Edmund Husserl's

Orgin of Geometr:
An Introduction
Jacques Derrida
TRANSLATED, WITH A PREFACE AND AFTERWORD,
BY JOHN P. LEAVEY, JR.
University of Nebraska Press
Lincoln and London
Copyright © 1962 by the Presses Universitaires de France
Translation copyright © 1978 by John P. Leavey, Jr.
Afterword copyright © 1989 by the University of Nebraska Press
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Bison Book printing: 1989
Most recent printing indicated by the frst digit below:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Derrida, Jacques.
Edmund Husserl 's Origin of geometry: an introduction / Jacques Derrida;
translated, with a preface and afterword, by John P. Leavey, Jr.
p. cm.
"First Bison Book printing"-T.p. verso.
Reprint. Originally published: Stony Brook, N.Y.: N. Hays, 1978.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8032-6580-8 (alk. paper)
1 . Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938. Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geo­
metrie als intentional-historisches Problem. 2. Phenomenology. I. Title.
QA447.D4713 1989
142' . 7-dc 19 CIP 88-38638
Reprinted by arrangement with Presses Universitaires de France and John P.
Leavey, Jr. Translated from the revised edition of Introduction a "L'Origine
de la geomerrie" de Husserl.
The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of American National
Standard for Information Services-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface: Undecidables and Old Names, by John P. Leavey
Undecidables and Deconstruction
Derrida's Introduction to The Origin oj Geometry
Deconstruction and the Science of Old Names
Translator's Note
Introduction to The Origin ofGeometr
*1. The Sense of Sense-Investigation: Responsibility.
Consciousness. and Existence
I. The Historical Reduction and the Necessity for
Return Inquiry (RiickJrage) in Reactivation
III. The Ego as Fundament and the Reduction of
Factuality
IV. Objectivity. Historicity. and Intentionality
V. Language, the Possibility of Transcendental
Historicity
VI. The How of Ideality: the Earth and the Living
Present
VII. The How of Ideality: Writing and Unil'ocity as
the Telos of Reactivation
.
VIII. Horizon: the Absolute of History. and Imaginar
Variation
IX. The Suspension of Ideality: Scient(fc Study of
the Life- World (Lebenswel)
X. Geography, Injnitization, and the Idea in the
Kantian Sense
XI. The Historicity of the Idea: Diff erence, Delay,
Origins. and the Transcendental
Appendix: The Origin of Geometry, by Edmund Husserl,
trans. David Carr
Coda: contrpunctus and translation, by John P. Leavey
Index of Passages Cited from Husserl
Index
v
1
7
18
20
23
27
34
51
62
66
76
87
107
117
122
141
155
181
193
197
¯ These headings, added for the convenience of the reader, do not appear in the
French edition.
Acknowledgments
The 1 974 second, revised French edition of EDMUND HUSSERL'S
L'ORIGINE DE LA GEOMETRIE. traduction et introduction par JAC­
QUES DERRIDA, in Epimethee, Essais Philosophiques, Collection
fondee par Jean Hyppolite, copyright © 1 962 by Presses U niversitaires
de France, 1 08, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, is the source of this
English translation.
We are grateful to the PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DE FRANCE
for their authorization to present this text in English.
HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY is here reprinted from THE
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY by EDMUND HUSSERL, translated by David
Carr. Copyright © 1 970 by Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
Pp. 353-78.
We are also grateful to NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS
for their authorization to reprint Husserl's text in full.
Preface
Undecidables and Old Names
UNDECIDABLES AND DECONSTRUCTION
Tympaniser-la philosophie.
Marges
Oaiaeo:eseair:eaea. aie||eeiaa| seeae. iaeaaveaiaaaaem.seei
si:aeia:a| . smaaveaeee¬eaa.ea«aaiaas|eeaea||eaiae|ee| ssaee:·
seaa:e|viaeiexi. 1aei:eaeaea.|eseeae:aaae:.i.e¡aeeaesDe::.aa
.ss.iaaieaaiiae] aaeia:eeiiaei«e. iae|ee|aaaiaeiexi.ae«:.ies
a|eaiiaee:. a. as . ae|avs, aaaa.ne:eaieaias aiiae.:e:ess:eaas

H. s
¬eiaea¨. siae aeeeasi:aei.ea¨eiiaeve:v. aeaeiwriting.
1exiseeea:ie:De::.aaea|v.a«:.i.ae.a«:.i.aeaaae:sieeaaei.a
iaee:a.aa:v sease.|aiasiaeo|aeeeim·«·e-iaea|«avs .aeemo|eie
e:asa:e e: se:aiea.aeeai eiwesie:ameiaoavs.es.· 1ae |ee|as aa
I
See, for exampl e, Eugenio Donato, "Structuralism: The Afermath, " Sub-Stance,
NO. 7 (Fall 1 973) , 9-26; Phillippe Sollers, "Programme, " in his Logiques (Paris: Seuil ,
1 968), pp. 9-1 4; or Julia Kristeva, Semei6tike: Recherches pour une semanalyse (Paris:
Seuil , 1 969); as well as any number of works by Roland Barthes or Derrida hi mself.
� "Like all the notions I am using, it belongs to the history of metaphysics and we can
onl y use it under erasure [sous rature ( added by tr. ) ] , " Jacques Derri da, Of
Grammatology, tf. Gayatri Spi vak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1 977) , p. 6. Since this translation, with an excellent preface by the translator, appeared
afer the present work was completed, I was unable to compare translations for consis­
tency of terminology (a I did with Allison' s translation of Speech and Phenomena), nor
was I able to comment on Mrs. Spi vak' s Preface. However, I have added references in
the notes to relevant sections of her preface. Her discussion of rature occurs on pp.
xi i i-xx. I t forms the backdrop for her lengthy discussion of Drrida' s " acknowledged
' precursors' -Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Husserl , " pp. xxi-liv. I n his translation of
" La ' differance, ' ' ' contained in Derrida' s Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on
Husserl ' s Theor of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 973) , p. 1 43,
David Allison notes : "Derrida ofen brackets or ' crosses out ' certain key terms taken
from metaphysics and logic, and in doing this, he follows Heidegger' s usage in Zur
Seinsfrage. The terms in question no longer have their ful l meaning, they no longer have
the status of a purely signifed content of expression-no longer, that is, after the decon­
struction of metaphysics. Generated out of the play of diference, they still retain a
vestigial trace of sense, however, a trace that cannot simply be gotten around
(incontourable) . "
1
2
Preface
archives of metaphysical inscriptions, as the encyclopedia of knowl­
edg�or the complete presence of the signifed (transcendental or not), is
foreIgn to Derrida's new "concept" of writing, l'ecriture. Derrida ex­
plains: "If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall be saying that the
destruction of the book, as it is now under way in all domains, denudes
the surface of the text. That necessary violence responds to a violence
that was no less necessary." The book's own violence, its "protection
of �heol
.
ogy and
.
o
.
f logocentrism against the disruption of writing,
agamst Its aphonstic energy, and . . . against diference in general,"3
forces the present-day violent distinction of the book and the text, in
order for "writing" to be understood.
Rature and the text ofDerrida wherein it occurs are themselves crossed
out or somehow suspended in his thought,- a thought seemingly too
abstract. His method of criticism, deconstruction, could be seen, as
Ricoeur says, as "consisting in laying waste to metaphysical discourse
by aporia"5-i.e., as a kind of mental gymnastics. This common, but
important, criticism of Derrida actually strikes at the heart of his enter­
prise. His continual insistence on the failure of metaphysics as onto­
theo-Iogy seems to support Ricoeur's criticism. Derrida still writes
"book�" in the ordinary sense, and all the words of his text are, by
necesSIty, not erased. In fact, deconstruction seems to be the violent
misinterpretation of Wester thought. However, the above criticism
also misses the point, or preferably, the non-point, of Derrida's work,
all of which could be considered as outside of books, hors-livre, as
´ Of Grammatology. p. 1 8 .
� " If there were only perception, pure permeability to frayi ng [facilitation, Bahnung J.
there would be no frayi ng. We would be written but nothing would be recorded; no
writing would be produced, retai ned, repeated as readability. But pure perception does
not exist [my emphasis] : we are written only by writing . . . by the i nstance wi thi n us
which always already governs perception, be i t i nternal or external. The ' subj ect' of
writing does not exist if we mean by that some sovereig solitude of the author. The
subject of wri ti ng is a system of relations between strata: of the Mystic Pad, of the
psyche, of society, of the world. Withi n that scene the punctual simplicity of the classical
subject is not to be found. In order to describe that structure, it is not enough to recall that
one always writes for someone; and the oppositions sender- recei ver, code-message, etc . ,
remain extremely coarse i nstruments. We would search the 'public' i n vai n for the frst
reader: i . e . , the frst author of a work. And the ' sociology of literature' i s blind to the war
and ruses-whose stakes are the origin of the work-between the author who reads and
the frst reader who dictates. The sociality of writing as drama requires an entirely
diferent discipli ne" (Jacques Derrida, "Freud et la sd:ne de I ' ecriture, " in his L' Ecriture
et la diff erence [Paris: Seuil, 1 967] , p. 335; ET: "Freud and the Scene of Writi ng, " tr.
Jefrey Mehlman, i n Yale French Studies, No. 48: French Freud [ 1972] , 1 1 3- 1 4) .
5 La Meraphore vive (Paris: Seui l, 1 975) , p. 365.
3
Preface
prefaces, as marginal comments written in the margins of other books
or texts."
The preface, Derrida says, is "a fourth text. Simulating the postface,
the recapitulation. and the recurrent anticipation, the auto-moveme�t of
the concept, it is an entirely other, diferent text, but �t the sam:
,
tIme,
as 'discourse of assistance,' it is the 'double' of what It exceeds. Th
.
e
fourth text, as text, is "the beyond everything [which] insofar
.
a� It
withstands all ontology . . . is not a primum movens. However, It Im­
parts [imprime] to everything . .. a movement of fction. ´ Derridafc­
tionalizes Western tradition, an action, in part, of teanng down or
apart, deconstructing or demolishing.9
. .
How does Derrida fctionalize? In other words, what IS the fctIonal
motion that his prefaces impress on everything? As the fourth text, it is
dissemination, 10 deconstruction, diferance: `
´ "All these texts . . . no doubt are the i nterminable preface to another text that I
would one day like to have the strength to write , or again the epigraph to anoth�r [te�t] ?f
which I would never have had the audacity to write . . . " (Positions [Pans: MlnUl t,
1 972] , p. 1 4) . On margi nality, see David Allison, "Derrid�' s C�itique of Husserl : The
Philosophy of Presence, " Diss. The Pennsyl vani a State Umverslty, 1 974, p. 1 77.
´
Jacques Derrida, La Dissemination (Paris : Seuil , 1 972) , pp. 33-35.
� Ibid., p. 65: my emphasis onfction.
� This unbuilding at times seems close to the negative moment often assigned to the
creati ve imagination. See Ray Hart, Unfnished Man and the Imagination (New York:
Herder, 1 968) , pp. 247-49.
'
¤ "
Dissemination ulti mately has no meaning and cannot be channeled i nto a defnition.
. . . If it is not possible to summarize dissemi nation, the seminal diferance, in i ts conce�­
tual tenor, it is because the force and form of its di sruption break through the
.
semantIc
horizon . . . . Dissemination . . . by produci ng a non-fnite number of semantIc efects,
does not allow itself to be reduced ei ther to a present of simple origin (La Dissemination,
La Double Seance. La Mythologie Blanche are practical re-stagings of all the false starts,
beginnings, i nci pits, titles , exergues, fctitious pretexts , etc. : decap�ta�i�ns) or to an e�­
chatological presence. It marks an irreducible and generative mul tJp!tclty. The s
.
lIpple­
men! and the turbulence of a certain lack break down the li mit of the text, exempt It fr�m
exhaustive and enclosing formal i zation or at least prohibit a saturating taxonomy of I ts
themes, of i ts signifed, of i ts i ntended meani ng ( vouloir-dire).
"Here we are playing, of course , upon the fortui tious resemblance, upon the purely
si mulative ki nshi p between seme and semen. They are in no way interconnected by
meaning. And yet, i n this skiddi ng and this purely exteral collusion, �he �ccident d
.
oes
produce a sort of semantic mirage: the deviance of the i ntended meant��, I ts refl ectlve­
efect (efet-refet) in wri ti ng sets a process i n motion. " Taken from �OSI:/Ons, pp. 6
.
1 -62:
ET: "Positions, " Diacritics, 2, No. 4 (Winter 1 972) , 37. See SPI Vak s Preface I n Of
Grammatology, pp. lxv-l xvi .
'' Alli son in hi s Translator' s Introduction to Speech and Phenomena notes: "The term
' deconstruction' (deconstruction), while perhaps unusual , should present no difculties
4
Preface
Dissemination diplces the three of onto-theo-logy according to an
angle of a certain bending-back. A crisi of versus: these marks no
longer allow themselves to be resumed or 'decided' in the two of the
binar opposition nor sublated [relever] in the three of speculative
dialectics . . . they destroy the trinitarian horizon. They textually
destroy it: they are the marks of dissemination (and not of polysemy)
because they do not allow themselves at any point to be pinned down
by the concept or content of a signifed. They 'add' there the more or
less of a fourth term. 1:l
here. It signifes a project of critical thought whose task is to locate and ' take apart' those
concepts which serve as the axioms or rules for a period of thought, those concepts which
command the unfolding of an entire epoch of metaphysics. ' Deconstruction' is somewhat
less negative than the Heideggerian or Nietzschean terms ' destruction' or ' reversal' ; it
suggests that certain foundational concepts of metaphysics will never be entirely elimi­
nated, even if thei r i mportance may seem to be efectively diminished. There is no simple
' overcoming' of metaphysics or the language of metaphysics. Derrida recognizes,
nonetheless, that the system of Wester thought is fnite; it has a fnite number of axioms
and a fnite number of permutations that will continue to work themselves out in a gi ven
period of time as particular moments within this tradition, e . g. , as particular schools or
movements of philosophy. I n this sense, Derrida also speaks of the ' completion' of
metaphysics, the terminal point of ' closure' (cloture) for the system. But the work of
deconstruction does not consist in simply pointing out the structural limits of
metaphysics . Rather, in breaking down and disassembling the ground of this tradition, its
task is both to exhibit the source of paradox and contradiction within the system, within
the very axioms themsel ves, and to set forth the possibilities for a new kind of meditation,
one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence" ( pp. xxxii -xxxi ii ) .
` � The a of diferance inscribes the at onceness of difering and deferring i n diferance
(the French verb diferer has both signifcations: to difer, to defer or delay ; etymologi­
cally the English words "difer" and "defer" stem from the same root) . Derrida explains
in "La diferance, " translated in Speech and Phenomena, p. 1 37: "the word ' diference'
(with an e) could never refer to difering as temporalizing or to diference as polemos [to
diference as di vision or spacing] . It is this loss of sense that the word diferance (with an
a) will have to schematically compensate for. Diferance . . . refers to [its] whole com­
plex of meanings not only when i t is supported by a language or interpreti ve context (like
any signifcation) , but it already does M somehow of itself. Or at least i t does so more
easily by itself than dos any other word: here the a comes more immediately from the
present participle [diferant (added by tr. )] and brings us closer to the action of ' di fering'
that is in progress . . . . But while bringing us closer to the infni tive and active core of
difering, 'diferance' with an a neutralizes what the infniti ve denotes as simply acti ve, in
the same way that ' parlance' does not signify the simple fact of speaking, of speaking to
or bing spoken to . . . . Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the
ending -ance is undecided between active and passive. And we shall see why what is
designated by ' diferance' is neither simply active nor simply passive, that i t announces or
rather recalls something like the middle voice, that it spaks of an operation which is not
an operation, which cannot be thought of ei ther as a passion or as an action of a subject
upon an object, as starting from an agent or from a patient, or on the basis of, or in vi ew
of, any of these terms. "
I´I
La Dissemination, p. 32.
5
Preface
1a.siexiaa|crisi .ae:.s.seiiae|.ae.eiiae| .aeei«:.i.ae· .ia.sacc. i. ea
eiiae iea:ia ie:m-iaai ei]ction-masi |e eeaee.vecei.a ie:ms
eiae:iaaaasaea|ea|ase:meeaaa.eseieae.ee. i aeiae:«e:cs. a
ae« ea|ea|as . iaaieic.ae:aaeee:c. ssem.aai.ea. .saeecec. s.aeeiae
e:.s.seiiae iexi .saei|:eaeaia|eai|voe|vsemve:iaeeve:a|aa·
caaeeeimeaa.ae. |ai:aiae:|viaeve:v. aa|. |.iviecee.cemeaa.ae
Nea·eae.ee :aas ia:eaeaeai De::. ca s iexis. i a si:aeia:e. s.ea.
aac r|av .a iae D.seea:se eiiae uamaa se.eaees. eeaee:a.aeiae
i«e .aie:o:eiai.eas ei . aie:o:eiai.ea. iaai «a.ea c:eams ei ce·
e.oae:.aeiaei:aiae:e:.e.aaaciaai«a.ea am:msi:eeo|avaaci:. es
ieoass|eveacmaaaacaamaa. sm.De::.casavs aeceesaei|e|.eve
iaaiiecav iae:e . saaveaesi.ea eichoosing. "15 O: aea. a. . a 1ae
ÐacseiHaa.iae:e. saes. mo|eaacaa.eaeeae. ee|ei«eeai«e
ie:ms eiceeeasi:aei.ea. e.iae: ue.ceeee: s ceeeasi:aei.ea ei eaie·
iaee·|eev |v meaas ei.is e«a|aaeaaee e:iae si:aeia:a| .si«av-|v
am:m.ae a|se|aie :aoia:e aac c.ae:eaee ~ ae« «:.i.ae masi
«eaveaac. aie:i«.aei|ei«emei.is"16 1a. s|ee.eeiaea·eae.ee.siae
ve:vieaacai.ea..iiae:e.seae.eiDe::.ca seaie:o:.se. ii.siaeaei.ea
eiiaeaacee.ca||e-iaai«a.ea.by analogy, De::.casavs-eaaaei|e
cee.cec svaaa|eev|eeaase. assa:aakeimaaaeies. aacee.ca|. |.iv
aas a :eie:eaee ie cee.ca|. |.iv. a :eie:eaee iaai masi |e e:essec
eai

·
1ae aacee.ca||e' ia|es .aie. ise|iia. saea·eae.ee. as «e||as iae
aea:eeiiaee||. os. s De::.casavs. are:maacHeaa. ae.
There is, then, probably no choice to be made between two lines of
thought; our task is rather to refect on the circularit which makes the
'` "Freud et la scene de l ' ecriture, " p. 302; ET p. 81 .
`´ I n L'Ecriture e t fa diference, pp. 427-28; ET: i n The Structuralist Controversy: The
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man ( Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1 970) , pp. 265-66.
I6
"The Ends of Man, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 30, No. 1 ( 1 969) ,
56. A French version of this article was published in Derrida' s Marges de la phiLosophie
(Paris: Mi nui t, 1 972) . The above ci tations occur on pp. 1 62-63.
I7
Sarah Kofman, " Un philosophe ' unheimlich, ' ' ' in Ecarts: Quatre Essais a propos
de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Fayard, 1 973) , p. 1 48, n. 1 . The whole essay of Kofman is
i nvaluable for "understanding" Derrida.

" It was necessary to analyze, to put to work, in the text of the history of philosophy
as well as in the so-called 'li terary' text . . . certain marks . . . which I called by analogy
(I emphasize this) undecidables, i . e . , simulative units, ' false' verbal, nominal or semantic
properties, which escape from inclusion in the philosophical (binary) opposition and
which nonetheless inhabit it, resist and disorganize it, but without ever constituting a third
term, without ever occasioning a solution in the form of speculative dialectics" (Po­
sitions, p. 58: ET p. 36).
6
Preface
one pass into the other indefnitely. And, by strictly repeating this
circle in its own historical possibility, we allow the production ofsome
elliptical change ofsite, within the dif erence involved in repetition; this
displacement is no doubt defcient, but with a defciency that is not yet,
or is already no longer, absence, negativit, nonbeing, lack, silence.
Neither matter nor form, it is nothing that any philosopheme, that is,
any dialectic, however determinate, can capture. It is an ellipsis of
both meaning andform; it is neither plenar speech nor peiectly
circular. More and less, neither more nor less-it is perhaps an
entirely dif erent question.
1aeaacee.ca||e s |ee.e.siaaieiiaee||.os. seiiaee.:e| e. aceie:mec.
ceeeaie:ece. :e|e ~|eae«.iaiaee.:e|e.ia. s|ee.eeiiaeaacee. ca|| e.
eic.ae:aaee .aaa.aeesiaeoe.ai .| .ae.aacsoaeeaaci.meiaemse|ves .
diferance already suggests a mode of writing (ecriture) without
presence and absence-without histor, cause, arche, or telos-which
would overturn all dialectic, theology, teleology, and ontology. This mode
ofwriting would exceed everything that the histor ofmetaphysics has
conceived in the form ofthe Aristotelian grmme: the point, the line, the
circle, as well as time and space themselves.
2
0
1a.s|ee.eeic.ae:aaee.s«aaiaa. maies. aaa||v.iaeea:|viexiei
De::.cai:aas|aiecae:e .a. sIntroduction ieuasse:|

sOrigin ofGeome­
tr. ia Of Grammatology, De::.casavs «aai eaa a|se|e sa.ceiia. s
Introduction: ue:e as e| se«ae:e. ie eese iae e:e||em . aie:ms ei
eae.ee.iee|| .aee: ie|e| .eveeaese|i e|| . aecie aas«e:.i|vayes e:
no, ieeeaee.·eeiaeea:ieaaaeeasaaa| |ea.aaeee:aeaaeea:(eaaaeeas
e|a. aseeas.aa..sieeeaiaseve:vc.ne:eai|eve|s .eaias .aacsiv| es

la
iae ceeeasi:aei.ea ei iae a:eae iae e:eie·} . eae cees aei mase a
eae.ee ¯tveame:e. mee:iaaii e:ea:ea:eeses. s iae| . ae]asi|eie:e
ia. s De::.casavs. "That is why a thought ofthe trace [diff e rancej can
no more break with a transcendental phenomenology than be reduced
to it. "21
iaeiae:«e:cs. De::.ca. sasmaeaaoaeaemeae|ee.siasaei . . sas
´ � "La Forme et Ie voul oi r-dire: note sur l a phenomenologie du langage, " i n Marges, p.
207: ET i n Speech and Phenomena , p. 1 28.
�" "Ousia et gramme: note sur une note de Sein und Zeit, " i n Marges, p. 78; ET:
'Ousia and Gramme': A Note to a Footnote in Being and Time, " tr. Edward S. Casey,
in Phenomenology i n Perspective, ed. F. J . Smi th (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 970) , p. 93.
�` P. 62.
7
Preface
maeaasi:aeia:a|.siasaei.aaaiae.sias«e| | asia.a|e:eiiaesae:ec.··
asae.iae:. Cae.eesaeecaei|emaceae:e.. aiaei. eaaaei|emace
DERRIDA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY
"To deconstruct" philosophy would. . . be to think the
structured genealogy of its concepts in the most faithful or
interior manner, but at the same time it woul be to determine
from a certain outside unqualiable or unnameable by
philosophy itself what this history could dissemble or prohibit,
becoming history through this somewhere interested
suppression.
Positions
Speech and Phenomena, De::.ca savs. .s iae essav i va| ae iae
mesi ·iaia. s«e:|aeeaesi.easiaeo:. v.|eeeeiiaeve.eesoeeeìì
aac oaeaei.e«:.i.ae.a:e|ai.eaie a||eiwesie:aa. sie:v.

saeaa

i�. s
eaesi.ea| eis. ise|i|eceo.eiec.aiaea.sie:veimeiaoavs.esaacII .is
mesi mece:a. e:.i.ea| . aac v.e.|aai ie:m. uasse:| s i:aaseeaceaia|
oaeaemeae|eev·· iieaa|eeeas.ce:ec.De::.caiee| s. asa|eaeaei

e
ieOf Gram mato logy , |ai a aeie iaai aas iae a:sio|aee .a ae|ass..
oa. |eseoa.ea:ea.ieeia:e. O:.aesavs. Speech and Phe

omena eaa|e
eeas.ce:ec as iae eiae: s.ce.i:eai e:|ae|asvea«.sa·eiaaeiae:
essav. oa|| . saec .a i º-:. as aa iai:ecaei.ea ie uasse:ì s O�gin of
Geometr. 1ae:eiaeo:e||emseeaee:a.ae«:. i.ae«e:ea|:eacvII o|aee
as saea aac eeaaeeiecie iae .::ecae.||e si:aeia:e ei'diferer' .a .is
:e| ai.easieeease.easaess. o:eseaee. se.eaee.a. sie:vaaciaea.sie:vei
se.eaee.iaec.saooea:aaeee:ce| av. aeeiiaee:.e.a.aacseea. ·
2'
E. Donato in " Structuralism: The Aftermath," p. 25, sees OJ Grammatology, along
with Foucaul t's The Order oj Things, as "the only quest for ti me past and ti me regained
that a fundamentalIy atheist [my emphasis] epistemological confguration might ofer. "
Al so see on this Mi kel Dufrenne, "Pour une phil osophi e non theologique, " i n hi s Le
Poetique, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 97�) ,
pp. 7-57. On Derrida and the sacred, see Henri Meschonnic , Le Signe e t Ie poeme ( ParIs:
Gal l i mard, 1 975 ) , pp. 401 -92.
¯`´ Positions, p. 1 3 .
¯ Ibid.
¯`´ Ibid. Derrida has an even earlier essay on Husserl , gi ven at a conference i n 1 959,
entitled" 'Genese et structure' et l a phenomenologi e. " It was reprinted i n L' Ecriture et
La diference i n 1 967, but frst appeared i n 1 965 i n Entretiens sur les notions de genese :t
de structure, ed. Maurice de Gandi l lac et a. (Paris: Mouton, 1 965) , pp. 243-6. ThIS,
then, is both before and after the work on the Origin, having obviousl y undergone
changes by the time of i ts reprinting in L'Ecriture (the use of the concept dif erance on p.
239 is the cl earest and si mplest exampl e of thi s change) . The article is very hel pful for
understanding Derrida's Introduction.
8
Preface
ia iaese eemmeais De::.ca o:eseais as «.ia aa eoi.ea. ~s ae
saeeesis. «eeea|cia|eSpeech and Phenomena asiae :eve:seeia. s
Introduction, «a.ea|eeemesiae e|ve:se. iae :.eai e:o:eoe:(recto)
s.ce.i a| .eaieiiaeeemmeaisa|eve. iaeIntroduction «ea|ciaea|eiae
essavDe::.cava|aeciaemesi. O:..iia.s. sieeeieeia: . asiae:eve:se
. e: . mo:eoe:· s.ce. De::.ca sIntroduction . s si.||ie |e a.ea| vo:.zec
.aac. sse|vDe::.ca·· . s.aee.i.siae«ae|e«a.eaaasva|ae ue:e
oe:ve:se|v. iae . mo:eoe: s.ce . aiiae|.ae |v .isve:v . mo:eo:.eiv iae
o:eoe:s.ce. saoo|emeaisiaeva|aeeiiaeæeeacessav. Speech and
Phenomena. iaia.seoi.ea.iaeIntroduction . s|eiao:eoe:.s. aee.i«as
«:.iiea a:si. .a1961, s.xvea:s |eie:e iaeoa||.eai.ea eiSpeech and
Phenomena) aac.mo:eoe:.s.aee.i.siae:eve:seeiiaeseeeacessav· .
1aea|eveeemmeais. ia|eai:emHea:.xeases.aie:v.e««.iaDe:·
:.ca.a1967, aaciaeeoi.easiaevo:eseaio:ev.ceia:iae:]asi.| eai.ea
ie:ae|ese:eac.aeeiDe::.casa:sima]e:oa||.saecessav. a.sIntro­
duction ieThe Orgin ofGeometr. ii.sa|seaa.ai:ecaei.eaieiae«e:|
eiDe::.ca.aeeae:a|aacia:a.saesa|as.eoa:ieiiaei:ame«e:|ie:a. s
|aie:. o:eseai«e:|.That basic framework-and ae:ei:ame«e:|saea|c
oess.||v|eeaaaeec.mmec.aie| vieseieio:e||ems. eoi.e.meiaec. .i
a||iaese ie:ms «e:e aeia|:eacv.aaceeaaie ie«aai«ea:e ee.aeie
eeas.ce:-s phenomenology. He«eve:. as «.|| |eeeme e|ea:. iae
oaeaemeae|eev.aeaesi.ea.saeiiaai:e] eeiec|vu.eae| reaeaa|i.a
a.s re:e«e:c ie iae Ðae|.sa ec.i.ea ei The Order of Things, a
oaeaemeae|eev «a.ea e.vesa|se|aieo:.e:.iv ie iae e|se:v.aesa|·
]eei. «a.eaaii:.|aiesaeeasi.iaieai:e|eieaaaei. «a.eao|aees.ise«a
oe.aieiv.e«aiiaee:.e.aeia||a.sie:.e.iv-«a.ea..asae:i .|eacsiea
i:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaess. ··waaii«.saiee|a.m |vsav.aeiaai
De::.ca s i:ame«e:|.soaeaemeae|ee.ea|.saeiiaaiae.sHasse:|.aae:
He.ceeee:.aa. e: evea .cea| .si e: ex. sieai.a| . e: iaai a. s meiaec .s
oaeaemeae|ee.ea| .xaiae:.i«aaiiesaeeesiiaaiDe::.caaasieaac.a
aacat the limits o:ee.se|v «ae:e oaeaemeae|eev ia.|s. . . e . . «ae:e.i
|eeemes iae mece:a. exemo|a:v :eeao.ia|ai.ea ei wesie¬ meia·
oavs.es· a ie:i.|e e:eaac ie: ea|i.vai.ae eaesi.eas a|eai iae aea·
¹
´ Derrida often refers to and summarizes the resul ts obtained in this study in his later
work. See, for example , Speech and Phenomena, pp. 80-8 1 ; or L' Ecriture et la diff er­
ence, pp. 22 and 248.
°` The Order of Things: An Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences (New York: Vintage
Books, 1 973) , p. xiv. I cannot resist ci ti ng Foucaul t' s statement to the " English-speaking
reader" concering his relation to the other half of the phenomenological-structural de­
bate: "In France, certain half-witted 'commentators' persist i n label l i ng me a 'struc­
turalist' . I have been unable to get it i nto thei r tiny minds that I have used none of the
methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis" ( xi v) .
9
Preface
oa.|eseoa.ea|per se .iae | . m. is e: ma:e.as ei oa.|eseoav·. a|eai
«:.i.ae.e:.e.asaaca.sie:v. aacc.ae:oaee.
ue:eeve:. iaeoaeaemeae|eevDe::. caexam.aesaaca:eaes«.ia. s
iae oaeaemeae|eeveis.ea.| eai.ea.··sa|i.i|eciai:ecaei.eaieiae
r:e||em ei s.eas .a Hasse:| s raeaemeae|eev. Speech and
Phenomena |eacsie iae eeae| as.ea. 1ae:e aeve:«as aav oe:eeo·
i.ea. · ra:iae:. ~aceeai:a:vie «aaioaeaemeae|eev-«a.ea .s
a|«avs oaeaemeae|eeveioe:eeoi.ea-aasi:. ec ie ma|e as |e|.eve.
eeai:a:vi e«aaiea:ces.:eeaaaeiia.|i e|eiemoiec.aie|e| .ev.ae.the
thing itself always escapes.
¹
sasec ea iae "absolute will-to-hear­
onesel-speak, ¯ oaeaemeae|oev masi a|«avs ia.|. masi a|«avs
ce|av·ceie:·c.ae:eai. aiethe thing itsel, eveatae a|se|aie ieaacai.ea
ie:semaeaeiiecav s iaeaeai. . e . se|i·eease.easaess waai:ema.as
.s ie: asiespeak, iema|eea:ve.ees:eseaaieia:eaeaeaiiaeee:·
:.ce:s .ae:ce:iema|eaoie:iae |:ea|ao eio:eseaee. .ae:ce:ie
saoo|emeaiiae.moaeieieae so:eseaee.
¹
¹
¿
De::.ca s«e:|iecaie:ema. asinside thi s failure aacneed to speak ei
oaeaemeae|eev ~saesae«s,oaeaemeae|eev|:ea|saoeaiae:ee|ei
o:eseaee..i. sasa|]eei.eaeisense iesee.ae. eiseaseieiaeseaseei
s.eai . s.aee sease .a eeae:a| .s .a iaei iae eeaeeoi ei eve:v
oaeaemeae|ee.ea|| e|c. Yei|eie:eia.s|:ea|.aeao..aiaem.csi
ei. i. . s«ae:e De::.ca «e:|s. r:.e:ie iae meiaoavs.ea| e| a.ms iaai
oaeaemeae|eevexe:e. sesaac«.ia.aiaeoess.|.|.iveiaceeeasi:aei.ve
:eve:sa| ei iae a.e:a:eav ei s.eai aac sease. s.aee iaev a:e
aacee.ca||e-iaai.s«ae:ei:a.iia|Hasse:|.aa«e:|eaa|eceae 1ae
o:e||emeimeiaec«.ia.aiaese| .m.i..s«aai«e«.||seeceve|eoec.a
De::.ca sIntroduction.
1aeIntroduction ieThe Orgin ofGeometr .sa|eae. exieas.veessav
eeaee¬ec «.ia a sae:i.aceoeaceaii:+emeat .ae|acec. aeee:c.aeie
Hasse:| s o:e|a||e .aieai. asaa ~ooeac.x ie The Crisis of European

See Paul Ricoeur, "Negati vity and Primary Afrmation, " i n hi s Histor and Truth,
tr. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 965) , p. 3 1 2.
¯´ p. 1 03 . Al so see the comments of Newton Garver i n hi s Preface to thi s work, xxi i i ­
xxi v, as well as Note 4 above.
´´Ibid. , p. 1 04.
´`Ibid. , p. 1 02.
¦

Ibid., p. 1 04 and xxvi i i-xxi x.
´`' "Form and Meaning, " in Marges, p. 1 88; ET in Speech and Phenomena, pp. 1 08-09.
10
Preface
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 1aema]e:ia:eacea. c. a

uasse:| s:eaeei.eas.aiaeOrigin .siaeeaesi.eaei|ee.aa.aese:en·
e.ns«.ia.ahistor aaciae. :sease.De::.ca sIntroduction

esoeeisu


se:| s maaae: eio:eeeec. ae iae:e.a. u. s eemmeaia:v¬ie:o:eiai.ea
ie| | e«siaee:ce:eieaesi.ea.aeaaciaeo:e||ems:a. sec|vuasse:| .aac
«.ia.a ia.s si:aeia:e De::.ca e|a|e:aies aac e|ae. caies-aac aaa|�v
saoo|emeais«aaiuasse:|«:.ies i a«aaiie||e«s. ae«ev�:. i«. | |
aei o:eeeec se :.ee:eas| v iasieac. i «. | | e|ae.caieiaea:ea.ieeia:a|
eeaeeoieia.sie:.e.iv.sease·a. sie:v·aaciae:�|

ieca:easeieaes·
i.ea.ae.ieaia. | s. |aaeaaee.«:. i.ae..cea|.iv.iaei.v.

e�eseai

aa

ciae
i:aaseeaceaia| . 1aeseeemmeais«.|||eoa:saec«. iamDe:ncas ai·
ie¬oiieaace:siaaciae. aie:o|aveioaeaemeae|ee(s

o:.ae.�| eeia||
o:.ae.o|es aac.isaaa|. asi.iai.ea. iae.aie:o�avº.iameeas..easaess
eiiaeceaa.ieia.aeo:eseai.aoe:seaaaciae¬aa.iei ceaasaaa|

a

s
ceie::ec 1e| es. De::.ca«aais ie aace:siaacoaeaemeae|eev as .i . s
., stretched |ei«eeaiaejnitizing eease.easaessei. ispririple a

ciae
injnitizing eease.easaessei.is aaa|institution,
.
iaeE

ds

iftung ¬c�

a.ie| v ceie::ec .a .is eeaieai |ai a|«avs ev.ceai II .is :e

a| ai.ve
va|ae 1ae c. a| eei.eei iaesei«e. eaeaemeaea aac i c�a. .s «�ai
De::icaseemsieiee| . me| .e.i|vaaicecuasse:|. aa. s:eueei.easeaa. s·
ie:ie.iv. aaca siacv ei De::.cas eem

m

eaia:v :evea| s «aaiaaeeeas
«aeaiaese. me| .eai.easa:emaceexe| . .. i
Hitoricity
re:uasse:| .a.sie:.e.iv(Geschichtlichkeit)35 eeaee:asiaee:ie.asaac
i:ac.i.easei.cea|e|]eeis. aaci:ac.i.ea.ise|i.saace:sieecie|e|eia
iae o:eeess ei aaac.ae ce«a aac iae eaca:aaee ei ia.s o:eeess . a
`´ Jacques Derrida, Introduction et Traduction de L'Origine de fa g�omet�ie de Hus­
serl , 2nd ed. (Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France, 1 974) . Tran
.
slatl?ns will be t�ke
.
n
from the text as presented below and the page references wi l l be CIted lU the text withm
parenthesi s. For this quote: ( 1 38) .
• . It should be noted that Geschichtlichkeit is the term used many years e�rlier
.
b
,

Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, §§72-77: "Temporal i ty and Ges�hichtl!chkel t.
Al though the English translators of Heidegger' s work, John Macqu�ITle �nd Edw
.
ard
Robinson, have rendered the term as historicality. most translators, I ncl udI�g D
.
ern�a,
prefer the term historicity for Geschichtlichkeit. I have followed the latter, usmg hlston�­
ity throughout . However, although both Heidegger and Husserl use the same term, theIr
senses are different . as Derrida's Introduction should make clear
: . .
In addition, David Carr, who translated Husserl ' s Crisis, explaI�s In �IS Phenomenol­
ogy and the Problem of History ( Evanston: Northwest�rn UOlversity �ess, 1 974� ,
pp. 66-67 , that Husserl ' s concern wi th the problem of hIstory dId not anse from hIS
l
11
Preface
ae:.iaee. i cea| e|]eeis a:e «aai a|eae eaa:aaiee iae oess. |.| .iv ei
a. sie:.e.iv. . . e. . iaea|«avs .aie:sa|]eei.veeease.easaesseia.sie:v
(29). i aeiae:«e:cs. a. sie:.e.iv. sa|«avsasense-histor. iieoe:aiesea
iae |eve| eiseaseaac .s:e|aiecieiaeo:e||emsei|aaeaaee. .cea| . iv.
i:aia.aacaamaas. ac. a.isi.v.aer:eseai-iaesea:eeeia||seaseaac
a.sie:v
~eee:c.aeie De::.ca iae:e a:e i«e eeaseeaeaeesie ia.sv.e«ie:
uasse:| . r.:si. uasse:| s .aea. :v |aes ie iae e:.e.a .. aia.s ease· ei
eeemei:v.saa. aea. :v. aieiaesease·a.sie:veigeometrical i:aias. .aie
iaee:.e.aaaci:aasm. ss. eaeigeometrical .cea|e|]eei.v.i.ese:e|]eeis,
aa. aea. :viaaieaaea|v|easease·.avesi.eai.ea(a uasse:|aseciae
ie:m·ofgeometr. 36 De::.casavsa|eaiia. s. 1emec.iaieeae:.aves·
i.eaieiaesease(besinnen) eie:.e.as. saiiaesamei.meie.maseeaese|i
:esoeas.||e(verntworten) ie:iaesease(Sinn) eise.eaeeaacoa.|ese·
oav.|:.aeia. sseaseieiaee|a:.ivei. is ia|a| meaii . aacoaieaese|i.a
aoes.i.eaeiresponsibility ie:ia. sseasesia:i.aei:emiaeieia|seaseei
ea:ex. sieaee (31). sease·.avesi.eai.ea:evea| siaeeeac.i.easie:aac
iae seaseeia. sie:.e.iv. |ai ea| via:eaeaoe:seaa| :esoeas.|.| .ivaac
:esoease
seeeac| v. iaee:. e. aei.cea|e|]eeis. asorigin, :a. sesie:uasse:|iae
o:e||emeiiae.:eaca:.aeae:.iaee . iae. :i:ac.i.ea ia eiae:«e:cs. .i
.cea|e|]eeisa:ei:a| ve:.e.aa|aaco:.me:c.a| .ae«eaaiaev|e:eeee·
a.zec e:sae«a waaio|aeesiaem. aa.sie:v.siae.:"essence-of-the-
jrst-time, " iae. :Erstmaligkeit; iaev ceaei eeea:. uasse:| savs. .a a
acquaintance with Heidegger' s Being and Time: " It is hardly to be expected, however,
that a problem with which Husserl is so preoccupied could have occurred to hi m over­
night, as i t were, or even have entered his thi nki ng from an outside source-such as
Heidegger' s Being and Time (with its chapter on Geschichtlichkeit) , which HusserJ seems
to have studied careful l y, for the frst time, in 1 932. We intend to show, i n fact , that the
concept of historicity has its roots in refections on various subjects going back as far as
1 9 1 3, and that i ts emergence i n the Crisis i s the efect of an accumulation and confuence
of trains of thought which ul timately force HusserI' s new introduction to phenomenology
to take on its pecul i ar form. " Carr refers, then, to Gadamer' s support of this position i n
his Truth and Method, tr. ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury
Press, 1 975) , p. 2 1 5: "These statements of the later Husser! [concering historicity] might
be motivated by the debate wi th Being and Time, but they are preceded by so many other
attempts to formulate his position that it i s cl ear that Husser! had always had in mind the
application of his ideas to the problems of the historical sciences. "
´ Sense-i nvestigation, Besinnung, prise de conscience-George Steiner explains thi s
notion wel l i n After Babel: Aspects ofLanguage and Translation (New York: Oxford
Uni versity Press , 1 975): "The complete penetrative grasp of a text , the complete dis­
covery and 'recreative apprehension of its l ife-forms (prise de conscience), is an act whose
realization can be precisel y felt but is nearly i mpossible to paraphrase or systematize" ( p.
25) .
+
12
Preface
"topos ouranios, " .a semeaeavea| v |eea| e. aaciaea ceseeacie iae
ea:ia.xaiae:..cea|e|]eeisa:eirac.i.ena|e|]eeis. aaciaevoesæss
a. sie:.e.iv as eaeeiiae.: e. cei.e eemoeaeais (48) . 1aasaavai·
iemoiieeeiaiiaee:.e.n eiiaese .cea|e|]eeis. anva. sie:.ea|:e·
caei.ea. «ea|c |e "reactivating anc aeei.e. aac . i«ea|caaveie
«e:|ia:eaeai:eeoaaaiasv.. mae.na:v·va:.ai.ea. ue«eve:.astradi­
tion, . cea|e|]eeisaaveaee:eiec.anceeni.aaeiecese·sec.meaiai.eas
.niae.:i:ansm. ss.ea.iae.:ce|.ve:vieiaeo:eseaianciaia:e.1aevaave
o.e|ec ao|aie:a|anc|a:enisi:aia«a.eaiaea.sie:.ea|:ecae:.eamasi
anaIIv recaee :n ercer :e :eaea iaei anc craso :ae enc:ns ei:ae
: ceaI:::esanueru:seass: en.
s.nee:aee:.e.n.aeaesi.enae:e.saoaeaemeneIee:ea|eae.::s:eae·
i.vai.enenia.| sa:e:ara.nea. :v(Ruckfrage). 1a. s.nea.:va|«avss:aris
«.iaaa e:.e.n s tradition, «a.ea masi .aia:a|e:ecaeecieiaeve:v
e:.e.aiae.nea.:v. ssee|.aeie:eaei.vaie. iaeiae:«e:cs. i:ac.i.ea . s
esseni.a|ie|eiaiae.aea.:v|ae|ieanciae:eaei.vai.eaeiaae:.e.a.
Ruckrage .s iae eaesi.en. ae |ae| through tradition ie iae e:. e. aei
.cea| .iv. Yei . asuasse:| s ie:m saeeesis. ia. seaesi.ea.ne:esoeacsie
aaa|:eacv:eee.vecmessaeeiaaiiaei:ac.i.eaaancseve:.Reactivation
.siae aamaneaoae.ive:a|.|.ivie:ea«a|eaiaeo:. me:c.a|senseiaai
sec.meaiec.i:ac.i.eaa|·seaseeeve:seve:~aa.ieancmec.aieeaoae·
.iv. :eaei.vai.ea masi «e:i ia:eaea eea.veea| |aaeaaee ie :eea.a a
o:.me:c.a|sease. ii. s. aeee:c.neieDe::. ca.Verantwortung aacBesin­
nung, iae:ea«a|ea.neaac|e.ae:esoeas.||eie:iaeo:.me:c.a|sease
iaai iae eea.veea| i:ac.i.ea eeneea| s . ~s aa.ie aac mec.aie .. . e. .
i:ac.i.eaa|· . iae a|.|.iv ie :eaei.vaie sease eaa |e |esi. a o|.eaiiaai
uasse:|ie|ieave :.seie iae e:.s.s .a oa. |eseoav«a.eaeaa:aeie:.zec
mece:ai.mes . ~ncvei.uasse:|eoai.aaec. :eaei.vai.en asaeaoae.iv
eiaamaa|.nc.aeeae:a|eaa|e.nan.i.zecia:eaeaiae.cea| .z.neoe«e:
eieeemei:v.
1ae :e|e eii:ac.i.ea.a uasse:| siaeaeai|eeemese|ea:e:. De::.ca
oe.aiseai. «aea«enei.eeiaaii:ac.i.eaeoe:aiesaaa|eeeas|vieiae
c.a|eei.e¯ ei.nie¬a|i.me·eease.easness. iaec.a|eei.eeio:eieai.ea
aac:eieai.ea«.ia.niaei.v.aer:eseai.1aea.sie:.ea|sec.meaiai.eaei
sense .aie:o|avs«. ia iaee:eai.eaeiae« sease«.ia. aiaeae:.zeaei
o:eseni sease. ~|| ei«a.ea .s oess.||eie:uasse:| . «e saa|| see. |e·
eaaseei|aaeaaee.oa:i.ea|a:|v«:.iiea|aaeaaee.s:· .1aas. a.sie:. e.iv
|eeemesoess.||eia:eaea:eia¬.nea.:vaac:eaei.vai.ea.ancvei|eia
a:e oess.||een|v|eeaaseiae:e. sane:.e.aanci:ac.i.eaei.cea|e|·
]eeis.|eeaaseiae:e. sa.sie:.e.iv.1a.se.:e|e.De::.caexo| a.as. . s«aai
eeaee¬suasse:| . «aaiseemsie|eeiaimesi.moe:iaaeeieuasse:|
. s as maea aa eoe:ai.ea .:eaei.vai.en .iæ|ias iae a|. |.iv ie eoea a
13
Preface
a.ccena.sie:.ea|ae|c·asiaeaaia:eeiiaeae|c.:se|i.asiaeoess.|.|.iv
eisemeia.ae|.|e:eaei.vai.en· (51).
seia:«eaave seea iaaia.sie:.e.iv.seeaee:aec«.iaiaee:.e. aaac
i:ac.i.eaei.cea| e|]eeis. re:uasse:| iae |aiie: aei.ea. iaai ei.cea|
ei]eeis. :eea. :esexam.nai.eaei|eiae|]eei.v.ivaac.cea|.iv.r.:siiae
o:e||emeiiaeie:me:.iaeaiae|aiie:.
O:.e.as a:e |ee.na.nes eiseneia.ne ae«. as saea. iaev :a.se iae
o:e||emei:eeeea. za|.| .iv. uasse:|aas«e:s|vsav.aeiaaiiae:emasi
|esemeei]eei.v.:v .a:aee:.e.a eian .cea|.:vie::ae .ceaI.:v:eie
reeecn:zaiIe.`¯)a:s means. oe:r:ua savs. :aa::ae senseei:aeeen·
s:::a::ncae:eanenivieuee:oae:eu:n:ae«eiei:aeeens:::a:euei·
)ee: .Anu:a: sneeess::v:sne:anex:ernaIia:e. ia:aaessea::aIneees·
s::v ei.aieai.eaa| .:v. 1aeprmordial senseeieve:v:niea::eaa| aei.s
only .isfnal sease. . . e. . iae eeasi.iai.eaeiaa e|]eei (64). iaeiae:
«e:cs. e|]eei.v.iv .aee::e|aieei. aieni.eaa|.iv.ie:ees.aiea:.ena|.iv-
iae o:e||em ei :eeeea.za|.|.iv-ie |e e:asoec a:si ia:eaea .is aaa|
o:ecaei. iae eeasi.iaiec e|]eei. se iae eaesi.ea .s aa::e«ec. «aai
a||e«sie:iaee|]eei.v.iveiao:.me:c.a|sease .aae:. e.a·a|sease.s.nee
iaeeeac.i.easeie|]eei.v.iva:eiaeseeia.sie:.e.iv:
1a. s |:. aes as ie iae o:e||em ei | aneaaee. iaai |v «a.ea sease
. ise|i-e::aiae:. exo:ess.ve meaa.ae. | . aea.si.e meaa.ae-|ia.as .is
.cea|e|]eei.v.iv. iaa. seemmeais. De::.cae|a|e:aiesia:eecee:eesei
.cea|e|]eei.v.iv. mo|.e.i.auasse:| s ana| vs. s .r.:si. iae:e.siae|eve|ei
iae«e:c s .cea|e|]eei.v.iv.1ae«e:c|.ea. ie:.asiaaee,.s:eeeea. z·
a||e«.ia.aseve:a||aaeaaees . |ai. s|eaacieiaese|aaeaaees. a«a.ea
iae«e:c. ise|ima|essease . seeeac|v. iae:e.siae|eve|eiiae«e:cs
sease.1ae.aienceceeaienie:s.ea.aeai.eaeiiae«e:c| .ea.sava.|·
a||eie maav|aneaaees. ie:examo|e.Leo, Lowe, |.ea. saeaiaaiiae
.cea|.ivs. en.aec iae:e|v .si:ee i:em a||iaeiaa| |.nea.si.e sa|]eei.v·
. iv(71). 1a.:c|v.iae:e. siae|eve|eia|se|aie.cea|e|]eei.v.iv. saea
´` Dorion Cairns, in his review-abstract of Husserl ' s "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung
der Geometrie al s intentional-historisches Problem" ("I nqui ry Concerning the Origin of
Geometry: a Problem of I ntentional Hi story")
'
Philosophy and Phenomenological Re­
search, I, No. 1 ( 1 940), p. 1 00, accurately presents Husserl ' s answer to this problem (he
is abstracting from the German transcription Fink publ ished in the same journal in 1 939) :
"Our mathematics, however, exists as an age-long advance from acquisition t o acquisi­
tion. Therefore i t must have been a more pri mi ti ve sense that frst was projected and
appeared in the evidence of a successful execution. But the phrase i s redundant. Evi­
dence means the grasping of a bei ng in the consciousness of its original 'itslf-thereness. '
And grasping covers other acts besides simply perceptive seei ng. The sense of the meant
object indicates the way to grasp it originaliter. Sense-formations whose nature it is to
exist as subjecti vel y prouced resul ts are 'grasped' originaliter in being produced . Suc­
cessful l y realizing a project is evidence; i n the reali zi ng, the efect is there as 'itself. · "
14
Preface
asiaei:ee.cea|. i. eseieeemei:v1ae.cea| .iv.aeaesi.eaae:e.siaaiei
iaee|¡eei.ise|i. Oaia. s|eve|eie|¡eei.v.iv.iae:e. saeacae:eaeeie
aavceiaeie|aaeaaee.ea|vacae:eaeeieiaeoess.|.|.ivei| aaeaaee. a
eeae:a| .� 1a. smeaas iaai i:aas|ai.ea . s.aaa.ie|v eoea. De::.caaas
e|ae.caieciaeseia:eecee:ees. ae:ce:iesae«iaai«aeauasse:| . .a
iaeOrigin, ceesaeic.si.aea.sa|ei«eeaiaee|¡eei. ise|iaac.issease .
ia.s eaa ea|v eeea: «.ia.a iae ia.:c :ee.ea ei .cea| e|¡eei.v.iv. iae
a|se|aie| vi:ee.cea|e|¡eei.v.ivei|aaeaaee 1aas|aaeaaee.s iaeiee|
ie::evea| .ae.cea|e|¡eei.v.iv.«a.ea.aia:a:evea|s. s.aee. iceesaei
| .ve. aa"topos ouranios, " iaaie|¡eei.v.iv.ise|i. s.ai:.as. ea||va. sie:.ea|
aac masi|eeeaaeeiec«.iai:aaseeaceaia| sa|¡eei.v.iv. 1aee:eaac
ie:i:aaseeaceaia|a. sie:.e.iv. saaeeve:ec.
uasse:| s eaesi.eaiaea|eeemesiaeae« ei.cea|.iv.aacaeivei
iaaiei.ise:.e.a· . ae«cees.cea|.iv. oa:i.ea|a:|veeemei:.ea|. cea|.iv.
a::.veaia|se| aie. cea|e|¡eei.v.ivi:em .is/»··.oe:seaa|e:.e.a .aiae
.aveaie: s m.ac:ra:acex.ea||v. aeeees|ae| eaee aea.aie|aaeaaee.
ue savs iaai . cea|.iv a::.vesai .is a|se|aie e|¡ eei.v.iv |v meaasei
|aaeaaee. iae ve:v ia.aei:em «a.ea .i «as i:v.ae ie eseaoe¡asi a
memeaiaee. 1aeoa:acex. De::.casavs. .s iaai. «. iaeaiiaeao·
oa:eaiia|| |ae|.aie |aaeaaee aac iae:e|v .aie a. sie:v. aia||«a.ea
«ea|ca|.eaaieiae. cea|oa:.iveisease.sease«ea|c:ema.aaaemo.:. ·
ea|ie:mai.ea. mo:.seaecasiaei.aaosveae|ee.ea|sa|¡eei.v. iv»the
inventor's head. u.sie:.ea| .aea:aai.ea .a |aaeaaeeì seis i:ee iae
i:aaseeaceaia| ..asieacei|.ac.ae. i . 1ae|asiaei.ea.iaei:aaseeacea·
ia| . masi iaea |e :eiaeaeai (77). i «. | | :eia:aie ia.s :eia. a|. ae .a
amemeai
1a. sae«.saea. evec|eeaaseaamaa|.ac.s.aeaeaaciaesame
«e:|c. aaceease.easaesseiia.siaeiesia||.saesiaeoess.|. |.iveia
aa.ve:sa||aaeaaee. uaa|.ac. s a:sieease.easei. ise|iuasse:| savsì
as aa.mmec.aieaacmec.aie |. aea.si.eeemmaa.iv (79). iaacc.·
i.ea. ea:Ða:ia. asiaeo|aeeeia||e|¡eeis. . saeiaae|¡eei.ise|iaac
eaaaei |eeeme eae ie: aa e|¡eei.ve se. eaee. ia iaei . De::.ca eem·
meais. iaeoess. |.|.iveiaeeemei:vsi:.ei|veemo|emeaisiae. moes·
s.|. |.ivei«aaieea|c|eea||eca eee·|eev. iaee|¡eei.vese.eaeeeiiae
Ða:ia. ise|i (83) . Cee|eev .s as :ac.ea||v . moess. || e. iaea. as . saa
e|¡eei.vese.eaeeeii:aaseeaceaia|sa|¡eei.v. iv. ~aceeemei:v.soes·
s.||eea|v. aseia: asiae a|eve . si:ae. s.aee oaeaemeae|eev s |as.e
o:.ae. o|e eiaa.iacea|«avs .aie:o|avs «.iaaa. aaa.ie .aacaeae|¡ee·
´' However, as Derrida poi nts out i n a note, p. 72 below, thi s ideality occurs and i s di s­
covered in a factual language, and thi s occurrence is "the crucial difculty of al l
[ Husserl ' s] philosophy of hi story: what i s the sense of thi s l ast [type of factuality?"
15
Preface
i.ve·.cea|oe|e-ae:e .ea:Ða:ia-iaeze:e·oe.aieia||oe:eeoi.ea iae
.aaa.ieae:.zea eieve:ve|¡eei.

1aeo:e||emei|aaeaaeeaac. cea|.iv. ae«eve:..si.:sieaeeaaie:ec
intraoe:seaa||v.1aer:si. aveaie:eieeemei:v.ie:examo| e. masiaave
|�eaa||� i� �eeeea.zeaaceemmaa.eaieaeeemei:.ea|. cea|.iv«.ia. a
a.se

«a.ac.v.caa|eease.easaess .seasemasi|e:eeeea.zecaaceem·
maa.eaiecasiaesameseasei:emeaememeaieiiaeeeeieaaeiae:
a|se|aie|vc.ae:eai memeai eiiae same eee. ue:eaea.a uasse:| :e·
i�:asio iaeaa.eaeie:meiiemoe:a|.zai.ea.iaei.v.aer:eseai. «aese
c. a�eei.ea|eaa:aeie:aac o:. me:c.a| .ivoe:m.i.ai:aoe:seaa|eemmaa. ·
�ai.ea. � a � �ease
iaea. De::.ca eeae| aces . ·»·c· sa|¡eei.v.iv .s r:si
lntrasa|· eeilv. iv.aiaeiiaaieso|a. asuasse:| s :eve:s.eaeaeeme:eie
iae i.

v.aer:eseai.a a.sc.seass.era|eaiiaee:ae.a|:e|eei«:.i. ae.
~s¬·e·oe:seaa|eemmaa.eai.eaoa:exee| |eaee. «:.i.aeeaa:aaiees
ie: uasse:|iaeoess.|.|.iveia|se| aie . cea|en¡eei.v.iv. ~ac De::.ca
a:eaesiaai. s.aee iaepossibilit ei«:.i.ae e.ves sease iae a|.|. iv ie
|eeemenonspatiotemporal, «:. i.ae saaei.easaaceemo| eiesiaeex.s·
ieaeeeioa:e i:aaseeaceaia| a. sie:. e.iv (87) , iaas oasa.ae aamaa·
|.ac. uasse:| iee| s. ae:ess a ae« ia:esae|c-iaai eii:aaseeaceaia|
eemmaa.iv De::.ca seemmeaieaia.s :esa|i. iaaiiae aaiaeai.eaei
ei«:.i.ae. sai:aaseeaceaia|:ecaei.eaoe:ie:mec|vaacie«a:ciae
�e
.
" (92), . ac. eaiesiaai«:.i.ae.saeeaaie:oa:iieiaei.v. aer:eseai
.a.aie:oe:seaa|eemmaa.eai.ea. iae:ce:aeiieaave i:aia c. saooea:
i:emiae«e:|c.i:em/»·c· sa|¡eei.v.iv. |eiamea:eve:iieiaei.v. ae
r:eseai. ie iae .aieai.eaa| aei eiiae eee. ieintra sa|¡eei.v.iv. s. aee
«:.i. ae.sintentional-i . e. , .ima|essease-uasse:|a:eaes|ae|ie«:.i·
.ae s .

ai

eai.eaa| .iv.ieiaeeee s . aieai.eaa|aei.aiaeaeiei«:.i. ae. ie
iae i.v.ae r:eseai «a.ea e:eaacs eve:v .aieai.eaa| aei .a |eia .is
a|ie:.ivaacsameaess. ~caoi.aeDe::.ca ssaee.aei:ema:|sa|eaiiae
i.v.aer:eseai.«eeea|csav. iaea.iaai«:.i.aeeeasi.iaiesiaeeiae:
aseiae:.a.ise|iaaciaesameassame. aiaeeiae:(86) .
Historicity and the Transcendental
u.sie:.e.iv. uasse:|savs. .saamaa|. ac sesseai.a|ae:.zea. iaei.v·
.ae r:eseai ieaacs iae a.sie:.e r:eseai. aac iae a.sie:.e r:eseai as
i:ac.i.eaa|.zai.ea.iae. aeessaaiieia|.zai.eaeiiaerasi.aiaer:eseai·
:evea|s�aeaa.ve:s�|~o:.e:.eia.sie:v.1aei.v.aer:eseaii, ieacaoi
uasse:| s«e:csiw.eeeaeiec|vDe::. ca. iaev.ia|mevemeaieiiae
eeex. sieaee aac iae .aie:«eav. ae . . . ei o:.me:c.a| ie:mai.eas
aac sec.meaiai.eas ei sease (109). uamaa|. ac . s a eemmaa.iv
16
Preface
eisoea|.ae|e.aes.aiae.:i.v.aer:eseais .iaei.v.aer:eseai|e.aeiae
aaa| :ei:eaeameai aac seea:.iv. De::.ca savs. ei eve:v
oaeaemeae|ee.ea|:ecaei.ea( 1 1 01 1 ) . ue«eace:s.iuasse:| sme:.i
«asaei. aaav.aecese:.|ec.. aai:a|vtranscendental meve. iaeeeac.·
i.easeioess. |.|.ivie:a.sie:v«a.ea«e:eaiiaesamei.meconcrete . .
|eeaaseiaeva:eexoe:.eaeecaace:iaeie:meihorizon " ( 1 1 7) ? ue:. ·
zea.siaei.v.aer:eseai s c.a|eei.ea|ie:m.iaeae«ei. isiemoe:a| .za·
i.ea. iae a| :eacviae:eei. isc.a|eei.eseisease
se ia: iae o:e||em ei. cea|.iv s e:.e.a aas |eea |eu .a a|evaaee
De::.caoe.aiseaiiaaiuasse:|«.|||eaveiaeeaesi.eaeoeaCeemei:.·
ea|.cea|.iv. sa|«avsbased on iaeme:oae|ee.ea|. cea|.i.esei. mae.aa·
i.ea aac sease. vei .i .s a|«avsa|:eacv a:aoia:e«.ia iaai seas.||e·
me:oae|ee.ea|. cea|.zai.eaweeea|csav. oe:aaos. iaaiuasse:| | eaves
eaeasi:aacaacee.cec.eeemei:v. s«aaiaasia|eao|aee.aiaeC:ee|
e:eai.ve.aaa.i.zai.ea.aacveiia.sscientifc, theoretical | eao. sa|«avs
|asec ea iae me:oae|ee.ea| . seas.||e .cea| .zai.ea eiiae o:ese. eai.ae
«e:|c. iaeLebenswelt. 1aas ae saves. n::.ca eeae|aces. |eia iae
a|se|aie|ve:.e.aa|seaseeieaeai:ac.i.eaa|| .ae..isa.sie:.e.iv·aac. is
:e|ai.v.iv «.ia. aa. sie:v. aeeae:a|( 1 3 1 ) .
ue«eve:. iae .cea|.z.aeaei.v.ivei understanding, eioa:e ia.a|·
. ae. . e . eiiae aea.mae.aai.veaacaeaseas.||e. . saeve:siac. ec .a
.ise|i.ae:a:e.iseeac.i.eas ii. sa:ac.ea|eoe:ai.ea. apassage to the
limit «aese si:aeia:e . siaaieimaiaemai.ea|. cea|.zai.ea. iae aea.a
aacaea.a «a.eaDe::.caiee| smasiaave. isprotentional ee::e|aie. a
.aieai.eaa|.iv Oaeeaea.a«ea:e|ec|ae|ieiaei.v.aer:eseai. iae
oaeaemeae|ee.ea| a|se|aie. iae ae« aeec.ae a oasi «a.ea .a ia:a
aeecsaiaia:eie«a:c«a.eaiaeo:eseaia|«avsa|:eacvieacs.seiaai
iaeo:eseai.siaeae:.zeaie:oasiaaciaia:e ue«eve:. De::.casavs.
iaeaa.iveiia. smevemeai. saeve:e.vea. . imasi|eexoe:.eaeece:
thought .iae:e|vma|.aeiaeoaeaemeaa|.zai.eaeii. meoess.||e· 1a. s
aa.iv.iae«e:|eiiaeicea.aiaekaai.aasease.. saeve:oaeaeme·
aa|.zec.a. ise|iue:eaea.a«eseeiaeeeaa.ei|ei«eeaiaeaa.i.z.ae
eease.easaesseioaeaemeae|eev s o:.ae.o|e aaciae .aaa.i.z.ae eea·
se.easaess ei . is aaa| . asi.iai.ea. iae .aaa.ie i cea iaai aaiae:.zes
aa.iace
waai iaea .s iae a.sie:.e.iveiiae maiaemai.ea|.oa.|eseoa.ea|·e:.·
e.a. .iiaei cea.s«aaia||e«sie:. cea|.iv s e:.e. a:seiaiae iceaaac
xeaseaa:ea. sie:.e.i.es. |eiamasiexoeseiaemse|ves.ae:ce:ie|e.
a|iaeaeaae. iae:a:eexaaasiec. aia. sexoes.i.ea1aeva:eeie:aa|vei
``´ See L' Ecriture, pp. 242 and 250 on the concept of the Idea i n the Kanti an sense.
17
Preface
a.sie:.ea| . s.aee eie:a.iv .s a mece eia. sie:.e.iv De::.casiaies. .aa
cee.s.veseaieaee.iaaiiaea|se|aieaesseiiaeicea.siae~|se|aieof
. aieai. eaa|a. sie:.e.iv( 1 42) , acc.aeiaaiiaeeices.eaaiesae.iae:a
sa|¡eei.veae:e|¡eei.veeeaei.ve.. e . ae.iae:iae ~|se|aieae:. a·
ieai.eaa| a.sie:.e.iv aas| :sio|aee iaeiae:«e:cs. iaei ceaasaa·
iae:.zai.eaei.cea|.iv.asiae|.m.iie«a:c«a.ea.cea|.ivoasses. reveals
iae |.m.ieia. sie:.e.iv .aac iae:e|v .ise«a | .m.i· . iae o:ee:ess.ve-
:·ea·/.e-mevemeai ei.aieai.eaa|.iv 1a. s o:ee:ess.ve mevemeai .s
i:ac.i.ea. e: as De::.ca savs. .aieai.eaa|.iv .s i:ac.i.eaa| .iv
ue:eeve:.s.aee. i . siaec. a|eei.ea|:eeiei iaei.v. aer:eseai. .aiea·
i.eaa|.iv. siae:eeieia. sie:.e.iv Ceaseeaeai| v. De::.caeeae|aces.
iae:e. saeaeeci e.aea.:ea|eaiiaeseaseeia.sie:.e.iv. a.sie:.e.iv.s
sense" (150). iaeiae:«e:cs. sease.straditionality aac iaeAbsolute is
Passage " ( 1 49) . 1aea|se|aie. s iaeaeieia| | i:ac.i.ea.aac ei a. sie·
:.e.ivaac. aieai.eaa|.iv· . i:aasm. ss.ea.aiaeaeieie:eai. ea
�e«De::.caa| sesavsiaaisease.siaeaooea:.aeei|e.ae¯( 1 48) ,
«a.eameaasiaai|e.ae.sa. sie:.ea| seiaeeaesi.eaie:a. m|eee¬es .
«aai .s iaee:.e.aeise.aeasu.sie:v ( l 5 1 ) ? Oaie| eevmav as|iae
eaesi.ea. |aiea|voaeaemeae|eev eaa o:ev.ce iae aooa:aias ie: aa
aas«e:se. ae. De::.casavs. .ssilently sae«aaace:iae aeeai.v.ivei
iaeapeiron " (ibid) . 1aedelay e:lateness eisoeeea.aia. smaa.iesiai.ea
eise.ae . s | aa||v iae oa.|eseoa.ea| . aei¡asi iae oaeaemeae|ee.ea| .
a|se|aie De::.casavs.
Here delay is the philosophical absolute, because the beginning of
methodic refection can only consist in the consciousness ofthe
implication ofanother previous, possible, and absolute origin in
generl. Since this alterity ofthe absolute orgin structurally appears in
my Living Present and since it can appear and be recognized only
in the primordiality ofsomething like my Living Present, this ver fact
signies the authenticit ofphenomenological delay and limitation. In
the lackluster guise ofa technique, the Reduction is only pure thought
as that delay, pure thought investigating the sense ofitsel as delay
within philosophy. ( 152 -53)
ra:e iaeaeai .s a|«avs ce|av Cease.easaesseiia.s ce|av. De::.ca
savs. . seease.easaesseiD. ae:eaee . eease.easaesseiiae.moess.|.| .iv
ei:ema.a.ae . aiae s.mo| eae«eiiae i.v.aer:eseai as «e|| asiae
.aa|.|.ivie|.veeae|esec. aas.mo|eaac.v.cec~|se|aie 1aei.v.ae
r:eseai .iaeaeve:o:eseaie:.e.aeise.aeaacsease. . aie:o|avs«.ia
iaea|«avsceie::ec~|se|aie «.ia.aia.seease.easaess. aeease.eas·
aess «.iaeai «a.ea. De::.ca eeae|aces. aeia.ae «ea|c aooea:
18
Preface
w.iaeai .ise«ao:eoe:cea.seeaee. iae:e«ea|c|eaea.sie:.e.iv.ae
sease.aeia.ae
Me:e a|si:aei|v.iaea. aaO:.e. a. aaa|se|aieO:.e. a. masi|eac.i·
ieaaiO:.e.a-iaeaeve:-vei-a| «avs-a|:eacv-iae:easiae|eveace:
|eie:e iaaima|esa||seaseoess.||e. 1aai D.ae:eaee. De::.caeea·
¡eeia:es. . soe:aaos«aaia| «avsaas|eeasa.caace:iaeeeaeeoiei
' transcendental' ia:eaea iae ea.emai.e a. sie:v ei.is c. so|aeemeais
ser:.me:c.a|D.ae:eaee«ea|c|ei:aaseeaceaia|-asmasi|e.aaa||v.
a. sie:.e.ivaac:ereei.easiae:eea.
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SCIENCE OF OLD NAMES
The "rationalit"-but perhaps that word should be abandoned
for reasons that will appear at the end of thi sentence-which
govers a writing thus enlrged and radicalzed, no longer
issues from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not
the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of
all the signifcations that have their source in that of the logos.
Particulrly the signicatin of truth.
Of Grammatology
r:.e:iee|a|e:ai.ae iae si:aeia:e eia. sie:.e.iv. i cese:.|eciae
ceeeasi:aei.ve |ee.eeiiaeaacee.ca|| e. eiaea·eae.ee. eidif erance.
ue«eve:,c.ae:aaee.sa|seaaold name, aname sous rature, e||.ie:aiec
|ve|cseases. oa:eaiaes.zec.1aeceeeasi:aei.eaeic.ae:aaee.ae| aces
iaeaace· sec.meaiai.eaaacsaoo|emeaiai.ea. e:sa|si.iai.ea·eiaae|c
aameie:aae« eeaeeoi. 1a.soa|eeavm.esaoo|emeaia:.iv.sasee·
eacmemeaie:|eve|eiDe::.casceeeasi:aei.ea. seeeacmemeaie:
| eve||e.aeaace:sieecae.iae:a. e:a:ea.ea||vae:ea:eae|ee.ea||v.1a. s
saoo|emeaia:v e:au.ae . s aeie«e:iav .a De::.ca s Introduction. ue
aas added semeia. ae ae«. semeia.ae c.ae:eai. i eiae e|c aame ei
oaeaemeae|eev.aiaaiiexi.
1aemevemeaieisaoo|emeaia:.iv. aseaeei a ee:ia.aaam|e:ei
aeasvaeavm.e sa|si.iai.eas ie: c.ae:aaee.· .ave|ves. aeee:c.aeie
De::.ca. i«ema¡e:seases.ia|eai:emiaer:eaeave:|suppleer) : iea||
aceae.eaev.ieeemo|eie·aacieia|eiaeo|aeeei.ie:eo|aee· ·· 1a. s.s
�´ "Diferance, " in Speech and Phenomena, p. 147.
4 1 0n the "concept" of supplementarity, see: Speech and Phenomena, ch. 7; Of
Gram ma to logy y Part I I, ch. 2 ; L Dissemination, pp. 1 80-96; and Alan Bass,
" ' Literature '(Literature, " Velocities ofChange: Critical Essays from MLN, ed. Richard
Macksey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press , 1 974), pp. 348-49.
19
Preface
ceeeasi:aei.eaasiaese.eaeeeie|caames. .ia| |sace| e.eaev.aiaee| c
eeaeeoiaac:eo|aees.i«a.|eas.ae. ise| caame De::. caas|s .
What is, then, the "strategic" necessity which sometimes requires that
an ol name be preserved in order to initiate a new concept? With all
the reservations imposed by the traditional distinction between the
name and the concept, one ought to be able to begin to describe this
0
I
er
!
i

n: aware ofthe fact that a name does not name the punctual
slmpliClty ofa concept but the system ofpredicates defning the
concept, the conceptual structure centered on such and such a
predicate, one proceeds: (1) to the setti,!-aside (prelevement) ofa
reduced predicative trait, which is held in reserve and limited within a
given conceptual structure (limitedfor some motivations and relations
offorce which are to be analyzed) named x; (2) to the de-limitation, the
grafting, and the controlled extension ofthis predicate which was set
aside, the name x being maintained as a tool ofinterventin (levier
d'i

te
n
e

tin) in
.
order to maintain a hold on the former organization
which It IS efectively a question oftransforming. Setting-aside,
grafting, extension: you know that this is what I called, according to
the process that I have just described, writing. -:
1aese.eaeeeie|caames. s«:.i.ae.aae|caame. ise|i.
ieimeae«:eaea:sesemeeiiaesaoo| emeaiai.easiaaiDe::.caac·
vaaees .a iae Introduction . ue savs D.ae:eaee .s i:aaseeaceaia|-
i:aaseeaceaia| |e.ae iae o:.me:c.a| D.ae:eaee eia c.ae:eai O:.e. a
1aasi:aaseeaceaia|. seea.va|eaiiec.aeaai.«.iaaaa) .
Ce�se.easaesseiD.ae:eaee . iaai«.iaeai«a.eaaeia.ae«ea|cao·
oea:. .si:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaess. . e . . c.ae:aaieease.easaess se
«eeea|csaviaaieease.easaess. sc.ae:aaee.«.iaaaa) . -:l
s.m.|a:|v. iae xecaei.ea. oa:e iaeaeai ei . is e«a ce|av. .s
i:aaseeaceaia| . De::.casavs . 1aeoa:eaac. aie:m.aa||ec. sea. eiace
?iiaeaeaisi:.v.aeie :ecaeeD.ae:eaee|vee.ae|eveaciaeiaa|.aaa·
.i� ie«a:c iae .aaa.iv ei.is sease aacva|ae . . e . . «a.|ema.aia.a.ae
D.a�:eaee-iaaic. sea.eiace«ea|c|ei:aaseeaceaia| ( 1 53) . 1aexe·
caei.ea.iaeaeai s e«ac.sea.eiaceaiD.ae:eaee . eaaea| v|eac.ae:·
aaixecaei.ea.
r:.me:c.a|D.ae:eaee .s i:aaseeaceaia| ~ac i:aaseeaceaia| D.ae:·
eaee . . e . iaea|«avsceie:cec·c.ae:.aec.ae:eaeeeiiaee:.e.a .sc.i·
ie:aaee.«.ia aaa) .
7
`� Positions, p. 96; ET: Diacritics, 3 , No. 1 (Spring 1 973) , p. 37.
4:1 See Speech and Phenomena , ch. 5 : "Signs and t he Blink of an Eye . " pp. 60-69. as
well as Note 4 above .
20
Preface
~ac. aaa| | v. |eeaase .i . s a meiaec ie: :eaeei.ae ea a.sie:.e.iv.
Ruckfrge .s iae:e|vi:aaseeaceaia| .i.s a c.ae:aai o:eeess De::.ca
savs ~ac1aeaeai s oa:e ee:ia.aiv«ea|c|ei:aaseeaceaia| . s.aee
.ieaa|ee|ie:«a:cieiaea|:eacvaaaeaaeec1e| esea| v|vacvaae.ae
ea .e: |e.ae .a acvaaee ei· iae O:.e. a iaai . aceaa.ie|v :ese:ves
.ise|i saeaaee:ia.aivaeve:aacie|ea:aiaai1aeaeai«ea|ca|«avs
|eieeeme (ibid. ) .
1aasiaexecaei.ea.Ruckfrge, eease.easaess. aac.aieai.eaa|.iv-
a|||as.eeeaeeoiseioaeaemeae| eev-aave|eeasaoo|emeaiec|vdi­
ferance; iaeva||oa:ia|eei.is|ee.eYeiiaeva:esi.||named xecaei.ea.
Ruckfrage, aac se ea raeaemeae|eev aas |eea saoo|emeaiec. .is
meiaoavs.ea| iexi ceeeasi:aeiec. aac iae e|c aames :eia.aec
raeaemeae|eev. sae|eaee:. |aisi. | | . s. oaeaemeae|eeviis .s .siaai
eia|| meiaoavs.es . sous rature: �.
i s iae:eaneed ieeaeeseae:e|ei«eeaaacee.ca|| esaace|caames :
i seaeeae.eeme:eia.iaia|ieDe::.ca s .aieaiiaaaiaeeiae:.. s eae.a
iaei c.ae:eai i:em iae eiae:: 1ae exemo|a:v ease ae:e seems ie|e
diernce .ise|i..a«a.eaaacee.ca||esaace|caamesa:e|eiapresent
aacdeferred .aiaes.|eaiiem|eiiaea, .aai:ae.|e|eiie:iaai.seas. | v
e:asec. e:esseceai. e:m.so:.aiec. aaÓ iaai .s aa:c|v :eaca||e aac
ceaa.ie|vaacee.ca||e
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
1aei:aas|ai.eaeae:ecae:e.siaaieiiaeseeeacec.i.eaeiDe::. ca s
Intrduction, oa||.saec |v r:esses ua.ve:s.ia.:esce r:aaee . a 1 974.
1aea:siec.i.ea«asoa||.saec.a 1 962. iaiaeiexi. ise|i.iaave.ac.·
eaiec:eie:eaeesieo:eseaiÐae|.sai:aas|ai.easei«e:|sie«a.eaDe:·
:.ca :eie:s. |ai aave mec.aec iaem «ae:e aeeessa:v ie aace:see:e
De::. ca s a:eameaiai.ea 1aesemec.aeai.easaave|eea .ac.eaiec|v
iae «e:c mec.aec . ase:iec«.ia.a |:ae|eis .a iae iexi 1exisaa·
ava.|a||e.aÐae|.sai:aas|ai.eai aavei:aas|aieci:emiaer:eaea1ae
uasse:| iexis aave |eea mec.aec .a aeee:caaee «.ia maav eiiae
saeeesi.easeiDe:.eaCa.:as Guide for Translating Husserl, oa:i.ea|a:|v
«aeaiaev|ea:eaaoe.aiiaaiDe::.ca. sarea. ae
~|| Ce:maaie:ms.a oa:eaiaesesa:e De::.ca sacc.i.eas s.m.|a:| v.
a|| exo|aaaie:v |:ae|eis iaai eeea: «.ia.a eaeiai.eas a:e De::.ca s
acc.i.eas i aave . ae|acecee:ia.a r:eaea aac Ce:maa ie:ms «.ia.a
|:ae|eis«ae:eaeeessa:v.aiaeiexi
saeaie:msasde facto aacde jure aave|eeaaace:see:ecea|v«ae:e
De::.caaassi:esseciaema.mse|i.s. aeeiaeva:eeueai:aas|ai.easei
21
Preface
iaer:eaeaeaia.iaaceac:e.i. 1aesame. si:aeeiapriori .ac¡ ee·
i.va|ie:m·aaca priori .acve:|.a|e:sa|siaai.veie:m· .i.|e«.se.iaave
ie| |e«ecCa.ms saeeesi.ea.ac.ae:eai.ai.ae|ei«eeaObjektivitit aac
Gegenstindlichkeit |viaeeao.ia|e:|e«e:ease
·
o
·
:esoeei.ve| v .De:·
:.ca.ie||e«.aeiaer:eaeai:ac.i.ea.. ac.eaiesGegenstindlichkeit |viae
aee|ee.smobjectite aacObjektivitit |vobjectivite. ) ue«eve:. s.aeeiae
r:eaeaobjet eemo:.ses |eiaiae meaa.aeeiGegenstand aaciaai ei
Objekt, aec.ae:eai.ai.ea. soess.||eie:iae«e:ce|]eei . a|iaeaea.a
eaeiai.easi:emuasse:|. iaas|eea:eia.aec. re:ia:iae:ceia.| seaia.s
o:e||em. seeiae1:aas|aie: sr:eiaeeeiiesie:Ð Ðm|:eeiesazaaae
saeae|a:c s A Study of Husserl's re:ma| aac 1:aaseeaceaia| iee.e
r.aa| | v. iaei:aas|ai.eaaas|eeaceae.a|.eaieiaac.aaeee:caaee«.ia
Dav.c~||. sea sea:|.e:i:aas|ai.eaeiDe::.ca sSpeech and Phnomena.
i «ea|c| .|eieiaaa|va:.eas oeeo|eie:iae.:.ava|aa||ea.c.a iae
o:eeesseiia.s i:aas|ai.ea 1e r:eiesse:sxe|e:i Dei«e.|e:. w.||.am
sea:cs|ee . aac~:iaa:Ðvaas. i exieacmvs.aee:esiiaaa|sie:iae.:
|eae·ie:meaeea:aeemeai i «ea|aa|se|.|eieiaaa|r:eiesse:Ðvaas
ie:a.soai.eaieaee|.aaeiiaeeemo|eiea:sic:au«.iaiaer:eaeaiexi
1aesameaoo:ee.ai.ea. sexieacecier:eiesse:¡amesDaeeaa.sie:a.s
.ava|aa||esaaesi.eas.a:e|ai.eaieiaea:siaa|ieiiaei:aas|ai.ea ~ac
i amoa:i.ea|a:|ve:aieia| ie r:eiesse:Dav. c~| |.sea ie: a.s oe:seaa|
i:.eacsa.o aac ec.ie:.a| a.c. as «e|| as a.s .ava|aa||e i:aas|ai.ea ei
De::.ca s eiae:ma]e:«e:|eauasse:| r:eiesse:J. u.| |.su.||e:«as
a| seve:vae|oia|«.iaa. smaav|.|| .ee:aoa.ea|a.csaaceeec«.|| .~ac.
aaa| | v. iammesiceeo|v.ace|iecier:eiesse:De::.caa. mse|iie:a.s
oe:seaa|ae| oaac oai.eaiacv.ee ca:.aeia.si.me u.s ee:c.a|.iv aac
saooe:i«e:ee:eai|vaoo:ee.aiec
i«ea|ca|se| .|eieiaaa|i:.eacs«ae|.ac|vae|oec.aiaeo:eoa:a·
i.eaeiiaeaaa|c:aii.se¬a:cuaii. xeaxem|e:i. aacmesioa:i.ea·
| a:|vsa:|a:aDeCeae.a.aacCa:|asea. sse| ~| se. iewa|ie:xasse||i
«aaiieexieace:ai.iaceie:oe:s.sieaieeecaame:aaci:. eacsa.oca:·
.aeia.soe:.ec. r.aa||v. i «ea|c | .|e ieiaaa|iae se|e.aa ~me:.eaa
Ðcaeai.eaa|reaacai.eaie:o:ev.c.ae me «.ia i.me ie eemo|eieia.s
«e:|
i «.saiecec.eaieia.s«e:|ie iae meme:veimviaiae:. «ae ea|v
sa«aa|i.iseemo|ei.ea.aaciemvmeiae:
Louvain-Leuven
December 1976
John P. Leavey
Introduction
to
" The Orgin of Geomet"
sv.is caie aac iaemes. ia. s mec.iai.eaei uasse:| [The Origin of
Geometr] ie|eaesieiae|asie:eaoei «:.i.aesiaaisa::eaacThe Crisi
ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. i i .sceeo| v
:eeieciae:e aacieiaaiexieai.ise:. e.aa| .iv:aasiae:.sseiaeiie.ae
.mmec.aie|vaooa:eai iiThe Origin ofGeometr .sc. s:.aea. s aai|ei:em
iaeCrisi, .i .s aeiieeaase ei .is cese:. oi.ve aeve|iv Nea:| va| | . is
mei.i s a:e a|:eacv o:eseai . a eiae: .avesi.eai.eas. «aeiae: iaev ie
|a:ee|vo:.e:iee:a|mesieeaiemoe:a:v«.ia. i i aiaei.The Origin of
Geometr s:. | | eeaee:as :ae s:aiasei:ae . cea| ei·eeis eise. eaee ei
«a.eaeeemei:v.seaeexamo|e· .iae.:o:ecaei.ea.iv.ceai.iv. aeaeis.
asiaesame . aaciaeeeasi.iai.eaei exaei.iaceia:eaea.cea| .zai.ea
aacoas saeeieiae| . m.i-ao:eeess«a.easia:is«.ia iae| .ie·«e:|c s
seas.i|e . aa.ie . aac o:ese.eai.ae maie:.a| s ~| se .a eaesi.ea a:e iae
` Die Krisis der ellropiischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phanomenologie:
Eine Einleitllng in die phanomenologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel , in HlIsser­
liana, Vol . 6 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 954); English translation [hereafer abbreviated as
ET]: The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduc­
tion to Phenomenological Philosophy, tr. David Carr ( Evanston: Northwestern Uni ver­
sity Press , 1 970) . [Since the ET does not contain al l the appendi ces that the German
edi ti on does, it wi l l be necessary at ti mes to refer to the German pagination. ] Hereafter
the ET wi l l be ci ted as C, the German as K. The Origin ofGeometr (C, pp. 353-78) is a
text appended to §9a on "Pure Geometry" (C, pp. 24-28) . In a forewording note Derrida
says, after stating that he will translate the version presented in K: "The original manu­
script dates from 1 936. Its typed transcription bears no title . The author of this transcrip­
tion, Eugen Fi nk , has also publ ished an elaboration of it in Rel ' lIe Interationa!e de
Philosophie , I , No. 2 (January 1 5, 1 939) . pp. 203-25 , under the ti tle ' Die Frage nach dem
Ursprung der Geometrie al s i ntentional -hi storisches Problem: Since then, this text has
been read and frequently ci ted under this form. Its hi story, at l east , then. al ready con­
ferred on i t a certain right to i ndependence. "
25
26
Jacques Derrida
.aie::e|aiecaac eeae:eie eeac.i.easie:iae oess. |. | .iv eiiaese .cea|
e|¡eeis . |aaeaaee. .aie:sa|¡eei.v.iv. aac iae «e:|c as iae aa.iv ei
e:eaacaac ae:.zea r.aa||v. iae ieeaa.eaeseioaeaemeae|ee.ea|ce·
se:. oi.ea.aeia||viaeseeiiaeva:.eas:ecaei.eas. a:ea|«avsai.| . zec
iessiaaaeve:ce iae.:va|.c.iv aaci:a.iia| aessaooea: .moa.:ec . a
uasse:| seves
Ne:. .a.i.a| | v. . s The Origin of Geometr c. si.aaa. saa|| e |v . is
cea||ee|asie:eie:.i.¡aesiaaia:ec. :eeiec. eaiaeeaeaaac.aaa.asia
ee:ia.aieeaa.e.siaace|]eei.v. si.::eseeas. |. | .iv.a iaee:aei.eeeise.·
eaee aacea. |eseeav. aacea iae eiae: aaac. aaa.asi a a. sie:. e. sm
|| .acec|viaeeme.:. e. si ea|ieifact aaceaasa| . sie:esamei.ea 1ae
a:sie:.i. e. sm«as iae sia:i.aaee. ai ie: Formal and Transcendental
Logic, iae Cartesian Meditations, aac iae Crisis. 1ae seeeac aac
aeeea:ecmaeaea:| . e:. . aiaeLogical Investigations, . a ra. |eseeav
as k.ae:eas ·e. eaee¯ .. a «a.ea . i«as iae iaacameaia| e:eeeeaea
i.ea:. aac.aIdeas I. 1ae:ecaei.ea ..iaeieeacemaai.ea .eia. sie:. e. si
aeaei. e. sm «as a|«avs .aie::e|aiec «. ia iaai eiesveae·aeaei. e. sm.
evea«aeaaee:ia.aa. sie:.e.ivaas |eeemeeaeaemeae|eav siaeme.
cese.ieiaea. aa eesiei.isc. tä ea|i.es . ia. s aei.eaeaaaeieess.||v|e
:ei:aeiec

saiaeve:aaciae i«eceaaae.ai.easeia.sie:.e.smaace|¡eei.v.sm
|eease e:eaa.ea|| vaa.iec as .aThe Origin of Geometr, «ae:e iaev
o:eeeeci:emiae same. moa| seaaca:e maiaa| | v.ave|vecia:eaeaeai
aa.i.ae:a:v«aese|ea:.ae. ssemei.mesc.seeaee:i.ae

Ne«iaes.aea·
|a:.iv eiea:iexi :esis ea iae iaeiiaai iae eea¡aaei.ea eiiaese i«e
siaac.aeaaciesiec:eiasa| se:eaiesaae«seaeme.eaiaeeaeaaac..i
|:.aesie| .eaiaae«ivoee:o:eiaac.iveia.sie:.e.iv.eaiaeeiae:aaac.
aacee::e|ai.ve| v. .iceie:m.aesiaeae«iee|saace:. e. aa|c.:eei.eaei
a.sie:.e:eaeei.ea1aea.sie:.e.ivei. cea|e|¡eei.v.i.es .. e .iae.:origin
aactrdition ..aiae am|.eaeasseaseeiia. s«e:c«a.ea. ae|aces|eia
iae mevemeaieii:aasm.ss.eaaaciaeoe:ca:aaeeeiae:.iaee· . e|evs
c.ae:eai:a| es. «a.eaa:eae.iae:iaeiaeiaa|.aie:eeaaeei.easeiemo.:.·
ea| a.sie:v. ae: aa .cea| aac aa.sie:.e acc.ae ea. 1ae |.:ia aac
ceve| eomeaieise.eaeemasiiaea|eaeeess.||eieaaaaaea:c·eisiv|e
ei a.sie:.ea| .aia.i.ea . a «a.ea iae .aieai.eaa| :eaei.vai.ea eisease
saea|c�c).·c~o:eeeceaaceeac.i.eaiaeemo.:.ea|ceie:m.aai.eaei
iaei
2 I n efect these pages of H usserl . frst written for hi mself. have t he rhythm of a thought
feel ing i ts way rather than setting i tsel f forth . But here the apparent di sconti nui ty al so
depends on an always regressive method. a method whi ch chooses i ts interruptions and
mul ti pl i es the returns toward i ts beginning in order to reach back and grasp it again each
ti me i n a recurrent l i ght .
27
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
iaiae. :.::ecae. ||e e:.e.aa| .iv. iaea.sie:.e.iveise.eaeeaac iae :e·
aeei.ea iaai .i .av. ies. Geschichtlichkeit aac Historie, aave ee:ia.a
eemmeaao:.e:.eeac.i.eas re:uasse:| .iae.:c.se|esa:e. soess.||e.a
o:.ae.o|eaacia.ssaea|c| eacasie:eeeas. ce:iaeo:e||emseiaa.ve:sa|
a.sie:ie.iv.aia-.:|:eacesiexieas.eai aeiae:«e:cs. iaeoess. |. |.ivei
semeia.ae | . se a a. sie:v ei se.eaee .moeses a :e:eac.ae aac a :e·
a«a|ea.ae ei iae sease ei a.sie:v .a eeae:a| . a| i.maie| v. .i·
oaeaemeae|ee.ea|sense «. ||me:ee«.ia .isie|ee|ee.eæsense.
uasse:|i:.es ie aeeemo|.saas.aea|a:o:eeieiiaeseesseai.a|oes·
s.|.|.i.es. aeeaaeei.ea«.iaeeemei:vaaciecee.oae:iae:e. aiaeo:e·
se:.oi.ea eia eeae:a| iass 1aas . | .se mesieiuasse:| s iexis. T/c
Origin of Geometr aas|eiaao:ee:ammai.eaacaaexemo|a:vva| ae
Ceaseeaeai| v. ea: :eac.ae ei .i masi |e ma:|ec |v iae exemo| a:v
eease.easaesso:eoe:iea||e. cei.eaiieai.eaaac|eea.cec|viaeoe| e
eiia. s .aaa.ie ias|. i:em «a.ea oaeaemeae|eev a|eae eaamase. is
«av iaiae.ai:ecaei.ea«eae«aiiemoi .ea:se|eam|.i.ea«. |||eie
:eeeea.zeaacs.iaaieeaesiaeeeiuasse:| s iaeaeai.«. ia . issoee.ae
o:esaooes.i.easaac.isoa:i.ea|a:aaaa.saec·iaie1aeaeaia.smemeai
eiuasse:| s :ac.ea|aess.sa|i.maieaeee:c.aeieiaeiaeis ..i.soe:aaos
aeisece¡a:e uasse:|:eoeaiec|vseemsieae:ee«.iaia. s 1ae:eie:e.
«e«. | | a|«avsi:vie|eea.cec|va. se«a. aieai.eas. evea«aea«eeei
eaaeaiao.aee:ia.ac.mea|i.es
I
1ae maiaemai.ea| e|¡eei seems ie |e iae o:.v. |eeec examo|e aac
mesioe:maaeaiia:eacea.c.aeuasse:| s:eaeei.ea1a.s.·|eeaaseiae
maiaemai.ea| e|¡eei.sideal. iis |e.ae. s iae:eaea|v i:aasoa:eai aac
exaaasiec|v.is oaeaemeaa| .iv ~|se| aie| ve|¡eei.ve. . e . ieia| |v:.c
eiemo.:.ea|sa|¡eei.v.iv. .iaeve:iae|ess. sea|v«aai. iaooea:sie|e
1ae:eie:e..i.sa|«avsa|:eacvreduced ie. isoaeaemeaa|sease .aac. is
|e.ae . s. i:em iae eaisei. ie |e aa e|¡eei [etre-objet ] ie. a oa:e
eease.easaess ·
´ In our translation [of The Origin of Geometry] , we wi l l i ndi cate t he di stinction be­
tween Historie and Geschichte i n parentheses only when t his di sti nction correspnds to
Husserl ' s expl ici t intenti on. which i s not-i ndeed . far from it-always the case.
� On the questi on of knowi ng whether. for HusserI
.
t he mathematical obj ect is the mode
of every object' s consti tution. and on the consequences of such a hypothesis
.
cf. the
di scussion i n which Walter Bi emel , Eugen Fi nk, and Roman I ngarden parti ci pated fol l ow­
i ng Bi emel ' s l ecture on " Les phases deci si ves dans I e devel oppement de la phi l osophi e
de Hu sser\ . · · i n Husser/ ( Cahiers de Royaumont . Phil osophi e No. 3 ) ( Paris: Minui t. 1 959) .
pp. 63 -7 1 .
28
Jacques Derria
1aePhilosophy of Arithmetic, uasse:| sa:si. moe:iaai«e:|. eea|c
aave|eeaeai.i|ecThe Origin of Arithmetic. Deso. ie aosveae|ee.si.e
. areei.ea«aesee:.e.aa| .ivaaseuea aac¡asi|v|eea emoaas. zec. . i
a|:eacveeaee:as . asceesThe Origin of Geometr, iae:eaei.vai.eaei
iaeo:.me:c.a|seaseeia:.ia¬ei.e s . cea| aa. i. es|v :eia:a. ae ieiae
si:aeia:eeioe:eeoi.eaaaciaeaeiseiaeeae:eiesa|¡eei.v.iv uasse:|
a. mse|ia|:eacvo:eoesecieaeeeaaiat once ie:iaeae:mai.ve. cea| .iv
eiaam|e:.«a.ea.saeve:aaemo.:.ea|iaeiaeeess.||eieaa. sie:v.a
o:ee.se|via.ssamesiv| e·aacie:.ise:eaac.ae.aaacia:eaeaiae| . vec
aeiei.is o:ecaei.ea
i asaeaaease .ae«eve:.iaeeeaes. seia:.iamei.e. saeiiaeaeaieias
aa.sie:veia:.iamei.e.. e . asaea|ia:a|ie:maacacveaia:eeiaamaa·
. iv ia 1 887-91 , iae e:.e. aei a:.iamei.e «as cese:.|ec . a ie:ms ei
psychological genesis. ia The Origin of Geometr, arie: auv vea:s ei
mec.iai.ea. uasse:| :eoeaisiae same o:e¡eei aace: iae soee. eseia
phenomenological histor. 1a. sace| .iv.sa||iaeme:e :ema:|a||es. aee
iaeoaiai:ave:sec. s. mmease iioassesa:siia:eaeaiae:ecaei.eaei
a||a. sie:.ea|e:osveae|ee.ea|eeaes. s ~rie:iaai . «aeaiaeeeaei.ec.·
meas.eaeioaeaemeae|eev. sc.seeve:ec.eeaes.s. ssi.||aeia. sie:vi a
oass.aei:emsiai.ei eeeaei.eeeasi.iai.ea.as aaaeaaeec. aIdeas I aac
iaeaaeeemo|.saec|ei«eeaiaevea:s1 91 5 aac 1 920, uasse:|si. | | aac
aeieaeaeecoaeaemeae|ee.ea|cese:.oi.ea.aiaeo:e||emseia. sie:.e·
.iv1aeiaemai.zai.eaeii:aaseeaceaia|eeaes. sma.aia.aeciaerec�e·
i.eaeia.sie:v.a||iaaieea|c|eo|aeecaace:iaeeaieee:veie|·eei.ve
: ; Cf. in particular Biemel , ibid. , pp. 35f. [ A German version of Bi emel ' s l ecture, "Di e
entscheidenden Phasen in Husserls Phi losophie , " ' appeared i n ZeitschriJt fijr phi­
losophische Forschung, 1 3 ( 1 959) , pp. 1 87-2 1 3 . An ET of thi s German version, enti­
tled "The Deci si ve Phases in the Development of Husseri ' s Phi l osophy, " is i n The
Phenomenology of Husser!: Selected Critical Readings, ed. and tr. R. O. El veton
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1 970) , pp. 1 48-73. Reference above begins on p. 1 48f. The Ger­
man and Engl i sh versions di fer from the French version publ i shd i n Husser; they also
do not i ncl ude the di scussi on mentioned in note 4 above. ] Despite hi s severity as regards
thi s psychologi stic tendency, Husserl conti nual l y refers to hi s frst book , especi al l y in
Formal and Transcendental Logic.
"Numbers are mental creations i nsofar as they form the resul ts of activi ti es exerci sed
upon concrete contents : what these acti viti es create, however, are not new and absol ute
contents whi ch we could fi nd again in space or in the ' external worl d' : rather are they
uni que relation-concepts which can onl y be produced again and again and which are in no
way capable of bei ng found somewhere ready-made. " This remakable �ass��e , wh�ch
already desi gnates the production, therefore the primordi al historiCIty, of ldealt tles whIch
no longer wil l ever belong to the time and space of empi rical hi story , i s from Con­
cerning the Concept of Number ( 1 887) , whi ch is taken up again as the frst chapter of
Philosophy of Arithmetic ( 1 89 1 ) . The passage is translated in Bi emel ' s articl e , in Husserl,
p. 37 [ ET: p. 1 50] .
29
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
so.:.iaac iaeea|ia:a|«e:|c«as:eo:essec«.ia. aiae soae:eei.ai:a·
«e:| c|. aess 1ae:eia :aieo:eo:ec.eai. ·eesoe:. eaee..aExperience and
Judgment aac.aFormal and Transcendental Logic, exieacecce«aiea
o:eea| ia:a|aaco:ea.sie:.esi:aia¬ei|.vecexoe:.eaee
~ac .a iae Cartesian Meditations, «aea uasse:| soeass a|eai iae
aa.iveiaa.sie:v..i.saeaesi.eaeiiaeaa.iveii:aees. ei:eie:eaees .
eisvaiaei.e:es.caes within iaeoa:eeee|ee.ea|soae:e · uasse:|aa·
ce:see:es ia. s. iae .cea| eo·eeis. iae a. eae: ie:¬s eiproducts ei
:easea. «a.eaa| eae assa:e iae oess.|.| .iveia.sie:.e.iv. . e iaea| ·
«avs .aie:sa|¡eei.ve eease.easaesseia. sie:v. ce aei|e| eae ieiae
eidos eiiae eeae:eieego (CM, §38. o 78) . ~iiae eac eiiae1a.:c
Ca:ies.aa Mec. iai.ea. iae . avesi.eai.eas iaai oa:i.ea |a:|veeaee:a iae
"theor o ei¬aa. eiaa¬aaee¬¬aa.iv.eiea|ia:e .aac seie:ia.
a:eceaaecasa| ie:.e:.:ee.eaa| .aacceoeaceaiias|s( ibid. , §29, o 63) .
~||iaese :ecaei.eas ae|c a fortiori ie:iae cese:.oi.eas ei o:.me:c. a|
iemoe:a|.ivaac .¬maaeaica:ai.ea
1aas iaeaeai:a|.zai.eaeiosveae|ee.ea|eeaes. saaciaaieia. sie:v
a:e si.||ea eeaa|ieei.ae .a iae iexis«a.ea o|aee iae i:aaseeaceaia|
ceve|eomeai .aieeas sai«aea. .aiae oe:.ec eiiaeCrisis, a. sie:v
.ise|i|:ea|sia:eaea.aieoaeaemeae| eev.aae«soaeeeieaesi.ea.ae.s
eoeaec.eaeiaai«.|||ec.mea|iiema.aia.a. aiae:ee.eaa||. m. is«a.ea
«e:ese| eaeo:ese:.|ecie:.i
wa.|e eeasiaai| vpracticed .a iae Crsis .ise|i.ia. s ae« aeeessie
a. sie:v. saeve:made a problem. ~i| easiaeic.:eei|vaacassaea Oa
iae eae aaac. iae eease.ea saesseia e:.s.saaciae am:mai.ea eia
ie|ee|eev ei :easea a:e only ae« oaias e: ¬eaas ie: |ee.i. m.z.ae
i:aaseeaceaia|.cea|.smeaeeaea.aOaiaeeiae:aaac.ieoaiiae«ae|e
ceve|eomeai ei wesie:a oa. | eseoav .aie oe:soeei. ve. ie ceaae iae
ra:eoeaaeidos aaciae¬aaei.aaa.ieiasss . aacie:eeeaaiiaeacvea
ia:esaac ¬.sacveaia:es eiiae i:aaseeaceaia|mei.i.eeaeea|eceaea
i.me|viaeve:veesia:eiaaiaaeeve:s.ia| |ia. s«ea|ce. vee:ec.iiea
|.aceisvaeoi.e:ei:esoeei.eaiaaiaee:.i.e. sm eia. sie:.e:easeaaac
exo| .e.iv¡a si.aeci:e¬iaesia:iNe.iae:iaesi:aeia:eseia. sie:.e.iv.a
´ Edmund Husser! , Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, tr.
Dorion Cairns ( The Hague: Nijhof, 1 970) ' Medi tation I V, §§37 and 38, pp. 75-80
-hereafter ci ted as CM.
� On the probl em of hi story in Husserl ' s phi l osophy , we refer particularl y to Paul
Ricoeur' s very fne arti cl e, " Husserl and the Sense of Hi story ," in Paul Ricoeur, Husserl:
An Analysis of His Phenomenology, tr. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree
( Evanston: Northwester Uni versity Press, 1 967) . pp. 1 43-74. On what obstructs the
di rect thematization of hi story in a transcendental phenomenology which at the same time
calls for this thematizati on, cf. more part icularl y pp. 1 45-5 1 .
30
Jacques Derrida
aeae:a|.aac«e ceaeivei|ae««aeiae:iaea. sie:.e.iveise. eaeeaac
iaai eiea. |eseeava:eexa¬e|ese:exeeei.eas . «aeiae:iaeva:eiae
a. aaesiaac¬esi:eve|aie:veess. |. | .i.es .e:.iiaeva:es. ¬e|v|eveac
a. sie:v.ise|i: .ae:iae¬eiaecseiiaeeaeae¬eae|eaveia. sie:v«e:e
¬aceiaee|]eeiseiseee. ae . e:. a.aa| ¡aesi.eas

1a. seeaaceaee«as
saeee:iec|viaesvsie¬eiaeec.ei.eee:ia.ai.eseieaeae¬eae|eav.i
se|i.«a.eaeea|c|eeeas. ce:ecasae:.i. e. s¬ei:easea.aaeae:a| i i
ia. sie|ee|ea.ea|:eac.aaeia. sie:veea|caei|eeaa:aeie:.zec. auas·
se:| seves|viaecea¬ai.e. ¬e:aceaee«. ia «a. ease¬aavea. |ese·
eae:s.i:e¬A:.siei|eieueae|ies:aaseav.ea:ee:ee. ve. aiaeeasiea|v
iae|a|e:ece:eseai|¬eaieiiae. :e«aiaeaaai.|i| s|eeaaseia. s :eac|aa
:eie::ecieiaeve:vi ceaeii:aaseeaceaia|eaeae¬eae|eav-«a.ea. s
aei.ise|iaea. |eseea. ea|svsie¬
saiia.s :eac.ae :eie::ec ie iaai iceaea|vmediately. ii «as si.||
aeeessa:viesae«.aasoee.ae.eeae:eie.aacc.:eei¬aaae:.
i iaaia.sie:v.asemo.:.ea|se.eaee. «as.| .|ea||emo.:.ea|se.eaees .
ceoeaceaieaoaeae¬eae|eev~«|.eaa|eaeeea|c:evea|i e. i. isiaac
eie.cei. e o:esaooes.i. eas .ia. sceoeaceaee. i:eeaeai|v am:mec. aac
a|«avs|eeai:eaiec|vo:eie:.i.ea. s.eaa|ec:aiae:iaaaexo|e:ec· .
2 . iaai a. sie:v-«aese e«a eeaieai eeai:a:v ie iaaieiiae eiae:
maie:.a|aacceoeaceaise.eaees·«as. |vv.:iaeei.isseaseei|e.ae.
a|«avs ¬a:|ec |v eaeaess aac .::eve:s. |.|.iv. . e . |v aea·
exemo|a:.aess-si.|||eai .ise|iie .mae.aa:v va:.ai.ea·aac ie e. cei.e
.aia.i.eas .
3. iaai . .aacc.i.ea ie iae emo. :.ea| aac aea·exemo|a:v eeaieai ei
a.sie:v. ee:ia.ae.cei.e eeaieai.ie:exa¬o|e. iaai eieeemei:v as iae
e.cei.eaaa| vs.seisoai.a|aaia:e·aac.ise|i|eeao:ecaeece::evea|ec
.a aa. sie:v«a.ea.::ecae.||v. aaa|.is. is|e.ae· sease ii. asuasse:|
am:ms. iaea. sie:veiiaeeeemei:.ea|e.cei.e.sexe¬o|a:v.iaeaa.sie:v
.aeeae:a| ae |eaee::. s|s|e.ae ac.si.aeiaacceoeaceaiseeie:eia
¬e:e:ac.ea|oaeaemeae|eev sv:ema.a.aeee¬o|eie|v«.ia. aaceie:·
m.aec :e|ai. v.iv. a. sie:v .a eeae:a| ae | ess eemo|eie|v eaeaees
oaeae¬eae|eev«.ia a||. isoess.|.|.i.esaac:esoeas. |. | .i.es. .ise:.e.aa|
ieeaa.eaesaacaii.iaces
¯ That, for exampl e, was not the case wi th psychology, whose relati ons wi th
phenomenology have been most abundantly defned, notably in ldeen II [ldeen ZI¡ einer
reinen Phinomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie, Vol . I I , ed. M. Biemel , in
Hllsserliana, Vol . 4 (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 952) ] . in the Cartesian Meditations, and i n the
third part of the Crisis . The recent publ ication by Walter Bi emel of the Lectures of 1 925
and of appended texts devoted to Phinomenologische Psychologie ( in Husserliana, Vol .
9 [The Hague: Nijhof, 1 962]) is a very rich testi mony to thi s.
'
31
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
Ne cea|i:aeseia:eea¬|.i.eas. «a. eaa:ea|sec. uea|ieaes. aa. ·
¬a:e:
¡
eCrisis aae.: ea| ||aiea:saaeea:eeses . :
¡
eea:| .e:«e:ss sa: . :
. s.aThe Origin of Geometr aac. aiaesae:ii:aemeaiseiiaesa¬e
oe:.eciaaiiaesea¬|.i.eas. .iseems .a:e¬esi.¬¬ec.aie| vassamec
wemasi|eea:eia|ae:e. iaeseam|.i.easa:eea|vserved |va|:eacv
iam.| .a:iae¬es«a. eaiaeve:.eai. aaae«c.:eei.ea

i asieaceisee. ae. i
asao:e|eaeai.eaeiiaeCrisis, «em.eai|esi:eae|viemoiecieseeThe
Origin of Geometr .aiie:ia|.ae.aieaeeeaaiiae|:ev.iveiia.ss|eiea·
ea|v as iae o:eiaee ie a:e·. ssaeeiFormal and Transcendental Logic,
«aeseoa:oeses. mo| v«ea|c|eacaoiecieamaie:.a|eaie|eevi aa.s
i ai:ecaei.eaie iaai «e:|. uasse:|oe:ee.vesiae mei.iei:ac.ea| .a·
vesi.eai.easeisease «.ia. aiaeo:eseaieeac.i.eaeira:eoeaa se.·
eaees sai«e|ae«iaaiie:uasse:|iaee:.i.ea|s.ea.aeaaeeeiia.s
s.iaai.ea:esa|is|essi:e¬semeeo.sie¬e|ee.ea|eeaa .ei. aae:eai.aiae
.aie¬a|ceve|eomeaieiiaesese.eaeesiaaai:emac.ve:ee|ei«eeaa·
iaeiaee:ei.ea|aaco:aei.ea|aei.v.iveiiaese.eaee.aiaeve:v:eae«a
ei.iso:ee:essaacsaeeess. aac|·.isseaseie:| .ieaaciaeoess. |. |.ivei
|e.ae:e|aiecieour «ae|e«e:|c

1a. si:ee.aeeise.eaee«.ia:esoeeiie
.is|ases.aiaeLebenswelt aac.isieaac.aesa|¡eei.veaeisaacea|iec|v
:ema. asaaeees sa:veeac.i.eaie:.iseeaeaesi s saiia. si:ee.aea|se
.ave|vesiaeia:eaieiaae|¡eei. v. sia| .eaai.ea.«a.eaeeaeea| siae.a·
si.iai.aee:.e.asaac:eace:siaemsi:aaeeaac. aaeeess. ||eieas 1a. s
eeea|iai. ea.«a. ea. sa| seaieeaa. e. zai.eaaacsaooesesiae"naivete of
a higher level" eiaa . avesi.eaie:|eeeme .::esoeas.||e. aas s.ma|ia·
aeeas|v:a.aeciae e:eai |e|.ei eiiae se.eaees aac oa. |eseoav .a
iaemse|ves . .iaas¬aceea:«e:|caa.aie| |.e.||e. 1emec.iaieeae:
.avesi.eaieiaesease(besinnen) eie:.e.as.saiiaesamei.¬eie. ma|e
eaese|t:esoeas.||e(verantworten) ie: iae sease(Sinn) eise.eaee aac
oa.|eseoav .|:.aeia.sseaseieiaee|a:.ivei.isia|a|¬eaii . aacoai
eaese|i.a aoes.i.eaeiresponsibility ie:ia. sseasesia:i.ae i:em iae
ieia|seaseeiea:ex. sieaee
1ae sa¬e c.sea.eiace aac iae same «.|| a:e aace:see:ec aac ex·
o:essec. a:.ee:eas| v. ceai.ea|ie:msi:emiae| :sioaeeseiThe Origin
1 0 Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhof, 1 969) , p.
5-hereafter ci ted as FTL. Al so cf. the commentary of Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of
Husserl' s Formal and Transcendental Logic, tf . Lester E. Embree ( Evanston: North­
wester Uni versi ty Press, 1 968) , notably pp. xxxi i i-l i i i .
I I
"We must place oursel ves above thi s whol e life and all t hi s cultural tradition and, by
radical sense- investi gations, seek for oursel ves si ngly and i n common t he ul ti mate pos­
si bi l i ti es and necessi ti es, on t he basis of whi ch we can take our position toward
actual i ti es in j udging, val ui ng, and acting" (FTL, pp. 5-6) . The citations are from
FTL, pp. 2, 5, and 9.


i
32
Jacques Derrida
of Geometr. ~ac(aeeaes(.eaas|ec(ae:eaooea:sa(a:s(s.ea((e|e
ea|vasoee.| ea(.eaei(aeeeae:a|eaes(.ea|eeaaaacce| aec. aFormal
and Transcendental Logic. is.(ae(aeaes(.eaae:eeiaoo|v.aeaeeae:a|
o:e]ee(«aese o:ee:amaac a|:eacv|eeae:eaa.zec(ea s. aea|a:aac
ceoeacea(se.eaee:D.cae(uasse:|«:. (e. 1aese. aves(.ea(.eas. eea·
eeo.ae(aeoess.||eseaseaacoess.||eme(aeceieeaa.aese.eaee as
saea.a:eaa(a:a|ìvc.:ee(ec| :s(eia||(e«aa(.sessea(.a| |veemmea(e
a|| oess.||e se.eaees 1aev saea|c|e ie| |e«ecseeeaca:.|v|vee::e·
soeac.ae sease·.aves(.ea(.eas ie: oa:(.ea|a: e:eaos ei se.eaees aac
s.ae|ese.eaees(ibid. , o -· :

