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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEWER ARTICLE III: The Bill

of Rights
Section
6

SECTION 6 : THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF CHANGING THE SAME


WITHIN THE LIMITS
PRESCRIBED BY LAW SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EXCEPT
UPON LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT. NEITHER SHALL
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL BE IMPAIRED EXCEPT IN THE
INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY OR
PUBLIC HEALTH, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.

RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 6:


1. Freedom to choose and change one’s place of abode.
2. Freedom to travel within the country and outside.

RIGHT CURTAILMENT/LIMITATIONS OF RIGHT


1. Liberty of abode Lawful order of the court and within
the limits prescribed by law.

2. Right to travel May be curtailed even by


administrative officers (ex. passport
officers) in the
interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

NOTE: The right to travel and the liberty of abode are distinct from the right to return to one’s
country, as shown by the fact that the Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on
Human Rights have separate guarantees for these. Hence, the right to return to one’s country
is not covered by the specific right to travel and liberty of abode. (Marcos v.Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668).

1. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT: LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL

• The liberty guaranteed by this provision includes


(1) freedom to choose and change one's place of abode and;
(2) freedom to travel both within the country and outside.
• Freedom of movement is not absolute.
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 13(2): everyone has the right to leave any
country, including one’s own, and to return to that country.
• Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 12(4): no one shall be deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
• The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is the
Court's well considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally
accepted principle of international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily
deprived thereof. [Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989)]
• Dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez in the Marcos case: Sec. 6 of the Bill of Rights states
categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within limits prescribed by
law may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court. Not by an executive officer. Not
even by the President. Sec. 6 further provides that the right to travel, and this obviously
includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
• The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not absolute rights. It can be
regulated by “lawful order.” The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by Section 6. The condition imposed by the CA is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. (Yap, Jr. v.
CA, 2001)

 The liberty of abode may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court, and the court is to be guided
by the limits prescribed by law on the liberty itself.
 The liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, but the appropriate executive officer is
not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. He can impose limits only on the basis of
national security, public safety, or public health and as may be provided by law.
 The right to travel should not be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all
means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.

2. ALIENS AND RIGHT TO ENTRY


While the right to travel of citizens covers both exit from and entry into the country, aliens
cannot claim the same right.

CASES : In Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil 851, a maid has the right to transfer to another
residence even
if she had not yet paid the amount advanced for her transportation from the province by
an employment agency which was then effectively detaining her.

Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the Mayor of Manila was not sustained by the
SC when
he deported some 170 women of ill-repute to Davao, for the admittedly commendable
purpose of ridding the city for serious moral and health problems. These women are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guarantees as are other citizens—to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality.

Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660, the respondents were justified in requiring
the members of certain non-Christian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their better
education, advancement and protection. The measure was held to be a legitimate
exercise of police power.

Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil 595, health officers may restrict access to
contaminated areas and also quarantine those already exposed to the disease sought to
be contained.

Zemel vs. Rusk, 381 US 1, the Secretary of State may regulate or even prohibit the
travel of citizens to hostile countries to prevent possible international misunderstanding
and conflict.

Section 26 of HAS of 2007—cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the
person charged with the crime of terrorism as therein defined is entitled to bail and if
granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right to
travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the
case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety.

SECTION 7 : THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS


OF PUBLIC
CONCERNED SHALL BE RECOGNIZED. ACCESS TO OFFICIAL
RECORDS, AND TO DOCUMENTS, AND PAPERS PERTAINING
TO OFFICIAL ACTS, TRANSACTIONS, OR DECISIONS, AS
WELL AS TO GOVERNMENT RESEARCH DATA USED AS
BASIS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT, SHALL BE AFFORDED
THE CITIZENS, SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW.

RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 7


1. Right to information on matters of public concern
2. Right of access to official records and documents

Persons entitled to the above rights: Only Filipino citizens. The citizen has a right to know what is
going on in the country and in his government so he can express his views thereon knowledgeably and
intelligently. One cannot question the extravagance of the government, for example, if is denied
examination of official vouchers. A citizen may not expose anomaly if those responsible for it may
validly prevent him from investigating their activities. In the interest of truth and fairness, the citizen
should not be made to guess only at what is being done by public functionaries and to base his views
and conclusions on mere rumors, half-truths, conjectures and even canards.

Discretion of government : The government has discretion with respect to the


authority to determine what matters are of public concern and the authority to determine the manner
of access to them.

RECOGNIZED RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION:


Recognized restrictions:
1. National security matters and intelligence information—this jurisdiction recognizes the
common law
holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters;

2. Trade or industrial secrets—(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code, RA 8293 and other
related laws and banking transactions—pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, RA
1405);

3. Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the
detention of
criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution;
and

4. Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials
and employees from using or divulging “confidential or classified information to the public.”
[Section 7 (c), RA 6713] Other acknowledged limitations to information access include
diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either
House of congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the SC. (Chavez vs. PCGG, 299
SCRA 744)1.

