of God and the Imäm. 2
At that moment the Residency believed there was some
possibility of success for the Imäm in his approaches to those
minor and petty shaykhs of the YdfiÌs who were not in receipt
of stipends from the Government, but not with the greater and
more powerful stipendiary chiefs. However, it soon came to the

Ahe
notice of the Residency through letters offShaykhs of Mawsatah,
Shaykh Salih Muhsin 'Askar and Shaykh Muhammad 'All
Muhsin 'Askar 3 that the Imäm had been in

also communication
with the protected stipendiary chiefs in the Ydfi'l and was
forbidding the general public from having dealings with the
infidels and instructing them to pay zakdt. Among the chiefs
addressed by the Imäm through Sayyid Muhammad 'All al-
SharIf, the Imam's emissary were Shaykh Muhsin 'Askar,
Naqlb of Mawsatah, and other Mawsatah Shaykhs such as
Shaykh Muhsin Qäsim al-Jahwarl, Shaykh Näsir Yahyd Abü
Shämah Shaykh Zayd b. Sälih 4

and al-Huraybl.
1 R/20/A/1257, Shaykh Zayd b. SElih al-HuraybI to Resident, 17/11/1911.

2 R/20/A/1257, Sayyid Muhammad 'All to ÀbdalI, 24/1/1912.
3 Shaykh SAlih Muhsin 'Askar was son of Shaykh Muhsin, Nagib of
Mawsatah, while Shaykh Muhammad b. 'All Muhsin Àskar was the
NagIb's grandson.
4 R/20/A/1257, Shaykhs of Mawsatah to Resident, 27/1/1912 & 15/2/1912.
90
The Residency thereafter wrote to several Shaykhs of
Yäfi'I asking for information the
about activity of the Imam.
In response, the NagIbs of Mawsatah, Shaykh Muhsin 'Askar
and Shaykh NäjI 'All 'Askar wrote to confirm that they were
among other Yäfi'I chiefs who were addressed by the Imäm. 1
The reports given by the Ydfi'I Shaykhs were further confirmed

by a letter dated February 23,1912, from the Imäm's emissary,
Sayyid Muhammad 'All al-Sharlf to the 'Abdall Sultan. Amongst
those who were summoned to submit to God and to the Imam,
were the Lower and Upper Ydfi'I Sultans, the Naqlb of

Mawsatah and all the heads of Yäfi'I, the Qutaybi, the 'Alawl,
the HawshabI and 2 However, from the YAfi'I

others. apart
chiefs and the 'Alawl Shaykhs, there had been no reports of the
activity of the Imam with other chiefs, indicating the possibility
of exaggeration on the part of Imam's emissary. Similarly,
there was also no evidence of the interference by the Imam in
the Hadramawt, contrary to the earlier information received by
the Residency. This was confirmed by Sayyid Husayn b. Hamid
al-Mihdar, on behalf of the Sultan of Mukalld and Shihr in his
letter to Major Condon, Acting Resident, in. reply to the
Resident's inquiry about such 3

activities.
The continuing reports of the activities of the Imam in the
Aden Protectorate particularly in the Ydfi'l countries after the
conclusion of a treaty with the Ottomans, had prompted the
1 R/20/A/1257, Naqlbs of Mawsatah to Resident, 15/2/1912.

2 InMarch 1912, the Imam's emissary, Sayyid Muhammad 'All sent
another list of the names of the Sultans, Shaykhs and noblemen of Yafi'I
to whom letters were addressed by the Imam, cf. R/20/A/1257, Sayyid
Muhammad 'All to 'Abdali, 23/2/1912 & 11/3/1912.
3 R/20/A/1257, Acting Sultan of MukallA & Shihr to Condon, Acting
Political Resesident, 26/5/1912.
91
Aden Residency to communicate with the will of Yaman in an
attempt to prevent further interference from the Imdm. The
original draft which was prepared in March 1912, had finally
been agreed upon with some minor alterations and was
thereafter sent in July that year to the will after the
Secretary of State for India gave his approval in a telegram to
the Viceroy on June 21,1912.1
A reply from Mahmad Nadlm Pasha on behalf of the wäli,
dated July 24,1912, pointed out the possibility that the
Protectorate chiefs who claimed to be in correspondence with
the Imäm were using old letters of the Imam. The truth of the
suggestion was soon proved by Jacob when he carefully
examined the originals and found that the date of one of them
had actually been interpolated in a different coloured ink from
that of the body of the letter, and possibly, therefore included at
a later date. The other original was defaced, having been cut in
half, and was undated. 2
The conduct of the YäfiÌ Shaykhs, who were, as Jacob
put it, "par excellence among the Arabs in the art of
diplomacy", can be regarded as their attempt to make the most
of their position so as to benefit themselves by obtaining large
quantities of arms and ammunition together with presents from
the British. The Yäfi'I chiefs were, therefore, asked to come to
Aden for further examination of the matter. In Aden in April
1912 they were told not to make the position worse by
1 R/20/A/1257, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 21/6/1912.

2 R/20/A/1257, Jacob to Bombay, 31/8/1912.
92
or precipitation. 1 After that date they to
excitement ceased
report on the movement of the Imdm in that area which
confirmed Jacob's view of their false reports.
Gavin, however, believed that there was evidence of
Imamic overtures among the Yäfi'Is. The Imam was apparently
aiming at securing his ends in Upper YAfi'I by diplomacy rather
than by force. In reply to YAfi'I questioning, he set out his
programme of peace, Muslim unity and the justification of his
ancestral claims. He refused stipends and said if invited by the
Yafi'Is he would nominate chiefs over each section of the tribes
to collect taxes, and this greatly annoyed some Yäfi'Is. However,
to others the Imam's offer of external support for a new
authority structure in the area, together with other proposals,
were not unattractive. The result was a new bout of intrigue
counter intrigue. 2 It can be assumed that the evidence of

and
using old letters of the Imam was possibly part of the drama in
order to obtain British favour after knowing its failure from the
Imam.
Imamic relations with tribes other than the previous
mentioned Yäfi'I stipendiary chiefs also took place. The
relationship was not initiated by the Imam but rather by the
tribes themselves and particularly those who desired the
interference of the Imam in order to settle their long inter-
tribal disputes, as in the case of the Amiri tribe. Sayyid
Muhammad Àli the Imam's emissary, for some time had been
,
in the AmIrl territory in an attempt to intervene between
1 R/20/A/1257, notes on the interview at the Residency, April 1912.

2 Gavin, op. cit., p. 242.
93
Shaykh Muhammad Näsir, chief of Qama'irah and Amir Sayf,
Amir of Pali' in settling an old quarrel about reprisals between
the tribesmen of Pali' and those of the Qamä'irah district. 1
The Amir of Dili` also entered into correspondence with the
Imam by stating his submission to the Imam and his readiness
to comply with his orders and restrictions. Accordingly the
AmIr wrote to the YäfiÌs asking them to befriend the Imam
and "not rely on the Frank. "2 However, he changed his policy
after being reproached by the Residency for his communication
with the Imam. He switched from a pro-Imamic to a pro-
British policy when he wrote to Shaykh Zayd b. Sälih al-
liuraybI him to cease the Imäm. 3

ordering communication with
Another similar case was that of Shaykh Àli Näshir, the
'Alawl chief. He had suffered badly at the hands of the Qutaybi,
and saw the Imdm as the best solution to his problem. Two of
his letters to the Imam were intercepted. From these letters, it
can be seen that he had for some time written to the Imdm for
assistance. This was due to the inter-tribal dispute between the
'Alawl and the Qutaybi which he stated in a letter to the Imam
we have undergone an undesirable ordeal of

...
trouble and torture... All persons had conspired
against us. We were coveted and robbed, our
homes demolished and our country occupied. We
have been reduced to poverty, and from dignity
lowered to humiliation. For 5 years we have been
suffering. We did not find amongst the Muslim who
sympathize with us. We referred to the Muslim
Shari'a, but found it a closed chapter. We ran in
all directions seeking for peace... we shall call on
you. We left the matter in the hands of our sire
1 R/20/A/1257, notes of interview with the Amir dated 3/8/1912.

2 R/20/A/1257, report from Muhammad 'All Muhsin 'Askar on May 30
1912.
3 R/20/A/1257, A mir to Jacob, 23/10/1912.
94
Sultan Ahmad Fadl and remained in his town of
Lahej for 5 months. He [the 'Abdall Sultan] wrote
to the Qutaibi people but they returned evasive and
1
playful replies.
There was also communication between the Imam and
Qädl Àtiq of Bayhän. In a letter to the Resident, the QAdl
revealed his reason for his conduct as he stated that his
"correspondence with the Imäm and the officials of the Sublime
Government have been for no other object except to use the
diplomacy within our power for averting their coming against
us and our country. "2
The initiative to correspond with the Imam may have also
come from those areas where the central authority was very
weak, particularly in Yäfi' where the chiefs were totally
lacking cohesion and adhesiveness. The stipendiaries among the
Y$fi'is had not been very wisely chosen by the British and a
number of influential shaykhs of paramount importance was
excluded from the list of stipendiary shaykhs, such as Shaykh
Zayd b. al-Huraybi who among others took the initiative to
communicate with the Imam. So the Resident was forced to
enlarge the list of stipendiaries in order to control the relation
of the Imam with the Aden Protectorate chiefs. Their purpose
was to obtain stipends from either the Imam or the British.
However, when they failed to obtain any positive promise of
granting stipends from either parties, there was no further
report on the communication between these unstipendiary YafiÌ
shaykhs and the Imam.
1 R/20/A/1257, 'AlawI to Imäm, 4/8/1912.

2 R/20/A/1257, QädI 'Atiq to Bell, 2/5/1912.
95
On the same analogy, the Resident, though haunted by the
articulate diplomacy of the stipendiary Ydfi'i chiefs, envisaged
the possibility of Imamic-tribal relations with other tribes in
the eastern countries such as Na'wah and Rub'atayn, Bayhäin
and Jabal Jihäf which were within the British Protectorate. In
the midst of this speculation a report received connected the
Imam with the Ottomans. In February 1913, the Legal Court of
Radä', administratively under the Ottoman jurisdiction, had
sent letters reminding the Shaykhs of Na'wah and Rub'atayn to
tender their to the Imäm. 1 The British Aden

submission at
immediately reacted by sending a letter in March 1913 to the
wall informing him of this matter and requesting him to check
2 While for from the Ottomans, the

such action. waiting a reply
Residency received a report in May 1913 that some Ottomans and
Imamic soldiers entered Na'wah and they were welcomed by
one of the influential shaykh, Muhammad 'Ali Muhsin 'Askar
3 The if it is true for the first time

al-Na'wI. report appears
since the treaty of Da'dn connects the Ottomans with the Imam
in his encroachments. Again In March 1914, the Resident further
received a letter from Sharif Ahmad Am Muhsin, Sharif of
Bayhän, informing him that the Imam and the Ottomans
contemplated an advance against Bayhän.
As these reports were to be further checked, the
Residency received reports of continuing Imamic encroachments
in the Protectorate. In January 1914, a band of Zaydis from the
Imam's side were brought up to Jabal Jihäf by Shaykh Muqbil
1 L/P&S/10/15, Court of Radii' to Shaykhs of Na'wah and Rub'atayn,

11/2 /1913.
2 L/P&S/10/15, Residency to Governor General of Yaman, 19/3 /1913.
3 L/P&S/10/15,10/5//1913.
96
Näji al-ZindänI, a former Ottoman chief appointed prior to the
British arrival in that 1 In February 1914 the Imam

area.
appointed Sharif Husayn as Governor over the Ahl GhanIm
(near RadmAn), the Sultan Baydä, directing them

subjects of of
to pay tithes, obey his orders and follow his advice. About the
same time the Resident received other letters forwarded by the
Fad1I and 'Awdhall Sultans, written by one of the Imam's
generals informing them of the contemplated advance of the
ImAm's troops into their countries and advising them to submit
themselves to them. These letters, though doubtful, bore the
Imam's seal. In the meantime, the Resident received a letter
from the Sultan of Baydä contradicting the previous report of
the interference of the Imam with Ahl Ghanim. Furthermore,
he received information from an Ottoman shaykh of Sabah,
near Qa'tabah, that the Imam declared his good will towards
the British Government and renounced any idea of intriguing
with the tribes in the Protectorate. 2
The Resident's opinion on this uncertain issue can be seen
from his report to India in April 1914 when he stated:
The attitude of the Imam towards the tribes in our

Protectorate is a matter of obscurity and
consequently of considerable anxiety to us. Although
he is at present fully occupied with settling issues
with the Idrisi so as to leave him little desire to
,
try conclusion with us, yet his name is a lever for
Arab intrigues to sow the seeds of doubt and
dissension in our protectorate and for our men
to blackmail us for presents of money, arms and
ammunition... situated as we are far away from
Imam's headquarters and practically ostracised
from our own Protectorate by the orders of the
Secretary of State for India [i. e. Lord Morley's policy
of non-interference in May 19061, it is difficult to
know what is going on in the Imam's sphere. 3
1 L/P&S/10/14,7/3/1914.
2 L/P&S/10/14 Sultan of Bayda to the Resident, March 1914.
3 L/P&S/10/14, Resident to Viceroy, 23/4/1914.
97
However, he did not believe that the Imam at that time had any
leisure to move towards or in the Protectorate. Nevertheless
there was no doubt that his agents were busy on all sides. At
this stage, Gavin believed the Imam was apparently seeking
nothing more than a general acceptance of his authority. What
he asked from the chiefs did not go beyond what he had been
accorded by the Ottomans in the treaty of Da'än namely
acceptance of his religious suzerainty and payment of the zakat
and 'ushur. The need for Muslim unity was part of his
arguments, the rest stressed his ancestral claims to Southern
Arabia and called on those holding documents from his
predecessors to renew their allegiance to the central Yaman
1
authority.
1.6 Conclusion
In conclusion the history of the Ottomans in the Yaman
particularly from 1872 until the treaty of Da`än in 1911, can be
regarded as a failure on the part of the Central Authority to
promote efficiency and welfare in the vilayet and to serve the
interest of the Yamanis. It seemed that the Ottomans treated
Yaman as if being an abandoned vilayet, subordinated and
dependent on other countries, notably Egypt and its Suez Canal.
Historically the Ottoman view on Yaman was mainly based on
Egypt's interest and viewpoint. The Yaman previously under the
Mamlüks of Egypt surrendered to the Ottomans in 1530s,
following the Ottomans conquest of Egypt in 1517 from the
98
MamlQks. But they were expelled from the Yarnan after they
occupied the country for one century, from 1530s to 1630s,
a period relatively short-lived compared to the rest of the
Muslim lands within the Empire. Moreover it was two and a
half centuries later, in 1872, that the Ottomans regained their
control in the Yaman highlands, and only after Muhammad 'All
of Egypt succeeded in subduing the Wahhäbiyah movement in
Arabia which paved the way for the Ottomans to strengthen
their position in the Tihämah in the 1840s. The Ottomans
moved to occupy San'd' in 1849, on the invitation of the Zaydi
ImAm, but were soon forced to settle in the TihAmah at the
uprising of the Zaydls. Again at the opening of the Suez Canal in
1869, the Ottomans began to consider the policy of securing the
whole Yamah. Though the Ottomans succeeded in taking San'ä'
in 1872, if not the whole Yaman, the entire policy of governing
the vilayet was absolutely incompetent. Accordingly it was less
than two decades later that the Zaydi Imams started in a series
of uprisings to oppose the malpractice of Ottoman administration
in the country.
Before the conclusion of the treaty of Da`än in 1911, the
Imamic-Ottoman relation was inharmonious. Initiated by the
mal-practices of the Ottoman officials, the ZaydI Imäms who
were treated only as local religious leaders, looked back to their
historical claims over the greater Yaman for inspiration,
Stimulated further by the Zaydi political concept, encouraged
them to rise up against the Ottomans in the name of religious
duty as Imäms who initially gained support and approval from
99
the Zaydl tribesmen and the notables. The purpose of the
uprising was finally achieved through the treaty of Da`dn which
not only benefited the Imäms and the Zaydis but also the
Ottomans.
Previously the Ottomans were greatly engaged with tribal
affairs in the Yaman as well as in the Aden Protectorate which
led to the confrontation with the British at Aden. This on-going
conflict ended after the settlement of boundary of 1902-1904
which freed the British from further Ottoman intervention in
the tribal affairs of the Protectorate. However the Imam
appeared to have taken the Ottoman5& place notably after the
conclusion of the treaty of Da`dn which provided him with
substantial power over his tribes. It may be observed that the
Imamic-tribal links ' had been established for various reasons.
During the early days of his Imamship, whilst Imam Yahyd and
the Ottomans were at war, the Imam wrote many letters to
Ydfi`, Däli`, Lahej, and others in order to learn what was the
attitude of those tribes towards the Ottomans and to secure
support from them if necessary. The Residency at Aden
observed the moves cautiously particularly after the policy of
non-intervention of 1906 was put into effect. At a later time,
after the conclusion of the treaty of Da`än, these letters had
been used by the YäfiÌ chiefs for their own purposes in order to
obtain presents and aids from the British. After recognizing the
truth, the Residency at Aden was less constrained.
It may be concluded, however, when the truce was
established between Imam Yahyd and the Ottomans, the Imam
100
saw a possibility of widening his sphere of influence over the
territory of his ancestors. This was largely initiated by a
number of Arab chiefs in inviting the Imäm to intervene in
their tribal affairs particularly from those non-stipendiary
chiefs apart from initiatives taken by the Imam and his agents.
The Imamic-tribal relations continued until the war broke out.
It is no doubt that the presence of the Imam was seen by the
officials at Aden as a key figure to the stability of the Ottomans,
the Arabs as well as the British in South West Arabia before,
during and after the war.
101
Chapter Two
British Policy in the Aden Protectorate
before World War 1
2.1 Introduction
Since the occupation of Aden in January 1839, British
policy had been one of non-intervention in hinterland affairs.
That policy had been re-affirmed in June 1871 when
C. U. Aitchison, the Government of India Foreign Secretary,
rejected the proposals of Wedderburn (Acting Secretary to the
Government of Bombay) to take over the whole Àbdall area so
that any foreign state could be prevented from taking up a
position manifestly antagonistic or injurious to British interests
which had been enlarged by the opening of the Suez canal. At
the time the French had already acquired a foothold at Shaykh
SaÌd. 1
Friendly relations with the neighbouring tribes, however,
were established shortly after the occupation. This was
apparently partly dictated by the needs of the security of the
sea route to India and East. But also served for the security of
the settlement and its supplies. An area in the hinterland behind
and near Aden was strictly controlled, kept free from
interference by other powers and bound by mutual friendship
and interest to the British. The first treaties of that kind with
the Arab neighbours was made in January 1839, immediately
I R. W. C. Large, Ph. D. thesis "The Extension of British Influence in and

around the Gulf of Aden 1865-1905", University of London, 1974, p. 2.67.
102
following the occupation of Aden. These included the treaties
with the chief of Àzib, a sub-tribe of the 'Abdalls, on January
31, with the 'Abdall Sultdn, Muhsin bin Fadl, on February 2,
with the chief of Waht, another sub-tribe of the 'Abdalls, and
the chief of the 'Aqrabls on February 4, with the chiefs of
the SubayhIs on February 18, and with Àli b. Ghalib, the
SultAn of Lower YdfiÌ. on February 21.1 A second batch of
similar treaties was made with the chief of Hawshabis on June
14 and the Fadlis on July 8 that year. 2
An agreement of a more binding nature was first made
with the Àbdall Sultan in June that year, by which the Sultan
not only engaged to maintain peace and friendship with the
British Government, but also was to receive a subsidy of $MT
6,500 (Maria Theresa) annually. The British Government also
undertook to pay the stipends to the Fadli, the YäfiÌ, the
HawshabI and the AmirI which were formerly paid by the
'Abdall Sultan to those tribes for keeping the trade 3

open routes.
These five tribes were stipendiaries of the British from the
first. The stipend of the sixth tribe, the ÀlawIs, was
subsequently secured to them through the intervention of the
HawshabI 4
chief.
Therefore, immediately after the acquisition of Aden, the
British Government successfully secured their position in and
1 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, pp. 46,48,53,99,139; F. U.

Abäzah, 'Adan wa al-siy sah al-BarItEnlyah, p. 232.
2 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, pp. 49,55,57-8.
3 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, p. 45; Minto Papers, MS 12592
(The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh); J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy
in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, p. 126.
4 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, p. 45; Minto Papers, MS 12592.
103
around Aden through friendship treaties with the neighbouring
tribes: the Àbdall, the Fadli, the 'Aqrabl, the Subayhi, the
Hawshabi, the YäfiÌ, and the ArnIri, then followed by the
'Awlaqls in 1855.1 The Àlawi, however, was secured through a
with no official treaty. Those treaties which had been

stipend
revoked for a number of occasions as a result of renewal of
hostilities with the British, constituted the basis for the
eventual formation of the Aden Protectorate which gradually
developed from the 1880s as a response to the increasing
influence of the Ottomans in the Protectorate after their return
to San'd' in 1872, and of the growing interest of the foreign
powers in the region after the opening of the Suez canal.
The Ottoman Government, after their second return to
Yaman, had contended that the Ottoman Sultdn's sovereignty
over those tribes, who had friendly relations with the

extended
British, in virtue of the former Ottoman occupation of Yaman.
The British Government, however, had always maintained that
Ottoman Empire. 2
those tribes were independent of the
'Accordingly, in 1873, the Government of India proposed that
those tribes should be taken under British protection, but this
initially, not sanctioned by the India Office. While the

was,
under consideration, the Government of India sent

question was
British force to support the 'Abdall Sultan against the

a
Ottomans who were giving military assistance to a rebel against
1 C. U. Aitchison, A soli ^tion of Treaties, p. 100.

2 Foreign Secretary's (Lord Dranville's) despatch of January 30 and
May 15,1873 pointed out that for over 200 years Yaman had been under
the rule of independent Arab chiefs. "It was the wish of Her
Majesty's Government that the independence of these chiefs in the
vicinity of Aden should be respected, and they could not view with
indifference any attempt to subvert their authority". Cf. Minto Papers,
MS 12592.
104
the Sultän. The Ottomans requested the British to withdraw
from Lahej and themselves disclaimed any intention to
interfere. The right of the Ottomans to request the withdrawal
of the British force from Lahej was, however, denied by the
Secretary of State for India, on the ground that the 'Abdalls and
other tribes who had treaty relations with the British,
were independent from the Ottoman Empire. 1
Ottoman interference, however, continued. In 1885, the
Ottomans occupied al-JalIlah, in the Amiri country. The British
Government protested and declared that they would not permit
any Ottoman interference with the stipendiary chiefs. These
declarations produced assurances from the Porte that their
officials in Yaman had been ordered not to interfere with any
tribes having treaty relations with Great Britain, and similar
assurances had been subsequently given on more than one
occasion. Subsequently, the whole subject of British relations
with the Aden tribes was discussed. In August 1886, the
Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, proposed that an effective protectorate
should be established over the Arab tribes from Shaykh Sa'Id to
the frontiers of Oman as a response to the constant boundary
disputes which finally raised the old claim of the Ottoman
Sultan to the whole of Arabia. "We should then ask the Turks to
consent to a delimitation of our protected territory in the
direction of theirs. If they agree, we should enter into a formal
Convention with them. If not we would lay down the limits of
the protectorate without their consent and make them respect
them. "2
"

2 Ibid.
105
Shortly afterwards, Protectorate treaties were entered
into with the tribes lying along the coast from the `Ätifl
SubayhIs on the West to Mahrl on the East. These included the
treaties with the Sultän of Socotra and Kishn in 1886,1 the
FadlIs, the 'Aqrabls, the Lower Àwlagis, the Shaykh of
Ìrgah, the Shaykh of Lower Hawra and the Quàyti in 1888,2
and the SubayhIs (`Ätifl and BarhimI) in 1889.3 Concerning the
ÀbdalI Sultan, British protection had been extended to him as
early as 1882 when article seven (7) of the Shaykh Ùthmän
Agreement of February 1882 stated that the Àbdall was now
under British protection. 4 The Shaykh Ùthmdn Agreement of
1882 was, therefore, a significant step towards the 'Abdall
official protectorate treaty concluded in 1887.
As regards the tribes further inland, the Government of
India decided that before any Protectorate agreement was
concluded with them a fuller knowledge of the country and of
the conditions of the tribes was required. Captain Wahab of the
Survey of India Department was, therefore, deputed to survey
the country. This survey was made in 1891-92. Although the
survey did not extend to the actual boundary of the territory of
1 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Agreement No LXXXII, 1886, pp.

185-6.
2 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Agreement No XXXVII, 1888, pp.
115, Agreement No XLIII, 1888, pp. 122-3, Agreement No XLVII, 1888, pp.
129-131, Agreement No XLIX, 1888, pp. 134-5, and Agreement No LI, 1888,
pp. 136-7; F. M. Hunter, C. W. H. Sealy and A. H. E. Mosse, An Account of
the Arab tribes in the vicinity of Aden, London (repr. 1986), pp. 125-146.
3 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Agreement Nos XXX; XXXI, 1889,
pp. 106-8.
4 Ibid, pp. 93-4.
Large also referred to this official Shaykh Othman Agreement of 1882 to
mark the beginning of the British protection over the 'Abdalls and
'Abdall Dependencies. cf. Large, op. cit., p. 7.13. Tom Little, however,
considered the Agreement of 1887 as the beginning of the British
protection when the Sultan Fadl bin 'All of Lahej agreed to accept
British protection in return for a monthly stipend of $1,250 Maria
Theresa dollar. cf. T. Little, South of Arabia -Arena of Conflict, London,
1968, p. 15.
106
the tribes concerned, it was sufficient for the purpose for which
it was 1 Subsequently, treaties

primarily required. protectorate
with most of the inland tribes in the vicinity of Aden were
concluded. These included treaties with the Lower Ydfi'Is, the
Hawshabis and the 'AlawIs in 1895.2 The British Government
had no Protectorate treaties with the 'Awlagi, and they were
not stipendiaries. The treaties with the Amiri was not,
however, of the character of a protectorate arrangement.
This marked the beginning of the policy of intervention in
the hinterland whereby through the protectorate treaties, the
British undertook to extend to the protected ruler "the gracious
favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress". In
return the protected ruler "agrees and promises... to refrain
from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty,
with any foreign or native power, except with the knowledge
and sanction of the British Government: and further promises to
give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden, or other British
officer, of the attempt by any other power to interfere with
[the protected ruler]. " In a later version of the agreement, the
protected ruler was further bound not to "cede, sell, mortgage,
lease or hire or give, or otherwise dispose of, the [ruler's]
territory, or any part of the same, at any time, to any power
than the British 3 The treaties had,

other government".

2 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Agreement No LIV, 1895, pp. 141-2,
Agreement No LXV, 1895, pp. 158-9, Agreement No LXVI, 1895, pp. 159-60.
3 Clauses which forbade the rulers to dispose of any part of his
territory other than to the British can be found in the Agreement of 1888
with the FadlI Sultän, the Agreement of 1889 with the SubayhIs, the
Agreement of 1895 with the Lower YafiÌs and the ÀlawIs, the revised
Protectorate Treaty of 1902 with the new Shaykh of 'Irqa, and the
revised Protectorate Treaty of 1902 with the new Shaykh of Hawra of
1902. cf. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties.
107
therefore, effectively given authority to the officials at Aden to
interfere through mediation or force with the Protectorate
affairs including inter-tribal disputes on frontiers and trade
routes as well as tribal quarrels.
In 1900, Muhammad Näsir Muqbil, the Ottoman
Qä'immagäm of Qamäìrah occupied a fort in the Hawshabl
country. This incident gave rise to a fresh frontier dispute. In
July 1901, a British force was despatched from Aden to expel the
Ottoman-backed Yamanis, the fort blown 1 In

and was up.
August 1901, as a result of frequent disputes on the frontier of
the territory of the Amir of Däli`, the Viceroy, Lord Curzon,
suggested that the frontier should be demarcated by a joint
Anglo-Turkish Commission. This was agreed both by the Sultan
and His Majesty. The Commissioners, Col. Wahab representing
the British, (later in November 1902 Mr. Fitzmaurice the
Second Dragoman at the Constantinople Embassy, was attached
as a Joint Commissioner) and the Ottoman, Col. Mustafa Remzi,
met at Däli` in February 1902 for work which resulted in the
settlement of the frontier in 1902-4.2
Following the delimitation of the boundary, the British
embarked on a policy of further involvement in the Protectorate
affairs. In 1904 part of the Aden Movable Column which had
been stationed at poli` since February 1903 was required to
remain there after the completion of the demarcation of the
AmirI territory. This was followed by a series of treaties of
peace and friendship by which the British undertook to

2 Ibid.
108
extend their protection, with the Upper Yäfi`ls in October 1903,1
the Upper Àwlagis and the Amir of Bayhän in December 1903,2
and the AmIr of Däli` in November 1904.3 However, the above
forward policy came to an end after the Liberals came to
power.
2.2 The Policy of Non-interference
A change of Government in Britain did not normally affect
foreign policy in and around Aden. Aden, as an outpost of the
Bombay Authorities, was under the control of the Government
of India and administratively too remote to concern anyone but
"Indian experts", defence planners and the representatives of
interests. 4 However at the time the Liberals to

shipping came
power in 1906 debate on the foreign and defence policy of the
British Empire was at its height. Gavin described the situation
by stating that
In the House of Commons there was a clamour

among the newly elected, radical and Labour
members for a cut in the country's imperial
commitments. From other quarters the Government
was under pressure to improve the defensive
efficiency of the Empire by resolving its Asiatic
difference with Russia as it had already in 1904
settled its African and other colonial differences
with France. The possibility that this involved
aligning Britain with one of the power blocs in
Europe was already half accepted when the Liberals
came to office. Accepted too was the complementary
naval strategy of concentrating the fleet in home
5 1
waters.
1 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, pp. 56,142-53.

2 Ibid, pp. 53,54,125,132.
3 Ibid, pp. 161-3.
4 Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, p. 232.
5 Ibid. pp. 232-3.
109
Aden policy did not escape from the new pressure. On
March 12,1906 the Bombay Government 1 reported the murder
of a postal runner near Shaykh Ùthmdn by the Subayhls, an
attack on Nubat Dukaym and other minor misdeeds of the
tribesmen, and requested a general review of the policy to be
pursued in regard to the tribes concerned namely the Subayhls,
the Hawshabis and the 'Abdall tribes. The Bombay Government
argued that "in view of the traditional principles which had
governed our relations with these tribes, we cannot overlook
the various offences of which the Atifi and Yusufi and sections
of the Subaihis have been guilty in murdering the postal
runner; and that it is necessary to take steps to reassert our
authority in the South West Corner of the Protectorate. "2
Bombay, therefore, recommended the following active measures
to be adopted: "in the first instance, to occupy Ras al-Ara
from the sea. " Should this measure not be successful, the
...
Government of Bombay would submit alternative proposals,
first "to supply the Lahej Sultan with arms and ammunitions
and money or, if necessary, military support, and to call upon
him to deal with the offending tribes over whom his Lordship is
recognized viz. the Subaihis and Haushabis, as well as his own
Abdali tribe. " Second "to send military expedition of our own
through the country next October, when the weather becomes
favourable. "3
1 Baron Lamington was the Governor of Bombay since December 12,

1903. He was replaced by Sir George Sydenham Clarke on October 10,
1907.
2 L/P&S/10/74, Governor of Bombay to Secretary of State for India,
12/3/1906-
3 Ibid.
110
When the Bombay letter of March 12 was received at the
India Office, William Lee Warner, formerly Secretary of the
Political Committee and now a member of the Indian Council, 1
made a crucial intervention which attacked the existing
policy of interference in the Protectorate. He argued:
looking to the great difficulty of increasing our

...
military force at Aden, the powerlessness of the
Turks who are not likely to encroach with hostile
intent, and the extreme desirability of not
encouraging the tribes or sub-tribes to look to our
intervention in case of quarrels with each other, we
should lay down the following principles:
1) The main object of the late delimitation is
achieved by our possession of a line beyond which
Turkish troops or agents cannot advance without
protest.
2) Accidental advances beyond that line should not be
exaggerated and our first resort in the event of any
deliberate or continued advance would be by
diplomatic action at Constantinople.
3) The suggestion is
made as a matter for
consideration thatround Aden and within the
Protectorate a , general line should be drawn within
which even internal disturbances would ordinarily
call for vigilance, and any acts of violence on British
territory would, of course, be punished at once. But
beyond the line of vigilance our agent should be
careful to take no action that could draw us into
political or military entanglements without express
sanction of the Government of India.
4) A railway line to Dthala or a cantonment there
are beyond the present contemplation of H. M.
Government. Even the permanent retention of an
agent there must be viewed as experimental.
5) The disarmament of the tribes in the nine cantons
is out of the question, but there is no objection to the
tribesmen being deprived of their arms on arrival in
British territory.
6) The despatch of postal runners or agents of the
British Government into the interior is to be avoided
as much as possible, so that the tribesmen may not
have the opportunity of attacking them or of
misunderstanding our intentions.
1 Sir William Lee Warner had long service in Bombay, Culcutta and
London. Educated at Rugby School and St. John College, Cambridge. He
joined the Bombay Civil Service in 1867. He held the highest post as
Secretary to the Government of Bombay 1887-1895. In September 1895 he
retired from the Civil Service and was then appointed as Secretary to
the Political and Secret Department, the India Office from September
1895 to November 1902 and then became a member of the Council of India
from November 1902 to November 1912.
111
7) Any punitive expedition for offences committed
during the demarcation and not then and there
punished is to be avoided.
8) No demonstration along the demarcated frontier is
needed, and the tribes on the frontier should settle
their own affairs with their neighbours over the
frontier as far as possible. 1
Warner's note greatly impressed the new Secretary of
State for India, Lord Morley, 2 the

who adopted all principles
of Warner's argument and formed his new policy of non-
intervention. On May 4,1906, the new policy to be pursued in
the Aden Protectorate was communicated to the Government
of India to coincide with the appointment of a new Resident,
Major-General E. De Brath. 3
Morley's despatch laid down principles" which reversed the
previous forward and intervention policy. In the first place he
adopted the interpretation of the former Foreign Secretary, Lord
Lansdowne, concerning the responsibilities and obligations of
Great Britain following the new frontier demarcation with the
Ottoman Government. The previous Foreign Secretary's
statement in the House of Lords on March 30 1903, in reply to a
question as to whether the demarcation of the Aden Boundary
which had been arranged with the Ottoman Government had
enlarged the British sphere of influence, was cited.
With regard to the responsibility for these

territories, I do not see why what has taken place
should make any difference in these responsibilities.
1 L/P&S/10/74, note by W. Lee Warner, 27/3/1906.

2 Lord Morley became Secretary of State for India since December
11,1905.
3 Major-General H. M. Mason was Resident at Aden until March 14,
1906. Major General E. De Brath was due to arrive on April 19,1906.
112
We have never desired to interfere with the internal
and domestic affairs of the tribes. On the other
hand, we have throughout made it perfectly plain
that we should not tolerate the interference of any
other Power with them. 1
The new Secretary of State for India added that his advisers
concurred in the fullest sense in the above interpretation.
Basically, Morley's argument on the policy of non-
interference with the tribes was based on what he saw as the
traditional role of Aden. He stated that
the security and strength of Aden, one of the main

posts and fortresses that guard the lines between
England and India, must always be a standing object
in national policy. That strength will obviously be
impaired and not augmented by quarrels with
tribes, by intervention in their disputes, by
multiplication of formal agreements with them, by
locating troops at a distance from the fortifications
of Aden, or by any excessive readiness to resort to
expeditions out of all proportion, whether immediate
or indirect, to either the occasions for them or to
to be by them. 2
any clear advantage gained
On the basis of these principles, the new orders were put
forward. First, frontier trespasses should not be exaggerated,
and should a protest be required, it would naturally be by way
of action at Constantinople. Second, the area where active
intervention by local authorities would be permitted was
specified.
Outside the territory of British India and within a

limited area of the Protectorate similar to that
formerly known as the Somali coast as the "10 mile
limit" internal disturbances would call for
interposition. But beyond that line our Agent should
be careful to avoid every step that might lead us
into military or political entanglements, without the
sanction of the Secretary State. 3
express of
1 L/P&S/10/74, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 4/5/1906.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
113
Third, troops and other schemes outside the defined area were
withdrawn. "A railway to Dthala (Pali') and a cantonment or
sanitarium there, should be considered as outside the
contemplation of the Government. This being so, the large body
of troops now stationed at Dthala should be withdrawn.... "1
Fourth, the Political Officer at Pali' was also to be withdrawn.
It was argued that in November 1904 the appointment of the
British officer was made temporarily. A year later, as proposed
by the Viceroy, the Secretary of State had made his position
permanent. Now, not only did Morley argue that the matter
was originally provisional, but also he went on to state that "on
the change of circumstances which will be the result of the
present instructions HM'S Government are satisfied that the
arrangement need not be regarded as a permanent one. "2 He
instructed that "it will be sufficient if the Political Agent is
permitted to visit Dhala temporarily and for special purposes as
occasion may require. "3 The decision as to when to withdraw
the Political Officer was left to the Viceroy. Other secondary
matters relating to the policy of non-intervention were also
spelt out in the despatch. The despatch of postal runners or
agents of the British Government into the interior was to be
avoided. Any project for disarming the tribes in the nine
cantons should be dismissed from serious consideration.
Punitive expeditions for offences committed during the
demarcation, and not punished then and there, were now

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
114
out of the question. No demonstrations along the frontier
whether demarcated or not, were needed, and last, no fresh
treaties were to be concluded without referring to the Foreign
Secretary. 1
The Secret Despatch of Lord Morley of May 4,1906 thus
reversed the policy of expansion which had been carried out
since the 1870s. The clear statement in support of non-
intervention caused surprise not only in India, Bombay and
Aden but also in London among individuals in India Office
Sir Hugh S. Barnes 2 who had served as Indian Foreign

namely
Secretary under three successive Viceroys and was now a
member of the Political Committee.
Lord Minto, 3 the Viceroy, although he was not yet

new
fully committed to the previous policy of expansion, expressed
his anxiety to Lord Morley. However, at the time of his arrival
in India in November 1905, the Aden frontier was just
demarcated and the policy being pursued was to exercise
political and military predominance up to the boundary line. In
a private letter of June 7,1906, Minto put forward his first
arguments in the hope of changing the new policy. Minto wrote,

2 Sir Hugh S. Barnes became Under Secretary to the
Government of India, Foreign Department from May 1890. Officiated as
Secretary to the Government of India in March 1896 and again in
April 1899. From December 1900 he was Secretary to the Government of
India before he retired in May 1905. Since then he became a member of
the Council of India until November 1913.
3 Gilbert John Elliot Murray Kynlynmound (1845-1914) 4th Earl of
Minto, was at Eton and Trinity Cambridge. He served in the army in
the Russo-Turkish War, 1877, in Afghanistan in 1879, and in Egypt in
1882. From 1883-6 he was Military Secretary to the 5th Marquess of
Lansdowne, Governor-General of Canada. From 1886 to 1898 he
involved himself in local affairs, notably the Volunteer Movement. From
1898 to 1904 he was Governor-General of Canada, and from November
1905 to November 1910 Viceroy of India.
115
I am afraid you have given us a great deal of
anxiety as to the Aden Hinterland question and the
proposed withdrawal from Dhala. We are at present
according to your despatch consulting Bombay, and I
have also asked for the opinion of the military
authorities. I confess the withdrawal appears to me
very full of difficulties. No one can be more opposed
than I am to undertaking doubtful expeditions or to
exaggerating the importance of frontier disputes, but
we have a lately delimited frontier on the Aden
Hinterland which we can not ignore, whilst the fact
of its existence makes it all the more incumbent on
us not only to object to illegal advances from the
Turkish side but to prevent raiding by our own
subjects in Turkish territory. Besides which there is
the protection of trade routes and our obligation to
the Amir of Dthala. I sincerely hope we shall not
leave him in the lurch in respect to any
responsibilities we have accepted in our dealings
with him. I am told there is no doubt that a
Turkish Customs post has been located at Ad Doka
within our frontier, and though of course this is a
fitting subject for remonstrance with the Porte, yet
our tolerance of it in the meantime can not but have
a very weakening effect on our influence in our own
territory. But perhaps not the least important
consideration affecting the withdrawal is the health
of the troops. With a healthy hill station in our
possession, it would appear to me absolute cruelty,
except under dire necessity, to remove troops from
that to the fiery furnace Aden. 1
station at
In reply, Morley wrote privately that "I won't go into
what you say about the Aden Hinterland, for I have sent you
enough on that business already. I believe I do full justice to
your arguments. "2 Minto, however, did not regard the Secret
Despatch of May 4 as constituting binding orders. He thought
that there was an opportunity for the Bombay Government and
the Resident at Aden to comment on whether any serious danger
or difficulty would arise if the new policy was put into effect.
The Viceroy accordingly wrote to Bombay and requested to be
1 Minto Papers, MS 12735, Minto to Morley, 7/6/1906.

2 Minto Papers, MS 12735, Morley to Minto, 29/6/1906.
116
furnished with a full statement of the views, both of the
Resident at Aden, and of the Governor in Council on the new

1 Minto On June 13, he
policy. was mistaken. received a
telegram from the India Office which gave him the impression
that he had perhaps wrongly interpreted the previous despatch.
He, however, still believed that he might be allowed, on
receiving the opinions requested from Bombay and Aden on the
general question, to be allowed to make representations about
the before it 2 On June 19, Minto

new policy was enforced.
received yet another telegram from Morley which made it clear
that he had no option. It read:
My despatch of May 4, laid down not merely general

views, but the definite intentions and purposes of
HM's Government. The despatch left points of detail
as to how to give effect to the policy. Matters other
than the prompt withdrawal of troops from Dhala,
were, however, left to the consideration of the
Government of India, and their views on these
details, and any question affecting the
administration of Aden, were invited. Meanwhile no
action should be taken that was not in strict
the despatch. 3
conformity with
Minto did not lose hope. He again wrote privately to
Morley to persuade him to review in the first place, the
Resident the Government of Bombay 4 before

opinions of the and
the new policy concerning Aden would be introduced. In the
meantime the Secret Despatch of May 4 was scrutinised at Aden
and Bombay in accordance with the request of the Government
of India which stressed the following points: first, "our
obligations to the Amir of Dthala... "; second, "the probable
1 L/P&S/10/74 & R/20/A/1102, Viceroy to Bombay, 12/6/1906.

2 L/P&S/10/74, Viceroy to India Office, 17/6/1906.
3 L/P&S/10/74, India Office to Viceroy, 19/6/1906.
4 Minto Papers, MS 12735, Minto to Morley, 20/6/1906.
117
effect of such a policy on other parts of the Hinterland, and on
our power to command the respect of the tribes, "; third

... ,
"the manner in which the proposed change would affect our
relations with neighbours beyond the delimited border,
whether... the Turks... or a body of independent tribes,

...
";
and fourth, "how far these instructions would affect our
capacity to carry out a policy of restricting the import of
arms and ammunition into the Hinterland and the re-export of
these to Somaliland and other countries. "l
Accordingly, Major-General E. De Brath, the new Resident
at Aden, forwarded his view to the Government of Bombay. His
general opinion on the new policy was presented from two
points of view, political and military. Politically, as he stated,
our complete withdrawal from the Hinterland

would, in my opinion, be shortly followed by a
recrudescence of tribal fighting, lawlessness, and
acts of violence on the trade routes; by an increase
in the illicit traffic in arms; and by an area of
intrigue on the part of the Turkish frontier officials.
These chiefs who have thrown in their lot with us
would lose all confidence in our policy and once
having lost it would never recover their faith in
2
us.
Militarily, "our withdrawal from Dhala, must be regarded as
wholly disadvantageous due to the unhealthy climate of
Aden in contrast with a good climate and exceptionally healthy
one of Dhala. "3 The Resident further argued that the presence of
the British at Däli` provided moral support to the Amir of Däli`
which did not only overcome the reluctance of his tribesmen to
1 R/20/A/1102, Government of India to Government of Bombay, 12/6/1906.

2 R/20/A/1102, Resident to Government of Bombay, 1/7/1906.
3 Ibid.
118
accept his suzerainty, but also helped him in fulfilling his
treaty obligations to keep the trade route open and safe. This
was also true for other rulers of the Protectorate, such as the
HawshabI chief, Sultdn Àll Mani`, a young and inexperienced
ruler whose hopes depended upon the presence of the British in
his country. The Ydfiì too required constant and close attention
by the Political Agent. The Resident further argued that the
British departure from the hinterland would afford the
Ottomans unlimited opportunities for intrigues and for
furtherance of their pan-Islamic programmes. Finally the
Resident believed that the new policy would increase the illicit
traffic in arms and ammunition due to the inability to watch
its development 1
and check on the spot.
On August 9,1906, Minto forwarded the views of the local
officials of Bombay and Aden in a last hope for convincing
Morley for change. Minto supported the views of the local
authorities, those of Bombay and Aden, concerning the retention
of the Aden garrison at Däli` and the permanent presence there
of a British Agent. Minto explained that the Government of India
had no desire to extend their responsibility and entangle
themselves in purely tribal affairs, but the question of policy in
the Hinterland was one to which they attached vital importance
and which it appeared to them might have been prejudged,
under the idea that they were associated with a policy
that they in no way desired to support. Minto argued that the
retention of British troops and the presence of the Political
Officer there, was to augment the strength of that fortress.
1 R/20/A/1102, Resident to Government of Bombay, 1/7/1906.
119
Pali', 96 miles from Aden, occupied a principal point
commanding the main trade routes between Aden and
Hinterland, and was also an important position on the line of
communications between Aden and the Yaman. He further
argued that the present policy of concentrating British naval
forces in European waters might easily leave the command of
the Arabian Sea in the hands of foreign powers. The climate of
Aden was also characterised as unhealthy and therefore very
little military training could be done there, unlike Pali'.
As regards the Political Officer who would not be stationed
at Däli` but would be allowed occasionally to visit the
hinterland, Minto stated that this would lose the opportunity for
checking or reporting Ottoman intrigues in the Protectorate
territory, apart from the trouble which would ensue during a
visit with escort. The Government of India's argument was
then based on the effect of the withdrawal upon the British
reputation among the Arabs at a time when it was doubtful
whether the Ottomans would be able to restore their rule in the
Yaman or whether they would be succeeded by independent
Arab tribes. The effect of the withdrawal on the AmIr of Ddli`,
whose position was entirely owing to British intervention was
also questioned. The withdrawal would lay the British
Government open to a charge of breach of faith and of treaty
obligation not only with the AmIr of Däli` but also with other
tribes, Hawshabl, Upper YdfiÌ and others. Minto finally argued
that there would be a real danger if the British now withdrew
as they would be confronted with an independent Arabia which
120
would have lost faith in British ability or willingness to keep
their promises to their friends. I
At the India Office, on receiving the views of the Viceroy,
Lee Warner drafted a despatch on Aden policy to Morley on
August 29. He repeated the previous views by stating that "we
are embarking on an entirely new policy outside the fortress of
Aden, which will require an Agent and more troops in order to
maintain an unpopular Amir in his throne, to combat a pan-
Islamic programme in Yaman, to settle tribal disputes, and
maintain our reputation among the Arabs. "2 He considered the
arguments from the Government of India were inconclusive,
Aden was said to be unhealthy but the Government of India
produced no figures; no complaint used to be made concerning
the problem of training at Aden; and as to arms traffic, it
was certain that a garrison at Pali' could have no influence
upon the matter due to the long line of frontier and the
landing 3
Turkish places at Shaykh Sa'Id.
However, Lee Warner did not carry all the Council
4 with him. In to Morley, Hugh Barnes

members a note argued
that the Government of India and the local authorities were
right. In general Barnes considered that "... we ought not to
forbid, as, I understand, the Despatch of 4th May did forbid
even the limited amount of interference and control which
experience shows us we have usefully exercised in the past.... "
I Minto Papers, MS 12636, Government of India to Secretary of State

for India, 9/8/1906.
2 L/P&S/10/74, note by Lee Warner, 29.8.1906.
3 L/P&S/10/74, note by Lee Warner, 29.8.1906.
4 Among other members of the Council of India were: Sir Hugh S.
Barnes (16/8/1905 6/11/1913), Lieut. Col Sir David W. K. Barr (since
-
16/8/1905) and Sir F. O. Schuster, Bart. (since 26/4/1906).
121
He argued that "there is no intention of prohibiting such limited
interference as the Residents have successfully exercised in the
past to keep open the trade routes and adjust intertribal
quarrels. "l
Morley, however, adopted Lee Warner's views which had
been approved by the Political Committee at the India Office. On
September 12,1906, the Secretary of State telegraphed to Viceroy
stated that he had carefully considered the representations of
the Government of India, but was unable substantially to
modify the conclusions he made in his despatch of May, 4. The
Resident and the Political Officer were instructed to act strictly
in a spirit of non-intervention. They were also instructed to
conduct affairs, on the understanding that the continuance of
the post of the Political Officer was temporary, so as to
2
minimise the effect of his withdrawal.
A further despatch of October 5, summarised the major
difference of opinion between the India Office and the Indian-
Aden authorities concerning the objectives of policy in Aden and
especially the policy pursed since the delimitation of the external
frontier of the Aden Protectorate. The Government of India, it
was argued, looked at the objectives of the policy of delimitation
mainly in local terms. Therefore the question of the garrison
at Dali` and the permanent retention of a Political Officer
there were seen as developing the policy of delimitation by the
extended establishment of British authority over the tribes. The
1 L/P&S/10/74, note by Sir Hugh Barnes, 5.9.1906. Barnes had not been
in London when the Despatch of May 4 was drafted, and he was absent
from the discussions in the Committee which preceded its formulation.
122
Government of India also considered it necessary to accomplish
this end by the following means to overcome the reluctance of
the tribesmen to accept the suzerainty of the Amir of Däli`, to
carry British influence into the territory of other tribes, to
conclude fresh treaties with other tribes, to secure for the
protected chiefs ready and friendly advice in the settlement of
tribal disputes, to check the spread of Pan-Islamism in Yaman,
and to maintain the British reputation with the Arabs.
On the other hand, the India Office emphasised the
diplomatic and international relations of the Empire rather than
local needs. Morley stated that "British interest at Aden mainly
centred in the British territory and fortress at Aden, and the
prime object of recent arrangements with the Ottoman Porte
was to reduce the risk of international complications by
arriving at a definite understanding as to the outer boundary of
the tribal country in political relations with the British
Settlement. "1 As to the local needs, Morley believed that the
Resident at Aden could settle the local inter-tribal disputes
without the continual presence of either troops or Political
Agents. He stressed that the troops were never authorised to
commit themselves in local disputes. The protection formally
extended to the tribes was a protection against foreign
aggression.
Morley also believed that the Pan-Islamic programme in
the Yaman which haunted the Residency at Aden could not be
controlled without undesirable meddling in the internal and
domestic doings of the tribes. Furthermore the stemming of
1 R/20/A/1102, India Office to Viceroy, 5/10/1906.
123
religious tides had never hitherto been regarded as a desirable
or even tolerable element in Indian Policy. The possibility of the
emergence of an independent Arabia, which was the subject
of warnings by the Viceroy, was regarded by Morley as a
subject of Imperial policy and not to be decided by considerations
of Indian interest alone.
Other arguments put forward by the Government of India
to support local interests, for example that Aden was unhealthy
and therefore troops could not be trained at Aden, and the
prevention of the arms traffic, were regarded by Morley as
secondary issues. With regard to the question of a railway to
Lahej, Morley stated that no sort of permission or
encouragement should be given to the extension of any line of
railway in the British territory at Aden without express
sanction from himself. He pointed to the unprofitable nature of
such an enterprise as the commerce of Aden by land had fallen
in year. 1 Earlier in a draft for the despatch, Lee Warner

recent
stated that the "Abdali Sultan was so poor that he could
never have thought of a railway unless it had been suggested to
him. "2 Warner further remarked that
We have nothing to gain and much to lose by giving

such a permission. If ever we were obliged to
defend Aden in a war in which Turkey was against
us the railway might possibly even help our
enemies. The argument of trade is surely a weak
one. The railway project was never even discussed
when trade was thriving in the last century (now
uncertain trade), and the fortress and settlement of
Aden were the main care of the Resident. 3
1 R/20/A/1102, India office to Viceroy, 5/10/1906.

