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Research methodology

1.1 A brief overview of the Research Project Ordinarily law makes no provisions for a situation which is considered instinctively natural for human beings. If some individuals create some situations, which usually human beings do not create, the society has a tendency to look down upon them as being uncommon or unnatural and this attitude is reflected in the laws. Whether those acts bring any particular harm or not the society shows its disapproval by declaring such acts as proscribed ones. This becomes evident when one examines the penal codes.1 This project deals with the offences of Hurt and Grievous Hurt and is titled µDifference between the Hurt and Grievous Hurt¶. Both of these are offences under the Indian Penal Code 1860. 1.2 Chapterisation and the Aim of Each Chapter This project has been divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the project and gives a general idea about the project as well as the scope and limitations, the method of research. The second chapter deals with the offence of Hurt and discusses Section 319 of the IPC. The researcher has briefly touched upon bigamy as a matrimonial offence and has subjected it to analysis by examining judgments of various courts in this regard. The various lacunae in the law have also been emphasized. The third chapter deals with the offence of Grievous hurt at length. It examines Section 320 and also how adultery becomes a ground for divorce. Case laws have also been discussed at appropriate places to examine the application of this law. The fourth chapter deals with a comparative analysis of the offences of Hurt and Grievous Hurt and studies the obvious as well as subtle differences between the two. The fifth chapter deals with the latest development in the evolution of law i.e the bill which recommends addition of s.326A and 326B, dealing with offence of acid attacks and subsequent punishment. The last chapter is the conclusion and it also discusses the recommendations of various law commissions for amending these laws to make them more effective. Some other solutions have also been discussed in this chapter.

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K N Chandrasekharan Pillai , ³COMMENT ON RATHINAM V. UNION OF INDIA´ (1995) SCC (Jour) 1

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Scope, Limitations and Method of Research The researcher has tried to widen the scope of her research by delving into the historical

evolution of these laws. Also, the researcher has tried to add a practical aspect the project by discussing it with lawyers and experts in the field of criminal law. Even though the scope of this study was very vast, due to the paucity of space, the researcher has restricted her discussion of these offences to India. This research is basically doctrinal as the researcher has relied on secondary sources of information like books, journals, commentaries and bare acts. The researcher also studied a number of articles in order to formulate a firm opinion about these topics. A lot of ideas that have been put forth in this research paper are from the researcher¶s own understanding of the topic and from what he has learnt in the various classes on Criminal Law. The researcher has put in sincere efforts to make this research project as informative as possible and a potential source of learning.

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Chapter:1 Case Analysis In the case of Virsa Singh v. state the appeal made was Appeal by special leave from the
judgment and order dated November 21, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1956, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ferozepore in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1956. Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant. N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. 1958. March 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered byBOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh. He was granted special leave to appeal by this Court but the leave is limited to " the question that on the finding accepted by the Punjab High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner." The appellant was tried with five others under sss. 302/49, 324/149 and 323/149 Indian Penal Code. He was also charged individually under s. 302. The other, were acquitted of the murder charge by the first Court but were convicted under ss. 326, 324 and 323 read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code. On appeal to the High Court they were all acquitted. The appellant was convicted by the first Court under s. 302 and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both Courts are agreed that the appellant caused it. It was caused as the result of a spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Singh, while he was still alive, said that it was " a punctured wound 2" x 1/2" transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal. He also said that " Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound." The incident occurred about 8 p. m. on July 13, 1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following day. The doctor who conducted the postmortem described the injury as3

. The researcher in his Project will try to find out the difference between Hurt and Grievous hurt .. at various places. and will try to cure the ambiguity between the two. 4 . 13" above the left inguinal ligament... The injury was through the whole thickness of the abdominal wall.. and digested food was flowing out from three cuts. Flakes of pus were sticking round the small intestines and there were six cuts.." The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Peritonitis was present and there was digested food in that cavity..." an oblique incised stitched wound 21/2" on the lower part of left side of belly.

castration.Chapter 2: Rational. µDisfiguration¶ ± the word µdisfigure¶ in this section means to do a man some external injury which detracts from his personal appearance. . the hurt has to be regarded as grievous hurt because of what has been stated in the clause 24.Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. A person causing grievous hurt to himself does not come within the purview of this section. 1860 Madho Singh (1878) PR No. . but does not weaken him as the cutting off a man¶s nose or ears. - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. Sixthly.Permanent Privation of the hearing of either ear Fourthly. µEmasculation¶. As defined under section 320 of Indian Penal Code. .Emasculation. Fifthly. Scope and Components of Grievous hurt The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous"2 First. A person emasculating himself cannot be convicted under this section3.Privation of any member or joint. section 373 3 2 5 .Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.the term µemasculation¶ means the depriving a person of masculine vigor. .5 Seventhly. Thirdly. Injury to the scrotum would render a man impotent. Secondly. -Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Losing eye-sight ± where as many as twenty four persons lost there yes-sight permanently in consequence of arrack distributed by the accused after mixing methyl alcohol in it . 22 of 1878 4 Chandrasenan E K AIR 1995 SC 1066 5 Law Commissioners 1st report.