CASES : BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314, May 4, 2007,
the right to information
is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be
precise. The people’s right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full
disclosure is confined to transactions involving “public interest’ and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRa 256—the information sought must be
“matters of public concern,” access to which may be limited by law. The information
sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasan
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure ‘clean’ loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former
First Lady Imelda Marcos. x x x The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and
the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the SC affirmed the right of the petitioner to
secure from the Civil Service Commission information regarding the civil service
eligibility of certain persons employed in the health department of the Cebu City
government.

 The right to information on matters of public concern is both the purpose and the limit of the right of
access to public documents.

“as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development”

 The reference is to government research data, that is, to the findings of government funded
research and not to the findings of privately funded research over which private proprietary rights
might exist.

 While access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated. The regulation can
come either from statutory law and the inherent power of an officer to control his office and the records
under his custody and to exercise some discretion as to the manner in which persons desiring to
inspect, examine, or copy the record may exercise their rights.

 In determining the allowable scope of official limitation on access to official records, it should be noted
that Sec. 7 guarantees only one general right – the right to information on matters of public concern.

 While the Constitution guarantees access to information on matters of public concern, access is subject
to reasonable regulation for the convenience of and for order in the office that has custody of the
documents. (Baldoza v. Dimaano)

 While the public officers in custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the
manner in which such records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such
discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying.
(Lantaco, Sr. V. Llamas)

 The real problem lies in determining what matters are of public concern and what are not. For every act
of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern.

 The right may be asserted even against government-owned and controlled corporations, because
their function, analogous to that of government agencies, is to serve the people.

 The right of the people to information must be balanced against other genuine interests necessary for
the proper functioning of government.

 The standards that have been developed for the regulation of speech and press and of assembly and
petition and of association are applicable to the right of access to information. (These are the dangerous
tendency rule, clear and present danger rule, and balance of interests test.)

 The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the
same function of service to the people.

 The GSIS may be compelled to show documents evidencing behest loans even if the transactions
are proprietary in nature.
SECTION 8 : THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, INCLUDING THOSE EMPLOYED IN THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS, TO FORM UNIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, OR SOCIETIES FOR
PURPOSES NOT CONTRARY TO LAW SHALL NOT BE ABRIDGED.

Right to Form associations—shall not be impaired without due process of law; guarantees the right
not to join an association. (Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961,
January 23, 2002)

This right is especially meaningful in a free society because a man is by nature gregarious. His
disposition to mix with others of the same persuasions, interests or objectives is guaranteed by this
provision. It also expressly guarantees to those employed in the public and private sectors the right to
form unions.

This right is available also to those in the government sectors. It is a settled in jurisprudence that, in
general, workers in the public sectors do not enjoy the right to strike. The general rule in the past and
up to present is that the ‘terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.’ x x x. Since the terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law.

Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. x x x
In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power,
the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. (Alliance of Concerned Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1)

In the case of Jacinto vs. CA, 281 SCRA 657, the SC held that petitioners were not penalized for the
exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their school
during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably
resulting in the nonholding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they
were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time—recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
within the bounds of law, no one—not the DECS, the CSC or even the SC—could have held them liable
for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of
classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature was
enjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made
answerable.

GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G. R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, it
was against the backdrop of the provisions of the Constitution that the Court resolved that employees
in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work;
that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike. It may be, as the appellate court urged, that the
freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of
grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties.The right to form associations
shall not be impaired without due process of law and is thus an aspect of the right of liberty. It is also
an aspect of the freedom of contract. In addition, insofar as the associations may have for their object
the advancement of beliefs and ideas, the freedom of association is an aspect of the freedom of
speech and expression, subject to the same limitation.
- The right also covers the right not to join an association.
- Government employees have the right to form unions. They also have the right to strike, unless there
is a statutory ban on them (i.e. ban on public school teachers).

 The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law.

 The instinct to organize is a very basic human drive.

 The right to form an association does not include the right to compel others to form an association. But
there may be situations in which, by entering into a contract, one may also be agreeing to join an
association.

 A land buyer who buys a lot with an annotated lien that the lot owner becomes an automatic
member of a homeowners’ association thereby voluntarily joins the association.

 One who becomes an employee of an establishment that has a closed shop agreement with the
union thereby becomes a member of the union.

 The right to form associations includes the right to unionize.

 The right of civil servants to unionize is also recognized in Article IX, B, Section 2(5) which says: “The
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.” The right is recognized
whether such employees perform governmental or proprietary functions.

 The right of labor in general to unionize is also recognized in Article XIII, Section 3: “The State shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”

 Employees of the SSS and public school teachers do not have a constitutional right to strike. But the
current ban on them against strikes is statutory and may be lifted by statute.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor: Sec. 23 of RA 875 requiring the
registration of labor unions was challenged as violative of the Bill of Rights. The SC held that this contention
was untenable. The registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be
exercised with or without said registration. It is merely a condition sine qua non to for the acquisition of
legal personality by labor organizations, associations, or unions and the possession of the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.

