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Paradigms of Organisational and Institutional Structures and Governance of Multilateral Financial Development Institutions (MFDIs)
Gerd Droesse
8 June 2011
Increased number of multilateral donors, including emerging new donors, private sector, philanthropic sources Strong increase in thematic funds and earmarking Thousands of NGOs assisting DMCs Great complexity of current aid architecture
2. Organizations hardly ever die vested interests and qualified majorities are formidable obstacles to reform. 2. New organizations created in response to emerging needs 3. Dissatisfaction with decision-making procedures of existing organizations 4. Easier to establish new organizations than amend their charters
Generation here is used to refer to a wide range of entities, institutions, alliances, facilities and financial intermediary funds serving as channels of multilateral concessional financing, in addition to MDBs and other multilateral financial development institutions (MFDIs).
Four Generations 1. First Generation (1948 1960) 2. Second Generation (1960 1980) 3. Third Generation (1980 2000) 4. Fourth Generation (2000 present)
First Generation
(1948 1960)
Institutions established as financial intermediaries without concessional window None of their charters provided for a concessional window but each found a way to provide concessional financing, directly or indirectly
IMF radically changed its functions to provide concessional financing through trust funds IBRD sponsored the establishment of IDA as the concessional arm of World Bank Group CEB provided subsidies from a trust account funded by profits EIB administers funding from European Union
Second Generation
(1960 1980)
Emergence of concessional windows Intergovernmental organizations, including concessional arms of groups With legal personality under international and municipal law Offered initially only limited concessional products (loans and TA) except OFID which also provided balance of payment support
http://www.who.int/apoc/onchocerciasis/ocp/en/index.ht
Third Generation
(1980 2000) 1. Intergovernmental organizations
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) (1999) charter provisions on special funds similar to AfDB and ADB no window for concessional loans special funds exclusively used for TAs
Established by multilateral environmental agreements Informal and flexible approach to institutionalized cooperation among states Generally comprise Conference or Meeting of Parties with decision making powers (does not meet at one location) Secretariat and subsidiary bodies May comprise financial mechanism Members of constituted bodies under AIAs (e.g. under Clean Development Mechanism and other mechanisms under Kyoto Protocol) often not covered by privileges and immunities
3.Third Generation Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) Have been established for many purposes Substitute for the establishment of intergovernmental organizations Generally not endowed with legal personality
Restructured Global Environment Facility (GEF) (1994) established by separate resolutions of the three implementing agencies as a sui generis financial mechanism, representing a unique blend of United Nations and Bretton Woods practices. (Ragazzi)
GEF paved the way for a new type of trust fund for development finance Fund managed by a trustee (the World Bank) but its the contributors to the Fund (GEF Council), not the trustee, who allocate the resources to beneficiaries Funded through a regular, formalized replenishment process
Sophie Smyth
GEF Implementation arrangements 3 implementing agencies (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP) 7 executing agencies
1. ADB 2. AfDB 3. EBRD 4. FAO 5. IADB 6. IFAD 7. UNIDO
Under umbrella institutional arrangements, GEF manages the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
HIPC Trust Fund (1997) Trust fund administered by World Bank Special decision-making procedures and consultative mechanisms apply
Prototype Carbon Fund (1999) Emerged under the auspices of Kyoto Protocol for combating climate change High-quality greenhouse gas emission reductions Public-private partnership IBRD is administrator and as trustee, legal owner of assets
Fourth Generation
(2000 present) States continued to be reluctant to establish new intergovernmental organizations However, legal personality is at the forefront of discussion and policy agenda
Different approaches in other sectors: New FIFs were not endowed in all cases with legal personality under municipal law
e.g. UNITAID leverages price reductions of quality drugs funded by airline tax WHO-hosted and administered
In some cases, conferring legal personality was the result of progressive institutionalization.
Governance structures and modalities of concessional financing reflect evolving development agenda
Governance structure draws on GEF experience before and after restructuring but is different from GEF
Trust Fund Committee and Subcommittees MDB Committee Partnership Forum Administrative Unit and Trustee
CIF implemented by MDBs working separately but with new mechanisms that enhance MDB cooperation Consensus-based decision-making procedures
Green Climate Fund (December 2010) Creation decided at Copenhagen and confirmed at Cancn Fund will be designed by Transitional Committee Core elements determined at Cancn Management by board comprising equal number of developed and developing parties (24) Standing Committee World Bank appointed interim trustee National institutions may have direct access to GCF financing
funds Cumulative resources received by GEF as of March 2009 amount to USD eq. 9.5 billion
GEF. 2009. Review of the GEF Trust Fund: Contributions, Funding Availability and Financial Risk, p. 8.
Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), and Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) with its three targeted programs, have already mobilized $6.4 billion since their establishment in 2008.
Paradigms of Organizational Structures Multilateral Financial Development Institutions (MFDIs) FIFs without legal personality (e.g. GEF) FIFs with legal personality under municipal law (e.g. Global Fund)
Concessional financing through trust funds or other external resources (e.g. IMF)
Same president
IBRD and IDA AfDB and AfDF
IBRD and IDA has the same governors and executive directors AfDB AfDF governance structure coordinated thorough AfDB membership in AfDF Different decision-making procedures, qualified majorities and voting rights may apply
Policy Implications
Separate legal personality of affiliated organizations:
no longer required to isolate risk of concessional operations emphasizes separation between concessional and nonconcessional windows, but close cooperation is warranted but potential advantage if MFDIs change their funding structure and commence leveraging funds from capital markets
Funding structures no longer in accord with: many new emerging donors, including the private sector and philanthropy developments in financial industry
Possible Solutions
1.Explore innovative financing mechanisms 2.Mobilize additional resources by leveraging resources on capital markets 3.Consider alternative uses of concessional resources (e.g. as risk buffers instead for subsidizing the cost of financing)
Lack of legal personality seen as a constraint to development effectiveness (quest for legal independence has not yet succeeded so far).
Complex coordination framework and fragmented implementation arrangements Equal representation of developing and developed Double voting procedure Participants of GEF Assembly not covered by privileges and immunities
Legal personality under municipal law Move away from three-tier Bretton Woods system Partnership Forum only a discussion forum;
Representation in Board and allocation of resources not based on membership Relies on recipient country level governance structures in addition to global governance structures Decision-making inspired by GEF and reflects the trend toward softer decision-making procedures
Way Forward
Assessment
Proposals for a grand redesign of aid architecture most likely cannot be implemented within a short or even medium-term perspective The current situation, which is characterized by proliferation and fragmentation of channels of concessional financing and earmarking of development aid, is likely to continue for a long period.
In parallel with the attempts to reform the current aid architecture, discussion should focus on matters that can be achieved within a medium-term range, based on the current legal frameworks of concessional windows.
Possible Solutions
Transform international organizations into similarly structured multi-donor platforms and umbrella operational arrangements comprising in addition to their own resources a variety of trust funds and other co-financing arrangements which are administered on the same terms and conditions for a defined purpose Create supplementary governance structures for umbrella financing arrangements for certain countries or sectors Actions can be taken as a matter of policy
With negative implications at various levels as they can lead to duplication and wasting scarce resources and create high transaction costs However, they are also an expression of the vitality of the development of the current aid architecture
Paradigm Shift
Paradigm shift in the relationship of MFDIs and other development institutions from Centralized decision-making to decentralization Consensus to cooptition (i.e., cooperative competition)
Decentralization
Federalism has served states well Partially decentralized decision-making should be the guiding principle to relations between multilateral financial development organizations
Kawai, Petri, and Sisli-Ciamarra illustrate this in relation to MDBs Global organizations (e.g. WB) should focus on project lending to address broad, global objectives alleviate negative global externalities, such as climate change, global energy and food shortages, and global epidemics and activities with great economies-of-scale Serve as a knowledge bank to collect and disseminate research findings
Regional development banks should focus on: - sub-global development challenges provision of regional public goods to be shared by countries with common interests - investments for regional infrastructure or regional financial markets
Kawai, Petri, and Sisli-Ciamarra
Cooptition
Relationship of organizations should be covered by cooptition (i.e. cooperative competition) Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) coined the term coopetition cooperation may enhance competition and businesses should cooperate to be competitive Companies cooperate to create a market and compete to divide it Cooptition is common between messaging services, cargo operators, and especially airlines.
Cooptition
Organizations should harmonize administrative terms and conditions to reduce transaction costs not compete over administrative arrangements or terms and conditions of financing (as they are channels of ODA) cooperate at the country level wherever feasible to minimize costs and increase the efficiency of their services
However, cooperation and harmonization do not implyand should not lead touniformity.
Competition between different providers of concessional financing may enhance their development impact as long as it is focused on innovation and development outcomes.
Airline Alliances
Airline alliances offer a paradigm for a future relationship of development organizations. They have: Harmonized their administrative/operational procedures to transport passengers and freight Cooperate in certain areas (e.g. check-in, lounges) to reduce costs But each airline maintains its own character and competes in providing the best standards of service and in selecting its areas of operations
Cooptition
Similarly, MDFIs should try to find new and innovative solutions Respond to the needs of their targets Enhance development impact Develop new instruments Provide excellent service Remain faithful to the purpose for which they were established Such cooperation facilitates institutional reform at a later stage