It is however not necessary that in order that there should be a fracture. though a defective criterion. there is fracture. in apportioning the punishment.8 Twenty days bodily pain ± ³ after a long consideration we have determined to give the name of grievous bodily hurt to all hurt which cause the sufferer to be in pain.1851 7 6 6 .7 The line between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and grievous hurt is a very thin and subtle one. but in cases where hurt has been caused without assault. during the space of twenty days. we take into consideration both the extent of the hurt and the intention of the offender. 26th Edition. or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.6 Eighthly.. the entire depth of bone should be broken. µAny hurt which endangers life¶ ± these words donot apply to cases in which life was not merely endangered but actually taken away. Law of Crimes. than that offences some of which approach in enormity to Labh Singh Crim. 1860. Abdul Wahab AIR 1946 Bombay 38 9 ibid 10 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal.p. . To draw such a line between with perfect accuracy is absolutely impossible. New Delhi.´9 Rational behind the section± the authors of the code observe10: ³we have found it very difficult to draw a line between those bodily hurts which are serious and those which are slight. which may. diseased or unable to pursue his ordinary avocation. 141 of 1956 Marimuthu AIR 1924 Mad 41 8 Government of Bombay v. Appeal No. With propriety be employed not merely in cases where violence has been used. diseased or unable to pursue his ordinary avocation. 2007. When any portion of the bone is broken off and there is a cleft or rupture. we think. but it as far better that such a line should be drawn. Bharat Law House. A commentary on the Indian Penal Code.µFractured or dislocation of a bone¶ ± fracture in common parlance means breaking through.Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain. in the other the injuries must be such as endangers life. It appears to us that the length of time during which the sufferer is in pain. though rudely. In the first case the injuries must be such as are likely to cause death.

whereas section 320 defines µgrievous hurt¶ To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. nor do they endanger life. should be classed together. and coming within the eight kinds enumerated in this section. A beating.13 12 Budri Roy (1875) 23 WR (Cr) 65 Sital AIR 1935 Oudh 468 13 Sham Behera AIR 1953 Ori 308 11 7 . nor dislocate them. distinguished by a broad and obvious line from slight hurts. nor deprives him of a member or a joint. and of which the traces disappear in a day. voluntarily inflicted. Such a beating. 11 When a person forcibly thrust lathi into the rectum of another person and causes serious injuries. A wound.12 Injuries inflicted with the help of burning firewood cannot be considered as grievous hurt as they donot come within the specific items of the injuries mentioned in the definition of grievous hurt. Some hurts which are not. nor blinds him. again . he was held guilty of causing grievous hurt. nor breaks his bones. this section is also in the nature of definite clause. Section 319 defines hurt. may nevertheless be most serious. may yet cause intense pain. for example.´ Scope ± like in section 319. prolonged disease. nor destroys his hearing. which neither emasculates the sufferer. it is clear. mad scratch which he headed by just sticking plaster. which does not maim the sufferer or break his bones may be so cruel as to bring him to point of death. like those kinds of hurt which are mentioned in condition 1 to 7. there must be some specific hurt. which requires only to be bathed with vinegar. lasting injury to constitution. ought not to be confounded with a bruise.murder. It is evidently desirable that law should make a distinction between such a wound. while others are little more than frolics which a good natures man would hardly recent.

14 Such a knowledge can be inferred from t he part of body chosen for inflicting violence and the severity of that violence as shown by the injuries on the body of the victim. is said "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt".-.Voluntarily causing hurt. But he is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind. A magistrate dealing with charges of voluntarily causing grievous hurt must consider and decide not only whether grievous hurt has been caused but if it has been caused voluntarily or himself knew to be likely to cause grievous hurt. If he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt . The provisions of this section are very precise and incapable of misconstruction.Chapter 3: Difference between Hurt and Grievous hurt Section 321 . .15 The means by which the injury was caused is not the true criterion.16 14 15 Devasahayam. must be essentially present in order to constitute the offence of hurt.Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person. and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt. Section 321 and the explanation to section 322 make it clear that either the ingredient of intention or that of knowledge. and does thereby cause hurt to any person. he cannot be convicted under section 325. The answer really depends on the nature of the injury caused and the manner in which the blows were administered. is said "voluntarily to cause hurt". Explanation. in re (1962) 1 MLJ 161 Gangda 1975 Cri LJ 1445 (Raj) 16 Ramban Mahton AIR 1958 Pat 452 8 . or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person. Section 322 ± Whoever voluntarily causes hurt. he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind. whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon.A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. if the hurt with the intention to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt.

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year. except in the case provided for by section 335. except in the case provided for by section 334.´ The prosecution must prove : (i) 17 18 That the accused caused hurt of any kind described in section 320 Ramakrishna Panicker AIR 1959 Ker 372 Babu Bika Jadhav 1996 Cri LJ 3952 (Bom) 19 Bikash Chand Mondal 1984 Cri LJ 1191 (Cal) 9 . voluntarily causes hurt. voluntarily causes grievous hurt. nor did the accused have knowledge that it was likely to cause grievous hurt or death.17 Where the accused was one of the persons who assaulted the deceased with a stick but there was no proof that the fatal blow or grievous injury was caused by him. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt ³Whoever. he is guilty of causing hurt and not death.19 Section 325. and shall also be liable to fine. even though death is caused. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt Whoever. it was held. or with both. When the injury is not serious and there was no intention to cause death or grievous hurt.Difference between punishments for µhurt¶ and µgrievous hurt¶ Section 323. shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years. the accused could only be convicted under section 323. or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.18 Where evidence gave no clue as to on which part of the body of deceased the accused has struck and prosecution also could not establish that the death of deceased was caused by striking on some vital body . that the accused could only be convicted under section 323.