·
1aeaa(e:.e:.(veiFormal and Transcendental Logic .a:e|a(.ea(e(ae
o:e||emseie:.e.aie:(aee(ae:se.eaeesaasasvs(ema(.eaac]a:.c.ea|
s.ea.aeaaee 1a.saeeessa:vaa(e:.e:.(v| :s(ce:.vesi:em(aeaa(a:eei
(:ac.(.eaa| |ee.e. «a.ea .s a|«avs o:esea(ec as(ae eeae:a| (aee:v ei
se.eaee. as (ae se.eaee ei se.eaee 1a.s s(a(emea( a| se :eie:s(e (ae
a. e:a:eaveiea(e|ee. esa|:eacve|a|e:a(ec.aIdeas I. ua(e:.a||vce(e:·
m.aecea(e|ee.esa:esa|e:c.aa(ec(eie:ma|ea(e|eev.«a.ea(:ea(s(ae
oa:e:a|eseiO|]ee(.v.(v.aeeae:a| ' ·Ne«eeeme(:v. sama(e:.a|ea·
(e|eev«aesee|]ee(. sce(e:m.aecas(ae soa(.a|.(vei(ae(a.ae|e|eae·
.ae(eNa(a:e
1aeiae((aa(eve:vc. meas.eaeiThe Origin of Geometr aeeea(aa(es
(a. sceoeaceaeeaac(a. s:e|a(.vesaoe:ae. a| .(veicese:.o(.ea«. ||(aas
|eexo|a. aecOaseve:a|eeeas.eas uasse:|ae(es(aa(aeo:esaooeses
(ae eeas(.(a(.ea ei(ae . cea| e|]ee(.v. (. es ei|ee.eaac |aaeaaee . a
I �
On the "di recti ve" character of logic, al so cf. FTL, §7 1 , pp. 1 8 1 -82.
I I
Cf. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson
( 1 93 1 ; rpt. New York: Col l ier Books, 1 962) , § § 8-1 O. 1 7 . pp. 56-62 and 70-71 -hereafer
cited as Ideas I. [At times Derrida refers to the notes of Paul Ricoeur in his invaluable
French translation. Idees directrices pOllr line phenomenologie et line philosophie phe­
nomenologique pures . Tome I: Introduction Jenerale a la phenomenologie pure (Pari s:
Gal limard. 1 950) . We wi l l refer to thi s translation as Idees . ] Here formal ontology desig­
nates formal logic "in the narrower sense" and "al l the other di scipl ines which constitute
the formal ' mathesis universalis ' (thus arithmetic also. pure anal ysi s. theory of mul ti ­
pl i ci ti es) . " Ideas I, p. 57 [ modi fed] .
´� "I t is clearl y realized that it is the essence of a material thing to be a res extensa, and
that consequently geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential phase of
sllch thinghood (Di ngl ichkei t) . the spatial form" ( Hu sserI ' s emphasi s) . Ideas I, §9. pp.
58-59.
Al so cf. Ideas I, § 25. p. 84: there geometry and ki nematics (which HusserI always
associates with geometry in the Crisis and in the Origin) are al so defi ned as " pure
mathematical . . . material" di scipli nes.
1 5
0n the translation of Gegenstindlichkeit by objectivity [F: objectite (and Objektivitit
or objectivite by Objectivity)] , cf. the French translation of FTL, p. 1 8, n. 3 . and the
f
33
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
eeae:a|.(aeee::e|a(.veeeas(.(a(.eao .a(e:sa|]ee(.v.(v.aaca||:e|a(ec
. aves(.ea(.eas iaaee:(a.asease . .(. s(:a|vaeeessa:v(esee(aa((a. s
e:ce:eiceoeaceaee. sae(:eve:sec 1ae oaeaemeaeaeie:. s. s. as
ie:ee(ia|aesseie:.e. as. aaso:ee.se| v(aeseaseei(a.s(voeei :eve:·
sa|( Umkehrung) .
sa(«a.|eeemo|e(e|v]as(.iv.ae(aeo:.e:.(veia.s:ea ee(.easea|ee.e .
uasse:|a| se soee.aes.aFormal and Transcendental Logic (aa( (a.s .s
ea|v eae oa(a ameae e(ae:s "Other paths a:e oess.||e ie: sease·
.aves(.ea(.eas«.(aa:ac.ea|a. m. aac(aeo:esea(«e:|a((emo(s(eeoea
ao. �( |eas( .a

ma.a see(.eas . eae saeees(ec|v(aea.s(e:.ea||ve.vea
:e|a(.eaei(ae.ceaeieeaa.aese.eaee(e|ee.eas.(saa(eeeacea(ae:¬
(FTL, o 7; uasse:| semoaas.s·
~| se. |vaspirling movement «a.ea.s(ae ma]e:|aceiea:(ex(. a
ET. p. 3 , tr. note 2 . Of course the notion of objectiv ity here is not in any snse tied to
Schopenhauer' s concept of Objektitit. [On matters of translation related to Husser! we
have fol lowed i n the main the suggestions of Dorion Cairns in Guide for Translating
Hlisser! (The Hague: Nihof, 1 973) . ] As for translations which we have had to do, we wi l l
be l ed to justify them i n the cours of thi s Introducti on.
| 6
Cf. FTL, p. 2: " the original relati onshi p between logic and sci ence has undergone a
remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themsel ves independent . With­
out bei ng able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-j ustifcati on. they fashioned
extremel y diferentiated methods. whose frui tful ness. it i s true . was pract ically certai n.
but whose productivity (Leistung) was not clarifed by ulti mate i nsight . " Our emphasi s.
�oreover, concerning geometrical science and mathematics i n general . Husser! has prin­
ci pal l y and most often defned thi s Umkehrung as the fal sifcation of sense . the di splace­
ment of ground, and the forgetti ng of origins . He has done this under at least three forms:
1 . Geometry. the model of exact science. i s responsi ble for the naturalization of the
psychic sphere-a fact that was pointed out i n the fi rst part of " Phi losophy as Rigorous
Science, " in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, tr. Quentin Lauer (N ew York:
Harper and Row, 1 965) , pp. 7 1 -1 47-hereafter ci ted as "PRS" ( cf. in particular pp. 82,
84, and 93) . We should also remember that i n Ideas I (§§72-75 , pp. 1 85-93) Husser! de­
no�nces the absurdity of geometrizing l i ved experience, on account of both geometrical ex­
actitude and deductivity.
2 . The geometrical ideal (or that of mathematical physics) , dogmatically recei ved, i s
what impel l ed Descartes t o cover over again the transcendental motif that he had ingeni­
ou�ly broug�t to l ight . The certitude of the cogito becomes the axiomatic ground, and
phi l osophy lb transformed i nto a deductive system. ordine geometrico: "only thi s
axio�atic fou�dation l i es even deeper than that of geometry and is called on to partici­
pate In the ul timate groundi ng even of geometrical knowledge" (CM, §3, p. 8) ; cf. al so C,
Part II, i n particular § 2 1 .
3 . Final l y, the whole Crisis tends to show how geometry, the ground for the mathemati­
zation of nature, hides true Nature. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why later on
Husserl will hardl y us-yet without expli ci tl y questioni ng again-the defni ti on of
geometry as an eidetic sci ence or as the material ontology of spatial l y extended, natural
thi ngs, a defni ti on often proposed as an example up to Ideas I.
· -
34
Jacques Derrid
|e|ce|ea:.ae.s|:eaeaia|eai«.ia.aiae:ee.eaa||.m.iseiiae.avesi.ea·
i.eaaaci:aase:essesiaemie«a:caae«ie:mei:ac.ea|. ivCeaee:a.ae
iae .aieai.eaa| a.sie:v ei a oa:i.ea|a: e.cei.e se.eaee. a sease·
.avesi.eai.eaei. iseeac.i.easeioess.|.|.iv«.| | :evea|ieasexemo|a:. |v
iaeeeac.i.easaacseaseeiiaea. sie:.e.iveise. eaee.aeeae:a| .iaeaei
aa.ve:sa|a.sie:.e.iv-iae| asiae:.zeaie:a| |seaseaacO|]eei.v.iv. a
eeae:a| . Ceaseeaeai| v. iaea:ea.ieeiea.e :e|ai.eas eve|eca memeai
aeea:eeemo|.eaiec. .iaei.ave:iec.1a.s«ea|ccemeasi:aie ..i . i«e:e
si.||aeeessa:v.ai«aaioe.aiiae]a:. c.ea|e:ce:ei. mo| .eai.eas. saeise
|. aea:aacae«c.mea|i.i. sie:eeeea.zeiaesia:i.aeoe.ai .
ii.s.aiaem. csieiiaesec.mea|i.esaac«. iaexi:emeo:aceaeeiaai
uasse:| i:.es ie ma|e a.s oa:oese aace:sieec .a The Origin of
Geometr.
II
ua sse:|ia|esaame:eas. c.ve:se .aac:aiae:. ai:.eaiemeiaece|ee.ea|
o:eeaai.eas.aiaea:sioaees .
1 . r:ev.ceciaeaei.ea eia.sie:v. s eeaee.vec. aaae« sease. iae
eaesi.eaoesecmasi|eaace:sieec.a.ismesia.sie:.e:eseaaaee ii.sa
eaesi.eaei:eoeai.aeaae:.e.a.i aeiae:«e:cs. :ereei.eaceesaei«e:|
aoeae:«.ia.aeeemei:v.ise|ias:eacv·mace.aaacec·ce«a( 1 57) . 1 7
1aeaii. iaceia|ea.iaea..saeiiaaieiaeeemeie:. iae| aiie:aasaia.s
c.soesa|aaa|:eacve.veasvsiemeii:aiasiaaiaesaooesese:ai. | .zes
.aa. seeemei:.z.aeaei.v.iv.e:.ia:iae:.aia.sc.soesa|a:eoess.|.| . i.es
eiae«ax.emai.zai.eas«a.ea .evea«.ia iae. :o:e||emsaacc.mea|·
i.es·already a:eaaaeaaeecasgeometrcal oess.|.|.i.es . 1ae :eea.:ec
aii.iace.sae|eaee:iaaieiiaee|ass.eeo.sieme|ee.si«ae.«.ia.aa|.ac
eiae:.zeaia|aacaa.sie:.eeai.«ea| csiacviaesvsiemai.esi:aeia:eei
eeemei:.ea| se.eaee e: eiva:.ea s eeemei:.es . seia iaese aii.iaces
«ea|c ceoeac ea «aai uasse:| aac ceaaec .a Formal and
Transcendental Logic aac:eea||ec.aiaeCrisis asa aa.vei-eiao:.e:.
se|i·ev.ceaeeiaai|eeos eve:vae:ma|eeemei:.ea|o:e]eei.amei.ea
(C, §9b, o 29) . Nei ea|v a:e iae . aie||.eeaee aaciae o:aei.ee ei
eeemei:va|«avsoess.||eaaceeas.eaa||vo:eieaacaace:eai.ve. |ai
se. saee:ia.aseeeac:ereei.eaeaeeasi.iaieceeemei:v. a||«.iaeai
c.sia:|.aee:saa|.ae[solicitee] eeemei:v.a.is|a:.ecseaseeie:.e. a.
1aeCrisis a|«avseeaeecia.s 1ae:e. saeaeecie:iaeeaesi.eaeiiae
e:.e.aì .a iae aii.iace ei iae eeemeie:. eae aas. arie: a|| . siac.ec
eeemei:v. eae aace:siaacs eeemei:.ea|eeaeeoisaaco:eoes.i.eas. . s
' The Origin of Geometry. p. 1 57 i n Appendi x. Hereafter all references t o the Origin
wi l l be placed in parentheses, as done here. [When placed in brackets , they indicate the
addition of the translator. ]
,
35
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
ia¬. |.a:«.ia ¬eiaecs ei eoe:ai.eaas«avsei cea| .ae«. ia o:ee.se|v
ceiaecsi:aeia:es . . . " (ibid. ).
l 8
Neeeemei:.z.aeaei.v.ivassaea, ae«eve:e:.i.ea| .eaa:eia:aiea
oe.aisae:ieiiaai iam.| .a:.iv
2. sai .i «e |eave iae aeiaa| e: v. :iaa| e.veas ei iae :eee.vec
eee·nei:v. aac.i«eiaeaeemeiea.sie:v sve:i.ea| c. meas.ea. ia:ee
eeaias.easaea.a|.e .a«a.iie:as
A) i aiaei:sio|aee.«ea:eaei. aie:esiecae:e. a iaemaaae:ei
|e.ae«a.eaiaeseaseeieeemei:vìaac.aCa|.|ee sìia.a|.ae. e:.a
iaai eia| | iae | aie . aae:.ie:seiiae e|ce:eeemei:.e sae«|ecee ( 1 57
mec.aecì · Deso.ie iae va| ae «a.ea «ea|c |e aiiaeaec ie saea aa
aoo:eaea,iae|aiie:ceoeacs ..aiae|esiavoeiaes.s .ea|veaaosveae|·
eeve:a. sie:veieeea.i.ea ~aceveai, |vv. :iaeeiiae.:cese:.oi.ve
siv|e . ia. sa.sie:vaacosveae|eev eseaoec«aai uasse:|a|«avssas·
oeeiec.evea.iiaevc. caei:ecaeeiaeae:mai.v.ivei.cea|e|]eeisaac
eeemei:.ea|truth ieiaeemo.:.ea|iaeisei| .vecexoe:.eaee. iaev«ea|c
ea|v.aie:m asa|eaiiaeiaeiaa| :eeiecaesseii:aia .aaa. sie:.ea|e:
osveae| ee.ea|m.|.eaeiiaei. Necea|iia.s:eeiecaessmav|eaeeess. ·
|| eieacese:.oi.veoaeaemeae|eev«a.ea«ea|c:esoeeia| | . ise:.e.aa|·
.iv. |ai.i«ea|cieaeaasaeia.aea|eaiiaei:aiaeieeemei:vaac. is
seaseeie:.e.a
re:Ca| . |ee-«aeseaame ae:e.siaeexemo|a:v.acexeiaaaii.iace
aacamemeai .:aiae:iaaaao:eoe:aame· -«asa| :eacvaa.aae:. ie:ei
eeemei:v · ii. .a iaeCrisi, ave:v .moe:iaai o|aee . s :ese:vecie:
Naturall y, here "geometry" serves i n an exemplary way t o designate mathematics
and even l@gic in general .
l !|
Cf. C, §9 1 , p. 57: . . . I have l i nked all our consi derations to hi s name [Gali leo' s] ,
i n a certain sense simplifying and ideali zi ng the matter; a more exact hi storical
anal ysi s would have to take account of how much of his thought he owed to hi s
predecessors. ' ( I shal l conti nue, i ncidentall y, and for good reasons, i n a similar
fashion. ) "
20
What Galileo inaugurated, openi ng the way for objecti vi sm by making mathematized
Nature an " in i tself, " marks the birth of a cri sis in the sciences and in philoso­
phy. All the more, then, does i t command the attention of the author of the Crisis.
Besides, Husserl already i nsists a great deal on the secondary character of Galileo' s
revol uti on and on the scientifc heritage that i t supposed , notably that of . . ' pure
geometry, ' the pure mathematics of spatiotemporal shapes in general, pregiven to Galileo
as an old tradition" (C. §9a, p. 24) , "the relatively advanced geometry known to Galileo,
already broadly applied not only to the earth but al so i n astronomy" (ibid . . § 9b , p. 28) .
For Galileo, the sense of the geometrical tradition' s origin was already lost: "Gali leo was
himsel f an heir i n respect to pure geometry. The inherited geometry. the inherited manner
of ' intuiti ve' conceptual i zing, provi ng, constructi ng, was no longer original geometry: in
this sort of ' intuiti veness ' it was already empty ofits sense" (ibid. , §9h, p. 49 [modifed] ;
Husserl ' s emphasis) .
36
Jacques Derrid
Ca| . |eeaaca. s:eve|ai.ea. «a.eauasse:|s.iaaies aiiae e:.e.aeiiae
mece:aso.:. i s oe:. | s· . ae:eiae :ac.ea| . sicemaac«aaisie aaceiae
sec.meaiai.easaoea«a.eaiaeeaie:o:.seeiaa.aaa.iemaiaemai.zai.ea
«as |asec we masireduce iaeve:v :ema:|a||eaesseiiaeCa|.|eaa
aa.vei-iei:eeiaeeaesi.eaasieiae e:.e.aeieeemei:v
ia iae Crisis, «a.|e . ave|.ae Ca| .|ee s ||.acaess ie iae i:ac.i.eaa|
soaeeeia. se«aacveaia:eaacces. eaai.aea. siaieia| em. ss.ea.
"Z
l
uasse:| aaaeaaeesve:vo:ee.se|viaeias|iaaiae«.||aace:ia|ea|.ii|e
|aie:ea. aiaeOrigin: re:Ca|.|ee.iaea. oa:eeeemei:vasi:ac.i.eai
«as e.vea-aac eieea:seae. ea.ieaace:siaaca||v. c. caeiiee| iae
aeecieee. aieiaemaaae:.a«a.eaiaeaeeemo|.sameaiei. cea| .zai.ea
e:.e. aa||va:ese .. e . ae« .ie:e«ea iae aace:|v.ae|as.seiiae o:e·
eeemei:.ea| . seas.||e«e:|caac.iso:aei.ea|a:is·e:ieeeeaova. mse|i
°' " It was a fateful omission that Gal i l eo did not i nquire in retur as to the original
sense-bestowi ng production whi ch, as ideali zation practiced on the original ground of all
theoretical and practical l ife-the i mmedi ately i ntuited world ( and here especial l y the
empirical l y i ntui ted world of bodi es)-resulted in the geometrica ideal formations)" (C,
§9h, p. 49 [modi fed] ) .
Li ke al l forgetful ness i n general , the "fatefl ness" of t hi s "omission" or negligence
( Versiumnis) , which is never questioned for or i n itself, assumes one of the three fol low­
ing signifcations, each varying according to text and context:
a) that of an empirical necessity (on the order of i ndi vi dual or soci al psychology as
well as that of factual history) , and thus, of an extrinsic necessity , one which is thereby
contingent i n comparison with the sense and teleology of reason. This necessity, then,
has the inconsistent negati vity of the "non-essence" (das Unwesen), of the "apparent "
defeat of reason. I ll uminated by the tel eology of Reason, i t ceases to be "an obscure fate,
an impenetrable desti ny" (cf. "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, " Ap­
pendi x I in C, p. 299) . [The ET of das Unwesen ofered by Carr is "disarray. " Paul
Ricoeur in his French translation of thi s text points out the l i teral translation as "non­
essence": "La Crise de I ' humanite europeenne et la phi l osophi e, " Revue de
Meraphysique et de Morale, 55, No. 3 (Jul y-October, 1 950) , p. 258. For the relation of
Ricoeur' s translation and the English one, see note 1 49 below. ]
b) that of a radical ethico-phi l osophical fault : the bankruptcy of philosophical fee­
dom and responsi bil ity.
c) that of an eideti c necessity: th necessity of sedimentation prescribed for al l
constitution and al l tradi tionalization of sense , therefore for al l hi story . Thi s prescription
i n turn is sometimes valued as the condition of hi storicity and the progressive advent of
reason, sometimes deval ued as what makes origins and accumulated sens become dor­
mant . It trul y is a threatening val ue.
I t is a matter of course that these three sigifcati ons, appaentl y i rreducibl e t o one
another, are concei ved by Husserl on the basis of one and the same latent i ntuition.
History itsel f is what this i ntui ti on announces. Even if we managed si multaneousl y and
without contradiction to think the uni tary ground on the basis of which these three
propositions can be recei ved, i t i s history itself that would be thought . But then the
possi bi li ty of a crisis of reason woul d disappear, the negativity of which ought to be
unthinkable in itself.
r
I
37
Introductin t o the Origin ofGeometr
«.ia eaesi.eas a|eai iae e:.e.as ei aoec.ei.e. maiaemai.ea| se|i·
ev.ceaee (C, §9b, o. 29) .
~ac. i . aiaeOrigin uasse:|soea|sei eaeae.aea. mse|i .a :eree·
i. eas«a.easa:e|vaeve:eeea::ecieCa|.|ee( 1 57) , .i. s|eeaase.asae
iacsa.c. aiaeCrisi: i ic.caeieaie:iaem.aceiaCa| . | eeiaai. i
«ea| ceve: |eeeme :e|evaai . .aceec eiiaacameaia| .moe:iaaee. ie
eeemei:v.asa|:aaeaei aaa.ve:sa||ae«|eceeei«aai. s.oa.|eseoav· .
iema|eeeemei:.ea|se|i·ev. ceaee-iae ae«ei. ise:.e.a-.aieao:e|
| em re:as. o:eeeec.ae|eveacCa|.|ee.aea:a.sie:.ea|:ereei.eas. .i
«.|| |e eieeas.ce:a||e .aie:esi ie see ae« a sa.u eiieeas |eeame
a:eeaiaacae«iae e:.e.aei|ae«|eceeaacie|eeemeama]e:o:e|·
|em (§9b, o. 29) . z
Z
iiiaeCa|. |eaac. seeve:v:es. cesesoee.a||v.aaie:ma| .z.ae.aaa.i.za·
i.eaeiaae.eaimaiaemai.es. ceesaeiiae:eia:aieiaemasaae:.e.ai. e
o:.me:c.a|.ivieaee:ia.aaa.iace: Nes. mo|e:esoease . soess.||eie
saea a eaesi.ea we «.|| see iaaiiae . aaa.ie aac a|:eacv |:e|ea
ia:eaea.«asa|:eacvai«e:|.«aeaiaea:sieeemei:v|eeaa-iaai. i.
iee.«asa|:eacvaa.aaa.i.zai.ea
B) sai.i«e:eia:aieaoe.aiia.ss. ce eiCa|.|ee. .siaeeaesi.ea
ae«eaeeisiacv.aeie:.ise|iiaeae:.iaee«a.ea«ase.veaiea. m:Nei
aavme:e 1ae eaesi.eaeie:. e.a«.||aei|eaoa.|e|ee.ea|· a.sie:.ea|
sea:ea . aiae. avesi.eai.eaei oa:i.ea|a:o:eoes.i.eas ( 1 58) iaai
iaea:sieeemeie:sc.seeve:ece:ieuaa| aiec 1ae:e..i«ea| cea| v|ea
maiie:ie:iae a.sie:veise.eaee.a iaee|ass.ea|seaseieia|e siee|ei
iaea|:eacveeasi.iaieceeaieaiseieeemei:.ea|eeea. i.eas. .aoa:i.ea| a:
eiiae a:sioesia|ai-·. ax.ems. iaee:ems. aac seie:ia. eeaieaisiaai
masi |e exo|e:ec aac ceie:m.aec as o:ee.se|v aac as eemo|eie| vas
oess.||ei:ema:eaee|ee.ea|ceeameais Deso.ie. is.aeeaiesia||e.aie:·
esi. saea aa. avesi.eai. eaeaaieaea as aeia. ae+|eaiiaeeeemei:. ea|
seaseeiiaea:sieeemei:.ea|aeis iieaaaeievea:eeeea.zeaac. se|aie
iaese aeis as saea exeeoi |v saooes.aeiaaiiae o:. me:c.a| sease ei
eeemei:v.sa|:eacv|ae«a
c· r.aa|| v. .ieaemasi:eia:aieiae.asi.iai.aeseaseeia:siaeis. .i
.saeiaia||aeaesi.eaeiceie:m.a.ae«aaiin fact «e:eiaea:s|aeis.
iaea:siexoe:.eaees . iaea:sieeemeie:s«ae«e:ein fact :esoeas.||e
22
These sentences announce what follows i n the Crisis, devoted to the transcendental
motif i n post-Galilean phi l osophy, as well as i nvesti gations like that of the Origin .
°`´ "Fi rst" (erste) nearly always designates in Husserl ei ther an undetermined primacy,
or, most ofen, a de facto chronological priority i n constituted cosmic time, i . e . , an
original factuali ty. Proto-, Arch-, and Ur- refer to phenomenological primordi ali ty. i . e . .
to that of sense, of ground, of the de jure, afer the reduction of all factuality.
I
38
Jacques Derrida
ie: iae acveai eieeemei:v saea a ceie:m.aai.ea. evea .i oess.||e .
«ea|caaiie:ea:a.ste:.ea|ea:.es.iv.aaceve:via.aeiaaiuasse:|aii:.·
|aies ie aee:ia.a:emaai.e. sm· . i«ea|c ea:.eaea:|ae«|eceeei
emo.:.ea|e.:eamsiaaees. eiaames. caies. aacseie:ia saievea.i.ai
.is |. m.i. ia. sceie:m. aai.ea«ea|cem|:aeea||iaea.sie:.ea|iaeisiaai
aaveeeasi.iaieciaeemo.:.ea|m.|.eaie:i:aia s ieaac.ae..i«ea|csi.||
|eaveas||.aca|eaiiaeve:vseaseeisaeaaieaac.ae. aseaseiaai.s
aeeessa:v aac eemoa:ec ie «a.ea iaeseiaeisaave ai |esiea|v aa
exemo|a:vs.ea.aeai.ea saeaemo.:.ea||ae«|eceeeaa¡asi.aa|| vo:e·
seai. ise|iasa.sie:.ea||ae«|eceeofia.aes:e|aiecieeeemei:vea| v|v
saooes.ae a ia||v ceve|eoec e|a:.iv a|eai iae ve:v sease ei«aai .s
ea||ecthe eeemei:.ea| se.eaee ~ac ae:e. ia. smeaase|a:.iva|eai. is
seaseeie:.e. a 1ae¡a:.c.ea|o:.e:.iveiiaeeaesi.eaeioaeaemeae|ee.·
ea|e:.e.a.siae:eie:ea|se|aie
saiia.seaesi.eaeaa|eas|ecea| vsecondarily aacat the end eiaa
.i. ae:a:v«a.ea. .a. isia:a.ea¡evsameiaece|ee.ea|aac:.eaiia|o:.e:·
. iv iaiaei . a||iaeseva:.eas|.acsei.aea.:.es«e¡asic. sm. ssecaave
|eeaeaaeaiao.aiaee|emeaieiaeeasi.iaieceeemei:v 1ae. :e|¡eei
saooesece:«aseeaiasec«.ia iae :esa|iseiaready-made eeemei:v
iaai«ea|caaveie|ereduced .ae:ce:ieaiia.aaeease.ea saessei.is
e:.e.a. aeease.easaess«a.ea«asaiiaesamei.meaa .aia.i.eaei. is
esseaee ia eiae:«e:cs. a|iaeaea.i ea|v aas ie:.iseeaieai.cea| es·
seaees. ready-made eeemei:v ae|cs ae:e.a |a||iae siaias eia iaei
«a.eamasi|e:ecaeec.a .isiaeiaa|.ivseiaai.is sease eaa|e :eac
i aceec..aia.sease.iaefact aasiaeie:eeiieaseaseeiiaeready-made.
sai ia. s:ecaei.ea aeecsas.is sia:i.aeoe.aiiae eeasi. iaiec:esa| i. i
aeai:a|.zes 1ae:emasia| «avsa|:eacvaave|eeaiaeiaeieiaa.sie:v
eieeemei:v . seiaaiiae :ecaei.eaeaa|eoe:ie:mec i masia|:eacv
aaveaaa.ve|ae«|eceeeieeemei:vaacmasiaeibegin ai.ise:.e.a
ue:eiaemeiaec s] a:.c.ea|aeeess.iveve:|aesa. sie:v siaeiaa|aeees·
s.ivDese.ieee:ia.aaeeea:aaees. ea. |eseeae:seimeiaeca:eee:aaes
me:ee:eieaac|vseas.i.veiea. sie:.e.iv.eveaiaeaaaiaevseemie:e
mevec. a:ess. easi:ema. sie:v seaia
seiaiae aeeess.ivieo:eeeec i:em iaeiaei eieeasi.iaiec se.eaee
aac iae :ee:ess.ea ie«a:cs iae aeaemo.:.ea| e:.e. asa:e ai iae same
i.meeeac.i.easeioess.|.|.iv.saeaa:e .as«e|ae«.iae.moe:ai.vesei
eve:vi:aaseeaceaia|oa.|eseoaviaeec«.ia semeia. ae|.|eiaea. sie:v
eimaiaemai.es ·~·aacameaia|c.ae:eaee:ema. as. ae«eve:.|ei«eea
¯` On the necessity of starting from existing sci ences that are util ized as the thread
guidi ng the transcendental regressi on, cf. FTL, pp. 8-9: "Thus we are presupposing the
sciences, as wel l as logic itself, on the basi s of the ' experience' that gi ves them to us
39
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
kaai s . aieai.ea aac iaaieiuasse:| . eae iaai . soe:aaos |esseas.|v
c.si.aea.saa||eiaaa«ea|ca:si|e . mae.aec
ia aa. sie:.ea|:ei:esoeei.eaie«a:cs e:.e.as. kaai a|se eve|es ia.s
maiai.eae:i:aasie:mai.ea( Uminderung), ia.s revolution" «a.eaeave
|.:iaiemaiaemai.eseaieisemeemo.:.ea| e:eo.aes .aiaeÐevoi.aa
i:ac.i.ea(Kritik der rein en Ver u nft, r:eiaeeie:acec . o x·
1aea. sie:veiia. s:eve|ai.ea. aii:.|aiecieiaeaaooviaeaeaiei
as.ae|emaa .a aa exoe:.meaii:em«a.eaiae oaiaiaaihad ie|e
ia|eamust ae|eaee:|em. ssecaaci:em«a.eaiaesa:e«aveise.eaee
«asopened aacprescribed (eingeschlagen und vorgezeichnet war) for all
times and in endless expansion (fur aile Zeiten und in unendlich Weiten),
«asme:ecee.s.veiaaaiaeemo.:.
_
a|c. seeve:veiiaeoaiaa:eaac
iaeiameasCaoe eiCeec ueoei (ibid. , o x.·
1aas. | .|euasse:| . kaai.s aiieai.ve ie iae a.sie:.ea| c. meas.eaei
ao:.e:.oess.|.|.i.esaac ieiae e:.e.aa|eeaes. seiai:aia. «aese |.:ia
.e: |.:ia ee:i.aeaie· . ase:.|es aac o:ese:.|es ema. iemoe:a|.iv aac
aa.ve:sa|.iv-aei ea|vie:iaeeoea.ae ei.is oess.|.|.iv. |ai a|se ie:
eaea ei. is ceve|eomeais aac ie: iae ieia|.iv ei . is|eeem. ae i.|e
uas se:| . aeaeai:a| .zesiaeiaeiaa|eeaieaiseiia.s :eve|ai.ea. aiae
mece eiia.a|.ae «.iaiae same.ac.ae:eaee. i aeiieei. .i .s ei|. ii|e
eeaseeaeaee ie: a.m iaai .is a. sie:v aas aei :eaeaec as 1ae
seaseeiiaea:sicemeasi:ai.eaeaa|e:.ee:eas| ve:asoec.eveaiaeaea
«e|ae«aeia.aeeiiaea:siiaeiaa|exoe:.eaeee:iaea:sieeemeie:.
«aeiae:. as kaai soee.aes. ae |e ea||ec1aa|ese:«aaieve:eae
ces. :es(ibid.).
Neve:iae|ess. kaai s .ac.ae:eaeeieiaeiaeiaa|e:.e.a.as«e||asie
iaeeeaieaieiiaeexamo|e-iae. sesee|esi:.aae|e-eeaee:a.ae«a.ea
ae ceve|eos iae .mo|.eai.eas ei . is c.seeve:v· . s me:e .mmec.aie|v
|ee.i.maieiaaauasse:| s re:iae .aaaea:a|maiai.ea«a.ea.aie:esis
kaaihands over eeemei:v:aiae:iaaae:eaies.i ..iseisi:eeaoess.|.|·
.iv. «a.ea. saeia.ae|essiaaaa. sie:.ea| . . ae:ce:ieaaac.iieas ~i
a:siia. s:eve|ai.ea. sea|va:eve|ai.eaie:iaea:sieeemeie:ii. s
beforehand. Because of thi s, our procedure seems not to be at al l radical , since the
genui ne sense of al l sciences . . . i s the very thi ng i n quest ion . . . . Nevertheless,
whether sciences and logic be genui ne or spurious, we do have experience of them as
cul tural formations gi ven to us beforehand and bearing withi n themsel ves their meani ng,
their ' sense. '
. .
Cf. also on thi s FTL. I ntrod . , pp. 1 3-1 4
.
and § 1 02, pp. 268-69 : and
eM, §3, pp. 8-9.
¯ ´ We emphasize those Kantian expressions which are also among t he most frequent i n
The Origin of Geometry. [The bracketed expression "of Good Hope" i s added i n con­
formi ty to the Engl i sh translation of Norman Kemp Smith. ]
40
Jacques Derrid
aeio:ecaeecova. m. ii .saace:sieecaace:acai.veeaieee:v. aaciae
aei.v.iveiiaeeeemeie:ie«a.eaiaeaaooviaeaeaieeea::ec.sea|v
iaeemo.:.ea| aaie|c.aeeia o:eieaac:eeeoi.ea waai .s mesieriea
i:aas|aiecov:eve|ai.ea . siaea||as.eaie a | .eaiiaai.se.vea. ie
a| .eaica«asea . "Dem ersten . . . dem ging ein Licht auf" (ibid. , o
X
)
. 26
uaceaoiec|v. uasse:| s o:ecaei.ea (Leistung)
2
7 a|se .ave|ves a
si:aiamei:eeeoi.ve. aia.i.easai«aaimaiie:sae:e.siaaiia.suas se:·
|.aa.aia.i.ea. as.ieeaee:asiae.cea|eo]eeiseimaiaemai.es . .saose·
|aie|veeasi.iai.veaace:eai.ve. iaeeo]eeise:eo]eei.v. i.esiaai. i.a·
ieacsc.cft ex.sibefore .i. aacia.s before" eiiae. cea|eo]eei.v.iv
ma:ss me:e iaaa iae ea:eae|ee.ea| eve eia iaei. .i ma:ss a i:aas·
eeaceaia| o:ea. sie:v i a iae kaai.aa :eve|ai . ea. ea iae eeai:a:v.
iae |:si eeemeie: me:e|v oeeemes eease.eas iaai .i saueesie: a. s
maiaemai.ea| aei.v.ivie :ema.a«.ia.aaeeaeeoiiaai .ialready pos­
sesses. 1aeeeasi:aei.eaie«a.eaaee.vesa. mse|i.iaea. .sea|viae
exo|.eai.eaeiaaa|:eacveeasi.iaieceeaeeoiiaaiaeeaeeaaie:s . as.i
«e:e. .a a. mse|ia cese:.oi.ea «a.ea ae ceaoiie: uasse:| as «e||
«ea|coei:aeeieve:vaeae:eai.veeeemei:.ea|aei. aac«a.eaieaeaes
as aoeai iae sease ei :eacv·mace eeemei:v as saea. oaiaei aoeai
eeemei:v .a iae aei ei oe.ae . as..iaiec re:. as kaai savs. ae
c.seeve:eciaaiaemasiaeiie||e«iaei:aeeei«aaiaesa«.aiae| ea:e
26
Cf. for example the French translation of A. Tremesaygues and B. Pacaud, Critique
de la raison pure (Paris: Presses Uni versitaries de France, 1 950) , p. 1 7. Of course , we are
authorized to pay such attention to these Kantian expressions only by the confrmation
that all of Kant' s phi l osophy seems to give them.
¯´ Among all the translations already proposed for the notion of Leistung, so frequently
utilized i n the Origin, the word "production" seemed to overlay most properly all the
signifcations that Husserl recognizes in thi s act that he al s designates by some com­
plementary notions: pro-duetion, which leads to the l ight , constitutes the "over against
us" of Objecti vity; but this bringing to l ight i s also, l ike all production (Erzeugung) in
general , a creation (Sehopfung) and an act of formation (Bildung, Gestaltung), from
which comes ideal objectivity as Gebilde, Gestalt, Erzeugnis, and so on. To be clear on
this, we have translated by "formation" the notion of Gebilde, which appears so often in
the Origin, and which up to now has been very di versely translated. The very vague
character of the word "formation" seemed to us to suit the indetermination of Husserl ' s
notion. I t also agrees with the geological metaphor which runs throughout t he text, where
all usions to sedimentation, to deposits, to stages, to strata, and to substrata of sense are
everywhere. But we were also unable to designate the act which engenders das Gebilde.
namel y, die Bildung, except by "formation. " Each time BiLdung has th i s active sense,
we wi l l insert the German word between parentheses. Do not forget, fi nally (and thi s i s
especially important here), that i n German Bildung also carries the general sense of
culture. There again, the notion of formation seemed the least foreign to thi s vi rtual
signifcation.
41
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
e:.aiaeoa:eeeaeeoieiiaaisameaea:e kaiae:aemasioeeei(hervor­
bringen) . .iseo]eei·w.iaiaeae|oei«aaiaea. mse|ioai.aie.iaac«aai
a priori «as :eo:eseaiec .a.iia:eaea iaeeeaeeoi.ia:eaea eeasi:ae·
i.ea· .~actesae«semeia. aea priori «.iaeemo|eie seea:.iv.aemasi
aii:.oaieieia.aes(Sache) aeia.aeoai«aaiaeeessa:. |vie||e«eci:em
«aaiaeaacoaiiae:ea. mse|i.aaeee:caaee«.iaa. seeaeeoi(ibid. ) . 21
Neceaoi. eaee iae eeemei:.ea| eeaeeoiaas:evea|ec .is i:eecem
«.ia :esoeeiie emo.:.ea| seas.o.|.iv. iae svaiaes.seiiae eeasi:ae·
i.ea . s . ::ecae.o|e ~ac .aceec .i . s aa .cea| a.sie:v sai .i . siae
a.sie:v eiaa eoe:ai.ea. aac aeieiaieaac.ae. iiaaie|csexo|.eai.ve
eesia:es. aiaesoaeeeiaoess.o. |.iva|:eacveoeaieiaeeeemeie:1ae
memeai eeemei:v . sesiao|.saecassaea. iae memeai. iaai .s. seme·
ia.aeeaaoesa.cei. i. iaeaeeemei:va|:eacv «.||oeeaiaeoe.aiei
oe.ae:evea|ecieiaeeease.easaesseiiaefrst eeemeie:.«ae. saei .as
.a iae Origin, o:eieeeemeie:. iae o:.ma| | v .asi.iai.ae (urstiftende)
eeemeie:.~i|easi.i«. ||oe:eacvieoe:evea|ec.a.is.a. i.a|eeaeeoi.
iaaieeaeeoi«aeseao:.e:.Oo] eei.v. iv«.||o:eseai|vsi:.seaavsao]eei
«aaieve: «.ia eeemei:.ea| . as.eai [lumiere] . ~ac s.aee kaai . s .a·
ie:esiec.aiaeoess.o.|.iveieeemei:vie:asao]eei.aeeae:a|..i.saei
ea|v |ess eeasi:.ei. ae. oai a| se ce]a:e aeeessa:v. iaai iae ce iaeie
sao]eeieisaeaa:eve|ai.eaoe aaveaeaia|| . aaciaaiiaeeeemei·
:.ea| examo|e se:v.ae as ea.ce-iae cemeasi:ai.ea ei iae . sesee|es
i:.aae|e-oe.ac.ae:eai. 1aeao:.e:.aaia:eeiiaaieeaeeoi«.ia. a«a.ea
«eeoe:aieo:ee|acesa| |a. sie:.ea|.avesi.eai.ea«aaieve:aoeai.issao·
]eeimaiie:Ceai:a:vie.issvaiaei.eexo|.eai.ea.iaeeeaeeoi.ise|i.asa
si:aeia:eeiao:.e:.o:ese:.oi.ea. eea|caei oea.sie:.ea| . oeeaase .i .s
aei . assaea .o:ecaeecaace:eaacecoviaeaeieiaeeae:eiesao]eei
2
!1
ue:e a|| a. sie:v eaa ea| v oe emo.:.ea| ~ac .i iae:e .s a o.:ia ei
eeemei:vie:kaai . .iseemsie oe ea| viae exi:.as.ecircumstance ie:
iaeeme:eeaeeeiai:aia.«a.ea.s . ise|ia|«avsa|:eacveeasi.iaiecie:
aav iaeiaa| eease.easaess· 1aas iae soeaiaaeeas e.cei.e :ecaei.ea
«a.eai:eesiaeeeemei:.ea|esseaeei:ema||emo.:.ea|:ea|.iv-iaaiei
seas. o|eaea:ai.eaas«e||asi:emiaeeeemeie: sosveae|ee.ea| |.vec
exoe:.eaee-.sie:kaaia|«avsa|:eacvceae ª si:.ei|vsoeas.ae. iae

The Erdmann edition notes that hen10rbringen has no "object" i n Kant' s text.
¯�The absence of the deci si ve notion of "material" or "contingent" a priori , such as
Husserl defned it, thus seems to uproot Kant ' s formalist apriorism from all concrete
hi story and to inhi bit the theme of a transcendental hi story.
On the notion of the contingent a priori , cf. in particular FTL. §6, pp. 29-30. The level
of geometry as a material ontology i s precisely that of such a . 'material a priori . "
´Thi s seems true, furthermore, of the whole of Kant' s transcendental analysi s.
, I
42
Jacques Derrid
:ecae(.ea. sae(ie:e:|vasa|]ee(«aema|esa. mse|i:esoeas.||eie:.(
. aa(:aaseeacea(a|acvea(a:e.ao:e(eeeeme(e:e:oa. |eseoae::eree(·
.aeeao:e(eeeeme(:v..(.sa|«avsa|:eacvmaceoes

.||ea

caeeess

:v
|v(aeaa(a:eeieeeme(:.ea|soaeeaac(ae

eeeme(ne

|



e( .na:nae
a sea:ee| v a|(e:ec eeavea(.eaa| r|a(ea. sm. kaa(s mc.ae:eaee (e
emo.:.ea|a.s(e:v. sea|v| ee.(.ma(eci:em(aememe

((aa(a

e:

o:e·
ieaac a. s(e:vaas a|:eacv e:ea(ec aeaemo.:.ea| e|·ee(s 1a.s a.

(e:v
:ema.asa.cceaie:kaa( Caa«eae(savae:e(aa(

(a

(aee:�ei. cea|
soaeeaac(.me|e(a:eea.:esaac

aoo:esses(�e|naeme(e| .ea(eiaa
.a(:.as.eaacaeaemo.:.ea|a.s(e:.e.(vei(aes.. eaeeseisoaeeaacme·
(.ea: iisoaeeaac(.me«e:e(:aaseeacea(a|:ea|.(.e

. a
*�
v«ea�c

|e
eoeaec|e(aie:aaaa.s(e:.eme(aoavs.esaacie:aa. s(ene. s(emo.ne

|
se.eaee («e .a(e::e|a(ecoess.|.|.(.es(aa( kaa( a|«avs ceaeaaeecm
eaeaad (aesamemevena((eave.cemo.:.e.smi:em(aes(a:(aaca(
aavo:.ee .kaa(aac(eeeaiaea. s(:aaseeacea(a|c.seea:s

(ea«e:|c
ei. cea|eeas(.(a(ece|]ee(s .«aeseee::e|a(e«as(ae:

ie:e.(se|iaeea·
s(.(a(ec sa|]ee( · 1a. sae(.ea eiao:e(ea. s(e:v. «a.ea (�e

ae|e

ei
kaa(.aaoa.|eseoavseems(ema|eeea(:ac.e(e:vevea«a.|emve|me
.( |eeemesuasse:| s (aeme

uasse:| s(as|.s(aasa||(aeme:eaaza:ceas. aaca. si:eecem

.(a
:esoee((eemo.:.ea||ae«|ecee. sme:ec.mea|((e]as(�iva(i:s(s.ea�
iaiae( «eae««eace:a|ea((aeseaseei(aeo:ecae(.ea
^
ieeeme(n·
ea|ee�eeo(s|eie:e aac(a.ss.ceei(aekaa(.aa:eve|a(.ea. |eie:e
aac(a.ss.ceei(aeeeas(.(a(.eaeiaa.cea| | voa:eaacesae(soaeeaac
(.me s.aeeeve:v.cea|e|]ee(.v.(v.so:ecaeec|v(aeae(eiaeeae:e(e
eease.easaess .(ae ea|v s(a:(.ae oe.a( ie: a (:

as

eacea(a|
oaeaemeae|eev· .eve:v.cea|e|]ee(. v.(vaasaa�s(e:v«a.ea.sa� «avs
a|:eacvaaaeaaeec.a(aa(eease.easaess. evea.i«e|ae«ae(ameei
.(sce(e:m.aeceea(ea( .
uo(eIdeas I (ae me(aece|ee.ea|e:eeas(. (a(.veaaa| vses:em�mec
s(n.e(a:a| aac s(a(.e. aac a|| a.s(e:v «as "reduced" as iae(aa| . (v e:
` ´´ Here we fnd, locally and through a diferent approach, the i nterpretatio� pro��sed
by Fi nk and approved by H usserl concerning the intraworldliness of t�e Kantlan cntl
.
que
compared wi th Husserl ' s investigation of the "origin of the world. Cf. Eug�� �m�:
"The Phenomenological Phi losophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Cntlcl sm,
.
in R. O. Elveton, ed. , The Phenomenology of Husserl, pp. 73- 1 47 . [The above quote I S
found on p. 95. ]
.
'
.
"I
'
't t'
,
.
can only be measured by
´ ¯Perhaps the depth of vigi lance H thIS Kantmn I ml a Ion
its difcul ty, its failure.
´ Husserl often stresses that the reference to a hi storical birth be i n�cribed wi
.
t�i n the
sense itself of every cultural ideal i ty, especiall y in Beilage XXVI I m the KnS1S, pp.
503-07.
43
Introductin to the Origin of Geomety
se.eaeeeieeas(.(a(ecaac.a(:a«e:| c|viae(aa|. (v1aas . (a.sa. s(e:vei
eeeme(:vaac:ema.aec.a(aeca:|aac«as]aceeceicea|(ia|oess. |. |·
. (ve:mec.ee:e.a(e:es(ie:(aeoaeaemeae|ee.s(e:ma(aema(.e.aaas
saea ¹Ceeme(:v s (:a(a..(sae:ma(.veva|ae. .s:ac.ea|| v.aceoeacea(
ei.(sa.s(e:v«a.ea.a((a.smemea(eiuasse:|s. (.ae:a:v..seeas. ce:ec
ea|v as a iae(aa| a.s(e:v ia| | .ae aace: (ae s(:e|e ei(ae sasoeas. ea
(Ausschaltung) . 35 uasse:| savs (a. s . .a (ae oe:.ec ei ra.|eseoav as
x.ee:eas se.eaee aacIdeas l) .a seme i:aa| ca:ases«a.ea. .i(ae
|eve|seieso|.ea(.eaaac(aeseasesei(ae«e:ca. s(e:vaacae(|eea
e|ea:|vc.s(.aea.saec. «ea|c|e.arae:aa(eea(:ac.e(.ea«.(a(aese ei
(ae Origin. 1aas . Ce:(a.a|v (ae ma(aema(.e.aa (ee «. | | ae( (a:a (e
a.s(e:.ea|se.eaee(e|e(aaea(a|ea((ae(:a(aeima(aema(.ea|(aee:. es
i(«. ||ae(eeea:(ea.m(e:e|a(e(aea.s(e:.ea|ceve|eomea(eima(ae·
ma(.ea| :eo:esea(a(.eas (ae Ce:maa aac r:eaea ec.(.eas acc aac
]acemea(si«.(a(aeeaes(.eaei(:a(a . rxs. o 1 26) . O:aea.a. a(
(ae eac eie:.(.e.z. ae aa emo.:.e.s((aee:v ei(ae e:. e.aeieeeme(:v
ias(eac ei oa. | eseoa.z.ae aac osveae|ee.z.ae a|ea( eeeme(:.ea|
(aeaea(aac.a(a.(.eai:emaaea(s.ce s(aacoe.a( .«e saea|cea(e:v.·
(a||v.a(e(aeseae(.v.(.es. aac(a:eaeac.:ee(aaa|vsesceie:m.ae(ae.:
. mmaaea(sease.i(mav«e|||e(aa(«eaave.aae:.(ecc.soes. (.easie:
eeea.(.eai:em (ae eeea.(.easeioas(eeae:a(.eas . but for the question
concering the sense and value of what we cognize, the history of this
heritage is as indif erent as is that ofour gold currency to its real value "
(Ideas 1, §25 , oo. 85-86 mec.ieci .ea:emoaas.s· .
´` Cf. in particular Ideas I, § 1 , n. I , p. 45, and p. 46, where both hi storical origin and
hi story as a human science are excluded. Conceri ng the human sciences, the question is
"provi si onally" lef open whether they are "natural sciences or . . . sciences of an
essentially new type. "
Of course, i t i s as facts and not as norms that the hi storical gIvens are pa­
renthesized. I n asking hi mself, ' which sciences' " can phenomenology " ' draw from' "
i nsofar as phenomenology is itself "a science of ' origins, ' " and what sciences must i t
. . ' not depend on: " Husser! writes: "I n the frst place i t goes without saying that wi th
the suspending of the natural world, physical and psychological, all individual objecti vi ­
ties whi ch are constituted through the functional acti vi ti es of consciousness in valuation
and i n practice are suspended-all varieties of cultural expression, works of the technical
and of the fi ne arts, of the sciences also (so far as we accept them as cultural facts and
not as validity-systems) [our emphasi s] , aesthetic and practical values ofe very shape and
form. Natural in the same sense are al so reali ties of such kinds of state, moral custom,
law, religion. Therewith all the natural and human sciences, with the entire knowledge
they have accumulated, undergo suspension as sciences which require for their develop­
ment the natural standpoint" (Ideas I, §56, p. 1 55 [modifi ed]) .
``´ Cf. the defnitions of hi story as an empirical human science in "PRS , " in particular
pp. 1 24-26.
I

44
Jacques Derrid
1aeeea(.aa.(vaaceeae:eaeeei(aesee|se:va(.easa:e(:a|v:ema:|·
a||e.i:s(. iae(aa|a.s(e:vmas(|e:eaaeec.ae:ce:(e:esoee(aacsae«
(aeae:ma(.ve.aceoeaceaeeei(ae. cea| e|]ee(.a. (s e«a:.ea(� (aea
aacea|v(aea.|v(aasave. c.aea||a.s(e:.e. s(e:|ee.e.s(eeaias.ea. .a
e:ce:(e :esoee(aac sae« (ae aa.eaea. s(e:.e.(v ei(ae .cea| e|]ee(
.(se|i.1aa(. s«av(aesei:s(:eaae(.easeiiae(aa|a.s(e:v«.||aeve:|e
:emevec.a(aeo·/o/»-evea|essse(aaae|se«ae:e
1a.s .s |eeaase ra. |eseoav as x.ee:eas se.eaee «as eeaee:aec
«.(a:esoeac. ae(e(ae|.aceia.s(e:.e.sm«a.ea:ecaeecae:m(eiae(.
aacIdeas I, «.(as. (aa(.aeeeeme(:v. aaaesemo|a:viasa.eaameae(ae
oa:e essea(.a| se.eaees s.aeeaeexistential thesis (Daseinsthesis) «as
aeeessa:ve:oe:m.((ec.(aesese.eaees«e:e. mmec.a(e|vi:eeci:ema||
iae(aa|.(v. Ne seas.||eiea:a(.ea.a(ae:ea|«e:|c.
·aeosveae|ee.ea|
esee:.eaee . ae iae(aa| [ evenementiel] eea(ea(aave. as saea. aav . a
s(.(a(.aesease1aeeeeme(:.ea|eidos . s:eeeea.zec. a(aa(.(«. (as(eec
(ae(es(eiaa||ae.aa(.ea.
There are pure sciences of essences, such as pure logic, pure
mathematics, pure time-theor, space-theor, theor of movement, etc.
These, in all their thought-constructions, are free throughout from any
positings of actualfact; or, what comes to the same thing, in them no
experience qua experience, i.e. , qua consciousness that apprehends or
sets up reality or factual existence, can take over the functin of
supplying a logial grounding. Where experience functions in them, it
is not as experience. The geometer who draws his fgure s on the
blackboard produces in so doing strokes that are actually there on a
board that is actually there. But his experience of what he thus
produces, qua experience, afords just as little groundfor his seeing
and thinking of the geometrical essence as does the physical act of
production itself. Whether or not he thereby hallucinates, and whether
instead of actually drawing lines he draws his lines and fgures in a
world of phantasy, does not really matter. The scientic investigator of
Nature behaves quite diff erently. (Ideas I, §7, p. 55 [modied ]; Hus-
serl's emphasis) :n
`Iö
The essential usel essness or the "inadequacy" of sensibl e " i l l ustration" i s already
underscored in the Logical Investigations, tr. J. N. Findl ay, 2 vol s. (New York:
Humanities Press, I 970)-hereafter cited as L/. [ All future references wi11 l i st the vol ume
number, the i nvestigation number or Prologomena, the s ection number, and the page:
e. g. , L/, I , I , § 1 8 , pp. 301 -02 means the frst volume, First Investigation,
.
etc. ��uss
.
erl
does this i n a passage (LI, 1, I , § 1 8 , pp. 301 -02) where he recalls the Cartesian dl stmctlon
between imaginatio and intellectio concerning the chiliagon and very preci sel y an­
nounces the theory of geometrical " idealization" that he wil l maintain in the Origin.
`I ¯
Thi s autonomy of mathematical truth compared to perception and natural reality (on
which mathematical truth could not be based) is described here only in a negative way.
Non-dependence is what is stressed. The positive ground of truth is not i nvestigated for
45
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr

ue

:e (aeavoe(aes.seiaa||ae. aa(.ea (a|es ao (ae :e| eass.eaec. .a
e. ce(.. ce(e:m.aa(. ea. |e ãe(.ea .a eeae:a| "the vital element ofphe­
nomenology" (Ideas /, §70, o 1 84 mec. ãeci· na(.iaa| |ae.aa|.eacees
ae(aace:m.ae (aeeidos ei(ae eeas(.(a(ec . cea| e|]ee( .|eeaase (ae
eidos .aeeae:a|aac (ae .cea|e|]ee(.a oa:(.ea|a:a:e .::ea| . (aeaea
ae(oaaa|asv:ea|.(.es-vea.iaa||ae. aa(.ea:evea|s(aemassaea· . .i.
ea(

aeo(ae:aaac

(aeeidos aac(ae.cea|e|]ee(ceae(o:ees.s(eve:v
sa|]ee(.veae(.asmaeeavea(.eaa|ir|a(ea. sm, .i(aea(aevaaveaa. s·
�e:v.(aevmas(|e:e|a(ec(e.. e .(aevmas(|ee:. me:c.a||ve:eaacec
m

(ae e:e(e. cea|. za(. eas |asec ea (ae sa|s(:a(e eiaa ae(aa| | v ee:-
�e. ve� :ea|«e:|cua((aevmas(ce(a. s(a:eaea(aee|emea(eiaae:.e-
ma|a.s(e:v

�tself. S
.
tarting from an anal ysi s of the mathematical " phenomenon: ' or in order to better
Isolate ItS "sense, " one simpl y reduces what is i ndicated in this sense as what cannot
presently be
.
retained by vi rtue of this gound. Husserl measures the eidetic intangibil ity
of mathematIcal sense by hallucination. In the Theaetetus ( 1 90b) , Plato had recourse to
dream. Huss�r\ ' s devel
.
opment is al so situated on the same plane and dons the same style
as the �arteslan anal YSI S before the hypothesi s of the Evi l Demon i n the First Meditation:
"At thl
.
s rate we might be justified in concl udi ng that . . . arithmetic, geometry, and so
on, whIch treat onl y of the simplest and most general subject-matter, and are i ndiferent
whether i t exi sts i n nature or not, have an el ement of i ndubi table certainty. Whether I am
awake
.
or asle

p, two and three add up to fve, and a square has onl y four sides; and it
see�s ImpOSSIble for
.
such obvious truths to fall under a suspicion of being fal se" [par. 7:
ET: In Descartes: Phi losophical Writings, tr. El i zabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach
(New York: Bobbs-Merri l l , 1 97 1 ), p. 63] .
For Descartes, only after this phenomenology of mathematical evidence and with the
hypothesi s of the Evil Demon wi l l the critical or juridical question be posed of the ground
that guarantees the truth of naive evidence. The description i tsel f and the "natural "
val i dity of t�is tru
.
th , moreover, wi l l never be put i nto question on their own specific
level . The pn�ordlal �round of these constituted truths, whose mode of appearing is thus
clearly recogmzed, WIll be delegated to a veracious God who i s al so the creator of eternal
�rut�s .
.
Husserl . afe� an analogous descriptive stage, will investigate this in primally
mstttutmg acts ( Urstiftung) , themsel ves hi storical. In this respect, Descartes' God, like
�?at of the gre
.
at �� assic rational i sts, woul d only be the name given to a hidden hi story and
woul� funct� on as the necessary reduction of empi rical hi story and the natural world . a
reductIon which pertains to the sense of these sciences.
But we wi l l see that, despite thi s extraordinary revolution which grounds the absolute
a�d eteral truth without the aid of God or infnite Reason, and which seems thus to
dl sc
.
l o
.
se (and
.
�e�escend toward) a primordial l y i nst ituted fnitude while completel y
a»OIdmg �mpl ncl sm, Husserl i s less di stant from Descartes than it seems. Thi s hidden
aIst�ry WIll take its sense from an i nfnite Tel os that Husserl will not hesitate to call God
m hiS
.
l ast unp�b
.
l i she
.
d writings. It is true that this i nfnite, which i s always already at
work
.
I n the ongms, IS not a positive and actual i nfnite. It i s given as an I dea i n the
KantJan sense, as a r
.
egulative .. indefnite" whose negativity gives up i ts rights to history.
�ot enl y
.
th�
,
moraltty but also the historicity of truth itself woul d here prevent thi s
f�lslfcatton of the actual infnite i nto an indefnite or an ad infnitum, a fal sifcation of
whi ch Hegel accused Kant and Fichte.
46
Jacques Derrid
ua||ae.aa(.ea. (aea. .s (:a(a s aeeemo|.eeea|v .a a s(

(.e «

e:|c ei
eeas(.(a(ecs.ea.iea(.eas 1eo:eeeec(e(aee:eaacaacoome:c.a|eea·
s(.(a(.eaei(:a(a. «e mas( :e(a:a. s(a:(.aei:em(ae :ea|«e:| c.

(e a
e:ea(.veesoe:.eaee Ðvea «e:e .( aa.eae aac |a:. ec.(a. sesoeneaee
:ema. as. ce]a:eas«e||asceiae(e.i:s(we:eeeea.ze.(�ea. (�a(!e:
(aesoae:eeisease.(ae(:aeeea(:a:veia

| | ae. aa(.ea

.aac.maema�.

a
.aeeae:a|·.sae(c.:ee(|voe:eeo(.ea.|a(a. s(e:v�:. .ivea
+

:eie:..(.s
(ae eease.easaesseia.s(e:.e.(vaac (ae :ea«a|emaeeieoems .
1aasea|v a( (ae | eve| aac oe.a(ma:|ec |vIdeas I cee

uasse:|
:e]e.a kaa( s .ac.ae:eaee (e a |.ac eia.s(e:v (a�( «ea|c s.mo|v |e
es(:.as.e aacemo.:.ea| ~| se. as seeaas uesse:|s aeeeaa(|e

emes
eeaeeoec«.(a(aeeeaes.seieeeme(:v aac ee((.ae|evea� (a.

s o:e·
|. m. aa:v s(aee. «e m.ea( esoee( (e see a.m :emeve (ae e.ce(..

ac
(:aaseeacea(a|:ecae(.easoa:e|vaacs.mc|v. aac:e(ao(eaeeas(.(a·
(.ve a.s(e:v. aa. s(e:v . a«a.ea(ae eeas. ce:a(.eaeiiae�s (aems�| ves
«ea|c|eeeme. ac.soeasa||e.|eeaaseae:eie:(aei:s((.me.assmea·
|a:a.s(e:.ea|e:.e. a. (ae. as(.(a(.aeiae(«ea|c |e.::eo|aeea||e. (ae:e·
ie:e invariable. 1a.s .ava:.aaeeei(ae iae(.ei«aa(eaa aeve:|ere­
peated assaea·«ea|cce]a:ee

::v ev

e:. (s

e.ce(.e � ava:.aaee�

aa(
eaa|erepeated ve| aa(a:.|vaacmceim(e|v·m(eaa.s(e:vei

:�
e·�s
u.s(e:vas .as(.(a(.ve«ea|c|e(aeo:eiea
�c

a:

a«�e:esease. s mc. s·
see. a||ei:em |e.ae. «ae:e (aeceiae(e .smc.ssee.a||e i:em�ae �e
]a:e 1aeae(.eaeie:.e. ae:eeaes.seea|cae|eaee:|e:eeeemzecm
'I×
The interpretation of Trfm-Duc-Thao, Phenomenologie et materialisme di

le

tique
( 1 95 1 ; rpt. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1 97 1 ) , i s strongly oriented t�ward thIs kmd �f
a conclusion. At the end of Husser\ ' s i ti nerary, the return to the " 'technical and economic
forms of production" (namel y, i n Husserlian langu�ge, �he retur to real , factual,
.
and
extri nsi c causality outside of every reduction) seems mevI
.
table to that a�t�or, who thmk�
Husserl was himself "obscurely" resigned to thi s at the tme of The Orzgm ofG

0
m
etr.
" Moreover, this i s what Husserl was obscurely presenting when he
.
was search 109 10 the
famous fragment on The Origin of Geometr to ground geo�etncal truth on hum�n
praxis " (p. 220). "The phenomenological explication is thus onented towards determm-
i ng the actual conditions in which truth is engendered" (p. 2 2 1 ) .
.
Husserl ' s reduction never had the sense (quite the contrary) of a negatIon-f �n
ignorance or a forgetfulness that woul d ' ' leave" the real conditions of sense and factualIty
in general in order to " come back" or not, in order to "pass on"
.
or not, to th�
.
real
anal ysis [of what i s] (for sense is nothing

ther thQ1

the se�se of realIty o
,
� of fa��ual It�).
Otherwise, his reduction mi ght seem vam and dIssembl Ing, and the r�tu� to
.
an
empiricist histori ci sm, fatal . That does not appear to be the case, since, WIth dl �lectIcal
material ism "we fnd oursel ves on a plane subsequent {posterieur] to the reductIOn, the
latter havin� suppressed the abstract conception of nature but �ot
.
t�e
,
�ctually real �ature
which implies in its development the whole movement of subjectiVity (the author s em-
phasis; pp. 227-28).
47
Intrduction to the Origin of Geometry
(ae oa:e oaeaemeae|ee.ea| sease (aa( uasse:| se ceeeec|v
c.s(.aea.saeco:¯
neeaase. ie:uasse:| . .( aas(ae eaa:ae(e:.s(.e«a.eaceiaesiae(-
aame| v. s.aea|a:aac emo.:.ea|es.s(eaee. (ae .::ecae.|.|.(v eiahere
and »o«-(ae (e(a| iae( ma:|.aeeeeme(:v s es(a|| . samea( «ea|c |e
.ava:.a||ei aceec.uasse:|savs(aa((aeaosa:eeeieeeme(:v.a(e:es(s
a.mae:e. aseia:as.(aac(a|eao|aeeeaee(dereinst), ie:(aei:s(
(.me(erstmalig), s(a:(.aei:ema"frst aeea.s.(.ea(aus einem ersten
Erwerben) ( 1 58-59) . na( «aa( aa(ae:. zec (ae essea(.a| :eac.aeof aac
within eeas(.(a(eceeeme(:v«as(aeoess.|.|.(vei. mae. aa(. ve| vva:v.ae
(aeaa(a:a|here and now ei(aeiea:ee:(aeosveae|ee.ea|esoe:.eaeeei
(aeeeeme(e:«ae. as«eaaveseea.«asae(.(s. as(.(a(e:ue:e .ea(ae
eea(:a:v.(aehere and now ei(ae i:s((.me¯. s. as(.(a(.veaace:ea(. ve
i s (a.sesoe:.eaee .aa.eaeei. (s|.ac .ae(as.aea|a:iae(-eaeie:«a.ea
«esaea|cae(|ea||e(esa|s(.(a(eaae(ae:iae(asaaesamo|e.ae:ce:
(ecee.oae:.(sesseaee:
i s(a. s(esav(aa((a.s.aseoa:a|.|.(veiiae(aacsease.a(aeeaeaess
eiaa.as(.(a(.aeae(o:ee|acesaeeessie:oaeaemeae|eev(ea| |a. s(e:v
aac(e(aeoa:eeidos eiaie:eve:sa|me:eece:.e.a:
Ne(a( a| | 1ae .ac.ssee.a|. |.(v. (se|iaas a:.ee:eas| vce(e:m. aa||e
oaeaemeae|ee.ea| sease 1ae .mae.aa:v va:.a(.ea ei s(a(.e oae·
aemeae|eev s.mo|v saooesec a (voe ei :ecae(.ea «aese s(v|e «.||
aave(e|e:eae«ec. aaa.s(e:.ea|oaeaemeae|eev.1aee. ce(.easoee(ei
(a. s:ecae(.ea«as(aeiteration eiaaeema s.aee(aeeidos . seeas(.(a(ec
aace|]ee(.ve. (ae se:.es eiae(s«a.ea.a(eacec .(eea|cae(|a(. a·
ceia.(e| v:es(e:e(ae. cea|.cea(.(veiasease«a.ea«asae(e|sea:ec
|vaava.s(e:.ea|eoae.(v.aac.(«ea|cea|v|eaeaes(.eaeie|a:.iv.ae.
. se|a(.ae.aacce(e:m. a.ae.(sev.ceaee..ava:.aaee.aace|]ee(.ve.ace·
oeaceaee 1aea.s(e:.ea|:ecae(.ea. «a.eaa| seeoe:a(es|vva:. a(.ea.
«. | | |e reactivating aacaee(.e. i as(eac ei:eoea(.ae (ae eeas(. (a(ec
seaseeiaa.cea|e|]ee(. eae«.||aave(e:ea«a|ea(aeceoeaceaeeei
´´ Opening Ideas I (Chapter 1 , § l a, p. 45, passage already ci ted), this defnition of
phenomenological origin ( in disti nction to genesis in the worldly human and natural
sciences) was already clearly specifi ed i n the LI, I , Prol. , §67, pp. 237-38; i n The
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. Martin Heidegger, tf. James S.
Churchill ( Bloomington, I nd. : I ndiana University Press, 1 97 1 ) , §2, pp. 27-28; and i n
"PRS," pp. 1 1 5-1 6. This di stinction, whi ch Husserl wi l l always j udge as deci sive, wil l
sti l l be underscored qui te frequently i n Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a
Genealogy of Logic, tf. from rev. ed. of Landgebe by Jaes S. Churchi ll and Karl
Ameriks ( Evanston: Northwestern Uni versity Press, 1 973)-hereafer cited as E­
paricularly § 1 , p. 1 1 ; i n FTL, in parti cular § 1 02, p. 269; i n the eM, §37, pp. 75-76; and of
course in the Origin.
48
Jacques Derrid
sease«.(a:esoee((eaa.aaaea:a|aac. as(.(a(.»eae(eea�ea|ec

aace:
seeeaca:v oass.».(.es aac .aia.(e sec. ¬ea(a(.ea·a on¬e:

c.a| �e(
«a.ea e:ea(ec (ae e|]ee( «aese eidos .s ce(e:¬.aec|v (ae .(e:a(.»e
:ecae(.ea ue:eaea.a«ea:eee.ae(e see(aa((ae:e. saes.¬o|e:e·
soease(e(aeeaes(.eaei(aeo:.e:.(veieae:ecae(.eae»e:aae(ae:

1ae s.aea|a:.(v ei(ae .a»a:.a||efrst time a|:eacv aasa aeeess.(v
«aesee.ce(.eiaac. s.aceec:a(ae:ee¬o|es.
First, (|e:e. s aaessence-of-the-frst-time . aeeae:a| .anErstmalig�eit, ·
aa. aaaea:a|s.ea.iea(.ea(aa(.sa|«avs:eo:ecae.||e. «aa(e»e:.(sce
iae(e esa¬o|e ¬av |e waa(e»e: «e:e (ae e¬o.:.ea| eea(ea( ei(ae
e:.e.a..(. saoec.e(.ea| |vaacao:.e:.aeees sa:v(aa(eee¬e�:vaas

aac
aae:.e.aaac(aas aasaooea:ecai:s((.¬e .i cea|eee¬e(nea|e|·ee(s
eaaae(aa»e(ae.:e:.e.aa|o|aee.ase¬etopos ouranios. uas�e:|a|:eacv
e¬oaas.zec (a.s . a(aeLogical Investigations, «ae:e ae

c. seasseca

||
. cea|s.ea.iea(.easaace|]ee(s. · ' 1ae. :a.s(e:.�.(v.

(�ea. .s

eaeei(ae.:
e.ce(.eee¬oeaea(s. aac(ae:e. saeeeae:e(ea.s(eoe. (v:a.�acees�e(
aeeessa:.| v. ¬o|. ea(e. a. (se|i(ae:eie:eaee(eaaEr

tmaltgkelf. wesa.c.
a¬e¬ea(aee.(aa(.(«ea|c|e. ¬oess.||e(eSa|s(¡(a(eanothe� iae(ie:
(aeaa. eaeiae(ei(aefrst time. uacea|(ec| v na(ea|v.iother .s¬�aa(
(eeaa|.iv esseaee aacae( e¬o.:.ea| es. s(e�eeas sa�a. re:� ameae
iae(a|:eacvaas.(sesseaeeasaa.eaeiae(wa..a.|v�em� ae(�mee(ae:
(aaa(aeiae(.(se|i.(a. s.s(ae(aes. sei(aeaea·ie(. »e.::eaa(v?i(ae
esseaee· ..sae((aeiae(aa| .(veiiae(|a((aeseaseei iae(-(a�(«�(aea(
«a.ea(aeiae(eea|c ae(aooea:aace.»e:.se(eaavce(e:¬m�(.eae:
c.seea:se . ~| :eacv. «aeauasse:|«:e(e. a ra.|eseoavasx. ee:e�s
se.eaee(aa(. ie:(aeoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|sa|sa¬o(.eaì .�aes. a�a| a� . s
e(e:aa||v (aeapeiron. raeae¬eae|eev eaa:eeeea.ze w.(a ?|·ee(. »e
»a|.c.(v ea| vesseaeesaacessea(.a|:e|a(.eas . o 1 1 6 ¬ec¡i�cì· . ae
e».cea(|vaace:s(eec|vs.aea|a:.(vea|v(aeeaeaesseiiae(�a.(soa:e
iae(aa|.(v aac ae( (aa( ei (ae e. ce(.e s.aea| a:.(. esceiaec mIde

s I
(§§ 1 1 , 1 4, 1 5 .oo62-63 aac66-69) asa|(.¬a(e¬a(e:.a|esseaeeswa..a.
`´ In its substantive form, this notion does not seem to have been employed b� Husserl
himself. It is found i n place of the adverbial expression erstmalig in the transcnpt of the
Origin published by Fink in Revue Internationale de Philosophie ( 1 939), pp. 203-225:
Fink, who also italicizes erstmalig (p. 207), speaks of Erstamaligke�tsmo�us [po 208] and
thus gives a thematic value to a sigifcation aimed at by a profound mtentIon of Husserl .
`´ Cf. in particular I , 1 , § 3 1 , p. 330. There Husserl completely condem�s i
,
n a �latonic
manner those who, like the "sons of the earth, " can "understand by ' bemg (Sem) �nlY
I b · "
.
e "being" in the world of natural reality, and he simultaneously rejects rea emg, ¡ . . .
h the hypothesis of the intelligible heaven. " They [the significat�on�] are not for t a� reas�n
objects which, though existing nowhere in the world, have bemg m a top�� ouramos or U
a divine mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization would b absurd.
49
I ntroductin to the Origin of Geometry
as x.eeea:ae(es. ese|aceea|ve¬o. :.ea|. ac. ».caa| .(v .eai v iae(aa| ·
.(v ` (Idees I, o. 239, a 1 ei(: · . . e .(aetode ti ei|:a(ees.s(eaee 1ae
o:e||e¬eiceoeaceaeee:.aceoeaceaee. ei(ae a|s(:ae(e:eeae:e(e
eaa:ae(e:ei(aesee.ce(.es..aa|a:.(. es . oesec. aIdeas I i:e¬(aeae(.eas
ei(ae1a.:ciee.ea|i a»es(.ea(.ea..s:ea||v¬e:ec.meaa(ese| »e«aea
.(eeaee:asa. s(e:.ea|s.aea|a:.(.es . «aesee¬o.:.ea|).:·. sae»e:. ¬¬e·
c.a(e|v o:esea( . i( eea|c |e sa.c (aa( (ae e.ce(.e oaeae¬eae|eev ei
a.s(e:v. aa».ae(e(:ea(ea|vs.aea|a:. (.esassaea . .s.aeaesease(ae
¬es(ceoeacea(aac(ae¬es(a|s(:ae(eise.eaees . na(. a»e:se| v. s. aee
ee:(a.aaeae¬o.:.ea|s.aea|a:.(.es. asuasse:|savs. eaa|eeeas. ce:ec.a
ee:(a.a:esoee(sas(ae¬es(eeae:e(eaac¬es(.aceoeacea( .s.aee(ae
s.aea|a:.(.es ei e:.e.as a:e (aese ei .as(.(a(.ae ae(s ei e»e:v .cea|
s.ea.iea(.ea aac. .a oa:(.ea|a:. ei (ae oess.|.|.(.eseise.eaee aac ei
oa.|eseoav. (aea (ae.:a. s(e:v .s (ae ¬es(.aceoeacea(. (ae ¬es(eea·
e:e(e.aac(aei:s(eise. eaees
i aceec.(ae(ae¬eeie. ce(.es.aea|a:.(.es. sa|:eacv(.es| . saeaeaea. a
Ideas I. ue«e»e:. s.aee(aee|ae(ae:e. s(ae. ¬¬aaea(| .»ecesoe:.eaee
e:(aeseas.||e(a.aeoe:ee.»ecoriginaliter, s. aea|a:iae(aa| .(v.sa|«avs
o:esea( . a|(aeaea :ecaeec. (e ea.ce aac eea(:e| (ae .a(a.(.ea ei(ae
a|(. ¬a(e¬a(e:.a|esseaee. na( as seea as a. s(e:.ea|c. s(aaee .s . a(e:·
oesec. (ae . a»es(.ea(.eaeie:.e. asae |eaee:o:eeeecs .a (a.s «av ~
cee(:.aeeitradition as(aee(ae:eia. s(e:.ea|oe:eeo(.ea(aea|eee¬es
aeeessa:v .(. sa((aeeea(e:eiThe Origin of Geometr.
Oa|vaace:(aeseeeac.(.easeaauasse:|«:.(e ea:. a(e:es(saa|||e
(ae. aea.:v|aes.a(e(ae ¬es(e:.e.aa| sease .a «a.ea eee¬e(:veaee
a:ese.«aso:esea(as(ae(:ac.(.eaei¬. ||eaa.a . «e.aea. :e.a(e(aa(
sease.a«a.ea.(aooea:ec.aa. s(e:vie:(aei:s((. ¬e»which it must
have appeared ea:e¬oaas. sì .e»ea(aeaea«esae«ae(a.aeei(aei:s(
e:ea(e:saaca:eae(e»eaass. aeai(e:(ae¬ ( 1 58 ¬ec.iecì· .
ue:e.(ae"in which it must have appeared" e|ea:|v:e»ea| suasse:| s
.a(ea(. eaaacsa¬sao(aeseaseei e»e:v:ecae(. ea1a. s"must " .aa»e
aooea:ec·¬a:|s(aeaeeess.(vae«:eeeea.zecaac(.¬e| ess| vass.eaec
(eaoas(iae(eiaae.ce(.eo:e· se:.o(.eaaaceiaaao:.e:.ae:¬ i eaa
s(a(e (a.s »a|ae ei aeeess.(v .aceoeacea(|v ei a|| iae(aa| eeea.(.ea .
He:ee»e:. (a.s .s a cea||e aeeess.(v .( .s (aa( ei a Quod aac a
Quomodo, aaeeess.(v eihaving had a a.s(e:.ea|origin aaceiaa».ae
aacsuch aae:.e.a.saeaaseaseeie:.e. a. na(aa.::ecae.||ea.s(e:.e. (v
.s:eeeea. zec.a(aa((a.s must" .saaaeaaeecea|vafter (aeiae(ei(ae
e»ea( .i eea|cae(ceiae(aeaeeessa:vseaseaac(aeaeeess.(vei(ae
�� Thi s notion of "must , " of apriori requi si te, concerning H past is frequently util ized i n
the Origin. It marks the possibility of a recurrent structural determination i n the absence
50
Jacques Derrid
e:.e.a|eie:eeeeme(:v«asin fact |eoaac|eie:e.(aac.a iae(|eea
e.vea(eme. ~|se|a(e|vi:ee«.(a:esoee((e«aa|.(eeveos. (ae|a«·
ia| aesseisease. sae(a.ae.a.(se|i
~|se. aacsecond, «aa(eve:in fact (aei:s(o:ecaeece:c.seeve:ec
eeeme(:.ea|. cea|.(.es«e:e . .(.sa priori aeeessa:v(aa((aevie||e«ec
i:em ase:(eiaea·eeeme(:v. (aa((aev so:aae i:em(ae se.| eio:e·
eeeme(:.ea|esoe:.eaee~oaeaemeae|eevei(aeesoe:.eaee.soess.||e
(aaa|s(ea:ecae(.eaaac(eaaaoo:eo:.a(ece·sec. mea(a(.ea
Third, aac | aa| |v. «aeeve:in fact (ae | :s( eeeme(e:s «e:e . aac
«aa(eve:in fact (aeemo. :.ea| eea(ea(ei(ae.:ae(s«as . .(. sa pror
aeeessa:v (aa( (ae es(a||.sa.ae ees(a:es aac a sease . saea (aa(
eeeme(:v . ssaeci:em(aemwith the sense as we now know it. re:. ei
eea:se . (ae :eae(.va(.ae:ecae(.ea saooeses(ae.(e:a(.ve:ecae(.eaei
(aes(a(.eaacs(:ae(a:a|aaa| vs. s.«a.ea(eaeaesa s eaeeaacie:a||«aa(
(ae eeeme(:.ea| oaeaemeaea .s aac «aea .(s oess.|.| . (v .s eeas(.·
(a(ec. 1a.smeaas-|vaaeeess.(v«a.ea.sae|ess(aaaaaaee.cea(a|
aaces(e:.e:ia(e-(aa(imas(s(a:(«.(a:eacv·maceeeeme(:v.saeaas
.( . s ae« . ae. :ea|a(.ea aac «a.eai eaa a|«avs oaeaemeae|ee.ea||v
:eac..ae:ce:(eee|ae|(a:eaea. (aaceaes(.ea(aeseaseei.(se:.e. a.
1aas . |e(a (aaa|s (e aac ceso.(e (ae sec.mea(a(.eas . i eaa:es(e:e
a.s(e:v(e.(s(:ac.(.eaa|c.aoaaae.(v.uasse:|ae:esoea|seiRuckfrage,
aae(.eaaecea|(ea::ea(eaeaea .|a(«a.eaae«(a|eseaasaa:oaac
o:ee.se sease. weaave(:aas|a(ec. (|vretur inquir (question en re­
tour) . i.|e. (sCe:maasvaeavm.:e(a:a.aea.:v.aacquestion en retour
as«e| |· .sma:|ec|v(aeoes(a|aaceo.s(e|a:v:eie:eaeee::eseaaaee
eiaeemmaa.ea(.eai:emac. s(aaee i.|eRuckfrage, :e(a:a. aea. :v.s
as|ec ea (ae |as.s eia i:s( oes(.ae. r:em a :eee.vec aac already
:eaca||edocument, (aeoess.|.|.(v.seae:ecmeeias|.aeaea.a.aacin
return, a|ea((aeo:. me:c.a|aaciaa| .a(ea(.eaei«aa(aas|eeae. vea
me|v(:ac.(.ea.1ae|a((e:.«a.ea. seo|vmec.aev.(se|iaaceoeaaess(e
a(e|eeemmaa.ea(.ea. aeeae:a| .. s(aea.asuasse:|savs. eoea. (e
eea(. aaec.aea.:v ( 1 58) .
1aeseaaa|ee.es. (aeme(aoae:.ea|ieeaseiea:(es(. eeai:ma(«aa(
oe.a(.s:eea. :ec(ae"zigzag" «aveio:eeeec.ae-ao:eeeca:e(aa((ae
of every material determi nati on. And if thi s apriori normativity of hi story is recognized
starting from the fact , after the fact, thi s after i s not the i ndication of a dependence. The
fact does not teach us through its factual content but as an example. It i s due to thi s
qfters own specifc character, in the necessity of preserving transcendence or reduced
factuality as clue , that the parti cular hi storicity of phenomenological di scourse is
announced.
51
Introduction to the Origin ofGeometry
Crisis o:eoesesas ase:(eiaeeessa:v "circle "":l aac«a.e|.s ea|v(|e
oa:eie:meieve:va.s(e:.ea|esoe:.eaee
xe(a:a. aea. :v. (ae:eae(.eaa:vaac(ae:eie:e:eve| a(.eaa:vmeaea(
ei (a. s .a(e:o|av ( Wechselspiel) , «ea|c |e . mo:ae(.ea|| e .ieeeme(:v
«e:e essea(.a||v seme(a.ae «a.ea eea(.aaa||v e.:ea| a(ec as eemmea
ee.a.a(aeva|.c.(vei.cea|.(v. tacea|(-c|v.aeme:e(aaa(ae|. s(e:v
ei.(s(:aasm.ss.eae:eaacs(aeva|aeeiee|c.·eaaaav«e:c|va.s(e:v
e.ve(ae seaseei(a.se.:ea|a(.eaaseemmeaee.a. s.aee . ea (ae eea·
(:a:v. a. s(e:v saooeses. ( xa(ae:. (aema.a(eaaaeeei(a.se. :ea|a(.ea
oe:m.(s(aeaea(:a| .za(.eaei«e:|c|va.s(e:v. Nea(:a| . za(.ea(aeaeoeas
(aesoaeeie:aa.a(ea(.eaa|aac. a(:.as.ea.s(e:vei(a. sve:ve.:ea|a(.ea
aacoe:m.(s(aeeemo:eaeas.eaeiae«a(:ac(.eaei(:a(a.soess. ||e.a
eeae:a| . iasae:(.«aa(seems(e|eeia(mes(. moe:(aaee(euasse:|.s
asmaeaaaeoe:a(.ea.:eae(.va(.ea.(se|ias(aea|.|.(v(eeoeaaa.ccea
a.s(e:.ea| ie|c· as (ae aa(a:e ei(aa( ie|c .(se|i.as(ae oess.|.|.(v ei
seme(a.ae| .|e:eae(.va(.ea·
1aas ea|vaace:(aeeeve:eis(a(.eoaeaemeae|eev s :ecae(.easeaa
«ema|ee(ae:.aia.(e|vme:e sa|(|eaacaaza:ceas :ecae(.eas. «a.ea
v.e|c |e(a (ae s.aea|a: esseaees ei . as(.(a(.ve ae(s aac. .a (ae.:
esemo|a:v«e|.(ae«ae|eseaseeiaaeoeaa. s(e:v.aeeae:a| w.(aea(
(aeWechselspiel ei(a.s cea||e:ecae(.ea. (ae oaeaemeae|eev eia.s·
(e:.e.(v«ea|c|eaaese:e.se. avaa.(v.as«ea|c|ea||oaeaemeae|eev.
ii«e(a|eie:e:aa(ec(aeoa.|eseoa.ea|aeaseaseeiaoa:e|vemo.:.ea|
a. s(e:vaac(ae. moe(eaeeeiaaaa.s(e:.ea|:a(.eaa| .sm.(aea«e:ea|.ze
(aese:.easaessei«aa(.sa(s(a|e
III
~||(aeseo:eeaa(.easaavemaceasseas.(.ve(e (aees(:emec.mea|(v
ei (ae (as| 1aas uasse: aace:see:es (ae o:e|.m. aa:v aac eeae:a|
eaa:ae(e:ei(a. smec.(a(.ea. aasea(eaee«a.eaaooea:s|e::e«ec«e:c
` "Thus we fnd oursel ves i n a sort of circle. The understanding of the begi nni ngs i s to
be gained ful l y onl y by starting with science as gi ven i n its present-day form, looking back
at its development. But in the absence of an understanding of the beginnings the
development i s mute as a development ofsense. Thus we have no other choice than to
proceed forward and backward in a ' zigzag' pattern . . . " (§91 , p. 58 [modifed]) .
¯ [ Derrida puts the phrase "pas plus que I ' hi storie de sa transmi ssion ne fonde la
valeur de I ' or" in quotations . I have been unable to locate thi s phrase, and Professor
Derrida himself does not remember from what i t is taken. It might simpl y be an adapta­
tion of the l ast phrase quoted from Ideas I on p. 43 above. ]
I
52
Jacques Derrida
ie: «e:ci:emFormal and Transcendental Logic .i a(:ecae(.ea. o. 6) :
1a. s :e(a:a . aea.:v aaave.ca||v :ema.as «.(a.a (ae soae:e eieea·
e:a|. (.es . |a( . as«esaa| | seeasee.(aesea:eeeae:a| . (.es«a.eaeaa|e
:.ea|veso|.ea(ec . . . " ( 1 58 mec.ieci·
Dea|(|ess. as ao:.e:. ce(e:m.aa(.ea. oaeaemeae|eev «. | | aeve: |e
a||e(eea:.ea(aeseeeae:a| .(.es . «aese.ac.eeaee.sessea(.a| .~ac(aev
«.|| |e :.ea|veso|.ea(ec ea|v .aao:esoee(.ve. :ee.eaa| . aac. .aa
ee:(a.a sease. naive s(v|eei«e:|. sa((a. saa.ve(- «ea|cae |eaee:
aave (ae sease .(asec(e aavebefore (ae sease·.aves(.ea(.eaei(aese
eeae:a|.(.es . asease·.aves(.ea(.ea(aa(uasse:|(e:msae:.(.e. smaac
«a.ea«.||aave a:eea| a(.veaacae:ma(.ve va|aeie:(a. s«e:|. Cea·
(.aaa||vea| | . aeas|ae|(e(aeaaae(.eeco:esaooes.(.easeieve::eea:·
:.aeo:e||ems. sease·.aves(.ea(.ea«. | | |eeoasi:ema|e::a(.ea.ie:ee(·
ia|aess. aac . ::esoeas.|.| .(v. ii se.eaee. «.(a :ac.ea| :esoeas.|. | .(v.
aas :eaeaec cee.s.eas. (aev eaa .mo:ess ea | .ie aa|.(aa| ae:ms as
ve| .(.eaa||ea(s.aso:ece|.aea(ecie:ms«.(a. a«a.ea(ae.ac.v.caa|cee.·
s.easeaea(. aaavease(eeeaiae(aemse| ves. aaceaaeeaiae(aem·
se| vesseia:as(aeseaa.ve:sa|cee. s.easaave|eeemeae(aa| | vaoo:e·
o:.a(ec. re:a:a(.eaa|o:ae(.ee. (aee:vao:.e:.eaa|eea|vace| .m.(.ae
ie:m..(eaaea|vo|aa(ieaees. (aee:ess.aeei«a.ea. ac.ea(esa|sa:c.(v
e:a|e::a(.ea (FTL, o. 6) .
1ae | :s( ei (aese :ac.ea| eeae:a| .(.es .s o:ee.se|v (aa( «a.ea aa·
(ae:. zes(ae:e(a:a.aea.:v. (aeaa.(veieeem
,
(:v s sease .s(aa(eia
(:ac.(.ea. Ceeme(:v s ceve|eomea( .s ahistor ea| v |eeaase .( .s a
a. s(e:v. ue«eve:ia:. (s|a.|c.aeaoo:ee:esses. ae«eve:eeae:eas(ae
o:e| .ie:a(.eaei.(sie:msaacme(ame:oaesesmav|e .(aevceae(ea||
aea.a.a(eeaes(.ea(aeaa.iecseaseei«aa(. .a(a.sceve| eomea( ..s(e
|e(aeaea(eiasthe eeeme(:.ea|se.eaee .1aee:eaacei(a.saa.(v.s(ae
«e:|c .(se|i. ae( as (ae ia.(e (e(a| .(v ei sea(.ea( |e.aes . |a( as (ae
.aia.(e(e(a|.(veioess.||eesoe:.eaees.asoaee.aeeae:a| .1aeaa.(vei
the eeeme(:.ea|se.eaee .«a.ea. sa| se.(seaeaess. . sae(eea| aec(e(ae
svs(ema(.eeeae:eaeeeia eeeme(:v«aeseas.emsa:ea|:eacveeas(.·
(a(ec. .(saa. (v. s(aa(eia(:ac.(.eaa|eeeme(:.ea|sease. aia.(e|veoea
(ea||its own :eve|a(.eas . 1eoese(aeeaes(.eaei(a. s(:ac.(.eaa|aa.(v. s
(eas|eaese|i.ae«. historically, aavea||eeeme(:. es|eea.e:«. | | (aev
|e.eeeme(:.es :
ra:(ae:me:e.(a. saa.(vei eeeme(:v s sease. saeaas . ( . s announced
.a(aeOrigin, . sae(a eeae:a|eeaeeo((aa(. ses(:ae(ec e:a|s(:ae(ec
i:em va:.eas|ae«aeeeme(:. es . Oa(aeeea(:a:v. .(. s(aeo:.me:c. a|
eeae:e(eesseaeeeieeeme(:v(aa(ma|essaeaaeeae:a|.z.aeeoe:a(.ea
oess.||e . Ne:.s(a.ssease·aa.(v(e|e eeaiasec«.(a(aeeeaeeo((aa(
uasse:|in fact ce(e:m.aecas(ae. cea|e:.ea(.aeeeeme(:.ea|o:ae(.ee. a
53
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
eeeme(:v s objective (aema(.eie|c ·1a.seeaeeo(.a|:eacvma:|ec|v
a.s(e:v· .s.as«e|ae«.(aa(eia"defnite" aeme|eevaacaaesaaas·
(. vececae(. v.(v.·s(a:(.aei:emasvs(emeias.ems«a.ea eeve:as a
ma|(.o|.e.(v.eve:vo:eoes.(.ea.sce(e:m.aa||eeither asaaa|v(.eeease·
eaeaeeor asaaa|v(.eeea(:ac.e(.ea. ··1aa(«ea|c|eaaa|(e:aa(.ve«e
eea|cae(ee(|eveac.saeaeeaiceaeec.cae(aave|eae(e«a.(|eie:e
|e.aeeea(:ac.e(ec. .aceec.(s va|ae:a|. |.(vaas|eea«e||sae«a. oa:·
(.ea|a:|v«aea Cece|c. seeve:ec(ae :.ea oess.|.| .(vei"undecidable"
o:eoes.(.eas.a 1 93 1 .
sa(a|| (aeeaes(.easa|ea((aeoess. |.|.(ve:. moess. |. |. (v eima.a·
(a.a. aeuasse:| s cemaacs~e.(ae:asaaessea(.a||v. aaeeess.||e:eea·
| a(.ve.cea|e:asame(aece|ee.ea|:a| eaacae(aa|(eeaa.eae.«a.eaae
| eaee:. aeeae:a|seemsoess.||e·~a:e(aevae(as|eco:ee.se|vwithin
(a.saa.(vei(aeeeeme(:.ee·ma(aema(.ea|ae:.zea.aeeae:a| .«. (a.a(ae
eoeaaa.(veiase.eaee:~ac.(.s«.(a.a(aeae:.zea(aa(uasse:|ae:e
eaes(.eas(aa((aeo:eeeeaoa(.ea«.(acee. ca|. | . (v|e|eaes . | a.(sve:v
aeea(. v.(v. (aeae(.eaei(aeaa·cee.ca||e~aoa:(i:em(aeiae((aa( .(
ea| v aas saea a sease |v seme .::ecae.||e :eie:eaee (e (ae .cea| ei
cee. ca|.| .(v·~a|se :e(a.as a ma(aema(.ea| va|ae ce:.veci:em se¬e
aa.eaesea:eeeiva|aevas(e:(aaa(aeo:e]ee(eidefniteness .(se|i.1a. s
«ae|ece|a(e. sea| vaace:s(aaca||e«. (a. aseme(a.ae|.|ethe eeeme(·
:.ea|e:ma(aema(.ea|se.eaee. «aeseaa.(v.ss(.||to come ea(ae|as.sei
«aa(. saaaeaaeec .a.(se:.e.a. waa(eve:mav|e(ae:esoeaseseea·
(:.|a(ec|v(aeeo. s(eme|ee.s(e:|v(aeae(.v.(vei(aese.ea(.| e.aves·
´�On the two ' ' faces" of science' s thematic and the objecti ve character of the thematic
on which the sci entifc researcher i s excl usi vel y focused in his activity as researcher. cf.
FTL, §9, pp. 36-38. "Thus the geometer . . . wi l l not think of explori ng, besides geomet­
rical shapes, geometrical thi nking" (p. 36) .
``On these questions, cf. i n particular Jean Cavai l l es, Sur f a Logique et f a theorie de fa
science (Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France, 1 947) , pp. 70f. : Tr�m-Duc-Th{,
Phenomenofogie, p. 35 : and especi al l y S. Bachel ard, A Study ofHusserl' s Logic [Part I ,
Ch. 3] . pp. 43-63.
´´ Thi s i deal is cl early defi ned by Husserl , notably in the LI, I , Pro! . , §70, pp. 24 1 and
243, before a section in which the relations of the phi losopher and the mathematician are
defned: in Ideas I. §72, pp. 1 87-88: and in FTL. §3 1 , pp. 94-97.
`' Moreover, that the anal yses of the Origin concerning the synthetic style of mathe­
matical tradition serve as an example of tradition i n general is thus confrmed. The very
movement whi ch enriches sense retains a sedimentary reference to the antecedent sense
at the bottom of the new sense and cannot di spense with i t . The intention which grasps
the new sense is original i nsofar as the prior project stil l remains and the i ntention wi l l
si mpl y not "gi ve way" to i t. Thus, undecidabi l i ty has a revolutionary and di sconcerti ng
sense, i t i s itsel onl y if i t remains essentially and intrinsically haunted i n its sense of
origin by the te/os of decidabi l i ty-whose di sruption i t marks.
54
Jacques Derrid
(.ea(e:(e(aese.moe:(aa(.a(:a·ma(aema(.ea|eaes(.easeiceia.(eaess
aac eemo|e(eaess. (aev eaa ea|v|e.a(ee:a(ec. a(e (a.saa. (v ei(ae
ma(aema(.ea|(:ac.(.ea«a.ea.seaes(.eaec. a(aeOrigin. ~ac(aev«. ||
aeve:eeaeeo. .a (ae e|]ee(.ve (aema(.e soae:e eise.eaee «ae:e
(aevmas(exe|as.ve|v:ema.a. aav(a.ae|a((ae ce(e:m.aecaa(a:e ei
(aeax.ema(.esvs(emsaacei(aececae(.ve.a(e:eeaaee(.eas(aa((aev
cee:ceae(aa(ae:.ze sa((|ee|·ee(.ve(aema(.eie|ceima(aema(.es
mas(a|:eacv|eeeas(.(a(ec.a.(sma(aema(.ea|sease ..ae:ce:ie:(ae
va|aeseieeaseeaeaee aac. aeeas.s(eaev(e|e:eace:eco:e||ema(.e.
aac .a e:ce:(e|ea||e(esav.aea.as((ae e|ass.eam:ma(.easeiuas·
se:| . "tertium datur. " ·
Ceaseeaea(|v.. i(aee:.e.aeima(aema(.esaac(aeaa.(vei.(ssease
«e:e .auasse:| s eves essea(.a||v(.ec(e (a. s.cea|eiexaaas(.vece·
cae(.v.(v.aacevea .i(aev«e:e .cea(.ea|«.(a(a.s. cea| .(aeOrigin' s
eaes(.ea«ea|c|e(a.a(eca((aeea(se(|vaee:(a.aa.s(e:.ea|:e|a(. v. (v.
aema((e:«aa(uas se:|a. mse|imav|ave(aeaea(a|ea((a. s:e|a(.v.(v
aacceso.(e«aa(eve:.a(e:es(.(mavs(.||ae|cassae| iae(ae:«e:cs.
.i(aeo:.me:c.a|ae(eia:eaac.ae(aa(uasse:|«.saes(ee|.e.([solliciter ;
ae:e«as(ae.as(.(a(.eaeiaaax.ema(.eaaccecae(.veie|ce:evea(ae
.as(.(a(.eaeiax.ema (.esaac(ae. cea|eicecae(.v.(v.aeeae:a|-aac.i
(a.s. as(.(a(.ea «as cese:. |ec as (aa( eima(aema(.es. (se|i-(aea(ae
uasse:|.aao:e]ee(«ea|c |e se:.eas|v(|:ea(eaec|v (ae eve|a(.eaei
+x.ema(. z. a(.ea(e«a:ca(e(a|ie:ma|.za(.ea«. (a. a«a.eaeaeaeeessa:·
.|veemesaoaea.as((ae|.m.(ss(a(ec|vCece| s(aee:em.aac:e|a(ec
(aee:ems· sa((|a(. sae(se Ðvea.iuasse:|a(eae(.meaceo(ec(ae
eeaeeo(.eaeie:eaac.aeax.ema(.esaaceveao:eoesec. (as(ae .cea|
ie: a|| exae(e.ce(.ec. se.o| . aes(Ideas I, §7, o 56) , .(seems|eea|v
eeas.ce:ec(a.s(e|easecondar e:eaac.ae1ae:e.saecea|(. . aaav
ease.(|a((|e|.acseio:. me:c.a|ev.ceaeeae.aves(.ea(esae:ea:eie:
+' l
Husserl wri tes i n FTL, �3 1 , p. 96: "the idea of a ' nomolofical science ' , or correla­
ti vely the idea of an infnite province (in mathematico-logical parlance , a multi pli ci ty)
goverable by an expl anatory nomology, includes the idea that there is no truth about
such a province that is not deduci bly i ncluded i n the 'fundamental l aws' of the corre­
spondi ng nomological science-just as, in the ideal Euclid, there i s no truth about space
that is not deducibly included in the ' complete' ( vollstindigen) system of space-axioms . "
Then , defi ning the "multiplicity-form in the pregnant sense, " Husserl conti nues: "Such a
multi pli ci ty-form is defi ned, not by just any formal axiom-system, but by a 'complete'
one. . . . The axiom-system formally defni ng such a mult i plicity i s di sti ngui shed by the
ci rcumstance that any proposition (proposition-form, natural l y) that can be constructed,
in accordance with the grammar of pure logi c, out of the concepts (concept-forms) occur­
i ng [sic] i n that system, i s either ' true'-that i s to say: an anal ytic (purely deducible)
consequence of the axioms-or 'false'-that is to say: an analytic contradiction-; ter­
tillm non datllr . . .
55
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
a. mo:.e:(e(|eseeiax.emsaacse:veas(ae.:e:eaac i aiae(. «eeaa
:eac .a (aeOrigin ( 1 68) : eaemas(a| se(a|eae(eei(aeeeas(:ae(.ve
ae(. v.(.es(aa(eoe:a(e«.(|eeeme(:.ea|.cea|.(.es«|.e||ave|eea ex·
o| .ea(ec |a(ae(|:eaea((eo:.me:c.a|ev.ceaee .r:. me:c.a|ev.ceaee
mas(ae(|eeeaiasec«. (a(aeev. ceaeeei ax.ems ; for axioms are in
principle the results ofprimordial sense-fashioning . s. aa|.|caae·and al­
ways have this behind them)" mec.iecj .
~x.ema(.es .aeeae:a|.i:em«a.e| a|eaeeve:v .cea| eiex|aas(.ve
aacexae(cecae(.v.(veaa(a|e.(ssease .i:em«a.e|a|eaeeve:vo:e|·
|em ei cee.ca|.|.(v eaa (aea so:.ae· a|:eacv saooeses. (ae:eie:e . a
sec.mea(a(.ea ei sease . . e . ax.ema(.es saooeses a o:.me:c.a| ev. ·
ceaee .a:ac.ea|e:eaac«a.e|. sa|:eacvoas( i(. s(aeaa|:eacvex.|ec
i:em(aee:.e.as(e«|.eauasse:|ae««.saes(e:e(a:a
Ceaseeaea(| � . .iuasse:|.i:em (aeLogical Investigations (eIdeas I
aac (eFormal and Transcendental Logic) .aceecass.eaec(ae aa::e«
seaseeicee.ca|. | . (v(e(aeae(.eaeieeeme(:.ea|ce(e:m.aa|.| .(v.(a.s.s
|eeaaseae|e(a. mse|i|eea.cec.aa.s aeaa.s(e:.ea|.aves(.ea(.eas|v
(aeo:esea(s(a(eeiaready-made se.eaee sa(asseeaas(aeeaes(.eaei
e:.e.a a:.ses. eeeme(:.ea| ce(e:m.aa|. |.(v seems .aceec (e aave (ae
seaseeieeeme(:.ea|ce(e:m.aa|.|.(vin general, as(ae.aia.(eae:.zeaei
ase.eaee.«aa(eve:ia(a:eie:msceve|eo. waeauasse:|soea|s.a(ae
:;O Our emphasi s. "Expl i cati on" ( Verdeutlichung) i s not to b confused either with
clarifcation (Klirung) or reacti vation: remai ni ng wi thi n const ituted sense, expl ication
makes that sense distinct wi thout restoring i t to its ful l clarity, i . e. , to i ts value as present
cognition, and above all without reactivating its primordi al intention. It is for reasons of
grammatical construction (the use of past or present parti ci pl es, of substanti ve or infni­
ti ve forms, etc. ) that we have kept the classic translation of Verdeutlichung as expl i ca­
tion. S. Bachel ard comments more rigorousl y on the sense of thi s notion by translating i t
as "process of di sti ngui shi ng" or "process which renders di sti nct . " On al l the problems
concerning expl i cation, clarificat ion, and reactivation of proposi tions in general . problems
to whi ch al l usi on is made i n the Origin, cf. notably FTL, § § 1 6 and 1 7, pp. 56-63, and
Appendix I I , pp. 3 1 3-29: also S. Bachelard, A Stlldy ofHusserl ' s Logic, Ch . 1 , pp. 1 4-23 .
I n his formulation of the Origin, Fi nk specifi es these di stinctions. Instead of opposing
"reacti vation" and "expl ication, " he di sti ngui shes between two moments or types of
reactivation in general: reactivation as "l ogical explication" and reactivation of the
"tradi tion of sense-formation (Sinnbildungstradition) i nternally present i n a t hemati c
sense-formation. " "When reactivation i n the first sense i s completed, when i t comes to
an end, only then does reactivation as return i nquiry concerning the ' pri mal i nstituting'
begi n" ( "Die Frage, " p. 2 1 5) . Thus, t hi s formulation confi rms and underscores the
necessary anteriority of the static analysi s and the static fi xi ng of sense, both of whi ch
must control al l genetic bearing [demarche] .
´' Geometrical determi nabi l i ty i n the broad sense would onl y be the regional and
abstract form of an i nfnite determi nability of being in general , which Husserl so often
called the ultimate horizon for every theoretical attitude and for al l phi l osophy.
. ·
!
.� · ,
56
Jacques Derrid
Origin eia ae:.zeaeieeeme(:.ea|ia(a:e.ao:ee.se| v(a. ss(v| e . i ·º· .
(a.ss(v|e.sae((aa(eicecae(.».(v.|a(eieeeme(:ve:ma(aema(.es.a
eeae:a| . i:em«a.eaasve(aaca|«avs(aeaacee.ca||ese:aave(ae:
ia(a:ema(aema(.ea|ie:ma(.ea«.||s(em
1a.smeaas (aa( i:em ae« ea «aea .a»es(.ea(.aee:.e.as. (ae . cea|
.(se|ieicee.ca|.|.(v. a|eae«.(ae»e:viae(aa| s(aeeei(aea.s(e:v ei
ma(aema(.es as saea . . sreduced; se. (ee. .s eaea ce(e:m.aeciae(aa|
(:ac.(.ea-|v c.se|es.ae (ae oa:e|v ma(aema(.ea| (:ac.(.ea aac oa:e
(:ac.(.eaa|.(v.aeeae:a| .1aas«eaace:s(aacuasse:| s :eoea(ecs(.oa·
|a(.ea.a(aeOrigin (aa( .eeaee:a.aeesae(se.eaees. ae.ssoea|.aea|ea(
(aese·ea||ec cecae(. »ese.eaees . acc.ae.seea||ec. a|(aeaea(aev
|vaemeaasme:e|vcecaee . | -s· 1ae:e.s(aasa(:a(a.e::a(ae:a
eeeme(:.ee·ma(aema(.ea|(:a(a· sease.aeeae:a| .«a.eaceesae(oe:m.(
.(se|i(e|e|eaac|v(aea|(e:aa(.»eei"true" e:ia|se. aso:ese:.|ec
|v(ae.cea|eiace| a.(ema|(.o|.e.(v..a«a.ea"the concepts ' true' and
'formal implication of the axioms' are equivalent, aac|.|e«.sea|se(ae
eeaeeo(s ia| se aacie:ma||v. mo|.ecas(aeeooes.(eeiaie:ma|. mo| .·
ea(.eaei(aeas.ems (Ideas I, §72, o | ss· 1aeaa.(veieeeme(:.ea|
(:a(a so:.me:c.a|sease.(aa(aa.(v«a.eae:.ea(s(aeOrigin, eea|c(aea
|eoesec.aaeaes(.eaei(a.s|.ac «aa(. sma(aema(.ea|ce(e:m.aa|.|·
.(v. aeeae:a| ..i(aeaacee.ca|.| .(veiao:eoes. (.ea.ie:esamo|e.. ss(.||
ama(aema(.ea|ce(e:m.aa(.ea:Ðssea(.a| | v. saeaaeaes(.eaeaaae(es·
oee(ace(e:m.aec:esoease. .(saea|cea|v.ac.ea(e(aeoa:eeoeaaess
aacaa.(veiaa.aaa.(eae:.zea
s. aeeaiae( seoae.(veea|c|e:ecaeeci:em(ae »e:v|ee.aa. ae|v
(ae o:ecae(.ea ei.cea|e|]ee(s. a.s(e:.ea| .a(e:eeaaee(.eas a:e .a(e:·
eeaaee(.easeiseaseaac»a|ae. «a.ea-|veao.(a| .z.aead infnitum aac
aeee:c.ae(eaae:.e.aa|mece~aaae»e:|eeo(ae.:sec.mea(a:vce·
oes.(sea(eie.:ea|a(.ea1aa(. saoess.|.|.(v.|a(ae(aaeeess.(v.s.aee
(ae.a(e:es(aac(ae c.mea|(v eiuasse:| s aaa|vs. s :esa|(i:em «aa(
(a.saaa| vs.saee:aesea|e(a o|aaesa(eaee
Sometimes uasse:|eeas.ce:seeeme(:vaacse.eaee.aeeae:a|asee:·
(a.aie:msameaee(ae:sei«aa(aeea||s(aeea|(a:a|«e:|c iaeaee(
(aev|e::e«a||(ae.:eaa:ae(e:.s(.esi:em.( 1a. s«e:|ces.s(sea(.:e|v
(a:eaea(:ac.(.ea. | ·s· ~ac(ae se.eaeesa:e ea|v seme(:ac.(.eas
ameaee(ae:s Oa(ae sa|]ee(ei(:ac.(.ea .aeeae:a| . «e aa»e seme
ao:.e:.e».ceaee(aa(ae.eae:aaeeeiiae(aa|a. s(e:veaaaace:m.ae Oa
(ae eae aaac. «e |ae« «.(a a |ae«|ecee ei aaassa.|a||e
e».ceaee-aa.mo|.e.(|ae«|ecee«a.ea.aaa|.(s(a.siae(aa||ae|
ei|ae«|ecee.e»e:v«ae:eaacessea(.a|| v¯( I ·s·-(aa(ea|(a:a|ie:¬a·
(.eas a|«avs :eie:(e aamaao:ecae(.eas . (aea. (aev :eie:(e so.:.(aa|
ae(s.asuasse:|. mmec.a(e|veeae|aces. aame»e«a.ea«e «.||eea·
57
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
s.ce: |a(e: 1a. s :eie:eaee (e (ae o:ecae(.»e ae( .s . ase:.|ec .a (ae
ie:ma(.ea.(se|i.|a(.(eaaoassaaae(.eeceaaeeeaa(ei(ae.cea|ie:ma·
(.ea s aa(eaemv ueaee (ae aeeess.(v (e :eea|| (ae ao:.e:. |aaa| .(.es
|a:.ec |v se.eaee aac ea|(a:e � ia a s.m. |a:iasa. ea. «e |ae«(aa(
aamaa.(vaasaoas(aac(aa( . i:em (a.siae(. .(.s.a(aeoas((aa((ae
r :s(.a»ea(e:s. | ·s·(aemse| »esa:eieaac.aaca|(aeaea(aevaa»e
.as(.(a(ec ae« so.:.(aa| ie:ms. (aevaa»e|eeaa||e(ece se ea|v|v
c.soes.ae ei :a« e: a|:eacv (:ac.(.eaa| . . e . so.:.(aa||v saaoec.
ma(e:.a| s
sa(ea (ae e(ae:aaac. (:ac.(.eaa| ce»e|eomea( . i:em «a.ea e»e:v
ea|(a:e aeea.:es(e(a|.(v a( eaea memea(. .a amec.a(ee:.mmec.a(e
svaea:eav· . cees ae( aa»ea eaasa| s(v|e eieeaes. s ia (ae «e:|c ei
aa(a:a|:ea|.(vsa|]ee((eaeaasa|(voeeice»e|eomea(.sec.mea(a(.ea.s
ae((aa(eiaaaeea.:ecsease(aa(.seea(.aaa||vaac.a(e:aa| |v:eeao.(a·
|a(ec1ae:e. saeaa(a:a|a.s(e:vie:uasse:|aavme:e(aaaie:ueee| .
aacie:(aesame:easeas 1aeaaa|eev«.|||ee»eae:ea(e:«aea«esee
(aa( .ie:uasse:|asie:ueee| .ea|(a:e.(se|i.a.(s| a.(eemo.:.ea|aa.(s.s
ae(same.ea((eeeas(.(a(e(aeoa:eaa.(veiaa.s(e:v 1a.s«.|||e(ae
ease ie:a|| aa(a:eoe|ee.ea|ea|(a:es «a.ea ce ae( oa:(.e.oa(e . a(ae
Ða:eoeaaeidos.
ue:e(aeOrigin :eoea(suasse:| s e:.(.eaeei D.|(aev. ara.| eseoavas
x.ee:easse. eaee wa.|eeemo|e(e|vaeeeo(.aeD.|(aev s e:.(.e. smei
(ae eaasa|.s( aa(a:a|.za(.ea eiso.:. ( aac(ae o:.ae.o|e eiaa e:.e.aa|
(voe·me:oae|eev eiea|(a:a| (e(a|.(. es. uasse:| «.saes (e es(:ae( (ae
.ceaeise.eaee.. e .a|e»ea|| .oa.|eseoav·i:em(aesa|] ee(.»e.mma·
aeaeeei(aeWeltanschauung.
~sea|(a:a|ie:m.(ae.ceaeise.eaee. saacea|(ec|va|seoa:(ei(ae
Weltanschauung, aac(aeeea(ea(eise.eaeeaacoa.|eseoav.saacea|(·
ec|v(:aasm.((ecaeee:c.ae(e(ae sameo:eeessasa||e(ae:ie:¬s ei
ea|(a:eaac(:ac.(.ea. aeeae:a| 1aeo:eeess. saaa|eeeas..iae(.cea(.ea|
(e (aa( ei .a(e:aa| (.me·eease.easaess cese:.|ec i:em (ae aeema(.e
».e«oe.a(.a(ae 1 904-1 0 |ee(a:es 1aeo:esea(aooea:sae.(ae:as(ae
�ao(a:eae:(aeeaee(eiaoas(. |a(as(ae:e(ea(.eaeiao:esea(oas(.
. e . as(ae:e(ea(.eaeia:e(ea(.ea.aacseie:(a s.aee(ae:e(ea(.eaa|
oe«e:ei|. ».ae eease.easaess .s |a. (e . (a.s eease.easaess o:ese:»es
s.ea.iea(.eas. »a|aes. aac oas( ae(s as aa|.(aa|.(.es (habitus) aac
sec.mea(a(.eas 1:ac.(.eaa|sec.mea(a(.ea.a(aeeemmaaa|«e:|c«.||
aa»e(aeiaae(.eaeiee.ae|eveac(ae:e(ea(.eaa|| a.(aceei.ac. ».caa|
eease.easaess Oieea:se .sec.mea(a:v:e(ea(.ea.sae(ea|v(aeeeac.·
�¯ This requirement ofTrivialitit i s frequently justified by Husserl, notably i n C. §9h, p.
50.
58
Jacques Derrid
(.eaie: (ae oess.|. | .(veio:e(ea(.ea. .( a|se|e|eaesessea(.a| | v(e (ae
eeae:a|ie:meio:e(ea(.ea. «a.ea .s .(se|ieeaee.vecaace:(ae a|se·
|a(e|v aa.eae aac aa.ve:sa| ie:m ei (ae i.v.ae r:esea( 1ae | a((e:.
«a. ea. s(aeo:.me:c.a|a|se| a(eei(emoe:a|.(v..sea| v(aema.a(eaaaee
ei«a+(.aceecmas(|eea||ec(aedialectic eio:e(ea(.eaaac:e(ea(.ea.
ceso.(e uasse:| s :eoaeaaaeeie:(aa( «e:c ia (aemevemea(eio:e·
(ea(.ea. (ae o:esea( . s :e(a.aec aac eeae |eveac as oas( o:esea( . . a
e:ce:(eeeas(.(a(eanother o:.me:c.a| aac e:.e.aa|~|se|a(e. aae(ae:
i. v. aer:esea(.w.(aea((a.ses(:ae:c.aa:va|se|a(ea|(e:a(.eaei«aa(
a|«avs:ema.as.a(aeeeae:e(eaac|.vecie:meiaaa|se|a(er:esea( .
«.(aea((a. s a|«avs:eae«ece:.e.aa| .(veiaaa|se| a(eo:. me:c.a| .(v.
a|«avso:esea(aaca|«avs|.vecassaea .aea. s(e:v«ea|c|eoess.||e
~| se. «aa(.s(:aeei(aei.v.aer:esea(.s(:aeei«aa(saooeses.(as.(s
e:eaac.(aea. s(e:.eo:esea( .(ae|a((e:a|«avs:eie:sme:ee:|ess. mme·
c.a(e|v (e (ae (e(a|.(v eia oas( «a.ea . aaa|. (s . (aac «a.ea a|«avs
aooea:saace:(ae eeae:a| ie:m eiaproject . ~( eve:v memea( eaea
a.s(e:.e(e(a|.(v. saea|(a:a|s(:ae(a:eaa.ma(ec|vao:e]ee(«a.ea.saa
.cea 1aas " Weltanschauung, (ee. .saa .cea .rxs . o 1 35) .
na(at other times, ea(ae eea(:a:v. uasse:|cese:. |es se.eaeeas a
aa.eae aac a:eae(voa| ie:m ei (:ac.(.eaa| ea|(a:e. nes. ces a|| (ae
eaa:ae(e:.s(.es (aa( .( aas .a eemmea «.(a e(ae:ea|(a:a|ie:ma(.eas.
se.eaee e|a.msaaessea(.a| o:.v.|eee . . ( cees ae( oe:m. ( . (se|i( e|e
eae| esec.aaava. s(e:.ea||vce(e:m.aecea| (a:eassaea.ie:.(aas(ae
aa.ve:sa|va| . c.(veitruth. ~saea|(a:a|ie:m«a.ea. sae(o:eoe:(eaav
ce iae(e ea|(a:e. (ae . ceaei se.eaee .s (ae . aces eioa:e ea|(a:e .a
eeae:a| . .(ces.eaa(es ea|(a:e s eidos par excellence. ia(a.s sease . (ae
ea|(a:a|ie:m se.eaee .ei«a.eaeeeme(:v .s eaeesamo|e· .s . (se|i
esemo|a:v .a(aecea||eseaseei(a. s«e:c.e. ce(.eaac(e|ee|ee. ea|
.(.s(aeoa:(.ea|a:esamo|e«a.eaea.ces(aee. ce(.e:ecae(.eaaac.a(a.·
(.ea.|a(.(a|se.s(aeesamo|eaacmece|«a.eamas(e:.ea(ea|(a:eas
.(s . cea| . se.eaee . s (ae . ceaei«aa( . i:em (ae i:s( memea( ei.(s
o:ecae(.ea.mas(|e(:aea|«avsaacie:eve:veae.|eveaceve:ve.vea
ea|(a:a|a:ea. i (. s(ae.aia.(eeidos eooesec(e(aeia.(e.cea|«a.ea
aa.ma(es(aeWeltanschauung:
Weltanschauung, too, is an "idea, " but ofa goal lying in the fnite , in
principle to be realized in an individual lie by way ofconstant
approach . . . . The "idea" ofWeltanschauung i consequently a
dif erent one for each time. . . . The " idea" ofscience, on the
contrar, is a supratemporal one, and here that means limited by no
relatedness to the spirit ofone time. . . . Science is a title standing for
absolute, timeless values. Every such value, once discovered, belongs
59
Introduction to the Origin ofGeometr
thereafter to the treasure trove ofall succeeding humanity and
obviously determines likewise the material contel1t ofthe idea of
culture, wisdom, Weltanschauung, as well as ofWeltanschauung
philosophy. (Ibid. , pp. 135-36)
iaaaea·cese:.o(.veoa:ese. eaee .(aemeceeisec.mea(a(.ea. ssaea
(aa(aes.ea.iea(.eaeeases(ee.:ea|a(ea(aavmemea(aaceaaa|«avs
|e:eeeaee.vecaac:ea«a|eaec. a.(se.:ea|a(.ea. ii. («asaeeessa:v
(aea (e c.s(.aea.sa |e(«eea aa(a:a| :ea| .(v aac so.:.(aa| ea|(a:e. «e
mas( ae« c.se:.m.aa(e. .a e:ce: (e aace:s(aac oa:e ea| (a:e aac
(:ac.(.eaa| .(v. aeeae:a| .|e(«eeaemo.:.ea|ea|(a:eaac(aa(ei(:a(a i a
e(ae:«e:cs. |e(«eeaceiae(e a.s(e:.ea| ea|(a:e.ea(aeeae aaac. . a
«a.ea sease·sec.mea(a(.ea cees ae( ese| ace (ae iae( (aa( va| .c.(v
.«a.ea. s:ee(ec.aa|aaeaaee.(e::a. a. eoeea. aacseie:(a·eaa|eeeme
ca(ec[eremption] , aacea(aee(ae:aaac. (aeea| (a:eei(:a(a.«aese
. cea|.(v.sa|se|a(e| vae:ma(.ve. Necea|(. (ae|a((e:«ea|c|einfact
. moess.||e«.(aea((aeie:me:na(ea(aeeaeaaac. (aeea|(a:eei(:a(a
. s(aea.eaes(aacmes(.::-cae.|| eoess. |. | .(veiemo.:.ea|ea|(a:e .ea
(aee(ae:aaac. (aeea| (a:e ei(:a(a . s. (se| iea| v(aeoess.|.| . (v eia
reduction eiemo.:.ea|ea|(a:e aac .smaa.ies(ec(e. (se|iea| v(a:eaea
saeaa:ecae(.ea.a:ecae(.ea«a. eaaas|eeemeoess.|| e|vaa.::ao·
(. eaei(ae. aia.(easa:eve|a(.ea«.(a.aemo.:.ea|ea| (a:e
~((ae same (.me. (ae ea|(a:e aac(:ac.(.ea ei(aetruth a:eeaa:ae·
(e:.zec |v a oa:aces.ea| a.s(e:.e.(v ia eae sease. (aev eaa aooea:
c. seaeaeeci:ema||a.s(e:v.s.aee(aeva:eae(. a(:.as.ea| |vaaee(ec|v
(aeemo. :.ea|eea(ea(ei:ea|a.s(e:vaac|vce(e:m. aecea|(a:a|.a(e:·
eeaaee(.eas 1a.semaae.oa(.eaeaa|eeeaiasec«.(aa|:ea|.aei:em
a.s(e:v.aeeae:a| re:(aese«aeeeaiae(aemse| ves(ea.s(e:.ea|iae(a·
a| .(v. as «e|| asie:(aese«ae eae|ese(aemse| ves . a(ae .cea| .(v ei
va| . c.(v.(aeaa::a(.eaei(ae(:a(aeaaea| vaave(aea. s(e:.ee:. e.aa| .(vei
mv(a
na(.aaae(ae:sease.eae(aa(ee::esoeacs(euasse:| s . a(ea(.ea.(ae
(:ac.(.eaei(:a(a.s(aemes(o:eieaacaacoa:es(a. s(e:vOa| v(aeoa:e
aa.(v ei saea a (:ac.(.ea s sease .s ao( (e es(a||. sa (a. s eea(.aa. (v.
i aceec. «. (aea((a. saeaa(aea(.ea.s(e:v«ea|c|e(aeaea(e:o:e]ee(ec
assaea. (ae:e«ea|cea|v|eaaemo.:.ea|aee:eea(eei| a.(eaacaee.·
cea(a| aa.( s ~s seea as oaeaemeae| eev |:ea|s i:e¬ |e(a eea·
vea(. eaa| r|a(ea. sm aac a. s(e:. e.s( emo.:.e. sm. (ae mevemea( ei
`´´ As Husserl had already stressed in the LI (I, I , §32, p. 3 3 1 ) , ideality i s not always
normative. Validity is a higher ideality which can or cannot be attached to ideality i n
general. We wi ll see this much later: the sense of error has i ts own particular i deality.
60
Jacques Derrid
i :aiaiaai.i«.saesiecese:.|e.s :ea||viaaieiaeeae:eieaacsoee. ie
a. sie:v-iae ieaacai.eas ei «a.ea a:e a iemoe:a| aac e:eai.ve sa|·
]eei. v.iv s aei s|aseceaiaeseas.||e«e:|caaciae|.ie·«e:|casea| ia:a|
«e:|c.
1a.s o:ee:ess .s |:eaeai a|eai |v iae oe:maaeai ieia|.zai.ea aac
:eoei.i.eaei.isaeea. s.i.eas . Ceemei:v. s|e:aeaieiafrst aeea.s.·
i.ea.eaieii:sie:eai.veaei.v.i.es .weaace:siaac. isoe:s.si.aemaaae:
ei|e.ae. .i. saeiea|vame|.|eie:«a:co:eeessi:emeaeseieiaeea. s. ·
i.easi eaaeiae:|aia eeai.aaeas svaiaes.s. a«a.ea a||aeea. s. i.eas
ma.aia.aiae.:va|.c.iv.a||ma|eaoaieia|.ivsaeaiaai .aieve:vo:eseai
siaee. iaeieia|aeea.s.i.ea .s. se ie soea|. iae ieia| o:em.se ie: iae
aeea.s.i.eas eiiae ae« |eve| . . . . 1ae sameia.ae. si:ae eieve:v
se.eaee ( 1 59) .
iei as aace:siaac ia. s as i:ae ei eve:v aea·cese:.oi.ve se. eaee .
1aese svaiaeses ce aei eeea: .a a osveae|ee.ea| meme:v. ae«eve:
ee||eei. ve. |ai :aiae: .a iaai "rational memor" se o:eieaac| v ce·
se:.|ec|vCasieanaeae|a:c.ameme:v|aseceaa"recurrent fruitul­
ness, " «a.eaa|eae .seaoa||eeieeasi.iai.aeaac:eia.a.aeiae"events
of reason. " · ia a.sPhilosophy of Arithmetic, uasse:|a|:eacv c.si.a·
ea.saec |ei«eea osveae|ee.ea| iemoe:a|.iv as saeeess. veaess .«aai
uamecese:.|ec·aaciaeiemoe:a|.iveiiaesvaiaei.e. aie:eeaaeei.eas
eisease. ue eeai.aaecieeso|.eaieia. sc.ne:eaee . aac.aiaeOrigin
( 1 66) aeemoaas.zesiaaiase.eai.iesiaee.sae(ea|vasease«a.ea.a
iaei eemes|aie:. |aiiae . aiee:ai.eaeiiae «ae| eea:| . e: sease. aa
ae«o:e]eei.
Ðee|ee.ea|sa|]eei.v.iveaaaei|e:esoeas.||eie:ia. sceve|eomeai .
«a.ea.seeai.aaa||vieia|. zec.aaaa|se|aier:eseai.Oa| vaeemmaaa|
sa|]eei. v.iveaa o:ecaeeiaea.sie:.ea| svsiemeii:aiaaac|e«ae||v
:esoeas.||eie:.i.ue«eve:.ia. sieia|sa|]eei.v.iv.«aeseaa.ivmasi|e
a|se|aieaaca priori .eiae:«.seeveaiaes|.eaiesii:aia«ea| c|eaa·
. mae.aa||e· .s |ai iae eemmeao|aee eia|| eee|ee.ea| sa|]eei.v. i. es.
«aeiae:aeiaa||vo:eseaie:oess.||e. «aeiae:oasi. o:eseai.e:iaia:e.
«aeiae:|ae«ae:aa|ae«a. Ðve:vse.eaee. s:e|aiecieaaeoeaeaa.a
eiiae eeae:ai.eas eiiaese «ae «e:|ie:aac «.iaeae aaeiae:. :e·
sea:eae:se.iae:|ae«ae:aa|ae«aieeaeaaeiae:«aeæeiae o:e·
caei. vesa|]eei.v.iveiiaeieia||. v. aese.eaee ( 1 59 mec|iecì· .
s.aeeiae ieia|.iveise. eaee.s eoea. iae aa. ve:sa|eemmaa|iva|se
aasiaeaa.iveiaae:.zea.ra:iae:me:e.iae. maeeeiiae eoeaeaa|a
cees aeiesaaasiiae ceoia eiia.seemmaaa| sa|]eei. v.iv. re: |iaei
,'4 Cf. in particular Le Rationalisme applique, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1 970), pp. 2 and 42-46.
61
1 ntroduction to the Origin ofGeometr
ea| vaasiaeaa.ivei.aie::e|aieaaess aac ee·:esoeas.|.| .iv-eaea. a·
vesi.eaie:aeiea| viee| sa. mse|itied to a| |iaeeiae:s|viaeaa.iveiaa
e|]eeie:ias|-|aiiae. avesi.eaie: se«asa|]eei.v.iv.seeasi.iaiec|v
iae.ceae:ae:.zeaeiia. sieia|sa|]eei.v.iv«a.ea.smace:esoeas. || e
.aaacia:eaeaa. mie:eaeaeia. saeisasase.eai.ie.avesi.eaie:. ia
aacia:eaeaa.m.iaaimeaas«.iaeai|e.aesa|si.iaiecie:a. m. |eeaase.
ai iaesamei.me.ae:ema. asiaea|se| aie e:. e. a. iaeeeasi.iai.aeaaco:es·
eaisea:eeeii:aia. raeaemeae| ee.ea| |v.iaei:aaseeaceaia|we .saei
something other iaaaiae i:aaseeaceaia|Ego . 1ae |aiie: s aei· .e»ea
«aeaiaevseemmaacaiec|vaa.cea|eemmaa.iv.ceaeieeaseie|e. ::e·
cae.|| viaeseeiameaac.e"[ think" -ie«a.ea.isameesie:ecaeeiae
emo. :.ea|eee| ee.ea|eeaieaieiiaeego .ae:ce:iec.seeve:iaec.mea·
s.eaeiiae"we" asamemeaieiiaeeidos "ego. Oae«ea|c. aceec
|eiemoiecieia.a|iaai.i. siaewe iaaima|esoess.|| eiae:ecaei.eaei
iae emo.:.ea|ego aac iae eme:eeaee eiiaeeidos "ego, " .isaea aa
avoeiaes.sc.caei| eac. aea.asiuasse:| s mesieso|.e.i.aieai.eas. ie
o|ae.ae iae eee|ee.ea|meaac.aa|si:aei:e|ai.eaie iaeieia|sa|]ee·
i.v.iv. ia aav ease. .iiae:e .s a a. sie:v eii:aia . .ieaa ea| v|e ia.s
eeae:eie .mo|.eai.eaaacia.s:ee.o:eea|eave|eomeaieiieia| .i.esaac
a|se|aies . 1a. s. soess.||eea| v|eeaase«ea:ecea|.ae«.ia.cea|aac
so.:.iaa| . mo|. eai. eas. 1ae cese.. oi.ea eiiaese i«e eaa:aeie:. si. es.
. cea|.ivaacse.:.iaa| .iv. sei:eeaeai|vevesec.aiaeOrigin, ceesaei
ee::eseeac. as«esae«.ieaavmeiaeavs.ea|asse:i.ea taacc. i. eaie
«a.ea. iaeva:e"founded" .aiaeseaseeiFundierung.
1ae.::ecae.||ea.sie:.e.iveieeemei:.ea||eeem.ae. seaa:aeie:.zec
|viaeiaeiiaaiiaetotal seaseeieeemei:v .aac.isaeeessa:vaeei.e
ee::e|aie .ieia|sa|]eei.v.iv·eea|caeiaave|eeao:eseaiasao:e]eei
aaciaeaasme|.|eia|i||meaiaiiae|ee.aa.ae( ] 59) . iiiaea.sie:vei
eeemei:v«e:eea|viaeceve|eomeaieiaoa:oese«ae||vo:eseaii:em
iae |ee.aa.ae. «e «ea|c aave ie cea| ea|v «.ia aa eso|.eai.ea e:a
eaas.·e:eai.ea. we «ea|c aaveea eae s. ce a svaea:ea.ee: i.me|ess
[uchronique p6 e:eaacaac.eaiaeeiae:s.ce.aoa:e| vemo. :. ea|c.aea·
:eav «.ia .is . ac. eai. veiaaei.ea|ai«.iaeaiaavo:eoe:aa.iv ei.is
e«a.Ne. iae:oa:ec.aea:envae:oa:esvaea:eavma|eaa. sie:v.1ae
´´Then begins the formidable difculties grappled with in the ffth of the Cartesian
Meditations, and into which we do not want to enter here.
´´[Derrida wants to suggest by the word uchronie a temporality akin to the spatiality of
utopia. We should also note Derrida' s use of the roots "temporalite" and "chronie" in
various words: panchronie and uchronie versus omnitemporalite and intemporalite (as
�ell as synchronie, diachronie, and anachronie) . When uchronie occurs again on p. 73 , i t
lb translated as intemporality. ]
· |
I
, * |
·
i
I
62
Jacques Derrda
:e]ee(ec avce(aes.s .s eaee ¬e:e (aa( ei a ee¬c| .e.(v -e(«eea
r|a(ea.s¬aace¬c.:.e.s¬
~sa¬a((e:eiiae(. evea-eie:e(aeoess.-.|.(vei(aeeoeac:e]ee(ei
eee¬e(:v. a ¬e:ec:.¬.(.veie:¬a(.eaeisease(Sinnbildung) aeeessa:·
.|v«ea(-eie:e. (asao:e|. ¬. aa:v s(aee. aacea-(ec|v. asaeaa«av
(aa(.(aocea:ecie:(aei:s((.¬e.a(aeev. ceaeeeisaeeessia|ae(aa| .z+·
(. ea( 1 59-60 ¬ec.r eci ·
IV
uav.ae :eaeaec (a. s ce.a( . uasse:| oe:ie:¬s a ce(ea:«a.ea ¬av
see¬c.seeaee:(.aei as(eaceicese:.-.ae(a. sc:.¬.(.veeeaes.seisease
.a. (se|iaac.a. (sErstmaligkeit, ae(ae.(|vaacc:ev. s. eaa||veeas. ce:s. (
(e-ealready ceae. . (ssease-e. ae a|:eacvev.cea( ue. seea(ea((e
:eea||(aa(«e|ae«(aeeeae:a|ie:mei(a.sev.ceaee. ·(ae|a((e:mas(
-e~.(eaaae(ae(-e-|.|ea||ev. ceaee.«ae(ae:oe:eeo(.vee:e.ce(.e· .
(ae.a(a.(.eaeiaaa(a:a|:ea| .(ve:eiaa.cea|e|]ee( .. e .e:aso. aeaa
es. s(ea( . a (ae eease. easaess ei.(s e:.e.aa| |e. ae·.(se|i·(ae:e ( 1 60
¬ec.iecì· 1a.s:eea||s(ae"principle ofall principles" ceiaec.aIdeas
I. ue«eve:| .((|e«e¬av|ae«a-ea((aei:s(eee¬e(:.ea|ev.ceaee. «e
ce|ae«a priori (aa(. (aasaac(eassa¬e (a.sie:¬ ua(evea(aeaea
aco|.ec(eaa. s(e:.ea|e:. e.a. a(a.sease. (a.sa priori |ae«|eceeeea·
eeo.ae(aeie:¬eiev. ceaee. sae(a.ae| ess(aaaa. s(e:.ea| Deia. aea
"source ofauthority" [Ideas I, §24, o.s·i ie:(aeeeea.(.eaeiaave-]ee(
. aeeae:a| ..(. seaeei(aeseformal a prori sacoesec-veve:v¬a(e:.a|
se.eaee.ae:e|veee¬e(:vaaca. s(e:v s.aee(aei:s(eee¬e::.ea|ev. ·
ceaeeaasaac(eeeaie:¬(e(a.soa((e:a.«eeaaaaveai:s(ee:(a.a(v
a-ea(.( .a (ae a|seaee eiaav e(ae: ¬a(e:.a| |re«|ecee ueaee (ae
content eieee¬e(:.ea|ev. ceaee.aeea(ea(«a.ea. sa. s(e:.ea|-eeaase
e:ea(ecie:(aei:s((. ¬e·.sae(ceiaecie:(ae¬e¬ea( uasse:|eeas. c·
e:s .(a|:eacvaeea.:ec
1a.sa|s(ea(.ea-eie:e(aeeea(ea(ei(aeo:.¬e:c.a|ae(aacev. ceaee
. so:ev.s.eaa| i ( . saeaes(.eaeia¬e(aece|ee.ea||. ¬. (a(.eaaac.eaee
aea.a. ei(ae aeeess.(v(e(a|eeae s s(a:(.aeoe.a(. a(aeeeas(.(a(ec
ua((a. s¬e(aece| ee.ea| aeeess.(v .s ea|v|ee. (.¬a(e ea (ae -as. s eia
o:eieaacca. |eseoa.ea|cee.s.ea uav.aee|ea:ec(a. ss(aee.uasse:|. a
eaee(eea(.aaesa.s¬ec.(a(.ea.ae«c:e(ee(ec-v(aa(ie:ma| |ee. (.¬a·
(.ea·as.ia. s(ae¬e«e:eae|eaee:(aee:.e.aeieee¬e(:.ea|sease.|a(
´` Thi s i s done i n terms which recall those of Ideas I, no doubt, but above al l those of
FTL: cf. notably FTL, § 59, pp. 1 56-59.
63
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
(ae genesis of the a-se|a(e. . e . .cea| ·Objectivity eisease. (a. ssease
|e.ae a|:eacvc:esea(ie:aav eease.easaess«aa(seeve: uasse:|:e·
cea(ec|vaace|s(.aa(e| v:e(a:as(eaeaes(.ea«a. ea. sa(-e((e¬(ae
ie||e«.ae. ae«eaa(aesa-]ee(.veeee| ee.ea|ev.ceaeeeisease|eee¬e
e|]ee(.veaac.a(e:sa-]ee(. ve:ue«eaa.(e.ve:.se(eaa.cea|aac(:ae
e-]ee(. «.(a a||(aeeaa:ae(e:.s(.es(aa(«e|ae«.((eaave. e¬a. (e¬
ce:a| va|.c.(v. aa. ve:sa| ae:¬a(. v.(v