2 L/P&S/10/74, note by Lee Warner, 29/8/1906.
3 Ibid.
124
2.3 The Withdrawal of the Political Officer
The new India Office policy did not at once settle the
question of the Political Officer at Däli`. Although the immediate
withdrawal of the Political Officer was considered impracticable
the India Office continued to remind the Government of India
that his retention was temporary. He was allowed to conduct
affairs with the tribes on that basis so as to minimise the effect
of his departure when it took place. He was also allowed to
negotiate affairs of secondary importance with the local Turkish
'
authorities when necessary.
Only in January 1907 was the withdrawal of troops from
Däli` completed. There however remained the Political Agent,
Major H. F. Jacob and his escort of 300 native troops. The
question of the new role of the Political Agent, now emerged.
The Government of Bombay requested the Government of India
to lay down clear instructions as to the role of the Political
Agent at Pali'. The Viceroy drew attention to the Aden policy
laid by the Secretary of State concerning the general
instructions to be given to the Political Officer at Pali' and these
instructions were passed to Bombay for action. - They ran as
follow:
It is the intention of HM's Government that the

Political Officer should be drawn from Dthala as
soon as local conditions will permit, and that
frontier affairs should then be dealt with by means
of occasional visits to Dthala when required. The
Political Officer should therefore understand that
it is his duty to conduct affairs so as to facilitate his
early withdrawal and to minimise its effect when it
take place. His dealings with the Turkish
authorities, with the AmIr and his subjects, and
1 R/20/A/1102, India Office to Viceroy, 5/10/1906.
125
with other sections of the tribe should be governed
by above considerations. He is to furnish as soon as
practicable, a report as to the date when
withdrawal would be possible and as to the means
of conducting frontier affairs after withdrawal. He
is to avoid any step likely to lead to political or
military entanglements and to adhere to policy of
non-interference with internal and domestic policy
of tribes. He may discuss affairs of secondary
importance with local Turkish authorities when
necessary, but must be circumspect in dealing with
complaints and careful not to exaggerate such
incidents as may occur. He may assist the Resident
in peaceful settlement of inter-tribal disputes, so far
as this can be done without involving entanglement
in purely tribal affairs, but must refer specially for
orders any case which appears to call for active
intervention. 1
Hitherto the question of the duration of the stay of the
Political Officer at Däli` remained unclear. The Secretary of
State, in a telegram on January 8,1907 left it the Political
Officer to report when he thought the withdrawal would be
possible. The Government of India, however, moved to prolong
the stay of the Political Officer. In a despatch of April 25,
the Government of India argued that there were advantages in
maintaining an officer at Däli` permanently. First, the officer
had provided valuable assistance to the Resident in the
settlement of inter-tribal disputes and so contributed to the
safety of the trade route. Second, the officer had exercised his
influence to check Ottoman intrigue in the protected territory,
to adjust disputes between Ottoman subjects and the protected
tribesmen, to secure the rebuilding of boundary pillars that had
been dismantled, and to prevent the violation of the frontier by
either party. Third, the officer had kept a watchful eye on the
1 L/P&S/10/74, Viceroy to Government of Bombay, 10/1/1907.
126
conflict between the Ottomans and the Arabs in the Yaman, and
had prevented the protected tribes from being drawn into the
1
struggle.
The Government of India further argued that this new
proposal i. e. to prolong the stay of the Political Officer, did not
alter the policy of HM's Government. They laid particular stress
upon the situation in the Yaman. They urged the retention of a
post of observation at Däli` to study the struggle between the
Imam and Porte and to get timely intelligence of any intrigue in
the Protectorate. The Porte, they stated, apparently found it
necessary to despatch a peace commission in order to achieve a
settlement after they had failed to secure one by force. But as
the fighting was reported to be continuing, the Imam, who was
anxious to enter into a treaty alliance with the British
Government, would endeavour to attract protected chiefs to his
aids. They argued that so long as a British Agent was at Däli`,
they were likely to get timely intelligence of such intrigues, and
Jacob would be able, by his personal influence, to frustrate
them. The Government of India also referred to a letter of Sir
N. O'Conor (7/8/1906), British Ambassador at Constantinople, to
Secretary of State for Foreign Affair, Sir E. Grey, questioning the
advisability of withdrawing the Political Agent while the Yaman
was still in a disturbed and critical condition.
The government of India alternatively suggested, as
recommended by the Resident, De Brath, to postpone the
withdrawal of the Agent until new arrangements to ensure the
1 L/P&S/10/74, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 25/4/1907.
127
safety of the Aden-Pali' road were made. These included
agreements with the Qutaybl, Hawshabi and Àlawi tribes with
the objects of making them' responsible for safeguarding portions
of the road passing through their territories.
The Secretary of State rejected the proposals of the
Viceroy to make the post of Political Agent permanent, or to
retain a post of observation at Däli`, or even to prolong the stay
of the officer in order to provide for the safety of the Aden-Däli`
trade route by means of agreements with the tribes, Àlawl,
Qutaybi and Hawshabi although he approved the conclusion of
the 2 In to a suggestion to retain the Political

agreements. reply
Officer in order to complete the proposed agreements, the
Secretary of State telegraphed the Viceroy on August 28 to
withdraw the Political Officer at once and excluded him from
the duty the 3

of completing agreements.
Affairs in the Yaman were also put forward as an
argument for delay. Major Jacob argued that if the Imam
secured the autonomy of Upper Yaman, his boundary would
march with the British, and the question of the nature and
channel of communication with him would require early
consideration. The Secretary of State did not consider the
argument as relevant. "Success of Imam, if as great as is
reported, may undoubtedly produce complications which will
have to be settled as they arise, but it constitutes no reason,
in the opinion of HM's Government, why withdrawal of the
Political Officer should be delayed. "4

128
The Indian authorities made one last attempt to modify
the policy. On September 7, the Viceroy telegraphed London
suggesting the Political officer should be allowed to rema in until
the end of September to compl ete the withdrawal and to permit
him to make Nubat, a place at the Àbdall-HawshabI border,
his headquarters for the purpose of completing the agreements.
The Secretary of State agreed to one month's extension but did
not approve making Nubat the new headquarters.
I do not see
why questions regarding limit of active
interference cannot be considered at Aden, or why
Agent's detention at Nobat and retention of
garrison there are required for that purpose. The
agreements will of course be proceeded, and for
their completion, I concur in allowing till end of
...
the month [September] for withdrawal. 1
The Indian-Aden authorities finally agreed, after one and
half years had lapsed, to abide fully by the new non-
intervention policy in the Aden Protectorate when in October
1907 the Political Officer and his escort evacuated Däli`.
The evacuation of the Political Officer from the hinterland,
to some extent, permitted the tribes to return to their old
disputes. The Resident reported in January 1908 that fighting
took place between the Qutaybl and the 'Alawl resulting in the
victory of the Qutaybl. Accordingly, hindered by the new policy,
the Resident took no action to mediate, instead the Qutaybi
was given the Àlawl's responsibility for the safety of the
as well as the transit dues and additional stipends. 2

road
But tribal disputes continued. In September 1908, the Qutaybl
and Àlawl rebuilt their own dars for the purpose of collecting

129
transit dues without obtaining permission from Aden, and this
matter, the Resident argued, would prove a constant menace
to the peace of the Aden-Däli` trade route. As a result, the
Resident proposed not to grant any stipend or other concession to
the Qutayb! until the new revised Agreement on the safety of
the Aden-Däli` 1
road was concluded.
The Indian-Aden officials must have believed as they
always anticipated that the new policy of non-intervention had
stimulated the return of old disputes between tribes. On the
contrary, Lee Warner believed the policy of withdrawing the
Political Officer was most successful.
Happily we did not keep the agent at Dhala for that

uncertain future. Since then we have heard of
nothing that is not natural and insignificant. The
Kutaibi and Alawi tribes have exchanged blows, as
they had done in former days. Trade (was) never
very value (valuable)... Again although we were
ensured (assured) that the Turks would overstep
the frontier nothing worth mention has happened in
that direction. 2
Later evidence, however, shows the force of the Indian-
Aden arguments for the delay of the withdrawal of the Political
Officer until the securing Aden-Ddli` trade route through
agreements. The revised agreements to provide for the safety of
Aden-Däli` route were finally forwarded for ratification only
after eight years had elapsed. Jacob traced the reasons for the
failure, "... the Political Agent evacuated Dhala before being able
to sign the proposed agreements. The Alawi and Kutaibi shaikhs
soon commenced hostilities.... The immediate cause for these
hostilities was due to the Alawi Shaikh's endeavour to re-erect

2 L/P&S/10/74, Lee Warner's note, 30/11/1907.
130
a dar (for the purpose of collecting transit dues) in the
vicinity of the demolished Dar al-Qabtan ", 1 one of the

...
posts along the Aden-Däli` trade route. The fight ended up with
the Àlawl losing possession of his territory which drove him
to take refuge in Lahej.
2.4 The Policy of Non-interference in tribal

affairs
In the following years the policy of non-interference was
strictly observed. Observation included non-intervention in
inter-tribal disputes, refusal of proposals to build a sanatorium
at Däli` and a railway from Aden to Däli` or even to Lahej,
withdrawal of troops and the Agent from the hinterland and no
punitive expeditions for past offences, no demonstrations along
the frontier, whether demarcated or not, avoidance of the
despatch of postal runners or agents into the interior, dismissal
of any project for disarming the tribes in the nine cantons, and
conclude fresh protectorate treaties.
The Resident made various proposals to break the policy
but was refused. The Resident pressed for interference as a
result of an attack by the Dambars tribes on a small party of
men belonging to King's Own Scottish Borders. The DambarI was
the most southerly of the Radfän tribes which owed allegiance
to the AmIr of Däli`, but later had been considered as nominally
under the Hawshabi Sultdn. However the tribe was not under
the real control of either of these chiefs. The Resident, De Brath,
1 L/P&S/10/74, Jacob's letter, 286/1913.
131
proposed to press both the Amir of Däli` and the Hawshabi
Sultan to undertake their correction. The India Office decided to
ignore the request of the Resident although these proposals were
made before the receipt of the Secret Despatch of October 5,
1906.
General De Brath, the Resident, continued to propose
intervention in an attempt to maintain the safety of the trade
route in the Aden Protectorate affairs but was also refused. In
August 1907, concurrently with the withdrawal of the Political
Officer from Ddli`, the Resident proposed that Aden troops should
act in support of the Àbdall and Hawshabi forces to police
a belt of country 35 miles (exceeding the allowed limit of 10
miles) from Shaykh Ùthmän for the maintenance of the safety
of the trade route. The Bombay Government replied that the
Governor in Council was not able to support De Brath's proposal
on the basis that it ran counter to the new policy of non-
interference. A further proposal of the Resident to place the
Aden troops at posts such as Nubat Dukaym, Am Rija and Bir-
am-Makhnuk to accomplish the policy of "35 mile limit" was
Bombay 1
considered by as indicative of a forward policy.
However, in 1908 the Resident finally convinced the
Government of Bombay that the proposal to extend the limit
for policing the trade route would avoid the necessity of more
serious punitive measures. The Government of Bombay
supported the proposals which were the following: first "that
the Aden Troop should police a belt of country, 35 miles from
1 R/20/A/1102, Bombay to Government of India, 6/9/1907.
132
from Sheikh Othman, acting in support of the Abdali and
Haushabi forces"; second "that detachments should be place at
Nobat Dukaim, Am Rija and Bir-am-Makhnuk, with a support
at Lahej, from which a system of patrols by tribal levies (by
whom the posts were to be held) would be organised and
support given to the troops of the Sultans of Lahej and Aqrabi,
respectively"; third "that no alteration should be made... in the
composition of the Aden Troop..., "; and fourth "that a Political
Officer, with a knowledge of Arabic should be appointed to
control the troop. "1
Following objections by the military authorities, the
Government of India suggested an alternative scheme. They now
proposed to reduce the strength of the Aden Troop to an escort to
the Resident, and to substitute for the remainder a Levy Corps,
in British pay, composed of representatives of every tribe in
the Protectorate under the command of a British Officer with
headquarters at Aden. This was because the Government of
India doubted whether the strength of the Aden Troop (which
after allowing for ordinary duties, sickness etc. would,
probably, provide only 60 men or 15 for each posts) and would
not be capable of adequately performing the proposed duties.
The Government of Bombay were accordingly asked to
consider the proposal, but they, however, opposed the scheme.
Bombay argued that the local Arabs had no real fighting
instincts; they would have no c ohesion; and the effect of any
action they might take would involve them in blood feuds.
Instead, Bombay recommended a new and modified scheme. The
1 R/20/A/1102, Bombay to Government of India, 1908.
133
Aden Troops would petrol the trade routes within the 35 mile
limit from a base at Khür Maksar. The frontier posts at Am
Rija, Nubat Dukaym, BIr-am-Makhnuk and Lahej would be
manned entirely by the Àbdall's men. 1 On October 20,1910 the
Government of India recommended to London the modified
proposal of the Bombay Government to be approved for the
purpose of immediate safeguarding of the trade routes, even
though the scheme as the Government of India recognised,
would involve risks such as trouble with the tribes. 2
In the meantime the Resident continued to propose more
active interference in Aden Protectorate affairs particularly
regarding the affairs of the Amir of Pali'. This new move was
first initiated by the Àbdali Sultan when he reported to the
Resident the steady decline of the authority of the Amir of Däli`,
in the hope that the Resident would reconsider the policy of
non-intervention. The decline in the authority of the AmIr was
most likely due to the withdrawal of the political Officer who
gave moral support to the AmIr, who had little control over
his tribesmen. In an earlier memorandum, Jacob as Political
Officer at Däli` had stated that the rule of the AmIr was, by
reason of his weakness and avarice, unpopular with a large
number of his tribesmen. Some of them were subservient to
him, but the majority recognised his authority in name only.
The latter included the Radfän tribes who were engaged in
chronic blood feuds, the Halmin and the Shäìrl. 3 In letter

a
(June 30 1910) to Bombay, the Resident confirmed the report
1 Minto Papers, MS 12636 ; R/20/A/1565, September 1910.

2 R/20/A/1565, September 1910.
3 R/20/A/1102, Jacob's memo, 31/3/1905.
134
that there was chaos in Pali': the Amir's feud with the Shä'iris
was resuscitated. The Resident therefore proposed as a first step
to support the railway project urged by the Àbdali Sultan, then
to armed assistance to the Amir. 1 The Government

give of
Bombay in replay drew the Resident's attention to the Morley
Secret Despatch of October 5,1906 which vetoed the policy of
active interference in the affairs of Arab tribes recommend by
Resident. 2 The domestic internal in

the and affairs of the tribes
the Protectorate were to be settled by themselves.
Limited interventions were, however, approved by the
India Office. These included the fresh protectorate treaties with
the Baydä and Àwdhall chiefs. Previously the treaty with the
chief of Baydä had been, however, already agreed by the
Foreign Office in May 1903 for the purpose of the Aden
delimitation, together with a treaty with the chief of Upper
Àwlagi. A year later a protectorate treaty had been concluded
with the Upper Àwlagi Sultan. The negotiation for a treaty
with the chief of Baydä however continued as the Baydä Sultan
declined to come to Aden for its conclusion. An attempt was
made to persuade his cousin, 'Al! bin Ahmad al-Rasäsi, the de
facto ruler, to complete the agreements. In July 1905 the
Government of India had approved the treaty, but it was
postponed further due to the continued refusal of the Baydä
Sultan to come to Aden or even Shuqrah. The negotiation for
the treaty however continued as reported on March 11,1906 by
the Resident Aden. 3

at
1 R/20/A/1342, Aden to Bombay, 30/6/1910.

2 R/20/A/1342, Bombay to Aden, 3/11/1910.
3 L/P&S/10/75,11/3/1906.
135
In regards to the Àwdhali, earlier on January 29,1907
the chief of the Àwdhall tribes, Sultan Qäsim b. Ahmad, had
expressed a desire to enter into a treaty with the British
Government. The Resident was satisfied the chief, a ruler of
some importance in the Dathinah district occupying a
commanding position on the routes, was independent of either
the Àwlagi, Bayhän or Fa41I control. The Resident further
argued that as the chief's uncle, Àbdu'Llah b. Qdsim was
pressing the chief to place himself under Ottoman protection,
timely sanction should be accorded to the conclusion of the usual

1
form of Protectorate Treaty.
The Resident's (now General Sir J. A. Bell 2) for

proposal
a formal agreement with the chiefs of Baydä and 'Awdhall was
refused by the Bombay Government. They took a different view
from that of the British Boundary Commission who believed that
the "proces-verbal" would probably not prevent the Ottomans
from claiming "Beda [Baydä] and its dependencies as part of the
Turkish administrative sub-district of Rada. "3
The Government of India, however, took a different view.
On August 7,1911, Henry Mac Mahon, 4 Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India supported General Bell's proposal when he
to Arthur Hirtzel, 5 Secretary to the Political

wrote privately
Department, India Office, to inquire whether he would be ready
I Minto Papers, MS 12636.

2 Sir James Alexander Bell became the Resident from November 1910.
3 L/P&S/10/75, June 1910.
4 Sir Arthur Henry Mc Mahon was assistant Secretary to Government of
India, Foreign Department from November 1899. From February 1911 he
became Secretary.
5 Frederik Arthur Hirtzel was private Secretary to Secretary of State
for India from October 1903 to October 1909. Since October 1909 he
became Political Secretary at the India Office.
136
to consider an official despatch on the matter. He argued that
The Baidha and Audhali tribes, are the only tribes in

the vicinity of Aden not in treaty relations with
us, while at the same time they are surrounded by
other tribes who are. Bombay Government's refusal
to entertain General Bell's proposals is due to the
policy laid down in Lord Morley's Secret Despatch
dated the 4th May 1906. The anomaly, which is
apparent, is one which it is desirable to remove. The
proposal involves no forward policy but merely aims
at the consolidation of a situation already in
existence; and in the circumstances, the Viceroy
thinks that the India Office might be willing, on
the strength of the arguments put forward by
General Bell, to reconsider the position as regards
the two tribes in question. 1
On receiving the private letter from Mac Mahon, Hirtzel
minuted officially for the approval of Secretary of State stating
that the present proposals is for a formal agreement of the kind
ruled by the Secretary of State's Despatch of 4 May 1906. It is
advocated on the other hand; on the ground that the Baydä and
ÀwdhalI Sultans are differentially treated, and therefore pre-
disposed to an unfriendly attitude towards 2 Hirtzel believed

us.
that it was possible that the Ottomans might claim "Beda and its
dependencies as part of the Turkish administrative sub-district
of Rada. "3 On September 15,1911, on the approval of the
Secretary of State, Mac Mahon received a reply from the India
Office stating that Hirtzel would be ready to consider any official
despatch. 4
Accordingly, on June 20,1912, Government of India
forwarded a proposal to India Office for the conclusion of
protectorate treaties with the 'Awdhall and Baydä Sultans, and
I L/P&S/10/75, McMahon to Hirtzel, 7/8/1911.

2 L/P&S/10/75, India Office's note, August 1911.
3 L/P&S/10/75, India Office's note, August 1911.
4 L/P&S/10/75, India Office to Mc Mahon, 15/9/1911.
137
on August 2, the India Office approved-1 Consequently in
September 1914 a treaty was concluded with the Àwdhali
Sultan, but the proposed treaty with the Baydä was again
postponed due to the attitude of the Baydä Sultan. 2
2.5 The policy of Non-interference and the

Ottomans
The Secret Despatch of May 4,1906 also laid down the
policy on non-interference in relation to frontier questions with
the Ottomans. "So far as the Turkish frontier is concerned, it is
in the highest degree desirable that the importance of trespasses
across the line, which are neither serious nor deliberate, should
not be exaggerated, and should a protest be required, it would
naturally be by way of action at Constantinople. "3 Only in
certain circumstances would an officer from Aden be allowed
to settle questions at the frontier. This was confirmed in the
Secretary of State's despatch of June 14,1907, prior to the
withdrawal of the Political Officer from Däli`. "As regards the
suggestion that it will be advisable thereafter occasionally to
depute an officer with an escort to the frontier for purposes
of necessary business with the tribes or the Turkish
authorities, no action, except on occasions of undoubted
emergency, should be taken without previous reference to
me. --4
1 L/P&S/10/75, India Office to Government of India, 2/8/1912.

2 L/P&S/10/75, September 1914.
3 L/P&S/10/74, Secretary of State for India to Govt. of India, 4/5/1906.
4 L/P&S/10/74, Secretary of State for India to Govt. of India, 14/6/1907.
138
The question of the frontier caused difficulties from the
beginning of the negotiation for the Aden Boundary in 1905.
There were four places, Jubän, Na'wah, Rubàtayn, and
Dhubiani, with which Mr Fitzmaurice, the British
Commissioner, and his Ottoman colleague experienced difficulty
during their negotiation. A compromise was finally arrived at
on the basis of the British Commissioner forgoing his claim to
Juban, and the Ottoman Commissioner his claim to the other
three places and this bargain was embodied in the proces-
verbal signed by both Commissioners on April 20,1905.1
Though the arrangement was agreed by both parties,
there remained difficulty in strictly observing the agreement. In
his memo, Jacob expressed his dissatisfaction with the
arrangement as he believed there would be constant friction if
Jubän became Ottoman while Na`wah and Dhubiani remained
British. 2
with
As early as January 1906, there had been report of the
interference of Ottoman officials in that quarter. Invitations
were sent to the Rub'atayn Shaykhs from the Ottoman mudirs
of Radä' and Jubeln asking them to meet the Ottoman officials
for the purpose of making friendship. Captain Jacob who was
the Political Officer at Pali' had not apparently addressed the
Ottoman officials, but he had advised the Rub'atayn Shaykhs to
say in reply that they were under British protection. Jacob's
3
action was approved by the Secretary of State.
I L/P&S/10/15, Jacob's memo, 19/5/1905.

2 Ibid.
139
The North East frontier question continued. In August 1908
the Shaykhs of Rub'atayn complained that the Ottoman
Qä'immagäm of Radä' and the Commander of the Ottoman troops
not only had summoned them with a view to exacting tribute
but also claimed that Rub'atayn was part of Radä' district. 1 But
as the Ottomans did not enter Rubàtayn no action was taken by
the Government of India.
There was a further report of the occupation of Na`wah
by an Ottoman Yamani Shaykh, and on a incursion into Jubän
by the Mawsatah Shaykh. To meet this persisting frontier
question the India Office agreed to delegate authority to the
Resident to settle dispute locally. The India Office forwarded the
Government of India's proposal to the Foreign Office that the
Resident should he instructed to try and settle the matter locally
without committing the Government of India to any action in
way, this 2 The Resident then

any and was approved. was
instructed to make an effort to secure the withdrawal of both
encroaching parties without in any way committing the British
Government to action. The matter, however, settled for a while
as the Ottoman Arabs were reported to have left Na'wah which
had been occupied by the YdfiÌs. The Resident at Aden did not
it necessary to take further 3

now consider action.
Since then the Resident was given authority from time to
time to act locally. As the question of whether Jubeln was
British or Ottoman reemerged, the Foreign Office concurred with
the India Office's proposal to permit the Resident at Aden to
1 L/P&S/10/15, Viceroy to London, 19/8/1908; Minto Papers, MS 12636.

2 L/P&S/10/15, Foreign Office to India Office, 17/5/1910.
3 L/P&S/10/15, Viceroy to London, 15/7/1909.
140
settle the matter locally. This happened when in September 1908
the Naglb of Mawsatah, accompanied by some Shaykhs of Jubeln
and a representative from Dhubiäni, arrived at Aden. The
Jubän Shaykhs not only asserted that Jubeln was a part of
Upper Yäfiì, but also claimed that these districts had always
been treated as one. They also produced a document which the
Shaykhs of Jubeln and YdfiÌ had agreed to and signed, about 76
years ago, to the effect that their countries were identical and
their interests were mutual. Moreover they did not want to be
placed under the Ottoman administration and complained that
the Turks had previously collected $3,000 from Jubeln. The
Nagib of Mawsatah supported the Jubän Shaykhs in their claim
and stated that he would never agree to a separation of their
countries, i. e. one within Ottoman and the other within British
limits. 1 It that the of the move by the Jubeln

seems purpose
Shaykhs was apparently to avoid further financial liabilities
towards the Ottomans; on the other hand should they become
British they would expect British entertainment. But one should
also consider that the question of Jubän was not yet settled
through definite demarcation; whether it was the Ottoman or
the British side of the border. On February 18,1910 a clear
instruction concerning the question of Jubän was passed to
Aden. "As regards Juban HM's Government consider it desirable
in view of the terms of the proces-verbal of the 20 April 1905, to
make it clear to the tribesmen concerned that they do not claim
the district as part of the British Protectorate". 2 The Resident

141
was advised to take a suitable opportunity of informing the
Nagib of Mawsatah and the Shaykhs of Jubeln in accordance
with the despatch.
A similar instruction was also given to Aden in relation to
reports of Ottoman exaction in Na'wah and Dhubidni to the
amount of 1200 and 300 dollars respectively. After consultation
with the Foreign Office, the India Office did not consider the
information at present available sufficient to make formal
representations to the Porte in regard to alleged Ottoman
exaction in these regions. The Resident at Aden was, therefore,
instructed to make further enquiry into the facts reported.
When he had fully satisfied himself as to the merits of the
claims against the Ottoman, he would be authorised to settle
the matter locally. Failing a local settlement, the Government
would then be prepared to consider further the question of

1 The Resident,
making recommendations at Constantinople. after
enquiries were made, ruled out the Dhubidnl claim, but the
Na`wah claims which were supported by documentary evidence,
were held to be established. The Resident was instructed on May
27,1911 to take the matter up with the local Ottoman
authorities at Radä'. In consequence of hostilities between the
Ottomans and the Imdm, the reference to the Ottoman
authorities was deferred temporarily. In November 1911 the
Resident was instructed to make the necessary reference
without delay. The Resident accordingly reported that he had
addressed the Governor General of Yaman on the subject on
several occasions, but has received only evasive answers. The
142
Bombay Government therefore requested the Government to
raise the question at Constantinople. The India Office agreed to
make the necessary representations at Constantinople, but there
was no further report on the matter as the war broke out.
There had also been reports of the encroachment of
Ottoman Arabs on the Hawshabi territory. On August 12 1908,
Resident reported that the Sultan of the Hawshabl informed
him that an Ottoman, Shaykh Manassar al-Wajlhl, had
encroached on his land and had destroyed two boundary pillars.
The Àbdall and Hawshabi Sultans were asked by the Resident to
have the pillars rebuilt immediately. In February 1913, the
Resident reported again on the above incident, and proposed to
take action. The Wa jIhi and Shaykh Muhammad Ndsir Muqbil
of al-Darayjah had encroached on the Hawshabi territory
within the British Protectorate, taken possession of some arable
lands and were levying taxes. The Resident proposed to send
Major Jacob to inspect the place in dispute and report how
matters stood. The matter was considered by the Resident as
"somewhat urgent". The Resident's proposal was supported by
the Government of Bombay which considered the circumstances
reported by the Resident on February 8,1913 as sufficiently
urgent to justify the deputation of Major Jacob to the Hawshabi
territory. 1 The Government of India agreed and suggested that
Ottoman officer should be deputed to meet Major Jacob

an
on the frontier to settle disputes locally. The Secretary of State
2
did not agree that there was an undoubted emergency at first,
1 L/P&S/10/14, April 1913.

143
but the proposal was reconsidered at the India Office, and the
proposal to settle disputes on the spot was then regarded as a
sensible one and the Foreign Office was urged to adopt it. On
July 8,1913, a letter was sent to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, "The Marquess of Crewe desires to support the
Government of India's suggestion that a Turkish Officer should
be deputed to the frontier to settle locally, in conjunction with
Major Jacob, the disputes which had arisen; and he would
recommend that with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, HM's
Ambassador at Constantinople should be instructed to address
the Turkish government accordingly. " This was approved by Sir
Edward Grey on July 21 and instructions were sent to
Charles Marling, HM's Charge' d'Affairs at Constantinople to
the Ottoman Government. 1

approach
For accomplishment of the assignment the Resident made a
further proposal to despatch a strong escort with Lt. Colonel
Jacob when he went to meet the Ottoman representative on the
border of the Aden Protectorate; and this was supported by the
Government of Bombay. The Resident's argument, which was
based on the Imäm's alleged incursions into the Protectorate,
was ruled out by the Government of India. The Viceroy
considered the proposal of the Resident conflicted with the policy
of non-intervention. Although the Resident continued to press
for approval, this was never sanctioned and the proposal was
overtaken by the outbreak of the war.
1 L/P&S/10/14, July 1913.
144
2.6 The Policy of Non-interference and the Imärn
The policy with the Imäms of San'd' had been one of non-
intervention which had been observed long before the new
policy was introduced by Morley. During the earlier part of the
19th century, the period when internal struggles in San`ä' and
the desultory warfare with the Ottoman were prevalent, the
Imams of San'd' repeatedly endeavoured to enlist the aid and
advice of the British Government in their cause, but a rigid
abstinence was maintained from all interference in their
1 During the in the early 20th century, the Zaydi

affairs. revolts
Imam (Sayyid Yahyä), again approached the British
Government for an alliance. The Resident declined the invitation
on the ground that "The recent revolt of Imam Muhammad
Yahyd has been regarded by the British Government in the light
of a rebellion against a friendly power, and Government have
now finally ruled it unnecessary to make any reply to the
various advances made to them by the Imam in the course of
the past two years. "2 He further pointed out that the Political
Agent at Däli` had urged the desirability of a neutral attitude in
view of the possibility of the eventual success of the Imam's
revolt. The India Office and the Foreign Office agreed that it was
unnecessary to send any reply to the Imdm's expression of a
desire for an alliance with the British Government through the
Àbdall Sultän. 3
agency of the
1 R/20/A/1268, Resident's note, 5/11/1906; Aitchison, A Collection of

Treaties, p. 71.
2 R/20/A/1268, Resident's note, 5/11/1906.
3 R/20/A/1268, Foreign Office to India Office, 22/1/1907.
145
Nevertheless, the appearance of Imäm Yahyä in the
political arena of South West Arabia had been carefully observed
by the Aden Residency notably when it was reported in June
1906 that the Imdm had addressed some chiefs in the Aden
Protectorate. 1 The Imamic

spread of activity as near as
Qa`tabah reported by the Resident in July 1907, led the
Government of India to support the suggestion to delay the
withdrawal of the Political Officer at Däli`. This was not
approved by the Secretary of State in a telegram to the Viceroy
on July 25,1907. "Success of the Imdm, if as great as is
reported, may undoubtedly produce complications which will
have to be settled as they arise. "2
Despite the increasing activity of the Imdm in the
Protectorate, the new policy prevented the Resident at Aden
from acting. A proposal of the Resident to address the Governor
General of the Yaman on the matter was forwarded by the
Bombay Government to the Government of India. In an
accompanying letter, the Government of Bombay traced the
issue
the Political Resident has from time to time

...
brought to notice the activities of the Imam and the
intrigues which he is carrying on with the tribes in
our Protectorate, He now reports that evidence is
daily increasing to show that he has designs of
securing control over tribes which formerly owed
allegiance to the Imam and which extend from our
undelimited frontier of Upper Yafa down to
Hadramaut. From letters received by the Resident
from the Yafai Sheikhs there appears to be great
excitement in that part of the country And the
Abdali Sultan has informed Major General Bell that
the Imam has sent an expeditionary force to Marib
with orders to hold itself in readiness to advance on
I R/20/A/1102, Resident to Bombay, 1/7/1906.

146
Yafa where the Sheikhs appear to be determined to
fight. 1
Bombay argued that although Lord Morley's despatch of May 4
1906 stated that any protest regarding Turkish aggressions
should be made by diplomatic means at Constantinople, the
authorities there were now fully occupied with other matters-
notably the dispute with the Imäm. Further, the Bombay
Government feared the emergence of a quarrel between the
Imam and the Protectorate tribes from which it would be
impossible for the British to stand 2

government aloof.
The Viceroy supported the Resident's proposal on the basis
of Lord Morley's despatch of February 18,1910 in which
sanction was given to settle disputes locally. The India Office
concurred and on June 12,1912 the Foreign Office was informed
that "Lord Crewe agrees that the manner of dealing with the
situation recommended by the government of India is the best to
adopt in the first instance, viz. for the Resident to address the
Turkish Governor-General of the Yaman direct with a view to
intrigue". 3
the immediate cessation of Imam correspondence and
On June 19, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 4
agreed.
Accordingly the Resident sent a letter on June 27 to the
Governor General of the Yaman in the terms approved by
London. Mahmüd Nadim Pasha, acting as agent to the Governor
General of the Yaman, replied to Aden on July 24 by denying
the allegations concerning the Imäm's correspondence with the
1 L/P&S/10/15, Bombay to Government of India, 17/5/1912.

2 Ibid.
3 L/P&S/10/15, India Office to Foreign Office, 2/6/1912.
147
tribes in the Protectorate. He however informed Aden that he
had written to the Imam asking him to refrain from all
interference with the Aden Protectorate tribes. '
Thereafter it became common for the Resident to protest
directly to the Governor General of the Yaman. The Resident in
another letter of November 7,1912 complained of the continuing
correspondence of the Imam with the tribes and referred to
the Imam's letter to the Amlr of Däli` On March 19,1913 the

.
Resident wrote to the Governor General of the Yaman informing
him that the intrigues continued notably in the case of the
Legal Court of Radd' which sent letters to the Shaykhs of
Na'wah and Rub'atayn exhorting them to be obedient to the
Imam "as obedience to him is obedience to God". Again on May
8,1913 the Resident wrote to inform the Governor General that
Ottoman and Imamic troops had moved into Na'wah. In
reply Mahmtid NadIm also denied that the entrance of the
Ottoman Imamic had taken 2

and soldiers place.
The Resident, however, was not satisfied with the reply
given by Mahmüd Nadim as he was on good terms with the
Imam. The Resident continuously pressed for a more active
policy in regard to the alleged incursions of the Imam in the
Protectorate. The Resident believed the existing policy of non-
intervention caused difficulty in monitoring the activities of the
Imam. "Situated as we are far away from the Imam's
headquarters and practically ostracised from our own
Protectorate by the order of Secretary of State for India, it is
difficult for us to know what is going on in the Imam's
1 R/20/A/1257, Mahmüd NadIm to Resident, 24/7/1912.

2 L/P&S/10/15, MahmCtd NadIm to Resident, 8/5/1913.
148
sphere. "l The Resident's proposal to depute Lt. Colonel Jacob
with a body of extra troops, in order to counteract the alleged
mischievous movements of the Imdm's agents and to the

set
minds of the protected Chiefs and allies at rest, was never
sanctioned and the proposal was overtaken by the outbreak of
the war.
2.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, it may be observed the policy of non-
intervention was introduced -not merely because of the change
of government in Britain at that time- but other circumstances
played a part. There had been a number of reasons that led
Morley, a new Secretary of State for India, to adopt the policy.
The British government was at that time reviewing their
foreign and defence policy. Aden Policy, therefore, also came
under review.
The arguments forwarded by Morley and Lee Warner at
the India Office, London, however, emphasized other factors.
The first of them was that the Government had already settled
their boundary disputes with the Ottomans through the Anglo-
Turkish Commission of 1902-5. The India office argued that the
primary objective of the intervention policy was achieved
through the above Commission. This can be traced in

principle
Morley's argument when he referred to the interpretation of the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lansdowne, in 1903,
the responsibility of the Government following the

concerning
1 L/P&S/10/14, Resident to Bombay, 23/5/1914.
149
settlement of the boundary with the Ottomans. This argument
appears to be accurate as the settlement had been observed by
the Ottomans though the agreement was only ratified later in
1914. Furthermore, it was a fact that the Ottomans were no
longer a threat to the British interest in South West Arabia after
their boundary settlement with the British. The policy of
intervention had begun when the threat of the Ottomans
appeared to be at its height. The Protectorate treaties with the
neighbouring tribes around Aden took place when the Ottomans
moved to occupy Däli` and support the rival of the 'Abdali
Sultän apart from their constant claim of the whole Yaman. The
Anglo-Turkish Commission was seen by the India Office as
settling this dispute. The Ottomans, moreover, were engaged
with the insurgence of the Zaydi Imdm from 1904 until 1911
when the Imdm agreed to stop his hostilities at the Treaty of
Da`dn. These circumstances had supported Lee Warner's
argument that the Ottomans would not move towards the Aden
Protectorate due to their powerlessness and this did not actually
happen as it was anticipated even after the withdrawal of
troops from Pali'
Nearer the scene, the Indian-Aden authorities, however,
interpreted the boundary settlement as extending their
responsibility, not only to secure the newly arrangement but
also to support the new protected chiefs following the boundary
demarcation. They also argued that as the Ottomans and the
Imam were fighting, they should follow events closely in order
to report or control the possible intervention of the Imam in the
Aden Protectorate. They were supported by the view of the
British Ambassador at Constantinople, N0 'Connor, when he
150
questioned the advisability of implementing the new policy while
the Yaman was in a critical state.
In London, the India Office, however, did not consider the
emergence of the Zaydl Imäm as an urgent factor which
required intervention, and the matter should not be decided by
the Indian-Aden authorities alone. Another reason for the India
Office policy was that the new policy was partly formed to
avoid British interference in purely tribal matters. The role of
Aden as a coaling station was safe guarded through the various
treaties with the neighbouring tribes. London's argument on the
role of Aden indicates the emphasis of the policy of non-
intervention as this arrangement would suffice to protect
coaling without any further interference in the tribal affairs.
The new policy was actually initiated by Lee Warner, a
member of the Council of India. He must have been acquainted
with Aden since he joined the Bombay Civil Service in 1867.
Later in 1887 he was appointed as Secretary to the Political
Department, Government of Bombay which dealt with Aden.
In 1895, he became Secretary to the Political and Secret
Department, India Office. From 1902 he was appointed a member
of the Council of India and remained until 1912. It is most
probable that his long experience with Aden was held in great
esteem by Morley. Morley turned down an argument by Barnes
to modify the policy though Barnes had also been a Secretary to
Foreign Department, government of India for a number of years
before he became a member in the Council.
The new policy was not only opposed by Barnes, a
member in the council, but also by Minto, the new Viceroy,
Lord Lamington, Governor of Bombay and De Brath, the new
151
Resident at Aden from May 1906. However, from September
1906, it became clear that the May despatch was a binding policy
Therefore since 1906, the policy relating to Aden was one of non-
intervention and this had been basically observed as the
national policy until the war broke out with the Ottomans
which eliminated all commitments which existed between them.
The Residents at Aden, De Brath and Bell, and other
officials such as Jacob continued to press London to modify the
policy in order to allow local authorities limited intervention
such as the settlement of disputes involving the Ottomans, the
Yamanis and the protected chiefs, extending the area of policing
for the safety of trade from the 10-mile limit to a 35-mile limit,
the conclusion of fresh treaties with the tribes, and assistance
to the Imam. Bombay, however, did not always approved
Aden's proposals on the ground that these ran counter to the
policy of non-intervention. In the case of the treaties with
Bayda and 'Awdhall, had the matter not been initiated by the
government of India, fresh treaties would have not been ratified
though that with Baydä had already been approved before the
new policy was put into force.
Throughout the years 1906-1914 the Residents in Aden,
both De Brath and Bell, opposed the policy of non-intervention
and sought to modify it. At the beginning of the period De Brath
was supported in his opposition by the authorities in India.
Subsequently Minto accepted the change and his successor,
Hardinge, was cautious in seeking any modification. While
Morley was at the India Office there was no breach of the
policy. Morley's despatch of February 18,1910, though allowed
the Resident to settle dispute locally, can not be regarded as a
152
breach to the policy as this was sanctioned by the Secretary of
State on case to case basis. This can be observed from the Secret
Despatch of May 4,1906 which stated that "only in certain
circumstances would an officer from Aden be allowed to settle
questions at the frontier. " Again this was confirmed by another
Secretary of State's despatch of June 14,1907 which permitted
local officer to settle dispute on occasions of undoubted
emergency, but with previous reference to the Secretary of
State. His successor, Crewe, uphold the policy of non-
intervention but was more willing to tolerate minor exceptions,
notably in the episode of the treaties with Baydd and the
Àwdhall in 1911.
The new policy was seen by the local authorities as
damaging British reputation among the tribes. The withdrawal
of the troops from Däli` indirectly encouraged the Imdm to
extend his influence into the Aden Protectorate in one way or
another. The advance of the Ottomans into Lahej during the
First World War and their stay there throughout the war was
seen as the result of the policy of non-intervention.
Furthermore, the British, since 1906, had relied heavily on the
Àbdali Sultdn as mediator and informant on tribal affairs.
Though the officials at Aden, notably Jacob, did not go so far as
to channel all relations with other hinterland chiefs through the
Àbdali, they consulted him in regard to the major politiczil

1 This dependence the 'Abdalls,
questions which arose. on who
had their own interest to consider had an injurious effect on the
British position with certain tribes, notably the YdfiÌs who
asked for direct British assistance.
153
CHAPTER THREE
THE OTTOMAN OCCUPATION OF LAHEJ 1915
3.1 The Imperial Powers in South West Arabia
prior to World War i
Prior to the First World War, the imperial powers, the
Ottomans and the British) had officially settled their boundary
conflicts in the Yaman when the Anglo-Turkish Boundary
Commission was ratified on March 19,1914. The ratification of
the boundary indicated that both Governments were prepared to
accept their earlier arrangements on the limit of their sphere of
influence in the Yaman. The British under the new Liberal
Government, adopted in 1906 a policy of non-intervention in the
Aden Protectorate, placing upon London and Istanbul a direct
and greater responsibility for settling future disputes in a
friendly atmosphere. Coincidentally, the Ottomans, under the
Young Turks also moved in the same lines, when they prepared
in 1913 to recognise the autonomy of the Imdm in the Yaman
highlands in accordance to the Treaty of Da`än.
As a result of the policy of reconciliation with local chiefs,
the position of the Ottoman troops in the Yaman had changed
considerably. In 1905 when the uprising of the Imäm was at its
height, the Ottomans had increased their troops in the Yaman,
drawing from their 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Army Corps and the
Hijdz Division apart from their existing 7th Army Corps
stationed in the vilayet. The total Ottoman strength had then
been 104 battalions. 1 In the following the

of about years, after
1 R/20/A/1256, note by Col. H. C. Surtee, military attache at

Constantinople, 24/10/1905. Each battalion was estimated to have a
strength between 350 and 500 men.
154
capture of San'd' from the Imäm, the strength of the troops
was reduced to only about 44 battalions derived from the 5th
army Corps and the Hijdz Division, apart from the 7th army
Corps. 1 Troops, 30,000 despatched

estimated at men were again
into the vilayet during the second uprising of the Imam in
1911.2 The treaty of Da`än of 1911 finally put an end to
the maintenance of mass forces in the Yaman. Thereafter
the Ottomans depended mainly upon the 7th army Corps, to
continue to confront the rebellious tribe of Zaräniq in the
Tihdmah and the Idrlsl in Àsir. These two rebellious elements
remained a problem to the security of the Ottomans in the
Yaman, especially the IdrisI, who renewed his struggle against
the Ottomans when the war broke out.
As regards the British, the policy of non-intervention in
the Protectorate had ended any attempt to extend their sphere of
influence beyond the border. Within the border they were
further restricted from interfering with the tribal affairs. In
addition there was the withdrawal of the Political Officer and
troops from Pali'. Long before the outbreak of World War 1,
both the Imperial Powers had limited their activities in South-
West Arabia, a place of no less strategic interest to either party.
At the beginning of the First World War, the British had
no accurate information on the strength of the Ottoman forces
in South Arabia. The Romanian Military Attache at
Constantinople reported in December 1914 that in South Arabia,
at San`ä' and Hudaydah there was an independent Ottoman
force, namely the 7th Corps consisting of 39th and 40th
1 FO 195/2254, December 1907.

155
Divisions with a strength of eighteen battalions. In addition
there were also the 21st ('Asir) and 22nd (Hijäz) Divisions at
Abhä and in the Hijdz giving them a total strength in South
Arabia of thirty-three battalions (between 13,000 and 16,000
1 This far less than the

men). estimate was new estimate
furnished to the Admiralty in December that year. According to
this second estimate the Ottoman strength on the Red Sea littoral
was estimated at about 37,000 men, still consisting of the Hijäz
and Àsir Divisions and the 7th Army corps. The 7th Corps was
located at San'd' in the Yaman, while the other two were
believed to have their headquarters in the Hijäz, at Makkah and
Madinah from where they were unlikely to make any move to
British 2 Yet
join an attack on the at Aden. another estimate was
later furnished in January 1915 by Qd'id bin Ahmad, the former
gä'immaqäm of the Hujariyah; according to this the strength of
the 7th Army Corps consisted of twenty-four battalions and
eight regiments, also ten battalions of another army Corps
which gave a total strength of 15,000. There were a further
5,000 troops consisting of two battalions of regular Arabs, and
four battalions 3 In March 1915

of gendarmerie. more precise
information on the Ottoman forces was provided by Major
Bradshaw, General Staff Officer at Aden. He estimated the
strength of the 7th Corps was about 15,000, including the 'Asir
Division but excluding the 22nd Hijdz Division. 4 Their

strength
was as follows: 6,000 of the 40th Hudaydah Division, 5,000 of the
L/MIL/17/5/3955, War Diary (War office to Govt.

I of India), 21/1/1915.
2 Admiralty 137/97,31/12/14.
3 L/MIL/17/5/3955, War Diary, 19/1/15.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3957, War Diary, 20/3/15.
156
21st Àsir Division and 4,000 of the 39th Division. In July 1915 a
rather smaller estimate than that of Bradshaw was furnished
by Major Rauf, (an Ottoman prisoner taken during the
Ottomans occupation of Lahej) who revealed the total strength
at 35 battalions. including the Àsir Division. Jacob seemed to
agree with Rauf as he calculated the strength of the 7th army
corps at about 35 battalions, numbering about 14,000.1 However,
only about one-third were available for offensive operations in
the South, the rest were scattered in garrisons particularly in
the Tihämah where it was necessary to guard against an attack
from the incursion by the Idr1sI. 2 The Commanding

sea or an
Officer was a Circassian, Àll SaÌd Pasha, a man of outstanding
3
personality and ability.
On the other hand, the number of the British forces at
Aden small, two Infantry Battalions, (a

was comparatively
British and an Indian), three companies of the Royal Garrison
Artillery, the 23rd (Fortress) Company of the Bombay Sappers
Miners the Aden Troop hundred 4 Early in

and and of one sabres.
August 1914, the Aden Brigade numbered only 1081 British troops
1 Jacob, Kings of Arabia, p. 168; R. Bidwell, "The Turkish Attack on

Aden 1915-1918", Arabian Studies, VI, p. 171. Thereafter it refers as
"The Turkish Attack on Aden"
2 R. Bidwell, "The Turkish Attack on Aden", p. 171.
3 Àll Said Pasha was an Ottoman General. He was president of an
Ottoman Commission to visit the IdrisI in November 1909. In May 1914,
he assumed charge of the 39th Division at San'd'. Before coming to
Arabia he belonged to one of the corps stationed at Constantinople, and
had served in Asia Minor. He was a strong nationalist of the 'Enver Bey'
type. Richardson, British Vice-Consul at Hudaydah described him as "a
man of great energy and resource, 'and is recognised in Turkish military
circles as a capable officer. He certainly struck me as being such and to
have been well read and well informed generally. He is both ambitious
and daring. He has great influence in the army in the Yaman, which
has confidence in him as a leader". General Staff India, Who's who in
Aden and Western Arabia, 1916, pp. 33-4. Cf. Wingate Papers.
4 Bidwell, "The Turkish Attack on Aden", p. 171.
157
and 1055 Indian Troops. 1 Early in November 1914, Sikh
A23rd
Pioneers were sent to Aden for reinforcement which increased
the strength of the Indian troops to 1974 men. The existing
British battalion, the Lancashire Fusiliers, was replaced in
December 1914 by the Brecknockshire Battalion of the South
Wales Borderers, which raised their number to 1188 men. 2

only
The total strength of the British forces at Aden was therefore a
little over 3,000 in contrast with 14,000 to 15,000 of the Ottomans
in the Yaman. It was not surprising therefore that throughout
the war requests for reinforcement were frequently made by
the Aden authority for defensive and offensive measures in the
area.
The Ottoman Government did not officially enter the war
on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungry against the Allies
until November 5,1914, but the British suspected the Ottoman
intention to join the war. In September that year it was
reported that the Ottoman troops were secretly concentrating
near the Egyptian border. The following month saw reports of
the concentration of the Ottoman troops not only in Syria and
Palestine, but also in Arabia.
Early in October, the Assistant Resident at Perim reported
that two Ottoman officers had arrived Manhali 3 to inspect

at
fort Shaykh Sa'Id opposite Perim, a British island in the Red Sea
with cable installations, coaling depot and lighthouse. Meanwhile
1 L/MIL/17/15/1198,1/8/1914.
2 L/MIL/17/15/3954, War Diary, 16/12/14; L/MIL/17/15/1199,1/1/1915.
The Aden Moveable Column was organised after the arrival of the Indian
troops: it consisted of 1,000 men, six 15-pounder guns and 10-pounders.
Cf. Bidwell, "The Turkish Attack on Aden", p. 171.
Manhali and Turba were two Ottoman forts at Shaykh SaÌd.
158
another source which brought news from Hudaydah indicated
preparations by the Ottomans for war and troops were being
moved from Àsir to Hudaydah and Jiddah. 1 A further

report
from the Resident, Sir J. Bell, 2 showed that the Ottomans were
also prepared to move to the Yaman-Protectorate border with
the aim to act against the Aden Protectorate, and to enlist the
of the Arab tribes at the border. 3 At the

co-operation end of
October, it was further reported that two Regiments of the
Ottoman troops at Ta'izz with their military equipment and
were ready to to Shaykh Sa'Id. 4 The

artillery proceed report
might have provided the Indian authorities with a proof of the
validity of their belief that the Ottomans were contemplating a
move to Shaykh Sa'Id with the aim of acting against Perim in
the Red Sea at the outbreak of war. Even before the Ottomans
entered the war, on September 4,1914, the Viceroy, Lord
Hardinge, suggested to occupy Shaykh Sa'Id, apparently for the
safety of Perim and the Red Sea.

2 General Bell's period in office expired on 12/11/1914 and was succeeded
by Major General D. S. L. Shaw. Jacob was acting Resident temporarily
before the arrival of the latter.
3 L/P&S/10/558, Aden to Bombay 11/10/1914.
,
4 R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letter, 24/10/1914.
159
3.2 The British Operation at Shaykh Said
Following the reports of the preparation of the Ottomans
at Shaykh Said, the Indian authorities secretly planned to
destroy them. This was in order to avoid any possible
interference with the British telegraphic communication,
convoys and shipping at Perim, only two miles away. The
movement and the strength of the Ottoman troops in that area
was cautiously watched by the Indian authorities, and
information on landing places at Shaykh Said was immediately
requested from the Resident for the purpose of attacking
the 1
place.
In the meantime it had been decided by London that should
the Ottomans enter the war against the Allies, the policy would
be that the Government should avoid action against any ports
in the Red Sea in an attempt to gain the co-operation of the Arab
chiefs, notably the Imam and the Idrlsl, against the Ottomans.
The Indian authorities were aware of the policy and on
'November 4 such instructions were sent to India2 but, as will
be shown, they were ignored.
Nevertheless, the Indian authorities took the opportunity
of the movement of the troops through the Red Sea to attack
Shaykh Said. The action was quickly taken before obtaining
official approval from the Admiralty in London. The Viceroy
presumably might have thought that action in the Red Sea was
still within his discretion. Therefore, as early as November 3,
1914 orders were sent to General H. V. Cox, commanding the
1 L/MIL/17/5/4056, War Diary, 23/10/1914.

2 L/P&S/10/558,4/11/1914.
160
29th Brigade, to seize Shaykh Said his way to Egypt. I The
on
following day the orders were amplified as follows:
The operation is intended to capture Sheikh Said and

to destroy the Turkish work, armaments and wells
there. Reports indicate the Turkish forces at Sheikh
Said number 500 men with 6 or 7 guns. The
operations will be carried out by the following units
of the 29th India Infantry Brigade: - the 14th Sikhs,
the 69th Punjabis, the 89th Punjabis, on Transports
"City of Manchester" and "Edavana" accompanied
by 23rd Pioneers on Transport "Nurani". The whole
under the command of Brigadier-General H. V. Cox.
General Officer Commanding, Aden will detail his
General Staff Officer, Major Bradshaw only him
and no individual at Perim or Aden is to be informed
of these orders. Sheikh Said will be evacuated after
destruction of the Turkish works, armaments, and
wells. Having re-embarked the troops of the 29th
Brigade, the ships will then proceed to Egypt, the
to Aden. 2
23rd Pioneer on the "Nurani" will return
The proposed operation was secretly circulated in India
Aden. 3 A copy was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the

and
East Indies, Bombay, to secure naval co-operation in the
proposed operation, namely the assistance of the ship, "Duke of
Edinburgh". Another copy was sent to the Resident at Aden who
reminded not to disclose the plan to anyone but Bradshaw,

was
to detailed information of the operation. Only on

provide
November 5, was the Secretary of State, Crewe, informed of
the plan when Hardinge telegraphed him privately that he had
told the Commander-in-Chief that
In view of the fact that we know the Turks have

been erecting some heavy guns at Sheikh Said,
opposite Perim, it would be advisable, when
1 L/MIL/I7/5/4056, War Diary, 3/11/1914.

2 L/MIL/17/5/4056, War Diary, 4/11/1914.
3 on the contrary, Bidwell seems to believe the original decision to
attack Shaykh SaÌd had been made between London and Delhi and the
local authorities in Aden were not consulted. Cf. Bidwell, "The Turkish
Attack on Aden", p. 172.
161
transporting a regiment of troops from India to
Aden, to take the opportunity for an escorting ship
to bombard and destroy the guns, and for the
Infantry regiment to land to blow up the buildings
and destroy the water-supply. It will have an
excellent effect in that part of Arabia and will
protect our telegraph station at Perim from attack. 1
Crewe did not discuss the proposed plan in his succeeding
communications with Hardinge, nor did he consult the
Admiralty, War Office or Foreign Office on the matter for their
views.
The Admiralty was not informed by the Commander-in-
Chief of East Indies, Rear-Admiral Pierse, when he agreed to co-
operate with the Viceroy in the operation. On November 9,
Pierse wired the Admiralty informing them of a plan for
the movement of ships, including "Duke of Edinburgh", to
Suez but yet he did not mention the proposed operation at
Shaykh Sa'Id. Only on November 11, when the action at
Shaykh Said had taken place, did Pierse inform the Admiralty
the involvement "Duke Edinburgh", 2 this caused

of of of and
surprise among the officials at the Admiralty. It seems that
none of them knew of the operation and even Admiral Slade had
insufficient knowledge to explain it. He remarked "I suppose this
operation was carried out at the instance of the Resident at
Aden... The initiation of operations in this region has been left to
the Resident at the request of the India Office on account of the
importance of securing the adherence of the Arabs. This fort is
in the territory claimed by the Imam. -3 At Aden, Jacob was
1 Hardinge Paper, 120, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India,

5/11/1914.
2 Admiralty, 137/97,11/11/1914.
3 Ibid.
162
duly not informed on the operation at Shaykh Sa'Id. Not
surprisingly he regarded the operation as folly for its main
result was to irritate the Imäm who resented it as an assault
his territory. 1
upon
Orders to operate at Shaykh Said were immediately put
into action. On November 4, Brigadier General Cox received
orders from the Chief of the General Staff. At 11 p. m. November
6, Cox left for Aden with the transport Edavana to enable him to
pick up Major Bradshaw. The ship arrived at 5.30 p. m.
November 8. Meanwhile at 6 p. m. November 8, "Duke of
Edinburgh" with "City of Manchester" and "Nurani" left for
Aden and arrived at Aden at 10 a. m. November 9.2 At 5 p. m.
November 9, the convoy left Aden for Shaykh Said and arrived
there at 1.45 a. m. November 10. At day-break the operation

3
was carried out.
The news of the successful operation was officially
telegraphed to London by Hardinge on November 11, stating that
We thought it desirable in consequence of persistent

reports to the effect that Turkish reinforcement(s)
with guns had been despatched to Sheikh Said, to
take advantage of presence en route of transports
with troops for Egypt, General Cox was accordingly
instructed to land a small force to destroy the works
there, afterwards continuing his journey. Sheikh
Said is within artillery (range) of the Perim cable
station and commands the eastern passage at
Perim. 4
1 Bidwell, "The Turkish Attack on Aden", p. 172.

