Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 FERNAN, C.J.
: Facts: The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense? 2. to be considered alone. Jr. 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.Constitution is to be separated from all the others.
Francisco vs. if practicable. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13. In other words. if by any reasonable construction. Then on June 2. On October 23. 2002. founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. Davide. a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G.. but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. and seven Associate Justices. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional. but voted to dismiss the same on October 22. in aid of legislation. and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
. former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form. the court must harmonize them. HRET
Facts: On July 22. the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation. on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). 2003. Issues: 1. 2003. the two can be made to stand together. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
In fine. other high crimes and betrayal of public trust. GR 178830. Section 3(5) of the Constitution.e. 2. 2003.3. another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI." 3. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Yes. Yes. this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its
. two of these. 2008
Respondent avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve. July 14. No. namely. NEDA. elude a precise definition. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. included the President’s use of the power to borrow. the initial action taken thereon. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner. considering that the first impeachment complaint. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing. to enter into foreign loan agreements. was filed on June 2.. 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23. the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Held: 1.
Suplico vs. Petitioners contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition. it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. which among others. i.
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments. the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 FLORENCIO B.
ISSUE: Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case?
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies. there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights. the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes. it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature. In those cases.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication. While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. Where the issue has become moot and academic. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries. Respondents. however intellectually challenging. ABAD. doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar. there is no justiciable controversy.apparent mootness. and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. precepts. the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles. but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
. the very antithesis of mootness. Where there is no more live subject of controversy.
. Simeon A. Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. Whether or not Executive Order No. Whether or not Executive Order No. Thus. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 3. Laurel Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections. Albano Jr.R. No. Datumanong.R. Rodolfo B. 192935. 1 violates the equal protection clause. and 5. when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan. a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. agencies and commissions." The Filipino people. G. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices.Justice Jose P. signed Executive Order No. The first case is G. walang mahirap. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. 1. No. Sr. 2. 4. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
. Fua. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective. and Orlando B. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The second case. 193036. is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.and guarantees to them. 2010. Lagman. the President on July 30. Whether or not Executive Order No. "Kung walang corrupt. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1. at the dawn of his administration. --. Issues: 1.
the taking of evidence. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v. the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy. the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. examination. finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. the legality of the investigation is sustained. To trace or track. 257. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition. but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. a legal inquiry. With AO 298 as mandate. novelty and weight as precedents. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public.Held: Legal Standing of the Petitioners The Court. judicial or otherwise.59 Thus: The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness. for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar. they should be resolved for the guidance of all. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department. Undoubtedly. x x an inquiry. to make an investigation. however. to which respondents belong."
. to search into. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. Commission on Human Rights. to find out by careful inquisition." "to inquire." "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function.
to decide. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments. the Davide Commission. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. which is expected to be the protector of the
. Implies a judicial determination of a fact. Decision The issue that seems to take center stage at present is . patent and manifest. and the entry of a judgment. through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws. settle or decree.In the legal sense. the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. at best. in order to be accorded with validity. These offices." Finally. is exercising undue interference." Thus. the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense. Much like its predecessors. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard." and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially. therefore. To determine finally. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility. not just those of the legislature. are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. its findings would. the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The petitioners assail Executive Order No. Executive Order No. x x.whether or not the Supreme Court. be recommendatory in nature. And being so. Is the Highest Tribunal. nowhere in Executive Order No. Applying these precepts to this case. or to sentence or condemn. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department. "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
 Notwithstanding the existence of a separability clause among its provisions. No. Nonetheless. The aftermath of R. 8180 in its entirety because its offensive provisions permeated the whole law and were the principal tools to carry deregulation into effect. contrary to its intent. R. 8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies. itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again. We declared: R. This time. No. SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. R. 8180 (R. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. We struck down the law as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result.
Garcia vs. Before deregulation. No.” R. the government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No. After deregulation.A. Congress responded to our Decision in Tatad by enacting on February 10. Congress excluded the offensive provisions found in the invalidated law. however. No. the petitions are GRANTED. 1998 a new oil deregulation law. 8479. but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress. 8180. No. we struck down R. this issue has been addressed by the Court. met strong opposition.Constitution.A. Executive Order No.A. As also prayed for. as this Court concluded in its November 5. PETRON. 8180) or the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. encouraged monopolistic power. 8180’s provisions on tariff differential. and predatory pricing inhibited fair competition. 1997 decision in Tatad vs. and interfered with the free interaction of market forces. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.A.A. 1. petitioner Garcia again sought to
. No. No. Executive Secretary THE FACTS After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the Philippines. inventory requirements. the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No.A. Secretary of Department of Energy. PETRON.A. WHEREFORE. and rightly so.
Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price control at a time when the market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly would be contrary to public interest. dated October 15. On December 17. and
Presidential Decree No. 8479 as we found the question replete with policy considerations. 1999. in Garcia vs. No. dated November 20. in the words of Justice Ynares-Santiago. 1889. taking into account relevant trends and prospects: Provided. 1985. 1984. 1431. the foregoing laws shall continue to be in force and effect with respect to LPG.” and thus asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional. That the foregoing provision notwithstanding. Corona (1999 Garcia case). 172. and anti-people.
(d) Letter of Instruction No.A. the Transition Phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are repealed: (a) (b) (c) Republic Act No. Letter of Instruction No. prescribed the period for removal of price control on gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry. anti-competition. dated May 9. 8479 which. 6173. regular gasoline and kerosene for the rest of the five (5)-month period. He specifically objected to Section 19 of R. as it would only provide an opportunity for the Big 3 to engage in price-fixing and overpricing. 1956. That in case full deregulation is started by the President in the exercise of the authority provided in this Section. as amended by Executive Order No. 1984. We declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 19 of R. 19. the ponente of the 1999 Garcia case:
. 1441. No.declare the new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Article XII. The assailed provision reads: SEC. 8479 is “glaringly pro-oligopoly. we denied petitioner Garcia’s plea for nullity. as amended. No. as amended. however. Presidential Decree No.A. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 1460. further.A. That when the public interest so requires. however. in essence. the five (5)month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG. regular gasoline and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products shall be covered by the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein. He averred that Section 19 of R. Section 19 of the Constitution. 137: Provided. the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation upon the recommendation of the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. – Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5) months following the effectivity of this Act: Provided. Start of Full Deregulation. as amended. (e) (f) (g) Letter of Instruction No.
A. No. 8479. quite simply. It is unquestionably a priority program of Government. It would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the determination. In this regard. what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination. Petitioner does not expressly challenge deregulation. The unabated overpricing of finished petroleum products by the Big 3 oligopoly is
. Moreover.” Be that as it may. 8479. we are not concerned with whether or not there should be deregulation. xxx xxx xxx
Reduced to its basic arguments. The issue. social and economic. To further support the present petition. He disagrees.A. He reasons that res judicata will not apply. however. No.It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is a policy determination of the highest order. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions. as the earlier cases did not completely resolve the controversy and were not decided on the merits. he maintains that the present case involves a matter of overarching and overriding importance to the national economy and to the public and cannot be sacrificed for technicalities like res judicata. with the allegation that the prior rulings of the Court in the two oil deregulation cases amount to res judicata that would effectively bar the resolution of the present petition. petitioner Garcia invokes the following additional grounds to nullify Section 19 of R. 2. The judgment on the issue is a settled matter and only Congress can reverse it. petitioner Garcia is again before us in the present petition for certiorari seeking a categorical declaration from this Court of the unconstitutionality of Section 19 of R. This is outside our jurisdiction. [Emphasis supplied. Subsequent events after the lifting of price control in 1997 have confirmed the continued existence of the Big 3 oligopoly and its overpricing of finished petroleum products. is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective. The Department of Energy Act of 1992 expressly mandates that the development and updating of the existing Philippine energy program “shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of the power and energy industry. which was already the subject of the 1999 Garcia case. THE PETITION Petitioner Garcia does not deny that the present petition for certiorari raises the same issue of the constitutionality of Section 19 of R. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice.A. No.] Undaunted. political. 8479: 1. it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is not against the legality of deregulation.
and continued overpricing. Excluded from these are questions of policy or wisdom. more importantly. No longer may the bare and blatant constitutionality of the lifting of price control be glossed over through the expediency of legislative wisdom or judgment call in the face of the Big 3 oligopoly’s characteristic. the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge.gravely and undeniably detrimental to the public interest. For a court to exercise this power. namely: (1) (2) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. certain requirements must first be met. petitioner Garcia invokes the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review. Cuenco puts it. The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. THE COURT’S RULING We resolve to dismiss the petition. 8479 as unconstitutional for contravening Section 19. In asking the Court to declare Section 19 of R. the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. 3. the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights. political questions refer “to those questions which.