.a(e| | . e.-.|.(vie:"everyone, " ac·
:ee(ecaessea(eia||"here and now" iae(aa|.(v.aacseie:
¡
a:1a. s.s(ae
a. s(e:.ea|:ece(.(.eaei(aeeaes(.eaeiO-]ee(.v.(vsei:eeaea(|vas|ec.a
(aeive|ee(a:eseiThe Idea ofPhenomenolog: ae«eaasa|]ee(.v.(vee
ea(ei. (se|i. ae:ce:(eeaeeaa(e:e:eeas(.(a(e(aee-]ee(:·
uasse:|aas. (aea. o:ev.s.eaa|| va|s(a.aec-eie:e (ae a.s(e:.ea|eea·
(ea( eiErstmaligkeit ea|v (e as| (ae eaes(.ea ei .(s e-]ee(. iea(.ea
[objectivation], . e . ei.(s|aaaea.ae.a(ea. s(e:vaac.(sa.s(e:.e. (v re:a
seaseaasea(e:ec.a(ea.s(e:vea|v.i.(aas-eee¬eaaa|se|a(ee-]ee(.
Husserl had posed thi s question i n the same terms but in i ts most inclusive extension
and with a more cri tical , but less historical, infl exion i n FTL, § 1 0, pp. 263-64. There,
however, i t is l i mited to the egological sphere of Objecti vity. Here it i s focused on the
possibi l ity of objecti ve spi ri t as the condition for history and i n thi s respect takes the
opposite vi ew to Di lthey' s questi on. Di l they, in efect, starts fom the already constituted
objective spi ri t . For hi m, what matters i s knowing how the signifcations and the values of
thi s objecti ve mi l i eu can be interiorized and assumed as such by i ndi vidual subjects-first
of al l in the hi stori an' s work on the basi s of testionies which are i ndi vidual in thei r origin
or object . Moreover, this question led Di lthey to di scover, like Husserl , a non­
psychological di mensi on of the subject. Di lthey writes: "Now the followi ng question
ari ses: how a nexus which i s not produced as such i n a mind [tete], which consequently i s
not di rectly experienced and can no more be l ed back t o t he l i ved experi ence of a person,
how can it be constituted as such i n the historian on the basis of the statements of thi s
person or of statements made about t hi s matter'? Thi s presupposes that some logical
SUbjects, who are not psychological subjects, can be constituted" (Part I I I : "Plan der
Fortsetzung zum Aufau der geschi chtlichen Wel t i n den Geisteswi ssenschaften. En­
twiirfe zur Kritik der hi storischen Verunf" [ "Plan for the Continuation of the Forma­
tion of the Hi storical World in the Human Studi es. Sketches for d Critique of Historical
Reason"] , in Di l they' s Der Aufau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaf­
ten, ed. Bernard Groethuysen, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: B . G. Teubner and Gottingen: Van­
denhoeck and Ruprecht, 1 958), Vol . 7 of Gesammelte Schriften, p. 282.
Thi s question i s "turned over" i n the Origin i n formulas which are strangel y si milar to
those of Di lthey. Thi s "reverse si de" of the question concers the radical origin and the
conditions of possi bil i ty for the objecti ve spirit itself. Afer the interconnections of sense
and the evidences of a monadic ego from which we cannot not start , de facto as wel l as de
j ure, how can an objecti ve spirit i n general be constituted as the pl ace of truth, tradition,
co-responsi bi l ity, and so forth? We wi l l see that, according to Husserl, a "logical "
subject wi l l no more be able to be responsible for such a possi bi l ity than could the
psychological subject .
'
64
Jacques Derrid
. . e . aa .cea| e|]ee(«a.ea. oa:aces.ea||v. mas(aave|:esea a|| (ae
mee:.aes«a.easeea:ec.((e(aeemo.:.ea|e:eaaceia. s(e:v.1aeeea·
c.(.easeiO|¡ee(.v.(v+:e(aea(aeeeac.(.easeia.s(e:.e.(v.(se|i.
waeauasse:|ia:(ae:eaceve(esaie«| .aes(e(aeo:ecae(.eaaac
ev.ceaeeeieeeme(:.ea|seaseassaeaaac.(se«ao:eoe:eea(ea(. ae
«.||ce se ea|vafter aav.ae ce(e:m.aec(ae eeae:a| eeac.(.eas ei . (s
O|]ee(. v.(v aac ei(ae O|]ee(. v.(v ei.cea| e|]ee(.v.(.es 1aas. ea|v
retroactively aacea(ae|as.sei. (s:esa|(seaa«e.|i am.aa(e(aeoa:e
sease ei(ae sa|]ee(.ve o:as. s«a.ea aas eaeeace:ec eeeme(:v. 1ae
seaseei(aeeeas(.(a(. aeae(eaaea|v|ecee.oae:ec.a(ae«e|ei(ae
eeas(.(a(ece|]ee( ~ac (a.saeeess.(v .sae( aa es(e:aa|ia(e. |a(aa
essea(.a|aeeess.(vei. a(ea(.eaa|.(v 1aeprimordial seaseeieve:v. a·
(ea(.eaa|ae(.sonly . (sfnal sease. . e .(aeeeas(. (a(.eaeiaae|]ee(..a
(ae|:eaces(seaseei(aese(e:ms· 1aa(. s«avea|va(e|ee|e.veaa
eoeaaoaoassaee.a«av|aes(e«a:c(ae|ee. aa.aes
ii (ae sease eieeeme(:.ea| sease .s O|]ee(.v.(v e:(ae .a(ea(.eaei
O|]ee(.v.(v..ieeeme(:v.sae:e(aeesemo|a:v. acesei|e.aese.ea(.ie .
aac.ia.s(e:v.s(aea.eaes(aacmes(:eve|a(e:voess.|.| .(vie:aaa.ve:·
sa|a.s(e:v.(aeeeaeeo(ei«a.ea«ea|cae(es.s(«.(aea(.(· . (aea(ae
seaseeisease .aeeae:a| .s ae:e ce(e:m.aecasobject: as seme (a.ae
(aa(.saeeess.||eaacava.|a||e. aeeae:a|aaci:s(ie:a:eea:ce:eaze
1ae «e:|c|v .maee eigaze «ea|cae(|e(ae aaae(.eecmece| ei(ae
|aee:e(.ea|a((.(aceeioa:e eease.easaess|a( . ea(aeeea(:a:v.«ea|c
|e::e«.(sseasei:em(aa(a((.(ace1a.s. sve:vmaea.aaeee:c«.(a(ae
. a.(.a| c.:ee(.ea ei oaeaemeae|eev (ae e|]ee( .aeeae:a| .s (ae iaa|
ea(eee:v eieve:v(a.ae (aa( eaa aooea:. . e . (aa( eaa |e ie: a oa:e
eease.easaess .a eeae:a| O|]ee(s .a eeae:a|]e.a a|| :ee.eas (e eea·
se.easaess. (aeUr-Region. 59
~| se. «aeauasse:|am:ms (aa( asease· o:ecae(.ea mas(aavefrst
o:esea(ec. (se|iasev.ceaee.a(aeoe:seaa|eease.easaessei(ae.avea·
(e:. aac «aea ae asss (ae eaes(.ea ei .(s subsequent ..a a iae(aa|
ea:eae|ee.ea|e:ce:·e|]ee(. iea(.ea.aee|.e.(sas.aceiie(.eaces(.aec
(e mase (ae eaa:ae(e:.s(.es ei .cea| O|]ee(.v.(v o:e||ema(.e aac (e
sae«(aa( (aeva:eae(a ma((e:eieea:se 1:a| v. (ae:e. sae(i:s(a
sa|]ee(. veeeeme(:.ea|ev.ceaee«a.ea«ea|c (aea |eeemee|]ee(.ve
Ceeme(:.ea|ev.ceaeeea|vs(a:(s(aememea( (ae:e. s ev.ceaeeeiaa
. cea|e|]ee(.v.(v.1ae|a((e:.s saeaea|v aue:aav.ae|eeaoa(. a(e
. a(e:sa|]ee(.vee.:ea|a(.eaCeeme(:.ea|es.s(eaee.sae(osvea.ees. s·
(eaee� .(ceesae(es.s(asseme(a.aeoe:seaa|«.(a. a(aeoe:seaa|soae:e
eieease.easaess . . (.s (ae es. s(eaee ei«aa( .s O|]ee(.ve|v(ae:eie:
´ Cf. Ideas I. in particular § 76, pp. 1 94-97.
65
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
eve:veae .ie:ae(aa|aacoess.||eeeeme(e:s. e:(aese«aeaace:s(aac
eeeme(:v· i aceec. .( aas. i:em .(s o:. ma| .as(.(a(.ea. aa es.s(eaee
«a.ea. soeea| .a:|vsao:a(emoe:a|aac«a.ea-ei(a. s«ea:eee:(a.a-.s
aeeess. ||e (e a|| mea. i:s( ei a|| (e (ae ae(aa| aac oess.||e ma(ae·
ma(.e.aaseia|| oeeo|es . a||aees. aac (a.s . s(:ae eia|| .(s oa:(.ea|a:
ie:ms ( 1 60 mec.iecì·
neie:eaacaue:mas((aea|eaea(:a| .zec. a(ae.:iae(aa| . (vaac
asec .a eae(a(.ea ma:ss na( eaa «e s.mo|v :eo|aee (aem «. (a (ae
(.me|ess.iaaco:ev.cec(aa(ei(aeeeac.(.eaeioess. |.| .(v:
1ae |aaeaaee eieeaes.s eea|c «e|| seemie(.ve a( (a. s oe.a( . (ae
cese:.o(.eaeiaav:ea|ceve|eomea(.aea(:a| .zec.ao:.ae.o|e·«ea|cae(
ea||ie:. (. |a(|:.ae.ae(e|.ea((aeie:ma|eeac.(.easeioess.|.| .(v.(ae
ce]a:e .mo| .ea(.eas. aace.ce(.e s(:a(.iea(.eascees ~:e«eae((aea
cea|.ae«.(aa.s(e:v:Dees(a. sae(:e(a:aas(eae|ass.e(:aaseeacea(a|
:ee:ess.ea: ~ac .s ae( (ae . a(e:eeaaee(.ae ei(:aaseeacea(a| aeees·
s.(. es . evea .inarrated aeee:c.ae (e ae«. (ceve|eos. a(|e((em(ae
s(a(.e. s(:ae(a:a| .aacae:ma(.veseaemaie:(aeeeac.(.easeiaa.s(e:v
:a(ae:(aaaa.s(e:v. (se|i:
Oaes(.easei(a.ss.acm.ea(se:.eas|v. moaea(ae«ae|ee:.e.aa|.(vei
(a.s a((emo( na(. ( seems (aev :ema.a ea(s.ce uasse:| s .a(ea(.ea
uacea|(ec|v(ae:e.sae(.a(a. saccount (ae|eas(e:a.aeia. s(e:v.i«e
aace:s(aac|v(aa((aeiae(aa|eea(ea(eiceve|eomea(. na((aeaeees·
s.(vei(a. s:ecae(.eaaas|eea]as(.ieca((aeea(se( ~ac(aeaaaevec
| e(ce«aei(aese«ae«ea|c esoee(uasse:| (e(e||(aemwhat really
happened, (e(e||(aemas(e:v[leur raconte une histoire], eaa|e saa:o
aac eas.|v.mae.aa||e ae«eve:. (a.sc. saooe.a(mea(.s . ||ee.(.ma(e.
uasse:|ea|v«.saec(ecee.oae:.aacvaaee(ae(es(a. cceaaace:eve:v
emo.:.ea|s(e:va|ea(«a.ea«e«ea| c|eea:.eas rae(aa|a.s(e:veaa
(aea |e e.vea i:ee :e. a ae ma((e: «aa( .(s s(v|e. . (smeiaec. e:.is
philosophy, .(«.||a|«avs me:ee:|essaa.ve|vsaooese(aeoess.|.|.(v
aacaeeess.(vei(ae.a(e:eeaaee(.eascese:.|ec|vuasæ:| .uacea|i·
ec|v (aese .a(e:eeaaee(.eas a:e a|«avs ma:sec |v a ]a:.c.ea| aac
(:aaseeacea(a| s.ea.iea(.ea. |a((aev :eie: (econcrete ae(slived .a a
unique svs(emei. as(. (a(.ae.mo|.ea(.eas . . e ..aasvs(em(aaiaas|eea
e:.e.aa||vo:ecaeecea|vo»:e-(aa(:ema.asce iaeie ¬c ce]a:e,ir­
reversible. 1aese(aeaa:e (aeinterconnections-of «aa(.s. . a(aen||es(
seaseei(ae«e:c.histor itsel. 1aas. eeai:ea(.ae«aa(.s(a:ea±aac
(a:eaea aa.s(e:.ea|acvea(a:e .(ae iae(ei«a.ea.s .neo|aeea||ei , a
60
Cf. in particular Tran-Duc-Thao, Phenomenoiogie, p. 221 . Following this interpreter,
"the subjectivist point of view" in The Origin ofGeometr would have prohibited Hus­
serl from "going beyond the level of common sense remarks. "
66
Jacques Derrid
ao:.e:. aac e.ce(.e:eac.aeaac c.seea:se saea|c |e oess.|| e uasse:|
c.cae(.avea(saeaaoess.|.| .(v. .(«ass.mo|vc. se|esecas«aa(.m·
o| .e.(|vaasa| «avseeac.(.eaec(aees.s(eaeeei(ae.cea|e|]ee(seia
oa:ese.eaeeaac(aaseiaoa:e (:ac.(.ea. aaceeaseeaea(| veiaoa:e
a. s(e:.e.(v.(aemece|eia.s(e:v.aeeae:a|
Pure-interconnections-of a.s(e:v.apriori-thought-of a. s(e:v. cees(a. s
ae(meaa(aa((aeseoess.|. | .(. esa:eae(.a(aemse| vesa. s(e:.ea| :Ne(a(
a|.ie:(aeva:enothing but (aeoes s.|.|.(.esof(aeaooea:aaeeofa.s(e:v
as such, ea(s.ce «a.ea(ae:e .s ae(a.ae u.s(e:v.(se|ies(a||. saes (ae
oess.|.| .(vei.(se«aaooea:.ae
v
1a.soess.|.|.(v.s| :s(ea||ec"language. " ii«eas|ea:se| vesa|ea(
(aemaaae:.a«a.ea(aesa|]ee(.veev. ceaeeeieeeme(:.ea|seaseea.as
.(s .cea|O|]ee(.v.(v.«emas(i:s(ae(e (aa(.cea|O|]ee(.v.(vae(ea| v
eaa:ae(e:.zeseeeme(:.ea|aacse.ea(.ie(:a(as . .(.s(aee|emea(ei| aa·
eaaee. aeeae:a| i(. so:eoe:(ea«ae|ee| asseiso.:.(aa|o:ecae(sei
(aeea|(a:a|«e:| c. (e «a.ea ae(ea| va| | se.ea(.ie ie:ma(.eas aac(ae
se.eaees(aemse| ves |e|eae |a( a| se. ie: esamo|e. (ae ie:ma(.eas ei
|. (e:a:va:( . | -ºmec.ieci ·
1a.smevemea(. saaa|eeeas(e«aa(«eaaa|vzecea:| .e:. (ae.cea|
O|]ee(.v.(veieeeme(:v. s| :s(o:esea(ecasaeaa:ae(e:.s(.eeemmea(e
a|ie:msei|aaeaaeeaacea|(a:e.|eie:e. (s esemo|a:v o:.v. |eee.s
ceiaec ia aa . moe:(aa( ae(e . uasse:| soee.ies (aa( (ae |:eaces(
eeaeeo( ei| . (e:a(a:e . i -º· eemo:. sesa| | . cea| ie:ma(. eas . s. aee. . a
e:ce:(e|esaea.(aevmas(a|«avs|eeaoa||eei|e.aeeso:ess.||e. a
c.seea:se aac (:aas|a(a||e . c.:ee(|v e:ae(. i:em eae| aaeaaee .a(e
aae(ae:.iae(ae:«e:cs. .cea|ie:ma(.easa:e:ee(ecea| v.a|aaeaaee.a
eeae:a| .ae(. a(aeiae(aa| .(vei|aaeaaeesaac(ae.:oa:(.ea|a:| .aea. s(.e
.aea:aa(.eas
i ( . s (a:eaea(aese(aemes. a|:eacvo:esea(. a(aeLogical Investiga­
tions aac(aei:s(see(.easeiFormal and Transcendental Logic, (aa((ae
ve:vsa|(|eaacsoee.ie eaa:ae(e:ei(aeuasse:|.aaeaes(.eaaooea:s
1ae.cea|e|]ee(. s(aea|se| a(emece|ie:aave|]ee(«aa(eve: .ie:
e|]ee(s .a eeae:a| . ' i(. sa|«avsme:ee|]ee(.ve(aaa (ae :ea| e|]ee(.
6 I
This ideality of the object, i . e . , here, of the mathematical thing itself, i s not the
non-reality of the noema described i n Ideas I (especially § §88, 97f. ) . The l atter charac­
terizes the type of intentional i ncl usion of every noema i n conscious l i ved experience,
whatever the intended type of exi stent may be and however i t may be intended (even if
67
Introuctin to the Origin of Geometry
(aaa(aeaa(a:a|es.s(ea( re:.i(ae|a((e::es.s(se:eooesesaav(a.ae..(
«ea|ca|«avs|eaceiae(eemo.:.ea|sa|]ee(.v.(v1ae:eie:e .(ae:ea|
e|]ee(eaaaeve:a((a.a(aa(a|se| a(eO|]ee(.v.(v«a.eaeaa|eo:eoesec
ie:a||sa|]ee(.v.(v.aeeae:a|.a(ae.a(aae.||e.cea(.(vei.(ssease 1ae
eaes(.ea"how is any object in general possible? " assames.(ssaa:oes(
aacmes(aceeaa(eie:m. (aea. .a(aeOrigin, «aea uas se:| «eace:s
"How is ideal Objectivity possible? " ue:e (ae eaes(.ea a| sea((a.as.|s
e:ea(es(c.mea| (v.s.aee:eeea:se(e(aeaa(a:a|O|]ee(.v.(veia«e:|c|v
es.s(ea(.sae|eaee:oess.|| enes.ces .eaeeaav.ae:eaeaec(ae| eve|ei
.cea|O|]ee(.v.(v.«es(.||eaeeaa(e:seve:a|me:ecee:ees
Necea|(|aaeaaee. s (ae:eaea|vmaceaoei.cea|e|]ee(.v.(.es . ie:
esamo|e. (ae «e:cLowe |.eai eeea:s ea| veaee .a (ae Ce:maa | aa·
eaaee ..(. s.cea(.ea|(a:eaeaea(.(s.aaame:a|| ea((e:aaees|vaave. vea
oe:seas. | - | mec.ieci ·
1aas. (ae«e:c¬o· i aasaa.cea|O|]ee(.v.(vaac. cea(.(v.s. aee.(. s
ae( .cea(.ea| «.(a aav ei. (s emo. :.ea| . oaeae(.e . e: e:aoa.e ma(e·
:.a|.za(.eas i(.sa|«avs(aesame «e:c«a.ea.smeaa(aac:eeeea.zec
(a:eaeaa||oess.||e| .aea.s(.eees(a:es i aseia:as(a.s.cea|e|]ee(eea·
i:ea(s|aaeaaeeas saea.(ae|a((e:saooesesasoea(aaeeasaea(:a|.za·
(.eaei(aeiae(aa|es.s(eaeeei(aesoea|.aesa|]ee(. ei«e:cs. aacei
(ae(a.aeces.eaa(ecsoeeea[La parole], (aea.. sea|v(aeo:ae(.eeeiaa
. mmec.a(e e.ce(.e � ~ac:- ce Ha:a|( ae(es ve:v o:ee.se| v (aa( (ae
we are deal i ng wi th perception of a real thing) . However, there is no doubt that thi s
non-reality of the noema (a very difcult and deci si ve notion) may be what, in the last
anal ysi s, permits the repetition of sense as the "same" and makes the idealization of
identity i n general possible. Undoubtedl y, we coul d show this in a precise way on the
basi s of §62 of FTL, devoted to ' ' The I deali ty of All Species of Objectivities Over Against
the Constituti ng Consciousness" and the "universal ideality of all intentional unities"
(pp. 1 65-66).
tI2
The l i nguistic neutralization of exi stence is an original idea only in the technical and
thematic signifcation that phenomenology gives it. Is not this idea the favorite of Mal­
larme and Valery? Hegel above al l had ampl y expl ored it. In the Encyclopedia ( one of the
few Hegel i an works that Husserl seems to have read) , the l i on already testifes to thi s
neutralization as an exemplary martyr: "Confronting the nae-Lion-we no longer
have any need ei ther of an intuition of such an animal or even an image, but the nae
(when we understand i t) i s i ts simple and imageless representation; in the name we thi nk"
(§462) . (Thi s passage i s ci ted by Jean Hyppolite i n hi s Logique et existence: Essai sur La
logique de Hegel [Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France , 1 953] , p. 39, a work which , on
a great many points, lets the profound convergence of Hegelian and Husserlian thought
appear. )
Hegel also writes: "The frst act , by which Adam i s made master of the animal s, was to
i mpose on them a name, i . e . , he anni hi l ated them i n thei r existence ( as exi stents)"
( "System of 1 803- 1 804") . Cited by Maurice Blanchot i n La Part dufeu (Pari s: Gallimard,
1 949) , p. 325.
68
Jacques Derrida
"reduction is implicitly carried o.·-s. mo|voe:ie:mecaac ae(ve(mace
eso|.e.(-asseeaas|aaeaaee. seeas.ce:ecea.(se«aaeeeaa(
"|i'\
ue:e «e a:e eeaee¬ec «.(a (ae e.ce(.e :ecae(.ea. na(. oa:aces.·
ea||v.ie:(a.s:easea.(seemsme:ec.mea|((esav(aa(a(aeaea(«a.ea
mevesse|e|vea(ae|eve|ei |aaeaaee. saeeessa:. |v.a(aea((.(aceei(ae
phenomenological reduction ea: emoaas. si . .( . s se( seaa:e|v . a (ae
e.ce(.e«e:|ceis.ea.aea(.ease:oa:e| .vecesoe:.eaees
"|¡·1
re:.i(ae oaeaemeae|ee.ea|:ecae(.ea.s (a|ea .a.(sia||es(sease. .(
mas(a| seea(a.|(ae:ecae(.eaeieeas(.(a(ece. ce(.esaac(aeaei.(se«a
|aaeaaee 1aeo:eeaa(.eaeieae(a(.eama:|sea| vsa(.s| es(a.s.m·
oe:a(.ve.aaaeea. veea|iasa.ea1a.s(:aaseeacea(a|:ecae(.eaeie.ce·
(.es. «a.ea.a.(smes(:ac.ea|memea(mas(s(.||(a:a as|ae|(e«a:ca
ae« aac .::ecae.||v aeeessa:v e.ce(.e . (aa( ei oa:e eease.easaess.
e:ea(es .a eaee( seme eeas.ce:a||e c.mea|(.es uasse:| . s ve:v eea·
se.easei(a.saacaeesoeses(aesec.mea|(.es«.(a(aee:ea(es(e|a:.(v
. aIdeas i.
1ae:eie:e . (e (ae ve:v es(ea( (aa( |aaeaaee .s ae( aa(a:a| . .(
oa:aces.ea||v eae:s (ae mes( caaee:eas :es.s(aaee (e (ae oae·
aemeae|ee.ea| :ecae(.ea. aac (:aaseeacea(a| c.seea:se «.|| :ema.a
B:l The Idea of Phenomenology: Husser/ian Exemplarism, tr. Garry L. Breckon
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 974) , p. 1 28.
´`Ibid. [modifed] .
"Meanwhile we cannot disconnect transcendents indefnitel y, transcendental purif­
cation cannot mean the disconnection of all transcendents, since otherwise a pure con­
sciousness might i ndeed remain over, but no possbi lity [sic 1 of a science of pure con­
sciousness" (Ideas I, § 59, p. 1 59) . I n thi s section, devoted to the necessary but difcult
reduction of formal ontology and fonal logic once all the transcendents of the material
ei detics have been excluded, Husserl concludes in favor of the possibility of such a
reduction, provided the "logical axioms " are maintained, axioms (li ke the principle of
contradiction) " whose uni versal and absolute val idity" the description of pure con­
sciousness could "make transparent by the help of examples taken from the data of its
own domain" ( p. 1 60) . But he says nothing about the language of this ultimate science of
pure consciousness, about the language which at least seems to suppose the sphere of
fonal logic that we j ust excluded. For Husserl, the univocity of expression and certain
precautions taken within and with the help of language itself (di stinctions, quotation
marks, neologi sms, revaluation and reactivation of old words, and so on) wil l always be
sufcient guarantees of rigor and nonworl dliness.
That is why, despi te the remarkable analyses which are devoted to it , despite the
constant interest i t bears (from the Logical Investigations to the Origin) , the specific
problem of language-its origin and i ts usage i n a transcendental phenomenology-has
always been excl uded or deferred. Thi s is explicitly so in FTL (§2, p. 2 1 , and §5, p. 27)
and i n the Origin, where he has written: "we shall not go i nto the general problem which
also arises here of the origin of language i n i ts ideal existence and its exi stence in the real
world" ( 1 61 ) .
69
Introuctin to the Origin of Geometry
. ::ecae.||ve||.(e:a(ec|vaee:(a.aam|.eaeas«e:|c|.aess nv. mae·
.a.ae(aa((aeOrigin «.|| | :s(.ac.ea(e(aeoess.|.| .(veia. s(e:vas(ae
oess.|.|.(vei|aaeaaee.«ea:eea|ea| a(.aeae«c.mea| (. seve:va((emo(
(e :ecaee ..a seme a|(. ma(e aac :ac.ea| (:aaseeacea(a| :ee:ess.ea· a
oaeaemeae|eeveia. s(e:.e.(v ~acseeaeeme:e«e seeaee:(a.aaea·
ceoeaceaeeeeaa:mec.a(aa( oaeaemeae|eev
¯ Thi s is a di fculty that Fink has frequently underscored (particularly in hi s famous
article i n Kantstudien of 1 933 [ "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl
and Contemporary Cri ti ci sm"] ) . For hi m, the phenomenological reduction "cannot b
presented by means of simpl e sentences of the natural attitude. It can be spoken of only
by transforming the natural function of language" ( Letter of May 1 1 , 1 936, cited by
Gaston Berger, The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, tr. Kathleen McLaughl in [ Evanston:
Northwestern Uni versity Press. 1 972] , p. 49).
And i n his admirable lecture on " Les concepts operatoires dans la phenomenologie de
Husserl , " he attributes a certain equi vocation in the usage of operative concepts (that of
"constitution, " for exampl e) to the fact that "Husserl does not pose the problem of a
'transcendental language. ' " He wonders if, after the reduction, one can sti l l "have at hi s
di sposal a Logos i n the same sense as before" (i n Husserl, Cahiers de Royaumont, p.
229) .
Si mi larl y, concerning the expression "intentional life, " S. Bachelard evokes the
danger of " a surreptitious return to psychologi sm. " for " language does not know the
phenomenological reduction and so holds us in the natural attitude" (A Study of HusserI' s
Logi c, p. xxxi ) .
On the basis of the problems i n t he Origin, we can thus go on t o ask oursel ves, for
example , what i s the hi dden sense, the nonthematic and dogmatically received sense of
the word "hi story" or of the word "origin"-a sense which. as the common fous of
these signifi cations, permits us to di sti nguish between factual "hi story" and intentional
"hi story, " between "origin" i n the ordinary sense and phenomenological "origin, " and
so on. What i s the uni tary ground starting from whi ch this difraction of sense is permitted
and i ntelligible? What i s history, what i s the origin, about which we can say that we must
understand them sometimes in one sense, sometimes in another? So long as the notion of
origin in general i s not criticized as such, the radical vocation i s always threatened by thi s
mythology of the absolute beginning, so remarkably denounced by Feuerbach in hi s
"Contribution to the Critique of Hegel ' s Phi losophy" ( 1 839) ( cf. Maniestes
philosophiques, tr. L. AIthusser [Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires de France . 1 960] , pp.
1 8-2 1 ) .
These questions can show the need for a certain renewed and rigorous phi lological or
"etymological" thematic, which would precede the discourse of phenomenology. A
fonidable task, because it supposes that all the problems which it would have to precede
are resolved, in particular, as a matter of fact : the i nterloutory problem of history and
that of the possibility of a hi storical philology. I n any c
a
se, this task never seems to have
appeared urgent to Husserl , even when the i dea of l i ngui stic "reactivation" takes on so
much importance for him. Unlike Heidegger, he almost never indulges in etymological
variations, and when he does so (cf. FTL, § 1 , pp. 1 8-1 9) , it does not detenine but
fol l ows the orientation of the i nvestigation. For Husserl , it would be absurd for sense not
to precede--e jure (and here the de jure i s difcult to make clear rune evidence
difcile D-the act of language whose own value wi l l always b that of expression .
It is rather signifcant that every critical enterpri se, juri di cal or transcendental, is made
70
Jacques Derrid
na||ae «e:c s cee:ee ei. cea| O|]ee|.v.|v .s ea| v. «e eea|c sav.
primar. Oa|v«.|a.aa iae|e·a.s|e:.ea| |aaeaaee . s|ae aeaa"Lowe"
i:ee. aac |ae:eie:e . cea| . eemca:ec «. |a . |s seas. ||e. caeae|.e . e:
e:aca.e.aea:aa|.eas . na|.|:ema. asessea|.a||v|.ec.asaCe:maa«e:c.
|e a :ea| sca|.e|emce:a| .|v� .| :ema.as . a|e::e|a|ec .a . |s ve:v .cea|
O|]ee|.v.|v «.|a |ae ce iae|e es.s|eaeeeiae.vea |aaeaaee aac |aas
«.|a|aeiae|aa|sa|]ee|.v.|veiaee:|a.ascea|.aeeemmaa. |v i|s. cea|
O|]ee|.v.|v.s|aea:e|a|.veaacc.s|. aea. saa||eea|vasaaemc. :.ea|iae|
i:em|aa|ei|ae r:eaeae:Ðae| .sa«e:c lion. "
1ae:eie:e«ee:ess. a|eaa.eae:cee:eeei. cea|O|]ee|.v.|v-|e|as
ea||. | secondar-as seeaas«ecassi:em|ae«e:c| e|aeaa.|vei|ae
sease "lion, " i:em "the expression" |e «aa| uasse:| ea| | s .a |ae
Logical Investigations |ae "intentional content" e: |ae aa. |v ei . |s
s.ea.iea|.ea. 1aesame eea|ea|eaa|e. a|eacecs|a:|.aei:emseve:a|
vulnerable by the irreducible factuality and the natural naivete of its language. We be­
come conscious of this vulnerability or of this vocation to silence in a second reflection on
the possibility of the jur�dico-transcendental regression itself. Despite its necessarily
speCUlative style, this refection is always focused, without having to succumb to empiri­
cism, on the world of culture and history. Attentiveness to the "fact" of language in
which ajuridical thought lets itself be transcribed, in which juridicalness would like to be
completely transparent, is a retur to factuality as the de j ure character of the de jure
itself. It is a reduction of the reduction and opens the way to an infnite di scursiveness.
This explains why the retur on itself of thought which has never wanted to prescribe
anything but a turning back [rep/i]
t
oward its own proper conditions remains more dif­
fcult for the "master" than for the "disciple. " Did not Herder. in his Verstand und
Erfahrung: Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der rein en Verunft [Leipzig, 1 799; rpt. Bruxelles:
Culture et Civilisation, 1 969, 2 vols. ] . already reproach Kant for not taking into consid­
eration the intrinsic necessity of language and its immanence in the most apriori act of
thought? Did not the author of the Essay on the Origin of Language [tr. Alexander Gode
in On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1 966)] also conclude that
language, rooted in cultural experience and in history, made all aprioriness of s ynthetic
judgments impossible or illusory? The inability of received language to be treated themat­
ically, an inability which precedes every critical regression as its shadow-is not the
unavowed dogmatism he thus denounces that geschichtlose "Naivitit" about which
Fink wonders whether it i s not the basis for "phenomenology' s methodological revolu­
tion" (cf. "L' Analyse intentionnelle et Ie probleme de la pen see speculative" [French tr.
Walter Biemel and Jean Ladriere] , in Problemes actuels de La phenomenologie, ed. H. L.
Van Breda [Pari s: Desclee de Brouwer, 1 952], pp. 64-65)? That i s only one of the
numerous analogies which could be taken up between the diferent futures of Kantian and
Husserlian transcendental idealisms, such as they are already outlined. Thus, in any
case, an irreducible proximity of language to primordial thought is signified in a zone
which eludes by nature every phenomenal or thematic actuality. Is this immediacy the
nearess of thought to itself? We would have to show why that cannot be decided.
´´Vol . I , Introd. to Vol. I I of the German ed. , §5, and 1 , § 1 1 , particularly pp. 259 and
284-85. Like those of FTL, the analyses concering linguistic ideality in the Origin
71
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
|aaeaaees. aac. |s .cea| .cea|.|v assa:es . |s|:aas|a|a|.|.|v 1a. s. cea|
.cea|.|veiseaseesc:essec|v| .ea.leo, Lowe, aacseie:|a ..s|aeai:eec
i:ema||iae|aa| linguistic sa|]ee|.v. |v.
na| |ae "object" itsel . s ae.|ae: |ae esc:ess.ea ae: |ae sease·
eea|ea| 1ae resa aac ||eec |.ea. . a|eacec |a:eaea |«e s|:a|a ei
. cea|.|.es. . saaa|a:a| .aac|ae:eie:eeea|.aeea| .:ea| .|v.as|aece:eec·
|.eaei|ae. mmec.a|e| vc:esea|seas.||e|a. aee:eaacs.cea|.|.esaace:
|aesee.:eamsiaaees. se|aeeea|.aeeaevei|ae| .ea. see.ae|e:eve:|e:·
a|e . a |ae . cea|.|v ei|ae esc:ess. ea aac .a | aa| ei . |s sease. 1ae
|:aas|a|a|.|.|vei|ae«e:clion, |aea. «. ||ae|. ac:.ae.c|e|ea|se|a|e
aacaa.ve:sa| i|«.|||eemc. :.ea|| veeac.|.eaec|v|aeeea|.aeea|ea·
eeaa|e:. aa:eeec|.ve. a|a. | .eaeiseme|a. ae| .|e|ae| .ea.1ae|a||e:. s
ae|aae|]ee|. v. |vei|aeaace:s|aac.ae. ¯ |a|aa e|]ee|ei:eeec|.v·
.|v 1ae .cea| . |v ei . |s sease aac ei«aa| .| eve|es .::ecae.||v
acae:es|eaaemc.:.ea|sa|]ee|.v.|v.1a. s«ea|c|e|:aeevea.ia||mea
aac|eea a|| e|e aaceea|cin fact eaeeaa|e:aacces.eaa|e |ae |.ea.
uace:|aese e.:eams|aaees|ae | .e |eaceiae|eaa|a:ece|ee.ea| eea·
e:a|.|v«ea|cae||e:ecaeecaavia:|ae:1a.s. s|eeaase|ae.cea|.|vei
sease.eeas.ce:ec. a. |se|iaac| .|e|aa|ei| aaeaaee. .sae:ea"bound"
directly suppose the subtle as well as indispensable distinctions found in the LI (nos. 1-5) ,
especially in the first and fourth Investigations.
In the First Investigation, the notion of " intentional content" or "unity of its significa­
tion" announces in the linguistic sphere the notion of "noematic sense, " or the " nuclea­
tic layer" (Kernschicht) of the noema, a notion the former implies and which is fully
elaborated only in Ideas I (in particular, cf. §90, pp. 241 f. ). Just as the core unity of
noematic sense (which is not the reality of the object itself) can be intended according to
various intentional modes (the sense "tree" can be attained in a perception, a memory,
an imagining, and so on) in order fnally to constitute a "complete" noema with all its
characteristics, so the ideal identity of signifi cation is made accessible to several lan­
guages and allows itself to be "translated. " In the Foreword to the 2nd edition of LI
( 1 91 3 ; p. 48 of Vol. I of ET) , Husserl recognizes that the notion of noema and of the
noetic-noematic correlation lacks completion in the First Investigation.
´¨ Husserl used a great number of examples when analyzing this distinction for the fi rst
time i n the LI (I, 1 , particularly § 1 2, pp. 286-87).
´´The diference between these two types of Objectivity, which comes back to the
diference between ideal objectivity and real object, is amply described in E (§63 , pp.
250t. ) . The objectivities of the understanding are on a "higher level" than those of
receptivity. They are not preconstituted, like the latter, in the pure passivity of sensible
receptivity, but in predicative spontaneity. "The mode of their original pregivenness is
their production in the predicative activity of the Ego . . . " [po 25 1 ] . Another diference:
that of their temporality (§64). Whereas the real object has its individual place in the
objective time of the world, the irreal object i s, with respect to this latter, tot

.
lly free,
i . e. , "timeless. " But i ts timelessness (ZeitLosigkeit) or i ts supratemporality ( Uberzeit­
lichkeit) is only a "mode" of temporality: omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit).
7
Jacques Derrid
.cea|.|vaacae|a"free" eae 1a. sc. ssee.a(.ea|e|«eea"free idealities"
aac"bound idealities, " «a.ea.sea|v. mo|.ec.a(aeOrigin70 .|a|. ac.s·
oeasa||e ie: .(s aace:s(aac.ae· . eaa||esas |eeemo:eaeac «aa| (ae
a|se| a|e .cea|O|]ee(.v.(vei. ie:esamo|e. (aeeeeme(:.ea|e|]ee( eaa
|eaac«aa(c.s|.aea.saes.|i:em|aa(ei|aaeaaeeas such aaci:em|aa(
ei|ae sease·eea(ea(as such.
1ae.cea|O|]ee(.v.|veieeeme(:v.sa|se|a|eaac«. |aea(aav|.acei
|. m.|i(s.cea| . (v¯tertia¬¯. sae|eaee:ea| v|aa|ei|aeeso:ess.eae:.a·
(ea(.eaa|eea|ea( ..|. s|aa|ei|aeobject itself. ~| |acae:eaee|eaav:ea|
eea|.aeeaev.s:emevec1aeoess. |. | .(vei(:aas|a|.ea. «a.ea.s.cea(.·
ea| «.|a (aa(ei(:ac.(.ea. . seoeaecad infnitum: 1ae rv|aaee:eaa
(aee:em..aceeca||eieeeme|:v.es.s|sea|veaee. aema||e:ae«euea
e:evea.a«aa||aaeaaee.|mav|eeso:esseci | .s. cea|.ea||v(aesame
.a(ae e:.e.aa||aaeaaee eiÐae| . caac.aa|| |:aas|a(.eas .aac«. (a.a
eaea|aaeaaee.(.saea.a|aesame. aema(|e:ae«maav|. mes. | aas
|eeaseas.||va((e:ec.i:em(aee:.e.aa|eso:ess.eaaac«:.(.ae·ce«a(e
|ae .aaame:a||ee:a|a|(e:aaeese:«:. ||eaaac e(ae:ceeamea(a|.eas
(Dokumentierungen) " . | -º·
1ae sease eiea|veaee e:eieaee aac ie: a| | . wa.ea .s |ae
essea(.a|meceei(aee|]ee( s. cea|es. s|eaeeaac(aas|aa(«a.eac.s·
| .aea.saes |ae e|]ee(i:em (aema| (. o|.e.(v ei:e|a(ec ae(saac|. vec
esoe:.eaees. seems(eaave|eeae|ea:|vceaaec.a(aeseve:v(e:ms|v
ue:|a:|(Pschologie als Wissenschaft, i i . § i :º. o 1 75) aac(a|eaao
aea.a|vuasse:| .1ae|a((e:.:eeeea.z.ae(aa(aee«esmaea|eue:|a:(
aaco:a.s.aea.mie:aav.aec.s(. aea. saec|e|(e:(aaakaa(|e|«eea|ae
`´ From the perspective of our text, this dissociation fi nds its most direct and illuminat­
ing explication in E (§65, p. 267). In particular, we can read there: "Thus it appears that
even cultural systems are not always completely free idealities, and this reveals the
diference between free idealities (such as logicomathematical systems and pure essential
structures of every kind) and bound idealities, which in their being-sense carry reality
with them and hence belong to the real world. All reality is here led back to spatiotempo­
rality as the form of the individual . But originally, reality belongs to nature : the world as
the world of realities receives its individuality from nature as its lowest stratum. When
we speak of truths, true states of afairs in the sense of theoretical science, and of the fact
that validity 'once and for all' and 'for everyone' belongs to their sense as the telos of
j udicative stipulation, then these are free idealities. They are bound to no territory, or
rather, they have their territory in the totality of the [mundane] universe and in every
possible universe. In what concers their possible reactivation, they are omnispatial and
omnitemporal. Bound realities [the German and Derrida' s translation thereof reads:
Bound idealities] are bound to Earth, to Mars, to particular territories, etc. " (Husserl ' s
emphasis) . Husserl immediately specifes, however, that by their "occurrence, " by their
coming on the scene and their " 'being discovered' " in a historically determined territory,
free idealities are also factual and worldly. Thus he states the crucial difculty of all his phi­
losophy of history: what is the sense of this last factuality?
73
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
|ee.ea|aac|aeosveae|ee.ea| . :eo:eaeaesa. m. aeae(ae| ess. ie:aav.ae
eeaiasec.cea|.(vaacae:ma|.v.|v(LI, i . r:e| . §59, oo : | --i s·
1a.s :eo:eaea . s ve:v ea|.ea(ea.ae. s.aee a|se|a|e|v e|]ee| .ve.
|:aas|a(a||e. aac (:ac.|.eaa| .cea| .cea(.|v .s ae|]as|aaveeeme(:.ea|
e|]ee|.v.|v. |a|genuine e|]ee|.v.(v Oaee «e ee( |eveac |ae |eaac
.cea|.(. es aac :eaea .cea| e|]ee(.v.(v .(se|i. «e eaa s(.|| eaeeaa(e: a
iae|aa| :es|:.e(.ea . |aa| ei c.sva|ae . ia| seaess. e: ca(ecaess
[eremption] . Necea|(|aee|]ee(.veseaseeiaia| se] acemea|. sa| se
.cea| re:|a.s:easea.(eaa|e.ace| a.|e|v:eoea(ecaac|aas|eeemes
ema.(emoe:a| 71 na(|ae e:.e.aaac |ae oess.|. |.|vei|a. s.cea|ema.·
|emoe:a|.(v:ema.ama:|ec|vaiae(aa|eea|.aeeaev.(aa|ei(ae:ea|.|v
.a|eacec |v |ae]acemea| e: (aa( ei sa|]ee|.ve ae|s 1aas . .a ce·
se:.o(.ve]acemea| s|ea:.aeea«e:|c| v:ea| .|. es. seaseeaa|ese .|sva·
|.c.(v«.|aea|s.ma|(aaeeas|v| es.ae.|sema.(emoe:a|.cea| .(v re:.|e
|a|eaouasse:| sesamo|eaea. a. I eaa.ace| a.|e| v:eoea|.as(aesame,
(ae o:eoes.(.ea 1ae aa|eme|.|e .s |ae ias(es| meaas ei (:ave| .
«ae:easi|ae«. || e|eia| seaacea(·ei·ca|e 1aeaaaea:eaveiva|. c. (v
.aae«avaaee|s(ae.a(emoe:a|.|v[uchronie] e:oaa|emoe:a| .|v[an­
chronie] ei .cea|.(v i.|e«.se. .a (ae .a|e:eeaaee|.eas ei a aea·
cese:.o|.vese.eaee saeaaseeeme(:v. e::e:a| se aas a eea(ea( «a.ea
eaa |eeeme .cea| aac ema. |emoe:a| .e::e: :esa||s e.(ae: i:em (ae
´ ' Once again it is in Experience and Judgment that the omnitemporality of simple
ideality is scrupulously distinguished from the omnitemporality of validity : " Furthermore,
it should be noted that this omnitemporality does not simply include within itself the
omnitemporality of validity. We do not speak here of validity, of truth, but merely of
objectivities of the understanding as suppositions [Vermeinheiten] and as possible, ideal­
identical, intentional poles, which can be ' realized' anew at any time in individual acts of
judgment-precisely as suppositions; whether they are realized in the self-evidence of
truth is another question. A judgment which was once true can cease to be true, like the
proposition 'The automobile is the fastest means of travel , ' which lost its validity in the
age of the airplane. Nevertheless, it can be constituted anew at any time as one and
identical by any individual in the self-evidence of distinctness: and, as a supposition, it
has its supratemporal. irreal identity" (§64 C . p. 26 1 [modifed)) . Also cf. LI. I. I , § I I , p .
285.
In the Origin Husserl also alludes to the ideal identity of judgments which not only
would be anachronistic in their validity but also contradictory and absurd in their sense­
content. These analyses, at the same time that they announce and orient a phenomenol­
ogy of the specific ideality of negative validities (of the fal se , the absurd, the evi l , the
ugly, etc. ) , assign limits to the "freedom" of those idealities which will always be, as we
wiII soon try to show, idealities "bound" to an empirical, determined temporality or to
some factuality. For what absolutely frees and completes the ideality of sense (alrady
endowed in itself with a certain degree of "freedom") is the ideality of positive validity
(by which evidence is not only distinct but clear when it reaches judgment) . It alone
causes sense to attain infi nite universality and infinite omnitemporality.
74
Jacques Derrid
|ee.ee·cecae(.veaaac|.aeeisvm|e|s«a.eaa:eve.cei(ae.:seaseaac
. a(e «a.ea. aa|ae«a(e as. a seas.||e iae(aa|.(v . s :e.a(:ecaeec. e:
i:em semeosveae|ee.ea|eea(.aeeaevaav.aeae sease . aeemoa:.sea
«.(aeeeme(:.ea|(:a(a· 1aeeea(ea(eie::e:eaa |eeeme saea evea
«aea .. a e::e: e: assamo(.ea· . eaee (ae s(:a(a ei a|:eacv ceiaec
. cea|.(.es . s(:ave:sec. «e aave ae(:eaeaec(ae(:a(aeieeeme(:.ea|
Sachverhalt, 72 aacevea«aea(aeve:v(aemeei(aes(a(emea(:ema.as
|eaac(eiae(aa| .(v1ae.cea| .(veiseasesvm|e|.ea||voa(sao«.(aa
ce| acec e: . aaa(aea(.ea||v sa(. siec (:a(a·. a(ea(.ea7:; i( ie||e«s.
(aea.(aa(. i(aeema.(emoe:a|.(veic.sva|ae. soess.||e.. (. sa|«avs. a
(aeseaseeiemo.:.ea| oess. |. |.(v. . e . eieea(.aeea(evea(aa| .(v ne·
s.ces. ema.(emoe:a|.(v. sma.a(a.aec. a. (seventualit ea|v|vasease
«a.eaa|«avs |eeos aoaee:(a.aessea(.a|:e|a(.ea«.(a(aea|sea(e:
eseeecec(:a(a.1a.s.s|eeaasei|ae«(aa(saeaaaea(ca(eco:eoes.·
(.eahad been true aacs(.||:ema.asaa.iecaacaa. ma(ec|vaa. a(ea(.ea
ei(:a(a. aa(aea(.e.(v. e:e|a:.(vk|.·|e/·, (aese(e:msa:e .aee:·
(a.a:esoee(ssvaeavmsie:uasse:|(aa(ieaama.a(a.aaac:eoea((ae
.cea| aa.(vei.(s sease ~aevea(aa||vabsurd intention, a|sa:c .a(ae
seaseeiaeaseasee:eeaa(e:sease . ¯(e|e«aa(.(. s. mas(eea(.aa·
a||voe.a(..aso.(eei. (se|n(e«a:c(aetelos eiaa(aea(.e.(vaac|e(.(se|i
|eea.cecsvm|e|.ea||v|v.(. a(aeve:vees(a:e.a«a.ea(ae.a(ea(.ea
o:e(eacs(e|ec.se:.ea(ec.1a.s.a(ea(.eamas(.. a(aeÐa:ve|e.aa| aa·
eaaee«a.ea(aeStranger ei(aeSophist soea|s· e«aao(e [dire] (ae
telos . ae:ce:(ec.se«a[de dire ] .(
1a.s (:aase:ess.ea ei |.aea. s(.e . cea|.(v. (aea. :ea||v cese:.|es a
mevemea(aaa|eeeas(e«aa(«eea:|.e:cese:.|ec se. eaee«asaea|·
(o:a|ie:m. |a(.(s oa:eoess.|.|.(vaooea:ecas(aeoa:eoess.|.|.(vei
`¯ A notion difcult to translate other than by the clumsy, strange, and l ess exact (but
for so long accepted) expression "state-of-afairs. "
``´ I n the LI, I . 1 , § 1 1 , pp. 285-86, these themes are already greatly explicated. For
example, Husserl writes: "What my assertion asserts, the content that the three perpen­
diculars of a triangle intersect in a point, neither arises nor passes away. (The frst
German edition and the French translation continue: " Each time I (or whoever else it
may b) pronounce with the same sense this same assertion, there i s a new judgment .
. . . But what they judge, what the assertion says, is all the same thing. "] It is an identity
in the strict sense, one and the sae geometrical truth.
" It i s the same in the case of aB assertions, even if what they assert is false and absurd.
Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts (of] afrming
or asserting it: it i s the sigifcation of the assertion, a unity in pluraity. . . .
"If ' possibility' or ' truth' is lacking, an assertion' s intention can only be carried out
symbolically: it cannot derive any 'fulness' from intuition or frm the categorial functions
performed on the latter, in which 'fulness' its value for knowledge consists. It then lacks,
as one says, a ' true' , a 'genuine' signifcation. Later we shall look more closely into this
distinction between intending and fulflling signifcation" (modifed] .
75
I ntroductin to the Origin ofGeometry
ea|(a:e ea| v aue: a :ecae(. ea ei eve:v ce iae(e ea|(a:e se ae:e
se. �aee. s. |.|e |aaeaaees aac |aaeaaee .aeeae:a| . eae ei(ae ie:ms
ei . cea|

O|·ee(. v.(v. |a( . (s oa:e oess.|.|.(v aooea:s ea|v (a:eaea
a:ecae(.eaeia|||aaeaaee-ae(ea|veieve:vceiae(e|aaeaaee|a(ei
(ae

i�e(ei|aaeaaee.aeeae:a| . 1aasuasse:|soee.aes.aaaa|se|a(e|v
ce..s.vesea(eaee na((ae. cea|.(. eseieeeme(:.ea|«e:cs sea(eaees
(aee:. es·eeas. ce:ec oa:e|v as |.aea.s(.e ie:ma(.eas-a;e ae( (a�
.cea|.(

. es (aa( ma|e ao «aa( .s eso:essec aac |:eaea((e va|.c.(v as
(:a(? M eeeme(:v. (ae |a((e: a:e .cea| eeeme(:.ea| e|]ee(s. s(a(es ei
aaa.:s.

e(e.wae:eve:seme(a.ae.sasse:(ec.eaeeaac.s(.aea.sa«aa(. s
(aema(.e . (aa( a|ea( «a.ea .( . s sa. c ..(s sease· . i:em (ae asse:(.ea
«a.ea .(se|i.ca:.ae(aeasse:(.ae.. saeve:aaceaaaeve:|e(aema(.e�
~ac (ae (aemeae:e .s o:ee.se|v.cea|e|]ee(.v.(.es. aac ea.(ec.ae:ea(
eaes i:em (aese eem.ae aace: (ae eeaeeo( ei |aaeaaee .| - |
mec.iecì · ··
ie( as i:s(ae(e (aa( .a (a. ssea(eaee(aeseaseei(aeasse:(.ea (ae
: (ae�e¯a|ea(«a.ea seme(a.aei.ssa.c. aac(aee|·ee(. (se|f a:e
.cea(.ea| .aiae(«a.eaeea|caeve::esa|(.a(aeeaseei:ea|e|·ee(se:ei
: |e�ac .cea| e|·ee(.v.(.es re: (ae i:s( (.me. «. (a (ae a|se|a(e
. cea|.(v ei aa e|·ee(-(ae eeeme(:.ea| e|]ee( «a.ea . s (a:eaea aac
(a:eaeaea|v(aeaa.(v ei.(s (:ae sease-«e oass |eveace::.cea:·
se|vesei(ae. cea| .|a(s(.|||eaac. O|· ee(.v.(vei|aaeaaeewes.ma|·
(aaeeas|v�eae? �aO|·ee�. v.(v(aa(. sa|se|a(e|vi:ee«.(a:esoee((ea||
iae�aa|

s�|¡ee(.v.(v1aa(.s«av(aeesemo|a:veaes(.eaei(aee:.e.aei
O|¡ee(.v.(vee�|c

ae(|eas|ecao:eoes| .aea. s(.e.cea|.(vassaea.|a(
ao:eoes«aa( . sm(eacec ae:ess[d travers ] aac ea(aee(ae:s. ce ei
[�u-�eld de] (a.s.cea|.(v.na(as(aea|se|a(e. cea|e|·ee(.v.(vceesae(
|.veM atapas ouranios, .(ie||e«s(aa(.
1 . �(si:e�?em«.(a:esoee((e a|| iae(aa|sa|]ee(.v.(v aas ea|v|a.c
|a:e.(s|ee. (. ma(e[de droit ] (.es«.(aa(:aaseeacea(a|sa|·ee(.v.(v.
2. . (s a.s(e:.e.(v.s .a(:.as.eaacessea(.a| .
Taas�aesoaeeie:atranscendental historicit .so:ese:.|ec.a a||. (s
�me�a(.ec�o(a. ~i:e:aav.aece(e:m.aecaaco:ev. cecaeeess.«. (aa||
.(s c.uea|(.es· (e (a.s soaee . uasse:| eaa (aea as| (ae a. s(e:.ee·
`` By the distinction they propose, these sentence.s give the greatest and most
exemplary sharpness to the central question of the Origin. Husserl added them after the
fact
.
to Fink' s typed version of the manuscript. They do not appear in the published
verSIon of 1 939.
At the end of a similar analysis, Husserl writes in FL: loutions "are not thematic
ends but theme-indicators" (§5 , p. 27).
76
Jacques Derrid
(:aaseeacea(a|eaes(.ea«a.eaieeasesa|| (ae c.sea.e(ace eia.s (ex(
Oa:o:e||emae«eeaee:aso:ee. se|v(ae. cea|e|]ee(.v.(.es«a.eaa:e
(aema(.e.aeeeme(:vae«ceeseeeme(:.ea|. cea| .(v·as(|.|e(aa(eia||
se.eaees·o:eeeeci:em .(s o:. ma:v .a(:aoe:seaa|e:. e. a. «ae:e .( . sa
ie:ma(.eao:ecaeec«. (a. a(ae eease.eas soaeeei(ae i:s(.avea(e: s
sea| . (e.(s . cea|O|]ee(.v.(v:( 1 6 1 mec.ieci ·
VI
uasse:| s :esoease.sc.:ee(aaceemesve:vea.e||v. i(aas(aes(v|e
eiaturnabout «a.eaeaa|esa:o:.s.ae. icea|.(veemes(e.(sO|]ee(. v. (v
|v meaas ei |aaeaaee. (a:eaea «a.ea .( :eee. ves. se (e soea|. .(s
|.aea. s(.eresa( 1 6 1 mec.ieci · .uasse:|ae(es(aa(«esee(a.s. a
acvaaee 1aeea|v eaes(.ea. (aea. . s ae« (Quomodo): ae« cees
| .aea.s(.e. aea:aa(.eama|eea(ei(aeme:e|v.a(:asa|]ee(.veie:ma(.ea
(aeObjective, (aa(«a.ea. ie:examo|e.aseeeme(:.ea|eeaeeo(e:s(a(e
eiaaa. :s..s. aae(aa|iae(o:esea(. .a(e||.e.||eie:a|| .ae«aaca|«avs.
a|:eacv|e.aeva|.c. a. ( s| .aea.s(.eexo:ess.eaaseeeme(:.ea|c.seea:se.
as eeeme(:.ea| o:eoes.(.ea .a .(s eeeme(:.ea| .cea| sease: ( 1 6 1
mec.iecì · .
we m.ea(|esa:o:. sec. ~r(e:aav.aeseoa(.ea(|vex(:ae(ec(ae(ae·
ma(.e(:a(aeiSachverhalt i:em| .aea.s(.e. cea|.(vaaci:ema|||eaac
.cea|. (. es. uasse:|(aeaseems(eredescend (e«a:c|aaeaaeeas(ae .a·
c.soeasa||emec. amaaceeac.(.eaeioess.|.| .(vie:a|se|a(e.cea|O|·
]ee(.v.(v. ie:truth .(se|i. «a.ea«ea|c |e «aa( .(.s ea| v (a:eaea .(s
a.s(e:.ea|aac.a(e:sa|]ee(.vee.:ea|a(.ea.1aas. ceesuasse:|ae(come
back (e|aaeaaee.ea|(a:e. aaca.s(e:v.a||ei«a.eaae:ecaeec.ae:ce:
(eaave(aeoa:eoess.|.| .(vei(:a(aeme:ee:isaeae(|eaacaea.a(e
|eac. a(ea.s(e:v(aa(«aesea|se|a(ei:eecemae]as(cese:. |ec:r:em
(aeaea. «.||aeae(|eeemoe||ec(e:emevea||(ae:ecae(.eass(eo|v
s(eo. .ae:ce:(e:eeeve:iaa||v(aereal (ex(eia. s(e:.ea|exoe:.eaee�
i a:ea| .(v-aac «e (a.a| .( (ae mes( . a(e:es(.ae c.mea|(v ei (a.s
(ex(-uasse:|ceesexae(|v(aeeooes.(e. 1a.sreturn (e|aaeaaee. asa
return home (eea|(a:eaaca.s(e:v.aeeae:a| .|:. aes(e.(siaa|eemo|e·
(.ea(aeoa:oeseei(ae:ecae(.ea. (se|i. Ce.ae|eveac |eaac.cea|.·
(.es(e«a:c(ae(aemeei(:a(a. s.(se|ia:ecae(.ea«a.eama|es(ae
.aceoeaceaeeei(:a(aaooea:«.(a:esoee((ea||ceiae(e ea|(a:eaac
|aaeaaee. aeeae:a| .na(eaeeme:e.(. sea|vaeaes(.eaei�. se|es.ae

a
]a:. c.ea|aac(:aaseeacea(a|ceoeaceaee. Necea|(eeeme(nea|(:a(a. s
|eveac eve:v oa:(.ea|a: aac iae(aa| | . aea.s(. e ae|cassaea. eae ie:
«a.eaeve:vsa|]ee(soea|.aeace(e:m.aec|aaeaaeeaac|e|eae.ae(ea
77
I ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry
ce(e:m.aecea|(a:a|eemmaa.(v.s. arae(:esoeas.||e.na((aeO|]ee(.v·
.(vei(a. s(:a(aeea|cnot |eeeas(.(a(ecwithout (aepure possibility eiaa
.aea.:v.a(eaoa:e|aaeaaee.aeeae:a| w.(aea((a. soa:eaacessea(.a|
oess.|.|.(v. (aeeeeme(:. ea|ie:ma(.ea«ea|c:ema.a.aera||eaacse| .·
(a:v. 1aea.( «ea|c |eabsolutely bound to the psychological lie of a
factual individual, (e(aa(eiaiae(aa|eemmaa.(v..aceec(eaoa:(.ea|a:
memea(ei(aa(|.ie. i(«ea|c|eeemeae.(ae:ema.(emoe:a| .ae:.a(e|·
|.e.||e ie:a| | . .(«ea|c ae(|e«aa(.(. s. · wae(ae:eeeme(:v eaa|e
soe�eaa|ea(.sae( . (aea. (aeex(:.as.eaacaee.cea(a|oess.|. |.(veia
ia|| . a(e (ae |ecv eisoeeea e:eia s| .o .a(e a a. s(e:.ea| mevemea(.
soeeea. sae|eaee:s. mo|v(aeexo:ess.ea(Aiisserung) ei«aa(.w.(aea(
.(. «ea|calready |eaa e|]ee( eaaea(aea.a.a. (so:.me:c.a|oa:.(v.
soeeeaconstitutes (ae e|]ee(aac .s a eeae:e(e]a:.c.ea| eeac.(.ea ei
(:a(a.1aeoa:acex.s(aa(.«.(aea((aeaooa:ea(ia|||ae|.a(e|aaeaaee
aac(ae:e|v. a(ea. s(e:v.aia||«a.ea«ea|ca|.eaa(e(ae.cea|oa:.(vei
sease.sease«ea|c:ema.aaaemo. :.ea|ie:ma(.ea.mo:.seaecasiae(.a
aosveae|ee.ea|sa|]ee(.v.(v»the inventor' s head. u.s(e:.ea|.aea:aa·
(.ease(si:ee(ae(:aaseeacea(a| ..as(eacei|.ac.ae. ( 1a. s|as(ae(.ea.
(ae(:aaseeacea(a| . mas((aea|e :e(aeaea(
Dees(a.sa|(.ma(e:ecae(.ea.«a.eaeoeasea(ea(:aaseeacea(a||aa·
eaaee.:eve|a(.ea.zeuasse:| s(aeaea(:·Dees (a. s:e(a:a(e(aesoea|·
. aesa|]ee(as«aa(eeas(.(a(es(ae.cea|e|]ee(.aac(aeaa|se|a(eO|·
]ee(. v.(v. o:eeeec (e eea(:ac.e( a o:ev.eas oa. |eseoav ei|aaeaaee:
He:|eaa·rea(vsoea|seia s(:.|.aeeea(:as(.a(a.s:esoee(|e(«eea
(aeOrigin ea(aeeaeaaacaac(aeLogical Investigations ea(aee(ae: ·¯
73 According to the same movement, omnitemporality and universal intelligibility (al­
though they may be concrete and experienced as such) are only the reduction of
f

�tual historical temporality and factual geographical spatial ity. "Supratemporality"
( Uberzeitlichkeit) and "timelessness" (Zeit/osigkeit) are defined i n their transcendence or
their negativity only in relation to worldly and factual temporality. Once the latter is
reduced, they appear as omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). the concrete mode of temporal­
ity in general.
´´ The expression "transcendental language" that we use here does not have the sense
o�"t�anscendental discourse. " This latter notion, invoked earlier, has been utilized by
�lOk 10 the sense of discourse adapted to transcendental description. Here we are speak-
1 09 of transcendental language insofar as, on the one hand, the l atter is "constituting"
compared with ideal Objectivity, and, on the other hand, insofar as it i s not confused in
its pure possibility with any de facto empirical language.
´´ Cf. "On the Phenomenology of Language, " in Merleau-Ponty' s Signs. tr. Richard C.
McCleary (Evanston: Northwester University Press, 1 964) , p. 84, or even
"Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, " tr. John Wild in Merleau-Ponty' s The Pri­
macy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwester University Press,
1 964) , pp. 83-84.
78
Jacques Derrid
uacea|(ec| v(aeLogical Investigations «�s

mere .a(e:e�(�c ea| v . a
«aa(ee::esoeacs( eai:s(oaaseeiceseoo(.ea�a(aeOrzgln: (aea�·
(eaemveieeas(.(a(ec.cea| e|]ee(seemoa:ec�. (� �| aaeaaee(a�(.·
.(se|ieeas(.(a(ec na(. a:eae(.eaaea.as(asa|·ee(.».s(osveae|ee.sm.
(ae eaes(.ea .s a|e»e a|| (e c.ssee.a(e (ae .cea|

e|]ee( i:em a| �

sa|·
·ee(. ».(v aaca|| emo.:.ea| |aaeaaee. |e�a e

i«a

.ea

eea�c ea|v eea·
iase (ae(:aasoa:ea( . aa. »eea| . aace|·ee(.»es.eaie

a(.easoia

oa:e
| ee.e na((ae:e(a:a(e(aeo:. me:c.a|.(vei(aesoeasmesa|·ee(.·ae
me:e . a eea(:as( «.(a (a.s i:s( aoo:e�ea (e |aaeaaee

(a�a

(a


. cea| . smeiIdeas I . s. as«as(aeaea(. «.(a(aeaooa

:ea(

|�e.e. sm
e: :ea| . sm ei(aeLogical Investigations. 1aeeaes(.ea .··. �o|v(e
oa:ea(aes.zeeeas(.(a(ec|aaeaaee.«a.ea.s«�a(uasse�|

eea�maes(e
ce .a Formal and Transcendental Logic and m (ae Orzgl n, m e:ce:.
sa|seeaea(| v. (e |e( (ae e:.e.aa| .(v eieeas(.(a(.»e |aaeaaee eeme(e
|.ea(

i 1econstitute aa.cea|e|]ee(.s(eoa(.(a((aeoe:maaea(c. ·oe·.(.ea ?
aoa:e eaze Ne«. |eie:e |e.ae (ae eeas(.(a(ec aac eseeec�c a�s.

| ·
.a:v eiaaae( «a.ea o:eeeecs (e«a:c (ae (:�(a ei sease. | mea. s(.

.
.cea|.(v .s (ae m.|.ea .a «a.ea (ae .cea| e|·ee( se((|es as «�a( .·
sec.mea(ece:ceoes.(ecna(ae:e(aeae(eio:. me:c.a|depositing .� ae(
(ae:eee:c.aeeiao:.»a(e(a.ae.|a((aeo:ecae(.eaeiacommon e|·ee( .
. e .eiaaobject «aesee:. e. aa|e«ae:.s(aasc. soesses�ec1aas|aa·
eaaee o:ese:»es (:a(a. se (aa( (:a(

a ea� |e:eea:cec .a (ae a

eaee·
ie:(a aeaeoaeme:a|. | |am. aa(.eaei.(· se·ea:a. |a(�| se se(aa(.(eaa
|eae(aea (aa( s(av. re: (ae:e «ea|c |e ae (:a(a «.(ae�( (aa( «e:c·
aea:c. ae [thesaurisation] , «a.ea . s ae( ea

| v«aa(
.
deposlts aac seeos
ae|cei(ae(:a(a.|a(a|se(aa(«.(aea(wa..aaproJect ei(:a(aaac(�e
.ceaeiaa. aia.(e(ass«ea|c|eaa. mae.aa||e 1aa(.s«av|aaea

aee.·
(aee|emea(ei(ae ea| v(:ac.(.ea.a«a.ea.|eveac. ac.».caa|im(ace·
sease·:e(ea(.eaaacsease·o:esoee(.aea:eoess.||e
ia (a. s :esoee( (ae:e .s se | .((|e c.seea(.aa.(v e:eea(:as( |e(«eea
uasse:| sea:| .es(aac|a(es((aeaea((aa(«eiacoaees.

a(�eLogic�l
Investigations «a.eaeea|c|e. ase:.|ec«.(aea(�ec.iea(.ea.

(a�
.
Orz­
gin ' oaeesea(aeessea(.a|iaae(.eaeiDokumentlerung, ea(ae spmtual
cor�oreality" ei|aaeaaee. aacea(aes(a(e�ea(as(a� ia|i||.aeei(ae
(:a(a·.a(ea(.ea 1a.s . s a|| (ae me:e se .i«e eeas.ce:Formal and
´` Thus, for example, Husserl writes: "All theoretical research, though by no mea�s
solely conducted in acts of verbal expression or complete
,
state�ent, none the less termi­
nates i n such statement. Only in this form can truth, and 10 particular t
.
he truth of theory,
become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available tr�asure for
knowledge and advancing research. Whatever the connection of thought with speech
may be , whether or not the appearance of our fnal judgements in the form of verbal
79
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
Transcendental Logic .oa:(.ea|a:| v§§ 1 -5, oo 1 8-29) aac(aeCartesian
Meditations (§4, o. I I ) . Ðaea(.me .uasse:||ee. as|vao:ee(.ae(aeaea(
i:em«aa(. («ea|c|e se|e|v. . a(aeae(ei»e:|a|eso:ess.ea. .a
e:ce:(e soee.iv (aea (aa( .(eea|c ae( |eeeme (:a(a «.(aea((aa(
"stating" aac"communicating . . . to others, " ei«a.eaaea| sesoese
. a(aeInvestigations (LI, i. i a(:e ve| II eiCe:maaÐc . §3, o255) .
re:..s(ae:eeeea.(.ea.a|aaeaaeeei«aa(constitutes a|se| a(e.cea|
O|]ee(.».(v.asia:as. (states (a.sO|]ee(.».(v. ae(]as(aae(ae:«avei
aaaeaae.ae e: :eoea(.ae (aa( (:aaseeacea(a| .a(e:sa|]ee(.».(v .s (ae
eeac.(.eaeiO|]ee(.».(v:~(|e((em. (aeo:e||emeieeeme(:v s e:.e.a
oa(s (ae o:e||em ei(ae eeas(.(a(.ea ei. a(e:sa|]ee(.».(v ea oa:«.(a
(aa( ei(aeoaeaemeae|ee.ea|e:.e.aei|aaeaaee. uasse:| . s»e:veea·
se.easei(a. s na(ae«.||ae(a((emo((a.sc.mea|(:ee:ess.ea. a(ae
Origin, a|(aeaea ae savs .( a:.ses ae:e ( 1 6 1 ) . re: (ae memea( .(
samees(esae«..iae(how, a(|eas(that |aaeaaeeaaceease.easaessei
ie||e« aamaa.(v a:e . a(e::e|a(ec oess.|. |.(.es aac a|:eacv e.»ea (ae
memea((aeoess. |.|.(veise.eaee. ses(a|| .saec1aeae:.zeaeiie||e«
maas.acsaooeses(aeae:.zeaei(ae«e:|c..(s(aacsea(aaca:(.ea|a(es
. (saa.(v aea. as([se detache et articule son unite sur] (ae aa.(v ei(ae
«e:| c. Oieea:se. (ae «e:|c aac ie||e« maas.ac ae:e ces.eaa(e (ae
a||·.ae|as.»e .|a(. a| a.(e|veoea. aa. (veioess.||eesoe:.eaeesaacae(
(a. s«e:|c :.ea(ae:e . (aeseie||e«mea :.ea(ae:e.«aeseiae(aa| .(vie:
uasse:| .s ae»e:aav(a.ae |a( a »a:.a||e esamo|e. Cease.easaessei
|e. ae·.aeemmaa.(v.aeaeaac(aesame«e:|ces(a||.saes(aeoess.|.|·
.(veiaaa.»e:sa||aaeaaee Haas.ac. s| :s(eease.easei.(se|t asaa
. mmec.a(eaac mec.a(e|.aea.s(.eeemmaa.(v ( 1 62) .
iaeeaaee(.ea «.(a (a. s«eaeec(eae(e(a:ee. moe:(aa(oe. a(s
i w.(a.a(aeae:.zeaei(a. seease.easaesseiie||e«maas.ac. .(. s
ma(a:e .ae:ma| maas. ac(aa(. so:. ».|eeec

|e(aas(aeae:.zea
eie. ».| . za(.ea aacas (ae|. aea. s(.eeemmaa.(v ( 1 62) . 1ae(aeme ei
pronouncements has a necessary grounding i n essence, i t is at least plain that judgements
stemming from higher intellectual regions, and in particular from the regions of science,
could barely arise without verbal expression" (LI, I , Introd. to Vol . II of German ed. , §2,
p. 250) .
7! Already in FTL, on the subject of the "idealizing presuppositions of logic" and tying
the problem of constitution with that of expression, Husserl concluded: " The problem of
constitution is again broadened when we recall that verbal expression, which we excluded
from our considerations of logic, i s an essential presupposition for intersubjective think­
ing and for an intersubjectivity of the theory accepted as ideally existing; and that accord­
i ngly an ideal identifability of the expression, as expression, must likewise raise a prob­
lem of constitution" (§73, p. 1 88) .
80
Jacques Derrida
aca| ( ae:ma|.(v. «a.ea (ee| ao me:e aac me:e :eem .a uasse:| s
aaa|vses. . s ae:e(:ea(ecas ama((e:ei eea:se.we«.||ae(s(:ess(a. s.·
ceso.(e (ae se:.eas o:e||ems (aa( .( seems (e aave �e oose �e: a
(:aaseeacea(a|oa.|eseoav.ae«eaama(a:.(vaacae:maa(ve.ve:.se(e
a:.ee:eas(:aaseeacea(a|·e.ce(.ece(e:m.aa(.ea:Cea|caca|(ae:ma|.(v
eve:|eeeas.ce:ece(ae:(aaaasaaemo.:.ea|aaciae(aa|modifcation
eiaa.ve:sa|(:aaseeacea(a|ae:ms.a(aee|ass.esease.i:em«a.eaeea·
(.aaa||vs(em(aesee(ae:emo.:.ea|eases. macaessaacea.|caeec:
na( ae:e (ee uasse:| aas eve:(a:e«a (a.s e| ass.e ae(.ea ei
(:aaseeacea(a| . (e (ae oe.a( ei e.v.ae a sease (e (ae .cea ei
(:aaseeacea(a| oa(ae|eev. · 1ae ae(.ea ei .aca|( ae:ma|.(v s·
• o:.v. |eee ceae(esae:eatelos' mecc|.ae|eie:eaaac.a(aeeidos. 1e
aaveaeeess(e(aeeidos eimaa|.acaacei|aaeaaee. ee:(a.ameaaac
ee:(a.asoea|.aesa|¡ee(s-macmeaaacea.|c:ea-a:eae(good esam·
o|es .~aca:s(.aecea|(. |eeaase(aevceae(oessess.a(ae.:e«a:.ea(
a oa:eaac:.ee:eas|vce(e:m.aa||eesseaee. na(.i(a.s. sse.ceesaca| (
ae:ma|.(v.«a.ea|ee.as«ae:eea.|caeeceacsaacs(eos«aeamaca�ss
s(a:(s.aaveaaesseaee:neeaaseae:e(aeeso:ess.eaeiaca| ( ae:ma|.(v
.sae(ae.veae.ce(.ece(e:m.aa(.ea.|a((ae.aceseiaa. cea|ae�a(.v·
.(v«a.ea.son the horizon eiceiae(eae:ma|aca|(s. iao:eoe:(.ea(e
ea:acvaaeemea(. a(ae so.:.(aa|«e:|caac(aea.aa.s(e:v. (aeeidos
eeases(e|eaaesseaee. ae:ce:(e|eeemeaae:m.aac(aeeeaeeo(ei
ae:.zea.so:ee:ess.ve|vsa|s(.(a(ecie:(aa(eis(:ae(a:eaacesseaee.
2. 1ae oess.|.| .(v eia mec.a(e e: .mmec.a(e ae:.zea eiaa.ve:sa|
|aaeaaee:.s|s:aaa.ae.a(e essea(.a|c.mea|(.esaac|. m.( s. 1a. soess.·
|.|.(va:s(saooeses(aa((aeaaza:ceaso:e||emeeaee:a.ae(aeoess.|.|·
.(veiaoa:ee:amma:aac"a priori ae:ms ei|aaeaaee. s:ese| vec.
aoess.|.|.(v uasse:|aeve:eeasec(e(a|eie: e:aa(ec. ·

i ( saooe�� .
aes(. (aa(eve:v(a.ae .saama||e.a(ae|:eaces(sease. . . e. .aaems(.·
80
We propose to come back to this elsewhere. [Cf. Derrida' s Speech and Phenomena:
And Other Essays on Husserl' s Theor of Signs, tf. David B. Allison (Evanston: North-
wester University Press, 1973), pp. 97-99. ]
8I
In "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity" (i C), the
.
phenomen�n �f
crisis is presented as a "sickness" of European society and culture, a SIckness whIch � s
not "natural" and gets no relief from "something like natur dotos" (p. 270). ThiS
"pathology, " moreover, has the profound ethical sense of a fall into "passivity, " of �
inability to be rendered "responsible" for sense in an authentic activity or authent1�
"reactivation. " Technical activity (that of science als) as such is a passivity in compan­
son to sense; it is the agitation of the sick and, already, the tremors of delirium.
82
Cf. LI, J, 4. On Husserl ' s faithfulness to this theme and the philosophical option that
orients i t, cf. in particular S. Bachelard, A Study of Hussert' s Logic [part J, Ch. 1 ] , pp.
8-1 1 .
81
Introductin to the Orgin ofGeometr
ea||veso:ess.||e . eve:veae eaa (a||a|ea(«aa( .s «. (a.a (ae sa:·
:eaac. ae «e:|c ei a.s e. v. | . za(. ea as O|¡ ee(. ve| v es. s(. ae ( 1 62
mec.aecì ·. iae(ae:«e:cs. asae(e:eeeaeeasas(aeessea(.a|s(:ae(a:es
eiseve:a|eeas(.(a(ec|aaeaaeese:ea|(a:esmav|e.(:aas|a(.ea.ao:.a·
e.o|e .saaa|«avs oess.||e(as|. («enormal mea«.||a|«avs aavea
prioriH3 eease.easaessei(ae.:|e|eae.ae(eee(ae:(eeae aac(ae same
aamaa.(v. |.v.ae.aeaeaac(aesame «e:|c. i.aea. s(.e c.ae:eaees-
aac«aa((aev .mo|v-«.||aooea:(e(aema((ae|e((emeiaaao:.e:.
ae:.zeae:s(:ae(a:e.(ae|.aea. s(.eeemmaa.(v.. . e. .(ae.mmec.a(eee:·
ta�a(vei|e(a |e.ae soea|.aesa|¡ee(s«aeeaaaeve:ces.eaa(e aav·
(ame|a(«aa(|e|eaes(e(aeae:.zeaei(ae.:«e:|cas(ae .::ecae.||v
eemmeaae:.zeaei(ae.:esoe:.eaee.1a. s.mo|.es(aa((aeveaaa|«avs.
. mmea.a(e|ve:ae( . s(aac(eee(ae:|eie:e(aesameaa(a:a|es. s(ea(-
«a.ea «e eaa a|«avs s(:.o ei (ae ea|(a:a| saoe:s(:ae(a:es aac
ea(eee:.esieaacec(fundiert) ea.( .aac«aeseaa.(v«ea|ca|«avsia:·
a.sa(aea| (.ma(ea:|.(:a(.eaie:eve:vmisunderstanding. Cease.easaess
eieeai:ea(.ae(aesame (a.ae. aae|¡ee(oe:ee.vecas saea.· .seea·
se.easaesseiaoa:eaaco:eea|(a:a|we. ue:e(ae:e(ao(eo:eea|(a:e. s
ae(:ee:ess.ea(e«a:cea|(a:a|primitiveness |a((ae:ecae(.eaeiace·
(e:m.aecea|(a:e. a(aee:e(.ea|eoe:a(.ea «a.ea . seae ei(aea.eaes(
ie:mseiea|(a:e.aeeae:a| .1a. soa:e|vaa(a:a|e|¡ee(.vees. s(ea(. s(ae
es.s(.aeseas.||e«e:|c.«a.ea|eeemes(aea:s(e:eaaceieemmaa.ea·
(.ea.(aeoe:maaea(eaaaeeie:(ae:e.avea(.eaei|aaeaaee~s(aemes(
aa.ve:sa| .(aemes(e|¡ee(.ve|vesa.|.(ece|emea(e.vea(eas. (aeea:(a
.(se|i.s«aa(ia:a.saes(aea:s(ma((e:eieve:v seas.||ee|¡ee( iaseia:
as .( .s (aeexemplar e|emea( .|e.ae me:e aa(a:a||v e|¡ee(.ve. me:e
oe:maaea(.me:ese|.c.me:e:.e.c.aacseie:(a .(aaaa||e(ae:elements;
aac.aa|:eace:sease. .(eemo:. ses(aem· . .(.sae:ma|(aa((aeea:(a
aasia:a. saec(aee:eaacie:(aea:s(.cea| .(.es. (aeaie:(aea:s(a|se·
|a(e|v aa. ve:sa| aac e|¡ee(.ve identities, (aese ei ea|ea| as aac
eeeme(:v.
na(o:eea|(a:a||vpure Nature .s a|«avs|a:.ec. se. as (ae a|(.ma(e
`� But both still have to meet. The question here, then, is only that of a material ,
therefore in a certain sense contingent, a priori (cf. above) .
H4 Jt i s the "as such" of the object' s substantial and objective unity which i s deci sive
here. In paricular i t di stinguishes human intersubjectivity from that which i s created
between animal s, men and animals, children, etc. All those finite communities al so rest
on the feel i ng of a presence to the same world whereby they confront the same things , and so
on, but in a nonobjecti ve, nontheoretical consciousness-which does not posit the object
"as such" in its independence and as the pole of infi nite determination. Those lower commu­
nities can also gi ve rise to a specifc phenomenology, and Husserl devoted i mportant
unpublished fragments to them.
82
Jacques Derrida
oess.|.|.iv ie:eemmaa.eai.ea. . i. sa|.ac ei.aaeeess.||e. ai:a·. cea| .
Caa«eaeisav. iaea.]asiiae eooes.ieei«aaiuasse:|sa.c:~:eaei
aea·eemmaa.eai.eaaacm.saace:siaac.aeiaeve:vae:.zeaeiea|ia:e
aac|aaeaaee:uacea|iec|vm.saace:siaac.ae.sa|«avsaiaeiaa|ae:.·
zeaaaciaeia.ie.aceseiiae.aia.ieoe|eeiaseaac.aie||.eeaee.nai
a|iaeaeaiae|aiie:. sa|«avsaaaeaaeecseiaai|aaeaaeeeaa|ee.a. .s
aeiia.iaceiaeesseai.a|«a.ea«eeaaaeve::ac.ea||vee|eveac:
1ae a|eve seems a|| iae me:e i:ae. esoee. a||v s.aee a|se|aie
i:aas|aia|.|.iv«ea|c |e sasoeacec sia:i.ae iae memeai iae s.ea.iec
eea|cae|eaee:|e|ec|ae|. e. iae:c.:eei|ve:.ac.:eei| v.:eiaemece|ei
aa e|]eei.ve aac seas.||e es. sieai. Ðve:v | .aea.si.e c±eas.ea iaai
«ea|ceseaoeia. sa|se|aiei:aas|aia|.|.iv«ea|c:ema.ama:|ec|viae
emo.:.ea| sa|]eei.v.iv eiaa . ac.v.caa| e: see.eiv. re: uasse:| . iae
mece| ei|aaeaaee.siaee|]eei.ve|aaeaaee eise.eaee. ~ oeei.e |aa·
eaaee. «aese s.ea.ieai.eas«ea|caei|eobjects, «. ||aeve:aaveaav
i:aaseeaceaia| va| aeie: a. m 1aaiiaei «ea|c aave ae eeaseeaeaee
within uasse:| .aaiaeaeai. .ia.s iaeaeai«e:e aei a| seiae iae:eaea
. avesi.eai.ea [approfondissement ] eisa|]eei.v.iv. Ne« sa|]eei.v. iv .a
eeae:a| . as maea emo.:.ea|asi:aaseeaceaia| . aooea:ecve:vea:| vie
uasse:| as. aaeeess.||e ie ac.:eei. aa.veea| . aac :.ee:eas |aaeaaee.
sa|]eei.v.iv.siaaca¬eaia||v. aeaa||e ~|:eacv.aThe Phenomenology
ofInteral Time-Consciousness, uasse:|:eie::ecieiaea| i.maie.ceai.iv
eiiaeeeasi.iai.verasei. mmaaeaii. meaaca|se|aiesa|]eei.v.ivaac
eeae|acecre:a||ia. s. aamesa:e|ae|.ae( §36, o. 100).85 ~ac. aiae
aaoa||.saec¬aaase:.oiseiC:eaoCeao:eieiemoe:a| .iv.ae«eace:s
.io:e·e|]eei.veie¬oe:a| .iv.o:eiemoe:a|.iv(Vorzeit) , .saei|eveaca||
c.seea:se(unsagbar) ie:iae oaeaemeae|ee.z.aeÐee.HsC1 31 1 5 i i .
i º·1. o 9). 1ae:eie:e . |aaeaaee. i:ac.i.ea. aaca. sie:v es.siea|v.a·
seia:ase|]eeis|:ea|iaesa:iaee
3 . ~siae.aia.ieae:.zeaeieve:voess.||eesoe:.eaee. iae«e:|c.s
eeaseeaeai|v iae aa.ve:se ei O|]eeis «a.ea .s | .aea. si.ea| | v es·
o:ess.||e.a.is|e.aeaac.is|e.ae·saea( 1 62) . 1aas. iaes. ea.ieai.ea
eiiae«e:|casae:.zea. se|ea:| veso| .eaiec. . . e. .asiae. aia.ie|veoea
ee¬mea o|aee ie: eve:via.ae «e eaa eaeeaaie: . ai:eai eiaac ie:
"
� In the same sense, cf. al l �he subtle analyses in the LI devoted to expressions
" lack[ing] an objective sense, " such as personal pronouns which " indicate" mediatel y
bl lt can never gi ve anythi ng to be seen. "The word T has not i tself di rectl y the power to
arouse the specifc I -presentation; thi s becomes fxed i n the actual pi ece of tal k. I t does
not work like the word ' l ion' which can arouse the idea of a l ion i n and by i tself. I n i ts
case, rather, an i ndicati ve function mediates, cryi ng as it were, to the hearer ' Your
vis-a-vis i ntends himself' " (I, 1 , § 26, p. 3 1 6) .
83
Introduction to the Origin of Geometr
ea:se| ves . i ai:eaieiaac ie:ea:se|ves.mo|.es. iaea.e. veaas aae|·
]eei .1ae«e:|c. iae:eie:e .. sesseai.a||vceie:m.aec|viaecai.veaac
ae:.zeaiæc. meas. eaei|e.aeoe:ee.vec[l' etre-perqu] .aaeaze«aese
e|]eeimasia|«avs|ea||eie|eatheorem. Ceemei:.ea|esemo|a:.aess
aacea|iec|v:esa|isi:emiaeiaeiiaai. asaaa|si:aeimaie:.a|se. ·
eaee .ia. sesemo|a:.aessi:eaisiaesoai.a| .ivei|ec. es.«a.ea. sea| v
eae eiiae|ecv s e.cei.eeemoeaeais· . . . e . i:eais«aaieeaie:s sease
eaiaeaei.eaeiae:.zeaaace|]eei. Deso.iea||iaeaaiaeea.si.emei.is
«a.eaaa.maieoaeaemeae|eev. soaee s o:. v. |eeeiae:e.a .s .a ee:ia.a
:esoeeis:ema:|a||e. iiiesi.iesieiaai e|]eei.v.si ieaceaev «a.ea
uasse:|s.ma|iaaeeas| veooesessev. ee:eas| v. aacvei«a.ea. sea|va
period, aa esseai.a| . aac iae:eie:e .::ecae.|| e. mevemeaieiiaeaeai.
1ae o:eieaac :aviam eiia. s ieas.ea |ei«eea e|]eei.v.sm aac iae
i:aaseeaceaia|mei.i.aieas.ease:ema:|a|| vcese:.|ec.aiaeCrisis, .s
a| se . moa:iec ie oaeaemeae|eev. ia ia.s :esoeei. iae o:e||em ei
eeemei:v. s:evea|.ae.
Ceemei:v. .aeaeei. .siaese.eaeeei«aai. sa|se|aie|ve|]eei.ve-
. e. . soai.a|.iv-.aiaee|]eeisiaaiiaeÐa:ia.our eemmeao|aee. eaa
. aceaa.ie|viao. saasea:eemmeae:eaac«.iaeiae:mea
.
·uai.iaa
e|]eei.vese.eaeeeiea:ia| via.aes.s eess.||e. aae|]eei.vese.eaeeei
iaeta:ia.ise|i.iaee:eaacaacieaacai.eaeiiaesee|]eeis . .sas:ac. ·
ea| | v .¬oess.||e as iaai eii:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iv. 1ae i:aas·
eeaceaia| Ða:ia . s aei aa e|]eei aac eaa aeve: |eeeme eae ~ac
iaeoess.|.|.iveiaeee¬ei:vsi:.ei|vee¬o|e¬eaisiae.moess.|.|.ivei
«aaieea|c |e ea||eca"geo-logy, " iaee|]eei.vese.eaeeeiiaeÐa:ia
.ise|i 1a.s .s iae sease eiiae i:aemeai¯ «a.eareduces, :aiae: iaaa

On the theme of "our Earth" as the "l ife-world" "i n the most comprehensive
sense" for a humanity which lives i n community and where one can be "understood" in a
communication whi ch must always say and pass through the thi ngs of our Earth , cf. E,
§38, pp. 1 62-67. Thi s section efecti vely i l l uminates, especially by its degree of elabora­
tion, the si mi l arly i nspired fragment on the Earth cited below. In thi s section, the uni ty of
the Earth i s grounded in the unity and oneness of temporal ity, the " fundamental form"
(Grundform), the "form of all forms" [ibid. , p. 1 6] .

Thi s fragment , whi ch i s entitled "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum
Phanomenologischen Ursprung der Rauml i chkeit der Natur" [ "Fundamental Investiga­
tions on the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature"] , dated May 1 934, was
publi shed i n 1 940 by Marvi n Farber in Philosophical Essays in Memor of Edmund
Husserl [rpt . Greenwood Press, 1 968] , pp. 307-25 . From the perspective of the science of
space, i t sketches a movement analogous to that of the Origin, but di rected toward
ki nematics . In a certain sense , it completes the Origin, although in the Origin Husserl
clearly specifi es that geometry is onl y a title for all mathematics of pure
spatiotemporali ty.
Thi s text, very spontaneous and not greatly worked out i n its wri ti ng, is presented as a
84
Jacques Derri
preface to a "science ofthe origin of spatiality, " of "corporeality, " of "Nature in the
sense of the natural sciences, " and to a "Transcendental Theor of Cognition in the
Natural Sciences" [po 307] . Husserl first wonders about the sense of the world in the
infnite openness of my surrounding world whose frontiers I can always go beyond. Over
against a determined objectivation [representation] of the world, that of the "Negroes"
or ' ' Greeks, " he sets that of the Coperican world. "We Copericans, we men of moder
time, we say: the earth is not ' the whole of Nature, ' it is one of the planets, in the infnite
space of the world. The earth is a spherical body which certainly is not perceptible as a
whol e, by a single person and all at once, but in a primordial [rimordiale] synthesis as
the unity of singular experiences bound to each other. But nonetheless it is a body!
Although for us it may be the experiential ground for all bodies i n the experiential genesis
of our world-objectivation" (p. 308).
H usserl then " reduces" the Coperican thesis by making the certainty of an Earh-as
the origin of every objective kinetic determination-appear as the transcendental presup­
position of this thesis. The question is to exhume, to unearth, the Earh, to lay bare the
primordial ground buried under the sedimentary deposits of scientifc culture and
objectivism.
For the Earth cannot become a mobile body: "It is on the Earth, toward the Earh,
starting from it, but still on it that motion ocurs. The Earth itself, in confority to the
original idea of it, does not move, nor is it at rest; it is in relation to the Earh that motion
and rest fi rst have sense. But then the Eath does not 'move' nor is at rest-and it is
entirely the same for the heavenly bodies and for the earth as one of them" (p. 309) .
The Earth is the fnal ground of our co-humanity (Mitmenscheit), for it is "the same
Earth for us, on it, in it, above it, there are the same bodies existing on it-'on it, ' etc. ,
the same corporeal (leiblichen) SUbjects, subjects of bodies (Leibern), who, for all, are
bodies (Korper) in a modified sense. But for us all , the Earth is the grund and not a body
in the full sense" (p. 3 1 5) .
But toward the end of the text, the Earth takes on a more formal sense. No longer is it a
question of thi s Earth here (the primordial here whose factuality would fnally b irreduc­
ible), but of a here and a ground in general for the deterination of body-objects in
general. For if I reached another planet by flying, and if, Husserl then said, I could
perceive the earth as a body, I would have "two Earths as ground-bodi es. " "But what
does two Earths signify? Two pieces of a single Earth with one humanity" (pp. 3 1 7-1 8) .
From then on the unity of all humanity determines the unity of the grund as such. This
unity of all humanity is correlative to the unity of the world as the infnite horizon of
experience, and not to the unity of this earth here. The World, which is not the factuality
of this historical world here, as Husserl ofen recalls, is the ground of gounds, the
horizon of horizons, and it is to the World that the transcendental immutability attributed
to the Earth returs, since the Earth then is only its factual index. Likewise
correlatively-humanity would then only be the facto-anthropological index of sub­
jectivity and of intersubjectivity in general , starting fom which every primordial here can
appear on the foundation of the Living Present, the rest and absolute maintenance of the
origin in which, by which, and for which all temporality and all motion appea.
Just as here he reduces the Copernican "relativity" of the earth, Husserl elsewhere
reduces Einstein's "relativity": "Where is that huge piece of method subjeted to
critique and clarification-that method that leads from the intuitively given surrunding
world to the idealization of mathematics and to the interpretation of these idealizations as
Objective being? Einstein's revolutionay innovations concer the foulae thrugh
which the idealized and naively Objectified physis is dealt with. But how formulae in
general , how mathematical Objectivation in general, receive sense on the substrtum of
85
Introuctin to the Origin ofGeometry
:eiaies. iae Ceoe:a.eaa aa.vei- aac sae«siaaiiae Ða:ia .a .is
o:eieo:.me:c.a|.iv cees aei meve. ¡asi as eae s e«a |ecv. asiae
o:.me:c.a| here aac zero-point ie: eve:v objective ceie:m.aai.ea ei
soaee aac soai.a|mei.ea. . saei.ise|i.amei.ea.a ia.s soaee as aa
e|]eei. se-aaa|eeeas|v-iaeta:ia.ase:.me:c|a||ecv.asiaee:eaac·
|ecv (Bodenkorper) i:em «a.ea a|eae a Ceeen|eaa ceie:m|aa·
i.eaeiiaeea:iaas|ecv·e|]eei|eeemeseess||| e. | saei|ise|ieae|ecv
ameaeeiae:s.aiaemeeaaa.ea|svsiem.r:.me:c.a||v. iaeÐa:iameves
aeme:eiaaaea:|ecvmevesaac|eavesiaeoe:maaeaeeei.ishere,
e:eaacec.aao:eseai.1aeÐa:iaiae:eie:e|ae«siae:esieiaaa|se·
|aiehere; a:esi«a.ea.saeiiae:esieiiaee|]eei.:esias meceei
mei.ea· . |aixesisia:i.aei:em«a.eamei.eaaac:esieaaaooea:aac
|eiaeaeaiassaea.iaexesieiaground aacahorzon .aiae.:eemmea
e:.e.a aac eac. 1ae Ða:ia . s. . a eaeei. |eia sae:i eiaac |eveac
eve:v|ecv·e|]eei-.aoa:i.ea|a:iaeCeoe:a.eaaea:ia-asiaee:eaac.
as iae ae:e ei .is :e|ai.ve aooea:.ae. nai iae Ða:ia eseeecs eve:v
|ecv·e|]eeias.is.aaa.ieae:.zea. ie:.i.saeve:esaaasiec|viae«e:|
eie|]eei.aeai.eaiaaio:eeeecs«.ia.a.i. 1aeÐa:ia.sawae|e«aese
oa:is . . . a:e |ec.es. |ai as a wae|e .i .s aei a |ecv
C:aac|eeeace . o 3 1 3] . 1ae:e. siaeaase.eaeeof soaee..aseia:as
.issia:i.aeoe.ai.saeiin soaee.
iiiaeoess.|.|.ivei|aaeaaee. sa|:eacvgiven ieiaeo:.ma||v. asi.iai·
.ae eeemeie:. .i samees iaai iae |aiie:aas o:ecaeec .a a.mse|iiae
.ceai.ivaaciae.cea|oe:maaeaeeeiaa e|]eei .ae:ce:ie|e a||eie
eemmaa.eaie .i neie:eiae same .s:eeeea.zecaaceemmaa.eaiec
ameaeseve:a| .ac.v.caa| s. .i.s:eeeea.zecaaceemmaa.eaiec«.ia.a
iae. ac.v. caa|eease.easaess aiie:ea.e|aaci:aas.ie:vev.ceaee.arie:
aaa. ieaacoass.ve:eieai.eavaa.saes. .is seaseeaab :e·o:ecaeecas
iae same .a iaeaeiei:eee||eei.ea� .is seaseaasaei:eia:aec ie
life and the intuitively given surrounding world-of this we lear nothing; and thus
Einstein does not reform the space and time i n wh ich our vi tal life (unser lebendiges
Leben) runs its course" ("Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity," in C, p.
295 [modified]) . In the Crisis (§34b, pp. 1 25f. ), a similarly oriented analysis also ques­
tions the objectivism of Einstein' s relativity.
88
In referring to this fragent, Tr�m-Dlc-Thao (Phenomenologie, p. 222) speaks of an
"undaunted refutation of the Coperican system. " However, it is a matter of course that
Husserl does not at any moment or on its own proper level contest the particular truth of
the objective Copernican science. He only recalls that Copernican science presupposes a
primordial Earth which this science will never be able to integrte into its objective
system.
l '
· v
86
Jacques Derrida
ae| a. aeaess |a (a. scoincidence of identity [recouvrement d' identitf] ,
ideality . s aaaeaaeecas saea aac .aeeae:a| .aaa eee|ee.ea| sa|]ee(
Ceaseeaea(| v. «aa(¬ases(a. s. cea| .(vageometrical .cea|.(v«. ||ea|v
.a(e:es(as|a(e:eawe«.||:esoee(uasse:| se:ce:eicese:.o(.eaaac
. a(ae¬eaa(.¬e«.||ce| ae(aeeeac.|.easie:.cea|.(v. aaa. a(e:sa|]ee·
(. »eee¬¬aa.(v
1aas. |eie:e|e. ae(ae .cea| .(veiaa .cea(.ea|e|]ee(ie:e(ae:sa|·
]ee(s. sease. s(a. s. cea|.(vie:other ¬e¬ea(sei(aesa¬esa|]ee( iaa
ee:(a.a«av. (ae:eie:e. . a(e:sa|]ee(. ». (v .s i:s| (ae aeae¬o. :. ea| :e|a·
(.eaeiÐee|eÐee.ei¬vo:esea(o:esea((ee(ae:o:esea(sassaea .. e .
as e(ae:s aac as o:esea(s .as oas| o:esea(s· | a(e:sa|]ee(. ».|v .s |ae
:e|a(.eaeiaaa|se|a(ee:.e.a(ee(ae:a|se|a(ee:. e. as. «a.eaa:ea|«avs
¬v e«a. ceso.(e (ae.: :ac.ea| a|(e:.(v 1aaass (e (a. s e. :ea|a(.ea ei
o:.¬e:c.a|a|se|a|es. (aesame (a.aeeaa|e(aeaea((a:eaeaa|se|a(e|v
e(ae:¬e¬ea(saacae(s wea|«avsee¬e|aes(e(aeiaa|.as(aaeeei
|a. s. (ae aa.eae aac essea(.a| ie:¬ ei |e¬oe:a|.za(.ea nv . (s »e:v
c.a|ee(.ea|aess. (aea|se|a(eo:.¬e:c.a|.(vei(aei. ».aer:esea(oe:¬.(s
(ae:ecae(. ea.«.(aea(aeea(.ea.eia||a|(e:.(v1aei. ».aer:esea(eea·
s(.(a(es (aee(ae:ase(ae:. a.(se|iaac(ae sa¬e as (ae sa¬e . a(ae
e(ae:9
0
��I These processes are abundantly described in The Phenomenology of Internal Time­
Consciousness, Ideas I, and in FTL. The passage from passi ve retention to memory or to
the acti vi ty of recollection, a passage which ' ' produces" ideality and pure Objectivity as
such and makes other absolute origins appear as such, i s always described by Husserl as
an already given essential possibility, as a structural abi l i ty whose source i s not made a
problem. Perhaps thi s source is not questioned by phenomenology because it is confused
wi th the possibility of phenomenology i tself. I n i ts "factual ity, " thi s passage i s also that
of the lower forms of Nature and conscious life. I t can also be the thematic site of what
today is cal led an "overcomi ng. " Here phenomenology would be "overcome" or com­
pleted i n an interpretative philosophy. Thus Tran-Duc-Thiw, after a remarkable interpre­
tation of phenomenology, exposes the " Dialectic of Real Movement, " starting from the
concepts of retention and reproduction and from difculties attached to them in
phenomenology, which alone. however, can give them a rigorous sense.
´`The possibility of constituting, withi n the unique and irreduci bl e form of the Li ving
Present (unchangeable in itself and always other i n its ' ' content") , another now and on its
basi s another here, another absolute origin of my absol utel y absolute origin, this possibil­
ity i s el sewhere presented by Husserl as the root of i ntersubjecti vi ty. I n the Cartesian
Meditations, this di alectic of temporalization is i nvoked as an analogous example of the
dialectic of i ntersubjecti vity. In order to illuminate the extraordinary constitution of
"another monad + « « in mi ne , " Husserl al ludes to temporalization, i n what he cal l s an
"i nstructi ve comparison" C§52, p. 1 1 5) .
But i n some unpubli shed material , he seems to go much further: "Urhyl e, " i . e . ,
temporal hyl e, i s defned there as the " core of the other than the Ego' s own" (Ichfremde
Kern) . Cf. Group C 6 ( August 1 930) , p. 6. On the sense of this notion of "alien to my
87
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
VII
A cee.s. »es(eo:e¬a. as(e|e(aseanv. (se|i(aesoeas.aesa|]ee(. .a
(ae s(:.e(seaseei(ae (e:¬. . s. aeaoa||e eia|se|a(e|ve:eaac.ae|ae
.cea| O|]ee(. ».(v ei sease O:a| ee¬¬aa.ea(.ea . . e . o:esea( . . ¬·
¬ec.a(e.aacsva.a:ea.eee¬¬aa.ea(.ea·a¬eae(aeo:e(eeee¬e(e:s. s
ae( same.ea(( ee. »e .cea|e|]ee(.». (. es(ae.: eea(.aa. ae( e|e aac
"persisting factual existence, " (aaass(e«a.ea(aevoe:ca:ee»eaca:·
.aeoe:.ecs.a«a.ea(ae. a»ea(e:aaca.sie||e«sa:eae|eaee:a«ase(e
saea aa eseaaaeee:e»ea. ¬e:e aa.»e:sa||v. ae|eaee:a|.»e 1e |e
a|se|a(e|v .cea|. (ae e|]ee( ¬as( s(.|| |e i:eec eiever (.e «.(a aa
ae(aa||v o:esea( sa|]ee(. ».(v .a eeae:a| 1ae:eie:e. .( ¬as( oe:ca:e
e»ea «aea ae eae aas ae(aa|. zec .| .a e».ceaee ( 1 64 ¬ec.ieci·
soeeea[langage oral] aasi:eec(aee|]ee(eiindividual sa|]ee(. ».(v|a(
|ea»es.(|eaac(e. (s|ee.aa.aeaac(e(ae svaea:eaveiaaeseaaaee
«.(a.a(aeinstitutive communit.
1aeoess.|. |. (vei writing «.||assa:e(aea|se|a(e(:ac. (. eaa| .za(. eaei
(aee|]ee| . .(sa|se|a(e.cea|O|]ee(. ».(v~. e .(aeoa:.(vei. (s:e|a(.ea
(eaaa.»e:sa|(:aaseeacea(a|sa|]ee(. ».(vw:.(.ae«.||ce(a. s|ve¬aa·
e.oa(. aeseasei:e¬.(sactually present e».ceaeeie:a:ea|sa|]ee(aac
i:e¬. (so:esea(e.:ea|a(.ea«.(a.aace(e:¬. aecee¬¬aa. (v 1aece·
e.s. »eiaae(. eaei«:.((eaeso:ess. ea.eieso:ess.ea«a.eaceea¬ea(s..s
(aa(.(¬asesee¬¬aa.ea(.eaoess.||e«. (aea(. ¬¬ec.a(e e:¬ec.a(e
acc:ess. .( . s. se (e soeas. ee¬¬aa. ea(.ea |eee¬e ».:(aa| ( 1 64
¬ec. ieci ·
1aa(virtuality, me:ee»e:. .s aa a¬|.eaeas »a|ae. .( s. ¬a|(aaeeas|v
¬asesoass. ».(v.ie:ee(ia|aess .aaca| |(aeoaeae¬eaaeicrisis oess.||e
ra:i:e¬aa».ae(eia||aea.a.a(ea:ea|reale] a.s(e:v.a(:a(a(aa(«e
aa»e ea.aec i:e¬ (a. s a.s(e:v-se:.o(a:a| soa(.e(e¬oe:a|.(v .«aese
e..e. aa|.(v«e «.||seea aeec(ece(e:¬.ae·-saae(.easaacee¬o|e(es
(ae es.s(eaeeeioa:e(:aaseeacea(a|a. s(e:.e. (v w.(aea( (ae a|(.¬a(e
e|]ee(. iea(.ea (aa(«:.(.aeoe:¬.(s . a|||aaeaaee «ea|c asve(:e¬a.a
Ego, " "the intrinsically frst other, " or of " the frst ' non-Ego' " i n t he constitution of the
alter ego, see notably CM, §§4S-49, pp. 1 05-0S.
Preobjecti ve and preexact temporali ty, which had to become the principal theme of the
transcendental aesthetics projected by Husserl (cf. notably FL, Concl usion, pp. 291 -92:
and CM, §6 1 q p. 1 46), i s then the root of transcendental intersubjecti vity. Al l the egos,
beyond al l possible diferences, can be encountered, recognized, and understood also in
the identity of the concrete and universal form of the Li vi ng Present. I n E, " tie as the
form of sensibility" i s described as the "ground" of the "necessary connection . . .
between the intentional objects of al l perceptions and positional presentifcations of an
Ego and a community of Egos" (§3S, p. 1 62 [modifed)) .
88
Jacques Derrida
eaoi.veeiiaeceiaeieaacaeiaa|. aieai.eaa|.iveiasoea|.aesa|]eeie:
eemmaa.iv eisoea|.aesa|]eei s. nv a|se|aie|vv.:iaa|.z.aec.a|eeae.
«:.i.aee:eaiesa|. aceiaaieaemeasi:aaseeaceaia|ie|ci:em«a.ea
eve:vo:eseaisa|]eeieaa|ea|seai
i aeeaaeei.ea«.iaiaeeeae:a|s.ea.ieai.eaeiiaeepoche, ¡eaauvo·
oe|.ie .ave|es iae oess.|.| .iveia sa|]eei|essi:aaseeaceaia|ie|c.
eae. a«a.eaiaeeeac.i.easeisa|]eei.v.iv«ea|caooea:aac«ae:e
iae sa|]eei «ea|c |e eeasi.iaiec sia:i.ae i:em iae i:aaseeaceaia|
ie|c w:.i.ae. as iae o|aee eia|se|aie|v oe:maaeai .cea| e|]ee·
i. v.i.esaaciae:eie:eeia|se|aieO|]eei.v. iv.ee:ia.a|veeasi.iaiessaea
ai:aaseeaceaia|ie| c. ~ac| .|e«.se. ie|e sa:e. i:aaseeaceaia|sa|·
]eei. v.iveaa|eia||vaaaeaaeecaacaooea:eaiae|as. seiia.sie|ce:
. is oess.|. |.iv. 1aas a sa|]eei|essi:aaseeaceaia| ie|c .s eae ei iae
eeac.i.eas eii:aaseeaceaia|sa|]eei.v.iv
naia|| ia. seaa |e sa.c ea|vea iae |as.seiaa .aieai.eaa|aaa|vs. s
«a.ea :eia.as i:em «:. i.ae aeia.ae |ai «:.i.ae s oa:e :e|ai.ea ie a
eease.easaess«a.eae:eaacs.i as saea. aacaei. isiaeiaa|.iv«a.ea.
|euie. ise|i..sieia||v«.iaeais.ea.ieai.ea[insignifante] . re:ia.s a|·
seaeeeisa|]eei. v.ivi:em iae i:aaseeaceaia| ie| c. aaa|seaee«aese
oess.|.|.iv i:ees a|se|aieO|]eei.v.iv. eaa |eea|vaiaeiaa| a|seaee.
evea.i.i:emevecie:a||i.meiaeieia|.iveiaeiaa|sa|]eeis. 1aee:.e.·
aa|.iveiiaeie|cei«:.i.ae . s. isa|. | .iviec. soease «.ia.due to its
sense, eve.v o:eseai :eac. ae .a eeae:a| . nai .iiae iesi cees aei aa·
aeaaee.is e«aoa:eceoeaceaeeeaa«:. ie:e::eace:.aeeae:a|.. e .
.i.i.s aeiaaaaiec|vav. :iaa|. aieai.eaa|.iv· .aac.iiae:e.saeoa:e|v
]a:.c.ea|oess. |.|.ivei.i|e.ae. aie| |.e.||eie:ai:aaseeaceaia|sa|]e

i
.aeeae:a| .iaeaiae:e.saeme:e.aiaevaea.ivei.issea|iaaaaeaaei.e
|.ie:a|aesse:iaeseas.||eeoae.iveiaceiaaeices.eaai.ea.aces.eaai.ea
ceo:.vecei.isi:aaseeaceaia|iaaei. ea.1aes.|eaeeeio:ea.sie:.ea:eaaa
aac|a:.ece.v. |.zai.eas. iaeeaiem|meaiei|esi. aieai.easaaceaa:cec
see:eis. aac iae . | |ee.|.|.iv ei iae |ao.ca:v .ase:.oi.ea c.se|ese iae
i:aaseeaeeaia|seaseeiceaiaas«aaiaa.iesiaeseia.aesieiaea|se·
|aie o:.v.|eee ei . aieai.eaa|.iv . a iae ve:v . asiaaee ei .is esseai.a|
]a:.c.ea|ia.|a:e [en ce qui l' unit a l' absolu du droit intentionnel dans
l ' instance meme de son echecl .
waeaeeas.ce:.aeiaece]a:eoa:.ivei.aieai.eaa|aa. mai.ea. uas-
se:|a|«avssavsiaaitae| .aea.si.ee:e:aoa.e|ecv. saresa.ao:eoe:
|ecv ·¡e//,.e:aso. :.iaa|ee:oe:ea|.iv(geitige Leiblichkeit) (FTL, §2, o.
21 ) . r:em iaea ea. «:. i.ae . s ae |eaee: ea|v iae «e:|c|v aac
´` We refer here to a comment by Jean Hyppolite during the discussion which followed
the lecture of Fr. Van Breda on "La Reduction phenomimologique, " in H usserl, Cahiers
de Royaumont, p. 323.
89
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
maemeieeaa.ea|a.cieai:aia«aesee«a|e. ae·sease«ea|cc.soease
«.iaa||«:.i.ae·ce«a 1aeoess.|.| .ive:aeeess.ivei|e.ae.aea:aaiec
. aae:aoa.es.ea.sae| eaee:s.mo|vesi:.as.eaaciaeiaa|.aeemoa:.sea
«.ia.cea|O|]eei.v.iv. .i.siaesine qua non eeac.i.eaeiO|]eei.v.iv s
.aie:aa|eemo|ei.ea ~s|eaeas .cea|O|]eei.v.iv. saei .e: :aiae:.can
aei |eeae:avec.aiae «e:|c-as |eae as . cea|O|]eei.v.iv.s aei .aa
oes.i.eaie|eoa:ivieaa.aea:aai.ea.«a.ea. .aiaeoa:.ivei. issease .
.s me:e iaaaasvsiemeis.eaa|s[signalisation] e:aaeaie:ea:meai·-
iaea .cea| O|]eei.v.iv . s aei ia||v eeasi.iaiec 1ae:eie:e. iae aei ei
«:.i. ae .s iae a.eaesi oess.|.| .iv eia| | "constitution, " a iaei aea.asi
«a.ea iae i:aaseeaceaia| ceoia ei .cea| O|] eei.v.iv s a. sie:.e.iv .s
measa:ec.
waai r. a| «:.ies a|eai soeeea .a a. s esee| |eai i:aase:.oi eiiae
Origin . sa fortiori i:aeie: «:.i. ae. i a seas.||e em|ec.meai eeea:s
iae |eea|. zai.eaaaciae iemoe:a|.zai.ea (Temporalisation) ei«aai. s.
|v.is|e.ae·sease. aa|eeaiecaacaaiemoe:a| . D. er:aee. o 2 1 0) .
saeaaie:ma|ai.ea:ema:|a||v saa:oeasiaeo:e|| emaaca«a|eas
iaeoeea|.a:v.:iaeei|aaeaaee .iie|ea:|vi:aas|aiesuasse:|sesaei.ae
eae:iieeaieaiae. cea| .iveiiaemai.eseaseaacei«e:cs[mots] .aiae. :
:e|ai.eas«.iaiae| .aea.si.eeveai naiceesaeiia. s ie:ma|ai.eaoe:·
´¯ This sensible embodiment has the peculiar qualities [l'errngete] of both sense' s
inhabitation of the word [mot] and the here and now use of the word' s ideality. In the first
case, embodiment is at its l i mit the inscription of an absolutely "free" and objective
ideality (that of geometrical truth, for example) within the ' 'bound" ideality of the word,
or i n general of a more free ideality within a less free ideality. In the second case,
embodiment is that of a necessarily bound ideality, that of the word' s identity within
language, in a real-sensible event. But this last embodiment is still done through another
step of mediate ideality whi(h Husserl does not directly describe, but which we think can
be located on the basi s of strictly Husserlian concepts. It is a question of ideal forms or
vague morphological types (a notion that we will have ocasion to specify farther on) ,
which are proper to the corporeality of graphic and vocal signs. The forms of graphic and
vocal signs must have a certain identity which is imposed and recognized each time in the
empirical fact of language. Without this always intended and approximate ideal identity
(that of letters and phonemes, for example), no sensible language would be possible or
intelligible as language, nor could it intend higher idealities. Naturally, this morphological
ideality is still more "bound" than the word' s ideality. The precise place of the properly
termed realizing [realisante] embodiment is ultimately therefore the union of the sensible
form with sensible material, a union traversed by the linguistic intention which always
intends, explicitly or not, the highest ideality. Linguistic incaration and the constitution
of written or scriptural space suppose, then, a closer and closer "interconnection" of ideality
and reality through a series of less and less ideal mediations and in the synthetic unity of an
intention. Thi s intentional synthesis is an unceasing movement of going and returing that
works to bind the ideality of sense and to free the reality of the sign. Each of the two opera­
tions is always haunted by the sense of the other: each operation is already announced in the
other or still retained i n it . Language frees the ideality of sense, then, in the very work of its
"binding" ("interconnecting" [enchainement] ).
90
Jacques Derrida
¬.(| .aea.s(.eem|ec.mea((e|eaace:s(eecas(a|.aeo|aeeea(s.ce(ae
|e.ae·sease ei .cea| e|]ee(.v.(v: ~s eeea::.ae e: aaesoee(ec|v
aaooea.ae .aacc.(.ea(e(ae|e. ae·sease:Deesae((a.sie:¬a|a(.ea
e.ve (ae . mo:ess.ea(aa(.cea| e|]ee(. v. (v . sia||veeas(.(a(ec as saea
before aacindependently of .(sem|ec.¬ea(.e::a(ae:.|eie:eaac.ace·
oeacea(|vei.(sability to be embodied?
sa(uasse:|.as. s(s(aa((:a(a.sae(ia||ve|]ee(. ve .. e ..cea| ..a(e||.·
e.||eie:eve:veaeaac.aceia.(e|voe:ca:a||e. as|eaeas.(eaaae(|e
sa.cand «:.((ea s.aee (a. s oe:ca:a|.|.(v . s(:a(a s ve:v sease. (ae
eeac.(.easie:.(ssa:v. va|a:e. ae|acec. a(aeseei. (s|.ie uacea|(ec|v.
(:a(aaeve:|eeos(ae.cea|O|]ee(.v.(ve:.cea(.(veiaavei.(soa:(.ea·
|a:ceiae(e| .aea.s(.e.aea:aa(.eas .aacee¬oa:ec( ea|||.aea. s(.eiae(a·
a|.(v.(:ema.asi:ee. sa((a.si:eecem.sea|voess. ||eo:ee.se|vi:e¬
(aemoment (:a(acan .aeeae:a||esa.ce:«:.((ea.. e. .on condition (aa(
(a.scan |eceae.ra:aces.ea||v.(aeoess.|. | .(vei|e.ae«:.((eafossibi­
lite graphique] oe:m.(s (ae a| (.ma(ei:ee.aeei.cea| .(v. 1ae:eie:e . «e
eea|ca|||a(:eve:se(ae(e:mseir.a| s ie:¬a|a (aeability eisease(e
|e| .aea.s(.ea||ve¬|ec.ec.s (ae ea|v ¬eaas|v«a.easease|eee¬es
aeasoa(. e(emoe:a|
neeaase.cea|O|]ee(.v.(veaaessea(.a||v.aie:¬e:saaoe(ae|ecvei
soeeeaaac«:.(.ae.aacs. aee.(ceoeacseaaoa:e|.aea. s(.e. a(ea(.ea.
.( .s :ac.ea||v .aceoeacea(eiseas.||e soa(.e(e¬oe:a|. (v. 1a. s ¬eaas
(aa(asoee.iesoa(.e(emoe:a|.(v. so:ese:. |ecie:ee¬¬aa.ea(.ea. aac
(ae:eie:e ie: oa:e (:ac.(.ea aaca. s(e:v. a soa(.e(emoe:a|.(v (aa( es·
eaoes(aea|(e:aa(.veei(aeseas.||eaac(ae.a(e||.e.||e.e:(aeemo.:.ea|
aac(ae¬e(e¬o.:.ea| .Ceaseeaea(| v. (:a(a.sae|eaee:simply es.|ec.a
(aeo:.¬e:c.a|evea(ei. (s|aaeaaee.i(sa.s(e:.ea|aa|.(a(aa(aea(.ea(es
(a.s evea( .]as(as (ae o:e(eceeamea(authenticates «ae(ae: . (. s(ae
ceoes.(a:veiaa.a(ea(.ea.«ae(ae:.(:eie:s«.(aea(ia|s.iea(.ea(eaa
e:.e. aa|aaco:. ¬e:c.a|ae( iae(ae:«e:cs. «ae(ae:(ae|. aea. s(. eevea(
:eie:s(eaaauthentic ae(..a(aeuasse:|.aaseaseei(ae«e:c· .|eeaase
.(es(a|| . saesa(:a(a·va| ae. . smace:esoeas.||eie:. (. aaceaaaooea|
(e(ae aa.ve:sa| .(vei.(s (es(.¬eav
uasse:|(aas.ac.ea(es(aec.:ee(.eaie:aoaeae¬eae|eevei(ae«:.(·
(ea (a.ae. soee.iea||v. cese:.|.ae(ae |ee| .a .(s aa.(v asaeaa.aei
s.ea. r ea(.eas 1a.saa.(veaa|e¬e:ee:| ess. cea|aacaeeessa:v.aac
(ae:eie:e aa. ve:sa| . aeee:c.ae(e (ae|ee| s sease·eea(ea(
.

,
~acae(
!J:l l n the Origin, Husserl di stinguishes between literature i n the broad sense, the realm
of all written di scourse, and literature as l iterary art. The literary work i s often chosen by
Husserl as the cl ue for analyzing the ideality of cultural objecti vi ties. The ideal identity of
the work wi l l never be mistaken for i ts sensible embodi ments. It does not derive i ts i ndi ­
vi dual identity from the latter. The origin of identity , moreover, i s the criterion which
91
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
ea|veaa(aa(.cea|aa.(v|e¬e:ee:|ess|eaac(eiae(aa| .(v.|a(a|se
aeee:c.ae(eaame:easaac eemo|e(e|ve:.e.aa|ie:msaacmeca|.(.es
He:eeve:.(ae:e|a(.eaei(ae ese¬o|a:s ( e(ae.:a:eae(voa|aa. (v. s
aacea|(ec|vaa.eaeameae(ae:eo:ecae(.easeie(ae:ea|(a:a|ie:¬a·
(.eas. esoee.a||v (aese ei (ae aea|.(e:a:v a:(s r.aa||v. (ae |ee| s
o:eoe:ve| a¬eaacca:a(.eaa:eae.(ae:oa:e|vseas.||eoaeaemeaa.ae:
oa:e|v.a(e||.e.||eaea¬eaa 1ae.:soee.ieeaa:ae(e:see¬s. ::ecae.||e
1a.s |e.ae ei(ae |ee|. (a.s .as(aaee eiprinted (aeaea( «aese
| aaeaaee.sae(aa(a:a| . Cas(easaeae|a:cea||sa"bibliomenon. ·
permits us to di stinguish between the real and the ideal . Husserl writes in E (§65, pp.
265-66) : "We call real i n a specifc sense all that which, i n real thi ngs i n the broader
sense. is, according to its sense, essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position;
but we call irreal ever determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to
spatiotemporal appearance in a specifcally real thing but which can appear in dif erent
realities as identical-not merely as simil ar" ( Husserl ' s emphasis) .
Thus the relation between the ideal and the real in all cultural objectivities (and frst in
all the arts) can be expl icated. That is relati vel y easy for the literary work. Thus,
"Goethe' s Faust i s found i n any number of real books (' book' denotes here what i s
produced by men and intended to be read: it i s already a determination which i s itself not
purely material. but a determination of signifcance !) , which are termed exemplars of
Faust. This mental sense which determines the work of art. the mental structure as such,
i s certainly ' embodied' i n the real world. but i t i s not i ndi vidual ized by thi s embodiment.
Or agai n: the same geometrical proposition can be uttered as often as desi red: every real
utterance has . . . identically the same sense" (ibid. , p. 26) .
But how can we determine the ideality of a work whose proto individualization is tied to
the work' s single spatiotemporal embodiment? How can we make i ts i deality appear by
varying factual exemplars. si nce the latter can only imi tate a factuality and not express or
" indicate" an i deal sense? I s i t, i n short. the same for the ideality of the pl astic arts. of
architecture? Or of music. whose case i s even more ambiguous? Although repetition may
be of a di ferent nature here. which in each case requires an appropriate and prdent
anal ysi s. i t i s no less possible in principle and thus makes an incontestable ideality
appear: "To be sure, an ideal object like Raphael ' s Madonna can in fact have only one
mundane state (Weltlichkeit) and i n fact i s not repeatable in an adequate identity (of the com­
plete ideal content). But in principle this ideal is indeed repeatabl e, as is Goethe's Faust"
(ibid. ) .
From the frst perception, then, of a work of plastic art as such (whose i deal value i s
primordially and intri nsically rooted i n an event), there i s a sort of i mmediate reduction of
factuality which permi ts, next, the neutralization of the necessary imperfection of re­
production. Here is not the place to prolong these analyses of aesthetic perception and
ideality. Husserl i s content to si tuate their domain and to defne prel i mi nary, i ndispens­
able distinctions . He proposes some analogous di stinctions in the cultural sphere of pol i­
tics and stri ves to bring to light both the ideality of the constitution of the state (of the
national wil l . for exampl e) and the originality of its "boundness" to the factual ity of a
territory, a nation, etc . , wi thi n which this constitution can be i ndefnitely repeated as i ts
ideal validity (ibid. , pp. 266-67) .
9 L' Activite rationaliste de l a physique contemporaine (Pari s: Presses U ni versi tai res
de France, 1 95 1 ) , pp. 6-7.
92
Jacques Derrid
ia(aeOrigin, uasse:|.||am.aa(esme:ec.:ee(|v(aa(m. |. eaei«:.

