Research methodology

1.1 A brief overview of the Research Project Ordinarily law makes no provisions for a situation which is considered instinctively natural for human beings. If some individuals create some situations, which usually human beings do not create, the society has a tendency to look down upon them as being uncommon or unnatural and this attitude is reflected in the laws. Whether those acts bring any particular harm or not the society shows its disapproval by declaring such acts as proscribed ones. This becomes evident when one examines the penal codes.1 This project deals with the offences of Hurt and Grievous Hurt and is titled µDifference between the Hurt and Grievous Hurt¶. Both of these are offences under the Indian Penal Code 1860. 1.2 Chapterisation and the Aim of Each Chapter This project has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the project and gives a general idea about the project as well as the scope and limitations, the method of research. The second chapter deals with the offence of Hurt and discusses Section 319 of the IPC. The researcher has briefly touched upon bigamy as a matrimonial offence and has subjected it to analysis by examining judgments of various courts in this regard. The various lacunae in the law have also been emphasized. The third chapter deals with the offence of Grievous hurt at length. It examines Section 320 and also how adultery becomes a ground for divorce. Case laws have also been discussed at appropriate places to examine the application of this law. The fourth chapter deals with a comparative analysis of the offences of Hurt and Grievous Hurt and studies the obvious as well as subtle differences between the two. The fifth chapter deals with the latest development in the evolution of law i.e the bill which recommends addition of s.326A and 326B, dealing with offence of acid attacks and subsequent punishment. The last chapter is the conclusion and it also discusses the recommendations of various law commissions for amending these laws to make them more effective. Some other solutions have also been discussed in this chapter.

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K N Chandrasekharan Pillai , ³COMMENT ON RATHINAM V. UNION OF INDIA´ (1995) SCC (Jour) 1

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Scope, Limitations and Method of Research The researcher has tried to widen the scope of her research by delving into the historical

evolution of these laws. Also, the researcher has tried to add a practical aspect the project by discussing it with lawyers and experts in the field of criminal law. Even though the scope of this study was very vast, due to the paucity of space, the researcher has restricted her discussion of these offences to India. This research is basically doctrinal as the researcher has relied on secondary sources of information like books, journals, commentaries and bare acts. The researcher also studied a number of articles in order to formulate a firm opinion about these topics. A lot of ideas that have been put forth in this research paper are from the researcher¶s own understanding of the topic and from what he has learnt in the various classes on Criminal Law. The researcher has put in sincere efforts to make this research project as informative as possible and a potential source of learning.

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Chapter:1 Case Analysis In the case of Virsa Singh v. state the appeal made was Appeal by special leave from the
judgment and order dated November 21, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1956, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ferozepore in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1956. Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant. N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. 1958. March 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered byBOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh. He was granted special leave to appeal by this Court but the leave is limited to " the question that on the finding accepted by the Punjab High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner." The appellant was tried with five others under sss. 302/49, 324/149 and 323/149 Indian Penal Code. He was also charged individually under s. 302. The other, were acquitted of the murder charge by the first Court but were convicted under ss. 326, 324 and 323 read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code. On appeal to the High Court they were all acquitted. The appellant was convicted by the first Court under s. 302 and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both Courts are agreed that the appellant caused it. It was caused as the result of a spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Singh, while he was still alive, said that it was " a punctured wound 2" x 1/2" transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal. He also said that " Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound." The incident occurred about 8 p. m. on July 13, 1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following day. The doctor who conducted the postmortem described the injury as3

and digested food was flowing out from three cuts.. The researcher in his Project will try to find out the difference between Hurt and Grievous hurt .." an oblique incised stitched wound 21/2" on the lower part of left side of belly... Flakes of pus were sticking round the small intestines and there were six cuts. 13" above the left inguinal ligament. and will try to cure the ambiguity between the two... The injury was through the whole thickness of the abdominal wall. Peritonitis was present and there was digested food in that cavity. at various places..." The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 4 .

Emasculation. .5 Seventhly. castration. Injury to the scrotum would render a man impotent. µDisfiguration¶ ± the word µdisfigure¶ in this section means to do a man some external injury which detracts from his personal appearance. . Thirdly.Privation of any member or joint. . Secondly. but does not weaken him as the cutting off a man¶s nose or ears. 1860 Madho Singh (1878) PR No. section 373 3 2 5 . the hurt has to be regarded as grievous hurt because of what has been stated in the clause 24. - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. A person emasculating himself cannot be convicted under this section3. As defined under section 320 of Indian Penal Code.Chapter 2: Rational. µEmasculation¶.Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Fifthly. -Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Scope and Components of Grievous hurt The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous"2 First. A person causing grievous hurt to himself does not come within the purview of this section. Losing eye-sight ± where as many as twenty four persons lost there yes-sight permanently in consequence of arrack distributed by the accused after mixing methyl alcohol in it . Sixthly.Permanent Privation of the hearing of either ear Fourthly. .the term µemasculation¶ means the depriving a person of masculine vigor. 22 of 1878 4 Chandrasenan E K AIR 1995 SC 1066 5 Law Commissioners 1st report.