Section 320 has very clearly laid down hurt which are to be classified as grievous hurt and the eighthly clause is the only one in which some interpretation and misuse is possible. It can safely inferred that the boxer µknew¶ if not µintended¶ that if he µpunches¶ a person twice in his stomach. This is only a case of simple hurt as the person had only slapped and in ordinary course of things it would not lead to death. or knew that he was likely. In this case it is very clearly evident from the circumstances that the intention was to cause to grievous hurt as he was a µboxer¶ and he µpunched¶ twice. Although there is a huge fundamental difference the offence of hurt and grievous hurt. An illustration in this respect can be that if a person slaps another person and he falls down. they are not that minutely followed in practical application. to cause grievous hurt of any kind described.299 and then move on to s. but it takes a little more for the prosecution to prove grievous hurt because the defense would always like to bring the injury from s. hitting his head on the ground which results in his death.319 in order to prove grievous hurt under s.319 because the punishment and fine imposed in much less.320 as they have to prove homicide under s. Now let us consider another case. (iii) That the accused did so voluntarily Where there is no evidence to indicate as to which of the accused persons actually caused grievous hurt none of them could be convicted under section 325. Going by the language of the section 319. The person falls down. Although intention can be inferred from the way in which the injury was caused. 20 Dipa AIR 1947 All 408 10 . The only catch in this section is the intention part. a boxer µpunches¶ a person in his stomach twice.(ii) That the accused intended.300 in order to prove murder. heads hits the ground and he dies.20 The prosecution does not have to prove hurt under s. there is no clear cut definition of hurt whereas on the contrary section 320 has defined which categories of hurt fall under grievous hurt.320 to s. It may be presumed that each of them intended to cause grievous hurt but such a presumption alone is not sufficient to establish the offence of causing grievous hurt unless it is further shown that the accused actually caused grievous hurt. but in practice. it will cause grievous hurt if not death.

326 the offence can be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years. C.pd AIR 1958 Pat 452 11 . shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 7 years and shall also be liable to a minimum of Rs. Patna. 1956. Therefore there is no need for categorization of various forms of disability. and sentencing 21 22 ncw.in/AnnualReports/200708/Eng/Annexure5.324 or 326 of the code. convicting the appellant under Section 325. non-bailable and non-compoundable. if he by that act caused permanent or partial damage or deformity. I. Insertion of new section 326 B ± Attempt to throw or use acid in any form on the other personwhoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that . The State22 AIR 1958 Pat 452 This case came as an appeal from the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge. whoever does any act of throwing acid or using acid in any form on the other person with the intention of or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such person permanent or partial damage or deformity disfiguration or disability to any part of the body of such person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than TEN years but which may extend to life and shall also be liable to fine which shall be minimum of Rs. P.Chapter 4: Latest development Insertion of new section 326A ± throwing or using of acid in any form on the body of another person ± notwithstanding contained in s. it is proposed in the bill that at least the minimum punishment be not less than 10 years and extend to life imprisonment. dated 22nd December.320 and 326 of the IPC but keeping in view the extreme heinous nature of the act and the fact that under s.nic. disfiguration or disability to any part of the body of such person. Justification: although the offences relating to acid throwing is covered under s. Further using acid with intention or knowledge is a punishable offense irrespective of the nature and extend of injury. 1 lakh21 Case Analysis 1 : Rambaran Mahton v. 5 lakhs The offense shall be cognizable. 2 lakhs and may extend to Rs.

P. described "grievous hurt". It is in the following terms : "Whoever voluntarily causes hurt. C. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the existence of grievous hurt is not by itself adequate to complete the offence under Section 325 I. or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person. I. C. His contention is that apart from the grievous hurt. C. there must be on the part of the accused either intention to cause grievous hurt or likely knowledge to cause it. What is meant by the expression "voluntarily to cause hurt. Both of them were separate in mess and cultivation. Rambaran Mahton. that the necessary knowledge or intention to cause grievous hurt was lacking in this case. is said. Section 320 I. He did not dispute that some of the injuries on the deceased were grievous. on 29th May. Important question is what offence is disclosed by the evidence produced by the prosecution. 1956. is said "voluntarily to cause hurt" what will in law amount to voluntarily causing grievous hurt is described in Section 322 I. Nokhali. C. In his opinion the offence the appellant committed was grievous hurt under Section 325. the deceased." is laid down in Section321 I. He urged. Explanation: A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. M. however. and he sentenced him accordingly. It provides that whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person. This incident was the development of a domestic feud between the two full brothers over almost a trifle and which resulted in the death of one of them took place at 6 P.him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. Section 325 provides for punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. But he is said 12 . and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt. was the elder brother of the appellant. but the learned Additional Sessions Judge found that the charge of murder had not been established. C. The Judge entirely agreed with the counsel for the petitioner so far as the general proposition of law enunciated by him is concerned. voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. P. in village Soh within the Bihar Police Station. The charge initially against the appellant was of murder under Section 302. and does thereby cause hurt to any person. P. if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt. P. P.