4. otherwise referred to as political questions: As Tañada vs. it is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review.A. definitive. Article XII of the Constitution. an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. or will sustain. which power is expressly recognized under Section 4(2). direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Through such power. Stated otherwise. under the Constitution. he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. Article VIII of the Constitution. and the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Actual Case Controversy Susceptible of Judicial Determination The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirements – the existence of an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. To avoid declaring the lifting of price control on finished petroleum products as unconstitutional is to consign to the dead letter dustbin the solemn and explicit constitutional command for the regulation of monopolies/oligopolies. are to be decided by the
. the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. No.
On the other hand. Carr. we cannot rule on when and to what extent deregulation should take place without passing upon the wisdom of the policy of deregulation that Congress has decided upon. It simply allows the State to act “when public interest so requires”. or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. what petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of immediately and fully deregulating the oil industry. the questions of (1) what public interest requires and (2) what the State reaction shall be essentially require the exercise of discretion on the part of the State. No. as the State may choose to regulate rather than to prohibit.
Whether a monopoly exists is a question of fact.A. if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question.A. Such determination essentially dwells on the soundness or wisdom of the timing and manner of the deregulation Congress wants to implement through R. “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.] Petitioner Garcia’s issues fit snugly into the political question mold. Carr.” Thus.people in their sovereign capacity. This Section states: The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. this constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of monopolies. 2. even then. Read correctly. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker vs. and Public interest requires its regulation or prohibition. or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. 8497. Stripped to its core. Two elements must concur before a monopoly may be regulated or prohibited: 1. 8479 contravenes the Constitutional directive to regulate or prohibit monopolies under Article XII.” [Emphasis supplied. No. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. There in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly. To use the words of Baker vs. the issue is not for us to resolve. or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. the ruling that petitioner Garcia
. or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question. Section 19 of R. as he insists that by adopting a policy of full deregulation through the removal of price controls at a time when an oligopoly still exists. no outright prohibition is mandated. Section 19 of the Constitution. Quite clearly.
A. nature of his petition. but to enforce the legislative will. as the application of the principle of res judicata presupposes that there is a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. 8479. Congress already determined that the problems confronting the local downstream oil industry are better addressed by removing all forms of prior controls and adopting a deregulated system. 2. To this end. Directly supporting our conclusion that Garcia raises a political question is his proposal to adopt instead a system of partial deregulation – a system he presents as more consistent with the Constitutional “dictate. Declaration of Policy. and for the same
. In such a situation. not to review or revise legislative action. we declared that the fundamental principle espoused by Section 19. instead of continuing with a highly regulated system enforced by means of restrictive prior controls. This intent is expressed in Section 2 of the law: SEC. Thus. Article XII of the Constitution is competition. but instead by the entrenched and dominant oligopoly where overpricing and price-fixing are possible. This legislative determination was a lawful exercise of Congress’ prerogative and one that this Court must respect and uphold. adequate and continuous supply of environmentally-clean and highquality petroleum products. the choice of undertaking full or partial deregulation is not for this Court to make. This same line of reasoning was what we used when we dismissed the first Garcia case. To be exact. acting as a body. question the wisdom of a coequal department’s acts. the branch of government that was given by the people the full discretionary authority to formulate the policy is the legislative department. In Tatad. determined that this objective is better realized by liberalizing the oil market. we cannot. For the Court to resolve a clearly non-justiciable matter would be to debase the principle of separation of powers that has been tightly woven by the Constitution into our republican system of government. Regardless of the individual opinions of the Members of this Court. before full deregulation can be implemented. hence. Petitioner Garcia’s thesis readily reveals the political. By enacting the assailed provision – Section 19 – of R. he calls for an indefinite period of partial deregulation through imposition of price controls. non-justiciable.A. it sits. and introduce adequate measures to ensure the attainment of these goals. The courts do not involve themselves with or delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. the State shall promote and encourage the entry of new participants in the downstream oil industry. we are simply declaring that then. by enacting R. No. No. as now.asks requires “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion”. Congress.” He avers that free market forces (in a fully deregulated environment) cannot prevail for as long as the market itself is dominated by an entrenched oligopoly. 8479. he claims that prices are not determined by the free play of supply and demand. – It shall be the policy of the State to liberalize and deregulate the downstream oil industry in order to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices. The petitioner correctly noted that this is not a matter of res judicata (as the respondents invoked).
Justice Leonardo A. “[a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive. The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. CONCLUSION To summarize. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case. In the words of Mr. we find that there is no justiciable controversy that would justify the grant of the petition.
.reasons. That the law failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification. we declare that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to this Court are non-justiciable matters that preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial review.