(.ae
«aesec.uea|(s.ea.iea(.eaaac. moe:(aaeeaeaaca|:eacv:eeeemzec
. a(aeLogical Investigations . 1aec.mea|(vei. (sces�:.�(.ea.scae(e
(aeiae((aa(«:.(.aeceiaes aac eemo|e(es (ae am|.ea.(veia|||aa·
eaaee. ~s (aeo:eeessei(aa(essea(.a|aaceeas(.(a�.veeao

ae.(v

ie:
em|ec.mea(. |aaeaaee.sa|se «ae:eeve:va|se|a(e|v. cea|e|·ee(.. . e. .
«ae:e(:a(a·. s iae(aa||vaaceea(.aeea(|vem|ec.ec.Ceave:se| v.(:a(a
aas.(se:.e.a.aaoa:eaacs.mo|e:.ea((esoeeeaaac«:.(.ae

.?a(eaee
eeas(.(a(ec .(eeac.(.easeso:ess.ea. . a. (s (a:a. asaaemo.:. ea|iae( .
1:a(a ceoe�csea(ae oa:e oess.|. | . (v eisoea|.aeaac «:.(.re.

|a(. s
.aceoeacea(ei«aa(. s soe|eae:«:.((ea. .aseia:

as(aev a:e m (ae
«e:|c ii. (ae:eie:e. (:a(asaae:s.a aac (a:eaea .(s| aaeaaee i:em a
ee:(a.aeaaaeea||eaess. .(sce«aia||«.|||e|essaia||(e«a:c|aaeaaee
(aaaacee:aca(.ea«.(a.a| aaeaaee.

r:em(aeaea..aeaee( .as.so:ese:.|ecie:. (. sease.sea(ae:ecm(ea
s.ea. aac (ae s.ea|eeemes(ae«e:|c|vaacesoesec:es.ceaee

eia�
aa(aeaea((:a(a.weaaveo:ev.eas|vseea(aa((:a(ae�aoe:ca:e. � (a.s
«av«.(aea(|e. ae(aeaea(.aae(e:.aiae(aac(aa(. s«aa(:�c.ea||v
emaae.oa(es(:a(ai:em a||emo.:.ea|sa|¡ee(. v. (v. a||iae(aa|| .�e. ��

c
(ae «ae|e :ea| «e:|c. ~( (ae same(.me. maa s eemmaaa||eme . s
|. uec(eaae«|eve| . i -1· ..(eaaaooea:..aeaee( . asa(:aaseeace�(a|
eemmaa.(v.1aeaa(aea(.eae(ei«:. (.ae. sa(:aaseeacea(a|:ecae(.e�
oe:ie:mec|vaac(e«a:c(aewe. na(s.aee. .ae:ce:(eeseaoe«e:|

ci·
aess seasemust i:s(be able (e|ese(ce«a. a(ae«e:|caac|eceoes.(ec
.as�as.||e soa(.e(emoe:a|. (v. .(mas(oa(.(sp�:�.a(ea(

.eaa|. cea|. (v.
. . e . . .(s (:a(a· sease. .a caaee:. 1aas a oess.|.| .(v. «a.ea evea ae:e
¨´ Cf. LI, I, Prol. , §6, p. 60: "Science exists objectively only in its literature, �ni� in
written work has it a rich relational being limited to men and their intellectual a�tlvltIes:
in this form it is propagated down the millennia, and survives individual s, generatIons and
nations. It therefore represents a set of external arrangements, which , ju
.
st as they arose
out of the knowledge-acts of many individuals, can again pass over into Just such a
.
ct� of
countless individual s, in a readily understandable manner, whose exact de
.
scnpt�on
would require much circumlocution" (our emphasis) . On this level of anaiysl
.
s, which
above all should disengage the objective autonomy of signifcat
.
ion, th� questIo� I S c�early
that of "external arrangements": sensible exemplars on which neither the Ideahty of
sense nor the clear intention of cognition depends. But this fact neither prohibits nor contra­
dicts at all the subsequent theme of writing as the intrinsic possibilit and intr.nsic c

ndition
of acts of objective cognition. The Origin maintains these two themes. That IS the difculty
we are striving to il l uminate here.
¨´ We take this word in the broad sense of sign-signifer or "sign-expression" (graphic
or vocal), the meaning that Husserl gives this term by opposing it to the " ind�cative" sig
(LI, I , 1 , §§ 1 -5, pp. 269-75) . On the basis of this distinc�ion, we �ould Interpret the
phenomenon of crisis (which, for Husserl , alwa�s r�fer
.
s to
.
a dl sord�� or I11?
,
ess of l�ngua�e)
as a degradation of the sign-expression into a Sign-indIcatIOn, of a clear (klar) intentIon
into an empty symbol .
93
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
aeee:asea|v«.(aemo.:.e.smaacaeaoa. | eseoav.aooea:s. aaoa.|ese·
oav«a.ea. s.a(|eas(|eeaaseeiee:(a.ame(.n·(aeeea(:a:veiemo.:.·
e.sm (ae oess.|.|.(v ei(:a(a s diappearance. weoa:oese| vase (ae
am|.eaeas «e:c c. saooea:aaee waa(c. saooea:s .s «aa( .s aaa. a. ·
| a(ec.|a(a|se«aa(eeases..a(e:m.((ea(|ve:ceia.(e| v. (eaooea:inJact
ve(«.(aea(aaee(.ae.(s|e.aee:|e.ae· sease.1ece(e:m. ae(aeseaseei
(a.s c. saooea:aaeeei(:a(a. s(aemes(c.mea|(o:e||emoesec|v(ae
Origin aaca||eiuasse:| soa.|eseoaveia. s(e:v.ra:(ae:me:e.«e«e:e
aaa||e(eiac.auasse:|aaaaeea.veea|:esoease(eaeaes(.ea«a.ea
ea|vma|es(aa(eioaeaemeae|eev. (se|i:e(a:a.«aa(. s(aeseaseei.(s
aooea:.ae:1aa(eea. veea(.ea«.| |o:esea(|v:evea||e(aae«maea(ae
aa(ae:ei(ae Crisis «as a s(:aaee: (e a. s(e:v e: ae« iaacamea(a|| v
. aeaoa||eae«asei(a|.ae. ( se:.eas| v. aaca(«aa(oe.a(. . a(aesame
memea(· ae s(:. ves(e :esoee(a.s(e:.e.(v s e«a oeea| .a: s.ea. | ea(.ea
aacoess.|.i .(vaac(:a| v(eoeae(:a(e(aem.
waa( (aea .s(a.soess. |. |.(veic.saooea:aaee:
i . ia(aei:s(o|aee.|e(as:a|eea((aeavoe(aes. seiadeath oj sense
.aeeae:a|«.(a.a(ae. ac. v. caa|eease.easaess uasse:|e|ea:|vsoee.| es
.a(aeOrigin aace|se«ae:e (aa(. eaee sease aooea:ec .aeee |ee.ea|
eease.easaess. .(s(e(a|aaa.a.|a(.ea|eeemes. moess.|| e. ·~sease(aa(
.seease:vecasasec.mea(a:vaa|.(aa|.(vaac«aesece:maa(oe(ea(.a|·
.(v eaa ce¡a:e |e :eaa.ma(ec . sae( :e(aoec (e ae(a. aeaess|v(ae
vaa.sa.aeei:e(ea(.easei:e(ea(.eas ra:i:em|e.aeaoaeaemeae|ee·
.ea|ae(a. ae. (aese·ea||ec' unconscious' ` e: ' universal substratum"
«ae:e sease.sceoes.(ec.s a | .m.(·meceeieease.easaess(FTL, o.
· i º· C|ea:|v.a(a.s(voeeiaaa| vs. s. aoea«a.eaie:m.ca||ec.mea|·
(.esa|:eacv«e. ea .uasse:|. sea|v«e::.eca|ea((aeoe:maaeaeeaac
v. :(aa|o:eseaeeeisease«.(a. a(aemeaac.esa|¡ee(.aacae(a|ea((ae
a|se|a(e|v.cea|O|¡ee(.v.(veiseaseea.aec(a:eaeasoeeeaaac«:.(.ae
i:em(aa(sa|¡ee(. v.(v.Ne«(a.sO|¡ee(. v.(v.sieaac(a:ea(eaecas(:a(a
. a(ae«e:| c. ProfoundJorgetJulness (ae:eie:ees(eacs.a(e(aesoaeesei
.a(e:sa|¡ee(.v.(vaac(aec.s(aaee|e(«eeaeemmaa.(.es Forgetfulness
.s aa.s(e:.ea|ea(eee:v.
`´ I n Ideas I; in E; but above all in FTL ( i n terms which are literally taken up again in
the Origin) , cf. in particular Appendix I I , §2c, pp. 3 1 8-1 9.
98
On the naivete of the classic problems of the Unconscious and on the question of
knowing whether an intentional analysis can open a methodical access to the Uncon­
scious, see " Fink' s Appendix on the Problem of the ' Unbewussten,' " i n C, pp. 385-87 .
�¨ Forgetfulness is a word that Husserl rarely employs in the Crisis; he never uses it i n
the first text of the Origin, perhaps because habit relates it very easil y t o i ndividual
consciousness or to its psychological sense: perhaps also because it can suggest an
annihilation of sense.
94
Jacques Derri
2. 1aee:aoa.es.ea.(aeeaa:aa(eeeiO|]ee(.v.(v.eaaa|sein fact |e
ces(:evec. 1a.scaaee:. s.aae:ea(.a(aeiae(aa|«e:|c|.aessei. ase:.o·
(.ea.(se|i.aacae(a.aeeaaceia.(.ve|vo:e(ee(. ase:.o(.eai:em(a. s. i a
saeaacase, |eeaaseuasse:|eeas.ce:sseaseae.(ae:aa.a·.(se|iae:a
oa:e so.:.(aa| .a(e:.e:.(v |a( aa e|]ee( (a:eaea aac (a:eaea. «e
m.ea(i:s((a.a|(aa((aeie:ee(ia|aess«a.eaie| |e«saoea(aeces(:ae·
(. eaeiO|]ee(.v.(v s eas(ec.a|s. ea[signe gardien] «ea| cae(aaee(.as
. aa r| a(ea. sm e: ne:esea. sm· (ae sa:iaee eia sease «.(aea(
aace:m.a.ae(ae sease.(se|i. saeaaie:ee(ia|aess«ea|cae(ea|vsao·
o:ess(a. ssease|a(«ea|caaa. a. |a(e.(.a(aesoee.ie|e.ae·. a·(ae·«e:|c
(e «a.ea .(s O|]ee(.v.(v .s ea(:as(ec. re: uasse:| e|ea:|v sa.c (a. s.
.aseia: as s.easeaa|e. mmec. a(e|voe:eeo(.||e |veve:veae. a(ae. :
corporeality; .aseia: as (ae.:|ec.es aac ee:oe:ea| ie:ms a:e a|«avs
a|:eacv.aaa.a(e:sa|]ee(.veae:. zea.(aeaseaseeaa|eceoes.(ec(ae:e
aaceemmaaa|.zec[mettre en communaUf] . Ce:oe:ea|es(e:.e:.(vaa·
cea|(ec|vceesae(constitute (aes. eaassaea|a(..aasease(aa(«e
mas|ma|ee|ea:.. sindispensable (e.| .
Ye( (ae avoe(aes. s ei saea aiae(aa| ces(:ae(.eacees ae( . a(e:es(
uasse:| a| a| | . wa.|e eemo|e(e|v :eeeea. z. ae (ae (e::.iv. aereality ei
(aeea::ea|:. s|. ae«ea|cceav.(aav(a.a|a|| e. . . e. .aavoa. |eseoa. ea|
s.ea.| eaaee. Necea|(ae«ea|cacm.((aa(aaa. ve:sa|eearae.a(. ea.
a «e:|c·«.ce|a:a.aeei|.|:a:. es. e:aea(as(:eoaeeimeaamea(se:
ceeamea(s .a eeae:a| «ea|c. a(:. as.ea| | v:avaee |eaac ea|(a:a|
. cea|.(. es. «aeseae(.ea«eeve|eca|eve. nv(ae.:acae:eaee(eseme
iae(aa|.(v.(aese. cea| .(.es. in their ver sense, «ea|c|eva|ae:a||e(e
(aa( «e:|c|v aee. cea( Dea(a .s eess.||eie:(aem a|eae aac aas (ae
(:aaseeacea(a|s.ea. aea(.ea«e]as(ae«e:aa(ec.(. |a(ea|v.aseia:as
(ae |eaac¯ . cea| . (v .s aa. ma(ec e: (:ave:sec |v a (:aaseeacea(a|
.a(ea(.ea.ea|v. aseia:as.(.sea. cec|v(ae1e| eseiaaa|se|a(ei:ee.ae
«a.eaaasae(|eeaia| |va((a. aecua(| .|e(aa(«a.eae:.ea(suasse:| s
:euee(.ea. seee.aea||v.(aeia||vi:eec.cea|.(vaaca|se|a(eO|]ee(.v.(v
eisease.ie:«a.eama(aema(.es. s (aemece| ). (ae(a:ea(eiaa.a(:. as. e
ces(:ae(.ea|v(ae|ecvei(aes.eaeaa|e:a|ecea( ~| |iae·aa|«:.(.aes.
.a«a.ea|:a(aeea|c|esec. mea(ec. «. | | aeve:|eaav(a.ae. a(aem·
se| ves|a(seas.||eesemo| a:s. . ac.v.caa|evea(s. asoaeeaac|.me
.«a.ea. sea|v(:ae(e+ ee:(a.ace.:eeie:|eaac. cea|. |. es·. s. aee
(:a(a ceesnot essea(.a| |v ceoeac eaany of them, (aev eea|call |e
ces(:evec «.(aea(eve:(a|.aethe ver sense of a|se|a(e. cea|.(v. ua·
cea|(ec|v. a|se|a(e. cea|.(v «ea|c|e eaaaeec. ma|.|a(ec. +ac eve:·
(a:e«ain fact; ce:aaos.(«ea|cc. s+coea:.aiae(i:em(ae sa:i+eeei
(ae«e:|c. |a| .(s sease·ei·|e.aeas(:a(a. «a.ea.s ae(.a(ae«e:|c-
ae.|ae:.aea:«e:|cae:e.ae·aave(ae:-«ea|c:e¬a. a.a(ae(.a.(se|i
95
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
i(s |e. ae·sease «ea|c o:ese:ve .(s e«aintrinsic a. s(e:. e.(v. . |s e«a
.a(e:eeaaee(. eas. aac(aeea(as(:eoaeei«e:|c|va. s(e:v«ea|c:ema.a
exterior (e.( .
1aa( .s «aa( uasse:| meaas «aea ae eooesesinternal e: .a(:.as.e
(innere) a.s(e:.e.(v(eexternal (aussere) a.s(e:v.1a. sc. s(.ae(.ea. «a.ea
aasea|vaoaeaemeae|ee.ea|sease.. scee.s.ve. · i(«ea|c|ei:a. (|ess
ie: a. m(e e|]ee((aa( a.s(e:.e.(v e:|e.ae·.a·a. s(e:v .s o:ee.se| v (ae
oess.|.|.(v ei|e.aeintrinsically esoesec (e (aeextrinsic, ie:(aea(ae
a. s(e:.e.(va|se|a(e|vo:eoe:(eaav(:a(a· sease«ea|c|em. ss.ae.aac
uasse:| s c. seea:se«ea|c|eo|aaeec. a(eaeeaias.eaeis.ea.iea(.eas
aac :ee.eas . we «ea|c (aea |e eeaeec.ae(aa( aoa:e.cea|.(veaa |e
eaaaeec|va:ea|eaase .«a.ea.s(e|esesease. iieeeme(:v.s(:ae. .(s
.a(e:aa|a.s(e:vmas(|e savec.a(ee:a||vi:ema| |seas. ||eaee:ess.ea.
s. aeeeeeme(:v.s(.ecae.(ae:(e(a. smemea(ae:e.ae:(e(a.s(e::.(e:v
ae:e.ae:(e(a.s«e:|cae:e.|a((ea||(ae«e:|c( Weltall) , ae(a. ae«.| |
eve:s(aac|e(«eea(ae«e:|c|vesoe:.eaees«a.ea.aea:aa(eceeeme(:v
aac«aa((aevaave|eeaaaea. a. c.seeve:.aeai:esa.«.(aea(aav(:aees
aacaue:(ae sa:eac.aeei(a. s«e:|cae:e·(ae oa(as eiaaacvea(a:e
|a:.ec . a aae(ae: :ea| a.s(e:v. i aeemoa:.sea «. (a veritas aeterna,
«aese o:eoe:a. s(e:.e.(vuasse:|«.saes(ee:aso aac a|ea|«a.eaae
soea|sme:eaacme:eeueaasa. s(aeaea(|eeemesa|| a:ec|va. s(e:v.
ae :ea| ceve|eomea(e(ae: (aaa (aa( ei(ae va:.a||eesamo|e.a(e:es(s
a.m. ~eee:c.ae|v.(aeavoe(aes.sei(ae«e:|c·«.ceea(as(:eoaeeea|c
evease:veasa:eve|a(e:v| e(.ea.
1aas. «esaea|c|ea||e(e:eoea(analogously (aeiameasaaa|vs.sei
see(.ea 49 eiIdeas i ' 1ae aaa|vs.s eeae| acec(aa(. ai:e: a ee:(a.a
e.ce(.e·(:aaseeacea(a| :ecae(.ea. oa:e eease.easaess .s . a(aae. ||e.
evea «aea (ae es. s(.ae «e:|c .s aaa. a. | a(ece:iae(aa|esoe:.eaeec.s·
se|vec (a:eaea.a(e:aa|eear.e(. . . . a(e.||as.ea(Ideas I, §49, o. 1 37
mec.ieci· . uasse:|c. cae(c. soa(e(aa(aace:(aesee.:eams(aaeesa||
eease.easaess«ea|cin fact |eces(:evecaac(aa(.(s«e:|c|ves. s(eaee
«ea|c|eeaea|iec«.(a(ae«e:|c.iaacc.(.ea.(aee|ea:es(.a(ea(.eaei
´´The opposition between intrinsic penetration and extrinsic circumspection is al ­
ready announced in Ideas I, preci sel y concering the hi story of geometry. There Husserl
shows how psychologistic or hi storicist empiricism remains "outside" [ Derrida' s empha­
sis] "geometrical thought and intuition, " whereas "we should enter vital ly into these
acti vi ti es and . . . determine their immanent sense " (§25, p. 85 [modifi ed]). Once exter­
nal hi story i s "reduced, " nothing i s opposed to the fact that thi s immanent sense may
have its own parti cular hi stori ci ty. The opposition between the two hi stories i s an expl i ci t
theme i n the Crisis ( see, for exampl e, §7, pp. 1 7-1 8, and § 1 5, p. 7 1 ) , i n "Philosophy as
Mankind' s Self-Refection" (c, pp. 338-39), and above al l in the Origin.
l 0 l
P. 1 36. The movement i s taken up again i n CM, §7, pp. 1 7-1 8.
96
Jacques Derrd
(a. saaa|vs.saacie(.ea. s(eeso|.ea(ea:ecae(.ea«a.eamas(:evea|(e
(ae(r·kegion-(:aaseeacea(a| eease.easaess-(aeessea(.a|:e|a(. v.(v
ei(ae «e:|c s sease .(ae «e:|c |e.ae (ae (e(a|.(vei:ee.eas· s.aee
(:aaseeacea(a|eease.easaesseaaa|«avsaac«.(aeemo|e(ei:eecem
mec.ive:sasoeac(ae(aes. seieach .(ae:eie:eeiall) eea(.aeea(es.s·
(eaee aac eieach .(ae:eie:e eiall) (:aaseeaceaee. .(s ve:v sease . s
ce]a:eaaca|se|a(e|v. aceoeacea(ei(ae«ae|e«e:|c.1aes.(aa(.eaei
(:a(a. oa:(.ea|a:|v ei eeeme(:.ea| (:a(a. . s aaa|eeeas. i( (ae:eie:e
o:eve|es(aesameeaes(.eas .
i aiae(. (a. se.ce(.e. aceoeaceaee. |:eaea((e| .ea(. aame(aece|ee.·
ea|.cea|.sm|vaie(.ea.eaa|eeaes(.eaecas(e. (sva|ae|eveac(ae
memea(eiIdeas I; . e . |eveac(aememea((aee. ce(.e·(:aaseeacea(a|
:ecae(.ea aas ae( ve( a((a.aec .(s iaa| :ac.ea|.(v aac. s o:ev.s.eaa||v
. mme|.|.zec. aeae:ee.ea.i aeaee(. (ae:ee.eaeioa:eeease.easaess.s
(ae:es. caeeia sasoeas.ea¯ (aa(s(.|| :ema.asme:ee.ce(.e (aaa
(:aaseeacea(a|aac.sea|v(aemes(o:eieaacei(aee.ce(.e:ecae(.eas
Ye((a. ssasoeas.ea.«a.ea(eacs(ec|seeve:(aeo:e(e:ee.easessea(.a|
s(:ae(a:es aac .s ee:(a.a|veeas(.(a(.veei(ae«e:|c. .s eeas(.(a(ec.(·
se|i.~ac. asuasse:|«.||sav. . (. sae((aea|(.ma(e (:aaseeacea(a|
:ee:ess.ea(ibid. , §8 1 , o.2 1 6) . 1 02 wea|cuasse:|aave]aceec(a. sie(.ea
va|.c(aememea(aes(ac.ec.ie:esamo|e..a(aeCartesian Meditations)
(aeeeae(.eeeas(.(a(.eaei(aeego . a(aeaa. (v¯ei. (s a. s(e:v: ··
i a
aee:(a.asease«eeaa savves 1a:eaea(ae se| .os.s(.eavoe(aes. s. a
«a.ea(aeCartesian Meditations a:ei:s(eeaeaec. oa:eeease.easaess
. ss(.||eeas.ce:ecas(aa(«a.eaae«e:|c|viae(aa|.(veaaoeae(:a(eas
saea. as "a selfcontained nexus of being" (Ideas I, §49, o 1 39
mec.ieci ·. uacea|(ec|v. (ae .a(:a·eee|ee.ea|sec.mea(a(.ea. (ae oe·
(ea(.a|ev. ceaee.(ae :es. caes. aac(ae:eie:eaees¯

·(aa((a. s a.s·
(e:v¯ ma|es aeeessa:v a:eea|vaae(«e:|eisease . na(|v(ae.::e·
o|aeea|. |.(v. .::eve:s.|.| .(v. aac.ava:. a|.| .(vei(ae.:.a(e:eeaaee(.eas.
a:e(aevae(a| se iae(s¯ e:iae(aa| s(:ae(a:es«.(a:esoee((e«a.ea
oa:eeease.easaess«ea|cae|eaee:|ei:ee:Cea|c(aesesec.mea(a:v
s(:ae(a:es ce]a:e sa:v.ve(aeaaa.a. |a(.ea. (aeeve:(a:e«. .aa«e:c.
(ae eemo|e(e va:.a(.ea eiiae(aa|.(v: ~s sease. «ea|c (aev ae(|e
ma:|ec|vaee:(a.ae:ce:ei(aeiae(aa|«e:|c(e«a.eapast eease. eas·
aess. s(.ec-aeease.easaess(. ec(ae:e|v. (se«a.a(e:eeaaee(.easaac
s(:ae(a:a||v. mo| .ea(ec.aeve:vo:esea(eease.easaess:
I 02
These fi rst reductions lead us to "the very threshold of phenomenology" (Ieas I,
§88, p. 237) .
' ``´ Already cited [see note 7 above] . Al so cf. on thi s FTL. Appendi x I I , � 2h .
pp. 3 1 6-1 7 .
` `` Already cited [ see note 7 above] .
97
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
uasse:|«ea|co:e|a||v:eo|v(aa(..asaeaaease.«ea:eeeas. ce:.ae
iae(aa| s(:ae(a:es . a(ae |.ie ei(aeego-i . e. , s(:ae(a:es |eaac (e
seme :ecae.||e eea(.aeeaev-aac ae(essea(.a| eaes :ecaeec(e (ae.:
oa:e .cea|.(v. 1ae aa.(v ei(aeego' s "histor" .s(aa( ei(aeeidos
"ego. " uasse:| s cese:. o(.ea meaas (aa( (ae essea(.a| ie:m eieve:v
.a(e:eeaaee(.ea. eve:vsec.mea(a(.ea. aac(ae:eie:eeve:va.s(e:v ie:
eve:vego .sse|i·saue.ea(. w.(a.a(a.s)o·¬eia. s(e:.e.(v(aa(«e«.sa
(ea((a.aasaa.ava:.aa( .a||iae(e·a.s(e:.ea|.a(e:eeaaee(.easa:eva:. ·
a||e a(«. ||
s. m.|a:|v.s. aee(ae.a(e:eeaaee(.easaacsec.mea(a(.easeieeeme(·
:.ea|(:a(aa:ei:eeeia||iae(aa| .(v.ae«e:|c|vea(as(:eoaeeaaoa(truth
.(se|i.acaaee:.~||iae(aa|oe:.| .(ae:eie:e.s(eosa((ae(a:esae|cei.(s
.a(e:aa|a.s(e:.e.(v Ðvea. ia||eeeme(:.ea|ceeamea(s ¯-aacas«e|| .
a||ae(aa|eeeme(e:s-aac(eeeme(e:a.aeaecav.(esoea|ei(a.sas
aaevea(ei¯eeeme(:v«ea|c|e(eeemm.(ave:v se:. easeeaias.ea
eiseaseaac(ea|c.ea(e:esoeas.|.| .(vie:a||:.ee:easc.seea:se Oae
eaaae(eeme|ae|(ea| |(a.sev.ceaee«.(aea(ma|.ae(aeseas.||e(ae
e:eaaceieeeme(:.ea|(:a(a aac. (ae:eie:e. «.(aea(eaes(.ea. ae eaee
me:e(aeseaseeieeeme(:veeas(.(a(ecasaae.ce(.ese.eaee Ne«(a.s
sease«asseea:e|vcee.cec«.(a.a(aes(a(.eaaa| vses(aa(.as«esa«
a|eve. «e:e (ae .ac.soeasa||eeaa:c :a.| s ie:a|| eeae(.e e:a. s(e:.ea|
oaeaemeae|eev
3 . we«ea|c|eia||veeav.aeec..iae:e-as.a a.s s(a(.eaaa| vses-
uasse:|aaceeas.ce:ec«:.(.ae(e|ea seas.||eoaeaemeaea na(c.c
«eae(]as( iac ea( (aa( «:.(.ae. .aasmaea as .(«as e:eaac.ae .e:
eea(:.|a(.ae(e(aee:eaac.aeei·(:a(a s a|se|a(eO|]ee(.v.(v.«asae(
merely aeeas(.(a(ec seas.||e |ecv(Korper), |a( «as a|se a o:eoe:|v
eeas(.(a(.ae|ecv¡e//.-(ae.a(ea(.eaa|o:.me:c.a|.(veiaue:e·aac·
Ne«ei(:a(a: ii«:.(.ae .sboth aiae(aa| evea(aac(aeaosa:e.aeei
sease. .i.( .s |e(aKorper aaa Leib, ae« «ea|c «:. (.ae o:ese:ve . (s
Leiblichkeit i:emee:oe:ea|c.sas(e::uasse:|. sae(ee. ae(e. mme|. |. ze
a. saaa|vs.s«.(a.a(a.sambiguity, «a.eaie: a.m .s ea|vao:ev.s.eaa|
aaciae(aa| eeaias.eaei:ee.eas 1aeoaeaemeae|ee.s(mas(c.sse|ve
(aeam|.ea.(v. . iaeceesae(«aa((e|e:ecaeec(e eea. veea(.ea. (e
eaeese s. |eaee. e:(eo:ee.o.(a(eoaeaemeae|eev.a(ephilosophy. uas·
se:| .(ae:eie:e .ma.a(a.asa. sc. ssee. a(.veaaa| vs.saacc.sa:(.ea|a(es(ae
am|.ea.(v iae:ce:(ee:aso(aeaa(a:eei(aecaaee:(a:ea(ea.ae(:a(a
itsel .a.(seeas(.(a(.vesoeeeae:«:.(.ae. .ae:ce:ae((e|eave. a(e:·
aa| a.s(e:.e. (v.ae. see.ae(e(:ae|ce«a(ae.a(ea(.eaei«:.(.ae.e:ei
:eac.ae· .a.(se|iaac .a .(s oa:.(v. .a a ae« :ecae(.ea ae . see.ae (e
.se|a(e(ae.a(ea(.eaa|ae(«a.eaeeas(.(a(esKorper as Leib aacma.a(a.a
(a.sae(.a.(sLeiblichkeit, . a.(s|.v.ae(:a(a· sease saeaaaaaa| vs.sae
| eaee:aasaavaeeceiKorper assaea Oa|v.a(ae.a(ea(.eaa|c. mea·
98
Jacques Derrid
s.eaeiao:eoe:| vaa. ma(e|ecv. ei(aegeistige Leiblichkit, me:eo:e·
e. se| v. .a (ae Geistigkeit ei(aeLeib .(e (aeese|as.ea eia| | iae(aa|
ee:oe:ea| .(v· . . s sease .a(:.as.ea||v (a:ea(eaec ~|(aeaea .a a word
[mot], Korper aacLeib, |ecvaacresa .a:einfact aame:.ea| | veaeaac
(aesamees.s(ea( .(ae.:seasesa:eceia.(.ve|vae(e:eeeaeeas. aacae·
(a. aeeaaeeme(e(ae|a((e:(a:eaea(aeie:me:Forgetulness ei(:a(a
.(se|i«.||(aas|eae(a.ae|a((aeia.|a:eeiaaae(aac(aea|c.ea(.eaeia
:esoeas.|. | .(v.a|aoseme:e(aaaaceiea(-aac(a.sie:ee(ia|aesseaa|e
mace(eaooea:.aoe:seaea|v ea(ae|as. s eiaa.a(ea(.eaa|a. s(e:v
r:em(aea ea.«ae(ae:.(:ema.asas(ae c.saooea:aaeeei.a(e:sa|·
]ee(.ve(:a(ae:.as«esa.ca|eve. aa.s(e:.ea|ea(eee:v.forgetfulness
eaaaeve:(ae|ess|ecese:.|ecasaoaeaemeaeaei(aeego, aseaeei.(s
.a(ea(.eaa| ¬ec.iea(.eas ~s. a(ea(.eaa|sease. eve:v(a.aeeaaaac
saea|c|ecese:.|ecea| vasamec.iea(.eaei(aeoa:eego, o:ev.cec(ae
seaseeieaea¬ec.| ea(.ea.s o:acea(| v:esoee(ec. asuasse:|(:.es(e
ce.ie:esamo|e. eeaee:a.ae(aec.uea|(eeas(.(a(.eaei(aealter ego.
wea|sesee(aa( .ie:(aesame:easea.ie:ee(ia|aess«. ||aeve:|e:ac.·
ea| .ae«eve:o:eieaac.(mav|e.aacseaseeaaa|«avs. .ao:.ae.o|eaac
ce]a:e .|e:eae(.va(ec
iaFormal and Transcendental Logic aac(aea .a(aeCrisis, | .aea. s(.e
e|]ee(.iea(.eaaacma(aema(.ea|svm|e| .za(.ea«e:e o:esea(ecas(ae
eeeas.ea ei (ae (eeaa.e. s( s aac e|]ee(. v. s( s a|.eaa(. ea. «a.ea ce·
e:acecse.eaee. a(eas|.||e:eame'·1a.saeeasa(.ea.(a|eaaoaea.a.a
(aeOrigin, . sme:eoa:(.ea|a:|vc. :ee(ecaea. as((aeme(aece|ee.ea|aac
eoe:a(.ve (eaea. ae ei ma(aema(.es Oae |ea:as (e ase s.eas «aese
o:.me:c.a| sease .«a.ea . s ae( a|«avs |ae |ee.ea| sease (aa( .s
sec. mea(ec aac aeeess.||e (e aa explication) . s eeaeea|ec e: oe(ea·
(.a| .zecaace:sec.¬ea(a(.eas 1ae| a((e:. «a.eaa:eea| v.a(ea(. ease:
.a(ea(.eaa| seases mace ce:maa(. a:e ae( ea|vsuperimposed .a (ae
.a(e:aa||eeem.aeeisease.|a(a:eme:ee:| essv. :(aa| | vimplicated .a
(ae.:(e(a| .(v.aeaeas(aeee:s(eo.ia(aeOrigin, (aeae(.eaeiStufe aas
|e(aas(:ae(a:a|aaceeae(.eseaseaaceaa|e(:aas|a(ec|v s(eo e:
|v s(aee· 1ae eee|ee.ea|. maee ei sec. mea(a(.ea (:aas|a(es :e·
¬a:|a||v«e||(aes(v|e ei(aa(. mo| .ea(.ea i(|:.aes(eee(ae:.ie: a||
.a(ea(s aac oa:oeses. (ae ie| |e«. ae . ¬aees. 1ae .maee eilevel e:
stratum-what .s ceoes.(ec |v aa .a:eac e: a o:ee:ess.ea ai(e: (ae
:ac.ea|aeve|(v eiaa .::ao(.eae:upsurge: eve:vacvaaee. eve:v o:e·
oes.(.ea(Satz) eiaae« sease .sat the same time aleap (Satz) aac a
` ``´ Cf. in particular C, §9f On "meaningless signs" [signes depourvus de signifcation]
and "games-meani ng" [signifcation de jeu] , cf. LI. I , 1 , *20. pp. 304-06. On vocables
and real signs as "bearers" of signifed idealities, cf. E, §65, p. 268.
99
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
sedimentar (satzartig) ia|||ae|eisease ~|se . (ae .maeeei(ae sa|·
s(aa(.a|oe:maaeaeeei«aa(. s(aea'upposed e:situated under (aesa:·
iaee eiae(aa|| vo:esea(ev. ceaee ~ac iaa||v. (ae . maeeei(ae eea·
eea|eco:eseaee(aa(aa ae(.v.(veieseava(.eaeaaa|«avs:e·o:ecaee
a|eve e:eaac as (ae ieaaca(.ea. (aa( . s .(se|ie:eaacec. ei a. eae:
s(:a(.iea(.eas i(|:.aesa|| (a.s (eee(ae:. a(ae s(:ae(a:a|aacinternal
aa. (veiasvs(em.eia:ee. ea. a«a.eaa||ceoes.(s..a(e::e|a(ec|a(
c.s(.ae(.a:ee:.e.aa||vo:ese:.|ec|vaaarchi-tectonics.
Ceai:ea(.ae sec.mea(ec sease. ea: i:s( caaee: . spassivity. ia (ae
Origin, uasse:|c«e|| sme:eea(ae:eeeo(.veaeeeo(aaeeeis.eas-i:s(
.a:eac.ae-(aaaea(aeseeeaca:v(eeaa.ea|e:|ee.ea|ae(.v.(v(aa(. s
ae(ea|vae(eea(:ac.e(e:v (e(aei:s(oass.v. (v |a(. ea(aeeea(:a:v.
saooeses. ( 1ae sva(aes.s«a.eaa«a|eas (ae s.ea (e s.ea.iea(.ea. s
i:s(. .aiae(. aeeessa:.|voass. veaacassee. a(.ve ·1aeoess.|. | .(vei
e.v.ae«av(e(a.si:s(expectation eisease.sa| as(.aecaaee: na(ea|v
freedom eaa|e(.(se|i|e(a:ea(eaec. a(a.s«av.«ea:ea|«avsi:ee(e
:ea«a|eaaavoass. ve| v:eee.vecsease.(e:eaa.ma(ea||. (sv.:(aa|.(.es.
aac(e (:aasie:m(aem|ae| . a(e(aeee::esoeac.aeae(.v.(v
1a.si:eecem. s(ae eaoae.(vie::eae(.va(.ea(aa(|e|eaese:.e.aa||v(e
eve:v aamaa|e.ae as a soea|.ae|e.ae ( 1 6) . nv(a. s :eae(.va(.ea.
«a.ea. uasse:|s(a(es . .sae(.aiae( (aeae:maac«.(aea(«a.eaa
ee:(a.a eemo:eaeas.ea .s a|«avs oess.|| e. i ae(.ve| v :e·o:ecaee (ae
o:.me:c.a|ev.ceaee .ima|emvse|iia||v:esoeas.|| eie:aaceease. eas
ei(aesease (aa(i (a|e ao Reaktivierung . s. .a (aecema.a ei.cea|
e|]ee(.v.(.es . (ae ve:v ae(eia||Verntwortung aaceia| |Besinnung, . a
(aeseasesceiaecea:|.e:Reaktivierung oe:m.(s|:.ae.ae(e|.ie.aace:
(ae sec.mea(a:v sa:iaees ei | .aea.s(.e aac ea|(a:a| aeea. s.(.eas. (ae
seasea:.s.aei:em. as(.(a(.aeev.ceaee1a.ssease.s:eaa. ma(ec|v(ae
iae((aa( i :es(e:e.((e.(s ceoeaceaeeeamvae|aac :eo:ecaee.( .a
mvse|isaea as.(aac|eeao:ecaeecie:(aei:s((. me|vaae(ae: Oi
eea:se.(aeae(. v.(vei:eae(.va(.ea.sseeeacwaa(.(e.ves|ae|(eme
l 0ö
This theme of passi ve synthesis is copiousl y explicated i n EJ and eM, but once
again it is in FTL that it i s particularly focused (as in the Origin) by the problem of the
sign and of the sedi mentation of ideal objecti vities. Cf. i n parti cular Appendix I I , pp.
3 1 3-29. On the sense of acti vities and passi vities in a phenomenology of reading as
outlined in the Origin, also see FTL, § 1 6, pp. 56-60.
Of course, the themes of passivity and sedimentation, i . e . , of the potentiality of sense ,
deri ve all thei r seriousness from the fact that they are imposed on a philosophy of actually
present evidence whose "pri nciple of all principles" is the immediate and actual [en acte]
presence of sense itself. If reactivation is valuable and urgent, that is because it can bring
back to present and acti ve evi dence a sense which is thus retrieved out of historical
vi rtual i ty. If, on the surface, phenomenology allows itself to be summoned outside of
itself by hi story, i t thus has found i n reactivation the medi um of its fdel i ty.
100
Jacques De"id
|s(aee:|e.aa||vo:esea(|ve|a(a| (|ea.(aa(ei(aeeeeme(:|ea|ie:ma(|ea.
ie:esamo|e·«a|ea| s|e(aaaae(|v|(vaacaoass|v|(v.i i(a| sae(|v|(v|s
esoee|a||v|||am|aa(ecae:e.|(|saecea|(|eeaase(aeev|ceaeeeeas|c·
e:ec |s (aa(eie:ea(ecaaces(a|||saec|cea|ie:ma(|eas . ··
xeseeas||| ||(vie::eae(|va(|ea| saee·:eseeas|||||(v. t(eaeaees(ae
eae«ae:eee|ves .|a(a|seaaca:s(eia||(aeeae«aee:ea(esaac(aea
ese:esses(aeseaseie:sec| mea(a(|ease|||(e:a(eseaseea|v|aseia:as
(ae:ea:esa:iaeesava||a||eie:(a| s. 1aeequivocit eiese:ess|ea|s(ae
eaeseaae|ceisec|mea(a:vceoes|(s .1aa(.s«av(aeo:|ma||v| as(|(a(·
|aeeeeme(e:aac(aese«aeie| |e«ai(e:a|mmas(|eeeaee:aeca|ea(
(aeaa|vee|(vei| |aea|s(|eeso:ess|eaaaca|ea(seea:|ae. |vave:v
ea:eia|ee|a|aeei«e:cs. o:eoes|(|eas.aaceemo|eseseio:eoes|(|eas.
( ae:esa|(s«a|eaa:e(e|eaa. veea||veso:essec( 1 65 mec|aecì· .
uasse:| aeve: eeasec (e aooea| (e (ae |moe:a(|ve ei aa|vee|(v
Ðea|vee|(v|s(aeoa(aeia| | oa||eseoa|ea|a|e::a(|ea. i ( |sa| | (aeme:e
c|uea|(ae((e|eaas(v ae:e . as(ae sease eieea|vee|(v |aeeae:a| |s
|(se|ieea|veea| . 1ae:e |sacontingent o|a:|vee|(v e:ma|(|s|ea|aeaaee
aacaaessential eae. 1aese a:ea|:eacvc|s(|aea|saec|a(aeInvestiga­
tions (LI, i . 1 , § 26, o 3 1 4) . 1aea:s(ceoeacseaaae|]ee(|veeeavea·
(|ea. (aas (ae«e:c cee s|ea|aes |e(a a(voeeiaa|ma| aac.|a
Ce:maa·a(voeei«aeea. asec| am|aes· . 1a|so|a:|vee|(vceesae(
m|s|eacaaveaeaac«ea:ea|«avsi:ee(e:ecaee|(. · 1aeseeeac|sei
¡01
To try to illuminate this point, we first would have to approach directly and fo itself
the difcult and decisive problem in phenomenology of activity and passivity in generl
on the basis of texts directly devoted to thi s (EJ, FTL, eM) . Such a study would perhaps
have to conclude that phenomenology has only argued with the arbitrary sense
[exigence du sens] of this couple of concepts, or indefnitely struggled with them, nael y,
wi th the most "irreducible" heritage (and indeed thereby perhaps the most obscuring
heritage) of Wester philosophy. In one of the fnest analyses where he works with the
concepts of passivity, activity, and passivity in activity, Husserl notes that the distinction
between these two notions cannot be "infexible, " and that in each case their sense must
be "recreated" according to "the concrete situation of the analysis, " as "for every
description of intentional phenomena" (E, §23 , p. 1 08) .
I 08
LI, I , 1 , § 26, p. 3 1 4: "The class of ambiguous expressions illustrated by this last
example are what one usually has in mind when one speaks of 'equivoation' . Ambiguity
i n such cases does not tend to shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of
signifi cations. We are free, in fact, to limit our expression to a single signification. The
ideal unity of each of the difering signifcations will not be afected by their attachment to
a common designation" [modifed] .
The purpose of univocity supposes, then, a decisive rupture with spontaneous lan­
guage, with the "civil language " of which Leibniz used to speak; after that, "philo­
sophical" or "scholarly [savant]" language can freely be given its own particular con­
ventions. Does not the sentence just cited sound like the faithful echo of another sentence
of the Nouveaux Essais sur l' Entendement Humain, well known to Husserl and where
101
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
sa|]ee(.vee:|e.a. aac.(ceoeacseae:|e.aa||a(ea(.eas. eaa|«avsae«
esoe:|eaees«a|eaaa.ma(e(ae.cea(.(veie|]ee(.veseaseaacmase.(
ea(e: .a(e aaie:eseea||e eeaaea:a(.eas . 1a. s o|a:. vee. (v . s aa aa·
ave|ca||e:a(ae:(aaaeaaaeeam|.ea.(vflurivocite], eae(aa(eaaae(|e
:emevec i:em ea: |aaeaaee |v aa a:(|ae. a| cev.ee e: eeavea(.ea
(LI, o 3 1 4) .
ue«eve:.(a|s|as(eea.vee.(v. s«aa(se|eaeeaacoa. |eseoav mas(
eve:eeme. i ( . s aaave.ca||e ea|v.a aa(a:a| |aaeaaee. | e . |a(ae
iae(e·ea|(a:a|oaeaemeaeao:eeec|ae(ae:ecae(.ea 1aa(uasse:|. sse
aas.eas (e :ecaee (ae eea|veea| sease eiea|(a:a| aa.ve(- :evea| s a
eeaee:a(aa(eaeeme:eeea|c|e.a(e:o:e(ec|e(aasa:eiasa|eia.s(e:v
aacasaceeoice|.(v(e(aeoa:eseaseeia|s(e:|e.(vOn the one hand, .a
eaee( . aa|vee.(v :emeves(:a(a ea(eia. s(e:v s :eaea ua. veea|ex·
o:ess|ea eemo|e(e| v |:ea|s (ae sa:iaee aac eae:s ae (a:a.ae |ae|
[rep/i] (e(aeme:ee:| essv.:(aa|s|ea|iea(|eas(aa((ae.a(ea(.easeea|c
ceoes.(a||a|eae(aeacvaaeeseia|aaeaaeee:ea|(a:e. 1aasuasse:| s
eeas(aa(assee|a(|eaeieea. veea|o:eeeec.aes«. (a ae:.(|e.smei pro-
fundity |saace:s(aaca||e · neeaase.(|:|aeseve:v(a|ae(ev.e««|(a.a
ao:esea(ae(eiev. ceaee. |eeaase ae(a|ae. sa|cceae:aaaeaaeec|a
(aeoeaam|:aeioe(ea(.a||a(ea(|eas. |eeaase . (aas mas(e:eca| |(ae
cvaam|eseisease.aa. veea||aaeaaee:ema|asthe same. i((aas|eeos
|(s. cea| . cea(|(v(a:eaeaea(a| | ea|(a:a| ceve|eomea(. i(.s(aeeeac.·
(.ea(aa(a| |e«seemmaa|ea(|eaameaeeeae:a(|easei|aves(.ea(e:sae
ma((e:ae« c|s(aa( aac assa:es(ae esae(|(ace ei(:aas|a(.ea aac(ae
Theophilus says: "i t depends upon us to fix their meanings [signifcations] , at least in any
scholarly language, and to agree to destroy this tower of Babel" (Book I I , Ch . i x, §9 [ET:
New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, tr. Alfred Gideon Langley (Chicago:
Open Court, 1 91 6), p. 373]) 7 This optimism i s only one of the afnities between Leibniz' s
and Husserl's philosophies of language: More broadly speaking, Husserl also very early
felt himself the heir to the Leibnizian conception of logic in general. Cf. notably LI, I ,
Prol . , §60, pp. 21 8f.
I09
On this, cf. above all "PRS, " p. 1 44: "Profundity [Tiefsinn] i s a mark of the chaos
that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear,
lucid order. Genuine science, so far as its real doctrine extends, knows no profundity. "
Husserl then proposes t o re-strike (umprigen), as i n the case of a currency rvaluation,
"the conjectures of profundity into unequivocal [German: eindeutige; French: uni­
voques] rational forms" and thus to "constitut[e] anew the rigorous sciences. " Likewise,
Husserl ' s criticisms written in the margins of [Heidegger's] Sein und Zeit attribute to a
Tiefsinnigkeit the responsibility for the Heideggerian "displacement" toward what Hus­
serl defnes as a facto-anthropological plane. Husserl prefers the value of interiority to
that of profundity or depth, interiority being related to the penetration of interal, intrinsic
(inner), i . e. , essential (wesentlich), sense.
102
Jacques Derrida
oa :.|v ei |:a!. |.ea | a e(|e: «e:!s» the other hlnd(| e ·e:v
¬e¬ea(aa. ·ee.|v:e¬e»essease-eveac(ae:eaeaeia. s(e:.ea|¬ec.i·
ea(.ea..(a|eae¬asesoa:ea. s|e:voess. -| e.. e .as(ae(:aas¬. ss. eaaac
:eee||ee|.ea[recueillement] eisease ua. »ee.(vea|v. ac. ea(es(ae|. m·
o. c. |vei||e |. s(e:.ea|e(ae: Oaeeaea. a. uasse:| s !e¬aa!ie: aa. ·
»ee.(v .«|.e| |e ie:¬a|a(ec -eie:e (aeo:ae(.ee ei|ae:ecae(. ea· . s
|ae:eie:eea|v(ae:ecae|. eaeie¬o.:.ea||. s(e:v(e«a:caoa:ea. s(e:v
·ae| a :e!ae(.ea ¬as| -e :eee¬¬eaee! .aceia.(e| v. ie: |aaeaaee
ae.(|e:eaaae:saea| !-e¬a. a(a.aecaace:(aeo:e(ee(. eaeiaa. ·ee.(v
iia:ac.ea|eea. »ee.(vo:ee|aces|.s(e:v..aeaee( . -vo|aae.ae.(. a(e
(|eaee(a:aa|aac . | |·(:aas¬.ss.-|e:.eaesei -eaac .cea| . (. es. a-se·
| a(eaa.»ee.(v«ea|c.(se|iaa»eaee(ae:eeaseeaeaee(aaa(es(e:.| .ze
e: oa:a|vze |.s(e:v . a(|e .ac.eeaee eiaa .aceia.(e .(e:a(.ea s.aee
eea. »ee.|va|«avse».ceaeesaee:(a.aceo(aeice»e| eo¬ea(aaceeaeea| ·
¬ea(eiaoas(. aac«|eaeae«. saes( eassa¬eaacinteriorize (|e¬e¬e:v
eiaea|(a:e. aas. aceirecollection (Erinnerung) .a(|eueee| . aasease.
eaeaas. iae. ae(|. seea.»ee.(v.|aeeae.eeei(«eeacea»e:s Oae«ea|c
:esem-|e(aa(ei¡ames¡evee.(e:eoea(aac(ase:esoeas. -.| .(vie:a| |
eea.»eea(.ea.(se|i.a(. | .z.aea|aaeaaee(aa(eea|ceeaa| .ze(aee:ea(es(
oess.-|esvaea:eav«.(|| aee:ea(es(oe(ea(.a|ie:-a:. ec. aeea¬a|a(ec.
aac .a(e:«e»ea .a(ea(.eas«.(a.a eaea | .aea.s(.e a(em. eaea»eea-|e.
eaea «e:c. eaea s.¬o|eo:eoes.(.ea. .a a|| «e:c| vea|(a:es aac (ae. :
¬es( .aeea.easie:¬s .¬v(ae|eev. :e|.e.ea. se.eaees. a:(s. | . (e:a(a:e.
oe|.(.es. oa. | eseoav. aac se ie:(a· ~ac. | .se ¡evee. (a. s eacea»e:
«ea|c(:v(emase(aes(:ae(a:a|aa.(veia||e¬o.:.ea|ea| (a:eaooea:.a
(aeeeae:a|.zeceea. »eea(.eaeia«:. (.ae(aa(.ae|eaee:(:aas|a(.aeeae
| aaeaaee . a(e aae(ae: ea (ae -as. s ei(ae.: eemmea ee:eseisease.
e.:ea| a(es(a:eaeaea(a| ||aaeaaeesa(eaee.aeeama|a(es(ae. :eae:e. es.
ae(aa|.zes (ae.: mes(see:e( eeaseaaaees. c.se|eses(ae.:a:(ae:mes(
ee¬¬ea ae:.zeas . ea|(. »a(es (ae.: assee.a(.»e sva(aeses . as(eac ei
a»e. c. ae(aem. aac:ec.see»e:s(aeoee(.e»a|aeeioass.».(v i asae:(.
:a(ae:(aaaoa(.(ea(eio| av «.(aeae(a(.ea¬a:ss. :a(ae:(aaa :e·
caee. (. (a. s«:.(.ae:ese| a(e|vse((|es. (se|iwithin (aelabyrinthian ie|c
eiea| (a:e-eaac-v.(se«aeea.»eea(.eas.. ae:ce:(e(:a»e| (a:eaea
aac eso| e:e (ae »as(es( oess.-|e a.s(e:.ea| c.s(aaee (aa( .s ae« a( a||
oess.-|e
'
I
´ Exactitude and univocity are overlapping notions for Husserl . Moreover, the exac­
titude of expression will have as its condition the exactitude of sense. Geometry, the
model of the sciences whose objects are exact, will therefore more easily attain univocity
than will the other sciences, phenomenology i n particular. We will retur to this l ater.
About the relations between exactitude and univocity in geometry, also cf. Ideas I, § 73,
pp. 1 89-90.
103
Introduction to the Origin of Geometry
1aee|ae:eacea»e:. suasse:| s. |e:ecaeee:. ¬oe»e:.s|e¬o.:.ea|
|aaeaaeeme(|ec.ea||v(e(aeoe.a(«|e:e.|saa. »eea|aac(:aas|a(a-|e
e|e¬ea(s a:e ae(aa| |v (:aasoa:ea(. .a e:ce: (e :eae| -aesaac e:aso
aea.aa( .|s oa:esea:ee aa.s(e:.e.(ve:(:ac.(.eaa|.(v(aa(ae ceiae(e
a.s(e:.ea|(e(a|.(v«. | | v.e|cei.(se|i1|. sa.s(e:.e.(ve:(:ac.(.eaa| .(v.s
a|«avsa|:eacvo:esaooesec-ve»e:vOcvsseaa:eoe(.(.eaei¡evee s
(voe .as -va||philosophy ofhistor ..a(aeea::ea(sease·aac-ve»e:v
phenomenology ofspirit. 1aeesseaeeseiaa.(e(e(a|.(.esaac(ae(vee| ·
eeveiaea:esei(aese. :.(«. | | a|«avs-e. cea| .(.es(aa(a:e -eaac(e
e¬e.:.ea|a. s(e:vOa| v-vmeaaseia. s(e:.e. sm. s .(eess. -| e(e:ema.a
(ae:eaaceeaiase(ae¬«. (a(aemevemea(ei(:a(a
l l l
na(uasse:| s o:e]ee( . as(|e (:aaseeacea(a| oa:a| |e| (e ¡evee s.
sae«s(aesa¬e:e| a(.».(v¡evee so:e]ee(. «a.eaa|seo:eeeececi:e¬
aee:(a.aaa(. ·a.s(e:.e.smaaca«. | |(ea«asei:em(aea.e|(ma:e
ei |.s(e:v.
* ! ! 2
a«. | |(e¬as(e: (aa(a.ea(ma:e.a a(e(a|aaco:esea(
:esamo(.ea. eea|c ea|v saeeeec -v a| |e((.ae .(s saa:e (e aa.»ee.(v.
«ae(ae:.(¬.ea(c:a«i:e¬ae.»eaaa. »ee.(ve:(:v(eo:ecaeeaae(ae:
O(ae:«.se. (ae»e:v(es(ei. (s:eoe(.(.ea«ea|caa»e-eeaaa.a(e|| .e.·
-| e . a( |eas( .( «ea|c |a»e :e¬a.aec se ie:e»e: aac ie:e»e:veae
i.se«.se. uasse:| aac (eac¬.(aa .::ecae.-|e. ea:.ea.ae.aaca|«avs
:eaaseea(eea. »ee.(v. a(eoa:e|. s(e:.e.(viaeaee( .a-se|a(eaa. »ee. :v
.s. ¬ae.aa-|eea|v. a(«e| . m.(.aeeases First: saooese(aeces.eaa(ec
(a.ae.sae(ea| vaaa-se|a(e|vs.aea|a:. .mma(a-|e.aacaa(a:a|e-]ee(.
-a( a| se aa es.s(ea( «aese aa.(v . . cea(.(v. aac O-]ee(.».(v «ea|c .a
(ae¬se| »es-eo:.e:(ea| |ea|(a:eNe«.i«esaooese(|a|saeaa(|. ae
e:oe:eeo(.ea es. s(s. |.aea.s(.e.cea|.(vaac .(s o:e]ee( eiaa.»ee.(v-
. e . (ae ae( ei |aaeaaee .|se|i. a(e:»eae aac i:e¬ (|e ea(se( o| aee
(aa( saooes. (. ea .aaea| (a:e. .aa ae(«e:sei| .aea.s(.e :e| a(.eas aac
eooes|(. eas. «a.ea «ea|c |eac a«e:c «.(a .a(ea(.ease:«. (a |a(e:a|
aac». :(aa|:e¬. aseeaees Ðea.»ee.(v. s(ae eeaeea(.a| ¬a:seie»e:v
ea|(a:e 1a.s i:s( avoe(aes.s eia aa. »eea| aac aa(a:a| | aaeaaee .s.
(ae:eie:e. a-sa:caaceea(:ac.e(e:v
Second: .sae((ae:esa| ((aesame.i.a((aee(|e:oe|eei| aaeaaee.aa
a-se| a(e| v.cea| e-]ee(mas(-eces.eaa(ec:1a.s(.me. (ae eaaaeeie:
'
I I
Husserl has always associated "Hegelianism" with "romantici sm" and wi th "hi s­
tori ci sm, " to which romanticism is led when "belief" in its "metaphysics of history" has
been lost. (Cf. especially " PRS, " pp. 76-77. ) Was not the e xpression Weltanschauung
frst Hegelian? (Cf. on this J. Hyppol ite, Genesis and Structure ofHegel' s "Phenomenology
of Spirit, " tr. Samuel Cheriak and John Heckman [Evanston: Northwester Uni versity
Press, 1 974] , pp. 469-70. )
I I ?
James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Random, 1 961 ) , p. 3 4 [ "Hi story, Stephen sai d, i s
a nightmare from which I am trying t o awake. "] .
104
Jacques Derrida
aa.vee.(v«ea|cae(|eeae:ec|vao:eea|(a:a| .|a(|va(:aasea|(a:a|
e|¡ee(. ie: esamo|e. (ae eeeme(:.ea| e|¡ee(. ia aav ease. aa. vee.(v
ee::esoeacs(e(aeve:v veea(.eaeise.eaee. uasse:|«:. (es.a(aeOri­
gin: ia aeee:c «.(a (ae esseaee ei se.eaee. (aea. . (s aae(.eaa:.es
ma.a(a.a (ae eeas(aa( e| a. m. (ae oe:seaa| ee:(a.a(v. (aa( eve:v(a.ae
(aevoa(. a(ese.ea(.ieasse:(.easaas|eeasa.c eaeeaacie:a|| . (aa(. (
s(aacsias(. ie:eve:.cea(.ea||v:eoea(a||e.asa||e.aev.ceaeeaacie:
a:(ae:(aee:e(.ea|e:o:ae(.ea|eacs-as.aca|.(a||va||e(e|e:eae(.·
va(ec«.(a(ae. cea(.(vei.(seeaa. ae sease ( 1 65-66 mec.ieci · .
na((a. s.cea(.(veisease.(aee:eaaceiaa. vee.(vaac(aeeeac.(.ea
ie::eae(.va(.ea..sa|«avs:e| a(. ve. |eeaase.(.sa|«avs.ase:.|ec«.(a.a
ame|.|esvs(emei:e|a(.easaac(a|es. (ssea:ee.a¬.aia.(e|veoea
o:e¡ee(eiaeea.s.(.ea. Ðvea .i(aese :e| a(.eas a:e. «. (a. aa se. eaee.
:e|a(.easeioa:e. cea|.(.esaac(:a(as. (aevceae((ae:e.ae. ve:. æ
aav|ess(esemes.aea|a:o|ae.aes.aoe:soee(.ve[mises en perspectives],
semema|(.o|e.a(e:eeaaee(.easeisease. aac(ae:eie:esememec.a(e
aacoe(ea(.a|a.ms. i i. .aiae(.eea.vee.(v. sa|«avs.::ecae.||e. (aa(. s
|eeaase«e:csaac| aaeaaee.aeeae:a|a:eae(¬ceaaaeve:|ea|se·
|a(eobjects. ' 1aevceae(oessessaav:es. s(aa(aacoe:maaea(.cea·
(.(v(aa(.sa|se|a(e| v(ae.:e«a. 1aev aave(ae.:| . aea.s(.e|e.aei:em
aa.a(ea(.ea«a.ea(:ave:ses(aemasmec.a(.eas.1ae same «e:c.s
a|«avse(ae:aeee:c.ae(e(aea|«avsc.ae:ea(.a(ea(.eaa|ae(s«a.ea
(ae:e|vma|ea«e:cs.ea.iea(.ve [signiant] . 1ae:e . sase:(eipure
eea.vee.(v ae:e. «a.ea e:e«s .a (ae ve:v :av(am ei se.eaee. Cea·
seeaea(|v. uasse:| soee.ies . a a ae(e (aa( (ae se.ea(.ie s(a(emea(.
«.(aea( |e.ae eaes(.eaec aea.a as (e .(s (:a(a. a|«avs :ema.as
o:ev.s.eaa| .aac(aa(O|¡ee(.ve.a|se| a(e|vi:m|ae«|eceeei(:a(a. s
aa.aia.(e.cea( 1 66) . ~|se|a(eaa.vee.(v. s.aaeeess.|| e. |a(ea|vas
aaicea.a (ae kaa(.aaseaseeaa|e. ii(ae aa. vee. (v .aves(.ea(ec|v
uasse:|aac(aeeea.veea(.eaeeae:a|.zec|v¡eveea:e.aiae(relative,
(aeva:e. (ae:eie:e. ae(sesymmetrically. re:(ae.:eemmeatelos, (ae
oes.(.ve va|ae eiaa.vee.(v. . simmediately :evea|ec ea| v «.(a.a (ae
:e|a(.v.(v(aa(uasse:|ceiaec.ua. vee.(v.sa|se(aea|se|a(eae:.zeaei
eea. vee.(v iae. v. ae.((aeseaseeiaa. aia.(e(as|. uasse:|ceesae(
ma|eaa|vee.(v.aseea|c|eiea:ec. (aeva| aeie:a|aaeaaee. moeve:·
. saecaac (aas:emevec ea(eia. s(e:v s :eaea. xa(ae:. aa.vee.(v .s
|e(a(aeao:.e:.aac(ae(e|ee| ee.ea|eeac.(.eaie:a||a. s(e:.e.(v..(. s(aa(
I l3
That is why, as we noted above, Husserl could not inquire as to the absoLute ideal
Objectivity concering language itself, whose ideality is always that of a "thematic
index" and not a theme. This irreducible mediacy thus makes illusory all the safety
promised by speech or writing themseLves .
105
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
«.(aea(«a.ea(aeve:veea.veea(.easeiemo.:.ea|ea|(a:eaac a. s(e:v
«ea|cae(|eoe·s.||e .
1aeo:e||emeiaa.vee.(veeaees. mmec. a(e| vaoea(aa(ei:eae(.va·
(.ea.i(sseaema.s(aesame .ie:.«.(aea(am.a. ma|| .aea. s(.e(:aasoa:·
eaev. ae :eae(.va(.ea«ea|c|e. mae.aa|| e. na(.iaa. vee.(v . s.aiae(
a|«avs :e|a(.ve. aac .i.(a|eaeoe:m. (s(ae :ecae(.ea eia| |emo.:.ea|
ea|(a:eaaceia||sec. mea(a(.ea. .s(aeoess.|.| .(veiaoa:ea.s(e:vei
sease(e|ecea|(ecce¡a:e:He:eoa:(.ea|a:|vs. aee. aue:aav.aeo:e·
sea(ec (ae eaoae.(v ie: :eae(. va(.ea. uasse:| cees ae(ia.|(e as|(ae
se:.easeaes(. eaof itsjnitude. iaase. eaee| . |eeeeme(:v.«aeseoe(ea·
(.a|.(vie:e:e«(a.ses(:ae:c.aa:v. .(. s.moess.||eie:eve:veeeme(e:.
a( eve:v . as(aa( aac eve:v(.meae :esames a.s (as| ai(e: aeeessa:v
.a(e::ao(.eas. (e oe:ie:m a (e(a| aac . mmec.a(e :eae(.va(.ea ei (ae
. mmease eaa. a ei ieaac.aes |ae| (e (ae e:. e.aa| o:em. ses ( 1 66
mec.ieci · . 1aeaeeess.(vei(aese. a(e::ao(.eas.saiae(aa|eae. s|eeo.
o:eiess.eaa||:ea|s. aac seie:(a· .«a.ea aas aeseaseeemoa:ec«.(a
eeeme(:.ea|(:a(a|a(.sae| ess.::ecae.||e(e. (.
~total :eae(.va(.ea.evea. i(aa(«e:eoess.|| e. «ea|c oa:a|vze(ae
.a(eoa|a.s(e:veieeeme(:v¡as(assa:e| vas«ea|c(ae:ac.ea|.moess.·
|.|.(veia||:eae(.va(.ea.uasse:|. sae(«e::.eca|ea((aa(.a((a. soe.a(
a(e(a|:eeaoe:a(.eaeie:.e.as.s s(.||ea|va(e|ee| ee.ea|ae:.zea. re:
aace:(aees(:.as.eaeeess.(v(aa(eeeme(:.ea|ae(. v.(v|e.a(e:m.((ea(. s
a| sea.cceaaaessea(.a| aac.a(e:aa|aeeess.(v. s.aee aeo. eeeei(ae
eeeme(:.ea|ec.iee.sse|i· same.ea(.aeimmediate :eae(.va(.ea.soess.·
||e. eaaav|eve| . 1aa(. s«av . uasse:|:ema:|s. (ae .ac.v.caa| aac
evea(aesee.a|eaoae.(v ie::eae(.va(.ea. seiaae|v.easia.(ace
( 1 68) . i ( «. || a| «avs|ecea.ec.mmec.a(e(e(a|.(v.
1ae e|v.easaess [evidence] ei (aa( ia.(ace aac ei (aa( aeeessa:v
mec.aeveea|cs(amouasse:| s «ae|eoa:oeseasaeasease. s. aee(aa(
ia. (ace. s.aiae(.::ecae.|| e. saea|c.(ae(ia:a.sa(ae(:aes(a:(.aeoe.a(
ie::eree(.aeeaa.s(e:v:w.(aea((aa(essea(.a|eeaeea|mea(eie:.e.as
aac«.(a.a(aeavoe(aes. seiaaa| |·oe«e:ia| :eae(.va(.ea.«aa(«ea|c
eease. easaesseia. s(e:.e.(v |e: ~| se. ae cea|(. (aa( eease.easaess
«ea|c |e ae(a.ae. . i.( «as :ac.ea| |v o:ea.|.(ec aeeess (e e:.e. as .
na(. se (aa( a. s(e:v mav aave .(s o:eoe:ceas.(v. mas(ae( (aea (ae
ca:|aess«a.eaeaea|is (ae e:.e.aa| o:em. ses.. (eaa|e oeae(:a(ec
|a( aeve:c.ss.oa(ec· ae( ea| v a.ce (ae iae( |a( a|se (ae . as(.(a(.ae
sease:~acmas(ae((aee:.(.ea| ie:ee(ia|aesseie:.e.as|e(aeia.(a·
ia| saace«. a (:a(a s acvaaee :a(ae: (aaa aa aee.cea(a| a|e::a(.ea:
1a. sc. s(. ae(.ea|e(«eeaiae(aacsease.e:(aeceiae(eaac(aece ¡a:e·
«ea|c|eeaaeec.a(aesease·.aves(.ea(.eaeiao:.me:c.a|ia.(ace.
na(ie:uasse:| .as«e|ae«.(aa(ia.(aceeaaappear o:ee.se|v.a.(s
106
Jacques Derrida
o:.me:c. a| .|vea|ve.»ea|aeiceaeiaa. aia.|ea.s|e:v1aas . iaeec«.|a
|aeia.|aceei:eae|.»a|.ea.uasse:|ceesae|e.»eao.as«esasoee| .|ae
i:s|c.:ee|.eaeia. s. a»es|.ea|. ea ueoes|oeaes|aeo:e||emaa|.|| a|e:
aac.a».|esΡ h. «.|aas| .ea(|vea.ema|.e|:e». |v.|eae|.ee|aa||ae:e
es. s(saa.cea| . za|. ea aame| v. |ae:eme»a|ei|.m.(si:emea:eaoae·
.(v .aaee:(a.a sease.|s .aia.(. za|.ea ( 1 68) . ~ seeeaca:v.cea| . z.ae
eoe:a|.ea |aea eemes|e:e| . e»e|ae:eae|.»a|.»ea|. | .(vei.|s ia.|ace
aac|e|s. (ee||eveac.|se|i 1a.s me»emea|.saaa|eeeas |e|aeeea·
s|.(a|.ea. ie: esamo|e. ei|ae aa.|vei|ae «e:|c s .aia.|e ae:.zeae:
. |eveac|aeia.|e.a(e:eeaaee(.eaei:e|ea|.easaaco:e|ea|.eas·|e|ie
eeas|.|a|.eaei(aee». ceaeeie:a|e|a|aa.|vei|ae.mmaaea(rasasaa
icea.a|aekaa|.aasease sa|a|e»ea|| .(a.sme»emea|.saaa|eeeas
|e|ae o:ecae|. eaeieeeme|:v s esae|.|ace |aeoassaee|e|ae .aia.|e
| .m.(eiaia. |eaaceaa| .(a|.»eseas.||e.a(a. (.ea s(:.e||vsoea|.ae.e»ea
ae:e .|. seeeme|:.ea| .cea|.za|.ea«a.ea oe:m. |s.aia.|.z.ae|ae :eae·
|. »a|. »e a|. | .|v we:|.ae .a(aec.aoaaaeasaess eioa:e . cea|.|v. (a. s
a|.|.(veas. |vaacce]a:e|:aase:esses.|s| .m.|s.«a.eaa:e(aeaaeme:e
(aaa(aeaem.aa|| . m.|seioa:eiae|aa| .|v1a.s. cea|.za(.ea.«a.eaaas
ie: .|s ee::e|a|e aa .aia.(e icea. a|«avscee.s. »e|v .a|e:»eaes .a(ae
c.uea| | memea|s ei uasse:| s cese:.o|.ea 1ae oaeaemeae|ee.ea|
s(a|asei.(se». ceaee:ema. as:a|ae:mvs|e:.eas 1ae.moess.|.| .|vei
aceeaa(e|vce|e:m. a.ae|aeeea|ea|ei|a. si ceaceesae|aace:m.ae.
uasse:|savs.aIdeas I, |ae :a|.eaa||:aasoa:eaevei. |s.as.ea|ia|e».·
ceaee(Einsichtigkeit).

ue«e»e:.(aeee:|a.a(vei«aa|eaaae»e:.m·
mec.a(e| vaacassaeao:esea|. (se|i.aaa. a|a. |.ea saea|coese seme
se:.eas o:e||emsie: oaeaemeae|eev .o:e||ems s.m.|a: |e |aese. ie:
esamo|e .ei|aeeeas(.(a(.eaei(aealter ego |vaa.::ecae.||vmec.a(e
.a|ea|.eaa| .|v· we«.||eemec.:ee(|v|ae|(e|a. s|a|e:.«aea|aeo:ec·
ae|.eaeieeeme|:.ea|esae(.|ace|v.cea| .za|.ea«.|||eea:eeaee:a~(
(ae o:esea(]aae|a:e. uasse:| o:e».s.eaa| |v a»e:|s (a. s c. mea| (v ue
«:.|es . 1aeoeea| .a:se:|eie».ceaee|e|eae.ae|esaea. cea| .za(.eas
«. ||eeaee:aas|a|e:( 1 68 mec.iecì ·
1aeeaoae.(vei:eae(. »a(.eamas||aea|e(:aasm. ||ec.. ae:ce:|aa|
se.eaee ae| ceeav |a(e a (:ac.(.ea emo(.ec eisease ~s |eae as
! t +
Cf. Ideas I, especially §83, pp. 220-22.
I I ö
Ibid. , p. 221 . [ I n hi s translation of the Origin, Derrida translates Einsicht by "evi ­
dence rationnel le . " In this he foll ows, as he says, the j ustifcation and practice of S.
Bachelard (see A Study ofHusserI' s Logi c, p. \ 0). This helps elucidate the phrase "l a
transparence rationnelle de son evidence" as a "translation" of "Einsi chtigkeit . " I n his
Guide for Translating Husserl, Dorion Cairs suggests the fol lowing: i nsi ght, i nsightful­
ness, i ntellectual seenness, apodictic evidentness, evidentness. Note adapted by Tr. ]
107
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
se.eaeeme»esa«avi:em.(s|ee|aa.aesaac. |s|ee.ea|saoe:s|:ae|a:es
a:eaeeama|a|ec.(aeeaaaeesie:saeaa(:aasm.ss.eacee:easeaa(.||ae
cav«aea|ae a|. |. |v aaooeas|eia. |. uaie:|aaa(e|v |a. s.s ea:
s. |aa|.ea.aac|aa|ei|ae«ae|emece:aaee ( 1 69) . 1aeac»aaeemea|s
eise.eaeeeaa|eoa:saec. e»ea«aea(ae seaseei.(se:.e.aaas|eea
| es| sa(|aea(ae»e:v|ee.ea| .(vei|aese.ea(.ieees(a:es. . mo:.seaec.a
mec.aev. |:ea|sce«a .a|ea se:|eieae.:.eaac.aaamaaa|sa:c.|v
D.cae|r|a(ecese:.|e|a. ss.(aa|.ea:wasae||aee|e:a.|veiesseaees
ie: a.m oe:aaos ea|v aae(ae: aame ie: a aeaemo.:.ea| a.s(e:.e. (v:
Ceeme(:vaac|aes(ac. es[sciences ] |aa|aeeemoaav. |a:ees.iecia:
i:em |ae.: iaacamea(a| .a|a.(.eas. 1aev a:e .aeaoa||e ei ». s.ea
(idein) aac:.»e|ec(e(aeavoe(aesesae|cas(ae. :o:.ae.o|es Ceaias. ae
svm|e|«.(a(:a(a. |aev seem(eas|ec:eam(oromen os oneirottousi)
(Republic vi i .···e· · 1ae:e|a:a.aea. :v.s|ae:eie:ea:eea||a:eae|
asaacie:as.|«.||:ea«a|ease.eaee|e. (so:.me:c.a|sease.. e .as«e
|ae«. .(siaa|sease
VIII
1aas(aeme|aecaac(aeseaseei(aeeaes(.eaeeaee:a.aee:.e.asa:e
.||am.aa|eca|(ae same |.meas|aeeeac.(.easie:|ae|:ac.(.eaeise.·
eaee. aeeae:a| ia e|es.ae(aeseo:e| .m. aa:v eeas.ce:a(.eas. uasse:|
:eea|| s(ae.:esemo|a:vaacia| | va.s|e:.ea|eaa:ae|e:..a|aeseaseei
Historie) : лe:v«ae:e|aeo:e||ems.(aee|a:.iv.ae. a»es|.ea|.eas. (ae
. as.ea|s .a(e o:.ae.o|esa:ehistorcal (historsch) . o wes|aac.|aea.
«.(a.a(aea.s|e:.ea|ae:.zea. a«a. eae»e:v|a.ae. sa. s(e:.ea| .ae«e»e:
|.((|e«emav |ae« a|ea|ce|e:m.aec(a. aes sa(|a. sae:.zeaaas .|s
essea|.a| s(:ae|a:e (aa(eaa|ec.se|esec|a:eaea me|aec.ea|. aea.:v
( 1 7 1 -72 mec.iecì·
w.(a:esoee(|ee(ae:se. eaees. as«.|a:esoee|(e|ae«e:|ceio:ese.·
ea(.ieea||a:e. e|ae::e(a:as(e(ae.:e:.e. asa:e |ae:eie:eo:ese:.|ec
1aeva:ea|«avsoess.||e .a|(aeaeaaso:e||ems|aev s|.| | :ema.a aa·
as|ec. 1a.sie|cei.aea.:vaasae|.m. (s. s.aeea.s(e:.e.|vem|:aees
|ae .aia.|e |e(a|.|v ei|e.aeaac sease. Na(a:a| |v. o:e||ems ei|a. s
oa:(.ea|a:se:|. mmec.a(e|va«a|ea|ae|e(a|o:e||emei(aeaa.»e:sa|
a.s|e:.e.(v ei (ae ee::e| a(. »e maaae:s ei |e.aeeraamaa.|v aac (ae
ea||a:a|«e:|caac(aeao:.e:.s(:ae(a:eeea(a.aec. a|a.sa.s(e:.e.|v
( 1 72) .
' ' ´ Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Hamilton and Cairs (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, \ 96 \ ) , p. 765. The translation is that of Paul Shorey.
108
Jacques Derrid
~r(e: aav.ae eoeaec a.s eaes(.ea a|ea( eeeme(:v (e .(s |:eaces(
ae:.zea. |a(|eie:eeem.ae|ae|(e(aece(e:m.aece:.e.aei(aa(se.·
eaee.uasse:|:esoeacs.asase:(eieemo|emea(a:ve|a:.aea(.ea·(e(«e
c.ame(:.ea||veooesecme(aece|ee.ea|e|] ee(.eas.
Ce:(a.a|v. (aea:s(«ea|co:eeeeci:em as(aaca:ceo.s(eme|ee.sm
ie:«a.ea(ae:e(a:a(eo:.me:c.a|ev.ceaeeaac(e.(s.as(.(a(.aeeea·
eeo(s .s aa .ac.soeasa||e (as|. na( (ae:e. sae(a. aea.s(e:.ea|(e(aa(.
1ae.||as.eaeia.s(e:veaa|ee.vea(e(a. sa:s(e|]ee(.eaea|v|vve:|a|
e: svm|e|.e a| |as.eas (e seme aac.seeve:a|| e [ 1 72] |a( aa:c|v
mv(a.ea| 1aa|es . uasse:| a. mse|iaac aaac|ec (a.s e|ass.e e|]ee(.ea
«aea.eeaee:a.ae(aee:.e.aeise.eaeeaaceeeme(:v i oa:(.ea|a:. ae
a((ae|ecemo.:.e.smaaces(ena|a.s(e:v. ue ae«:e]ee(s.(|eeaase
.( m.seeas(:aes . (se«a s(v|e eia.s(e:.ea| .aves(.ea(.ea. «a.ea .s as
interal aacaeaemo.:.ea|asoess.|| e.is. (aseia|(e:eea||(aa(aeve:aas
.(|eeaaeaes(.eaei:e(a:a.ae(e1aa|ese:(aeiae(aa||ee.aa.aesei
eeeme(:v:na((e:eaeaaeeiae(aa|a.s(e:v. sae(a(a||(eea(eaese|iea
i:em a.s(e:v.aeeae:a| . Oa(aeeea(:a:v. . ( . s(eeoeaeaese|i(e (ae
seaseeia. s(e:.e.(v. ~ac.aasea(eaee«aeses(:ess. a(|eas(. eea(:as(s
«.(a (aa(eia.s ea:|v oaeaemeae|eev . |a(«a.eaea|v eeaa:ms aac
ceeoeas. «. (a aaacm.:a||eace|.(v. (ae. a.(.a|c.s(:as(«.(a:eea:c(e
eeavea(.eaa|a.s(e:v· . uasse:|soee.aes( 1 72-73) :
The ruling dogma of the separation in prnciple between epistemo­
logical elucidation and historical, even humanistic-psychological
explanation, between epistemological and genetic origin, is funda­
mentally mistaken [is fundamentally turned upside down: Derrida 's
translation], unless one inadmissibly limits, in the usual way, the
concepts of "histor, " "historical explanation, " and "genesis. " Or
rather, what is fundamentally mistaken is the limitation through which
precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of histor are
concealed.
1e.aves(.ea(e(aeseaseeiase.eaeeas(:ac|(.eaaacasea|(a:a|ie:m
.s(e.aves(.ea(e(ae seaseei. (seemo|e(ea. s(e:.e.(v. r:em(a. siae(.
eve:v . a(:ase.ea(.ae eso|.ea(.ea. eve:v :e(a:a (e a:s( as. ems. (e
o:.me:c.a|ev.ceaeesaac. as(.(a(.aeeeaeeo(s. .sa((aesame(. me a.s·
(e:.ea| c. se|esa:e [ 1 73] . waa(eve:ea:.eae:aaee ea (ae sa|]ee(ei
I I 7
I n Ideas I, §25, pp. 84-86, will be found a long pissage i n which Husserl develops
on his own, and in curiously similar terms, the objection that he prtends to addrss here.
The confrontation of this text with that of the Origin can b rmarkably i l luminating as to
the sense and fdelity of Husserl ' s itinerary.
109
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
ae(aa|a.s(e:v. «e |ae«a prori (aa(eve:vea|(a:a| o:esea(.(ae:eie:e
eve:vse.ea(.aeo:esea( ..mo|.ea(es.a.(s(e(a|.(v(ae(e(a|.(vei(aeoas(
1aeaa.(vei(a. saaeeas. ae(e(a|.za(.ea«a.ea. sa|«avs|:eaea(a|ea(
.a(aeie:mei(aea.s(e:.er:esea(.(ae r:. me:c.a|.a.(se|i¯[Primordial
e� soiD |eacs as. .iee::ee(|v.aea.:ecei. (e (ae aa.ve:sa| ~o:. e:. ei
a.s(e:v.As(|eA|se|a(eaae|aaeea||e.a.(se|iei(aeL. v. aer:esea(. a
«a.e�.(. se:eaacec, (|ea. s(e:.er:esea(. sa( a:s(s.ea(ea| v(ae.:·
:eca..||eaacea:ee|aeeaacmevemea(ei(|a((e(a|.za(.eaaac(aa(
(:ac.(.eaa|. za(. ea.
,
1ae |. s(e:.er:esea(.s (aea. s(e:.ea|A|se|a(e~
(ae v.(a| ¬evemea( ei (ae eees. s(eaee aac (ae .a(e:«eav.ae (des
Miteinander und Ineinander) ei o:. me:c.a| ie:ma(.eas aac sec.·
mea(a(.eas ei sease (Sinnbildllllg [lind Sinnsedimentierllng] ) " ( 1 74
mec.aecì· .
Ðve:voa:(.ea|a:a.s(e:.ea|. aves(.ea(.eamas(ce]a:eae(e.(sme:ee:
|ess . mmec.a(e ceoeaceaee ea (aa( .as.ea( . a(e aoec.e(.e o:. ae.o|es
[evidence absolument principielle] . ~||aa|.(aa|iae(aa|a.s(e:v:ema.as
.aeemo:eaeas.|| e( 1 74) as|eaeas(aesea o:. e:.aaveae(|eeaeso| . ·
ea(ecaacas|eaeasiae(aa|a. s(e:vaasae(acao(ec. (sme(aec(e(ae
ae(.eaei.a(:.as.e a.s(e:v. (e (ae ae(.eaei(ae .a(ea(.eaa| a.s(e:v ei
sease.
1a.s|eacsas(e(aeseeeac:.oes(e. (a. s(.mec.:ee(ecaea.as(a.s(e:.·
e.sm:a(ae:(aaaemo.:.ea|a.s(e:v.1aeseaemaei(a.se:. (.e. sm. saaa|·
eeeas(e(aa(«a.eaaace:|.esra. |eseoavask.ee:easse.eaee. na(
(ae a.s(e:.e.smuasse:|ae«a((ae|s. ceso.(eama.(.eseeaaee(.ae.((e
D.|(aev s (aee:vei(aeWeltanschauung, seems(eaave ame:ee(aae·
see.e|ee.ea| . a me:emodern s(v|e. ~ac ae:e «aa( uasse:| «aa(s (e
«:es(i:ema.s(e:.ea|:e|a(. v. sm.s| ess(ae(:a(ae:.cea|ae:mseise.·
eaeeaacoa.|eseoav(aaa(aeao:.e:.eia.s(e:.ea|se. eaee.(se|i.
ia eaee(. e(aae|ee. smse(s(ae a|aacaa(ma|(.o| .e.(vei(es(.mea.es
a((es(.ae(aa(eaeaoeeo|e.eaea(:.|e. eaeaaamaae:eaoaas. (s«e:|c.
.(sao:.e:. . .(s e:ce:..(s|ee.e . .(sa.s(e:v. eve:aea.as((aeaa.ve:sa|a
o:.e:. . (ae aaeeac.(.eaecaacaoec.e(.es(:ae(a:es . (ae aa.(a:ve:eaac
eia.s(e:v. saeaasuasse:|meaas(ecese:.|e(aem.
Ne«. on the one hand, (aeseaa.moeaeaa||e(es(.mea. esceae(|e·
| .e |a(. ea (ae eea(:a:v. o:esaooese (ae s(:ae(a:e ei(ae aa. ve:sa|
ae:.zeaaac(ae ao:.e:.eia.s(e:v (aa( uasse:| ces.eaa(es . (aeseo:e·
´ `´ Naturally, it is a question, as Husserl clearly states, of the hi storic Present in
general as the ultimate universal form of every possible historical experience, an experi­
ence which itself is grounded in the Living Present of egological consciousness.
Moreover, Husserl emphasi zes i n a footnote [ 1 74] that all of intrinsic hi story passes
through the intrinsic history of the totality of individual persons.
· +·
� i
!
� ,
110
Jacques Derrid
saooes.(.easea|veaases.aea|a:aacce(e:m. aecao:.e:.(e |ea:(.ea·
|a(ec (ae:e. a i(sauees. (aea. (e :esoee( (aesea:(.ea|a(.eas aac (ae
eemo|.ea(eca.e:a:eav«a.easa|m.(sme:ee:|essce(e:m.aecma(e:.a|
ao:.e:.(e(aeao:.e:|ie:meiaa.ve:sa|a. s(e:|e.(v.On the other hand,
(aeiae(s. «a.eaa:e(aas. ave|ec(esaooe:((a. s:e|a(. v. sm.eaa|e
ce(e:m.aec asee:(a.aa.s(e:.ea|iae(sea|v .iseme(a.ae| . |e a. s(e:.ea|
(:a(a . s ce(e:m.aa||e . aeeae:a| . · · xaa|e s ae« .( :ea||v «as
| :-i . (ae a|(.ma(e:eie:eaeeie:a| |iae(aa|a. s(e:v.o:esaooesesas. (s
ae:.zea a a.s(e:.ea| ce(e:m.aa|.| .(v (aa(eve:v emo.:.ea| se.eaee. |v
.(se|ia|eaeaacassaea.. soe«e:|ess(ee:eaac. ~eee:c.ae|v. «eaeec
ae(i:s(ea(e:.a(eseme|.aceie:.(.ea|c.seass.eaei(aeiae(sse(ea(|v
a.s(e:.e. sm. .(. seaeaea(aa((aee|a.mei(ae. :iae(aa|.(va|:eacvo:e·
saooeses(aea. s(e:.ea|ao:.e:..i(a. se|a.m.s(eaaveaavsease. | :-
mec.ieci ·
iae:ce:(e|ea||e(ees(a|| . saiae(sasiae(sof a.s(e:v. «emas(
a|«avs a|:eacv |ae« «aa( a. s(e:v . s aac aace: «aa( eeac.(.eas-
eeae:e(eeeac.(.eas-.(|s oess.|| e. we mas(a|:eacv|e eaeaeec .a a
o:eeemo:eaeas.eaeia. s(e:.e.(v. . . e. . ei(ae .ava:.aa(seia.s(e:v (aa(
|aaeaaee. (:ac.(.ea. eemmaa. (v. aac se ie:(a a:e. ia e:ce: ie: (ae
e(aae|ee.ea| iae( (e aooea:. e(aae|ee.ea| eemmaa.ea(.ea mas(a|·
:eacv|es(a:(ec«.(a.a(aeae:.zeaeiaa.ve:sa|aamaa.(v.(«emeae:
(«ee:eaoseimeamas(aave|eeaa||e(e|eaace:s(eecs(a:(.aei:em
(aeoess.|.|.(. es. ae«eve:oee:.eiaaa.ve:sa|| aaeaaee.1aee(aae|ee.s(
mas(|esa:e .aoec.e(.ea||v. (aa(other meaa|seaeeessa:.|v| .ve«.(a.aa
eemmaa.(vei|aaeaaeeaac(:ac.(.ea.«.(a.a(aeae:.zeaeiaa.s(e:v.
sa:e.a|se. ei«aa(a||(aa(meaas.aeeae:a| ta(aea|(. ma(e:eeea:se..(
. saeeessa:v(e|ae«(aa((aea. s(e:.er:esea(.aeeae:a|-(ae.::eaae. ·
|| eie:meieve:va.s(e:.ea|esee:.eaee-. s(aee:eaaceia| | a. s(e:.e.(v.
aac(aa(t eea|c a|«avseeme(e(e:ms .a (a. s r:esea(«. (a (ae mes(
c.s(aa(.(aemes(c. ne:ea(e(ae: ¯ ue«eve:s(:aaee(eeaeae(ae:(«e
mea mav |e. (aev a| «avs a:e aaae:s(aaca||e-a( (ae | . m.(-.a (ae
eemmeaa| . (v ei(ae. :i. v. ae r:esea(. a«a. ea(aea. s(e:.e r:esea( . s
:ee(ec 1aa( eaea ei(ae.: iaacamea(a| r:esea(s . s. also, ma(e:.a||v
ce(e:m.aec |v .(s .ase:(.ea«.(a.a(ae iae(aa|eea(ea(eia (:ac.(.ea.
see.a|s(:ae(a:e. |aaeaaee. aacseie:(a. (aa(eaeacees ae(aave(ae
same sease·eea(ea(. (a. s .a ae «av aaee(s (ae eemmeaa|(v ei(ae.:
ie:m 1a.s aa.ve:sa|ie:m. «a.ea. s(ae mes(prmordial aacconcrete
|.vec esoe:.eaee. .s saooesec |v a|| |e.ae·(eee(ae:. 1a. s ie:m a| se
seems(e|e(aeiaa|:e(:eaeamea(.(ae:eie:e(aemes(responsible seea·
I I !I
Some analogous developments will be found in the Vienna Lecture, "Phi losophy
and the Crisis of European Humanity, " i n C, p. 296.
1 11
Introductin to the Origin of Geomet
:.(v. eieve:v oaeaemeae|ee.ea| :ecae(.ea ia (a. s a|(. ma(ejurdical
instant [instance] .s aaaeaaeec(aemes(:ac.ea|aa.(vei(ae«e:|c.
1aas eve:vo:e||emeia.s(e:.ea|iae(s .ave|vesa.s(e:.ea|.ava:.aa(s
(ae ve:v memea((ae o:e||emaa(ae:.zes aee:(a.arelativism. 1 20 1ae
|a((e::e(a.asa||.(sva|ae.o:ev.cec.(s|eve|eimateriality aac.(sao:.e:|
eeac.(.eas a:e aoo:eo:.a(e|v ce(e:m. aec. 1ae oa:( ceve(ec (e :e·
| a(.v. sm.a (ae ee|e|:a(ecie((e:(e i-vv·n:aa| eaa|e .a(e:o:e(ec. a
(a. s«av r:em(aa(|e((e:.«:.((eaavea:ea:|.e:(aaa(aeOrigin, · ·«e
m.ea((
¡
. a|. ea (ae eea(:a:v. (aa( uasse:| :eaeaaeec(ae a.s(e:.ea| a
o:.e:.c.seeve:ec|v. mae.aa:vva:.a(.ea¬c:eeeea.zec (aa((aeoa:e
oaeaemeae|eev eia. s(e:vaac(eesoee(seme(a.aee(ae:(aaaesam
o|esi:em(aeeea(ea(ei(aeemo.:.ea|se.eaees. e(aae|eev. aoa:(.ea|a: .
1a.s.sae(a||v(ae:eac.ae(aa(He:|eaa·rea(vo:eoesec taa|e((e:(e
i-vv·n:aa|«a.eaaas|eeao:ese:vec. uasse:|seems(eacm.((aa((ae
iae(s ee |eveac «aa( «e . mae.ae aac (aa( (a.s oe.a( |ea:s a :ea|
s.ea.ieaaee. i( .sas|i(ae. mae.aa(.ea.|eu(e.(se|i..saaa||e(e:eo:e·
sea((ae oess.|.|.(.eseies.s(eaee «a.eaa:e:ea|.zec .ac.ae:ea( ea|·
(a:es. . . . uasse:|ìsa«(aa(. (. soe:aaosae(oess.||eie:as.«ae|.ve
. aee:(a.aa. s(e:.ea|(:ac.(.eas. (eeeaee.veei(aea.s(e:.ea|oess.|.|.(vei
(aeseo:.m.(.vemea|vame:eva:.a(.eaeiea:. mae.aa(.ea.·
O:aea.a
Historical relativism is now no longer dominated at one stroke by a
mode ofthought which would have all the keys ofhistory and would be
in a position to drw up a table ofall historical possibles before any
factual experimental inquir. On the contrar, the thinker who wishes
I 20
Is it necessary to underscore that the question here is not that of a criticism of
historical or socio-ethnological science as such? Husserl simpl y wants to cal l the problem
back to its presuppositions. Phenomenol ogy, whi ch alone can bring them to light as such ,
at times has been, moreover, taken up by the researchers themsel ves wi th various de­
grees of explication.
This precaution had been formulated as an hommage to history as human science i n
"PRS, " p. 1 29.
I � i
Letter of March I I , 1 935. Husserl there speaks notably of the "indubitable legiti­
macy" that "historical relativism" involves "as anthropological fact" (our emphasis)
and of the possible and necessary task of a comprehensi ve Einfiihlung with respect to
pri mi ti ve societies that are "wi thout history" (geschichtlos) . [A great deal of this letter i s
availabl e i n Merleau-Ponty' s articl es cited beiow. See notes 1 22-1 25-tr. ] He insi sts
v igorously on the fact that the rights of relativi sm thus understood are preserved and
"conserved" by "the i ntentional anal ysi s" of transcendental phenomenology.
I22
Cf. "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, " pp. 90-91 . The sae interpretation
is presented i n Merleau-Ponty' s article, "The Philosopher and Sociology, " i n Signs, pp.
98-1 ] 3.
. �
1 12
Jacques Derid
to dominate history in this way must learnfrom the facts and must
enter into them . . . . The eidetic ofhistor cannot dispense with
factual historical investigation. In the eyes ofHusserl, philosophy, as a
coherent thought which leads to a classication offacts according to
their value and truth, continues to have its fnal imporance. But it
must begin by understanding all lived experences. (Our emphasis) ·
i ssaeaaa.a(e:o:e(a(.ea]as(. iec:
1aeea|v:e|a(. v. smuasse:|ae|ae«|eceesasva|.c. s (aa(a((aeaec(e
a.s(e:.ee· aa(a:eoe|ee.ea| iae(s ¯ assaeaaac .a(ae.:iae(aa| .(v uas·
se:|aeve:eea(es(ec(a.sva|.c.(vevea. a ra.|eseoavasx.ee:easse.·
eaee. ¯ 1aea. s(e:.ea| ao:.e:. (e «a.eaae aac a|«avs aooea|ec.aac
me:eaacme:e .asama((e:eiiae(·«e:eaeve:o:esea(ec..(seems.as
|evseia.s(e:v¯ e:asa(a||eeia||a.s(e:.ea|oess.||es|eie:eaav
iae(aa|esoe:.mea(a|.aea.:v. ¯~acs. aeea.s(e:vaac(aea.s(e:.ea|oes·
s. ||es a|ea(«a.ea He:|eaa·rea(v soea|s:eo:esea( (aema(e:.a| aac
ce(e:m.aeceea(ea(eia. s(e:.ea|mec.iea(.eas. . . e. .(aeiae(aa|oess.||e
:ea| . zec. asaeaaacsaeaa see.e(v. ea|(a:e. eoeea. aacseie:(a· . (e
.a(e:o:e(uasse:|. a(aea|evemaaae:. s(ease:.|e(ea.m(aeo:e(ea·
s.eaeicecae.aeiae(aa|.(v.(se|ia priori. weeaaae(s(eo«. (a saea a
avoe(aes. s. «a.eaeea(:ac.e(s (ae ve:v o:em. ses eioaeaemeae| eev.
uasse:|aacea|(ec| v(aeaea((aa(a||eia.s(e:v sce(e:m.aecoess.||es
aac(eeeaie:m(e(aeao:.e:.esseaeeseia.s(e:.e.(veeaee:a.aeeve:v
oess.||eea| (a:e.eve:voess.||e|aaeaaee.eve:voess. ||e(:ac.(.eana(
aeve:c.caec:eam(eie:esee .|vsemee .ce(.ececae(.ea.a| | (aeiae(s.
a||(ae oa:(.ea|a:oess.|| es «a.ea mas( eeaie:m (e (aese a o:.e:. ei
aa.ve:sa|a. s(e:.e.(v.
na(ae((ececaeeiae(aa|.(va prori, .s(aa((e | ea:ai:em(aeiae(s¯ :
Ne( aav me:e. .i (aa( s.ea. ies (aa( e.ce(.e .a(a.(.ea«. ||aave (e |e
a|aaceaec-evea o:ev.s.eaa||v-aac iae(s asec e(ae:«.se (aaa as
esamo|es.aaa. mae.aa:vva:.a(.ea.1aeoa:oeseei(aeva:.a(.ea(eea·
a.eae. ae.ce(.e:eac.aeaacaeve:|eea(eesaaas((aema|(.o| .e.(vei
oess.||eiae(s ea(aeeea(:a:v.(ae(eeaa.eaeeveaaas(aeo:.v.|eeeei
|e.aea||e (e «e:|ea ea| veae ei(aese oess. ||es .a aa esemo|a:v
eease.easaess[conscience d' exemple] . 1aas. (a. s(eeaa.eae aas aeve:
aac (aem.ss.eaeic.soeas.aeì«.(aiae(aa|a.s(e:.ea|. aves(.ea(.ea¯ .
e:a(|eas(. .i.(cees(a. s. .(. sae(|vo:e(eac.ae(e sa|s(.(a(eie:(ae
a.s(e:.ea|. aea.:v..aaa(.e.oa(.ae(aeiae(s·(ae se|.(a:v:eree(.eaeia
a. s(e:.aa¯. · ·¹.(s.mo|vde jure o:eeeceseve:vma(e:.a|a.s(e:.ea|.aves·
(. ea(.eaaacaasaeaeeceiiae(sassaea(e:evea|(e(aea.s(e:.aa(ae
ao:.e:.seaseeia.sae(.v.(vaace|]ee( s. 1ece(e:m. ae(a. ssease.s.ie:
l 33
Ibid. , pp. 9 1 -92 [modifed] .
I ?4
Ibid. , p. 92.
1 13
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
uass�:| .se|!((|eaeaes(.eaei|ee.aa.aeì|vaace:s(aac.aea||| .vec
eso

e:�eaees. eia|aacea.ae e:|.m.(.ae(ae (eeaa.eae ei. mae.aa:v
va�.�uea. (a

a� (ae|a((e:.s eso| .e.(|vaaci:eeaea(|vo:ese:.|ec.a(ae
O

lgm, awn(ae(aa

(eaa|eeeas.ce:eceaeeiuasse:| s |as( re:a.m.
(a.

s(eeameae:emaas(aeme(aec¯aeee:c.ae(e«a.ea«ee|(a.a a
a�. �e:sa|aaca| seisecao:.e:.ei(aea. s(e:. ea|«e:|c«a.ea. s a| «avs
enema| |veeaa. ae( 1 77) .
ra:�ae:ea. ae savs. «e a|seaave . aac |ae« (aa( «e aave . (ae
eaoa..(veie?mo�e(ei:�ecem(e(:aasie:m. .a(aeaea(aacoaaa(asv.
ea:aa�a� a.s(ene�|ex.s(�aee. . . . ~aco:ee. se|v.a(a. sae(.v.(vei
i:eevanauea.aaca:aamae(a:eaea(aeeeaee.va||eoess.|.| .(.esie:
(ae|.ie·«e:|c.(ae:ea:.se�.«.(aaoec.e(.ese|i·ev.ceaee. aaessea(. a||v
eeae:a|se(eie|emea(seeae(a:eaeaa||(aeva:.aa(s . 1ae:e|v«e
aave :emeveceve:v|eac(e (aeiae(aa| |v va| .c a. s(e:.ea| «e:|c aac
a��� ree
.
�:cec(a. s«e:|c .(se|ime:e|vaseae ei(ae eeaeeo(aa| oes·
s.|.|.(.es ( 1 77) .
ue:e�ea. a. �ecea?(. .

mae.aa:vva:.a(.eaaac(ae:ecae(.eade facto
(a|e

(ae.:s(a:(aeoea(aiae(aa| .(v na(aea.a (aev :e(a.ai:emiae(
?a|v.(ses�mo|a:.(vaac.(sessea(.a|s(:ae(a:e..(soess.|.| .(v¯aacae(
.(siae(aa| .(v.
ii(�e c�s�ev�:vei(aeao:.e:.s(:ae(a:esaac(ae.ava:.aa(seiaa.ve:·
sa|a.s(e:...(v .s

me(ae�e!ee.ea||v aac]a:.c.ea||vi:s(. (a. sc.seeve:v
(eaeaes

as ae(aae-(a.s . sev.cea( . aaci:s((e uasse:|-a|ea(eaea
:ea| see.e(v s e:eaea:ea|a.s(e:.ea|memea( s e«asoee.ie eaa:ae(e:
o:eoesecie:(aes�e.e|ee. s( se:a. s(e:.aa s ae(.v.(v 1ae:eie:e. . (aas
aeve:|eeaa�aes(.eaei(aa(.ae:eieeas(:ae(.aei«aa(ma|essease
eie(ae:esoeneaeesaace.v. |.za(.eas|vaoa:e|v. mae. aa:vva:.a(.eaei
eae sì e«aesoe:.eaees ¯·

Neve:(ae|ess. .ii«e:ea||e(eeeas(:ae((ae seaseeie(ae:esoe·
neaeesaace. v.| .za�.eas ¯. a(aa(maaae: .i«ea|cc.seeve:.a«aa(«av
(aeva:ealso esoe:�eae�saace. v.|.za(.eas. aacae(ae«(aeva:ed·õef·
ent. i ae:ce:(ea((aa(a.sseaseeiever e. v. |.za(.eae:ever esoe:.eaee.
1 25 Mer�eau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Soci ology, " p . 1 07 [modifed] . Always
commentlfl� on the same letter, Merleau-Ponty wri tes: "Here he [ Husserl] seems to admit
t�at the philosopher �ou
.
ld not pos
.
s�bly have immediate access to the universal by refec­
tIon alone-that he � s H no posItIon to do without anthropological experience or to
�ons�ruct wha� c?nstItut�s the meaning of other experiences and ci vilizations by a purel y
Imagmary varIatIon of hI S own experiences" (p. 1 07) .
I n �e
.
rleau-Ponty' s Phenomenology of Perception [ t r. Col i n Smith ( New York:
Humafltle�
.
Pre
.
ss, 1 962)] .
.
the w�ol e l ast period of HusserI' s thought was already i nter­
preted as t
,
�Cl tly [ break� n�] Wlt� the phi losophy of essences, " a rupture by which
Huss�rl �as merely explICItly laYIIg down analytic procedures which he had long been
appl ymg' ( p. 49) .
1 14
Jacques Derrid
i«. | | a:s(aave(e:ecaee«aa((ae:e. s eimy own ..a(aeiae(aa|sease.
eieea:se·.a(aeexoe:.eaeeaace. v. | .za(.eai:em«a.eai .aiae(s(a:( .
Oaee(aa(seaseei(ae exoe:.eaeee: e.v. |.za(.ea.a eeae:a|aas |eea
macee|ea:. ieea|c|ee.(.ma(e|v(:v(ece(e:m.ae(aediference |e(«eea
(aeva:.easiae(seie.v. |.za(.eaaacexoe:.eaee.1a.sceesae(meaa(aa(
isaea|ca|aaceaeve:ve.ce(.ea((.(acei:em(aa(memea(ea. w.(a. aa
maeae:ea(e:iae(aa|ce(e:m.aa(.ea. e(ae::ecae(.easa:es(.||oess.|| e
aacaeeessa:v.:ecae(.eas(aa(mas(|eo:acea(| va:(.ea|a(ecaeee:c.ae
(e (ae.: cee:ee eieeae:a| .(v. ceoeaceaee. aac se ie:(a. ve( a|«avs
:esoee(.ae. as uasse:| soee.| es .a (ae Origin, (ae :a|e ei(ae s(:.e(
sa|samo(.ea | ἓei(aes.aea|a:aace:(aeaa.ve:sa| .iao:eoe:(.ea
(e (ae .ae:ease ei ma(e:.a| ce(e:m. aa(.ea. :e|a(.v. sm¯ ex(eacs . (s
:.ea(s. |a(.s. aee.(. sceoeacea((e(aea.eaes(cee:ee..(«.||aeve:|e.
as uasse:| ae(es .a (ae same |e((e:. (ae |as( «e:c ei se. ea(.ae
|ae«|ecee.¯
Ce:(a.a|v(ae «e:|ei(ae a.s(e:.aa. see.e|ee.s(. e(aae|ee.s(. aac se
ie:(aeeas(.(a(esa|.acei:ea|.zec. mae.aævva:.a(.ea.a(aeeaeeaa(e:
«.(aiae(aa| c.ae:eaee. (a. s|.aceiva:.a(.eaeaa|easecc.:ee(|vie:
aeeess(e(aeeeae:e(eaacaa.ve:sa|eemoeaea(seisee. a|.(ve:a. s(e:.e·
.(v s.aee (aese . ava:.aa(s «.| | (eaea as ae(a.ae a|ea( (ae soee.ae
eaa:ae(e:eiaoa:(.ea|a:see.e(ve:eoeea.i«.||-esoee.a||v-aave(e
emoa(a.ze (einzufuhlen), as uasse:| sa.c(e i-vv·n:aa| . na((a. s
emoa(a.z.ae(Einfuh lung) , as(aeiae(aa| ce(e:m.aa(.ea eic.ae:eaee.
eaaae(exae(|v. as(.(a(ese.eaeece]a:e. Einfuhlung .(se|i. s oess.||eea|v
within aacby virtue ei(aeao:.e:.aa.ve:sa|s(:ae(a:eseisee.a| .(vaac
a.s(e:.e.(v. i(saooesesaa.mmec.a(e(:aaseeacea(a|eemmaa.(veia||
a. s(e:.ea| e. v. | . za(.easaac(aeoess. |.| .(veiaaEinfuhlung . aeeae:a| .
ia (ae ma(e:.a| ce(e:m. aa(.ea ei a. s(e:. e.(. es. Einfuhlung, me:eeve:.
s(:.e(|v eeaie:ms «.(a (ae me(aec ei a|| a.s(e:.ea| oaeaemeae|eev.
s.aee.(oeae(:a(esa. s(e:.ea| s.ea.| ea(.easi:em «. (a.a aac ma|es(ae
external .aea.:vceoeaceainternal . a(a. (.ea.
na(. (aea. ae« ce«e:eeeae.|e(ae am:ma(.eaaeee:c.ae(e«a.ea
a.s(e:.e.(v .s aaessea(.a|s(:ae(a:eei(ae ae:.zeaie:a||aamaa.(v .as
«e||asie:eve:veemmaa. (v·aac(aea|| as. ea(e(ae aeaa. s(e:.e.(v¯
(Geschichtlosigkeit) eiee:(a.aa:eaa.e see.e(.es :· · 1a. saeaa.s(e:.e.(v
seemsae((e aaveaav oa:eaaca|se|a(e s.ea.aea(.eaie:uasse:|. i (
«ea|cea|vmodiy (aeao:.e:.s(:ae(a:eeimaa|.ac saa.ve:sa|a. s(e:.e·
.(vemo. :.ea||ve:ma(e:.a| | v. i(«ea|cb (aeie:meia.s(e:.e.(v(aa(. s
ea|v o:eoe:( eaa. (e see.e(.eseae|esec. a(ae.: | ee|ecae:.zeas-
see. e(.esasve(:emeveci:em(ae.::ao(.eaei(ae Ða:eoeaa¯i ceaei
I ?6
Letter already cited.
1 15
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
(ae . a| a.(e(as|aac (:ac.(.ea 1ae. : s(aeaa(.ea «ea|c ae( |e (ae
me:e a|seaeeeia. s(e:.e.(v |a( a|.ac eiaa.(ace .a(aeo:e]ee(aac
:eee||ee(.eaeisease 1ae:eie:e .aacea| v.aeemoa:.sea«.(a(ae.a| ·
».(eaacoa:ea. s(e:. e.(vei(aeEuropeaneidos, cea:eaa.esee.e(.esseem
«.(aea(a.s(e:v. ia(aeCrisis, me:eeve:.uasse:|ea| v:eeeea.zesaa
empirical (voe .a(aesesee.e(.es«a.eaceae(oa:(.e.oa(e.a(aeÐa:e·
oeaaicea. Neaa.s(e:.e.(v.(aea.«ea|cea| v|e(ae|e«e:|. m.(·meceei
emo.:.ea|a.s(e:.e.(v 1aeam|.ea.(veiaaexample «a.ea. sa(eaeeaa
aac.s(.aea.saecsample aaca(e|ee|ee.ea|model . ss(. ||ieaacae:e ia
(aea:s(sease.. aiae(. «eeea|csav«.(auasse:|(aa(eve:veemmaa.(v
. s.aa.s(e:v.(aa(a. s(e:.e.(v. s(aeessea(.a|ae:.zeaeiaamaa.(v..aseia:
as (ae:e .s ae aamaa.(v«.(aea(see.a| .(v aac ea|(a:e. r:em(a.soe:·
soee(.ve . aav see.e(v a( a| | . Ða:eoeaa. a:eaa.e . e: seme e(ae:. eaa
se:veasaaexamo|e. aaae.ce(.e:eeeea.(.ea na(ea(aee(ae:aaac.
Ða:eoeaas(aeo:. v.|eeeei|e.ae(aegood example, ie:.(.aea:aa(es. a
.(s oa:.(v (ae 1e|es eia| | a.s(e:.e.(v. aa.ve:sa|.(v. ema.(emoe:a| .(v.
.aaa.(e (:ac.(.eaa| .(v. aac se ie:(a. |v .aves(.ea(.ae(ae sease ei(ae
oa:eaac. aaa.(eoess.|.| .(veia. s(e:.e.(v .Ða:eoeaasa«a|eaeca.s(e:v
(e.(se«ao:eoe:eac.1ae:eie:e..a(a. sseeeacsease.oa:ea.s(e:.e.(v
.s :ese:vec ie: (ae Ða:eoeaa eidos. 1ae emo. :.ea| (voes ei aea
Ða:eoeaasee.e(.es. (aea.a:eea|vmore or less a.s(e:.ea| . a((ae|e«e:
|. m. (. (aevtend toward aeaa. s(e:.e.(v.
1aasuasse:| .s |ec (e c.s(. aea.sa (ae e:. e.aa| .(v eiva:. eas |eve|s
within (aemes(aa.ve:sa|eidos eia. s(e:.e.(v. iaave:v|:.eii:aemea( .
«aese .aso.:a(.ea .s ve:v s. m.|a:(e (aa( ei(aeOrigin, uasse:|ce(e:·
m.aes (a:ee s(aees e: s(eos eia.s(e:.e.(v ia o:eoe:(.ea (e (ae ac·
vaaeemea(.a(aa(a.e:a:eave:(e(aeo:ee:ess.ea.a(aa(ceve|eomea(.
a.s(e:.e.(vassamese:ea(e:oessess.eaei. (se«aesseaee . r.:s( .(ae:e
«ea|c |e a.s(e:.e.(v .a (ae mes( eeae:a| sease. as(ae esseaee eia||
aamaaex.s(eaee . .aasmaeaasaamaaex.s(eaeeaeeessa:.| vmeves. a
(aeso.:.(aa| soaee eia ea|(a:e e:(:ac.(.ea. 1ae.mmec.a(e|v a. eae:
|eve|«ea|c |e (aa( eiÐa:eoeaaea|(a:e . (ae(aee:e(.ea|o:e]ee(.aac
oa.|eseoav 1ae (a.:c |eve| . aaa| | v. «ea|c |e eaa:ae(e:.zec |v (ae
eeave:s.ea ei oa. |eseoav .a(e oaeaemeae|eev"1 27 1aas. a( eaea
' �` "Stufen der Geschichtl i chkeit . Erste Geschichtlichkeit . " 1 934. Bei lage XXVI . in K,
pp. 502-03. El sewhere Husserl writes i n t he same vei n: ' " Human l i fe i s necessari l y, i n the
main and as cul tural life, hi storical i n the strictest sense. But scientifc l i fe , life as the l ife
of a man of sci ence in a horizon of a communi ty of men of science, si gifi es a new kind of
hi storici ty" (Beilage XXVI I , 1 935 , in K, p. 507) . Al so see "Philosophy and the Cri si s of
European Humanity, " in C, p. 279. Husserl speaks there of a "revolutionization of
historici ty. " [ I n the versi on that Paul Ri coeur translates (see note 1 49 below) , the li ne i s
rendered: " ' revoluti on i n the heart of hi storicity, " the emphasis by Derrida. ]
� I
116
Jacques Drrid
s(aee,(ae:eve|a(. ea«a.eaeve:(a:e«s(aeo:ev. easo:e]ee(|vaa.aaa·
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(aeva:eae(. aiae(mataa||vexe|as.ve. ae(ea|vce(aeveeex.s(. a(ae
«e:| c, |a(eaeaac(ae same see.e(veaama|e (aemeeaa|i(«.(a.a
.(se|i,.a(aecm e:ea(.a(ecaa.(veiaae:eaa.es.ma|(aae.(v.
i( .s (aea s(:a.ea((e«a:c(ae e. ce(.e.ava:.aa(saac (ae (e|ee|ee.ea|
a|se| a(eseia.s(e:.e.(v(aa(uasse:| s:eree(.ea.sc.:ee(ec.1aeinteral
aacdynamic c. ae:ea(.a(.eaei(aese. ava:.aa(smas(ae(| ese s.ea(ei
(aa(iae( . (a. sc.ae:ea(.at.ea.so:ee.se|v(aes.ea(aa((ae.ava:.aa(sof
a.s(e:.e.(v, (aeesseaeesof |eeem.aea:e :ea| | v.aeaes(.eaae:e. we
eea|c (aea |e (emo(ec |v aa .a(e:o:e(a(.eac. ame(:.ea| | veooesec (e
(aa(eiHe:|eaa·rea(vaacma.a(a. a(aa(uasæ:| ,ia:i:emeoea.ae(ae
oaeaemeae|ee.ea| oa:ea(aeses (e a.s(e:.ea| iae(aa|.(v aace: a|| . (s
ie:ms, |eavesa. s(e:vme:e(aaaeve:outside (aem. weeea|ca|«avs
sav (aa( , |v ceaa.(.ea aac | .|e a|| eeac.(.eas eioess. |. |.(v, (ae . a·
va:.aa(seia.s(e:v(aas (:ae|ecce«a|vuasse:|a:eae(historical . a
(aemse| ves . we «ea|c (aea eeae| ace, | . |e wa|(e: n.eme| . (aa(
uasse:| s essavs «a.ea (:v (e e:aso a. s(e:.e.(v (aema(.ea||v eaa |e
eeas.ce:ecasia.|a:es .
12R
na(«aa(«ea|ca.s(e:.e.(vaacc.seea:sea|ea(a.s(e:v|e,i aeaeei
(aese .ava:.aa(s «e:e oess.||e: ia e:ce: (e soea| ei ia.|a:e . a (ae
(aema(.za(.ea eia.s(e:.e.(v , mas(«e ae( a|:eacvaave aeeess(e aa
.ava:.aa(aacme:ee:|ess(aema(.eseaseeia. s(e:.e.(v:~ac.sae((aa(
seaseo:ee.se|v«aa(.saaaeaaeec.auasse:| s |as(mec.(a(.eas,. aeem·
o|e(eas(aeva:e:
ii(ae(aema(.za(.eaei(aeaoec.e(.e. ava:.aa(saacei(aea.s(e:.ea|a
o:.e:.«asa(iaa|(, «ea|cae((aa(|e.aeemoa:.sea«.(ahistor :a(ae:
(aaa «.(a historicity? 1ae ia.|a:e «ea|c (aea |e rae:aa( .i, a( seme
memea(, uasse:|«as(e|eeeme.a(e:es(ec.aseme(a.ae| .|ea. s(e:v.
I ?8
"Les Phases decisives dans Ie developpement de la philosphie de Husserl" (al­
ready cited [see note 5] , in Husserl, Cahiers de Royaumont, p. 58) . [Thi s comment is only
found i n the French version of this essay. J Walter Biemel very accurately sees the Crisis
as a work of old age too easily interpreted as a turning point in Husserl' s thought, despite
the profound continuity which unites it to his previous i nvestigations. At the end of this
valuable lecture-while underscoring Husserl ' s fi delity-the author recalls the discom­
fort of Husserl who, in "an entire series of manuscripts from group K III , " "asks himself
why philosophy should need history" ( in The Phenomenology ofHusserl, ed. Elveton, p.
1 67) . And in Beilagen XXV and XXVIII of the Krisis, Husserl asks himself in particular:
"Why does philosophy need the hi story of philosophy?" ( in K, p. 495), and: "How is
Hi story Required?" ( in K, p. 508; i n C, Appendix IX, p. 389).
117
Introduction t o the Origin of Geometr
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ecee«a.ea, uasse:|savs, .saeve:|ea:aec[ 1 76] , «a.eaaeemo.:.ea|
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. sa(eaee(aeaa.(vaac(ae.aeemo|e(.eaie:(aa(esoe:. eaee-(aeaa·
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e:.(.ea|oa.|eseoav s s(a(eeia|s(:ae(oess.|.|.(v.a(e(aeeeae:e(e.aaa·
.(eoe(ea(.a| .(vsee:e(|vo:esaooesec(ae:e. a. 1aeae(.eaeiae:.zea(aas
ma|es(aeao:.e:.aac(ae(e|ee|ee.ea|ee.ae.ce.
IX
~i(e:|:eacea.aea. s:eree(.ea(e.ae|ace(aeo:e||ems eiaa.ve:sa|
a. s(e:.e.(v,uasse:|aa::e«s(aeae|ceia. saaa|vs. saaceemes|ae|(e
(aee:.e. aeieeeme(:v.i aaie«oaees, aeoa(sie:«a:c(aemes(eea·
e:e(ecese:.o(.easei(a.s(es(. Cemmea(a(e:saavemes(euea:e(a. aec
(aese cese:.o(.eas|eeaase, .asae:(, asuasse:|a.mse|iaace:see:es.
(aevee|eveacie:ma|eeae:a|. (.es [ 1 77] aac. s(a:(.aei:emaamaa
o:ax.s·c:a«aea:(e(ae eeas(.(a(.eaeieeeme(:.ea|o:e(e.cea|.(. es. a
(aeo:ese.ea(.aesoae:eei(aeea|(a:a|«e:|c.
1ae oes(a:e [situation] ei(a. saaa|vs.sseems:.ee:eas|vo:ese:.|ec
|v(ae|ea:.aeei(aemec.(a(.ea, ceso.(e. (s:a(ae:i:ees(v|e .~s«ea:e
ee.ae (e see, .(s eea(ea( .s |essaeve| .a uasse:| s «e:| (aaa a(a:s(
aooa:ea( . ~i(e:aav.aece(e:m. aec(aeeeac.(.easie: (:ac. (.eaa|.(vin
generl, «e aave (ae :.ea( (e :e(a:a (e one ei (aese (:ac.(.eas«a.ea
.se:v.ae]as(amemea(aee asaaesemo|a:vea.ce·. sae«s(ac.ec. a
.(se|i.~i(e:aav.aeaxec(aeseaseaac(aeme(aecie:all eaes(.ea.aeei
e:.e.as, «eas|a eaes(.eaa|ea(a s.ae|e e:.e.a. Oa(aee(ae:aaac,
eeeme(:v aas|eea :eeeea.zecas a(:ac.(.eaa| svs(emei.cea|e|]ee·
(.v.(. es. Ne«.a.cea|e|]ee(.v.(v,|e(aO|]ee(.v.(vaac. cea|.(vmas(|e
118
Jacques Derrid
aeeeaa(ecie:. ceso.(e(ae.:ceeo·:ee(ec.a(e::e|a(ecaessaac(ae.::e·
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ea(e:s.a(e(:ac.(.ea|v. (se|]ee(.| ea(.eaaac(aaseaa|ei:eec.eaa|e
aaaceceve:weeaea( .(aea.(e|ee.a.asuasse:|cees·|vaeeeaa(.ae
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ao:.e:.s(:ae(a:eseia.s(e:.e.(veea|c|eeaes(.eaecea|v|v:eeea:se(e
|aaeaaee .«:.(.ae. (aeeaoae.(vei:eae(.va(.ea. aaciaa| |v(e¬e(aec
1aaa|s(e(a. s¬e(aec. «a.ea a|eae eaa||esee¬o:eaeas.eaei(ae.a·
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uasse:| as|ec a.¬se|i. ae«eea|c. cea| sease. already constituted . a
sa|]ee(.ve.¬¬aaeaee .|ee|]ee(.veaaceaeaeec.aa.s(e:vaac. a(ae
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eas¬e¬ea( .eea|c.cea|.(v.(se|i|eeeas(.(a(ec:
1aeaeeess.(vei(a.s«aveiee.ae|ae|[recursion] (a:eaeaase:.esei
z. ezaes see¬s (e ea.ce uasse:| «aea ae «:.(es . 1a:eaea (a. s
¬e(aec.ee.ae|eveac(aeie:¬a|eeae:a|.(.es«eesa.|.(ecea:|.e: .«e
eaaa|se¬a|e(ae¬a(.e(aa(aoec.e(.easoee(ei(aeo:ese.ea(.ie«e:|c
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¬as(aavese:vecas(ae¬a(e:. a|ie:a. s.cea| . za(.eas ( 1 77) .
r.:s( . «e ¬as( ce|.¬.((aese s(:ae(a:es ei (ae o:ese.ea(.|e «e:|c
«a.eaeea|c.as(.(a(eaeeeme(:v 1a.scese:.o(.ea.sa|«avsoess.||e.
s.aee (ae s(:a(a¬ ei(ae o:ese.ea(.ie «e:|c .s aeve: ces(:evec. ae:
ce| a.(.ve|veeaeea|ec1a.ss(:a(a¬:ema.as. a(ae(aace:(ae aa.ve:se
ce(e:¬.aec |v (ae .cea| esae(.(aceeise.eaee ~ac. aeee:c.ae(eaa
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ei.ceas(a:e«aeve:(ae«e:|cei.¬mec.a(e.a(a.(.eaaacesoe:.eaee.
eve:ì(ae|.ie·«e:|c.ie:eaeaei(ae:esa|(seise. eaeeaas.(sieaaca(.ea
eisease.a(a.s. mmec.a(eesoe:.eaeeaac.(see::esoeac. ae«e:|caac
:eie:s|ae|(e.( i(. s(a:eaea(aeea:|ei.ceas(aa(«e(a|eie:(:ae
se.ae«aa(. sae(aa||va¬e(aec
' \ 29
! ´
|I
EJ
,
pp. 44-45 , in a paragraph which concers precisely geometry' s ideal exactitude.
The same image is used in C (§9h : " The life-world as the forgotten meani ng-fundament of
natural science, " p. 5 1 ) . Husserl ' s ambiguous attitude before science-which he val ued
utmost as project and l east i n i ts superstructural precariousness and ability to conceal
refects the very movement of the "historical" constitution of sense: creation which
discloses and sedimentation whi ch covers over i mpl y each other.
1 19
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
1ae:eie:e ..(. so:eoe:(e:ecaee(ae.cea|sec.¬ea(a(.easeise.eaee
.ae:ce:(ec. seeve:(ae aa|ecaessei(ae o:eeee¬e(:.ea|«e:|c 1a.�
ae« "epoche" ei (ae e|]ee(.ve se.eaees. (ae o:e||e¬ ei «a.ea .s
ceve|eoec.a (aeCrisis, .s c.mea|(ie:seve:a| :easeas.
I ´\
1 . 1ae|:s(c.iiea|(v.s(aa(eieve:v:ecae(.ea. .(¬as(|e|eo(i:em
|e.aeaie:ee(ia|aessaac aaeea(.ea. a sa|(:ae(.eae:ceva|aa(.eaei
«aa(.(¬e(aec.ea||vce·sec.¬ea(se:aea(:a| .zes
2. ~s(ae:ecae(.eaeie|]ee(.ve· esae(se.eaee.(a.sae«epoche ¬as(
ae(eaase as(e :eaeaaee a||se.ea(.ieaess 1ae(ae¬a(.za(.ea ei(ae
Lebenswelt mas(|ese.ea(.ieaaca((a.a(e(aeao:.e:.«a.eaa:eae
|eaee:(aeaa|.(aa|eaesei|ee.eaace|]ee(.vese. eaee 1 31 uasse:|er(ea
o:esea(s(a. sas aoa:aces . (aeLebenswelt, (aeo:ee|]ee(.vesoae:e
ei sa|]ee(.ve·:e|a(.ve s.ea.iea(.eas. aasaaa.ve:sa| . aaeeac.(.eaec
s(:ae(a:e .as(:ae(a:eo:ese:.|ecie:.(sve:v:e|a(. v.(v·
\ `\2
1aeao:.e:.ei
|ee.eaace|]ee(.vese.eaeea:ea|se:ee(ecaace:eaacec .a(aea
o:.e:.ei(aeLebenswelt (C, §34 e , o 1 30) . wea:eeeaiaec|vaa. ve(-(e
(aeie:¬e:aac|eo(.eae:aa(ei(ae.: sease·:e|a(.ea(Sinnbeziehung)
(e(ae|.ie·«e:|cw.(aea((a.se:eaac.ae:e|a(.ea.(aeva:e . a¬. c·a.:
(ibid. , §36, o 1 4 1 ) .
3 . r.aa||v. .(. s ae( saiie.ea((e c.sse|ve «aa(uasse:|ea|| s. .a(ae
|aaeaaeeeise| zaae.(ae(:a(aseise.eaee. (:a(as.a(ae¬se|ves
(ibid. , o 1 30) ; «e¬as(eea(.aaa||vma|eo:e||e¬a(.e(ae:e| a(.eaei(ae
Lebenswelt ' s sa|]ee(.ve·:e|a(. ve (:a(as aac se.eaee s e|]ee(.ve·esae(
(:a(as 1ae oa:aces ei(ae.: ¬a(aa| . a(e::e|a(.ea ¬a|es |e(a (:a(as
ea.e¬a(.ea(eaee(ibid. , o 1 3 1 ) . ia(ae. aseea:.(vei(a.sea.ema. . a
(ae.as(a|. |.(vei(aesoaee|e(«eea(aese(«e(:a(as. (aeepoche ¬as(
|es(:e(eaec|e(«eea(aearche aac(aetelos eiaoassaee 1«etruths,
(aa(eidoxa aac(aa(eiepisteme, «aeseseaseaacao:.e:.a:eae(e:eee·
aeeas .a (aemse| ves . :e¬a.a .a(e::e|a(ec (Aufeinanderbezogenheit)
(ibid. ) . se.eaee s (:a(a .a . (se|i .s ae( aav |ess (:a(a-) (ae
sa|]ee(.ve·:e|a(.ve «e:|c. .a «a.ea .( aas .(s |ases Ne cea|( (ae:e
es. s(s a aa.ve|v saoe:ie.a| |ase|essaess(Bodenlosigkeit) : (aa( ei(ae
:a(.eaa|.s(saac(ae(:ac. (.eaa|se.ea(.ie. aves(.ea(e:s«aemeveaaeea·
s(:a.aec.a(aea(¬esoae:eei(ae|ee.ea| aace|]ee(.veao:.e:.aacce
! ·¹
0
Cf. notably § §33 to 39, pp. 1 2 1 -48, and the related texts appended there.
! ·¹
` Ibid. On the difculty and necessity for a sci entifi c thematization of the Lebenswelt.
cf. (§33] , p. 1 22. On the di stinction between the two U priori, cf. above all ( §36] , pp.
1 37-4 1 . I n the Origin, "logic" always has the sense of the "sedimented. "
´�
´
Ibid. [§37], pp. 1 42-43 . On the structural permanence of the presci entifc l ife-world,
also cf. [§9h] , p. 5 1 .
.-j
120
Jacques Derrid
ae(:e|a(e(aem(e(ae. :a.s(e:.ea|e:eaac.a(ae|.ie·«e:|c.1aevae.(ae:
«e::va|ea((ae. :e«aresponsibility ae:as|(aemse|ves . what

m I in the
process of doing? Nor: from where does that come? na((ae

eIS, aae(ae:
aa.ve(-]as(asse:.eas. |a(«.(aame:e mece:as(v|e. aa.ve(eeio·

iaac.(ve: ceo(a aac ae( eisaoe:ie.a|.(v. .(eeas. s( s.a :eceseeacme
(e«a:c (ae o:ese.ea(.ie oe:eeo(.ea «.(aea( ma|.ae o:e||ema(.e (ae
(:aase:ess. ea ( Uberschreitung) (ibid. , §36, o 1 39 Ð1. sa:oass·
. ae¯ì · ei(ae|.ie·«e:|c s (:a(a(e«a:c(ae «e:|cei(:a(as. a (aem·
se|ves 1ae:e(a:o(e(aes(:ae(a:eseio:ese.ea(.ieesoe:.eaee mas(
eea(.aaa||v|eeo a|.ve(aequestin: How can the a priori of scientic
Objectivity be constituted staring from those of the lie-world? w.(aea(
(a. seaes(.ea.aav:e(a:a.ae«eve:oeae(:a(.ae.:.s|sa|c.ea(.aea||se. ·
ea(. ie eaa|.(vin general aaca||oa.|eseoa.ea|c. ea.(v.evea.i.(m. ea(
aave(:.eco:ee.o.(a(.aea|ee.(. ma(e:eae(.ea(e«aa(uasse:|ea|| s .a(e|·
|ee(aa| . s(.e avoe:(:eoav¯ (ibid. , §34f, o. 1 33) . ii «e eeas.ce: (a. s
eaes(.ea(e|eat once a.s(e:.ea|aac(:aaseeacea(a|.«esee(e«aa(.::e·
soeas.||eemo.:. e. sma||(ae oaeaemeae| ee. es eio:ese.ea(.ieoe:eeo·
(.eaa:eeeacemaec. oaeaemeae|ee.es«a.ea«ea|cae(|e((aemse|ves
|e|ese(|v(aa(eaes(.ea
we mas( a|se |e«a:e ei ie:ee((.ae (aa( (ae o:ese.ea(.ie «e:|c-
«a.ea (ae o:e(eeeeme(e: aas a( a. s c. soesa| aac «a.ea «e (aas
:eeeve:-cees ae( aave (ae :ac.ea|.(v ei (ae o:eo:ec.ea(.ve «e:|c
(e «a.ea uasse:| (:.es (e :e(a:a. a|evea|| . . aExperience and Judg­
ment. 1 33 1ae o:ese.ea(.ie«e:|c . s aea|(a:a|«e:|c a|:eacv .aie:mec
|v o:ec.ea(.ea. va|aes. emo.:.ea| (eeaa. eaes. aac (ae o:ae(.ee ei
measa:emea( aac .acae(.veaess «a. ea (aemse|ves aave (ae. : e«a
s(v|eeiee:(a.a(v
1ae a|eve eaa||es as (e oe.a( ea( aea.a (ae ceoeacea( s(a(as ei
uasse:| s(es(. (aes(a(aseieve:vs(a:(.aeoe.a(aaceve:ve|aeea. c. ae
:eree(.eaeaaa.ve:sa|a. s(e:.e.(v.Ce:(a. a|v. (aeessea(.a|s(:ae(a:esei
(aeo:ese.ea(.ie«e:|ca:ec.seeve:ec|vacea||e:ecae(.ea. (aa(eia| |
ce(e:m.aec iae(aa| ea|(a:e aac (aa( ei(ae se. ea(.ie saoe:s(:ae(a:es
«a.eaes(eac|eveacoa:(.ea|a:ea|(a:a| a:eas. ae:ce:(e |ei:ee ei
(aem na((a.s saea|cae(ma|easie:ee((aa((aeo:ese.ea(.ieea|(a:a|
«e:|ceaa|e:ecaeec..a. (s(an. . aa:ac.ea|"epoche" «a.ea«aa(s(e
ea(aoa(a(e«a:c«aa( . sa|:eacv saooesec. (ae(:aaseeacea(a|eea·
s(.(a(.eaei(aee|]ee(. aeeae:a|.|eie:e(ae. cea|e|]ee(«a.ease:ves.
ae«eve:. as esamo|eaacmece|ie: O|]ee(.v.(v· . (ae o:eo:ec.ea(.ve
s(:a(ameiesoe:.eaee.(aes(a(.eaaceeae(.eeeas(.(a(.eaei(aeego aac
´´´ This work does not attain the prepredicative world i n its frst radicality. It supposes,
like Ideas I, an already constituted temporality. Cf. on this Ideas [, notably §81 , p.
2 16-1 7, and EJ, § 14, p. 68.
121
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
alter ego, o:. me:c.a| (emoe:a| .(v. aac se ie:(a 1aese :ecae(.eas.
me:eeve:. a:e ceae .a (es(s ea:| .e: (aaa (aeCrisis . i aIdeas I, (ae
|:eacea.aeei(ae(:aaseeacea(a|:ecae(.eaa|:eacves(eacsby anticipa­
tion asia:as(aee.ce(.eeia.s(e:v.«a.eauasse:|(aeaea(s(.||:ema.aec
(e|eceae . ~r(e:aav.ae]as(.ieca.ssasoeas.eaeia||(:aaseeacea(·
e.ce(.ecema.as. ae(aa|oavs.ea|Na(a:e. aac(aeemo.:.ea|e:e.ce·
(.e se.eaees eiNa(a:e .eeeme(:v. |.aema(.es. oa:e oavs.es. aac se
ie:(a· . uasse:|«:e(e .
Si
:
nilarly, just as we �ave suspended all experiential sciences dealing
With the nature ofammate beings and all empirical human sciences
concer

ing pers

nal beings in personal reltionships, concering men
as subjects ofhistor, as bearers ofculture, and treating also the
cultural formations themselves, and so forth, we also suspend now the
eietic sciences which corespond to these objectivities. We do so in
ovance and
.
in idea; for, as everyone knows, these ontological-:idetic
sCle
n
ces (ratonal psychology, sociology, for instance) have nt as yet
recelv

d �proper grounding, at any rate none that i pure and free from
all obJectIOn. (Ideas I, § 60, p. 162 [modied]; our emphasis)
weeea|c(aeasav(aa(uasse:|.aacvaaeesa|]ee(eca.s(e:v s e. ce(.e
(e