 Mere membership in the Communist Party and similar organizations may not be punished as a criminal
offense. Membership does not render the members either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit
rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle
without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it if coupled
with action or advocacy of action. (People v. Hernandez)

(Note: The Anti-Subversion Act has been repealed.)

SECTION 9 : PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE


WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION.

WHO CAN EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN:


a. The national government
b. Congress
c. Executive, pursuant to legislation enacted by Congress
d. Local government units, pursuant to an ordinance enacted by their respective legislative bodies
(under LGC)
e. Public utilities, as may be delegated by law.

When is the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessary?


It is only necessary when the owner does not want or opposes the sale of his property. Thus, if a valid
contract exists between the government and the owner, the government cannot exercise the power of
eminent domain as a substitute to the enforcement of the contract.

ELEMENTS OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN CODE: TPJ


1. There is a TAKING of private property
2. Taking is for PUBLIC USE
3. Payment of JUST COMPENSATION

"TAKING"
A. Elements: CODE: E P A P O
a. The expropriator enters the property
b. The entrance must not be for a momentary period, i.e., it must be permanent
c. Entry is made under warrant or color of legal authority
d. Property is devoted to Public use
e. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.

B. Compensable taking does not need to involve all the property interests which form part of the
right of ownership. When one or more of the property rights are appropriated and applied to a
public purpose, there is already a compensable taking, even if bare title still remains with the
owner.

"PUBLIC USE"
Public use, for purposes of expropriation, is synonymous with public welfare as the latter term is used
in the concept of police power. Examples of public use include land reform and socialized housing.

"JUST COMPENSATION"
Compensation is just if the owner receives a sum equivalent to the market value of his property.
Market value is generally defined as the fair value of the property as between one who desires to
purchase and one who desires to sell. The point of reference used in determining fair value is the
value at the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
Thus, future potential use of the land is not considered in computing just compensation.

Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain


a. To determine the adequacy of the compensation
b. To determine the necessity of the taking
c. To determine the "public use" character of the taking. However, if the expropriation is
pursuant to a specific law passed by Congress, the courts cannot question the public use
character of the taking.

When municipal property is taken by the State:


Compensation is required if the property is a patrimonial property, that is, property acquired by the
municipality with its private funds in its corporate or private capacity. However, if it is any other
property such as public buildings or legua comunal held by the municipality for the State in trust for
the inhabitants, the State is free to dispose of it at will, without
any compensation.

Point of reference for valuating a piece of property:


General rule : The value must be that as of the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation.
Exception : When the filing of the case comes later than the time of taking and meanwhile
the
value of the property has increased because of the use to which the expropriator
has put it, the value is that of the time of the earlier taking. BUT if the value
increased independently of what the expropriator did, then the value is that of
the latter filing of the case.

NOTE: Even before compensation is given, entry may be made upon the property condemned. The
deposit of money or an equivalent form of payment such as government bonds is necessary
and sufficient to satisfy the requirement. Any law fixing the amount of just compensation is not
binding on the courts because it is a question of fact which is always subject to review by the
courts.

REGULATION v. TAKING
REGULATION TAKING
Compensation is not required
Title is not transferred Just compensation
Title is transferred
Property taken for public
Property interest is restricted or destroyed
An exercise of police power, not for public use use

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.Central Luzon Drug Corporation (456 SCRA 414) (April
15, 2005)
Ratio:
• The tax benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private
property taken by the State for public use.
• The taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.

Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro
Manila* (466 SCRA 235) (August 9, 2005)
Ratio:
• The following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government
unit must be complied with:
(1)an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property;
(2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless;
(3) there is payment of just compensation as Required under Section 9, Article 3 of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws;
(4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made tothe owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Constitutional Provisions on Eminent Domain

1. Article III, Section 9

2. Article XII, Section 18


The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and,
upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises
to be operated by the Government.

3. Article XIII, Section 4


The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the
State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
4. Article XVIII, Section 22
At the earliest possible time, the Government shall expropriate idle or abandoned agricultural lands as
may be defined by law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.

Right of eminent domain – the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public
but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose. (Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge)

 It is a power inherent in sovereignty. Hence, it is a power which need not be granted by any
fundamental law.

 The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by tradition lodged with the executive arm of the
government. It is, however, evident from the same authority that the power is dormant until the
Legislature sets it in motion. (Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus)

 Once authority, however, has been given to the executive, expropriation proceedings may be
maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the executive without the aid of any special legislative
authority other than that already in the statute books. Put differently: Once authority is given to the
exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive
authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent. (Republic v. Juan)

 The power of eminent domain may also be conferred upon municipal governments and other
government entities.

 The Legislature has the authority to delegate the right of eminent domain to private entities
operating public utilities (ex. MERALCO).

 In the hands of the legislature, the power of eminent domain is an inherent power. In the hands of
government agencies, local governments and public utilities, however, eminent domain is only a
delegated power.