141 of 1956 Marimuthu AIR 1924 Mad 41 8 Government of Bombay v. In the first case the injuries must be such as are likely to cause death. When any portion of the bone is broken off and there is a cleft or rupture. 2007. . Bharat Law House.1851 7 6 6 .. Law of Crimes. 1860. we take into consideration both the extent of the hurt and the intention of the offender. in the other the injuries must be such as endangers life.µFractured or dislocation of a bone¶ ± fracture in common parlance means breaking through.´9 Rational behind the section± the authors of the code observe10: ³we have found it very difficult to draw a line between those bodily hurts which are serious and those which are slight.8 Twenty days bodily pain ± ³ after a long consideration we have determined to give the name of grievous bodily hurt to all hurt which cause the sufferer to be in pain. we think. Appeal No. or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. though rudely. To draw such a line between with perfect accuracy is absolutely impossible. but it as far better that such a line should be drawn.p.7 The line between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and grievous hurt is a very thin and subtle one. there is fracture. the entire depth of bone should be broken. A commentary on the Indian Penal Code.6 Eighthly.Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain. during the space of twenty days. New Delhi. Abdul Wahab AIR 1946 Bombay 38 9 ibid 10 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal. diseased or unable to pursue his ordinary avocation. 26th Edition. It is however not necessary that in order that there should be a fracture. though a defective criterion. It appears to us that the length of time during which the sufferer is in pain. than that offences some of which approach in enormity to Labh Singh Crim. diseased or unable to pursue his ordinary avocation. which may. With propriety be employed not merely in cases where violence has been used. in apportioning the punishment. but in cases where hurt has been caused without assault. µAny hurt which endangers life¶ ± these words donot apply to cases in which life was not merely endangered but actually taken away.

and coming within the eight kinds enumerated in this section. It is evidently desirable that law should make a distinction between such a wound. may nevertheless be most serious. there must be some specific hurt. 11 When a person forcibly thrust lathi into the rectum of another person and causes serious injuries.12 Injuries inflicted with the help of burning firewood cannot be considered as grievous hurt as they donot come within the specific items of the injuries mentioned in the definition of grievous hurt. nor blinds him. like those kinds of hurt which are mentioned in condition 1 to 7. ought not to be confounded with a bruise. while others are little more than frolics which a good natures man would hardly recent. nor deprives him of a member or a joint. whereas section 320 defines µgrievous hurt¶ To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. this section is also in the nature of definite clause. nor do they endanger life. which neither emasculates the sufferer. which does not maim the sufferer or break his bones may be so cruel as to bring him to point of death. A beating. prolonged disease. for example. it is clear. and of which the traces disappear in a day.´ Scope ± like in section 319. which requires only to be bathed with vinegar. Section 319 defines hurt. he was held guilty of causing grievous hurt. nor destroys his hearing. distinguished by a broad and obvious line from slight hurts. Such a beating. voluntarily inflicted. again . nor breaks his bones. A wound. mad scratch which he headed by just sticking plaster. lasting injury to constitution. should be classed together. may yet cause intense pain. nor dislocate them.murder.13 12 Budri Roy (1875) 23 WR (Cr) 65 Sital AIR 1935 Oudh 468 13 Sham Behera AIR 1953 Ori 308 11 7 . Some hurts which are not.

16 14 15 Devasahayam. or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person. he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind. and does thereby cause hurt to any person. and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt. A magistrate dealing with charges of voluntarily causing grievous hurt must consider and decide not only whether grievous hurt has been caused but if it has been caused voluntarily or himself knew to be likely to cause grievous hurt. Explanation. if the hurt with the intention to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt. . if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind. Section 321 and the explanation to section 322 make it clear that either the ingredient of intention or that of knowledge.A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. in re (1962) 1 MLJ 161 Gangda 1975 Cri LJ 1445 (Raj) 16 Ramban Mahton AIR 1958 Pat 452 8 .15 The means by which the injury was caused is not the true criterion. But he is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. he cannot be convicted under section 325.Voluntarily causing hurt. The answer really depends on the nature of the injury caused and the manner in which the blows were administered. is said "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt". is said "voluntarily to cause hurt". must be essentially present in order to constitute the offence of hurt. whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon.14 Such a knowledge can be inferred from t he part of body chosen for inflicting violence and the severity of that violence as shown by the injuries on the body of the victim. If he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt . Section 322 ± Whoever voluntarily causes hurt. The provisions of this section are very precise and incapable of misconstruction.Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person.Chapter 3: Difference between Hurt and Grievous hurt Section 321 .-.

or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. voluntarily causes hurt. When the injury is not serious and there was no intention to cause death or grievous hurt. shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years. voluntarily causes grievous hurt. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt ³Whoever. even though death is caused.19 Section 325.Difference between punishments for µhurt¶ and µgrievous hurt¶ Section 323.18 Where evidence gave no clue as to on which part of the body of deceased the accused has struck and prosecution also could not establish that the death of deceased was caused by striking on some vital body . it was held. except in the case provided for by section 334. that the accused could only be convicted under section 323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt Whoever.´ The prosecution must prove : (i) 17 18 That the accused caused hurt of any kind described in section 320 Ramakrishna Panicker AIR 1959 Ker 372 Babu Bika Jadhav 1996 Cri LJ 3952 (Bom) 19 Bikash Chand Mondal 1984 Cri LJ 1191 (Cal) 9 .17 Where the accused was one of the persons who assaulted the deceased with a stick but there was no proof that the fatal blow or grievous injury was caused by him. shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year. except in the case provided for by section 335. or with both. nor did the accused have knowledge that it was likely to cause grievous hurt or death. the accused could only be convicted under section 323. and shall also be liable to fine. he is guilty of causing hurt and not death.