2 Admiralty, 137/899, Report by Cox and Capt. Blackett, 14/14/1914.
3 Ibid.
4 L/MIL/17/5/4056, War Diary (Viceroy to Sec. of State for India),
11/11/1914.
163
At the India Office, news of the operation at Shaykh Said
did not surprise the officials there; presumably they were
informed earlier by Crewe. They, however, believed that the
withdrawal from Shaykh SaÌd after the occupation was a
mistake. The India Office favoured holding that place, and
Admiral Slade had even suggested asking the Arabs to hold
Shaykh SaÌd for the British, in an attempt to bring them into
the British camp. 1 On November 22, the India Office telegraphed
the Viceroy suggesting the Resident should take steps in
negotiating with the Arabs to hold Shaykh Said on behalf of the
British, but it was probably too late as Shaykh Said was
reported to have been reoccupied by the Arabs before the
be made. 2
arrangement could
As a result of the operation at Shaykh Said, the
Admiralty adopted a definite policy with regard to the naval
operations in the Red Sea. On November 15, the First Lord of the
Admiralty sent a letter to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign
Office, Lord Kitchener at the War Office and Lord Crewe at the
India Office to obtain their views regarding the policy that all
naval operations in the Red Sea should be concerted between the
General Officer Commanding and Senior Naval Officer Egypt, and
preventing the Government of India from issuing orders through
the Admiral at Bombay. This was agreed, but Crewe added that
his Office should be consulted, especially as regards Arab policy
as well as Muslim sentiment. Accordingly on November 17, the
Admiralty telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies
1 L/P&S/10/558,18/11/1914.
2 L/P&S/10/558, India Office's note, 5/12/1914; Admiralty 137/899,
1/12/1914.
164
that "naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be
directed from India. "l
Under the new arrangement control of operations in the
Red Sea was now in the joint hands of the Admiralty and the
General Officer Commanding, Egypt. This arrangement was
initiated by the Admiralty in consequence of the events at
Shaykh Sa'Id and agreed by the Foreign Office and the India
Office though on conditions. Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-
in-Chief, India informed Hardinge that he was not satisfied with
the new arrangements. He argued that
it
is true that India, or perhaps more correctly
...
the Resident at Aden, is to be consulted before
anything is done which affects Indian interests, but
I do not like the position. It seems to me that Your
Excellency will have no real control, and that things
(can/may? ) easily be done through ignorance which
may involve us in the most serious trouble and
make it imperative on us to try and pull them out of
risk to 2
some mess at whatever ourselves.
It was not clear how far the Viceroy shared the views of
the Commander-in-chief concerning the new arrangements for
the control of the Red Sea. Later evidence shows that the
Viceroy had become a stumbling-block to the forward policy in
the Red Sea proposed by London. Perhaps the arrangement did
not satisfy him as he always believed that any successful
operation should be handed to the officials on the spot, and not
be in the hands of the Home authorities.
As regards the Ottomans, the attack at Shaykh SaÌd
provided them with an opportunity for attempting to persuade
I Admiralty 137/97,17111/1914.
2 Hardinge Papers, 120, Duff to Hardinge, 27/11/1914.
165
the chiefs of the Protectorate to co-operate with them on
religious grounds against the British. The gd'immaqäm of
Hujariyah, Ahmad Nu`mdn, immediately sent a letter to the
Àbdall Sultan stating that
by their attack on Sheikh Said the English have

...
shown their desire to efface Islam. Actuated by ties
of my friendship towards you and bonds of Islamic
brotherhood. I write to ascertain your mind and to
tell you that both Shafai and Zaidi tribesmen are
collecting at the orders of the Turkish Government
to defend their religion and country-1
The Àbdali Sultdn and other prominent chiefs in the
Protectorate had been informed by the Resident immediately
after the action took place, describing it as necessary owing to
the menacing attitude of the Ottomans there, without harming
the local Arabs the British had 2 The

with whom no quarrel.
Àbdall Sultan who remained loyal to the British expressed his
pleasure at the success of the British at Shaykh Said by stating
"we highly appreciated your action in this matter as it will
have an excellent effect and check any further transgression. "3
He stated that he had also written to Ahmad Nu`män and other
Ottomans assuring them that the British action at Shaykh SaÌd
was occasioned by the menacing attitude of that fort towards
British shipping. 4
In the meantime a concerted policy concerning the Red Sea
had been discussed in London. On November 16, Sir George Clerk
of the Foreign Office, Admiral Slade of the Admiralty, and

2 R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Newsletter, 21/11/1914.
3 Ibid.
166
Aurthur Hirtzel of the India Office proposed to occupy Shaykh
Sa'Id, though the Ottoman post there had already been
destroyed, arguing that it was necessary to occupy it to prevent
a revival of the French claim; at the same time Kamardn, the
Farsän Islands Hudaydah be occupied. 1 Jacob,

and should also
acting Resident, did not, however, agree to the proposal to
occupy Hudaydah on the grounds that
being a town on the mainland, as belying our

assertion that we have no desire for extension of our
territory. We proved by our abandonment of Sheikh
Said, after the destruction of the fort, that we had
no ulterior aim. A reply from Imam is still awaited
by us, and if we occupied Hodeida, prior to its
receipt, the Imam would misunderstand our action.
Hodeida, is the port for Sana'a, and generally for the
territory of the Imam. Our plan, until it is proved
futile, is to work against the Turks by Arabs
agency... promising them reasonable assistance and
assuring them of our support after the conclusion of
hostilities to secure autonomy. It was the Arab
under Turkish lead who bore the brunt of the
defence at Sheikh Said. I do not advocate occupation
unless a further menace takes place. Kamaran is an
island and belongs to Turkey and is connected with
pilgrim traffic. Sanitary methods introduced there
by Turks were very drastic and all Moslems would
appreciate a change of hands. Farsan was formerly
Idrisi's but it is now Turkish, and it is open to
Government after the British flag has been hoisted
there, to consider the advisability of restoring it to
Idrisi. 2
All those proposals by Jacob were agreed by the Bombay
Government. The Viceroy too agreed but not on the restoration

khe
ofAFarsän Islands to the Idrisi. Concerning the operation at
Shaykh Said Hardinge argued that "further until we know
definitely the attitude of Imam, ldrisi and Turkish Arabs
1 L/P&S/10/558, Minute by Mr. Clerk (Foreign Office), 16/11/1914.

2 L/P&S/10/559, Acting Resident to Government of India, 24/11/1914.
167
generally, occupation of Sheikh Said and Hodeida appears
premature.... Unless therefore Turkish Arabs adopt definitely
threatening attitude, I deprecate any action as regards Sheikh
Said and Hodeida for the present. "1
However, towards the end of November 1914, a large force
of Arabs were reported to have reoccupied Shaykh Sa'Id.
Consequently the new Resident, Major General D. G. L. Shaw,
to occupy it if the Perim, 2 this

proposed enemy attacked and
initially by the Viceroy. 3 The India Office too were

was agreed
of the opinion that once the Ottomans were turned out from
there the Arabs could not be allowed to occupy it on their
behalf. 4 Later he was informed that it was impossible to

after
transport heavy guns by land to Shaykh Said, the Viceroy
opposed its re-occupation arguing it was unnecessary and
undesirable not only because it would lock up troops there who
were better employed elsewhere but it would also tend to
irritate the tribes and render an isolated garrison at Shaykh
than Perim 5 After

Said a greater source of anxiety now was.
receiving the views of the Government of India, the India Office,
on the other hand, preferred to occupy it. They noted that "this
department remained of the opinion that sound policy would
have been either preferably to have held Sheikh Said when we

,
took it from the Turks on November 10 or to have opened

2 L/P&S/10/558, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 1/12/1914. Major
General Shaw arrived at Aden on November 26 and thereafter resumed
the duty as Resident and General Officer commanding Aden.
4 L/P&S/10/558, minute of India Office, 1/12/1914.
5 L/P&S/10/558,3/12/1914.
168
negotiations with the Arabs, before they have time to re-occupy
it, or asking them to hold it in our behalf. "1 However they
agreed with the Government of India that the present position
now was unfavourable as there were no troops available. The
to occupy Shaykh Said was, therefore dropped. 2

plan
But when the India Office was informed of the presence of
the Ottomans at Shaykh SaÌd, Crewe immediately telegraphed
Hardinge to ascertain definitely whether the Ottomans were
there or not. "If they are, and you cannot furnish troops, I will
approach War Office though at present it might not be easy for
them to detach any considerable force from Egypt. "3
Accordingly, Hardinge telegraphed London on December 13,
informing him of a report from Aden that there were 300
Ottoman regulars and two to three thousand Arabs at Shaykh
Said in addition to 250 regulars and 1,000 Arabs in support at
Mukhä. 4 However, the action proposed by Crewe was not
clear to the Viceroy as he stated "it is not clear what action
your proposal should be taken: whether you mean a permanent
occupation of that place or merely a raid such as that lately
made. "5 The Viceroy did not agree to the former, not only
because he certainly could not supply troops, but also due to
lack of drinking water, even if troops were found by Egypt. He
instead preferred a raid as this he thought he might be able to
carry out as five British Infantry Battalions including the
Lancashire Fusiliers from Aden would rendezvous at or near
I L/P&S/10/558, minute at India Office, 5/12/1914.

2 L/P&S/10/559, Government of India to Resident, 10/12/1914.
3 Hardinge Papers, 120, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy,
11/12/1914.
4 Admiralty 137/899,13/12/1914.
5 Ibid.
169
Aden for next naval escort homewards on December 14. This
force could be accompanied by part of the 23rd Pioneers from
Aden for demolition work but the latter must at once return to
Aden. Hardinge, however, did not see any permanent advantage
which would be obtained from a raid unless there were really
heavy guns to be destroyed and this he found difficult to
believe. 1
Shaw, the Resident, also did not agree with the proposal to
attack Shaykh Said. He argued that
from a political point of view if no

... it is
reinforcement can be expected I consider
objectionable by attacking Sheikh Said to chance
raising hostilities of Arabs in the Yemen because
Turks were enabled by the last bombardment to
take advantage of this to gave Arabs to understand
that British now clearly wished to annex Arabian
soil and proclaim Jehad against them. So far Arabs
generally have not received Jehad well and attitude
of Imam is not yet apparent. If we now attack
without reinforcements having been sent to Aden,
Protectorate will be rendered liable to attack by the
Turks who will probably be able to proclaim Jehad.
Present garrison at Aden being too weak to
undertake in support of protected Arabs any
2
effective action.
London, however, took a different view. In reply to
Hardinge, Crewe elcplained that he was strongly opposed to the
occupation of Shaykh Sa'Id and nor did he approve a military
similar to the last one which did not bring effective

raid
results. He therefore proposed to undertake a naval
bombardment and to station a small warship at -Perim to
to attack that 3
prevent any attempt place.
1 Admiralty 197/899,13/12/1914.
2 L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Government of India, 13/12/1914;
3 L/P&S/10/559, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 13/12/1914;
L/P&S/10/559, India Office to Aden, 14/12/1914.
170
The alternative proposal from London did not change the
views of the local authorities. Shaw, the Resident, believed that
a purely naval bombardment without combined naval and
military action would not bring any definite result. 1 The
Admiralty agreed to the proposal of the Resident and were
prepared to welcome a joint attack as apparently suggested by
the Resident. 2 However, due to the the

obstructive views of
Resident and the Viceroy, the India Office informed the
Admiralty that it was not expedient to take any aggressive
action against the Ottomans at Shaykh Said which would
with those views or with the policy they represented. 3

conflict
The movement of the Ottomans at Shaykh SaÌd prior to
the outbreak of war in South West Arabia was probably
connected with the operations against Egypt as these took place
simultaneously. It is possible that these two were planned as a
double offensive in an attempt to control the movement of the
British in the Red Sea. At Shaykh SaÌd the Ottomans were,
however, unable to launch any effective measures against
Perim as a result of the British action there. But the fort was
immediately reoccupied and preparations were made to hold it
for a combined action against Perim and Aden which took place
in June 1915.
1 L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Secretary of State for India, 15/12/1914;

Admiralty 197/899,15/12/1914; Admiralty 197/899, Admiralty to India
Office, 18/12/1914.
2 Admiralty 137/899, Admiralty to India Office, 18/12/1914.
3 Admiralty 137/899, India Office to Admiralty, 22/12/1914.
171
3.3 The Ottoman Movement towards the Aden
Protectorate
Since the beginning of the war, the British had practically
no reliable information on the plan and movements of the
Ottomans in the Yaman and the Aden Protectorate. This was
partly as a result of the withdrawal of the Political Officer from
Däli` in 1907, information on the affairs of the Protectorate came
thereafter primarily from the Àbdali Sultdn. Commenting on
the extended role of the Àbdall Sultdn for intelligence about
events in the Yaman, Bidwell remarked there seems no evidence
that either the military or the Residency made any strenuous
effort to obtain alternative sources of information: Wingate
sneered at the 'soi-distant intelligence people in Aden' and
marvelled 'how our old British Empire rills along as it does with
in high 1
the number of inefficient places'.
It was not surprising when it was first rumoured in the
hinterland that Muhammad Näsir b. Muqbil, gä'immaqäm of
(Commander at Mäwiyah: he was called by the

-Qamd'irah
British as the Mavia Shaykh) and Ahmad Nu`män, gä'imrnaqäm
of Hujariyah, with the Ottoman forces intended to invade Lahej
and warlike preparations such as transports and recruitment of
men were going on, that Jacob, as acting Resident, discredited
the idea that Lahej their 2 Subsequent

was objective. news was
reported by the AmIr of Däli` who hinted that the Ottomans and
the Arabs were preparing to make a move into the Protectorate.
1 Bidwell, op. cit., p. 174

2 R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letter, 21/11114; L/P&S/10/558, Viceroy to
Secretary of State for India, 17/11/1914.
172
He stated that an Ottoman staff officer had secretly visited
Qa'tabah and inspected the borders and that an expedition was
already on the move from San'd' with the object of advancing in
three directions: Mawiyah, al-Darayjah and Qa`tabah. The first
column was reported to have already arrived at Ibb. The
gä'immaqäm of Qa'tabah, Qd'id Sälih was furthermore reported
to have written to the YdfiÌ chiefs to join them in an attempt
to their way into the Protectorate. 1 This too did

pave not
convince Shaw, the new Resident, that the preparation was
a real threat to the protected tribes. He commented that "the
Turkish Arab forces were afraid we mean to make an
attack"; probably that he believed the tribes of the Aden
Protectorate would oppose them particularly the YdfiÌs. It was
only when the news was confirmed by the 'Abdall Sultan that
the Resident raised the matter officially. From the preparation
at Turba, Mdwiyah and Ibb, the Àbdall speculated that the
Ottomans might attempt to attack the Aden Protectorate from
three directions: first, Ahmad Nu`mdn would attack the
Subayhis from the right; Muhammad Näsir would attack al-
Darayjah from the centre; and Qd'id Sälih would attack Pali'
from the left. 2
In December of that year it was certain that about 10
battalions of the 7th Corps had moved southwards to Taìzz,
Shaykh Sa'Id. 3 Details the

Qa'tabah and of movements of
Ottoman forces were reported as follows: 800 Turks with 2,000

2 Ibid.
3 Admiralty, 137197,31/12/1914.
173
Arabs at Shaykh Said under Ahmad Nu`män; two regular
battalions at Mäwiyah under Muhammad Näsir; and 3,000
Turks and Arabs at Ibb. 1 In order to support effectively the
protectorate tribes or to attack Shaykh Said, the Resident
telegraphed the Viceroy that he required one brigade of
infantry. 2 In the the Àbdall Sultan

meantime reacted promptly
by recruiting mercenaries among the YäfiÌs and Àwlagis in an
to defend his Lahej. 3 To support this the

attempt capital, action,
Resident supplied 20,000 rounds of ammunition (Le Gras) to the
Àbdall Sultdn. 4
By the end of December 1914, the Viceroy was convinced
that the Ottomans were positively aiming at invading the
Protectorate. He therefore insisted on reinforcements possibly
from Egypt as he telegraphed the Secretary of State for India
mentioning that there was a
clear possibility of invasion of Hinterland, as

Turkish troops are assembling on Aden frontier.
Would it be possible in case of necessity to send
troops required for Aden from Egypt rather than
from India? We are not in a position to send,
reinforcements from India, except in case of extreme
5
urgency.
The Secretary of State replied that the War Office could not
definitely promise to send reinforcements to Aden from Egypt. 6
Two weeks later, the Viceroy doubted whether an invasion
would take place due to the latest information that the Ottoman
1 L/MIL/17/5/3954, War Diary 1/12/1914.

2 L/ M IL/17/5/3954, War Diary (Resident to Viceroy) 2/12/1914.
3 L/ M IL/17/5/3954, War Diary 8/12/1914.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3954, War Diary 12/12/1914.
5 L/MIL/17/5/3954, War Diary (Viceroy to Sec of State for India),
28/12/1914.
6 L/MIL/I7/5/3955, War Diary (Sec of State for India to Viceroy),
5/1/1915.
174
forces in South Yaman were much below strength and were
not concentrated. While acknowledging that troops could not be
sent from Egypt, the Viceroy decided that
we do not propose, in view of our more important

commitments in other places, to send reinforcements
from India to Aden, and, in the event of the Aden
Hinterland being invaded by the Turkish and Arab
troops, we shall merely instruct the General Officer
Commanding to defend the Aden Settlement. The
present garrison is, in our opinion, sufficient for
this purpose. 1
In the meantime diplomatic attempts were made by the
Ottomans to win over the Protectorate chiefs, as can be seen
by letters received by them. The policy of winning over the
Protectorate chiefs was carried through by various means
including the Imam and the Ottomans qVimmagäms in the
Yaman. According to an Arab source, in the early days of
the war, the Imam sent a letter to the 'Abdall Sultan at the
instigation of Mahmüd Nadim, the Ottoman Governor General, in
to bring the Sultan into the Ottoman camp. 2 The

an attempt
Imam's letter to the 'Abdall Sultan which contained the above
message is not, however, available in the British sources;
probably the Resident did not report the whole content of the
letter as he always submitted a summary, along with his
comment. The 'Abdall Sultan reported that on November 23, the
Imam wrote his first letter since the war, to the ÀbdalI,
expressing great friendship with the house of 'Abdall from
ancient time, and sought information regarding the treaty
between his ancestors and the British Government. But there
1 L/MIL/17/5/3955, War Diary, 15/1/1915.

2 'Abdall, Hadivat al-zaman p. 208.
,
1
175
was no report of any message from Mahmizd Nadim to the
Àbdall Sultan and there was no further report on the use of the
Imam to persuade the Àbdall Sultan. The Imam at this stage
apparently abstained from correspondence with the 'Abdall
Sultan and up to the middle of December, the Imam had not yet
replied to letters from the Residency, the Àbdall Sultan and
Àbdu'Lldh al-Mughirah, the pan-Arab emissary who was sent
from Egypt to Yaman. 1 The Sultan had earlier sent a letter to
the Imam informing him of the mistake committed by the
Ottomans in joining the war in which the Moslems would have
lä jamal. 2
no benefit -lä nägah wa
The gd'immaqdm of Hujariyah, Shaykh Ahmad Nu'man,
was very active in his attempt to win over the Protectorate
chiefs to the Ottoman side. In November 1914, the Residency
received a report through the Àbdall Sultan that the Subayhi
Shaykhs had received letters from Ahmad Nu`män inviting
to him. 3 In December 1914, the 'Aqrabl

them come and see
Shaykh received a letter from Ahmad Nu`mdn accusing the
English and inducing him to make common cause with the
the infidels. 4 Further reports from the

Ottomans against
Subayhis indicated that Ahmad Nu`mdn and other Ottoman
Shaykhs were trying their best to make an attempt to persuade
the Subayhis to join the Ottomans by offering them monthly
Shaw that this likely to happen. 5

stipends. commented was not
I L/P&S/10/558 & L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Viceroy, 17/12/1914.

2 'Abdall, Hadlyat a1-z2tman p. 208.
,
3 R/20/A/1319, Weekly Letter, 28/11/1914.
4 R/20/A/1319 & L/P&S/10/295, Weekly Letter, 5/12/1914.
5 R/20/A/1319, Weekly Letter, 26/12/1914.
176
It might be possible that some of the Subayhis, probably non-
stipendiaries, put forward these ideas in order to obtain
stipends from the British. At this stage the rest of the chiefs had
not been persuaded by the Ottomans.
The most effective course of action at this stage if not
material persuasion, would be the use of jihad. On November 7,
the Shaykh al-Isldm in Istanbul had issued the first stage of the
call to a jihäd which was declared to be the sacred duty to all
Moslems in the world, including those living under the rule of
Great Britain, France and Russia, to unite against those three
enemies of Islam; to take up arms against them and their allies;
and to refuse under all circumstances, even when threatened
with the death penalty, to assist the Government of the Entente
in their attack on the Ottoman Empire and its German and
Austro-Hungarian defenders. On November 8, the Ottoman
Sultan issued the second stage for the liberation of enslaved
Islam as well as in defence of the threatened Empire. Then on
November 23, the Ottoman Sultan issued the third and final call
to a jihad in to the Moslem World. ' A similar

a manifesto step
had also been taken by the Ottoman Shaykhs to invite the
protectorate chiefs to join them for the sake of jihad. An
Ottoman Shaykh al-Mashdyikh (the principal Shaykh) of Jubän
in Yaman, neighbouring the Ydfiì country, Shaykh Sälih al-
Ta'iri sent letters to all the `ägils in the Upper YdfiÌ, inviting
them to Jubän to discuss matters relating to the jihad. Some of
the chiefs were reported to have to see him 2

gone probably
1 Menahem Mansoor, Arab Worlds Political and Diplomatic History

62 I, Washington, 1972, November
, vol. p. 1914.
2 L/P&S/101295, Weekly Letter, 20/2/1915.
177
non-stipendiaries, but the majority remained uncertain.
Earlier, after the operation at Shaykh Sa'Id, Ahmad Nu`män
took the opportunity to attempt to persuade the Àbdali Sultan to
join on the basis of religion but obviously failed as the Sultan
remained pro-British. Letters of invitation to most of the chiefs

Ehe
.
of/I Protectorate had emphasised religious duty such as the letter
to the Àgrabi Shaykh, but this also failed. Hitherto there was
no report of co-operation among the stipendiary chiefs of the
Aden Protectorate with the Ottomans. The call for jihad as well
as religious persuasion was very much impaired by British
counter propaganda, which was not confined to the Aden
Protectorate but also spread in Yaman.
The Ottomans had also experienced difficulty in enlisting
the co-operation of the Arabs in Yaman. In the early days of the
war they required efforts from Shaykh Muhammad b. Näsir
Muqbil, the Ottoman gä'immaqdm of Qamä'irah, to recruit a
large force Lahej the 1 Ibn Näsir Muqbil

with as objective.
to be from Lahej. 2 to
appeared averse attacking and moved
arrange a pact with the Àbdali Sultan. The Sultan agreed and
the Resident immediately pursued the matter arguing that "we
cannot with certainty rely on Imam's desertion of Turks
because firstly, he receives Turkish stipend and is friendly with
Wali of Yaman; secondly, he counts upon Turkish soldiers to
overawe certain of his tribesmen who resented his alliance with
Turks and oppressors of the Yaman since 1872. "3 The question of
1 L/P&S/10/558, Resident's telegram, 16/11/1914.

3 L/P&S/10/558, & L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Viceroy, 17/12/1914.
178
the Mavia Shaykh soon appeared in the agenda of Arab policy
together with that of the Idrisl of Àsir and was discussed in
India and London.
The reluctance attitude of the Mavia Shaykh to co-operate
with the Ottomans had undoubtedly effected the plan to move
into the Protectorate, which had to be deferred at least for some
time. The Ottomans, however, seemed to be certain about their
plan to move to the Protectorate when at the end of January
1915, it was reported that the Ottomans had moved their
headquarters from San`ä' to Ta'izz, and their forces were
distributed as follows: 1/5th of the Turks with 2,000 Arabs at
Radä'; 1/5th with 1,000 Arabs at Qa'tabah; 2/5th with 1,500
Arabs at Ta'izz, and 1/5th with 200 Arabs at Shaykh Sa1d. 1 This
move undoubtedly brought pressure on the chiefs of the
Protectorate who requested assistance in arms and ammunition
for self defence in the event of being attacked. 2 The Resident
then asked the Government of India for authorisation to issue
assistance to them, and this was sanctioned. 3

military
The Resident anticipated that following the transfer of the
headquarters to Ta'izz, an attack on the Protectorate was
imminent. The military officials in India, however, thought
that the Ottoman movements indicated a defensive rather than
an offensive policy. They observed that the Ottomans had
earlier concentrated their main strength at Shaykh SaÌd
because they feared a renewed attack on that place. But when
no attack was made, the Ottomans might then fear a British
1 L/MIL/17/5/3955, War Diary 15/1/1915.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3955, War Diary 30/1/1915.
3 Ibid.
179
offensive elsewhere and therefore their recent relocation of
troops was aimed at that purpose. '
The view of the military officials in India who believed
that the Ottoman policy was rather defensive, proved to be
inaccurate when early in February the Ottomans moved across
the border into places, al-Baydä and Pali'. About February 1,
the Ottomans, with a strength of 400 Turks and 1,000 Arabs,
crossed the border, near Pali`, and on February 7, a small
number of them numbering about 100 Turks and 300 Arabs
occupied Jabal Jihdf, a strong position in the territory of
Pali'. The main body, numbering probably 300 Turks and 700
Arabs, were camped near Sanah, seven miles from Pali' within
the territory of the Protectorate. 2 Consequently, Shaw
recommended that a British force of one brigade of infantry and
one mountain battery should be sent to Pali'. He believed that an
advance of the British would lead the tribes to fight in defence
of their interests. He argued that "since the Turks crossed the
frontier, and it is now imperative for British prestige among
our protected tribes that the British should take action and lead
them against Turks and not to leave it to Mavia, a Turkish
Arab (who recently agreed to fight the Ottomans) to do. "3
Concurrently with the, incursion at Pali', a small number of
Ottoman and Imamic troops attacked the Maldjim, a tribe under
the Baydä Sultan, north east of the Protectorate. The Resident
reacted immediately by sending 25,000 rounds of ammunition as
1 L/MIL/17/5/3956, War Diary 1/2/1915.

2 L/P&S/10/559, Resident to viceroy, 6/2/1915; L/MIL/17/5/3956, War
Diary, 2,13, & 15/2/1915.
3 L/P&S/10/559, Viceroy to India Office, 8/2/1915; L/MIL/17/5/3956, War
Diary, 7/2/1915.
180
requested by the Sultän. 1 As a result joint from
of resistance
the tribesmen of Baydä and Àwdhali, the Ottomans 2

withdrew.
The advance of the Ottomans across the frontier was
considered a blow to the British reputation among the protected
tribes unless appropriate action was taken. At the India Office it
was remarked that it
will be forced upon our tribes to choose who they

will serve. To these tribes we have distributed
certain scraps of paper extending to them the
gracious favour and protection of H. M. the King
Emperor. That they will not side with the party
that betrays his weakness by not keeping his word
is a reasonable conjecture; and if they join the
Turks it is certain that in a short time we shall be
shut up in Aden. The effect of that on the whole
Arab be deplorable. 3
question will
The India Office supported the view of the Resident that the
time had come for reinforcements as financing and arming the
Mavia Shaykh was no real substitute at that juncture. The
Viceroy, however, moved to subsidise chiefs inside and on the
borders of the Protectorate, including the Mavia, and a sum of
Rs 75,000 was placed at the disposal of the Resident for that
purpose. The Viceroy repeatedly acknowledged that no
reinforcements either permanent or temporary could be sent
from India in the disorder. 4

except case of extreme
At this juncture the Home authorities decided that they
could not provide permanent reinforcements for Aden. As for
temporary reinforcement, they believed, this could be spared
1 L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Viceroy, 3/2/1915; L/MIL/17/5/3956, War

Diary, 3/2/1915.
2 L/MIL/17/5/3956, War Diary, 15/2/1915.
3 L/P&S/10/559, India Office's note, (no date).
4 L/P&S/10/559,12/2/1915; L/MIL/17/5/3956, War Diary, 10/2/1915.
181
from East Africa or Egypt with the approval of the War Office.
The objection to a merely temporary reinforcement of the Aden
garrison, preferred by the Home authorities, was that even if
the Ottomans were driven out of the British territory, they
would probably again invade it after the withdrawal of the
British troops from the area. The officials on the spot believed
that the effect of the British advance in the first place on the
tribesmen and local chiefs would be to stimulate tribal
resistance to the Ottomans while they expected that the British
would advance to their assistance whenever they required.
It was not surprising therefore that the Amirl tribesmen
rendered their submission to the Ottomans when they did not
expect that the British would advance to the hills in the
Protectorate. To other tribes on the border, though they were
supplied by the Resident with arms and ammunition, they
pleaded their powerlessness against the Ottomans with guns,
unless the British advanced to their assistance. The troops in
Aden were only strong enough to protect the Settlement and
none could be spared to assist the tribes who were nominally
under the British protection.
Consequently the alternative measures to repel the
Ottomans in the Protectorate as well as in the Yaman rested
upon the policy of raising the Arab movement. The following
months saw the Mavia Shaykh and the IdrIsi supported with
arms and money. An agreement with the Mavia Shaykh was
made on February 19,1915 and this was followed by the
agreement with the Idrisi on May 20,1915.
182
3.4 The Ottoman Occupation of Lahej
After their occupation of the hilly territory of the AmIr of
Däli` early in February 1915, the Ottomans made no further
movements into the lowland of the Protectorate though there
was no sign of any counter attack from the British or the
tribes. The Indian authorities on the other hand had no troops
to spare as reinforcements for Aden in order to drive the
Ottomans from that hill. Furthermore, the Aden Movable
Column was instructed not to proceed to the hills to avoid any
entanglement with the Ottomans there.
At the end of February it appeared that the Ottoman
strength in the vicinity of Däli` was less than previously
estimated, and they were reported to be scattered along the
frontier from Qa`tabah to Shaykh SaÌd with no particularly
1 This indicated that the

large concentration at any point.
event in the vicinity of Däli` was not the Ottoman main
advance which gave hope to the British effort of supporting the
Mavia Shaykh who signed an agreement in February 1915.
It was not surprising that due to the inactivity of the
Ottomans, the Resident proposed, on February 17, to send 200 of
his men tö- capture the Kamardn Islands, following a report
that a large money remittance, mails and telegrams of the
Ottomans wer e passing through Ji ddah to their headquarters in
Yaman to dhows being 2 Although

which small were used.
London agreed to the Resident's proposal, the Government of
1 Cf. appendix II, p. 378.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3956, War Diary, 17/2/1915.
183
India, however, "adhered to their opinion that Kamaran Islands
should not be occupied as it might irritate Arabs and stir them
to fresh efforts against Aden besides forming an undesirable
detachment"1 and the plan was accordingly deferred.
Meanwhile, the Government of India, who probably believed in
the possibility of the advance of the Ottomans, decided an March
23 to take. the opportunity to disembark the four companies of
Sunni Muslims of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry in an attempt
to reinforce the garrison at Aden. The headquarters of the 126th
battalion, together with the two Sikh Companies, the two
Hazara Companies and the maxim gun section were however, to
to Bushire Muscat. 2
proceed and
The Colonial Office, who perhaps believed that Aden was
secured due to the uncertainty of the Ottoman plans in Yaman,
proposed in April 1915 to request the use of 600 Indian Infantry
of the Aden Garrison for temporary service in Somaliland and
by the India Office. 3 The Viceroy that

this was agreed replied
Aden to furnish the troops. 4 India's

was unable above protest
against sending the troops was however over-ruled by the
Home Government, and it was therefore agreed to send two
Sunni Companies of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry and four
the 109th Infantry. 5 The troops did

Companies of not go to
Somaliland as the plan was deferred temporarily.
The change of the Ottoman headquarters from San'd' to
Ta'izz in January 1915 might have brought some pressure on the
1 L/MIL/17/5/3957, War Diary, 10/3/1915 & 12/3/1915.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3957, War Diary, 23/3/1915.
3 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 10/4/1915.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 12/4/1915.
5 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 15/4/1915.
184
Mavia Shaykh in his undertaking to oust the Ottomans from the
area, particularly when the bulk of the Ottoman forces had
moved there. Moreover the Ottomans appeared to have adopted
an offensive policy when they occupied Jabal Jihäf early in
February 1915. However, in early April, news reached the
Residency that all hostile Arabs and Turks would soon be driven
from the vicinity of Jabal Jihäf and Däli`. The Resident assumed
that this due-to the the Mavia Shaykh. 1 Since

was efforts of
there was no confirmation of the above news, the military
officials in India considered that Mavia's operation against the
had 2 At the
Ottomans not yet produced much effect. end of April
the Resident began to doubt the co-operation of the Mavia when
he was reported to be present with the Governor-General and
Sa'Id Pasha at al-Jalilah, north of Däli` and within the Amirl
territory, which was occupied by 70 Turks and 300 Arabs. The
Resident who now believed that the Mavia might join the
Ottomans in a plan to attack Lahej, recommended no removal
troops from Aden for in Somaliland. 3 This

of operations was
agreed by the Secretary of State for India, who advised
postponement of the operations until all danger of attack on the
Aden Protectorate, Lahej, was over. 4

namely
In May, 1915 it was clear that the Mavia was
unable to undertake the responsibilities in accordance with the
agreement. He alternatively offered to secure the capture of the
1 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 12/4/1915.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 19/4/1915.
3 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 23/4/1915.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3958, War Diary, 28/4/1915.
185
Governor-General of Yaman, but this project too he abandoned,
and instead requested the British to send troops to Shaykh Sa'Id,
or DAli'. 1
al-Darayjah
The inactivity of the Mavia Shaykh led the Resident to
drop him as an active factor in the expulsion of the Ottomans
who at that moment had occupied the commanding height at al-
JalIlah and had a custom house at Sanah, both in the territory
of the British Protectorate. The Resident then advocated more
active measures otherwise, he argued, "our prestige there and
throughout the Hinterland must greatly suffer: for while on the
one hand the Turks are seen active and encroaching, we on the
other hand, are apparently oblivious and indifferent. «2 The
Resident again repeated his proposal to move to the Qäli' plateau
and planned to hold a position around Nubat Dukaym at the
road junction from Mäwiyah and Oalabah in order to support
the troops at I)Ali'. For this he required reinforcement of at
least one battalion.
The Government of India considered the Resident's
proposal to move to Qäli' as inadvisable and he was informed
that no reinforcement could be spared. As regards the damage to
the prestige of the British Government following the incursion of
the Ottomans into the Protectorate, they argued that It was
upon the success of the armies in the main theatre of operations
rather than upon local demonstrations that the prestige of the
British Government depended. This was agreed by the India
Office. 3
1 R/20/A/3966 & L/P&S/10/559,3/5/1915; L/MIL/17/5/3959, War Diary,

5/5/1915.
2 R/20/A/3966 & L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Viceroy, 3/5/1915.
3 R/20/A/3966, Strnia to Aden, 14/5/: 915.
186
Earlier in a telegram to the Secretary of State, the Viceroy
argued that "hitherto attitude of Turks has been inert and their
violation of Protectorate has been of a nominal character,
furthermore forces at their disposal are not numerically strong
enough without energetic Arab co-operation, of which there is
no indication to seriously threaten safety of Aden Protectorate. "l
As regards the proposal of the Secretary of State to reinforce
Aden with the Nepalese troops, the Viceroy argued that
from the present information received by us from

Resident at Aden there is indication that the
troops now stationed at Aden are sufficiently
strong to cope with any attack by Turks which is
likely to be made on Lahej. In any case Government
of India can not see their way to spare Nepalese
troops; moreover these troops would not prove
suitable for the duty required of them. Apart from
this fact however we have at request of Nepalese
Prime Minister given him what is practically a
pledge that Government of India will not despatch
Nepalese troops for services 2
overseas.
This too was agreed by the India Office.
Meanwhile the Ottomans seemed to be continuing their
efforts to prepare for an advance in the Protectorate. The
Governor-General accompanied by the Commander of the 7th
Army Corps, had made a tour which lasted for six weeks along
the Protectorate border, and had interviewed the principal
Shaykhs of the area and taken hostages as guarantee for co-
operation. However there was no main concentration along the
border except at Shaykh SaÌd and Muza. Consequently 'the
military officials in India doubted the intended invasion of the
Aden Protectorate. 3
1 L/MIL/17/5/3959, War Diary, 10/5/1915.

2 Ibid.
3 L/MIL/17/5/3959, War Diary, 17/5/1915.
187
The Ottomans, diplomatically, appeared to be prepared to
move to Lahej when in Jumada al-akhir 1333 AD (April/May
1915) the Governor-General, Mahmad Nadim sent his
representatives see the Àbdali Sultan or his emissary. The
representatives were Muhammad Näsir Muqbil the Mavia
Shaykh; Qä41 Abd al-Rahmän, Qädi of the Liwa of Ta'izz;
Ahmad Nu`män, Qä'immagäm of Hujariyah; Sälih al-Tä'irl,
Shaykh al-Mashäyikh of Jubän; and Qd'id Sälih, gä'immaqäm
of Qa'tabah. They met the Sultan's envoy, Muhsin Fadl, in the
Hawshabi country and persuaded him to sign an agreement
with the Ottomans. A letter from Mahmüd Nadim was also
submitted which indicated that the arrangement to come to
terms with the 'Abdall Sultan was made earlier through letters
from the Imam Qädl Àbd al-Rahmdn. 1 These letters and

and
the meeting are not available in the British sources.
Apart from the above arrangements, towards the end of
May, there was news on the mobilisation of troops towards
Qa'tabah and Ta'izz. The Officer Commanding at Perim
.confirmed the news when he reported that 150 Turks remained
Shaykh Sa'Id, while the rest (about 1,600) had left on 25 May
at
for Ta'izz. 2 A few days later, one battalion the Ottomans,

of
who were recently concentrated at Ta'izz, were reported to
have moved northward as a result of the Idrisi's action against
Lulzayyah. However, another battalion was reported to have
to Mäwiyah. 3
moved
The Aden Residency was suspicious of the movement of the
Ottomans southwards. Early in June the Hawshabi Sultdn
'Abdall, Hadiyat al-zaman, pp. 209-210.

_
2 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 31/5/1915.
3 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 8/5/1915.
188
reported the news of the arrival of the Ottomans at Mdwiyah.
They were variously estimated from two to six battalions which
the Resident believed to be an exaggeration. Nevertheless, as a
precautionary step, the Àbdali Sultan sent his troops to Nubat
Dukaym, 1 day's Lahej. The

about one march, north of troops
concentrated at Mäwiyah were further reported to have moved
to al-Darayjah, and the Residency expected that they had
arrived there since June 12.2 Accordingly an interview was held
with the Àbdali Sultan and the Resident decided to send the
Camel troop of the Aden troop to support the Àbdali. This troop
would be moved to Lahej on June 14.3 This was approved by
the Indian 4 The Resident First

authorities. made various moves.
the Camel troop despatched to Nubat Dukaym, 5 but they

was
were withdrawn later to Lahej when it was considered they
were too far advanced at Nubat Dukaym owing to it numerical
weakness. The Resident then sent out to Lahej the Pony Troops
of the Aden Troop to support the Camel Troop and they both
acted as a Reserve to the 'Abdall Sultan. An intelligence officer
to Lahej. 6 The Resident

and an artillery officer was also sent
also decided to send out the Movable Column if it proved
necessary, but he preferred to delay the movement, due to the
great heat, until the last possible moment.?
1 R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letter, 12/6/1915; L/MIL/17/5/3960, War

Diary, 12/6/1915.
2 Al-Darayjah is in the HawshabI country on the route from Aden to
Ta'izz, about 60 miles from Aden.
3 R/20/A/3966, Resident to Secretary of State for India, 13/6/1915.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 13/6/1915.
5 Nubat Dukaym is 34 miles (3 stages) from Shaykh Ùthman. Lahej is
15 miles from the latter place.
6 R/20/A/3966, G. O. G Aden to C. G. S. Simla, 17/6/15; L/MIL/17/5/3960,
War Diary, 14/6/1915.
7 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 14/6/1915.
189
The Government of India however required exact reasons
from the Resident which made him consider it imperative to
send the Camel troop to support the Sultdn. They were anxious
that on no account should the force be entangled in operations
in the hills which might necessitate further troops being sent to
extricate it or to avoid a defeat. They, however, instructed the
Resident to be in readiness at a moment's notice. Even if the
Resident had definite information that the Ottomans were about
to debouch from the hills on to Lahej, he was ordered not to go
beyond Shaykh Ùthmän without previous sanction from the
Government India. 1 In reply the Resident stated that "The

of
Camel Troop, Aden Troop was despatched because our
representatives who went out to meet the Abdali Sultan on the
border considered that the Abdali Sultan was very alarmed,
firstly on account of the Turkish concentration at Mavia, which
he said, on account of his friendship with us, was directed
solely against him and secondly on account of his doubts of how
much the British Government intended to do for him. "2 It was
on political grounds that the Resident considered that a move'
was necessary in order to assure the Sultän that the British
would meet his request which he had repeatedly put forward.
The reported advance of the Ottomans on al-Darayjah was
reported to India as related to the shelling of Perim on June 13.
The Indian authorities believed that the action at Perim was
probably aimed at distracting attention from the movement in
south-east of Mäwiyah, and therefore intended to divert some of
1 R/20/A/3966, Simla to Aden, 15/6/1915.

2 R/20/A/3966, Aden to Simla, 17/6/1915.
190
the British troops from Aden to Shaykh SaÌd. The Viceroy
described the dilemma of the Indian authorities to the Secretary
of State asking whether they should send troops to Shaykh Said
from Aden which undoubtedly would weaken the Aden
Garrison, and in the event of an attack on Lahej, render them
unable to defend the Àbdali Sultan. Or, if they refrained from
any action at Shaykh Sa'Id, it would result in the alienation of
Arab sympathy and damage to British prestige. The Viceroy
believed that this was the plan of the German advisers in the
Yaman who had deliberately prepared this dilemma for the
British. The Indian authorities accordingly recommended that
combined operations with the Admiralty would be appropriate
for the action, and because India could not provide troops, they
troops be sent from Egypt. 1 The Secretary

recommended should
of State replied that the Admiralty had deferred their decision,
pending receipt of a report from "Northbrook" which was
reconnoitring Shaykh Said. The report was delayed due to
2
misty weather.
The Viceroy's apprehension which was based on the
intelligence of the military officials was misplaced. The latest
information from the Resident showed that no Ottoman troops
had crossed the hinterland from Mdwiyah, the move which
was believed earlier to be concerted with the action at Perim.
There were only 400 Turks at Mdwiyah, and the greater portion
Ottoman forces in Hujariyah. 3 The Resident

of the were still
therefore believed that the original intention of a forward
1 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, Viceroy to Secretary State for India,

16/6/1915.
2 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 21/6/1915.
3 Ibid..
191
movement from Mäwiyah on Lahej had been checked by the
British occupation of Kamarän, Zuqar and Hanish Islands
in June, 1 which
early caused a diversion and induced them to
hurry troops to Shaykh Said. He also expected that the
Ottomans now anticipated an attack on Shaykh SaÌd in
for their bombardment 2

retaliation of Perim.
Hitherto the military officials in India were of opinion that
although the Ottomans were reported to have received
reinforcements from Syria and the Hijäz, the situation did not
seem to warrant anxiety. They further believed that though not
strong enough to move into the hills, the Aden Movable Column
I- should be capable of protecting Lahej and of preventing the
Ottomans from debouching from the hills. 3
On June 29, the Àbdali Sultan reported that a force about
1000 Turks, 10 guns and some Arabs intended to leave Mdwiyah
for al-Darayjah and Lahej on July 1. At al-Darayjah there
were already 200 Turks, some Arabs and 2 guns. Accordingly,
an intelligence Officer and Colonel Jacob were sent to Lahej to
check the Sultan's information following previous information
furnished by him having been found to be unreliable. The
Resident proposed that should the report be confirmed, he would
send the Movable Column on July 1 to Shaykh Ùthmdn and to
Feyash the day, 4 and this was It the

next approved. was at
discretion of the Resident to operate as necessary for the defence
of Lahej, provided that the Movable Column did not become
1 Baldry, "British Naval Operations against Turkish Yaman 1914-1919",

Arabica, vol. 23, pp. 163-4.
2 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 28/6/1915.
3 Ibid.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 29/6/1915.
192
in the foothills. 1 The the intended
entangled report of advance
to Mäwiyah was discovered to be unreliable, and therefore the
Resident cancelled the plan to move to Shaykh Ùthmdn. 2
Meanwhile the Indian authorities expressed their concern about
the contradictory information furnished by the Resident within
a short period of time.
The Resident, however, received reliable information at 8
p. m. on July 2, which stated that the main body of the Ottoman
troops from Mdwiyah had reached al-Darayjah and the
advanced guard had reached Mileh. Another column under Àbd
al-Qddir Nu`mdn, new gä'immaqdm of Hujariyah (after the
death of Abmad Nu`mdn), had reached Habil Masweda by the
wadi Akkan route. The Resident decided that he should
the Movable Column July 3, to Shaykh 'Uthman. 3

move out on
The next day, July 3, the Resident telegraphed that Nubat
Dukaym was occupied by the Ottomans and the Àbdall
mercenaries had dispersed after a second demonstration by the
300 men Anad. 4

Ottomans at Tannan, leaving only at al
On July 3,1915, the Viceroy telegraphed the Secretary of
State about reports of the advance of Ottoman troops from
Mdwiyah into the Aden Protectorate. The telegram further
stated that "these have now arrived at Addareja...... Their
numbers were approximately 600 Turks, 400 Arabs with 8
5 Hirtzel, Political Secretary at the India Office, described

guns.
the move as the Ottoman main advance because the position
1 L/MIL/17/5/3960, War Diary, 30/6/1915.

2 Ibid.
3 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 2/7/1915.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 3/7/1915; L/P&S/10/559,517/1915;
R/20/A/4044,30/7/15.
193
of al-Darayjah was on the route from Ta'izz, the Ottomans new
headquarters, to Aden. 1
Further details concerning the Ottoman military
operations towards Lahej came to light after the capture of
Major Rauf Bey, the commander of a brigade which took part in
the occupation of Lahej. He reported that on Thursday, July 1,
1915, three battalions of his Brigade and three others of Husnl
Bey's Brigade left Mdwiyah and arrived the same day at al-
Darayjah. On Friday, July 2, the troops arrived at Musaymir.
On Saturday, they were at Nubat Dukaym and on Sunday July
4, Rauf arrived at Lahej with one of his own battalions and
from Uusnl Bay's Brigade. 2

three
On their way to Lahej the Ottoman forces only met
in Nubat Dukaym and Lahej. At al-Darayjah in the

opposition
Hawshabl and at Musaymir, its capital, the Ottoman

country
forces were not opposed but instead received co-operation from
the Hawshabls and the Subayhls who took part in the
Nubat Dukaym. 3 The dispersal of the ÀbdalI's

attack on
there left the road open to the Ottoman force to

mercenaries
15 miles. 4
advance to Lahej, a distance of only
On July 3, the Aden Movable Column with a strength of
350 British Territorial Infantry and 500 Indian Infantry was
from Aden to Lahej, in an attempt to support the 'AbdalI

sent
Sultdn's mercenaries at Tannan. On the evening of the same day
the Aden Column reached Shaykh 'Uthmdn and made a forced
1 L/P&S/10/559, A1-Darayjah is in the FlawshabI country on the route

from Aden to Ta'izz, about 60 miles from Aden
3 Àbdall, Hadlvat al-zaman, p. 216.
4 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 3/7/1915.
194
march to Lahej, starting at 3 am on July 4, by the shortest
route over the sand in order to protect Lahej, if possible, after
hearing the Sultän's mercenaries had dispersed Tannan. 1 By

at
July 4, part of the Movable Column, about 250 British and
Indian Infantry with a battery of 10-pounder-guns (estimated
by the Resident), arrived at a position just north of Lahej
they were able to support the Àbdall Sultdn's force (now

where
apparently only 300 strong), and the Aden troop. Bradshaw
reported that owing to the heavy going, lack of water, and
300 men (a little

fierce heat at that time of the year, only more
than the Resident's report) were able to reach Lahej by 5 p. m.
on July 4.2
At 4 p. m. July 4, the Aden troops reported the presence of
Ottoman force at 600 Turks (including cavalry),

an estimated
with 4 field guns, machine guns and large contingent of Arabs.
As this force was advancing, the Aden troop fell back at 4 p. m.
on the Lahej position. The position faced north and was held by
all the troops who had been able to reach Lahej. At 5.30 they
were first attacked by the Ottomans. At the first sound of firing
the British camel transport (consisting of only 4 camel 10

whole
to reach Lahej, deserted. 3 These

pounder guns) who were able
troops, however, maintained their position until 10 p. m.. under
the fire of the Ottoman artillery. By this time the northern
edge of Lahej, on which the Ottoman fire had been partially
directed, was observed to be on fire. During the night, hostile
1 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary 3/7/1915 & 5/7/1915; R/20/A/4044,

,
Bradshaw's report, 30/7/1915.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
195
attacks from the west were beaten off with some hand to hand
fighting taking place. Some parties of the Ottoman forces, which
had penetrated Lahej from the north, continued practically
throughout the night to attack with shell and rifle firing at
the hospital which was situated in a garden to the south of the
town.
Meanwhile the remaining British and Indian troops who,
due to lack of water, had been unable to reach Lahej, were
collected to cover the 15th pounder battery which because of the
deep sand and lack of extra camel transport had found it
impossible to advance by 7 p. m. beyond a point about four and
half miles south of Lahej. At 12 midnight this supporting force
was withdrawn to cover the water supply at Bir Nasr, two
further (six from Lahej). 1

miles south miles
Shaw, the Resident gave orders to withdraw the forces at
Lahej to Bir Nasr and to retire further to Shaykh Ùthmdn,
owing to inability to hold on to their positions in face of a larger
force of Turks and Arabs and superior shell fire. He explained
that
owing to the desertion of all transport and camel
men, and the treachery of our Arab friendlies, the
troops in Lahej were no longer able to maintain
their position in face of and under shell fire of the
superior forces of Turks and Arabs, I ordered this
force to use all available transport for the removal
of the sick and wounded, and to withdraw to the
water at Bir Nasr. The withdrawal was carried out
at 5 am. on 5th, but owing to the necessity of using
the only available means of transport for carrying
the wounded and sick, three quarter of ammunition,
all kits and equipment together with 2 10-pounder-
guns and some 450 machine guns were abandoned at
Lahej. I left Bir Nasr at 9 30 am. and, in view of
the fact that our troops were suffering very
severely from the great shortness of water, and
food, withdrew the force to the next water supply
1 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 3&5/7/1915; R/20/A/4044, Bradshaw's

report, 30/7/1915.
196
at Bir Amr. The enemy did not follow up the
retirement which was continued at 4 p. m.. Sheikh
Uthman being reached 9 am. on July 6.1
The next day, July 7, the Resident reported that the
Ottomans, who had the strength of 8 battalions and 20 guns, had
intended to attack Aden on July 9. The Resident was of the
opinion that
owing to reduction of numbers of my force through

excessive heat, and loss of ammunition and
equipment through desertion of transport, it is
impossible at this season to defend the long line
necessary to protect Sheikh Uthman from all sides
without thereby unduly exposing Aden, which is of
Imperial importance. For these reasons I have
withdrawn into the Aden defence, and placed an
outpost line extending from the Cavalry lines to
Khur Maksar Bridge, supported by HM ships Minto,
Northbrook, Empress of Asia, and Empress of Russia
in order to protect Admiralty wireless station,
which I believe is thought second only to defence of
Aden. 2
The withdrawal from Shaykh Ùthmän enabled many Subayhl
and Fadli clans to arrive there for the purpose of looting before
the arrival of the Ottoman force.
Meanwhile the 'Abdall Sultan left Hawtah, the city, on
Monday July 5 before dawn, but was mistaken for an enemy
and shot by the Indian Infantry. He was taken back to his
palace and left Lahej for Aden in the morning, July 5. On July
13, he died in Aden after an operation. There were 72 casualties
among the British and Indian forces, of which 7 were killed,
3
20 were wounded and 29 died of heat stroke.
1 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 7/7/1915.