 In the hands of the Congress the scope of the power is, like the scope of legislative power itself,
plenary. It is as broad as the scope of police power itself. It can thus reach every form of property which
the State might need for public use. It can reach even private property already dedicated to public use
or even property devoted to religious worship.

 The delegated power of eminent domain of local governments is strictly speaking not a power of
eminent but of inferior domain – a share merely in eminent domain. Hence, it is only as broad the
eminent authority would allow it to be.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila: The city was seeking to expropriate a portion of a
Chinese cemetery in order to open a street through the cemetery. It was considered as a cemetery adjusted
to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China and authorized by the Spanish
government as a mark of recognition of the civic contribution of Chinese nationals. The Court asserted that
a cemetery open to the public was already in public use and no part of the ground could be taken for other
public uses under a general authority. Hence, the City of Manila was without authority to expropriate the
property. But the Court said that if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a
certain or particular parcel of land for some specified purpose, the courts would be without authority to
enquire into the purpose of the legislation. And that is what the legislature did.

Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain

1. The purpose of the taking must be public use.

2. Just compensation must be given to the private owner.

Public use – public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit.

– whatever is beneficially employed for the community.


 Any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of eminent domain, for purposes of
great advantage to the community, is a taking for public use.

Ex. Expropriation for socialized housing, expropriation for the construction of irrigation systems to make
water available for farmers, for urban and housing reform

Just compensation – the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.

 Expressed differently, the compensation given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a
sum equivalent to its market value.

Market value – the price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal trade and competition.

– the price and value of the article established or shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of
business;

– the fair value of the property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell;
– the current price;

– the general or ordinary price for which property may be sold in that locality.

Consequential damages – damages to other interests of the owner that can be attributed to the
expropriation.

Consequential benefits – the increase in the value of the other interests of the owner that can be
attributed to the new use to which his former property will be put by the expropriating authority.

 If the property is taken before compensation is given or before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be
computed from the time the property was taken to the time compensation is given or deposited with
the court.

Market Value
+ Consequential Damages
– Consequential Benefits
= Just Compensation

Q: What is the point of reference for assessing the value of a piece of property?

A: The general rule is that the value must be that as of the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation (Sec.4, Rule 67, Rules of Court). The filing of the case generally coincides with the taking.

 Legal interest accrues between the time payment is due and the actual payment.

 Just compensation is due not to the owner alone. All other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own
the property are entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term “owner” refers to all
those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a
vendee in possession under an executory contract.

 Even before compensation is given, entry may be made upon the property condemned. Sec. 247 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment shall require payment of the sum awarded...before
the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the public use. Under Sec. 2 of Act 2826,
however, when condemnation proceedings are instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government,
immediate possession could be given to the government before the amount had been fully settled.

Q: Is the right of immediate entry before payment constitutional?

A: In Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes, the Court said that “according to the weight of authority, if the
constitution or statutes do not expressly require it, actual payment or tender before taking is unnecessary,
and it will be sufficient if a certain and adequate remedy is provided by which the owner can obtain
compensation without any unreasonable delay.” Deposit of the money with the court satisfied constitutional
requirements.

 The right to enter into immediate possession of the property even before the final ascertainment and
payment of just compensation is given to any plaintiff.

Q: Must compensation be in cash?

A: No. As Manila Railroad Co.v. Paredes says, “it will be sufficient if a certain and adequate remedy is
provided by which the owner can obtain compensation without any unreasonable delay.” Art. XIII, Sec. 8,
which says, “Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises
of their choice,” clearly means that payment need not be in cash.

 Friar lands were confiscated by the American administration in order to win Filipino cooperation. A
purchase of nearly all the lands in question was effected for the amount of approximately $ 7 million,
which was raised by the sale of bonds. In a large measure, therefore, the friar lands question was solved
without the need of the exercise of eminent domain powers.

 The religious corporations, however, were not the only holders of large landed estates. The
encomienda system brought to the Philippines by the Spaniards created a big landlord class formed
from aristocratic families who had served Spanish officialdom well.

 The Constitution speaks of “lands”, and not “landed estates”. The “area test” was rejected in favor of
the state’s “quest for social justice and peace.” As long as a congressional legislation declares that
condemnation of a particular land is for the specific purpose stated in the Constitution, it is not for the
judiciary to enquire as to whether or not the taking of such land is for public use. (J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration)

 Expropriation for resale for the purpose of alleviating the condition of landless farmers is a state
duty in social justice.

Aspects of Judicial Review

1. The adequacy of the compensation

2. The necessity of the taking

3. The “public use” character of the purpose of the taking

 The procedure in expropriation cases set down in the Code of Civil Procedure, which has since been
superseded by the Rules of Court, provided for the judicial appointment of 3 commissioners to view the
premises and assess the damages to be paid for the condemnation. The commissioners made their
report to the court, and Sec. 245 of the Code expressly declared that none of their proceedings shall be
effectual to bind the property or the parties until the court shall have accepted their report and
rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations.