(aeaa(ae�(.e(�aaseeacea(a|:ecae(.ea-aae.ce(.eae«. ||(:v(eeea·
s(.(a(e s(a:(ae a (ae Crisis. 1aa( .s «av. ae cea|(. (ae «e:c
(:aaseeacea(a| . «a.eauasse:|aea:|va|«avs:ese:vesie:(aeego ' s
oa:e eeas(.(a(.ae ae(.v.(v. . s aeve:a(.|.zec .a(aeOrigin. iii mvse|i
aavesoe|eaei(:aaseeacea(a|a. s(e:.e.(v .icese.ae:ce:(ec.s(.aea.sa
a(eaeeemo.:.ea|a. s(e:vaacas.mo|ee.ce(.eeia.s(e:voa:a||e|(e(ae
e(ae:e. ce(.es eiNa(a:e aac so.:. (. 1aeeidos eia. s(e:.e.(v. as eso|. ·
ea(ec aue: (aeCrisis, seems (e eseeec (ae | . m. (sass.eaec (e .( |e·
ie:eaaac|vIdeas I. i(sse.eaee.sae |eaee:merely eaeaamaase.eaee
ameaee(ae:s i(. s(aa(eiaaae(. v.(veeas(.(a(.ae(ae«ae|esoae:eei
a|se|a(e .cea| O|]ee(. v.(vaaca||(aee.ce(.e se.eaees 1aa((a. seea·
s(.(a(.aea. s(e:vmav|eme:eo«ieaac| veeas(.(a(ec.(se|i.saea.s.ae
cea|( .eaeei(aemes(oe:maaea(me(.iseiuasse:| s (aeaea( . a| se.eae
ei(aemes(c.mea|( .ie:. (aeee:cs|ac| v«. (a(aa(eiaa.s(e:.e.(v«a.ea
.asuasse:|sa.cme:eaacme:eer(ea·(:ave:seseve:v(a.ae(a:eaeaaac
(a:eaea .aaci:s(eia||(aeego .(se|i ·
I¦I4
~|�these difculties seem concentrated to us in the sense that Husserl gives to the
expresslo� "transcendental histor, " which he utilizes (to our knowledge) only once, in
an unpublIshed manuscript of Group C (C 8 II, October 29, p. 3) : thus, the question
concers the intermonadic relation (always considered in itself, of course , as an inten­
tional modifcation of the monad in general in its primordial temporality) , a relation
thanks to which the constitution of a common world becomes possible. This relation
s�ructurally implies the horizon of the history of the spirit, past and future; the latter
discovers for us what perception cannot give us.
122
Jacques De"ida
x
waa( .(aea.a:e(aeessea(.a|aaceeae:a|ee¬oeaea(sei(aeo:ese.ea·
(.ieea|(a:a| «e:|c: O::a(ae:.«aa( a:e. . a(aa(«e:|c. (ae. ava:. aa(
s(:ae(a:es«a.eaaaveeeac.(.eaec(aeacvea(eieee¬e(:v:ue«eve:
o:e|eaac ea: . eae:aaeeeeaee:a. aea. s(e:.ea|iae(s . «e sae« «.(a aa
. ¬¬ec.a(eaacaoec.e(.esae«|ecee-(aeseaseei«a.eaeaaa|«avs|e
.aves(.ea|ec-(aeie||e«.ae
i 1aa((a. so:eeee¬e(:.ea|«e:|c «as a«e:|ceithings c. soesecei
aeee:c.ae(eaaaaesae( soaee aac(.¬e
I . I·¯:
2. 1aa((aese(a.aes¬as(aave|eeaee:oe:ea| Ce:oe:ea| .(v. sa
oa:(.ea|a:ce(e:¬.aa(.eaei(a.ae aeec(Dinglichkeit) .aeeae:a|.|a(s.aee
ea| |a:ea|:eacvaac(eaave| eu. (s¬a:sea(ae«e:|c.|eeaase|aaeaaee
aac .a(e:sa|]ee(. v.(v ¬as( aave o:eeecec eee¬e(:v· . · ee:oe:ea|.(v
cees ae( esaaas(. ve|v eve:|ao (a.aeaeec. s. aee (ae aeeessa:.| v
eees.s(.ae aa¬aa |e.aes a:e ae( (a. asa||e as ¬e:e |ec. es aac. | .se
evea(aeea|(a:a|O|]ee(s«a. ea|e|eae«.(a(ae¬s(:ae(a:a||v.a:eae(
esaaas(ec. aee:oe:ea||e.ae ( 1 77) .
3. 1aa( (aese oa:e |ec.es aac (e aave soa(.a| saaoes. saaoes ei
¬e(.ea. aac a|(e:a(.easeiceie:¬a(.ea [ 1 77] .
4. 1aa( ¬a(e:.a| eaa|.(.es .ee|e:. «e.ea(. aa:caess. aac se ie:(a·
¬as(aeeessa:. | v|e:e|a(ec(e(aeseo:eeee¬e(:.ea| .soa(.e(e¬oe:a|
saaoes|vasaoo|e¬ea(a:ve.ce(..ce(e:¬.aa(.ea
i aIdeas I, «a.|eeso|.ea(.ae(aeo:.ae. o|esei:ee.eaa|a:(.ea|a(. eaaac
.a(e:aa| s(:ae(a:e. uasse:|(:ea(ec (aesee. ce(.e eaa:ae(e:. s(.es as aa
.aces. «ae:eas(aeva:eac.:ee((ae¬e. a(aeOrigin: 1aeeeas(:ae(.ea
ei(aea.eaes(eeae:e(eeeaas.(ae:ee.ea·ea(eieeae:a(aa(a:eoa:(|v
c. s]aae(.ve .oa:(|vieaacec.aeaeaae(ae:.aac.a(a. s ¬a(aa||v. ae|�·
s.ve· . ee::esoeacs(e(aeeeas(:ae(.eaei(aeeeae:e(a(aa(|e|eae(e

. (
ea(ei|e«es(c.ae:eaees(aa(a:eoa:(|vc.s]aae(.ve.oa:(|vieaacecm
eaeaae(ae:.as obtains with temporl, spatial, and material determina­
tions, for instance, in the case ofthe thing " .·72.o i s-mec.iecì .ea:
e¬oaas.s· . ' ·
ra:eeee¬e(:v aac s.ae¬a(.es.aaca| | (ae assee. a(ec se. eaeesie:
!
´` This idea, already developed in §9a of the Crisis, is more directly i nscribed within
an anal ysi s of the Lebenswelt . in §36 , p. 1 39, an analysi s identical to that in the Origin.
´ ´ Thi s j ustifes (at least on a specifc point) the anteriority of the Origin ' s anal yses
concerning language and being-in-community.
! ·l
´
Al so cf. § 149, pp. 382-83 et passim.
123
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometr
«a. ea(|e·a:e|aeesa¬o| e|e:e· .(aea.«. | | |ematerial e.ce(.es .s.aee
(ae. :oa:oese.s(ae(a.ae| v. aac(aas(aeee:oe:ea|. ce(e:m. aa(. eaei
e|]ee(s.aeeae:a| .sa((aeva:eabstract ¬a(e:.a|se.eaees. |eeaase(aev
ea|v(:ea( ee:(a.a e. ce(.e ee¬oeaea(s eiee:oe:ea| (a.aes .aeeae:a| .
c.s:eea:c.ae(ae. :. aceoeacea(aac eeae:e(e(e(a|.(v.«a.eaa|seee¬·
o:.ses(ae ¬a(e:.a| (stojich), seas.|| eeaa|.(.es aac(ae(e(a|. (v ei
(ae. :o:ec.ea(es . soa(.a|saaoes . (e¬oe:a|saaoes. aacsaaoesei¬e(.ea
a:ea|«avssingled out from (ae(e(a|.(vei(aeoe:ee.vec|ecv
sv .(se|ia|eae. (aea. a s(a(.eaaa| vs. seea|ca priori aac:.ee:eas|v
:eea||ie:as(aa((aeo:e(eeee¬e(e:a|«avsa|:eacvaaca(a. sc.soesa|
aaesae(soa(.e(e¬oe:a|saaoesaacessea(.a||vvaeae¬e:oae|ee.ea|
(voes . «a.eaeaaa|«avse.ve:.se (eao:eeee¬e(:.ea|descriptive se.·
eaee 1a.seea|c|eea||ecgeogrphy. re:saeaasa|]ee(.(ae :.ee:ei
e.ce(.easse:(.eas.|.se(aa(ie:ce(e:¬.a.aevaeaeesseaees·.sae(a(a||
aace:¬.aec|v(aeaeeessa:vaaexae(.(aceei(aeoe:ee.vece|]ee( we
¬as( .aceec |e«a:e ei se.ea(.ie aa.ve(-. «a.eaeaases (a.s aaexae·
(.(aceei(aee|]ee(e:eeaeeo((e|eeeas.ce:ecasa ceiee( . asaa
. aexae(.(ace . uasse:|«:.(es.«e a:e s(. ||eae(.aei:e¬Ideas I) : 1ae
¬es( oe:iee(eeeme(:v aac .(s ¬es( oe:iee( o:ae(.ea|eea(:e| eaaae(
ae|o (ae cese:.o(.ve se.ea(.ie . aves(.ea(e:eiNa(a:e (e exo:ess o:e·
e.se|v..aexae(eee¬e(:.ea|eeaeeo(s·(aa(«a.ea. aseo|a.a.seaace:·
s(aaca||e . aac se ea(.:e| v sa.(a||e a«av ae exo:esses .a(ae «e:cs
ae(eaec..acea(ec.|eas· saaoec.a¬|.||.ie:¬.aac(ae|.se-s.¬o|eeea·
eeo(s«a.eaa:eessentially and not accidentally inexact, aaca:etherefore
a|seaa¬a(ae¬a(.ea| .·:1. o. 1 90 mec.ieci ' ·
5. 1aa( . |v a o:ae(.ea| aeeess.(v eica.|v | . ie. ee:(a.a saaoes aac
ee:(a.ao:eeessesei(:aasie:¬a(.eaeea|c|eoe:ee. vec. :es(e:ec.aac
o:ee:ess.ve|voe:iee(ec.ie:exa¬o|e.:.e. c|.aes. eveasa:iaees. aacse
ie:(a Ðve:v¬e:oae|ee.ea| . . . e. .o:eeee¬e(:.ea|.ce(e:¬.aa(.ea«e:ss
aeee:c.ae(e(aeeaa|.(a(.vee:aca(.easeiseas.||e.a(a. (.eamore or less
smooth sa:iaees. s.ces. | . aes. e:more or less rough aae| es. aac seea
1a.sceesae(o:ea.|.(a:.ee:easaacaa. veea|e.ce(.eix.aeeivaeae
¬e:oae|ee.ea|(voes. ia(aeOrigin, uasse:|«:.(es.oa:ea(ae(.ea||vaac
se¬e«aa( ea.e¬a(.ea|| v·(aa(|eie:eexae(.(acee¬e:ees. o:eeeec.ae
i:e¬(aeiae(aa| . aa essea(.a| ie:¬ |eee¬es :eeeea.za||e (a:eaea a
¬e(aeceiva:.a(.ea . i :s· .1aeseaseei(a. s:e¬a:s|eee¬ese|ea:e:
ea (ae |as. s eiIdeas I aac (aeCrisis. sv . mae.aa:vva:.a(.ea«e eaa
e|(a.a.aexae(|a(oa:e¬e:oae|ee.ea|(voes . :eaacaess . ie:exam·
I 38
This whole section, devoted to "Descriptive and Exact Sciences, " i s very impor­
tant for understanding the Origin .
124
Jacques Derrid
o|e . under «a.ea .s constructed iae eee¬ei:.ea| .cea|.iv ei iae e.:·
e|e ·1aeaei.eaeiia.seoe:ai.eaei sa|si:aei.ea .sa|se:eoeaiec
.aiaeCrisis . naiiaeivoe:eaacaess.sae| essa|:eacvia:a.saec«.ia
aee:ia.a.cea| . iv ..i.saeiie|eeeaiasec«. iaiae¬a|i.o|.e.iveiaaia:a|
saaoes «a.ea ¬e:e e: | ess ee::esoeac ie .i .a oe:eeoi.ea. Oa|v aa
. ¬ae.aai. ve.aieac.aeeaaaiia.aiaai.cea| .iv.a.iso:eeee¬ei:.ea|oa:·
.iv. nai ia. s oa:e .cea| .iv .s eia seas.||e e:ce:aac ¬asi|e c.si.a·
ea.saecea:eia|| vi:e¬oa:eeee¬ei:.ea|. cea|.iv.«a.ea. a.ise|i. s:e·
|easeci:e¬a||seas.||ee:. ¬ae.aai.ve.aia.i.veaess. 1ae. ¬ae.aai.ea. s
«aai e.ves ¬e iaeoa:e ¬e:oae|ee.ea| ivoe. aac.i eaa i:aasie:¬
seas.||e saaoesea| v .aie eiae:seas.||esaaoes (C, §9a, o. 25) . ~e·
ee:c.aeieuasse:| .iaea.oa:eseas.||e.cea| .iv.ss.iaaieceaao:e¬aia·
emai.ea| |eve| . Once constituted, oa:e¬aiae¬ai.es«.||iaas |eaeeess.·
||e ea|vie aace:siaac.ae .«aeseaei.eaaasae o:ee.se ieeaa.ea|
sease. auasse:|· ..aaavease .ieaaaei.v.iveeaee. va||e.aiaeseaseei
Ca:ies.aa.aie||eeiaa| .s¬. s.aeeia.saei.v.iv.saieaeei:eeci:e¬i«e
ae¬eeeaeeasiaea|i. es. i:e¬.¬ae.aai.eaaacseas.|. |.iv.iase¬eve:v
ea| .eaiea.ae| .aeseeaee:a.aeia. s. aiaeCrisis, iae o:ee.seeeaieaiei
«a.eaceesaeisee¬ie|eieaac.aaaveiae:eiuasse:| siexis .aeaas
«:.iiea.
In the intuitively given surrounding world, by abstractively directing
our regard to the mere spatiotemporal shapes, we experience
.
"bodies " -not geometrical-ideal bodies but precisely those bodies that
we actually experience, with the content which is the actual content of
experience. No matter how arbitrarily we may transform these bodies
in phantasy, the/ree and in a certain sense "ideal" possibilities we thus
obtain are anything but geometcal-ideal possibilities: they are not the
geometrically ' 'pure" shapes whih can be inscribed in ideal
space¯"pure" bodies, "pure" straight lines, "pure" planes, other
"pure" fgures, and the movements and deformations which occur
in "pure" fgures. Thus geometrical space does not signiy anything like
imaginar space . . . . (Ibid. , [modied]; our emphasis)
I 4U
´¨¨ Cf. on this Ideas I, §75; and Notes 3 and 4 of Ricoeur in Idees, p. 238. We would fnd
anticipated in the Philosophy of Arithmetic the principle for an analogous distinction
between perceptive plurality and arithmetical plurality. On the other hand, a distinction
of the sae type between a certain " style" of causality or of premathematical i nductivity
and those of pure physics i s invoked i n the Crisis and appended texts, notably i n passages
devoted to Galileo.
I 40
An essential diference remains, even if here he outwardly echoes Kant ("the propo­
sitions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination, "
Prologomena t o Any Future Metaphysics, § 1 3 [ET: ed. Lewis White Beck (New York:
The Liberal Arts Press, 1 950) , p. 34] ) . According to Kant, geometry is not imaginary
ffantastique] because it is grounded on the universal forms of pure sensibility, on the
125
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
~|iaeaeaeee¬ei:.ea|.cea|.iv¬av|e o:ecaeecstarting i:e¬seas.·
||e¬eroae|ee.ea|. cea|.iv. ia.siaeie·a.sie:.ea|ceoa:ia:eoe.ai. saa|·
|. iec as a e:eaac «.ia.a eeasi.iaiec eee¬ei:v. uacea|iec| v. .a . is
ia:a. .¬ae.aai. ve·seas.||e.cea|.zai.ea.«.iaeai«a.eaeee¬ei:veea|c
aeiaavea:.sea·oesesse¬ece|.eaieo:e||e¬seie:. e.a.ei«a.eauas·
se:|. sverveease.eas . ~|iaeaeaia. se:.e.a. siae e:.e.aei«aai o:e·
eecesaaceeac.i.easeee¬ei:v..i.saeiie|eeeaiasec«.iaiaee:.e.a
eieee¬ei:v.ise|iaaca||ei.is:e|aiecoess.|.|.i.es . .iea|vaaiae:.zes
«aai«eea:|.e:ea||eca"geogrphy. " iaeve:voaeae¬eae|ee.ea|:e·
e:ess.eaie|ee.aa.aes. iaeaei.eaeia internal e:intrinsic a.sie:vaac
sease |eisas ce|.aeaie se¬e saieiv·eaieaes [crans d' arret], as «e||as
a:i.ea|aie.i aeiave.c.a||"regressus ad infnitum. " 1ae.aie:aa|sease
eieee¬ei:v. «a.eao:ev.cesas«.iaasiai.eaaa|vs.s. o:ese:.|esiaai
iaeeaesi.eaeieee¬ei:v se:.e.asieoaiiaeconstituted seaseei«aai
aasimmediately eeac.i.eaec eee¬ei:v 1ae sea:eeeio:e eee¬ei:.ea|
.cea|.i. eseaa|e|euo:ev.s.eaa| |v.aiaeca:|. · ¹ ·1aas . uasse:|«:.ies.
si. | | . eaesi.eas|.|eiaaieiiaee|a:.ieai.eaeiiaee:.e.aeieee¬ei:v
aaveae|eseceaa:aeie:. saeaiaaieaeaeecaei.aea.:e|eveaciaese
o:ese. eai.iemaie:.a| s( 1 72) .
1aeo:e||e¬seie:.e.aoeseceais.ceiaaieae|esa:eaaceeaee:a.ae
iaeseaseeio:eexaeie:o:ee|¡eei.vesoai.eie¬oe:a|.iv«ea|ciaciae. :
ideality of sensible space. But according to Husser!, on the contrary, geometrical ideality
is not imaginary [imaginaire] because i t i s uprooted from all sensible ground in general .
In accordance with Kant, it was sufcient for Husserl to be purifed of empirical and
material sensibility to escape empirical imagination. As for what concers at least the
structure of mathematical truth and cognition, i not their origin . Husserl remains then
nearer to Descares than to Kant. It is true for the latter, as has been sufciently em­
phasized, that the concept of sensibility is no longer derived from a "sensualist" defni­
tion. We could not say this i s always the case for Descartes or Husser! '
I � I
Access to the origin of sensible ideality, a product of the imagination, would also
require, then, a direct thematization of imagination as such. Now the latter, whose
operative role is nevertheless so deci sive, never seems to have been sufciently inquired
into by Husser! ' It retains [ garde] an ambiguous status: a derived and founded reproduc­
tive ability on the one hand, it is, on the other, the manifestation of a radial theoretical
freedom. It especially makes the exemplariness of the fact emerge and hands over the
sense of the fact outside of the factuality of the fact . Presented in the Crisis as a faculty
that is homogeneous with sensibility, it simultaneously uproots morphological ideality
from pure sensible reali ty.
It i s by beginning with the direct thematization of imagination i n i ts si tuation as an
original lived experience (utilizing imagination as the operative instrument of all eideticsL
by freely describing the phenomenological conditions for fction, therefore for the
phenomenological method, that Sartre' s breakthrough [trouee) has so profoundly
unbalanced-and then overthrown-the landscape of Husserl ' s phenomenology and
abandoned its horizon.

126
Jacques Derid
o|aee. as. ce (aeae«transcendental aesthetics «a.eauasse:|oa:(.ea·
|a:|v eea(e¬o|a(ec . a(ae Ceae| as. ea eiFormal and Transcendental
Logic .oo. :ºi º·· · ··

ra:acex.ea||v.|eeaase. cea|eee¬ei:.ea|soaee.saei.¬ae.�a:v.aac
iae:eie:eae(seas.||e· ..(s. cea| .iveaa|e:e|aiec(e(aeie(a|a¬ivei�ae
seas.||e«e:|c ~ac. ie:iaesa¬e :easea. aoo|.eceeeme(:v:e¬ams
oess.||e. ee. ae se ia: as ie |e eeaiasec . aea: eves «.iaiae (:ae
aaia:e(aaiaoo|.eceee¬ei:va((aesa¬ei.¬eeeaeea| s ' ·i aeaee( .a
seas.||e . cea|.iv. «a.eaa|«avs so:.aesi:e¬ . ¬ae.aai.ea. eea|c ea|v
e.ve:.seieaa. ¬ae.aa:vrantastique] soaeeaacaa. ¬ae.aa:vrant


tique] se.eaeeeisoaee.ieaaaaie:eseea||eaac .ae:eaa.eo:e|.ie:ai.

e�
ei¬e:oae|ee.ea|(voes ia(aaiease.«eeea|caeiau:¬.as«e|ee.i.·
¬aie| vaac«. (aee¬o|e(eseea:. (vc.c.(aai «eaavenot two but
,

nlY
one universalform of the world: aeii«e|aiea| vone geometr . . . (C,
§9 c ,
o ·1·.
. .
1a.s seas.||e aac. (e a ee:(a.a cee:ee. e¬o.:.ea| aai.e.oai.ea �a| ·
iaeaea .a ee¬oa:.sea «.(a iaeis sa|¬.i(ec ie va:.a(.ea. . ¬ag.na(.v

e
.cea|.(veiiae¬e:oae|ee.ea|ivoeeaaae|eaee:|e¬e:e|�e¬o.:..a|·.s
(:ae ae(ea|vie:eee¬ei:.ea|forms |a(a| seie:eee¬e(:.ea|¬easa:e·
¬ea( 1ae|a(ie:ee¬esie(aeie:e. aaacia:eaeao:ax. s ie:exa¬o|e .
«ae:e] as(c. s(:.|a(.ea.s .a(eacec. | :s· ~aemo.:. ea| (eeaa. eaeei
¬easa:e¬ea(..asa:vev.ae..aæea.iee(a:e.aacseie:(a·¬as(aeees·
sa:. |v|e|eaeieeve:vo:ese.eai.ieea|ia:e uasse:|

ceesae� �|a|e:aie
ea(aai.a(aeOrigin. iaiaeCrsis aesee¬sieeeas. ce:e¬o.:.ea|¬ea·
sa:e asa siaee ia:iae:(aaa seas.||e¬e:oae|eevea(ae oa(a(e«a:cs
oa:eeee¬e(:.ea|. cea|.(v.Heasa:e. a.i.a(esaa

acv

aaee. a(a� se�seei
(aeaa. veea| ..aie:sa|]ee(.ve .(ae:eie:e. cea|·e|·eei.veceie:¬ma(.eaei
(aeeee¬ei:.ea|ia.ae(C, §9 c , o·1· He:eeve:.ea�e| ea:|va.eae:e:
sa|seeaeai|eve| .(aea:.(a¬ei.za(.eaeieee¬ei:vw.!||eevosec

asa
ae« :eve|a(.ea«.(a.aeee¬e(:v. ue«eve:. iae enemeiia.s s..eaee
«.|| ea|v|e¬e:eceeo|v|a:.ec.aac.(s sease e¬o(.ec ·
I 42
These few pages are very i mportant, here in parti cular, for determi ni ng
.
the
.
�rchitec­
tonic situation of the Origin . On the sense of thi s "transcendental aesthetICS , al so cf.
CM, § 6 1 . p. 1 46.
! 1'I
"So fami l iar to us i s the shift between a priori theory ad empi rical i nqui ry i n
everyday life that we usual l y tend not to separate the space a�d t�e spatia
.
l shape
.
s
geometry talks about from the space and spatial shapes of expenentIal actualIty, as If
they were one and the same" (C, §9a, p. 24).
´ `` On surveying, see notably §9a, pp. 27-28. On surveying as "pregeometrical
achi evement, " which i s also "a meaning-fundament for geometry, " see §9h, p. 49.
´ Cf. C. §9f. pp. 44-45. Husserl speaks there of an "arithmetizat�on of �eometry: :
which "leads al most automatical l y, i n a certain way, t o the emptymg of Its sense
127
Introductin to the Orgin ofGeometry
wesae«. iaea. a priori (aa(iaeoavs.ea|(a.ae. (ae|ecv. (aevaeae
¬e:oae|ee.ea|aacoae:eae¬.e(voes. iaea:iei¬easa:e.iaeoess.|. |.(v
ei.¬ae.aa:vva:.a(. ea.aaco:eexae(soa(.eie¬oe:a|.(va|:eacvaac(e
|e| eea(ec.a(aeea|ia:a|ae|c(aa(«aseae:ecieiaeoa. |eseoae:«ae
c.caeive(sae«eee¬e(:v|ai«aesaea|c|eeeae-. va||eas.(s. avea·
(e: . | :s·
1aas(ae . asi.(ai.eaeieee±e(:veea|cea|v|eaphilosophical aei
uasse:| . «ae eriea soeasseir| aiea.z.aeeee¬ei:v (FTL, Ceae|a·
s. ea. o :º:· .a|«avsass.eaec(eia. s . as(.(a(.aeaeiaeea(e¬oe:aae.(·
eisense «.(a(aeseaee|eir|a(e(Ideas I, ·º. o. ·s·. r|a(ea. s¬(C,
§9, o :·· . iaeC:eessea.cec|viaer|aiea.ecee(:.aeeii ceas (ibid. ,
·s. o. : i · . ' · r|aiea.e. cea|.s¬. · ··aacseie:ia.1aeoa.|eseoae:.sa
¬aa «ae .aaaea:aies iae iaee:ei.ea| aii.iace . iae |a((e: .s ea|v (ae
so.:.( s :ac.ea|i:eece¬.«a.eaaa(ae:.zesa¬eve|eveacia.(aceaac
eoeas (ae ae:.zea ei sae«|ecee as (aa( ei a o:eaav.ae. . . e . eiaa
.aaa.ie o:e]eei e: (ass( Vorhaben) . 1ae:e|v. iae iaee:e(.ea| a((.iace
¬ases.cea| .za(.ea s cee. s. veoassaee(e(ae| . ¬.(oess.||e.as«e||as
(ae eeas(.(a(.ea ei(ae ¬a(ae¬a(.ea| ae|c .a eeae:a| Na(a:a| | v. ia.s
oassaeeie(ae|.¬.(. sea|v(aeee.ae|eveaceve:vseas. || eaaciaeiaa|
| .¬. i. i( eeaee:as iae .cea| | . ¬.i eiaa .aaa.ie (:aase:ess. ea. ae((ae
iae(aa||.¬.ieiiae(:aase:essecia. (ace
s(a:i.aei:e¬(a. s. aaaea:a|.aaa.(.za(.ea.¬a(ae¬a(.eseeea.zesae«
.aaa.i. za(.eas «a.ea a:e se ¬aav .aie:.e: :eve|ai.eas . re:. .i (ae
o:.¬e:c.a|.aaa.(.zai.eaeoeasiae¬a(ae¬a(.ea|ae|cie.aaa.(eieeaa·
c.i.es ie: iaeC:eess. .(ae| essfrst | .¬.(siaeao:.e:. svs(e¬ei(aa(
o:ecae(.v.(v1aeve:veeaiea(eiaa.aaa.ieo:ecae(.ea«.|||eeeaiaec
«.(a.aaaao:.e:.svsie¬«a.ea.ie:(aeC:eess. «. | | a|«avs|eclosed.
[modifi ed] . Formal algebrization was already presented as a threat for primordial sense
and the "clari ty" of geometry i n Ideas I. where the " ' pure' geometer" was defned as
the one "who dispenses with the methods of algebra" (§70, p. 1 82) .
1 41; As Husserl often remarked, the al lusion to Greece , to the Greek origin of phi loso­
phy and mathemati cs, has no external hi storico-empirical sense. It i s the factual
[ h' cncmentief] i ndex of an i nteral sense of origi n . Cf. on thi s parti cul arl y "Phi losophy
and the Cri si s of European Humanity" ( in C, pp. 279-80) . Of course, the whole problem
of a phenomenology of hi story supposes that the " indicati ve" character of such language
is resol ved.
´´ "Idealization and the Science of Reali ty-The Mathematization of Nature" ( Before
1 928) , Abhandlung in Krisis, p. 29 1 ; Appendi x I I in Crisis. p. 3 1 3. In addition to thi s text.
one of the most specifc sketches from the h istorical perspective concerning the relation
between Plato' s philosophy and the advent of pure mathematics by ideal ization and
passage to the limit has been publ i shed by R. Boehm in Bei l age VI I of Erste Philosophie
( 1 923124) . Vol . 1 (in Husserliana. Vol . 7 [The Hague: Nijhof, 1 956] , pp. 327-28) .
128
Jacques Derid
1|e ea.ce|e:e .s Ðae|.ceaaeeemei:v. e: :aiae: i|e " ideal Euclid, "
aeee:c.ae ie uasse:| s exo:ess.ea. «|.e| .s :esi:.eiec ie sease. aei
a.sie:.ea|iaei. iaie:.aii|eca«aeimece:ai.mes. i|eao:.e:.svsiem
«. | | . ise|i|eeve:i|:e«a|vaae«. aaa.i.zai.ea. saii|e|aiie:«. | | ea|v
iaseo|aeewithin .aaa.ivasi|eoess.|.|.iveiaaai|emai.ea|ao:.e:.. a
eeae:a| . re:|aos . i|ea. «eaeeci ec.si.aea. s| |ei«eea. eai|e eae
aaac. . aaa.i.zai.ea asi|e. asi.iai.aeaeieimai|emai.es. . e. . asi|e
c.se|esa:e ei mai|emai.ea| ao:.e:.aess .ise|i-i|e oess.|.|.iv ei
mai|emai.zai.ea.aeeae:a|-aac. eaiae ei|e:|aac. . aaa.i.zai.easas
i|eea|a:eemeaiseiao:.e:.svsiems . 1|ese|aiie:«ea|cea|vaave|ac
ieaccc. meas.easei. aaa.ivieiaeao:.e:. .|aiiaev«ea|caeieeaee:a
ao:.e:.aess. ise|i.iai|eOrigin, uasse:|. s.aie:esiec.a.aaa.i.zai.ea.a
i|ea:sisease.1|ai.s«avaereduced a||iaeao:.e:.svsiemseioasie:
o:eseaieee¬ei:v..ae:ce:ie:eaea|aesaace:asoaea.aiaee:.e.aei
ao:.e:.aess.ise|iai.issea:ee. . . e. .i|e. asi.iai.ve.aaa.i.zai.ea
re:aaossae|ac.si.aei.eaaeeeaaisie:aeeai:ac.ei.ea.oe.aieceai
|vraa|x.eeea: . |ei«eea iaev.eaaaieeia:e. ra.|eseoavaaciae
C:.s.seiÐa:eoeaa uamaa.iv· aac i|eCrisi .ise|i.«|.e|. x.eeea:
aeies. eees |aes ie C:eesiaeaeaiaac .a oa:i.ea|a:ie Ðae| .ceaa
eee¬ei:v.ieass.eai|ee|e:veiaav. aeeeaee. veceiaa.aaa.ieiassei
sae«.ae. . .
.
··
He:eeve:. iae c.ae:eaee «e o:eoeseie e|se:ve|ei«eea iae i«e
s.acsei.aaa.iv«ea|caeiaia||eemo|eie|veaaee«aai. .ai|e|.ie:a|·
aesseiiae iexis. :ema.asaaae:aaieooes.i.ea iei as o|aees.ce|v
s.ceiaei«emesiaooa:eai|v.::eeeae. |a||eoassaees.

Only Greek philosophy leads, by a specic development, to a science
in the form ofinfnite theory, ofwhich Greek geometry supplied us,
for some millennia, the example and soverei{n model.
Mathematics-the idea ofthe infnite, of infnte tasks-is like a
Babylonian tower: although unfnished, it remains a task full ofsense,
opened onto the infnite. This infnity has for its correlate the new man
ofinfnite ends.
~acia:iae:ea.
Infnity is discovered, frst in the form ofthe idealization of
magnitudes, ofmeasures, ofnumbers, fgures, straight lines, poles,
surfaces, etc . . . . Now without its being advanced explicitly as a
!
"" Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and the Sense of History, " i n Husserl: An AnaLysis, p. 1 61 ,
n. 1 5.
129
Introductin to the Orgin ofGeometry
hypothesi, intutitively given nature and world are transformed into a
mathematical world, the world ofthe mathematical natural sciences.
A
.
ntiquity led the way: in its mathematics was accomplished the frst
dlscov
.
er ofboth
.
n
f
inite ideals and infnite tasks. Thi becomes for all
later times the gUldmg star ofthe sciences. · ·

Ofcourse the ancients, guided by the Platonic doctrine ofIdeas, had
already idealized empirical numbers, units ofmeasurement, empirical
fgures in space, points, lines, surfaces, bodies; and they had
trnsformed the propositions and proofs ofgeometr into
ideal-geometrical propositions and proofs. What is more, with
Euclid

an geometr had grwn up the highly impressive idea ofa
s

stemlcally

ohe
:
ent deductive theor, aimed at a most broadly and
highly conceived Ideal goal, resting on "axiomatic" fundamental
concepts and prnciples, proceeding according to apodictic
argume
!�
s- totality formed ofpure rationality, a totality whose
uncondltloned truth i available to insight and which consists
exclusively ofunconditioned truths recognized through immediate and
mediate insight. But Euclidean geometr, and ancient mathematics in
general, knows only fnite tasks, a fnitely closed Ü prior. Aristotelian
syl/ogistics belongs here also, as an a prior which takes precedence
over all others. Antiquity goes this far, but never far enough to grsp
the possi

ility ofthe infnite task which, for us, is linked as a matter of
Course wlth the concept ofgeometrical space and with the concept of
geometr as the science belonging to it. (C, § 8, pp. 21 -22; Husserl' s
emphasis)
weeaaaeiei|aiiaea:sieiiaea|eveiexisea|vaii:.|aies.aaa.i.za·
i.ea. aiaea:siseaseie C:eesoa. |eseoavaac eee¬ei:v. · �· . . e . iae
e:eai.ve .cea|. zai.ea eimaiae¬ai.es .aeeae:a|-aiaei iaev «.|| aei
|e cea.ec .a iae Crisis. 1ae:e ex. sis aa .aaa.iv «a.ea eeaa| . zes
' "
´ [The fi rst part of thi s passage i s taken from " La Crise de J ' humanite europeenne et
l a philosophie, " translated by Paul Ricoeur. Thi s version (translated from Ms M I I I 5 I I
b) di fers i n places from the version ( Ms M I I I 5 I I a) publ i shed i n the Krisis and translated
i nto Engl i sh ( Lauer' s translation of this text i n the same volume that contains his transla­
tion of " PRS, " Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, also follows the latter
v�rsion). I have always cited the version in C, since here occurs the only signi fi cant
divergence between the two texts i n Derrida's use of them. The second part of the above
quoted passage is found on p. 293 of C. Note adapted by tr. ]
´ ´´ In this respect, it can be said that, by thei r intention, the Vienna Lecture and the
Origin are nearer each other than they both are to the Crisis . Both are interested in a
proto-origin prior to the "Gal ilean" origin of modern times. Cf. what we said above
about the reduction of the Galilean atti tude.
130
Jacques Derrida
(ae c. seeve:v ei (ae ao:.e:.aess ei ma(aema(.es .a eeae:a| aac (ae
(:aase:ess.eaeiseas.||eia.(aces. evea.i(aei:s(ao:.e:.svs(em.s.a
.(se|iclosed, as(aeseeeacoassaees(a(es Oa(ae|as. seiaia.(eao:.e:.
svs(em. aa . aia.(e aam|e: ei m+(aema(.ea| eoe:a(.eas aac
(:aasie:ma(.eas. sa|:eacvoess.||e. a(aa(s,s(em. evea.i(aeva:eae(
. aia.(e|ve:ea(. ve ~|evea|| .ceso.(e(aee|esecaessei(aesvs(em.«e
a:ewithin ma(aema(.ea|.aia.(v|eeaase«eaaveceia.(. ve|v.cea|.zec
aaceeae|eveac(aeiae(aa|aacseas.||eia. (aces 1ae.aia.(e. a| a.(v
ei(aemece:a:eve|a(.eaeaa(aea|eaaaeaaeec.a(aeia.(e. aia.(vei
~a(.ea.(v s e:ea(. ea wa.|e . aves(.ea(.ae (ae sease ei «aa( (aev
e:ea(ec-ma(aema(.ea|ao:.e:.aess-(aeC:ee|ss.mo|v«ea|cae(aave
. aves(.ea(ec(|eseaseeia||(aeoe«e:sei.a| a.(v«a.ea«e:eeae|esec
.a(aa(ao:.e:.aessaac. (ae:eie:e. (e |e sa:e . ei(ae oa:eaac.a| a.(e
a.s(e:.e.(v eima(aema(.es 1aa(«. || |e ceaeea|vo:ee:ess.ve|vaac
| a(e:ea.|v. a(e:eeaaee(.ae:eve|a(.eaa:vceve|eomea(seeaie:m.ae(e
(aeo�eieaaca. s(e:.e.(v eima(aema(.es aac (eae:ea(. v.(v«a.ea a|·
«avso:eeeecs|vc.se|esa:e '
i i(aa( «e:e se. (ae eea(:as(|e(«eea(ae(«e (ex(s«ea|c|e|ess
a|:ao( eae«ea|c(aema(.zema(aema(.ea|aprioriness aac(aee(ae:(ae
ao:.e:.svs(eme:svs(ems. e::a(ae:ma(|ema(.ea|systematicity. w.(a.a
(ae.a| a.(veoeaec|v(aeC:ee|s .aae«.a| a. (.za(.ea. so:ecaeec.eae
«a.ea «.|| ma|e (ae o:ev.eas e|esa:e aooea:. ae( as (ae e|esa:e
oa:a|vz.ae(aeC:ee|son the threshold eima(aema(.ea|.aia.(v . (se|i.
|a(as (ae e|esa:e seeeaca:.|v| .m.(.ae (aemwithin (ae ma(aema(.ea|
| e|c.aeeae:a| Ðvea. a(aeso.:.(ei(aeCrsis, (aemeceo.aia.(. za(.ea
«. | | ma:| | ess aa aa(aea(.e aosa:a.ae (aaa a |.ac ei:esa::ee(.ea ei
eeeme(:v He:eeve:. (a.sse|i·:e|.:(a[renaissance a sol] «.|||ea((ae
sa¬e(.¬eea| vaae«obliteration ei(aea:s(|. :(a.ee:i. aea(e: Aac..(
¬as(|e+ccec.(aee:eeessei.a(:a·ma(ae¬a(.ea|.aaa.(. za(.eaeaa(aea
|eaeae:a| . zecad infnitum aacaeee:c.aa(eaaaeee|e:

(e

c:av(a¬
I
·
3Z
sa(.ieaea. aia.(.za(.ea.saae«|.:(a eieeeme(:v .a. (saa(aea(.e
o:. me:c.a|. a(ea(.ea.«a.ea«eae(.ees(.||:ema.aeca.ccea(eaee:(a.a
I.5I
On thi s cf. the Crisis. notably §8, p. 22, and §9h, pp. 5 1 -52, and §71 , pp. 245-46.
I ö2
The text taken from the Crisis, which does not seem to put into question ever again
the "Greek" origin of mathematics as an i nfnite t ask, poses thus the difcult intra­
mathematical problem of closure, a notion which can have mul ti pl e senses according to
the contexts i n which it i s employed. On all these questions, we refer particularly to S.
Bachelard. A Study of Husserf ' s Logic. Part 1 . Ch. 3 . pp. 43-63 . Moreover, there i s al so a
closure of the mathematical domain in general in i ts ideal unity as mathematical sense, a
closure wi thi n which al l i nfnitization will have to be maintained, simpl y because thi s
infnitization sti l l concerns ideal-mathematical objecti vities. About the mathematical sys­
tem in genera\
'
Husserl speaks of "an i nfnite and yet self-enclosed world of ideal objec­
ti vities as a feld for study" (C, §9a. p. 26 [modifed] ) .
131
!ntroductin to the Origin of Geometr
ex(ea(|v(aee|esa:eei(aeo:ev. eassvs(em· . «emav «eace: .i.(.s
s(. | | |ee.(.ma(e (e soea| eian e:.e.a eieeeme(:v Deesae(eeeme(:v
aaveaa. aia.(eaam|e:ei|.:(as.e:|.:(aee:(. | ea(es·.a «a.ea.eaea
(.me.aae(ae:|.:(a. saaaeaaeec. «a.|es(. | ||e.aeeeaeeai ec:Has(«e
ae(sav(aa(eeeme(:v.sea(ae«av(e«a:c.(se:.e.a.. as(eaceio:e·
eeec.aei:em. (:
uasse:|aacea|(ec|v«ea|cae:ee1e|e|ee.ea|seaseaac(aeseaseei
e:.e.a «e:e a| «avsma(aa| | v.mo| .ea(ecie:a. m se.aeaaaeaaeec .a
eaeae(ae:.(aev «.|||e:evea| ecia||vea|v(a:eaeaeaeae(ae:a((ae
. a| a.(eoe|eeia.s(e:vsa(. (aea.«avaaveeeeme(:v|ee. a«.(aoa:e
.cea| .za(.eaaacexae(.(ace:wavae(aave. (|ee.a«.(a . mae.aa(.ve·
seas.||e .cea|.za(.ea aacme:oae|ee.ea| (voe|eev. s.aee exae(.(ace . s
already aa(.e. oa(ec(ae:e: O:. eeave:se|v. «avstill ea| | (ae svs(ems
«a.ea«e:e(e(a|| v:.c eieeae:e(eeeeme(:veeeme(:.ea| :1a. s(voeei
eaes(.ea.aeaacea|(ec|vrelativizes (aesoee.ie.(veieeeme(:.ea|sease
as saea |a(ceesae(eaes(.ea.(. a.(se|i 1aeeeeme(:.ea|telos . sae
cea|( ea| v (ae i:aemea( e: oa:(.ea|a: seemea( eia aa.ve:sa| 1e|es
«a.ea(:ave:ses. o:eeeces. aaceees|eveac(aeeeeme(:.ea|eae. |a(
eeeme(:v s acvea(a:e. s:.ee:eas|va:(.ea|a(ece:ceo|evec. a[s' articule
en] (aa(1e|es (aeacvea(a:ec. cae(|ee.aas such |eie:e(aeeme:eeaee
eia|se|a(e|voa:eaacaeaseas.||e.cea|.(v..(:ema.as(aeacvea(a:eo)
eeeme(:vas|eaeasoa:e.cea|e|]ee(.v.(. esa:eeea| aec«.(a.a(aeie|c
eiao:.e:.aesseoeaec|v(aeC:ee|s ¯�1aeauasse:|eaaat one and the
same time soea|eiaoa:eseaseaacaa.a(e:aa|a. s(e:.e.(veieeeme(:v
aaceaasav.asaeei(eacees. (aa(aaa.ve:sa|(e|ee|eeveixeasea«as
a( «e:|.aaamaaa. s(e:v|eie:e(aeC:eee·Ða:eoeaaeem. ae(eeea·
se.easaess [prise de conscience ] , (aa( oa:e . cea|.(v .s aaaeaaeec .a
|eaac.cea| .(v. aacseea 1aas. a((aesame(.meae saves(aeabso­
lutely e:.e.aa|seasee:internal a.s(e:.e.(veieaea(:ac.(.eaa|| .aeaac.(s
:e|a(. v.(v«.(a.aaa.ve:sa|a.s(e:.e.(vi a(a.smaaae:ae.sassa:ecei
oeae(:a(.ae aa. ve:sa| a.s(e:.e.(v ea|v i:em «.(a. a. esoee.a| | v .i. |v
o:eie:eaee .ae(a:asa.s:eea:c(ea(:ac.(.eaasexemo|a:vas(aa(ei
ma(|ema(.es
ra:i:em|e.ae(aeaeeess(e semeoess.|.| . (v(aa(. s .(se|iaa. s(e:.e
ve(c. seeve:ec«. (a.aaa. s(e:v.«|.e|«ea|c.a(a:a|e(:aasiea:ec|v
.(· .(aeeoeaaessei(ae. a| a.(e.sea|v.ea(aeeea(:a:v.(aeeoeaaessei
a.s(e:vitself, .a(ae a(mes(ceo(as aacoa:.(vei.(s esseaee w.(|ea(
l .·\
Thi s i s true, of course, onl y i nsofar as these objectivities are related, immediatel y or
not . to spatiality in genera\ , if geometry is considered in i tsel f and in the strict sense ; to
movement i n general . if kinematics i s considered in itself and in the strict sense. (But
Husser! ofen says that "geometry" i s an "abbreviation" for al l the objective and exact
sciences of pure spatiotemporal i ty. ) But i f geometry i s considered in i ts exemplariness.
thi s i s generally true for every absolutel y pure and "free" i deal objecti vity.
132
Jacques Deric
ia.s:.u.a iae aa.ie. a.sie:.ea|aamaa.iv. e::aiae:a.sie:.ea|e.v.|.za·
i.eas. «ea|cea| ve|a.maaemo.:.ea|ivoeeisee.e·¬ia:eoe|ee.ea|aa·
.ivsai,as«eaavee|ea:|vseea.eme.:.ea|a.sie:v. sesseai.a||v.ac.s
i.aea. saa||ei:emaeaa.sie:v
~|se. uasse:|¡acees.iaeme:eaeeessa:v.aiaeOrigin iaaa. aiae
v.eaaa ieeia:e e:iaeCrisi ie aeeeaai.historcaly, ie:iae |.:iaei
oa.|eseoav«a.eaaaseeac.i.eaeciaaieieeemei:v.1a.swasiae|.:ia
eioa:ea.sie:v.1aee:.e.aeia.sie:.e.iv(Geschichtlichkeit) «.||aeve:|e
ceoeaceaieaaa.sie:v(Historie) . ~|iaeaeaiaeiaee:ei.ea|aii.iacemav
|eseeeaca:vaac.aie:m.iieaieaiaee:ce:eiiaeiaa|.iv.· ¹.i«ea|c |e
i:a.i|essiecese:.|eiaeoaeaemeae|ee.ea|aac. ai:. as.eeeaes.sei«aai
o:ee. se|vesia|| .saes iaeoess.|.| .ivie:saea acese:.oi.ea. 1a. scees
aeimeaa.me:eeve:.iaai.i.s. moess.||ee:ase|essiei:vaaesi:.as.e
aacoa:a||e|¯a.sie:.ea|aoo:eaeaieia. ssa|¡eei.ai.|.z. aea||iaeoes·
s.||e iaeiaa| e.veas .eeee:aoa.ea|. eeeaem.e. ea|ia:a| . see.e|ee.ea| .
osveae|ee.ea| . aac se ie:ia· «.ia iae aaesi eemoeieaee. iae aimesi
meiaece|ee.ea|seea:.iv. aac«.iaeaiv.e|c.aeieeaasa|.sm.aiem.sm.
aacseea. i.|e«.se .aiaeie·eeaei.ecese:.oi.eaeiiaemesiam|.i.eas
i:aaseeaceaia| :ecaei.ea eaa|ei:.ec. «.ia iaeae| oeia|| ava.|a||e
emo.:.ea|iee| s . saeaaiiemois«ea|caaveiae.:ia| | va|aeea|v.aseia:
asiaev«ea|c|eeeacaeiec«.iaiaeee:ia.aiviaaieve:via.ae.ssoe|ea
eiiaeaexcept iae:ecaei.eaitsel, except iaee:.e.aeioa.|eseoavaac
a.sie:vthemselves aacassaea.iaiae|esieieases. «esoea|ei«aai.s
si:.ei|voa:a||e|ieiaem.
r:em iae memeai uasse:| .s e.vea |eia iae o:ese.eai.ae ea|ia:a|
«e:|cand iaeoa.|eseoae:aseeac.i.easie:eeemei:v s e:.e. a. iaea|·
seaeeeia||eeae:eiecese:.oi.eaeiiae.asi.iaie: saeis saea|c aei|e
sa:o:.s.ae Ne: c. saooe.ai.ae. 1aese eeac.i.eas «e:e .ac.soeasa|| e.
|aia| sesame.eai .~|se.. asemeve:va| |as.ve|.aes«a. eaaccaeia.ae
ieiaeo:ev.eassiai.ecese:.oi.eas.iaeseaseeiiae.aaaea:a|eoe:ai.ea
. sesaaasiec. 1aeaa.iaces. «a.eaiaeo:eieeeemeie:oa.|eseoae:aas
aia. sc.soesa|.ameaeiaea.eaesia:e|eaac.cea|.i. es·aac«a.eaae
oe:ee.veseaaa.aaa.ieae:.zea. asie:mai.easceve|eoeceaieio:as.s
aaciaeaeaiei.aie:mseioe:ieei.ea.e|ea:|vse:veea|vas|asesie:a
ae«se:ieio:as. seaiei«a.eas.m.|a:|vaamecae«ie¬ai.ease:e«.
ii. sev.ceai.aacvaaeeiaaiia. sae«se:ieiie:mai.ea«. | | |eao:ecaei
a:.s.aeeaieiaa.cea|.z.ae.so. :.iaa|aei. eaeei oa:eia.a|.ae.«a.ea
aas .is maie:.a|s .a iae ces.eaaiecaa.ve:sa|o:ee.veas eiia.siaeiaa|
aamaa.ivaacaamaasa::eaac.re«e:|caace:eaies . cea|e|¡eei. v.i. es
eaieiiaem . i :ºmec.aeci · .
!
´` On this cf. notably EJ, § 1 4, p. 65.
133
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
ue:e«e a:e .iaea.as a|asi:eeea:se. |eie:eaa .cea|.z.aeeoe:ai.ea
«aeseaei.v.ivaasaeve:|eeasiac.ecie:.ise| iaac«aeseeeac.i.eas
a:eaeve:ie|esesiac.ec.s.aee«ea:ecea| .ae«.ia�a:ac.ea||v.asi.ia·
i.veeoe:ai.ea1a. s.cea|.zai.ea. siaai«a.ea .eaiae|as. seiaseas.||e
.cea|.iv.iaeme:oae|ee.ea|ivoeei:eancaess. ie:esamo|e· .ma|esa
a.eae:.a|se|aie|ve|¡eei.ve.esaei .aacaeaseas.||e.cea|.iveeea:-iae
e. :e|e . a s.m.|a:| vaamec|aiiae«¯ie:mai.ea¨i ae:ce:ie:eaea
|ae|aace:asoaea.aiaespecies . . e. . iae e:.e.aa| asoeei eiseas.||e
me:oae|ee.ea|.cea| .iv· .«emasieeasiaai|veeii:eei:emeeemei:.ea|
habits «a.eaieaciee|iaseaie.i. iaThe Poetics of Space, eeaee:a.ae
iae eaaoie: eai.i|ec 1|e raeaemeae|eev ei xeaacaess. Casiea
naeae|a:ceve|esia.si:ea||eseme|aiaeeessa:vdeception: 1aec.m·
ea|iviaaiaacie |eeve:eeme .a«:.i.aeia. seaaoie:«asieave.ca| |
eeemei:.ea|ev.ceaee. ·
ua| .|e me:oae|ee.ea| .cea| .iv. esaei .cea|.iv aas |eea o:ecaeec
«.iaeaiiaeesseai.a|a.ceiseas.|.|.ive:.mae.aai.ea..i|:e|ea«av|v
a|eaoi:emeve:vcese:.oi. vemee:.ae. uacea|iec| via.s| eaoc:e«.is
saooe:i e: aooea| i:em seas.||e .cea|.iv. uasæ:| a|«avs soea|s ei
eeemei:v s seas.||e saooe:i. sa|si:aie. e:|as.s(Ideas I, ·:º.
o i s·· . ·· naiiaese ieaacai.eas a:e aei iae iaacameaia| s eaes. a|·
' ´`´ The same principle and notion of substructive idealization, but without substantial
supplementary explication, is found again and again from one end to the other of Hus­
sert ' s work. In particular: a) in the LI, I , 1 , § 1 8 , p. 302. There we read among others those
lines devoted to idealization and to which the Origin will add nothing: "The image . . .
provides only a foothold for intellectio. It ofers no genuine instance of our intended
pattern, only an instance of the sort of sensuous form which is the natural starting-point
for geometrical ' idealization' . In these intellectual thought-processes of geometry, the
ideal of a geometrical figure i s constituted, which is then expressed in the fixed meaning
of the defnitory expression. Actually to perform this intellectual process may be presup­
posed by our frst formation of primitive geometrical expressions and by our application
of them in knowledge, but not for their revived understanding and their continued
sigifcant use" ; b) in Ideas I, §74, pp. 1 90-91 ; c) in "Idealization and the Science of
Reality-The Mathematization of Nature" (Before 1 928), Appendix I I , in C, pp. 301 -1 4;
d) i nEl, § to, pp. 41 -46; e) inFTLy §96c, and Conclusion, pp. 243 and 291 -93; f) in C, §9a
naturally, but also in §36, where in summary is said: "These categorical features of the
life-world have the same names but are not concered, M to speak, with the theoretical
idealizations and the hypothetical substructions of the geometrician and the physicist"
(p. 1 40; our emphasis); and g) in Appendix V: "Objectivity and the World of Experi­
ence, " in C, pp. 343-5 1 .
'
õß
The Poetics of Space, tf. Maria Iolas (Boston: Beacon, 1 964) , p. xxxv.
´´` All these formulas are also encountered in the texts we just cited. The sensible type
serves as the foundation for geometry in the process of being constituted. Next, it will
only serve as an illustrative "auxiliary" or "adjunct" to a geometrical activity which
goes through it toward pure ideality.
134
Jacques Derrida
(aeaea(ae|a((e:eaea(ae((e¬ase(aeie:¬e:|eie:ee((ea| ( .s oa:e
(a.as.ae(aa(. s:esoeas.||eie:(ae|eao.aeacvaaeeei. cea|.za(.eaaac
ie:eee¬e(:.ea|(:a(aassaea1ae. aaaea:a|eaa:ae(e:ei(ae.cea| . z.ae
ae(.(ae:ac.ea|aac. ::ao(.vei:eece¬«a.ea(aa(ae(¬aa.ies(s. aac(ae
cee.s.vec. seea(.aa.(v«a..aao:ee(s(aeae(i:e¬. (soas(eeac.(. eas. a||
(a.sa.ces(ae.cea|.z.aeae(i:e¬aeeaea|ee.ea|cese:. o(.ea
,

|i(ae ea:|.e:(es(sce ae((eaea as aav ¬e:e a|ea( (aeprocess ei
.cea| .za(.ea. a:e (aev ¬e:e o:ee.se as (e (aeorgin of the abilit (e
.cea| .ze: |(ceesae(see¬se |a. (s¬es(eeae:e(ece(e:¬.aa(.eas. (ae
eoe:a(.ea. sa|«avso:esea(ecasaoassaee(e(ae| .¬.( s(a:(.aei:e¬
aaanticipatory s(:ae(a:e ei .a(ea(.eaa|.(v. «e ee |eveac ¬e:oae·
| ee.ea| .cea|.(v (e«a:c (ae . cea| aac .ava:.aa( oe|e ei aa . aia.(e
aoo:es.¬a(.ea
sa(ie: (ae .a(ea(.eaa| aa(.e.oa(.ea (e |eao (e (ae .aia.(e . .( ¬as(
already |e . cea| waa( (a.s .cea| . za(.ea eiaa(.e.oa(.ea a(eaee aa·
l �8
I n the same sense Gonseth notes: "The passage from the i ntuitive notion: the
intended line, to the ideal notion: the straight line, i s something completely indescriba­
ble" (Les Mathematiques et la realite: Essai sur la methode axiomatique [Pari s: Lib­
rairie Fel i x Alcan, 1 936] , p. 76).
t �!i
To us the most specifc passages concering thi s seem to be the fol lowing:
A) "Geometrical concepts are 'ideal' concepts, they express something which one
cannot ' see' ; their 'origin, ' and therefore their content also, is essentially other than that
of the descriptive concepts as concepts which express the essential nature of t hings as
drawn di rectly from si mpl e i ntui ti on, and not anything ' ideal . ' Exact concepts have their
correlates i n essences, which have the character of 'Ideas ' in the Kantian sense . Over
against these I deas or ideal essences stand the morphological essences, as correlates of
descri pti ve concepts .
" That ideation . . . gi ves ideal essences as ideal 'limits, ' which cannot on principle be
found in any sensory intuit ion, to which on occasion morphological essences ' approxi­
mate more or l ess, without ever reaching them . . » " (Ideas I, �74, pp. 1 90-9 1 ; Husserl ' s
emphasi s) .
B) The text which follows, taken from the Crisis (§9a, p. 26) , i s of a more genetic style.
Here Husserl also shows himself more sensitive to the difculty of a description which, he
thi nks, sti l l remains to be done: "Without going more deeply into the essential intercon­
nections i nvol ved here (which has never been done systematically and is by no means
easy) , we can understand that, out of the praxis of perfecting, of freel y pressi ng toward
the horizons of conceivable (erdenklicher) perfecting ' again and again' (Immer-wieder),
limit-shapes emerge toward which the particular series of perfectings tend, as toward
i nvariant and never attainable poles. If we are interested in these ideal shapes and are
consistently engaged in determining them and in constructing new ones out of those
already determined, we are ' geometers. ' The same i s true of the broader sphere whi ch
includes the dimension of time: we are mathematicians of the ' pure' shapes whose uni­
versal form is the coideal i zed form of space-time. In place of real praxi s . . . we now
have an ideal praxis of ' pure thinking' which remains excl usi vel y within the realm of
pure limit-shapes . " Husserl ' s emphasi s.
135
Introductin to the Origin of Geometry
(ae:.zesaaco:ese:.|es. s(aeo:eseaeeie:eease. easaesseiaaIdea in
the Kantian sense. 1ae|a((e:.s(aee|]ee(eiaaideation, aaa¬euasse:|
eueae.ves(e.cea| .za(.eaaac«a.ea¬as(|ec.s(.aea. saeci:e¬.cea·
(.eaas(ae.a(a.(.eaeiaaesseaee( Wesensschau) .
l h0
1aec.ae:eaee|e·
(«eea(aese(«e.cea(.eas. s eaeeaaeeas(.(a(eaae|]ee(asae:ea(.ea.
(aee(ae:eaace(e:¬.ae.(.aaa. a(a.(.ea r:. ¬e:c.a|eee¬e(:.ea|.cea·
(.ea. ie:esa¬o|e. |:.aesa|ea(aaesseaee«a.eac.c ae(es. s(|eie:e
(ae .cea(.ea 1a.s .cea(.ea . s (ae:eie:e ¬e:ehistorical. sa(eaee (ae
.cea| e|]ee( . s eeas(.(a(ec «.(a.a :eacv·¬ace eee¬e(:v. (ae
Wesensschau :eea. as.(s:.ea(s |(. sae(|veaaaee(aa((aesa¬e«e:c
ces.eaa(es(«ec.ae:ea(eoe:a(.eas .a|e(aeases. (aee|]ee(.saa.::ea|
esseaee. a|(aeaea ae( a( a|| . ¬ae.aa:v [antastique] . | a eeas(.(a(ec
eee¬e(:v.(aeWesensschau ea|v:eoea(s(aeo:ecae(.ve.cea| .za(.ea |i
(?eeee¬e(:.ea|Wesensschau . soess.||eea|v|eeaase.cea| .z.ae.cea·
(.�
a aa
� already o:ecaeec (ae eee¬e(:.ea| e|]ee( . eeave:se| v. (|e
on�e:c.a| oassaee·(e·(ae·| .¬.(.soess.||eea| v.iea.cec|vaaesseaee
«a.eaeaa a| «avs |e aa(.e.oa(ec aac(aea :eeeea. zec. |eeaase a
truth eioa:esoaee.s.aeaes(.ea1aa(.s«avoassaees(e(ae| . ¬.(a:e
ae( (e |e ceae a:|.(:a:. | ve:a.¬| ess| v 1aa( .s «av eee¬e(:v .s (a. s
es(:ae:c. aa:v eoe:a(.ea (ae e:ea(.ea eiaa e.ce(.e | ( ie| |e«s (aa(
e�e�e(:v s .aia.(e a.s(e:v «.||a|«avs see .(s aa.(vo:ese:. |ec|v(ae
e.ce(.. s(:ae(a:e eia :ee. ea. e: ¬e:e o:ee. se| v. |v (ae aa.(v eiaa
a?s(:�e(
��
¬ea( � �soa(.a|.(v·eia:ee.ea 1a.saa.(vee:(a.a|v.sae(
�.s(e

oea|

..(.

e¬o.nea|| vaaeaaaeea||e sa(.(.sea| v(aeaa. (vof (ae
mi¬(ea. s(enea|ceve|eo¬ea(ei(aee.ce(.eea||eceee¬e(:v |(is no­
thing ea(s.ce (aea.s(e:veieee¬e(:v.(se|i
Ðsseaee·| .¬.(s saooese (aeaaa eoea|e:.zeaaac(ae|:eas(a:eaea
(e«a:c(ae.aia.(eeiaa" immer wieder" e:aa" und so weiter, " «a.ea. s
(aeve:v¬eve¬ea(ei¬a(ae¬a(.ea|. cea|.za(.ea.aeeae:a| | i(aes(:ae·
(a:
� �
i(ae "again and again" . siaaca¬ea(a| ae:e. (ae o:. v. | eeec
oes.(.eaei(|eo:e(ea(.eaa|c.¬eas.eaei.a(ea(.eaa|.(vaacei(aa(ei(ae
ia(a:e .a(aeeeas(.(a(.ea eisoaee .aeeae:a| ¬as(|e aesae«|eceec
I 60
Cf. Idees, § 74, pp. 235-36, n. 1 of translator.
I 6!
On t he "again and agai n, " t he iterative "over and over again, " or t he "and so
forth" as fundamental forms of idealization, "since de facto no one can always again"
[take all the ideal i zations into consideration] (FTL, p. 1 88) , cf. FTL, §74, pp. 1 88-89; and
� Bachelard
:
A Study ofHusserl's Logic [Part I I , Ch . 3] , pp. 1 1 9f. The "and so forth, "
masmuc�as I t belon�s t o the evident structure of the noema of the thing i n general, had
been copIOusl y descnbed i n Ideas I (cf. particularly § 1 49, pp. 379-83 , which sketches on
thi s a comparison between ideation, i ntuition of the I dea and of the "and so forth, " and
pure intuition i n the Kantian sense, whose ideation would only be phenomenological
clarifcation) .
136
Jacques Derrid
sai.a eooes.i.eaieiae | .vecsoaee.a «a.eaiae.aceia.ieaesseiiae
acam|:ai.eas .s a i:aaseeaceaee iaai esseai.a||v eaa aeve: |e mas·
ie:ec.iae.cea| .zecsoaeeeimaiaemai.esa||e«sasieee.mmec.aie| v
ieiae. aia.ie| .m.iei«aai. s. aiaeiaaaaia.saecmevemeai.1aas. iae
i:aaseeaceaeeeieve:v| .veciaia:eeaa|ea|se|aie|vaoo:eo:.aiecaac
:ecaeec.aiaeve:veesia:e«a.eai:eesiaaiiaia:eie:aa.aia.iece·
ve|eomeai. Haiaemai.ea| soaee ae |eaee: sae«s «aai sa:i:e ea| | s
i:aasoaeaemeaa|.iv. 1aeceve|eomeaiseimaiaemai.ea|soaee«. ||
aeve:de jure eseaoe as. iaai . s«av.im. eaiseemme:e :eassa:.ae.
me:eour own. sai.siaaiaeia|se|eeaase.iaas|eeememe:eie:e.ea
ieas:
we:e«ei e:esoeeiaaci e:eoeaiiaese aame:eas mec.ai.easeaee
aea.a.«e«ea|ciaas|e|ec|aeseaeeme:eie«a:co:.me:c.a|iemoe:·
a|.iv1ae aea.aaacaea.a «a.eaaaacseve:exaei.iace.ase:.|esiae
acveaieimaiaemai.es«.ia.aiaeeia.ee·ie|ee|ee.ea|o:ese:.oi.eaeiiae
.aia.ie iass. ~ac iae |aiie: . s e:eaacec. iaea. .a iae mevemeai ei
o:.me:c.a|oaeaemeae|ee.ea|iemoe:a|.zai.ea.i «a.eaiaei.v.aer:e·
seaieieease.easaessae|cs. ise|iasiaeo:.me:c.a|~|se|aieea|v.aaa
.aceia.ieo:eieai.ea. aa.maiecaacaa.iec|viaeicea(in the Kantian
sense) eiiae ieia| aax ei|.vecexoe:.eaee. · · ~s «e aave seea. iae
i.v.aer:eseai.siaeoaeaemeae|ee.ea|a|se|aieeaiei«a.eaieaaaei
ee|eeaase.i. siaai.a«a.ea. ie«a:c«a.ea. aacsia:i.aei:em«a.ea
eve:v ee.ae eai. s eaeeiec. 1ae i.v.ae r:eseai aasiae .::ecae.||e
e:.e.aa|.iveiaNe«. iaee:eaaceiaue:e.ea|v.i.i:eia. as..ae:ce:ie
|ec.si.aea.saa||ei:em.i·iaeoasiNe«as such, . . e . . asiaeoasio:e·
` `'� Cf. the important §83 of Ideas I : "Apprehension of the Uni tary Stream of Experi­
ence as ' Idea, ' ' ' pp. 220-22. Thi s Idea i s the common root of the theoretical and
the ethical. Finite and objective ethical values are undoubtedly constituted and
grounded, according to Husserl, by a theoretical subject. Thi s point has been very accu­
rately brought to light by Emmanuel Levinas (The Theor of Intuition in Husserl' s
Phenomenology, tr. Andre Orianne [Evanston: Northwester University Press, 1 973] ,
pp. 1 33-34) and by Gaston Berger (The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, pp. 8082). But
on a deeper level , theoretical consciousness i s nothing other, in itself and thoroughly
understood, than a practical consciousness, the consciousness of an infnite task and the
site of absolute value for itself and for humanity as rational subjectivity. Cf. , for example:
"Philosophy as Mankind' s Self-Refection, " Appendix IV in C, pp. 335-4 1 . There we
read: mankind "is rational in seeking to be rational . . . reason allows for no diferentia­
tion into ' theoretical , ' ' practical , ' '
a
esthetic' . . . being human is teleological being and
an ought-to-be . . . " (p. 341 ) . Also cf. CM, §41 , p. 88. The uni ty of Reason in all its
usages would manifest itself fully for Husserl in the theoretical project (rather than in the
practical function, as would be the case for Kant). On this point , a systematic confronta­
tion between Husserl and Kant on the one hand and Husserl and Fichte on the other
would be necessary.
137
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
seaieiaa a|se|aiee:.e.a..asieaceioa:e|vaacs.mo|vsaeeeec.ae.i .a
aa e|]eei.ve i.me sai ia. s :eieai.ea «.|| aei |e oess.||e «.iaeai a
o:eieai.ea«a.ea.s.is ve:vie:mi:si. |eeaase.i:eia.asaNe««a.ea
«as. ise|iaae:.e.aa|o:e]eei. .ise|i:eia.a.aeaaeiae:o:e]eei . aacseea.
aexi. |eeaase iae :eieai.ea .s a|«avsiae esseai.a| mec.ieai.ea eia
Ne« a|«avs .a sasoease . a|«avsieac.ae ie«a:c a aexiNe«. 1ae
~|se|aieeiiaei.v.aer:eseai .iaea. .sea|viae. aceia.ieHa.aieaaaee
iaeNe«aessì eiia.s cea||eeave|eo.ae. saiia. sHa.aieaaaee. ise|i
aooea:sas such, .i.siaeLiving r:eseai .aac.iaasiaephenomenological
seaseeiaconsciousness ea|v.iiaeaa.iveiia.smevemeai.se.veaas
indefnite aac .i. isseaseei. aceia.ieaess .sannounced .aiae r:eseai
. . . e . . .iiae eoeaaess eiiae .aia.ie iaia:e . s. as saea. a oess.|.|.iv
experienced [vecue ] as sease aac :.eai· . Deaia «.|| aei |e eem·
o:eaeacec as sease|aiasa iaei exi:.as.e ieiaemevemeaieiiem·
oe:a|.zai. ea. 1aeaa.ivei.aia.iv. iaeeeac.i.eaie:iaaiiemoe:a|.za·
i.ea.masiiaea|ethought, s.aee.i.saaaeaaeec«.iaeaiaooea:.aeaac
«.iaeai|e.aeeeaia.aec.aar:eseai. 1a. siaeaeaiaa.iv.«a.eamases
iaeoaeaemeaa|.zai.eaeii.meassaeaoess.||e..siae:eie:ea|«avsiae
icea.aiae kaai.aasease«a.eaaeve:oaeaemeaa|.zes. ise|i
1ae aaia. saecaess ei uasse:| s :eaeei.eas ea o:.me:c.a|
iemoe:a|.iv-iae.::.eaaess. |aia|se.as. ssa. c. iaec.ssai.siaei.eaiaev
|eii iae. :aaiae:-aas |eae |eea aace:see:ec ti iae maaase:.ois ei
Group C iaas]asi|viase.aaieHasse:|
·
seemmeaiaie:s . . siaai aei|e
eaase iaese maaase:.ois ieaea ea iae mesi o:eieaac :ee.ea ei
oaeaemeae|ee.ea|:eaeei.ea.«ae:ecarsaess:. sss|e.aeae|eaee:iae
o:ev. s.eaeiaooea:.aee:iae| e|c«a.eaeae:s.ise|iieoaeaemeaa||.eai.
|aiiaeie:eve:aeeia:aa|sea:eeeiiae| .eai.ise|i:~:eaeiiaeiceaaac
iae. cea|.z.aea|.|.iv.«a.eaexemo|a:. | veeeaovasae:easiaee:.e.aei
maiaemai.es. seoi|aes.aia.sesseai.a|ca:saess:
1aeicea.aiaekaai.aasease.iae:eea|ai.veoe|eie:eve:v. aia.ie
iass.assamesc.ve:se|aiaaa|eeeasiaaei.easiaaia:ecee.s.veaisev·
e:a|oe.aisa|eaeuasse:| s .i.ae:a:v. raa| x.eeea:ve:v o:ee.se|v:ee·
eea.zes .a iae icea iae mec.ai.ae :e|e |ei«eea eease.easaess aac
a.sie:v.' Ne«. «a.|e eemo|eie| vma:s.ae .i «.ia iae a.eaesiaac
mesieeasiaaiie|ee|ee.ea|c.ea. iv. «a.|eeemo|eie|ve:aai.aea|e|.ev.ae
aiieai.eaie«aai.ieeac.i.eas. uasse:|aeve:maceiae iceaitsel iae
theme eiaoaeaemeae|ee.ea|cese:.oi.ea.ueaeve:c.:eei|vceiaec.is
ivoeeiev.ceaee«.ia.aoaeaemeae|eev.«aeæ 'prnciple ofal prnci­
pies" aaca:eaeivoa|ie:m eiev.ceaeea:eiae .mmec.aieo:eseaeeei
! 6³
"Husserl and the Sense of History, " in Husserl: An Analysis, p. 1 45.
138
Jacques Derrida
(ae(a.aa. (se|i .aee:sea ¯ime|. e.(|v(aa(�eaa�.ei(aeeaeae

¬eaa||v
aeaaeae:aeaaa||e(a.aa.(ae:eie:e(aefnzte (ama .1ae¬e(. ioiaa·
.(aaeaasee:aaesme:eaua.(v«.(a(ae
.
|a((e� . �e| .ea(.ea(?a� .(a���
see¬s (e aave «.(a oaeae¬eae|eev s onae. o|e ei onae. o| es
raeae¬eae|eev «ea|a (aas |estretched |e(«eea (aejnitizing eea·
se.easaessei.(sprinciple aaa(aeinjnitizing eease.easaessei.(saaa|
institution, (aeEndstiftung .aaeaa.(e|vaeie::ea[differee] .a .(seea(ea(
|a(a|«avsev.aea(.a.(s:eea|a(.veva|ae. ·
i ( . sae(|veaaaee(aa((ae:e.saeoaeae¬eae|eevei(aei aea. ��e
|a((e:eaaae(|ee.vea.aoe:sea.ae:ae(e:¬.aea.aaaev. aeaee. ie:.(I S
ea|v(aeoess.|.|.(veiev.aeaeeaaa(aeeoeaae�sei

� see�ae.(se|i..(. s
ea|vdeterminability as (ae ae:.zea ie:eve:v m(a.(.ea. aeeae:�| . (ae
. av.s.||e¬.|.eaeisee. aeaaa|eeeas(e(aea. aoaaae.(vei(ae~ns(e(e·
|. aaD. aoaaaeas. aae|e¬ea(a|(a.:a.|a((aeeaesea:eeei(aes��aa�a
(aev.s.||e |va.aoaaaeasi¬eaa«aa(.sv. s.||e.aaave(ae(v. s. ||em
.(se|i.|a(:a(ae:e«.ae.(sv.s.|.| .(v(e(aeee|ea:eise¬e(a.aee| se. i (
. s(aaass( e(a. sa|eae (aa((aeee|ea:eia(a.ae. sseea(De Anima,
1i s|·. ii(ae:e. s ae(a.ae(esava|ea((aeiaea /·se|. .(.s|eeaase(ae
l 64
An essential fni tude can appear i n phenomenology i n another sense: to recogni�e
that the transcendental reduction must remain an eidetic reduction in order to avo� d
empirical ideali sm is to recognize that transcend
.
ental ideali s�does nO
,
t proc
.
eed, e,en 1 0
the Kantian tradition itself, without the afrmatIon of the phI losopher s radIcal fmtude.
This necessi ty for the transcendental reduction to remai n so i s th�necess
.
ity to make �he
absolute and primordial ground of the sense of being appear 10 � regIon (the r�glOn
" consciousness" unifed by an ego and an Idea) , i . e. , i n a region whIch, even were It
.
the
Ur-Region, i s no l ess a domain of determined existents . The uni tary ground of all �egl Ons
can onl y appear i n one region; it can onl y then be concealed und�r a typ�of bemg�ess
[itance] determined the very moment it app�ars
.
as
.
the �round. Wlthout thIs
.
oc�ult�tI?�,
philosophical di scourse woul d renounce all
.
eldetIc r
.
1gor,
.
I . e. , all sense. T�e eIdetIc l
,
l m1ta­
tion i s then indispensable, and the reductIOn receIves 1ts true sen�e ,h1Ch, c�ntrary to
appearances, is that of prudence and critical humíl i t�. �it
.
hout �hl �d1sappe�nng �f the
ground necessary for appearing itself, wi thout th1S hmltatlon w1thm a
.
cert�m reglonal­
ness, without this reduction that Heidegger impl i citly reproaches h1m w1th, �us
.
serl
thinks that philosophy even more surel y fal l s back i nto regionalness; better st1l1, mto
empirical regionalness-here, for exampl e, under the form of anthropological factu�l ity,
Husserl thi nks, that of Dasein . On thi s poi nt, the dialogue between Husserl and Heldeg­
ger could go on indefnitel y, except considering that the reduction i s alw�ys already
supposed as the essential possibility of Dasein, and that, convers�IY, consc10u
.
sness as
transcendental source i s not a "region" in the strict sense, even If the neceSSI ty of �n
eidetic language has to consider it as such. For both Husserl and Heidegger, the co��hc­
ity of appearing and of concealing seems i n any case primordial, essential , and defmtlve.
I 6^
[ET: On the Soul, t r. J. A. Smith, i n The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1 941 ) , p. 568 (modifed) . ]
139
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
i aea. s(aa(s(a:(.aei:e¬«a.ease¬e(a.ae.aeeae:a|eaa |e sa.a. i (s
e«a oa:(.ea|a:o:eseaee . (aea. eaaae(aeoeaaeaaoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|
(v,eeiev.aeaee . Deso.(e(ae¬a|(.o|.e.(vei:eie:eaees(e(ae i aea.a
uasse:| s |as(«:.(.aes. (ae ¬es( o:ee. se (ex(eeaee:a.ae .(s(voe ei
ev.aeaee .s ieaaa. .(see¬s. .a(ae eaao(e:eiIdeas I aeve(ea(e(ae
oaeaemeae|eeveixeasea.· | 1ª .ooª---:· .Ceaee:a.ae(aeaaeeaa(e
e.veaaessei(ae(:aaseeaaea((a.ae.«eaaa(ae:eao:e||e¬aaa|eeeas
(e(aa(ei(ae(e(a|aa.(vei(ae. ¬¬aaea(aax.a«a.ea. (a. s(.¬e .eaea
|. veaexoe:.eaee.s aaeeaa(e|ve. vea. ~|(aeaea(ae(:aaseeaaea((a.ae
|e|eae.ae(eNa(a:eeaaae(|ee.vea«.(aee¬o|e(eae(e:¬.aaaevaaa
«.(a s.¬.|a:|v ee¬o|e(e . a(a.(a|.|.(v .a aav |.¬.(ea | a.(e eease. eas·
aess. "as Idea .. a(aekaa(.aasease·. [its] complete givenness is . . .
prescribed . . . " (ibid. , o. ª--· .
1a. siaeaei(ae. aaa.(eae(e:¬. aa|.|.(vei(aesa¬ex-¬e:eeve:. as
«e| | . (aa(ei(ae «e:|a .a eeae:a|-aes. eaa(esì(a:eaea. (sessea(.a|
aa(a:eatpe ofevidence that is its own" (ibid. , oª-:¬ea.aeaì · . '
.
sa(
(a. sev.aeaeeei(ae iaeaas :eea|a(.veoess.|. |.(v.s a|se|a(e|vexeeo·
(.eaa| . aoaeae¬eae|eev. .(aasaeo:eoe:eea(ea(. e::a(ae:. (. sae(
ev.aeaeeei(aei aea seea(ea( i(.sev.aeaeeea|v. aseiaras.(i sjnite,
. . e . . ae:e.formal, s.aee(aeeea(ea(ei(ae. aaa.(ei aea. s a|sea(aaa. s
aea.ea( eeve:v. a(a.(.ea.1ae.aeaeiaa. aaa.(vessea(.a||v¬e(.va(ea
.s ae( .(se|i aa . aaa.(v. (ae ev.aeaee (aa((a. s .aaa.(v . s . a(:. as.ea||v
.aeaoa||e ei|e.ae e.vea aees ae( exe|aae |a( :a(ae: ae¬aaas (ae
(:aasoa:ea(e.veaaessei(aeIdea ei(a. s. aaa.(v (ibid. ¬ea.aeaì· .
i a(aei aeaei.aaa.(v.(ae:e .sae(e:¬. aeaev. aeaeeea|vei(aei aea.
|a(ae(ei(aa(ei«a.ea.(. s(aeiaea. 1aeiaea. s(aeoe|eeiaoa:e
.a(ea(.ea.e¬o(veieve:vae(e:m.aeae|]ee( i(a|eae:evea|s.(aea.(ae
|e.aeei(ae.a(ea(.eaintentionality .(se|i.
1aas . ie:eaee. ae(a.ae aooea:s .aa soee.ae ev. aeaee. waa(aees
aooea: . s ea|v(ae :eea|a(.ve oess. |.|.(v ei aooea:.ae aaa (ae aa.(e
ee:(a.a(vei. aaa.(eoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|ae(e:¬.aa|.|.(v. . . e. .aee:(a.a(v
«.(aea(aee::esoeaa.aeev.aeaee. svaeaa.(.ea.ae(a.aeeaa|eaaaea
(e(a.sie:¬a|ae(e:¬.aa(.eaei(aeiaea 1ae|a((e:. as(ae. aaa.(eae(e:·
¬.aa|.|.(veix. . s ea|vrelation with an object. i( .s. . a(ae |:eaaes(
sease.Objectivit . (se|i.
ia a.s a:(.e|e ea kaa( aaa uasse:| . raa| x.eeea: «:.(es (ae
I66
In FTL, Husserl also evokes "thi s phenomenologically cl arifable i nfi nite anticipa­
tion (which, as an i nfnite anticipation, has an evidence of its own) " (§ 1 6c, n. I , p . 62).
But, at that poi nt , Husserl no longer goes beyond the promise or suggestion made i n the
passage. Moreover, at the end of thi s note he refers to Ideas I.
140
Jacques Derrid
c.si.aei.ea.iaacameaia|.a kaai. . . |eiweeaintention ¬cintuition "
.s ieia||vaa|aewa.aHasse:| .
³!ö7
i aiaei.s aeaac.si.aei.ea. saeve:
iaemai.e. auasse:| . Necea|i.aa. aieai.ea.awa.eaaeia.ae. se.vea
eaaaeiaave. assaea. aoaeaemeae|oe.ea|eaa:aeie:.aacuasse:|eaa·
aeieeae:eie|vcese:.|e. i. ai|easiaei.a. iseeaieai. ie:iae. aieai.ea s
ie:m. saeeae:eieaac| .vecev.ceaee. wa.ea. saeiiaeease. akaai.
~eee:a.ae|v.phenomenology eaaaei|ee:eaacecassaea. a. ise|i.ae:
eaa .iitsel .ac.eaie .is ewa o:eoe: | .m.is . sai . s aei iae ee:ia.aiv
.w.iaeaiamaie:.a||vceie:m.aecev.ceaee·eiiae. aaa.ieceie:m.aa|.|·
.iveixe:eiiaee|¡eei.aeeae:a|aa .aieai.eaw.iaeai.aia. i.ea. aa
emoiv.aieai.eawa.ea|eiae:eaacs aac.s c.si.aea. saeci:emeve:v
ceie:m.aecoaeaemeae|ee.ea|.aia.i.ea: is aeiiae samei:aeie:aav
eease. easaesseiiae.aaa.ieias|aacie:ie|ee|ee.ea|ee:ia.aivaace:a||
.isie:ms :~ssa:ec|v. iaea.ia.s.aieai.eaa|oa:esease[sens pur d'inten­
tion], ia.sintentionality, .a. ise|i.siae|asiia.aeiaaiaoaeaemeae|eev
eaac. :eei|vcese:.|eeiae:w.seiaaa.a.isaa. ieaeis ..aia.i.eas.:esa|is .
e:e|¡eeis . |ai . w.iaeaiwaai.aee:|e.aea||eie cese:.|e.i. Hasse:|
aeve:iae|ess:eeeea.zes. c.si.aea.saes. aacposits ia. s.aieai.eaa|.ivas
iaea.eaesisea:eeeiva|ae .He|eeaiesiaespace wae:eeease.easaess
aei.aes .ise|i ei iae i cea s o:ese:. oi.ea aac iaas .s :eeeea.zec as
i:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaessia:eaeaiaes.eaeiiae.aaa.ie.ia. ssoaee
.siaeinteral |eiweeaiaei ceaei. aaa.iv.a.isie:ma|aacaa.ie.vei
eeae:eie·ev. ceaeeaaciae.aaa.iv. ise|ieiwa.eaiae:e. siaeicea.ii.s
eaiae|as.seiia. sae:.zea·ee:ia.aiviaaiiaea.sie:.e.iveiseaseaaciae
ceve|eomeaieixeaseaa:eseii:ee.
I 67
"Kant and Husserl , " in Husserl: An Analysis, pp. 1 75-201 . In this very dense
article, Ricoeur defi nes Husserlianism as the completion of a latent phenomenology and
the reduction of an ontological disquietude, both of which aimate Kantianism; of these
he has said that "Husserl did phenomenology, but Kant limited andfounded it" (p. 201 ) .
I n thi s way the formidable and decisive problems of the Fifth Cartesian Medi tation are
taken up again in a Kantian reading: the practical detenination of the person by respect
must precede and condition a theoretical constitution which, by itself alone, cannot have
access to the alter ego as such. Also cf. on this Fallible Man, tr. Charles Kelbley
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1 965), pp. 1 05-2 1 . As for the relation with an object which
preoccupies us here, Ricoeur writes more particularly: "The key to the problem is the
distinction, fundamental in Kant but totally unknown in Husserl, between intention and
intuition . Kant radically separates from one another the relation to something and the
intuition of something. An object " X is an intention without intition. This distinction
subtends that of thinking and knowing and maintains the ageement as well as the tension
between them" (p. 1 89).
Here we naturally leave aside those various possibilities, so often invoked by Husserl ,
of empty intentions, like the symbolic intentions that are deceived or not fulflled, and so
on. They could not b said to be deprived of intuition in general . Their emptiness is
circumscribed, in that they always bear reference to a determined but absent intuition.
141
Introductin to the Origin ofGeomet
re:aaos ia. s ae|os as ieeemo:eaeacwaviae icea.a i~ kaai.aa
seaseaac. ae:e.iaemaiaemai.ea|. cea| .zai.eawa.easaooeses. ieea|c
ea|v|eoperative aacnot thematic eeaeeois.
!öB
1a. soaeaemeae|ee.ea|
aeaiaemai.zai.eae|evsao:eieaacaac.::ecae. ||eaeeess.iv.1aeicea
.siae|as.seawa.eaaoaeaemeae|eev.sseiao.ae:ce:ieaea.eveiae
aaa|.aieai.eaeioa.|eseoav.1aaiaoaeaemeae|ee.ea|ceie:m.aai.eaei
iae icea . ise|i mav |e :ac.ea||v . moess.||e i:em iaea ea s.ea.aes
oe:aaosiaaioaeaemeae|eeveaaaei|e:eaeeiec.aaoaeaemeae|eevei
oaeaemeae|eev.aaciaai. isLogos eaaaeve:aooea:assaea.eaaaeve:
|e e.vea.a aoa.|eseoaveisee.ae. |ai .|.|e a|| soeeea· eaa ea|v |e
aea:c e: aace:sieec ia:eaea iae v.s.||e. 1ae Endstitung ei
oaeaemeae|eev .oaeaemeae|eev s a|i.maie e:.i.ea| |ee.i. mai.ea. . . e . .
waai . issease . va|ae . aac:.eaiie||as a|eai.i· . iaea. aeve:c.:eei|v
measa:es aoie aoaeaemeae|eev. ~i|easi ia.sEndstitung eaae.ve
aeeessie.ise|i.aaoa.|eseoav..aseia:as.i.sannounced .aaeeae:eie
oaeaemeae| ee.ea|ev.ceaee..aaeeae:eieconsciousness wa.ea. smace
responsible ie:.iceso.ieiaeaa.iaceeiiaaieease.easaess.aac. aseia:
as .i e:eaacs i:aaseeaceaia| a. sie:. e.iv aac i:aaseeaceaia| .aie:sa|·
]eei.v.iv. Hasse:| s oaeaemeae|eevsia:isi:em ia. slived anticipation
asa:ac.ea|:esoeas.|.|.iv.semeia.aewa. ea. waeaeeas.ce:ec|.ie:a| |v.
ceesaeiseemie|eiaeeasew.iaiaekaai.aae:.i.eae·
X

1a�o:eseaeeeiiaeiceaa|eae. iae:eie:e.aaiae:.zesiae|eaoieoa:e
.cea| |iv|viaeaea:e·|.m.iaaciaeacveaieimaiaemai.es . aiaeiiaai
eea|ce.ve:.seiecea|isa|eaiiaaie:.e.a s soee.aea.sie:.e.iv. ~:ewe
aeieeai:eaiecw.iaaaaa.sie:.ea|iceaeaiaeeaeaaacaac.is.ase:i.ea
.aiaeeveaie:a.sie:.ea|iaeieaiaeeiae:: ia wa.ea ease. wewea|c
si:.|eiae saaesiaai Hasse:|o:ee.se|vwaaisieave.caacwea|cm.ss
ea:ia:eei-oaeaemeae|ee.ea|a.sie:v.waaiwei:a|vaeec.sie.aves·
i.eaieiaeseaseeiiaeicea so:eieaaca.sie:.e. iv.
uacea|iec| viaeiceaaaciaexeaseaa. ccea.aa.sie:vaac.amaaas
: 'animal rationale" a:eeie:aa| .uasse:|eueasavsia. s saiia.seie:a.iv
IS only a a.sie:.e.iv. ii . s iae possibilt of a.sie:v .ise|i. iis
sao:aiemoe:a|.iv-eemoa:ec w. ia emo. :.ea| iemoe:a|.iv-.s ea|v aa
ema.iemoe:a|.iv.1aeicea. |.|exeasea. .snothing eais.ceiae a.sie:v
I68
We refer here to the very enlightening distinction proposed by Fink in his lecture,
already cited, on " Les Concepts operatoires dans la phenomenologie de Husser\ . " [See
note 66 above. ]
1 '
Ì
142
Jacques Derrid
.a«a.ea.(dispLays .(se|i.. e. . .a«a.ea..aeaeaac(aesa¬emeve¬ea(·
.(c.se|esesaac|e(s. (se|i|e(a:ea(eaec
s. aee(aetcea. sae(a.aaea(s.cea. s(e:v|a((aesense ofa||a.s(e:v.
ea|vaa. s(e:.ee·(:aaseeacea(a|sa|] ee(.v.(veaa|emace:eseeas.||eie:
.( 1aas. .a(aeCartesian Meditations . i .·1· . uasse:|soeasseic.se|es·
.ae(aeiaa|sease(Zwecksinn) eise.eaeeasa"noematic phenomenon. "
i a(:aaseeacea(a|sa|]ee(. v.(v s c.se|esa:eei (aei cea. progressiveness
.sae(aaex(:.as.eeea(.aeeaev(aa(aaee(s(aeicea|a((ae. ¬oe:a(.ve
o:ese:.o(.ea ei .(s esseaee. · 1ae icea .s ae( aa ~|se|a(e (aa(frst
ex. s(s.a(aeo|ea.(aceei.(sesseaeeaac(aeaceseeacs.a(ea.s(e:ve:
|eee¬esc. se|esec.aa sa|]ee(.v. (v «aese ae(s «ea|c ae(|e.a(:. as. ·
ea||v.ac.soeasa||e(e.( · ·ii(aa(«e:e(:ae. a||(:aaseeacea(a|a.s(e:.e·
.(veea|c|esa.c(e|eea|vaae¬o.:.ea|a. s(e:v. . . a(.|. zecas«aa(
:evea|sessea(.a|.a(e:eeaaee(.eas · ·· na((aeseesæa(. a|.a(e:eeaaee·
(.eas «ea|c |e . ¬oess.||e . (aev «ea|c |e ae(a.ae «.(aea( a
(:aaseeacea(a|sa|]ee(. v.(vaac.(s(:aaseeacea(a|a.s(e:.e.(v. 1ae ~|·
se|a(e ei (ae icea as (ae 1e|es ei aa .aia.(e ce(e:¬.aa|.|.(v . s (ae
~|se|a(eof .a(ea(.eaa|a.s(e:.e.(v 1aeof ces.eaa(es ae.(ae:a¬e:e| v
e|]ee(.veae:a¬e:e|vsa|]ee(.veeea. (.ve (ae eieeaee:asae.(ae:
aa .aceoeacea( . e|]ee(.ve ~|se|a(e (aa( .sc.se|esec .a aa .a(ea(.ea
«a.ea.s:e|a(. ve(e(aa(~|se|a(e. «a.(sie:.(.aaceeaie:¬s(e. (. ae:
cees(aeeieeaee:aasa|]ee(. ve~|se|a(e«a.eae:ea(esaacass. ¬.·
|a(es sease . a(e .(s e«a .a(e:.e:.(v. xa(ae:. (a. s ei eeaee:as (ae
.a(ea(.eaa|~|se|a(eeiObjectivity, (aeoa:e:e|a(.ea«. (aaae|]ee(a
:e|a(.ea .a «a.easa|]ee( aace|]ee( a:e :ee.o:eea||veaeeace:ec aac
eeve:aec ii(ae of aaaeaaees ae. (ae: aa e|,ee(.ve ae:a sa|]ee(.ve
eea.(.ve.(aa(.s|eeaase.(eeaee:as(ae~|se|a(eofgenitivity .(se|ias
ì i·!i
That the Idea may not be i mmediately graspable in its evidence i s, i n any case, the
sign of its profound hi storicity. The expanded title of "Philosophy as Mankind' s Self­
Refl ection" i s: "Phil osophy as Manki nd' s Self-Refl ection: the Self-Realization of Reason
through Stages of Development Requires as its Own Function the Stages of Development
of this Self- Refection" ( see ' ' La Philosophie comme prise de conscience de I ' humanite, "
tr. Paul Ri coeur, i nDeucafion, 3 : Verite e t Liberte [Cahiers de Phi l osophi e] , ed. Jean Wahl
[Neuchatel : Edition de la Baconniere, October 1 950] , p. 1 1 6) .
t ¯º
Husserl rigorously distingui shes Idea from eidos (cf. Ideas I, Introd. , p. 42) . The
I dea, then, is not essence. From which the difculty, already indicated, of an intuitive
grasp or evidence of what is neither an existent nor an essence. But it is als necessary to
say of the Idea that it has no essence, for it is only the openness of the horizon for the
emergence and determination of every essence. As the i nvi sible condition of nidence, by
preserving the seen, it loses any reference to seeing indicated i n eidos, a notion from
which it nevertheless results in its mysterious Platonic fous. The I dea can only be
understood [or heard: entendre J .
t ¯ !
Jean Cavail l es, Sur fa Logique, p. 77.
143
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
(aeoa:eoess.|.| .(veiaeeae(.e:e|a(.ea (aeof eaa¬a:s(aesa|]ee( s.
as well as (aee|]ee( s. eeaea|ee.ea||vseeeaca:vaacceoeacea(s(a(as .
(aea.(a:eaea(aeve:veoeaaessei . (s.ace(e:¬.aa(.ea.. ( eaa¬a:s(ae.:
o:.¬e:c.a|.a(e:ceoeaceaee ii(aa(. se|ea:|v(aeease. «avsaea|c«e
eaeese. as Cava.||es (aeaea(. |e(«eea aa a|se|a(e |ee.e aac a
(:aaseeacea(a| |ee.e (Sur La Logique, o ::· . e: |e(«eea aeea·
se.easaesseio:ee:ess aaca o:ee:esseieease.easaess (ibid. , o
:s· :~| |(ae¬e:ese.s.aee(aedialectical eeaes. s(aa(Cava. |i-seooeses
(e (ae ae(.v.(v eiuasse:|.aa eease. easaess .s cese:.|ec o:ee.æ|v
aaceeo.eas|v|vuasse:|eava:.eas|eve| s. a|(aeaea(ae«e:c.saeve:
mea(.eaec weaave seeaae«¬aea(a.sae(.v.(veieease.easaess
«as|e(a aa(e:.e:aacoes(e:.e:(e oass.v.(v. (aa((ae¬eve¬ea( ei
e:.me:c. ai(emee:a| .za(.ea.(aea|(.ma(ea:eaaceia| | eeas(.(a(.ea·«as
c. a|ee(.ea|(a:eaaaaac(a:eaaa.aac(aa(.aseve:vaa(aea(.ec.a|ee(. e.(v
«aa(s·(a. smevemea(«asea|v(aec. a|ee(.e|e(«eea(aec. a|ee(.ea|.(ae
.aceaa.(ema(aa|aac.::ecae.||e.me|.ea(. eaeie:e(ea(.easaac:e(ea
(.eas·aac(aeaeac. a|ee(.ea|.(aea|se|a(eaaceeae:e(e. cea(.(vei(ae
i. v.aar:esea(.(aeaa. ve:sa|ie:meia| |eease.easaess· ti(aeA|se|a(e
ei(:aaseeacea(a|a.s(e:v .s .aceec. asuasse:| savs .a(aeOrigin, (ae
v. (a|mevemea(ei(aeeeex.s(eaeeaac(ae.a(e:«eav.aa(des Mitein­
ander und Ineinander) ei e:.me:c. a| ie:ma(.eas aac sec. mea(a(.eas
eisease(Sinnbildung und Sinnsedimentierung) " .e.(ec.e 1 09 a|eve·.
(aea(ae e:ea(. ve ae(. v.(v eisease . ¬o|.es . a .(se|ia oass.v.(v :e·
ea:c.ae eeas(.(a(ec aac sec.¬ea(ec seasea sease «a. ea aooea:s
aacae(sassaeaea|v«.(a.a(aeo:e]ee( eia ae«e:ea(. v. (v. aacse
ie:(a waa( Cava.||es ]acees . ¬oess.||e e: c.mea|( (e ac¬.( ie:
oaeae¬eae|eev-«ae:e(ae¬e(.veie::esea:eaaac(aee:eaaceie|·
]ee(.v.(.esa:e:.ea(|v(aeeeaaee(.ea(eae:ea(.vesa|]ee(.v.(v(Sur La
Logique, o. -·· ·. s o:ee. se|v«aa( uasse:|cese:.|es .a (aeOrigin,
eaea(.¬e(ae(ae¬eeisec.¬ea(a(.ea.s(aeieeaseia.s:eaee(.ea.1e
aea.a (ase ao Cava.||es (e:¬s. uasse:| sae«s exae(| v (aa( a sa|·
]ee(.v.(v ae:¬ec .a .(s r:esea( |v a eeas(.(a(ec e|]ee(.ve sease
.«a.ea .s (ae:eie:e .(s a|se|a(e|ee.e · ias(eas . (s ae:¬s (e a
a.eae:sa|]ee(.v. (v. . e .(eitsel .a(aee:ea(.ve¬eve¬ea(|v«a.ea
.(eees|eveac.(se|iaac o:ecaeesaae«sease. aac seea 1a.sae«
sease«.||a|se|e(ae¬e¬ea(eiahigher sease·. aves(.ea(.ea.a«a.ea
(ae oas( sease. sec. ¬ea(ec aac :e(a. aec i:s( . a a se:: eie|]ee(.v.s(
a((.(ace. «.|| |e :ea«aseaec .a .(s ceoeacea( :e|a(.ea (e |.v.ae sa|·
¯ Cavai l l es, who then referred above al l to Ideas I and to FTL, moreover added: "Per­
haps the later phenomenological investigations at least permit such a bluntly posed di lemma
to be contested" (p. 65) .
144
Jacques Derrid
¡eei. v.iv. uasse:|aeve:seemsieaaveiaeaeaiiaaiia.s«asiea|ase
iae s.aea|a:.iv eiiae a|se|aie-ie :ese:ve ie: .i iae ee.ae.ceaee|e·
i«eeaiaeeeasi.iai.aeaaciaeeeasi.iaiecmemeais(ibid. ) . re:a.m
ia.s ee.ae.ceaee . s s.mo|v aeia.ae |ai iae a|se|aie aa.iv eisease s
movement, . . e. . iaeaa.ivei iaeaeaee.ae.ceaeeaacei iae .aceaa.ie
ee.mo|.eai.eaeiiaeeeasi.iaiecaaceeasi.iai.aememeaisin the abso­
lute identit eiai.v.aer:eseaiiaaic.a| eei.ea||vo:e¡eeisaacma.aia.as
itsel·
Oieea:se.a| |ia.s:ema.asoa:acex.ea|aaceeai:ac.eie:vas| eaeas
«eeeai.aaeieeeas.ce:-. mo|.e.i|ve:aei-iaeiceaassome thing aac
xeaseaasaaabilit. wemasieeasiaai|v:eia:a. iaea.
1 . 1euas.e:| s eeae:eiecese:.oi.easeeaee:a.aeiaeaeema s|e.ae
aea·:ea||v.ae|acec. aeease.easaess. eeaee:a.aeiae.cea|.iveiaeema·
i.esease.aa.ae|acecaess«a.ea. sae.iae:asa|¡eeiae:aae|¡eei.aac
iae:eie:eis nothing but iaee|¡eei sO|¡eei.v. iv.iaeaooea:.aeei. is as
saeafor aeease.easaess: .aaceeaee:a.aeiaeaea.mae.aa:v[nonfan­
tastique] .::ea|.iveiiaeeidos . aa.::ea|.iv«a.ea. snothing other than
iaeseaseaacoess.|.|.tvofiaeiaa|:ea|.ivie«a.ea.i. sa|«avs:e|aiec.
.mmec.aie| ve:aei. asiae:.ee:easo:ese:. oi.eaeiiaeeidos' esseai.a|
meceeiaooea:.ae· . ii«eacm.iie:¡asieae. asiaai. evea«e:e. iaa
.::ecae.||e o:esamoi.ea. iaaiiae:e .s .a uasse:|«aai oe:aaosiae:e
«as aei evea .a r|aie .exeeoi .a iae |.ie:a|aess ei a.s mvias aac
oecaeeev)-aame|v.a r|aiea. sm eiiaeeidos e:iaeicea-iaeaiae
«ae|e oaeaemeae|ee.ea| eaie:o:.se. esoee.a| | v «aea .ieeaee:as a.s·
ie:v.|eeemesanovel. 1aeicea. ssi.|||essaaex. sieaiiaaaiaeeidos, .i
iaai . s oess.||e . ie: iaeeidos . s aa e|¡eei iaai. sceie:m.aa||e aac
aeeess.||eiea ia.ie .aia.i.ea 1ae | cea.saei . |i.sa| «avs|eveac
|e.ae (epekeina tes ousias) . ~s iae 1e|es eiiae .aaa.ie ceie:m.aa·
|.|.iv ei|e.ae. .i.s |ai|e.ae seoeaaessieiae|. eaiei.ise«aoae·
aemeaa|.iv. .i . s iae | . eai ei |.eai. iae saa ei iae v.s.|| e saa. a
a.cceasaa«a. easae«s«.iaeai|e.aesae«a. ~ac.i.saecea|i«aai
ar|aiemaiec|vr|aiea. s¬ie| | sas a|eai.
:. 1e uasse:| s aei.ea ei xeasea. Ðvea .i ee:ia.a exo:ess.eas ai
i|mesm.eaisaeeesiia.s.a.cceaxeasea.saeiaaa|.|.iveeaeea|ec.a
iae saace«s eia a. sie:.ea| sa|¡eei.v.iv e: .aiae sa|«e:|c [arrere­
monde] ei|eeem.ae xeasea.saeisemeeie:a.ivai«e:s.aa. sie:v.
` ´ Li kewi se, the transcendental Ego in the phenomenological sense has no other con­
tent but the empirical ego and, further, no real content of its own, although i t is not the
abstractform of a content either, as indeed might some falsel y psed problems about thi s
suggest. I n its most radical moment, every transcendental reduction gi ves access to a
145
Introuctin to the Origin ofGeometr
a:si|eeaaseiae:e.saea.sie:v«.iaeaixeasea. . . e. .aeoa:ei:aasm.s·
s.eaeiseaseasiaei:ac.i.eaeii:aia.iaea|eeaase.:ee.o:eea||v·iae:e
.saexeasea«.iaeaia. sie:v. . . e. .«.iaeaiiaeeeae:eieaac.asi.iai.ae
aeis ei i:aaseeaceaia| sa|·eei.v.iv. «.iaeai .is e|¡ eei.aeai.eas aac
sec.meaiai.eas . Ne««aea«e soea|eixeaseaa.ccea.aaamaas.ac.
.i.sc.mea|iieeei:. ceiiaeosveae|ee.ea|oaaaiemeiiaea|ive:a|.|.iv.
«aea«esoea|eixeaseaa.ccea.aa.sie:v.iae. mae|aai.veseaemaei
aeameaa|sa|siaaee.s aa:cieeaaee. ii«eeeaaaeea:se|vesieiaese
soeca|ai.veo:e¡ac.ees . e. iae:a. sie:v«ea|cea|vaaveaaemo.:.ea|aac
exi:.as.es.ea.aeai.ea.e:e| sexeasea«ea|cea|v|eamvia.Oaeeme:e
«e «ea|c aave ie eaeese |ei«eea xeasea aac u. sie:v. Yei ve:v
ea:| v. .aa.se:.i.e. smeiosveae|ee.smaac.aiae :eia:aieiaeia.aes
iaemse|vesasiaeacveaieii:aeoes.i.v. sm. uasse:|a:eeceeii. ae
:.ceiiaesoeei:ameiiaesea| siaea|i. esaaca| |iaevesi.eeseie|ass..
sa|siaai.a|.sms .
i i xeasea. s|aiiaeesseai.a|si:aeia:eei iaei:aaseeacea(a|ego aac
iaei:aaseeaceaia|we, .i is .|.seiaem. a. sie:.ea|ia:eaeaaacia:eaea
Ceave:se| v. a.sie:.e.iv. as saea.is :ai.eaa|ia:eaea aacia:eaea. nai
being, «a.eaa:i.ea|aiesxeaseaaacu. siecv.a:e|ai.eaieeaeaeiae:..s
a"sense, " aie|ee|ee.ea|eaeai· ie·|e«a.eaeeasi.iaies|e.aeasmeve·
meai .1ae|asioaeeseiiaeOrigin a:eeaeaeec.aia.so:e||em De«e
aeisiaacae:e|eie:eiaee:eaiaaco:eieaaco:e||em·ae:.zeaeixea·
sea.iaesamexeaseaiaaiiaaei.eas.aeve:vmaa.iaeanimal rationale,
aemaiie:ae«o:.m.i.veae. s:. i sº¬ec.ieci· .
Ðaeaivoeeiiaeiaa|aamaa.iv aasia.sesseaeeeianimal rationale.
Ðaeaivoe. uasse:|eeai.aaes. aas a :eei.aiaeesseai.a|si:ae(a:eei
«aai .s aa.ve:sa||vaamaa. ia:eaea«a.eaaie|ee|ee.ea|xeasea :aa·
a.aeia:eaeaeaia||a.sie:.e.ivaaaeaaees.ise|i.w.iaia. s.s:evea|eca
seieio:e||ems.a.is e«a:.eai:e|aiecieiaeieia|.iveia. sie:vaacie
iae ieia| sease «a.ea a|i. maie|v e.ves .i .is aa.iv . | sº mec.ieci·
thoroughly historical SUbjecti vi ty. In a letter of November 1 6, 1 930, Husserl writes:
" For, with the transcendental reduction, I attained, I am convinced, concrete and real
subjectivity in the ultimate sense in al l the fullness of i ts being and life, and in thi s
subjecti vity, uni versal constituting life (and not si mpl y theoretical constituting life) :
absolute subjecti vi ty i n its hi storicity" (letter published by A. Diemer, French tf.
Al exandre Lowit and Henri Colombie, i n "La Phenomenologie de Husserl comme
metaphysique, " Les Etudes Philosophiques, NS 9 [ 1 954] , p. 3�hereafter cited as
Diemer) .
` ´� "Reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title for possible accidental
matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing essentially necessar structural
form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity" (eM, §23, p. 57) .
·� |
146
Jacques Derrid
i. |eiaei:sieee¬ei:.ea|aei«a.easaooeses.i.iaei:siphilosophical
aei.s ea|viae sease·. a»esi.eai.eaeiia. sa.sie:.ea|:ai.eaa|.iv 'in the
constant movement of selelucidation. " · ·1e|ee|ee.ea| xeaseaa|:eacv
eeeao.ec e. v.| . zai.eas [l'humanite dans ses tpes empirques] |eie:e
iae oa. |eseoa.ea| sease·.avesi.eai.ea .a sease·.avesi.eai.ea «a.ea
awa|eaecxeaseaie.ise|i·aacaaaeaaeeciaeoa:eæaseeia. sie:.e.iv.
. e . iae ve:v seaseof xeasea. ie a.sie:v 1ae sease·. avesi.eai.eaei
«aai«asa|:eacv iae:e ¬a:|sa:aoia:eaac. eeaseeaeai|v. a:ac.ea|
aac e:eai.ve e:.a. a
·
Ðve:v se/t·a«a|ea.aa [naissance a se. } ei a
|aieai.aieai.ea.sa:e|. :iauav.aaa::.vecai.ise|i.ea. | eseea. ea|kea
seaeaaiaasese:e. se ea|viae a:eaeai.e¯ iaaei.eaei|ea.aa.aaaac
e:ese:.ei.ea. ra. |eseeavaaciaeC:. s. seiÐa:eeeaaua¬aa.iv. ¯.aC,
o :sº· i aseia:asiae:ac.ea|oa.|eseoae:ee¬o| .es«.iaiaedemand ei
iaeieees. |emustprescribe [commander] ; . aseia:asae:esoeacsieaac
.s:esoeas.||eie:. i. aeassa¬esiae:esoeas.|. |.ivie:amandate. Oa|v
.aia. sseaseceesuasse:|ceiaea. ¬asa"functionar of mankind" [C,
·:. o | :ì
sai«aai. s iaeself (selbst) eiia. sse|i·e|ae. cai.ea(Selbsterhellung) ?
i s aa¬aai:aaseeaceaia|eease.easaessea|viaeo|aeeei:eres. vea:i.e·
a|ai.ea. . e . iaemediation ei a ieees :eia|.ae oessess. ea eiitself
ia:eaea ia.s eease.easaess: Ce:ia.a ¬aaase:.ois ei iae | asi oe:. ec
¬.eai saeeesi ia.s. eaes aeee:c.ae ie «a.ea iae a|se|aie ieees
«ea|c |e |eveac i:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei. v.iv ··· nai . iia.s "b-
1 7: "Thus philosophy is nothing other than rational i sm, through and through, but it i s
rati onali sm diferentiated wi thi n i tself according t o the diferent stages of t he movement
of intention and fulfllment: i t is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation
[Scl bsterhel lung] , begun with the first breakthrough of phi losophy into mankind. whose i n­
nate reason wa� previously in a state of concealment, of noctural obscurity" ( " Phi losophy
as Mankind's Self-Reflection, " i n C, p. 338) .
1 7
n
"Just as man and even t he Papuan represent a new stage of animal nature, i . e . , as
opposed to the beast, so philosophical reason represents a new stage of human nature and
its reason" ( "Phi losophy and the Cri si s of European Humanity, " in C, p. 290; also cf.
pp. 298-99) .
1 7 7 Cf. E I I I , 4, p. 60: "The absolute polar ideal I dea. that of an absolute in a new
sense, of an absolute whi ch is situated beyond the worl d, beyond man, beyond
transcendental subjecti vi ty: i t i s the absolute Logos, the absolute truth . . . as unum,
verum, bonum . o . " (Diemer, p. 39) .
If the I dea is thought here to have a transcendental sense and. as we wi l l see in a
moment, is "beyond" only compared wi th the constituted moment of transcendental
subjecti vi ty, we can observe that Husserl profoundly recuperates the original scholastic
sense of the transcendental (unum, verum, bonum, etc . , as the transcategorial of Aristote­
lian logic) over and above its Kantian meani ng. but also in a development of the Kantian
enterprise .
147
Introductin to the Origin of Geometr
veac ces.eaaies ea|v a ie| ee|ee.ea| i:aaseeaceaee. .i ve:v e|ea:|v
eaaaeiceo:.vehistorical i:aaseeaceaia|sa|]eei.v.iveiiaea|se|aieei
iaeSel; |eeaase. s.aeeiaeieeesa|«avsaasiaeie:¬eia1e|es . .is
i:aaseeaceaee«ea|caei|e:ea|i:aaseeaceaee|aiiae. cea| re|eie:
|:.ae.ae a|eai |:aaseeaceaia| sa|]eei.v.iv itsel. Oiae: oassaees
saeeesiia.s.oassaees«a.ea. «.iaeaiaavcea|i. ¬e:e| .ie:a|| veeaie:¬
iea||eiuasse:| s ¬esi| asi.ae. aieai. eas ·
1aei:ae¬eais«a.ea¬eai.eaCeca:e¬a:|ec«.iaiaesa¬eaooa:·
eaia¬|.ea.ivCec.sae|eaee:.ave|ec. asie:esa¬o|e.aIdeas I .·11.
o. i :· . aac·:º. o : i º· . ea|vas iaeese¬o|a:v¬ece|aac | . ¬.ieia||
eease.easaessei. ¬oess. |. |.iv.aiaeo:eeieiaae. cei.ei:aia. iae|aiie:
|e.aei:si «aai Cec a. ¬se|ieea|caeiea| | .aie eaesi.ea Cec .s ae
|eaee:ces.eaaiecasiaei:aaseeaceaio:.ae.o|e-aaceeaseeaeai|va|se
:ecaeec .aIdeas I .··s. oo | ·:-·s·-eieve:v aa.ve:sa|factual
ie|ee|eev. e. iae:eiNaia:ee:iae so.:. i. . e . eia. sie:v D.v.ae eea·
se.easaess. «a.ea:evea|siae.aiaae.|. |.iveieeasi.iaiecesæaees .sa
iei.eaa|eeaieaiaaciaec.:eei.ae1e|esie:iae :ea|aa.ve:se ~s s�ea
.i. sa iaeiaa|.iv 1ae :ecaei.ea eiCec asiaeiaa| |e.ae aac iaeiaal
eease.easaessseisi:eeiaes.ea.ieai.eaeii:aaseeaceaia|c.v. a.iv.saea
as.iaooea:s.aiae|asi«:.i.aes 1aea¬|.ea.iv«eaaaeaaeeca¬e·
¬eaiaeeeeaee:aso:ee.se|viae:e|ai.eaeiiaei:aaseeaceaia|~|se|aie
�sc. v.a.ivaaciaei:aaseeaceaia|~|se|aieasa. sie:.ea|sa|]eei. v. iv ia
.isi:aaseeaceaia| sease. Cec . sse¬ei.¬esces.eaaiecasiaeeaeie·
«a:c«a.ea ia¬eaiae«avaac«aesoea|s.aas . aieiae:i.¬es
as «aai .s aeia.ae eiae:iaaaiaere|e' · ~ii.¬esiaeieeeses·
o:essesitself through ai:aaseeaceaia|a. sie:v.aieiae:i.¬es.i.sea|v
iaea|se|aieoe|a:aaiaeai.e.ivof i:aaseeaceaia|a.sie:.e.ivitself iaiae
i:siease .i:aaseeaceaia|oaeae¬eae|eev«ea|c|eea| viae¬esi:.ee:·
easlanguage eiasoeea| ai.ve¬eiaoavs.ese:aaa|se| aie.cea|. s¬ i a
iaeseeeacease.iaeeeaeeois|e::e«eci:e¬¬eiaoavs.es«ea|caave
ea| vametaphorical aac.ac.eai.ve sease. «a.ea«ea|caeiesseai.a| |v
aaeeiiaee:.e.aa|oa:.iveioaeae¬eae|eevasi:aaseeaceaia|. cea|.s¬
iaiaei:siease.iaeesseai.a|aaco:eseaio|ea.iaceeiaa.aia.iv«ea|c
i ¯8
I n the same fragment (Diemer, p. 40) . the transcendence of the Logos i s defned as a
transcendental norm, "the i nfnitely di stant Pole. the I dea of an absol utely perfect
transcendental omni-communi ty. · ·
1 7� K I I I , p. 1 06 (Diemer. p. 47) . [Derrida translates hi s frst cited phrase from the
German found i n Diemer on p. 48 rather than quoting the French given on p. 47. 1 In thi s
sense. the Pole as "beyond" i s always beyond for the Self of transcendental conscious­
ness. It i s its own beyond. It will never be a real transcendence: "the path which starts
from the Ego . . . is its own path [our emphasi s] , but all these paths lead to the same
pole, situated beyond the world and man: God" (ibid. ) .
148
Jacques Derri
|eunfolded ea| v.aaa.sie:.ea|c. sea:s.veaessi:em«a.ea. i«ea|c|ei
. ise|i|ederived. iaiaeseeeacease..aaa.iv«ea|c|eea|viae.aceaa.ie
openness iei:aiaaacieoaeaemeaa|.ivie:asa|¡eei.v.iviaai.sa|«avs
aa.ie.a.isiaeiaa||e.ae.
weeea|c|eaeme:eaaia.iaia|ieuasse:|iaaa|vsee.aeac.|emma
ae:e . 1ecese «ea|c sa:e|v|e ie si:aacea:se|ves . aa soeea| ai.ve
aii.iace. .aiaeoe¡e:ai.veseaseiaaiuasse:|a|«avsass.eaecieia.s· .
1aeoaeaemeae|ee.ea|aii.iace. sa:siaaava.|a|.|.iveiaiieai.eaie:iae
iaia:eeiai:aia«a.ea. sa|«avsa|:eacvaaaeaaeec. i asieaceii:aai.·
ea||v.avesi.eai.aeiaeeoi.eas. «emasisi:.veie«a:ciaeaeeessa:.|v
single :eeieieve:vc. |emma.Deesiaeseaseeii:aaseeaceaia|a.sie:.e·
.ivma|eitsel aaae:sieec e:aea:cìthrugh iaaia.sie:.e.iv. | .|eiae
ieees«a.ea.saiiae|ee.aa.ae:i s Cec.eaiaeeeai:a:v.ea|viaeãaa|
a|a||meais.iaaiecaiiae.aaa.ie.iaeaameie:iaeae:.zeaeiae:.zeas.
aaaiaeEntelechy eii:aaseeaceaia| a.sie:.e.iv . ise|i:· 1aei«eai
eaee. ea iae|as.s eia si. | | ceeoe: aa.iv. saea oe:aaos . siae ea|v
oess.||e:esoeaseieiaeeaesi.eaeia.sie:.e.iv.Ceasoea|saacoasses
through constituted a.sie:v.ae. sbeyond . a:e|ai.eaieeeasi.iaieca.s·
ie:vaaca||iaeeeasi.iaiecmemeaiseii:aaseeaceaia|| .ie. saiae.s
only iaere|efor itself eiconstituting a.sie:.e.ivaacconstituting a.sie:.·
ea| i:aaseeaceaia| sa|¡eei.v.iv. 1ae c.a·a.sie:.e.iv e: iae meia·
a.sie:.e.iveiiaec. v. aeieeesea|vi:ave:sesaaceees|eveac raei
asiae:eacv·mace eia.sie:v. veiiaeieees .sbut iaeoa:emeve·
meaiei.ise«aa.sie:.e.iv.
1a.s s.iaai.ea ei iae ieees .s o:eieaac|v aaa|eeeas-aac aei |v
eaaaee-ieiaaieieve:v.cea| .iv.saeaasea:aaa|vs.seilanguage aas
eaa||eaasiesoee.iv ia. seeaeeoi· icea|.iv. sat once sao:aiemoe:a|
aaaema.iemoe:a| . aacuasse:|eaa|. aes.isemei.¬esi eaeiasa.ea.
semei.mes .a iae eiae:. aeee:c.aeie «aeiae:e:aei ae :e|aies .iie
iaeiaa|iemoe:a|.iv.Oa|viaea eaa«esavtaaioa:esease. iae.aea| .iv
ei. cea|.iv.«a.ea.snothing other than iaeaooea:.aeei|e.ae..sat once
sao:aiemoe:a|.uasse:|a|seeriea savsi.me| ess[in-temporel] ) aacem·
a.iemoe:a| . e:aea.aiaai"supratemporality implies omnitemporlit, "
iae|aiie:.ise|i|e.aeea|v" a mode of temporality" (E, ·-1c , o :-|
mec.aecì · . ~:e aei sao:aiemoe:a|.iv aaa ema.iemoe:a|.iv a|se iae
eaa:aeie:.si.es eiTime itsel? ~:eiaev aei iae eaa:aeie:. si.es eiiae
i.v|aer:eseai.«a.ea.siaea|se|aieeeae:eiere:mei oaeaemeae|ee.·
ea|iemoe:a|.ivaaciaeo:.me:c.a|~|se|aieeia||i:aaseeaceaia| |.ie:· ·
t 80
F I , 24, p . 6 8 (Diemer, p . 47: "God i s the Entelechy . . . )

t 8 |
"Die urzeitliche, iiberzeitliche ' Zeitlichkei t, ' " Husserl says, speaking of "my Liv­
ing Present" (C 2 I I I , 1 932, pp. 8-9) .
149
Introductn to the Origin of Geometry
1aea.cceaiemoe:a|aa.iveic.a· . sao:a· . e:.a ·iemoe:a|.ivea
iaeeaeaaacaaceiomniiemoe:a|.iveaiaeeiae:.siaeaa.ia:ve:eaac
eia||iaes.ea.aeai.easUnstances] c. ssee.aiec|viaeva:.eas:ecaei.eas.
�aeia

a|.ivaacesseai.a|.iv.«e:|a|.aessaacaea«e:|a|. aess. :ea|.ivaac
.aeaaiv. empeiria aaci:aaseeaceaia|.iv. 1a. s aa.iv. asiemoe:a|.iv s
iemoe:a|aa.ivie:eve:vGeschehen, ie:eve:va. sie:vas iaeassem||aee
ei«aaiaaooeas.aeeae:a| ..sa.sie:.e.iv.ise|i
I there is any histor, iaea a.sie:.e. iv eaa b ea|v iae oassaee ei
soeeea [Parole] , iae oa:e i:ac.i.ea eia o:.me:c.a| ieees ie«a:c a
oe|a:1e|es sais.aeeiae:eeaab aeia.aeeais. ceiaeoa:ea.sie:.e.iv
eiiaaioassaee.s.aeeiae:e.saese.ae«a.eaaasseaseeais.ceeiia.s
a.sie:.e.ive:eseaoes.is.aaa.ieae:.zea. s.aeeiaeieeesaaciae1e|es
are
.
aeia. �e�at