2 Ibid.
3 R/20/A/4044, Bradshaw's report, 30/7/1915; R/20/A/3966, Shaw's
report, 6/7/1915.
197
GA'T H
(February operation)
nah 13.2.1915
Jabal Jihaf
TA'IZ WIAH 1 xU,
(The Ottoman new HQ) (J e/July ope ion)
Darayjah 1.7.1915
'.
Musaymir 2.7.1915
1 \Tannan
HUJARIYAH
Nubat Dukaym 3.7.1915
4.7.1915
17.7.1915
PE
13.6.1915
Map showing the occupation of Lahej.
198
After the defeat at Lahej, the Viceroy accordingly
telegraphed the Secretary of State on July 8, proposing to take
the following steps: first, to reoccupy Lahej in order to restore
British prestige amongst the Arabs who were now all hostile;
second, to reinstate the 'Abdali Sultdn, and third, to reopen
communication with the hinterland. To achieve that, the
Viceroy estimated that at least one brigade of infantry, one
regiment of cavalry and one field of mountain battery, in
addition to the troops available at Aden, were required. The
Viceroy who could not provide Aden with these troops,
requested that they should be supplied from Egypt. He further
requested that "the brigade we would select is Younghusband's,
and we ask that it may be sent. We require, in any case, the
service of Younghusband himself to relieve General Shaw as
General Officer Commanding and Resident at Aden, as we are no
longer prepared to entrust the important Imperial interest
at Aden to the latter's charge, our confidence in him having
been so shaken by the events reported.... "1 The Viceroy was
informed that Kitchener agreed to send General Younghusband's
Brigade to Aden temporarily. 2
On July 15, General Sir George Younghusband took over as
General Officer Commanding and Resident. The next day he
expressed his views that "I do not recommend any further
military operations at this season, partly on account of great
heat, but mainly because it seems unwise to risk becoming
involved in military and political prestige I am advised that it
1 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 8/7/1915.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 9/7/1915.
199
will be necessary to send a force to Lahej and the hinterland at
a suitable season, but this is a matter which can wait. "1 To
achieve the latter course, Younghusband suggested that two
strong brigades were required for an advance on Lahej. One
brigade should then be left at Lahej in garrison. This course of
action was favoured by the military officials in India. On July
21, Shaykh Ùthmdn was reoccupied. It was only occupied by
the Ottomans for four days from July 17.2 The above position
remained up to the end of the war.
To sum up, the Ottoman forces in the Yaman succeeded in
their operation at Lahej; first, owing to the co-operation of the
Protectorate tribes with the Ottomans at Lahej. Second, the
'Abdall Sultdn's troops, who mainly recruited from the
tribesmen of Ydfiìs, 'Awlaqls and Fadlis, failed to check the
movement of the Ottoman forces, due to their lack of discipline
the circumstance that they were mercenaries. But

and perhaps
the key reason for their failure was insufficient assistance from
the British. Only a small number of the British and Indian
Infantry were able to reach Lahej and therefore failed to protect
the city from the attack of a better equipped and larger Ottoman
force-3 The reason for their failure to reach Lahej with full
was, according to Shaw and Bradshaw, the intense

strength
heat. It can be argued, however, that the Resident's decision to
delay the mobilisation of the Column, owing to the absence of a
reliable information, was a mistake. Bradshaw

prompt
1 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 17/7/1915 & 21/7/1915.

2 Ibid.
3 Bidwell described that the British position was made worse by the
fact that the Arab camel driver. who had all the spare ammunition,
water and, food had deserted. Many of them were SubayhIs, delighted
at the chance of revenge on the 'AbdalI Sultan. Cf. Bidwell, "The Turkish
Attack on Aden 1915-18", Arabian Studies V1, p. 177.
, no:
200
described that after receiving news of the dispersal of the
Abdali's troops at Nubat Dukaym, the troops were forced to
march to Lahej; from Shaykh Ùthmän by the shortest route
over the sand, which was practically devoid of water, in order,
if possible, to protect Lahej. Consequently, the majority of the
Column numbering from 550 to 600, and the 15-pounder battery
were unable to reach Lahej, owing to lack 1 But

of water. even
if the Column had arrived in full strength in good time it is
doubtful if, with their armament, they could resist the advance
of a superior Ottoman force. The main reason for the Ottoman
success was the refusal of London to reinforce Aden. London
was prepared to sacrifice the Aden protectorate in the interest
of operations elsewhere.
1 Gavin also doubts that the intense heat was a main reason for the
failure of the Aden troops at Lahej.
201
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ADEN PROTECTORATE DURING THE
WAR
4.1 THE EARLY DAYS OF WAR
At the outbreak of war with Germany and Austria, the
Aden Residency informed all the chiefs in the Protectorate
apparently to gauge their attitude towards Britain. Not
surprisingly, letters were received from most of the
Protectorate chiefs expressing their loyalty to the British, and
their 1 The Àbdall Sultdn, for instance, who

offering services.
was always ahead of the rest of the Protectorate chiefs,
staunchly replied to the Resident, pronouncing his readiness to
render every assistance and place his lives in the cause of
the least hint from the Resident. 2

success on receiving
When war was declared with the Ottomans on November

a
5,1914, the Arabs of the Aden Protectorate were inAdilemma,
to abide by the agreements with the British, or to side

.either
their fellow Muslims, and they became a continuous target of
intrigue throughout the war. At Aden the situation was rather
different, Immediately after news of the entrance of the
Ottomans into the war reached the people of Aden, a resolution
was at once passed by Shams al-ùlamä', Sayyid Àbdu'Lläh
Àidrüs, the Mansab of Aden, expressing the stance of the
Muslims in Aden in favour of the British, 3 though prayers
1 L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letter, 22/8/1914 & 31/10/1914.

3 L/P&S/10/519, Aden Weekly Letter, 7/11/1914.
202
continued to be said for the Ottoman Sultan in Àidrüs and
Jawahl mosques at Aden until the end of July 1918,1 only
a few months before the war ended. Surprisingly, all the
Protectorate chiefs also continued to remain loyal to the British
they disapproved the the Ottomans. 2 This

and action of case
remained true only in the early days of the war.
The British and the Ottomans were again on race to win
over the Arabs in the Protectorate. The Àbdall Sultan, who was
much more pro-British than the other chiefs as British policy
made him the centre of their influence, was put to use to take a
leading part in encouraging the rest of the Protectorate chiefs to
stay loyal to the British. In December 1914, the 'Abdall Sultan,
at the instigation of the Resident, sent letters to all the sultans,
chiefs and shaykhs of the Arabs, the friends of Great Britain in
the Peninsula of Arabia in an attempt to induce them to comply
their treaty the British Government. 3 This

with with move was
obviously taken following the British action at Shaykh SaÌd
which took place in early November. In response, Ahmad
Nu`män, the Ottoman gä'immaqäm of Hujariyah, sent a letter
to the Àbdall Sultdn apparently to protest against the British
action at Shaykh SaÌd as an indication of their desire to efface
Islam, and indirectly to advise the Sultan in a hope of getting
his sympathy towards the Ottomans. Jacob, acting Resident,
immediately proposed to the Viceroy to
I L/P&S/10/610, Aden Weekly Letter, 22/8/1918.

203
issue a proclamation to Turkish Arab leaders,
reasserting our leanings, denying our desire for
more territory, and expressing surprise that Arabs
should league themselves with the Turks, the real
enemies of Islam and the thwarts of Arab progress,
at the same time warning them against any
violation of our boundary which would necessitate
our taking immediate action. But this I would, if
permitted, send through the Abdali Sultan. 1
Jacob's proposal was approved by the Viceroy and on November
20, he telegraphed the Secretary of State stating "I propose,
therefore, to approve issue of proposed declaration by Resident
at Aden to Turkish Arab leaders and also a communication in
the sense to Arabs Aden Protectorate", 2 this

same of and was
approved.
In the early days of the war, the British won the day as
the attitude which prevailed throughout the Protectorate
appeared to be loyalty to them. This can be seen not only
through the letters of the chiefs to the Aden Residency
referring to their attitude to the British, but also in their replies
to the invitations of the Ottomans in the Yaman. Immediately
after they joined the war, the Ottomans made a number of
attempts through their officials in the Yaman to persuade chiefs

w1}º-,
of the Aden Protectorate to sideAthe Ottoman Empire. The
Ottoman gä'immacqäms sent letters to these chiefs inviting them

{y%0-
to discuss matters relating to war notably jihäd and offering
stipends. Most of the chiefs declined to send any reply, and wrote
to the Aden Residency for consultation on the proper course of
The ÀgrabI Shaykh, for example, a letter

action. . who received
from Ahmad Nu`mdn, wrote in December 1914 to express his
1 L/P& S/10/604, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 17/11/1914.

2 L/P&S/10/604, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20/11/1914.
204
firm loyalty to the British and inquire whether he should send
to the 1 The Subayhl Shaykhs

a reply gä'immaqäm. also wrote
to the Àbdali Sultan to inform him that they declined the
invitation of the Ottoman gd'immaqäm as well as his offer

2 Similarly the Upper YdfiÌ Shaykh,
of monthly stipends.
Shaykh Muhammad b. Muhsin Àskar was invited together with
all the `-ägils in the Upper YdfiÌ to discuss matters relating to
jihad. He replied to Shaykh Shcih b. Sälih al-TA'irI, the principal
Shaykh of Rada', that he was a friend of the British
Government and one man could not serve two masters at one
the time. 3 Shaykh Muhsin Àskar, the

and same chief nagib of
Mawsatah in Upper YdfiÌ reacted further, warning the
Ottomans, following the advice of the Àbdall Sultan, about the
intention of the Ottomans to invade Lahej. He wrote to the
Governor-General of the Yaman and Sa'Id Pasha warning them
that in the event of their attacking Lahej, the YdfiÌs would join
the Àbdalls, and pointed out to the Ottomans that they should
u1e
brothers 4
not be the cause of shedding of their in religion.
Ablood
However, in the case of non-stipendiary shaykhs in the
Protectorate, some of them accepted the invitations of the
Ottoman gä'immaqäms. The Subayhl Shaykhs reported that
some of the Arab shaykhs among the Subayhls had gone to see
Ahmad Nu`mdn. They were the Julaydi Shaykh, Mansab Sayyid
Qadrl Yäsin, and a few of the Attawl clansmen of the Jurabi
tribe. 5 Some Yäfiìs were also reported to have accepted the

2 R/20/A/1319 & L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letter, 26/12/1914.
205
invitations of al-Tä'irl, and had gone to see him at Jubän. 1
In the early days of the war, the chiefs of the
Protectorate were, therefore, persuaded by the Ottomans to side
with them through approaches via their fellow Arabs. In the
north east of the Protectorate, the principal Shaykh of Radä',
Shaykh Sälih b Sälih al-Tä'iri was very active in trying to
induce the Ydfi`ls to support the Ottomans. In the West, Ahmad
Nu`män, the gä'immaqäm of Hujariyah, was responsible for
approaching the Subayhis and the 'Aqrabis to join the Ottomans.
Although some of the shaykhs were reported to have accepted
the invitations, they were obviously not stipendiaries. This
indicates that the measure was generally unsuccessful in
persuading the stipendiaries chiefs to co-operate with the
Ottomans on religious issues. Moreover there was no report on
the offer of the stipend except among the SubayhIs but there
was very much doubt as to the authenticity of the offer as this
was reported to the Àbdali. Perhaps the key reason for the
reluctance of the chiefs to co-operate with the Ottomans at this
stage was that they were far from experiencing a real threat
from the Ottomans. From the letters received by them from the
Ottomans it was reported that they were simply invited to
discuss a matter relating to jihdd, and furthermore there was
no sign of movements of the Ottomans in their direction which
could threaten them.
It was not until February 1915 when the Ottoman force
moved across the border and occupied Jabal Jihäf in the AmIrI
territory that Ottoman pressure on the Arabs of the Protectorate
206
became considerable. This pressure was stepped up when in
July 1915 the Ottoman forces moved further southward from
Mäwiyah and occupied al-Darayjah and Musaymir in the
Hawshabi country and finally took Lahej which directly
threatened British authority over the Aden Protectorate until the
end of the war. Under these circumstances, a changed course
of action by the chiefs and the tribes seemed inevitable. It is,
however, necessary to discuss the various tribes individually as
there are distinct differences between them which had a
profound effect on their relation with the Ottomans and the
British during the war. Discussion of individual tribes will vary
in length, as separate files are available only on the Àbdali, the
Fadli, the AmIr of Pali' and the chiefs of Hadramawt.
4.2 The Amir of 171i: Nair b Sayf
The instability of the political influence of the AmIr
of Pali' in his country, which went back well before the
presence of the British on the scene, apparently recurred
following the evacuation of the Political officer from that place,
and this situation continued until the war broke out. About the
end of October 1914 a number of reports from various shaykhs
in the hinterland, including Sayyid Muhammad Tähä, the
British news correspondent at Jabal Jihäf, reached Aden
informing the Residency that the Amir of Däli`, Nair bin Sayf
had left his capital to go to Qa `tabah and to pay a visit to Qä'id
Sälih, the gä'immaqäm of that place. It was later reported that
the AmIr had gone further to San'd' with the intention of
207
joining the Ottomans. 1 The Amir denied intention the
.. any of
kind and wrote a letter in November 1914 to the Àbdall Sultan
stating that he had gone to Qa'tabah and entered into a treaty
with the gä'immaqäm at that place for the safety of the trade
routes. He, however, furnished news of the Ottoman victories
at Cairo and the Suez Canal and prayed for the victory to the
Ottoman Government. 2 On the information from the

receipt of
Àbdall Sultan, the Resident wrote to the Amlr reminding him
not to believe and spread false rumours of the victory of the
Ottomans and reminding him if he gave way to needless fears
and directly or indirectly espoused the cause of the Ottomans,
his stipend would be stopped and he would no longer be
recognised as AmIr. The AmIr replied in January 1915 professing
his loyalty to the British and characterised the report received
by the Resident false. 3 Shaw, the Resident, believed that the

as
AmIr's object in leaving Pali' was originally and solely to arrive
at some understanding with the gä'immaqäm of Qa'tabah for
the safety of the trade route as this was a procedure very
common on the border. Just before the war, the Amir paid a
visit to Aden to seek for help concerning the conduct of his
brothers who had established a taxing post at al-Tafwa in the
AmIrI territory levying taxes the travellers. 4 Moreover,

on one
of his brothers was reported to have detained goods belonging
to the Ottoman subjects and following his failure to settle the
1 R/20/A/4064, Shaw to Bombay, 25/2/1915.

4 R/20/A/678,28/7/1914 & 4/8/1914.
208
matter, the Ottoman Arabs occupied his fortlet at Sanah. The
matter was finally settled through the interference of Qä'id
Sälih, the gä'immaqäm Qa'tabah. 1 Qä'id Sälih

new of was
further reported to have invited several Shaykhs on either side
of the border to act for the maintenance of peace, and the Amir
, ä'id
himself had called on/, for the same purposes.? Though the
Amir had little control even over his brothers, the Residency,
who observed that the people of Dali` were generally opposed to
him, had no record that he had been deposed by his people as
reported by Mackawee, a prominent Adeni merchant, which
prompted the Amir to get help from the Ottoman. Àbd al-
Hamid, his brother, in fact came to Aden proclaiming that he
had been appointed as a new AmIr, but the Residency was still
waiting for confirmation of the report as he had no document to
support his claim. It was most probably that through him
Mackawee was informed about affairs in Dali`. In Qa'tabah,
however, the AmIr, seeing the warlike preparations of the
Ottomans and the Imam and failing to note any tendency on the
part of the British to advance, fell an easy prey into the hands
of the Ottomans. He wrote to the Àbdali Sultan to warn him
and through him to warn the Resident of the Ottomans'
intention of invading the Protectorate, and asked for help. In
reply he was urged to defend his own borders, and was told
that he might rely on British assistance in the event of any

3
encroachment on his authority.

3 L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letter, 25/1/1915; R/20/A/4064, Beatty to
Cairo, 20/6/1919.
209
When Ottoman forces occupied Pali' in February 1915
the Amlr was reported to have returned to Dali' accompanied by

It
Qä'id Sälih. He was, however, still at Sanah when he wrote to
the Residency on February 13, that he had allowed the Ottomans
to enter his country in order that they might assist him in
keeping order, and maintaining security on the roads. 1 Shaw,
the Resident, had no doubt that the Amir had given himself
wholly to the cause of the Ottomans and from the reports
received from the Àbdall Sultan and other sources understood
that Ottomans were already in possession of several places
within the Amir's dominions and were levying taxes. The
Residency also held letters issued by the Amir to several of his
village headmen, asking them to prepare quarters for the
the Ottomans. 2 Shaw, therefore, to ignore

advent of proposed
the Amir and had suspended his stipend, but would leave
to the 3
the appointment of AmIr's successor choice of his people.
The unpopular family of the Amir of Pali' apparently became a
target. In March of that year, it was reported that the people of
Pali' were opposed to the AmIr's House, and wanted none of the
family as their AmIr and therefore the appointment claimed by
Àbd al-Hamid as a new Amir obviously did not 4

materialise.
The Amir was not happy with the treatment he received
from the Ottomans following the occupation of his country. It
was reported that during his visit to Däli` the Governor General
of the Yaman did not call on the Amir, and when the latter
called on him he gave the Amir the cold shoulder. With this

3 Ibid.
210
rebuff, coupled with the establishment of an Ottoman custom
Sanah, 1 it that the Amir

post at was not surprising expressed
his sincere love and friendship towards the British Government.
He further stated that he was determined to make a bold stand

t6 e
and fight the Ottomans to the last and wantedABritish to provide
the 2 The Residency, believed that

necessities of war. which
the AmIr was endeavouring to consolidate his strength, and to
get the Radfan tribes to join him, did not provide the Amir with
his requirements. His plan to fight against the Ottomans was
not carried when Muhammad Näsir Muqbil occupied Pali' with
force. 3 Däli` following the

a large was occupied refusal of the
Amir to go to Qa'tabah to see Ibn Ndsir Muqbil in order to settle
matters in consequence of a night attack made on the Ottoman
camp at al-Jalllah in the Amlri territory in which the Amlr's
to have been involved. 4 Subsequently

party was suspected all
the Amirl shaykhs and 'ägils went and saw Ibn Näsir Muqbil,
possibly in connection with same incident, while the Amir and
his brothers left for the QutaybI 5 Although Ibn Nä*ir

country.
Muqbil evacuated Däli`, it was not until November 1915 that the
AmIr apparently came to some settlement with the Ottomans by
which the latter reinstated him, and gave him an escort of 300
Turks and Arabs on his return to his country, in addition to 50
rifles and MT $400.6 It was further reported that the Ottomans
had allowed him to retain possession of the villages of Jabal
1 L/P& S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letter, 8/5/1915.

2 L/P&S/10/295 & R/20/A/4568, Aden Weekly Letter, 22/5/1915.
5 Ibid.
211
Jihäf, Azragi, Ahmadl and al-Fajara, for which in return he
agreed to pay an annual tax of $8 to 10,000 to the Porte. '
Towards the end of 1915 and early 1916 a number of
reports started to reach the Aden Residency informing the
authorities of the Amir's support for the Ottoman cause. As
early as January 1916, the Amir was reported to have called on
all Shd'iri `dgils, a section of the Amirl, to tender their
submission to him and the Ottomans but without 2 The

success.
Amir had also written to many of the Radfan tribesmen
including the Qutaybl Shaykh asking them to join the Islamic
Government. 3 In September 1916 the AmIr his

and some of
tribesmen were reported to have been seen at an attack on Bir
Jäbir, before Shaykh 'Uthmän. The Amir remained loyal 4 to
the Ottomans until the war ended and also paid frequent visits
to Lahej.
Although in the early days of the war the Amir's relations
with the Ottomans were difficult, from the end of 1915 until the
end of the war he stayed loyal to them and kept up good
relations with them. His participation in the Ottoman
campaigns, though unsuccessful, proved that he had effectively
supported the Ottomans. In a note after the war, Jacob proposed
that "I do not recommend any reopening of relations with him.
Before renewing our connection with the Amiri tribe, we should
insist on their nominating a new AmIr, one acceptable to us. "5
The policy advocated in Jacob's note was approved by General
Stewart and, in accordance with it, an intimation was sent to

2 L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letter, 19/1/1916 & 28/1/1916.
3 Ibid.
4 L/MIL/17/16/17, Sept. 1917; R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
5 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
212
the Amiri tribe that they must choose a new Amir. This
communication, however, produced no effect, except that
several letters were received from various sources asking
that Amir Nasr should be forgiven. Amir Nasr's brothers, one
of whom might have succeeded him, took no steps towards
ousting him. On the contrary, they interceded on his behalf. In
his proposal, Beatty, Assistant Resident, noted that "There was
no doubt of his disloyalty: on the other hand it is true that in
November 1914 he wrote warning us of the Turk's intention of
invading the Protectorate, and asking for help. In reply he was
urged to defend his own borders, and told that in the event of
encroachment on them, he might rely on our assistance. This
was an empty promise, for actually we failed to protect even
our neighbour, the Àbdali. Our inability to send up any force to
safeguard the borders of our Protectorate, must, in my opinion,
be taken into consideration in judging the behaviour of a
chief who was distant from Aden and immediately on the
Turkish border. "1 His past conduct of disloyalty to the British,
however, was eventually accepted by Aden as due to force
majeure. Although the Amir had thrown in his lot with the
Ottomans, some of the tribes in his country remained loyal to
the British as in the case of the Jihäfis. This indicates the
Amir's authority extended over only a proportion of his tribes.
1 R/20/A/4064, Beatty to Wingate, 20/6/1919,
213
4.3 The Fadli Sultan: Husayn b. Ahmad
Shortly after the occupation of Lahej, the Ottomans opened
communication with Sultan Husayn b. Ahmad, the Fad1I Sultan,
in order to bring the Sultan to their side. In June or more
probably July 1915 the Sultan received a letter from SaÌd Pasha
at Lahej through Àll Bd Àbdu'Lldh Mahdl al-Zuhayrl asking
him to come to Lahej. 1 The Sultan then left for Lahej but when
be arrived at Akrabia he changed his mind and wrote a letter to
SaÌd Pasha informing him that owing to his old age and fasting
during the present month of Ramadan, he was unable to call on
him at that time, but he hoped to do so after the fast. He also
pointed out that he was a British subject. The letter was sent
through the Sultan's representative al-Wabrl, who went to
Lahej probably in July 1915, in order to inquire what the Pasha
required of the Sultan. On August 5, Al-Wabrl was interviewed
at Aden and reported that the Pasha had told him that the Fall
tribesmen and the Ottomans were of one religion and that he
wished for the Fadll's co-operation against the British in making
an attack on Aden, and the Pasha had threatened that he would
his country if the Sultan refused to do so. 2

proceed against
The Pasha's attempt to persuade the FadlI Sultan to co-
operate against the British on religious grounds proved
unsuccessful. In a letter to Younghusband, the Resident, the
Sultan revealed that although the Ottomans had sent him a flag
through al-Wabri, he stated that "we have no benefit out of it
1 R/20/A/4044, Notes of an interview with al-Wabri, 5/8/1915; 20/A/4076,

Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
2 R/20/A/4862, Notes of an interview with al-WabrI, 5/8/1915.
214
(flag) the Turks have benefit from
nor any us. "1 It was
probably after noting the disinclination of the Sultdn to proceed
with the plan to attack Aden, that the Pasha asked for the co-
operation of the Sultan to stop supplies going to Aden through his
territory, and threatened to overrun his country should he not
2
co-operate.
Hitherto, the Fad1I Sultan had had no sympathy with the
Ottomans. Like all the Arab chiefs he was impressed by the
strength of the Ottoman force which took Lahej right under the
eyes of the Aden garrison and continued to hold it. The Sultan
had reason to fear the Ottomans at Lahej where they could at
any time launch an attack on his country which was only one
day's march from Lahej. On the other hand, the Sultan's fear of
his own tribesmen in his territory was far more than his fear
of the Ottomans at Lahej as the tribesmen were capable of
threatening his influence should they be assisted; in particular
the Sultan had little control over the Ahl Haydarah Am Mansur
and the Mardkishah. The Ahl Haydarah were reported to have
already been in communication with the Ottomans at Lahej, In
October of that year, the Ahl Haydarah were further reported
to have gone to Lahej to ask the Pasha for his support against
the Sultan whom they opposed on the grounds that the Sultan
did not treat them well. The Pasha advised them to continue
attacking trade routes in the Fadli country, especially the route
leading to and from Aden, and promised to look into the
later. 3 This Said Pasha to try

grievance opportunity prompted
I R/20/A/4862, Fad1I to Younghusband, Shawwäl 1333/August 1915.

215
to persuade the Sultdn to come to terms with the Ahl
Haydarah, 1 and hence to bring him to his side.
This circumstance finally drove the Sultan in November
1915 to come down to Aden to ask for assistance in arms and
ammunition in order to punish the Ahl Haydarah. He wanted
200 men and two guns to co-operate with his men in coercing
the Ahl Haydarah. At Aden the Sultan was extremely
disappointed at finding that no British assistance was offered to
him and he was told to take measures himself. He was further
told that his own forces were sufficient to move against the Ahl
Haydarah, and that the Turks could not send more men from
Lahej, but this did not alter his opinion. He asked "How did the
Turks take (Lahej)? " 2 implying that the Ottomans

al-Hawtah
were too strong to be resisted. The Sultan added that he was at
their mercy as he was only one day's march from Lahej and he
believed that they could strike at him whenever they liked. The
Sultan further asked the Residency that HMS Jupiter should
visit Shuqra and land a force of bluejackets to overawe his
tribesmen of the Maräkishah who were uncertain in their
allegiance after the descent of the Ottomans to Lahej. This
3 Though the Fad1I Sultan had

request was also refused. reason
to fear the possibility of rebellion by his tribesmen namely the
Ahl Haydarah, who were evidently on good terms with the
Ottomans, and had discovered that the British would not come
to assist him, yet still he did not throw " in his lot with the
Ottomans. On January 1,1916 (25 Safar 1334), he reported to
1 R/20/A/4862, interview with the Fad1I Sultän, 26/11/1915.

2 Ibid.
3 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
216
Aden about the overtures of the Ottomans to his tribesmen after
they had failed to establish a relationship with him. As a result
of the Pasha's invitations to his tribesmen and other Arabs, the
Sultan reported that some of his tribesmen had gone to Lahej
without his knowledge, and the Pasha had given each of the
headmen the tribesmen £10 and £5 respectively. 1

and ordinary
As the Sultan did not specifically mention any of the tribes by
name, it may well have been tribes other than the Ahl
Haydarah and Mardkishah.
The Fadll Sultan was in a dilemma whether to meet the
Pasha's invitation or to remain loyal to the British. The
Resident, who had already advised him that he was strong
enough to coerce his own tribesmen made a further attempt to
dismiss the fear of the Ottomans which had haunted the Sultan
since the occupation of Lahej. After the incident at Ìmdd, where
100 Turks with the help of some 400 Subayhls, YdfiÌs and the
Ahl Haydarah had been defeated by the local Shaykh,
Muhammad 'Ubayd and his men, the Resident wrote to the Fad1I
Sultan to convince him that he should no longer fear the
Ottomans, and informed him that further news had been
received at Aden to the effect that the Ottomans had no intention
helping Haydarah. 2 In the Sultan to the

of reply wrote
Residency stating that he had to adjourn the expedition he
intended to make against the Ahl I-Iaydarah owing to the harvest
3
season.
In January 1916 the FadlI Sultan, was obliged to make up
his mind when he heard of the movement of the Ottomans
I R/20/A/4862, Fad1I to Price, 1/1/1916.

2 R/20/A/4862, Resident to FadlI, 14/12/1915.
3 R/20/A/4862, Fad1I to Jacob, 9/1/1916.
217
to the Àlawi and Qutaybi territories. The Fad1i Sultan
subsequently deputed Shaykh Àbdu'Lldh b. Ahmad Muzälim to
ask for one month's truce during which the Sultan would finish
gathering the harvest and then would come to terms with the
Ottomans, but the Ottomans refused. The Sultan then sent a
letter to his relatives advising them to remove their families as
quickly as possible fearing an Ottoman movement to his
country-1 Then news came from the Hawshabi Sultan that the
Ottomans were advancing on him, and he advised him either to
in to take 2 So the Sultan

stay quiet or positive steps. submitted
to the Ottomans at Lahej.
Colonel Wauhope with Northbrook who had arrived a few
days previously at Shuqra and left for Aden on January 16,
confirmed that the Sultan had gone to Lahej. The Sultan was
reported to have left Shuqra on January 11, ostensibly to punish
certain marauders who were looting his crops, but really his
intention was to proceed to SaÌd Pasha. Wauhope further
reported that while Northbrook was still at Shuqra, the FadlI
Sultan had sent a letter to say that he was "drawn to Lahej,
but if the warship waited a day or two he would board the ship
and proceed to Aden. "3
Therefore, discouraged by want of assistance from the
British and fearful of the Ottomans and their assistance to the
Ahl Haydarah, the Sultdn finally joined the Ottomans. On
January 29,1916, the Sultdn wrote to justify his action by
stating that "we have not offended against the British
I R/20/A/4862, interview with Muhammad Mabrttk (Ahl Abyan),

11/1/1916.
2 R/20/A/4862,13/1/1916.
3 L/P&S/10/295, Political Intelligence Summary, 17/1/1916.
218
Government. But (we went to the Turks) in order to avoid their
wickedness and to safeguard our country from destruction. "1 He
further wrote on February 2, stating that
the soldiers of the Turks entered Hawshabl tract.

The Pasha had written to us that unless we go to
him he would come into our country and occupy it.
We remained expecting you to send soldiers to
prevent the entry of Turkish soldiers but we were
at our wits' end. If the Turkish soldiers came into
our country they would devastate it. We did not go
to the Pasha but for the good of the people in
general. We thus saved our country from his
occupation. He has received no benefit from us.
We shall not make any breach of our friendship.
Our friendship will, on the contrary, become more
firm. We favour Government (who) have been
mixed with our blood and flesh since 40 years. We
Turkish 2
are only under pressure.
The Sultan further remarked that his enemies, the Ahl
Haydarah and the Mardkishah, were numerous and that they
had gone to Lahej and lied against him. He therefore had had to
go to Lahej to clear himself and to make arrangements for his
the of their fields. 3

subjects and peaceful enjoyment
The Aden Residency could not afford to lose any more of
their Arab friends in the Protectorate and attempted to regain
their reputation at least among those who were still loyal.
On February 7, prompted by the action of the Fad1I Sultan, the
Resident wrote to all the chiefs in the Protectorate, except those
who were in the Ottoman camp such as the AmIr of Pali`,
the Hawshabi and the Àlawl, to warn them about the
behaviour of the Sultan. The Resident wrote to say that
Sultan Husain complained to us that his tribesmen,

the Ahl Haidara Mansur in combination with the
Yafais at Abyan, have intrigued with the Turks and
were making raids in his territory. In order to
1 R/20/A/4862, Fad1I to Price, 29/1/1916.

2 R/20/A/4862, Fadli to Price, 2/2/1916.
219
fulfill our promise by action, as soon as we heard
that the Turks have moved towards al-Harur we
advanced with our forces and attacked the Turks...
we also sent a man-of-war to the Sultan at Shukra.
While we were engaged in the fight with the Turks,
he at the very time proceeded to Lahej to arrange
terms with the Pasha. "1
The Resident was desperate to win over the rest of the
Protectorate chiefs though he knew that his assistance to the
Fadli Sultan was made at the very last moment which left the
Sultan no enough time to make up his mind to remain loyal or

2
to join the Ottomans at Lahej.
The visit of the Fadli Sultan to Lahej led to a change in the
attitude of the Sultan. At Lahej, the Sultan was offered a piece
of cultivable land belonging to the family of the Àbdall Sultan
in an attempt to prolong his stay at Lahej, but this he said he
3 He wrote on February 2, stating that "the Pasha has

refused.
of his own free will given us cultivable lands, a garden and a
palace. We have not asked him for any thing of the sort. All his
offers remain with him whereas we are in our country. "4 The
Pasha continued to press him to stay at Lahej as he had
invited the Ahl Haydarah and the Yäfiìs to Lahej; in order to
arrange for a settlement with the Sultan. The Sultan
accordingly wrote to his son, Àll b Ahmad, his son-in-law,
Àbdu'Lläh, and his grandson Àbd al-Qddir, presumably to
1 R/20/A/4862, Resident to the chiefs, 7/2/1916.

2 In a note on "Shukra and the Ahl Fadl", Jacob stated "If, in the first
instance, we had given Sultan Hussein of Shukra the arms he asked for,
if we had consented to his proposal to send H. M. S. 'Jupiter' to that
and
and disembark 600 bluejackets, I believe the present contretemps
port
never have risen". Cf. Wingate Papers 123/12/63, Jacob's note,
would
24/10/17.
3 R/20/A/4862,21/1/1916.
4 R/20/A/4862, Fad1I to Price, 2/2/1916.
220
advise them to settle their affairs with the tribesmen at Lahej. 1
Three months peace were arranged by SaÌd Pasha between the
Sultan the Ahl Haydarah Mansür. 2 At the instigation

and of the
Pasha, the Fad1I Sultan was further reported to have written
letters to the Àwlagl Sultan, the 'Awdhall, the Baydä and
others, extolling the good treatment he had received at Ottoman
hands, and urging them to surrender to Lahej, or else he would
close the road to Aden, therefore cutting off their trade with
that 3
place.
When the Sultan returned to his country he apparently
continued to carry out the instructions of Sa'Id Pasha. The
Sultan was reported from various sources to have announced by
the beat of a drum that the road to and from Aden was closed. 4
The Sultan was further reported to have told his Marakishah
shaykhs, probably in order to resume his authority over these
tribesmen, to plunder all caravans that came through Abyan for
Aden. The fact that subsequently for three days no caravans
had Aden to confirm the Sultan's 5

arrived at seemed activity.
However, the Sultan immediately wrote to deny the above
6
accusations.
The Fadli Sultan's stipend was immediately stopped when
he was reported to have gone to Lahej, and further his port,
Shuqra, was closed as a counter measure of the British against
his co-operation with the Ottomans. Hitherto there was no
report that the Fadli Sultan had received the stipend promised

2 R/20/A/4862, Interview with a messenger sen t to Abyan, 14/2/1916.
221
by Said Pasha to compensate for what he might lose from the
British. Presumably the present of lands, a garden and a palace
was partly to fulfill the promise, but the Sultan refused to
accept. Accordingly on February 3, the Fadli Sultan wrote to ask
for his stipend and for the lifting of the blockade of his port,
Shuqra. 1 The Resident was far from satisfied with the attitude
of the Fadi! Sultan as he was continuing to co-operate with the
Ottomans and acting on their orders. The Fadli Sultan was
reported to have threatened his grandson, Àbd al-Qädir, that,
should he continue his relations with Aden, he would bring the
Ottomans to him. 2 The Fadli warned the Fulaysi

punish also
Shaykh, one of the Fadli shaykhs who remained loyal to the
British, against maintaining his relations with Aden, as the
Sultan had given an undertaking to Said Pasha that he would
not allow the shaykh to go there. Subsequently a Turkish
expedition was reported to have been sent to punish the Fulaysl
Shaykh. 3
Early in May 1916, following the information received at
Aden to the effect that a Turkish officer would be sent by Sa'Id
Pasha to Abydn, the Resident sent letters to Sultdn Bübakr b
Näsir, the Lower Àwlagl and Àbd al-Qddir, grandson of the
Fad1I Sultän, ordering them to capture the officers. Subsequently
a letter from Said Pasha to Sultän Husayn had been handed to
the Àbdall Sultan. The letter, dated March 25,1916, required
the FadlI Sultan to sign an agreement and return it to the Pasha
in order that it might be sent to Constantinople. Sultan Àbd al-
1 R/20/A/4862, Fad1I to Jacob, 3/2/1916.

222
Karim b. Fadl, the Àbdall, commented on the Ottomans' new
plan
It is probable that the Turks are desirous of

concluding such treaties with the Arab Chiefs, the
friends. of the British Government, whom they have
taken up or shall take up to their side through the
medium of their power of conquest and ocqupation of
the country, separating Aden from the hinterland. It
is understood from this policy adopted by Said Pasha
with the Sultan that he wishes to substantiate and
strengthen the sway of the Turkish Government
over the country under protection of British
Government, with the belief that Turks will
permanently remain (in this country). The objective
of such agreement with the chiefs might be that
they wish to annex this country to their territory,
in case a settlement is made between the British
Government and Turkey before they are driven
away from the country they are now occupying, on
the support of the consent of the chiefs who signed
the agreement which they secure now under the
Arabs. 1
It was reported later that the Fa41I Sultan had evidently signed
the treaty. 2 It is understandable as the Sultan was not only
acting under pressure, but perhaps also believed that the
Ottomans might win in the war and he would have a share in
the fruits of victory.
The Fadli Sultan repeatedly explained his conduct to the
Residency by stating that "we went to him under pressure with
a view to save our country. We have otherwise no wish to see
him (SaÌd Pasha). "3 In reply Jacob wrote to state that "we
understand your attitude in going over to Lahej. We think it a
grave mistake on your part, but are willing to consider your
action after the war and when the Turks are driven out of the
territory they now hold. As your people the Maräkishah and
1 R/20/A/4862, 'Abdall to Walton, 8/6/1916; also in L/P&S/10/551.

3 R/20/A/4862, Fadli to Jacob, 15/8/1916.
223
others have been freely going in to Lahej and supplying the
Turks with goods, we do not at present propose to open Shukra
for them. "'
In November 1917, following the information received at
Aden to the effect that about 100 Turks had been dispatched
from Lahej to arrest the Fadll Sultan's grandson, Àbd al-Qddir,
and Ahmad b. Mihdhar, the Resident sent Captain Laurance
Oliphant on H. M. S. Sapphire to deliver the above message. Àbd
al-Qddir did not come on board during day time so as be
recognised by his grandfather. About 9.15 p. m. Àbd al-Qddir
arrived and the above message was given to him. In spite of
this and the British warning to him, he did not think it was
necessary to leave his home, family and dependents and go to
Aden. He stated that as he had 1,000 armed men he was willing
to take on 100 or 200 Turks with pleasure. If more came he
would arrange to escape to the hills or to Aden and in any case,
he naively remarked, the only way they could take him alive
be to over his dead body. 2

would
Sultan Husayn b. Ahmad, the FadlI Sultan, was apparently
inactive but his son, Àbdallah b. Husayn and son-in-law, Àll
b. Ahmad, and other prominent shaykhs were reported to be in
constant communication with SaÌd Pasha. In April 1917, an
expedition under Captain B. R. Reilly, Assistant Resident,
proceeded to the Fadli country in order to punish these people
who actively worked for the Ottomans at Lahej. The ship
arrived too late to arrest Muhammad b. Àbdu'Lläh and Shcim b.
1 R/20/A/4862, Fadll to Jacob, 25/8/1916.

2 R/20/A/4862, Report by Cpt Laurance Oliphant, 27/11/1916.
224
Àbdu'Lldh at al-Kaud as they had left the place. It was
reported that two messengers had left at dawn for Lahej; to
report the arrival of the expedition, and further that the Fad1I
Sultan's son, Àbdallah b. Husayn, had gone personally to SaÌd
Pasha to ask for assistance. The Turks, who were reported
earlier at Ba Shahara, had left their post at Ba Shahara six
days previously. Salim b. Àbdallah's house was accordingly
destroyed. The expedition proceeded to Musaymir where Àli b.
Ahmad, the Fadli Sultan's son-in-law lived, in order to arrest
him, but he left that morning with his family. While at
Musaymir, information was received to the effect that the
Fadll's men were removing ammunition stores from the dar
at Ba Shahara. The expedition immediately proceeded to that
place, and the dar, which was previously occupied by the
Turks, was occupied with small resistance from the Arabs at
the later demolished. '

place, and was
In September 1917, Ahmad Mihdhar reported that SaÌd
Pasha had conferred with the Fadils, Àbdu'Lläh b. Husayn, Àll
b. Ahmad and Muhammad b. Àbdu'Lläh with a view to arrest
Ahmad Mihdhar Àbd 2 This by

and al-Qädir. was confirmed
Àbd al-Qddir as he stated they had gone to SaÌd Pasha and
informed him that we are keeping the friendship of the British
Government and are supporting their course. They request him
to punish us as a lesson to others so much so that the other
Arabs might be terrified. Said Pasha agreed and promised to
come out after the Ìd. 3
1 R/20/A/4862, Report by Captain Reilly, 20/4/1917.

2 R/20/A/4862,28/9/1917.
3 R/20/A/4862. Àbd al-Qädir to Reilly, 28/9/1917.
225
Following information from Àbd al-Qddir to the effect that
the Ottomans were advancing towards him, another expedition
proceeded to the Fall country under Major Reilly in H. M. S.
Dufferin. On September 27,1917 the ship reached Shuqra but
there was no sign of the Ottomans. Àbd al-Qddir was
interviewed and said that his information concerning the
advance of the Ottomans was brought by a Hajri named
Àbdu'Lldh Bd Damän. According to Àbd al-Qädir, Àbdu'Lläh Bä
Daman had seen the Turkish force, which amounted to 2
Regiments, 150 Somalis and Arabs. But when Àbdu'Lläh himself
was interviewed separately, he stated that he had not told Àbd
al-Qädir what the latter alleged he had said. Reilly believed that
"'Abd al-Qddir added the number of the enemy himself as a bit
of corroborative figure which would help in getting him our
assistance. "1 There was no doubt, as Reilly believed, that he
was genuinely frightened, and he begged Reilly to accept his
excuses. Àbd al-Qädir again reported in October that he had
sent one of his soldiers to the Ydfiìs territory following the
information that the Ottoman forces consisting of two Regiments
and 150 Somalis and Arabs, were reported in that country.
Reilly then wrote to Àbd al-Qddir to inform him that the alarm
2 Àbd to remain loyal to the
was a false one. al-Qddir continued
British until the war ended. Due to his co-operation with the
British, in May 1918, Stewart, the Resident, proposed to grant a

3
personal stipend of 100 dollars a month to Sultan Àbd al-Qädir,
and this was approved.
I R/20/A/4862, Report from Reilly, 29/9/1917.

2 R/20/A/4862,10/10/1917.
3 R/20/A/4862, Stewart to Wingate, 22/5/1918.
226
There was no doubt, therefore, that Sultdn Husayn b
Alimad, the Fadli Sultdn, had thrown in his lot with the
Ottomans since January 1916 and remained loyal to them until
the war ended. What is more, he received a stipend from the
Ottomans at Lahej. After the war, Jacob noted that
My personal view is that this old man was

thoroughly frightened by the Pasha and though
his action is to us unintelligible we should not judge
him over harshly in the circumstances I have
mentioned above (that all his requests for assistance
were refused). Sultan Husen cannot live much
longer and I think our prestige will gain by
his '
pardoning past conducts.
Sultan Husayn was therefore pardoned, but his grandson, not
his son Àbdu'Lläh, was nominated successor to the Fadli Sultän,
Husayn b. Ahmad.
4.4 The Hadramawt
The principal and most powerful chief in the
Hadramawt was the Qu'aytl Sultdn, Sir Ghdlib b. Àwdd who
had control over the coastal district with the ports of Shihr
and Mukalld as well as interior towns including Hajar, Hawrah,

.
Qatan and Shibdm. Only in the 1880s, British regard the
Athe .
affairs in the Hadramawt as relevant to the safety of Aden and
the Protectorate. The move was taken apparently in response to
the constant efforts of the Ottomans to annex the area and the
growing interest of Europeans notably Germany and Italy in the
1 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
227
1 Previously in 1850 the Ottomans sent a force of 800
country.
at the request of a Hadrami Sayyid (and as this

men apparently
was authorised by the Pasha of Hudaydah, it was not an official
Ottoman enterprise) to subdue Mukalld, but they were defeated.
The next year, Mukallä was offered to the British due to the
fear of further Ottoman incursions but the offer was declined.
In 1867 the Ottomans made their official endeavour. A warship
was sent in an attempt to annex Shihr, Mukalld and the whole
coast, but the Ottoman's pretension of sovereignty was evaded
by the chiefs, notably the Quàytl and the NagIb of Mukallä who
were anxious for British protection. The Naqlb of MukallA
offered the town to the British, and it was again refused.

4-
However some steps were taken by the British towards
preventing the Ottomans from further interference.
Representations were made to the Porte and after some
discussion it was agreed that both Britain and the Ottoman
Government should abstain from all Interference in HadramI
2 British policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the

affairs.
Hadramawt was revised after 1872 when the Ottoman
Government was committed to its new Arabian policy. A
Hadrami Sayyid, with a record of anti-British activity in India,
Hadramawt. 3 The
was named as Governor of the first treaty of
friendship was concluded with the Quàytl ruler in 1882
after Mukallä was secured to him from the NagIb of

apparently
Mukallä through British intervention and in 1888 British
I Gavin, op. cit. pp. 167-8; Ulrike Freitag, "Hadrami rivalries and
international politics: World War I and its aftermath", Paper presented
to the international workshop: South Arabian Migration Movements in
the Indian Ocean, the Hadrami case, ca. 1750-1967, SOAS, 27-29 April
1995, p. 2.
2 Gavin, op. cit., pp. 164-5; Ingrams, Aden Protectorate, pp. 32-3.
3 Gavin, op. cit., pp. 167-8.
228
protection was extended to the Quàyti ruler. The treaties
granted Àwäd b Ùmar who emerged as sole Quàyti ruler
since 1888 (and from 1902 he was recognised as Sultan by the
British) opportunities to strengthen his position from internal
pretenders, namely his nephews Husayn and Munassir b.
Àbdu'Lläh and external rivalries, notably the KathirIs. 1 The
other chief was the KathIri Sultan, Mansur b. Ghälib, who
occupied the greater part of the interior of Hadramawt including
Sayyün, Tarim and al-Ghurfah. The Kathirl was independent in
his territory and cannot be considered as Ottoman territory
although the Sultan's name as Caliph was recited in the Friday
prayer. On the other hand, though some tribal chiefs in the
Hadramawt nominally recognised the supremacy of the Sublime
Porte and professed to be its proteges, no part of the Hadramawt
had ever been really incorporated in the Ottoman Empire, nor
had the Porte ever imposed taxes or exercised any form of

2 The Kathiri to be determined to seek for
sovereignty. appeared
an alliance, and continued to do so until the war broke out,
notably with the British and the Imam in an effort to acquire a
sea port which was under the control of the Qu'aytl. There was
no treaty with the Kathirl; before the war their strong pro-
Ottoman inclination perhaps prejudiced the British against them,
and at the beginning of the war the India Office was in favour
of entering into a treaty relation with the tribe but the
Foreign Office decided that this was not necessary. The British
however regarded all the people of Hadramawt as under their
1 Freitag, op. cit., p. 2.

229
influence, and therefore attempted to bring the Kathirl under
the suzerainty of the Quàyti Sultan, the protected chief.
As early as July 1915, the Ottomans attempted to extend
their operations to the east of the Protectorate, the Hadramawt
and the regions in its vicinity, such as Ma'rib and Najrän. In
July 1915, Sultan Sir Ghälib, the Quàyti, reported great activity
by the Imam's and Ottoman agents in the area. They were said
to be inducing people to join the Ottomans against the British. 1
The Resident was not, however, able to identify the agents.
Only in April 1916, did it appear that some notables of
I-iadramawt were the agents of the Imäm and the Ottomans
notably Sayyid Àbd al-Rahmän b. Ùbaydu'Llah al-Saqqaf, a
figure 2 They
leading religious and a historian. were reported to
be in contact with the Kathiri Sultan of Tarim, Sultan Man*iar
b. Ghdlib, and to have mustered some men and be in possession

3
of small guns.
Hitherto the activities of the Ottomans in the Hadramawt
had been far from clear. Their plans came to light only when
letters of Said Pasha to the Hadrarnawt were intercepted in
June 1916 by Àbd al-Qddir, the Fad1i Sultän's grandson, at
Shuqra at the Resident's order. Said Pasha's letters were
to Sayyid Àbd al-Rahmgin b. Ùbaydu'Lläh al-

addressed
.. .
Sagqdf, the Kathiri Sultan, the wazir of the Quàyti Sultan and
Sayyid al-Haddad. In his letter to al-Sagqaf, the Imam's agent
(he was also identified as a mufti of the Kathiri country) the
Pasha enjoined on him the necessity for losing no time in

2 Freitag, op. cit, p. 5.
230
smoothing the way for the early acceptance of Ottoman rule
over the area. The Pasha expressed his gratitude for what the
Sayyid had done for him by giving admonitions and
instructions to the people of Hadramawt and advised him to
his 1
continue effort.
1 L/P&S/10/610 & R/20/A/1319, Said Pasha to Sayyid Àbd al-Rahman

al-Sagqäf, 7/6/1916.
"Continue to advise them strenuously and acquaint them with the bad
result, because they are ignorant people. If it were not due to the
influence of ignorance they would not have recognised the sway of
a foreigner. We wonder at the people of Hadramaut who submit tothe
foreigner without realising what his ulterior object is. If their
submission is due to the fact that they are eager to receive financial
mundane matter and such worldly dross which is liable to waste
away, then that which they receive from the foreigners is a
despicable thing for they do not give away their property but for some
object knowable to those who are conversant with the intrigues of
the foreigners. By extravagantly giving away their property their
ulterior object is the extortion of property. Let this be set aside and
direct your attention towards that which they have been doing to the
Moslems who, by means of their intrigues, have become their prey
and fallen in their traps.... Although they seemingly ignore it yet the
people of Hadramaut have known the right is with us and their hands
and ours are Islamic hands....
Shortly our victorious soldiers will move towards the East for
the purpose of punishing every (man who is) obstinate or a helper
of the English. God willing, this will take effect after the Ramadan Id
festival (August 1916) is over And we acquaint you that the military
....
force will arrive from the sacred city of Mecca within the period of
at least 11/2 months. Part of it has already arrived on the border of
Yemen and shortly its final arrival will be complete in Lahej for
the purpose of occupying Aden....
Our desire of your religious energy is the despatch of the replies
to the letters which may constitute the entry (of the people)
under the protection of the Ottoman Government. We request the
expedition of the completion of the same.... and of their despatch to us
early because the time is opportune now i. e. before the end of the war
and because if this is effected before the end of the war the replies
will be despatched to the Great Caliph before the conclusion of the peace
so that Hadramaut will be relieved from the yoke of the enemy in
accordance with the international law. If the replies are delayed till
after the war is over then its relief will be a difficult task....
The Sublime Government are attacking the enemies at the
present moment and are winning the battle in every place with the
help of all the Arab Moslems and others with their souls and
substance. Those who may be in your direction and anxious to
in the declaration of the sacred Jihad then (they must
participate
that it is their bounded duty. At the present moment
understand)
there is no necessity for help in men because there is sufficient
of soldiers. Your stay in Hadramaut for the purpose of guiding
number
the people to the proper path of nature Cf. L/P&S/10/610 &
....
R/20/A/1319, SaÌd Pasha to al-Sagqaf, 7/6/1916.
231
Not only did the letter contain the method of which Sa'Id
Pasha tried to work upon the Arab shaykhs but also it indicated
that he was attempting to make treaties with the people of
Hadramawt similar to the treaty made with the FadlI Sultan.
In a letter to the Kathirl, the Pasha urged the Sultan to sign the
treaty. Almost at the same time the Quàytl sent a copy of the
agreement which he received from Sa'Id Pasha. '

same
It appears that the Kathiri Sultan refused to commit
himself. He protested against signing the treaty which would
draw upon him the wrath of the British and result in the
closing of Mukallä to his imports by sea, and further the
confiscation of his properties in Singapore and elsewhere. Said
Pasha realised the Sultan's difficulty. He congratulated the
Sultan on his loyalty to the House of Ùthmän and told him that
after a month peace would be signed, and the way would be
clear for the Ottoman aggrandisement of lands now under
British influence. 2
In his letter to the wazir of the Quàytl Sultan, Sayyid
Husayn b. Hamid al-Mihdar, Said Pasha reminded him of his
relations with the British. The Pasha's letter was a protest and
a threat to the wazir for having accepted a British decoration
(Khan Bahadur) which was only, as he put it, "defiling
the 3 The Pasha Sayyid

wazir's neck". advised al-Haddad to
watch the perverse British friend in Upper Àwlagi, Sultdn Shcih
b. Àbdu'Lläh. 4
1 R/20/A/1408, Quàyti to Walton, 20/6/1916.

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
232
Though the treaty was not signed, the spirit of the treaty
had been adopted, particularly by the Ashräf, notably al-
Sagqäf, and the Kathiris. Their attitude was made more
complex by the fact that the Qu'aytl was held responsible for
bringing the Kathirl under his control. In May 1915 the Resident
reported to Bombay about the political conflicts in the
Haclramawt.
For some time past the Hadramaut has been visited

by emissaries from the Turks and from the Imam,
and the Imam's "Ashraf", religious emissaries,
now in the country have been intriguing with
the Kathiri Sultan Ibn Abdallah against the Mukalla
Sultan's rule. The Qaiti Sultan claimed that he had
concluded treaties with the Kathiri. It seemed
doubtful then that the relations between the Qaiti
Sultan and the Kathiri were as good as he depicted
them. The Kathiri has many subjects carrying
on an extensive trade in Java and Singapore. He is
dissatisfied with the Sultan's policy to unite the
whole of the Hadramaut under his rule. The Kathiri
lives up-country at Terim and wants a sea port in
order to develop his own country. It appears natural
that he and his traders should feel restless owing to
the fact that their trade having to pass through
Mukalla enriches the port. "1
The Qu'aytl Sultdn, who claimed some months previously
that he had concluded a treaty with the KathIrl, now, in
September 1916, doubted the latter's co-operation when he
learned that the Kathlri was ; 'flirting" with the Ottomans and
was in constant communication with Sa'Id Pasha. This was
confirmed by Dr. A Mac Rae who just returned from his visit
to Shuqrah and Mukallä and reported that the Quàyti wazIr's
conciliation had failed. 2 The Quàyti the

attempt at accused
Kathirl Sultan of making himself an enemy to SaÌd Pasha due to
1 L/P&S/10/551 & R/20/A/1408, Walton, the Resident to Bombay, 13/5/1916.

2 R/20/A/4862, Reports by Alex Mac Rae on his visit to Shuqrah and
Mukalla, 15-16 Sept. 1916.
233
his friendship with the British. In June that year, it was
rumoured that the ZaydIs would come to punish the people of
Hadramawt for having relations with the British, which led the
Quàyti Sultan to request arms and men with a man-of-war
and money to the value $100,000 as a gift and $100,000 on loan
this 1 Though the Zaydls withdrew, the

and was approved.
Hadramawt was not free from intrigues.
Following a report by Lee Warner, a Straits Settlements
Civil Servant, describing the fact that most of Arabs who
resided in the Dutch East Indies and Straits Settlements were
the Kathlrl tribe, and that they were actively intriguing against
the Quàyti, the India Office suggested to the Foreign office that
a British agent or Consular Officer should be appointed to
Mukalld. The India Office argued that
such an officer would presumably act in

subordination to the Aden Residency through which
the relations of His Majesty's Government with the
Sultans of Shehr and Mukalla have been conducted
for over 50 years. The present Sultan has shown
himself thoroughly loyal to the British connection,
and the appointment of a British Agent to his
capital, following as it would upon the assistance
recently given him in arms and money, would serve
to strengthen still further the ties which bind
him to Great Britain and to convince him of the
determination of His Majesty's Government, whose
formal protection he has enjoyed since 1888, to
his legitimate interests. 2
safeguard
The appointment of such an agent was approved by the
Foreign Office. Approval was also given for the position of the
Agent in relation to the Aden Residency as suggested by the
India Office. 3
1 L/P&S/10/610 & R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letters, 24/6/1916;

L/P&S/10/551,30/12/1916.
3 L/P&S/10/551, Foreign Office to Cairo, 2/3/1915.
234
Meanwhile the negotiations between the Quàytl and the
Kathirl continued. At an interview with Captain Reilly,
assistant Resident, at Aden in February 1917, the Quàytl was
optimistic about a future settlement with the Kathiri, and even
wished that no action should be taken against any properties of
the Sayyid as had been suggested earlier by the Resident. 1 The
prospect for a settlement became brighter when it was reported
that Said Pasha had written to the Kathlris that he could not
support them with men and arms. This move convinced the
Quàyti Sultdn's wazir that this action would force the Kathiris
to be more 2 On the hand, the Quàyti Sultan's

amenable. other
wazir was himself warned by Sa'Id Pasha that "Had it not
been for the defence of Saiyid Abd al-Rahman on your behalf,
on account of your being a descendent of the Prophet, we would
have punished you. "3 In September 1917, SaÌd Pasha wrote to
the Quàyti Sultan's wazir to warn him further that
we have heard of your evil acts and deviation

from the right path... You have been devoting your
time and services to the cause of the British
Government desiring by that to pollute the
country which was considered holy by your
fathers and ancestors, on account of your
avariciousness . for dirham and dinar and in the
hope of getting a title and medal .... 4
These letter5, which undoubtedly brought considerable pressure
on Sayyid al-Mihdar, the minister of the Quàyti Sultdn to break
his allegiance, led him and the QuàytI Sultan to come down to
1 L/P&S/10/551, Interview with the QuàytI, 20/2/1917.