 In the language of City of Manila v. Estrada, “there is ample authority in the statute to authorize the
courts to change or modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or decreasing the amount of
the award, if the facts of the case will justify such change or modifications.”

 Judicial review of administrative valuation is not incompatible with the fact that the power of eminent
domain is lodged with the legislative and executive department. That the courts can review the report
of commissioners is now established doctrine.

 Trial by commissioners is a substantive right which a judge may not dispense with.

Q: Can the Court review a legislative or administrative judgment that a particular use to which the property
will be put is a public use or a public necessity?

A: When expropriation is done not directly by the legislative authority but by another government agency
or by a municipal corporation and in virtue of an authorizing statute which neither specifies the purpose of
the taking nor the property to be taken, there should be no doubt but that the courts must come in to
perform its duty of enforcing the provision of the Constitution.

 The necessity of the taking is a question of fact which must be established by proper evidence. The
need for judicial review is even more where the legislative act was authored not by a legislative body
but by a President exercising legislative authority.

 The courts can look into the public character of the purpose of the taking by government agencies other
than the legislature.

Police Power Eminent Domain


Object: General welfare
Achieves its object by Achieves its object by taking
regulation
Compensation not required Just compensation required

 When title to property is transferred to the expropriating authority, there is compensable taking. Neither
acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking.

 It is in cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry must be made whether the
impairment of property right is merely a regulation or already amounts to compensable taking.

 When a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable
taking. Where, however, a property interest is merely restricted because continued unrestricted use
would be injurious to public welfare or where property is destroyed because continued existence of the
property would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking.

U.S. v. Toribio: A statute regulating the slaughter of carabao for the purpose of conserving an adequate
supply of draft animals was upheld as a legitimate exercise of police power and not a form of taking under
eminent domain as to require compensation.

Seng Kee & Co. v. Earnshaw: An ordinance dividing a city into industrial and residential areas was a
legitimate regulation and not a taking of property without just compensation.

People v. de Guzman: When a zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a lumber yard within certain
areas was challenged as confiscatory, the Court upheld it as a valid exercise of police power.

 In the cases above, while the regulations affected the right of ownership, none of the property
interests was appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. Use of the property of the
owner was limited, but no aspect of the property was used by or for the public.

 The deprivation of use can be total and it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires
use of the property or any property interest therein.
 Ex. A law was passed authorizing the destruction of coconut trees infected with Kadang-Kadang in
order to prevent the further spread of Kadang-Kadang. Coconut tree owners whose trees are
ordered to be cut down cannot complain of unlawful deprivation of property without just
compensation. There would be destruction but no compensable taking.

People v. Fajardo: On the strength of an authorization given by a municipal ordinance, the mayor did not
permit Fajardo to put up a house on his land on the ground that the proposed structure would destroy the
view or beauty of the public plaza. The ordinance was declared fatally defective for being an invalid
delegation of legislative authority. The Court, however, assuming the ordinance as a valid delegation of
authority to issue zoning regulations, stated that the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it
operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the
bounds of police power, and amounts to taking of appellant’s property without just compensation.

Q: Is it the permanence and the totality of the deprivation which constitute compensable taking?

A: No. Total destruction without utilization is not appropriation but is merely regulation by police power.
One must look beyond the deprivation and ask for the ultimate purpose.
 The establishment of an easement is a form of compensable taking.

 Ex. The repeated firing of guns over a piece of land


The flight of planes from a nearby military airport over plaintiff’s property below the navigable
airspace resulting in the ruin of plaintiff’s chicken farm
Low landing and take-off flights which made the nearby residential area unlivable

National Power Corporation v. Spouses Mesiricordia Gutierrez: The owner of the land was awarded
full compensation against the NPC’s argument that the owners were not totally deprived of the use of the
land and could still plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact with the wires. The Court
said that the right of way easement perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition that below said transmission lines no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed.

Cabrera v. Court of Appeals: A lot owner was prejudiced by the closure of a road since his access to the
national road had been limited. Compensation was not allowed. This is not a case where property has been
expropriated and the owner is entitled to just compensation. The construction of the new road was
undertaken under the general welfare clause and thus was an exercise of police power.

Bel Air Village Association v. Intermediate Court of Appeals: The subdivision was ordered to open a
gate to a road within the subdivision. The order to open the road was ruled to be an exercise of police
power and not of eminent domain. It was found that the deed of donation covering the road stipulated that
the road would also be for the general public. Hence, the order to open the gate was deemed an abatement
of a public nuisance.

Elements of Taking

1. That the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period,
and

2. That in devoting the property for public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of
its beneficial use.

 If the expropriating authority chooses not to take possession of the property until after judgment is
rendered, the moment of taking, for purposes of fixing compensation, is not the date of filing the
condemnation suit but the date of judgment.

SECTION 10 : NO LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT


SHALL BE PASSED.