.ceiaeinterplay ( Wechselspiel) eiiae.::ee. o:eea|.aso.·
:ai.ea.ia.ss.emaesiaeaiaaiiaeAbsolute is Passage. 1:ac.i.eaa|.iv. s
«aaie. :ea|aiesi:emeaeieiaeeiae:.. ||am.aai.aeeae|viaeeiae:.aa
mevemeai «ae:e.aeease. easaessa.seeve:s .is oaia .a aa . aaeã a.ie
:ecaei.ea. a|«avs a|:eacv|eeaa. aac «ae:e.a eve:v acveaia:e .s a
eaaneeeic. :eei.ea [conversion] aaceve:v:eia:aieiaee:.e.aaaaa·
aae. easmeveie«a:ciaeae:. zea1a.smevemeai.sa|seDanger(ous)
as the Absolute [I'Absolu d' un Danger] . re:.iiae|. eaieisease. sea| v
ia

:eaearassa�e.iaai.s|eeaaseiae| .eaieaaa| se|e| esieaiae«av
i.|esoeeea.aeaieaa|e|esiea|v.aiae.aaaiaeai.e.iveialanguage
aaa|viaea|c.eai.eaeia soea|. ae|e. ae. iaiaai :esoeei . oaeaeme-
ae|eev as Heiaea ei D. seea:se .s | :si ei a|| Selbstbesinnung aaa
Verantwortung, iae i:ee :ese|ai.eaie ia|e ao eae s e«a sease .e:
:eea.aeease. easaess [reprendre son sens ]) . .a e:ae: ie ma|e eaese|i
aeeeaaia||e.ia:eaeasoeeea. ie:aa.moe:.|ecoaia«av ¯ 1a.ssoeeea
. s a. sie:.ea| . |eeaase .i . s a|«avs a|:eaav aresponse. xesoeas.|.|.iv
ae:emeaas saea|ae:.ae a«e:ceae aea:s soe|ea[une parole enten­
due] , as«e||asia|.aeeaeaese|iiaei:aasie:eisease..ae:ce:ie|ee|
ar(e:.isaavaaee. ia.ismesi:aa.ea|.mo|.eai.eas. iaea. Heiaea.saei
iaeaeai:a|o:eiaeee:preambulator exe:e. seeiiaeaeai. xaiae:..i. s
iaeaeai.ise|i.aiaeeease.easaessei.iseemo|eiea.sie:.e.iv
´`¯ Since The Idea of Phenomenology [tr. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikain
(The Hague: Nijhof, 1 973)] (cf. [Lecture 1] , pp. 1 8-1 9) , Husserl' s entire itinerary con­
firms the essence of phenomenology in its fundamental discovery, that of the
transcendental; reduction as the essence of Method, in the richest and perhaps most
enigatic sense of this word. Husserl says the transcendental reduction i s "the Prto­
Method of all philosophical methods" (C 2 I I ; S, 7; Diemer, p. 36) . On the sense of
phenomenology as Method, see particularly Beilage XI I I : "Foreword to the Continuation
of the Cri si s, " in K, pp. 435-5. [A French translation is presented by H. Dussort in
Revue Philosophique de France et de l' Etranger, 1 49 ( 1 959) , pp. 447-2. Some passages
are translated in C, p. 1 02 , and pp. xxviii ff. ]
150
Jacques Derid
~||(a.s:.ee:eas|vceve|eos(aec.seeve:vei.a(ea(.eaa| .(v.1ae| a((e:
.s a|se ae(a.ae|a((ae~|se|a(eeia|.v.aeMeve¬ea(«.(aea(«a.ea
ae.(ae: .(s eac ae: .(s e:.e.a «ea|c aave aav eaaaee eiaooea:.ae.
i a(ea(.eaa|.(v .s (:ac.(.eaa| .(v. ~(.(s e:ea(es(ceo(a~. . e . . .a(aeoa:e
¬eve¬ea(eioaeae¬eae|ee.ea|(e¬oe:a|.za(.eaas(aeee.aeea(i:e¬
se|i(e se|iei(ae~|se|a(eei(aei.v.aer:esea(-.a(ea(.eaa|.(v .s(ae
:ee(eia. s(e:. e.(vii(aa(.sse. «eceae(aave(eassea:se| veswhat .s
(aeseaseeia.s(e:.e.(v.i aa||(aes.ea.iea(.easei(a. s(e:¬.a.s(e:.e.(v.s
sense.
r:ev.cec«e :esoee(.(sphenomenological va|ae. saea aa asse:(.ea
ceesae((:aase:esssease.(se|i.. . e. .a. s(e:v sappearing aac(aepossi­
bility ei.(s aooea:.ae. saeaaaasse:(.eaceesae( ¬.s (:aaseeacea(a|
.cea| . s¬aac soeea|a(. ve¬e(aoavs.es i as(eac. .( ¬a:ss (ae ¬e¬ea(
oaeae¬eae|eeveaa|ea:(.ea|a(ec.«.(aea(eeaias.ea.«. (aaoa. |ese·
oavoes.ae(aeeaes(.eaeise.aee:u.s(e:v.1a. sea(e|ee.ea| eaes·
(. ea . ea(e|ee.ea| .a (ae aea·uasse:|.aa sease ei(ae (e:¬. «a.ea
a|eaeeaa|e .aac(ecaver(ea.s.eooesec(euasse:| s oaeae¬eae|ee.·
ea|ea(e|eev·eaaae(s(e¬i:e¬aoaeae¬eae|eevassaea. sa(«ece
ae(|e|.evee.(ae:(aa((a.seaes(.eaeaaeve:.in philosophical discourse,
simply o:eeece(:aaseeacea(a|oaeae¬eae|eevas .(s o:esaooes.(.eae:
|a(ea(e:eaac. Oa (aeeea(:a:v.(a.seaes(.ea«ea|c ¬a:s «.(a.aoa.·
|eseoav.aeeae:a|(ae¬e¬ea(«ae:e.aoaeae¬eae|eev(e:¬.aa(esas
(aeoa.|eseoa.ea|o:eoaecea(.eie:eve:voa.|eseoa.ea|decision-a ¬e·
¬ea(eeaee.vec¬e:eeve:|vuasse:| .s. aee(a.so:eoaecea(.e.sa| «avs
aaaeaaeecas.aia.(e.(aa(moment . sae(aiae(aa|. (v|a(aa.cea|sease.
a:.ea(«a.ea«.| |a|«avs:e¬a.aaace:oaeae¬eae|ee.ea|]a:. sc.e(.ea.a
:.ea( (aa(oaeae¬eae|eeva|eae eaa ese:e. se|veso| .e.(|vaa(.e.oa(.ae
(aeeacei.(s.(.ae:a:v.
weaeec(eeeae|ace(a.so:eoaecea(.ece]a:ee:aa(.e.oa(e.(siae(aa|
eac. se (aa( «e ¬av oass i:e¬ (ae eaes(.ea "how" (e (ae eaes(.ea
"why" -(esae«ei«aa(«esoeas. i(.s. a(a.s:esoee((aa(a||oa.|e·
seoa.ea|c.seea:se¬as(ce:.ve.(saa(ae:.(vi:e¬oaeae¬eae|eev we
¬as(esaaas(ce]a:e(aeeaes(.eaeia.s(e:.e.(v s seaseaaceia.s(e:.e·
.(vassease. . e. .ei(aepossibility of a.s(e:.ea|iae(aa| .(vaooea:.ae.se
(aa(«e eaa¬aseia|| sease ei(aeie||e«.aeeaes(.eas .Is there, and
why is there, any historical factuality? 1aese («e eaes(.eas a:e .::e
cae.||v.a(e::e|a(ec.1ae «aveaae¬e:eeea|vi:e¬(aepossible .. a
(ae¬e(aoavs.ea|e:ea(e| ee.ea|sease .aacae(.a(aeoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|
sease· aea|e.ae eia. s(e:.ea| iae(aa| .(v. aac aea|e.aeas aeaa. s(e:v
ea|v c.se|eses.(seventuality ea(ae |as. seiaeease.easaesseioa:e
seaseaacoa:ea. s(e:. e.(v.. . e .ea(ae|as. seiaeease.easaesseipos­
sibility .a(ae oaeae¬eae|ee.ea| sease. ~s «e aave saue.ea(|v seea.
151
I ntroduction to the Origin ofGeometry
(a.seease.easaess «a.eaoaeae¬eae|eeva|eaeeaa|:.ae(e|.ea(·eaa
ea| v|ea(e|ee|ee.ea|eease.easaess 1a.s.s|eeaase(aesease(e«a.ea
«eaaveaeeess. sae(aaevea( s|e.ae.|eeaase(a.sseaseeaaa|«avs
ae(|e. aea:aa(ec..(eaac.eea(e:ae(|e|e:a.|eeaase(ae «av e«es
.(sse:.easaess(eaoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|ee:(a.a(vaac(a:eaea(a. sse:. eas·
aess:eeeve:s (ae v.:a|eaee eiaa "in view of what?" 1ae ea(e|ee.ea|
eaes(.ea.(aea.see¬sa||e(ea:.seea| vea(eia(e|ee|ee.ea|am:¬a(.ea.
. . e. . ea( eii:eece¬ 1e|ee|eev .s (ae (a:ea(eaec aa.(v eisease aac
|e.ae.eioaeae¬eae|eevaacea(e| eevue«eve:.(a.s(e|ee|eev.«a.ea
aeve:eeasec(ee:eaac aacaa.¬a(e uasse:| s (aeaea(. eaaae(|ede­
termined .aaoa.| eseoa.ea|| aaeaaee«.(aea(o:ev. s.eaa||v|:eas.ae(a.s
aa.(vie:(ae|eaei(eioaeae¬eae|eev.
1aas. sae«.ae«aa((ae seaseeiaaevea(.sea(ae|as. seiaiae(aa|
[evenementielle] esa¬o|e.aac«aa((aeseaseeisease .aeeae:a|.sea
(ae |as.s eiese¬o|a:.aess .a eeae:a| . «e eaa (aea ass ea:se|ves a
eaes(.ea«a.eaae|eaee:o:eeeecsi:e¬oaeae¬eae|eevassaea Ne( .
" What is a Fact? " , aeaes(.ea(e«a.ea aoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|ea(e|eev
:esoeacsasa:a|e . sa( . "Why are a factual starting point in factualit
and a reduction possible in general? " O:. " What is the factuality offact
which supposes the exemplariness offact? " O:ve(." What is the primor­
dial unity ofsense andfact, a unit for which, by themselves alone, neither
can account?" i ae(ae:«e:cs. sae«.ae«aa(sease.sasa.s(e:.e.(v. i
eaa e|ea:|v ass ¬vse|i«av (ae:e «ea|c |e aav a.s(e:v :a(ae: (aaa
ae(a.ae.
l i
a
Oa(aeeeac.(.ea(aa((ae(as.aese:.eas|veioa:eiae(aa| .(v
ie||e«sar(e:(aeoess.|.| .(veioaeae¬eae|eevaacassa¬es.(s] a:.c.ea|
o:.e:.(v. (e(aseiae(aa|.(v se:.eas|vas saea .sae|eaee:(e:e(a:a(e
e¬o. :.e.s¬e:aeaoa.|eseoav. Oa(aeeea(:a:v. .(ee¬o|e(es oa.|ese·
oav. sa(|eeaaseei(aa( ..(¬as(s(aac. a(aeo:eea:.easeoeaaesseia
eaes(.ea.(aeeaes(.eaei(aee:.e.aeise.aeasu.s(e:v.Ðve:v:esoease
(esaeaaeaes(.eaeaa:esa:iaee ea|v .aaoaeae¬eae|ee.ea|o:eeess
Oa(e|eevea|vaasa:.ea((e (ae eaes(.ea. | a(aea|«avseoea|:eaea
[breche] ei(a.seaes(.ea.se.ae.(se|i.ssilently sae«aaace:(aeaeea(.v·
.(vei(aeapeiron.
l i
4 uacea|(ec| v. se.ae .(se|i¬as(a|«avsa|:eacv|e
| 8¦!
Such a question can be repeated about every si ngle factuality and about al l the
particular forms of i nfnite historicity as the horizon of every phenomenon, about all the
determined forms of the world in general as the horizon of every possible experience,
singularly of this hi storical world right here.
! S4
We have already cited the passage in which Husserl, gathering together the entire
signifcance of his enterpri se, afrms that , for phenomenology, pure exi stential [existen­
tielle] factuality as wild si ngularity (always outside the reach of every ei detic subsump­
tion) i s "eternally the apeiron" ( "PRS, " p. 1 1 6). We pass from phenomenology to ontol­
ogy ( in the non-Husserlian sense) when we si lently question the upsurge of stark fact and
152
Jacques Derrida
e.vea(e(a.a|.ae..a(aeo:e·sa¬o(.ea-wa.ea. sa|sea:esa¬o(.eai
He(aec'�·~acaacea|(ec|vaeeess(ese.aeand se.ae sa::.va|¬as(
a|wavsa|:eacv|econtracted e:drawn together, waeaoaeae¬eae|eev
|ee. as|ve|a. ¬.ae(ae:.ea((esoea|[droit a parole] . ~ac.ise.aec. c
ae(have (e|e u.s(e:v(a:eaeaaac(a:eaea.(aedelay e:lateness ei
D. seea:seafter (aesaew.aeeise.aewea|c|e|a(as. ¬o|e¬. sie:(aae
[fautive misere] ei(aeaea(asoaeae¬eae|eev. 1aa((a. seaaae(|ese.
|eeaasea.s(e:.e.(v. so:ese:.|ecie:se.ae.(aa(ce|av. s(aeces(. avei
1aeaea(.(se|iasD.seea:se-ea|v aoaeae¬eae|eeveaasay (a· saac
¬a|eoa.|eseoaveeaa|(e. (. re:oaeae¬eae|eeva|eaeeaa¬a|e.aaa·
. (ea.s(e:.e.(vaooea:. . e ..aaa.(ec.seea:seaac. aaa. (ec.a|ee(.ea|aess
as(aeoa:eoess.|. | .(vaac(aeve:vesseaeeeise.ae.a¬aa.ies(a(.eai(
a|eaeeaaeoea(aea|se|a(esa|¡ee(.v.(veisease(ese.ae·u.s(e:v|v
¬a|.aea|se|a(e(:aaseeacea(a|sa|¡ee(.v.(vaooea:.a((aeeacei(ae
¬es( :ac.ea| :ecae(.ea· as oa:e oass.ve·ae(.ve (e¬oe:a|. (v. as oa:e
aa(e·(e¬oe:a|.za(.eaei(aei.v.aer:esea(-. . e. .aswealready saw. as
. a(e:sa|¡ee(.v.(v 1ae c.sea:s.ve aac c.a|ee(.ea| .a(e:sa|¡ee(.v.(v ei
1.¬ew.(a.(se|i.a(ae. aaa.(e¬a|(.o|.e.(vaac. aaa.(e. ¬o|.ea(.eaei.(s
a|se|a(ee:.e.asea(.(|eseve:ve(ae:. a(e:sa|¡ee(.v.(v. aeeae:a|(eex.s(
aac¬a|es(aeoe|e¬.ea|aa.(veiaooea:.aeaacc.saooea:.ae.::ecae.·
||eue:ece|av.s(aeoa. |eseoa.ea|a|se|a(e.|eeaase(ae|ee.aa.aeei
¬e(aec.e:eaee(.eaeaaea|veeas.s(.a(aeeease.easaessei(ae.¬o|.ea·
(.eaeianother o:ev. eas. oess.||e.aaca|se|a(ee:.e.a.aeeae:a| . s.aee
cease to consider the Fact in its phenomenological "function. " Then the l atter can no
longer be exhausted and reduced to its sense by a phenomenological operation, even were
it pursued ad infnitum. The Fact is always more or always less, always other, in any
case, than what Husserl defines it as when he writes, for example, in a formula which
marks the highest ambition of his project: fact' , with its ' irrationality' , is itself a
structural concept within the system ofthe concrete Apiori" (eM, § 39, p. 8 1 ; HusserJ ' s
emphasis) . But phenomenology alone, by going t o the end of eidetic determination, by
exhausting itself, can strip pure materiality from the Fact. It alone can avoid the confu­
sion of pure factuality with such and such of its determinations. Naturally, having
reached this point, in order not to fall back into the philosophical nonsense of ir­
rationalism or empiricism, the Fact then must not function: its sense must not b deter­
mined outside or independently of all phenomenology. Also, once we have become
conscious of phenomenology' s juridical priority in all philosophical discourse, perhaps it
is permissible to regret again that Husserl had not also asked this ontological question
about which there is nothing to say concerning the question itself. But how can we lament
that phenomenology is not an ontology?
¯¨´ [Derrida says of the neologism presumption: "} wanted to escape the current mean­
ing of the word presomption (conjecture or hypothesis), in order to be nearer the
metaphorical schema of anticipation and in order to set it more visibly over against the
very rare French word resumption ( I' m not even sure it exists}-which can only be
written with a u . " Therefore, this word is translated as "pre-sumption" to emphasize its
diference from ' ' presumption. ' ' ]
153
Introductin to the Origin ofGeometry
(a. s a|(e:.(v ei (ae a|se|a(e e:.e.a s(:ae(a:a| |v aooea:s .amy Living
Present aacs.aee.(eaaaooea:aac|e:eeeea. zecea| v.a(aeo:. ¬e:
c.a|.(veise¬e(a.ae|.|emy Living Present, (a. sve:viae(s.ea.aes(ae
aa(aea(.e.(veioaeae¬eae|ee.ea|ce|avaac|.¬. (a(.eaia(ae| ae|| as(e:
ea.seeia(eeaa.eae.(aexecae(.ea. sea|voa:e(aeaea(as(aa(ce|av.
oa:e (aeaea(.aves(.ea(.ae(ae seaseei| (se|iasce|avw.(a.aoa.|ese·
oavCea|c(ae:e|eaaaa(aea(.e(aeaea(eise.aeas u.s (e:v.as«e| |as
aaaa(aea(.ea. s(e:.e.(vei(aeaea( . .i(aeeease.easaesseice|aveea|c
|e:ecaeec:sa(eea|c(ae:e|eaavoa.|eseoav..i(a. seease. easaessei
ce|avwasae(o:.¬e:c.a|aacoa:e:Newao:.¬e:c.a|eease.easaessei
ce|aveaaea|vaave(aeoa:eie:¬eiaa(.e.oa(.ea. ~((aesa¬e(.¬e.
oa:e eease. easaess eice|av eaa ea|v |e a oa:e aac |ee.(.¬a(e. aac
(ae:eie:e ao:.e:. . o:esa¬o(.ea. w.(aea(wa.ea .eaee aea.a· c.seea:se
aaca. s(e:vwea|cae(|eoess.||e.
1ae. ¬oess.|.| .(vei:es(.ae.a(aes.¬o|e¬a.a(eaaaeeaewaessi eia
i. v.aer:esea( .(ae se|e aaca|se|a(e|va|se|a(ee:.e.aei(aeDerae(e
and (ae De ¡a:e. ei se. aeand sease. |a( a|wavs e(ae: .a .(s se|i·
.cea(.(v. (ae . aa|.|.(v (e |.veeae|esec .a (ae .aaeeea( aac.v.cecaess
[indiviSion] ei(aeo:.¬e:c.a|~|se|a(e.|eeaase(ae~|se|a(e. spresent
ea|v.a|e.aedefered-delayed [dierant] w.(aea(:eso.(e .(a.s. ¬oe(eaee
aac(a. s. ¬oess.|.| .(va:ee.vea.aao:.¬e:c. a|aacoa:eeease.easaess
eiD.ae:eaee .saeaaconsciousness, w. (a. (ss(:aaees(v|eeiaa.(v.¬as(
|ea||e(e|e:es(e:ec(e. (sewa|.ea( .w.(aea(saeaaeease.easaess.
w.(aea(. (sewao:eoe:cea. seeaee. ae(a.aewea|caooea:.
1aeo:. ¬e:c.a|D.ae:eaeeei(aea|se|a(eO:. e. a. wa.eaeaaaac. a·
ceaa.(e|v¬as( |e(a :e(a.aaacaaaeaaee. (s oa:e eeae:e(eie:¬w. (a
ao:.e:.seea:. (v . . e. .(ae|eveace:(ae(a. s· s.cewa.eae.vessease(ea| |
e¬o.:.ea| eea. as aac a| iae(aa| o:eias.ea. (aa( .s oe:aaos waa( aas
a|wavs|eeasa.caace:(aeeeaeee(ei"transcendental, " (a:eaea(ae
ea.ema(.e a.s(e:v ei .(s c. se|aeemea(s D. ne:eaee wea|c |e (:aa
seeacea(a| . 1ae ea:e aac .a(e:m. aa||e c. sea. e(ace ei (aeaea( s(:.v
. ae(e:ecaee¨D. ne:eaee|vee.ae|eveaciae(aa|. aaa.(v(ewa:c(ae
.aaa.(vei.(sseaseaacva|ae.. . e. .wa.|e¬a.a(a.a.aeD.ae:eaee-(aa(
c. sea. e(ace wea|c |e (:aaseeacea(a| ~ac 1aeaea( s oa:e ee:(a.a(v
wea|c |e(:aaseeacea(a| . s. aee.(eaa|ee|ie:wa:c(e(aea|:eacvaa·
aeaaeec1e|esea| v|vacvaae.aeea.e:|e.ae.aacvaaeeei[en avan­
cant sur] ) (aeO:.e.a(aa(. aceaa.(e|v:ese:ves .(se| i. saeaaee:(a.a(v
aeve:aac(e|ea:a(aa(1aeaea(wea|aa|wavs|e(eee¬e.
1a. ss(:aaeeo:eeess. eaeia"Rickrage" . s(ae¬eve¬ea(s|e(eaec
.aThe Origin ofGeometr, wae:e|v(i.so.eeeeiw:.(.aea| seae| cs. as
uasse:| savs. aaexe¬o|a:vs.ea.aeaaee[ 1 57] .
July 1961
Appendix
The Origin of Geometr ¯
THE INTEREST THAT o:eoe| sas .a ia. s«e:| ma|es.iaeeessa:vie
eaeaeea:sieia||.a:eaeei.eas«a.easa:e|vaeve:eeea::ecieCa|.|ee
we masiieeas ea: eaze aei me:e|v aoea iae :eacv·mace. aaacec·
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a. si|.a|.ae..i«asaec.ae:eai. aa. si|.a|.aai:em«aai.i«as. aiaai
eia||iae|aie. aae:.ie:seiiaee|ce:eeemei:.e«. scem.«aeaeve:iaev
«e:eai «e:|.e.iae:asoa:eeeemeie:se:asma|.aeo:aei.ea|aoo|.ea·
i.easeieeemei:v.xaiae:..aceeca|evea||.«emasia| se.aea.:e|ae|
.aieiae e:.e.aa|meaa.ae eiiae aaacec·ce«aeeemei:v. «a.eaeea·
i.aaecie|eva| .c«.iaia.s ve:vsamemeaa.ae-eeai.aaecaacaiiae
samei. me«asceve|eoecia:iae:.:ema.a.aes.mo|v eeemei:v .aa||
.isae«ie:ms . Oa:eeas.ce:ai.eas«.||aeeessa:.| v| eacieiaeceeoesi
o:e||emseimeaa.ae. o:e||emseise.eaeeaaceiiaea. sie:veise.eaee
. aeeae:a| .aac.aceec.aiaeeaci eo:e||emseiaaa.ve:sa|a.sie:v. a
eeae:a| . se iaai ea: o:e|| ems aac exoes.i.eas eeaee:a.ae Ca|.|eaa
eeemei:via|eeaaaexemo|a:vs.ea.aeaaee.
iei. i|eaeiec. aacvaaeeiaai..aiaem.csieiea:a. sie:.ea|mec.ia·
i.eas eamecemoa. |eseoav.i|e:eaooea:s ae:eie:iaeã :sii.me«.ia
Ca|.|ee.ia:eaeaiaec.se|esa:eeiiaeceoia·o:e||emseiiaemeaa.ae·
e:.e.aeieeemei:vaac.ieaaceceaia. s. eii|emeaa.ae·e:.e.aeia. s
ae«oavs.es. ae|a:.iv.ae| .eaiie:ea:«ae|eaace:ia|.ae.aame| v. iae
.cea eiì see|.ae ie ea::v eai. .a iae ie:m eia.sie:.ea| mec.iai.eas.
se|i·:eaeei.eas a|eaiea:e«ao:eseai oa.|eseoaiea| s.iaai.ea . aiae
aeoe iaai.a ia. s«av «e eaaaaa||via|e oessess.eaeiiaemeaa.ae.
meiaec.aac|ee.aa.aeeioa. | eseoav. iaeone oa.|eseoavie«a.eaea:
| .iesee|sie|eaaceaeaiie|eceveiec. re:.as«.|||eeemeev.ceai
ae:e. ai a:si. aeeaaeei.ea «.ia eaeexamo| e. ea:.avesi.eai.easa:e
a. sie:.ea|.aaaaaasaa|sease.aame|v..av. :iaeeiaiaemai.ec.:eei.ea
«a.ea eoeas ao ceoia·o:e||ems ea.ie aa|ae«aiee:c.aa:va. sie:v.
o:e||ems«a.ea.ae«eve:,] .aiae.:e«a«av. æeaacea|iec|va.sie:.·
` This manuscript was written in 1 936 and was edited and published (beginning with the
third paragraph) by Eugen Fink i n the Revue internationale de philosophie , Vol . I , No. 2
( 1 939) under the title "Der Ursprung der Geometrie als i ntentional- historisches Prob­
l em. " It appears in Biemel ' s edi tion of the Crisis as "Beilage I I I , " pp. 365-6. The first
paragaphs suggest i t was meant for i nclusi on i n the Crisis.
157
.
158
Edmund Husserl
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eaaaaia:a||vaeivei|eseeaaiiae |ee. aa.ae.
1aeeaesi.eaeiiaee:.e.aeieee¬ei:v.aace:«a.eai.i|eae:e .ie:iae
sa|eei|:ev.iv.«e. ae|acea||c.se.o|.aesiaaicea|«. iasaaoesex.si.ae
¬aiae¬ai.ea||v.aoa:esoaee·i.¬e·saa| | aei|eeeas. ce:ecae:easiae
oa.|e|ee.ea|·a.sie:.ea|eaesi.ea.. e .asiaesea:eaie:iaei:sieee¬ei·
e:s «ae aeiaa|| v aiie:ec oa:e eee¬ei:.ea| o:eoes.i.eas. o:eeis.
iaee:. es. e:ie:iaeoa:i.ea|a:o:eoes.i.easiaevc. seeve:ec. e:iae|. |e.
xaiae:iaaa ia. s. ea: .aie:esi saa|||e iae .aea.:v |ae| .aieiae ¬esi
e:.e.aa|sease.a«a.eaeee¬ei:veaeea:ese. «aso:eseaiasiaei:ac.·
i.eaei¬.| | eaa. a. .ssi.||o:eseaiie:as. aac.ssi.|||e.ae«e:|ecea. aa
| .ve|vie:«a:c ceve|eo¬eai . · «e .aea.:e .aie iaai sease .a «a.ea .i
aooea:ec.a a.sie:vie:iaei:sii.¬e-.a«a.ea.iaacieaooea:.evea
iaeaea«e|ae«aeia. aeeiiaei:sie:eaie:saaca:eaeieveaas|.ae
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asiaev aeeessa:. |v ¬asiaave |eea .a iae.: o:. ¬a||v esia||.sa.ae
iaaei.ea. 1a.s :ee:ess.ve .aea.:v aaave.ca||v :e¬a.as «.ia.a iae
soae:eeieeae:a|.i.es . |ai. as«esaa||seeasee. iaesea:eeeae:a|.i.es
«a.eaeaa|e:.ea|vexo| .eaiec.«.iao:ese:.|ecoess.|.|.i.eseia::.v.ae
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eee¬ei:v«a.ea.s:eacv·¬ace.seiesoea|.i:e¬«a.eaiae:ee:ess.ve
.aea. :v |ee.as. . sai:ac. i.ea Oa:aa¬aaex. sieaee ¬eves«.ia.a.a·
aa¬e:a||ei:ac.i.eas .1ae«ae|eea|ia:a|«e:|c. .aa||.isie:¬s. ex.sis
ia:eaeai:ac.i.ea1aeseie:¬saavea:.seaassaeaaei¬e:e|veaasa| | v.
«ea|se|ae«a|:eaaviaaii:ac.i.ea. so:ee.se| vi:ac.i.ea.aav.aea:.sea
«.ia. aea:aa¬aasoaeeia:eaeaaa¬aaaei.v.iv.. e. .so. :. iaa|| v. evea
iaeaea«eeeae:a||v|ae«aeia.ae.e:aseeecasaeia.ae.eiiaeoa:·
i.ea|a: o:eveaaaee aac eiiae so.:.iaa| sea:ee iaai |:eaeai .i a|eai .
~ac vei iae:e |.es .a ia.s|ae|ei|ae«|ecee. eve:v«ae:e aac essea·
i.a||v. aa.¬o|.e.i|ae«|ecee. «a.eaeaaiaasa| se|e¬aceexo|.e. i. a
|ae«|ecee ei aaassa.|a||e se|i·ev.ceaee ii |ee. as «. ia saoe:ie. a|
ee¬¬eao|aees. saea as. iaai eve:via.aei:ac.i.eaa| aasa:.seaeaiei
aa¬aa aei.v.iv. iaai aeee:c.ae|v oasi ¬ea aac aa¬aa e. v. | .zai.eas
ex.siec.aaca¬eaeiae¬iae.:i:si. aveaie:s. «aesaaoeciaeae«eai
ei¬aie:.a| saiaaac.«aeiae::a«e:a| :eacvso.:.iaa||vsaaoec r:e¬
iaesaoe:ie.a| .ae«eve:.eae. s|ec. aieiaeceoias 1:ac.i.ea.seoea.a
ia.seeae:a|«avieeeai.aaec.aea.:v.aac. . ieaeeeas. sieai|v¬a.aia.as
¯ So also for Gal i l eo and al l the periods followi ng the Renaissance, continual l y being
worked on in a l i vely forward development, and yet at the same time a traiti on.
159
The Origin of Geometry
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ee¬o|.sa¬eai . i:siasao:e]eeiaaciaea .asaeeessia|exeeai.ea
O|v.eas|v.i.s iae sa¬eae:e as«.iaeve:veiae:. aveai.ea. Ðve:v
so.:.iaa|aeee¬o|.sa¬eaio:eeeec.aei:e¬.isi:sio:e]eeiie.isexeea·
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ie:«a:c¬eve¬eaii:e¬aeea.s.i.easaso:e¬.sesieae«aeea.s.i.eas.
.a«aeseeai.e¬eaa.ae iaaieiiaeo:e¬. ses. s .ae|acec .iae o:eeess
eeai.aa.ae .a ia. s¬aaae:·. iaea . i. se| ea: iaaiiaetotal ¬eaa. aeei
eee¬ei:v.asaceve|eoecse.eaee. as.aiaeeaseeieve:vse. eaee· eea|c
aeiaave|eeao:eseaiasao:e]eeiaaciaeaas¬e|. |eia|i| |¬eaiaiiae
|ee.aa.ae ~ ¬e:e o:. ¬.i.veie:¬ai.ea ei¬eaa.aeaeeessa:. | v«eai
160
Edmund Husserl
|eie:e .i as a o:e|.m.aa:v siaee. aacea|iec|v.a saea a «av iaai .i
aooea:ecie:iaea:sii.me. aiaese|i·ev.ceaeeeisaeeessia|:ea|.zai.ea.
sai ia.s «av ei exo:ess.ae .i .s aeiaa||v eve:||e«a. se|i·ev.ceaee
meaasaeia.aeme:eiaaae:aso.aeaaeai.iv«.iaiaeeeose.easaessei
.is e:.e.aa| |e.ae·.ise|i·iae:e [Selbst-dal saeeessia| :ea|.zai.ea ei a
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«aaiaas |eea:ea|.zec.siae:e.originaliter, as .ise|r.
saiae«eaesi.easa:. se. 1a. so:eeesseio:e¡eei.aeaacsaeeessia||v
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esia||.sameai . aa ex.sieaee «a.ea . s oeea|.a:|v saoe:iemoe:a| aac
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e|asseiso.:.iaa|o:ecaeiseiiaeea|ia:a|«e:|c. ie«a.eaaeiea|va||
se.eai.aeeeasi:aei. eas aaciaese.eaeesiaemse|ves|e|eae|aia| se. ie:
examo|e. iaeeeasi:aei.eas eiaae |.ie:aia:e.· we:|seiia.se|assce
aei. |.|e iee|s .aamme:s. o|.e:s·e:|.|e a:ea.ieeia:a|aaceiae:saea
o:ecaeis. aavea:eoeaia|. |.iv.amaav|.|eexemo|a:s. 1aerviaaee·
:eaaiaee:em. .aceecìa||eieeemei:v.ex.sisea|veaee .aemaiie:ae«
eiieae:evea.a«aai|aaeaaee.imav|eexo:essec.ii.s.ceai.ea||viae
same.aiaee:.e.aa||aaeaaeeeiÐae|.caac.aa| |i:aas|ai.eas .aac
«.ia.aeaea|aaeaaee.i. saea.aiaesame .aemaiie:ae«maavi.mes.i
aas |eea seas.||vaiie:ec. i:emiaee:.e.aa|exo:ess.ea aac «:.i.ae·
ce«aieiae.aaame:a||ee:a|aiie:aaeese:«:.iieaaaceiae:ceeamea·
iai.eas. 1ae seas.||e aiie:aaees aave soai.eiemoe:a| .ac.v.caai.ea
.aiae«e:|c|.|ea||ee:oe:ea|eeea::eaees. |.|eeve:via.aeem|ec.ec
.a |ec.es as saea. |ai ia.s .s aei i:ae eiiae so.:.iaa| ie:m .ise|i.
¯ But the broadest concept of l iterature encompasses them all : that is, it belongs to
thei r objective bei ng that they be li ngui stical l y expressed and can be expressed again and
again; or, more preci sely, they have their objecti vi ty, their existence-for-everyone, only
as signifi cation, as the meaning of speech. This is true i n a peculi ar fashi on i n the case of
the objecti ve sci ences : for them the di ference between the original l anguage of the work
and its translation i nto other languages does not remove i ts identical accessibil i ty or
change it i nto an i nauthentic, indirect accessi bi l i ty.
161
The Origin of Geometr
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v. :iaeeiiaesei«e·|eve|ec:eoei.i. easaaca|i.maie|v.av.:iaeeiseas.·
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ã :si.aveaie: ssea| . ie.is.cea|e|¡eei.v.iv :iaacvaaee«eseeiaai.i
eeea:s|vmeaasei | aaeaaee.ia:eaea«a.ea.i:eee.ves.seiesoea|..is
| . aea. si.e|.v.ae|ecv[Sprachleib] . saiae«cees| .aea.si.eem|ec.meai
ma|eeaieiiaeme:e|v.ai:asa|¡eei.vesi:aeia:eiaeobjective si:aeia:e
«a.ea.e. e. .aseeemei:.ea|eeaeeoie:siaieeiaaa.:s.. s. aiaeio:eseai
asaace:siaaca||e|va||aac. sva|.c.a|:eacv.a.is| .aea. si.eexo:ess.ea
aseeemei:.ea|soeeea.aseeemei:.ea|o:eoes.i.ea.ie:a||iaeiaia:e.a
.iseeemei:.ea|sease:
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eimaa «.ia.a aamaa e. v. |.zai.ea. aac iae «e:|c as iae ae:.zea ei
aamaaex.sieaee.
i.v.ae «a|eia|| v. aiae«e:|c «e a:e eeasiaai|v eease.eas eiiae
«e:|c. «aeiae:«e oav aiieai.eaie .ie: aei. eease.eas ei.i asiae
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aacoess.||e.aie:esisaacaei.v.i.es. ~|«avs siaac.aeeaiaea.asiiae
«e:|c·ae:.zea.siaeae:.zeaeiea:ie||e«mea.«aeiae:iae:ea:eaavei
iaem o:eseai e:aei. seie:e evea ia|.ae aei.ee ei.i ai a|| . «e a:e
eease. easeiiaeeoeaae:.zeaeiea:ie||e«mea«. ia.is|.m.iecaae|eas
eiea:ae.ea|e:s. iaese|ae«aieas . wea:eiae:e|veeeease.easeiiae
¡
!
1 62
Edmund H usserl
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a¬eease.easeiiae¬as ¬veiae:s. as iaese«.ia«ae¬ieaaeaie:
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ia. s .ave|vesì a :ee.o:eea| eeii.ae a|eae «.ia eiae:s . aaceaiae
|as.seiiaese:e|ai.easieaacea|«.iaiae¬.eaie:.aieoa:i.ea|a:¬eces
eiee¬¬aa.iv«. iaiae¬. aaciaea |ae«. .a a aa|.iaa| «av. ei¬v
|e.aese:e|aiec i. |e¬e. eve:vaa¬aa|e.ae-aac(a.s. sae«ae. s
aace:sieec|v¬eaaceve:veaee|se-aasa.sie||e«¬eaaac. a| «avs
eeaai.aea.¬se|i.e.v. |.zai.ea.aeeae:a| ..a«a.eaae|ae«sa. ¬se|iie
|e|.v.ae.
ii. so:ee.se|vie ia.sae:.zeaeie.v.|.zai.eaiaaiee¬¬ea|aaeaaee
|e|eaes Oae.seease.easeie.v.|.zai.eai:e¬iaesia:iasaa.¬¬ec.aie
aac ¬ec.aie| .aea.si.eee¬¬aa.iv. C|ea:| v.i.sea|via:eaea|aaeaaee
aac.isia:·:eaea.aeceea¬eaiai.eas. asoess.||eee¬¬aa.eai.eas.iaai
�aeae:.zeaeie.v.| .zai.eaeaa|eaaeoeaaaceac|esseae .as.ia|«avs
.sie:¬ea. waai.so:.v.|eeec.aeease.easaessasiaeae:.zeaeie.v.|.·
zai.ea aac as iae |.aea. si.e ee¬¬aa.iv .s ¬aia:e ae:¬a| e.v.| .zai.ea
.ia|.aea«av iaea|ae:¬a| aac iae «e:|c eiea.|c:ea· . ia ia.s sease
e.v.| .zai.ea. s. ie:eve:v¬aa«aese«e·ae:.zea.i.s. aee¬¬aa.ivei
iaese «ae eaa :ee.o:eea||v exo:ess iae¬se|ves. ae:¬a||v. .a a ia||v
aace:siaaca||eiasa.ea.aac«.ia.aia.see¬¬aa.iveve:veaeeaaia|s
a|eai«aai.s«.ia.aiaesa::eaac.ae«e:|ceia.se.v.|.zai.eaase|]ee·
i.ve|vex.si.aeÐve:via.aeaas.isaa¬e.e:.saa¬a||e.aiae|:eacesi
sease. . e. . | .aea.si.ea||vexo:ess.||e.1aee|]eei.ve«e:|c. si:e¬iae
sia:i iae «e:|c ie: a|| . iae «e:|c «a.ea eve:veae aas as «e:|c·
ae:.zeai ise|]eei.ve|e.aeo:esaooeses¬ea.aace:s(eecas¬ea«.ia
aee¬¬ea|aaeaaee . iaaeaaee.ie:.isoa:i.asiaaei.eaaacexe:e.sec
eaoae.iv. .s:e|aiecee::e|ai.ve|vieiae«e:|c. iaeaa.ve:seeie|]eeis
«a.ea. s|.aea. si.ea||vexo:ess.||e.a.is|e.aeaac.is|e.ae· saea1aas
¬eaas¬ea.ie||e«¬ea.«e:|c-iae«e:|cei«a.ea¬ea.ei«a.ea«e.
a| «avs ia|| aac eaa ia||-aac. ea iae eiae: aaac. |aaeaaee. a:e .a·
seoa:a||v.aie:i«.aec. aac eae.sa|«avs ee:ia.a eiiae.: .aseoa:a||e
:e|ai.eaa| aa.iv. iaeaea asaa||v ea| v . ¬o| .e.i| v. .a iae ¬aaae: eia
ae:.zea
1a.s|e.aeo:esaooesec. iaeo:.¬a||vesia||.sa.aeeee¬eie:eaae|·
v.eas| v a|se exo:ess a.s .aie:aa| si:aeia:e sai iae eaesi.ea a:.ses
�ea.a. ue«cees iae |aiie:. .a .is.cea|.iv. iae:e|v |eee¬ee|]ee·
i.ve:1e|esa:e.se¬eia.aeosvea.e«a.eaeaa|eaace:sieec|veiae:s
[nachverstehbar] aac.see¬¬aa.ea||e.asse¬eia.aeosvea.e|e|eae.ae
ieia. s¬aa.. seo ipso e|]eei. ve. ]asiasaea.¬se|i.aseeae:eie¬aa..s
exoe:.eaeea||eaacaa¬a||e|veve:veaeasa:ea|ia.ae.aiae«e:|cei
163
The Origin of Geometry
ia. aes.a eeae:a| reeo|eeaaae:eea|eaisaeaia.aes. eaa¬a|eee¬·
¬ea ve:.aa||easse:i.easeaiae|as.seiee¬¬eaexoe:.eaee.eie sa(
ae«cees(ae.ai:aosvea.ea||veeasi.iaiecsi:aeia:ea::. vea(aa.aie:·
sa|]eei.ve|e.aeei.ise«aasaa.cea|e|]eei«a.ea.aseee¬ei:.ea| .
. s aavia.ae|aia:ea|osvea.e e|]eei. evea iaeaea. i aas a:.sea osv·
ea.ea||v:ieias:eaeei 1aee:.e.aa||e.ae·.ise|i·iae:e. .aiae. ¬¬ec.
aev[Aktualitit ] ei.isi:sio:ecaei.ea.. e ..ae:.e.aa|se|i·ev.ceaee.
:esa|is . a ae oe:s. si.ae aeea. s.i.ea ai a|| iaai eea|c aave e|]eei. ve
ex. sieaee v. v. cse|i· ev.ceaeeoasses-iaeaea. asaeaa«aviaaiiae
aei.v.iv.¬¬ec.aie|vians.aieiaeoass.v.iveiiaeae«.ae|viac.aeeea·
se.easaessei«aai·aas·]asi·ae«·|eea. r. aa||via. s:eieai.ea c.sa,·
oea:s. |aiiae c.saooea:ec oass.aeaac|e.aeoas(aasaei|eee¬e
aeia.aeie:iaesa|]eei.aeaesi.ea..ieaa|e:ea«a|eaec 1eiaeoass.v·
.ivei«aai .sai| :sie|sea:e| va«a|eaecaac«aai oe:aaose¬e:ees
«.iae:eaie:aace:eaie:e|a:.iviae:e|e|eaesiaeoess.||eaei.v.iveia
:eee||eei.ea.a«a.eaiaeoasiexoe:.eae.ae[Erleben] .s|.vecia:eaea.a
a eaas.·ae« aac eaas.·aei.ve«av. Ne« .iiae e:.e. aa||vse|i·ev. ceai
o:ecaei.ea. asiae oa:eia| i|| ¬eaiei. is .aieai.ea. . s«aai.s:eae«ec
.:eee||eeiec· .iae:eaeeessa:. |veeea:s. aeee¬oaav.ae(aeaei. ve:eee|·
|eei.eaei«aai. soasi.aaaei.v.iveieeaea::eaiaeiaa|o:ecae(.ea.aac
iae:e a:.ses iae:e|v. .a e:.e.aa| ee.ae. ceaee. iae se|i·ev.ceaee ei
.ceai.iv «aaiaasae«|eea:ea|.zec.ae:.e.aa|iasa.ea.siaesa¬eas
«aai «as o:ev.eas|vse|i·ev.ceai ~|seeeesia||. saec.s iae eaoae.iv
ie::eoei.i.eaai«.||«.iaiaese|i·ev.ceaeeeiiae.ceai.iv.ee.ae.ceaee
ei.ceai.iv· eiiae si:aeia:e ia:eaeaeaiiae eaa.a ei:eoei.i.eas Yei
evea«.iaia.s.«eaavesi.||aeieeae|eveaciaesa|]eeiaaca.s sa|·
]eei.ve.ev. ceaieaoae.i.es. iaai.s.«esi.||aaveae e|]eei. v.ive.vea
i(ceesa:.se.ae«eve:-.aao:e|. ¬.aa:vsiaee-.aaace:siaaca||eiasa·
.eaasseeaas«eia|e.aieeeas.ce:ai.eaiaeiaaei.eaeie¬oaiavaac
ie| |e« ¬aa|.acas a ee¬¬aa.(veie¬oaiav aacei| aaeaaee. ia iae
eeaiaei ei:ee.o:eea|| .aea.si.e aace:siaac.ae. (ae e:.e.aa| o:ecaei.ea
aaciaeo:ecaeieieaesa|]eeieaa|eactively aace:sieec|viaeeiae:s
ia ia. sia||aace:siaac.aeei«aai .s o:ecaeec|viae eiae:. as .a iae
easeei:eee||eei. ea. ao:eseaieeaeee¬o|.sa¬eaieaeae se«aoa:iei
iaeo:eseai.iecaei.v.ivaeeessa:.|via|eso|aee.|aiaiiae sa¬ei.¬e
iae:e.sa|seiaese|i·ev.ceaieease.easaesseiiae.ceai.(veiiae¬eaia|
si:aeia:e.aiaeo:ecaei.easei|eia(ae:eee.ve:eiiaeee¬¬aa.eai.ea
aaciaeee¬¬aa.eaie:. aac ia.s eeea:s :ee.o:eea||v 1ae o:ecae(.eas
eaa:eo:ecaeeiae.:|.|eaessesi:e¬oe:seaieoe:sea.aac.aiaeeaa.a
eiiaeaace:siaac.aeeiiaese:eoei.i.eas«aai.sse|i·ev.ceaiia:asaoas
iaesa¬e.aiaeeease.easaesseiiaeeiae: |a(aeaa.iveiiaeee¬¬a·
164
Edmund Husserl
a.iveieemmaa.eai.eaameaeseve:a|oe:seasiae:eoeaiec|vo:ecaeec
si:aeia:e|eeemesaae|¡eeieieease.easaess. aeiasa|.|eaess. |aias
iaeeaesi:aeia:eeemmeaiea|| .
Ne««emasiaeieiaaiiaee|¡eei.v.ivei iae.cea|si:aeia:eaas aei
vei|eeaia| | veeasi.iaiecia:eaeasaeaaeiaa|i:aasie::.aeei«aaiaas
|eeae:.e.aa||vo:ecaeec.aeaeieeiae:s«aee:.e.aa||v:eo:ecaee.i
waai .s | ae|.ae. siaepersisting existence eiiae .cea|e|¡eeis evea
ca:.ae oe:.ecs .a «a.ea iae .aveaie: aac a.s ie||e«sa:e ae |eaee:
«a|eia||vse:e|aiece:eveaa:eae|eaee:a|.ve.waai.s|ae|.ae.siae.:
eeai.aa.ae·ie·|eevea«aeaaeeaeaaseease.eas| vi:ea|.zeciaem.a
se|i·ev.ceaee.
1ae.moe:iaaiiaaei.eaei«:.iiea.ceeameai.ae|.aea.si.eexo:ess.ea
. siaai.ima|eseemmaa.eai.easoess.||e«.iaeai.mmec.aiee:mec.aie
oe:seaa| acc:ess . .i .s. se ie soea|. eemmaa.eai.ea|eeeme v.:iaa| .
1a:eaea ia.s . iae eemmaaa| .zai.ea ei maa .s |.uec ie a ae« |eve| .
w:.iiea s.easa:e . «aea eeas.ce:eci:em aoa:e|vee:oe:ea|oe.aiei
v. e«. si:a.eaiie:«a:c|v.seas.||vexoe:.eaeea||e.aac.i. sa|«avsoes·
s.||eiaaiiaev|e.aie:sa|¡eei.ve|vexoe:.eaeea||e. aeemmea. naias
| .aea.si.e s.eas iaev a«a|ea. as ce | .aea. si.e seaacs. iae.: iam.|.a·
s.ea.aeai.eas . 1ae a«a|ea.ae .s semeia.ae oass.ve. iae a«a|eaec
s.ea.aeai.ea. siaas e.veaoass.ve|v.s.m. |a:|vieiae«av.a«a.eaaav
eiae: aei.v.iv «a.ea aas saa| .aie e|sea:. iv. eaee assee.ai.ve|v
a«a|eaec.eme:eesaia:sipassively asame:ee:|esse|ea:meme:v.i a
iaeoass.v.iv. aeaesi.eaae:e.as. aiaeeaseeimeme:v. «aai. soas·
s.ve|va«a|eaeceaa|ei:aasie:mec|ae|.·seiesoea|..aieiaeee::e·
soeac.aeaei.v.iv.ia. s.siaeeaoae.ivie::eaei.vai.eaiaai|e|eaese:.e·
.aa||vieeve:vaamaa|e. aeasasoea|.ae|e.ae.~eee:c. ae| v. iaea.iae
«:.i.ae·ce«aeaeeisai:aasie:mai.eaeiiaee:.e.aa|meceei|e.aeei
iae meaa.ae· si:aeia:e. e. e. ,] «.ia.a iae eeemei:.ea| soae:e ei se|i·
ev.ceaee. eiiaeeeemei:.ea|si:aeia:e«a.ea .s oai. aie«e:cs . ii |e·
eemessec.meaiec. seiesoea|.naiiae:eace:eaama|e.ise|i·ev.ceai
aea. a. eaa:eaei.vaieiaese|i·ev.ceaee.t
1ae:e .s a c.si.aei.ea. iaea. |ei«eea oass.ve|v aace:siaac.ae iae
exo:ess.eaaacma|.ae.ise|i·ev.ceai|v:eaei.vai.ae.ismeaa.ae.nai
iae:ea|seex.sioess.|.|.i.eseia|.aceiaei.v.iv.aia.a|.ae.aie:msei
¯ This is a transformation of which one is consci ous a being i n i tself patterned afer
[what is passi vel y awakened].
t But this is by no means necessary or even factuall y normal . Even without this he can
understand; he can concur " as a matter of course" in the validity of what is understood
wi thout any acti vity of his own. In this case he comports hi msl f purel y passivel y and
recepti vel y.
165
The Orgin of Geometry
ia.aesiaaiaave |eeaia|ea aome:e|v :eeeoi.ve|v. oass.ve|v. «a.ea
cea|s «.ia s.ea.aeai.eas ea|v oass.ve|v aace:sieec aac ia|ea eve:.
«.iaeaiaaveiiaese|i·ev.ceaeeeie:.e.aa|aei.v.iv.rass.v.iv.aeeae:a|
.siae:ea|meiia.aesiaaia:e|eaacieeeiae:aacme|i.aieeaeaaeiae:
assee.ai.ve|v. «ae:e a||meaa.aeiaaia:.ses .s oaiieeeiae:oass. ve|v.
waaieiieaaaooeasae:e .siaaiameaa.aea:. ses«a.ea.saooa:eai|v
oess.||easaaa. iv-. . e. .eaaaooa:eai|v|emacese|i·ev.ceaeeia:eaea
aoess.||e:eaei.vai.ea-«ae:easiaeaiiemoiaiaeiaa|:eaei.vai.eaeaa
:eaei.vaieea|viae.ac.v.caa|mem|e:seiiaeeem|.aai.ea. «a.|eiae
.aieai.eaieaa.iviaem.aiea«ae| e. .asieacei|e.aea|a||ec. eemesie
aeia.ae. iaai . s. iae eai.e va|.c.iv .s cesi:evec ia:eaea iae e:.e.aa|
eease.easaesseiaa||.iv.
ii.seasviesee iaai evea .a e:c.aa:viaamaa|.ie. aac a:sieia||.a
eve:v.ac.v.caa||.iei:emea.|caeecaoiemaia:.iv.iaee:.e.aa||v.aia.·
i.ve| .ie«a.eae:eaies.ise:.e.aa||vse|i·ev.ceaisi:aeia:esia:eaeaae·
i.v.i.eseaiae|as.seisease·exoe:.eaeeve:vea.e|| vaac.a.ae:eas.ae
measa:eia||sv.ei.mieiaeseduction oflanguage. C:eaie:aace:eaie:
seemeais eiia.s|.ie |aose .aie a |.ac eiia||.aeaac :eac.ae iaai . s
cem.aaiecoa:e|v|v assee.ai.ea.aaceriea eaeaea. .a:esoeeiieiae
va|.c.i. es a::.vec ai .a ia.s «av. .i .s c.saooe.aiec |v sa|seeaeai
exoe:.eaee .
Ne«eae «.|| sav iaai .aiae soae:eiaai.aie:esis as ae:e-iaaiei
se.eaee. eiia.a|.aec.:eeiecie«a:ciae aiia.ameaieii:aias aac iae
ave.caaeeeiia|seaeec-eae .s e|v.eas|ve:eai|veeaee:aeci:emiae
sia:iieoaiasieoieiaei:eeo|aveiassee.ai.veeeasi:aei.eas . iav.e«
eiiaeaaave.ca||e sec.meaiai.ea eimeaia|o:ecaeis .aiaeie:m ei
oe:s.si.ae| .aea.si.eaeea.s.i.eas.«a.eaeaa|eia|eaaoaea.aaia:si
me:e|voass.ve|vaac|eia|eaeve:|vaaveaee|se.saeaeeas::aei.eas
:ema.a a eeasiaaicaaee:. 1a.scaaee:. s ave.cec .ieae aeime:e|v
eeav.aeeseaese|iexoesiiaeieiaaiiaeoa:i.ea|a:eeasi:aei.eaeaa|e
:eaei.vaiec |ai assa:eseaese|ii:emiae sia:i . arie: iae sea·ev.ceai
o:.ma|esia|| .sameai. ei.iseaoae.ivie|e:eaei.vaiecaaceaca:.ae|v
ma.aia.aec. 1a. seeea:s«aeaeaeaasav.e«ieiaeaa.vee.ivei| .a·
ea.si.eexo:ess.eaaacieseea:.ae. |vmeaaseiiaemesioa.asia|.ae
ie:mai.eaeiiae:e|evaai«e:cs. o:eoes.i.eas. aaceemo|exeseio:eoe·
s.i.eas . iae:esa|is«a.eaa:eie|eaa.veea||vexo:essec1a. smasi|e
ceae|viae .ac.v.caa|se.eai.si . aacaeiea|v|viae .aveaie:|ai|v
eve:v se.eai.siasamem|e:eiiae se.eai.aeeemmaa.ivaue:aeaas
ia|eaeve:i:emiaeeiae:s«aai.sie|eia|eaeve:.1a. s|e|eaes. iaea.
ie iae oa:i.ea|a:s eiiae se.eai.ae i:ac.i.ea «.ia.a iae eeaesoeac.ae
eemmaa. iv eise.eai.sis as a eemmaa.iv ei|ae«|ecee | . v.ae .a iae
aa.iveiaeemmea:esoeas.|.|.iv.iaaeee:c«.iaiaeesseaeeeise.eaee.
166
Edmund Husserl
iaea. .is iaaei.eaa:.es ¬a.aia.a iae eeasiaaie|a. ¬. iae oe:seaa| ee�·
ia.aiv.iaaieve:via.aeiaevoai.aie se.eai.ieasse:i.ensaas |eea sa.c
eaeeaacie:a| | . iaai.i siaacsiasi . ie:eve:.ceai.ea||v:eoeaia||e
«.ia se|i·ev.ceaee aac asa||e ie: ia:iae: iaee:ei.ea| e: o:aei.ea|
eacs-as .aca|.ia||v :eaei.vaia||e «.ia iae .ceai.iv ei .is aeiaa|
¬eaa. ae ·
ue«eve:.i«e¬e:eia. aesa:e.¬oe:iaaiae:er.:si «eaaveaeivei
iasea.aieaeeeaaiiaeiaeiiaaise.eai.ieia. as.aeaiia.asae«:esa|isea
iae |as.s eiiaese a|:eacv aiia.aec. iaai iae ae« eaes se:ve as iae
ieaacai.eaie:si. | | eiae:s. eie-.aiaeaa.iveiao:eoaeai.veo:eee·sei
i:aasie::ec¬eaa.ae
| aiaeiaa||v. ¬¬easeo:e|.te:ai.eaeiase.eaee|.seeee¬ei:v.«aai
aas|eee¬eeiiaee|a.¬aaciaeeaoae.ivie::eaei.vai.ea:waeaeve:v
:esea:eae:«e:ss ea a.s oa:i eiiae |a.|c.ae. «aai eiiae veeai.eaa|
.aie::aoi.easaaci.¬eeaiie::esi .«a.eaeaaaei|eeve:|eesecae:e:
waea ae:eia:asieiae aeiaa|eeai.aaai.eaei«e:s. ¬asiaei:si:aa
ia:eaea iae «ae|e . ¬¬ease eaa.a eie:eaac.�es |aes ie ia� e:.e.�a|
o:e¬.sesaacaeiaa||v:eaei.vaieiae«ae|eiame:

|ise. as..eaeeis�
ea:¬ece:aeee¬ei:v«ea|ce|v.eas|vaei|eoess.||eaia|| ~acvei.i
.s eiiae esseaeeeiiae :esa|iseieaea siaee aeiea|viaai iae.:.cea|
eai.e¬eaa.ae.aiaeiee¬es|aie:iaaaiaaieiea:|.e::esa|isi

|aii?ai .
s.aee ¬eaa.ae .s e:eaacec aoea ¬eaa.ae. iae ea:|.e: ¬eaame

e.ves
se¬eia.aeei. isva| .c.ivieiae|aie:eae..aceec|eee¬esoa:iei. iie

a
ee:ia.a esieai 1aasae |a. |c.ae||ees«. ia. aiae ¬eaia| si:aeia:e . s
se|i· same.eai . aac aeae. iaea. eaa |e .¬¬ec.aie| v :eaei.vaiec |v
.ise|ii

1a.s .s esoee.a||vi:ae eise.eaees «a.ea . | .seeee¬ei:v. aaveiae.:
iae¬ai.esoae:e. a. cea|o:ecaeis. .a . cea|.i.es!:e¬

«a.

ea¬e:� aac
¬e:e. cea| .i.esaia. eae:|eve|sa:eo:ecaeec |i.sea.iec.ae:eai.aiae
se·ea||eccese:.oi.ve se.eaees. «ae:eiaeiaee:ei.ea|.aie:esi. e|ass.iv·
.aeaaccese:.|. ae.:e¬a.as«.ia.aiaesoae:eeisease· .aia.i.ea.«a.ea
ie: .i :eo:eseais se|i·ev.ceaee ue:e. ai |easi. aeeae:a| . eve:v ae«
o:eoes.i.eaeaa|v. ise|i|eeasaec.a ie:se|i·ev. ceaee
ue«. |v eeai:asi . .s a se.eaee| .seeee¬ei:voess�||e: Je«. as �
svsie¬ai.e. eac|ess|ve:e«.ae si:ai.iec si:aeia:eei.�eaai.e

s

e�a

.i
¬a.aia.a. ise:.e.aa|¬eaa.aeia| aessia:eaea|. v. ae:eaei.vaia|.|iv.i.is
¯ At frst, of course, i t is a matter of a frm direction of the wi l l , which the scientist
establishes i n hi mself, aimed at the certain capacity for reactivation. If the goal of reac­
tivatability can be onl y relatively fulflled, then the cla
.
i m whi�h
.
stems fro� the ��n­
sciousness of being able to acquire something also has Its relat�vlt� ; and thI S relatIVIty
also makes itself noticeable and is driven out. Ultimatel y, obJectIve, absolutely frm
knowledge of truth is an infnite idea.
167
The Origin of Geometr
eeea.i.veia.as.ae.ssaooesecieo:ecaeese¬eia.aeae««.iaeai|e.ae
ae|e ie :eaei.vaieiaeo:ev.eas|eve|s eisae«| ecee |aesie iaei:si:
Ðvea . i ia. s eea|c aave saeeeecec ai a ¬e:e o:. ¬.i.ve siaee ei
eee¬ei:v..iseae:ev«ea|ca|i. ¬aie| vaave|eeaiee¬aeasoeai.aiae
eae:ieio:eea:.aese|i·ev.ceaeeaac«ea|caeiaave|eeaava.|a||eie:
aa.eae:o:ecaei.v.iv
ue:e «e¬asiiase.aieeeas.ce:ai.eaiaeoeea|.a: |ee.ea| aei.v.iv
«a.ea. si.ecsoee.iea||vie|aaeaaee. as«e||asieiae.cea|eeea.i.ve
si:aeia:esiaaia:.se soee.iea||v«.ia.a. i 1e aavseaieaee si:aeia:es
iaaie¬e:ee«. ia.aa¬e:e| voass.veaace:siaac.aeiae:e|e|eaesessea·
i.a||va oeea| .a:se:ieiaei.v.iv|esicese:. |ec |viae«e:c eso| .ea·
i.ea~oass.ve|ve¬e:e.aeseaieaee.e e ..a¬e¬e:v· .e:eaeaea:c
aac oass.ve|v aace:sieec. . s ai i:si ¬e:e|v :eee.vec «.ia a oass.ve
eee·oa:i.e.oai.ea.iaseaaoasva|.c.aac.aia.sie:¬ .i. sa|:eacvea:
¬eaa.ae r:e¬ia.s«ec.si.aea. saiaeoeea| . a:aac.¬oe:iaaiaei.v.iv
ei eso|.eai.ae ea: ¬eaa.ae wae:eas .a .is i:si ie:¬ .i «as a
si:a.eaiie:«a:c|v va|.c ¬eaa.ae. iasea ao as aa.ia:v aac aac.i·
ie:eai.aiec-eeae:eie|v soeas. ae. a si:a.eaiie:«a:c|v va| . c cee| a:a·
i.ve seaieaee~ae« «aai .a .ise|i .s vaeae aac aac.ae:eai.aiec . s
aei. ve| veso|.eaiecCeas.ce:.ie:esa¬o| e. i|e«av. a«a.ea«eaace:·
siaac. «aea saoe:ie.a||v:eac.aeiae ae«soaoe:. aac s.¬o|v :eee.ve
(aeae«s . ae:eiae:e .saoass.veias.ae·eve:eieai.eva|.c.ivsaea
iaai«aai.s:eacsi:a.eai«av|eee¬esea:eo.a.ea
sai.i.sse¬eia.aesoee.a|.as«eaave sa. c. ieaave iae. aieai.eaie
eso|.eaie .ieeaeaee.aiaeaei.v.iv«a.eaa:i.ea|aies«aaiaas|eea:eac
.e:aa.aie:esi.aeseaieaeei:e¬.i· .esi:aei.aeeae|veae..aseoa:ai.ea
i:e¬ «aai aas |eea vaeae| v. oass.ve|v :eee.vecas a aa.iv. iae e|e·
¬eaisei¬eaa. ae. iaas|:.ae.aeiaeieia|va|.c.ivieaei.veoe:ie:¬aaee
.a a ae« «av ea iae |as.s eiiae .ac.v.caa| va|. c.i.es waai «as a
oass.ve¬eaa.ae·oaiie:aaasae«|eee¬eeaeeeasi:aeiecia:eaeaae·
i.veo:ecaei.ea 1a. saei.v.iv. iaea. .saoeea|.a:se:ieise|i·ev.ceaee .
iae si:aeia:ea:.s. aeeaiei.i.s.aiae ¬eceeiaav.ae|eea e:.e.aa||v
o:ecaeec ~ac .a eeaaeei.ea «.ia ia. s se|i·ev.ceaee . iee. iae:e .s
ee¬¬aaa|.zai.ea 1ae eso|.eaiec¡ace¬eai |eee¬es aa . cea| e|¡eei
eaoa||eei|e.aeoassecea|i.sia. se|¡eeiese|as.ve|viaai.s¬eaai|v
|ee.e«aea.isoeasseiseaieaeese:¡ace¬eais ~aciaasiaedomain of
logic . saa.ve:sa||vces.eaaiec.ia. s. saa. ve:sa||viaesoae:eei|e.aeie
«a.ea |ee.e oe:ia.as .aseia: as .i .s iae iaee:v ei iae seaieaees e:
o:eoes.i.easì.aeeae:a|
1a:eaeaia. saei. v. iv. ae«.ia:iae:aei. v.i.es|eee¬eoess. ||e-se|i·
¯ Verdeutlichung, i . e. , maki ng explicit.
168
Edmund H usserl
ev.ceaieeasi:aei.easeiae«¡acemeaisea iae |as.seiiaesea|:eacv
va|.cie:as . 1a.s . siaeoeea||a:ieaia:eei|ee.ea|ia.a|. aeaacei.is
oa:e|v|ee.ea|se|i· ev.ceaees . ~|| ia.s :ema.as. aiaeievea«aea¡ ace·
meaisa:e i:aasie:mec .aie assamoi.eas. «ae:e. . asieac eiea:se|ves
asse:i.aee:¡ace.ae.«eia.a|ea:se|ves.aieiaeoes.i.eaeiasse:i.aee:
¡ace.ae.
ue:e«esaa||eeaeeai:aieeaiaeseaieaeesei| aaeaaeeasiaeveeme
ieasoass.ve|vaaca:eme:e|v:eee.vec. iaia.seeaaeei.ea.imasia|se
|eaeieciaaiseaieaeese. veiaemse|ves.aeease. easaessas:eo:ecae·
i.vei:aasie:mai.easeiaae:.e.aa|meaa. aeo:ecaeeceaieiaaaeiaa| .
e:.e.aa|aei.v.iv . iaai. s. .aiaemse|vesiaev:eie:iesaeaaeeaes.s . i a
iaesoae:eei|ee.ea|se|i· ev.ceaee.cecaei.ea.e:.aie:eaee. aiemsei
eeaseeaeaee. o|avs aeeasiaaiaacesseai.a|:e|e. Oaiaeeiae:aaac.
eaemasia|seia|eaeieeiiaeeeasi:aei.veaei.v.i.esiaaieoe:aie«. ia
eeemei:.ea| .cea| .i.es«a.ea aave|eea exo|.eaiec|ai aei|:eaeaiie
e:.e.aa| se|i·ev.ceaee. .O:.e.aa| se|i·ev.ceaee masi aei b eeaiasec
«.iaiaese|i·ev. ceaeeei ax.ems .ie:ax.emsa:e. ao:.ae.o|ea|:eacv
iae:esa|iseie:.e.aa|meaa.ae·eeasi:aei.eaaaca|«avsaaveia. s|e·
a.aciaem. ·
Ne««aaia|eaiiaeoess.|.| .iveieemo|eieaaceeaa.ae:eaei.vai.ea
.aia| | e:.e.aa|.iv. ia:eaeaee.ae|ae|ieiae o:.ma|se|i·ev.ceaees. .a
iaeeaseeieeemei:vaaciaese·ea||eccecaei.vese.eaees.seea||ec.
a|iaeaeaiaev|vaemeaasme:e| vcecaee· :ue:eiaeiaacameaia||a«.
«.ia aaeeac.i.eaa||veeae:a|se|i·ev.aeaee. .s . .iiae o:em.seseaaae·
iaa||v|e:eaei.vaiec|ae|ieiaemesie:.e.aa|se|i·ev.ceaee.iaeaiae.:
se|i·ev.ceai eeaseeaeaees eaa |e a|se ~eee:c.ae|v . iaooea:s iaai.
|ee.aa.ae«.iaiaeo:.ma|se|i·ev. ceaees . iaee:.e.aa|eeaa.aeaessmasi
o:eoaeaie.ise|iia:eaeaiaeeaa.aei|ee.ea|.aie:eaee. aemaiie:ae«
|eae.i. s ue«eve:..i«eeeas.ce:iaee|v.easaa.iaceeiiae.ac.v.caa|
aac evea iae see. a| eaoae.iv iei:aasie:m iae|ee.ea|eaa. aseieea·
ia:.es. i:a| v. aiaeaa.iveieaeaeeemo|.sameai..aiee:.e.aa||veeaa. ae
eaa. aseise|i·ev.ceaee.«eaei.eeiaaiiiea|eveì| a«eeaia. as«.ia.a
.ise|iaa. cea|.zai.ea. aame|v.iae:emeva|ei| .m.isi:emea:eaoae.iv.
.aaee:ia.a sease. is.aaa.i.zai.ea. 1aeoeea|.a: se:i eise|i·ev.ceaee
|e|eae.aei esaea.cea|.zai.eas«.||eeaee:aas | aie:.
1aesea:e. iaea. iae eeae:a| esseai.a|.as.eais «a.eae|ae.caieiae
«ae|emeiaec.ea|ceve|eomeaieiiae cecaei.ve se.eaeesaac«. ia.i
iaemaaae:ei|e.ae«a.ea. sesæai.a|ieiaem.
1aesese.eaeesa:eaeiaaacecce«a:eacv·mace.aiaeie:meicee·
ameaiecseaieaees .iaev.ave|vea| .ve| v. o:ecaei. ve|vacvaae.aeie:·
mai.eaeimeaa.ae. «a.eaa|«avsaasiaeceeameaiec.asasec.meaiei
ea:|.e:o:ecaei.ea. ai.iscísoesa| .aiaai.icea|s«.ia.i|ee.ea||v. sai
1 69
The Origin of Geometr
eai eiseaieaees«.ia sec. meaiec s.ea.aeai.ea. |ee.ea| cea|.ae eaa
o:ecaee ea|veiae:seaieaeeseiiaesameeaa:aeie:. 1aaia||ae«ae·
ea. s.i.easexo:essaaaeiaa|eeemei:.ea|i:aia.see:ia.aao:. e:. aace:
iaeo:esaooes.i.eaiaaiiaeieaacai.easeiiaeaecaei.vesi:aeia:eaave
i:a|v|eeao:ecaeecaace|¡eei.aec. ae:.e.aa|sea·ev.ceaee .. . e .aave
|eeemeaa.ve:sa||vaeeess.||eaeea.s.i.eas. ~eeai.aa.ivi:emeaeoe:·
se
º
ieaae�ae:.i:emeae i.me ieaaeiae:.masiaave |eeaeaoa||eei
oem�

eao.ec eai. ii .s e|ea: iaai iae meiaec eio:ecae.ae e:.e.aa|
.cea|.i.eseaiei«aai.so:ese.eai.aea||ve. vea.aiaeea|ia:a|«e:|cmasi
aave|eea«:.iieace«aaacaxec.aa:m seaieaeeso:.e:ieiae ex. s·
ieaee ei eeemei:v. ia:iae:me:e. iae eaoae.iv ie: i:aas|ai.ae iaese
seaieaee� i:em va

ae| .aea.si.eaace:siaac.ae .aie iae e|a:.iv eiiae
:eaei.vai.eaeiiae.:se|i·ev.ceaimeaa.aemasiaave|eea. .a.is e«a
«av. aaacecce«aaaceve:eaoa||eei|e.aeaaacecce«a.

Oa|�as| eaeasia.seeac.i.ea«assai.saec. e:ea| v«aeaiaeoess.|.|·
.ivei.is�a|a||meai«asoe:ieei|vseea:ecie:a||i.me. eea|ceeemei:v
o:ese:ve.iseea
�.ae.e:.e�aa|meaa.aeasacecaei.vese. eaeeia:eaea·
eaiiaeo:ee:ess.eaei|ee.ea|eeasi:aei.eas . iaeiae:«e:cs.ea| v.aia.s
ea

e eea|c eve:v eeemeie: |e eaoa||e ei|:.ae.ae ie mec.aie sea·
ev.�eaee iae m

aa.ae |ene |v eve:v seaieaee. aei me:e| v as . is
sec.meaiec .|ee.ea|· seaieaee·meaa.ae |aias. is aeiaa| meaa.ae .is
i:aia· meaa. ae. ~acseie:a||eieeemei:v.
·

1aeo:ee:esseicecaei.eaie||e«siema|·|ee.ea|se|i·ev.ceaee. |ai
w. i|�a

i iae aeiaa||v ceve|eoeceaoae.iv ie: :eaei.vai.aeiaee:.e.aa|
aei. v.i.eseeaia.aec«.ia.a. isaacameaia|eeaeeois. . . e. «.iaeaiiae
«aai
��
ciae ae« ei.iso:ese.eai.aemaie:.a|s . eeemei:v«ea|c
|eai:ac.i.eaemoiveimeaa.ae,¬c.i«eea:se|vesc.caeiaaveia.s
eaoae.iv.«eeea|caeve:evea|ae««aeiae:eeemei:vaace:eve:c.c
aaveaeeaa.aemeaa.ae.eaeiaaieea|c:ea| | vb easaec.a.
uaie:iaaaie|v. ae«eve:.ia.s. s ea:s.iaai.ea.aaciaaieiiae«ae|e
mece:aaee.
1ae o:esaooes.i.ea meai.eaeca|eveaas .aiae(aeve:|eeaia|·
a||ec. He�iae|. v. aei:a�.i.eaeiiaemeaa.ae·ie:mai.eaeie|emeaia:v
�eaeeoi
�.saeiaa||veao.eceaeaa|eseea.ae|emeaia:veeemei:.ea|
asi:aei.eaaac .isiexi|ee|s, «aai«e aeiaa||v|ea:aiae:e .sae«ie
cea|«.iaready-made eeaeeoisaacseaieaees. aa:.ee:eas|vmeiaec.ea|
«av. xeace:.aeiae eeaeeois seas. ||v. aia.ia||e |vmeaas eic:a«a
aea:es. ssa|si.iaiecie:iaeaeiaa|o:ecaei.eaeiiaeo:.ma|.cea|.i.es
~ac i�e :esi . s ceae |�saeeess-aei iae saeeess eiaeiaa| .as.eai
e

xieacme|eveaciae|ee.ea|meiaec se«ase|i·ev.ceaee.|aiiaeo:ae·
i.ea| saeeesseseiaoo|.ec eeemei:v. .is .mmease . iaeaea aei aace:·
sieec. o:aei.ea|aseia|aess. 1e ia.s «emasiacc semeia.ae iaai«.||
170
Edmund Husser
|eeeme v. s.||e ia:iae:ea .a iae i:eaimeaieia. sie:.ea| maiaemai.es.
aame| v. iaecaaee:seiase.eai.ie| .ieiaai. seemo|eie|ve. veaeve:ie
|ee.ea| aei.v.i. es 1aese caaee:s | . e .a ee:ia.a o:ee:ess. ve i:aasie:·
mai.easeimeaa.ae·ie«a.eaia.sse:ieise. eai.iei:eaimeaic:. veseae
nvexa.|.i.aeiaeesseai.a|o:esaooes.i.easaoea«a.ea:esisiaea.s·
ie:.ea|oess.|. |.iveiaeeaa.aei:ac.i.ea.i:aeie.ise:.e. as. eise.eaees
| . se eeemei:v. «e eaa aace:siaac ae« saea se. eaees eaa v.ia||v
ceve|eo ia:eaeaeai iae eeaia:. es aac si.|| aei |e eeaa.ae 1ae . a·
ae:.iaaee eio:eoes.i.eas aac eiiae meiaecei|ee.ea||v eeasi:aei.ae
ae«o:eoes.i.easaac.cea| .i.eseaaeeai.aae«. iaeai.aie::aoi.eai:em
eaeoe:.ecieiae aexi. «a.|eiaeeaoae.ivie::eaei.vai.ae iaeo:. ma|
|ee.aa.aes. . e . iaesea:eeseimeaa. aeie:eve:via.aeiaaieemes|aie:.
aas aei |eeaaaacec ce«a «.ia .i waai.s| aes.ae .s iaaso:ee.se|v
«aai aac e.vea aac aac ie e.ve meaa.ae ie a|| o:eoes.i.eas aac
iaee:.es. ameaa.aea:.s.aei:emiaeo:.ma|sea:ees«a.eaeaa|emace
se|i·ev.ceaiaea.aaacaea.a
Oieea:se. e:ammai.ea||veeae:eaio:eoes.i.easaac eeaeaieaai.eas
eio:eoes.i.eas. ae maiie: ae« iaev aavea:.sea aac aave aea.evec
va|.c.iv·-vea .i. i. s ia:eaea me:eassee.ai.ea-aa·e .a a|| e.:eam·
siaaeesiae. :e«a|ee.ea|meaa.ae.. e .iae.:meaa.aeiaaieaa|emace
se|i·ev.ceaiia:eaeaexo|.eai.ea. ia. seaaiaea|e. ceai.aecaea.aaac
aea.a as iae same o:eoes.i.ea. «a.ea .s e.iae: |ee.ea||v eeae:eai e:
.aeeae:eai.«ae:e.aiae|aiie:ease.ieaaaei|eexeeaiec.aiaeaa. ivei
aa aeiaa|¡acemeai i ao:eoes.i.eas«a.ea|e|eaeieeeiae:.a eaece·
ma.aaac.aiaececaei.vesvsiemsiaaieaa|emaceeaieiiaem«e
aavea:ea|mei. cea| .ceai.i.es . aacie:iaeseiae:eex.sieas.|vaace:·
siaaca|| eoess.|. | .i.es ei| asi.ae i:ac.i.eaa|.zai.ea nai o:eoes. i.eas.
| .seeiae:ea|ia:a|si:aeia:es . aooea:eaiaeseeae.aiaeie:meii:ac.·
i.ea.iaeve|a. m. seiesoeas. ie|esec.meaiai.easeiai:aia·meaa.ae
iaaieaa |e mace e:.e.aa||v se|i·ev.ceai. «ae:eas .i .s |v ae meaas
aeeessa:viaaiiaev aeiaa||vìaavesaeaameaa.ae. as.aiaeeaseei
assee. ai.ve|vce:.vecia|s.aeai.eas 1aasiae«ae| eo:ee.veacecaei.ve
se.eaee.iaeieia|svsiemeio:eoes.i.eas.aiaeaa.iveiiae.:va| .c.i.es.
.si:siea|vae| a. m«a.eaeaa|e¡asi.aecasaaexo:ess.eaeiiaea||eeec
i:aia·meaa.aeea| via:eaeaiaeaeiaa|eaoae.ivie::eaei.vai.ea
1a:eaeaia.ssiaieeiaaa.:s«eeaaaace:siaaciaeceeoe::easeaie:
iae cemaac.«a.eaaasso:eacia:eaeaeaiiaemece:aoe:. ec aac aas
aaa||v |eea eeae:a||v aceeoiec. ie: a se·ea||ec eo.sieme|ee.ea|
¯ These work to the beneft of logical method, but they remove one further and further
from the origins and make one i nsensitive to the problem of origi n and thus to the actual
ontic and truth-meaning of all these sciences.
171
The Orgin ofGeomety
e:eaac.ae ei iae se.eaees. iaeaea e| a:.iv aas aeve: |eea aea. evec
a|eai«aaiiaemaea·acm.:ecse.eaeesa:eaeiaa||v|aes.ae ·

~s

ie:ia:iae:ceia.|seaiaeao:eei.aeeiaae:.e. aa| | veeaa.aei:ac.·
i.ea. . e . eae «a.ea .ave|vece:.e.aa| se|i·ev. ceaee ai .is aeiaa| i:si
|ee. aa.ae.eaeeaaoe.aiieoess.||eaaceas. |vaace:siaaca||e:easeas
| aiaei:sie:a|eeeoe:ai.eaeiiae|ee.aa.aeeeemeie:s. iaeaeec«as
aa�e:sia

ca||v|aes.aeie:aaexaeiix.aeeicese:.oi.easeiiaeo:ese. ·
eai.ie onma| maie:.a|aaceiiae«avs.a «a.ea. .a :e|ai.ea ie ia.s
maie:.a| . eeemei:.ea|.cea|.i.esa:eseieeeiae:«.iaiae| :siax.ema·
i.e

o:eoes.i.eas ra:iae:. iae |ee.ea|saoe:si:aeia:esc.c aei vei:.se
�ea.eaiaaieaeeea|caei:eia:aaea.aaacaea.aieiaee:.e.aa|meaa·
1 09: Oaiaeeiae:

aaac.iaeoess.|.|.iveiiaeo:aei.ea|aoo| .eai.eaeiiae
cenvec| a«s. «a.ea«asaeiaa||ve|v.eas.aeeaaeei.ea«.iaiaee:.e.·
»a|c�ve|eomeais

aace:siaaca||v|ecea.es| v. .aiae:ea|meio:ax. s. ie
aaa|.iaa||vo:aei.eecmeiaeceias.aemaiaemai.es. . iaeec|e.ie|:.ae
a|eaiaseia|ia.aes 1a. smeiaeceea|caaia:a||v|eaaacecce«aevea
«.iaeai iae a|.|.iv ie: e:.e.aa| se|i·ev.ceaee 1aa s maiaemai.es
emoi.ecei

eaa.ae.eea|ceeae:a||vo:eoaeaie. ise|i.eeasiaai|v|e.a�
accec ie|oe.ea| | v. as eea|ciae meiaec.eseiieeaa.ea|aoo|.eai.eaea
iaeeiae:s.ce1aeexi:ae:c.aa:. |via:·:eaea.aeo:aei.ea|aseia|aess|e·
eameei

. ise|iama¡e:mei.veie:iaeacvaaeemeaiaacaoo:ee.ai.eaei
iaese s..ea�es 1aas

a|se .i .s aace:siaaca||e iaai iae |esi e:.e.aa|
i:aia·meaaaemace .ise|iie|i s |. ii|e. .aceec. iaai iae aeecie: iae
ee::esoeac.ae :ee:ess.ve .aea.:v aac ie |e :ea«aseaec He:e iaaa
ia.s . iaei:aeseaseeisaeaaa. aea.:vaacie|ec.seeve:ec
Oa::esa|is|aseceao:.ae.o|ea:eeiaeeae:a|.iviaaiexieacseve:a||
iae �e·ea||
�c �ecaei.ve se.eaees aac evea .ac.eaies s.m.|a: o:e||ems
aac

mvesi.eai.e
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ie:a||se.eaees re:a||eiiaemaaveiaeme|.|.ivei
sec:�eaiec i:ac.i.�asiaai a:e «e:sec aoea. aea.a aac aea.a. |vaa
aei. v.iv e�
�:e�aea

e ae« si:aeia:es eimeaa.ae aac aaac.ae iaem
ce«aÐx. si.
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mia.s«av.iaevexieaceaca:.ae|via:eaeai.me.s. aee
a

||ae«aeea.s.i.easa:e. aiansec.meaiecaac|eeeme«e:s.aemaie·
:�a| s Ðve:

«�e:e iae o:e||ems. iae e|a:.iv.ae .avesi.eai.eas. iae .a·
s.eaiseionae.o|ea:ehistorical. wesiaac«.ia.aiaeae:.zeaeiaamaa
e�v. | .zai.ea.�aeeae.a«a.ea«eea:se|vesae«|.ve wea:eeeasiaai|v.
�.ia| �ve�ase. easeiia. sae:.zea.aacsoee.aea||vasaiemoe:a|ae:.zea
. mo|.ec 1 0 ea:e.veao:eseai ae:.zea 1e iae eae aamaae.v.| .zai.ea
i�e:eee.-es

eacsesseai.a||viaeeaeea|ia:a|«e:|casiaesa::eaac.ae
|.ie·«e:|c «.ia .is oeea| . a:ì maaae:ei|e.ae. ia.s «e:|c. ie: eve:v
¯ What �oes Hume
.
do but endeavor to i nquire back into the primal impressions of
developed Ideas and, I n genera, scientifc ideas?
1 72
Edmund Husserl
a. sie:.ea|oe:.ecaace.v. |.zai.ea. aas. isoa:i.ea|a:�eai�:esaac

.so:�·
e.se|v iae i:ac.i.ea. we siaac. iaea. «.ia.a iae a.sienea| aenze� m
«a|eaeve:via.ae .s a.sie:.ea| . eveaiaeaea«e mav |ae« ve:v |. ii|e
a|ea(.i. aaceaa.ie«av. sai. i aas.isesseai.a|si:aeia:e

iaaieaa|e
:evea|ec ia:eaea meiaec.ea|. aea.:v. 1a. s.aea.:v o:es

en|es a||i�e
oess.||esoee.a|.zeceaesi.eas. iaas .ae|aa.ae.ie:iae

s..�aees. iae.�·
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1 73
The Origin ofGeomet
eeaes.s . O::aiae:. «aai.siaac±eaia||vm.sia|ea.s(ae| . m. iai.ea
ia:eaea «a.ea o:ee.se|v iae ceeoesiaac mesieeaa. aeo:e||emsei
a. sie:va:eeeaeea|ec.iieaeia.a|seve:ea:exoes.i.eas.«a.eaa:eei
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c.meas.easi . «aai iaev ma|e e|v. eas . s o:ee.se|v iaai «aai «e
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ecee eeaee:a.aeaaexie:aa|eaasa| . iv «a.eaeaeeisiaesaeeess.eaei
a. sie:.ea|eeaaea:ai.eas. as.i.i«e:e|ae«|ecee|asecea.acaei.ea.
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s.i.ese:iaea.eaes(ea|ia:e. se. eaee. siaie. eaa:ea . eeeaem.ee:eaa. ·
zai.ea. eie. i . iaai eve:v si:a.ea(ie:«a:c aace:siaac.ae ei .( as aa
exoe:.eai. a|iaei.ave|vesiae eeeease. easaess (aai. (. sseme(a. ae
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ae«me:e|v .mo|.e.i|v ee.mo|.ec(a. s meaa.ae. s. (ae:e|e|eaesie.(
(aese|i·ev. cea(oess.|.|.(veiexo|.eai.ea. ei ma|.ae.(exo|.e.( aac
e|a:.iv.ae .i. Ðve:v exo| .eai.ea aac eve:v i:aas.i.ea i:em ma|.ae
exo|.e.iiema|.aese|i·ev. ceai.eveaoe:aaos.aeases«ae:eeaesieos
maeaieeseeai . s aeia.aeeiae:iaaaa. sie:.ea| c.se|esa:e. . a.ise|i.
esseai.a|| v..i. ssemeia.aea.sie:.ea|. aacassaea.i|ea:s. «.iaesseai.a|
aeeess.iv.(aeae:.zeaei. isa. sie:v«.ia. a. ise|i1a.s. seieea:sea|se
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(.ea eo ie iae o:eseai. «a.ea .s ea: o:eseai Óò a o:eeess eiì
i:ac.i.eaa|. z.ae.ise|i. are«.ae·siai.ev.ia| .iv.1a. s . s. asaas|eeasa.c.
aaaaceie:m.aeceeae:a|.iv. |ai.iaas.ao:.ae.o|eas(:aeia:e«a.eaeaa
|emaeame:e«.ce|vexo|.eaiec|vo:eeeec.aei:emiaese.ac.ea(.eas .
a si:ae(a:e«a.eaa|see:eaacs. .mo| .es. iaeoess.|.|.i.esie:eve:v
sea:eaie:aacceie:m.aai.eaeieeae:eie.iaeiaa|siaieseiaaa.:s

Ha|.aeeeemei:vse|i·e».ceai.iaea.«aeiae:eae.se|ea:a|eaiia. s
e:aei ..siaec.se|esa:eei. isa.sie:.ea|i:ac.(.ea.sa((a. s|ae«|ecee. . i
.(. saei(e:ema.aemoivia||e:aac.ae:ea(.aieceeae:a| . (v. :eea.:es(ae
me(aec.ea|o:ecaei.ea.o:eeeec.aei:emiaeo:eseaiaacea::.ecea(as
:esea:ea.aiaeo:eseai. eic.ae:eai.aiecse|i·ev. ceaeesei(aeivoec. s·
eeve:eca|eve.. aseve:a|i:aemea(a:v. aves(.eai.easei«aai|e|eaes
iesaea|ae«|eceesaoe:ae. a||v. as.i«e:e· .Ca::.eceaisvsiemai.ea||v.
1 74
Edmund Husserl
saea se|i·ev.ceaees :esa|i .a aeia.aeeiae: aac aeia.ae| ess iaaa iae
aa.ve:sa| a o:.e:. eia.sie:v «.ia a|| .is a.ea|v a|aacaaieemoeaeai
e|emeais.
weeaaa|sesavae«iaaia.sie:v.si:emiaesia:iaeia.aeeiae:iaaa
iaev.ia|mevemeaieiiaeeeex.sieaeeaaciae. aie:«eav.aeeie:.e.aa|
ie:mai.easaacsec.meaiai.easeimeaa.ae
~avia.aeiaai.ssae«aie|eaa.sie:.ea|iaei . e.iae:.aiaeo:eseai
ia:eaeaexoe:.eaeee:|vaa. sie:.aaasaiaei.aiaeoasi. aeeessa:.|v
aas.isinner structure ofmeaning; |aiesoee.a||viaemei.vai.eaa|.aie:·
eeaaeei.eas esia||. saec a|eai.i.aie:ms eieve:vcav aace:siaac.ae
aave ceeo. ia:iae: aac ia:iae:·:eaea.ae . mo|.eai.eas «a.ea masi |e
.aie::eeaiec. c. se|esec ~|| me:e|vì iaeiaa| a. sie:v :ema. as .aeem·
o:eaeas.||e |eeaase. a|«avs me:e|v c:a«.ae .is eeae|as.eas aaive|v
aacsi:a.eaiieoa:c|vi:emiaeis. .iaeve:
,
a|esiaemai.eiae eeae:a|
e:eaac eimeaa.ae aoea «a.ea a|| saea eeae|as.eas :esi. aas aeve:
.avesi.eaieciae. mmeasesi:aeia:a|ao:.e:.«a.ea.so:eoe:ie. i Oa| v
iaec.se|esa:eeiiaeesseai.a||veeae:a|si:aeia:e·| v. ae.aea:o:eseai
aac iaea .a eve:v oasi e:iaia:e a.sie:.ea| o:eseai as saea . aac. .a
ieia| .iv.ea| viaec.se|esa:eeiiaeeeae:eie.a.sie:.ea|i.me.a«a.ea«e
| . ve ..a«a.eaea:ieia|aamaa.iv|.ves.a:esoeeiie.isieia| .esseai.a||v
eeae:a|si:aeia:e-ea|via. sc.se|esa:eeaama|eoess.||ea. sie:.ea|.a·
ea.:v [Historie] «a.ea . s i:a|v aace:siaac.ae. .as.eaiia| . aac .a iae
eeaa.aeseasese.eai.ae 1a.s.siaeeeae:eie. a.sie:.ea|ao:.e:.«a.ea
eaeemoasseseve:via.aeiaaiex. sisasa.sie:.ea||eeem.aeaacaav. ae·
|eeemee:ex.sis.a.isesseai.a||e.aeasi:ac.i.eaaacaaac.ae·ce«a.
waaiaas|eeasa.c«as:e|aiecieiaeieia|ie:m a.sie:.ea|o:eseai.a
eeae:a| . a.sie:.ea|i.meeeae:a||v.saiiaeoa:i.ea|a:eeaaea:ai.easei
ea|ia:e. «a.ea aac iae.:o|aee«.ia.a .is eeae:eai a.sie:.ea||e.aeas
i:ac.i.ea aac as v.ia||v aaac.ae iaemse|ves ce«a. aave «.ia.a ia.s
ieia|.iv ea|v :e|ai. ve|v se|i· same. eai |e.ae .a i:ac.i.eaa|.iv. ea|v iae
|e.ae ei aease|i· same.eai eemoeaeais Ce::e| ai. ve|v. ae«. aeeeaai
«ea|caaveie|eia|eaeiiaesae¡ eeiseia.sie:.e.iv.iaeoe:seas«ae
e:eaie ea|ia:a| ie:mai.eas. iaaei.ea.ae .a ieia|.iv e:eai.ve oe:seaa|
e. v.|.zai.ea ·
¯ The superfcial structure of the exteral l y " " ready-made" men wi thi n the social­
hi storical , essential structure of humanity, but also the deeper [structures] which disclose the
inner hi storicities of the persons taking part . [ "Structures" is Biemel 's interpolation. ]
t The hi storical world i s, t o be sure, frst pregiven as a social-hi storical world . But i t is
historical only through the i nner historici ty of the i ndi vidual s, who are i ndi vi dual s in thei r
i nner historicity, together wi th that of other communal i zed persons . Recall what was said
i n a few meager begi nni ng exposi ti ons about memories and the constant historicity to be
found i n them [pp. 1 62[ above] .
1 75
The Origin ofGeometry
i a:esoeeiieeeemei:veae:eeeea.zes. ae«iaai«eaaveoe.aieceai
iae a.cceaaessei. isiaacameaia|eeaeeois. «a.eaaave|eeeme.aae·
eess.||e. aac aave mace iaem aace:siaaca||e as saea .a a:si|as.e
eai|.aes. iaaiea| viaeeease.eas| vseiias|eic.seeve:.aeiiaea. sie:.·
ea|e:.e.aeieeemei:v.«.ia.aiaeieia|o:e||emeiiaeao:.e:.eia.s·
ie:.e.iv. aeeae:a|·eaao:ev.ceiaemeiaecie:aeeemei:v«a.ea.si:ae
ie.ise:.e.asaacaiiaesamei.me.sie|eaace:sieec.aaaa.ve:sa|·
a. sie:.ea|«av.aaciaesame.si:aeie:a| |se.eaees. ie:oa. |eseoav. ia
o:.ae.o| e. iaea.aa.sie:veioa.|eseoav.aa.sie:veiiaeoa:i.ea|a:se.·
eaees.aiaesiv|eeiiaeasaa|iaeiaa|a. sie:v.eaaaeiaa||v:eace:aeia·
.aeeiiae.:sa|¡eeimaiie:eemo:eaeas.||e re:a eeaa.aea. sie:v ei
oa.|eseoav.aeeaa.aea. sie:veiiaeoa:i.ea|a:se.eaees. .saeia. aeeiae:
iaaaiaei:ae.aeeiiaea. sie:.ea|meaa.ae·si:aeia:es e.vea.aiae o:e·
seai .e:iae.:se|i·ev.ceaees. a|eaeiaeceeameaieceaa.aeia. sie:.ea|
|ae|·:eie:eaees.aieiaea.cceac.¬eas.eaeiiaeo:. ¬a|se|i·ev.ceaees
«a.eaaace:|.eiaem ·Ðveaiaeve:vo:e||emae:eeaa|emaceaace:·
siaaca||eea|via:eaea:eeea:seieiaea. sie:.ea|ao:.e:.asiaeaa.ve:·
sa|sea:eeeia||eeaee.va||eo:e||emseiaace:siaac.ae. 1aeo:e||em
eieeaa.ae a.sie:.ea| exo|aaai.ea eemes ieeeiae: . .a iae ease eiiae
se.eaees . «.iaeo. sieme|ee.ea|e:eaac.aee:e|a:.| eai.ea
we masiexoeeiveiaseeeacaacve:v«e.eaive|¡eei.ear:emiae
a.sie:.e. sm«a.eao:eva.|sexieas.ve|v .ac.ae:eaiie:ms iecavì i ex·
oeei| .ii|e:eeeoi.v.ivie:aceoia·.aea.:v«a.eaeees|eveaciaeasaa|
iaeiaa|a.sie:v.asceesiaeeaeeai| .aec.aia. s«e:|.esoee.a| | vs.aee .
asiaeexo:ess.eaao:.e:. ¯.ac.eaies. .i|avse|a.mieasi:.ei|vaaeea·
c.i.eaecaaci:a|vaoec.ei.ese|i·ev. ceaeeexieac.ae|eveaca||a. sie:.·
ea|iaei.e.i.es . Oae«. | | e|¡eei «aaiaaivei-.iesee|iec.so|av. aacie
e|a. m ie aave c. so|avec. a a.sie:.ea| ao:.e:. . aa a|se|aie. saoe:iem·
oe:a|va|.c.iv.aue:«eaavee|ia.aecsaeaa|aacaaiiesi.meavie:iae
:e|ai.v.iveieve:via.aea.sie:.ea|.eia| |a. sie:.ea||vceve|eoec«e:|c·
aooe:eeoi.eas. :.eai|ae| ie iaese eiiae o:. m.i.ve i:.|es Ðve:v
oeeo|e. |a:ee e:sma|| . aas.is «e:|c.a«a.ea .ie:iaai oeeo|e .eve:v·
ia.ae ais «e||ieeeiae:. «aeiae:.amvia.ea|·mae.ea|e:.a Ða:eoeaa·
:ai.eaa| ie:ms . aac .a «a.ea eve:via.ae eaa |e exo| a.aec oe:ieei| v.
Ðve:voeeo|eaas. is| ee.eaac.aeee:c.ae| v. .iia.s|ee.e. sexo|.eaiec
.ao:eoes.i.eas. .isao:.e:. .
ue«eve:. |ei as eeas.ce:iaemeiaece|eeveiesia||. sa.aea. sie:.ea|
¯ But what counts as primal self-evidence for the sciences is determined by an edu­
cated person or a sphere of such persons who pose new questions, new historical ques­
tions, questi ons concerni ng the i nner depth-dimension as well as those concering an
external hi storicity in the social-hi storical worl d.
1 76
Edmund Husserl
iaeis.aeeae:a|. iaas .ae|ac.aeiaai eiiae iaeis saooe:i.aeiaee|]ee·
i.ea. aac|eiasceia. s.a:eea:cie«aaisaeameiaece|eevo:esao·
oeses Deesaeiiae aace:ia|.ae eia aamaa. si.e se.eaeeeiae« . i
:ea||v «as eeaia.a a o:esaooes. i.ea ia|ea ie: e:aaiec. a va|.c.iv·
e:eaacaeve:e|se:vec. aeve:maceiaemai.e.eiasi:.ei|vaaassa.|a||e
ivoeen se|i·ev. ceaee. «.iaeai«a.ea a.sie:.ea| .aea.:v «ea|c |e a
meaa.ae|esseaie:o:. se:~||eaesi.ea.aeaaccemeasi:ai.ae«a.ea. s . a
iaeasaa|seasea.sie:.ea|o:esaooesesa. sie:v [Geschichte] asiaeaa.·
ve:sa|ae:.zeaeieaesi.ea.ae. ae(exo|.e.i|v. |aisi.||as a ae:.zeaei
.mo|.e.i ee:(a|a|v. «a.ea. .a so.(e ei a|| vaeae |ae|±eaac·. aceie:·
m.aaev. .siaeo:esaooes.(. eaeia||ceie:m. aa|.|.(v.e:eia||. aieai.ea
iesee|aacieesia|| . sace(e:m. aeciaeis.
waai. sa. sie:.ea||vo:.ma:v. a.ise|t. sea:o:eseai. we a|«avsa|·
:eacv |ae«eiea:o:eseai«e:|c aac iaai«e|. ve.a .i. a|«avs sa:·
:eaacec |v aa eoea|v eac|ess ae:.zea eiaa|ae«a aeiaa|.i. es . 1a. s
|ae«.ae.asae:.zea·ee:ia.aiv.. s aeisemeia.ae|ea:aec. aei|ae«|ecee
«a.ea«aseaeeaeiaa|aacaasme:e| vsaa||ae|ie|eeemeoa:ieiiae
|ae|e:eaac.iaeae:.zea·ee:ia.aivaacie|ea|:eacviae:e.ae:ce:ie|e
eaoa||e ei|e.ae | a.c eaiiaemai.ea| | v. .i . s a|:eacv o:esaooesec .a
e:ce:iaai«eeaasee|ie|ae««aai«eceaei|ae«. ~||aei·|ae«.ae
eeaee:as(ae aa|ae«a «e:| c. «a.ea veiex.sis . aacvaaeeie:asas
«e:|c. asiaeae:.zeaeia||eaesi.easeiiaeo:eseaiaaciaas a|sea||
eaesi.eas «a.ea a:e soee.ãea||v a.sie:.ea|. 1aese a:e iae eaesi.eas
«a.eaeeaeenmea. asiaese«aeaeiaace:eaie. aiae. :eemmaaa|.zec
eeex.sieaee. aiae«e:|caaci:aasie:miaeeeasiaaiea|ia:a|iaeeeiiae
«e:|c. De «e aei |ae« ia:iae:-«e aave a|:eacv aac eeeas.ea ie
soea|eiia.s-iaaiia. sa.sie:.ea|o:eseaiaas.isa. sie:.ea|oasis|ea.ac
. i. iaai. iaasceve|eoeceaieiiaem.iaaia.sie:.ea|oasi. saeeai.aa.iv
eioasis«a.eao:eeeeci:emeaeaaeiae:.eaea. asaoasio:eseai.|e.ae
ai:ac.i.eao:ecae.aei:ac.i.eaeaiei. ise|i:De«eaei|ae«iaaiiae
o:eseaiaaciae«ae|eeia. sie:.ea|i.me. mo|.ec. a. i. siaaieiaa. sie:.·
ea||veeae:eaiaacaa.ãece.v.| .zai.ea. eeae:eaiia:eaea. iseeae:ai.ve
|eacaaceeasiaai eemmaaa| .zai.ea . aea|i.vai.ae «aai aasa|:eacv
|eeaea|i.vaiec |eie:e. «aeiae:.a eeeoe:a(.ve «e:| e: .a :ee.o:eea|
. aie:aei.ea.eie. :Deesa||ia.saeiaaaeaaeeaaa.ve:sa||ae«.aeei
(aeae:.zea. aa . mo|.e.i |ae«.ae(aaieaa|e maceexo|.e.isvsiemai·
.ea|| v.a. isesseai.a|si:aeia:e:i s aeiiae:esa|(.aee:eaio:e||emae:e
(aeae:.zeaie«a:c«a.eaa||eaesi.eas(eac.aac(aas (aeae:.zea«a.ea
.so:esaooesec.aa||eiiaem:~eee:c.ae|v. «eaeecaeiã:sieaie:.aie
seme|.aceie:.i.ea|c. seass. eaeiiaeiaeis seieai|va.sie:.e.sm. .(. s
eaeaea(aa(evea(aee|a. meiiae.:iae(aa|aesso:esaooeses(aea. s(e:. ·
ea|ao:.e:..iia. se|a.m.sieaaveameaa.ae
1 77
The Origin of Geomety
saiacea|ia:.sesa||iaesame. 1aeae:.zea·exoes.i.eaie«a.ea«e
:eea::ec masiaei|eece«a . avaeae. saoe:ãe.a|ia| |. . imasi.(se|t
a::. veai.(se«ase:ieise.eai.ãec.se.o|.ae.1aeseaieaees. a«a.ea.i. s
exo:essecmasi|eãxecaaceaoa||eei|e.aemacese|i·ev. ceaiaea.a
aacaea.a. 1a:eaea «aai meiaecce «ee|(a.a a aa.ve:sa| aaca|se
ãxecao:.e:.eiiaea. sie:.ea|«e:|c«a.ea. sa|«avse:.e.aa||veeaa. ae:
waeaeve:«eeeas.ce:. i. weãacea:se|ves«. ia iaese|i· ev.ceaiea·
oae. ivie:eree(-ieia:aieiaeae:.zeaaacieoeae(:aie.i. aaaexoe·
s.ie:v«av. sai«ea| seaave .aac|ae«iaai«eaave. iaeeaoae.ivei
eemo|eiei:eecemiei:aasie:m. .aiaeaeaiaacoaaaiasv. ea:aamaa
a.sie:.ea| ex. sieaee aac «aai .s iae:e exoesec as .is |.ie·«e:|c. ~ac
o:ee.se|v.aia.saei.v.iveii:eeva:.ai.ea. aac.a:aaa.aeia:eaeaiae
eeaee. va||eoess.|.|.i.esie:iae|.te·«e:|c.iae:ea:.ses. «.iaaoec.ei.e
se|i·ev.ceaee. aaessea(.a||veeae:a|seieie|emeaisee.aeia:eaeaa||
iaeva:.aais . aaceiia.s«eeaaeeav.aeeea:se|ves«.iai:a|vaoec.ei.e
ee:ia.aiv.1ae:e|v«eaave:emeveceve:v|eacieiaeiaeiaa||vva| .c
a. sie:.ea|«e:|caacaave:eea:cecia.s«e:|c. ise|ime:e|vìaseaeei
iaeeeaeeoiaa|oess.|.|.(.es. 1a. si:eecem. aaciaec.:ee(.eaeiea:eaze
aoea(aeaoec.ei.ea||v. ava:.aai. :esa|is.aiae|aiie:aea.aaacaea.a-
«.iaiaese|i·ev.ceaeeei|e.aea||eie:eoeaiiae. ava:.aaisi:aeia:ea(
«.||-as«aai.s. ceai.ea| .«aaieaa|emacese|i·ev.ceaiorgin aliter ai
aavi.me. eaa|eãxec.aaa. veea||aaeaaeeasiaeesseaeeeeas(aai|v
. mo|.ec.a(aere«.ae.v.ia|ae:.zea
1a:eaeaia.sme(aec.ee.ae|eveaciaeie:ma|eeae:a|. i. es«eexa.|·
.iecea:|.e:. «eeaaa|sema|eiaemai.eiaaiaoec.ei.easoeeiìeiiae
o:ese.eai.ãe «e:|c iaai iae e:.e.aa| ieaace: eieeeme(:v aac ai a. s
c. soesa| . iaai «a. ea mas( aave se:vec as (ae maie:.a| ie: a.s
.cea|.zai.eas.
Oeemei:vaaciaese. eaeesmesie|ese|v:e|aiec(e. iaaveiece«. ia
soaee·i. meaaciaesaaoes. ãea:es. a|sesaaoeseime(.ea. a|(e:ai.easei
ceie:mai.ea. eie . . iaaia:e oess.||e«.ia.asoaee·(.me. oa:i.ea|a:|vas
measa:a||emaea.iaces. ii. sae«e|ea:iaa(evea.i«e|ae«a| mes(
aeia.aea|ea(iaea.sie:.ea| sa::eaac.ae«e:|cei(aeã:sieeeme(e:s.
(a.smaea. see:ia.aasaa.ava:.aa(. e sseai.a|si:aeia:e. (aa(. s«asa
«e:|ceiia.aes ..ae|ac. aeiaeaamaa|e.aes(aemse|vesassa|¡ee(s
ei ia.s «e:|c· . (aai a|| ia.aes aeeessa:.|v aac ie aave a |ec.|v
eaa:aeie:-a|(aeaea aei a|| ia.aes eea|c |e me:e |ec.es. s.aee (ae
aeeessa:.|veeex. si.aeaamaa|e.aesa:eaeiia.a|a||easme:e|ec. es
aac. | .|eeveaiaeea|(a:a|e|¡ee(s«a.ea|e|eae«. (a(aemsi:ae(a:a||v.
a:eaeiexaaasiec . aee:oe:ea| |e.ae. waa(. sa|see|ea:. aaceaa|e
seea:ecai|eas(.a. (sesseai.a|aae|easia:eaeaea:eia|ao:.e:.exo|.ea·
(.ea. . s(aa((aeseoa:e |ec. esaacsoai.e(emoe:a| saaoesaac ma(e·
1 78
Edmund H usserl
:.a| [stoiiche] eaa|.(.es.ee|e:.«a:m(a.«e.ea(.aa:caess.e(e. · :e|a(ec
(e(aem. ra:(ae:. . (.se|ea:(aa(.a (ae|.ieeio:ae(.ea|aeecsee:(a.a
oa:(.ea|a:.za(.easeisaaoes(eecea(aac(aa(a(eeaa.ea|o:ax.sa|«avs
a.mec a(i (aeo:ecae(.eaeioa:(.ea|a:o:eie::ec saaoes aac(ae . m·
o:evemea(ei(aemaeee:c.ae(eee:(a.ac.:ee(.easeie:acaa|aess.
r.:s((e|es.ae|ecea(i:em(ae(a.ae·saaoesa:esa:iaees-me:ee:
|esssmee(a. me:ee:|essoe:iee(sa:iaees .ecees. me:ee:|ess:eaea
e:ia.:|vevea .. ae(ae:«e:cs. me:ee:|essoa:e|. aes. aae|es. me:e
e: | ess oenee( oe.a(s . (aea. aea.a. ameae (ae |. aes. ie: examo|e.
s(:a.ea(| .aesa:eesoee.a||vo:eie::ec.aacameae(aesa:iaees(aeevea
sa:iaees . ie:examo| e. ie: o:ae(.ea| oa:oeses |ea:cs| .m.(ec|v evea
sa:iaees. s(:a.ea( |.aes. aac oe. a(s a:e c:eie::ec. «ae:eas(e(a||v e:
oa:(.a||vea:vec sa:iaeesa:e aaces.:a||eie:maav |.acseio:ae(.ea|
.a(e:es(s. 1aas (ae o:ecae(.ea eieveasa:iaeesaac (ae.:oe:iee(.ea
.oe| .sa.ae·a|«avso|avs.(s:e|e. ao:ax. s. sea|se. aeases«ae:e]as(
c.s(:.|a(.ea .s .a(eacec. ue:e (ae :eaea es(.ma(e ei maea. (aces .s
(:aasiemec. a(e(aemeasa:emea(eimaea. (aces|veeaa(.ae(aeeeaa|
oa:(s . .ue:e. (ee. o:eeeec.aei:em (aeiae(aa| . aaessea(.a|ie:m|e·
eemes:eeeea.za||e(a:eaeaame(aeceiva:.a(.ea. · Heasa:.ae|e|eaes
(e eve:v ea|(a:e. va:v.aeea|v aeee:c.ae (e s(aeesi:emo:.m.(.ve(e
a.eae:oe:iee(.eas. weeaa a|«avso:esaooese sememeasa:.ae(eea·
a.eae. «ae(ae: ei a |e«e: e: a.eae: (voe. .a (ae essea(.a| ie:«a:c
ceve|eomea(eiea|(a:e. as «e|| asi (aee:e«(aeisaeaa(eeaa.eae.
(aasa|se .ae|ac.ae(ae a:(eices.¬ie:|a. |c.aes.eisa:vev.aeae|cs.
oa(a«avs. e(e . · saea a (eeaa.eae .s a|«avs a|:eacv (ae:e. a|:eacv
a|aacaa(| vceve|eoecaaco:ee.vea(e(aeoa.|eseoae:«aec.cae(ve(
|ae«eeeme(:v|a(«aesaea| c|e eeaee. va||e as .(s.avea(e:. ~sa
oa.|eseoae:o:eeeec.aei:em(aeo:ae(.ea| .ã a.(esa::eaac.ae«e:|c.ei
(ae:eem. (ae e.(v. (ae|aacseaoe. e(e . aac (emoe:a||v (ae «e:|c ei
oe:.ec.ea|eeea::eaees . cav.mea(a.e(e · (e(ae(aee:e(.ea|«e:|c·v.e«
aac«e:|c·|ae«|ecee . aeaas(aeã a.(e|v|ae«aaacaa|ae«asoaees
aac(.mesasia. (ee|emea(s«.(a.a(aeae:.zeaeiaaeoea.aaa.(v na(
«.(a(a.saeceesae(ve(aaveeeeme(:.ea|soaee. ma(aema(.ea|(.me.
aac«aa(eve:e|se.s (e |eeemeaaeve| so.:.(aa|o:ecae(ea(ei(aese
ã a.(e e|emea(s «a.ea se:ve as ma(e:.a| . aac «.(a a.s maa.ie|c ia.(e
saaoes.a(ae.:soaee·(.meaeceesae(ve(aaveeeeme(:.ea|saaoes . (ae
oae:eaem.esaaoes. a.ssaaoes. asiie:ma(.easceve|eoecea(eio:ax. s
aac(aeaea(ei.a (e:mseie:acaa|i,e:iee(.ea. e|ea:|v se:ve ea|v as
`' Bi emei ' s interpolation.
� "I have reverted to the original version of this sentence as given in the critica ap­
paratus; I can make no sense of the emended version given in the text . "-D. Carr.
1 79
The Origin ofGeomety
|ases

ie:aae« se:(eio:ax.sea(ei«a.eas.m.|a:|vaamecae«eea·
s(:ae(|ease:e«.
i( .sev.cea( .aacvaaee (aa( (a.sae« se:(eieeas(:ae(.ea«.|||ea
�:ecae(

a:.s.ae

ea(eia� .cea|.z.ae. so.:.(aa|ae( . eaeeioa:e(a.a|·
ae. «a.eaaas

.(sma(ena|s.a(aeces.eaa(eceeae:a|o:ee.veasei(a. s
�ae(a
.
�|aamaa.(vaacaamaasa::eaac.ae«e:|caace:ea(es.cea|e|·
·ee(s ea(ei(aem.
Ne«(aeo:e||em«ea|c|e(ec.seeve:.(a:eaea:eeea:se(e«aa(. s
essea(.a|

(e a.s(e:v [Historie], (ae a. s(e:.ea| e:.e.aa| meaa.ae «a.ea
aeeessan| � «as�||� (e e.ve aac c.c e.ve (e (ae «ae|e |eeem.ae ei
eeeme(:v.(soe:s.s(ae(:a(a·meaa.ae
i(.s

eio�:(�ea|a:. moe:(aaeeae«(e|:.ae.a(eieeasaaces(a||.sa(ae
ie||e«aeas.ea(. Oa|v .i(ae aoec.e(.ea||v eeae:a| eea(ea(. .ava:.aa(
(a:eaea

ea(a||e

eaee. va||eva:.a(.ea. ei(ae soa(.e(emoe:a| soae:e ei
s

aaoes

.s(a|

eaa(e aeeeaa(.a(ae.cea| .za(.eaeaaaa .cea|eeas(:ae·
(. eaan�e«a.eaeaa|eaace:s(eecie:a| |ia(a:e(. meaac|va||eem.ae
eeae:a(.eas ei mea aac (aas|e eaoa||e ei|e.ae aaacec ce«a aac
:eo

:ecaeec«.(a(ae. cea(.ea|.a(e:sa|] ee(.vemeaa.ae1a.seeac.(.ea.s
va|.cia:|eveaceeeme(:vie:a||so. :.(aa|s(:ae(a:es«a.eaa:e(e|e
aaeeac.(.eaa||vaaceeae:a||veaoa||eei|e.aeaaacecce«awe:e(ae
(�.a|.

ae�e(.v

.(veiase.ea(.s((e.a(:ecaeeseme(a.ae(.me·|eaac.a
a. s(aa|ae.. . e. . seme(a.ae|eaac(e«aa(.sme:e|viae(aa|a|ea(a.s
o:esea( or seme(a.aeva|.cie: a. mas ame:e|viae(aa| (:ac.(.ea. a.s
ee

as(:ae(.�a«ea|c| . |e«.seaavea¬e:e|v(.me·|eaacea(.emeaa.ae.
(a.smeaaae«ea|c|eaace:s(aaca||eea|v|v(aese¬ea «aesaa:ec
(aes�meme:e|viae(aa|o:esaooes.(.easeiaace:s(aac.ae

i(.s aeea

era|eeav.e(.ea (aa( eeeme(:v. «.(a a|| .(s (:a(as. .sva|.c
w.(aaaeeac.(.e

aec�eae:a|.(vie:a||mea.a||(.mes. a||oeeo| es. aacae(
me:e| vie:

�||a. s(ene�||v

iae(aa|eaes|a(ie:a||eeaee.va||eeaes 1ae
o:esaooes.(.eas eionae. o|e ie:(a.s eeav.e(.ea aave aeve: |eea ex·
o|e:ec|eeaase(aevaaveaeve:|eease:.eas| vmaceao:e||e¬ na(.(
aas

a|se|eee�ee|ea:(eas(aa(eve:ves(a|| .samea(eiaa. s(e:.ea|iae(
�a.e� |avse|a.m(eaaeeac.(.eaece|]ee(. v. (v|. |e«.seo:esa,,eses(a.s
. avanaa(e:a|se|a(eao:.e:.
?a| v(a:eae? (aec.se|esa:eei(a.sao:.e:. i eaa(ae:e|eaaao:.e:.
s.. eae

e ex(eac¬e |eveac a|| a.s(e:.ea| iae(.e.(.es. a|| a.s(e:.ea| sa:·
:e�acae «e:|cs. oeeo|es. (.¬es. e.v.| .za(.eas . ea| v.a (a.s«av eaaa
s..eaeeasaetera veritas ao,ea:Oa| vea(a.siaacamea(.s|asec(ae
se�a:eceaoae.(� ei.aea.:.ae|aesi:em(ae(emoe:a:. | vce,| e(ecse| i·
e».ceaeeeias..eaee(e(ae ,:.¬a| se|i·ev.ceaees