he may safely be taken to have intended grievous hurt. then although grievous hurt may unexpectedly have ensued. and his contention was that in this case it cannot be said that grievous hurt was in contemplation of the accused." It states in clear terms that the offence of grievous hurt is not caused unless the offender both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. Appellant contended that at the time of the occurrence the appellant was admittedly without any weapon. " The appellant largely relied upon Explanation to Section 322. or knew himself. there must be complete correspondence between the result and the intention or the knowledge of the accused (3) the hurt was caused voluntarily. if intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind. he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind. a person cannot be held guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt even if it was in his contemplation. only assuming that grievous hurt was not in his contemplation. It will appear from Section 325 read with Section 322 I. When the act that he did in the process of causing hurt is such as any person of ordinary prudence knows it likely to cause grievous hurt. C. to be likely to cause. or at least to have contemplated grievous hurt as likely to occur. If the act was such that nothing more than simple hurt could reasonably be thought likely to ensue from it. P. If the hurt actually caused is simple. and assuming the entire prosecution case to be correct. Explanation to Section 322 really unfolds the significance of the expression "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. P. In other words. that the essential ingredients of the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. he assaulted him. to constitute the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. If he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt. the offender can be convicted of simple hurt. C.voluntarily to cause grievous hurt. Bearing in mind these underlying principles. This is quite obvious on the plain reading of Section 322 along with Section 325 I. grievous hurt. he cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 325 even if the resultant hurt was grievous. are three in number : (1) grievous hurt as described in Section 320 must first be caused. (2) the offender intended. only with fists and slaps 13 . the question is whether the appellant in this case intended to cause or had the knowledge of the likelihood of causing grievous hurt.

he should have known that he was likely thereby to cause grievous hurt to him. 49. The Judge did not agree with appellant on this point. It is true that the spleen was in enlarged condition. It appears that the blows must have been given with more than usual force. In my opinion. If in such circumstances a person belabours a man with fists and slaps. If it were. There will absolutely no justification for the appellant to strike him with strong fists and slaps when he neither retaliated nor tried to defend himself. that even slight force might have resulted in the rupture of the spleen.and therefore. While he was lying on the ground. While Nokhali was lying in such a helpless condition. the appellant. but it cannot be doubted that the way in which he assaulted his brother. He was wholly undefended. whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon. If the absence of injuries on the person of the appellant is indicative of anything it is this that Nokhali was completely in his grip. not even a scratch. 14 . assaulted him recklessly with fists and slaps on every part of his body. as it will be obvious to everybody of ordinary prudence. There could have been no intention on the part of the appellant to cause grievous hurt to his elder brother. He had sustained no injuries. unable either to strike him in self-defense or extricate himself from his hold. The means by which the injury was caused is not the true criterion. What was found in this case is that Nokhali had been dashed to the ground. the appellant sat on his stomach and administered him fists and slaps. As will appear from the opinion. of the doctor. P. the 23 Law Commission of India. as stated by the doctor. three of his ribs were fractured and the spleen was ruptured. and it is likely. it is I think obvious. so howsoever. These injuries could not have been caused unless blows were given to him with great force. But there is absolutely no explanation so far as the fracture of the ribs is concerned. The answer really depends upon the nature of the injury caused and the manner in which the blows were administered. that grievous hurt would ensue. 1971. the provisions of Section 325 will not be attracted if no weapon was used in causing it. This is not all. FORTY-SECOND REPORT: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE . totally. the appellant could not possibly have known that the consequence of his act was grievous hurt23. grievous an injury may be.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge took into consideration these special features of the case and for that reason held him guilty not of murder but of causing grievous hurt. Judgment of the High Court-Having regard to the relationship between the parties and also the fact that this unfortunate incident occurred on the spur of the moment due to provocation given by the deceased himself and also considering the fact that there was absolutely no intention on the part of the appellant either to kill him or to cause him such bodily injury as was likely to cause his death. and the humane in him triumphed. It is indicative of the fact that remorse eventually overpowered him when passion subsided. The respondent had no business to go to plot 849 where the appellants along with his mother and sisters were carrying on irrigation work peacefully. C. The evidence shows that he gave him water to drink and also sprinkled water upon his body in order to bring him to his senses. 153. after Nokhali became senseless. These very circumstances also call for a lenient consideration of his case. (ed. Further.offence that was caused in this case was grievous hurt. The ends of justice will be sufficiently met if he is awarded one year's rigorous imprisonment. Vibhute. too severe.). He stayed on to tend him. Counsel for the appellant contended that even if the offence came within the purview of Section 325 the sentence of five years was in the circumstances of the case. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW.24 Lastly. the sentence from five years' rigorous imprisonment was decreased to one year's rigorous imprisonment 24 K. They show that the appellant beat his brother under great provocation given by the deceased himself and in the heat of the moment. P. I. Therefore. th 15 . 10 ed..I. It is common ground that plot 849 which was the venue of the occurrence did not belong to the deceased but that it had been allotted exclusively to his mother who was admittedly residing with the appellant. as contemplated by Section 325. p. 2011. he did not forsake him and leave the place.