WHEN DOES A LAW IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS:


1. If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of
performance
2. If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed
3. If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms.

Civil Code, Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.

Nature of protection
• Purpose: Safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted
interference by the State.
• General Rule: Contracts should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by
subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and
obligations. The will of the parties to the contract must prevail.
Contracts affected
• Affects legal, executed and executory contracts, which must be valid.
Limitations
• A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely
invalidated by a subsequent law.
• Strict construction. Charters, franchises and licenses granted by the Government are strictly
construed against the grantees.
• If a law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. This is because
public welfare is superior to private rights (PNB v. Remigio, G.R. 78508, March 21, 1995). Into
each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police
power as long as the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare.
• Eminent domain and taxation may also validly limit the impairment clause.
Effect of emergency legislation on contracts
• In a national emergency, such as a protracted economic depression, the police power may be
exercised to the extent of impairing some of the rights of parties arising from contracts.
However, such emergency laws are to remain in effect only during the continuance of the
emergency.

Currency legislation and contracts


• The legislative department has complete authority to determine the currency of the state and
to prescribe what articles shall be used and accepted as legal tender in the payment of lawful
obligations.
• Private parties are bound to observe this governmental authority over the nation's currency in
the execution of their contracts.

Impairment
• In order to come within the meaning of the constitutional provision, the obligation of contract
must be impaired by some legislative act (statute, ordinance, etc.). The act need not be by a
legislative office; but it should be legislative in nature. Furthermore, the impairment must be
substantial (Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Assoc. v. DILG Secretary, G.R. 143076, June
10, 2003).
• A mere administrative order, not legislative in nature, may not be considered a cause of
impairment within the scope of the constitutional guarantee. The guarantee is also not violated
by court decisions.
• The act of impairment is anything which diminishes the value of the contract. The legislature
may, however, change the remedy or may prescribe new modes of procedure. The change
does not impair the obligation of contracts so long as another remedy, just as efficacious, is
provided for the adequate enforcement of the rights under the contract. (Manila Trading Co v.
Reyes, 1935)

NOTE:
• A mere change in PROCEDURAL REMEDIES which does not change the substance of the
contract, and which still leaves an efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the
obligation of contracts.
• A valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts.
• The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being
of the community may require, or the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.
• The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual
agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they should be respected
by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of
the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of the obligor and the obligee must
be observed; the obligation of their contract must not be impaired. However, the protection of
the impairment clause is not absolute. There are instances when contracts valid at the time of
their conclusion may become invalid, or some of their provisions may be rendered inoperative
or illegal, by virtue of supervening legislation.
Limitations:
1. Police power—prevails over contracts;
2. Eminent domain—may impair obligation of contracts; and
3. Taxation—cannot impair obligation of contracts.

Impairment—anything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract There is impairment when there is
change in the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or
imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24,
1922)

Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006, in
unequivocal terms, the SC have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of
timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. Since timber licenses
are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

 The law relating to the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall
within the prohibition the change must impair the obligation of the existing contract, and the
impairment must be substantial.

 A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of
performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its
satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a
contract and is therefore null and void. (Clemons v. Nolting)

 Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily
impairs the contract itself. (U.S. v. Diaz Conde)

Government of the Philippine Islands v. Frank: The terms of a statute had been made a part of the
contract between Frank and the Government. The Court said that a subsequent amendment of the statute
could not have the effect of amending the terms of the contract.

 To come under the prohibition, the law must effect a change on the rights of the parties with reference
to each other and not with reference to non-parties. Moreover, what the prohibition envisions are
enactments passed by a governmental law-making body.

 An additional tax imposed upon goods already contracted to be sold does not impair the contract
between the buyer and seller.

 A change in the Catholic Church’s canon law which affects the contractual relation between parties
with reference to internal affairs of the church is not covered by the prohibition.

 During the period of transition, a statute was passed providing that money judgments rendered in court
should be stated in terms of the new Philippine currency in an amount equivalent to the value of the old.
The law, when applied to contractual debts, was challenged as an impairment of the obligation of
contracts. In Gaspar v. Molina, the Court upheld the statute since it did not require the debtor to pay
more nor the creditor to receive less than they were required to pay or receive under the former law.
Clemons v. Nolting: An attempt by the government to satisfy an obligation to pay in U.S. dollars by the
payment of Philippine pesos at the rate of P2 = $1 when the commercial value of the U.S. dollar was much
more, was deemed an impairment of the contractual obligation.

 The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-
judicial power.

 Police power is superior over the sanctity of contracts.

 Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of police
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public
Service Commission)

 In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, in upholding a statute granting to workers rights which they
did not have under existing contracts, the Court said that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
is limited by the exercise of police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare.

 The contract clause did not preclude remedial legislation in the interest of the general welfare.

Primero v. Court of Agrarian Relations: The security of tenure guaranteed to an agricultural tenant by a
statute was challenged as impairing existing tenancy relations. The Court ruled that the law was
unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.