It can safely inferred that the boxer µknew¶ if not µintended¶ that if he µpunches¶ a person twice in his stomach. or knew that he was likely.300 in order to prove murder. hitting his head on the ground which results in his death. but in practice. (iii) That the accused did so voluntarily Where there is no evidence to indicate as to which of the accused persons actually caused grievous hurt none of them could be convicted under section 325. Section 320 has very clearly laid down hurt which are to be classified as grievous hurt and the eighthly clause is the only one in which some interpretation and misuse is possible.319 in order to prove grievous hurt under s. The only catch in this section is the intention part. Although intention can be inferred from the way in which the injury was caused. Now let us consider another case. Going by the language of the section 319.(ii) That the accused intended. This is only a case of simple hurt as the person had only slapped and in ordinary course of things it would not lead to death. It may be presumed that each of them intended to cause grievous hurt but such a presumption alone is not sufficient to establish the offence of causing grievous hurt unless it is further shown that the accused actually caused grievous hurt.320 to s. The person falls down. they are not that minutely followed in practical application. An illustration in this respect can be that if a person slaps another person and he falls down. heads hits the ground and he dies. a boxer µpunches¶ a person in his stomach twice.319 because the punishment and fine imposed in much less. it will cause grievous hurt if not death. Although there is a huge fundamental difference the offence of hurt and grievous hurt.320 as they have to prove homicide under s.299 and then move on to s. there is no clear cut definition of hurt whereas on the contrary section 320 has defined which categories of hurt fall under grievous hurt.20 The prosecution does not have to prove hurt under s. to cause grievous hurt of any kind described. In this case it is very clearly evident from the circumstances that the intention was to cause to grievous hurt as he was a µboxer¶ and he µpunched¶ twice. 20 Dipa AIR 1947 All 408 10 . but it takes a little more for the prosecution to prove grievous hurt because the defense would always like to bring the injury from s.

dated 22nd December. if he by that act caused permanent or partial damage or deformity.pd AIR 1958 Pat 452 11 . Insertion of new section 326 B ± Attempt to throw or use acid in any form on the other personwhoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that . non-bailable and non-compoundable. 5 lakhs The offense shall be cognizable.Chapter 4: Latest development Insertion of new section 326A ± throwing or using of acid in any form on the body of another person ± notwithstanding contained in s. shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 7 years and shall also be liable to a minimum of Rs. 326 the offence can be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years.320 and 326 of the IPC but keeping in view the extreme heinous nature of the act and the fact that under s.nic. C. Justification: although the offences relating to acid throwing is covered under s. 2 lakhs and may extend to Rs. Therefore there is no need for categorization of various forms of disability.324 or 326 of the code. and sentencing 21 22 ncw. 1956. disfiguration or disability to any part of the body of such person. The State22 AIR 1958 Pat 452 This case came as an appeal from the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge. Further using acid with intention or knowledge is a punishable offense irrespective of the nature and extend of injury. whoever does any act of throwing acid or using acid in any form on the other person with the intention of or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such person permanent or partial damage or deformity disfiguration or disability to any part of the body of such person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than TEN years but which may extend to life and shall also be liable to fine which shall be minimum of Rs. P. Patna. convicting the appellant under Section 325.in/AnnualReports/200708/Eng/Annexure5. 1 lakh21 Case Analysis 1 : Rambaran Mahton v. it is proposed in the bill that at least the minimum punishment be not less than 10 years and extend to life imprisonment. I.

1956. P. M. P. on 29th May. described "grievous hurt". The Judge entirely agreed with the counsel for the petitioner so far as the general proposition of law enunciated by him is concerned. Nokhali. What is meant by the expression "voluntarily to cause hurt. Both of them were separate in mess and cultivation. The charge initially against the appellant was of murder under Section 302. if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the existence of grievous hurt is not by itself adequate to complete the offence under Section 325 I. P." is laid down in Section321 I. It is in the following terms : "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt. there must be on the part of the accused either intention to cause grievous hurt or likely knowledge to cause it. was the elder brother of the appellant.him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. He did not dispute that some of the injuries on the deceased were grievous. He urged. but the learned Additional Sessions Judge found that the charge of murder had not been established. C. This incident was the development of a domestic feud between the two full brothers over almost a trifle and which resulted in the death of one of them took place at 6 P. however. I. and does thereby cause hurt to any person. Section 320 I. is said. Section 325 provides for punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. C. P. voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. in village Soh within the Bihar Police Station. is said "voluntarily to cause hurt" what will in law amount to voluntarily causing grievous hurt is described in Section 322 I. and he sentenced him accordingly. the deceased. and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt. C. C. But he is said 12 . C. It provides that whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person. that the necessary knowledge or intention to cause grievous hurt was lacking in this case. Important question is what offence is disclosed by the evidence produced by the prosecution. P. His contention is that apart from the grievous hurt. Explanation: A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. Rambaran Mahton. or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person. In his opinion the offence the appellant committed was grievous hurt under Section 325.