-; Bi emel ' s interpolation.
180
Edmund Husserl
De«eae(s(aacae:e|eie:e(aee:ea(aaco:eieaaco:e||em·ae:.zea
ei:easea. (ae same :easea (aa(iaae(. eas . aeve:v maa. (aeanimal
rationale, aema((e:ae«o:.m.(.veae. s:
1a. s. sae((aeo|aee(eoeae(:a(e.a(e(aeseceo(as(aemse|ves .
i aaav ease. «eeaaae«:eeeea.ze i:ema||(a.s(aa(a. s(e:.e. sm.
«a.ea «.saes (e e|a:.iv (ae a.s(e:.ea| e: eo. s(eme|ee.ea| esseaee ei
ma(aema(.esi:em(aes(aacoe.a(ei(aemae.ea|e. :eams(aaeese:e(ae:
maaae:seiaooe:eeo(.eaeia(.me·|eaace. v. |. za(.ea. .s m. s(a|ea.a
o:.ae.o|e. re: :emaa(.e so.:.(s (ae mv(a.ea|·mae.ea| e|emea(s ei(ae
a.s(e:.ea|aaco:ea.s(e:.ea|asoee(seima(aema(.esmav|eoa:(.ea|a:|v
a((:ae(. ve. |a( (e e| .ae (e (a. s me:e| v a. s(e:.ea|| v iae(aa| asoee( ei
ma(aema(.es. so:ee.se|v(e|eseeaese|i(ease:(ei:emaa(.e. smaac(e
eve:|ee|(aeeeaa. aeo:e||em.(ae.a(e:aa|·a.s(e:.ea|o:e||em.(aeeo.s·
(eme|ee.ea|o:e||em. ~|se. eae s eazee|v.eas|veaaae((aea|eeeme
i:ee(e:eeeea.ze(aa(iae(.e.(. eseieve:v(voe.. ae|ac.ae(aese.ave|vec
.a (ae a.s(e:.e.s(ìe|¡ee(.ea. aavea :ee( .a(ae essea(.a| s(:ae(a:eei
«aa(. seeae:a||vaamaa.(a:eaea«a.eaa(e|ee|ee.ea|:easea:aaa.ae
(a:eaeaea(a||a. s(e:.e.(vaaaeaaees.(se|i.w.(a(a. s.s:evea|ecase(ei
o:e||ems. a.(se«a:.ea(:e|a(ec(e(ae(e(a|.(veia.s(e:vaac(e(aeia||
meaa.ae«a.eaa|(.ma(e|ve. ves.(. (saa.(v.
ii(ae asaa|iae(aa|s(acveia. s(e:v.aeeae:a|.aac.aoa:(.ea|a:(ae
a.s(e:v«a.ea. ames(:eeea((.mes aasaea.evec(:aeaa.ve:sa|ex(ea·
s.eaeve:a||aamaa.(v. .s(eaaveaavmeaa.aea(a|| . saeaameaa.ae
eaaea|v|ee:eaacecaoea«aa(«eeaaae:eea||.a(e:aa|a.s(e:v.aac
assaeaaoea(aeieaaca(.easei(aeaa.ve:sa|a. s(e:.ea|ao:.e:. .saeaa
meaa. aeaeeessa:.|v|eacsia:(ae:(e(ae. ac.ea(eca.eaes(eaes(.eaeia
aa.ve:sa|(e|ee|eevei:easea.
ii. ar(e:(aeseexoes.(.eas. «a.eaaave.||am.aa(ecve:v eeae:a|aac
maav·s.ceco:e||em·ae:.zeas . «e| avce«a(aeie||e«.aeasseme(a. ae
eemo|e(e|vseea:ec.aame| v. (aa( (aeaamaasa::eaac.ae«e:|c.s(ae
same(ecavaaca|«avs. aac(aas a| se. a:esoee((e«aa(.s:e|evaa((e
o:.ma|es(a||. samea(aac| as(.ae(:ac.(.ea.(aea«eeaasae«.aseve:a|
s(eos. ea|v. a aa exo|e:a(e:v «av. .a eeaaee(.ea «. (a ea:e«a sa:·
:eaac.ae«e:|c.«aa(saea|c|eeeas.ce:ec.ame:ece(a.|ie:(aeo:e|·
|em ei (ae .cea| .z.ae o:. ma| es(a||ísamea( ei (ae meaa.ae·s(:ae(a:e
eeeme(:v
Coda
contrapunctus and translation
[ ¯ ¯ ¯ ]
In the Erste Untersuchung of The Trial Joseph K. "thought he re­
marked that the si lent Exami ning Magi strate, wi th a look to someone in
the crowd, just gave a sign rein Zeichen] . " K. cal l s it .. 'a secret si gn' "
( "ein geheimes Zeichen" ) , but because he has interrupted the si gn be­
fore any response , because he has intervened "prematurel y, " punctu­
ated the scene vorzeitig, untimel y, wi th his suspicion and wi th his "be­
trayal " before the si lent Examining Magistrate , the "meani ng of the
si gn, " its Bedeutung, cannot be known. Joseph K. "abandons quite de­
liberately" learni ng the secret si gn' s signifcance with hi s betrayal and
punctuation. Yet the punctuation begi ns with accepting responsi bi l ity
for the sign. In the interrupti on, K. " 'empowers' " ( "ermachtige" ) the
Exami ni ng Magi strate to speak with words , not wi th secret signs (Franz
Kafka, Der Prozej [Frankfurt am Mai n: Fi scher, 1 979] : 42; The Trial,
trans . Wi l l a and Edwi n Muir [New York: Schocken, 1 974] : 44).
Accepting the responsibi l i ty of the secret sign , wi thout response , in
order to empower with words-the rhythm of the interruption.
How am I to punctuate my reading of thi s text I transl ated over el even
years ago? Wi l l any punctuation be timely or in rhythm? Or is punctua­
tion always vorzeitig? Can the responsibi l i ty for such a punctuation be
intentional ly assumed and the meaning abandoned in favor of another
meani ng?
My responsibil ity i s the responsibi l ity of the transl ator.
|¯ ¯ ¯ I
Thi s frst extended publication of Derrida ( 1 962) i ncl udes hi s transla­
tion of Husserl ' s Origin of Geometr. In one sense, I would say Derrida
has del iberatel y abandoned any other transl ations . Yet in another sense,
I would say Derrida has never fni shed transl ating; he continues to trans­
late, cl ai mi ng that "the question of deconstruction is also through and
through the question of transl ati on" (Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese
Friend, " trans . Davi d Wood and Andrew Benjami n, i n Derrida and
184
John P. Leavey
"Dijerance, " ed. David Wood and Robert Berasconi [Evanston:
Northwester University Press , 1 988] : 1 ) or frequently using transl ation
as the lever for intervening in a textual fel d, as he states, for exampl e,
concering his use of transl ation in reading Heidegger on the hand:
I am doing so for two reasons. On the one hand, in order not to eface the
constraints or the chances of the idiom in which I myselwork, teach, read,
or write . . . . On the other hand, I thought that Heidegger' s text could be
still more accessible, could gain some supplementar readability by reach­
ing us through a third ear; the explication (Auseinandersetzung) with one
tongue extra can refne our translation C
U
bersetzung) of the text that is
called " original. " . . . one can write on the typewriter, as I have done,
with three hands among three tongues. ( "Geschlecht I: Heidegger's
Hand, " trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. , in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The
Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis [Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1 987J: 1 96n)
In Derrida's translation of Husserl ' s text, L' origine de la geometrie
(2nd ed. [Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1 974]), there is a note
concering the transl ator' s task. It reads: "We have strived to preserve in
our transl ation the very spontaneous rhythm of Husserl ' s phrasing, even
when it is greatly marked by the incompletion of the sketch. For reasons
of cl arity, however, we have had to modify on two or three occasions the
original text' s punctuation . . . " (p. 1 73n). This note, which occurs i n
that strange space between the title and the body of the text, that strange
space of the transl ator, states an almost traditional desire of the transla­
tor, the desire for fdel ity, for matching the original and the transl ation
not simply in sense, but also in rhythm. The rhythm of the phrasing i s
connected with punctuation, which required some infdelity in favor of
clarity, in favor of, then, the fdelity of sense. This transl ator' s dilemma
i s also the reader' s.
How is one to punctuate a text? a corpus? here, now, Derrida's text?
his corpus? Have I intercepted too early, in an untimely way, a secret
sign? Am I l ike Joseph K. then to accept responsibility for this untimely
designation and empower another signifcance-for example, that this
"frst" piece is to be read as the germ of al l the rest of Derrida's work? or
that it is to be read as a youthful work without much interest for reading
the mature Derrida, for reading the true signifcance of the text? or that it
is to be read as more philosophical than the later, more l iterary texts? or
that this is a preambul atory text, preambulatory to deconstruction?
The punctuation of a corpus raises many difculties . First, the desig­
nation "corpus" i s often understood as an attempt to unify a group of
texts signed by an author, movement, or time period. As of 1 988 the
185
Coda
corpus of Derrida is de facto incomplete, which would disrupt any move
to unity. Second, unl ike certain readers (for example, phenomenol ogi­
cal , hermeneutic , dialogic, or new critical) that claim just the opposite
and close the corpus in any act of reading, a transl ator argues that a
corpus remains incomplete, marked by transl ation as in need of transla­
tion, even upon the death of the author, the more common closure of a
corpus . In other words , transl ation marks the incompletion of any
corpus and concentrates the problems of reading. The transl ator wants to
punctuate for clarity, for reasons of cl arity, and wants to take respon­
sibility, deliberately, for the punctuation that punctuates too early or too
late, because the del ay of cl arity to itself is precisely rhythm, punctua­
tion, counterpoint.
Derrida himself has punctuated this text and his corpus at least three
times . The frst is the 1 967 punctuation of Positions ( see pp. 7-9 above).
A second is the 1 982 punctuation of Joyce, of "Joyce' s ghost . . . al­
ways coming on board" in the corpus . In this punctuation, Derrida says,
"at the very centre" of the Introduction t o The Origin ojGeometr, there
is the comparison of Husserl and Joyce, "two great model s" or "para­
digms" on the "rel ationship between l anguage and history" that "try to
recapture a pure historicity. "
To do this, Husserl proposes to render language [langageJ as transparent
as possible, univocal, limited to what, by being transmittable or able to be
placed in tradition, thereby constitutes the only condition of a possible his­
toricity. From this point of view it is necessar that some minimal read­
ability, an element of univocity, an analyzable equivocit resist the Joycean
overload and condensationfor a reading to begin to take place, and the
work's legacy . . . . The other great paradigm would be the Joyce of Fin­
negans Wake. He repeats and mobilizes and babelizes the asymptotic total­
ity of the equivocal. He makes this both his theme and his operation. He
tries to make outcrop, with the greatest possible synchrony, at great speed,
the greatest power of the meanings buried in each syllabic fragment, sub­
jecting each atom of writing to fssion in order to overload the unconscious
with the whole memory of man . . . . This generalized equivocality of writ­
ing does not translate one language into another on the basis of common
cores of sense . . . ; it talks several languages at once, parasitizing
them . . . . (Ulysse gramophone: deux mots pour Joyce [Paris: Galilee,
1 987J: 27-28; "Two Words for Joyce, " trans. Geof Bennington, in Post­
structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French, ed. Derek Attridge and Daniel
Ferrer [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 984J: 149 [modiedJ)
The third punctuation is Derrida's 1 980 thesis "defense" : "The Time
of a Thesi s: Punctuations" (in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Al an
186
John P. Leavey
Montefore [Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1 983] ) . In rela­
tion to the thesi s sur travaux, Derrida punctuates into three periods: ( 1 )
from 1 968 to 1 974 the thesi s was neglected as other works were pub­
l i shed; (2) from 1 974 to sometime in 1 979-80, he thought , "rightly or
wrongly, that it was neither consistent nor desirable to be a candidate for
any new academic title or responsibi l ity" (p. 48) ; (3) during 1 980 and af­
ter, the thesis sur travaux i s accepted and the position of Directeur i s
taken at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Prior to the
punctuation of the thesi s , other punctuations abound. From 1 963 to
1 968 , after the Introduction to The Origin of Geometr, after the frst
thesis on "The ideal i ty of the l iterary object" (Jean Hyppol i te directed),
and after the Memoire on "the problem of genesi s in the phenomenol­
ogy of Husserl " (Maurice de Gandi l l ac "watched over this work" as the
"entire examination committee" [p+ 39]) , there i s the working out of "a
sort of strategic device . . . an unclosed, unenclosable, not whol l y for­
mal i zable ensemble of rules for readi ng, interpretation and writi ng" (p.
40) .
Derrida punctuates the Introduction to The Origin of Geometr du­
al l y. He states in his thesi s defense:
Naturally, all of the problems worked on in the Introduction to The Origin
of Geometry have continued to organize the work I have subsequently at­
tempted in connection with philosophical, literary and even non-discursive
corpora, most notably that of pictorial works: I am thinking, for example,
of the historicity of ideal objects, of tradition, of inheritance, offliation or
of wills and testaments, of archives, libraries, books, of writing and living
speech, of the relationships between semiotics and linguistics, of the ques­
tion of truth and of undecidability, of the irreducible otherness that divides
the sel-identity of the living present, of the necessity for new analyses con­
cerning non-mathematical idealities. (Pp. 39-0)
But this punctuation of the corpus (a punctuation sets up a rhythm of
work and organi zation to the corpus , to the movement of the body of
work) is punctuated again, contrapunctus . In di scussing later texts
(those after 1 974), Derrida says: "I should have liked i n thi s respect to
have been able to shape both my di scourse and my practice, as one says,
t o ft the premises of my earl ier undertakings. In fact , if not i n principle,
this was not al ways easy, not always possibl e, at times indeed very bur­
densome in a number of ways" (p. 49). Whi le the Introduction to The
Origin oJGeometr provided the organization for the subsequent work,
this punctuation marks itself as di srupted in fact if not in principle, with
the burden of its rhythm not always possible: thi s thesis defense, which
187
Coda
as desire "delights in being without defence, " which i s desi gnated as a
captatio, that i s, a quest or the disrupted question, thi s thesi s defense
"has been also as i mpoveri shed as a punctuation mark, rather, I should
say, an apostrophe in an unfni shed text" (p. 50).
How to punctuate now? Should I, as a transl ator, alter just a few occa­
sions for clarity, for the sake of the rhythm? As one way of punctuating
thi s text, of punctuating the transl ation of thi s piece, I want to read the
responsibi l ity of translation for Husserl by reading a note with two sig­
ni fcant punctuati ons of Derrida, those of translation and l i terature, the
frst being, as we have seen, the "question" of thi s corpus and the sec­
ond, as Derrida points out i n his punctuations , being his " most constant
interest" ( "my most constant interest , coming even before my philo­
sophical interest I should say, if thi s i s possible, has been directed to­
wards l iterature , towards that writing which i s called l iterary" [ "Time
of a Thesi s , " p. 37]) . . .
|¯ ¯ ¯ !
In The Origin oJGeometry, in the passage distinguishing geometrical
existence from psychic exi stence, Husserl states that "from i ts primal
establ i shment" geometrical exi stence is "objectively there for 'every­
one' [objektiv Dasezendem Jur 'jedermann' ] ' ' ' is "an existence [Da­
sein] which i s pecul iarly supertemporal [eigenartig uberzeitliches] and
which-of thi s we are certain-is accessible [zugingliches] to all
men. " The objectivity of this exi stence i s "an ' ideal ' objecti vity, " which
i s "proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cul tural worl d
[geistigen Erzeugnissen der Kulturwelt] , to which not only al l scienti fc
constructions and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example,
the constructions of fine l i terature [die Gebilde der schonen Litera­
fur] . " Husserl goes on to diferentiate thi s objectivity from that of tool s
or architecture, which, whil e they "have repeatabil ity in many l i ke ex­
empl ars [gleichen Exemplaren] , " do not have the identical sameness of
ideal objectivity, whi ch transl ation guarantees: "The Pythagorean theo­
rem, all of geometry, exi sts only once, no matter how often or even in
what language it may be expressed. It is identical l y the same in the ' orig­
inal l anguage' [ ' originalen Sprache' ] of Eucl i d and i n all ' transl ations'
[ ' Ubersetzungen' ] ; and withi n each l anguage i t i s again the same, no
matter how many times i t has been sensibly uttered, from the original
expression and writing-down to the innumerable oral utterances or writ­
ten and other documentations" (p. 1 60 above; Husserl , Die Krisis der
europiischen WissenschaJten und die transzendenfale Phinomeno-
188
John P. Leavey
logie, ed. WaIter Bi emel , vol . 6 of Husserliana: Edmund Husserl: Ges­
ammelte Werke [The Hague: Nijhof, 1 954] : 367-68). D'Amico, in
"Husser! on the Foundational Structures of Natural and Cultural Sci­
ences , " states that the diference i s that between the signifer and the sig­
nifed: "In this context HusserI makes the di stinction between the ' sensi­
ble u�terance' or means of expression (signifer) and the meaning of
what I S asserted or said (signifed). The ideal object i s at the level of the
signifed as a thematic assertion or meaning. The signifer would be the
historically contingent vehicle for the signifed (for example, a certain
written or spoken language or set of signs and symbol s). The signifer
can be replaced with no loss of ideal ity or meaning since that aspect of
the sign i s fundamentally arbitrar. Ideality means, on the contrary, that
the object sufers no l oss of original self-evidence" (Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 42 [ 1 98 1 -82] : 1 0).
But insofar as geometry i s a problem of tradition, there arises the
question of the diference between the repeatabil ity of the same and the
l ike, in D'Amico's terms , "between ideality and the corruption of cul­
tural transmission, " or in more general terms , of the "authenticity" of
the repetition (p. 1 0), which i s the cri si s of the European sciences . In a
note added by Husser! to Fink' s typescript of Husserl 's text, a note with a
number of mi sreadings and appended to the sentence that ends "con­
structions of fne l iterature, " a response is begun by means of transla­
tion, which is responsible for the diference or authenticity of the repeti­
tion. The translation by David Carr reads (p. 1 60n above):
But the broadest concept of literature encompasses them all [the scientifc
constructions, the sciences themselves, and the constructions of literature J;
that is, i t belongs to their objective being that they be linguistically ex­
pressed and can be expressed again and again; or, more precisely, they
have their objectivity, their existence-for-everone, only as signication, as
the meaning of speech. [D'Amico mistakenly modifes this to read: " 'or
more precisely, they only have meaning and signifcance from the speech of
objectivity (Reden die ObjektiviHit), as they have existencejor-everone' "
( '"Husserl, " p. J J ). Husserl writes (Krisis, p. 368n): "nur als Bedeutung,
SInn von Reden die Objektivitat , das Fir-jedermann-Dasein zu haben" :
only as meaning, as the sense of speech does it belong to their objective be­
ing to have objectivity, existencejor-everone. J This is true in a peculiar
fashion in the case of the objective sciences:for them the diierence between
the original language of the work and its translation into other languages
does not remove its identical accessibility or change it into an inauthentic,
indirect accessibilit.
189
Goa
In this translation, the l ast l i ne seems i n l ine with Husserl ' s text. In the
objective sciences, the diference between the original and the transl a­
tion does not remove access to the identical sense of the original expres­
sion, the transl ation does not make the accessibility inauthentic (un­
eigentlichen) or indirect (indirekten). D'Amico notes that the "use of
' inauthentic' in the above quote suggests the problem raised about the
di stortion or l oss that haunts the replication of cultural forms" ( "Hus­
ser! , " p. 1 1 ).
Derrida, however, fol lows Husserl ' s text and transl ates the l ast line in
j ust the opposite sense: "ou plutot la rend seulement indirecte, non ex­
presse" (L' origine, p. 1 79n). That i s, in the objective sciences (die ob­
jektiven Wissenschaften, a narrower category than literature in general),
the transl ation diference does not remove access to the identical sense
of the original expression, rather it renders the access only indirect, in­
di stinct, inauthentic, improper (bzw. nur zu einer uneigentlichen, indi­
rekten macht [Krisis, 368n] ).
Husser! seems of two mi nds here: translatability guarantees the same
sense in geometry (the Pythagorean theorem is "identically the same" in
the original language and al l "translations") and yet the diference be­
tween transl ation and original renders the accessibility to that identical
sameness (ideal object), indirect, inauthentic, improper, indi stinct. The
counterpoint of these two minds i s the double bind of history for Hus­
ser! , as we shal l see.
Derrida highl ights this note in the Introduction:
In an important note, Husserl specifes that "the broadest concept of litera­
ture" ( 1 60) comprises all idealformations, since, in order to be such, they
must always be capable of being expressible in discourse and translatable,
directly or not, from one language into another. In other words, idealfor­
mations are rooted only in language in general, not in the factuality of lan­
guages and their particular linguistic incarnations. (P. 66; my emphasis)
"Directly or not" establi shes the l imits of transl atabil ity of ideal forma­
tions (or constructions, in Carr's transl ation) in "the broadest concept of
l iterature. " Derrida remarks the translatabi lity of ideal formations as
"rooted only in language in general . " What are the l i mits of ideality' s
rootedness in language in general? In distingui shing the ideal formations
of geometrical objectivity (the most ideal of ideal formations, that i s, a
free ideali ty), Derrida argues that geometrical ideal objecti vity is "abso­
lute and without any kind of l imit. Its ideal ity . . . i s no l onger only that
of the expressi on or intentional content; it is that of the object itsel· Al l
190
John P. Leavey
adherence to any real contingency is removed. The possibi lity of trans­
lation, which is identical with that of tradition, is opened ad infnitum
. . ¶ " (p. 72 above). In other words , the ideal ity of ideal formations
opens upon infnite transl ation; its rootedness in language is in no de
facto language, but in language in general ; in language, but not lan­
guages ; in langage, but not langues. Thi s is the double bind of the Babel
scene: "in one stroke" ideality "commands and forbids" transl ation "by
showing and hiding . . . the l i mi t" ( "Des tours de Babel , " trans . Joseph
Graham, in Diference in Translation, ed. Joseph F. Graham [Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1 985] : 204), the l imit between language and
languages . Derrida notes that the factual ity of free ideality is the "cru­
cial difculty of all [Husserl ' s] phi losophy of hi story. " Free ideal ities ,
although free of al l contingency, occur in hi story, and this occurrence
means that " free idealities are also factual and worldl y. " Thus the cru­
cial question i s, "what is the sense of this last factual ity?" (p. 72n
above). In other words , for the transl ator, what i s the sense of l anguages
in Babel ' s double bind?
The double bind of Babel is curiousl y echoed in the two occurrences
ofthe tower of Babel in Derri da' s Introducti on, the frst in the discussion
of the asymmetrical transcendental paral l el s of Joyce and Husserl on
equivocity and univocity, the second concerning the infnities of Hus­
serl o Both occurrences, however, while arguing in opposite directions
on the tower (one for its destruction, the other for its building), do so for
the sake of univocity. In the frst instance, the tower of Babel is to be de­
stroyed in order to fx meaning. Husserl ' s text reminds Derrida of Leib­
niz's statement: " ' i t depends upon us to fx their meanings, at least in
any scholarly language, and to agree to destroy this tower of Babel ' " (p.
l O I n above). In the second, in a citation from Husserl ' s "Cri si s of Euro­
pean Humanity and Phi losophy, " mathematics i s compared to the tower
of Babylon (Babel) as the infnite task to be completed: " ' Math­
ematics-the idea of the infnite, of infnite tasks-is l ike a Babylonian
tower: although unfni shed, it remains a task ful l of sense, opened onto
the infi nite. Thi s infnity has for its correlate the new man of infnite
ends' " (p. 1 28 above). In these two occurrences, uni vocity i s possible
(and so impossible, contrapunctus) only this-side-of or beyond (before
or after the end of) Babel (see pp. 1 03-4 above for a discussi on of the
impossible " l imiting cases" of absol ute univocity); this-side-of or be­
yond the double bind of Babel -transl ate, do not transl ate; thi s-side-of
or beyond languages; this-side-of or beyond, in HusserI 's terms , the
"seduction oj language [Verfiihrung der Sprache] " (p. 1 65 above;
Krisis, p. 372) ; this-side-of or beyond translation, which, in the Ver-
191
Coda
fuhrung of language, i s al so Uberjuhrung,
.
the ev�r transmitte� and
transmissible (tradier and tradierbar) capaCIty to bnng to the cl ant�of
reactivation in assuming responsibil ity for sense (p. 1 69 above; Knsl
.
s,
pp. 375-76); this-side-of or beyond hi story; this-s� de-of or
.
beyond wnt­
ing, counterpoint, punctuation, the rhythm of the mterruptIOn.
.
If absolute univocity (the ideal) is the impossible double bmd for
Husserl , how does he work with hi story? D' Amico ends his essay on
HusserI by recalling Marx' s argument against Hegel :
the manner by which we come to know and thus advance fro

imm

diat

and naive knowledge to that ofrefective self-understandmg lS not ldentlcal
to the way in which the object (as real object, rather than object ofkn

wl­
edge) came about historically and materially. History does not recap

tulate
the methodology ofknowledge. Philosophy is, however, pushed to thls ob­
vious error because any contingency or materiality threatens the suprem­
acy ofthe ideal. ( "Husserl, " p. 20)
He goes on to concl ude that Husserl 's "efort to save t�e theor�tica� atti­
tude involves [him] in the perennial oppositions of reahty
.
and Ideal Ity
.
or
necessity and contingency. In each case, while his anal YSI S shows an m­
separable connection, Husserl onl y ' values' ideal ity; and thus the mate­
rial , the diferent , and the contingent are denied or removed from t�e do­
main of knowledge" (p. 22). D' Amico punctuates Husserl ' s valuat�on m
quotation marks and highl ights the evaluat�on. Yet in counterpo
.
mt to
thi s punctuation, there is a counterpunctuatIOn. Husserl I
.
nvokes Ideal­
ity, but that ideality i s al ways caught in Babel ' s double bmd, such that
the material the diferent, and the contingent are removed from the do­
main of kno
'
wledge (ideality) only insofar as they are the conditions of
possibil ity of that ideal ity and thus empower the domain of knowledg�.
In other words , Babel , as the "primordial Diference of the absolut�<n­
gin, " as "the beyond or the this-side which gives sense to al l empincal
genius and al l factual profusion, " punctuates the transcendenta
.
l as the
double bind of thought , the double bind of "the strange processIOn of a
' Ruckrage' " (p. 1 53 above) . Or perhaps , untime
.
ly, t�e t�anscendental
i s the punctuati on, the punctuation of the double bmd, m hI story .
|¯ ¯ ¯ !
Coda: Have I abandoned prematurely meaning in favor of the signa­
ture? As my responsibil ity i s the transl ator' s, i s the signature to be trans­
lated? Can it be? From deja to da to j' accepte, signatures punctuate
1 92
John P. Leavey
Derrida's COrpUS . In the Introduction, one such signature is the signature
of horizon, a "decisive" notion: "Horizon is the always-already-there
[Ie toujours-deja-la] of a future which keeps the indetermination of its
infnite openness intact . . . . a horizon is always virtually present in ev­
ery experience; for it is at once the unity and the incompletion for that
experience-the anticipated unity in every incompletion" (p. 1 1 7
above; L' origine, p. 1 23). Always already there, on the horizon, punctu­
ated, the signature of a corpus incomplete .
John P. Leavey, Jr.
September 1 988
Index ofPassages
Cited from Husserl
[Page numbers refer to the present book. ]
Cartesian Meditations
§3: 3 3 , 39
§4: 79, 1 42
§7: 95
§23 : 1 45
§29: 29
§ 37: 29, 47, 96
§38: 29, 96
§39: 1 52
§4 1 : 1 36
§§48-49: 86-87
§52: 86
§6 1 : 87, 1 26
The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology
§7: 95 , 1 46
§ 8: 1 27, 1 29, 1 30
§9: 1 27
§9a : 35, 1 22 , 1 24, 1 26, 1 30, 1 33 , 1 34
§9b : 34-35, 36-37
§9c : 1 26
§,: 98, 1 26
§9h : 35, 36, 57, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 26 , 1 30
§91 : 3 5 , 5 1
§ 1 5 : 95
§2 1 : 3 3
§§33-39: 1 1 9
§33 : 1 1 9
§34b : 85
§34e : 1 1 9
§34f: 1 20
§36: 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 22, 1 33
§37: 1 1 9
§7 1 : 1 30
Appendi x I : . ' Phi losophy and the Cri si sof
European Humanity" (Abhandlung
C in Krisis, the German edition) : 36,
80, 84-85, 1 1 0, 1 1 5 , 1 27, 1 28-29, 1 46
Appendix I I (Abhandlung A in Krisis) :
1 27, 1 33
Appendix IV (§73-Schl usswort i n
Krisis) : 95, 1 36, 142 , 1 46
Appendix V (Bei lage I I in Krisis) : 1 33
Appendix I X (Bei lage XXVI I I i n Krisis) :
1 1 6
" Fi nk' s Appendi x on the Problem of the
' Unconscious' : 93
Die Krisis der europiischen
Wissenschaften und die
tranzendentale Phinomenologie
Bei lage XI I I : 1 49
Bei lage XXV: 1 1 6
Bei l age XXVI : 1 1 5
Beilage XXVI I : 42 , 1 1 5
Experience and Judgment
§ I : 47
§ I O: 1 1 8, 1 33
§ 1 4: 1 20, 1 32
§23 : 1 00
§38: 83 , 87
§63 : 7 1
§64: 7 1
§64c: 73 , 1 48
§65: 72, 91 , 98
Erste Philosophie ( 1 923124) , Vol . I
Bei lage VI I : 1 27
Formal and Transcendental Logic
I ntroduction: 3 1 , 32, 33, 38-39, 52
§§ 1 -5: 79
§ I : 69
§2: 68, 88
§5: 68 , 75
§6: 4 1
194
Index ofPassages Cited from Husser!
Formal and Transcendental Logic
( continued)
§9: 53
§ 1 6: 55, 99, 1 39
§ 1 7: 55
§3 1 : 53 , 54
§59: 62
§62 : 67
§ 71 : 32
§73 : 79
§74: 1 35
§96c: 1 33
§ 1 00: 63
§ 1 02: 39, 47
Conclusion: 87, 1 26, 1 27 , 1 33
Appendi x I I : 55, 99
§2b : 96
§2c : 93
The Idea ofPhenomenology
Lecture I [po 23 of German] : 1 49
Ideas I
I ntroduction: 1 42
§ I : 43 , 47
§7: 44, 54
§8: 32
§9: 32, 1 27
§ 1 0: 32
§ I I : 48
§ 1 4: 48
§ 1 5 : 48
§ 1 7: 32
§24: 62
§25: 32, 43 , 95, 1 08
§44: 1 47
§49: 95 , 96
§56: 43
§58: 1 47
§59: 68
§60: 1 2 1
§70: 45 , 1 27 , 1 33
§72: 33, 53 , 56, 1 22
§73 : 3 3 , 1 02
§74: 33, 1 23 , 1 33 , 1 34 , 1 35
§75 : 33, 1 24
§76: 64
§79: 1 47
§8 1 : 96, 1 20
§83 : 1 06, 1 36
§88: 66, 96
§90: 7 1
§§97f. : 6
§ 1 43 : 1 39
§ 1 49: 1 22 , 1 35
Logical Investigations
Foreword to 2nd Ed. : 7 1
Prologomena
§6: 92
§59: 73
§60: 1 02
§67: 47
§70: 53
I ntroduction to Vol . II of German Ed.
§2: 78-79
§3: 79
§5: 70
First I nvestigation
§§ 1 -5: 92
§ I I : 70, 73 , 74
§ 1 2 : 7 1
§ 1 8: 44, 1 33
§20: 98
§26: 82, 1 00
§3 1 : 48
§32: 59
Fourth I nvestigation: 80
I nvestigations 1 -5: 7 1
The Origin of Geometry: passim
The Phenomenology of Internal
Time-Consciousne ss
§2: 47
§36: 82
Concering the Concept ofNl mber ( 1 887)
p. 37: 28
"Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der
Geometrie al s intentional-hi stori sches
Probl em. " Ed. E. Fink
p. 207: 48
p. 208: 48
p. 2 1 0: 89
p. 2 1 5 : 55
"Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum
Phanomeno\ogischen Ursprung der
i
I
|
1
195
Index ofPassages Cited from Hussert
Raumli chkei t der Natur" ( May 1 934)
pp. 307, 308, 309, 3 1 5, 3 1 7, 3 1 8: 83-85
"Phi l osophy as Rigorous Science": 33 , 43 ,
47, 48, 58-59, 1 01 , 1 03 , I I I , 1 5 1
Letter of March I I , 1 935, to Levy- Bruhl :
I I I , 1 1 4
Letter of November 1 6, 1 930: 1 45
Unpubl i shed Transcripts
C 2 I I : S, 7: 1 49
C 2 I I I , 1 932, pp. 8-9: 1 48
C 6, August 1 930, p. 5: 87
C 8 I I , October 29, p. 3: 1 2 1
C 1 3/ 1 5 I I , 1 934, p. 9 : 80
E I I I 4, p. 60: . 1 46, 1 47
F 1 24, p. 68: 1 48
K I I I , p. 1 06: 1 47
ì
1
Index
Absolute 1 7, 58, 86, 1 09, 1 1 6, 1 36-37,
1 43-44, 1 46n, 1 47-50. 1 52-53
of intentional hi storicity 1 7, 1 42
Act
primally i nstituting act ( Urstiftung) 45n,
48, 49, 1 27, 1 28, 1 45 , 1 60 (primal
establi shment) , 1 65 , 1 80
Aesthetics
transcendental aestheti cs 87n, 1 26, 1 26n
"again and again" (toujours encore,
Immer-wieder) 1 34n, 1 35-36, 1 35n
Algebrization 1 27n
Al l i son, David B. I n, 3n-4n, 2 1
Alter ego 87n, 98, 1 06, 1 2 1 , 1 40n
Alterity 1 7 , 86, 1 53
"and so forth" (et ainsi de suite, und so
weiter) 1 35 , 1 35n
Anexactitude 1 22-23
Anni hi lation (of sense) 93 , 93n, 95 , 96
apeiron 1 7 , 48, 1 5 1 n
a priori, Apriori 62, 8 1 , 1 09- 1 3 , 1 1 6- 1 20,
1 1 9n, 1 28-3 1 , 1 52n, 1 74-77, 1 79, 1 80
of hi story 1 5, 1 09, 1 74
contingent 4 1 n
arche 6 , 1 1 9
Ari stotle 30, 1 29, 1 38, 1 46n
Arithmetization 1 26, 1 26n-27n
Attitude
eidetic 1 1 4
natural 69n
phenomenological 1 48
theoretical 55n, 1 27, 1 32
Authentici ty 74, 1 47, 1 53
Axi oms: axiomati cs 33n, 52-55 , 56, 68n,
1 08, 1 29, 1 68, 1 7 1
Bachelard, Gaston 60, 9 1 , 1 33
Bachelard, Suzanne 3 1 n, 53n, 55n, 69n,
80n, 1 06n, 1 30n, 1 35 n
Bass, Al an 1 8n
Bei ng 1 7, 46, 48n, 93 , 96, 1 04, 1 07, 1 1 8,
1 22 , 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 45 , 1 45n, 1 47-53 ,
1 7 1
of the book 9 1
of the mathematical object 27
Objecti ve 84n, 1 60n
speaking 1 49, 1 64
Bergsoni sm 94
Biemel , Walter 27n, 1 1 6, 1 1 6n
Berger, Gaston 69n, 1 36n
Body
Korper 84n, 85 , 88, 94, 97-98, 1 22-24,
1 27, 1 60, 1 77
Leib 84n, 88, 97-98
Bol zano 1 1 9
Book 1 -3 , 90-9 1 , 9 1 n
Brunschi vcg 30
Cairns, Dorion 1 3n, 20-2 1 , 33n
Calcul us 8 1
Carr, David I On
Cavai l l es, Jean 53n, 1 42n, 1 43 , 1 43n, 1 44
Clarifi cation; clarity 55n, 74 , 1 25 , 1 27n,
1 35n, 1 63 , 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 73 , 1 75
cog ito 33n
Communi cation 82, 83n, 87, 90, 1 0 1 , 1 1 0,
1 64
Communi ty 93 , 1 1 0, 1 1 4-1 5 , 1 62 , 1 63-64
i nstitutive 87
transcendental 1 1 4, 1 47n
Consciousness 7, 1 0, 1 1 , 1 8-20, 27, 42 , 57,
63 , 68, 68n, 8 1 , 8 1 n, 93n, 95 , 96, 1 09,
1 35-3 8, 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 40, 1 43-44,
1 49-5 1 , 1 53 , 1 59, 1 6{, 1 62 , 1 63 , 1 64,
1 65 , 1 68
constituting 67
di vine 1 47
exemplary 27, 1 1 2
factual 4 1 , 1 47
i ndi vidual 1 5 , 57, 85 , 93
self-consciousness 9
transcendental 8, 1 9, 96, 1 46, 1 47n
as Or-Region 64, 96, 1 38n
of origin 38
of fel l ow humanity 79
of hi storicity 1 05
198
Index
Consti tution 1 3 , 25 , 27n, 28, 32-33, 46, 62 ,
63 , 64, 7 1 n, 77-79, 77n, 79n, 86, 86n,
87n, 88, 89. 94, 98, 1 06, 1 1 7, 1 1 8,
1 1 8n. 1 20, 1 20n, 1 2 1 , 1 2 1 n. 1 24, 1 25 ,
1 35, 1 40n, 1 4 1 , 1 43-44, 1 4S, 1 45n,
1 46n, 1 47. 1 48
Copernicani sm 84n. 85 , 85n
Corporeality ( corporeite, Leihlichkeit) 84n ,
88. 89n. 94. 97-98. 1 22. 1 23 . 1 77
(bodi l y character)
Cri si s 33. 80n. 87. 92n
textual 5
Cul ture 57-59. 75 . 76, 8 1 . 82. 1 0 1 -03 . 1 05 .
I I I . 1 1 2 . 1 1 5 . 1 2 1 . 1 22 . 1 73 . 1 74
Eu ropean I 1 5
pre scientifc 1 07. 1 26
sci enti fc 84n
Dasein 1 38n
Death 1 37
of sense 93-94
transcendental sense of 88. 94
Deconstruction 1 -3 , 3n-4n. 6. 1 8
Deduct i vity 33n. 53-56
Defni teness (defnitude) 53-54
De lure 37n. 46. 1 05, 1 37, 1 53
Delay (retard) 1 7. 1 52-53
Descartes 33n. 44n. 45n, 1 24. 1 25 n
De-sedi mentation 50. 1 1 9
Dialect i c 4. 6, 1 2. 1 6. 86. 86n. 1 43-44, 1 52
of protention and retenti on 58
Diaphanei ty 50. 1 06, 1 38
Diferance 3 . 4n. 5 , 6. 9. 1 8-20
Diference 2. 4n. 5. 6. 1 7-1 8 . 1 9. 1 1 3-1 4.
1 22 . 1 53
Di lthey. Wi lhelm 57. 63n. 1 09
Di sappearance of truth 93-98
Discourse 97. 1 1 6. 1 49, I S2-53
phenomenological 50n. 69n
phi l osophical 1 38n. 1 50. 1 52n
transcendental 68. 77n
Di ssemi nation 3. 3n. 4. 5
Dokumentierung 72 . 78. 1 60. 1 6 1 . 1 62 . 1 64,
1 68
doxa 1 1 9
Earth 1 4-1 5 . 8 1 . 83 . 83n-85n. 85
Ego 6 1 , 7 1 n. 86, 86n-87n. 1 44n. 1 47. 1 67
phenomenologi zi ng 82
ego 29, 6 1 , 63 . 87n, 96-97. 98. 1 20-2 1 ,
1 38n. 1 45
Eidetic 67-68. 68n. 1 2 1 , 1 23 . 1 25n. 1 35
of hi story 1 1 2. 1 2 1
eidos 29. 4S . 47-49. 58, 80. 1 42n. 1 44
European 29, 57. 1 1 4-1 5
geometrical 44
ego 6 1 . 97
of hi storicity 1 1 5
Ei nstei n. Albert 84n-85n
Embodi ment (incorporation,
Verkorperung) 9 1 n. 92 , 1 60
l i ngui sti c 90n
sensible 89. 89n. 90n. 1 6 1
Embree. Lester E. 2 1
Empathy (Einjihlung) 1 1 I n. 1 1 4. 1 62 , 1 63
empeiria 1 49
Empi ri ci sm 42, 59. 62 . 93 . 95n. 1 08 . 1 20.
l S I . 1 52n
Entelechy 1 48. 1 48n
epekeina tes ousias 1 44
episteme 1 1 9
Epi stemologism 1 08
epoche 88. 1 1 9-20
Equi voci ty 1 00-04. l OOn
Erasure (rature) 1 -2 . I n. 5 . 1 8 . 20
Error 73-74
Essence 47, 48. 80. 1 07, 1 1 5-1 6. 1 23 . 1 3 1 ,
1 34n. 1 35 . 1 42 . 1 42n. 1 47, 1 65 . 1 66.
1 80
irreal 1 35
non-fi cti ve irreali ty of 48
Essence-of-the-frst-time (Erstmaligkeit)
1 1 , 48. 48n. 62
Essentiality 1 49
Ethi cs 1 36n
Eucl i d 54n. 72, 1 28-29. 1 58, 1 60
Evidence 1 3n. 47. 56. 62 , 63n. 64, 73 n, 87,
96, 99. 99n. 1 00. 1 04. 1 06. 1 1 3 , 1 1 7.
1 35n. 1 37-4 1 . 1 42n. 1 58, 1 59. 1 60.
1 64. 1 66. 1 67. 1 68 . 1 70, 1 73 . 1 75. 1 76
primordial (originaire) 54-55 , 62 , 1 08 ,
1 63 (origi nal sel f-evi dence) , 1 68 , 1 69.
1 7 1 , 1 72
Exacti tude 25, 1 0 1 -02 , 1 02n, 1 1 8 , 1 1 8n.
1 23 , 1 3 1 . 1 36
geometrical 33n. 1 06
Exi stence 48, 49. 66. 67n. 87, 95 . I I I . 1 1 3 .
1 1 5 , 1 58, 1 60, 1 62 , 1 64
Exi stent 66n. 67. 67n, 8 1 . 82 , 1 38n, 1 44.
1 60 (enti ty)
Exi stent ial thesi s ( these d' existence,
Daseinsthesis) 44, 96
\
1
Experience. l i ved ( \CI I , Erlehnis ) 29, 33n.
35 . 4 1 . 49, 63n. 65 , 66n. 68 . 72 . 1 1 0.
1 1 2 . 1 1 3 . 1 1 7, 1 25n, 1 36, 1 37. 1 39. 1 40
Expli cation ( elucidation, Verdelltlic/wng)
55n, 61 . 98. 1 67. 1 73 , 1 77
Expression 69n. 70-72 . 77. 79, 79n. 1 00.
l OOn. 1 02 . 1 33n, 1 64
Exteriority 92n
corporeal 94
Fact : Factual i ty (jait, jacticite) 26. 37n.
38. 40, 42-44, 43n. 46-49. 46n. 50n,
56. 59, 63 , 64. 66. 70, 70n. 72n. 74.
84n. 86. 88, 9 1 . 91 n. 92 , 94, 96. 1 05 .
1 06, 1 1 0-1 3 . 1 1 6. 1 22 , 1 23 . 1 25n,
1 27n, 1 28, 1 32 . 1 37. 1 38n, 1 47-5 1 .
1 5 I n-52n. 1 73 , 1 74. 1 75 , 1 76, 1 79 1 80
i nsti tuti ng 46
.
Feuerbach, Ludwig 69n
Fichte, Johann G. 45n, 1 36n
Fiction 3. 5. 45. 64. 95 . 96, 1 25n
Fictional i ze 3
Fi ni tude (fnite, fnitude) 37, 45n. 82.
1 05-06. 1 1 5 , 1 27. 1 30. 1 32, 1 38, 1 38n.
1 4 1 , 1 68
Fi nk. Eugen 25n. 27n. 42n . 55n. 69n-70n
75n. 77n. 89. 90. 1 4 1 n, 1 57n
.
First t i me. eidetic fund of 48-S0
Forgetfulness (oublij 33. 36n. 46n , 52. 87.
93 . 93n, 94. 98. l OS , 1 1 9
Form 5-6. 55n. 83n, 87n . 1 1 0. 1 23 . 1 26.
1 37, 1 43 . 1 44n. 1 45n. 1 48 . 1 53 . 1 58 .
1 74
corporeal 94
cul tural 1 08
ideal 89n
of hi storicity 97
Foucaul t . Michel 7n. 8. 8n
Freud I n
Gadamer. Hans-Georg l I n
Gali leo 35-37. 35n. 36n, 1 24n. 1 29n, 1 57.
1 58n
Gaze (regard) 64. 78. 83 , 1 57. 1 77. 1 80
Genesi s 28 . 47n. 57, 62 . 63 . 65 . 84n, 1 08 .
1 32 . 1 43 . 1 73
psychological 28. 29
transcendental 28
of geometry 46
Geneticism 26
199
Index
Geni ti vity 1 42-43
Geography 1 23 , 1 25
Geology 1 4, 83
Geometry I I , 1 4, 1 5 . 25. 27, 32. 32n. 33n.
34-41 , 35n. 44, 47-53 , 56, 58, 60-62 ,
64-66, 72-73 , 8 1 . 83 , 95 , 97, 1 02n,
1 05-08, 1 1 7- 1 8 , 1 2 1 -23 , 1 24n-25n,
1 25-30. 1 26n, l 27n, 1 30n, 1 32 , 1 33n,
1 35 , 1 46, 1 57, 1 59, 1 60, 1 66 , 1 68, 1 72 ,
1 73 . 1 75 . 1 77, 1 78, 1 80
God 45n. 1 47-8, 1 47n, 1 48n
Godel 53 , 54
Ground, grounding (t"ondement , folld(/ tioll ,
sol) 26, 33n, 37n, 44-46. 45n, 52 ,
54-55 , 58. 61 , 64, 8 1 , 83 , 84n, 85 , 87,
87n , 97, 99, 1 04, 1 09. 1 1 0. 1 1 9, 1 20,
1 2 1 . 1 25n, 1 3 3 , 1 33n, 1 38n , 1 43 , 1 49.
1 50, 1 5 1 . 1 73 , 1 74. 1 75, 1 80
Hal l ucinat ion 44-46, 45n
Hegel , G. W. F. 45n, 57, 67n, 1 02
Heidegger, Mart i n I n, 4n, 5 . 8, I On- l i n,
69n, l O I n, 1 38n
Herbart. J . F. 72
Herder. J . G. 70n
Hi storici sm 26. 44, 46n, 1 03 , 1 03n. 1 09- 1 0.
1 75-76, 1 80
Hi stori ci ty (Geschichtlichkeit) 8, 1 0-1 8 ,
26-29, 28n. 34, 42 . 44, 46. 48, 49. 50n,
59. 6 1 , 63-64, 66, 89, 93 . 97, 1 0 L
1 03-04. 1 07 , 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 2-1 8. 1 1 5n,
1 20, 1 30, 1 32 . 1 40, 1 4 1 . 1 42n, 1 45 ,
1 45n, 1 49-53 . 1 72 , 1 73 . 1 74. 1 74n,
1 75n. 1 80
i ntent ional 1 42
i ntrinsic 94-95 , 95n. 97. 1 3 1
transcendental 75. 87, 1 2 1 , 1 4 1 . 1 42, 1 48
Hi story 1 0, 1 4. 27, 29. 29n, 30, 34. 35 , 36n.
38. 39. 42-47. 43n. 49-52 , 50n. 59,
6 1 -66, 63n. 69. 69n. 70. 76, 82 , 90. 93 .
95-97. 95n. 99. 1 01 . 1 02. 1 04. 1 05 ,
1 08-1 2 . 1 1 5- 1 8, 1 1 6n, 1 20, 1 3 1 . 1 32 ,
1 37 , 1 4 1 , 1 42 . 1 44-46. 1 48-53 .
1 72-73 . 1 74. 1 75 . 1 79. 1 80
external 95 . 95n. 1 08
i nfnite 1 06. 1 35
i ntent ional 34. 98. 1 09
i nternal 1 05 . 1 09. 1 25 . 1 80
natural 57
phenomenological 28, 1 4 1
real (reale) 87
200
Index
Hi story (continued)
real (reel/e) 59, 95, 1 09
transcendental 41 n. 1 2 1 n, 1 47
Horizon 1 5 , 1 6, 26, 34, 53 , 55, 55n. 56, 60,
79. 80-83 , 84n, 85, 94, 1 02 , 1 04-1 0,
1 1 4-1 6, 1 25n, 1 27. 1 32, 1 34n, 1 35,
1 38, 1 40, 1 42n, 1 45, 1 48, 1 49, 1 59,
1 6 1 , 1 62 , 1 7 1 -72, 1 73. 1 76, 1 77, 1 78,
1 80
H ors-/ivre 2
Hume, David 1 7 1 n
Hyppolite, Jean 88, 88n, 1 03n
Idea ( i n t he Kantian sense) 1 0, 1 6-1 7 , 1 04,
l OS , 1 34n, 1 35-2, 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 42n,
1 44, 1 46n, 1 47n
European 1 1 4-1 5
I dealism 96, 1 38n, 1 47
transcendental 29, 70n, 78, 1 38n, 1 47,
I SO
Ideality 1 0, 1 3 , 1 4, 27n, 5 1 , 55, 59, 59n, 61 ,
66n-67n, 7 1 , 73 , 75 , 76, 86, 86n, 89,
89n, 90, 90n, 9 I n, 92 , 92n, 95 , 97, 98n,
l OOn, 1 04, 1 04n, 1 06, 1 1 7-1 8, 1 24-26,
1 25n, 1 3 1 , 1 33, 1 33n, 1 34, 1 4 1 ,
1 48-49, 1 6 1 , 1 62 , 1 66, 1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1
bound 7 1 -73 , 72n, 76, 89n, 94, 1 02, 1 3 1 ,
1 32
cultural 42n, 94
free 1 4, 7 1 -72, 72n, 89n, 94
l i ngui stic 70n-7 I n, 74-76, 78, 1 03
sensible 1 24, 1 25, 1 33
I dealization 25 , 36, 44n, 67n, 84n, 1 06, 1 1 8 ,
1 27n, 1 28, 1 3 1 , 1 32-35, 1 33n, 1 35n,
1 37, 1 68, 1 77, 1 79, 1 80
imaginat i ve-sensible 1 25
mathematical 1 6, 1 35, 1 41
substructi ve 1 33, 1 33n
Ideation 1 34n, 1 35, 1 35n
I dentity 47, 67, 67n, 7 1 , 73 , 81 , 85 , 86, 87n,
89n, 90, 90n-9 I n, 1 04, 1 43 , 1 44, 1 5 3 ,
1 63 , 1 66, 1 70
lmaginatio 44n
I magination; i maginary 3n, 1 6, 46, 7 1 n,
I I I , 1 1 3 , 1 24, 1 24n- 1 25n, 1 26, 1 33 ,
1 33n, 1 3 5, 1 45
Incarnation ( Verleiblichung) 6, 76, 89,
89n, 90, 1 1 5 , 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 (embodiment)
hi storical 77
I ndefni teness 1 37
I nducti vity 1 24n
I nexact itude 1 23
Infi nite 45n. 1 28, 1 3 1 , 1 34, 1 39n, 1 40, 1 42 ,
1 48, 1 50
I nfni tization 1 6, 1 1 6, 1 27-30, 1 30n, 1 68
creati ve 1 6, 1 28-30
formali zing 37, 1 28
I nfnity 1 28-30, 1 37, 1 39, 1 40, 1 47-48, 1 53,
1 78
Ingarden, Roman 27n
Intel/ectio 44n, 1 33n
I ntellectuali sm 1 24
I ntemporality see Timel essness
Intention: intentionality 1 3 , 1 5- 1 7, 64, 88,
89n, 97-98, 1 04, 1 06, 1 1 6, 1 24, 1 30,
1 34, 1 35 , 1 39, 1 40, 1 40n, 1 46, 1 46n,
1 50, 1 63
transcendental 94
intentional content 70, 7 1 n, 72
I nterconnection 26, 56, 59, 60, 63n, 65 , 66,
73 , 89n, 95, 96, 97, 1 04, 1 05, 1 30,
1 34n, 1 42, 1 63 (chain) , 1 74
I nteriority l O I n, 1 08, 1 42
I ntersubjective ; intersubjecti vity 1 5 , 25 ,
33, 64-65 , 76, 79, 79n, 8 1 n, 86, 86n,
87n, 93 , 1 1 8, 1 26, 1 4 1 , 1 52 , 1 63 , 1 79
I ntrasubjecti vi ty 1 5 , 76, 1 63
I ntuition 62, 67n, 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 4, 1 1 8 , 1 23 ,
1 34n, 1 35 , 1 35n, 1 38, 1 39, 1 40, 1 40n,
1 42 , 1 44
eidetic 30, 38, 1 1 2
geometrical 43
originally presentive 1 00
recepti ve 40, 7 1
of an essence ( Wesensschau) 1 35
I nvariant , historical I I I , 1 1 3 , 1 1 6, 1 1 8,
1 22 , 1 34, 1 34n, 1 77 , 1 79
I rrationalism 1 52n
I rreality 1 44
I rresponsbi l i ty 52
Joyce, James 1 02-04, 1 03n
Kant : Kanti ani sm 39-42, 45n, 70n, 72 ,
1 1 7 , 1 24n-25n, 1 36n, 1 38n, 1 40, 1 40n,
1 4 1 , 1 46n
Kinematics 1 30n
Kofman, Sarah 5
201
Index
Language (/angage+ langlle) 1 0, 1 2 , 1 4-1 5 .
26. 59, 66-72 , 68n, 70n, 75 , 76, 77n,
78-82 , 85 , 87, 89, 89n, 9 1 , 92 ,
1 00n-0 I n, 1 01 -03 , 1 04, 1 04n, 1 1 0,
1 1 2 , 1 1 8, 1 22 , 1 22n, l 27n, 1 47, 1 48,
1 49, 1 5 1 , 1 60, 1 60n, 1 6 1 -62 , 1 65 .
1 67
transcendental 69n, 77, 77n
Leibni z, G. W. 1 00n-0 I n
Levi nas, Emmanuel 1 36n
Levy-Bruhl , Luci en I I I , 1 1 4
Life 3 1 n. 69n, 77, 86n, 1 1 5n, 1 23 , 1 45n,
1 57, 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 70
Life-world (monde de la �· ie. Lebenswelt)
1 6, 25, 3 1 , 60, 1 1 3 , 1 1 8-20, 1 1 8n,
1 1 9n, l 22n, 1 33n, 1 7 1 , 1 77
Li vi ng Present 1 0-1 2 , 1 5-1 7 , 57, 84n, 86,
87n, 1 09. 1 09n, 1 1 0, 1 36-37. 1 43 , 1 44,
1 48, 1 48n, 1 50, 1 52-53
Logic 32, 32n, 33 , 33n, 35n, 38n . 68n, 73 ,
78 , 79n, l OI n, 1 1 9, 1 1 9n, 1 43 , 1 46n,
1 67-68, 1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 75
of diferance 5-7, 9, 1 8-20
pure logical grammar 80
Logi ci sm 78
Logocentri ci sm 2
Logos 69n, 1 41 , 1 46-8, 1 47n, 1 49
Mallarme , Stephane 67n
Material i sm, dialectical 46n
Mathemati cs 1 3n, 33n, 37, 39, 53 , 54. 56.
83n, 84n, 94, 98, 1 24, 1 27, l 27n, 1 30n,
1 3 1 , 1 36, 1 4 \ , 1 59. 1 70. 1 7 1 , 1 80
Greek 1 28-30, 1 30n
Meaning (vollioir-dire) 3n, 6. See Sense .
Memory 86n, 1 02 , 1 64. 1 67
rational 60
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 77 , 1 1 1 -1 3 , I I I n ,
1 1 3n, 1 1 6
Metaphysical ; metaphysi cs I , I n. 2 , 4n,
6-8, 20, 6 1 , 1 47, 1 50
of hi story 1 03n
Method 38, 84n, 1 07, 1 09. 1 1 3 , 1 1 4, 1 1 8.
1 25n, 1 49, 1 49n, 1 52 , 1 57 , 1 69, 1 70n,
1 7 1 , 1 75 , 1 77
Mi sunderstanding 8 1 -82
Morphological types 1 26
pure 1 24
vague 89n, 1 23 , 1 27
Mul ti pl i ci ty 53. 54. 54n. 56, 1 1 2 , 1 24. 1 52
de Mural t, Andre 67-68
Myth 59. 1 44. 1 45
Name 67n. 80, 82 . 1 33n. 1 62
Nature 33n. 46n. 72n. 8 1 , 84n . 86n, 1 2 1 .
1 26. 1 47
Neutral i zation 29. 5 1 , 65, 67. 67n. 9 1 n.
1 1 9. 1 29
Ni etzsche. Friedrich I n. 4n
Noema 47. 66n-67n. 7 1 n. 1 35n. 1 42 , 1 44
Nonbei ng I SO
Nonhi stori ci ty (Geschichtlosigkeit) 1 1 4-1 5
Nonhi story 1 32 . 1 50
Nonphi l osophy 93 . 1 5 I
Nonworl dl i ness 1 49
Norm: normat i vity 43n, 44. 49. SOn. 52 . 59.
59n. 63 . 73 . 80. 1 09, 1 43
Normality 80, 80n, 1 62 . 1 64n
Novel 1 44
Object 27n, 64. 66, 67, 7 1 n. 72. 77. 8 1 -83 .
87. 94 , 1 m. 1 04, 1 20. 1 22, 1 23 . 1 35 .
1 39. 1 40, 1 42-45 . 1 62 . 1 77
absolute 63 . 1 04
common 78
geometrical 48. 75 , 1 04 . 1 3 5 , 1 6 1
ideal 1 0-1 2 . 25-26. 29. 40. 44. 45 , 47 .
62-6, 66. 77. 78. 85. 9 1 n. 92 , 1 03 .
1 1 8 . 1 20, 1 35 . 1 64
mathematical 27, 27n
real (real) 66, 67. 7 1 n, 75 . 1 61
of recepti vi ty 7 1 . 7 1 n
Objecti fcation (objectil'ation) 87. 98. 1 1 8 .
1 45
Objecti vati on (representation) 84n
Objecti vi sm 26, 83 . 84n, 85n, 98. 143
Objecti vity (objectivite, Objektivitdt)
1 3-1 4. 1 5 , 2 1 . 32 , 32n-33n, 34, 41 . 63 ,
63n. 64. 66, 67. 70, 7 1 n, 72 , 75 , 76. 79.
86n. 87. 88, 89, 93 , 94, 97. l OOn , 1 04n .
1 1 7- 1 8, 1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 39, 1 44, 1 60, 1 61 ,
1 63 , 1 79
objecti vi ty (objectite. Gegenstiindlichkeit)
I I , 2 1 , 26. 32 . 32n-33n, 40. 6. 67,
7 1 n, 73 , 75 . 76, 87, 88. 90, 94, 99. 99n.
1 1 7-1 8 , 1 2 1 , 1 30n, 1 3 1 , 1 3 l n , 1 32 .
1 43 , 1 61 (i deal object) , 1 63 . 1 67, 1 79
of understanding 7 \ , 7 1 n , 73n
cultural 90n-9 1 n
202
Index
Old names, science of (paleonymy) 1 8-20
Omnitemporality 39, 7 1 n, 73 , 73n, 74 , 77n,
1 4 1 , 1 48-49
Ontology 3 , 6, 1 7, 1 40n, 1 50-5 1 , 1 5 1 n,
1 52n
formal 32n, 68n
material 3 1
Onto-theo-Iogy 2, 4
Origin 3n, 5, 7, 9-1 2 , 1 6, 3 1 , 34, 35n, 37,
39, 46-47, 48, 49, 53 , 55 , 62 , 63 n, 68n,
69n, 75 , 76, 84n, 1 0 1 , 1 05 , 1 07, 1 1 7,
1 25 , 1 25n, 1 28 , 1 32 . 1 34. 1 34n. 1 41 ,
1 46, 1 49. 1 50, 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 , 1 70, 1 75
of geometry 36-37, 48. 79. 1 08, 1 1 7, 1 25 .
1 26, 1 3 1 , 1 58, 1 72 , 1 75
absolute 1 7-1 8, 86, 86n, 1 37. 1 52-53
phenomenological 38, 47n, 69n, 79
sense of 35, 35n, 38, 49, 1 07, 1 27n, 1 3 1 .
1 79 (original meaning)
Ought-to-be 1 36n. 1 45
Ownness 86n-87n
Passage 1 1 9, 1 49
Passage to the l i mit 25 . 1 06. 1 27, 1 27n,
1 34-35
Passi vi ty 87, 99, 99n, 1 00, l OOn, 1 02, 1 43 ,
1 63-65 , 1 67
Perception 9, 27, 44n, 46, 49, 67n, 7 1 n, 83 ,
84n, 87n, 9 1 , 1 2 1 n, 1 24
pre scienti fc 1 20
Phenomenality 27, 1 44, 1 48
Phenomenology 8, 9, 1 7, 20, 27, 29n, 30,
30n, 35, 43n, 4
5
. 45n, 47, 50, 5 1 , 52 ,
67n, 73n, 8 1 n, 83 , 86, 93 , 96n, 97,
l OOn, 1 06, 1 08 , I I I , I l l n, 1 1 2 , 1 1 4,
1 1 5 , 1 20, 1 25n, 1 38-4 1 , 1 38n, 1 40n,
1 43 , 1 49-52 , 1 49n, 1 5 1 n, 1 52n
of hi storicity 5 1 , 69
of hi story 49, 1 27n
of reading 99n
of the spi ri t 1 03
of the written thing 90
transcendental 6, 7, 42 , 48 , 68n, I I I n,
1 47
Phil osophy 9, I I , 1 7, 25 , 26, 29, 3 1 , 33n,
37, 38 , 49, 55n, 57, 86n, 93 , 97, 99,
l OOn. 1 0 1 , 1 02 , 1 09, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3n, 1 1 5 ,
1 1 6n, 1 27, 1 27n, 1 28 , 1 29, 1 32 , 1 38n,
1 4 1 , 1 42n, 1 46, 1 46n, 1 50, 1 52-53 ,
1 57, 1 75
of hi story 65 , 72n, 93 , 1 03
of language 77, 10 I n
cri tical 1 1 7
transcendental 80
physis 84n
Plato; Platonism 42, 45 , 45n, 48n, 59, 62 ,
94, 1 07, 1 27, 1 27n. 1 29, 1 42n, 1 44
Pl urivocity 1 00-0 I
Polysemy 4, 5
"Positi vi sm, true" 1 45
Preface 3 , 1 49
Prepredi cati ve experience 29
Presence 7, 9, 1 35 , 1 37, 1 39
Present 57-58, 60, 86, 86n, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 37,
1 43 , 1 53 , 1 73, 1 74, 1 76, 1 79
hi storic 1 5 , 58, 1 09, 1 09n, 1 1 0, 1 74, 1 76
Pretemporality ( Vorzeit) 82
Primi ti veness, cul tural 8 1
Primordial in Itself 1 09. 1 76 (what i s
hi storically primary i n i tself)
Primordiality (originarite) 37, 58, 78, 86,
1 06
"Princi ple of all princi pl es" 1 0, 1 4, 1 6, 62 ,
99n, 1 37-38
Production 40, 40n, 46n, 56-57, 58, 6,
7 1 n, 78, 86n, 1 06, 1 63 , 1 78
Profundity 26, 1 0 1 , l O i n, 1 20, 1 58 (depths)
Project 58, 78, 1 04, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6, 1 27, 1 37, 1 43 ,
1 44, 1 59
theoretical 1 36n
Protention 1 2 , 58, 1 06, 1 35-37, 1 43
Protogeometer (primally instituting
geometer) 4 1 , 42 , 85 , 87, 1 00, 1 20,
1 32 , 1 62 , 1 77
Protohi story 42
Protoideality I 1 7 , 1 1 8
Protoprimordiality (archi-originaritej 85
Prototemporality (proto-temporalite) 82
Psychologism 69n, 78, 1 45
Psychology 30n, 73 , 1 2 1
Pythagorean theorem 72 , 1 60
Ranke, L. von 1 1 0, 1 76
Rational i sm 5 1 . 1 46n
Rationality 1 29, 1 45 , 1 46
Reactivation 1 2-1 3 , 26, 28 , 5 1 , 55n, 68n,
69n, 72n, 80n, 98, 99-1 00, 99n, 1 04,
1 05-06, 1 1 8, 1 64-67, 1 69, 1 70
Reali sm 78
203
Index
Reality 46n , 7 1 n, 72n, 73 , 89n, 9 1 n, 94, 1 44,
1 49
natural 48n, 59, 62 , 7 1
Reason 1 6-1 7 , 29, 30, 45n, 1 36n, 1 39, 1 40,
1 4 1 , 1 42n, 1 44-46, 1 45n, 1 80
events of 60
teleol ogy of 29, 36n, 1 3 1 , 1 80
hi storic 29
Recollection 85, 86n, 1 02n, 1 1 5, 1 63
Reduction 1 7, 1 9-20, 26, 37n, 38 , 42, 45n,
46n, 48, 49, 50, 5 1 , 56, 59, 65 , 70n, 75 ,
76-77, 8 1 , 83 , 86, 9 1 n , 95 , 97, 1 02 ,
1 05 , 1 1 3-1 4. 1 1 8-20, 1 28 , 1 29, 1 32 ,
1 38n, 1 40n, 1 47, 1 49, 1 52-53 , 1 52n
eidetic 4 1 , 46, 47, 68, 1 38n
ei detic-transcendental 95 , 96
hi storical 1 2 . 47
iterati ve 47-48
phenomenological 1 6, 68, 69n
reactivati ng 47. 50
transcendental 1 5 , 46, 68, 69, 92, 1 2 1 ,
1 3 2 , 1 38n, 1 49n
Regression 69. 70. 96, 1 25
Relation wi th an object 1 39, 1 40n, 1 42
Relati vi sm 1 1 0, I l l , I l l n , 1 1 2 , 1 1 4
Relati vity 84n-85n, 1 04, 1 3 1 , 1 75
Representation 67n
Responsi bi l i ty ( Verant�t'ortung) I I , 1 2 , 3 1 ,
36n, 52 , 60, 80n, 97- 1 00, 1 20, 1 4 1 ,
1 42 , 1 49, 1 65
co-responsi bi l ity 6 1 , 63n, 1 00
Retenti on 1 2 , 57-58, 78, 85, 86n, 93 , 1 06,
1 37. 1 43 , 1 63
Return I nqui ry (question en retollr,
Riickfrage) 1 2 , 20, 49, 50-52 , 55n,
1 07, 1 53 , 1 57-59 ( i nqu ire back) , 1 7 1
(regressi ve i nqui ry) , 1 72 , 1 79
" Return to the thi ngs themsel ves" 1 45
Ricoeur, Paul 2 . 9n, 1 28, 1 37, 1 39-40, 1 40n
Romanti ci sm 38, 1 03n, 1 80
Sameness 25, 67, 67n, 70, 73 , 8 1 , 85, 86,
1 01 , 1 63
Sartre, Jean-Paul 1 25n, 1 36
Science 7, I I , 25-27, 3 1 -34, 33n, 38-39,
38n-39n, 45n, 49, 52, 53 , 54, 56-58,
60, 66, 68n, 72n, 73 , 74-75 , 78n, 79,
79n, 82 , 83 , 84n, 85 , 92n, 97, 98, 1 01 ,
l O i n, 1 02 , 1 02n, 1 04-1 \ , 1 1 8 , 1 1 8n,
1 1 9, 1 2 1 -23, 1 23n, 1 28, 1 29, 1 3 1 , 1 42,
1 57 , 1 59, 1 60, 1 60n, 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 66, 1 70,
1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 75 , 1 77, 1 79
nomological 53 , 54n, 55 , 55n
Sedimentation 1 2 . 36, 36n, 48, 50, 55 , 56,
57, 59, 78, 84n, 96, 97, 98-99, 99n,
1 00, 1 05 , 1 09, 1 1 8n, 1 43 , 1 45 , 1 64,
1 65 , 1 68-69, 1 70, 1 7 I
sense-sedi mentation 59, 1 09, 1 43 , 1 74
( sedi mentations of meaning)
Self 1 46-47, 1 46n, 1 47n
Sense (sens, Sinn) 9, 1 0, I I , 1 3-1 5 , 1 3n,
1 7, 26, 27, 3 1 , 34, 37n, 39n, 43 , 46-47,
46n, 49. 50, 5 1 n, 52 , 53n, 55, 63 , 63n,
6, 69n, 73 , 74, 78 , 83 . 85-86, 87, 88 ,
89, 89n, 9 I n, 92 , 92n, 93 , 93n, 94, 95n,
96, 97-1 00, 99n, l OOn, 1 02, 1 04-07,
1 07-1 0, 1 1 2-1 6, 1 1 8, 1 1 8n, 1 1 9, 1 22 ,
1 25 . 1 25n, 1 26, 1 26n, 1 27n, 1 30-32,
1 30n, 1 37, 1 38n, 1 40, 1 42-53 , 1 46n,
1 52n, 1 57 (meani ng) , 1 58, 1 59, 1 60n,
1 66, 1 67, 1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 74, 1 76,
1 80
sense-content 7 1 , 72, 73n, 90, 1 1 0
sense-formation (Sinnbildung) 1 5 , 55 ,
55n, 62 , 1 09, 1 43 , 1 59 (formation of
meani ng) . 1 68 (meani ng-construc­
tion), 1 69, 1 72 , 1 74, 1 80 (meani ng­
structure)
sense-uni ty 52, 54, 56
of being (seils d' etre, Seinssinn,
being-sense) 30, 72n, 89, 90, 94, 1 59
(ontic meani ng), 1 66, 1 70n, 1 79
of geometry 37, 52, 64, 66, 1 25
i nsti tuting 37, 44, 1 05
phenomenal 27
phenomenological 95 , 1 37, 1 44n, 1 50
teleological 1 3 1
Sense-i nvestigation (prise de conscience ,
Besinnung) I I , l i n, 1 2 , 3 1 -33 , 3 1 n,
52 , 99, 1 05 , 1 1 6, 1 4 1 , 1 43 , 1 46, 1 49,
1 57 (sel f-refl ections)
Sensibi l i ty 1 24, 1 25n, 1 33 , 1 33n
Sign 89n, 92 , 92n, 94, 98n, 99, 99n, 1 64
custodial 94
graphic 89, 94, 1 64 ( written signs)
Signi fcation 46, 48, 48n, 57, 59, 63n, 64,
67n, 68, 7 1 n, 74n, 78, 82 , 92 , 92n, 93 ,
94, 95 , 99, l OOn, 1 0 1 , 1 1 4, 1 45 , 1 47,
1 50, 1 60n, 1 64, 1 65 , 1 69
subjecti ve-relati ve 1 1 9
204
Index
Signifcation (continued)
unity of 70, 7 1 n
Soci ality 2n, 1 1 4-1 5
Space; spatiality 6, 77n, 83 , 83n-85n, 85,
1 22-24, 1 26, 1 26n, 1 30n, 1 35-36
scriptural 89n
Space and ti me 1 34n
anexact 1 22
i deal 42
Spatiotemporality 70, 72n, 83n, 90, 92 ,
1 25 , 1 27 , 1 30n, 1 58, 1 77
scriptural 87
Speech (parole) 67, 77, 78n-79n, 87, 9 1 ,
92 , 97. 1 04n, 1 4 1 , 1 49, 1 52
Spirit , objecti ve 63n
State of af airs (Sachverhalt) 74, 74n, 75 ,
76, 1 6 1 , 1 73
Stei ner, George l i n
Structurali sm I , 5 , 8n
Subject 2n, 8, 42 , 88, 1 42 , 1 43, 1 44, 1 60,
1 63 . 1 74, 1 77
of writing 2n
egological 63n
l ogical 63n
monadic 93
psychological 63n
real (reel) 87
speaki ng 67, 76, 77, 78, 80, 87, 88
theoretical 1 36n
Subjecti vi ty 46n, 6 1 . 63 , 67, 7 1 , 78, 82, 87,
88, 92 , 1 36n, 1 43-44, 1 45n, 1 48
communal 60
ego logical 60
factual 70, 75
hi storico-transcendental 1 42 , 1 47 , 1 48
psychological 77
total 6 1
transcendental 1 4, 75 , 82, 83 , 87, 88 ,
1 42 , 1 45 , 1 45n, 1 46, 1 46n, 1 47 , 1 52
Substruct ion 1 24, 1 3 3 , 1 33n
Subsumpti on, phenomenological 48, 1 1 4,
1 59
Supplement ; supplementarity 3 n, 8 , 1 0,
1 8-20
Supratemporality 58, 7 1 n, 77n, 1 4 1 ,
1 48-49, 1 48n, 1 60, 1 75
Suspension (Ausschaltung) 43 , 43n, 96,
96n, 1 2 1
Symbol ; symbolic 74, 74n , 92n, 1 40n
Synthesi s 99, 99n, 1 02 , 1 07, 1 59
Task, i nfi nite 78; 1 1 5 , 1 27, 1 28, 1 29, 1 30n,
1 36 , 1 36n, 1 37, 1 40
Telecommuni cat ion 50
Telos ; teleology 20, 45n , 64, 72n, 74, 80,
94, 1 04, 1 1 7, 1 1 9 , 1 3 1 , 1 37 . 1 40, 1 42 ,
1 44, 1 45 , 1 47, 1 49, 1 5 1 , 1 53
Temporality 60. 7 1 n , 77n, 83 n, 84n, 86n .
87n, 1 20n, 1 41 , 1 48. 1 48n, 1 49
primordial (primordiale) 29, 58, 1 2 1 ,
1 2 1 n, 1 36, 1 37
Temporalization 1 6, 86, 89, 1 37 , 1 43 , 1 50
Text 1 -2 . 65 . 88, 1 03
real (reel) text of hi storic experience 76
Thales 39, 1 08, 1 72
Thing 9, 32n, 4 1 , 1 22-23 , 1 26 , 1 27, 1 35n,
1 38, 1 61 , 1 62 , 1 63 , 1 77
belonging to Nature 32 , 33n, 1 39
designated 67
transcendent 1 39
Thinghood (choseile, Dinglichkeit) 3 2n,
1 22
Thi nki ng, pure 1 6, 1 7, 1 9, 1 32 . 1 34, 1 34n,
1 53 , 1 79
Time 6, 87n, 1 23 , 1 37 , 1 48, 1 52
phenomenalization of 1 37
Time-consci ousness, i nternal 1 2 , 57
Ti melessness 7 1 n, 73 , 77n, 1 48-49
lode Ii 49
topos ouranios 1 2 , 1 4, 48 , 48n, 75
Trace 6, 95
Tradi ti on; tradi tionality 1 0, 1 2 , 1 7 , 36n, 49,
50, 52 , 53n, 55n, 56, 57, 59, 63n, 66,
78 , 82 . 87 , 90, 1 02-03 , 1 06-1 2 , 1 1 5 ,
1 1 7-1 8 , 1 3 1 , 1 49, 1 50, 1 58, 1 59 , 1 65 ,
1 69 , 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 72 , 1 73 , 1 74 , 1 80
of truth 5 1 , 59, 1 45
Transcendence; transcendental 1 0, 1 4,
1 5- 1 8, 1 9-20 , 29, 37n, 50n, 68n, 76,
77, 77n, 80, 82, 83 , 84n, 88 , 96, 1 1 7 ,
1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 36, 1 46n, 1 47, 1 47n, 1 49,
1 53
Translation; translatabi lity 1 4 , 7 1 , 7 1 n, 72 ,
8 1 , 82 , 1 0 1 -03 , 1 60, 1 60n, 1 69
Transphenomenal i ty 1 36
Tri vial i ty 57
Truth 5 , 1 1 , 38 , 39, 4 1 , 44, 45n , 46, 46n, 5 1 ,
58-60, 6 1 , 63n , 72n, 73n, 78, 79, 85n,
87, 90, 92 , 93 , 94, 96, 97, 98., 1 03 , 1 04,
l OS , 1 07 , 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 , 1 35 , 1 46n,
1 47, 1 48 , 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 66n, 1 79
205
Index
truth-i ntention 74, 78
truth- sense 56, 92 , 95, 97, 1 69
(truth-meani ng) , 1 70, 1 70n, 1 79
truths in themsel ves 1 1 9 , 1 20, 1 25n
geometrical 35, 66, 74, 74n, 75 , 76-77 ,
96, 1 05 , 1 34, 1 69
Unconscious 93 , 93n
Undecidabl es 5-6, 5n, 1 8 , 20, 53 , 53n , 56
Understandi ng 1 6, 5 1 n, 1 24, 1 75
Uni vocity 68n, 1 00, l OOn, 1 02-05 , 1 02n,
1 26, 1 65 , 1 77
Valery , Paul 67n
Val i di ty 59, 59n, 60, 63 , 68n, 72n, 73 , 73n,
75 . 1 59, 1 6 1 , l 64n, 1 65 , 1 66, 1 70,
1 75
Van Breda, H. L. 88n
Variation, imaginary 1 2 , 30, 47, 96,
1 1 1 -1 4, 1 23-24, 1 26, 1 27 , 1 77, 1 78,
1 79
Veritas aeterna 95 , 1 79
Voice (voix) 7
We
precultural 8 1
transcendental 6 1 , 1 45
WeltansclwlIlInR 57-59, 1 03n, 1 09
Wrd (mot) 67, 68n, 75 , 89, 89n, 98, 1 02 ,
1 04, 1 49, 1 6 1 , 1 65
World 26, 3 1 , 52 , 79, 8 1 n, 82 , 83 , 84n. 92 ,
94, 95 , 96, 1 06, I I I , 1 1 3 , 1 1 8, 1 2 1 n,
1 22 , 1 26 , 1 29, 1 39, 1 46n, 1 47n, 1 62
communal 57
cul tural 56, 60. 70, 1 1 7, 1 20. 1 58. 1 60.
1 69, 1 7 1 , I 72
prepredi cati ve 1 20, 1 20n
pre sci enti fc 1 1 8. 1 20. 1 22 , 1 3 2 , 1 77
real (real) 44 , 45 , 46, 68n, 72n, 91 n, 92 ,
1 6 1
all the world ( Weltall) 95
Worl dl i ness 69, 92, 94, 1 49
Wri ti ng I , 2 , 5 , 6, 9, 1 0, 1 2 , 1 5 . 1 9, 87-93 ,
92n, 97, 1 02 , 1 04n, 1 1 8

Copyright © 1962 by the Presses Universitaires de France Translation copyright © 1978 by John P. Leavey, Jr. Afterword copyright © 1989 by the University of Nebraska Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First Bison Book printing: 1989 Most recent printing indicated by the first digit below: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Derrida, Jacques. Edmund Husserl 's Origin of geometry: an introduction / Jacques Derrida; translated, with a preface and afterword , by John P. Leavey, Jr. p. cm. "First Bison Book printing"-T.p. verso. Reprint. Originally published: Stony Brook, N.Y.: N. Hays, 1978. Includes index. ISBN 0-8032-6580-8 (alk. paper) 1 . Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938. Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geo­ metrie als intentional-historisches Problem. 2. Phenomenology. I. T itle. QA447.D4713 1989 142' . 7-dc19 CIP 88-38638

Contents
Acknowledgments Preface: Undecidables and Old Names, by John P. Leav ey
Undecidables and Deconstruction Derrida's Introduction to The Origin oj Geometry Deconstruction and the Science of Old Names Translator's Note

v
1 7 18 20

Introduction to The Origin of Geometry
*1. II.
III. IV. V. V I. VII. The Sense of Sense-Investigation: Responsibility. Consciousness. and Existence The Historical Reduction and the Necessity for Return Inquiry (RiickJrage) in Reactivation The Ego as Fundament and the Reduction of Factuality Objectivity. Historicity. and Intentionality Language, the Possibility of Transcendental Historicity The How of Ideality: the Earth and the Living Present The How of Ideality: Writing and Unil'ocity as . the Telos of Reactivation Horizon: the Absolute of History. and Imaginary Variation The Suspension of Ideality: Scient(fic Study of the Life- World (Lebenswelt)

23
27 34 51 62 66 76 87 107 117 12 2 141

Reprinted by arrangement with Presses Universitaires de France and John P. Leavey, Jr. Translated from the revised edition of Introduction a "L'Origine
de

VIII.

la

geomerrie" de Husserl.

IX. X.
XI.

The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Services-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Geography, Injinitization, and the Idea in the Kantian Sense The Historicity of the Idea: Dif rence, e f Origins. and the Transcendental

Appendix: The Origin of Geometry, by Edmund Husserl,

trans. David Carr Coda: contrapunctus and translation, by John P. Leavey
Index of Passages Cited from Husserl Index

155 181 193 197

* The se headings, added for the convenience of the reader, do not appear in the French edition .

Acknowledgm ents
1 974 second, revised French edition of EDMUND HUSSERL'S L'ORIGINE DE L A GEOMETRIE. traduction et i ntroduction par JAC­
The QUES DERRIDA, in Epimethee, Essais Philosophiques, Collection fondee par Jean Hyppolite, copyright © de France, English translation. We are grateful to the PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DE FRANCE for their authorization to present this text in English. HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY is here reprinted from THE CRISIS OF E UROPEAN SCIENCES AND TR ANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY by EDMUND HUSSERL, translated by David Carr. Copyright © 1 970 by Northwestern University Press, Evanston. Pp. 353-78 . We are also grateful to NORTHW ESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS for their authorization to reprint Husserl's text in full.

1 962 by Presses U niversitaires 1 08 , Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, is the source of this

with an e xcellent preface by the translator. The French philosopher and critic Jacques Derrida is situated at the juncture of the two. it belongs to the h istory of metaphysics and we c an o n l y u se it u nder erasu re [so us ra ture (added by tr . xiii-xx. Heidegger. appeared after the present work was completed . 1 969). after the decon­ struction of metaphysic s . he writes about the origins. tf. " Structuralism: The Aftermath . 1 973) . His " method" is the " deconstruction" of the very idea of writing . Texts occur for Derrida only in writing. Husserl . Freud . ' ' ' contained in Derrida' s Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl 's Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern U niversity Press . they no longer have the status of a purely signified content of expression-no longer. a trace that cannot simply be gotten around (incontourable ) . "Programme . or Julia Kristeva. pp. Since this translation . and in doing this . for e x ample. 9-26. the book and the text. however . 9. xxi-liv . " 1 1 . I t forms the backdrop for her lengthy discussion of Derrida' s " acknowledged ' precursors'-Nietzsche . Phillippe Sollers. Semei6tike: Recherches pour une semanalyse (Paris: Seuil . Generated out of the play of difference . 7 (Fall 1 973 ) . as well as any number of works by Roland Barthes or Derrida himself. 60. David Allison notes : " Derrida often brackets o r ' crosses o u t ' certain k e y terms taken from metaphysics and logic.Pref ace Undecidables a nd Old Names UNDECIDABLES AND DECONSTRUCTION Tympaniser-la philosophie. but as the place of rature-the always incomplete erasure or scratching out of Western metaphysics. " Sub-Stance. Marges On the present French intellectual scene. p." Jacq u e s Derri d a . I was unable to compare translations for consis­ tency of terminology (as I did with Allison ' s translation of Speech and Phenomena). Of Grammatology. a writing understood not in the ordinary sense. the advent and demise of structuralism have accompanied what has been called the book's super­ sedure by the text. delays. " pp. nor was I able to comment on Mrs . and different paths at their crossroads .:! The book as an I See . Spivak' s Preface . that is . I have added references in the notes to relevant sections of her preface. they still retain a vestigial trace of sense .1 4. ) ] . p . " in his Logiques (Paris : Seu il . The terms in question no longer have their full meaning. NO. he follows H eidegger ' s usage in Zur Seinsf rage. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns H opkins U niversity Press . H er discussion of rature occurs on pp. However . 1 4 3 . Eugenio Donato . 1 977) . 1 968). I n his translation of " La ' differance . � " Like all the notions I am using.

and the opposition s sender-rec eiver. deconstructing or demolishing. " Taken from �OSI!/Ons. The sociality of writin g as drama requires an entirely different discipline" (Jacques Derrida. criticism of Derrida actually strikes at the heart of his enter­ prise. see David Allison. of teanng down or Rature and the text of Derrida wherein it occurs are themselves crossed out or somehow suspended in his thought. p. in order for "writing" to be understood. The ' subj ect' of writing does not exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author.In Of Grammatology. the seminal differance . They are in no way interconnected by meaning. However.' it is the 'double' of what It exceeds. . . : decap �ta � i�ns) or to an e �­ chatological presence . ". beginnings . Derrida says. Dissemination .-t a thought seemingly too abstract. It Im­ as 'discourse of assistance. 335. �he �ccident d oes . deconstruction seems to be the violent misinterpretation of Western thought. II differance: I:! H " All these texts . pp. . 11 Alli son in his Translator' s Introduction to Speech and Phenomena note s: " The term ' deconstruction' (deconstruction). i ncipits . no doubt are the interminable preface to another text that I would one day like to have the strength to write . . 1 975) . And yet. That necessary violence responds to a violence that was no less necessary. archives of metaphysical inscriptions. fourth text. . p. b e it i nternal o r external. upon the purely simulative kinship between sem e and se men . 33-35. of Derrida's work. . i n this skidd i ng and this purely external collusion. p . the non-point. deconstruction. exem pt It fr�m e xhaustive and enclosing formalization or at least proh ibit a saturating taxonomy of Its themes. If it is not possible to summarize dissemination . plains: "If I distinguish the text from the book. " Freud et la sd:ne de I ' ecriture. " (Positions [Pans : MlnUlt. or preferably. 1 4). In order to describe that structure. 1 77 .14) . in part.9 . � Ibid. should present no difficulties �) 5 La Meraphore vive (Paris : Seuil. Bahnun g J. i n Yale French Studies. an action." the recapitulation. 1 972] . l'ecriture . of its signified . . In fact. exergues. . His method of c riticism. as text."3 forces the present-day violent distinction of the book and the text. On marginality . . 247-49. by Jacques Derrida. And the ' sociology of literature' is blind to the war and ruses-wh ose stakes are the origin of the work-be tween the author who reads and the first reader who dictates.e. different text. 37. . and . " Derrid �' s C � itique of Husserl : The Philosophy of Presence . upon the fortuitious resemblance . and all the words of his text are.against difference in general. The Pennsylvania State Umverslty . the auto-moveme� t of the concept. I shall be saying that the destruction of the book. . ." Diss . it is di ssemin ation. . as the encyclopedia of knowl­ prefaces. by producing a non-finite n u mber of semantIc effects. of course .e . 6 1 -62: ET: " Positions. but The . retained .8 Derridafic­ tionalizes Western tradition. 1 97 2) . . fictitious pretexts . there would be no fraying . hors-livre. It marks an irreducible and generative multJp!tclty . titles . See SPIVak s Preface . etc . We would search the 'public ' i n vain for the first reader: i . pp. in i ts conce �­ tual tenor. does not allow itself to be reduced either to a present of simple origin (La Dissemination. Simulating the postface. With in that scene the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found . The s lIpple­ . it is not enough to recall that one always writes for someone. of society . S ee Ray Hart. p.2 3 Preface Preface edg � or the complete presence of the signified (transcendental or not). . 10 "Dissemination ultimately has no meaning and cannot be channeled into a definition. We would be written but nothing would be recorde d . is foreIgn to Derrida's new "concept" of writing. 48: French Freud [ 1972 ] . is not a primum movens. No. His continual insistence on the failure of metaphysics as onto­ theo-Iogy seems to support Ricoeur's criticism. of its i ntended meaning ( vouloir-dire). as "consisting in laying waste to metaphysical discourse by aporia"5-i.. as it is now under way in all domains. men! and the turbulence of a certain lack break down the li mit of the text. is "the beyond everything [which] insofar a� It . or again the epigraph to anoth� r [te � t] ?f which I would never have had the audacity to write . . withstands all ontology . pp . it is an entirely other. . La Double Seance. as O Grammatology. but important. 1 8 . 1 974. " tr. a movement of fiction. . . But pure perception does not exist [my emphasis ] : we are written only by writing . is "a fourth text. no writing would be produce d. . lxv-lxvi. " H ere we are playing . . La Dissemination (Paris : S euil . 1 967] . p. etc .. 7 "book �" in the ordinary sense. its "protection of heol ogy and of logocentrism against the disruption of writing. horizon . 10 deconstruction. what IS the fictIonal motion that his prefaces impress on everything? As the fourth text. f � " If there were only percept ion . all of which could be considered as outside of books. as a kind of mental gymnastics. p. 1 1 3. Derrida still writes necesSIty. of the psyche . Derrida ex­ �t the sam: . ET: " Freud and the Scene of Writing. This common. The subject of writing is a system of relations between strata: of the Mystic Pad. " in his L' Ecriture et la difference [Paris: Seuil. La Mythologie Blanche are practical re-stagings of all the false starts. as marginal comments written in the margins of other books or texts." The book's own violence. the above criticism also misses the point. . However. 365. pure permeab ility to fraying [facilitat io n . and the recurrent anticipation. Its reflectlve­ effect (effet-reflet) in writing sets a process in motion. . not erased. Unfinished Man and the Imagination (New York: Herder. ." Diacritics. by the instance within u s which always already governs perceptio n . of the world. 4 (Winter 1 972) . No. parts The preface.. as Ricoeur says. produce a sort of semantic mirage: the deviance of the i ntended meant �� . repeated as readabil ity . 1 968) . Jeffrey Mehlman. 65 : my emphasis onfiction. denudes the surface of the text. This u nbuilding at times seems close to the negative moment often assigned to the creative imagination . tIme. 7 � [imprime] to everything . agamst Its aphonstic energy. while perhaps u nusual . pp. How does Derrida fictionalize? In other words. it is because the force and form of its disru ption break through the semantIc . code-mes sage. 2. . . could be seen. remain extremely coarse instrument s . :l apart. the first author of a work.

xxxii-xxxiii ) . 56. It is this loss of sense that the word differance (with an a) will have to schematically compensate for. Sign. but it already does so somehow of itself. Derrida recognizes.e . without ever occasioning a solution in the form of speculative dialectics" (Po­ sitions. as Sarah Kofman notes. Rather. which escape from inclusion in the philosophical (binary) opposition and which nonetheless inhabit it. since the crisis of the text is not brought about by polysemy or the overabun­ dance of meaning. which cannot be thought of either as a passion or as an action of a subject upon an object. they destroy the trinitarian horizon. either Heidegger's deconstruction of onto­ theo-Iogy by means of its own language or the structuralist way-by " affirming absolute rupture and difference. They 'add' there the more or less of a fourth term. . IH " The Ends of Man. Differance . that the system of Western thought is finite. nonetheless. this addition of the fourth term-that of fiction . ." concerning the "two interpretations of interpretation. ET: i n The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (Baltimore: The Johns H opkins Pre ss. a s well a s the figure of the ellipsis. . 1 62-63. . I n L'Ecriture e t fa difference. Or at least it does so more easily by itself than does any other word : here the a comes more immediately from the present participle [diff erant (added by tr. They textually destroy it: they are the marks of dissemination (and not of polysemy) because they do not allow themselves at any point to be pinned down by the concept or content of a signified. 8 1 . of Derrida's enterprise. in breaking down and disassembling the ground of this tradition. those concepts wh ich command the unfolding of an entire epoch of metaphysics. is needed. . )] and brings us closer to the action of ' differing' that is in progress . as starting from an agent or from a patient. 1 972) . pp. if there is one. 36). probably no choice to b e made between two lines of thought. 1 973) . . " 1:1 This textual crisis (a crisis of the line. undecidability has a reference to decidability . And we shall see why what is designated by ' differance' is neither simply active nor simply passive . ' Deconstruction' is somewhat less negative than the Heideggerian or Nietzschean terms ' destruction' or ' reversal' . 30. of the line of writing). .". IH " It was necessary to analyze. A French version of this article was published in Derrida' s Marges de la phiLosophie (Paris: Minuit. I � The a o f d ifferance inscribes the a t onceness o f differing and deferring i n differance (the French verb differer has both significations: to differ.4 5 Pref ace Pref ace Dissemination displaces the three of onto-theo-logy according to an angle o a certain bending-back. . In other words. which I called by analogy (I emphasize this) undecidables. " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. s imulative units. the terminal point of ' closure ' (cloture) for the system ." translated in Speech and Phenomena. 17 La Dissemination . to defer or delay . by analogy ." Derrida says he does not believe "that today there is any question of choosing. 3 2 . that it announces or rather recalls something like the middle voice . . Derrida e x plains in " La differance. or in view of.must be conceived of in terms other than as a calculus or mechanics of choice. . one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence" ( pp . "16 This logic of non-choice is the very foundation. 427-28. Derrida says-cannot be decided. even if their i mportance may seem to be effectively diminished . 1 ( 1 969). In this sense. and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. The above citations occur on pp. in "The Ends of Man. " Freud et la scene de l ' ecriture. Derrida also speaks of the ' completion' of metaphysic s . then. p p . There is no simple ' ov ercoming' of metaphysics or the language of metaphysics. and to set forth the possibilities for a new kind of meditation." there is no " simple and unique" choice between two forms of deconstruction. . it suggests that certain foundational concepts of metaphysics will never be entirely elimi­ nated. The whole essay of Kofman is invaluable for " understanding" Derrida. But while bringing us closer to the infinitive and active core of differing. e . that it speaks of an operation which is not an operation. p. 302. etymologi­ cally the English words " differ" and "defer" stem from the same root) . 1 48. . " p. ' ' ' in Ecarts: Quatre Essais a propos de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Fayard. n. 'differance' with an a neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as simply active. By analogy because.1:l here. to put to work. p. certain marks . 265-66. any of these terms. i . ' false' verbal. our task is rather to reflect on the circularity which makes the 14 I. 1 . a new calculus . . p. It is the notion of the undecidable-that which. " " A new writing must weave and intertwine the two motifs. nominal or semantic properties. But the work of deconstruction does not consist in simply pointing out the structural limits of metaphysics . No. that of differance or dissemination. Derrida says in " Form and Meaning": " "14 There is. of speaking to or be ing spoken to . Sarah Kofman. . in the text of the history of philosophy as well as in the so-called 'literary' text . within the very axioms themselves. In " Structure." that which "dreams of de­ ciphering" the truth or origin and that which " affirms freeplay and tries to pass beyond man and humanism. " 1 7 The undecidable!H takes into itself this non-choice. its task is both to e xhibit the source of paradox and contradiction within the s yste m .g. . but without ever constituting a third term. 1 970). It signifies a project of critical thought whose task is to locate and ' take apart' those concepts which serve as the axioms or rules for a period of thought. or on the basis of. refers to [its] whole com­ plex of meanings not only when it is s upported by a language or interpretive context (like any signification) . it has a finite number of axioms and a finite number of permutations that will continue to work themselves out in a given period of time as particular moments within this tradition. a reference that must be " crossed out . p. A crisis of versus: these marks no f longer allow themselves to be resumed or 'decided' in the two of the binary opposition nor sublated [relever] in the three of speculative dialectics . 58 : ET p. ET p. as particular schools or movements of philosophy . in the same way that ' parlance ' does not signify the simple fact of speaking. "15 Or again. Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the ending -ance is undecided between active and passiv e . but rather by the very inability to decide meaning. . . 1 37 : " the word ' difference ' (with an e) could never refer to differing as temporalizing or to difference as polemos [to difference as division or spacing] . " Un philosophe ' unheimlich . resist and disorganize it. Non-choice runs throughout Derrida' s texts.

pp. e d . 2nd rev ised and enlarged ed. he says. 1 975 ). ThIS. It is an ellipsis o f both meaning andform." Or. arche. J . " 25 22 E . and so on. "21 This logic of "differance" is what animates. cause. Maurice de Gandillac et aI. 1 28. Neither matter nor form. The article is very helpful for understanding Derrida's Introduction . 20 no more break with a transcendental phenomenology tha n be reduced to it. 9 3 . paths. O n Derrida and the sacred . given at a conference in 1 959. Edward S .6 Preface 7 Preface displacement is no doubt deficient. ." in Marges. Derrida says: " That is why a thought of the trace [dife f In other words. the line. 19 circle in its own historical possibility.> Positions . pp. Positions The undecidable' s logic is that of the ellipsis of the circle. 7 8 ." Also see on this M i kel D ufrenne. this logic of the undecidable. This mode of writing would exceed everything that the history of metaphysics has conceived in the form of the Aristotelian gramme: the point. the disappearance or delaying of the origin. Ibid. " tr. Derrida is as much a phenomenologist as not. to Of Gram mato logy . 1 965) . then . ed . entitled" 'Genese et structure' et l a phenomenologie. neither more nor less-it is perhaps an entirely different question. in fact. 2 5 . in Phenomenology i n Perspective. 243-60. In the deconstruction of the arche [the proto-] . as an Introduction to Husser1 ' s O �gin of Geometry . "23 In this work he questions "the privilege of the voice [speech] and phonetic writing in relation to all of Western history. p. is the "essay I value the most. p . but at the same time it would be to determine from a certain outside unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy itself what this history could dissemble or prohibit. an atheist as well as thinker of the sacred. as "the only quest for time past and time regained that a fundamentalIy atheist [my emphasis] epistemological configuration might offer. the early text of Derrida translated here . 1 3 .22 as neither. (Paris: Presses U n iv ersitaires de France . Derrida has an e ven earlier essay on H u sserl . nonbeing. however determinate. of differance . one does not make a choice." It was reprinted in L ' Ecriture et La difference i n 1 967 . see Henri M eschonnic . can capture. 1 �"La �1 P. by strictly repeating this much a structuralist as not. to conceive of appurtenance as an allegiance or nonappurtenance as plain speaking. science. be to think the structured genealogy of its concepts in the most faithful or interior manner. to pose the problem in terms of choice. p p . finally. (Paris: Mouton . and vigilant form: Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. More and less. In Of Grammatology." Even more important for our purposes is the line just before this . a deformed. along with Foucault's The Order oj Things . absence. cannot be made ! DERRIDA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY "To deconstruct" philosophy would. Smith (The H ague : N ijhoff. negativity. or is already no longer. within the difference involved in repetition. ET: 'Ousia and Gramm e': A N ote to a Footnote in Being and Time . 207: ET in Speech and Phenomena . but a note that has the first place " in a claSSIC philosophic architecture. 40 1 -92. There the problems concerning writing were already III place as such and connected to the irreducible structure of 'differer' in its relations to consciousness. critical. theology. the circle. Forme et Ie vouloir-dire: note sur la phenomenologie du langage . . as a long note . Along with the circle. to oblige or to believe oneself obliged to answer it by a yes or no. Ibid." in his Le Poetique. that is." p. 239 is the clearest and simplest example of this change ) . as well as time and space themselves . . hav ing obviously undergone changes by the time of i ts reprinting in L'Ecriture (the use of the concept differance on p . Derrida says what can also be said of thi s Introduction: "Here as elsewhere. L e Signe e t Ie poeme (ParIs: Gallimard . any dialectic. decentered circle. sees OJ Gramma tology. it is neither plenary speech nor peifectly circular. Derrida feels. history and the history of science. Derrida says. Donato in " Structuralism: The Aftermath. and ontology. silence . teleology. question lets itself be depicted in the history of metaphysIcs and III ItS most modern. and styles . we allow the production of some elliptical change o site. 62. 2:1 H 2. 1 970) . . F. And. presence. but with a deficiency that is not yet. Speech and Phe�omena can be considered as "the other side (front or back as you wish) of another essay. Choices need not be made here. but first appeared i n 1 965 i n Entretiens sur les notions de genese : t de structure. such a � t�is . lack. this f one pass into the other indefinitely. his Introduction to Husserl ' s Origin ofGeome­ try ." in Ma rges. p . 1 97 � ) . becoming history th rough this somewhere interested suppression. "24 It can be considered . is both before and after the work on the Origin. . p. C ase y . and space and time themselves : differance already suggests a mode of writing (ecriture) without presence and absence-without history. line. is to confuse very different levels. or telos-which would overturn all dialectic. " Pour une philosophi e non theologique. unhinges the point. published in 1 962. �" " Ou sia et gramme: note sur une note de Sein u n d Zeit. it is nothing that any philosopheme. is as Speech and Phenomena . p . 7-57.

the Introduction is both proper (since it was written first. pp. More perversely. "Form and M eaning. . six years before the publication of Speech and Phenomena ) and improper (since it is the reverse of the second essay) . if this is to go too far. Also see the comments of N ewton Garver in his Preface to this work . as the reverse (or improper) side. 1 04 and xxviii-xxi x . In this option. tr. However. the thing itself always escapes . As he shows. That basic framework-and here framework should possibly be changed immediately to set of problems. for example . as will become clear. about writing.e . ET in Speech a n d Phenomena. . " :3:3 Yet "before" this breaking up. phenomenology breaks upon the rock of presence. Prior to the metaphysical claims that phenomenology exercises and within the possibility of a deconstructive reversal of the hierarchy of sight and sense. In light of the comments above. As he suggests. "27 What I wish to claim by saying that Derrida' s framework is phenomenological is not that he is Husserlian or Heideggerian. M oreover. the right or proper (recto) side. optic. in order to supplement the impact of one' s presence. Speech and Phenomena . since sense in general is in fact the concept of every phenomenological field. and the options they present provide further justification for a close reading of Derrida' s first major published essay. 1 04. since they are undecidable-that is where fruitful Husserlian work can be done. taken from Henri Ronse' s interview with Der­ rida in 1967. 1 965) . See." in his History a nd Truth. It is also an introduction to the work of Derrida in general and furnishes a basic part of the framework for his later. according to HusserI's probable intent. or key terms that characterize structural analysis" ( xiv). a phenomenology " which gives absolute priority to the observing sub­ ject. the phenomenology Derrida examines and argues with is the " phenomenology of signification. which becomes the obverse. self-consciousness . The above comments. where it becomes the modern." in Marges. 3 1 2.e . 26 philosophical per se (the limits or "margins " of philosophy). the phenomenology in question is not that rejected by Michel Foucault in his Foreword to the English edition of The Order of Things. 27 The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York : Vintage Books. in short. which attributes a constitutent role to an act.8 Preface 9 Pref ace In these comments Derrida presents us with an option. I have been unable to get it i nto their tiny m inds that I hav e used none of the methods. " supplements" the value of the second essay. since it is the whole which has value. Speech and Phenomena. xxiii­ xxiv. origins and history. 1 03 . we could take Speech and Phenomena as the reverse of his Introduction. the improper side . "28 Subtitled " Introduction to the Problem of Signs in HusserI' s Phenomenology. in 1961. C harles A. in the midst of it. is where Derrida works. of sense to the sense of sight. 31 p . must always delay-defer-differentiate the thing itself. certain half-witted 'commentators' persist in labelling me a 'struc­ turalist' . attacking by its very impropriety the proper side. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. and differance. 1 88 . . 1 08-09. :12 Ibid. method. " Negativ ity and Primary Affirmation . 30 Ibid . I want to suggest that Derrida has found in and at the limits precisely where phenomenology fails (i. as well as Note 4 above. contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing. it is "a subjection of sense to seeing." Speech and Phenomena leads to the conclusion: " There never was any 'percep­ tion. 2 9 p . concepts. I cannot resist citing Foucault' s statement to the " English-speaking reader" concerning h is relation to the other half of the phenomenological-structural de­ bate: " In France. extensive essay concerned with a short independent fragment included. Derrida ' s work to date remains inside this failure and need to speak of phenomenology. p. present work. Or. the Introduction would then be the essay Derrida valued the most. p. leads to a transcendental consciousness. exemplary recapitulation of Western meta­ physics) a fertile ground for cultivating questions about the nonDerrida often refers to and summarizes the results obtained in this study in h is later work. pp. 3:1 p. i . as an Appendix to The Crisis of European 2H See Paul Ricoeur. pp. 80-8 1 . Rather. "ao "31 "a2 The Introduction to The Origin of Geometry is a long. or that his method is phenomenological. his Intro­ duction to The Origin of Geometry. or even idealist or existential. The problem of method within these limits is what we will see developed in Derrida ' s Introduction . even the absolute foundation for so much of today' s thought. . p . 1 973) . Ibid. 1 02. p. ' "29 Further: "And contrary to what phenomenology-which is always phenomenology of perception-has tried to make us believe. which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity-which . Derrida' s Introduction is still to be highly prized (and is so by Derrida26). Based on the "absolute will-to -hear­ oneself-speak. if all these terms were not already inadequate to what we are going to consider-is phenomenology. xiv. 22 and 248 . to make our voices resonate throughout the cor­ ridors in order to make up for the breakup of presence.. or L' Ecriture et la difer­ f ence. . phenomenology must always fail. What remains is " for us to speak.

in fact . how can they be recog­ nized or known. to Gadamer' s support of th is position i n his Truth a n d Method. 36 Derrida says about this: " To meditate on or inves­ tigate the sense (besinnen) of origins is at the same time to: make oneself responsible (verantworten) for the sense (Sinn) of science and philoso­ phy. althou gh both uction shoul d make clear: . nitely deferred in its content but always eVIdent III ItS re� ulatIve value. tr .e. 66-67 . explaI �s In � IS Phenomenol­ In additio n . for the first tim e . as it were . These comments will be pursued wlthm Dernda. in a acquaintance with Heidegger' s Being and Tim e: " It is hardly to be expected . What places them in history is their "essence-of-thejirst-time.ern� a. John Macqu �ITle �nd Edw. their tradition. is an act whose realization can be precise l y felt but is nearly impossible to paraphrase or systematize" ( p . howev � r. Historicity and For Husserl. 25) . that H usserl ' s conce rn with • . Derrida wants to understand phenomenology as It IS .ard Althou gh the E nglish transla tors of H eidegg cality.entary reveals what happens when these implications are made explICIt. I wIll not proceed so rigorously. raises for Husserl the problem of their enduring heritage . that a problem with which Hu sserl is so preoccupied could have occurred to him over­ night. an inquiry that can only be a " sense-investigation" (as Husserl used the term) of geometry. most transla tors. that the concept of historicity has its roots in reflections on various subjects going back as far as 1 9 1 3. the always intersubjective consciousness of history" (29). which H usserJ seems to have studied carefu l l y . .. the E�ds�iftung md� fi­ . The major thread guidin� Husserl's reflections in the Origin is the question of beginnings or on­ gins within history and their sense. "34 heritage. I will elucidate the archItectural " concept" of historicity (sense-history) and the r� l� ted areas of ques­ tioning it entails: language. § §72-77 er' s work. if ideal objects are truly original and primordial. as Derrida's Introd rl ' s Crisis . but only through personal responsibility and response. stretched between the jinitizing consciousness of its priru:iple a� d the injinitizing consciousness of its final institution. but they are preceded by so many other attempts to formulate his position that it is clear that H usser! had always had in mind the application of his ideas to the problems of the historical sciences . : "Temp Martin Heidegger in Being a nd Time." Carr refers. bring this sense to the clarity of its 'fulfil[ment] . ideality. H owev er. who transla ted Husse �. the LIVI� g � esent: an d the transcendental. p. 2 1 5 : "These statements of the later H usser! [concerning historicity] might be motivated by the debate with Being and Time . have rendered the term as histori usmg h lston� ­ Gesch ichtlic hkeit. Husserl's inquiry back to the origin (in this case) of geometry is an inquiry into the sense-history of geometrical truths. For this quote : ( 1 38) . and humankind in its Living Present-the source of all sense and history. ton: N orthw est�rn UOl:. I n other words. truth.slatl? ns will be t �ke. or e ven have entered his thinking from an outside source-such as Heidegger's Being an d Time (with its chapter on Geschich tlich keit). Sense-investigation. (Paris : Pre sse s U nivers itaires text withm the page references will be CIted 10 the from the text as prese nted below and parenthe sis . serl . Tran .· 'princi� le of all principles" and its final institution: the interp� ay ': Ithm conSCIousness of the definite thing present in person and the mfinIte Idea as an al� a� s deferred Telos. First. and within this structure Derrida elaborates and elucidates-and final �y " supplements"-what Husserl writes. " at. then .10 Preface 11 Pre face Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. . Instead. as origin. David Carr. ideality. Sense-investigation reveals the conditions for and the sense of historicity. and tradition itself is ss. in 1 932 . Robins on . and that i ts emergence in the Crisis is the effect of an accumulation and confluence of trains of thought which ultimately force H usserI' s new introduction to phenomenology to take on its peculiar form . phenomenon and Id� a. Husserl says. prefer the term historicity for and Husserl u se the same term.' and put oneself in a position of responsibility for this sense starting from the total sense of our existence" (31). Besinnung. According to Derrida there are two consequences to this view for Husserl.. 1 975). into the origin and transmission of geometrical ideal objectivities or objects. " their Erstmaligkeit. Ideal objects are what alone guarantee "the possibility of historicity. ed . historicity (Geschichtlichkeit)35 concerns the origin sboth under stood to be traditions of ideal objec ts. 1 974 ogy and the Problem of History ( Evans m of hIstor y dId not anse from hIS the proble pp. In what follows. i. 1 974) . the Ir Heide gger ity throu ghout . 1 975): "The complete penetrativ e gras p of a text . IS w� at Derrida seems to feel implicitly guided Husserl in his reflectIOns on hIS­ toricity.m. sense s are different . 2 nd ed. they do not occur. l . I ncludI� g D. ersity �ess. Secondly. writing. however. His commentary-mterpretatIon follows the order of questioning and the problems raised by Husserl. and a study of Derrida's com. :1 It should be noted that Geschi orality and Ges �h ichtl!ch kelt. b� chtlichkeit is the term used many years e�rlier. I have follow ed the latter. a the proce ss of handing down and the endur ance of this proce :H de L'Origine de fa g �omet�ie de H u s­ Jacque s Derrid a. We intend to show. prise de cons cience -George Steiner e xplains th is notion well in After Babel: Aspects of Language a nd Translation (New York: Oxford U n iversity Press . Derrida' s Introduction � espects H� s­ serl ' s manner of proceeding therein. Garrett Barden and J oh n Cumming (New York: S eabury Press. s at­ tempt to understand the interplay of phenomenolog( s. It operates on the level of sense and is related to the problems of language. . the origin of ideal objects. historicity is always a sense-history. the complete d is­ covery and 'recreative apprehension of its life-forms (prise de conscience). Introduction et Traduc tion n de Franc e . In other words. The dialectic of these two.

then the latter. So the question is narrowed: what allows for the objectivity of a primordial sense . 1 00. the effect is there as 'itself. This circle. an origin-al sense. we shall see. forces intentionality­ the problem of recognizability-to be grasped first through its final product: the constituted object. tradition is essential to both the inquiry back to and the reactivation of an origin. that the "sense of the con. Verantwortung and Besin­ primordial sense nung. this questioning respon ds to ideality . They have picked up lateral and latent strata which the historical reducti on must finally reduce in order to reach back and grasp the origins of the idealitie s under discussi on. The role of tradition in Husserl ' s though t becom es clearer . Thus any at­ tempt to get at the "origin " of these ideal objects . particularly written language (87). Derrid a points out. there is the level of absolute ideal objectivity. All of which is possibl e for Husserl. be­ cause of language. p . as Husser an already receive d message that the tradition hands over. accurately presents H usserl ' s answer to th is problem (he is abstracting from the German transcription Fink published in the same journal in 1 939) : " Our mathematics . Therefore it must have been a more primitive sense that first was projected and appeared in the evidence of a successful exec ution.17 Dorion Cairn s . the constitution of an object" (64). histori city becom es possible through return inquiry and reactivation. since the conditions of objectivity are those of historicity? This brings us to the problem of language. Secondly. " and they possess historic ity as one of their "eideti c components" (48) . reactivation must work through equivocal language to regain a primordial sense. as tradi­ tion. Howev er. there is the level of the word's ideal objectivity. because there is historic ity. reactivation as a capacity of humankind in general can be infinitiz ed through the idealiz ing power of geometry. which must in turn be reduce d to the very origin the inquiry is seeking to reactivate. i . And yet. the reawa kening and being respon sible for the cal tradition conceals . any historical "re­ duction . of Ruckfrage is the questioning back through tradition to the origin l ' s term suggest s. First. when we notice that tradition operates analogously to the "dialectic" of internal time-co nsciousness. . I. is recogniz­ able within several languages. Rather. Since the origin in question here is a phenomenological one. Yet. Husserl continu ed.. they raise the problem of recognizability. however. In other words. Derrida says. N o . Suc­ cessfully realizing a project is evidence . that of ideal objects. a correlate of intentionality." would be "reactivating and noetic. In other words. Derrid a explain s. such that the ideality sign ified thereby is free 'from all factual linguistic subjectiv­ ity" (71). Sense-formations whose nature it is to e xist as subjectivel y produced results are 'grasped ' originaliter in being produced . A finite and mediate capac­ ity. 1 ( 1 940). Husserl answers by saying that there must be some objectivity in the origin of an ideality for the ideality to be recognizable.e. e xists a s an age-long advance from acquisition t o acquisi­ tion . In his comments. It is. As finite and mediate (i . a plight that Husserl felt gave rise to the crisis in philoso phy which characterized modern times. ideal objects are "traditional objects. " hidden historical field) as the nature of the field itself (as the possibility of something like reactivation)" (51). linguistic meaning--obtains its ideal objectivity.e. stituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the constituted ob­ ject. Reactivation is the human capacity or ability to reawaken the primordial sense that sedime nted (traditional) sense covers over. Derrida elaborates three degrees of ideal objectivity implicit in Husserl ' s analysis . 12 Pref ace 13 Pref ace in some heavenly locale. in h is review-abstract of H u sserl' s " D ie Frage nach dem U rsprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem" (" I nquiry Concerning the Origin of Geometry: a Problem of I ntentional H istory " ) Philosophy and Phenomenological Re ­ ' search." and it would have to work through free phantasy (imaginary) variation. and then descend to the earth . its reactivation entails a return inquiry (Ruckfrage). This inquiry always starts with an origin ' s tradition . in the reali zing. that the equivo traditional). is whatl concern s Husserl : "what seems to be of utmost importance to Hussera is as much an operation (reactivation itself as the ability to open " topos ouranios. according to Derrida . requires examination of both objectivity and ideality. the ability to reactivate sense can be lost. . their delivery to the present and future. but an essential neces­ sity of intentionality. for example. So far we have seen that historicity is concerned with the origin and tradition of ideal objects. . and yet both are possible only because there is an origin and tradition of ideal ob­ jects. The sense o f t h e meant object indicates the way to grasp it originaliter. the dialectic of protention and retention within the Living Present. there is the level of the word's sense. The intended content or signification of the word "lion" is avail­ able to many languages. Leo. such · . Origins are beginnings of something new . The historical sedimentation of sense interplays with the creation of new sense within the horizon of present sense. ideal objects have accrete d (and continu e to do so) sedimen tations in their tran smission . The word "lion. but is bound to those languages in which the word itself makes sense . as such. Thirdly. Lowe. that by which sense itself-or rather. And this necessity is not an external fate. Evi­ dence means the grasping of a being in the consciou sness of its original 'itself-therenes s . ' A n d grasping covers other acts besides simply perceptive seeing . The primordial sense of every intentional act is only its final sense. · " ." for instance. But the phrase is redundant. lion. First the problem of the former. expressive meaning.a7 This means. Thus. For Husserl the latter notion . objectivity .

the absolutely free ideal objectivity of language. Thus language is the tool for revealing ideal objectivity . thus pushing human­ kind. is humankind ' s essential horizo ing Present found s the historic Present. In order not to have truth disappear from the world . instead of binding it. whose dla�ectIcal character and primordiality permit intrapersonal comm uni­ � atlOn. intersubjectivity is first ntra subJe ct vlty. Here again Husserl er re­ t� rns t? the uniqu e form of temporaliza tion. there is no adherence to any de facto language. The Living Present is.�H This means that translation is infinitely open. must then be rethought " (77). as is an objective science of transcendental sUbjectivity . from inter subjectivity. our Earth-the zero-point of all perception the ' " infinite horizon" of every object . sense would remain an empiri­ cal formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity-in the inventor's head. to adapt Husse rl s word s tWice quoted by Derri da. this can only occur within the third region of ideal objectivity. thi s ideality occurs and i s di s­ covered in a factual language . Adapt ing Derrid a' s succinct remarks about the Living Present. does not distinguish between the object itself and its sense . particularly geometrical ideality. which in turn reveals. must have b�en abl� t� �ecogn ize and comm unicate a geometrical ideality within hiS o. The probl em of language and ideality. is not an object itself and cannot become one for an objective science. Since writing is intentional-i . And geometry is pos­ sible only insofar as the above is true. then. arrive at absolute ideal objectivity from its intrapersonal origin in the inventor's mind? Paradoxically.wn IndiVidual consc iousness . p . " On this level of objectivity. t l Historicity and the Tran scendental H istoricity. we could say. without the ap­ parent fall back into language and thereby into history.14 ace Pref 15 Preface as the free idealities of geometry. Husserl's question then becomes the " how" of ideality (and not yet that of its origin): how does ideality. Historical incarnation [in language] sets free the transcendental. since phenomenology' s basic principle of finitude always interplays with an infinite (and nonobjec:!H However. only adherence to the possibility of language in general. he goes back once again to language. " the vital coexi stenc e and the interweaving . as the place of all objects. the LIVIng Present which groun ds every intentional act in both its alterity and sameness. as Derrida points out in a note . � n � � ense . a fact that explains Husse rl's rever sion once more the Living Present in his discus sion about the crucial role of writin to g. Derrida concl udes. writin g guarantees for Husserl the possib ility of absol ute ideal objec tivity . Geology is as radically impossible. e ." Derrida says. " the possibility of a geometry strictly complements the impos­ sibility of what could be called a 'geo-Iogy.' the objective science of the Earth itself" (83) . the Living Presen t. Derrida has elucidated these three degrees in order to show that when Husseri. Husserl feels." (92). to the ego' s intentional act in the act of writing. indicates that writing is a counterpart to the Living Present In Interpersonal communication. the very thing from which it was trying to escape just a moment ago . to the intentional act of the ego. Mankind is first conscious of itself [Husserl says] 'as an immediate and mediate linguistic community' " (79). since it does not live in a " topos ouranios. . The last notion. it makes sense-Husserl argues back to writ­ ing's i ntentionality. our Earth. writin g " sanctions and comp letes the exis­ tence of pure transcendental historicity" (87) . for example. And Derri argue s that. and the historic n: the Liv­ Present traditi onalization (the incessant totalization of the Past in the Presenas t) revea ls �he univers�l Aprio ri of history. then. the transcenden­ tal. " is that. in the Origin. to intra subjectivity . then. that writin g "const itutes the other as other in itself and the same as same in the other " (86) .. of primomovement of the rdial forma and sedimentat ions of sense " (109). Sense must be recog nized and com­ mUnIcated as the same sense from one moment of the ego to anoth absol utely different moment of the same ego. " and consciousness of this fact "establishes the possibility of a universal language. "The paradox. however. acros s a new thresh old-that of comm unity . that the transcendental " authentic act of writing is a transcendental reduction performed by and toward the �e . In addi­ tion. to . The ground for transcendental historicity is uncovered. I will return to this rethinking in a moment. . The ideality in question here is that of " the object itself. is first encou ntered intra personally. . The first inventor of geom etry. . Derrid a' s comment on this result . since the possibility of writing gives sense the ability da to becom e nonspatiotemporal. Husserl says. . " that objectivity itself is intrinsically historical and must be connected with transcendental sUbjectivity. This "how" is achieved becau se humankind is "in one and the same world. Derrida com­ ments. Humankind is a comm tions unity . and this occurrence is "the crucial difficulty of all [ Husserl' s] philosophy of history : what i s the sense of th is last [type of] factuality?" tive) ideal pole-here . In fact. 72 below . He says that ideality arrives at its absolute objectivity by means of language. a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense. both men revert to the Living Present. As mterpersonal comm unication par excel lence.

" Derrida says. since it is the dialectical root of the Living Present. However. Geometri­ cal ideality is always based on the morphological idealities of imagina­ tion and sense. . but only phenomenology can provide the apparatus for an answer. Thus he saves. the Living Present being the "final retrenchment" and " security . . "nothing would appear. both must expose "themselves" in order to be. of the nonimaginative and nonsensible. So the question for him becomes : what is " the origin of Being as History" ( l 5 1 ) ? Ontology may ask the question. . Derrida points out that Husserl will leave the question open. possible. the " already there" of its dialectics of sense. and yet this scientific. The absolute is the act of all tradition (and of histo­ ricity and intentionality): transmission in the act of creation. sensible idealization of the pre scientific world. The delay or lateness of speech in this manifestation of Being is finally the philosophical. Once again we are led back to the Living Present. sense is traditionality and ' 'the Absolute is Passage " ( 1 49) . absolute. We could say . because the beginning of methodic reflection can only consist in the consciousness of the implication of another previous.1 1 ) . that Husserl leaves each strand undecided: geometry is what has taken place in the Greek creative infinitization. the Idea as au­ thorization of ideality. Derrida says. " Consequently. neither the " Absolute" nor "in­ tentional historicity" has fi r st place. Derrida states. is never studied in itself. Derrida concludes. In the lackluster guise of a technique. yet it is always already a rupture with that sensible­ morphological idealization. that the absoluteness of the Idea " is the Absolute of intentional historicity" ( 1 42). theoretical leap is always based on the morphological. In other words. as the limit toward which ideality passes. adding that the " of" designates neither a sUbjective nor objective genetive. Being. a conscious­ ness without which." i. It is a radical operation. since eternity is a mode of historicity. so that the present is the horizon for past and future. " the phenomenological absolute. because they are experienced under the form of horizon " ( 1 1 7) ? Hori­ zon is the Living Present' s dialectical form. it must be experienced or thought (thereby making the phenomenalization of time possible)." the now needing a past which in turn needs a future toward which the present always already tends. 242 and 250 on the concept of the Idea in the Kantian sense ." Moreover. However. both the absolutely original sense of each traditional line (its historicity) and its "relativity" within history in general ( 1 3 1 ) . or as Derrida says.39 is never phenome­ nalized in itself. perhaps. interplays with the always deferred Absolute within this consciousness.39 historical. the Reduction is only pure thought as that delay. i . nor are its conditions. pure thought investigating the sense of itself as delay within philosophy. " inten­ tionality is the root of historicity. the how of its temporaliza­ tion. a passage to the limit whose structure is that of mathematical idealization. The Living Present. in a decisive sentence. the Lebenswelt. e . ( 152 -53) See L ' Ecriture. " of every phenomenological reduction" ( 1 1 0. He wonders if Husserl's merit was not in having described. of "pure think­ ing. in a truly transcendental move. This unity . the never present origin of Being and Sense. the infinite Idea that authorizes finitude. " historicity is sense " (150). " is silently shown under the negativity of the apeiron " (ibid) . Here again we see the " conflict" between the finitizing consciousness of phenomenology's principle and the infinitizing con­ sciousness of its final institution. the unity of this movement is never given. " . Derrida concludes. Consciousness of this delay. " intentionality is traditionality. reveals the limit of historicity (and thereby its own limit): the progressive­ creative-movement of intentionality. and absolute origin in general. there is no need to inquire about the sense of historicity. Since this alterity o the absolute origin structurally appears in f my Living Present and since it can appear and be recognized only in the primordiality of something like my Living Present. if the I dea is what allows for ideality' s origin? Both the Idea and Reason are historicities. Derrida says. which means that being is historical. the " again and again" which Derrida feels must have its protentional correlate in intentionality. although neither are exhau sted in this exposition. the work of the Idea in the Kantian sense. Derrida concludes. . the idealizing activity o f understanding. What then is the historicity of the mathematical (philosophical) ori­ gin.16 Preface 17 Preface of speaking beings in their Living Presents. They are eternal yet . In other words. "the condi­ tions of possibility for history which were at the same time concrete . � ow Derrida also says that sense is "the appearing of being" ( 1 48) . Derrida says. So far the problem of ideality' s origin has been left in abeyance . This progressive movement is tradition. Derrida says: Here delay is the philosophical absolute. Pure thought is always delay . not just the phenomenological. pp. this very fact signifies the authenticity of phenomenological delay and limitation. is consciousness of Difference : consciousness of the impossibility of remaining in the simple now of the Living Present as well as the " inability to live enclosed in" a simple undivided Absolute.e.

La Dissemina tion . differant consciousness . p p . . (2) to the de-limitation. " is perhaps what always has been said under the concept of 'transcendental' through the enigmatic history of its displacements . an Origin. Setting-aside. 2 . And transcendental Differ­ ence .-to involves. Derrida says: " The pure and interminable disquietude ?f thought striving to ' reduce' Difference by going beyond factual infin­ It� toward the infinity of its sense and value . . the always deferred-differing difference of the origin is differance (with an a ) . a name sous rature. that without which nothing would ap­ pear.!!?-aside (prelevement) of a reduced predicative trait. c h . 7. one ought to be able to begin to describe this 0I? era!i�n: aware of the fact that a name does not name the punctual slmpliClty of a concept but the system o predicates defining the f concept. p. Thus transcendental is equivalent to differant (with an a ) . pp. ch. extension: you know that this is what I called. ch. The deconstruction of differance includes then a de-sedimentation and supplementation (or substitution) of an old name for a new "concept. then. " So Primordial Difference would be transcendental-as must be. differance is also an old name . . and the controlled extension o this predicate which was set f aside. obliterated by old senses. " in Speech and Phenomena. which is held in reserve and limited within a given conceptual structure (limitedfor some motivations and relations offorce which are to be analyzed) named x. the " strategic" necessity which sometimes requires that an old name be preserved in order to initiate a new concept? With all the reservations imposed by the traditional distinction between the name and the concept. " This paleonymic supplementarity is a sec­ ond moment or level of Derrida' s deconstruction. the Reduction. That Difference. according to Derrida. Primordial Difference is transcendental. two major senses (taken from the French verb suppleer) : to fill a deficiency (to complete) and to take the place of (to replace) . can only be a differ­ ant Reduction. as one of " a certain number of nonsynonymic substitutions" for differance. to the old name of phenomenology in that text. nothing. no longer issues from a logos. the de-construction. 348-49 . a s well as Note 4 above . second moment or level being understood neither hierarchically nor chronologically. thought' s own disquietude at Difference . which It IS effectively a question of transf orming.-tl This is �o The science of old names is writing. then. historicity and reflections thereon. see: Speech and Phenomena . ' " Differance. and Alan Bass. while maintaining Dlff�rence-that disquietude would be transcendental" ( 1 53 ) . He says Difference is transcendental­ transcendental being the primordial Difference of a different Origin. IS transcendental consciousness.e . The movement of supplementarity . Positions .e . 4:1 S e e Speech a n d Phenomena . according to the process that I have just described. " there would be no historicity. is transcendental. not the demolition but the de-sedimentation. i. no sense. Co� sciousness of Difference . Of Gram ma to logy Part I I. So we could say that consciousness is differance (with an a ) . finally. 1 974). parenthesized. writing. " Velocities of Change: Critical Essays from MLN. This supplementary grafting is noteworthy in Derrida' s Introduction . ET: Diacritics. of differance. 147. the grafting. I described the deconstructive logic of the undecidable. " ' Literature '(Literature . However. the name x being maintained as a tool of intervention (levier d'i�ten:e�tion) in order to maintain a hold on the former organization . Let me now rehearse some of the supplementations that Derrida ad­ vances in the Introduction . 1 80-96 . it inaugurates the destruction . 96. 3 7 . . The Re­ ductIon. No. ed . " pp. He has added something new. . Further.18 Preface 19 Preface Without ' 'its own proper dehiscence. p. More abstractly. must be a dif­ fera nt Origin-the never-yet-always-already-there as the "beyond" or " before" that makes all sense possible. 5 : " S igns and t h e Blink of a n Eye . Richard Macksey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press . Derrida asks : What is. 60-69. i. Of Grammatology Prior to elaborating the " structure" of historicity. of non-choice. an old name itself. -t:! DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SCIENCE OF OLD NAMES The "rationality"-but perhaps that word should be abandoned for reasons that will appear at the end of this sentence-which governs a writing thus enlarged and radicalized. pure thought of its own delay. 3 . of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos. something different. p. Derrida con­ jectures. the conceptual structure centered on such and such a predicate. grafting. i . one proceeds: (1) to the setti.e . an absolute Origin. deconstruction as the science of old names: it fills a deficiency in the old concept and replaces it while using its old name.-t:l Similarly. 1 (Spring 1 973) . 4� 4 1 0n the " concept" of supplementarity . Particularly the signification of truth.