P. which is the gravest form of culpable homicide and is termed µmurder¶. and then murder (section 300. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added25. 16 . Exceptions 1 to 5).Chapter 5Culpable homicide and Murder Culpable homicide²Meaning. homicide classified murder classes:² 300). l. These are:² (i) Culpable homicide of the first degree. to either of which fine may be added.P.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is the genus. FORTY-SECOND REPORT: THE INDIAN PENAL CODE . 1971.C. the Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide. (b) by doing an act. and Culpable homicide section (ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299.²The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide simpliciter (section 299. 25 Law Commission of India. (iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree. is culpable homicide Culpable (i) not amounting may to murder broadly amounting (Section be to 300. The residuary of culpable homicide after the special characteristics of murder have been removed from it. Essential ingredients of Culpable Homicide :(a) Causing of death. clauses (i) and (ii) is punishable under section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years. Exceptions into ( two I to 5).C. For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence. which is defined in section 299. (ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) as defined in section 300.) which is a species of culpable homicide. I.P. clause (iii) and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both. 97.

Death caused of person other than intended.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. it will not amount to culpable homicide unless the above conditions are satisfied.S. p. B accordingly obtains poison from A and gives it to his mother in a roasted apple.P. p. But the person would not be set free.¶ A).A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. 155. or it may respire so imperfectly that it may be difficult to obtain clear proof that respiration has taken place.²In order to hold a person liable under the impugned section there must be causing of death of a human being as defined under Section 46. A counsels B to poison his mother. 17 . or (iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.P. The clause µthough the child may not have breathed¶ suggests that a child may be born alive. ( The word "death" denotes the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context).Vibhute.I. Causing death.C depending on the gravity of the injury. P. child and at least partially an infant under delivery or just delivered27. He would be punishable for causing miscarriage either under section 312 or 315. 10th ed. Causing of death must be of a living human being which means a living man. though he never 26 27 K.I. woman. The act of causing death amounts to culpable homicide if any part of that child has been brought forth. (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. (b) Thus though an act may cause death. appended to section 299.²To attract the provisions of this section it suffices if the death of a human being is caused whether the person was intended to be killed or not. 10 ed.Vibhute. though it may not breath (respire). But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child. P. For instance. The act of A amounts to murder by B. th K. The mother gives the apple to a child of B. if any part of that child has been brought forth. not knowing it contains poison.C. 2009. The causing of death of a child in the mother¶s womb is not homicide as stated in Explanation 3 The causing of the death of child in the mother's womb is not homicide26. 162. though the child may not have breathed or been completely born. I. 2009.(c) the act of causing death must be done:² (i) with the intention of causing death. though the child may not have breathed or been completely born. I.S. and the child eats it and dies.

C. Intention².I. it means an actual intention.Vibhute. such as by poisoning. or turns out to be. illustration (a) to section 299 says that a person can be guilty of culpable homicide by causing the death of a person whose death he did not intend. The existence of intention is not to be inferred unless death follows as a natural and probable consequence from the act An intention also includes foresight of certainty. 10 ed. etc. The connection between the µact¶ and the death caused by the act must he direct and distinct. which injury is.P.C.S. Similarly. Thus. such as a parent not supplying food and medical care to his child. Hence. the existing intention of the moment.²Death may be caused by a hundred and one means. beating and so on and so forth. existence f some previous design. 2009. but illegal omissions as well. 159. and though not immediate it 28 K. With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death-It means an intention to cause a particular injury. the word µact¶ has been given a wider meaning in the Code inasmuch as it includes not only an act of commission. By doing an Act.intended to kill the child (section 301. I. drowning. Thus a deliberate firing by a loaded gun at once leads to inference that the intention was to cause death. where a Life Guard on Swimming poll. p. As explained under section 32. where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused. B). nature of theweapon used. a husband starving his wife.). one likely to cause death. striking. Intention does not imply assume the. th 18 . the force and numberof blows. the part of the body on which the blow was given. The legal maxim is that everyone must be presumed to intend the normal consequences of his act.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. Illustration (a) to this section shows that a person can be guilty of culpable homicide of a person whose death he did not intend28 .¶ that results in the voluntary causing of the child¶s and wife¶s death. Intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties (viz. The intension means expectation of consequence in question. P. For instances.P. not following his duty and that¶s caused death of person. A consequence is deemed to be intended though it is not desired when it is foreseen as substantially certain. 1. it is immaterial to go into the question of whether the accused had intention to cause death.). death may also be caused by neglect of duty. Intention of causing death is not the intention of causing the µdeath of any particular person.