235
Aden to request 1 In the meantime the Kathirl
assistance. was
still awaiting the assistance of arms and ammunition from Sa'Id
Pasha who was reported earlier to have declined the offer. 2
There had been a number of attempts to bridge the
relations between the Kathiris and the Quàytis. It has been
said that a friendly agreement took place between the Quàyti
and the KathIri but failed. In February 1917, the Quàyti Sultan
who was at Aden reported to the Resident that his minister,
Sayyid al-Mihdar was negotiating with the Kathirl who was
by Sayyid 3 This initiative did

represented al-Sagqäf. also not
bear fruit. The Kathiri Sultan wrote to Said Pasha that
we suggested to Syed al-Sakkaf to discuss matters

with the Ku'aiti wazir, Syed Husen ibn Hamid, on
the subjects he wants from us. (On discovering)
that the wazir was liar, cunning and traitor etc.,
he (Sayed al-Sakkaf) deserted him for the sake of
Allah. The said wazir was urging that we should
unite and combine together. He used to fill up our
hearts by mentioning the English and threatens us
with the strength of the Power. He tells us that if
we do not submit to his wishes the British
Government will confiscate the states of all of us
and capture our men living in his countries. 4
Probably at the instigation of the Resident, the Quàytl Sultan
reported to the Aden Residency that he continued to advise the
Kathiri to cease further communications with the Ottomans.
When this move proved unsuccessful, the Qu'aytl urged the
Residency to take action on their properties in the Hadramawt. 5
The Qu'aytl further urged Britain to take action on the family
and Kathirl and their property in Singapore. 6

of al-Sagqdf

2 R/20/A4864, Kathlri to SaÌd Pasha, 15/5/1917.
3 R/20/A4864, Interview with the Quàytl, 17/2/1917.
4 R/20/A4864, The KathIrI to Sa'Id Pasha, 15/5/1917.
5 R/20/A4864, The Quàytl to Stewart, 14/4/1917.
6 R/20/A4864, The QuàytI to Stewart, 15/7/1917.
236
In January 1918 the Quàyti again expressed his desire to
make a treaty with the Kathiri. Wingate reported to the Foreign
Office that he agreed to the following terms which had been
suggested by the Quàyti
1- Kathirl to have local autonomy under their own
Sultans who would acknowledge suzerainty of Mukalla.
2- Kathiri as part of Mukalla territory to accept British
protection.
3- Future disputes between the two contracting parties to
be referred to Resident at Aden for settlement.
4- Kathlri to be precluded from corresponding with
Foreign Powers and to address their communications to Aden
through Mukalla. 1
Though Lee Warner had been appointed as British Agent at
Mukalla, Wingate suggested that his appointment should not be
announced during the present negotiations between the Qu'aytl
and the Kathlri in order to avoid any speculation. Lee Warner
stayed in Cairo for a few days and was destined for the Dutch
East Indies with no stop at Aden. The India Office expressed
their dissatisfaction with the plan as they suggested that Lee
Warner should remain long enough in Cairo to learn Arabic and
to get in touch with the Arab Bureau as his assignment was
for the the Qu'aytl-Kathlrl disputes. 2

primarily settlement of
In July 1918 the above terms of agreement had been accepted
by the Kathirl delegates, and the KathlrI Sultan's attitude
appeared to be favourable. The change of the attitude of the
Kathiri was apparently as a result of a joint Qu'aytl and British
1 L/P&S/10/551, Cairo to FO, 16/1/1918; R/20/A/1410, January 1918.

2 L/P&S/10/551, India Office's note, 1/7/1918.
237
blockade of trade between wädl Hadramawt and migrants in
India, Singapore and Indonesia which caused a food shortage in
Hadramawt, and consequently in August the agreement
including its were by parties involved. 1

supplement signed all
4.5 The Àbdali
The Ottomans were aware of the pre-eminent position of
the Àbdali Sultan, Sir Àli b Ahmad among the chiefs in the
Protectorate and his importance to the British in Aden. When
the war broke out the Ottomans made considerable efforts to
persuade the Sultdn to side with them. The first attempt was
made by the gä'immaqäm of Hujariyah, Ahmad Nu`mAn,
when he wrote to the Sultan describing the British action at
Shaykh SaÌd as "their desire to efface Islam", and informed
him that "both Shafie and Zeidi tribesmen are collecting at the
orders of the Ottoman Government to defend their religion and
country. ''2 The Sultan lost no time in replying to Ahmad
Nu`män and other pro-Ottoman Arabs assuring them that the
British action at Shaykh SaÌd was occasioned by the menacing
fort 3
attitude of the Ottomans at that towards British shipping.
The reputation of the Àbdall Sultan as an influential
figure in Southwest Arabia was also respected by Imäm Yahyä
who had a secret treaty with the former before the war.
Ahmad Fadl bin Àll Muhsin, al-Àbdali, mentioned that, at the
of war, Sa'Id Pasha instructed the Imäm to write to

outbreak
1 Freitag, op. cit., p. 5; R/20/A/1410, Copy of the QuàytI-Kathlri

Agreement of August 1918.
3 Ibid.
238
the 'Abdall Sultan, to persuade the Sultan to co-operate with the
Ottomans. This was followed by the visit of SaÌd Pasha's
envoys to meet the Sultan's secretary. In the meeting at
Musaymir the Sultan's secretary was reminded of his duty to
Islam and asked if the 'Abdall Sultan would stand by the Islamic
Government and whether he would allow the Ottoman troops to
through the 'Abdall to besiege Aden. 1 This

pass country attempt
obviously failed as the 'Abdall Sultan was fully loyal to the
British.
The loyalty of the 'Abdall Sultan to the British was evident
in several ways. He was given a medal, K. C. I E. 2, and a gift of
arms and ammunition on the eve of the war. He was given the
duty of writing a proclamation to all the chiefs in Arabia,
declaring British friendship towards Muslims in order to clear
any doubt of the British intention following their attack on
Shaykh Sa'Id. This he wrote in November 1914. In December
1914 the 'Abdall Sultan received a letter from the Imam in a
reply to his letter expressing great friendship with the House of
'Abdall from ancient times and seeking information on a treaty
between his British Government. 3 In the

ancestors and same
month the Ottoman gd'immaqäm of Qamä'lrah, Shaykh
Muhammad Näsir b. Muqbil, the Mavia Shaykh known by the
British, expressed his desire to make a pact with the 'Abdall
who agreed, provided that the British guaranteed his
independence thereafter. 4 The Sultan continued to have in

a say
the agreement as the payment to the Mavia Shaykh would be
I Wingate Papers, Mackawee to Wingate, 26/5/1915.

2 K. C. I. E. stands for Knight Commander of the Indian Empire
3 L/P&S/10/558 & L/P&S/10/559, Imam to ÀbdalI, 17/12/1914,
4 L/P&S/10/558 & L/P&S/10/559,17/: 2/1914.
239
made through and under the advice of the Àbdall Sultan.
As the British made the 'Abdall Sultan the centre of their
influence, they could not afford to lose him. Assistance was
immediately sent to Lahej when the British heard about the
advance of the Ottomans in order to protect the city. For
various reasons, British assistance could not protect the Sultan,
who was shot during his withdrawal to Aden and died a few
days later at Aden. As all of his families, supporters and
soldiers fled to Aden and other places, they were, therefore,
able to hold an assembly attended by the various heads of the
Àbdali ruling house to elect a new Sultan. On July 14, by a
great majority they elected 'Abd al-Karim b. Fadl b. Àll, cousin
of the deceased Sultan and the eldest son of a former Sultan, to
be the Sultän. 1 After the election of a Sultan by the court,

new
the headmen of the principal clans should give it their
"imprimatur" and the first ceremony was the "turbanning" of
the elected by the Sayyids of Waht. These ceremonies could not
be completed as the Sayyid had sought Ottoman protection and
the chief had been deserted by his tribesmen. The Resident
suggested that the Sultan would be installed after the occupation
from the Ottomans. 2 The

of Lahej appointment of Àbd al-Karim
was, however, approved by the British and the payment of
break. 3 At the
stipend was continued without end of July it was
reported that the Mansab of Waht had recognised the election of
Àbd had the prescribed turban. 4

al-Karim, and sent
1 R/20/A/3996,14/7/1915.
2 Ibid.
3 R/20/A/3966,24/7/1915.
4 Ibid.
240
At the occupation of Lahej, a great number of the Àbdalis,
estimated by Ahmad Fadl b. Àli Muhsin al-Àbdall, as more
than 4,000 left the city for Aden and other places such as Bir
Ahmad, Shaykh Ùthmdn, Ìmäd, Abyan Suhayb. l Those

and
who stayed behind were maltreated by the Ottomans. Ahmad
Fadl gives ample evidence of the maltreatment received by the
Àbdalls. 2 Their treatment by the fatwd

was prompted of
Shaykh al-Islam which allowed the confiscation of the property
of a Muslim who had left a Muslim country for a Christian
3
country.
The new 'Abdall Sultan appeared to be as loyal as the
former one to the British. He continued to act on the advice of
the Resident. Early in April 1916, the Resident visited the 'Abdall
and advised him that "the Arab chiefs should prove their
friendship by something more than profession, and it was their
country that was invaded by the Turks and they should do
something to defend their own country if they wished it to be
regarded in future as belonging to them, and it would be very
easy for them to boycott the Turks and to raid their
communications. "4 Accordingly, the Àbdall Sultan wrote on
the proposed lines to all neighbouring rulers. In reply they
professed their willingness to do something against the Ottomans
but they feared reprisal. The Sultan had also written to all the
presumably at the instructions of the Resident,

stipendiaries,
to gauge the chiefs attitude in the event of a British

seeking
1 Àbdall, Hadiyat al-zaman, p. 221.

2 Àbdall, Hadivat al-zaman, pp. 221-228.
3 Ibid. p. 227.
4 L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letters, 20/5/1916.
241
movement from Shaykh Ùthmän. Many of them replied that
they would act when the time came but asked for arms and
'
ammunition.
Following the news of the Arab revolt under Sharif
Husayn in the summer of 1916, the Àbdall wrote to the Resident
expressing his pleasure. He also wrote to all the neighbouring
shaykhs and Sultäns giving them details and urging them to
take part in the general Arab rising against the Turks. He sent
a congratulatory letter to the Sharif. To the Imdm he wrote
him to join in the general Arab revolt. 2

urging
Despite the occupation of Lahej, the. new Àbdall Sultan,
Sultdn Àbd al-Karim b. Fadl, who remained at Aden throughout
the war, continued to play a key role in the political affairs of
the Aden Protectorate. His activities at Aden as a British
propagandist provided ready assistance to the British in dealing
with the Protectorate chiefs. The Sultän had further
responsibility for the affairs of his family, soldiers and
tribesmen who moved together with him to Aden. Their number
had increased to 1,453, and this put him to debt, particularly
his commitment in paying the rent for houses for his people. the
Resident, therefore, proposed to increased his stipend so as not
be a burden on him when he would return to Lahej to
reestablish his country, and this was approved.

242
4.6 Other Protectorate Chiefs
At the beginning of the war all the Protectorate chiefs
remained loyal to the British in spite of the efforts the
Ottomans. But when the Ottomans moved to the AmIrI country
in February 1915 and the British failed to extend their
protection, the AmIr of Dali` fell an easy prey to them. At
the occupation of Lahej in July 1916, the Ottomans were joined
by the Hawshabi Sultan and his tribesmen, the Subayhls and
some non-stipendiary shaykhs of the YäfiÌs. 1 These

chiefs who
must have been forced to join the Ottomans in the attack on
Lahej, were not, however, required to defend the city or to
be ready for other offensive measures at Shaykh Ùthman or
to return to their homes. 2 It is not

Aden as they were allowed
known whether they were given any reward for their co-
operation at Lahej, but on the night of the attack there was
whole-sale looting by the Arabs as well as the Turks, and SaÌd
Pasha stopped it only after the third day. In the meantime the
'Ottomans spread a story that a German fleet was to attack
Aden, and as soon as the attack was made from the sea, they
from the land. 3 Though the

would attack story was propaganda,
it implied that. the Ottomans at Lahej were not strong enough to
launch an attack on Aden, and this was admitted by Sa'Id Pasha
after the war. The Ottomans advanced only as far as Shaykh
Ùthmdn a few days after the British withdrew.
A defeat at Shaykh Ùthmän on July 21,1915 compelled
SaÌd Pasha, who now feared a British advance on Lahej, to ask
1 R/20/A/3966,13/7/1915.
3 Ibid.
243
for the co-operation of the Arabs, including the Protectorate
chiefs, for the defence of Lahej. Consequently on July 29, the
Hawshabi Sultän with 250 men arrived at Lahej. 1 He was
followed by some of the protected Subayhls such as Imad Ahmad
(the Julaydi), Darwish Battäsh (the Dubayni) and Sälih b.
(the 2 Some
Ahmad Mansüri) with 600 men. of the Yamani Arabs
were also reported to have arrived at Lahej.
The British did not, however, move to reoccupy Lahej.
This measure allowed the Ottomans to continue their efforts to
win over the rest of the Protectorate. Said Pasha repeatedly
sent letters inviting those such as the Qutaybl, who had not yet
submitted to the Ottomans to come to Lahej. Hitherto the
Qutaybi had remained loyal to the British, but he was put
under intense pressure by the invitations. He reported to Aden
that though he had so far made excuses for non-compliance, he
could not be sure that the Ottomans would not eventually make
ingress into his territory. 3 The Qutaybi's to

an anxiety appeared
be well founded when in January 1916, it was reported that
1000 Ottomans had left Lahej for the 'Alawl and the Qutaybi
countries. Their plan was to occupy the Àlawi, Qutaybt and
Fad1I countries in an attempt to block the Abyän route, thus
forcing them to tender their submission to Lahej. It was
reported that fighting took place in the Qutaybl country, and the
Ottomans defeated. 4 The Qutaybi was (after a fight

were with
the Ottomans) reported to have sent his nephew, Mugbil

4 L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letter 19/1/1916.
244
Àbdu'Lldh, to treat with them at Lahej, but he dismissed the
idea that he had tendered his submission to them. He explain
that Muqbil's mission was only for the safe conduct of *the
Qutaybi caravan. He, therefore, asked for assistance in order to
1 In
fight the Ottomans. a letter from the QutaybI Shaykh dated
January 20,1916, the Resident noted that it appeared that there
was no fighting with the Ottomans, as reported earlier, but the
Ottomans persistently asserted that they would come to the
Qutaybi country, if the Shaykh did not go to them after the
arrival of the Qutaybl caravan from Aden for which a safe-
conduct was promised by the Pasha. He suggested that as the
Arabs disliked the behaviour of the Turks, the British
Government should act at once, either by sending troops or
arms and ammunition otherwise it would be useless later,
the done, to blame the Shaykh. 2 The

when mischief was
Qutaybi Shaykhis letter undoubtedly implied that the Ottomans
pressure had been stepped up. Shortly after, he was finally
compelled to go to Lahej, and in March 1916 his stipend was
3 The Shaykh, however, to Aden

suspended. wrote explaining
that his reason for going to Lahej was to save his country from
invasion, and he asserted that the Pasha had derived no benefit
from his to Lahej. 4 On the hand, the Shaykh

visit other was
reported to have actually signed the same agreement which the
pasha required from other chiefs, including the Fad1I and the
to have handed it to Sa'Id Pasha. 5 However,

Kathirl, and over
after the war, Jacob suggested that his past conduct should be

4 Ibid.
245
forgiven l
as he was under duress.
It appears that the Pasha made considerable attempts to
bring all the Protectorate under his control. The 'Alawl Shaykh,
Àll Näshir, who did not join the Ottoman camp, reported in
August 1915 that the Ottomans had given him trouble and
plundered many things belonging to him and his people, and
carried away some rifles and camels of his people at Lahej and
other places in Yaman. 2 As Ottoman increased in his

pressure
area, the 'Alawl left his country for Aden in September 1915
using the Abyan route. At Ìmäd, on his way to Aden, Àli
Näshir wrote to justify his action by stating that "as
negotiations ceased to come from both you and ourselves and as
we and our subjects are in strained circumstances, we thought
it best to come down in person to you even though we expose
to killing". 3 He in Aden on September

ourselves safely arrived
22, and stayed for eleven days. He stated that he had come to
Aden now because he feared being treated with disrespect by
the Turks. He heard that instructions had been given to the
Hawshabis YäfiÌs to find him. 4 On his

and and arrest return
to his country, in December 1915, Näshir received a letter from
SaÌd Pasha warning him against his communication with the
British and inviting him to Lahej. The 'Alawl was now in great
fear. 5 The Ottomans moved a step further when in January
1916, they proceeded to the 'Alawl country, occupied it and took
the 'Alawl Shaykh, his son and thirty others to Lahej as
1 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.

2 R/20/A/4583, 'Alawl Shaykh to Jacob, August 1915.
3 R/20/A/4583, 'Alawl Shaykh to Jacob, September 1915.
4 R/20/A/4583, October 1915.
5 R/20/A/4583, December 1915.
246
prisoners. ' This was confirmed when on January 30,1916, the
Àlawl wrote to explain that he had perforce to go to Lahej to
treat the Ottomans. 2 He in May 1917

with again wrote
complaining of the intrigues of the Qutaybi Shaykh's nephew.
After that date there were no further communications between
the Àlawi Shaykh and the British until the end of the war.
The Ottomans had also extended their activities to Bir
Ahmad. After the occupation of Lahej, Shaykh Fadl b.
Àbdu'Lldh, the 'Aqrabl ruler of BIr Ahmad who hitherto
remained loyal to the British, was invited to Lahej but he
refused. He was also given an Ottoman flag but did not hoist it
and instead he sent it at once to Aden. For this action, he was
vilified by the Pasha in a letter dated August 2,1915. The
to Aden' 3 informed the Shaykh

letter, which was then also sent
that the Pasha was expecting him and other tribal headmen
to Lahej the the British. 4

to come after success against
Shortly afterwards (probably in August 1915) a party of
Turks and Somalis surrounded the Shaykh's house in Bir
Ahmad and he was taken to Lahej, where he was fettered and
imprisoned for a few months, and kept in Lahej under
surveillance. After he was captured no further news was
received about him. Bir Ahmad was, however, dismantled by
the British for military reasons, and the inhabitants were
1 L/P&S/10/295, Political Intelligent Summary, 8/1/1916.

2 L/P&S/10/295, Political Intelligent Summary, 5/2/1916.
3 R/20/A/4076,20/1/1916.
4 R/20/A/4044, Said Pasha to the 'Aqrabl, 2/8/1915.
"for the purpose of displaying their gladness and attaching yourself to
the troops of those who recognise one God; but you left for Aden and
there you put yourself into a corner in a state of a broken spirit and
pleased yourself at the expense of the noble people. But from a religious
sympathetic point of view and consistent with the Islamic brotherly
247
brought to Aden and housed. At the end of the war, Jacob
suggested that Shaykh Fadl b. Àbdu'Lldh should be allowed to
return to Bir Ahmad and some compensation should be paid to
him his tribes for rebuilding 1

and purposes.
The Yäfl'I country where there were numerous clans and
the country was split up into chieftaincies, also became a target for
intrigues. The Upper YdfiÌ Sultan, Qahtän b. Ùmar was deposed
by his tribesmen well before the outbreak of war, but he
continued to enjoy the stipend. His brother, Sälih b. Ùmar, who
was not stipendiary, was in control of the Upper YäfiÌ. The
British, however, made the Mawsatah Nagibs, who styled
themselves as "the fathers of Ydfl' ", their stipendiaries in
addition to other shaykhs in the area. At the beginning of the
war, the YäfiÌs remained loyal to the British except a few of
their non-stipendiary shaykhs who accepted the advice of al-
Ta'irl, the principal Shaykh of Radd'. When the Ottomans
affection we accepted your plea through the lad you sent to us after the
conquest and we accordingly gave you assurance of safety in the belief
that you were one of those who are honest people and we have also
furnished you with the illustrious Turkish standard: considering you
were of those who are resolute and religious people but experience has
proved to us that you have renounced our friendship, patronised the
kafirs and have made yourself the means of exporting them provisions
such as water, firewood and kirbi which they are in need for and
desired to be a man having a double face and it seems that you have
forgotten the same of the Apostle "no double-faced man would be
esteemed by God". You have striven to help the English by giving them
your opinions and furnishing them with news of our affairs and
movements and desired to be favoured by the unbelieving nation as if
you are not aware that Jews will not be pleased with thee, neither the
Christian, until thou follow their religion.... As you have adopted this
course that Islam faith stands as a barrier between you and us and
against our giving you any protection on account of the iniquity you
have been doing.... You are not a fitting man to be shadowed by the
Excellent ottoman standard. The retention of it by you and hoisted is a
humiliation to the flag. For it be from us to overlook such a treason.
Return it to us soon and note that there remains no assurance of safety
between you and us. " Jacob, however, stated that he was imprisoned
for a year, but another report by the 'Aqrabl agent in January 1916 said
that the 'Aqrabl Shaykh had been set free at Lahej, but not allowed to
to Bir Ahmad. Cf. L/P&S/10/295, AWL, 20/1/1916.
return
1 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
248
occupied Lahej, some Ydfi`Ys were reported to have joined the
1 they continued to have relation with the

operation, and
Ottomans did the Lower Yäfiìs. 2 These

as some of were most
probably non-stipendiaries. The stipendiary shaykhs, on the
other hand remained loyal to the British. Following the fall of
Lahej to the Ottomans, some of the stipendiary shaykhs wrote a
joint letter regretting the event. They claimed that the ÀbdalI's
call for assistance reached them too late, otherwise they would
certainly have given him material help, but the Resident
considered this to be untrue. They further stated that they
were prepared to prove their friendship to the British in action,
and not by words, and therefore proposed a plan according to
which the British must send to Yäfi` one or two of the most
influential members of the Àbdalls family, so that they, in
could call in the aid of the YäfiÌs. The Resident believed

person,
that the YäfiÌs might join the British forces if they were on
the spot, but otherwise could never be trusted, and he
lip 3 At the
considered that statement as mere service. success
of Sharif Husayn, many Ydfiìs chiefs including the formerly
pro-Ottoman Yäfiì Sultan Sälih b. Ùmar, had written to
congratulate the Sharif, and styled him as Sayyidinä wa
Mawlänä Amir al-Mu'minin wa Hämi al-Hararnayn which
implied that they recognised him as spiritual leader of the
Muslims. 4 Though there was no report of fighting against the
Ottomans in the Yäfiì country, the chiefs of the area appeared
1 R/20/A/3966,13/7/1915.
2 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
3 L/P& S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letters, 2/10/1915.
4 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
249
determined to rise against the Ottomans, and letters were sent
to several shaykhs of Na`wah and its vicinity to stir them up
against the Ottomans. 1 However, by the Àbdali's

a report agent
at Lahej indicated otherwise. He stated that he had seen a letter
written by Shaykh Sälih al-Tä'iri, the principal Shaykh of
Radä', informing Sa'Id Pasha that the naglbs of Mawsatah had
replied to him expressing their willingness to make friendship
the Ottomans. 2 Nevertheless there further

with was no report
that they joined the Ottomans at Lahej.
To sum up, the co-operation of some of the Protectorate
chiefs with the Ottomans at Lahej were under compulsion.
When SaÌd Pasha was interviewed after the war, he confirmed
that the Hawshabl Sultan, Àll Mdni`, protested against his order
to proceed to Lahej, but he compelled the Sultan to join. 3 The
Subayhls generally helped the Ottomans through force majeure.
They were not, however, always amenable to the Pasha who
had from time to time sent Turks and Somalis to punish them. 4
The cases of the Àgrabi, the Àlawl Shaykh, the Qutaybl falls in
the same categories of the Amir of Pali' and the Fadli Sultan.
Towards the east, the Ottomans pressure was a little less, so
that some of the chiefs in the area, such as the YäfiÌs, the
Àwlagis and Quàyti did not submit to the Ottomans at Lahej.
Therefore the policy of the Ottomans in the Aden Protectorate
should be discussed in general on the basis of detailed discussion
of Ottomans-tribal relations.
1 L/P& S/10/610 & R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letters, 28/3/1917.

3 R/20/A/4076, Jacob's note, 4/1/1919.
4 Ibid.
250
4.7 The Ottoman Policy in the Protectorate
Tribal and inter-tribal politics in the Aden Protectorate
were the basis for relations between the imperial powers, (the
British and the Ottomans) and the tribes. The social and the
political structure of the tribes requires some explanation. In
the Aden Protectorate, there were a number of confederations
composed of several tribes ruled by a Sultan who was not a
tribesman, but traditionally came from a ruling family. The
power of the Sultan over his territory varied greatly from one
tribes to the other. A few of the chiefs in the Protectorate, such
as the Sultan of Àbdall and the Sultan of Quàytl, exercised a
more absolute authority over their tribes than did other chiefs.
The Sultan of Hawshabi, if he had had a strong will, might
have had a similar authority over the majority of his tribe. The
AmIr of the Amiri tribe, which was a confederacy of various
small tribes, exercised his absolute authority over only a
comparatively small proportion of them. The Sultan of Upper
Yafiì had little or no authority over his tribe; power was
shared by his nagibs. The Fadli Sultan had no authority over
several of his sub-tribes, namely Ahl Haydarah Am Mansur
and Mardkishah. The Àwlagi had several chiefs, while many of
the outlying and nomadic tribes were practically beyond the
control of their Sultans. The Subayhl were less united; there
were no Sultan or head Shaykh and their were divided into a
large number of petty clans.
The weakening of the authority of the rulers of the
majority of the tribes in the Protectorate intensified when the
Ottoman occupied Lahej which led to a break in the official links
251
not only with the Àbdalt at Lahej but also with the rest of the
Protectorate because the Àbdali Sultan had formerly been an
official mediator. Furthermore in the tribal system the support
given by the tribe was a basis for the authority of the Sultan
or chief. This structure, however, had undergone changes as
the Sultan came to be supported by the British morally and
financially, thus reducing his reliance on those under him. The
Sultan or chief who had little control over his tribe, and who
reduced his reliance on the support of the tribes following the
more direct protection embodied in the protectorate treaties,
was forced to react independently of the traditional system of
tribalism in order to secure his position. This was the case of
the majority of the Protectorate chiefs namely the Amlr of Däli`
and the Fadli Sultan who rallied to the side of the Ottomans at
Lahej in order to have strong support behind them particularly
when the British showed less commitment to protect them.
The tribesmen reacted similarly in accordance with their
tribal system. Those who had no confederacy and no Sultan or
chief such as the Subayhls had been in communication with the
Ottomans since the war broke out. Those tribesmen who were
not under the control of a Sultan or chief began to lean to the
Ottomans in order to back up their position as in the case of the
action taken by the Maräkishah, one of the Fad1I tribe, who co-
operated with the Ottomans at Lahej against the Fadli Sultan.
The Ottomans, who were aware of the social and
political structure of the tribes in the Protectorate, acted
similarly in their approach towards the chiefs and the
tribesmen. It has been said that the Ottomans were in
communication with the Subayhis and offered a stipend to
252
them, if it is true, hoping that they would co-operate and place
themselves under the Ottomans. The Ottomans had been in
communication not only with the chiefs in the Protectorate,
where their aim was to replace the British, but also with the
Sayyids, who had much influence in the tribal system as

.
mediators owing to their religious knowledge and their status as
descendants of the Prophet such as the Ashraf of Waht who
had a voice in the appointment of an Àbdali Sultan. They also
had communications with the Ashraf of Hadramawt.
The Ottomans had various methods to win over the chiefs
of the Protectorate. At the beginning of the war, jihäd had been
widely used in order to incite religious sentiments, so that these
chiefs would join them, but this appeal proved unsuccessful due
to the counter measure adopted by the British, proclaiming that
the present war was not a holy war as it was originated by
Germany which had persuaded the Ottoman Empire the come to
its side, and the proclaiming of the protection of the Holy places.
When the Ottomans noticed that their religious appeal was
unacceptable by the chiefs, they moved to occupy the
Protectorate territory notably Lahej which eventually brought
most of the tribes into their camp.
There were a number of reasons which motivated the
Ottomans to move into the Protectorate and settle at Lahej. In

,
his book written after the war, Jacob argued that the British
policy in the Hinterland was one of the causes which allowed
the Ottomans to extend their movements into the Protectorate.
He contended that the withdrawal of the political officer and
troops from Däli` which took place in 1907 and the withdrawal
of the Camel troops which had been posted at Dukaym since
253
mid-June 1915 had encouraged the Ottomans to move with the
knowledge that there would be less resistance in the
Protectorate. Moreover it handicapped the British in the
acquisition of reliable information, and this proved to be fatal to
them in making a decision to move to the hinterland
Furthermore, the failure to construct a railway from Aden to
Lahej which facilitate the movement of troops and the
bombardment of Shaykh Said which had aroused the Arabs to
join the Ottomans, added to the reasons. Finally the
bombardment of Luhayyah which took place in June 1915 in an
attempt of the British to assist the IdrIsI who did not appear,
1
led the Ottomans to suspect a division against them, added to
the above reasons. The bombardment of Luhayyah was also
considered by Major Rauf as a catalyst for leaving Mäwiyah
when he commented "we were incensed at the bombardment of
Luhaiya down from Mawia", 2 to retaliate

and so came possibly
if not on Aden, then on Aden Protectorate.
Above all the British policy of blockading the Red Sea
which stopped the supply to reach the Ottomans in the
hinterland gave a final impetus for the attack. At the beginning
of the war when the above measure was implemented, the
Arabs expected that this measure might lead to expansion of the
Ottomans into the Aden Hinterland. The difficulty in maintaining
troops in the interior was the real motive revealed later
at the interview between Jacob and Àll Sa'Id Pasha after the
1 Jacob, op. cit., pp. 164-5; L/P&S/10/560.

2 The shelling resulted in part of the town being burned out and yet the
IdrIsI did not arrive at the scene even after the bombardment. Cf.
Jacob, op. cit., p. 168.
254
war. Said Pasha explained that
People wondered why I descended on Lahej: I was no

fool. I knew I could not take Aden, for you had
command of the sea. I did not propose to rush
Shaykh Uthman even. The truth was I could not
possibly have kept my forces together another nine
days in Mavia. They would have starved. I could of
course have tapped the resources of that tract but
that was obviously not polite as I had to befriend
my Arabs, and avoid any action that would cause
resentment. I had therefore perforce to come down
to the rich country about Lahj. 1
Jacob apparently was convinced and describes Àli Sa'ld Pasha
as soldier-diplomat who decided to make Lahej pay for the
upkeep of his army.
The above reason for occupying Lahej was also known
among the Arab gä'immaqdms. Al-Àbdali, the author of Hadlyat
al-zaman, quoted a source from them to the effect that the plan
to occupy Lahej came from Àll Said Pasha. He was aware that
his troops in the Yaman might die of hunger due to the
lack of supply if the blockade of the Red Sea by the British
continued. Thus he suggested to occupy Lahej where he could
provide for his troops with sufficient supply of foodstuffs and

2
cereals.
It is the fact that Lahej is the richest of the oases in the
littoral belt of the Aden Protectorate. 3 Furthermore Lahej was
the most important commercial centre outside Aden. It was a
market for fabrics and manufactured articles from Aden, and
in return it supplied Aden with fodder, vegetables and firewood.
Lahej also levied transit dues on articles brought from the
Yaman namely coffee and qät. 4 The Ottomans were,
1. R/20/A/4054, note of the interview with Said Pasha, 6/1/1919.

3 ÀbdalI, Hadiyat al-zaman, p 221.
4 Admiralty War Staff; A handbook of Arabia, vol. I, p. 180.
255
furthermore, in difficulty about cash to buy their supplies as
the British had occupied the Kamardn islands in June 1915 as
part of their plan to cut communications, including money
remittance between Jiddah and the Yaman.
The occupation of Lahej served not only for the necessity
of supply but also helped the Ottomans to hold the political
control of the tribes as the Àbdali had always been the standing
source of British influence among the Protectorate chiefs. Long
before the occupation of Lahej, the Ottomans made several
attempts to persuade the Àbdall Sultdn, particularly on religious
ground, to side them against the British. It was not clear
therefore, that the Ottomans expected that they could not win
over the Sultan. The attitude of the Sultan might have been
known to the Ottomans as he wrote to the Imam arguing the
Ottoman's decision to enter the war was a mistake from which
the Moslems had no benefit The Ottoman authorities in the
Yaman, however, continued their efforts to win over the
Sultan. The attitude of the Àbdali Sultan, who remained loyal
to the British had, to some extent prevented the Ottomans
from imposing a real threat to Aden itself. Had the Sultan agreed
to co-operate with the Ottomans, the Imam would certainly
have joined in. The Imam expressed his dissatisfaction at the
occupation of Lahej, and apparently had a secret agreement
with the Àbdall Sultan. The Ottomans, who crushed the
influence of the 'Abdall Sultan and hence the British among the
chiefs of the Protectorate, had therefore filled the vacuum in the
tribal politics of the Protectorate. It may be observed that after
the occupation of Lahej the Ottoman plan to move to Aden, if
was entirely dependent on the massive support from the

any,
256
protectorate tribesmen. But when they did not achieve this ends
they settled only at Lahej for the rest of the time.
The immediate impulse in the advance of the Ottomans on
Lahej was, therefore, not merely to win over the Arab chiefs
but to secure the posi tion of the Ottoman forces in the Yaman
when they had been blocked by sea since the war started.
Shortly after the fall of Lahej, the Pasha began his
communications with the Protectorate chiefs to secure their
support mainly for the purposes of securing supplies for Lahej.
On June 15,1916, the Pasha issued a notification, announcing
the abolition of taxes on goods, jowari, vegetables, fruit and

crops
otherA in Lahej in order to encourage traders to bring their
goods to Lahej. The notification also prohibited trading with
Aden. 1 These measures were only successful when the position
of the Ottomans at Lahej and the Protectorate was not
challenged by the British.
Therefore, throughout the war, though the British
maintained their sea blockade, the position of the Ottomans in
the Protectorate and the Yaman was economically secured. A
number of reports had been received in Aden illustrating
financial difficulty faced by the Ottomans at Lahej, on the one
hand, and their successful measures to overcome their
catastrophe on the other. In February 1917, the ÀbdalI SultAn's
agent reported that "the Turks have no money beyond what
they can get by encouraging caravans to pass through Lahej.
The whole of the produce of the Yemen, such as coffee, skins
and ghee, which comes in by the land route, has now been
I L/P&S/10/610, Aden Weekly Letter, 8/7/1916.
257
successfully diverted through Lahej and taxes are levied at
fixed rates per camel according to the commodities carried. "1
Supplies were also reported to have continued to flow to
Lahej from various places. In September that year Muhammad
Àbd al-Qddir Mackawee reported that an abundance of supplies
were obtainable at Lahej, such as goods, kerosene oil, tobacco
and even dates. Most of the supplies came from Shuqrah and
Abyan and other places on the coast. He further stated that:
It is not known how these supplies reach Shukra

and other ports of that coast, and whether they
come from Aden or elsewhere. However it is certain
that between 20 and 30 camel loads come to Lahej
from these places every three or four days and on
Tuesday last, 35 camel loads entered Lahej before
me. Supplies also come from Buraika. Every Monday
and Thursday five or six camel loads and four or
five donkey of rice, sugar, white shirting and cotton
prints, cut tobacco and kerosene oil in the bottles
come from Buraika. On other days small quantities
come from this place. On Tuesday last there were
more than 200 cases of kerosene oil lying in the
customs house (al-Mahkamah) at Lahej. As regards
tobacco, most of it comes from Meedi (via
cut
San'd'). 2
The flow of supplies to Lahej from many places, including
Aden continued and in March 1918 one of the Sayyids of al-
Àrdshah in the Lahej districts, Sayyid Sälih Bü Bakr, came to
Aden and stated that the Lahej bazaars were well stocked with
3 After the war SaÌd Pasha revealed the

all sorts of supplies.
source of supply which had been reported abundant at Lahej as
follows: "I got most of my supply from Aden through Abyan;
from Shukra and Ahwar, but mainly from Makalla. The Turks

2 L/P&5/10/610, Aden Weekly Letter, 7/9/1917
3 L/P&5/10/610, report from Sayyid Sa1ih Bü Bakr, 23/4/1918.
258
got nothing from Am Bureika except a stray sack of flour,
occasionally. A certain supply came down from Yafa, and this
came originally from Aden. "1
` Although the Ottomans succeeded in securing sufficient
supplies at Lahej and derived revenue by levying tax on
caravans, they were in difficulty about the lack of cash notably
from 1917 onwards. In April it was reported that Mahmüd
Nadim, the Governor-General of the Yaman had notified the
local commanders that he could not contribute towards the
salaries and emoluments of the forces at Lahej which therefore
themselves from local 2 In May that

must maintain revenues.
year, the Àbdall Sultan's agent reported that the Ottomans
were again in difficulty with cash, and they were buying grain
from the inhabitants on credit, promising to repay in kind
when they received supplies from the Yaman: in addition the
being in 3 This
salaries were paid arrears. was apparently as a
result of the Sharif's revolt which isolated the Yaman from
any assistance from Istanbul. Previously, before the outbreak of
hostilities in the Hijdz, a sum of £T30,000 in cash and a similar
amount in notes was despatched from Constantinople for the use
of-troops in Yaman. In all six officers, divided into three parties
left for Yaman by three separate roads. Two of these officers
arrived at Lahej on May 20,1917 with money. Four other
officers arrived in San'd' about April 8,1917 with £T30,000 in
bank notes and £T3,000 in gold. The party travelled disguised as
Najd. 4 It may be observed that there

pilgrims and came via
1 R/20/A/4054, note of the interview with SaÌd Pasha, 6/1/1919.

2 L/P&S/10/610, Aden Weekly Letters (AWL), 9/4/1917
3 L/P&S/10/610, AWL, 8/5/1917.
4 L/P&S/10/610, AWL, 13/6/917.
259
was no evidence of further assistance to Yaman from
Constantinople after the event of Arab uprisings in the Hijäz.
It may be observed that the relations set up by the
Ottomans with the tribes had as their objectives economic
rather than political or religious purposes. Nonetheless, the
political or religious purposes of the Ottomans in the Protectorate
should not be ignored as these complemented each other. This
can be seen from the effort of Said Pasha to conclude a treaty
with some of the Protectorate chiefs such as the Fadli, the
Qutaybi, the Hawshabi, the Kathiri and others, declaring that
they would have their independence not only from the Ottomans
but also from the British after the war. The Resident believed
that this course of action had been widely adopted over the
Protectorate, and evidently some of the chiefs had actually
signed the agreement and handed it over to Said Pasha notably
the Qutaybl Shaykh. The Fadll Sultan evidently signed it, but
his grandson objected to the treaty and tried to stop it reaching
SaÌd Pasha. The Resident believed that many others like the
Hawshabl have the treaty. 1 The 'Abdall Sultan

might signed
gave his comment on the effect of the treaty on the political as
well as the economical aspects of the Protectorate by stating that
"if this project... is consummated the result will seriously
affect us and we shall be under their mercy, as they will be
able to divert the caravan route wherever they want from
our country and make kafilas travel in the Haushabi territory
and thence to the Fadli country. We shall consequently lose our
1 L/P&5/10/610 & R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letters, 24/6/1916.
260
transit dues in addition to the losses we have suffered
already. "1
The agreement with the Protectorate chiefs was also to
meet the Ottoman plan for the future settlement of the occupied
territory. In January 1917, Mahmüd Nadim received a telegram
from Sa'Id Pasha at Lahej suggesting that "none of the enemy
Powers will be allowed to interfere in Arabian affairs or such
pertaining to Arabian Islands. Lahej and the nine cantons in
Yemen which have been conquered in this war to be given up
by England together with Sheikh Uthman and Aden to the
Turkish Government. " 2
1 R/20/A/4862, 'Abdall to Walton, 8/6/1916.

261
Chapter Five
Imam Yaliyä During the War
5.1 Imam Yariyä between the Ottomans and the
British
The Treaty of Da`än was the basis for the relationship
between the Imäm and the Ottomans during the First World
War. Since the treaty was concluded in 1911, it had been
faithfully observed by both parties, the Imam and the
Ottomans, although not ratified until September 22,1913. The
Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912 further strengthened these new
amicable relations. In his letter to the Àbdall Sultdn after the
signature of the Treaty of Da`dn, the Imam described the
purpose of his reconciliation with the Ottomansa5 beirj besides
elevating the word of God, to resist the aggressions of Italy and
foreigners in Tripoli. 1 The cordial relations between the

other
Imäm and the Ottomans continued. When the Ottomans were
further threatened by the Balkans at a time before the peace
was declared with Italy, the Imäm remained friendly with the
Ottomans. Although he frequently admitted that the Yaman
was, in ancient times, an- a-ppendage of his predecessors, he did
not mediate ousticig the Ottomans from his country during those
critical periods, the Italian and the Balkan wars.
The Treaty of Da`än appeared to have superseded earlier
overtures of the Imäm to open relations with the British
through the Àbdall Sultdn. After the Treaty was signed in 1911,
I R/20/A/1257, Imäm to Àbdali, 19/11/1911.
262
there was no report before 1914 of further approach of the
Imäm who was obviously no longer in need of assistance in
order to continue to fight the Ottomans. However, in September
1914, the Imdm made an attempt to reopen relations with the
British. He deputed his emissary to Lahej to sound out the
Àbdall Sultän about obtaining British assistance in the
manufacture 1 The Imäm's latest

of gun powder. overture gave
the British at Aden the impression that the Imdm's attitude
towards the British Government on the eve of the war was
friendly. 2
When the Ottomans entered the war, the Imdm continued
to remain faithful to the Ottomans so long as their interests
linked them together, despite early efforts of the British to win

a
him over. The Imdm continued to receive/monthly allocation
from. the Ottomans of MT11,0003 and so did the tribes of Häshid
and BakIl. The Imdm also continued to have a number of
Ottoman troops, estimated four to six battalions stationed at his
Shaharah. 4 These
stronghold, arrangements continued mainly
as a result of the good offices of the Governor General of the
" Yaman, Mahmüd Nadim Pasha, who remained in office from
1913 to 1919 with a short break in 1915 and who kept on the best
of terms with the Imdm. Mahmüd Nadlm was one of those who
had initiated the negotiation with the Imam leading to the treaty
Da`dn. 5 The Imdm, who continued to receive treatment

of good
from the Ottomans, had no reason to break his relations with
1 L/P&S/10/558,11/9/1914.
2 L/P&S/10/558, notes by Jacob, 15/8/1914; L/P&S/10/462, Resident to
Secretary to Govt. of India 19/8/1914.
3 L/P&S/10/558, Aden to Bombay, 15/8/1914.
4 Wingate's papers 123/2/13, Mackawee to Wingate, 24/1/1915.
5 Gavin, Aden under British Rule 1839-1967 pp. 224-5; E. Macro,
,
Yemen and the Western World since 1571, p. 49
263
the Ottomans in order to acquire British favours.
Due to his commitment to the Ottomans, the Imam, at the
beginning of the war, appeared to adopt a policy of joining them

!he
in their campaign in jAden Protectorate and in the Yaman,
aiming at averting any potential extension of British rule and
extending their own sphere of influence. However on more than
one occasion the Imam had his 1 At the beginning

own agenda. of
the war, at the instigation of Mal; imttd Nadim, the Imam wrote
to his friend, the Àbdali Sultan persuading him to side with the
Ottomans during the 2 The Imam

war. also contributed an
amount of one lakh of (MT) dollars as assistance for the jihäd. 3
At the same time the Imam served his own interest. As
early as January 1915 the Imdm began a military campaign in
the eastern parts of the Protectorate including Baydä, Dhubyani
Rub'atayn. 4 The the Imdm in those

and movement of areas was
apparently suggested by the Ottomans in an attempt to create a
diversion through the Imdm so as to induce the British to send a
large expeditionary force to protect the frontier. The British
would then have to face not only the Ottomans but also the
Zaydis. But the Imdm had his own reasons for taking the
opportunity to re-establish his predecessors' authority over
those territories. The Imam benefited from Ottoman support as
he was backed in his campaign by religious sermons, arguments
from the Sultdn. 5 In March 1915

and proclamations a
considerable number of the Imäm's men was reported to have
come to Qa'tabah near Däli' on the Protectorate frontier. This
1 Freitag, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

2 Ahmad Fadl al-'Abdall, Hadivat al-zaman, pp. 207-8.
3 Wingate's papers 123/2/13, Mackawee to Wingate, 24/1/1915.
4 Ibid.
5 FO 882/18, Mackawee to Wingate, 3/3/1915.
264
report was followed by a visit of the Governor General of the
Yaman presumably to ensure that the frontier was in a proper

1
state of defence.
Hitherto the Imdm had thrown in his lot with the
Ottomans. When the Ottomans moved into the Protectorate and
occupied Lahej, the Imam expressed his disapproval of the
2 The Imam Ottoman in the

action. opposed expansion
Protectorate not because he favoured the British, but because
the Ottoman presence conflicted with his own claim to the
Yaman as the possessions of his forebears. Lahej he considered
a part and parcel of his ancient domain: also he had a secret
treaty the Àbdall Sultdn. 3 The Imam, however,

with continued
to remain loyal to the Ottomans although he was not satisfied
with their methods of rule but for the time being he found that
the best policy was to abide by the terms of the Da`än treaty.
The Imam was also very alarmed about the presence of
the British at Aden and the spread of their sphere of influence
over his ancestors territory. It was in his interest therefore to
watch carefully the struggle between the British and the
Ottomans, two foreign powers in his country. When the
British bombarded Shaykh SaÌd in November 1914, the Imam
was averse to the action: Shaykh SaÌd, he said, was part of
his ancient possessions and he hoped to regain the ascendancy
there. 4 In reply the British wrote on November 24 to the Imam
stating that

2 papers 123/6/9, Jacob's memo, 10/5/1916.
_Wingate's 123/6/9, Jacob's memo, 16/9/1916.
3. Wingate s papers
4 R/20/A/1527, Jacob's memo, 9/9/1915.
265
the British Government have no wish whatsoever to
extend their frontiers... As regards Sheikh Said it
was the Turks who by increasing their armament
in that place had menaced the security of British
shipping and so it was necessary to dislodge them,
and dismantle their forts. When this was done the
British force returned, in order to prove that they
had no desire to extend their territory. They were
careful not to injure the village nor did they touch
the wells on which the Arabs are dependent. '
Possibly dissatisfied with the reply, the Imdm sent his envoy to
Lahej in January 1915 apparently to inquire as to the precise
attitude of the British and their alleged policy of expansion in
the Yaman during the war. This mission cannot be considered
as an attempt on the part of the Imäm to open negotiations with
the British because the envoy expressed to the Àbdall Sultan and
Jacob, the Imäm's favourable attitude towards the Ottomans

WWICII
in the Treaty 2
was accordance with of Da`än.
In the meantime pressure was building up on the Imam to
break his friendship with the Ottomans. In February 1915,
Sharif Hajj Àbdu'Lldh al-Dumayn, Sharif Husayn's envoy, was
interviewed at Aden. He reported that Sharif Husayn, who was
now well disposed towards the British Government, had written
to the Imam "warning him to rid himself of the Turks and
cautioned him not to show any hostilities towards the British
Government but to befriend them". Further the envoy had an
oral message from Sharif Husayn to advise the Imam not to
believe or trust the Turks but to think of his future by
1 R/20/A/4886, Resident to Imam, 24/11/1914.

2. R/20/A/1527, Jacob's memo, 9/9/1915.
Ahmad Fadl b 'All Muhsin, a contemporary writer of the 'Abdalls, after
observing the movements of the Imam during the war, concluded that
the policy of the Imam was neutrality, showing his sympathy and
inclination towards the Ottomans but avoiding a clash with the British
in. the hope of gaining something after the war. Cf. al-'Abdall, Hadivat
alb, p. 208.
266
building a friendship with the British. 1 The Arab in the
rising
Hijäz gave weight to the efforts of the British in stepping up
pressure upon the Imam to break his relations with the
Ottomans. In June and July, 1916, the British wrote to the
Imam informing him of the Arab rising in the Hijäz and urging
him to take action against the Turks. The Imam was further
guaranteed that he would receive from the British the same
amount as he received monthly from the Ottomans. 2 The Imam,
however, chose to remain faithful to the Ottomans and in
response to these letters, he wrote in October 1916, saying:
The reason which hinders us from taking action is

not due to timidity of the fight, impotence or
awaiting the result of the victory; neither it is due
to the riches to be derived or silver or gold which
we seek. Albeit the fighting that continued for
several years in the past is already known and has
given fame to the bravery which our soldiers and
supporters have shown in the scenes of war. Praise
be to God. They are today much stronger and more
intrepid than ever; their words correspond with
their deeds in their obedience to us. The intentions of
their hearts do not check them from being
submissive to us nor the false rumours make them
swerve from executing our honourable commands
either in the north or in the south.
We are aware that the British Government
have extensive resources and their liberality is
the best to be gained. However you know that the
pact which was concluded between the Ottoman
Government and ourselves which they have
hitherto observed faithfully and adhered to in a
satisfactory manner is the cause which from
religious point of view we could not find a way to
violate. "3
In response to the Àbdal! Sultan, who also urged him to rise
against the Turks following the Arab rising, the Imam wrote in
October 1916 rejecting any charge of hoping for personal gain in
the"war by saying
1 R/20/A/4886,. note of interview with al-Durnayn, 7/2/1915,

2 R/20/A/4886, Aden to Imam, 22/6/1916 & 17/7/1916.
3 R/20/A/4886, Imam to British, 16/10/1916.
267
personally I have no idea of gaining riches and
goods nor am I desirous of worldly comforts in order
to maintain the attitude of gentleness and courtesy.
What keeps me inactive therefore is, as you know,
my obligation to the Laws of Shara' and the
necessity of following the course indicated by the
Quran and the principles of the Prophet. As my
predecessors were, so myself and any successors,
members of this holy dynasty who will occupy the
position of the Imamate and take over its burdens
-have only to regard its original founder; we do not
care to amass riches and store them up for
descendants and posterity. We do not also desire like
kings to indulge in soft beddings, delicious food and
drinks, cloths, parks, palaces etc. which suit the
luxurious only. We strive for what we are ordered
to, and that is "al-Amr bi al-ma`rüf wa al-nahy àn
al-munkar" for which we do not hesitate to lay
down our life and property. "l
Thus the Imäm was not ready to take up the offer of
negotiations initiated by the British even after the Arab rising.
According to information from Constantinople dated February 20,
1917, the Imam had denounced the attitude adopted by Sharif
Husayn, who in collusion with the British revolted against the
Ottoman Government. The information stated that the Imam in
any event would lend his assistance and spare no efforts to
guarantee' the needs of the local population. It further stated
that by the act of humanity shown by him towards the
population, Imam Yahyä had proved his attachment to the
Caliphate and to the Imperial Government. The Imam was
quoted saying that even if he had only a piece of bread, he
have it with the 2 It is

would shared government. not surprising
that in such a public pronouncement the Imam should seek to
please the Ottomans. The Imam, however, still closed the door
to negotiations with the British. In response to a letter from
Jacob referring to the agreement that existed between the Imam
"1
R/20/A/4886, Imam to British, 16/10/1916.
2 L/P&S/10/610, War Office to India Office, 3/3/1917.
268
of San'd' and the British Government in 1821, the Imdm wrote
in December 1916 saying that since a long time had passed, and
many changes and events had occurred, it was therefore
difficult to find trace of the circumstances. 1 On the he

contrary
protested against the British Government's action in blockading
the sea by stating that
it was expected that the magnanimous British

Government will have kind consideration for the
inhabitants of this country who have suffered
destruction in the former wars and would not shut
the doors against their livelihood from the sea,
though the product of their country might be
sufficient to provide them with food and other
requirements. The roads, however, have been closed
and the cold shoulder given to such people who have
shown no hostile attitude towards government at
2
all.
In reply the British wrote in March 1917, persuading the Imäm
to join the British with a promise to open the Arabian ports to
enable free supplies of food to Yaman and offering pecuniary
and monthly assistance to him and his tribes and again
mentioning his former relationship with the British in 1821.3
The Resident also requested the Imam to send his envoy to Aden.
Accordingly in June 1917, the Imam deputed his envoy, NagIb
Abd al-Wahld b Ahmad al-KhawlänI to open discussions. There
seems no obvious reason for the Imäm's decision to open
negotiations with the British. To the Imdm, the envoy was sent
at the request of the British. Events in other theatres of the
war, such as the fall of Baghdad, may have influenced him to
change his policy.
At the same time a strong anti-Imamic confederacy was
formed in the Yaman with a view to expelling the Ottomans and
1 L/P&S/10/610, Imam to Jacob, 1/la/16.