This is quite obvious on the plain reading of Section 322 along with Section 325 I. In other words. " The appellant largely relied upon Explanation to Section 322. P. to constitute the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. It will appear from Section 325 read with Section 322 I. the question is whether the appellant in this case intended to cause or had the knowledge of the likelihood of causing grievous hurt. then although grievous hurt may unexpectedly have ensued. P." It states in clear terms that the offence of grievous hurt is not caused unless the offender both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. only assuming that grievous hurt was not in his contemplation. to be likely to cause. C. grievous hurt. if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind. are three in number : (1) grievous hurt as described in Section 320 must first be caused. When the act that he did in the process of causing hurt is such as any person of ordinary prudence knows it likely to cause grievous hurt. or knew himself. the offender can be convicted of simple hurt. C. he may safely be taken to have intended grievous hurt. If the hurt actually caused is simple. If he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt. he assaulted him. Bearing in mind these underlying principles. (2) the offender intended. Explanation to Section 322 really unfolds the significance of the expression "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. only with fists and slaps 13 . and assuming the entire prosecution case to be correct. he cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 325 even if the resultant hurt was grievous. If the act was such that nothing more than simple hurt could reasonably be thought likely to ensue from it. a person cannot be held guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt even if it was in his contemplation. that the essential ingredients of the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. Appellant contended that at the time of the occurrence the appellant was admittedly without any weapon. he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind. and his contention was that in this case it cannot be said that grievous hurt was in contemplation of the accused. there must be complete correspondence between the result and the intention or the knowledge of the accused (3) the hurt was caused voluntarily. or at least to have contemplated grievous hurt as likely to occur.voluntarily to cause grievous hurt.

If in such circumstances a person belabours a man with fists and slaps. It appears that the blows must have been given with more than usual force. totally. He had sustained no injuries. These injuries could not have been caused unless blows were given to him with great force. This is not all. grievous an injury may be. It is true that the spleen was in enlarged condition. whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon. the 23 Law Commission of India. As will appear from the opinion. If the absence of injuries on the person of the appellant is indicative of anything it is this that Nokhali was completely in his grip. But there is absolutely no explanation so far as the fracture of the ribs is concerned. 14 . There could have been no intention on the part of the appellant to cause grievous hurt to his elder brother. 49. P. but it cannot be doubted that the way in which he assaulted his brother. three of his ribs were fractured and the spleen was ruptured. unable either to strike him in self-defense or extricate himself from his hold. While he was lying on the ground. the provisions of Section 325 will not be attracted if no weapon was used in causing it. While Nokhali was lying in such a helpless condition. If it were. of the doctor. and it is likely. the appellant. that grievous hurt would ensue.and therefore. The means by which the injury was caused is not the true criterion. that even slight force might have resulted in the rupture of the spleen. so howsoever. the appellant could not possibly have known that the consequence of his act was grievous hurt23. The Judge did not agree with appellant on this point. FORTY-SECOND REPORT: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE . not even a scratch. In my opinion. as stated by the doctor. it is I think obvious. The answer really depends upon the nature of the injury caused and the manner in which the blows were administered. the appellant sat on his stomach and administered him fists and slaps. 1971. he should have known that he was likely thereby to cause grievous hurt to him. assaulted him recklessly with fists and slaps on every part of his body. as it will be obvious to everybody of ordinary prudence. What was found in this case is that Nokhali had been dashed to the ground. There will absolutely no justification for the appellant to strike him with strong fists and slaps when he neither retaliated nor tried to defend himself. He was wholly undefended.

Vibhute. It is indicative of the fact that remorse eventually overpowered him when passion subsided. P. 10 ed. p. th 15 . PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. The respondent had no business to go to plot 849 where the appellants along with his mother and sisters were carrying on irrigation work peacefully. he did not forsake him and leave the place. They show that the appellant beat his brother under great provocation given by the deceased himself and in the heat of the moment. Counsel for the appellant contended that even if the offence came within the purview of Section 325 the sentence of five years was in the circumstances of the case.I. It is common ground that plot 849 which was the venue of the occurrence did not belong to the deceased but that it had been allotted exclusively to his mother who was admittedly residing with the appellant. too severe. after Nokhali became senseless. He stayed on to tend him. The evidence shows that he gave him water to drink and also sprinkled water upon his body in order to bring him to his senses.. as contemplated by Section 325.24 Lastly. 153. 2011. The ends of justice will be sufficiently met if he is awarded one year's rigorous imprisonment. Judgment of the High Court-Having regard to the relationship between the parties and also the fact that this unfortunate incident occurred on the spur of the moment due to provocation given by the deceased himself and also considering the fact that there was absolutely no intention on the part of the appellant either to kill him or to cause him such bodily injury as was likely to cause his death. the sentence from five years' rigorous imprisonment was decreased to one year's rigorous imprisonment 24 K. I. and the humane in him triumphed. The learned Additional Sessions Judge took into consideration these special features of the case and for that reason held him guilty not of murder but of causing grievous hurt. Therefore.offence that was caused in this case was grievous hurt. C.). (ed. These very circumstances also call for a lenient consideration of his case. Further.

l. Essential ingredients of Culpable Homicide :(a) Causing of death. which is the gravest form of culpable homicide and is termed µmurder¶.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is the genus. and Culpable homicide section (ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300. the Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide. (ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) as defined in section 300. P. 25 Law Commission of India. The residuary of culpable homicide after the special characteristics of murder have been removed from it. clause (iii) and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both. 1971. For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence.P.Chapter 5Culpable homicide and Murder Culpable homicide²Meaning. Exceptions into ( two I to 5).P.C. FORTY-SECOND REPORT: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE . Exceptions 1 to 5). which is defined in section 299. and then murder (section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299. 16 . I. is culpable homicide Culpable (i) not amounting may to murder broadly amounting (Section be to 300. to either of which fine may be added. (iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree. clauses (i) and (ii) is punishable under section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years. 97. homicide classified murder classes:² 300). (b) by doing an act.C. These are:² (i) Culpable homicide of the first degree.) which is a species of culpable homicide. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added25.²The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide simpliciter (section 299.