or if the time gap between the act and the death is too long. p. except in the most extraordinary circumstances. or- 29 K. Murder Except in the cases hereinafter excepted.Vibhute. µor if it is broken by the intervention of the subsequentcauses. if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. the above condition is not fulfilled. in some cases. 2009.S. gross negligence may amount to knowledge29. the law does not make any distinction in punishment. The word µknowledge¶ includes all cases ofrash acts by which death is caused.must not be too remote. one likely to cause death. or2ndly:. If the connection between the act and death is obscure or if it is obscured by concurrent causes. But as. It is not the death itself which is intended. of the injury are foreseen. for rashness¶ imports a knowledge of the likely result of an act which the actor does in spite of the risk.If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. 10 ed. culpable homicide is murder. in both the cases. th 19 . It is not necessary that the consequences.A PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW.. nor the effect of injury.g. Section 300. A person who voluntarily inflicts injury such as to endanger life must always. which injury is. Knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. 158. where The accused kills a person by hitting him under the belief that he was hitting at a ghost. the object is the same. The latter is a lower degree of criminality than the former. For example. be taken toknow that he is likely to cause death (e. when the accused fired his gun in the air to scare away the opposite party and in the act one stray pellet caused gunshot wound to a person killing him). The expression µintention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death¶ merely means an intention to cause a particular injury. P.The difference between the two expressions µintention of causing death¶ and µintention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death¶ is a difference of degrees in criminality. With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death-Knowledge in comparison to intention is strong word-and imports a certainty and not means a probability.I. or turns out to be.

in all probability.3rdly:. Here knowledge on the part of the offender imports certainty and not merely a probability. 10 ed. First. death´. A case would fall under this clause if the offender. and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW.´Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause.If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must. cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 101. or4thly:. his assailant must have known to be likely to cause his death.). If the probability of death µis very great then the requirement of third clauseare satisfied and the fact that a particular individual may because of specially ski1led treatment or being in possession of a particularly strong constitution have survived an injury. causes hurt to him which may not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death had the deceased been of sound health.I. Vibhute. 30 K. there is the subjective knowledge that death . It applies to those special cases where the person injured is in such a condition or state of health that his death would be likely to be caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound health and where the person inflicting the injuryknows that owing to such condition or state of health. there is intention to cause bodily harm and secondly. p.will be the likely consequence of the intended injury30. (ed. but which with the special knowledge of the diseased condition of the deceased.² Where a man intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Here the offender knows that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death of the person. he is likely to cause the death of the person injured. th 20 . Clause (1) Intention of Causing Death:-As of Culpable homicide Clause 2²With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender know be likely to cause death.²In case of an offence falling under this clause the mental attitude of the accused is two-fold. 2011. he would be liable for murder. having knowledge that a person was suffering from some disease or was of unsound health.If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and thebodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature tocause death. Clause 3.

or that some other kindof injury was intended. culpable homicide is 31 32 AIR 1958 SC 465 th K. the enquiryproceeds further and. iii) Thirdly. is not enough to prove that such an injury is not ³sufficient in the ordinary course of nature´ to cause death. These are purely objective investigations. These observations of Vivian Bose. 4 ed. which was a result of a spear thrust. that is to say. Medical Report: The injury was a punctured wound 2. ii) Secondly. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC.D. case quite under objectively. Three coils of intestine were also coming out. The doctor said that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and. it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of thethree elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.The appellant was convicted by the first court under section 302 IPC and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. it the must establish. Once these three elements are proved to be present. TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. It is mainly after this judgment that clear guidelines were provided for the application of this section. the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. have become locus classicus. it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodilyinjury. Virsa Singh vs. 2008. This four point test is applied in many such subsequent cases . There was only one injury on his person. 21 .which would prove fatal to the majority of persons subjected to it. He was granted special leave to the Supreme Court on the following: Issue: On the finding of High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner The court gave a four-point test which prosecution must observe and prove in order to bring i) First. the nature of the injury must be proved. 300. that it was not accidental or unintentional. that a this bodily injury is section: present.Gaur. iv) Fourthly.x transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal. State of Punjab31 Facts: The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. J. p. thirdly32. of course. 162.This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do withthe intention of the offender.

Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point. Bharat Law House. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which. The court read the clause 3 of section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intentionbeing read as linked to the second part in the following way::. and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury. A commentary on the Indian Penal Code. pp. was sufficient to cause death. and did not extend to the intention of causing death. 30th ed.? Court totally disagreed with such an argument calling it to be a fallacious argument. the offence would be murder. then the intention is to kill and in that event.e. the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the section. Law of Crimes. 1860. 124. if both the following conditions are satisfied: i. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted33. namely . in the ordinary course of nature. Ratanlal & Dheerajlal.1851 34 22 .V Chandrachud. 2007.If there is an intention toinflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It was argued that the intention that the section requires must be related. even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The argument that prosecution must prove an intention to inflict only that kind of injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature was found to be fallacious by the court. The intent requirement The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a given case whether offence involved is murder or not .34" 33 Y. th Ratanlal & Dhirajlal. "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. p. but also to the clause. viz. not only to the bodily injury inflicted. 2008. According to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case. Supreme Court also discussed the intent element required for this section in great detail. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.murder. 26 Edition. New Delhi.