 New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure more strict were not
allowed to apply retroactively. (Co v. Philippine National Bank)

 Limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to a reasonable exercise of police power and,
hence, zoning regulations are superior to contractual restrictions on the use of property. (Ortigas &
Co. v. FEATI Bank)

 Contracts also yield to the requirements of freedom of worship.

A license or permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee, and is not a
property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against the impairment of
contracts may extend. (Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank)

SECTION 11 : FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES AND


ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE SHALL NOT BE DENIED TO ANY
PERSON BY REASON OF POVERTY.

Inspired by social justice policy and covered by the equal protection clause, this rule has been
implemented by several provisions of the Rules of Court in favor of the pauper litigant. The IBP
provides deserving indigents with free legal aid, including representation in court, and similar services
available from the DOJ to litigants who cannot afford retained counsel, like the accused in a criminal
case who can ask for the assistance of counsel de officio. There are also private legal assistance
organizations now functioning for the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be unable to
resort to the courts of justice because only of their misfortune of being poor. This provision makes
them the equal of the rich before the law.

 This provision is the basis for Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis.
Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and labourers. They need not be
persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. It suffices that the plaintiff is indigent.
SECTION 12 : (1). ANY PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION FOR
THE
COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE, SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO
BE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO
HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE. IF THE PERSON
CANNOT AFFORD THE SERVICES OF COUNSEL, HE MUST BE
PROVIDED WITH ONE. THESE RIGHTS CANNOT BE WAIVED
EXCEPT IN WRITING AND IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.

(2) NO TORTURE, FORCE, VIOLENCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION, OR


ANY
OTHER MEANS WHICH VITIATE THE FREE WILL SHALL BE USED
AGAINST
HIM. SECRET DETENTION PLACES, SOLITARY,
INCOMMUNICADO, OR OTHER SIMILAR FORMS OF
DETENTION ARE PROHIBITED.

(3) ANY CONFESSION OR ADMISSION OBTAINED IN


VIOLATION OF THIS OR SEC. 17 HEREOF, SHALL BE
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.

(4) THE LAW SHALL PROVIDE FOR PENAL AND CIVIL


SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THIS SECTION, AS WELL
AS COMPENSATION TO AND
REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS OF TORTURE OR SIMILAR
PRACTICES, AND THEIR FAMILIES.

Rep. Act No. 7438 : AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING, AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Statement of Policy. --- It is the policy of the State to value the dignity of every human
being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers. ---
(a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times
be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person
arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided
by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or
detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and
of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such persons in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession
shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Art. 125 of
the RPC, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and
void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national NGO duly accredited
by the CHR or by any international NGO duly accredited by the Office of the
President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé
or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is under investigation in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer
for any violation of law.
Section. 3. Assisting Counsel. --- Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by
the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the
prosecution of crimes. The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to
the following fees:
(a) The amount of P150.00 if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;
(b) The amount of P250.00 if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of P350.00 if the suspect is chargeable with a capital offense. The fee for the
assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is
conducted, provided that if the municipality or city cannot pay such fee, the province
comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City
Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before
the province pays said fees. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in
accordance with the provision of Art. 125 of the RPC.
Section. 4. Penalty Clause. ---
(a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer who fails to inform any
person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of
P6,000.00 or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than 8 years but not more than 10 years, or
both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense. The same
penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of
such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent
counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of
an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by
him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him,
or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the
night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 4 years nor more than 6 years,
and a fine of P4,000.00. The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security
officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section. 5. Repealing Clause. --- RA 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, PDs, EOs or
rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section. 6. Effectivity. --- This Act shall take effect 15 days following its publication in the OG or in
any daily newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Approved, April 27, 1992.

When do the rights begin to be available?


(1) when the person is already in custody
(2) custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
(3) during “critical pre-trial stages” in the criminal process

Rights end at the time of the filing of criminal cases in court

MIRANDA RIGHTS [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966)]


Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be informed of the following rights:
1. Right to remain silent
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can and will
be used against him.
3. Right to counsel before and during interrogation
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel, then one will be provided for him by the
state.
5. Even if the person consent to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment
he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present.
6. if the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been
observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used
against him.

• The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person arrested is a prominent
Constitutional lawyer, as to assure him that his interrogators are willing to respect his rights
amidst the pressure of custodial investigation.
• The “Miranda rights” are available to avoid involuntary extrajudicial confession

For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following


requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary
(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel
(3) it must be express
(4) it must be in writing

Prosecution has burden to prove warnings


The prosecution may not use statements whether exculpatory or inculpatory [People v. Nicandro]

Custodial phase of investigation police line-up


No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel.While the right
may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
[Gamboa v. Cruz]

TEST OF WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS


What may be waived: the right to remain silent and to counsel but not the right to be
given “Miranda
warnings” or the right to be informed of these rights.
• As the warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any
subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent,"
• Waiver must be in writing, and made in the presence of counsel (ruling effective only on April
26, 1983. Cannot apply retrospectively to waivers before that date.)