2 Ibid.
3 R/20/A/4886, British to Imäm, 12/3/1917.
269
this may have compelled the Imam to make up his mind in
dealing with the British. The involvement of the Idrisi in
negotiating with the Udshid and Bakil, the powerful Zaydi tribes
and adherents of the Imam, in the confederacy, may have
further stepped up the process of negotiation. There were a
number of Arab chiefs in the Yaman who had been involved in
the rising against the Ottomans, including among others the
Zaydl shaykhs of Häshid and Bakll and the Shdfi'I shaykhs of
Hujariyah and Ta'izz. Although the confederacy of Häshid and
Bakll emerged as an alternative to the Imam only in the latter
parts of the war, the origin of the confederacy appeared in an
earlier period. Qd'id b Ahmad, Shaykh of Hujariyah, had begun
to co-operate with the British against the Ottomans through the
Àbdall Sultan before the war, during the life time of Sultan Sir
Àli b. Ahmad. He had for a long time been endeavouring to
persuade the Arab chiefs of the Yaman to work against the
Ottomans. He tried to influence Ahmad b. 'All Pasha of Ta'izz,
Mansur b Àll b 'Abdu'Lldh of 'Udayn and his brothers. The
'above two chiefs enlisted Naglb Yahyd b Yahyä al-Shayf and
Naqlb Hasan Qd'id Abü Rds, the ZaydIs, in their league, forming
one alliance. It was arranged that the Zaydi leaders, Yahyä al-
Shayf and Abü Räs__should start their movement and that Qä'id
b Ahmad, Ahmad Pasha and the Shaykhs of 'Udayn would
follow. 1
At this stage the Imam's purpose was apparently to
discover the reaction of the British. At the beginning of the
discussions, the envoy was reluctant to spell out the Imam's
I R/20/A/4080,28/12/1916.
270
demands. He stated that he was sent because the British had
requested a man to be sent and so he came to know their
wishes. Finally he conveyed the following summary of the
message from the Imäm: 1
1- The Imäm must have all the Yemen from Häli point
southwards, excluding Aden.
2- The Idrlsl must be removed from Arabia.
3- the Government must have no intercourse with any of
the people of the Yemen except through or with the knowledge of
the Imäm.
The Resident immediately asked the 'Abdall Sultan about
his view on this new overtures of the Imam. The Sultan gave
his view that the Imam was merely trying to serve his own
interests. The Sultan thought that it was a genuine attempt on
the part of the Imam either to come to some terms or to see
how far the British were prepared to go. He, however, doubted
whether any fruitful outcome would ensue as he regarded the
action from the Imam as ambiguous. On the contrary the
Sultan suggested that it would be better to back the confederacy
of Häshid and Bakil, which could be more easily moulded to suit
British views. On the other hand, he argued, the Imam was a
much more powerful factor than the confederacy, and if he
joined the British there might be trouble with the new
it would in inter-tribal fight. 2 The Sultan's

confederacy and end
reluctance to back the Imam was natural as he also had
ambitions not only in the Protectorate but beyond it including
the ShdfiÌ tract in the Yaman. Therefore, the Sultän insisted on
1 R/20/A/4080, Interview with the Imam's envoy, 1/4/1917.

2 R/20/A/4886, Interview with the 'Abdall Sultan, 19/7/1917.
271
supporting the confederacy as this would not threaten his
interests in the Protectorate when the war ended and also the
leaders of the confederacy from the Shäfiì countries had
worked through the Sultdn, particularly at the beginning of the
negotiations, which undoubtedly laid a basis for his influence
there.
The following month saw a more concrete suggestion on
the part of the Imam as his envoy, Shaykh Àbd al-WahId al-
Khawläni brought a proposal, and suggested that the Imam
would agree to co-operate if the British accepted his terms
notably on British recognition of his undefined territory in the
Yaman including all ports of Yaman and the removal of the
Idrisi from 'AsIr. 1
The Resident considered the terms offered by the Imam
were altogether unacceptable, and therefore suggested no
further discussion. The Viceroy, however, suggested that
although his conditions are clearly impossible, yet

his overtures are highly significant and it would be,
we think, a serious mistake to rebuff them and
close the door to further negotiation. I suggest we
that we welcome this evidence of friendship on
-reply
1 The following Is the Imam's terms.

I-, That the British Government must recognise the hereditary rights
of the Imam to administer all the ports of Yemen, without
interference by anybody with him or his agents and officers.
ii-a That the Imam must send the Turks left in the Yemen with
protective escorts to places of security, either in Hedjaz, Syria or such
other Turkish station where they could settle down. It would be a
shame for the Imam, if they do not reach a place of safe
ii-b That the transport charges of these Turks, their families,
children and baggage shall be born by the British Government. They
will be permitted to take away whatever they like of their belongings
[presumably including their arms]. Such men as wish to stay with the
Imam, or [whom] the Imam wishes to retain for his own purposes
shall be excepted. The British Government shall further pay for the
escort for the outward and inward journey.
iii- That the British Government shall remove Sayyid Idrisi from
the Yemen as he does nothing but create ill-will, and cause bloodshed
people as to go (lean towards) him for a time, with no good
among such
272
his part and would gladly come to an agreement
with him, but making him clearly understand that
we cannot intervene in intertribal disputes and that
we could not for a moment think of abandoning our
staunch and loyal friends. That for the present our
first aim is the expulsion of the Turks from Arabia
and if the Imam will co-operate with us in this
thereafter we will gladly use our best endeavours
to secure a satisfactory settlement between Imam
and his neighbours". 1
results, as God knows, and the experience of about 10 years shows.

Moreover he does not belong to any ruling family, his ancestors
being subjects of "al-Qasim" (the Imam's family). An ordinary
person, he (the Idrisi) has become what he is with the support of some
Powers who helped him with money and arms [i. e. Italy and Britain].
iv- That the British Government shall immediately provide the Imam
with sufficient funds, and ammunition and quick firing arms, to
punish the Turks and other wicked people with. (The British
Government shall also pay) subsidies and allowance to such persons as
were in receipt of same from the Turks. It is no secret that the Yemen
did not pay its way, and the Turks used to obtain very large amounts
of their gold currency (Liras) from Constantinople every month, and
since the stoppage of this source, were obliged to take loan from the
Imam.
v- That the British Government shall also pay the debt due by the
Turks to the Imam.
vi- That the British Government shall not admit anyone from Yemen,
either to its own nationality or to that of any other, without the
Imam's permission.
vii- That the British Government shall further allot a sum of money
,
monthly for chiefs and guards.
viii- That the British Government shall appoint men qualified in the
manufacture of firearms and accoutrements to remain permanently
with the Imam, or liable to periodical transfers, on replacement by
similarly able men, to instruct his men.
ix-_ That free trade shall be permitted with Yemen people, after the
Turks are begun to be removed and relations with them broken off.
x- If merchants, either British subjects, or those of other Powers
wish to visit any of the Yemen ports with a view to trade, they shall
not do so, except with the permission of the Imam. They shall further,
not go beyond the port (limit) to other places except under a fresh
permission from the Imam, authorising him to visit only such places
for which he has obtained permission.
xi- That the import of intoxicating drugs and other articles prohibited
by the Islamic religion shall be absolutely prohibited.
xii- Should the Turkish Government or its allies intend attacking
Yemen during or after the war the British Government shall oppose
them at sea or give the Imam whatever he wants in the shape of
money, arms and ammunition. Cf. R/20/A/4886, Imam's proposal,
27/8/1917.
1 R/20/A/4886, Viceroy to Sec of State, 23/7/1917.
273
The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, agreed with
the Viceroy and the Resident at Aden, that the terms offered by
the, Imam were altogether unacceptable, and afforded no basis
for%w discussion. However, he recognised the advantage of
declining the offer in such a way as not entirely to bar the door
for future negotiation. The India Office suggested to the Foreign
Office that the reply to the Imam should take the form
suggested in the Viceroy's telegram rather than that proposed
by- the Resident, 1 and this 2

was agreed.
The Imam was informed that his terms were
unacceptable. The Resident stated that
we have staunch and loyal friends in the

Protectorate and in Asir, and I am to point out that
under no circumstances could we for a moment
consider abandoning them. We are prepared to give
you at once the same subsidy which you formerly
drew from the Turks, from the moment your
adherence to the Arab cause against the Turks. 3
On October 24,1917 a similar letter was sent to the Imam
bearing the message from the British High Commissioner in
Egypt
i- That the Imam might be guaranteed the subsidy
he had received from the Turks provided his
adherence to the Arab cause was openly given.
ii- That our agreement with Arab Chiefs was to be
emphasised by which we undertook not to support
one Arab faction against the other.
iii- That inasmuch as the Arab movement had been
joined by every influential Chief in the Arabian
Peninsula, his hesitation implied hostility to Arab
independence which depended for success on the
suppression of territorial disputes between Arabs
until after the war when friendly and fair
be out. 4
arrangements could carried
1 R/20/A/4886, India Office to Foreign Office, 26/7/1917.

2.. R/20/A/4886, Foreign Office to India Office, 2/8/1917.
3 R/20/A/4903 March 1921
4, Ibid
274
Accordingly on December 1917, the Imdm envoys submitted
new proposals which were considered by the Resident as a
possible basis for an agreement with the Imam. Some of the
former articles were dropped, particularly that concerning the
Idrlsl (article iii). 1

removal of the
The Àbdall Sultan again strongly opposed acceptance of the
Imam's terms. As he saw the matter, an agreement would only
serve the Imam's interests. The ÀbdalI Sultan's remarks again
indicate his ambition in the Shdfi`Y Yaman. He stated that
the immediate opening of a Yemen port will be

detrimental to Abdali interests especially if the
Imam obtains possession of the Yemen lowlands as
well as the highlands. All or the greater part of the
Yemen trade will be diverted to the Imam's port.
The Imam's stipend was paid to him in consideration
of his handing over the Tihama to them [the
Ottomans]. I therefore argue that if the Imam gets
the same stipend from the British Government the
control of the Tihama should remain with the
British Government. To give him both a stipend and
Tihama' is uncalled-for: further the stipend granted
by the Turks to the Shaikhs were paid direct by the
Turks. 2
The Resident, however, saw that there might be some
chance of settlement if some definite proposals could be made
particularly regarding the future of Idrisi and Tihdmah which
had always been key elements in a settlement. The Resident
argued that there was no objection to communicating the terms
the British treaty 1915 the Idr1s1 to the Imäim. 3

of of with
Meanwhile, in February 1918, the Imäm's envoy demanded that
the British should recognise the Idrlsi as being entirely under
the Imdm. In March that year the Resident went to Egypt for
1 Article (iii) was replaced by the following "The Idrisi to maintain his
present position but to make no further movement. ".
2 R/20/A/4903, March 1921.
3 Ibid.
275
consultation, and at a meeting with the High Commissioner and
other it was decided: 1

officers
i- to inform the Imam of the terms of the treaty

with the Idrisi.
ii- to assure the Imam of his independence in the
Yemen as the British had already promised the
Idrisi his independence.
iii- the treaties that are already in force with
different Sultans and Sheikhs must be kept outside
all discussion.
iv- to finance the Imam and his tribes on the pre-
War Turkish scale, the tribesmen to be paid through
the Imam and not directly by the British.
v- to furnish the Imam and the tribes with the
necessary paraphernalia of war against the Turks.
vi- to allow him to dispose of Turkish prisoners of
war as he likes.
vii- to lend him men to teach the manufacture of
gun powder.
viii- to open to trade a non-Idrlsi port such as
Ghulaifika or some other free from Turkish
interference, as soon as the arrangement with the
Imam is completed. The port to be free for Arabs
generally and not especially for the Imam.
The Resident as well as the High Commissioner wrote to
the Imam informing him of the above terms as a new basis for
settlement. Accordingly, in June 1918 the Imam replied to the
High Commissioner and the Resident. His new terms were
briefly the following: 2
i- the Imam agreed to the British assurance of his

independence but wanted them to guarantee him the
whole of the Yemen [i. e. as defined by his envoy in
July 1917].
ii- the Imam agreed as regards the necessary
material of war for use against the Turks, and
asked specially for guns, ammunition, cash and
transport animals.
iii- He accepted the British decision regarding
Turkish prisoners of war, but hinted that the
British should help to pay for them.
iv- the Imam agreed to the subsidy for himself and
the tribesmen on the pre-war scale.
v- the Imam asked for the opening of Hodeida and
Mokha ports.
vi- the Imam asked for expert armourers for
making arms, ammunition and other equipment.
1 R/20/A/4903, March 1921.

2 Ibid.
276
vii- the Imam asked that the British should not deal
with any of the Yemen people except through him
with the exception of Lahej.
viii- Yemen merchants to be allowed to trade safely
in British dominions.
ix- no alcohol to be imported and munitions except
for the Imam himself.
x- no non-Moslem traders to be allowed in the
Yemen except with the Imam's permission. He was
to be allowed to exclude Moslem traders also if he
considered them objectionable.
xi- the Imam further suggested the British to
redeem what the Turks owed him on account of
arrears of stipends and repayment of loans made by
him to them.
Although Stewart, the Resident, concluded that the Imam's
attitude JAS unfriendly, Colonel Jacob and Wingate, High
Commissioner, considered it as otherwise. Wingate considered
that an alliance with the Imam would bring benefits to the
British. He argued that relations with the Imam would lead not
only to stability in the political affairs of South West Arabia but
also enable the British to assist the Imam in his country's
economic development, and would block interference by any
other power in the political affairs of the Imam. It would also
lead to the establishment of British prestige in South West
Arabia and counter a claim by the Ottomans to the continuance
dominion in the Yaman. l Based

of their nominal on the above
argument, it was accordingly decided to write a temporising
letter to the Imam to ask him to send a duly accredited person
to conclude a treaty. However that letter was never sent as the
armistices intervened. A letter from the Imam, dated October 1,
reached Aden after the armistice. In this letter, although he
continued to maintain his hostile attitude, he moderated his
demands as regards his claim over the tribes in the British
1 R/20/A/4903, March 1921.
277
Protectorate. No action, however, was taken on the Imam's
letter. His envoy, Nagib Àbd al-Wahid was called and the whole
situation arising from the armistice was explained to him. He
was told the lines upon which the Imam should act, and
was sent home on November 14, with a letter to the Imam,
forwarding the terms of the armistice and enjoining him, in
accordance with the clause 16, to assist in the immediate

4iie
evacuation ofATurkish garrison. The Imam, presumably
not. happy with the terms of the armistice, obstructed the
departure of the Turks on the ground that he had not been
officially informed of the terms of armistice, nor did he approve
of, them on account of his pecuniary and other obligations
towards the Porte, and not to mention the Porte's obligations to
him. The British, however, occupied Hudaydah in an effort to
facilitate the evacuation of the Ottomans. This action compelled
the Imam to end his refusal to allow the departure of the
Ottomans. The majority of the Ottoman forces accordingly came
down to Hudaydah and surrendered but a number of military
officers and the greater part of the civil officers including
Mahmüd Nadim, the Governor General of the Yaman, remained
behind. 1
To sum up, the Imam had never committed himself to
support the British policy, nor broken with the Ottomans. As
time went by, particularly when he was under pressure from
his tribes, the Häshid and Bakil, he carefully left his options
open for negotiation with the British as he did in June 1917
when he deputed Naglb Àbd al-WahId al-Khawldni to carry out
1. R/20/A/4903 March 1921
278
the negotiations. The Imdrris initial overture was obviously to
discover how far the British would go to guarantee his interests
in the Yaman. The Imam's attitude may be explained because he
and the Ottomans were mutually dependent on one another,
since without the goodwill of his followers the position of the
Ottomans would be untenable and without the support of the
Ottoman garrisons he would be in danger from the dissident
elements among his own people. The Imam was not yet sure
what would be the outcome of the Anglo-Ottoman rivalries and
preferred to keep his present material advantages, while not
breaking irreparably with the British, rather than jeopardise
his future by discarding his Ottoman allies and risking all on
the British future success. But in December 1917 there was

hod
evidence that the Imdm, ýmoved closer towards agreement with
the-British as he moderated his demands when he agreed to
leave Àsir to the Idrisi which would have concluded a treaty
with the British if the armistice had not intervened.
5.2 Imam Yahyä and the Aden Protectorate
Tribes
The claim of the Imäm to his predecessor's authority
over greater Yaman, which included the Idris1 territory in Àsir
and the British Protectorate, had to some extent shaped the
between the Imam and the Protectorate tribes and

relations
the Arab Chiefs in the Yaman. The Imam had from the
other
ov"
beginning endeavoured to realise his claim, treaty of Da`än
Xthe
with the Ottomans paved the way for its development when he
was given autonomy over the Zaydl highlands.
279
When the First World War broke out, the Imam, who
remained loyal to the Ottomans, lost no time in pursuing his
interests in the direction of the Protectorate. The Imam
considered the present situation a suitable occasion for extending
his influence, by all possible means, to include some parts of the
Protectorate. As early as November 1914, news of the movement
of the Imamic forces together with the Ottoman forces from
San` ä' to Qa'tabah were reported by the Amir of Pali' and the
llawshabi Sultan. In December that year, the Imam himself
wrote to the Àbdali Sultan saying that he had sent his army in
the direction of Jabal Jihäf and Pali' in the Protectorate. The
Imam had also sent his envoy, Muhammad b. Àll al-Sharif in
the direction. 1 The expedition was, however, carried out only in
the neighbouring countries of the Protectorate such as Radä',
Dhamär and Qa`tabah, and aimed at settling the administration
the 2 apparently for the interest of the Imam as well as

of area,
the Ottomans.
As early as January 1915, the eastern countries of the
Aden Protectorate including Baydä and Rub'atayn were occupied
by the Imäm. There was, however, fierce resistance-from the
inhabitants supported by the Àwdhali at the request of the
people of Baydä. These tribes, partly due to the fact that they
were ShäfiÌs, were determined to defend their countries and
they considered it a disgrace to be beaten by the ZaydIs or to be
their 3 though they were formerly under Zaydl rule

under rule,
and their chieftains were formerly the Imam's viceroys. This
1 R/20/A/4886 Imam to 'AbdalI 23/12/1914.

, ,
2 R/20/A/4886 Muhammad 'All al-Sharif to 'Abdall 28/12/1914.
, ,
280
can be explained as they were now under British protection and
moreover, the Baydä and the 'Awdhall chiefs were immediately
assisted by the Resident with 25,000 rounds of Le Gras
for their defence. 1 The the

ammunition resistance against
invasion of the ZaydIs led the Imam to reconsider for the time
being his initial ventures as it was plain that the countries of
Baydä, Ydfi' and 'Awlagl were difficult for him to conquer and
hold. This incident forced the Imam to diversify his campaign
through the use of religious arguments and the Sultan's
proclamation in the hope of winning over the Protectorate
tribes. However, at this moment, only the Zaydis appeared to
join the Imam such as in the case of Shaykh Àbd al-Rahmän,
chief of Ma'rib. Around the same time 'Abd al-Rahmdn
approached the British to acquire a stipend2 possibly after
failing to obtain the same from the Imam.
Early in 1916, the Imam's movement in the vicinity of the
Protectorate appeared again. The Imam was reported to have
moved his forces with war materials to Radä', in the Yaman.
This movement was apparently aimed at the north east of the
Protectorate namely Baydä and 'Awlagi, with the intention of
proceeding to the Hadramawt following success at the former
The Upper 'Awlagl Shaykh, Shaykh Mulhsin b. Farld

places.
to Aden that a party of Zaydis who had arrived at

reported
RadA' had sent letters addressed to Sultan Sälih b. 'Abdu'Lläh
himself asking them either to go to Sa'Id Pasha or to the

and
Imäm. 3 The 'Awlaqls did not, however, reply either to the
1 L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly Letters, 6/2/15 & 13/2/15.

2 L/P&S/10/610, Aden Weekly Letters, April 1916.
281
Pasha or the Imdm, but maintained their friendship with the
British. In a letter to the ÀwlagI chief, Ahmad Näsir al-Rounel,
the Imäm's commanding officer at Baydä, stated that they were
going shortly towards Baydd, and informed the chief that
Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, another Imäm's officer, was instructed to
lead forces towards the Hadramawt. 1
The Imäm, therefore, did not confine himself to the
countries of the north east of the Protectorate but also had
ambitions in the Hadramawt. The Qu'ayti Sultan reported to
Aden in July 1915 great activity of the Imam's and Ottoman
agents in the Hadramawt. However, the Ashräfs of Hadramawt
were the only group who communicated with the Imam and
the Ottomans at Lahej, notably Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmdn b.
Ùbaydu'Lläh 2 The Imam however, reluctant

al-Saqqaf. was,
to pursue his military movements in the Hadramawt country

was
for no apparent reason, presumably he waitin9 for the success
,,
in the north east of the Protectorate as a passage to the
Hadramawt. The forces under Sharaf al-DIn, the Imam's

.iF waS
officer'Areported in June 1916, did not proceed to Hadramawt as
intended and up to September 1916 there was no further report
from the Imam to the people of Hadramawt. 3

of communications
From the second half of 1916, there had been increasing
pressure on the part of the Imam once again over the north
eastern territory of the Protectorate, including ÀwlagI, Baydä
and the neighbouring countries which had been formerly
abandoned. Accordingly, the Àbdall Sultan reacted, presumably

2 L/P&S/101295, Aden Weekly Letter, 17/7/15; L/P&S/10/295, Aden Weekly
Letter, 29/4/16; L/P&S/10/295 & R/20/A/1319, Aden Weekly Letter, 10/6/16.
282
at the instigation of the British following the Arab rising, by
writing to the Imam complaining about the activities of the
Imdm's officers. The Àbdall's letter is as follows: 1
Letters had been addressed to some of shaikhs of the

Aulaki country who are our allies... that it should
rather be presumed that it was written under your
eminent order... such letters are issued very
frequently by your mugaddams now-a-days and it
is very surprising to see our fellow countrymen are
calling and urging us to enslave to the Turkish yoke.
Do not such people fear God and have consideration
for the kinship, ties of relation and neighbourhood
(they bear towards one another) that they are
trying to put them (Arabs) into paws and jaws of
the wild Anatolians, the aggressors under whose
hands your people had severely suffered for
years?...
We are made astonished to find that the
writer of the letter finds faults and criticises the
attitude of the Arabs which is entirely and solely
devoted in the interest of Moslem chiefs who rule
the country independently and exercise their own
laws and customs since they knew themselves and
the same relations have subsisted among them
individually... such harsh and strong expressions
are likely to create doubts and lead to hatred and
aversion amongst the Arabs who are expected to
unite and react together in the right course. The
Muqaddams, however, are frequently sending such
circulars which they imply to have been written
under your orders which we do not believe.
Therefore we refer this matter to your Lordship
with a view that you will prevent such publications
and show your good will and sincere inclination
towards these chiefs (Aulaqi and others)".
Besides the appeal by the Àbdall Sultan, rifles and
had also been sent by the British to the 'Awlaqls 2

ammunition
apparently for defensive use if the Imdm persisted in proceeding
with his forces to that place. Moreover, the Upper Àwlagl
Sültdn and the Upper ÀwlagI Shaykh had made a formal
agreement with the Àbdali Sultän that they would unite with
1 L/P&S/10/610, Aden Weekly Letter, 24/6/16; R/20/A/4886, 'Abdall to

Imäm, 2 Jamäd Awwal 1334.
283
him the Ottomans if the British 1 The Imamic
against moved out.
forces did not, however, proceed to Baydä and the neighbouring
countries as intended, most probably upon the advice of the
Àbdali Sultan which had often been respected by the Imam.
The year 1917, however, saw once again the movement of
the, Imam in the eastern countries including Jubeln (Ottoman),
Na'wah and Rubàtayn (British). The Imam's forces made
frequent moves into the eastern countries of the Protectorate
and attempted to exercise their authority by collecting tithes
and taking hostages. In June 1917, the nagibs of Mawsatah
confirmed the news of an attack by the Zaydis on Jubeln,
Na'wah Rub'atayn, 2 and it was further reported by Sälih

and
Muhsin Àskar, the British correspondent, in Upper YdfiÌ that a
fine' $3,000 had been imposed these. 3 In November

of on each of
1917, Muhammad Àbd al-Qädir Mackawee, an Aden merchant
who had frequent communications with Wingate through the
war, wrote to confirm the news of the activities of Sayyid
Muhammad Darwish of Riydshiyah who was then engaged in
collecting tithes on behalf of the Imäm in the districts of
in the Ydfiì 4 Previously, in June 1916

Qa`tabah and country.
Sayyid Muhammad Darwish received very considerable
from Aden. He was attacked and fell into the hands

assistance
of thre Ottomans with all his caravan and was imprisoned at
Lahej. He escaped and came back to Aden. He was again given
and sent out but he was heard to be with the Imam.

assistance
It was reported later that he had been released by the Imam

284
and" sent back with some Imamic soldiers to Shaib
with
instructions to collect tithes there for the Imäm. 1
There had also been further reports on the activities of
the Imdm in the eastern countries including Ma'rib and Bayhän.
In May 1917 Sharif of Bayhän wrote that the Zaydls had
written to the Qädi of Bayhän, Sayyid Àtiq, a British
correspondent, asking him to see them. In a letter to the QAdl
of - Bayhän dated August 14,1917, the Imam's envoy, Sayyid
Ahmad b. Yahyd al-Kibsi stated that he had been instructed
by the Imam and Ottoman Government to proceed to Ma'rib,
Ùbaydah, Muräd, Bayhän, Haban and all other eastern places
in- the neighbourhood in order to see the welfare of the people of
that country and to draw them to the right path accounting to
the commands of God, the Prophet, the Imam and the Ottoman
Government. He further asked the Qädl to arrange a meeting in
order to be informed of the orders of the Imam and the Ottoman
Government. 2 It that al-Kibsi was working as agent

appeared
for both Imam and the Ottomans in order to raise the tribes
in those the British. He, however, failed. 3

places against
During the war the Imam took the opportunity, first, to
consolidate his authority in the Yaman, and then to extend his
influence from the Zaydi highlands to the eastern countries of
the Yamani border such as Jubeln, Qa'tabah and their vicinity.
Throughout the war, the Imdm attempted to extend his sphere
of influence over the tribes of the Protectorate, namely in the
north eastern territory such as Baydä and Rub'atayn, through
military measures as well as religious appeal and in the name

3 Ibid.
285
of, Khalifah. However, the Imam's success prevailed only among
the Zaydls of Ma'rib whose position was even immersed by the
dominant majority of the ShdfiÌs. Though the Ashrafs of the
Hadramawt were in constant support for the Imam, they were,
however, small in number and considered outsiders in the
tribal system.
On the whole the Imam did not succeed in winning over
the tribes in the British protected. The failure of the Imam's
endeavour rested largely upon his general attitude towards
the war. Though he was pro-Ottoman, he remained neutral.
He did not even share the triumph of the Ottoman at Lahej. He
had his own interest in the Protectorate, but he did not seek
any direct confrontation with the British and likewise the
'Abdall Sultan. The Imam was actually in dilemma, to proceed
with, his own interest to consolidate his authority over the
Protectorate but with a policy of not confronting directly with
the British and at the same time pro-Ottoman. The Imam's
policy, was further worsened by the fact the tribes of the

were
ProtectorateX not only Shdfiìs but were armed by the British.
Moreover, the Imam had a secret understanding with the
Àbdall Sultan: he seemed to have continued his effort to regions
away from Lahej.
The Imam's weakness and failure in winning over the
tribes in the Protectorate did not put an end to his ambitions in
the, country. His influence on the border of the Protectorate
could at any time threaten the Protectorate tribes during and
after the war, as he occupied Däli` and held it for a number
of years even after the war.
286
Chapter Six
British Policy and Commitments During
the War
6.1 Policy adopted for the conduct of the

war against the Ottomans
As early as August 1914, Britain had anticipated the
possibility of the entrance of the Ottoman Government into the
war against Great Britain and her allies. The India Office and
the Foreign Office were at the same time supplied with reports
from their officers in India, Egypt and Constantinople about the
military preparations of the Ottomans. 1
A number of measures affecting Arabia were set in train.
The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, suggested that it would be prudent
to announce the freedom of Holy places and pilgrimages from
attack and this was agreed by London. On September 1,1914
the Government of India was authorised by the Foreign Office
to give this assurance publicly in the event of the Ottomans
opening hostilities the 2 The Viceroy further

against allies.
proposed diversions against the Ottomans especially in the
Persian Gulf and this suggestion was supported by Sir Louis
Mallet, British Ambassador at Constantinople as well as by the
Admiralty. 3 Meanwhile Lord Kitchener, Secretary State for

of
War, suggested sending a personal message through Milne
Cheetham, Acting High Commissioner Egypt, 4 to Sharif Husayn

of
1 FO 371/2138-2142.
2 FO 371/2139, Foreign Office to Viceroy, 1/9/1914.
3 FO 371/2139,4-9/9/1914.
4 Milne Cheetham was Charge d'Affaires at Cairo from July 1910. He
was acting High Commissioner from December 18,1914 to January 1,
1915, from November 8 to 25,1915, from January 22 to March 25,
1919, and from September 4 to November 10,1919.
287
to ascertain what would be his and other Arabs' attitude in the
event of war between Britain the Ottoman Empire. 1 Earlier,

and
Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs advised
Mallet to urge on the Ottomans the advantages of neutrality;
otherwise Britain would react by claiming Egypt, supporting
Arabs against the Ottomans, forming another Muslim authority
for Arabia the Muslim Holy Places. 2 Although

and controlling
Mallet did not agree to mention the Arabs or the Holy Places to
the Ottomans, the above measures remained the views of the
Foreign Office. On September 1, while authorising the Viceroy
to make an announcement in relation to the Holy Places, Grey
suggested giving every support and encouragement to the Arabs
to possess themselves of Arabia and the Holy Places. He left
details to the India Office which, he presumed, was in a better
to deal the Arabs in Arabia. 3

position with
Although. different views were held by the India Office and
the Foreign Office in London, and by their respective officials in
Aden, India, Egypt and Constantinople about measures against
the Ottomans and how the Arabs could best be used, it soon
became policy to use the Arabs against the Ottomans in one way
or another. At Aden, Colonel Jacob, who was Acting Political
Resident, solicited support for the ImAm in an attempt

-
to persuade them to form an Arab coalition against the IdrIsI
Ottomans. In a telegram to Lord Crewe, Secretary of State for
India, on August 19, Jacob described the attitude of the Imam
as friendly and that of the Idr1s1 as expectant.
1 FO 371/2139,24/9/1914.
2 FO 371/2138, Grey to Mallet, 29/8/1914.
288
If Turkey proves hostile to us, it would be possible
by promise of monetary assistance to encourage
Imam to revoke his pact with the Turks the
and
result would be an Arab coalition of Imam and Idrisi
against the Turks... Thus without ourselves taking
any hostile measures by land which would only
excite suspicion in our Protectorate, we could make
Turkish position in South West Arabia untenable. "1
The Government of Bombay supported Aden's proposal as

did the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge. While forwarding Jacob's
proposal, Hardinge suggested that the project could be extended
to include the Sharif of Makkah through the medium Ibn

of
Saud, 2 but the latter in
course was, the event, left to Kitchener.
On September 11, Aden informed the India Office that IdrIsI

an
agent and the Imäm's emissary were now at Aden and pressed
for-action. Aden proposed to offer friendship and protection to
the. IdrIs1 and also to offer him Farsdn which had been taken
from him by the Ottomans and, in addition, to leave his ports
Jizän, Maydiand Habl free from blockade. To the Imdm, Aden
proposed to promise autonomy in the district which he now
possessed; to enter into a bond of friendship with him and to
exhort him to make peace with the Idrisl. Aden also informed
London that the Imdm had sent his emissary to Lahej to
approach the 'Abdall Sultan to recruit a man to teach the
manufacture of gunpowder in the Yaman. The Resident also
proposed to honour two protected rulers, the Sultans of Lahej
and Mukallä in order to demonstrate the British inclination
towards the Arabs. Finally, the Resident proposed naval and
the Ottoman 3
military operations against ports.
1 L/P&S/10/558 also L/P&S/10/559, Acting Political Resident to Secretary of

State for India, 19/8/1914.
3 L/P&S/10/558, Aden to Bombay (Repeat to London & Simla), 11/9/1914.
289
The officials at the India Office did not consider the
Resident's proposal as sufficiently urgent to require immediate
action. This decision reflected the view of the Foreign Office
which believed that it was premature before the Ottomans had
entered the war to raise the questions proposed by the
Resident. They believed that current events in France (the

also
Battle of the Marne) had greatly reduced the possibility of
Turkey joining in the 1 Two weeks later the Political

war.
Secretary the India Office, Sir Frederick Arthur Hirtzel, 2

at
discussed the matter with the Military Secretary at the India
Office, General E. Barrow, after they had received a further
telegram from the Resident which reported attempts by the
Ottomans to persuade the Imdm and the Idrisi to cease fighting
against each other. The Resident reminded the India Office that
if the news above... be true, Turks have anticipated

us and rendered programme outlined in my secret
telegram of September 11, somewhat difficult though
not impossible. I therefore ask that definite action be
taken firstly, regarding assistance to Imam qua
manufacture of gunpowder and, secondly, the
3
decoration of our two influential protected chiefs.
Barrow agreed that whatever decision might be arrived at on
the larger question in Arabia, there could be no harm in
sanctioning at once these two preliminary measures, the
to the Imäm and the granting of titles to the Arab

assistance
The India Office agreed and pressed the Government of

chiefs.
India for immediate action regarding the bestowal of honours to
1 L/P&S/10/558, note at the India Office, 14/9/1914.

2 F. A. Hirtzel has been political secretary at the India Office since
1909. He was promoted to assistant Under Secretary of State in
October
March 1917.
Resident to Secretary of State for India, 30/9/1914.
3 L/P&S/10/558,
290
the chiefs. As a result, on October 8, the Viceroy made public
the grant of decorations of honorary K. C. I. E. to the Sultdns of
Lahej and Mukallä, one day before the these
award of honours
had been sanctioned by the King.
The approval of the India Office to the Resident's proposals
might also have been influenced by a report from Cairo stating

that.
immediately prior to and since the outbreak of war

in Europe, the Turkish Government has made great
efforts to come to an agreement with the principal
chiefs in Arabia in order to secure, if not their
active assistance, at least their friendly neutrality,
and it appears probable that considerable success is
attending their efforts. In any case it seems almost
certain that the Sharif of Mecca has now definitely
thrown in his lot with Turkey. This action appears
to have formed part of a general Pan-Islamic
movement, engineered from Constantinople. "1
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was considering further
suggestions concerning British policy in the event of hostilities
with, the Ottomans. On September 22, Mallet submitted a
memorandum written by Mr. Ryan, Acting First Dragoman at
Constantinople, to the Foreign Office and this was supplemented
by another memorandum prepared by Mr. Fitzmaurice, First
Dragoman who was now in London on leave. Grey passed both
memoranda to Crewe and suggested that "in view of the fact
that the Turks are stirring up the Arabs in the lIijdz against
Egypt bringing their influence to bear on the ImAm

and are all
Said Idrisi [Sayyid Idrisi] in the Yemen, it may become

and
imperative for HM' Government in self defence to try to

s
1 L/P&5/10/558, Cheetham to Cairo, 7/9/1914.
291
counteract this movement. "l The India Office, probably
influenced by the Foreign Office's view, made a further move.

They' requested the views of the Government India the
of on
other recommendations made in the Resident's telegram of

September 11, including the use of the Idrisi the Imäm
and
against the Ottomans, the restoration of Farsdn to the Idrisi,
the bombardment of Hudaydah and Mukha and the capture of

Kamarän. They reminded Hardinge of the Resident's argument
that by bombardment of Hudaydah and Mukha, Turkish food
supplies would be cut off. This would temporarily affect

Imam...
By bombarding Hodeida, it is believed that hostile

tribes Zaranik, would rise against Turks. Their
Sheikhs a short time ago asked to come under our
-flag. We should capture Kamaran. Bombardment of
these ports would incite two Arab chiefs [the Idrisl
and the Imam] to speedy rebellion.... 2
Hardinge agreed to the proposal to bombard Hudaydah and
Mukhd and to restore Farsdn to the Idrisi, but did not agree to
the seizure of Kamarän which might be interpreted as a British
design against pilgrim traffic. On receiving these views from
Hardinge, Crewe, who had been acquainted with the inclination
of the views of his officials at the India Office towards the
Resident's proposal, forwarded Hardinge's telegram to Sir
Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with his
own 'recommendation. Crewe doubted whether any positive
action could be taken in the Aden region, and considered that
British policy should be limited to the prevention of Turkish
intrigue and aggression in the Aden Hinterland. Crewe suggested

2 L/P&S/10/558 (as in the Resident's proposal to the Government of India
on 11/9/1914).
292
that, the Government of India should be to
authorised make
friendly overtures at once to the Imäm, through the Resident
at Aden,
limiting the promise of autonomy to the promise of

diplomatic support in securing autonomy at the close
of the war, and offering such arms and
ammunition as the Government of India may be able
to spare. The loan of an instructor in the
manufacture of gunpowder has already been
authorised. Regarding naval action in the Red Sea,
Crewe suggested that nothing should be done that
might threaten the pilgrim traffic and that Britain
should not blockade or bombard ports upon which
the Imäm was dependent without some previous
understanding with him. 1
Grey approved Crewe' proposal and the Government of India
was advised to authorise the Resident to make friendly
overtures to the Imäm. To the Idrisi, the Resident might
promise autonomy limited to an assurance of diplomatic support
at close war. 2 The Admiralty with the views of the

of agreed
India Office and assured Grey that they did not propose to
the Red Sea Ports. 3

suggest any action against
Thus before the commencement of hostilities with the
Ottomans, it had become British policy to raise the Arab cause
against the ottoman Government rather than to adopt military
measures. In Cairo, apart from the communications between
Kitchener Sharif Àbdu'Lläh, the Sharif llusayn's son, the

and
pan-Arab movement was also reported to have become active.
On October 28, Cheetham telegraphed Grey that the pan-Arab
leaders in Cairo had despatched to Jiddah for Southern

agents
Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and

and Eastern Palestine; to Beirut for
to the Persian Gulf for

Hauran; to Jiddah for Hijdz; and
19/10/1914.
1 L/P&S/10/558, India Office to Foreign Office,
3 L/P&S/10/558, Admiralty to India Office, 26/10/1914.
293
Mesopotamia and for the districts under the rule of Ibn Sa`üd.
They also proposed to send agents to the Idrisi and the Imam
immediately after 'obtaining suitable agents. 1
-In South West Arabia, the policy was to bring the IdrisI
.
and the Imam together against the Ottomans but Britain was, as
yet' prepared to offer little or no inducement. The Resident was
to be instructed to say that
HM's Government are unwillingto commit

themselves to definite offers to Idrisi fulfillment of
'which they may not be able to enforce even in
most favourable circumstances, and they cannot
undertake to adjudicate in detail between his claim
and those of Imam, though they will gladly use
their good offices in bringing the two parties
together. he [IdrIsI] should be encouraged to come
...
to terms provisionally with Imam in order that
they be to face the Turks.... 2
may united
At the time that these instructions were sent to India hostilities
had already commenced between the Ottoman Government and
Russia when Ottoman naval forces bombarded the Black Sea
ports on 29 October 1914. Although for a further week there was
uncertainty about whether this event signalled actual war
between the Ottomans and the Entente, British policy became
less constrained.
6.2 The Arab movement policy in South West

Arabia
When war was declared with the Ottoman Government,
the policy of supporting the Arabs in South West Arabia, notably
the Imäm and the Idrlsi against the Ottomans in the Yaman
1 L/P&S/10/558, Cheetham to Grey, 28/10/1914.

294
was immediately put into action. On November 4, Crewe was
informed by General James A Bell, the Resident, that the
Admiralty had instructed Royal Naval vessels on November 2 to
proceed up the Red Sea to destroy Ottoman steamers and dhows
and, then to collect and detain in a suitable harbour all Arab
dhows. Bell, however, advocated extreme caution in the
treatment of. the Arab dhows since they all flew the Ottoman
flag,. even including those of the Idris1, and also he was
concerned not to thwart the pan-Arab movement. 1 Hardinge,
the Viceroy, entirely concurred with Bell on the differential
treatment of Arab dhows. The Viceroy emphasised that "it is
most important that we should let Arabs see that we have no
quarrel with them at present and indeed are anxious to assist
them if they will break with Turkey. "2 Crewe then requested
that the naval authorities in the Red Sea might at once be
instructed to take no measures against local shipping in those
regions without previous consultation with the Resident at

3 Instructions lines by the Admiralty
Aden. on these were cabled
4
to the Senior Naval Officer at Egypt.
It had so far been the policy of the India Office to unite
the Idrlsi and the Imam against the Ottomans. The Resident,
however, decided that at the moment, i. e. early November, it
was not possible to work for reconciliation between the IdrIsI
and the Imäm due to the difficulty for Aden to gauge the
relations between the Imam and Mahmüd Nadim, the Ottoman
1 L/P&S/10/558, Resident to Secretary of State for India, 4/11/1914.

2- L/P&S/10/558, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 4/11/1914.
3 L/P&S/10/558, Secretary of State for India to Admiralty, 4/11/1914.
4 L/P&S/10/558, Admiralty to Egypt, 4/11/1914
295
Governor General of the Yaman. Bell instead suggested that these
two chiefs should be urged to take independent action against
the Ottomans. In order to expedite the co-operation of the IdrIsI,
Bell even suggested that Jacob should be sent to Sabia, the
capital of the Idrisi, about five hours ride from the port of
Jizän, immediately after the arrival of the IdrIsI agent in his
capital. The agent now left Aden for Sabia. The Viceroy,
however, instructed Jacob to leave Aden temporarily. 1

not even
Caution was also observed in relations with the ImAm.
The Resident's proposal to bombard Hudaydah was made before
the war and was intended to encourage the Idrlsl and the Imam
into speedy rebellion against the Ottomans. The proposal was
supported by the Government of Bombay but the Viceroy did not
now see the action as suitable and instead suggested a blockade
in order to cut off Turkish food supplies. This measure,
however, he thought might well be reserved until the Imam
his 2 Grey concurred in the suggested blockade

showed attitude.
of Hudaydah provided that the attitude of the Imam was clearly
established.
The Government of India's declaration, which denied any
element of a religious character in the war and promised the
protection of the Muslim Holy Places together with the port of
Jiddah during the war undoubtedly stimulated the Arab
movement, apart from its degree of success in winning over
Britain's Muslim subjects and allies. The India Office saw the
importance of extending the above assurance to the Idrisi. The

296
announcement was issued by the Government of India which
published it in the Pioneer Mail on November 6,1914.
The following public announcement is published for

general information: In view of the outbreak of
war between Great Britain and Turkey, which, to
the regret of Great Britain, has been brought about
by the ill-advised, unprovoked and deliberate action
of the Ottoman Government, His Excellency the
Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty's Government
to make the following public announcement in
regard to the Holy places of Arabia, including the
holy shrines of Mesopotamia and the Port of Jeddah,
in order that they may be no misunderstanding on
the part of His Majesty's most loyal Moslem subjects
as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in
this war in which no question of a religious
character is involved. These holy places and Jeddah
will be immune from attack or molestation by the
British naval and military forces so long as there is
no interference with pilgrims from India to the holy
places and shrines in question. At the request of His
Majesty's Government the governments of France
and Russia have given them (the British
Government) similar assurances. 1
The issue of the Arab movement was again brought into
attention by Cheetham, when he wired on November 11 from
Cairo, warning about the possibility of great speculation among
the Arabs on the scheme by saying that:
Leaders of Arab movement suggest Arabs may be

suspicious of our intentions more especially
concerning Red Sea ports and Arab coast trade.
Excellent effect would be produced by a definite
statement on the part of the British Government
that there was no intention to undertake military or
naval operation in Arabia except for protection of
Arab interests against Turkish or other aggression
or in support of attempt by Arabs to free themselves
from Turkish 2
rule.
Similar views were also current at Aden. Jacob, again
Political Resident, 3 telegraphed the Viceroy on November

acting
16, warning the Government that the bombardment of Shaykh
1 L/P&S/10/558,6/11/1914.
2 L/P& S/10/558, Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 15/11/1914,
3 Jacob was acting Political Resident due to the retirement of Dell in
November 13,1914. Major General DL Shaw took office on November 26,
1914.
297
Sa'ld on November 10, had caused suspicions among the Arabs
about British policy. Jacob reported that Shaykh Ahmad
Nu'mdn, the gä'immaqäm of Hujariah, had written to the
'Abdali Sultan stating that "By their attack on Sheikh Said the
English have shown their desire to efface Islam". Jacob,
therefore, suggested to issue a proclamation to Turkish Arab
leaders, announcing British inclination towards the Arabs,
denying British desire for more territory, expressing surprise
of the Arab friendship with the Turks, their real enemy, and
warning them against violation of the British territory-1 This
by the Governments of Bombay 2 India,

was agreed and which
to include the Arabs in the Protectorate. 3 Jacob

proposed also
further suggested that the proclamation should be sent to Arab
leaders, including the Imam, who had been apprehensive of
Christian designs on Islam and its territories, according to
letters which he had written some months earlier to the 'AbdalI
Sultän. 4 Jacob's suggestion, which was considered as an
elaboration of Cheetham's proposal, was then approved by the
India Office, which cabled the Resident on November 23,1914
authorising him to issue a proclamation on the following lines:
The British Government do not entertain any desire

to extend the frontiers of their territory, and feel
confident that Arabs will not league themselves with
Turks, who are the real enemies of Arab progress
and welfare, against English who are determined to
maintain rights of Islam and respect Holy places and
who have invariably defended Arab interests. There
must at the same time be no violation of British
border. In the establishment of that peace and order
which alone can further Arab prosperity and
progress the British Government count on the co-

2 L/P&S/10/558, Bombay to Viceroy, 19/11/1914.
4 L/P&S/10/558, Acting Political Resident to Government of India,
21/11/1914.
298
operation of the Arab chiefs. Ifany Arabs violate
British territory and are so foolish as to join
Turkish cause their hostility will be punished by
force. 1
On November 24, Jacob informed the Viceroy that he would
issue a proclamation according to the above lines.
Meanwhile in London, the Foreign Office, the Admiralty
and the India Office were discussing measures to be taken in the
Red Sea and Arabia, apart from the existing policy of supporting
the Arab movement. Accordingly on November 16, Sir George
Russell Clerk' 2 senior clerk at the War Department of the
Foreign Office, prepared a memorandum which was agreed by
the India Office and the Admiralty and read as follows:
These islands (Farsan Islands) should certainly be

occupied, but as part of a general and progressive
plan, to be carried out from Aden. We should begin
by Sheikh Said, opposite Perim (the
occupying
Turkish post there has already been destroyed, but
we ought to occupy it, to prevent a revival of
French claim): then, Camaran: then the Farsan
Islands: and lastly, Hodeida. In each case we should
endeavour to work with the local Arabs. as
...
Hodeida is the only source of supply for Sanaa, the
Turks would be obliged to give in fairly soon,
his 3
especially as the Imam would seize chance.
At Aden, Jacob disagreed generally with some of those
proposals particularly those concerning with the occupation of
ports and towns on the mainland. He stated that
the Arabs might construe our occupation of Hodeida,

being a town on the mainland, as belying our
assertion that we have no desire for extension of our
territory. We proved by our abandonment of Sheikh
Said, after the destruction of the port, that we had
no ulterior aim. A reply from the Imam is still
awaited by us, and if we occupied Hodeida, prior to
its receipt, the Imam would misunderstand our
1 L/P&S/10/559, Viceroy to Resident, 23/11/1914.

2GR Clerk had knowledge of Amharic and Turkish apart from his vast
experience in diplomatic service including service at Istanbul.
3 L/P&S/10/558 The memo was discussed by Clerk (Foreign Office),
Hirtzel (India Office) and Admiral Slade (Admiralty), 16/11/1914.
299
action. Hodeida, is the port for Sanaa, and generally
for the territory of the Imam... Our plan, until it
is proved futile, is to work against the -Turks by
Arab agency declaring our policy as outlined in the
proclamation, promising them reasonable assistance
and assuring them of our support after the
conclusion of hostilities to secure autonomy. 1
Jacob, however, agreed with the proposal to occupy places other
than Hudaydah and Shaykh Said. The Government of Bombay
agreed with Jacob. So did the Government of India.
In view of our proclamation that we do not intend to

extend our frontier, occupation of places on
mainland might at present juncture be regarded as
break (breach) of faith. Further until we know
definitely attitude of Imam, Idrisi and Turkish
Arabs generally occupation of Sheikh Said and
Hodeida appears premature. Latter is port for Sanaa
and Imam's territory generally. It occupation might
not only be misunderstood but if with only one
battalion -as proposed by London- actually tend to
provoke attack by Arabs which would stultify our
whole policy of conciliation and our efforts to secure
Arab co-operation in this quarter. Unless therefore
Turkish Arabs adopt definitely threatening attitude
deprecate any action as regards Sheikh Said and
Hodeida for the present. 2
Before receiving views of the Government of India, Hirtzel,
Political Secretary at the India Office minuted that "the less we
entangle ourselves on the Red Sea coast the better. But Sheikh
Said, cannot be ignored, and I feel very strongly that having
once turned the Turks out we cannot allow the Arabs to
it on their behalf fly the Turkish flag". 3

reoccupy and
On November 28, D. L. Shaw, the new Resident reported
that Shaykh Sa`ld had been reoccupied by a large force of Arabs
with one large and four small guns. The Resident immediately
reinforced the Perim garrison and suggested that should the
1 L/P&S/10/559, Acting Political Resident to Government of India,

24/11/1914.
3 L/P&S/10/558, India Office's minute, 29/11/1914.
300
enemy attack it was very necessary for the sake of prestige
that the British occupy Shaykh Said and this would dishearten
enemy movement there and elsewhere. For that purpose the
Resident required troops other than by denuding Aden and also
services the Duke Edinburgh. 1 Shaw's

again of ship, of view
was apparently opposed by Hardinge. Most probably Jacob too
disagreed as he always hoped for co-operation with the Arab
chiefs and wanted to avoid occupying Shaykh SaÌd. Hardinge
argued that "reoccupation was unnecessary and in any case
undesirable not only because it would lock up troops better
employed elsewhere but it would also tend to irritate tribes and
render isolated garrison greater source of anxiety than Perim
now is. "2 The India Office agreed with Hardinge and complained
that
this department remains of opinion that sound policy

would have been either (and preferably) to have
held Sheikh Said when we took it from the Turks
on November 10, or to have opened negotiations
with the Arabs, before they had time to reoccupy
it, The latter course was suggested in our
...
telegram of 22.11.14, probably too late. The present
position seems to be that we have in fact no troops
we can lock up there. 3
Crewe informed the Foreign Office that he was inclined to accept
the views of the Government of India, but he thought that the
Arabs should be clearly given to understand that while the
British did not desire to interfere with them so long as they
were of good behaviour, they must take the consequences if
they hostilities against the British. 4

attempted

3 L/P&S/10/558, minute at the India Office, 5/12/1914.
301
The policy of securing Arab support had begun to show
some result which to some extent gave weight to the strategy of
abstaining from naval and military action against the ports and
towns of the Imam and the Idrlsl. The Idrisl had now been in
communication with the Residency. The Residency reminded the
Admiralty that "we are particularly anxious to allow supplies to
enter ports of Idrisi.... As to purely Turkish ports in Red Sea
such as Hodeida, Mokha, Kokha, Luheiya, I think that all should
be watched and their supplies cut off. "1 As to the Imam the
Resident reported to the Government of India that hitherto there
was no reply from him. If he joined the Ottomans, the Resident
agreed that Britain should occupy Hudaydah and Shaykh SaÌd to
cool the Imdm's ardour. For that purpose the Resident proposed
to Aden. 2 The Government Bombay backed the

reinforce of
Resident and recommended that a Movable Column should be
formed at Aden for the use of the Resident at his discretion
wherever he discerned any threat to the border. The Bombay
Government also proposed to reinforce Aden so as to be able to
invasion the the Arab levies. 3

repel any with assistance of
The Resident again declined to attack Shaykh Said without
reinforcement of Aden particularly after the Ottomans had
succeeded in reoccupying it with an estimated 300 regular and
two to three thousand irregular troops in addition to the 1,000
irregular and 250 regular troops they had at Mukha. The
Resident argued that
if no reinforcement can be expected I consider it is

objectionable by attacking Sheikh Said to chance
raising hostilities of Arabs in the Yemen because
1 L/P&S/10/558, Resident to Admiral, 4/12/1914.