It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present. but when it comes to the question of intention. It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will 35 K. the enquiry shifts to the next clause . intention is only linked up and is restricted to the causing of the bodily injury and not to the knowledge or intention of causing such bodily injury that is sufficient to cause bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction and to that extent the enquiry is objective. Vibhute. Once that is found.I. p.). Such a principle is based on broad lines of common sense because if intention is considered to be of causing an injury which is sufficient to cause death. then any person could always plead that he never had an intention to cause such a injury and it would have been very difficult to prove him wrong35."and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 169. th 23 . Then it is the later part of the enquiry which is objective in nature to find out that whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not." The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section. 300. of course. The first is subjective to the offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person.In our opinion. thirdly. 10 ed." It must. 2011. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. So the crux is that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to inflict the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but that he had an intention to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the body of the deceased. first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be established. Thus. the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under s. (ed. What needs to be proved is that the accused had an intention to cause the same bodily injury found to be present on the person of deceased which was later found to be sufficient to cause death.

The true difference lies in the degree. This clause applies to cases of dangerous action without an intention to cause specific bodily injury to any person. the act done must be accompanied with the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (i) death.be likely to cause death.K. or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.A. 24 . Vol. or (ii) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. the offence is murder. Further. p. Further. there being the greater intention or knowledge of the fatal 36 .).e. Sarvaria. Thus a man who strikes another in the throat with a knife. 9th ed.. No one has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. However. When such an act is done with the knowledge that death might be the probable result and without any excuse for including the risk of causing death or injury as is likely to cause death. and they can only escape if it can be shown. they must face the consequences. as a matter of purely objective inference. Clause 4²Knowledge of imminently dangerous act.1.¶ However.²This clause comprehends generally the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all probability cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.g. the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether. 669. the difference between culpable homicide and murder is real though very fine and based upon a very subtle distinction of the intention and knowledge involved in these crimes. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be proved. (ed. must be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to the life of the person at whom he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to cause that person¶s death. 2003. furious driving or firing at a target near the public road36. µas the causing of death¶ is common to both. Difference B/W Culpable Homicide and Murder:According to Sir James Stephen the definition of culpable homicide and murder are the weakest part of the Code. R. NELSON S INDIAN PENAL CODE. the accused must have committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of (a) causing death or (b) such injury as is likely to cause death. as they are defined in forms closely resembling each other and at times it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two. there must necessarily be criminal intention or knowledge in both culpable homicide and murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind. the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Then. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide. 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'.1. 668. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. th 25 . I. p.C. 9 ed. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide37. For the purpose of fixing punishment.K. R. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is.).consequences in the one case than the other. Vol. Murder Section 300 With the intention of causing death 37 S. (ed. Sarvaria. The confusion is caused.P.With the intention of causing death. 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. The first is. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. 2003. proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence. what may be called.A. following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. Speaking generally. The four cases describing the offence under section 300. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. NELSON S INDIAN PENAL CODE. attempt to explain this difference. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Culpable Homicide section 299 . if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections.

38 (1877) ILR 1 Bom 342 26 . or immature age or other special circumstances could be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. and Z dies in consequence of the blow.C. is found in theitalicized words.C. who is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death. if the offender knows that the particular person injured is likely. show that where there is an intention to kill. cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. As given in Illustration (b) to section 300. where A knowingly with intention of causing death strikes Z. either from peculiarity of constitution. and clause (1) to section 300. and commits such act without C.P. [Illustration (a) to section 300(1). LP.C. in all probability. with the intention of causing bodily injury With the intention of causing such bodily as is likely to cause death .. or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must. injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused.P. ----------If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any personand the bodily injury intended to beinflicted is sufficient in the ordinarycourse of nature to cause death. the offence is always murder. Reg Versus govinda38:(i) Death caused intentionally: Murder: Clause (a) to section 299 I. The offence is murder. I. A is guilty of murder. (ii) Injury caused resulting in death knowing the peculiar conditions of the victim ² Murder: Clause (2) to section 300: The essence of clause (2) to section 300.

it is murder. The determining factor is the international injury which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. (iii) Risk to human life resulting in Death (a)if death likely result²Culpable homicide (b) if t²Murder: Clause (c) to section 299.although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.P. when the chances of its happening are almost certain. death caused as a result of furious driving will be culpable homicide. For example.C. I.: Clause (c) to section 299. it may be said that the thing may µprobably happen¶. and clause (4) to section 300. and sometimes both are relevant. that is to say.C. it is murder [Illustration (d) to 3001. the probability of death is not so high. whereas death caused as a result of firing at a mark near a public road would be a case of murder under section 300. it is said that it will µmost probably happen¶.P. The word µlikely¶ means µprobably¶.C. the offence does not fall within the definition of murder but Culpable homicide 39 (2002 (7) SCC 175) 27 . I. sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused.C. I. I.P. y Abdul waheed khan V/s state of Andhra Pradesh39 (iv) Injury likely to cause death²Culpable homicide: and Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death²Murder clause (b) to section 299 and clause (iii)to section 300: It is on a comparison of clause (b) to section 299 and clause (iii) to section 300 that the decision of doubtful cases like the present must generally depend.C. is intended to apply to cases in which there is no intention to cause death. if it is the most probable result. I. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used.P. Sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is intended. the offence is murder. If the intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. it is culpable homicide [Illustration (b) to 299]. In such a case whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon degree of risk to human life. if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. and clause (4) to section 300. nevertheless death has resulted. If death is a likely result. It is culpable homicide if the bodily injury intended is likely to cause death. When the chances of the happening of a thing are fifty-fifty.P.