Exclusionary rule a.k.a. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREEDOCTRINE


Art. III, Sec. 12(3). Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

• Justice Frankfurter, in Nardone v. US: Once the primary source is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence is also inadmissible.
• In Peo. v. Urro, went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced confessions, regardless
of their truth, are null and void
• This is not bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the methods used to extract
them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system

Exceptions to the Exclusionary rule:


1. In Harris v. US, it was held that a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda may
nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit. Miranda shield cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense.
2. In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. In such
exigent circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose bet. giving the warnings at
the risk that public safety will be endangered.
3. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17, 1973. [Magtoto v.
Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975)], the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
4. Not applicable to res gestae statements [People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)]
5. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations [People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA
216 (1989)]

Privilege against self-incrimination


• The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself."
• It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry."
• However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time.
• It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed.
• The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed.

Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony


A suspect has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1. BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT but after having been taken into custody the continuing
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have
evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to crossexamination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate
him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

Signing receipts not self-incriminatory


The receipts for seized items are mandatory on the part of apprehending and seizing police officers.
They are merely intended to show that the items were taken from the accused. [People v. Boholst 152
SCRA 263 (1987)]
v. Rights against double jeopardy
No person can be prosecuted twice for the same offense.
• Requisites:
(1) Valid complaint or information
(2) Filed before a competent court
(3) To which the defendant had pleaded
(4) Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case was otherwise terminated
without his express consent (People v. Judge Pineda, G.R. 44205)
When is 2nd prosecution allowed?
supervening death, unjustified dismissal, dismissal on motion to quash, absence of jurisdiction

When is 2nd prosecution prohibited:


(1) dismissal on demurrer
(2) prosecution for the same act

1. Prosecution for supervening death even after earlier conviction for physical injuries
When after the 1st prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense, and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitute a new and distinct offense, the accused could not be said to be in 2nd jeopardy in
indicted for the new offense [Melo v. People, 85 Phil 766 (1950)]

2. Retrial after unjustified dismissal allowed


If dismissal was void for having been issued without legal basis, the acquittal bought about by
the
dismissal is also void. Hence, no jeopardy can attach from such acquittal [People v. Jardin]

3. Double jeopardy for same act


The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute, provided that both offenses spring from the same set of acts. [People v.
Relova]

4. Dismissal on motion to quash prevents jeopardy


The dismissal on motion to quash does not amount to an acquittal on the merits, from a legal
standpoint, the defendant is deemed as not having been charged with the commission of any
offense whatsoever under the defective information.

5. Double jeopardy after dismissal on demurrer


6. Absence of jurisdiction prevents jeopardy

Custodial investigation – the time when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.

Rights of Persons under Custodial Investigation (Miranda doctrine)

1. The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a
right to remain silent.
2. After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in
court.

3. He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigators should tell
him that he has the right to counsel at that point.

4. He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

5. Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment he
asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present.

6. If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been
observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used
against him.

 The reason for the rule is that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in
the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. For coercion can be mental as well as physical,
and the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.

 In People v. Tolentino, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official
acts related to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled
any doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove during a trial that prior to questioning the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected
rights.

Q: At what point in the inquiry do the rights become available?

A: The rights become available the moment a person had become the focus of investigation and had been
taken into custody.

 Sec. 12(1) does not apply to situations where the person presents himself to the police and in the
process makes his admissions. It also does not apply to subjection to paraffin test because it is not
communicative action or testimonial compulsion. Nor does it apply to one placed in a police line-up,
unless there is a move on the part of the investigators to elicit admissions or confessions. But a person
already under custodial investigation who is placed in a police line-up is entitled to Sec. 12 rights.

Rights available under Sec. 12(1)

1. The right to remain silent.


2. The right to counsel.
3. The right to be informed of such rights.

 A person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question. His silence may not be
used against him.

 If the accused never raises an objection to counsel given him, he is deemed to have been properly
counseled.

 The right to counsel was a right to effective counsel from the first moment of questioning and all
throughout.

 Even in times of emergency, and especially in times of emergency, the right to counsel must be
respected.

 The right of a person under investigation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed.
 The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of charges, the preliminary
examination and investigation after charges are filed, and the period of trial. Sec. 12(1) rights were
conceived for the first of these 3 phases, that is, when the enquiry is under the control of police officers.
Outside of this situation, the applicable provisions are Sec. 14 and Sec. 17. It is for this reason that an
extrajudicial confession sworn to before a judge enjoys the mark of voluntariness.

 The defendant may waive effectuation of the rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently.

 The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. (People v. Galit)

 Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence that the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted their confessions and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that they were not interested in having a lawyer assist them
during the taking of the confession. (People v. Jara)

“These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”

The implication of this rule is that, in localities where there are no lawyers, the state must bring the
individual to a place where there is one or bring counsel to the place