²In order to hold a person liable under the impugned section there must be causing of death of a human being as defined under Section 46. (b) Thus though an act may cause death. The causing of death of a child in the mother¶s womb is not homicide as stated in Explanation 3 The causing of the death of child in the mother's womb is not homicide26.¶ A). B accordingly obtains poison from A and gives it to his mother in a roasted apple. He would be punishable for causing miscarriage either under section 312 or 315. if any part of that child has been brought forth. The mother gives the apple to a child of B. ( The word "death" denotes the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context). 10th ed. 2009. 10 ed.S. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child. But the person would not be set free. 155. 162.I. I.²To attract the provisions of this section it suffices if the death of a human being is caused whether the person was intended to be killed or not. 2009.P. not knowing it contains poison.(c) the act of causing death must be done:² (i) with the intention of causing death. (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. or it may respire so imperfectly that it may be difficult to obtain clear proof that respiration has taken place. appended to section 299. though he never 26 27 K. though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.Vibhute.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. Causing death. The act of A amounts to murder by B. Causing of death must be of a living human being which means a living man. or (iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death. child and at least partially an infant under delivery or just delivered27. The act of causing death amounts to culpable homicide if any part of that child has been brought forth. th K. The clause µthough the child may not have breathed¶ suggests that a child may be born alive.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW.C. and the child eats it and dies. woman.Vibhute. P.S. p.C depending on the gravity of the injury. though it may not breath (respire). p.I. For instance.P. though the child may not have breathed or been completely born. I. it will not amount to culpable homicide unless the above conditions are satisfied. 17 . Death caused of person other than intended. A counsels B to poison his mother. P.

Intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties (viz. Similarly. A consequence is deemed to be intended though it is not desired when it is foreseen as substantially certain. The intension means expectation of consequence in question. it means an actual intention.C.Vibhute. I.P. such as by poisoning. where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused. The legal maxim is that everyone must be presumed to intend the normal consequences of his act. th 18 . drowning. but illegal omissions as well.P. etc. Illustration (a) to this section shows that a person can be guilty of culpable homicide of a person whose death he did not intend28 .). death may also be caused by neglect of duty. a husband starving his wife. 159.intended to kill the child (section 301. Intention does not imply assume the. the word µact¶ has been given a wider meaning in the Code inasmuch as it includes not only an act of commission. With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death-It means an intention to cause a particular injury. which injury is.I. the existing intention of the moment. or turns out to be. P. one likely to cause death. the force and numberof blows.C. existence f some previous design. Intention². For instances. p. striking. where a Life Guard on Swimming poll. By doing an Act. 10 ed. The existence of intention is not to be inferred unless death follows as a natural and probable consequence from the act An intention also includes foresight of certainty. 1.S. Thus a deliberate firing by a loaded gun at once leads to inference that the intention was to cause death. beating and so on and so forth.²Death may be caused by a hundred and one means. not following his duty and that¶s caused death of person. and though not immediate it 28 K. such as a parent not supplying food and medical care to his child. As explained under section 32. Thus. the part of the body on which the blow was given.). it is immaterial to go into the question of whether the accused had intention to cause death. Hence. The connection between the µact¶ and the death caused by the act must he direct and distinct. B). nature of theweapon used.¶ that results in the voluntary causing of the child¶s and wife¶s death.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. 2009. illustration (a) to section 299 says that a person can be guilty of culpable homicide by causing the death of a person whose death he did not intend. Intention of causing death is not the intention of causing the µdeath of any particular person.

or turns out to be. A person who voluntarily inflicts injury such as to endanger life must always. 2009. gross negligence may amount to knowledge29. The word µknowledge¶ includes all cases ofrash acts by which death is caused. It is not necessary that the consequences.g.The difference between the two expressions µintention of causing death¶ and µintention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death¶ is a difference of degrees in criminality.must not be too remote. the above condition is not fulfilled..Vibhute. If the connection between the act and death is obscure or if it is obscured by concurrent causes. It is not the death itself which is intended. or2ndly:. where The accused kills a person by hitting him under the belief that he was hitting at a ghost.If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. except in the most extraordinary circumstances. 10 ed. one likely to cause death. The expression µintention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death¶ merely means an intention to cause a particular injury. But as. p. Murder Except in the cases hereinafter excepted.I.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. µor if it is broken by the intervention of the subsequentcauses. culpable homicide is murder. th 19 . P. which injury is. or- 29 K. nor the effect of injury. The latter is a lower degree of criminality than the former. Knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. in both the cases. of the injury are foreseen. Section 300. for rashness¶ imports a knowledge of the likely result of an act which the actor does in spite of the risk. the object is the same. in some cases. 158. when the accused fired his gun in the air to scare away the opposite party and in the act one stray pellet caused gunshot wound to a person killing him).S. if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death-Knowledge in comparison to intention is strong word-and imports a certainty and not means a probability. or if the time gap between the act and the death is too long. be taken toknow that he is likely to cause death (e. the law does not make any distinction in punishment. For example.