C.41 Knowledge in the context of Section 299 would.P.C. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. The distinction between the terms 'knowledge' 40 41 [2009] INSC 1140 th K. Relate to the Degree of knowledge of the consequences. or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. It is designed to provide for rarest of rare cases wherein the accused puts. or by poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water. and (ii) µmust in all probability cause death.). I. I.¶ (under section 300. 28 . I. and clause (4) to section 300. (ed.C. where death is caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd[vide lllustratiod7]. in jeopardy lives of many persons as envisaged in illustration (d) to section 300.P.²The Code contemplates in clause (c) to section 299.. refers to personal knowledge. as to when an act is culpable homicide and murder by reason of the act being done with the knowledge described in the respective clauses.( William Slaney case) Knowledge v. and clause (4) to section 300. 2011. The knowledge used in clause (c) to section 299. The fourth clause to section 300 contemplates the doing of an imminently dangerous act in general and not the doing of any bodily harm to any particular individual.not amounting to murder or something less. p. mean consciousness or realization or understanding.C. 10 ed. inter alia. I. I. or by opening the grid of a bridge just as a railway passenger train is about to pass over it.The distinction between knowledge and intention.P. The difference between the two clauses relate to the words: (i) µlikely to cause death¶ in section 299 clause (c). but the act is done with such callousness towards the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.( Virsa Singh V/s state of Punjab) and (jagriti Devi V/s State of Himachal Pardesh 40) (v) Distinction between section 299(c) and section 300 clause (4). and the like. For example. 153. This clause is usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause death of any particular person. the imminently dangerous act. Intention:. the extreme depravity of mind regardless ness of sanctity of human life.P.P. and property that place the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by intention. In such and like cases. clause (4). Vibhute.I.C.

An inference of knowledge that it is likely to cause death must be arrived at keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in each case. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered Where murder is caused by a single blow In the case of Jai Prakash. Jagtar Singh v. These circumstances under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at least a doubt arose that all his 42 42 INDIAN PENAL CODE. the accused could have been barely aware i. State of Punjab. State of Tamil Nadu (1984). Tholan v. State of Punjab (1983). as mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury i. the court observed that42 : In all these cases. It is held in all these cases that there was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances.e. grappling etc. Therefore. State of Punjab (1981). injury by a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 'intention' is different from 'motive' or 'ignorance' or' negligence'. Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention connotes a conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and summed up into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a particular and specific end which the human mind conceives and perceives before itself. 29 . to say that he desired expressly that such injury only should be the result. the Court referred to the decisions of this Court in the cases of Kulwant Rai v. Randhir Singh v. It is the 'knowledge' or 'intention' with which the act is done that makes difference. it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions as used in these provisions. only had knowledge of the consequences. The accused must be aware of the consequences of his act.e. The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel. 1860.and 'intention' again is a difference of degrees. (1981). Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab (1982). in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder.

accused gave a single fatal blow with knife on the chest on the left side of the sternum between the costal joint of the 6th and 7th ribs.I. anterior and posterior after passing the ribs and thereafter entering the liver and perforating a portion of stomach. p. whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body. 153. pericardium. 2011.P. PSA PILLAI S CRIMINAL LAW. State of M. entail conviction under Section 302 IPC. 10 ed.mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular result. Vibhute. while confirming the conviction under Section 302.). In the case of Mahesh Balmiki alias Munna v. The nature of the injury. A single blow may. fracturing both the ribs and track of the wound going through the sternum. the circumstances in which the injury in caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. in some cases. it may be pointed out that there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326 IPC. the weapon used. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. th 30 . conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code was upheld by the High Court and when appeal was brought to Supreme Court by Special Leave.43" 43 K. (ed. There. (1999). court observed: "Adverting to the contention of a single blow.

whether the act is murder or not.44 During the quarrel the accused dragged the victim by holding his hand. It appeared as if the victim was drunk and the accused dragged him with no intention to assault. 44 45 Devasahayam. Therefore. It could be inferred that the accused did not intend to cause grievous hurt. whereby the victim fell down and sustained leg injuries.45 After the judgment in Virsa Singh's case. Determination of intention becomes difficult where a single blow has caused murder. but grievous hurt ensued unexpectedly. Determining the intention becomes important in determining. in rem (1962) 1 MLJ Dalapati Majhi 1982 Cri LJ 134 31 . where it is caused by a single blow there cannot be any intention to cause murder and would fall under culpable homicide. But it is not a rule that. the situation became very clear.Conclusion Section 321 and explanation of section 322 make it clear that either the ingredients of intention or that of knowledge must be essentially present in order to constitute the offence of hurt. conviction under section 325 was liable to be set aside. Courts while determining the required intention give due caution to the circumstances in which the incident occurred.

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