2 L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Government of India, 8/12/1914.
302
Turks were enabled by the last bombardment to
take advantage of this to give Arabs to understand
that British now clearlywished to annex Arabian soil
and proclaim Jehad against them. So far Arabs
generally have not received Jehad well.... If we
now attack without reinforcements having been sent
to Aden, Protectorate will be rendered liable to
attack by the Turks who will probably be able to
proclaim Jehad. Present garrison at Aden being too
weak to undertake in support of protected Arabs any
1
effective action.
The Resident cabled the same opinion to London in relation to
the 2
naval bombardment of Shaykh Sa'Id.
Shaw, the Resident, now seemed to have accepted the
importance of the Arab policy. Perhaps he was almost convinced
that India and London would not approve Aden's reinforcement
on the ground that no spare troops were available, but he did
not give up hopes of eventual reinforcement. On December 17,
Shaw reported the further progress of the pan-Arab policy in
South West Arabia. The Imdm had written to the Àbdall Sultän
on November 23, expressing great friendship with the house of
Àbdali from ancient time and seeking information regarding
the treaty between his ancestors and the British Government.
The IdrIsl had written on November 21, approving the
Resident's suggestion (Jacob) that the Arabs should unite against
the Ottomans, thanking the British for the promised assistance
in arms and ammunition and for leaving his ports open to
commerce, asking for his independence to be assured and for a
pact be discussed. The Resident also brought to notice that the
Ottoman gä'immaqäm of Shurmdn and Qamä'irah, Shaykh
Muhammad b. Näsir Muqbil, known as Shaykh of Mäwiyah,
had written to ask for a pact between himself and the 'Abdall

303
Sultän provided that his independence would be guaranteed by
the British. With the attraction of the Shaykh of Mäwiyah to
the pan-Arab programme at the time when the Imäm's attitude
was uncertain, Shaw suggested Britain should back the Shaykh,
whose jurisdiction extended from Qa'tabah down to Shaykh
SaÌd and who was alleged to be able to control Ahmad Nu`man,
the gä'immaqäm of Hujariyah, one of the Ottoman propagandists
in South West Arabia. As additions to the existing policy of
supporting Arabs against the Ottomans, the Resident proposed
two further measures "firstly, to be materially reinforced and
this is imperative for our prestige and then to await the
enemy's attack. Secondly, sanctioning alliance proposed and

...
ourselves to support attack after being reinforced. "l
The Government of Bombay agreed with the Resident's
proposed pact with the Idrlsi and the pact between the
Mäwiyah Shaykh and the Àbdali Sultan but agreed that these
arrangements should not go beyond what was compatible with
the possibility of the Imam eventually combining with the
British. Bombay argued that "our prime endeavour should be
the detachment Imam from Turks". 2 Bombay in

of was not
favour of the Resident's proposal to support an attack on the
Ottomans by the Mäwiyah Shaykh and the 'Abdall Sultan but
they strongly supported the reinforcement of the Aden garrison.
Hardinge, however, still wished to keep clear of
commitments at Aden. On December 20, he ruled out Shaw's
proposal for the reinforcement of Aden unless that action was
1 L/P&S/10/558 & L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Government of India,

17/12/1914.
304
vital to the holding of Aden itself. As to the Imam, the Viceroy
suggested leaving him alone. As to the IdrIsl the Viceroy did not
agree with a proposal by Shaw to send Shaw and Jacob to
Jizan. Such an initiative would encourage the Idrisi to consider
himself of great importance apart from the inconvenience of
their leaving Aden at present. The IdrisI might be told that the
British Government were prepared to guarantee him
independence. The Viceroy agreed with the Resident's proposal of
an alliance between the Mdwiyah Shaykh and the Àbdali Sultan
and to guarantee Mäwiyah's independence after the war. The
Viceroy's proposed support for Arab co-operation was, however,
confined to non-offensive operations, namely assistance in
money, arms and ammunition. 1 The Viceroy's proposals
Idrlsi Mawiyah were in London. 2

regarding and agreed
In January 1915, the Aden Residency was occupied with
negotiations with the Mäwiyah Shaykh and the Imam. But the
Residency also became concerned with the defence of the
frontier when it was again reported that the Ottomans and the
Imamic forces were massing troops on the frontier. The event
led the Resident to again strongly urge the necessity for
reinforcement as the "moral effect will be immense and likely
to deter Turks and Imam from taking offensive measures on
our border and would also give confidence to the Turkish Arabs
whom we expected to make the first attack. "3 At the India
Office, Hirtzel noted that there were no troops in India
for reinforcement and this circumstance further

available
the situation because of the inability of the British to

prejudiced

2 L/P&S/10/559, Viceroy to Resident, 31/12/1914.
305
r
help their friends and protect their proteges. Barrow agreed.
"We shall certainly lose face with the Arabs if we show
ourselves unable to support them effectively where and when
they require support". 1 Barrow if Lahej came to grief

suggested
it would be a serious blow to our prestige and influence in
Arabia, the sooner we can send reinforcement to Aden the
better, and if the invasion of Egypt fizzles out [i. e. the Ottoman
attack on the Canal in January 1915], perhaps troops could be
operated from that country. "2
The Government of India could not supply reinforcements
for Aden. When it was reported early in February that the
Ottoman and the Imamic troops were attacking the Malajim
tribe under Baydä within the territory of the Aden Protectorate,
the Resident immediately sent 25,000 rounds of ammunition (Le
Gras) 3 Few days later the Resident

as an urgent measure.
reported that the Ottoman and Imamic troops had crossed the
Protectorate frontier and were encamped within seven miles of
Däli`. 4 The Resident that this advance could affect the

argued
hoped for co-operation of the Mdwiyah Shaykh as he might be
compelled by the Ottomans to fight against the British. The
Resident, therefore, strongly urged as an alternative to assist
the Mäwiyah Shaykh with money as required by his agent. He
also proposed that a British force of one brigade of infantry and
one mountain battery should be sent to Däli`. The Resident
remarked that the "situation is entirely changed since the Turks
1 L/P&S/10/559, India office's minute, 22/1/1915.

2 Ibid.
306
crossed the frontier, and it is now imperative for British
prestige among our protected tribes that the British should take
action and lead them against Turks and not leave it to Mavia
[Mdwiyah], India Office

a Turkish Arab, to do. "1 The was also
disturbed at the cause of events. Hirtzel noted that
with the advance of the Turks across the frontier

the necessity will be forced upon our tribes to
choose who they will serve. if they join the Turk
...
it is certain that in short time we shall be shut up
in Aden. The effect of that on the whole Arab
question will be deplorable. There is therefore a
crying need of reinforcements. For these the
financing and arming of the Mavia Shaykh is no real
substitute at the present juncture. 2
The Government of India were more optimistic. Hardinge
considered that the assistance to Mdwiyah could certainly
squash the movement of the Ottomans in Däli` territory. He
argued that it would be better for the British troops, if
reinforced, to go up to Däli`, as this step would be more likely
to check the Ottoman movement, but there were no
reinforcements available which could be sent either
permanently or temporarily from India except in the case of
extreme disorders. 3 The Resident again pressed for
reinforcements to assist friendly Arabs in defence of the
Protectorate when he subsequently reported the advance of the
Ottoman troops in Däli` territory with the connivance of the
Amir of Dali` and the submission of the AmirI tribesmen to the
Ottomans. 4

2 L/P&S/10/559, India office's note, February 1915.
3 L/P&S/10/559, Viceroy to India office, 10/2/1915.
307
In the the negotiations with the Imam, the
meantime,
Idrlsi and the Mdwiyah Shaykh continued to preoccupy Aden,
Bombay, Simla and London. The Imam wrote on December 25,
1914 (received January 27,1915) in reply to the Resident's letter
of November 24,1914. The Imam stated his pleasure at the
friendship which existed between the British and himself and
his thanks for the policy of non-intervention in Arabia and
Islam. He, however, expressed surprise at the action at Shaykh
SaÌd. He also stated that he wished to preserve his independence
and furthermore entered a claim for the Caliphate. It was
reported that "he desires no temporal rule but demands the dues
claimed for the Caliphate in his office as protector of Holy Places
his the Moslems in Arabia is supreme. 1

and says authority over
Although the Imam's claim was obviously doubtful it indicated
his ambitions in Arabia. This letter was followed by the
dispatch of the Imam's envoy, Muhammad 'Al! Sharif, to Lahej
and Aden. Early in February the envoy was interviewed by
Jacob, the assistant Resident. The envoy was informed of the
British wish that the Imam should remain neutral if Britain
attacked the Ottomans in the Yaman; in return the British
Government would guarantee the Imam's autonomy in Upper
Yaman. However, now the Imamic-ldrisi relations began to
as an issue. The envoy expressed his apprehensions

emerge
the Idrlsl's possible attack upon the. Ottomans and

concerning
the öf the Imäm. 2

the Idrlsi's self-aggrandizement at expense
On the hand the IdrIsi, who supported the British

other
Arab quite prepared to attack the Ottomans at

policy, was

308
once. His agent at Aden was negotiating for a Protectorate treaty
and assistance in money, arms and ammunition-1 The Resident
was soon authorised to negotiate a treaty with the Idrlsl on the
understanding that any terms likely to alienate the Imam while
he to be 2 The Mdwiyah
was still wavering were avoided.
Shaykh too was apparently determined to fight the Ottomans,
although his position was more difficult than that of the Idrlsi.
The Resident explained that "the former [the Mawiyah Shaykh]
is a Turkish Pasha in receipt of Turkish stipend and on actual
Turkish soil while latter [the Idris! ] was free from Turkish
attack. "3 Nevertheless, a treaty was concluded on February 19
with the Mdwiyah Shaykh's representative according to which
the Mäwiyah Shaykh undertook to expel the Ottomans and their
Arab- supporters from the Liwä of Ta'izz in return for
monetary assistance and a promise by the British Government
of his recognition as an independent Shaykh and his protection
from aggression on the part of any European power or from the
Ottomans after the war. The Government of India approved the
agreement while reminding the Resident that the guarantee of
the Mdwiyah Shaykh's independence and protection depended
entirely on his fulfillment of his obligations under the
4
agreement.
Meanwhile, the negotiations for a treaty with the IdrIsI
had continued. Early in March the Resident informed the
Government of India that the IdrlsI representative was
extremely anxious to make a treaty of friendship in order to

309
secure his sea board against foreign attack and to obtain
diplomatic support for his autonomy after the war. The Idrisi's
agent claimed that the assistance already approved by the
Government of India of Rs25,000 together with permission to
purchase Rs 30,000 worth of arms and ammunition was
insufficient to permit an attack upon, and the expulsion of the
Ottomans and their Arab allies from Àsir province as well as
to withstand the prospective attack of a reported 3,000 Turks
with nine field pieces from Damascus, a force which was
believed to have been sent to Madinah for use against the IdrlsI.
The agent therefore asked for further assistance and this was
by the Resident. 1 The Resident telegraphed the

approved again
Government of India asking for a definite proposal to be made to
2
the Idrisl before the return of his representative.
The Government of India, however, were not satisfied
and did not agree to assist the Idrisl further with arms and
money before he definitely demonstrated that the assistance so
far given was being used for the British cause. The Government
of India denied the report of the arrival of Ottoman troops from
Syria. They also doubted whether the IdrIsi would attack and
oust the Ottomans. Instead the Government of India proposed to
the Resident to inform the agent that the Government must first
see the draft agreement that the Idrlsi was ready to conclude
his 3 The Resident

and must have some evidence of co-operation.
cabled to the Government of India stressing the

again
importance of the Idrlsi in Arabia and of the role of the IdrIsI in
the policy of supporting the Arab movement against the
1 L/P&S/10/559 & R/20/A/3966, Resident to India Office, 9/3/1915.

2 R/20/A/3966, Resident to India Office, 13/3/19,15.
3 R/20/A/3966, Government of India to Resident, 14/3/1915.
310
Ottomans. 1 The India Office was inclined to support Shaw's
view against that of the Government of India. In a minute,
Hirtzel noted
In view of the importance of securing the early

adherence of the Idrisi and his success... the delay
of the Government of India in dealing with the
Resident's telegram of March 9 seems unreasonable,
and their decision wrong. This is surely not a time
to be haggling over £1800 and some ammunition, and
the only man who is really in a position to judge
whether they will be well expended is the Resident'.
It must necessarily be weeks before the draft
treaty is forthcoming and seems most inadvisable
to delay matters for it.... The defeat of the Idrisi
would turn the scale definitely against us, and all
be 2
money and arms already given would wasted.
The Secretary of State agreed and approved the Resident's
proposal.
On April 28,1915 a treaty was concluded with the IdrisI
under which he agreed to attack and to oust the Ottomans from
their stations in the Yaman and to harass them in that
direction, and also to extend his territories at their expense.
The Idrisi further undertook to abstain from any hostile or
provocative action against Imam Yahyd in return for a
guarantee from the British against any attack upon his sea
3
board and also of his independence.
The view of the Resident concerning the difficulties in the
way of the Mdwiyah Shaykh carrying out his obligations in
with the agreement turned out to be true. In April

accordance
1915, the Àbdali Sultän reported to Aden of the uncertainty
surrounding the intentions of the Mäwiyah Shaykh who was
with 70 Turkish cavalry, 50 infantry, and about 300 Arabs
1 R/20/A/3966 & L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Government of India, 15/3/1915.

2 R/20/A/3966, Secretary of State for India to Government of India,
16/3/1915.
3 L/P&S/10/559, IdrIsi Treaty, 30/4/1915.
311
across the border. With the Mdwiyah Shaykh also were the
Ottoman Governor-General of the Yaman, and Said Pasha who
commanded the Ottoman troops and had occupied a position at
al-Jalilah. These new circumstances, in addition to continual
presence of the Ottoman troops at Däli` since February, gave
weight to the Resident's refusal to permit the transfer of troops
from Aden to Somaliland which had been requested by the
Foreign Office. 1
By early in May, it was clear that the Mäwiyah Shaykh
was now in the Ottoman camp. The Resident stated that
it is now alleged by Mavia [the Mdwiyah Shaykh]

that on account of difficulty of the task guaranteed
to be undertaken by him in his agreement, and the
possibility of victory going to Germans and Turks.
He finds himself unable to oust the Turks from Liwa
Ta'iz unless the balance of the dole promised by us
be disbursed to him and unless he be also assisted
with troops. 2
Aware of the difficulty of the position of the Mäwiyah Shaykh,
the Resident thought any action by the Shaykh against the
Ottomans was unlikely. But the Resident, on the other hand,
considered the movement of the Ottomans, if not checked, would
adversely affect British prestige throughout the hinterland.
Reviewing the course of British policy in South West
Arabia from August 1914 to the early summer of 1915 one can
observe two policies contending for supremacy: the Arab policy
and the policy of direct British and Indian military action. A
continuing debate focused on the question of whether these two
policies were complementary or alternatives. In the autumn of
1 R/20/A/3966 & L/P&S/10/559, Resident to Viceroy, 23/4/1915.

2 R/20/A/3966 & L/P&S/10/559,3/5/1915.
312
1915 it began to appear that they were opposed: operation on the
mainland of Arabia would alienate the Arabs. The strong
inclination of British policy makers towards the Arab policy was
also influenced by the circumstances that no troops were
available (and more precisely that London, Egypt and especially
India declined to make troops available) for the support of the
policy of direct action.
From the end of 1914 the postulates, of the Arab policy
were increasingly called into question by the Aden authorities
who argued that, after all, the Arab policy would not work
unless it was given more vigorous British support and that
troop reinforcements for Aden were essential. At this time
British policy began to shift from the offensive position which
had reshaped the period from August to November 1914 with the
objective to weaken or remove the Ottomans from the region to
a defensive outlook in which the object was to prevent an
Ottoman attack on the Aden Protectorate with damage to British
prestige.
The Arab policy was also made more doubtful by the lack
of success in winning over the Arabs. Treaties were made with
the IdrisI and the Mäwiyah Shaykhs but ev en as they now
negotiated there were evident doubts about the ability and will
of the Arab leaders to carry them out. And the key to any hopes
of success was the proposed alliance with the Imdm and that
was not achieved.
The chief responsibility for a failure of British policy in
South West Arabia must be borne by the Government of India,
and their viceroy, Hardinge. The Aden Residents supported
usually by the Bombay Government consistently pressed for a
313
more active policy and were occasionally supported by London.
It was Hardinge who persistently denied that he could make
available the required measures.
The advance of the Ottomans in al-Jalilah and the
submission of the Mäwiyah Shaykh to the ottomans in April
1915 and further the advance of the Ottomans into Lahej in
July that year had cast doubts on the British policy of
supporting the Arab movement with money, arms and
ammunitio n in South West Arabia. An offensive military
operation now began to appear again as the appropriate
alternative to the Arab policy.
6.3 An Offensive or A Defensive Policy?
Ever since war had broken out, the Resident had made a
number of requests for reinforcements in order to safeguard the
Protectorate territories from an Ottoman attack. He was
supported by the India Office but the reinforcements never
materialised as the War Office and the Government of India
could not afford to provide the troops. This situation remained
unchanged even after the Ottomans moved across the
Protectorate and occupied Lahej. It appears that the British
policy conducted in South West Arabia during the war was
defensive as Aden was reinforced temporarily after the fall of
Lahej, and therefore could not perform offensive measures.
The Resident initiated from the beginning, even with the
small strength available at Aden, to adopt an offensive policy.
Following the advance of the Ottomans in al-JalIlah and the
314
failure the Mawiyah Shaykh to take action against the
of
Ottomans, the Resident proposed to move to the Pali' plateau
with the force available at Aden in order to support the
protected tribes and to recover British territory now under the
occupation of the Ottomans. Otherwise, he argued, British
prestige there and throughout the hinterland would greatly
suffer. The Resident planned to remain longer than one week on
the Pali' plateau and therefore suggested that British forces
should hold a position at Nubat Dukaym at the road junction
from Mäwiyah and Qa`tabah. This operation would require
battalion. 1
reinforcements of at least one
The Government of India opposed the operation. It was
inadvisable and in any case there was no reinforcement which
could be spared. The Government of India argued that
it is upon the success of our arms in the main

theatre of operations rather than upon local
demonstrations that the prestige of His Majesty's
Government depends. Most disastrous results would
follow any entanglement in the Aden Hinterland, and
success to the extent of satisfactorily clearing up the
is not probable. 2
situation
These views were supported by the Secretary of State for India.
In the meantime on May 27 1915, under the Coalition
Government, Crewe by Austen Chamberlain. 3 This

was replaced
had considerable effect as Crewe had always been

change
inclined to back Hirtzel and therefore the Resident in support
policy in South West Arabia. Crewe always

of a more active
the Resident, Shaw, as an expert on the field, and in

regarded
Resident to Viceroy, 3/5/1915.

1 R/20/A/3966 also L/P&S/10/559,
2 R/20/A/3966, Viceroy to Resident, 14/5/1915.
3 Moberly, History of the Great War, vol. I, London, 1923, p. 239.
315
the case of further monetary assistance to the Idrisi suggested
by Shaw, he had over ruled the decision made by Hardinge,
who came eventually to regard the Resident as incapable
particularly after his defeat at Lahej. Chamberlain was more
inclined to back Hardinge, though his stance was always in
conformity with the Resident's view.
The change did not, however, alter the position of Aden in
comparison with other theatres of war. The War Council had at
all times taken the view that primary consideration should be
given to the principal theatres of operations i. e. the Western and
Eastern Fronts, followed by secondary theatres, including
Balkans, Trans-Caucasia and Mesopotamia and German Colonies.
In the Red Sea region, the defence of Egypt and Suez Canal was
given much higher priory than Arabia. At the Cabinet meeting
of November '25, Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty indicated
the importance of the defence of Egypt when he suggested an
attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to control the
Dardanelles. Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, on the
hand, felt about Egypt and the Suez Canal. 1

other no anxiety
Arabia together with the rest of the Ottoman Arab lands
excluding Egypt was first seriously discussed in the Cabinet
only in March 1915 during the discussion on the partition of
the Ottoman Empire in Asia. 2
As a result of the entrance of Italy into the war and the
possibility that the Italians might take their chance to occupy
Farsän and other islands, the Foreign Office considered the
1 Cab/22/1, War Council's note, 25/11/1914.

2 Cab/22/1, War Council's note on the partition of Turkey in Asia,
19/3/1915.
316
Zukür islands. 1 The
occupation of Farsdn, Kamarän and
Resident agreed with the proposal to occupy Kamardn, Farsän
and Zukür, and surprisingly, offered to supply the troops for
the operation from Aden on the ground that these islands came
into the 2 The Government India

sphere of influence of Aden. of
was less enthusiastic and proposed that Britain should first try
for a diplomatic agreement with the Italian Government. Only if
that attempt proved futile did they agree to occupy Zukur
islands Farsdn in the the IdrIsI. 3

only. was possession of
Chamberlain concurred with the Government of India that the
proposed occupation of Farsan should be abandoned, but decided
to proceed immediately to occupy Kamarän Zukür. 4 The

and
measures were immediately taken and Kamardn was occupied.
When the Ottomans moved southward across the
Protectorate in June 1915, the British forces at Aden and their
Arab allies were really put to the test. It soon became clear that
the protectorate area, designed as a buffer zone, was
vulnerable and most of the protected chiefs soon fell into the
hands of the Ottomans as their forces moved to Lahej. With the
occupation of Lahej, South West Arabia moved high on the
agenda in India as well as in London. The Viceroy immediately
requested reinforcements from Egypt as, he claimed, troops
were not available from India in order to retake Lahej. The
War Office agreed to send the 28th Brigade temporarily to Aden.
The Aden Residency had, as we have seen, made a
number of requests for reinforcements in order to safeguard
1 R/20/A/3966, Secretary of State for India to Resident, 27/5/1915.

2 R/20/A/3966, Resident to Secretary of State for India, 28/5/1915.
3 R/20/A/3966, Government of India to Secretary of State for India,
30/5/1915.
4 R/20/A/3966, Secretary of State for India to Resident, 4/4/1915.
317
the Protectorate territories from an Ottoman attack. The
Residency was supported by the India Office but reinforcements
never materialised as the War Office and the Government of
India would not provide the troops. The situation now changed
after the Ottomans had occupied Lahej when the War Office
provided a brigade from Egypt. But by this time the new
General Officer Commanding Aden, General Younghusband, was
not in favour of defending the Protectorate. He argued that with
the forces available the Turks could be defeated and driven out
of Lahej, but if the British forces then evacuated the place the
Turks it and British prestige would suffer. ' He

would reoccupy
further argued that as the British required Aden only as a
naval base, and that was quite secure, it was a mistake to
to Lahej. 2 He three alternative moves: first,

advance suggested
to remain strictly in a passive defensive position, second, to
make a sudden dash on Lahej, returning when operations were
completed, and third, to make a deliberate attack on the enemy,
drive them out, and then occupy Lahej, with a Brigade. He was
not in favour of second move as it was doubtful from military
point of view and also unsound politically. He believed the first
course was best and when the general situation of the war was
favourable, the third alternative could be adopted and a brigade
left at Lahej. He even suggested that if the first alternative was
adopted, it would be possible to withdraw the 28th Brigade,
provided that Aden was reinforced from India. This advice was
welcome in London and India. The Secretary of State for

very
1 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 31/7/1915.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3961, War Diary, 11/8/1915.
318
India, Austen Chamberlain, agreed with" Younghusband's
suggestion. 1 The Viceroy, Hardinge, also approved a defensive
attitude at Aden and agreed to the departure of half of the 28th
Brigade. 2
It appears that from July 1916 onwards offensive
measures at Aden were seriously discussed in London and India
apparently after the Arab rising in the Hijäz. Chamberlain, who
was in office from May 1915 to July 1917, always gave careful
consideration to the views expressed by the officials at Aden.
General C. H. U. Price, the new Resident, who replaced
Younghusband, from September 10,1915, and Colonel Jacob,
repeatedly made pleas for reinforcements to be sent to Aden to
enable offensive operations to be undertaken at Aden. But only a
year later did the War Cabinet Committee agree to take action.
In July 1916, at the time of the Arab Revolt in Hijäz, the War
Cabinet Committee directed that plans should be prepared for an
offensive in the autumn of 1916 with the object of ejecting
the Ottomans from Lahej and restoring British influence in the
Hinterland. 3 The General Officer Commanding Resident

new and
Aden, James Marshall Stewart, 4 was, therefore, to

at requested.
prepare plans which included all requirements, military,
medical and others including technical, such as railway
extension, motor transport and aviation. The operations were,
however, intended to be confined to territory within the British
boundary. In the meantime Stewart was instructed to maintain
as far as possible an active defence during the summer months
1 L/MIL/17/5/3962, War Diary, 21/8/1915 & 23/8/1915.

2 L/MIL/17/5/3962, War Diary, 30/8/1915.
3 L/P&S/11/112, India office to Resident, 9/11/1916.
4 J. M. Stewart, Political Resident and General Officer Commanding Aden
from June 1,1916 to July 1920.
319
of 1916, using all reasonable means to harass the Ottomans and
hold them at Lahej, thus preventing them from cooperating
with the Imam in an attack on the Idrisi. The reason for
postponement of the operations to the autumn was that the
Government of India could not provide the necessary troops
except for the relief of the Hampshire howitzer battery. It was
hoped that by autumn 1916 troops from East Africa would be
available to reinforce Aden for offensive operations together
from the War Office. 1 But

with additional material supplied
after examination of the proposals put before them, the War
Committee decided in their meeting of September 22,1916 that
the operations should not be undertaken in 1916 because neither
the War Office nor the Government of India could or would
supply the troops and material which Stewart considered
indispensable. 2 Chamberlain informed Stewart that so long as
that continued to be the case he feared that the measures which
Stewart and Jacob desired to see carried out must remain in
3
abeyance.
Stewart continued to press for reinforcement. When he
heard of a prospect that troops would be set free from India,
the Resident telegraphed to the India Office pressing for
reconsideration of the offensive. Barrow, followed the request
up and wrote to the War Office to inquire whether the Army
Council would now reconsider their opinion that operations from
Aden be attempted. 4 In the War Office

should not reply stated
that no decision had as yet been arrived at as to the release of
1 L/P&S/11/112,20/7/1916.
2 L/P&S/11/112, India office to Resident, 9/11/1916; L/P&S/11/112, note by
Barrow, 8/12/1916.
3 L/P&S/11/112, India Office to Resident, 9/11/1916.
4 L/P&S/11/112, Barrow to War Office, 8/12/1916.
320
units from India, and to say that the position as regards our
inability to spare troops from major theatres of war, which
prompted the decision of the War Committee on the 18 September
remains unaltered. 1 The hopes for operations against

military
the Ottomans at Lahej were thus dashed by the unwillingness
of the War Office and the India Government to supply troops.
Stewart made a further attempt in May 1917. When
reports reached Aden that Yamani tribes which formed a
confederacy had decided to overthrow the Imäm and to eject the
Ottomans from Yaman, Stewart, immediately telegraphed on
May 15,1917 to India and London to propose a support for the
2 Chamberlain supported the Resident's proposal and

movement.
telegraphed the Viceroy, Chelmsford, on May 17, saying that
prima facie, he thought that the movement should be supported,
he the Foreign Office in that 3

and was addressing sense.
Chelmsford, however, did not agree, arguing that he was not
able to gauge the prospect of the confederacy's success, and as
the ejection of the Turks was only a secondary object, he
thought that it would be well to follow the traditional policy of
non-interference in inter-Arab quarrels. He further argued that
if the British supported the confederacy and failed, the British

.
would actually make the Imam a permanent enemy. He
suggested that the Resident might reply to the tribes that the
Government would not support the confederacy until it had
shown that its main objective was against the Turks and that
the likely to 4 Chamberlain, however,

plans were succeed.
1 L/P&S/11/112, war office to India office, 16/12/1916.

2 L/P&S/10/587, Resident to Viceroy (rpt to London), 15/5/1917.
3 L/P&S/10/587, Sec of State to Viceroy, 17/5/1917.
4 L/P&S/10/587, Viceroy to Sec of State, 17/5/1917.
321
overruled Chelmsford's views and supported Stewart when he
telegraphed the Viceroy on May 25, informing him that the
Resident might proceed with his proposal. He told Stewart,
however, that he should make it clear, in promising general
support, that military co-operation from Aden was not
intended. For the ejection of the Turks, help in arms and money
be 1 Chelmsford, however, remained

alone might promised.
hostile to the policy, arguing that the Government of India's
experience of Southern Arabs made them still doubtful as to the
sincerity of the declared objective of the confederacy i. e. the
ousting of the Turks from Yaman, and he repeated his last
2
argument.
After informing the Viceroy on May 25, that permission
had been given to the Resident to proceed with his proposal,
Chamberlain again telegraphed on the same day to the Viceroy,
informing him that no action should be taken. The reason was
that Aden itself now doubted the volume of the report.
Chamberlain telegraphed the Viceroy next day and stated that
the scheme was regarded as unsound by Colonel Jacob who
in London. 3 So the the

was now policy of supporting
confederacy, the pursuit of which was taken 'following the
passive policy, came to an end.
In 1917 a significant change took place in the conduct of
British policy in South West Arabia. In an effort to press for
a more effective policy in South West Arabia, the India Office
suggested in July 1917 the transfer of military control of the
region to the War Office and of political control to the Foreign
1 L/P&S/10/587, Sec of State to Viceroy, 25/5/1917.

2 L/P&S/10/587, Viceroy to Sec of State, 26/5/1917.
3 L/P&S/10/587, Sec of State to Viceroy, 25-6/5/1917.
322
Office and therefore to put Aden under the administration of the
British High Commissioner in Egypt. The move was apparently
to re-establish British prestige in those areas for the purpose of
the John Evelyn Shuckburgh, 1 who had

post-war settlement.
replaced Hirtzel as secretary of the political department at the
India Office, whose views were always influential in the India
Office, remarked that by this change the India Office had no
longer any locus standi, either from a military or a political
point of view. He went on to comment, saying that
I feel bound to record, however, that Col Jacob has in

recent conversations, repeatedly impressed upon me
the view that there will never be any real
improvement of the situation in South West Arabia
until we are ourselves in a position to take military
action from Aden. So far we have confined ourselves
to endeavouring to persuade other people (Idrisi & c)
to do for us what it has not been convenient to us to
do for ourselves; and the results have, not
unnaturally, been negligible. Col Jacob considers it
all important, from the point of view of our future
relations with the Arab tribes, that the Turks
should actually be driven out of Lahej and the rest
of our Protectorate by force of (British) arms before
the war ends. Victory elsewhere, followed by a
diplomatic withdrawal of the Turk, will not be
sufficient for local purposes, and will not reestablish
a belief in our power and capacity to protect our
own friends and interests. The Arab is only
impressed by what before his 2
passes own eyes.
Shuckburgh suggested that the Secretary of State for India,
Montagu, should now circulate a brief memorandum to the
Middle Eastern Committee, the only place for the India Office to
in
participate/matters relating to Aden after the transfer of its
control to the Foreign Office and the War Office. A memorandum
based on Shuckburgh's minute was agreed by Montagu and
copies were sent to the Foreign Office and the War Office. The
1 J. E. Shuckburgh was assistant secretary at the political department,

the India Office since October 1912 before he was promoted to secretary
in March 1917, replacing Arthur Hirtzel.
2 L/P&S/11/112, minute by Shuckburgh, 4/8/1917.
323
memorandum was prepared by the political department at the
India Office. After outlining a brief history of the occupation of
Lahej by the Ottomans, it was stated that
The situation in which we have had to acquiesce

during the past two years is anything but a
satisfactory one. Indeed one of the main reasons
which prompted the India Office in suggesting the
transference of military control was the hope that
it might lead to more effective measures. It is true
that our position at Aden itself has never been
seriously threatened; but we have had the
humiliation of looking idly on, month after month,
at the occupation of our territory by the enemy, and
of presenting to the world a spectacle of inability to
help either ourselves or our friends. There may
have been deplorable; and there is little hope that
the political situation will improve until we are in a
position to take effective military action. So far we
have confined ourselves to attempting to induce the
local Arabs (Sayyid Idrisi & c) to do for us what we
have not found it convenient to do for ourselves -a
policy which, naturally has not been very fruitful
in results- from the point of view of our relations
...
with the Arab tribes, that the Turks should actually
be driven out of Lahej and the rest of our
Protectorate by force of British arms before the war
ends. 1
The transfer of the military control of Aden to the War
Office did not bring the changes hoped for by the India Office.
Until the end of the war, the War Office remained hostile to
military operations in South West Arabia. On October 1 1918, Sir
Francis Reginald Wingate, the British High Commissioner of
Egypt, 2 urged the Foreign Office that on political grounds the
reoccupation of Lahej now in the winter 1918 was regarded as
essential. On October 25, the Foreign Office replied stating that
the War Office did not now propose to initiate operations from
4l, e
Aden. But in view ofgeneral military situation, the War Office
1 L/P&S/11/112, India office's memo, 25/8/1917.

2 F. Wingate was the British High Commissioner of Egypt from January
1,1917 to October 13,1919.
324
had made inquiries as to possible reinforcement of the Aden
garrison in order to begin operations in the shortest possible
time if 1 This last hope Resident the High

necessary. of the and
Commissioner from the War Office did not materialise as the
war ended.
6.4 Post-war settlement
At the close of war, the first move adopted by the British
was to regain, as smoothly as possible, their position in South
West Arabia by removing all the Ottoman troops in the area.
After the armistice of Mudros was signed on October 31 1918, the
War Office at once instructed Aden to communicate the terms of
the armistice to the Ottoman military Commander at Lahej,
SaÌd Pasha, and to arrange in accordance with clause sixteen
(16) of the armistice, for the surrender of all garrisons in the
Yaman. 2 Only SaÌd Pasha and his troops Lahej to

at agreed
surrender initially: the remaining troops in the Yaman were
evacuated only after the occupation of Hudaydah. The Imam
was the reason for the delay as he obstructed the departure of
the troops on the ground that he had not been officially
informed of the terms of the armistice. Nor did the Imam

the
approve ofAarmistice of Mudros on account of his pecuniary and
1 L/P&S/11/112, Foreign Office to Wingate, 25/10/1917.

2 On October 29, the Empire
Ottoman surrendered to the Allies. On
October 30, the armistice of Mudros was signed by Great Britain and
Turkey, ending hostilities between two nations. The agreement was
signed at 9: 40 pm and was to become effective at noon October 31. The
Ottoman Empire surrendered all garrisons in HiJaz, 'Asir, Yaman, Syria
and Mesopotamia to the local Allied Commanders. Cf. Menaham Mansoor,
op. cit., p. October 1918.
325
other obligations towards the Porte and vice versa. However,
the occupation of Hudaydah compelled the Imdm to remove his
ban on the evacuation of the Ottoman troops. The majority of
the Ottoman military forces accordingly came down to the coast
at Hudaydah and surrendered. Some of the Ottoman military
officers and the greater part of the civil officers, including
Mahmüd Nadim, remained behind.
Militarily, at the withdrawal of the Ottomans from
Yaman, Aden and South West Arabia were now free from
imperial conflicts, but politically, the area was far from quiet
as internal disputes began to rise. The most urgent question
after the departure of the Ottomans from South West Arabia
was the settlement between several chiefs namely the Idrisi,
the Imam and the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla. But as Aden and
South West Arabia was now, politically, under the control of the
Foreign Office, the post-war settlement appeared to represent
the views of the Foreign Office which involved other chiefs in
Arabia rather than the traditional views on Aden from the
perspectives of the Indian Government and the India Office.
For the first time an overall plan for Arabia was put
forward; Aden and South West Arabia was seen as part and
was
parcel of the scheme. The plan, initiated byßa(four, the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, who cabled to Wingate, the British
High Commissioner of Egypt for his views. A number of copies
were also sent to Arbur, General Clayton, Col. Wilson C. E.
(Jiddah), Col. Jacob (liaison officer, Cairo) and Cpt Clayton for
Grey that 1
the same purposes. wrote
1 FO 882/20, Foreign Office to High Commissioner, 14/3/1919.
326
A suggestion has been made to me that owing to the
evacuation of the Turks from south West Arabia a
reconsideration of our general policy towards the
IDRISI and the IMAM has become advisable. The
main arguments advanced in favour of this are: -
While it was to our advantage to encourage the
Arabs to turn to us in preference to the Turks,
there was no reason against our financing lesser
sheikhs and generally following the Turkish example
in order to minimise the 'power of titular
overlordships. The latter are now claiming
independence which makes it questionable whether
it is desirable for us to continue our old policy. The
Imdm, for example, is obviously anxious lest we
should undermine his influence over many sheikhs
whom he considers as his subjects, and has in
consequence shown an inclination to look to other
powers for recognition of his independence. The first
essential in the realisation of a united Arabia,
whether under a single suzerainty or on the federal
plan, is that the largest possible political units
should be consolidated and encouraged. By this it is
not suggested that our present commitments to
smaller sheikhs should be repudiated; but it is
considered that we could safeguard their interests
just as efficiently for the future through the
intermediary of a titular overlord as at present, if
they were given clearly to understand that any
injustice on his part would be regarded as a
legitimate reason for direct representations to us.
This policy should be sufficient to prevent any
titular overlord from looking elsewhere for support.
As regards King Hussein, it is suggested that, if
and when the Idrisi and the Imäm express a
willingness to recognise his nominal suzerainty we
should encourage him to follow our example by using
them as intermediaries in all his dealings with their
subjects; and that we should as far as possible
discourage him from what seems to be his present
policy, i. e. of suborning their underlings by dealing
with them direct. These proposals are
interdependent since we could not well discourage
King Hussein from interfering unless we ourselves
were recognised as the supporter of the Idrisi and
the Imäm.
The proposal of the Foreign Office, namely the overall plan
for Arabia, was vigorously accepted but with precaution not
only in Egypt but also in Aden. Major Cornwallis, Director of the
Arab Bureau stated that he agreed with the principle to
consolidate as many units as possible under one head. He,
however, doubted the outcome of the plan as the question of the
327
nominal suzerainty of the King Husayn over the Imdm and the
IdrIsl seemed to be a difficult one. The issue depended entirely
on the willingness of the Imdm and the Idris! to recognise King
Husayn as suzerain. He suggested that British best policy would
be, first, to treat Arabia as a number of federated states,
second, to make agreements with the different princes such as
Ibn Sa'tid, the Imdm and the Idrlsl but not with any lesser
units or persons, and finally to encourage and assist the
pilgrimage in every way so as to enhance King Husayn's position
as Grand Sharif of the Holy Places. 1
The proposal of the Foreign Office was also agreed by Col.
Cyril Edward Wilson. 2 He that the British

pointed out assuming
were given a mandate for Arabia, the only possible way of
achieving a united Arabia was for the British to introduce a
charter of autonomy for each state. To begin this move, he
suggested sending Amir Àbdu'Lläh son of Husayn of the Hijäz to
see the Idrisl, and to ask the Imam or his deputy to meet the
Amlr to discuss the charter and boundaries of Àsir and Yaman.
The Amir would be accompanied by a British officer who would
use his influence on behalf of the British to induce the Imam
and the Idris! to recognise King Husayn's suzerainty on the
British 3
guarantee of their charter of autonomy.
Stewart, the Resident at Aden too agreed with the overall
plan for Arabia and the general policy towards the IdrIsl and
the Imam. But he also had his own plan. He suggested the first
act should be to determine the spheres of the IdrIsI in
I FO 882/20, Director of Arab Bureau to High Commissioner 29/3/1919.

,
2 Wilson was a British military and political representative in the
Hijaz (July 1916- December 1919)
3 FO 882/20, Clayton to High Commissioner, 30/3/1919.
328
accordance with the promise given by Britain, then those of the
Imam, King Husayn and Ibn Sa`üd. When this process of
delimitation was completed he suggested cautiously encouraging
the recognition of the nominal suzerainty of King Husayn by the
Idrisi the Imäm. 1

and
Brigadier General Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (1917-1919), 2 with the

also agreed
policy line indicated by the Foreign Office. He suggested that
Britain should obtain control of Arabia in order to carry out the
policy of the confederation of States. He also suggested making
an agreement with the Imdm in accordance with a draft
prepared by Jacob. Agreements with other rulers should be
made through a special commission with its headquarters
in Cairo. 3
Sir Reginald Wingate, the British High Commissioner in
Egypt, after obtaining the views of the officials in Egypt, Hijäz
and Aden, replied to the Foreign Office stating that he concurred
entirely with the Foreign Office's proposal, namely in regard to
the Idrisi and the Imdm. In relation to overall plan for Arabia,
he commented that "If we get the mandate for Arabia, Hejaz,
Asir, Nejd and Yemen should each be defined so as to include all
areas as its titular overlords could effectively control in any
way. Our hold in each case would be a subsidy. "4 Wingate
believed that no other satisfactory solution was possible under
1 FO 882/20, Resident to High Commissioner, 30/3/1919.

2 G. Clayton was a Director of intelligence in Cairo in 1914. When the
war broke out he was appointed director of military intelligence at
headquarters in Cairo. Owing to his knowledge of the Arab politics he
was in a position to assist the Arab revolt against the Turks, and by
creating the Arab Bureau in Cairo to guide the course of revolt
throughout the war. In: 1917 he was promoted Brigadier General, and
became chief political officer with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in
Palestine.
3 FO 882/20, Clayton to High Commissioner, 4/4/1919.
4 FO 882/20, High Commissioner to Foreign Office, 7/4/1919.
329
those conditions, but he emphasised on how to take effect. "At
the moment the most urgent need from every standpoint is
definition of boundaries. The respective claims of Ibn Saud,
Imam, Idrisi and King Hussein are still quite incompatible and
while the future of such places as Khurma, Loheiya and
Kunfida, for instance remains uncertain "1 He, therefore,

...
considered the following stages should be taken:
We ought, first to formulate a treaty with the

Imam, definitely omitting all frontier questions...
This no point, I think, in sending Colonel Jacob to
interview him until we have decided on our policy.
His views are already well known to us. Further,
until we recognise his position as on a par with that
of the other chiefs, by a definite guarded recognition
of his general rule over Yemen, he will continue to
distrust us and to turn also to other powers. A
treaty which is in the course of being drafted here,
will be wired to you very soon for approval. From
the point of view of Arabian politics it would be
advantageous if it could be ratified and come into
force provisionally pending the results of Peace
Conference. I suggest if and when the Peace
Conference gives us the mandate for Arabia, we
should appoint a frontier commission in order to
afford the overlords concerned a chance of stating
their cases either througha representative or in
2
person.
When this was completed, Wingate suggested moving to establish
the suzerainty of King Husayn. Meanwhile a proposed treaty
with the Imam was drafted by Jacob and it was sent by
Wingate to Stewart, the Resident) for his perusal. 3
1 FO 882/20, High Commissioner to Foreign Office, 7/4/1919.

2 Ibid.
3 Draft terms of the proposed treaty with the ImAm are as follows: -
HM Government [undertake]
reaffirm willingness to ensue ImAm's Independence throughout

-to
Yemen without prejudices to present British proteges.
- to deal with him only within Yemen provided his rule is just.
- to prevent import of liquor and harmful drugs.
- to allow Yemen free trade by sea as soon as military exigencies
permit.
- to have all harbour and railway concessions.
- not to be liable for continuance of old Turkish stipends nor for
settlement of Turkish debts.
330
On receiving counter proposal from Egypt, the Foreign
Office agreed that it was now urgent and important to make a
treaty with the Imäm before the Peace Conference in Paris as
the British position would be stronger if a treaty already
existed. It should be observed that British mission to the Imäm
became a key factor in the opinion of the Foreign Office in
adopting the overall plan for the post-war settlement in Arabia.
The Foreign office instructed the High Commissioner to open
negotiations.
You should therefore without delay dispatch Colonel

Jacob to open preliminary discussions. He should
explain to the Imam that His Majesty's Government
do not intend to interfere in internal matters but
are anxious to see the separation and discord in
Arabia superseded by principles of cohesion and co-
operation. They realise that this policy can be
successful only if it has the goodwill of the
autonomous rulers of Arabia through whom they
propose alone to deal. Excluding the Aden
Protectorate, the autonomous rulers in question are
King Hussein, Imam himself, Ibn Saud, Sultan Shehr
Mokalla and the Idrisi who has late earned for
himself by his assistance during the war to the
allied cause a position which His Majesty's
Government propose to recognise.
The Imam [undertakes]

- to guarantee religious freedom of all his subjects.
- to correspond with British Government alone.
- not to code sell or mortgage any part of Yemen to other power
or people.
- to forbid all import of arms, applying in case of need to HM
Government.
to have no foreigners in his service without HM Government's
-
consent.
- to put question of frontiers in hands of commission at which all
concerned will be represented.
Both the Imam and HM Government [undertake]
to have official agents. Imam at Aden. HM Government both at

-
Imam's court and stich other ports as they deem necessary.
- to arrange that goods for Imam's personal use and for British
Government be allownt reciprocally to pass customs free of duty.
- Finally HM Government to pay Imam a subsidy to enable him to
carry out his obligations.
Cf. FO 882/20, High Commissioner to Resident, 9/4/1919.
331
With a view to establishing permanent
friendly relations between these rulers His Majestyis
Government have decided to invite them to conclude
simultaneous treaties. By these they will all of them
mutually recognise independence of the others and
undertake to submit all questions of boundaries
other causes of dispute to British arbitration in the
first place.
As regards the relations between King Hussein
and the other overlords Colonel Jacob should also
sound the Imam making it clear that in no case will
His Majesty's Government support any claim of one
autonomous ruler except with the concurrence and
at the desire of both parties. At present nothing
should be said on the question of relations with
other powers. Colonel Jacob, if the point is raised,
should take the line that it is clearly desirable in the
best interests of Arabs themselves that they should
accept the same referee and that these is no question
of any other power claiming the traditional position
of His Majesty's Government as friend and protector
of the Arabs so far as he is aware.
After the establishment of his satisfactory
relations on the above lines he may proceed to a
guarded discussion of boundaries professing himself
ready to do what he can to support the Imams claims
but stating that he can make no definite
pronouncement because he is not authorised to do
so. 1
With the above message Jacob left for San`d' but because
of fear felt by the Quhrah tribe, that is,, <it was intended to
hand over the whole southern Tihämah to the ImAm, he was
arrested at Bdjil. This event left the question of Imamic-British
relations unsettled for a number of years to come.
1 FO 882/20, Foreign Office to High Commissioner, 24/5/1919.
332
Conclusion
It is a difficult task to be able to measure the importance
of South West Arabia to the Ottomans and the British prior to

'Tb-
and during World War 1. early history of imperial expansion in
A
was
the area which followed by constant conflicts and involved a
considerable amount of diplomacy and intrigues with the natives
may suggest that South West Arabia was considered as equally
as important to the other areas within the Empire. It may be
observed, however, that from the beginning of the 20th century,
South West Arabia was considered something of a backwater
notably by the British. This was initially prompted by the non-
intervention policy of 1906 which can be interpreted as a
reverse to the previous forward policy, reviving therefore the
traditional function of only Aden, and so eliminating the
competition for supremacy in the hinterland. The Ottomans too
abandoned their fighting for complete dominance in the country
after they recognised the autonomy of the Zaydi Imam in
Yaman in 1911. Attempts were also made to settle with the
Idrisi.
It may also be observed that during the war, the position
of South West Arabia to these powers in relation to other war
theatres remained practically the same as before the war.
Gavin concludes that as Aden had become a rearguard position
in time of peace it was not likely that it would become a spear-
head in time of war.
Indeed the main concern of both British and Turks

appears to have been to use South West Arabia to
draw enemy forces away from the really vital
theatres of operations. The war was fought out
there with little more than the peace-time
333
establishments on either side. It was a war in
which each side sought to mobilise the largest
possible support from the local Arab population
against its adversary. 1
It may also be observed that during those years of
rivalries, the British and the Ottomans experienced somewhat
similar difficulties in dealing with the people of the Yarnan and
the Protectorate respectively. Initially, the British and the
Ottomans were in desperate need of a permanent settlement
within their respective spheres of influence, for political as well
as economic reasons. The Ottomans had earlier experienced
difficulty in governing the Yaman which resulted in their
withdrawal from the area in the 1630s in the face of the
opposition by the Zaydi Imdm of Sa'dah. They reappeared in
1849 in the Tihdmah and their attempts to settle in the
highlands failed, although with the co-operation of the Zaydi
Imäm, al-Mutawakkil Muhammad b. Yahyd, and not until 1872
did they succeed in occupying San`ä'. However after 1891, a
series of revolts led by the Zaydl ImAms broke out. In 1905
Imäm Yahyä led a massive revolt which succeeded in capturing
San'd'. Three months later, the Ottomans were able to repulse
the rebels and pushed them back to their strongholds in
Shahdrah. Various attempts were made to capture these
positions but they failed. These attempts were followed by a
series of diplomatic missions which were sent to the Yaman to
try and to establish a settlement with the Imam. But in 1911
another revolt took place. Though the rebels failed to capture
San'd', the Imam was, as in the past, capable of striking back
334
at any time, and coupled with the new threat of the Italians in
Tripoli, compelled a new Commander-in-Chief, Ìzzat Pasha to
come to terms with the Imdm in 1911 in the treaty of Da`än.
The treaty which was ratified in 1913 indicated an obvious
need for a settlement and a need to appreciate the presence of
local leaders and to recognise their autonomy.
Interestingly, the British in South West Arabia were
also facing a similar problem of dealing with the tribes, but no
serious attempts were initiated to expel the British from the
area. Historically from 1839 to 1870s British policy had been one
of non-intervention in tribal affairs. The only relations which
existed following the occupation of Aden were in the form of
friendship treaties. This policy apparently sufficed for the
security of Aden and the sea route to India and the East. The
rulers of the neighbouring tribes had been independent of the
Ottomans then the Imäm since the early 18th century.
However, when the tribes were threatened by the presence of
the Ottomans in 1872, they began to seek foreign assistance
notably from the British at Aden and subsequently a forward,
interventionist, policy in tribal affairs was put into effect.
The intervention policy later proved costly and led to
military commitments which diverted attention from the
traditional function of Aden as a coaling station on the route to
Suez. The argument against intervention won the day when the
Liberals came to power in 1905. On May 4,1906 the new
Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, reversed the policy
which had been carried out since the 1870s.

of expansion
335
9
It may be observed that both the Ottomans and the British
faced continuous difficulties in dealing directly with the tribes
and therefore used intermediaries. They were the Imdm in the
Yaman and the Sultan of Lahej in the Protectorate. Unexpectedly
to the Ottomans, Islam did not operate to their advantage.
Instead Islam remained a yardstick used by the Yamanis to
observe and judge unfavourably the practice of the Ottomans.
Besides, the Imam was still a recognised figure in the political
structure of Yamani society as he had always been in the past.
The treaty of Da`än stood as a compromise between the political
needs of the Zaydls and their Imam on one hand, and the
interests of the Ottomans in the Yaman on the other. This
solution proved successful throughout the remaining years of
the Ottomans in the Yaman. But the Shäfiìs in the Yaman
were a different story altogether. Although the Shafi'I tribes
had in the past been subject to the ZaydI Imäm, the treaty of
Da'än did not bring any changes to them. The Ottoman
administration in the area remained intact, mainly because the
Shafi'l tribes were no longer under the Imäm, and further,
they were not united under one particular leader. The Ottoman
failure to come to terms with a new Shäfi'I leader in 'AsIr,
Sayyid Muhammad Idrisl, resulted in constant opposition to
the Ottomans.
The Protectorate tribes, mainly Shafi'Is, were in a similar
condition to their fellow Yamanis as they were numerous and
were not united. During the interventionist policy, the British
did not make any attempt to bring changes to the tribal
structure as they were able to control these tribes individually.
However when the non-intervention policy came into force, it
336
restricted the British interference in tribal affairs, and the
use of an intermediary was an answer. The Sultanate of Lahej
was soon promoted to be the leading British intermediary with
the tribes, mainly due to the stability of the influence of the
Àbdall Sultanate in Lahej, and the past role of the Sultans in
dealing with the tribes, notably that of the Subayhis and the
Hawshabls. This policy remained in practice during and after
the war.
I
During the war similarity faced by the Ottomans and the
British continued to be the case. This can be envisaged by the
fact that neither the British nor the Ottomans were able to
make any serious military attempt to rid the other party of the
area. The British, most likely hindered by insufficient troops,
adopted their usual method of inciting the Arabs notably the
YamanIs to take initiative themselves to fight the Ottomans
through promising their independence at a treaty and offering
financial and military assistance. The measures proved to be
successful in winning over the Yamanl chiefs notably the IdrlsI
and the Mäwiyah Shaykh. Attempts were also made to win
over the Imam but failed. On the contrary no offensive measure
was taken to regain their former control of the Protectorate.
The Ottomans too endeavoured to extend their control in
the Protectorate. Their occupation of Lahej served at their
advantage in winning over the Arab chiefs in the British
Protectorate. But no attempt was made either by themselves or
with the co-operation of the Protectorate tribes to besiege the
British at Aden. Instead, similar to the British, the Ottomans
attempted to conclude treaties with the chiefs, promising their
future independence from the British after the war.
337
Most of the Arab chiefs and the tribesmen in the Yaman
and the Protectorate adopted practically the same line as they
did before the war except those under the threat of the
Ottomans in the Yaman and at Lahej. It is not surprising
therefore that the Idris! sought assistance from the British
immediately after the outbreak of war. But the initiative made
by the Mdwiyah Shaykh to enter an alliance with the
Àbdall Sultan against his former master the Ottomans was a
unique and an interesting event. Presumably being located on
the border of the Protectorate and being himself was

neighbouring
a ShäfiÌ, prompted the Mäwiyah Shaykh to acquire British
favour and assistance. At the same time he hoped to gain his
independence from the Ottomans and henceforth from the Zaydl
Imam presumably if the latter was given a mandate in the
Yaman after the war as a reward for his loyalty. Most of the
a
Zaydl chiefs and tribesmen adopteddstance which appeared
to be in conformity with the tribal patterns and practices. The
establishment of the confederation of Häshid and BakIl in the
later period of the war against the Imam was a common
response of a typical tribal resentment, being partly motivated
for material gains. As to the principal chiefs of the Protectorate,
namely the 'Abdall and the QuàytI Sultans, they adopted a
policy which appeared politically to suit their own interests.
The ÀbdalI Sultan who remained at Aden throughout the war
continued to be a mediator between the British and the
Protectorate tribes, and frequently his views were sought by
the Resident. The Àbdali was quick to respond to an alliance
with the Mdwiyah Shaykh as this would undoubtedly expand
his sphere of influence further into the ShäfiÌ country in the
338
Yaman. On the contrary he consistently voiced his opposition on
the proposed Imamic-British treaty which he believed
would unquestionably damage the position he enjoyed among the
tribes in South West Arabia. The Quàyti, likewise, gained more
influence in the Hadramawt after an agreement was concluded
with the Kathiri which ended their prolonged and endless
rivalry.
Finally, in relation to the study of the history of South
West Arabia prior to and during World War 1, a survey of the
literature available on the subject is necessary for comparison
with further interpretations and analysis.
The first chapter is entitled "the Ottomans in the Yaman
and the Treaty of Da`dn". General and detailed coverage on the
area can be found in English as well as in Arabic sources.
Abazah's work, entitled "al-Hukm al-Ùthmjnl fI al-Yaman
1872-1918" is the principal secondary source in Arabic. The work
is generally reliable as he made reference not only the Arabic
literature but also the British archives. In English, J. Baldry
has made a thorough coverage of the subject in his articles: "al-
Yaman and the Turkish occupation 1849-1914", "Imäm Yahyä
and the Yamani uprising of 1904-1907", and "Imärn Yahyä and
the Yamani uprising of 1911". A number of questions, however,
have not been fully dealt with.
Concerning the Ottoman administration, the following
questions remain unanswered. For instance, when exactly was
Yaman as a vilayet included in the operation of the new
Ottoman Provincial Reform Law of 1864 and were the Yamanis