It applies to those special cases where the person injured is in such a condition or state of health that his death would be likely to be caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound health and where the person inflicting the injuryknows that owing to such condition or state of health. Vibhute. Clause 3. Here the offender knows that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death of the person.will be the likely consequence of the intended injury30.If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must. 10 ed. (ed. in all probability.I. p. th 20 .²In case of an offence falling under this clause the mental attitude of the accused is two-fold. having knowledge that a person was suffering from some disease or was of unsound health. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW.). but which with the special knowledge of the diseased condition of the deceased. there is the subjective knowledge that death .´Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause.If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and thebodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature tocause death.3rdly:. cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. he is likely to cause the death of the person injured. 30 K. A case would fall under this clause if the offender. 101. If the probability of death µis very great then the requirement of third clauseare satisfied and the fact that a particular individual may because of specially ski1led treatment or being in possession of a particularly strong constitution have survived an injury. or4thly:.² Where a man intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Here knowledge on the part of the offender imports certainty and not merely a probability. causes hurt to him which may not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death had the deceased been of sound health. death´. there is intention to cause bodily harm and secondly. and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 2011. First. Clause (1) Intention of Causing Death:-As of Culpable homicide Clause 2²With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender know be likely to cause death. he would be liable for murder. his assailant must have known to be likely to cause his death.

He was granted special leave to the Supreme Court on the following: Issue: On the finding of High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner The court gave a four-point test which prosecution must observe and prove in order to bring i) First. 300.Gaur. These are purely objective investigations. culpable homicide is 31 32 AIR 1958 SC 465 th K.This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do withthe intention of the offender. of course. Medical Report: The injury was a punctured wound 2. it the must establish.x transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal. 2008. These observations of Vivian Bose. thirdly32. or that some other kindof injury was intended.D. have become locus classicus. 21 . Virsa Singh vs.The appellant was convicted by the first court under section 302 IPC and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. It is mainly after this judgment that clear guidelines were provided for the application of this section.which would prove fatal to the majority of persons subjected to it. iv) Fourthly. p. case quite under objectively. it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of thethree elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 162. it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodilyinjury. Once these three elements are proved to be present. Three coils of intestine were also coming out. State of Punjab31 Facts: The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. iii) Thirdly. There was only one injury on his person. is not enough to prove that such an injury is not ³sufficient in the ordinary course of nature´ to cause death. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and. the nature of the injury must be proved. J. the enquiryproceeds further and. This four point test is applied in many such subsequent cases . that a this bodily injury is section: present. that it was not accidental or unintentional. TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. that is to say. 4 ed. The doctor said that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. which was a result of a spear thrust. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC. ii) Secondly.

(a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury. then the intention is to kill and in that event. and did not extend to the intention of causing death.V Chandrachud. th Ratanlal & Dhirajlal.e. not only to the bodily injury inflicted. Bharat Law House. Ratanlal & Dheerajlal.34" 33 Y. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which. New Delhi. the offence would be murder. The court read the clause 3 of section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intentionbeing read as linked to the second part in the following way::. According to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case. The argument that prosecution must prove an intention to inflict only that kind of injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature was found to be fallacious by the court. The intent requirement The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a given case whether offence involved is murder or not . that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted33. 2007. Law of Crimes. 124. the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the section.If there is an intention toinflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.? Court totally disagreed with such an argument calling it to be a fallacious argument. even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. namely . was sufficient to cause death. p. in the ordinary course of nature. 1860. 30th ed. pp. A commentary on the Indian Penal Code. viz. It was argued that the intention that the section requires must be related. and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.murder. 26 Edition. 2008. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. but also to the clause. Supreme Court also discussed the intent element required for this section in great detail. "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.1851 34 22 .

PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. (ed." It must. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. What needs to be proved is that the accused had an intention to cause the same bodily injury found to be present on the person of deceased which was later found to be sufficient to cause death. 2011." The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section. the enquiry shifts to the next clause . intention is only linked up and is restricted to the causing of the bodily injury and not to the knowledge or intention of causing such bodily injury that is sufficient to cause bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. thirdly."and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under s. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. 169. but when it comes to the question of intention. the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. 300. of course. It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will 35 K. first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be established. 10 ed. then any person could always plead that he never had an intention to cause such a injury and it would have been very difficult to prove him wrong35.I. Such a principle is based on broad lines of common sense because if intention is considered to be of causing an injury which is sufficient to cause death. Then it is the later part of the enquiry which is objective in nature to find out that whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not.In our opinion. th 23 . Thus.). These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction and to that extent the enquiry is objective. p. Vibhute. that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present. So the crux is that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to inflict the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but that he had an intention to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the body of the deceased. The first is subjective to the offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person. Once that is found.

¶ However.be likely to cause death. When such an act is done with the knowledge that death might be the probable result and without any excuse for including the risk of causing death or injury as is likely to cause death. there being the greater intention or knowledge of the fatal 36 . and they can only escape if it can be shown. No one has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. However. Thus a man who strikes another in the throat with a knife. as a matter of purely objective inference. The true difference lies in the degree. If they inflict injuries of that kind. NELSON S INDIAN PENAL CODE. the act done must be accompanied with the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (i) death.). the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether. or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. as they are defined in forms closely resembling each other and at times it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two. Further. the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.²This clause comprehends generally the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all probability cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 24 . Difference B/W Culpable Homicide and Murder:According to Sir James Stephen the definition of culpable homicide and murder are the weakest part of the Code. Further. must be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to the life of the person at whom he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to cause that person¶s death.1. the accused must have committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of (a) causing death or (b) such injury as is likely to cause death. 9th ed.e. p. the offence is murder.g. Sarvaria. Clause 4²Knowledge of imminently dangerous act. µas the causing of death¶ is common to both. they must face the consequences. 2003. Vol. This clause applies to cases of dangerous action without an intention to cause specific bodily injury to any person. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be proved. the difference between culpable homicide and murder is real though very fine and based upon a very subtle distinction of the intention and knowledge involved in these crimes. R.K.. 669. (ed. or (ii) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. furious driving or firing at a target near the public road36. there must necessarily be criminal intention or knowledge in both culpable homicide and murder.A.

'culpable homicide of the first degree'. attempt to explain this difference. Then. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.K.C. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'.consequences in the one case than the other. 9 ed. if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections.A. following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is. I. R. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The first is. the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide37.With the intention of causing death.1. p. th 25 . Vol. there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. Sarvaria.). This is the greatest form of culpable homicide. (ed. 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence. Murder Section 300 With the intention of causing death 37 S. The confusion is caused. also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. For the purpose of fixing punishment. Speaking generally. allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. 668.P. The four cases describing the offence under section 300. what may be called. 2003. NELSON S INDIAN PENAL CODE. Culpable Homicide section 299 . The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300.

P.C. if the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely.C. either from peculiarity of constitution. who is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death. As given in Illustration (b) to section 300. injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. 38 (1877) ILR 1 Bom 342 26 . Reg Versus govinda38:(i) Death caused intentionally: Murder: Clause (a) to section 299 I. [Illustration (a) to section 300(1). is found in theitalicized words. (ii) Injury caused resulting in death knowing the peculiar conditions of the victim ² Murder: Clause (2) to section 300: The essence of clause (2) to section 300. and clause (1) to section 300. with the intention of causing bodily injury With the intention of causing such bodily as is likely to cause death . I. show that where there is an intention to kill. cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. A is guilty of murder. and commits such act without C.. where A knowingly with intention of causing death strikes Z. or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must.C. ----------If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any personand the bodily injury intended to beinflicted is sufficient in the ordinarycourse of nature to cause death. or immature age or other special circumstances could be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. in all probability. and Z dies in consequence of the blow. the offence is always murder. LP. The offence is murder.P.

although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. it may be said that the thing may µprobably happen¶.P. For example.: Clause (c) to section 299. the offence does not fall within the definition of murder but Culpable homicide 39 (2002 (7) SCC 175) 27 . The word µlikely¶ means µprobably¶. nevertheless death has resulted. I. when the chances of its happening are almost certain.C. (iii) Risk to human life resulting in Death (a)if death likely result²Culpable homicide (b) if t²Murder: Clause (c) to section 299.P.P. and clause (4) to section 300. it is murder. If death is a likely result. it is murder [Illustration (d) to 3001.P. I.P. I. The determining factor is the international injury which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. that is to say. it is culpable homicide [Illustration (b) to 299]. and sometimes both are relevant. and clause (4) to section 300. Sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is intended. I. is intended to apply to cases in which there is no intention to cause death.C. sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused.C. death caused as a result of furious driving will be culpable homicide. When the chances of the happening of a thing are fifty-fifty. I. if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. y Abdul waheed khan V/s state of Andhra Pradesh39 (iv) Injury likely to cause death²Culpable homicide: and Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death²Murder clause (b) to section 299 and clause (iii)to section 300: It is on a comparison of clause (b) to section 299 and clause (iii) to section 300 that the decision of doubtful cases like the present must generally depend. If the intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. the probability of death is not so high. It is culpable homicide if the bodily injury intended is likely to cause death. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used. if it is the most probable result. it is said that it will µmost probably happen¶.C. whereas death caused as a result of firing at a mark near a public road would be a case of murder under section 300.C. In such a case whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon degree of risk to human life. the offence is murder.

and the like. refers to personal knowledge. The knowledge used in clause (c) to section 299. 2011.). The difference between the two clauses relate to the words: (i) µlikely to cause death¶ in section 299 clause (c). Vibhute. clause (4).P. 10 ed. p.( William Slaney case) Knowledge v.C. In such and like cases. I.The distinction between knowledge and intention. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. as to when an act is culpable homicide and murder by reason of the act being done with the knowledge described in the respective clauses. I.C. For example. This clause is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause death of any particular person. I. The distinction between the terms 'knowledge' 40 41 [2009] INSC 1140 th K.C.I. and property that place the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by intention.P.P. 153. It is designed to provide for rarest of rare cases wherein the accused puts. but the act is done with such callousness towards the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. where death is caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd[vide lllustratiod7]. and clause (4) to section 300. Intention:. or by opening the grid of a bridge just as a railway passenger train is about to pass over it. or by poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water.41 Knowledge in the context of Section 299 would.. 28 .P. I. the imminently dangerous act.¶ (under section 300. the extreme depravity of mind regardless ness of sanctity of human life.not amounting to murder or something less. and clause (4) to section 300. inter alia. mean consciousness or realization or understanding. I.P. in jeopardy lives of many persons as envisaged in illustration (d) to section 300. and (ii) µmust in all probability cause death.²The Code contemplates in clause (c) to section 299. Relate to the Degree of knowledge of the consequences.C. (ed. The fourth clause to section 300 contemplates the doing of an imminently dangerous act in general and not the doing of any bodily harm to any particular individual.( Virsa Singh V/s state of Punjab) and (jagriti Devi V/s State of Himachal Pardesh 40) (v) Distinction between section 299(c) and section 300 clause (4).C.