£1
subject to conscription?
i.
339
It has been said that in 1872 the Ottomans successfully
took Sand' from the Zaydi Imdm. Abäzah claims that after the
occupation of San`ä', the 1864 provincial law was extended into
the Yaman almost at the same time as into Arabia, but he does
not give the exact date. S. J. Shaw and R. H. Davison provided
only a clue when they. excluded the Arabian Peninsula and
Yaman from the operation of the new law at least until the end
of 1876. Sdti` al-Husri and Harold Jacob, who both provided
details of the division of the province of the Yaman under the
new law, also did not give the date when the law was extended
into the province of the Yaman. It seems likely that the Yaman
was not administered under the Provincial Reform Law of 1864
until at least after 1876. The delay in the extension of the new
r"
law into the Yaman may obviously be due to its being newly
acquired land. But later evidence, particularly that of the
malpractice of the Ottoman administration in the Yaman,
perhaps suggests a different reason. Not only had the Yaman
never been a high priority in the eyes of the Ottoman
Government, but it had also been a home for out of favour
Ottoman civil and army officials. Accordingly maladministration
became rampant but no serious action was taken until the
survival of the Ottomans was under threat. The introduction of
the new law in the Yaman, which was initially delayed, did
therefore, in its purpose of effecting a substantial }

not, succeed
improvement in the administration.
Concerning the Imperial army, the Yamanis were
exempted from conscription, but they were recruited for the
Gendarmerie as volunteers sometime after 1878. In 1899,
however, rumours about the conscription of the YamanIs spread
340
in the vilayet, but this intention was apparently denied by the
Minister of War. The Yamanis were, therefore, never
conscripted for the Imperial army. It is not clear why the
Yamanis were exempted from compulsory military service. The
Ottoman Government stipulated that every Muslim citizen in the
Empire was subjected to military conscription except those who
inhabited Istanbul and Arabia and those related to certain tribal
populations such as the Albanians and the Kurds. The YamanIs
were perhaps included into the first category.
There are questions on the Zaydi Imäm which remain
unanswered. For instance, what was the position of the Imdms
before and after the ottoman occupation of San'd'? Why did the
Imäm revolt against the Ottomans? Was the revolt was solely
due to the maladministration of the Ottomans or was it due to a
religious dispute as well?
Evidence for the independence of the Zaydi Imdms in the
Yaman before the Ottoman occupation of San'ä' in 1872 is
mentioned in Arabic as well as in English sources. Accounts of
the role and position of the Imdms after 1872 can hardly be
found in English sources. Baldry could not provide this
information as the British official at Hudaydah, G. A.
Richardson, did not report the temporal position and role of the
Imams under the Ottomans. The Arabic sources, such as al-
ÀgIli, quoted by Abäzah, described the Imams and their family
as being paid by the Ottomans and prevented from collecting
taxes. The Ottomans even restricted the role of the Imams in
mediating with the tribesmen. The Imams were described as no
more than local religious leaders. The Imams were therefore
demoted to the status of local shaykhs or ùlamä' who still had
341
ä
some authority, notably on local religious affairs, but had no
power to adjudicate disputes among the people formerly under
their authority. The limiting of the influence of the Imdms to a
position similar to that of local shaykhs or ùlamd', as opposed
to their previous position, apparently emerged as one of the
main reasons why the Imams revolted against the Ottomans.
This revolt may also have been influenced by Zaydi doctrine
which always inspired revolt against unlslamic, unjust or evil
rule. The traditional claims of the Imams over the Yaman may
also have influenced their attitude. Baldry as well as Abäzah,
however, argued that the real reason was the malpractice of
the Ottoman officials. This reason, however, appeared to be only
one factor which led to the uprising of the Yamanis. After the
treaty of Da`dn, the Zaydi Imam no longer complained about the
malpractice of the officials, that is to say after he was granted
authority in the Yaman highlands, home of the Zayd1s, the
Imam did not proceed with any demands for more territory in
the Yaman inhabited by the Shdfl'Is or complain of their
treatment by Ottoman officials. The Ottoman refusal to
recognise the authority of the Imams in the Yaman highlands,
home of the Zaydis was, therefore, a key issue which drove
them to fight the Ottomans. But the basis of the authority of the
Imams rested on the co-operation of the tribes, the principal
shaykhs and the ùlamä'.
The treaty of Da`än has appeared in a number of versions
and requires a small comment. al-WdsiÌ's work "Tärikh al- t,,
Yaman" is apparently the only Arabic source which contains the
treaty, and most of the secondary works in Arabic on the
subject did no go beyond referring to al-WAsi'I. Though he did
342
not mention the location the treaty to which he referred, al-
WdsiÌ had presumably seen it himself. Baldry, however,
referred to document in the Arab Bureau in Cairo. It is not clear
how a copy of the treaty was acquired by the Arab Bureau
which was formed later in 1916, three years after the treaty
was ratified. It is most probabl that the Arab Bureau and al-
WäsiÌ might have referred to the same source as their two
versions appear almost identical though they differ in a few
small details. Another version is available in the Aden Residency
Records which was apparently referred to by Jacob in his book
"Kings of Arabia" as his text was identical with that of the Aden
Residency. This version of the treaty was sent to Aden by an
Arab shaykh and was accordingly translated into English. The
Arabic version is, unfortunately, not available in the Aden
Residency Records. In addition to the above three versions,
Richardson provided his own account of the treaty, but most of
the elements mentioned in his account did not appear in any
version. However, Richardson's account is valuable as he
provided details of the settlement between the Imäm and the
Ottomans. This settlement includes the Imdm's renunciation of
his claim to the Caliphate, and therefore to the title of Amlr al-
Mu'minin, retaining only the title of Imam of Zaydls. It also
includes details of the subsidy to the Imam and the principal
shaykhs, and release of hostages, which are not available in
any other version, but appear to be a fact frequently referred
to by the Aden, Residency, notably that part which related to the
Imam's subsidy, throughout their dealing with the Imam during
the First World War. In the absence of any available Ottoman
version of the settlement, the version in the Aden Residency
343
Records is probably the most authentic. Not only does the
version have more details than the other two, but Jacob, who
had intimate knowledge of the area, relied exclusively on the
third version.
Another question concerns the relationship between the
Imam and the Aden Protectorate tribes following the treaty of
Da'an. The matter is very unclear, and Some questions remain
unanswered for instance whether the Zaydi Imam really
attempted to extend his sphere of influence into the British
protected country between the treaty of Da`dn and the outbreak
of the First World War.
It was a fact that the Imam made considerable attempts
to persuade those neighbouring tribes to support him against the
Ottomans during his campaigns to fight the latter between 1904
to 1911. But after he had made a reconciliation with the
Ottomans in 1911, he obviously was no longer threatened by
them. The Imam's relations with the Protectorate tribes
appeared to be ambiguous as he was given only autonomy in the
Zaydi territory and furthermore his autonomy was subject to
the administration of the central government. Works on the
subject are few. Gavin mentioned the Imam's relations with the
tribes and was convinced that the Imam continued his intrigues
with the tribes even after the treaty of Da`än in 1911. The Aden
Residency Records provide most of the information on the
subject, notably in form of letters they received from the
protectorate tribes particularly the Ydfi`ls. The Aden Residency
was at the beginning inclined to believe that the Imam really
continued his intrigues with the stipendiary chiefs after the
treaty of Da`än in an attempt to extend his influence over the
344
Protectorate territory. This belief drove the Residency to
.
I- communicate with the Ottoman Governor-General, Mahmtid
Nadim Pasha, with the approval of the Foreign Office. In reply,
Mahmüd Nadlm denied any intrigues made by the Imam.
Prompted by the reply, Jacob examined the alleged letters of the
Imam sent to the Residency by the Ydfiìs, and discovered that
alterations had been made to the letters. He concluded that these
alterations were purposely made. by the Ydfiìs themselves to
create a situation where they could press the British for more
assistance in presents, arms and money. There is no certain
evidence therefore that the Imäm continued his intrigues with
the stipendiary tribes in his efforts to extend his authority
and influence in the Protectorate.
Normal relations between the Imäm and the tribes of the
Protectorate, however, continued to exist with tribes other than
the stipendiary Ydfiìs. These relations were not initiated by the
Imdm but by the tribes themselves such as the AmirI, the

the.
Àlawl, /Qddi of Bayhän and a number of non-stipendiary
shaykhs of the Protectorate for various reasons, and the Imam
lost no time in grabbing the opportunity. In another case a
former Ottoman shaykh in Jabal Jihdf in the AmIrI territory
invited the Zaydis into the place. The Imam's relations with
these tribes was therefore initiated by themselves. It should be
remembered that the tribes across the border had relations
among themselves for years before the new border came into
being. The new boundary introduced by foreign powers did not
stop them from continuing their former practice of
communicating between tribes and even settling disputes
through mediators from outside, such as the Sayyids. On a
345
number of occasions the tribes invited the Ottomans and the
Zaydls or the Imam as mediators to settle tribal disputes. On
the whole affairs in the Aden hinterland were increasingly
remote from the Residency especially after the withdrawal of
the British Political Officer from Däli`. The Residency had
therefore no reliable information about Imamic affairs in

-
the hinterland. In 1914, the Resident, Bell, stated that he was
uncertain about the Imdm's intrigues and he did not believe that
the Imam had at that time any leisure to move towards or in
the Protectorate, but he did not deny the possibility that the
Imam's agents were busy on all sides.
Chapter two is entitled "British Policy in the Aden
Protectorate before World War I". General and detailed works on

4
the subject are mostly available in English andifew in Arabic.
The works of Bidwell, Gavin and Large are worth mentioning
here, and in Arabic, Abäzah's work is valuable. Large provided
detailed coverage on the development of the policy of
intervention in his Ph. D thesis from 1870s to 1905 where he
ended his scope of study. A number of aspects pertaining to the
subsequent policy of non-intervention have not been dealt
in similar detail. Both Bidwell and Gavin describe the policy

with
of non-intervention, but several aspects require to be further
examined: Morley's dispatch setting out the non-intervention
policy, the discussion on the new policy in Aden, Bombay, Simla
and London, and the effect of the new policy on the tribes, the
Ottomans and the Imdm.
First, it must not be supposed that after the occupation of
Aden in January 1839, British policy was one of intervention in
Aden hinterland affairs, though a number of treaties of
346
friendship were made with the neighbouring tribes immediately
after the occupation, and coincidentally these tribes later
emerged among the protected chiefs. Second, it was only after
the arrival of the Ottomans in the Yaman in the 1870s that the
proposal was made to bring those nine tribes, which previously
had relations with the British in form of treaty relations or
others, under British protection. The proposal which was made
in 1873 was not initially approved. But after the Ottoman
pressure intensified, the Government of India in 1886 proposed to
establish an affective protectorate over the hinterland, and soon
afterwards protectorate treaties were made. This was the
beginning of the policy of intervention, and was followed by a
number of commitments such as the demarcation of the
boundary with the Ottomans, the introduction of troops and the
establishment of a political officer in Däli`.
The intervention policy came to an end when the Liberals

-she
came to power. It is a fact, as Gavin emphasised, thatAnon-
intervention policy was initiated by W. Lee Warner, a member
of the Indian Council, and it caught the eye of the new
Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, who then formed the
dispatch of May 4,1906. Gavin did not proceed to describe details
of the new policy which was not immediately put into force as
the officials in Aden, Bombay, Simla and London were discussing
any serious or damaging effects which could arise. Apparently
the officials in Aden and Bombay were not inclined to accept the
new policy. The Viceroy initially supported these local views on
the basis of local advantages. It was not until September 12,
1906 that these local views were overruled by London. In
October 5,1906, an explanation was made by London of the
347
disadvantages of local interests in comparison with the imperial
interests.
After September or perhaps October 1906, the policy of
non-intervention was strictly observed by the India Office. The
Aden Residency was in a dilemma, facing political instability in
the Protectorate territory while observing the policy of non-
intervention, and therefore the Residency pressed for active
intervention. The new policy was seen to be difficult to
implement with respect to relations with the Ottoman
authorities in the Yaman. The Aden authorities had, under the
new policy, no discretion to settle boundary disputes, but must
have approval from the India Office and the Foreign Office. The
situation grew worse before the Aden authorities were
authorised to take action, but they were finally authorised to
intervene in hinterland affairs. The situation could have been
avoided if the Aden authorities had been given discretion to
settle locally and further if a British officer and troops were
present in the hinterland to prevent the occurrence of disputes
before they matured. It was also argued that the Aden
Residency was cut off from news of the hinterland except
through agents of the Àbdali Sultdn and Arab news
correspondents in the hinterland. The information provid'd by
them was sometimes unreliable and this situation could have
been avoided if the British officer was present there.
The policy of non-intervention was also seen as making it
difficult to follow new developments in the Yaman especially the
movement of the Imdm in the Yaman and in the north east of
the Protectorate. As a result of the change of policy, the Aden
Residency was authorised to raise with the Ottoman officials
348
matters relating to the Imam. But as the Imam was On good
terms with the Ottomans, his position must have naturally been
protected, and the protected tribes were made to bear all the
blame and they were immediately called to Aden to clarify the
situation, notably on the occasion of the alleged Imamic-Yäfi`l
relations.
Therefore, throughout the years 1906-1914, the Aden
Residency opposed the policy of non-intervention and sought to
modify it. At the beginning of the policy, the Governor General,
Minto, supported the opposition of the local officials, but
subsequently he accepted the change and his successor, Hardinge
was cautious in seeking any modification. While Morley was at
the India Office there was no breach of the policy. His
successor, Crewe, uphold the policy of non-intervention in
principle but was more willing to tolerate minor exceptions,
notably in the episode of the treaties with Baydä and the
Àwdhali in 1911. The political secretaries in India and London,
McMahon and Hirtzel respectively, were also inclined to accept
minor modifications and supported the initiative to conclude
fresh treaties with the Sultans of Baydä and 'Awdhall.
The damaging effect of the policy of non-intervention was,
according to local officials, considerable. The withdrawal of the
troops indirectly encouraged the Ottomans and the ImAm alike
to extend their influence into the Protectorate. The advance of
the Ottomans into Lahej in 1915 was seen as a direct result of
the policy of non-intervention. The policy had changed the role
of the Àbdali Sultan and after the new policy was put into
effect, the Aden Residency relied mostly on him as mediator
between the government and the tribes and also as a British
349
informant. This policy undoubtedly increased the influence of
the Àbdall Sultan in the Protectorate. The dependence on the
Àbdall, who had his own interests to consider, had an injurious
effect on the British position with other tribes. The policy which
loosened ties with those tribes encouraged them to look towards
the Imam and the Ottomans for assistance in settling tribal
matters. This circumstance had a damaging effect to the British
prestige in the Protectorate before and during the war.
The third chapter is entitled "the Ottoman occupation of
Lahej in 1915". The general and detailed works on the area are
mainly in English. Al-Àbdall was the single source in Arabic
who had an intimate knowledge on the period. Abazah
frequently referred to al-Àbdall on matters relating to Aden
and Lahej. In English, the works by Peterson, Baldry, Bidwell
and Gavin are worth mentioning here. A number of questions
still have to be answered and a few points require more
accurate information. For instance, what was the strength of
the British and the Ottomans in Aden and Yaman respectively?
Reference to accounts of the first operation at Shaykh Sa'Id are
still questionable. Why did the Ottomans occupy the Protectorate
or Lahej and not Aden?
It is difficult to ascertain the exact strength of the Ottoman
forces in the Yaman at the beginning of the war. A number of
varied estimates was initially provided. It was not until the
Ottomans moved into the Protectorate, i. e. after more than six
months, that reliable information on their strength was
available. In July 1915 Bradshaw provided an estimate of 15,000
Ottomans, probably the most accurate. This estimate was
apparently referred to by Jacob as he provided an identical
350
estimate to that of Bradshaw. It appeared that the Ottoman
forces in the Yaman did not undergo changes at the beginning of
the war. There were no further reports of reinforcements sent
to Yaman.
Meanwhile the strength of the British forces at Aden did
not undergo much change either. Reinforcements to Aden were
not immediately sent when the war broke out as suggested by
Gavin and Bidwell. It is a fact that one Battalion, the
Brecknockshire Battalion of the South Wales Borderers, was sent
to Aden in November 1914 and arrived in December that year,
but this could not be considered as reinforcements as the
Battalion was sent to release the existing Battalion, the
Lancashire Fusiliers, at Aden. The 23rd Sikh Pioneers was,
however, sent from India to Aden in November 1914, but it was
far from adequate for the protection of the Protectorate area as
the Indian troops were raised to only 1974 men. Together with
the British troops, the total strength of the Aden Brigade was a
little over 3,000 by December 1914 in contrast with 15,000
Ottomans.
The operation at Shaykh SaÌd requires a second look.
Baldry and Bidwell were of opinion that the action was taken on
a decision from London, and Aden was not consulted. Reference
to various offices in London and elsewhere is needed to ascertain
this event. First, the Political Department at the India Office,
London. The Department did not record any minutes or
discussions on the proposed action at Shaykh SaÌd prior to the
operation. It looks as if the India Office was not officially
consulted. A reference to the Viceroy's papers is therefore
essential. The Private Papers of Hardinge contain some
351
information on the operation but it is inadequate. In a private
letter dated November 5 to Crewe, Hardinge states that the
operation would be made at Shaykh Said to crush the Ottoman
fort there. Hardinge's Papers unfortunately contain no further
information about whether the operation was approved or not.
The War Diaries of the Government of India, on the other hand,
contain full information about the plans at Shaykh Said. From
the War Diaries, it appears that discussions on the proposed
plans at Shaykh SaÌd had taken place between the Viceroy,
Hardinge, the Resident at Aden, Bell, Brigadier General Cox, who
was in command of the operation, and Rear-Admiral Pierse, the
Commander-in-Chief of East Indies. On November 4 Cox received
orders from the Chief of the General Staff in India, and on
November 6 he left for Aden to pick up Bradshaw. On November
8, the Duke of Edinburgh and other ships left for Aden. The War
Diaries, therefore, indicate that the plans were initiated by the
Viceroy, and he further instructed the Resident to keep the
plans secret at Aden except for communication with Bradshaw
whose co-operation in the execution of the operation was
needed. The Viceroy communicated with the Rear-Admiral in
order to-obtained the co-operation of the Duke of Edinburgh to
escort and assist the operation on its way to Egypt. Records of
the Admiralty finally provide a complete account of the action
at Shaykh Sa'Id. From minutes and notes at the Admiralty the
action at Shaykh Sa'Id was apparently taken without approval
from London, notably from the Admiralty. The Admiralty was
not even informed about the proposed operation, and initially
believed after the action had taken place that the operation was
352
carried out at the instance of the Resident at Aden. This was
obviously incorrect.
f
Concerning the Ottoman plans in South West Arabia, it- has
been argued that the Ottomans really aimed at taking Aden from
the British. This conclusion was supported by the movement of
the Ottomans towards Aden after the fall of Lahej as they went
on to occupy Shaykh Ùthmän, only a few miles from Aden.
Attempts were also made to attack Perim and the Suez Canal
which could be explained as part of an overall plan to control
the Red Sea, and therefore pave the way for occupying Aden and
Egypt. In the absence of Ottoman sources for the war period,
this conclusion may probably stand, especially at the beginning
of the war when the movements towards the Suez Canal and
Perim were made at the same time. This action was followed by
the movement of the Ottoman forces onland towards the
Protectorate and the occupation of Däli`. But after the failure to
capture Suez Canal and Perim, the overall plan if it existed in
the form described might have been changed. The forces in the
Yaman were probably better to be prepared for use against
more immediate enemies- the Idrisi in Àsir and the British at
Aden. Meanwhile the survival of the Ottoman forces was
further threatened as supplies to the Yaman from the Red Sea
had been blocked since the early days of the war. All these
factors may have altered the plan of the Ottomans. Although an
attempt to capture Perim was again made at the same time as
the movement towards the Protectorate in June 1915, it was
apparently intended not to take control of the Red Sea but only
to divert the attention of the British from the main Ottoman
movements towards Lahej. The Ottoman's main concern at this
353
point was how to survive in the Yaman. At an interview after
the war, Sa'Id Pasha revealed that he did not want to put the
burden of providing supplies for his forces on the YamanIs,
hoping to avoid any opposition from them, but to put the burden
on the people of the Protectorate. He further admitted that he
knew the British had control of the Sea and he therefore did not
plan to capture Aden as the British were able to recapture it at
any time. He also admitted that because of that reason he
delayed his movements against Shaykh Sa'Id. Lahej was
therefore the main aim of Sa`Yd Pasha as he knew that at Lahej
his forces would adequately be supplied.
Chapter four is entitled "The Aden Protectorate during the
war". Generally speaking the above topic has not been
thoroughly discussed perhaps due to the lack of material. The
main source used in the thesis is the Aden Residency Records,
notably the Aden Weekly Letters and the individual files
concerning the tribes. Unfortunately the Arabic Department
which naturally dealt with the tribes did not keep record of the
political affairs of the tribes, but only material relating to
entertainment and subsidies of the tribes. The coverage
therefore did not extend to the latter period of the war as there
was no entertainment to be made. Apart from scattered
information from the Aden Residency Records, Jacob also
provided a summary of the episode in his book and admitted
that the detailed story of the tribes during the war would
require a sizeable volume
It can be summed up that at the beginning of the war, all
the Protectorate chiefs were loyal to the British, most probably
because they continued to be given stipends. But when
354
their stipends were stopped following their co-operation with
the Ottomans, they turned to the Ottomans in order to receive
new stipends. However in the cases of less powerful chiefs or
chiefs who had numerous tribes to control, they were
apparently forced to join the Ottoman camp not only for
material advantages i. e. stipends but also for their survival,
notably the Amir of Däli` and the FadlI Sultan.

with.
The first chief who sided/I the Ottomans was the Amir of
Däli`. Mackawee who maintained good relations with Wingate,
provided useful information to the Residency. But in the case of
the Amir of Däli` his information was apparently unreliable
when he reported to Wingate that the AmIr was rejected by his
tribes. He obviously gained his information from one of the
Amir's brothers who came down to Aden claiming that he had
been appointed as a new Amlr. The Residency awaited further
confirmation of the news, but inclined not to believe him as he
did not provide any relevant documents. Later evidence
confirmed that the Amlr was under force majeure to side the
Ottomans when he knew that British assistance would not be
sent to him. As time went by he became an active supporter of
the Ottomans, notably from early 1916 onwards. A1-ÀbdalI in
his book "Hadlyat al-zaman" did not agree with Jacob who, he
believed, unfairly described the attitude of the Amir in his book
"Kings of Arabia". Al-Àbdall stated that he did not know why
Jacob described the AmIr in such a way as Jacob himself knew
why those chiefs, including the Amir, who had been left for
years under the mercy of the Ottomans, joined and assisted the
Ottomans. If he knew that Jacob had even suggested punishing
the Amir, Nasr bin Shayf, by nominating a new AmIr, al-
355
Àbdali might have been even more convinced that the AmIr had
not justly been treated by Jacob. The reason why Jacob took
such an action maybe because he had himself seen the Amir's
authentic letters ýo his tribesmen in which the AmIr urged them
to support the Ottoman Caliphate against the British
Government. Jacob further knew that the Amir had taken
refuge with the Imam after the war. He therefore thought that
the Amir's attitude to the British was most reprehensible.
Jacob's suggestion of nominating a new chief did not materialise
as the Amlr's brothers, one of whom should have succeeded
him, took no steps towards ousting him. On the contrary, they
interceded on his behalf. At the failure to carry out Jacob's
suggestion, Beatty reviewed the Amir's case and argued that,
though there was no doubt of his disloyalty, the government
should also take into account that his action was prompted by
the failure of the British to protect the Protectorate. His
disloyalty to the British was eventually accepted as being due to
force majeure.
Other chiefs who had thrown in their lots with the
Ottomans at Lahej were the Hawshabl Sultan and the Shaykhs
of the SubayhIs. These chiefs were apparently forced to join the
Ottomans almost at the same time during the course of the
occupation of Lahej. They were followed by other chiefs,
particularly after the fall of Lahej, such as the Fadli Sultan, the
ÀgrabI Shaykh, the Alawi Shaykh, the Qutaybi Shaykh and
some non-stipendiary shaykhs in the Protectorate.
Jacob agreed that most of the chiefs were forced to join the
Ottomans. The Hawshabl Sultan for instance declared that he
was forced to join the Ottoman forces in entering Lahej. This
356
statement was confirmed by Sa'Id Pasha. But because his
relations with the Àbdali had not been cordial since the death of
Sultan Ahmad Fadl, it was. not unnatural that, having been
forced to go to Lahej he found himself only too glad to take over
Lahej lands and enjoy their produce. His conduct was, however,
forgiven after the war. Jacob also agreed the Fadli Sultan was
under duress which led him to join the Ottomans. The Sultan
had less control over some of his tribesmen, notably over Ahl
Haydarah Am Mansur and Mardkishah and this, coupled with
his fear of the Ottoman's threat, compelled him to side with
Said Pasha. Jacob was convinced that the Sultan had been given
a stipend by the Pasha, but suggested that as he was thoroughly
frightened by the Pasha, his action should also be pardoned. His
grandson, Àbd al-Qddir, who was not on good terms with him
and who remained loyal to the British throughout the war, was
nominated to succeed him after his death.
Jacob also considered that the 'Aqrabl, the Qutaybi and
the 'Alawi Shaykhs were compelled to join the Ottomans at
Lahej and their past conduct was therefore pardoned. The
Yäfi'is who generally were not under direct threat from the
Ottomans did not submit their allegiance to Lahej. Some of 44 e.
Upper and Lower Yäfi'Is, however, established relations with
the Ottomans at Lahej, and these must have been from non-
stipendiary Shaykhs as the Ydfi'I country contained numerous
independent clans. One example worth mentioning here is the
Sultan of Upper Yäfi'I. Sultan Qahtän b. 'Umar, who was
deposed by his tribesmen as the Upper Yäfi'I Sultan, continued

4
to receive a stipend from the British. His brother, Salih b.
'Umar, was actually in real control in the Upper Ydfi'I, but was
357
not a stipendiary. In the Hadramawt, the non-stipendiary
Sultan of Kathirl was a considerable nuisance to the British
throughout the war as he and his adviser, Sayyid al-Sagqdf,
were on good terms with the Ottomans at Lahej.
Only a few of the stipendiary chiefs such as the Àwlagi
Shaykh and the QuàytT Sultän did not submit to the Ottomans,
as the Ottoman pressure was less towards the east and the
north east of the Protectorate. But here the influence of the
Imäm increased after the war broke out. A statement made by
Jacob in his book that the majority of the tribes did not join the
Ottomans is, therefore, in contradiction with his earlier notes
contained in a memorandum kept in the Aden Records.
Chapter five is entitled "Imdm Yahyd, the Ottomans and
the British". Few works on Imamic-British relations during the
war have been written in English or in Arabic. Abäzah wrote
on Imamic-British relations between two world wars and
traced back relations from the First World War. Gavin, Bidwell
and Peterson provided useful coverage on the subject
particularly in the early stages of the war. However, a number
of points and questions are left unanswered. For instance did
any relations exist between the Imäm and the British? If so
why did the Imdm eventually open his negotiation with the
British? Were there any stages of negotiations? and what was the
final state of the negotiation at the end of the war?
Almost no detailed discussions are available on the
Imamic-British relations. Some have suggested that because the
Imdm was loyal to the Ottomans he did not even attempt to
negotiate with the British. This view is apparently correct only
at the first stage of the war. The Imdm did not immediately
358
reply to the letter of the Resident as did other Arab chiefs
notably the IdrIsi. The Imam did reply to the Resident's letter
but only at a much later period, and furthermore he expressed
his loyalty to the Ottomans.
The Imdm did not open negotiations with the British until
June 1917. Why did the Imam change his policy? Or did the
Imam really change his policy! There seems no obvious reason
for the Imam's decision to open negotiations. A number of
possibilities have been suggested such as that events in the
Yaman and other war theatres might have influenced him to
change his policy, namely the fall of Baghdad and the
establishment of the confederacy of Häshid and Bakil. At this
stage, the Imam's intention was apparently to discover how far
the British would go to guarantee his interests in the Yaman.
The reason is not uncommon as the Imam and the Ottomans
were mutually dependent on one another for their survival.
Furthermore the Imam did not know what would be the
outcome of the war, and therefore preferred to keep his present
material advantages, while not breaking altogether with the
British, rather than to jeopardise his future by discarding
entirely his Ottoman allies and risking all on the British future
success. However after he found out that the British would not
guarantee all the Yaman including Àsir to him, the Imam, by
December 1917, moderated his demands, notably that for the
removal of he Idrisl from Àsir, and in February 1918 the Imam
suggested placing the Idrlsi under him. The opportunity was
now open for further negotiation. The British agreed to other
demands except those regarding the Arab chiefs who had treaty
notably the Idrisl and the Protectorate chiefs. The Imam in
359
reply accepted in general but included his own clause which
stated that the British should not deal with any of the Yaman
people except through him. Though Stewart did not suggest
further negotiations, Jacob, who was now in Cairo, and Wingate
insisted and suggested inviting the Imam's deputy to conclude a
treaty. Not only the British, but the Imam too now seriously
moved to an agreement as he now dropped his claims over the
tribes of the Protectorate. But this course of action did not
materialise as the armistice intervened.
There is a question too concerning the relations between
the Imam and the tribes. During the war the Imam had
ambitions in the Protectorate. He made several attempts to
extend his authority over the territory through religious appeals
and in the name of the Khalifah, and small scale military
incursions were also made into the territory. On the whole the
Imam failed to achieve his aims. The failure of the Imam in the
Protectorate reflects his general attitude during the war. He
was throughout pro-Ottoman but remained inactive. He did not
share in the triumph of the Ottoman at Lahej against the
British. He probably had his own interests in the Protectorate as
he always laid down his claims over the area. The Imam did
not also seek any direct confrontation with the British. The
Imam was actually in a dilemma, to proceed with his interest
to consolidate his authority over the Protectorate or continue
with a policy of not confronting the British and at the same
time remaining pro-Ottoman. In the light of the uncertain
future he proceeded with the policy of establishing his influence
over the Protectorate, namely in the eastern Aden Protectorate.
His plan failed.
360
The failure of the Imam is, mainly due to his attitude
towards the Ottomans and the British. The Imam furthermore
had relations with the Àbdali Sultan and to some extent he
might have been influenced by the latter. The Imam was not
very serious in realising his ambitions. However after the war
he moved to consolidate his authority over the north east of the
Protectorate perhaps when he believed he had no other course
open to him, the Ottomans had gone and the British, as he saw,
now fully supported the Idrlsl but not him. The weakness of the
Imam's effort was coupled with the lack of Ottoman backing. He
seems to have during the war confined his efforts to regions
away from the Ottoman centre in Lahej. The British
furthermore continued to subsidise the tribes with arms and
ammunition to fight against the invasion of the Imdm. Tribes in
the area were mainly Shäfiìs and as they began to accustom
themselves to living under the British they now perhaps
hesitated to live under the Zaydl ruler. The tribes were also
uncertain what would be the result of the war, and they would
fight only for their present material advantages.
Chapter six is entitled "British Policy and Commitments
during the War". There is a sizeable literature on the First
World War on the involvement of Great Britain in the war. It is
mostly concentrated on British involvement at home, on the
Western and Eastern Fronts, including administration, strategy
and political affairs, British policy and war aims, operations as
well as people at war. This also includes writings on the roles
of the politicians and officials, such as Asquith, Lloyd George,
Lord Kitchener and others.
361
These works cover thoroughly events in the Middle East as
a whole, notably in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt, Persia,
Central and North Arabia i. e. Ibn Sa`üd and Sharif Husayn.
There is, however, less coverage of Aden and South West
Arabia. Moberly provided only a few pages on operations at
Aden. Dane made a more extensive coverage but rather general.
Busch fully treated the operations in South West Arabia but did
not complete the whole episode of the war. Gavin is inclined to
argue that the policy of non-intervention was continued
throughout the war at Aden. Bidwell made a full coverage only
on the operations in Aden. Peterson provided a general sketch of
the involvement of the Arab actors in South West Arabia.
However a number of aspects have not been covered notably the
views of Aden, Bombay, India and then Cairo which formed the
policy adopted by Home Government notably in the Arab Policy,
the military measures and the post-war settlement. In this
chapter an attempt was made to establish a link between
views, policy and operations which were developed throughout
the war and its aftermath.
Gavin made an interesting remark on the role of Jacob
before the war. He concludes that for most of the period up to
the First World War, Aden's policy was very much that of
Major (later Lieut. ) H. F. Jacob. 1 However, British

-Col. policy in
South West Arabia during the war has not been analysed. It is
interesting to note that before the entrance of the Ottomans into
the war, proposals were made by Jacob when he was acting
Resident at Aden to bring the Arabs in South West Arabia,
notably the Idrlsi and the Imam into British camp in a
concerted Arab policy. This view was eventually adopted by the
362
Home Government as Imperial policy to be observed if the
Ottomans joined the war against the British. The successive
Residents at Aden had apparently no previous experience on the
political affairs of South West Arabia. They must have relied on
Jacob on political matters as long as Jacob remained as Assistant
Resident. Jacob was on leave in London in July 1917 when a
move was made to back the confederacy of Häshid and BakIl to
replace the Imam was put forward. Initially, Chamberlain
agreed with the proposal and instructed a plan to go ahead but
apparently after he was advised by Jacob he reversed the plan
and put an end to the policy of supporting the smaller chiefs
against the Imam and then the Ottomans. The Imam remained
in the view of Jacob as a key figure in the political affairs of
South West Arabia. Jacob's argument must have been pretty
strong which could eventually influence the view of the
Secretary of State for India. Stewart was obviously upset with
the result coupled with the knowledge that Jacob was behind
the decision. In his plea for reconsideration, Stewart traced
back the proposal and revealed that it was initially initiated by
Jacob himself, and he as the Resident supported the move. But
as Jacob was away at the time the proposal was made, he did
not apparently agree with his own initiative. Stewart believed
that if Jacob had been present at Aden, he must have agreed
with the move.
At the beginning of the war, when the Arab policy failed
to achieve the aims hoped by Jacob, notably through the
reluctance of the Imäm to co-operate with the British, he moved
363
to propose offensive measures, not only to safeguard the British
protected area but to bring the Arab chiefs onto the British side.
The proposal was denied by the Government of India on the
ground that no troops were available for reinforcements at
Aden. After the failure of Aden Brigade to protect Lahej,
reinforcements were sent temporarily from Egypt. As a
military man who had no previous experience in Arab political
affairs, and presumably he did not consult Jacob on the matter,
General Younghusband who replaced Shaw, did not proceed to
occupy Lahej mainly on military reasons although adequate
forces were now available at Aden.
Successive suggestions and proposals from the Residents
were confined only to offensive measures, initially put forward
by Jacob, but the main concern was no longer military victory
at Lahej but the future settlement. The failure to restore British
prestige at Lahej resulted in keeping away the Arab chiefs from
the British and in imposing great difficulty in the settlement of
the post-war period. Again the key figure was the Imam. After
the withdrawal of the Ottoman the Imäm would emerge a new
leader and would claim the territory occupied by the Ottomans
during the war.
It may be observed that from September 1917, control of
Aden was no longer under the India Office but under the Foreign
Office and the War Office. The proposal for change was initiated
by J. E. Shuchburgh, secretary at the political department, India
Office in an effort to press for more active measures in South
West Arabia. The change of the control of Aden did not have a
major effect on Aden. It remained useful only as a coaling
station. But Aden and South West Arabia were now under the
364
r
control of Cairo together with the rest of Arabia. Previously
Cairo and India shared the control of Arabia; Aden and Yaman
were evaluated through Indian interests and Hijdz and others
were under the purview of Cairo. Under the control of Cairo a
comprehensive plan for Arabia became possible notably in the
post-war period settlements. It is important to note that from
September 1917 Jacob was the liaison officer in Cairo
representing the Government of India. A policy first initiated by
the Foreign Office was designed, promising the independence of
overlord chiefs in Arabia notably Ibn Sa`üd, King Husayn,
Sayyid Idrlsi and the Imam. Furthermore, Arabia was planned
to be united notably under the suzerainty of King Husayn. The
influence of Jacob now extended beyond South West Arabia as
he worked with Wingate, the High Commissioner) on

closely
scrutinising the new policy which received full support

.
from Cairo and Aden, The proposal was put into action. In South
West Arabia the first move to achieve this end was to negotiate
with the Imam. Jacob appeared to be the man for the job. He
was accordingly sent with the detailed instructions to discuss
the future of Arabia with the Imdm at San`. '. But as he failed
to reach that place, the future settlement in Arabia in general
and in South West Arabia in particular encountered serious
difficulties and continued to remain so for a number of years to
come. It was clearly a setback for Jacob in his last years of
service, but did he deserve to receive the blame for the outcome
of his failure? The episode certainly needs another study.
365
Appendix I
The Treaty of Da`än

[Dated on the 27th Shawwdl 1329 A. H corresponding with the
7th Tashrin Awwal 1327 (20th October 1911)]
Aden Residency version býuleen

1. An agreement of harmony has been entered intoh his
Highness Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid-ud-din the relier
on God the Lord of the Universe the one hand) and his
- -(on
honour Sahib-ul-'Atufa (master of kindness) the Commander-
in-chief of the military staff and the Commandant of the
Yemen forces Izzat Pasha who has been deputed by Illustrious
Government (on the other hand) as follows: -
This agreement is to receive the ratification of the Sublime
Porte and its object is to improve the condition of the hills
in Yemen which hills are shown below and are now directly
governed by the Sublime Ottoman Government; -
The hills are ;-

The province of San'a and its outlying districts & 'Amaran,
Hajja, Kokaban, Haraz ( with the exception of Sa'fan and Bani
Muqati ) Anis, Dhamar, Yerim, Rada and those Zaidis who are
in the province of Ta'iz if their number exceed one-half of
the population.
Arab Bureau version

1- This Agreement is concluded today between El Imam (El
Mutawakil Ala Allah) Yehia Ibn Mohammed Hemid El Din, and

Ferik Izzet Pasha, General Officer Commanding the Force in El
Yemen for the reformation of the countries (provinces) which
are actually under the administration of the Ottoman
Government in El Yemen hills and which are inhabited by the
"Zind' [Zaydi], viz. Sana'a, Omran, Heja, Kankeban
[Kawkaban], Hujur, Anes, Zemär, Yerim, and the districts of
Heraz, Taez, Redaa and environs.
[" Introduction" in al-WäsiÌ]
366
Aden Residency version
2. The disposal of different judicial cases between litigants
residing in the aforesaid countries and the enforcement of the

law against every perpetrator of crimes in conformity with the
Zaidi doctrine & the appointing & changing of Judges shall be
conducted by the Imam after reporting such appointment &
changes in writing to government & receiving their sanction for

the same from Constantinople through the local government. But
the management of the affairs by such Judges should not be
interrupted during the intervening space of time at which time
the Imam makes a reference to Government & the latter pass all
their orders which are preliminarily pronounced by Judges who
administer justices. Appeals are open to the party dissatisfied
with such orders.
Arab Bureau version

2- The Imam nominates judges to administer the Zind [ZaydI] in
accordance with the Sharia Law in so far as concerns the Zaidia
sect, and submits their names to the Wali who will send their
names to Constantinople without delay for confirmation the

judges will also be transferred in the same manner.
[ Article (1) in al-Wäsiì]

3. Should any one be not satisfied with the decision of the
appellate Court & complained to the Imam, it is then for the

Imam to enquire of Government into the subject matter of the
complaint. If it were eventually proved that his complaint was
correct then the decision is to be revised.
Arab Bureau version

3- A Court of Appeal will be formed which court will deal with
cases which are submitted to it through the Imam. Its decisions
will be submitted to the Government.
[Article (2) in al-WäsiÌ]
367
4. The appellate Court is held at the seat of government & is
composed of a President and members elected by the Imam &

in the same manner judges are appointed, subject to the
confirmation of government.
Arab Bureau version

4- The Court of Appeal to be in Sanaa. the Imam will nominate
the President and members of the Court and their appointments
will be confirmed by the Government.

5. If the appellate court which is composed as here in' before-
mentioned, passed a decree in accordance with the law of
retaliation in re the execution of a certain murderer who has
legally become liable to be executed it is primarily the duty of

the judge to ask the heirs of the murdered man to pardon the
murderer or to persuade them to accept dia' from him. Should
they (the heirs of the deceased) be disagreeable the appellate

Court should then refer the matter to Constantinople and ask
sanction to carry into effect the Lextalionis after fully stating

that the judge has done his best in requesting the heirs to
pardon or to accept the dia' but that they would not agree. This
should be done on the one condition that the term of the issue
of the Irade on this subject should not exceed 4 months from

the date of dispatch of judgement of the said court.
Arab Bureau version

5- The two parties (the Government and the Imam), will try
to unite their opinions regarding sentences of death, and if they
fail to agree the case will be submitted to Sheikh el-Islam in
Constantinople for approval and will be confirmed by Imperial
Order, all to be done within four months only, and the sentence
of death will then be executed.
[Article (4) in al-Wäsiì]
368
6. When there appears any obvious necessity for the
substitution of any judges for misconduct it is for the

Government to notify the same to the Imam giving him, at the
same time the reasons and the legal proofs that necessitated
the removal and then it is for the Imam to remove such judge.
Arab Bureau version

6- If the conduct of one of the judges be found to be
unsatisfactory, the Imam will inform the Wali, giving his
reasons.

7. In order to dispose of cases in conformity with the doctrine
of the greatest Imam Abu Hanifa An-Nu'man, government are

to appoint judges to do so between these who may be embracing
the Hanafi creed, excluding those belonging to the local hills of
Yemen.
Arab Bureau version
7- The Government will nominate judges from the Hanafi and

Shafii sects, except for the natives of the Yemen mountains.
369
8. In the event of the existence of a case between a Zaidi &
another who may be embracing one of the different Muslim

creeds (excluding the hill men) such is to be transferred
a case
to a court of mixed judges composed of Zaidis and Hanafis.
Should there be any diversity of judgement between the judges
then the opinion of the judge representing the accused should
be upheld.
Arab Bureau version

8- If cases occur between followers of different sect a mixed
Court will be formed from the Zind [Zaydi] and Shawafea
[Shäfiì] for the settlement cases.

9 The judge appointed in the circles and districts can have
trustworthy assistants for them in order to serve them in the
management of their affairs, to safeguard them and to bring

before them the litigants, provided that their number may not
exceed 6 men in each circle and 3 men in each district.
Government are to provide them with pay in their capacity as
managers or policemen. If this number prove inadequate
Government are to replenish it with helpers from the police as
the occasion may require
Arab Bureau version

9- The Government will nominate an officer by the name
Mubasher (Inspector General) to inspect the judges travel
who
about in their districts and villages, and are likened to moving
courts.
[Article (9) of the Arab Bureau impliesa different meaning

compared with al-Wäsi'I and the Aden Records, when it says:
"Mubasher to inspect the judges", instead of to assist the
...
judges as can be found in the Aden Record or implicitly implied
by al-Wasi'i]
370
10. The management of the endowed property [wagfs] and the
executorship should be in the hands of the Imam.
Arab Bureau version

10- The Imam will take charge of the wakfs and wills.
["Wills" does not appear in the Aden Records]


11. The Illustrious Government are to extend their pardon to-
wards all the former crimes committed by the people of the

hills indisposed [not disposed
said as well as the yet of] cases
inclusive and up to the inception of the date of this compromise.
The crimes referred of above are those of a political nature
and which were perpetrated during the fight and the causes
arising therefrom.
Arab Bureau version
11- All political offences which are committed up to the date of

the Agreement will be pardoned and all pending cases to be
dropped.
[Article (11) in al-WäsiÌ but includes taxes as well]

[But Article (10) in al-WdsiÌ reads: "The Government will
appoint judges for Shdfiìs and Hanafis except in the mountains".
This is a repetition of Article (6) in al-WdsiÌ or Article (7) of
the Arab Bureau and the Aden Record)
371
Y .. ý, ýr a.ýý-......ý.,.ýT
3

12. In the same manner as government have extended their
pardon towards the past crimes and offences as well as such

cases which are all pending against the hillmen. Government
are likewise to extend their absolute pardon towards Khawlan,

Nahm and Arhab and also to exempt them from paying taxes
for 10 years provided that the people residing in such countries
should desist from committing any wrong against the officers
of Government and also desist from creating what would effect
the general safety on the roads. Should any one of them or a
party act to the contrary then the culprit is to be personally
and legally punished according to his merits. Should all the
people of the country in general or a portion thereof
conjointly commit any disturbance and the same is proved

against them then they should be punished and shall thereafter
forfeit the right of pardon.
Arab Bureau version

12- As the in the district of Solan [Khawlän], Arhab and
natives
Nihen [Nahm] are in a state of poverty, the Government will
not draw any taxes from them for 10 years provided they keep
to their obedience and true loyalty to the Ottoman Government.
[Article (12) in al-WäsiÌ but excludes Nahm]

13. No one of the people of the hills in question should be
asked to pay more than the legal tithes ie the dues fixed by
estimate on the produce of their fields sheep and goats and

other an'am i. e. camels, cattle and sheep and goats, as laid
down by law.
Arab Bureau version

13-The Government will not levy on the natives of El yemen
any taxes other than those prescribed by the Sharia.
[Article (13) in al-Wäsiì)
372
14. Should any complaint be made to the authorities or to the
judge of the district who has been appointed by the Imam
against the collectors of taxes or the appraisers or should

there appear the slightest cause of ill-treatment by these
people then it is, first of all, necessary for the local judge and
the higher official of the local authorities to ascertain the facts,
whatever shall then legally be proved should be disposed of by

judge, and the authorities shall then carry the orders into
effect.
Arab Bureau version

14- If an accusation is made of an injustice committed by the
tax gatherer, to the Government or to the judges, or if any
irregularity takes place, the Government and the judges will
make investigations and the Government will execute the
sentence passed by the judges.

15. There is no objection to any ones desiring to grant, of his
own free will to the Im am anything, provided he personally
gives the same to H. H the Imam or to the managers of
endowments, trustees of lands duly appointed by the Imam or
through the Sheikh of Government who have been elected by
the people or through the Judges
.
Arab Bureau version

15- The Zind [Zaydi] natives can offer presents to the Imam
and these presents can be presented direct or through the

Government Sheikhs or the judges.
[Article (15) in al-Wäsi`Y]
373
16. The Imam is to recover through any one in whom he relies

the land revenue of the lands having, connection with the
Imamship and the Illustrious Government are to recover their
legal tithes [ùshr].
Arab Bureau version
16- The Imam will pay tithes of his own lands.
17. The circle [sub-district] of Jabal ash-Sharq which is a

dependency of the district of Anis and which comprises of the
Ozlas of Jabal Ash-Sharq, Bani Tashyeb, Bani As'ad, Al Manar,
Bani Khalid and Bani Suwed to be remitted of all taxes for a
term of 10 years. After the expiry of this period these Ozlas
should pay tithes and other legal taxes to Government in the

same manner as those of other localities.
Arab Bureau version
17- The gathering of taxes of the Sheirag mountains [Jabal al-

Sharq], in the vicinity of An es, will be postponed for 10 years as
the people are in great poverty.
[Article (17) in al-Wdsi`Y but a clause "for 10 years" does not

appear in this article]
374
18. The Imam is to set at large all the hostages of the outskirts
of San'a namely Bani al-Harith, Bani Hashaish, Hamdan, Bilad
al-Bustan, Sauhan, Bi-lad Ar-rus, Bani Bakhlul as well as the
hostages of Haraz and Ahl Amaran.
Arab Bureau version
18- The Imam will give up the hostages which he has taken
from the Sheikhs of Sanaa and its neighbourhood and of Heraz,

Omran and environs.
[Article (18) in al-Wdsiì. A clause for 10 years", however,
appears in this Article -most probably by printing mistake-

instead of in the Article (17)]
19. The people of the Imam and those of Government and
others are secured during their journeys and return journeys
with merchandise & c. If any one of those who knock about
seeking means of livelihood is accused with having resorted to
any act disturbing the public peace he should be arrested and
surrendered to the judge who shall make the necessary

investigation in his case.
Arab Bureau version

a
19- The Government officials and the Imam can go and come
from one place to another in any direction within the Yemen on
the condition that they do not disturb the peace.
[Article (19) in al-Wäsi`Y]
375
20. After affixing this signature on the agreement of harmony
no one is to aggress over the other in his respective jurisdiction.
Arab Bureau version
20- Neither party will, after the confirmation of the Agreement
by the high Firman, transgress on the country which is today
under the administration of the second party.
376
Appendix II
The Ottomans at Lahej 1
In July 1915 after the Ottomans occupation of Lahej,
Major Bradshaw, estimated the distribution of the Ottoman
forces as follows:
1. Àsir Division - 5000 men, located on line Häli Point-Abad.
2.40th Division - 4500 men, located at Sä`dah, Zaydlyah,
Luhayyah, Salif, Hudaydah, Bayt al-Faglh, Zabld etc. and along
the wädI Maur.
3.39th Division - 5500 including 1,500 from the 40th Division.
They were located at San'd', Udayn and Ibb, Qa'tabah, Ta'izz,
Mäwiyah-Zaydlyah, Hujariyah, Muza and Shaykh Sa'Id, 1 AIi',
and Lahej. This division was commanded by General Ali Sa'Id
Pasha.
1 R/20/A/4044,31/7/1915.
377
Appendix III
Copy of a treaty between the Ottomans and the Arab

chiefs of the Protectorate
We the undersigned, Chiefs, Mansabs, Sheikhs, learned men,

heads of tribesmen and the merchants generally do hereby
denounce and relinquish, the protection, friendship, control of
suzerainty which the British government claim to maintain on
us and deny the same in toto. We freely relinquish our
obligations to them (British) and declare the self-government of
our country according to the principles of our religion.
We hereby agree and admit that the Ottoman Turkish

Government have the right of governing and exercising powerful
hand over us that we are their subordinate and obedient
subjects who obey and surrender to their rule and who espouse
their cause during the times of war and peace, in as much as
the religion and Islamic ties, binds us to them by generations
since times immemorial.
In conformity with the proclamation issued by the Sultan of

the Islam declaring sacred and religious war against England
and her allies, we hereby denounce and sever our relation and
connection which the British Government assert to have on us,
and further undertake to support our Sublime Ottoman
Government and its Sultans of the Great Ottoman lineage, to be
friends to those who befriend them, and inimical who are
hostile to them. We shall protect all their subjects who come
to country as traders, visitors or travellers, to safeguard them
and their property and treat them with consideration.
We (agree) to refrain from entering into any foreign intercourse
or alliance without the consent and authority of our

Government. We on behalf of ourselves and descendant) shall
stick to this (from this day) till the day of resurrection.
378
,. ýý ý
fý
-. a
We solicit our sublime Ottoman Government to publish this
our notification to all the European Powers who have been

thinking that we have placed ourselves under the protection of
the British government so that they might know that we
refute and annul the protection which they (British) assert to
maintain over us. We ignore and do not care for it (British

Protection) and also do not care for those who acted as
intermediary or endeavoured to enforce it. They should also
know that we absolutely recognise the sovereignty of the
Sublime Ottoman Government and that the European Powers
might in the cause of justice and freedom -which are incumbent
on every civilised nation- recognise and uphold the same, in

bQ.
order that every impostor should Aconvinced that he is claiming
a right which belongs kothers.
We have drawn this in a public meeting attended by

honourable notable persons who possess power, influence and
authority such as Chiefs, Mansabs, Sayeds, Sheikhs, learned
men, merchants and heads of tribesmen, their subordin ates

and all the subject s. We have signed with our free will and
consent. May this be known by all concerned. God is all
depend. 1
sufficient and on Him we
1 L/P&S/10/610, AWL, 24/6/1916.
379
..,. -I
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Anglo-Ottoman Rivalries in South West Arabia Prior To and During The First World War: 1906-1919

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ANGLO-OTTOMAN RIVALRIES

IN SOUTH WEST ARABIA

Thesis submitted to the

Chapter One: The Ottomans in the Yaman

2.1 Introduction 102

Chapter Three: The Ottoman Occupation of Lahej

3.1 The Imperial Powers in South West Arabia prior to

4.1 The Early Days of War 202

Chapter Five: Imam Yahyd during World War 1

5.1 Imam Yahyd between the Ottomans and the British

Chapter Six: British Policy and Commitments during the

6.1 Policy Adopted for the Conduct of War Against the

6.2 The Arab Movement Policy in South West Arabia 294

Appendices 366,377 & 378

This thesis, entitled "Anglo-Ottoman rivalries in South

with imperial policies and commitments in South West Arabia

of Anglo-Ottoman relations in these years.

The thesis is divided into six chapters, an introduction and

a conclusion. The thesis begins with an inquisitive survey of the

literature available on the subject. The first chapter deals with

the Ottomans in the Yaman and their relations with the

YamanIs and the Imdm. The second chapter examines the

change in British policy in South West Arabia from intervention

to non-intervention. These two chapters also trace changes in

the of both imperial resulting from the boundary

chapter examines the advance of the Ottomans in South West

Arabia and their occupation of Lahej during the First World

War. The fourth chapter analyses the Ottoman policy in the

British Protectorate and traces the effect of the occupation of

Lahej on the tribes of the Protectorate. The third and fourth

chapters also cover the revival of Anglo-Ottoman rivalries in

South West Arabia. The fifth chapter examines the attitude of

Protectorate. The sixth chapter analyses the development of

British policy and commitments in South West Arabia during the

South West Arabia following the withdrawal of the Ottomans

from the area. The conclusion embodies a review chapter-by-

chapter of the present works on the subject for comparison

with further data, interpretation and analysis.

I would like to thank the Association of Commonwealth

Universities for the Commonwealth Academic Staff Scholarship

awarded to carry out my research at the School of Oriental and

African Studies from September 1985 to August 1988. I would

also like to thank the National University of Malaysia for

extending my study at SOAS from September 1988 to July 1989;

sabbatical leave in the United Kingdom.

This research would have and could not have been

conducted without the endless assistance and supervision from

Professor M. E. Yapp at the History Department, SOAS to whom I

am extremely grateful, for his patience and advice through all

these years. My thanks also specifically to Professor D. Arnold

and Dr. U. Freitag at the History Department, SOAS for their

assistance in assuring the completing of this study. Without

present form. To others in the Department I would also like to

convey my gratitude notably for providing me with assistance

in conducting this research.

I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge

my appreciation to the institutions which have rendered their

assistance throughout my research, notably the Library of the

School of Oriental and African Studies, the India Office Library,

the Public Records Office, the Library of the University of

Cambridge, the Libraries at the Oxford University, the Library

of the University of Birmingham, the Library of the University

of Durham and the National Library of Scotland at Edinburgh.