1860. injury by a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. State of Punjab. it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions as used in these provisions.and 'intention' again is a difference of degrees. the accused could have been barely aware i. in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder. the court observed that42 : In all these cases. The accused must be aware of the consequences of his act. State of Punjab (1981). 29 . only had knowledge of the consequences.e. It is the 'knowledge' or 'intention' with which the act is done that makes difference. Jagtar Singh v. the Court referred to the decisions of this Court in the cases of Kulwant Rai v. Therefore. State of Tamil Nadu (1984). grappling etc. 'intention' is different from 'motive' or 'ignorance' or' negligence'. (1981). as mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury i. These circumstances under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at least a doubt arose that all his 42 42 INDIAN PENAL CODE. State of Punjab (1982). Tholan v. to say that he desired expressly that such injury only should be the result. Gurmail Singh v. An inference of knowledge that it is likely to cause death must be arrived at keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in each case. The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered Where murder is caused by a single blow In the case of Jai Prakash.e. State of Punjab (1983). It is held in all these cases that there was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances. Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention connotes a conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and summed up into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a particular and specific end which the human mind conceives and perceives before itself. Randhir Singh v.

There. accused gave a single fatal blow with knife on the chest on the left side of the sternum between the costal joint of the 6th and 7th ribs. A single blow may.).mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular result. entail conviction under Section 302 IPC.I. it may be pointed out that there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. State of M. in some cases. 153. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. Vibhute. th 30 . the weapon used. conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code was upheld by the High Court and when appeal was brought to Supreme Court by Special Leave. The nature of the injury. 2011. In the case of Mahesh Balmiki alias Munna v. while confirming the conviction under Section 302. whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body. the circumstances in which the injury in caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him.43" 43 K. 10 ed. (ed.P. in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326 IPC. pericardium. court observed: "Adverting to the contention of a single blow. (1999). fracturing both the ribs and track of the wound going through the sternum. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. p. anterior and posterior after passing the ribs and thereafter entering the liver and perforating a portion of stomach.

It appeared as if the victim was drunk and the accused dragged him with no intention to assault.44 During the quarrel the accused dragged the victim by holding his hand. 44 45 Devasahayam.Conclusion Section 321 and explanation of section 322 make it clear that either the ingredients of intention or that of knowledge must be essentially present in order to constitute the offence of hurt. Determining the intention becomes important in determining. It could be inferred that the accused did not intend to cause grievous hurt. the situation became very clear. But it is not a rule that. Courts while determining the required intention give due caution to the circumstances in which the incident occurred. where it is caused by a single blow there cannot be any intention to cause murder and would fall under culpable homicide. whether the act is murder or not. in rem (1962) 1 MLJ Dalapati Majhi 1982 Cri LJ 134 31 . whereby the victim fell down and sustained leg injuries. Determination of intention becomes difficult where a single blow has caused murder. conviction under section 325 was liable to be set aside.45 After the judgment in Virsa Singh's case. Therefore. but grievous hurt ensued unexpectedly.

32nd ed. 9th ed. 4. THE TEXT BOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE.. . 6. 10. P 377 7. Thomson Reuters. Vol 2 . RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. . JS Honrby. RA Nelson. 10th edn. 1860 .BIBLIOGRAPHY Books: 1. Oxford University Press. Lexis Nexis Butterworth.. 4th ed. . Universal Law Publication House. 5. RP Kataria and SKA Naqvi .. PENAL LAW OF INDIA . 4th ed. CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS. New Delhi. Bryan A Garnar. Justice M. . Sweet and Maxwell. 11. 11th ed. 12. Alan Reed & Ben Fitzpatrick . CRIMINAL LAW . OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER¶S DICTIONARY.Vol 3 . COMMENTARY ON THE INDIA PENAL CODE. Editor VR Manohar. KD Gaur. 5th ed.. Lexis nexis Butterworths. Vol 3. Lexis nexis Butterworths. 10th ed. BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY. Butterworth Lexis Nexis. 9. Premier Publishing Company. KI Vibhute. AN ANALYTICAL AND EXHAUSTIVE COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. 2nd ed. KD Gaur. 8. Vol 2 . 12. Law publishers India Pvt Ltd. 2010 . Kamal Law House Calcutta. 32 . 3.. 2. 7th ed.L Singhal & Sabiha . PSA PILLAI¶S CRIMINAL LAW . Orient Publishing Company. Dr Hari Singh Gour¶s . 9th ed. INDIAN PENAL CODE. INDIAN PENAL CODE . Vol 2 . Basu¶s INDIAN PENAL CODE. Ashoke Law House . 1st ed. J S Sarkar .

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