For further details on this problem. or misprinted. but still is. following the French tradition. crossed out. and intentionality­ all basic concepts of phenomenology-have been supplemented by dif­ ferance. no differentiation is possible for the word " object. Likewise. I extend my sincerest thanks for their long-term encouragement." although in quotations from Husserl it has been retained. I have indi­ cated references to present English translations of works to which Der­ rida refers. I wish to dedicate this work to the memory of my father. as well as his invaluable translation of Derrida' s other major work on Hu sserl. I would like to thank various people for their invaluable aid in the process of this translation. John P. Such terms as de facto and de jure have been underscored only where Derrida has stressed them himself. " The same is true of apriori (adjec­ tival form) and a priori (adverbial or substantive form). Ruckfrage a the French " en fait" and " en droit. All German terms in parentheses are Derrida' s additions . phenomenology. finally. particularly when they bear on a point that Derrida is arguing. to Walter Russell I want to extend gratitude for persistent good humor and friendship dur­ ing this period . Yet they are still named Reduction. The first edition was published in 1 962. Is there a need to choose here between undecidables and old names ? Is one choice more faithful to Derrida' s intent than the other. His cordiality and support were greatly appreciated. The translation offered here is that of the second edition of Derrida's published by Presses Universitaires de France in 1 974. The same appreciation is extended to Professor James Dagenais for his invaluable suggestions in relation to the first half of the translation. I have followed Cairns' suggestion in differentiating between Objektivitiit and Gegenstiindlichkeit by the capital or lower case " 0 " respectively. Finally. finally. These modifications have been indicated by the word " modified" inserted within brackets in the text. in which undecidables and old names are both present and deferred in the silent tomb of the a . I would also like to thank Professor Evans for his patient checking of the complete first draft with the French text. Texts un­ available in English translation I have translated from the French. Also. see the Translator's Preface of Lester E . Finally. Lea vey TRANSLATOR 'S NOTE Introduction. I would like to thank the Belgian American Educational Foundation for providing me with time to complete this work. and to my mother. i s one in fact different from the other? The exemplary case here seems to be difJerance itself. And I am particularly grateful to Professor David Allison for his personal friendship and editorial aid. all explanatory brackets that occur within quotations are Derrida's additions. and so on. Hillis Miller was also very helpful with his many bibliographical aids and goodwill. they all partake of its logic. Its " is" is that of all metaphysics. indicates Gegenstiindlichkeit by the neologism objectite and Objektivitiit by objectivite . And. the translation has been done in light of and in accordance with David Allison' s earlier translation of Derrida's Speech and Phenomena . Embree to Suzanne Bachelard's A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic . is thereby transcendental: it is a differant process. and the old names retained. I would also like to thank friends who kindly helped in the prepara­ tion of the final draft: Bernard Matt. and Arthur Evans. Ruckfrage. (Der­ rida. in a fragile letter that is easily erased. To Professors Robert Detweiler. Derrida says: "And Thought's pure certainty would be transcendental. I am most deeply indebted to Professor Derrida himself for his personal help and patient advice during this time. since the French objet comprises both the meaning of Gegenstand and that of Objekt. consciousness. and most particu­ larly Barbara DeConcini and Carla Schissel . Professor J. Thus the Reduction. The Husserl texts have been modified in accordance with many of the suggestions of Dorion Cairns' Guide for Translating Husserl. Such a certainty never had to learn that Thought would always be to come" (ibid.).20 21 Pref ace Preface And. ) However. William Beardslee . I have included certain French and German terms within brackets where necessary in the text. Phenomenology has been supplemented. who only saw half its completion. Phenomenology is no longer. since it can look forward to the already announced Telos only by advancing on (or being in advance of) the Origin that indefinitely reserves itself. Similarly. its metaphysical text deconstructed. an that is hardly readable and definitely undecidable . but have modified them where necessary to underscore Derrida' s argumentation. sous rature: � . because it is a method for reflecting on historicity. Ron Rembert. In the text itself. since they are often translations of Louvain-Leuven December 1 976 . Ruckfrage.

" The Origin of Geometry " Introduction to .

In fact. Vol . by identifying acts. their production. In a foreword ing note Derrida says. as " the same . already con­ ferred on it a certain right to independence . The Origin of Geometry still concerns the status of the ideal objects of science (of which geometry is one example) . in HlIsser­ liana . Also in question are the I Die Krisis der ellropiiischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phanomenologie: Eine Einleitllng in die phanomenologische Philosophie. 203-25 . English translation [hereafter abbreviated as ET]: The Crisis of European Sciences and Trans cendental Phenomenology: An Introduc­ tion to Phenomenological Philosophy . 2 (January 1 5. Eugen Fink . I . th is text has been read and frequently cited under this form . t It is deeply rooted there and to that extent its originality runs the risk of not being immediately apparent. Walter B iemel . the German as K. 1 970) . [S ince the ET does not contain all the appendices that the German edition does. this meditation of Husserl [The Origin of Geometry ] belongs to the last group of writings that surround The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. ed . The author of this transcrip­ tion . The Origin of Geometry (C. 3 53-78) is a text appended to §9a on "Pure Geometry " (C. Its typed transcription bears no title . 6 (The H ague: N ijhoff. then. tr. pp. after stating that he will translate the version presented in K: "The original manu­ script dates from 1 936. pp. has also publ ished an elaboration of it in Rel'lIe Internationa!e de Philosophie . No. Nearly all its motifs are already present in other investigations. at least .By its date and themes. it will be necessary at times to refer to the German pagination . David Carr ( E vanston: N orthwestern Univer­ sity Press . whether they be largely prior to or almost contemporary with it. ] Hereafter the ET will be cited as C. If The Origin of Geometry is distinguishable from the Crisis. 24-28) . 1 939) . pp. it is not because of its descriptive novelty. and prescientific materials. under the title ' Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie al s intentional-historisches Problem : Since then." and the constitution of exactitude through idealization and passage to the limit-a process which starts with the life-world' s sensib le . finite . " 25 . 1 954). Its history .

I The mathematical object seems to be the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding Husserl's reflection. Thus. The Origin of Geometry has both a programmatic and an exemplary value . h ave t h e rhythm o f a thought feel ing its way rather than setting itself forth . it nevertheless is only what it appears to be. 63 -7 1 . from the outset. if not condemnation . are always utilized. wh ich i s not-i ndeed . the possibility of something like a history of science imposes a rereading and a re­ awakening of the " sense" of history in general: ultimately. Geschichtlichkeit and Historie . far from it-always the case . on the other hand . where they proceed from the same impulse and are mutually involved throughout an itinerary whose bearing is sometimes disconcerting. which are neither the factual interconnections of empiri­ cal history. it brings to light a new type or profundity of historicity. Eugen Fink. 2 Now the singu­ larity of our text rests on the fact that the conjunction of these two standing and tested refusals creates a new scheme: on the one hand . their origin and tradition (in the ambiguous sense of this word which includes both the movement of transmission and the perdurance of heritage). like most of Husser!' s texts. and its being is. The first criticism was the starting point for Forma l and Transcendenta l Logic. Husserl tries to accomplish a singular proof of these essential pos­ sibilities in connection with geometry and to decipher therein the pre­ scription of a general task. pp . cf. and the Crisis. it is always already reduced to its phenomenal sense . a method which c hooses its interruptions and multiplies the returns toward its beginning in order to reach back and grasp it again each time in a recurrent l ight . and on the consequences of such a hy pothesis . Though this moment of Husserl ' s radicalness is ultimate according to the facts. i . � On the question of knowing w hether. even when a certain historicity has become phenomenology's theme. with its specific presuppositions and its particular unfinished state. i. The historicity of ideal objectivities. and on the other hand. against a certain technicist and objectivist irresponsibility in the practice of sci­ ence and philosophy. · · i n Husser/ ( Cah iers d e Royaumont . nor an ideal and ahistoric adding on. Husserl repeatedly seems to agree with this. and Roman I ngarden participated fol low­ i ng B iemel ' s lecture on " Les phase s decisi ves dans Ie developpement de la philosophi e d e H u sser\ . of historicist geneticism was always interrelated with that of psycho-geneticism. Therefore. despite the high cost of its diffi c ulties . and the world as the unity of ground and horizon . our reading of it must be marked by the exemplary consciousness proper to all eidetic attention and be guided by the pole of this infinite task. the discussion in which Walter Bieme l . obeys different rules. w e wi l l indicate t h e d i stinc tion be­ tween Historie and Geschichte in parentheses only when t h is distinction corres ponds to H u sserl ' s explicit intention. But never had the two denunciations of historicism and objectivism been so organically united as in The Origin of Geometry. it determines the new tools and original direction of historic reflection. the Cartesian Meditations. I n other words. this action cannot possibly be retracted . the historicity of science and the re­ flection that it invites. Ph ilosoph ie N o . The second had appeared much earlier. Nor. initially. . i t8 phenomenological sense will merge with its teleological sense . totally rid of empirical subjectivity. notably those of the various reductions.e. and correlatively. 3 have certain common apriori conditions.26 Jacques Derrida 27 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry interrelated and concrete conditions for the possibility of these ideal objects: language. Its being is thoroughly transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality.e . But here the apparent discontinuity al so depends on an always regressive method. intersubjectivity. For Husserl. Absolutely objective. This is because the mathematical object is ideal. and in Ideas I. we will always try to be guided by his own intentions. . their disclosure is possible in principle and this should lead us to reconsider the problems of universal historicity in their broadest extension. Consequently. Therefore. for HusserI . the techniques of phenomenological de­ scription. even when we get caught up in certain difficulties. our sole ambition will be to recognize and situate one stage of Husserl' s thought. Less than ever do their validity and fruitfulness appear impaired in Husserl' s eyes. it is perhaps not so de jure . to be an object [etre-objet ] for a pure consciousness. on the one hand. from which phenomenology alone can make its way. In their irreducible originality. 3 ) ( Paris : M inuit. 2 I n effect these pages o f H usserl . Finally. in " Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (in which it was the fundamental preoccupa­ tion). against a historicism blinded by the empiricist cult of fact and causalist presumption . .-t : l In our translation [of The Origin of Geometry ] . first written for himself. The reduction . In the introduction we now attempt. 1 959) . t he mathematical obj ect is the mode of every object's constitution. in the Logical Investigations. is The O rigin of Geometry distinguishable by its double cluster of critiques that are directed. The birth and development of science must then be accessible to an unheard-of style of historical intuition in which the intentional reactivation of sense should�e jure-precede and condition the empirical determination of fact.

and so forth . " ' appeared in ZeitschriJt fijr phi­ losophische Forsch ung. And in the Cartesian Meditations. But when.fi In such a case . Despite a psychologistic inflection whose originality has often and justly been emphasized. 1 967) . Elveton (Ch icago: Quadrangle . The passage is translated in Biemel ' s article . Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. the reactivation of the primordial sense of arithmetic' s ideal unities by returning to the structure of perception and the acts of a concrete subjectivity. it is a question of the unity of traces. regional. tr. Cf. On what obstructs the direct thematization of history in a transcendental phenomenology whic h at the same time calls for this thematization. " which alone assure the possibility of historicity . pp. is from Con­ cerning the Concept of Number ( 1 887) . While constantl y practiced in the Crisis itself. of ldealttles whIch no longer will ever belong to the time and space of empirical h i story . " This rem ax:kable � ass��e . when Husserl speaks about the unity of a history. On the one hand. " of synthetic "residues " within the pure egological sphere . of "referenc es . 1 48-7 3 . . in Experience and Judgment and in Formal and Transcendental Logic ." in Pau l Ricoeur. Edward G.28 Jacques Derrida 29 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry The Philosophy of Arithmetic. ed. 75-80 -hereafter cited as CM . [A German version of B ieme l ' s lecture. e . p. in Husserl. in particular Biemel . the origin of arithmetic was described in terms of psychological genesis . This fidelity is all the more remarkable since the path traversed is immense . 1 87-2 1 3 . a new space of questioni ng is opened. In 1887-9 1 . all that could be placed under the category of objective :. tr . " are defined as ulterior. An ET of this German version. however. . as a cultural form and adventure of human­ ity. extended down to a precultural and prehistoric stratum of lived experience . one that will be difficult to maintain in the regional limits which were so long prescribed for it. After that. cf. . Husserl: An A nalysis of His Phenomenology . this new access to history is never made a problem . however. HusserI' s first important work. At the end of the Third Cartesian Meditation . It passes first through the reduction of all historical or psychological genesis . . H Thus the neutralization of psychological genesis and that of history are still on equal footing in the texts which place the transcendental development in focus. Embree (Evanston : Northwestern U niversity Press. wh �ch already designates the prod uction . e " the al­ ways intersubje ctive consciousness of history. 78) . and to recount the adven­ tures and misadventures of the transcendental motif. pp. pp. 1 3 ( 1 959) . therefore the primord ial h istoriCIty . concealed each time by the very gesture that uncovers it: all this would give credit to a kind of synoptic retrospection that no criticism of historic reason had explicity ju stified from the start. to define the European eidos and the man of infinite tasks. spirit and the cultural world was repressed within the sphere of intra­ worldlines s . i . Reference above begins on p. R. " N umbers are mental creations insofar as they form the re su lts of activ ities exerc i sed upon concrete contents : what these activities create. In The Origin o Geometry . § 38 . do not belong to the eidos of the concrete ego (CM. The retu rn to prepredicative experience . p . § § 3 7 and 3 8 . pp. which is taken up again as the first c hapter of Philosophy of Arithmetic ( 1 89 1 ) . 1 970 ) ' Meditation I V. especially in Formal and Tra nscendental Logic. I n passing from static t o genetic constitution. and dependent tasks ( ibid. the genesis of arithmetic is not thought of as a history of arithmetic. � On the problem of history in H u sserl ' s philosophy . §29 . . p. the investigat ions that particu larly concern the "theory . the consciou sness of a crisis and the affirmation of a teleology of reason are only new paths or means for legitimizing transcendental idealism once again. 35ff. The Ger­ man and English versions differ from the French version published in Husser!. Ballard and Lester E. Husserl repeats the same project under the species of a phenomenological history. i Edmund Hu sser! . enti­ tled "The Decisive Phases in the Development of H u sseri ' s Ph ilosoph y . are not new and absolute contents which we could find again in space or in the 'external world' : rather are they uniqu e relation-concepts wh ich can onl y be prod uced again and again and wh ich are in no way c apable of being found somewhere ready-mad e . Husserl still had not engaged phenomenological description in the problems of historic­ ity. of man. a s announced i n Ideas I and then accomplished between the years 1 9 1 5 and 1920. ] Des pite h is severity as regards this psychologi stic tendency . " Die entscheidenden Phasen in H usserls Philosophie . Neither the structure s of historicity in . pp. Busserl himself already proposed to account at once for the normative ideality of number (which is never an empirical fact accessible to a history in precisely this same style) and for its grounding in and through the lived act of its production. history itself breaks through into phenomenology. At least not directly and as such. and tr. f. as does The Origin of Geometry. more part ic ularl y pp. of human community . to put the whole developm ent of Western philosoph y into perspecti ve. 1 50] . 1 43-74 . of culture . after fifty years of f meditation. they also do not include the discussion mentioned in note 4 abo ve .5 it already concerns. 1 970) . The thematization of transcendental genesis maintained the :ed � c­ tion of history . 1 45-5 1 . 63) . we refer partic ularl y to Paul Ricoeu r' s very fine article . " is in The Phenomenology of Husser!: Selected Critical Readings. O. 1 48ff. in the period of the Crisis. Dorion Cairns (The H ague: N ijhoff. 37 [ ET: p. could have been entitled The Origin of Arithmetic. when the genetic di­ mension of phenomenology is discovered . i . All these reduction s hold a fortiori for the descriptio ns of primordial temporality and immanent duration. genesis is still not history. On the other hand.' Husserl un­ derscores this: the ideal objects. " H usserl and the Sense of H i story . H u sserl continually refers to his first book . ibid . " the higher forms of products of reason.

in Hllsserlia na . Vol . and acting" (FTL. ani­ mate th e Crisis and. Lester E. B iemel . pp. Also cf. U That. seek for ourselves si ngly and in common the ultimate pos­ sibilities and necessities . then history in general no longer risks being a distinct and dependent sector of a more radical phenomenology. frequently affirmed. by non­ exemplariness-still lent itself to imaginary variations and to eidetic intuitions . and b) its sense for life and the possibility of being related to our whole world . Vol . Embree (Evanston: N orth­ western University Press . This occultation.e. that. i. . M . val uing. We must be careful here: these ambitions are only served by already familiar themes which they orient in a new direction . as Husserl affirms.9 2 . concrete. and 9 . xxxii i-l i i i . The same disquietude and the same will are underscored and ex­ pressed in rigorously identical terms from the first pages of The Origin J J 1 0 Formal and Transcendental Logic. 1 969) .r 30 Jacques Derrida 31 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry general (and we do not yet know whether the historicity of science and that of philosophy are examples or exceptions. notably in ldeen II [ldeen Zll einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Ph ilosophie . it seems. notably pp . 3. for e xample . But this reading referred to that Idea only mediately. I I . which is also a technicization and supposes the "naivete of a higher level" of an investigator become irresponsible. which are also difficult ones. A S tudy of Husserl' s Formal and Transcendental Logic . bring this sense to the clarity of its "fulfil[ment]. as empirical science. was not the case wi th psychology. or if they are simply beyond history itself). The citations are from FTL. by virtue of its sense of being. had always been treated by preterition. like all empirical sciences. whether they are the highest and most revelatory possibilities . we might be strongly tempted to see The Origin of Geometry (after taking into account the brevity of this sketch) only as the preface to a re-issue of Formal and Transcendental Logic. 9 [The H ague: Nijhoff. 1 962]) is a very rich testimony to this. in the Cartesian Meditations. 1 968) . that of geometry as the eidetic analysis of spatial nature) had itself been produced or revealed in a history which irreducibly inhabits its being-sense . . It was still necessary to show in a specific. Husserl perceives the motif of " radical in­ vestigations of sense" within the "present condition of European sci­ ences . history in general no less completely engages phenomenology with all its possibilities and responsibilities. tr. 5. The recent publ ication by Walter B i emel of the Lectures of 1 925 and of appended texts devoted to Phiinomenologische Psychologie ( in Husserliana . If this teleological reading of history could not be characterized in Hus­ serl 's eyes by the dogmatic imprudence with which so many philoso­ phers (from Aristotle to Hegel to Brunschvicg) perceive in the past only the labored presentiment of their own thought. tf . to all intents and purposes . This freeing of science with respect to its bases in the Lebenswelt and its founding subjective acts undoubtedly remains a necessary condition for its conquests. This confidence was supported by the system of apodictic certainties of phenomenology it­ self. which could be considered as a criticism of reason in general . the commentary o f S uzanne Bachelard. in addition to the empirical and non-exemplary content of history. and in the th ird part of the Crisis . and direct manner: 1 . But this freeing also involves the threat of an objectivist alienation. In his Introduction to that work." and put oneself in a position of responsibility for this sense starting from the total sense of our existence. are most immediately assumed . whose purpose simply would be adapted to a material ontology . " To meditate on or investigate the sense (besinnen) of origins is at the same time to: make oneself responsible (verantworten) for the sense (Sinn) of science and philosophy . If. No doubt these three ambitions. always marked by oneness and irreversibility. But it is in The Origin of Geometry and in the short fragments of the same period that these ambitions. 5-6) . 4 (The H ague: N ijhoff. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff. 11 " We m u s t place oursel ves above this whole life and all t h i s cultural tradition and . by radical sense . signaled rather than explored) . 2 . which conceals the in­ stituting origins and renders them strange and inaccessible to us. By remaining completely within a deter­ mined relativity. that history-whose own content (contrary to that of the other material and dependent sciences) was. on t he basis of which we can take o ur position toward actualities in j udging. Instead of seeing it as a prolongation of the Crisis. p . ed . pp. 1 95 2) ] . certain eidetic content (for example. the history of the geometrical eidetic is exemplary. nor the methods of the phenomenology of history were made the objects of specific . Vol . its original techniques and attitudes. whose relations with phenomenology have been most abundantly defined . "10 But we know that for Husserl the critical significance of this situation results less from some epistemological conflict inherent in the internal development of these sciences than from a divorce between a) the theoretical and practical activity of the science in the very renown of its progress and success. dependent on phenomenology-which alone could reveal to it its fund of eidetic presuppositions (this dependence. that history.investigations . 5-hereafter c i ted a s FTL . has simulta­ neously ruined the "great belief" of the sciences and philosophy in themselves : it has made our world "unintelligible. original questions . was. it is because this reading referred to the very I dea of transcendental phenomenology-which is not itself a philosophical system . th e earlier works .

2 . it is truly necessary to see that this order of dependence is not reversed. in particular § 2 1 . 3 . Hu sser! has prin­ cipally and most often defi ned this Umkehrung as the falsification of sense . 1:3 N ow geometry is a material on­ tology whose object is determined as the spatiality of the thing belong­ ing to Nature. 1 8 1 -82. With­ out being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-j ustification. 58-59 . p. ] As for translations whic h we have had to do . p . Ideas I. 1 973) . Part II. 1 950) . 82. The phenomenon of "crisis. • � i Cf. the displace­ ment of ground. They should be followed secondarily by corre­ sponding sense-investigations for particular groups of sciences and single sciences" (ibid. p. New York: Collier Books. The certitude of the cogito becomes the axiomatic ground . Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. FTL . f general. § § 8. The geometrical ideal (or that o f mathematical physics). On the " di rective" character of logic . also C. " Our e mphasi s . concerning geometrical science and mathematics in general . whose fruitfulness. and the present work attempts to open up. ET. rpt. a definition often proposed as an e xample up to Ideas I. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why later on H u sserl will hardly u se-yet without e xplicitl y questioning again-the definiti on of geometry as an eidetic science or as the material ontology of spatially extended . p. 1 962) . Husserr s emphasis) . the spatial form " ( H u sserI ' s emphasis ) . We will refer to th is translation as Idees . The sciences made themselve s independent . Boyce Gibson ( 1 93 1 . tr. 1 7 . p. p p . ] H ere formal ontology de sig­ nates formal logic "in the narrower sense " and "all the other disc ipline s whic h constitute the formal ' ma thesis universa lis ' (th u s arithmetic also. ordine geometrico: " only th is axio � atic fou �dation lies even deeper than that of geometry and is called on to partici­ pate In the ultimate grounding even of geometrical knowledge" (CM. Materially deter­ mined ontologies are subordinated to formal ontology. they fashioned extremely differentiated method s. On several occasions Husserl notes that he presupposes the constitution of the ideal objectivities1. " in Phenomenology and the Crisis ofPhilosophy. the whole Crisis tends to show how geometry . it is true . Quentin Lauer (N ew York : Harper and Row. W. tr. the model of exact science . Tome I: Introduction J?enerale a la phenom enologie pu re (Pari s: Gal limard. one suggested by the historically given relation of the Idea of genuine science to logic as its antecendent norm" (FTL. " as forgetfulness of origins. He has done this under at least three form s: 1 . Ideas I. Is it not a question here of applying a general project whose program had already been organized to a singular and dependent science? Did not Husserl write: "These investigations. the ground for the mathemati­ zation of nature. § 25 .1 O . in particular p p . In a certain sense . . 84. the correlative constitution of intersubjectivity. 3 . dogmatically received. 1 85-9 3 ) Husser! de­ no�nces the absurdity of geometrizing l i ved experience. of logic and language in 1-1 1� 1 :1 o Geometry. . 56-62 and 70-7 1 -hereafter cited as Ideas I. n . Of course the notion of objectiv ity here is not in any sense tied to Schopenhauer' s concept of Objektitiit . Also cf. main sections. FTL. Husserl also specifies in Formal and Transcendental Logic that this is only one path among others: "Other paths are possible for sense­ investigations with a radical aim . R. 6)? 1 2 The anteriority of Formal and Transcendental Logic in relation to the problems of origin for the other sciences has a systematic and juridical significance. is responsible for the naturalization of the psychic sphere-a fact that was pointed out in the first part of " Ph ilosophy as Rigorous Science . are naturally directed first of all to what is essentially common to all possible sciences . and all related investigations. cf. Also . This necessary anteriority first derives from the nature of traditional logic. But while completely justifying the priority of his refl ections on logic . i s what impelled Descartes t o cover over again the transcendental motif that h e had ingeni­ ou � ly broug�t to l ight . Idees directrices pOllr line phenomenologie et line philosophie ph e­ nomenologique pures . p. 7 1 . 1 965) . I ii Cf. we will be led to ju stify them in the cou rse of this Introd uction. has precisely the sense of this type of " rever­ sal" ( Umkehrung) . and the . §7 1 . We should also remember that in Ideas I (§§72-75 . and philosophy IS transformed i nto a deductive system . The fact that every dimension of The Origin of Geometry accentuates this dependence and this relative superficiality of description will thus be explained. Final l y . 57 [modified] . cf. and 93). theory of mu lti­ plicities) . con­ cerning the possible sense and possible method of genuine science as such. 3 . pure analysis. the French translation of FTL. which is always presented as the general theory of science. [On matters of translation related to H usser! we have followed in the main the suggestions of Dorion Cairns in Guide f Translating or Hlisser! (The H ague : N ijhoff. pp . material" disciplines . which treats the pure rules of Objectivity in general. . and that consequently geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential ph ase of sllch thinghood (Dingl ichkeit). pp. Geometry . This statement also refers to the hierarchy of ontologies already elaborated in Ideas I. on account of both geometrical ex­ actitude and deductivity . al so cf. tr. a I /. 15 0n the translation of Gegenstiindlichkeit b y objectivity [FT: objectite (and Objektivitiit or objectivite by Objectivity)] . was pract ically certai n. § 3 . § 9 . p. pp. 1� " I t is clearl y realized that it is the essence of a material th ing to be a res extensa. by a spiraling movement which is the major find of our text. �t least in. 2: " the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times . note 2 .147-hereafter c ited as " PR S " (cf. 84: there geometry and kinematic s (which Hu sserI always associates with geometry in the Crisis and in the Origin) are al so defined as " pure mathematical .. as the science of science.r 32 Jacques Derrida 33 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry And the question asked there appears at first sight to be only a specification of the general question begun and defined in Formal and Transcendental Logic. 8) . 1 8. [At time s Derrida refers to the note s of Paul Ricoeur in his invaluable French translation. but whose productivity (Leistung) was not clarified by ultimate insight . � oreover. p. h ides true N ature . and the forgetting of origins . " Ideas I. 7 . natural things . pp.

' pure geometry . 2 8) . . . and rather intricate methodological precautions in the first pages. in the Crisis. here "geometry " serves in an exemp lary way t o de signate mathematics and even l@gic in general . It is a question of repeating an origin. p. Despite the value which would be attached to such an approach. 57: . . rather than a proper name19-was already an inheritor of geometry. if it were still necessary. §9b. by virtue of their descriptive style . bold clearing is brought about within the regional limits of the investiga­ tion and transgresses them toward a new form of radicality . p . then. studied geometry . incidentally. further. pregiven to Galileo as an old tradition" (C. IX 1 !1 Cf. at his disposal are possibilities of new axiomatizations which (even with their problems and difficul­ ties) already are announced as geometrical possibilities . diverse . one ' understands' geometrical concepts and propositions. ) " " 20 What Galileo inaugurated . § 9b . reflection does not work upon or within geometry itself as "ready-made. they would only inform us about the factual rootedness of truth in a historical or psychological milieu of fact. Concerning the intentional history of a particular eidetic science. however critical . For Galileo. " 2. then of universal historicity-the last horizon for all sense and Objectivity in general. p. Provided the notion of history is conceived in a new sense. i n a certain sense simplifying and idealizing the matter. . 49 [mod ified] . does it command the attention of the author of the Crisis . A ll the more . after all. but so is a certain second reflection on constituted geometry. the question posed must be understood in its most historic resonance . Hereafter all reference s t o the Origin will be placed in parentheses . [When placed in brackets . is 1 7 The Origin of Geometry. " (ibid. This would demonstrate . ' the pure mathematics of spatiotemporal shapes in general. ). then .' I' . the sense of the geometrical tradition ' s origin was already lost: "Galileo was himself an heir in respect to pure geometry . 29) . ] familiar with methods of operation as ways of dealing with precisely defined structures . The Crisis always echoed this . the inherited manner of ' intuitive' conceptual izing . prov i ng . p. the latter depends. w as no longer original geome try: in this sort of ' intuitiveness ' it was already empty of its sense" (ibid. No geometrizing activity as such. and if we then come to history ' s vertical dimension . Consequently. But if we leave the actual or virtual givens of the received geo'11etry. . all without disturbing or shaking [sollicitee ] geometry in its buried sense of origin. opening the w a y for objectivism by making mathematized Nature an " in itself. a more exact historical analysi s would have to take account of how much of his thought he owed to his predecessors. 1 57 in Appendi x . § 9 h . the architectonic relations evoked a moment ago are complicated. is not that of a geometer: the latter has at his disposal an already given system of truths that he supposes or utilizes in his geometrizing activity. if not inverted. constructing. 34 Jacques Derrida 35 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Geometry. . ' ( I shall continue . For Galileo-whose name here is the exemplary index of an attitude and a moment. would study the systematic structure of geometrical science or of variou s geometries. 24) . they indicate the addition of the translator . §9 1 . i n a similar fashion . handed-down" ( 1 57) . . I have linked all ou r considerations to h i s name [Gali leo' s] . a very important place is reserved for IX Natu rall y . No doubt this rootedness may be accessi­ ble to a descriptive phenomenology which would respect all its original­ ity. a sense­ investigation of its conditions of possibility will reveal to us exemplarily the conditions and sense of the historicity of science in general.." or " in that of all the late inheritors of the older geometric knowledge" ( 1 57 [modified]). p. In other words. can return to a point short of that ' 'familiarity.. "the relatively advanced geometry known to Galileo . even if they did not reduce the normativity of ideal objects and geometrical truth to the empirical facts of lived experience. as done here . but it would teach us nothing about the truth of geometry and its sense of origin . H usserl already insists a great deal on the secondary character of Galileo' s revoluti on and on the scientific heritage that i t supposed . within a kind of horizontal and ahistoric cut. §9a. C . " marks the birth of a cri sis in the sc iences and in philoso­ phy . 1 7 The attitude taken. or.20 If. Both these attitudes would depend on what Husserl had defined in Formal and Transcendental Logic and recalled in the Crisis as a " naivete of a priori self-evidence that keeps every normal geometrical project in motion" (C. p . notably that of . And even if. It is in the midst of these difficulties and with extreme prudence that Husserl tries to make his purpose understood in The Origin of II Hu sserl takes numerous. in the best hypothesis. The required attitude is no longer that of the classic epistemologist who. already broadly applied not only to the earth but also i n astronomy" (ibid . The inherited g eometry. at what point the juridical order of implications is not so linear and how difficult it is to recognize the starting point. we are not interested here in " the manner of being which the sense [of geometry] had in [Galileo' s] thinking. 1 . Besides. H usserl' s emphasis) . . three confusions again lie in wait for us: A) In the first place. only on a psychol­ ogy or history of cognition. this history and psychology escaped what Husserl always sus­ pected. and for good reasons. Not only are the intelligence and the practice of geometry always possible and ocasionally profound and creative. . "There is no need for [the question of the origin] in the attitude of the geometer: one has.

axioms. if one must return to the instituting sense of first acts. the first experiences. 299) . §9b. of ground. see note 1 49 below . was already at work. And if in the Origin Husserl speaks of engaging himself " in reflec­ tions which surely never occurred to Galileo" ( 1 57) .) " First" (erste) nearly always designates in H u sserl either an undetermined primacy. p. c) that of an e idetic necessity: the necessity of sedimentation prescribed for all constitution and all traditionalization of sense . . B) But if we return to a point this side of Galileo. with questions about the origins of apodictic. C) Finally. . then. " Z l Husserl announces very precisely the task that he will undertake a little later on in the Origin: " For Galileo. is the question now one of studying for itself the heritage which was given to him? Not any more. the first geometers who were in fact responsible 22 These sentences announce what follows in the Crisis. p. each varying according to text and context: a) that of an empirical n ecessity (on the order of individual or social p sychology as well as that of factual history ) . or. p. while invoking Galileo's blindness to the traditional space of his own adventure and designating his "fateful omission. " R evu e de Meraphysique et de Morale.e .z Z If the Galilean discovery resides especially in a formalizing infinitiza­ tion of ancient mathematics. too. " Philoso phy and the Crisis of E uropean H u manity . here the radicalist demand wants to undo the sedimentations upon which the enterprise of an infinite mathematization was based. sensible world and its practical arts) or to occupy himself 21 " It was a fateful omission that Galileo d id not inquire in return as to the original sense-bestowing production which. 1 950) . it is history itself that would be thought . For the relation of Ricoeur's translation and the English one . It truly is a threatening val u e . 29) . contents that must be explored and determined as precisely and as completely as possible from archeological documents. of the de jure. did not feel the need to go into the manner in which the accomplishment of idealization originally arose (i. it is because. Even if we managed sim ultaneously and without contradiction to think the u nitary ground on the basis of which these three propositions can be received . therefore for all history . The question of origin will not be a "philological-historical . most often. as idealization practiced on the original ground of all theoretical and practical l ife-the immediately i ntuited world (and here especially the empirically i ntuited world of bodies)-resulted in the geometrical ideal formations)" (C. It cannot even recognize and isolate those acts as such except by supposing that the primordial sense of geometry is already known . We must reduce the very remarkableness of the Galilean naivete to free the question as to the origin of geometry. There. one which is thereby contingent in comparison with the sen se and teleology of reason. after the reduction of all factuality . [pure geometry as tradition] was given-and of course he. p. assu mes one of the three fol low­ ing significations. 49 [modified ] ) . and so forth. devoted to the transcendental motif in post-Galilean philosoph y. it would only be a matter for the history of science in the classical sense to take stock of the already constituted contents of geometrical cognitions. it will be of considerable interest to see how a shift of focus became urgent and how the 'origin' of knowledge had to become a major prob­ lem" (§9b. 258. i . a de facto chronological priority in constituted cosmic tim e . Despite its incontestable inter­ est. " Paul Ricoeur in his French translation of this text points out the literal translation as " non­ essence" : " La Crise de I ' humanite europeenne et la philosophie . in particular of the first postulates. H istory itself is what this intuition announces. . has the inconsistent negati vity of the " non-essence" (das Unwesen). 2. are conceived by H u sserl on the basis of o ne and the same latent i ntuition. as well as i nvestigations like that of the Origin . For us. p. quite understandably. and Ur. e . 29) . was already an infinitization. § 9 h . sometimes devalued as what makes origins and accumulated sense become dor­ mant . I lluminated by the teleology of Reason. when the first geometry began-that it. mathematical self­ evidence" (C. 3 (July-October. indeed of fundamental importance. This prescription in turn is sometime s valued as the condition of historicity and the progressive advent of reason. to that of sense. This nece ssity . then . ] b) that of a radical ethico-philosophical fau lt : the bankruptcy of philosophical free­ dom and responsibil ity . Arch-. which is never questioned for or in itself. In the Crisis. to geometry. No.refer to phenomenological primordiality.36 Jacques Derrida r I 37 Introduction t o the Origin of Geometry Galileo and his revolution (which Husserl situates at the origin of the modern spirit's perils). an original factuality. and thus. L i k e a l l forgetfu l ness i n general . search" in the investigation of " particular propositions" ( 1 58) that the first geometers discovered or fonnulated. i. an im penetrable destiny" (cf. to make geometrical self-evidence-the ' how' of its origin-into a prob­ lem.e . the n egativity of which ought to be u nthinkable in itself. as a branch of a universal knowledge of what is (philosophy) . . . We will see that the infinite had already broken through . I t is a matter of course that these three significations. o f the "apparen t " defeat o f reason . does not the return to them as an origin tie primordiality to a certain finitude? No simple response is possible to such a question. 5 5 ." A p­ pendix I in C. Proto-. i t c eases to b e "an obscure fate . . of an extrinsic necessity . proceeding beyond Galileo in our historical reflections. [The ET of das Unwesen offered by Carr is "disarray. as he had said in the Crisis: " It did not enter the mind of a Galileo that it would ever become relevant. apparently irreducible t o one another. it is not at all a question of determining what in fact were the firsf:l acts. the "fateful ness" o f t h i s "omission" o r negligence ( Versiiumnis ) . such an investigation can teach us nothing about the geometrical sense of the first geometrical acts. how it grew on the underlying basis of the pre­ geometrical. But then the possibility of a crisis of reason would disappear. theorems.

In a historical retrospection towards origins. Like Husserl. We emphasize those Kantian express ions which are also among t h e most frequent i n The Origin of Geometry. But even if. on the basis of the 'experience ' that gives them to us Kant's intention and that of Husserl. Here the method ' s juridical necessity overlaps history's factual neces­ sity. . But this reduction needs as its starting point the constituted result it neutralizes . . this means clarity about its sense of origin. p p . p p . xi) . 24 A r'u ndamental difference remains.). pp. But this question can be asked only secondarily and at the end of an itinerary which. 8-9 : " Thus we are presupposing the sciences. Such empirical knowledge can justifiably pre­ sent itself as historical knowledge of things related to geometry only by supposing a fully developed clarity about the very sense of what is called the geometrical science. Kant' s indifference to the factual origin (as well as to the content of the example-the isosceles triangle-concerning which he develops the implications of its discovery) is more immediately legitimate than Husserl's. pp. " attributed to the "happy thought of a single man" in " an experiment from which the path that had to be taken must no longer be missed and from which the sure way of science was opened and prescribed (eingeschlagen und vorgezeichnet war) for all times and in endless expansion (fur aile Zeiten und in unendlich Weiten). in order to hand it to us. as we know. it sets free a possibil­ ity. the imperatives of every transcendental philosophy faced with something like the history of mathematics ." as Kant specifies. he neutralizes the factual contents of this "revolution in the mode of thinking" with the same indifference. this " revolution " which gave birth to mathematics out of some empirical " gropings" in the Egyptian tradition (Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Their object supposed or was confused with the results of a ready-made geometry that would have to be reduced in order to attain a consciou sness of its origin. philosophers of method are perhaps more profoundly sensitive to historicity. 268-69 : and eM. FTL. cf. 1 3. Both the necessity to proceed from the fact of constituted science and the regression towards the nonempirical origins are at the same time conditions of possibility : such are . § 3 . " was more "decisive" than the empirical discovery " of the path around the famous Cape [of Good Hope]" (ibid. In effect. x). Such a determination. At first this "revolution" is only a "revelation for" the first geometer. In other words. would flatter our historical curiosity (and everything that Husserl attri­ butes to a certain " romanticism"). The juridical priority of the question of phenomenologi­ cal origin is therefore absolute . our procedure seems not to be at all radical. s ince the genuine sense of all sciences . . it would still leave us blind about the very sense of such a founding: a sense that is necessary and compared to which these facts have at best only an exemplary signification. one that is perhaps less easily distinguishable than would first be imagined. all these various kinds of inquiries we just dismissed have been caught up in the element of a constituted geometry. but also for each of its developments and for the totality of its becoming. their ' sense . like Husserl. even if possible . Preface to 2nd ed. which is nothing less than historical. I ntrod . even though they seem to re­ move digressions from history's path . a consciousness which was at the same time an intuition of its essence . . Nevertheless. as well as logic itself. even though we know nothing of the first factual experience or the first geometer.1 4 . it is of little consequence for him that its " history" has "not reached" u s . Despite certain appearances. it would enrich our knowledge of empirical circumstances. between 24 On the necessity of starting from existing sciences that are util ized as the thread guiding the transcendental regression. . although it only has for its content ideal es­ sences. dates. Cf. so that the reduction can be performed . and so forth . ' . p. . of names. in its turn. In fact. also o n thi s FTL. "The history of this revolution. . the fact has the forgotten sense of the ready-made . "he be called Thales or whatever one desires" (ibid. whether sciences and logic be genu ine or spuriou s. And here. Kant is attentive to the historical dimension of apriori possibilities and to the original genesis of a truth. Kant also evokes this mutation or transformation ( Umiinderung). There must always already have been the fact of a history of geometry . and § 1 02 . "whether.] . we do have experience of them as cultural formations given to us beforehand and bearing withi n them selves their mean i ng . . Indeed . 2 :. this determination would embrace all the historical facts that have constituted the empirical milieu for truth's founding.25 Thus. It is beforehand . The sense of the first demonstration can be rigorously grasped. p. at its limit. [The bracketed expression " of Good Hope " i s added in con­ formity to the Engl i sh translation of Norman Kemp Smith . Nevertheless. For the inaugural mutation which interests Kant hands over geometry rather than creates it. in this case. 8-9 . ready-made geometry holds here in bulk the status of a fact which must be reduced in its factuality so that its sense can be read. however. . i s the very thing i n quest ion .38 Jacques Derrida 39 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry I for the advent of geometry. I must already have a naive knowledge of geometry and must not begin at its origin. enjoys a methodological and rightful prior­ ity. whose birth (or birth certificate) inscribes and prescribes omnitemporality and universality-not only for the opening of its possibility. Because of this.

protogeometer. I t also agrees with the geological metaphor which runs throughout t h e text. Erzeugnis. it seems to be only the extrinsic circumstance for the emergence of a truth (which is itself always already constituted for any factual consciousness). because it is not. . but not about geometry in the act of being instituted. Of course . Husserl's production (Leistung) 2 7 also involves a stratum of receptive intuition . The "construction" to which he gives himself. as such . then. The very vague character of the word "formation" seemed to us to suit the indetermination of H u sserl ' s notion. in particular FTL. Do not forget. namel y . the word "production" seemed to overlay most properly all the significations that Husserl recognizes in this act that he also designates by some com­ plementary notions: pro-duetion . die Bildung . it is not only less constricting. But what matters here is that this Husser­ lian intuition. where allusions to sedimentation. for example the French translation of A. And to know something a priori with complete security. At least it will be ready to be revealed in its initial concept. that the de facto subject of such a "revelation" be " anyone at all. " For. the concept itself. To be c lear on this. 'material a prior i . and which up to now has been very diversely translated . and which teaches us about the sense of ready-made geometry as such. finally (an d this i s especially important here). a creation (Sehopfung) and an act of formation (Bildung. that is. But we were also unable to designate the act which engenders das Gebilde. as it were. but this bringing to light is also. In the Kantian revelation. produced and grounded by the act of a concrete subject. thus seems to uproot Kant ' s formalist apriorism from all concrete history and to inh ibit the theme of a transcendental history. to deposits.:w Strictly speaking. so frequently u tilized in the Origin. 29-30. such as Husserl defined it. Gestalt.26 or in the bare concept of that same figure . Undoubtedly. some­ thing can be said of it. constitutes the "over against us" of Objectivity. then geometry already will be on the point of being revealed to the consciousness of the first geometer. he must attribute to things (Sache) nothing but what necessarily followed from what he had put there himself in accordance with his concept" (ibid. but also de jure necessary. the primally instituting (urstiftende) geometer. And if there is a birth of geometry for Kant. " and that the geomet­ rical example serving as guide-the demonstration of the isosceles triangle-be indifferent. . furthermore. and not of a founding. the synthesis of the " construc­ tion" is irreducible. who is not. is abso­ lutely constitutive and creative: the objects or objectivities that it in­ tends did fWt exist before it. Rather he must beget (hervor­ bringen) (its object) with the help of what he himself put into it and what a priori was represented in it through the concept (through construc­ tion). cf.) . the moment. we will insert the German word between parenthese s . The moment geometry is established as such . " : lO T h i s 2� The signification. which leads to the l ight . seems true. It is understood under a dative category. "he discovered that he must not follow the trace of what he saw in the figure 26 Cf. 21' No doubt. But it is the history of an operation. . Thus the spontaneous eidetic reduction which frees the geometrical essence from all empirical reality-that of sensible figuration as well as from the geometer's psychological lived experience-is for Kant always already done. absence of the decisive notion of " material" or " contingent" a prior i . we have translated by "formation" the notion of Gebilde . p. Tremesaygues and B . as it concerns the ideal objects of mathematics. is only the explication of an already constituted concept that he encounters. There again. and so on. we are authorized to pay such attention to these Kantian expressions only by the confirmation that all of Kant' s philosophy seems to give them . which appears so often in the Origin . to strata. 1 7. p . the first geometer merely becomes conscious that it suffices for his mathematical activity to remain within a concept that it already pos­ sesses . pp. What is most often translated by "revelation" is the allusion to " a light that is given . the 2H The Erdmann edition notes that hen10rbringen has no "object" in Kant' s text. and the activity of the geometer to which the " happy thought" occurred is only the empirical unfolding of a profound reception. §6. the notion of formation seemed the least foreign to th is virtual X ) . The apriori nature of that concept within which we operate precludes all historical investigation whatever about its sub­ ject matter. o f the whole o f Kant' s transcendental analysis. The level of geometry as a material ontology is precisely that of such a . " Each time BiLdung has th is active sense . in himself-a description which no doubt for Husserl as well would be true of every noncreative geometrical act. On the notion of the contingent a priori. on the contrary . from which comes ideal objectivity as Gebilde. dem ging ein Licht auf" (ibid. And since Kant is in­ terested in the possibility of geometry for a subject in general. .40 Jacques Derrida 41 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry not produced by him. 27 Among all the translations already proposed for the notion of Leistung . that concept whose apriori Objectivity will presently strike any subject whatever with geometrical insight [lumiere ] . And indeed it is an ideal history. Pacaud . Critique de la raison pure (Paris : Presses U niversitaries de France . could not be historical . Contrary to its synthetic explication. that in German Bildung also carries the general sense of culture . as in the Origin . except by "formation . to stages. Gestaltung). l ike all production (Erzeugung) in general . and this " before" of the ideal objectivity marks more than the chronological eve of a fact: it marks a trans­ cendental prehistory ." as Kant says. " to " a light dawns on" : "Dem ersten . once the geometrical concept has revealed its freedom with respect to empirical sensibility. as a structure of apriori prescription. and to substrata of sense are everywhere. 2!1 Here all history can only be empirical. It unfolds explicative gestures in the space of a possibility already open to the geometer. 1 950) .

us.:l:l method ological or con stitu tive analyse s rem �meor Up to Ideas I the uced" as factualI ty stnictural and static." in particular pp. pp . ' ' t'Ion . I ity. p. moral custom . with the entire knowledge they have accumulated . resp ect to emp irica l knowledge is moree diffithe productIon ?f geometn­ In fact . Thus : " Certainly the mathematician too will not turn to historical science to be taught about the truth of mathematical theories .geom t�s mdifference to by the nature Kan a " scarcely altered" conventional PlatonIs m. is considered only as a factual history falling under the stroke of the suspension (Ausscha ltu ng) . . In asking himse lf. of the sc iences also (so far as we accept them as cultural fa cts and not as validity-system s) [our emphasis]. at the end of criticizing an empiricist theory of the origin of geometry: " Instead of philosophizing and psychologizing about geometrical thought and intuition from an outside standpoint. our emphasis) . pp. loca lly and throu e Kan tlan c ntl que ernin g the intraworl dline ss of t . . conc by Fink and appr oved by H usse rl d. who se correlat tory . tion ? If space and time were transcendental real a histonc ist emp Inc�1 ed both for an ahistoric metaph ysic s and for always denounced m open Kant science two interrelated poss ibili ties that irici sm from the start and at avo id emp one and the sam e mov e. espe c ially in Beilage XXV I sense itself of every cultu ral ideal :\1 science of constituted and intraworIdly factuality. .] . 85-86 [modified] . . Eug�� f tigat ion of the " origin o the worl comp ared with H u sserl ' s inves rary Cntl cl sm . can only be mea sure d by vigilance m th IS Kant mn " I Iml't a : \ 2 Perh aps the dept h of its diffic ulty.. Cf. Barnng of geometrical space and the . works of the tec hn ical and of the fine arts.34 Geometry's truth.we now wonder abo ut the sens of tian " reve lation. Natural in the same sense are also realitie s of such kind s of state . a . ' " and what sciences mu st it . 1 24-26. we should enter vi­ tally into these activities. e� t that a �or� pro­ the mom emp irical history is only legitimated from irical objects. physical and psychological. §56. sciences of an essentially new type . religion . found o n p. Kant had to confine his tran scene was ther fore�Itse lf a con­ � of ideal con stitu ted objects. 35 HusserI says this (in the period of " Philosophy as Rigorous Science" and Ideas l) in some frank phrases which . and p. where both historical origin and history as a human science are excluded . its failur e . a protogeomet e pos ible a� d nece ss �ry � ing on protogeometry . It will not occur to him to relate the historical development of mathe­ matical representations [the German and French editions add: and judgments] with the question of truth" ("PRS . birth be in �c ribed wi t� in the that the reference to a h istor ical . 1 26) . undergo s uspension as sciences which require for their deve lop­ ment the natural standpoint" (Ideas I. Therewith all the natural and human sciences. would be in flagrant contradiction with those of the Origin . 45. 503-07. . ' which sciences' " can phenomenology " ' draw from ' " insofar as phenomenology is itself "a science of ' origins .1 47 .:l:! and his free dom � Ith Bus serl ' s task is thus all the more hazardocult to just �fY at first sIgh� . eve . pp ." p. ' not depend on : " H usser! writes: " In the first place it goes without say ing that with the su spending of the natural world . But to dental disc ours to a world any price . n. :n This notion ry even whI le mvo kmg Kantian phil osophy seem s to make contrad icto . Can we not say here�e bnn gmg to lIght of an and time both requires and �upp ress es t nces of spac e and mo­ spac e intr insic and nonempirical historicIty of the SCIe itie � . 1 55 [modified]) . at this moment of Busserl' s itinerary . this history of geometry had remained in the dark and was judged of doubtful possibil­ ity or mediocre interest for the phenomenologist or mathematician as such . Thus. [The abov e quote ed . law . m :\. . O . and all history was "red retat io� pro �� sed gh a different approach . its normative value. " O f course . empo hy of Edm und Huss erl and Cont IS "The Phen omen olog ical Phi losop erl. Or again. in particular Ideas I. it is always already mad etnc l �bJ �ct. but for the question concerning the sense and value of what we cognize. if the levels of explication and the senses of the word "history" had not been clearly distinguished. all indiv idual objectivi­ ties which are constituted through the functional ac tivities of consc iousness in valuation and in practice are suspended-all varieties of cultural expression. ThIs hI �tOry found history has already created nonemp that th� theor� of Idea l . it ' beco mes Bus serl' s theme .42 Jacques Derrida 43 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry himself resp onsi ble for it reduction is not for or by a subj ect who makes er or phil osopher reflect­ in a transcendental adventure. It may well be that we have inherited dispositions for cognition from the cognitions of past generations. stituted subj ect. I :\4 Cf. 95. Cf. Since every ideal obje ctiv ity is product for a tr�ns� endental con scio usne ss (the only starting poin a h �story whIch IS a� way s phenomeno logy ). 7 3. . aesthetic and practical values of e very shape and form . and through direct analyses determine their immanent sense. is radically independent of its history which." before cal co�cep ts before and this side of the Kan pure and exact space and and this side of the con stitu tion of an ideallyed by the act of a concrete time . . :u H usser l often stres ses the KnS1 S. whI ch t�e �hole of of a protohis . Concerning the human sc iences. 46. The Phenomenology of Huss in R. the i nterp Here we find. . E lveto n. the definitions of history as an empirical human science in " PRS . rem ains hidd en for Kant. d its determined content . i t is a s facts and not a s norms that the hi storical gIven s are pa­ renthes ized . the history of this heritage is as indiff erent as is that of our gold currency to its real value " (Ideas 1. § 1 . � �m� : . p. every ideal objectiv ity has n If we know noth mg of alre ady ann oun ced in that con sciousness. I . . §25 . the que stion is " provisionally" left open whether they are " natural sc iences or .:�y wou �d be .

qua experience . the s ection number. geometry. The p. and are i ndifferent whether it exists in nature or not. i . This is becau se " Philosophy as Rigorous Science" was concerned norm to fact. That is why these first reductions of remo ved in the Origin -even less so than elsewhere. . see s ImpOSSIble for such obvious truths to fall under a suspicion of being false " [par. no psych any in­ tiel] content have as such . 63] . the investigation number or Prologomena. etc . which is always already at . it supplying a logical grounding. . I . and the page : e . only after this phenomenology of mathematical evidence and with the hypothesis of the Evil Demon will the critical or juridical question be posed of the ground that guarantees the truth of naive ev idence . . Whether I am a wake or asle�p . such as pure theory of move ment . mstttutmg acts ( Urstiftung) . 3 0 1 -02 means the first volume. mal hIstOry. indefinite" whose negativity gives up its rights to history . f lslficatton of the actual infinite into an indefinite or an a d infinitum .' the eidos and the ideal object do not preexist every subjective act. . wil l never be put into que stion on their own specific . (New York : H umanities Press. Huss �r\ ' s devel opment is also situated on the same plane and dons the same style . § 1 8 . by thus avoid ing all histor icist ideal objec t order to respe ct and show the uniqu e historicity of thewill never be factual history itself. This hidden ? Ist ry WIll take its sense from an infinite Telos that H usserl will not hesitate to call God m hiS l ast unp b l ished writings. afte an analogous descriptive stage . on. . does this in a passage (LI. arithmetic. I f logic . I 970)-hereafter c ited as L/.e. 30 1 -02) where he recalls the Cartesian dlstmctlon between imaginatio and intellectio concerning the chiliagon and very precisely an­ nounces the theory of geometrical " idealization" that he wil l maintain in the Origin . themsel ves historical. pure There are pure sciences of essen ces . . I . like at of the gre at assic rationalists. Since no existential thesis (Daseinsth from all were imme diately freed nece ssary or permitted . what comes to the same thing. He. . and wh ich seem s thu s to dlsclo se (and e escend toward) a primordially inst ituted finitude while completely . F indlay . and whether production itself. KantJan sense . as a regulative . The geometer who draws his figure s on the is not as experience are actua lly there on a blackboard produ ces in so doing strokes that f ience o what he thus board that is actua lly there . L/. whose mode of appearing is thus c learly recogmzed. if then they have a his­ �ory. tr. tr. Non-dependence is what is stressed. qua consciousness over the function of sets up reality or factual existence . 1 84 [modified]) . The geometrical eidos is recognized in that the test of hallu cination: . whIch treat only of the simplest and most general subject-matter. . in them no f positings o actua lfact . experience . have an element of indubitable certainty . are f or. they must be related to. in all their thought-construction s. N . woul funct on as the necessary reduction of empirical history and the natural world . � � � � � � �? � � � � �� � � �� � This autonomy of mathematical truth compared to perception and natural reality (on which mathematical truth could not be based) is described here only in a negative way . and so . ree throughout from any These . does not really matter. §7. two and three add up to five . No sensi ble figuration in the real world . would only be the name given to a h idden h istory and . But his exper s just as little groun dfor his seeing produces. a:OIdmg m plnclsm . with situating geometry esis) was pure essential sciences. despite this extraordinary revolution which grounds the absolute a d eternal truth without the aid of God or infinite Reason. But they must do this through the element of an orig. mathematics." though not phantasy realities--even if hallucination reveals them as such) : if. In this re spect. §70. It is given as an I dea in the . The de scription itself and the " natural" validity of t is tru th . serl's emphasis) :n :lfi The essential uselessness or the " inadequacy" of sens ible " illustration" i s already u nderscored in the Logical Investigations. The pn ordlal round of these constituted truths. § 1 8 . with respo nding to the kind of histo ricism which reduced on among the in an exemplary fashi and Ideas I. a fal sification of which Hegel accused Kant and Fichte . in eIdetIC determination. [ A ll future references w i11 list the volume number. g. factual history must be reduc ed in order � then the normative indep endence of the ideal object in its own right in or logici st confu sion. IS not a positive and actual infinite . 2 vols. space-theory. p. In the Theaetetus ( 1 90b). a reductIon which pertains to the sense of these sciences.re the hypothesis of hallucination takes up the role assigned . But if hallucination does not undermine the eidos of the constituted ideal object (because the eidos in general and the ideal object in particular are " irreal . no factual [evenemen it with stood stituting sense . they must be primordially grounded m � the protoidealizations based on the substrate of an actually per­ � eIve � real world. 55 [modified ]. Whether or not he thereby hallu s his lines andfigures in a instead of actua lly drawing lines he draw scientific inves tigator of f world o phantasy. these sciences a6 ological factu ality. will investigate th is in primally . pp. . of mathematIcal sense by hallucination. 1.e . i. J . Where experience . It is true that this infinite. First Investigation .44 Jacques Derrida 45 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry rk­ The conti nuity and coherence of these observations are truly rema to respect and show able: first. � � u sserl . " one simply reduces what is indicated in this sense as what cannot presently be retained by virtue of this ground . (Ideas I. as the � arteslan analYSIS before the hypothesis of the Evil Demon in the First Meditation : "At thl s rate we might be justified in concluding that . . 7 : . But we will see that. and it . . can take functions in them . � tself. and a square has onl y four sides. afford the physical act of and thinking of the geometrica l essence as does cinates. HusNature beha ves quite differently . WIll be delegated to a veracious God who is also the creator of eternal rut s . on t. and only then. Plato had recourse to dream. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach (New York: Bobbs-Merril l . level . 1 97 1 ). H usserl measures the eidetic intangib il ity . pp. etc . H usserl . ot ?nly th moraltty but also the historicity of truth itself would here prevent this . ET: In Descartes: Philosophical Writings. For Descartes. to fiction in generaL "the vital element of phe­ nomenology" (Ideas /. .he ?ther hand. . work In the ongms. I . moreover. pure time-theory.tarting from an analysis of the mathematical " phenomenon: ' or in order to better Isolate ItS " sense . Husserl is less distant from Descartes than it seem s . Descartes' God. p. as m a [conventional] Platonism. S. that apprehends or experience qua experience .. The positive ground of truth is not investigated for :l i � � � .

1 97 1 ) . §67. will be reactivating and noetic.real analysis [of what is] (for sense is nothing �ther thQ1� the se�se of realIty o of fa ualIt�). then. in The Phenomenology of Internal Tim e-Consciousness. for Husserl. this definition of phenomenological origin ( in distinction to genesis in the worldly human and natural sciences) was already clearly specified in the LI. That does not appear to be the case. from rev . . . and it would only be a question of clarifying. pp. this i s what Husserl was obscurely presenting when he . (and Imagma� l �n in general) is not directly perception. the return to the " 'technical and economic forms of production" (namel y . The eidetic aspect of this reduction was the iteration of a noema: since the eidos is constituted and objective. to th� . 2 2 1 ) . Here . one will have to reawaken the dependence of . or not. 27-28 . a history in which the consideration of fac �s thems� lves would become indispensable. ed. starting from a "first acquisition" (aus einem ersten Erwerben) ( 1 58-59) . factual. 1 1 . p. §37. the here and now of the " first time" is institutive and creative.and extrinsic causality outside of every reduction) seems mevI. But what authorized the essential reading of and within constituted geometry was the possibility of imaginatively varying the natural here and now of the figure or the psychological experience of the geometer who . " Moreover. Churchill and Karl Ameriks ( Evanston : Northwe stern U niversity Press. as soon as Husserl s account be � omes concerned with the genesis of geometry and getting beyon� thl. Thus only at the level and point marked by Ideas I doe� Husserl rejoin Kant' s indifference to a kind of history th� t would sImply be extrinsic and empirical . Also. Is this experience . can be repeated voluntarily and mdefimtely) mto a hIstory of �r�gl �s. This d istinction.orld of constituted significations . de jure as well as de facto. . p. who thmk H usserl was h imself " obscurely" resigned to this at the tme of The Orzgm ofG� 0m. "for the first time" (erstmalig). is strongly oriented t ward thIs kmd f a conclu sion . singular and empirical existence. and determining its evidence. Martin H eidegger. 227-28). is truth' s accomplice only in a st�tic w. which also operates by variation. 197 1 ). t� at !or the sphere of sense. . since . unique of its kind . which H usserl will always j udge a s deci sive. to an Otherwise . rpt. . The imaginary variation of static phe­ nomenology simply supposed a type of reduction whose style will have to be renewed in a historical phenomenology. . 39 Opening Ideas I (Chapter 1 . where the de facto IS . but history . there­ fore invariable .t e . The indissociability itself has a rigorously determinable phenomenological sense. he return to real.mdlssoclable from � he �e jure. and i n " PRS . 45. ctually real ature which implies in its development the whole movement of subjectiVity (the author s em:lH � � � � �� � � � the pure phenomenological sense that Husserl so doggedly distinguished : Because. Indeed .table to that a t or. to a . � r. The historical reduction. was search109 10 the famous fragment on The Origin of Geometry to ground geo etncal truth on hum n praxis " (p. Husserl says that the upsurge of geometry interests him here insofar as it had taken place " once" (dereinst). p p . w ill still be u nderscored quite frequently in Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. tf. this expenence remains. we might expect to see him remove the eIdetIC �nd transcendental reductions purely and simply. passage already cited). Churchill ( B loomington. of Landgrebe by James S. in Husserlian langu ge . creative experience. his reduction might seem vam and dIssemblIng . and the r tu . the materialism "we find ourselves on a plane subsequent {posterieur] latter havin suppressed the abstract conception of nature but ot . To proceed to the ground and pnmordtal con­ stitution of truth. 220). At the end of Hu sser\ ' s itinerary . 1 15. invariance. isolating. the series of acts which intended it could not but in­ definitely restore the ideal identity of a sense which was not obscured by any historical opacity. as we have seen. New York: Gordon and Breach . I nd . If youy. Prol. etry. and of course in the Origin. tf. on the contrary.s pre­ liminary stage. w � �� � � � � � � � � phasis. starting from the real world. and return to a constItu­ tive history. History as institutive would be the profou �d ar� a w�ere sense IS mdls­ sociable from being. in order to " pass on" . we must return. the instituting fact would be irreplaceable. first. it has the characteristic which defines fact­ namely. 237-3 8 . 75-76.1 6 . Even were it unique and buried. was not its institutor . It IS the consciousness of historicity and the reawakemng of ongms .:lH because here for the first tIme.refer.46 Jacques Derrida 47 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Hallucination. : I ndiana U niversity Press. and objective inde­ pendence. We recognize. i n FTL. WIth dl lectIcal empiricist historicism to the reductIOn. ed. § l a. I . in the eM. . fatal . James S ." p p . in particular § 1 02. H usserl ' s reduction never had the sense (quite the contrary) of a negatIon-of �n ignorance or a forgetfulnes s that would ' ' leave" the real conditions of sense and factualIty in general in order to " come back" or not. t �en. as smgu­ lar historical origin. This invariance of the fact (of what can never be re­ peated as such) would de jure c� rry ov er its eidetic � nvariance �� hat . Phenomenologie et materialisme di� le�tique ( 195 1 . " The phenomenolo gical explication is thus onented towards determmi ng the actual conditions in which truth is engendered" (p . not a singular fact-one for which we should not be able to substitute another fact as an example in order to decipher its essence? Is this to say that this inseparability of fact and sense in the oneness of an instituting act precludes access for phenomenology to all history and to the pure eidos of a forever submerged origin? Not at all. The notion of "origin" or genesis could no longer be recogmzed m The interpretatio n of Trfm-Duc-T hao. 1 973)-hereafter cited as EJ­ particularly § 1 . pp . § 2 . the true contrary of h �l1ucination. pp. 269. p. Instead of repeating the constituted sense of an ideal object. the irreducibility of a here and now-the total fact marking geometry's establishment would be invariable.

like the " sons of the earth. . 1 5 . It is found in place of the adverbial expression erstmalig in the transcnpt of the Origin published by Fink in Revue Internationale de Ph ilosophie ( 1 939). as Ricoeur notes. to guide and control the intuition of the ultimate material essence. pp. even though we know nothing of the first creators and are not even asking after them" ( 1 58 [modified]) . such a sense of origin. posed in Ideas I from the notions of the Third Logical I nvestigation . can be considered in certain respects as the most concrete and most independent. It could be said that the eidetic phenomenology of history. this notion does not seem to have been employed b� Husserl himself. "for [the phenomenological subsumption]. exclude " only empirical individuality . since the singularities of origins are those of instituting acts of every ideal signification and .�h does �ot necessarily implicate in itself the reference to an Er� tmaltgkelf. There Husserl completely condem�s i n a �latonic manner those who. t�en. . the most con­ crete. 41 Cf. This "must " (have appeared) marks the necessity now recognized and timelessly assigned to a past fact of an eidetic pre-scription and of an apriori norm . . for such metaphysical hypostatization would be absurd . eidetic components.). Here again we are going to see that there is no simple re­ sponse to the question of the priority of one reduction over another: The singularity of the invariable first time already has a necessIty whose eidetic fund is indeed rather complex. e . a moment ago. this is a double necessity : it is that of a Quod and a Quomodo. But as soon as historical distance is inter­ posed. Here. Whatever were the empirical content of the origin. ' our interest shall be the inquiry back into the most original sense in which geometry once arose. I deal geometncal objects cannot have their original place in some topos ouranios . 1 . in particular. 239 . a necessity of having had a historical origin and of having had such an origin. i. �he sin�ula� IS eternally the apeiron . only 'factual­ ity' " (Idees I. A doctrine of tradition as the ether of historical perception then becomes necessary: it is at the center of The Origin of Geometry. concerning a past is frequently utilized in the Origin . p. We saId. and he simultaneously rejects the hypothesis of the intelligible heaven. have bemg m a top �� ouramos or m a divine mind. though existing nowhere in the world. as Husserl says. and the first of sciences.e.dtal �ct which created the object whose eidos is determined by the IteratIve reduction . was present as the tradition of millennia . we inquire into that sense in which it appeared in history for the first time-in which it must have appeared [our emphasis]. is in one sense the most dependent and the most abstract of sciences. since certain nonempirical singularities. p. 62-63 and 66-69) as ultimate material essences WhICh. under secondary passiv ities and infinite sedimentations--a pnmor. But only If other IS m � ant to qualify essence and not empirical existe�ce as su �h . For � umque fact already has its essence as unique fact WhICh. having to treat only singularities as such . . 1 of tr. speaks of Erstamaligke �tsmo �us [po 208] and thus gives a thematic value to a signification aimed at by a profound mtentIon of Husserl. is really more difficuH to solve when it concerns historical singularities. 1 1 6 [mod!fi �d]). that it would be impossible to S ubst tute . where he dIscussed a. the investigation of origins no longer proceeds in this way . in particular I . of the possibilities of science and of philosophy. " They [the significat�on�] are not for t h a� reas�n objects which. First. by �em� not�mg other than the fact itself (this is the thesis of the non-fictive Irreahty ?f the essence). Moreover. 207). and there is no concrete histoncity :vhI. 330. . " of apriori requisite. However. is not the factuality of fact but the sense of fact-th �t w�thout which the fact could not appear and give rise to any determm�tIon or discourse . " 1. . Only under these conditions can Husserl write: .IS one of theIr ." can "understand by 'bemg. the "in which it must have appeared" clearly reveals Husserl's intention and sums up the sense of every reduction. I can state this value of necessity independently of all factual cognition . there is an essence-of-the-first-time in general. Phenomenology can recognize WIth ? bJectlve validity only essences and essential relations" (p. an Erstmalig�eit. it is apodictically and a priori necessary that geome� ry has. n. "being" in the world of natural reality. Indeed. since the clue there is the immanent lived experience or the sensible thing perceived originaliter.ll ideal significations and objects. But inversely. The problem of dependence or independence. then their history is the most independent. of the abstract or concrete character of these eidetic singularities. singular factuality is always present. the theme of eidetic singularities is already ticklish enough in Ideas I .anothe� fact for the unique fact of thefirst time . whatever ItS de facto example may be . Hus�erl already emphasized this in the Logical Investigations. who also italicizes erstmalig (p. when Husserl wrote in " Philosophy as Rigoro� s Science" that. had an origin and thus has appeared a first time . whose empiricalfact is never imme­ diately present. But an irreducible historicity is recognized in that this " must" is announced only after the fact of the eventY I could not define the necessary sense and the necessity of the �� Th is notion of " mu st . (Sem) �nlY · reaI bemg.-l 1 Their histori� ity. It marks the possibility of a recurrent structural determination in the absence . Already. 40 an inaugural signification that is always reproducible. i 40 In its substantive form . although reduced. 203-225: Fink. § 3 1 . pp.48 Jacques Derrida 49 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry sense with respect to an inaugural and institutive act con� ealed . Undoubtedly. the tode ti of brute existence . he evidently understood by singularity only the oneness of fact � n ItS pure factuality and not that of the eidetic singularities defined m Ide� s I (§§ 1 1 . 1 4 .

in the nece ssity of preserving transcendence or reduced factuality as clue . since . Absolutely free with respect to what it governs. and second. We have translated it by return inquiry (question en re­ tour) . is then. to continued inquiry" ( 1 58) . the law­ fulness of sense is nothing in itself. of course . such as it is now in circulation and which I can always phenomenologically read. and whatever in fact the empirical content of their acts was. the reactivating reduction supposes the iterative reduction of the static and structural analysis. It might simply be an adapta­ tion of the last phrase quoted from Ideas I on p. the maintenance of this circulation permits the neutralization of worldly history. If we take for granted the philosophical nonsense of a purely empirical history and the impotence of an ahistorical rationalism . . what seems to be of utmost importance to Husserl is as much an operation (reactivation itself as the ability to open a hidden historical field) as the nature of that field itself (as the possibility of something like reactivation) . Third. Thu s we have no other choice than to proceed forward and backward in a ' zigzag' pattern . The fact does not teach u s through its factual content but as an example. A phenomenology of the experience is possible thanks to a reduction and to an appropriate de-sedimentation. But in the absence of an u nderstanding of the beginnings the development i s mute as a development of sense. Thus. the possibility is offered me of asking again. proposes as a sort of necessary "circle " ":l and which is only the pure form of every historical experience. . such that geometry issued from them with the sense as we now know it. a notion no doubt current enough . on the con­ trary. I can restore history to its traditional diaphaneity . as Husserl says. Thus Husser! underscores the preliminary and general character of this meditation in a sentence which appears borrowed word 4:l " Thus we find ourselves in a sort of circle. thi s after i s not the indication of a dependence . . Also. And if this apriori normativ ity of history is recognized starting from the fact . return inquiry (and question en retour as well) is marked by the postal and epistolary reference or resonance of a communication from a distance. .. and finally. Husserl here speaks of Ruckfrage. I have been unable to locate this phrase . Thu s only under the cover of static phenomenology's reductions can we make other infinitely more subtle and hazardous reductions. The latter. the whole sense of an open history in general. . 58 [modified]) . and in return. the metaphorical focus of our text. it is a priori necessary that they followed from a sort of non-geometry. 43 above .50 Jacques Derrida 51 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry origin before geometry was in fact born and before it had in fact been given to me. return inquiry is asked on the basis of a first posting. Like Ruckfrage . "open . Without the Wechselspiel of this double reduction. It i s due to this qfter s own specific character. III Crisis All these precautions have made us sensitive to the extreme difficulty of the task. that they sprang from the soil of pre­ geometrical experience. [ Derrida puts the phrase " pas plus que I ' h i storie de sa transmission ne fonde la valeur de I 'or" in quotations . For. then we realize the seriousness of what is at stake. would be impracticable if geometry were essentially something which continually circulated as common coin in the validity of ideality. which teaches u s once and for all what the geometrical "phenomenon" is and when its possibility is consti­ tuted.. in their exemplary web. Neutralization then opens the space for an intentional and intrinsic history of this very circulation and permits the comprehension of how a tradition of truth is possible in general . as would be all phenomenology . history supposes it. From a received and already readable document. that the particular h istoricity of phenomenological discourse is announced. it is a priori necessary that the establishing gestures had a sense . but which now takes on a sharp and precise sense. which yield both the singular essences of institutive acts and. the reactionary and therefore revolutionary moment of this interplay ( Wechselspiel) . ] H .. In short. Undoubtedly. after the fact. Like its German synonym. about the primordial and final intention of what has been given me by tradition. This means-by a necessity which is no less than an accidental and exterior fate-that I must start with ready-made geometry. The understanding of the beginnings is to be gained fully only by starting with science as given in its present-day form . looking back at its development. in order to go back through it and question the sense of its origin. can any wordly history give the sense of this circulation as common coin . whatever in fact the first produced or discovered geometrical idealities were . which is only mediacy itself and openness to a telecommunication in general . the phenomenology of his­ toricity would be an exercise in vanity. both thanks to and despite the sedimentations. These analogies. whoever in fact the first geometers were . no more than the history of its transmission grounds the value of gold. " (§91 . Return inquiry. Rather. confirm at what point is required the "zigzag " way of proceeding-a procedure that the of every material determination . p. and Professor Derrida h imself does not remember from what it is taken.

45 This concept (already marked by history) is. 46 Starting from a system of axioms which " governs" a multiplicity. 6) . Whatever may be the responses con­ tributed by the epistemologist or by the activity of the scientific inves4� On the two ' ' faces" of science ' s thematic and the objective character of the thematic on which the scientific researcher i s exclusively focu sed in his activ ity as researcher. S ur f a Logique et f a theorie de fa science (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France . 43-63 . I . but. 70ff. However far its building up progresses. And they will be " richly explicated" only in a prospective. Con­ tinually calling us back to the unnoticed presuppositions of ever recur­ ring problems. 1 947). . pp. regional . cf. geometrical thinking" (p. its unity is that of a traditional geometrical sense infinitely open to all its own revolutions . pp. 94-97. will not th ink of exploring. historically. it is itself only if it remains essentially and intrinsically haunted in its sense of origin by the te/os of decidability-whose di sruption it marks. indeed its vulnerability has been well shown. geometries? Furthermore. The ground of this unity is the world itself: not as the finite totality of sentient beings. f Ch . : Tr�m-Duc-Th {lO . pp. these are generalities which can be richly explicated . it is the primordial concrete essence of geometry that makes such a generalizing operation possible . I n its very negativity . they can impress on life habitual norms as volitional bents. Phenomenofogie. par­ ticularly when G6del discovered the rich possibility of "undecidable " propositions in 1 93 1 . FTL. this unity of geometry's sense. cf. theory a priori can be only a delimiting form. such as it is announced in the Origin. within the open unity of a science? And it is within the horizon that Husserl here questions that the preoccupation with decidability belongs. as we shall soon see.47 That would be an alternative we could not get beyond . The first of these radical generalities is precisely that which au­ thorizes the return inquiry: the unity of geom etry's sense is that of a tradition. in this development. notably in the LI. undecidability has a revolutionary and disconcerting sense . as we know. whose unity is still to come on the basis of what is announced in its origin. pp. in a certain sense. p. Pro!. Nor is this sense-unity to be confused with the concept that Husserl in fact determined as the ideal orienting geometrical practice in geometry's objective thematic field. but as the infinite totality of possible experiences in space in general. §70. as predelineated forms within which the individual deci­ sions ought in any case to confine themselves. For a rational practice. 35 : and especially S . To pose the question of this traditional unity is to ask oneself: how. But this naivete would no longer have the sense it used to have before the sense-investigation of these generalities . " Thus the geometer . is to be thought of as the geometrical science . A Study o Husserl' s Logic [Part I . however generous the proliferation of its forms and metamorphoses may be . . and. naive style of work. pp . p. has reached decisions. The intention which grasps the new sense is original insofar as the prior project stil l remains and the intention will simply not " gi ve way" to it. 24 1 and 243 . have all geometries been. . Bachelard . or will they be. and irresponsibility.52 Jacques Derrida 53 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry I for word from Formal and Transcendental Logic (Introduction. Thus . every proposition is determinable either as analytic conse­ quence or as analytic contradiction. 4 0 On these questions. the notion of the un-decidable-apart from the fact that it only has such a sense by some irreducible reference to the ideal of decidability4S-also retains a mathematical value derived from some unique source of value vaster than the project of definiteness itself. But all the questions about the possibility or impossibility of main­ taining Husserl's demands-either as an essentially inaccessible regu­ lative ideal or as a methodological rule and actual technique (which no longer in general seems possible)-are they not asked precisely within this unity of the geometrico-mathematical horizon in general . The very movement which enriches sense retains a sedimentary reference to the antecedent sense at the bottom of the new sense and cannot dispense w ith it . that the analyses of the Origin concerning the synthetic style of mathe­ matical tradition serve as an example of tradition in general is thus confirmed. forget­ fulness. is not a general concept that is extracted or abstracted from various known geometries. a sense-investigation that Husserl terms a " criticism" and which will have a regulative and normative value for this work. besides geomet­ rical shapes. . 1 87-88: and in FTL. 47 This ideal is clearly defined by H u sserl . 36). Geometry's development is a history only because it is a history. Such confidence did not have long to wait before being contradicted . the crossing of which indicates absurdity or aberration" (FTL. sense-investigation will keep us from aberration. it can only plant fences. which is also its oneness. with radical responsibility. §72. before a section in which the relations of the philosopher and the mathematician are defined : in Ideas I. whose indigence is essential . p . is not confi n ed to the systematic coherence of a geometry whose axioms are already consti­ tuted. 6): " This return inquiry unavoidably remains within the sphere of gen­ eralities. 36-38. that of a "definite" nomology and an exhaus­ tive deductivity. . pp . 3 ] . in particular Jean Cavailles. " ( 1 58 [modified]) . . §9. Doubtless. The unity of the geometrical science . § 3 1 . phenomenology will never be able to enrich these generalities. they do not call again into question the unified sense of what. This whole debate is only understandable within something like the geomet­ rical or mathematical science. and can confine them­ selves so far as those universal decisions have become actually appro­ priated. On the contrary. 4H Moreover. " If science. a s apriori determination.

if Husserl (from the Logical Investigations to Ideas I and to Formal and Transcendental Logic ) indeed assigned the narrow sense of decidability to the notion of geometrical determinability. 96: " the idea of a 'nomolof{ical science ' . in order for the values of consequence and inconsistency to be rendered problematic. a radical ground which is already past. pp. as the infinite horizon of a science. " Expl i cation" ( Verdeutlichu ng) is not to be confused e ither with clarification (Kliirung) or reactivation: remaining within const ituted sense . and even if they were identical with this ideal. for axioms are in principle the results o primordial sense-fashioning (Sinnbildung) and al­ f ways have this behind them )" [modifiedJ. And they will never concern. and Appendix I I . But that is not so ! Even if Husserl at one time adopted the conception of grounding axiomatics and even proposed it as the ideal for " all 'exact' eidetic disciplines" (Ideas I. . clarificat ion . defining the " multiplicity-form in the pregna n t sen se .54 Jacques Derrida 55 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry tigator to these important intra-mathematical questions of definiteness and completeness. . against the classic affirmations of Hus­ serl. It is then already exiled from the origins to which Husserl now wishes to return.! When Husser! speaks in the :. . it seems he only considered this to be a secondary grounding . . Bachelard comments more rigorously on the sense of this notion by translating it as " process of distinguishing" or " process wh ich renders distinct . in accordance with the grammar of pure logic . " Hu sserl continues: " Such a multiplicity-form is defined. explication makes that sense distinct without restoring it to its ful l clarity . But as soon as the question of origin arises. . whatever future forms develop.e . we can read in the Origin ( 1 68): "one must also take note of the constructive activities that operate with geometrical idealities which have been 'ex­ plicated' but not brought to primordial evidence. .O Our emphasis. " Then .'-'o Axiomatics in general (from which alone every ideal of exhaustive and exact deductivity can take its sense . i . § 7 . Instead o f opposing " reactivation" and " explication . e tc . pp. The axiom-system formally defini ng such a mult iplicity i s distinguished by the circumstance that any proposition (proposition-form . 1 4-2 3 . they can only be integrated into this unity of the mathematical tradition which is questioned in the Origin. Thu s . in the "objective" thematic sphere of science where they must exclusively remain. 3 1 3-29: also S. a sedimentation of sense: i. wh ich H u sserl so often called the ultimate horizon for every theoretical attitude and for all philosophy. . 1 . I n h is formulation o f the Origin . pp . 5 6-63 . of substantive or infin i­ tive forms . 56) . But the objective thematic field of mathematics must already be constituted in its mathematical sense . " On all the p roblem s concerning explication. geometrical determinability seems indeed to have the sense of geometrical determinability in general. In other words. :. therefore . n aturally) that can be constructed . and above all without reactivating its primordi al intention." p. . e. anything but the determined nature of the axiomatic systems and of the deductive interconnections that they do or do not authorize. Consequentl�'. Fink specifies these distinctions. " 49 Consequently . p . no matter what Husserl himself may have thought about this relativity and despite whatever interest it may still hold as such. there i s no truth about space that is not deducibly included in the ' complete' ( vollstiindigen) system of space-axioms . In fact. ) that we have kept the classic translation of Verdeutlichung as e xplica­ tion . notably FTL. 2 1 5) . 1!1 him prior to those of axioms and serve as their ground. or correla­ tively the idea of an infinite province (in mathematico-logical parlance .. in the ideal Euclid. There is no doubt. if the origin of mathematics and the unity of its sense were in Husserl' s eyes essentially tied to this ideal of exhaustive de­ ductivity ." he distinguishes between two moments or type s of reactivation in general: reactivation as " logical explication" and reactivation of the " tradition of sense-formation (Sinnbildungstradition ) i nternally present in a t hematic sense-formation. both of which must control all genetic bearing [demarche ] ." " When reactivation i n the first sense i s completed. this is because he let himself be guided in his nonhistorical investigations by the present state of a ready-made science . and in order to be able to say. axiomatics supposes a primordial evi­ dence . not by just any formal axiom-system . that the kinds of primordial evidence he investigates here are for Hu sserl writes in FTL. is e ither ' true'-that is to say: an analytic (purely deducible ) consequence of the axioms-or 'false'-that is to say : an analytic contradiction-. Bachelard . problems to which allusion is made in the Origin. ter­ tillm non datllr .. S . and reactivation of propositions in general . A S tlldy of Husserl ' s Logic .1 Geometrical determinability i n the broad sense wou ld only be the regional and abstract form of an infinite determinability of being in general . when it comes to an end. to its value as present cognition. Ch . but by a 'complete' one . (Primordial evidence must not be confused with the evidence of 'axioms' . includes the idea that there is no truth about such a province that is not deducibly i nc luded in the 'fundamental laws' of the corre­ sponding nomological science-just as. � 3 1 . out of the concepts (concept-forms) occur­ ing [sic] in that system . § § 1 6 and 17. a multiplicity) governable by an explanatory nomology. only then does reactivation as return i nqu iry concerning the 'primal instituting' begin" ( " Die Frage . cf. in any case. the Origin 's question would be tainted at the outset by a certain historical relativity. p . "tertium datur. It is for reasons of grammatical construction (the u se of past or present participles. if the primordial act of grounding that Husserl wishes to el icit [solliciter J here was the institution of an axiomatic and deductive field or even the institution of ax iomatics and the ideal of deductivity in general-and if this institution was described as that of mathematics itself-then the Husserlian project would be seriously threatened by the evolution of axiomatiziation toward a total formalization within which one necessar­ ily comes up against the limits stated by Godel's theorem (and related theorems) . t h is formulation confirms and underscores the necessary anteriority of the static analy sis and the s tatic fixing of sense. from which alone every prob­ lem of decidability can then spring) already supposes.

notably in C. then. from which as yet and always the undecidables or any other future mathematical formation will stem.e. This world exists entirely "through tradition" ( 1 58). That is a possibility. §9h. On the subject of tradition in general. materials . above all . On the one hand. we know with "a knowledge of unassailable evidence"-an "implicit knowledge" which inhabits this factual " lack of knowledge. This reference to the productive act is inscribed in the formation itself. the idea of science is undoubtedly also part of the Weltanschauung. but it can pass unnoticed on account of the ideal forma­ tion' s autonomy. " While completely accepting Dilthey' s criticism of the causalist naturalization of spirit and the principle of an original typo-morphology of cultural totalities. but not a necessity. we know that humanity has a past and that. This means that from now on when investigating origins. although they by no means merely deduce" ( 1 68) . does not have a causal style of genesis . and although they have instituted new spiritual forms. This will be the case for all anthropological cultures which do not participate in the European eidos. but of geometry or mathematics in general. of a " horizon of geometrical future in precisely this style" ( 159) . §72 . Traditional sedimentation in the communal world will have the function of going beyond the retentional fi n itude of individual consciousness.· " 56 Jacques Derrida 57 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry '. . philosophy) from the SUbj ective imma­ nence of the Weltanschauung. As cultural form. 50. . traditional development.e. and past acts as habitualities (habitus) and sedimentations . Of course . In the world of natural reality subject to a causal type of development. There is no natural history for Husser! any more than for Hegel. The process is analogous. I . they refer to spiritual acts. since the interest and the difficulty of HusserI's analysis result from what this analysis accrues on both planes at once. which-by capitalizing ad infinitum and according to an original mode-can never keep their sedimentary de­ posits out of circulation. And the sciences are only some traditions among others. Hence the necessity to recall the apriori banalities buried by science and culture. Sometimes Husser! considers geometry and science in general as cer­ tain forms among others of what he calls the cultural world.� In a similar fashion. ifnot identicaL to that of internal time-consciousness described from the noematic viewpoint in the 1 904. 1 88).1 0 lectures. Here the Origin repeats Husserl ' s critique ofDilthey in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science. sedimentation is not that of an acquired sense that is continually and internally recapitu­ lated. for Husserl as for Hegel . Since a fact's opacity could be reduced from the very beginning by the production of ideal objects. from which every culture acquires totality at each moment (in a mediate or immediate synchrony) . such a question cannot ex­ pect a determined response. concerning exact sciences. for example. the ideal itself of decidability .1 'I ' .:. Husser! wishes to extract the idea of science (i. p. it is in the past that the " first inventors" ( 1 58) themselves are found . if the undecidability of a proposition . and the content of science and philosophy is undoubt­ edly transmitted according to the same process as all other forms of culture and tradition in general .� . that unity which orients the Origin. along with every factual stage of the history of mathematics as such . as Husserl immediately concludes in a move which we will con" Origin sider later. The unity of geometrical truth' s primordial sense. In effect they borrow all their characteristics from it. The present appears neither as the �upture nor the effect of a past. Since the retentional power of living consciousness is finite . i. . historical interconnections are inter­ connections of sense and value. as the retention of a retention . is each determined factual tradition-by disclosing the purely mathematical tradition and pure traditionality in general. they have been able to do so only by disposing of raw or already traditional . this style is not that of deductivity. adding: "so called. . in which "the concepts ' true ' and 'formal implication of the axioms' are equivalent. p. or rather a geometrico-mathematical truth-sense in general. culture itself in its fi n ite empirical units is not sufficient to constitute the pure unity of a history. But on the other hand. is still a mathematical determination? Essentially. sedimentary retention is not only the condi�2 This requirement of Trivialitiit is frequently j u stified by Husserl. too. and for the same reasons. e . which does not permit itself to be bound by the alternative of "true" or "false. he is speaking about the "so-called 'deductive sciences' ' ' ." as prescribed by the ideal of a definite multiplicity. and so forth . Thus we understand HusserI ' s repeated stipu­ lation in the Origin that. is reduced. There is thus a truth . and likewise also the concepts 'false' and 'formally implied as the opposite of a formal impli­ cation of the axioms' (Ideas I. but as the retention of a present past. spiritually shaped . everywhere and essentially" ( I 58)-that cultural forma­ tions always refer to human productions . The analogy will be even greater when we see that. we have some apriori evidence that no ignorance of factual history can undermine . so. values. could then be posed in a question of this kind: what is mathematical determinabil­ ity in general. from this fact. it should only indicate the pure openness and unity of an infinite horizon. this consciousness preserves significations.

The "idea" of Weltanschauung is consequently a different one for each time. as well as for those who enclose themselves in the ideal ity of validity. between de facto historical culture. The latter. 135-36) In a non-descriptive pure science . As soon as phenomenology breaks from both con­ ventional Platonism and historicist empiricism . on the f contrary. the present is retained and gone beyond as past present. another Living Present. p. the latter always refers more or less imme­ diately to the totality of a past which inhabits it and which always appears under the general form of a project ." Thus " Weltanschauung. Also . In the movement of pro­ tention. since they are not intrinsically affected by the empirical content of real history and by determined cultural inter­ connections . for it has the universal validity of truth . . always present and always lived as such . Weltanschauung. . in order to understand pure culture and traditionality in general . the culture of truth is itself only the possibility of a reduction of empirical culture and is manifested to itself only through such a reduction. But in another sense. on the other hand. the culture and tradition of the truth are charac­ terized by a paradoxical historicity." p. pp. is an "idea . too.3 As Husserl had already stressed in the LI (I. Validity is a higher ideality which can or cannot be attached to ideality in general. no history would be possible. and so forth) can become dated [peremption ] . Husserl describes science as a unique and archetypal form of traditional culture. the culture of truth is the highest and most irreducible possibility of empirical culture . Every such value. ideality is not always normative . the historic present. But on the one hand. timeless values . At every moment each historic totality is a cultural structure animated by a project which is an " idea. a reduction which has become possible by an irrup­ tion of the infinite as a revolution within empirical culture. . too. (Ibid. and here that means limited by no relatedness to the spirit of one time. epoch. It is the infinite eidos opposed to the finite ideal which animates the Weltanschauung: Weltanschauung. But at other times. . we must now discriminate. what is true of the Living Present is true of what supposes it as its ground. As a cultural form which is not proper to any de facto culture. 3 3 1 ) . I . in principle to be realized in an individual life by way of constant approach . . belongs thereafter to the treasure trove o all succeeding humanity and f obviously determines likewise the material contel1t of the idea of culture. is only the maintenance of what indeed mu st be called the dialectic of protention and retention. the tradition of truth is the most profound and purest history. 1 35) . the movement of . Science is the idea of what. there would only be an empirical aggregate of fi n ite and acci­ dental units.58 Jacques Derrida 59 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry tion for the possibility of protention: it also belongs essentially to the general form of protention. the narration of the truth can only have the historic originality of myth . is a supratemporal one. it designates culture's eidos par excellence. the mode of sedimentation is such that no signification ceases to circulate at any moment and can always be reconceived and reawakened in its circulation . must be true always and for everyone. once discovered. . is an ' idea' " (" PRS . on the contrary. the culture of truth . in which sense-sedimentation does not exclude the fact that validity (which is rooted in a language. which is the primordial absolute of temporality . In other words. the latter would be in fact impossible without the former. between empirical culture and that of truth . . without this no authentic history would be thought or projected as such. and on the other hand. For those who confine themselves to historical factu­ ality. . without this always renewed originality of an absolute primordiality . they can appear disengaged from all history. . At the same time. . This emancipation can be confused with a breaking from history in general. beyond every given cultural area. on the one hand. terrain. despite HusserI ' s repugnance for that word. eidetic and teleological : it is the particular example which guides the eidetic reduction and intui­ tion. If it was necessary then to distinguish between natural reality and spiritual culture. which is itself conceived under the abso­ lutely unique and universal form of the Living Present. in order to constitute another primordial and original Absolute.53 No doubt. We will see this much later: the sense of error has its own particular ideality. whose ideality is absolutely normative. In this sense . science claims an essential privilege : it does not permit itself to be enclosed in any historically determined culture as such. In one sense.. from the first moment of its production. wisdom. the idea of science is the index of pure culture in general. as well as of Weltanschauung philosophy. Only the pure unity of such a tradition' s sense is apt to establish this continuity. Without this extraordinary absolute alteration of what always remains in the concrete and lived form of an absolute Present. one that corresponds to Husserl' s intention. Indeed. Besides all the characteristics that it has in common with other cultural formations. §32. The " idea" o science . Science is a title standing for absolute. . " but of a goal lying in the finite . but it also is the example and model which must orient culture as its ideal. the cultural form " science" (of which geometry is one example) is itself " exemplary" in the double sense of this word.

as we know. but rather in that "rational memory " so profound ly de­ scribed by Gaston Bachelard . a purely empirical diach­ rony with its indicative function but without any proper unity of its own. Furthermore. this total subjectiv ity. out of first creative activities . present. If the history of geometry were only the development of a purpose wholly present from the beginning. the total premise for the acquisitio ns of the new level. at every present stage. re­ searchers either known or unknown to one another who are the pro­ ductive subjecti vity of the total living science " ( 1 59 [modified]) . in particular Le Rationalisme applique. the constituting and pres­ ent source of truth. 73 . 2 and 42-46. When uchronie occurs again on p. because. it IS translated as intemporality. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. The " :'I. " 54 In his Philosophy of Arithmetic. This progress is brought about by the permanent totalization and repetition of its acquisitions . the universa l commun ity also has the unity of a horizon. to placing the ego logical monad in abstract relation to the total subjec­ tivity. We understand its persisting manner of being: it is not only a mobile forward process from one set of acquisi­ tions to another but a continuo us synthesis in which all acquisitio ns maintain their validity. even when they seem mandated by an ideal community. whose unity must be absolute and a priori (otherwise even the slightest truth would be un­ imaginable) is but the common place of all egological subjectivities.60 Jacques Derrida 61 1ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry truth that it wishes to describe is really that of a concrete and specific history-the foundations of which are a temporal and creative sub­ jectivity ' s acts based on the sensible world and the life-world as cultural world . all make up a totality such that. The latter's acts. . The same thing is true of every science" ( 1 59) . ideality and spirituality. Neither pure diachrony nor pure synchrony make a history. whether past. Husserl already distin­ guished between psychol ogical temporality as successi veness (what Hume describe d) and the temporality of the synthetic interconnections of sense. or future. whether known or unknow n. . 56 Then begins the formidable difficulties grappled with in the fifth of the and into which we do not want to enter here. " Every science is related to an open chain of the generations of those who work for and with one another . however collectiv e. only has the unity of interrelatedness and co-responsibility-each in­ vestigator not only feels himself tied to all the others by the unity of an object or task-but the investigator' s own subjectivity is constituted by the idea or horizon of this total subjectivity which is made responsible in and through him for each of his acts as a scientific investigator. " which alone is capable of constitut ing and retaining the "events of reason . For it not . The irreducible historicity of geometrical becoming is characterized by the fact that "the total sense of geometry" (and its necessary noetic correlate . These synthese s do not occur in a psychological memory . does not correspond. so frequently evoked in the Origin. [Derrida wants to suggest by the word uchronie a temporality akin to the spatiality of We should also note Derrida's use of the roots "temporalite " and "chronie" in various words: panchronie and uchronie versus omnitemporalite and intemporalite (as �ell as synchronie. the transcendental we is not som ething other than the transcendental Ego .4 Cf.' 55 Meditations. whether actually present or possible . pp. which is continua lly totalized in an absolute Present. and anachronie ) . and in the Origin " in ( 1 66) he emphas izes that a scientific stage is not only a sense which ion of the whole earlier sense in a fact comes later. Geometr y is born "out of afirst acquisi­ tion. This is possible only because we are dealing with ideal and spiritual implications. We would have on one side a synchronic or timeless [uchronique p6 ground and. Howeve r. Let us understand this as true of every non-desc riptive science . a memory based on a "recurrent fruitful­ ness. if there is a history of truth . it can only be this concrete implication and this reciprocal envelopment of totalities and absolutes . at the same time. In any case. In addition to which. 1 970). against Husserl ' s most explicit intentions. The description of these two characteristics. Phenomenologically. the total acquisition is. Egological subjectiv ity cannot be responsi ble for this develop ment.] . to any metaphysical assertion . the image of the " open chain" does not exhau st the depth of this commun al subjectivity. One would indeed be tempted to think that it is the we that makes possible the reduction of the empirical ego and the emergence of the eidos " ego. Cartesian utopia . diachronie. total subjectivity) "could not have been present as a project and then as mobile fulfillment at the beginning" ( ] 59) .'. so to speak. he remains the absolute origin. " if such an hypothesis did not lead. He continue d to explicate this differenc e . 4th ed. Only a commun al subjectiv ity can produce the historical system of truth and be wholly responsi ble for it." but the integrat new project. Since the totality of science is open. they are "founded" in the sense of Fundierung. do not cease to be irre­ ducibly those of a monadic "[ think" -to which it suffices to reduce the empirical egological content of the ego in order to discover the d imen­ sion of the " we" as a moment of the eidos "ego. on the other side. we would have to deal only with an explication or a quasi-creation. In and through him. . that means without being substituted for him.

b ut above all those of FTL: cf. For a sense has entered into history only if it has become an absolute object. i . There. § 59. 2nd ed. This recalls the "principle of all principles" defined in Ideas I. Thi s question i s "turned over" in the Origin in formulas which are strangely similar to those of Dilthey. Defining a "source of au thority" [Ideas I. and so forth? This is the historical repetition of the question of Objectivity so frequently asked in the five lectures of The Idea of Phenomenology: how can subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object?·'JH Husserl has. For him.l . however.62 Jacques Derrida 63 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry rejected hypothesis is once more that of a complicity between " Platonism" and empiricism. i . in effect. En­ twiirfe zur Kritik der historischen Vernunft" [" Plan for the Continuation of the Forma­ tion of the H istorical World in the H uman Studies. even before the possibility of the open project of geometry. how can it be constituted as such in the historian on the basis of the statements of th i s person o r o f statements made about t h i s matter'? Th is pre suppose s that some logical SUbjects. " up­ rootedness out of all "here and now" factuality. . starts from the already constituted objective spiri t . Here it is focu sed on the possibility of objective spirit as the condition for h istory and in this respect takes the opposite view to Dilthey' s question. Husser! consid­ ers it already acquired. what matters is knowing how the significations and the values of thi s objective milieu can be interiorized and assumed as such by i ndiv idual subjects-first of all in the historian ' s work on the basis of testimonies which are individual in their origin or object . As a matter of fact. like H usserl. . it is limited to the egological sphere of Objecti v ity .e. 83] for the cognition of any object in general. here by geometry and history. Husser! performs a detour which may seem . . . 263-64. G . Instead of describing this primitive genesis of sense in itself and in its Erstmaligkeit. provisionally abstained before the historical con­ tent of Erstmaligkeit only to ask the question of its objectification [objectivation ]. 7 of Gesammelte Sch riften . co-responsibility . This "reverse side" of the question concerns the radical origin and the conditions of possibility for the objective spirit itself. After the interconnections of sense and the evidences of a monadic ego from which we cannot not start . (Stuttgart: B . ideal) Objectivity of sense. pp. no doubt. of its launching into history and its historicity. undoubtedly in such a way that it appeared for the first time in the evidence of successful actualiza­ tion" ( 1 59-60 [modifi e d]). p. universal normativity . but less h istorical. 1 958). how can an objective spirit i n general be constituted as the place of truth. . e . can be constitu ted" (Part I I I : " Plan der Fortsetzung zum Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften . Teubner and Gottingen: Van­ denhoeck and Ruprecht. B ernard Groethuysen . I I IV . It is a question of a methodological limitation and . Vol . then. He is content to recall that we know the general form of this evidence:37 the latter must be-it cannot not be-like all evidence (whether perceptive or eidetic).d isconcerting. notably FTL. Dilthey. in Dilthey' s Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaf­ ten. it is one of those formal a priori supposed by every material science. de facto as wel l as de j ure . ed . pp. inflexion i n FTL. § 1 00. §24 . of the necessity to take one' s starting point in the constituted . Husserl in effect continues his meditation (now protected by that formal legitima­ tion) as if his theme were no longer the origin of geometrical sense. Since the first geometrical evi­ dence has had to conform to this pattern. This abstention before the content of the primordial act and evidence is provisional. "grasping an existent in the consciousness of its original being-itself-there" ( 1 60 [modified]). who are not psychological subjects. its sense being already evident. p. " a more primitive formation of sense (Sinnbildung) necessar­ ily went before it as a preliminary stage. a non­ psychological dimension of the subject. the intuition of a natural reality or of an ideal object.' 1 . intelligibility for "everyone. once again.) 7 This i s done i n terms which recall those of Ideas I. Sketches for a Critique of H istorical Reason" ] . e . the genesis of the absolute (i . according to H u sserl. we do know a priori that it has had to assume this form. Moreover. this a priori knowledge con­ cerning the form of evidence is nothing less than historical. this question led Dilthey to discover . i Having reached this point. 282. Dilthey writes: " N ow the following que stion arises: how a nexus which is not produced as such in a mind [tete ]. . a " logical " subject will no more be able to be responsible for such a possibility than could the psychological subject . Having cleared this stage. this sense being already present for any consciousness whatsoever. Hence the content of geometrical evidence (a content which is historical because created for the first time) is not defined for the moment. and so forth ? We will see that. But even though applied to a historical origin in this case. But this methodological necessity is only legitimate on the basis of a profound philosophical decision. with all the characteristics that we know it to have: omnitem­ poraI validity.'H H usserl had posed this question in the same terms but in i ts most inclusive extension and with a more cri tical . which consequently i s not directly experienced and c a n no more be l e d back t o t h e lived experience o f a person. Husserl re­ peatedly and obstinately returns to a question which is at bottom the following: how can the subjective egological evidence of sense become objective and intersubjective? How can it give rise to an ideal and true object. he tacitly and provisionally considers it to be already done. tradition . However little we may know about the first geometrical evidence. i . but . we can have a first certainty about it in the absence of any other material knowledge. 1 56-59 .

there is not first a SUbjective geometrical evidence which would then become objective . But it seems they remain outside Husserl ' s intention. and this is true of all its particular forms " ( 1 60 [modified]). its method. but an essential necessity of intentionality." Cf. Truly.e . he will do so only after having determined the general conditions of its Objectivity and of the Objectivity of ideal objectivities. only retroactively and on the basis of its results can we illuminate the pure sense of the subjective praxis which has engendered geometry. Following this interpreter.64 Jacques Derrida 65 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry 'i i. i . Geometrical evidence only starts "the moment" there i s evidence of an ideal objectivity.e . " Before" and " after" must then be neutralized in their factuality and used in quotation marks. The latter is such only " after" having been put into intersubjective circulation. . Undoubt­ edly these interconnections are always marked by a juridical and transcendental signification. Phenomenoiogie. the Ur-Region. structural. an flO Cf. And the annoyed letdown of those who would expect Husserl to tell them what really happened. when Husserl affirms that a sense-production must have first presented itself as evidence in the personal consciousness of the inven­ tor. i. and eidetic stratifications does. at bottom the static. this disappointment is illegitimate. Husserl only wished to decipher in advance the text hidden under every empirical story about which we would be curious . then the sense of sense in general is here determined as object: as some thing that is accessible and available in general and first for a regard or gaze. it has. . p. Are we not then dealing with history? Does this not return us to a classic transcendental regression? And is not the interconnecting of transcendental neces­ sities. or those who understand geometry). " Geometrical existence is not psychic exis­ tence � it does not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness . it will always more or less naively suppose the possibility and necessity of the interconnections described by Husserl. it is the existence of what is Objectively there for . Indeed. Objects in general join all regions to con­ sciousness. all ages. The worldly image of gaze would not be the unnoticed model of the theoretical attitude of pure consciousness but. a way back toward the beginnings. would borrow its sense from that attitude.9 ' everyone' (for actual and possible geometers. "the subjectivist point of view" in The Origin of Geometry would have prohibited Hus­ serl from "going beyond the level of common sense remarks. on the contrary. If the sense of geometrical sense is Objectivity or the intention of Objectivity. That is why only a teleology can open up a passage. can be sharp and easily imaginable: 60 however. from its primal institution. the de jure implications. in the fullest sense of the word. if geometry is here the exemplary index of being scientific . and if history is the highest and most revelatory possibility for a univer­ sal history (the concept of which would not exist without it). confronting what is through and through a historical adventure (the fact of which is irreplaceable). an existence which is peculiarly supratemporal and which-of this we are certain-is accessible to all men. in particular § 76. pp. . Thus. paradoxically. When Husserl farther on devotes a few lines to the production and evidence of geometrical sense as such and its own proper content. ir­ reversible. The sense of the constituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the constituted object. Ideas I. . Thus. in particular Tran-Duc-Thao. he elicits a kind of fiction destined to make the characteristics of ideal Objectivity problematic and to show that they are not a matter of course . This is very much in accord with the initial direction of phenomenology : the object in general is the final category of everything that can appear. Factual history can then be given free rein: no matter what its style. or its philosophy. an ideal object which. i.e. 1 94-97. And this necessity is not an external fate. to tell them a story [leur raconte une histoire ]. . and when he asks the question of its subsequent (in a factual chronological order) objectification. the constitution of an object (in the broadest sense of these terms) . that can be for a pure consciousness in general. The primordial sense of every in­ tentional act is only its final sense. and normative schema for the conditions of a history rather than history itself? Questions of this kind might seriously impugn the whole originality of this attempt. The con­ ditions of Objectivity are then the conditions of historicity itself. first of all to the actual and possible mathe­ maticians of all peoples.e. history itself. These then are the interconnections-of what is.'. but bringing to light the formal conditions of possibility. even if narrated according to how it develops. Undoubtedly there is not in this account the least grain of history if we understand by that the factual content of development. but they refer to concrete acts lived in a unique system of instituting implications . must have broken all the moorings which secured it to the empirical ground of history. 22 1 . in a system that has been originally produced only once-that remains de facto and de jure. But the neces­ sity of this reduction has been justified at the outset. 59 Also. But can we simply replace them with the timeless "if" and "provided that" of the condition of possibility? The language of genesis could well seem fictive at this point: the description of any real development (neutralized in principle) would not call for it.

Speech [La parole ]. the latter supposes a spontaneous neutraliza­ tion of the factual existence of the speaking subject. Husserl did not invent such a possibility .e .e . U ndoubtedly. that the very subtle and specific character of the Husserlian question appears. here . li2 The linguistic neutralization of existence is an original idea only in the technical and thematic signification that phenomenology gives it. it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any given persons" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). when Husserl wonders: "How is ideal Objectivity possible? " Here the question also attains its greatest difficulty. since recourse to the natural Objectivity of a worldly existent is no longer possible. . there is no doubt that this non-reality of the noema (a very d ifficult and decisive notion) may be what. to which not only all scientific formations and the sciences themselves belong but also. in the name we think" (§462) . we must first note that ideal Objectivity not only characterizes geometrical and scientific truths . we still encounter several more degrees . not in the factuality of languages and their particular linguistic incarnations . Pure-interconnections-of history. is only the practice of an immediate eidetic . since. outside which there is nothing. the real object can never attain that absolute Objectivity which can be proposed for all subjectivity in general in the intangible identity of its sense. we could show this in a precise way on the basis of §62 of FTL. Thus. since it is not identical with any of its empirical . on a great many points. Insofar as this ideal object con­ fronts language as such. does this not mean that these possibilities are not in themselves historical? Not at an . in order to be such . by which Adam is made master of the animal s. This movement is analogous to what we analyzed earlier: the ideal Objectivity of geometry is first presented as a characteristic common to an forms of language and culture. the word [mot] has an ideal Objectivity and identity. For if the latter resists or opposes anything. or graphic mate­ rializations. devoted to ' ' The I deality of All Species of Objectiv ities Over Again st the Constituting Consciousness" and the " universal ideality of a ll intentional unities" (pp. lets the profound convergence of Hegelian and H usserlian thought appear. the word Lowe [lion] occurs only once in the German lan­ guage . apriori-thought-of history. it is the element of lan­ guage in general. of words. 1 953] . then. (This passage is cited by Jean H yppolite in his Logique et existence: Essai sur La logique de Hegel [Pari s: Presses Universitaires de France .66 Jacques Derrida 67 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry apriori and eidetic reading and discourse should be possible. History itself establishes the possibility of its own appearing. The ideal object is the absolute model for any object whatever. 39. then. the model of history in general. and of the thing designated. p . 61 This ideality of the object. was to impose on them a name . The question "how is any object in general possible? " assumes its sharpest and most adequate form. for they are nothing but the possibilities of the appearance of history as such . phonetic . permits the repetition of sense as the "same " and makes the idealization of identity in general possible . is not the non-reality of the noema described in Ideas I (especially § § 88. Besides. N o doubt language i s "thoroughly made u p of ideal objectivities . for objects in general. but the name (when we u nderstand it) is its simple and imageless representation. whatever the intended type of existent may be and however it may be intended (even if than the natural existent. Is not this idea the favorite of Mal­ larme and Valery? H egel above all had amply explored it. 1 65-66). I t i s through these themes. directly or not. . Husserl specifies that "the broadest concept of literature" ( 1 60) comprises all ideal formations. . ) . they must always be capable of being expressible in discourse and translatable . already present i n the Logical Investiga­ tions and the first sections of Formal and Transcendental Logic. a work which . for example. In other words. In an important note . In the Encyclopedia ( one of the few Hegelian works that H usserl seems to have read) . C ited by Maurice Blanchot in La Part dufeu (Paris: Gallimard. 97ff. H owever.) Hegel also writes : "The first act . before its ' 'exemplary" privilege is defined. he annihilated them in their existence (as existents)" ( " System of 1 803.1 804" ) . Therefore . for example. ideal formations are rooted only in language in general. once having reached the level of ideal Objectivity. it was simply disclosed as what im­ plicitly has always conditioned the existence of the ideal objects of a pure science and thus of a pure tradition. " If we ask ourselves about the manner in which the subjective evidence of geometrical sense gains its ideal Objectivity. in the last analysis. The l atter charac­ terizes the type of intentional i nclusion of every noema in conscious lived experience. v This possibility is first called "language. p. in the Origin. 1 949) . the l ion already te stifies to this neutralization as an exemplary martyr: " Confronting the name-Lion-we no longer have any need either of an intuition of such an animal or even an image . of the mathematical thing itself. " It is proper to a whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world. i . it would always be a de facto empirical subjectivity. from one language into another. 325. and consequently of a pure historicity. i .fi� Andre de Muralt notes very precisely that the we are deali ng with perception of a real thing) . It is always the same word which is meant and recognized through all possible linguistic gestures.!i! It is always more objective than the real object. the formations of literary art" ( 1 60 [modified]).

xxxi ) . Husserl concludes in favor of the possibility of such a reduction. " for " language does not know the phenomenological reduction and so holds us in the natural attitude" (A Study ofHusserI' s Logic. What is the unitary ground starting from which this diffraction of sense is permitted and intelligible? What is history. is made B:l The Idea of Phenomenology: Husser/ian Exemplarism . 6 4 Ibid. 49). as the common focus of these s ignifications. 1 936. ' " H e wonders if. For Husserl. cited by Gaston Berger. In any c ase . Cah iers de Royaumont. because it supposes that all the problems which it would have to precede are resolved ." and so on . paradoxi­ cally. U nlike Heidegger. 1 8. but no possbility [sic 1 of a science of pure con­ sciousness" (Ideas I. And in his admirable lecture on " Les concepts operatoires dans la phenomenologie de Husserl . juridical or transcendental. about wh ich we can say that we must understand them sometimes in one sense. axioms (like the principle of contradiction) " whose universal and absolute validity" the description of pure con­ sciousness could " make transparent by the help of e xamples taken from the data of its own domain" (p. . Manifestes philosophiques." it paradoxically offers the most dangerous resistance to the phe­ nomenological reduction. But he says nothing about the language of this ultimate science of pure consciousness. and so on) w ill always be sufficient guarantees of rigor and nonworldline ss . Garry L. 65 Therefore . where he h as written: "we shall not go into the general problem which also arises here of the origin of language in its ideal existence and its existence in the real world" ( 1 6 1 ) . and §5 . which in its most radical moment must still turn us back toward a new and irreducibly necessary eidetic . p. [modified] . what i s the hidden sense . For if the phenomenological reduction is taken in its fullest sense. For Husserl. and when he does so (cf. pp. and transcendental discourse will remain " Ii:l " Ii·t irreducibly obliterated by a certain ambiguous worldliness. 66 This is a difficulty that Fink has frequently underscored (particularly in his famous article in Kan tstudien of 1 933 ["The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism " ] ) . " between " origin" in the ordinary sense and phenomenological "orig in . 1 60). creates in effect some considerable difficulties. But. 1 59) . AIthusser [Paris : Presses Universitaires de France . in particular. quotation marks. 1 974) . p. one can still "have at his disposal a Logos in the same sense as before" (in Husserl. e ven when the i dea of l i nguistic " reactivation" takes on so much importance for h im . For him. This transcendental reduction of eide­ tics. FTL. tr. sometimes in another? So long as the notion of origin in general is not criticized as such . he almost never indulges in e tymological variations. 1 28. we can thu s g o o n t o ask ourselves. 229) . § 59. it must also entail the reduction of constituted eidetics and then of its own language." he attributes a certain equivocation in the u sage of operative concepts (that of " constitution . as a matter of fact : the interlocutory problem of h istory and that of the possibility of a historical philology . Thi s is e xplicitly so in FTL (§2.'i'i By imag­ ining that the Origin will first indicate the possibility of history as the possibility of language. the specific problem of language-its origin and i ts usage in a transcendental phenomenology-has always been excl uded or deferred. Similarly .1 9) . L. which would precede the discourse of phenomenology. On the basis o f the problems in t h e Origin . about the language which at least seems to suppose the sphere of fonnal logic that we j ust excluded. despite the remarkable analyses which are devoted to it . it does not detennine but follows the orientation of the investigation. the nonthematic and dogmatically rece ived sense of the word " hi story" or of the word " origin"-a sense wh ich . the radical vocation i s always threatened by this mythology of the absolute beginning. Kathleen McLaughlin [ Evanston: Northwestern U niversity Press. " S. p. that of pure consciousness. And so once more we see a certain non­ dependence confirmed in that phenomenology. we are calculating how difficult is every attempt to reduce (in some ultimate and radical transcendental regression) a phenomenology of historicity . It is rather significant that every critical enterprise. since otherwise a pure con­ sciou sne ss might indeed remain over. The precaution of "quotation marks" only satisfies this im­ perative in an equivocal fashion. That is why. In th is section. I. transcendental purifi­ cation cannot mean the disconnection of all transcendents. 1 960] . Here we are concerned with the eidetic reduction.:. devoted to the necessary but difficult reduction of formal ontology and fonnal logic once all the transcendents of the material eidetics have been excluded. HusserI is very con­ scious of this and he exposes these difficulties with the greatest clarity in Ideas 1. neologisms. p. § 1 . it would be absurd for sense not to precede---d e jure (and here the de jure is difficult to make clear rune evidence difficile D-the act of language whose own value will always be that of expression . p. " Meanwh ile we cannot disconnect transcendents indefinitely. It can be spoken of only by transforming the natural function of language" ( Letter of May 1 1 . 1 972] . A fonnidable task. to the very extent that language is not " natural . tr. the phenomenological reduction "cannot be presented by means of s imple sentences of the natural attitude. p. pp. 27) and in the Origin. what is the origin . after the reduction. th is task never seems to have appeared urgent to Husserl . the univoc ity of expression and certain precautions taken within and with the help of language itself (distinctions. 2 1 . The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy." for exam ple) to the fact that " H usserl does not pose the problem of a 'transcendental language. concerning the expression " intentional life . p. provided the " logical axioms " are maintained. for this reason it seems more difficult to say that "a thought which moves solely on the level of language is necessarily in the attitude of the phenomenological reduction [our emphasis] . revaluation and reactivation of old words. Breckon (Evanston: Northwestern U niversity Press. 1 8-2 1 ) . it is set squarely in the eidetic world of significations or pure lived experiences . so remarkably denounced by Feuerbach in his " Contribution to the C ritique of H egel ' s Philosophy" ( 1 839) ( cf. for example . These questions can show the need for a certain renewed and rigorous philological or " etymological" thematic . permits us to distinguish between factual " history" and intentional "hi story . tr.68 Jacques Derrida 69 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry "reduction is implicitly carried out-simply performed and not yet made explicit-as soon as language is considered on its own account. despite the constant interest it bears (from the Logical Investigations to the Origin ) . Bachelard evokes the danger of " a surreptitious return to psychologism.

already reproach Kant for not taking into consid­ eration the intrinsic necessity of language and its immanence in the most apriori act of thought? Did not the author of the Essay on the Origin of Language [tr. Thus. and therefore contingent. . 250tf. in any case. leo. In the First Investigation.). the irreal object is. as the percep­ tion of the immediately present sensible thing grounds idealities under those circumstances. then. p. 24 1ff. 1799.. such as they are already outlined. so the contingency of the l ion is going to reverber­ ate in the ideality of the expression and in that of its sense. Another difference: that of their temporality (§64). reality. and 1 .r. This would be true even if all men had been able to and could in fact encounter and designate the lion. § 1 1 . to Vol. 1952]. in his Verstand und f Er ahrung: Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der rein en Vernunft [Leipzig. without having to succumb to empiri­ cism . Van Breda [Paris: Descl ee de Brouwer. Like those of FTL. It is a reduction of the reduction and opens the way to an infinite discursiveness. 286-87). to a real spatiotemporality � it remains interrelated in its very ideal Objectivity with the de facto existence of a given language and thus with the factual subjectivity of a certain speaking community. 1-5). will not in principle be absolute and universal. this reflection is always focused. so the ideal identity of signification is made accessible to several lan­ guages and allows itself to be "translated. intended through two strata of idealities. particularly pp. or graphic incarnations. Alexander Gode in On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick U ngar. in which juridicalness would like to be completely transparent. "L'Analyse intentionnelle et Ie probleme de la pensee speculative" [French tr. rpt.e. the notion of " intentional content" or "unity of its significa­ tion" announces in the linguistic sphere the notion of "noematic sense. particularly § 12. but in predicative spontaneity. is here a "bound" directly suppose the subtle as well as indispensable distinctions found in the LI (nos. phonetic . " Did not Herder. . we could say. . This is because the ideality of sense. Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation. L. " from "the expression " to what Husserl calls in the Logical Investigations the "intentional content" or " the unity of its signification .(.70 Jacques Derrida 71 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry primary. in Problemes actuels de La phenomenologie. is a natural. pp. They are not preconstituted. an inability which precedes every critical regression as its shadow-is not the unavowed dogmatism he thus denounces that geschichtlose "Naivitiit" about which Fink wonders whether it is not the basis for "phenomenology' s methodological revolu­ tion" (cf. 6 7 Vol. Lowe. 1 966)] also conclude that language. in the pure passivity of sensible receptivity. The translatability of the word lion. . The latter is not an "objectivity of the understanding. pp. a memory. This explains why the return on itself of thought which has never wanted to prescribe anything but a turning back [rep/i] toward its own proper conditions remains more dif­ ficult for the " master" than for the "disciple . Whereas the real object has its individual place in the objective time of the world. The objectivities of the understanding are on a "higher level" than those of receptivity. " But its timelessness (ZeitLosigkeit) or its supratemporality ( Uberzeit­ lichkeit) is only a " mode" of temporality: omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). Only within a facto-historical language is the noun "Lowe" free. But the "object" itself is neither the expression nor the sense­ content. " but an " object of receptiv­ ity. " In the Foreword to the 2nd edition of LI ( 1 9 1 3 . ed. 1 969. 2 vols. on the world of culture and history. and so forth . Under those circumstances the tie to a de facto anthropological gen­ erality would not be reduced any further. I . Its ideal Objectivity is then relative and distinguishable only as an empirical fact from that of the French or English word " lion. is a return to factuality as the de jure character of the de jure itself. Just as the core unity of noematic sense (which is not the reality of the object itself) can be intended according to various intentional modes (the sense " tree" can be attained in a perception. Attentiveness to the "fact" of language in which ajuridical thought lets itself be transcribed. Walter Biemel and Jean Ladriere] . considered in itself and l ike that of language. is amply described in EJ (§63 . 48 of Vol. Introd. This ideal identity of sense expressed by lion. " [po 25 1 ] .]. rooted in cultural experience and in history. 64-65)? That is only one of the numerous analogies which could be taken up between the different futures of Kantian and Husserlian transcendental idealisms. compared with its sensible. 1 .9 The ideality of its sense and of what it evokes irreducibly adheres to an empirical subjectivity. It will be empirically conditioned by the contingent en­ counter in a receptive intuition of something like the lion. an irreducible proximity of language to primordial thought is signified in a zone which eludes by nature every phenomenal or thematic actuality. But it remains essentially tied. "The mode of their original pregivenness is f their production in the predicative activity o the Ego . I of ET). and so on) in order finally to constitute a "complete" noema with all its characteristics." or the " nuclea­ tic layer" (Kernschicht) of the noema. . §90. Despite its necessarily speCUlative style. 259 and 284-85. and therefore ideal. tot�lly free. i. I I of the German ed. The same content can be intended starting from several " IH vulnerable by the irreducible factuality and the natural naivete of its language. and its ideal identity assures its translatability. Husserl recognizes that the notion of noema and of the noetic-noematic correlation lacks completion in the First Investigation. pp. an imagining. Is this immediacy the nearness of thought to itself? We would have to show why that cannot be decided. with respect to this latter. especially in the first and fourth Investigations. which comes back to the difference between ideal objectivity and real object. "(. as a German word. is then freed from all factual linguistic subjectivity. §5. made all aprioriness of s ynthetic judgments impossible or illusory? The inability of received language to be treated themat­ ically. like the latter. H. cf. the analyses concerning linguistic ideality in the Origin languages. pp. "timeless. 68 Husserl used a great number of examples when analyzing this distinction for the fi r st time in the LI (I. a notion the former implies and which is fully elaborated only in Ideas I (in particular. 69 The difference between these two types of Objectivity. The flesh and blood lion. " Therefore we cross into a higher degree of ideal Objectivity-let us call it secondary-as soon as we pass from the word to the unity of the sense "lion .). But the word' s degree of ideal Objectivity is only. We be­ come conscious of this vulnerability or of this vocation to silence in a second reflection on the possibility of the jur�dico-transcendental regression itself.

and traditional ideal identity is not just any geometrical objectivity . 70 From the perspective of our text . pp. 26 1 [modified)) . which is identi­ cal with that of tradition . The anachrony of validity in no way affects the intemporality [uch ronie ] or pantemporality [pan­ chronie ] of ideality . p. p . true states of affairs in the sense of theoretical science. I t is identically the same in the 'original language' of Euclid and in all 'translations' . since absolutely objective. no matter how many times it has been sensibly uttered . recognizing that he owes much to Herbart and praising him for having distinguished better than Kant between the - logical and the psychological . I. of truth . LI. § 1 20. in de­ scriptive judgments bearing on worldly realities. in the interconnections of a non­ descriptive science such as geometry. Prol. 1 75) and taken up again by Husserl. no matter how often or even in what language it may be expressed. A judgment wh ich was once true can cease to be true. 2 1 6-18) . they have their territory in the totality of the [mundane] universe and in every possible universe . This reproach i s very enlightening. we can still encounter a factual restriction : that of disvalue . The possibility of translation. This dissociation between "free idealities " and "bound idealities. however. then these are free idealities . I can indefi n itely repeat. ) . etc . In the Origin Husserl also alludes to the ideal identity of judgments which not only would be anachronistic in their validity but also contradictory and absurd in their sense­ content. it has its supratemporal. indeed all of geometry. We do not speak here of validity. All reality is here led back to spatiotempo­ rality as the form of the individual . they are omnispatial and omnitemporal. to particular territories . the proposition: " The automobile is the fastest means of travel . it can be constituted anew at any time as one and identical by any individual in the self-evidence of distinctness: and . and this reveals the diff erence between free idealities (such as logicomathematical systems and pure essential structures of every kind) and bound idealities. I . determined temporality or to some factuality. For. Bound realities [the German and Derrida' s translation thereof reads: Bound idealities] are bound to Earth . this dissociation finds its most direct and illum inat­ ing explication in EJ (§ 65 . ideal­ identical. Also cf. . but genuine objectivity . Nevertheless. No doubt the objective sense of a false judgment is also ideal. I . The sense of "only once" or of "once and for all. The latter. Likewise.' which lost its validity in the age of the airplane . irreal identity" (§64 c. the absurd. we can read there: " Thus it appears that even cultural systems are not always completely free idealities. as a supposition. For what absolutely frees and completes the ideality of sense (already endowed in itself with a certain degree of "freedom") is the ideality of positive validity (by which evidence is not only distinct but clear when it reache s j udgment) . it should be noted that this omnitemporality does not simply include within itself the omnitemporality of validity. the evil. Husserl immediately spec ifies. Once we get beyond the bound idealities and reach ideal objectivity itself. whether they are realized in the self-evidence of truth is another qu estion. for having confused ideality and normativity (LI. nonetheless. " (Hu sserl ' s emphasis) . In what concerns their possible reactivation. seems to have been clearly defined in these very terms by Herbart (Psychologie als Wissenschaft. §59. p. to take up HusserI' s example again. reproaches him. and of the fact that validity 'once and for all' and 'for everyone' belongs to their sense as the telos of j udicative stipulation. Thus. reality belongs to nature : the world as the world of realities receives its individuality from nature as its lowest stratum . which can be ' realized' anew at any time in individual acts of judgment-precisely as suppositions. from the original expression and writing-down to the innumerable oral utterances or written and other documentations (Dokumentierungen) " ( 1 60)." which is the essential mode of the object's ideal existence and thus that which dis­ tinguishes the object from the multiplicity of related acts and lived experiences. All adherence to any real contingency is removed. When we speak of truths. It alone causes sense to attain infinite universality and infinite omnitemporality . the ugly. 267). like the proposition 'The automobile is the fastest means of travel. or rather. to Mars. Thus he states the crucial difficulty of all his phi­ losophy of history: what is the sense of this last factuality? p. but merely of objectivities of the understanding as suppositions [Verm einheiten] and as possible. as the same. " b y their coming on the scene and their " 'being discovered' " in a historically determined territory. which in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence belong to the real world. 71 But the origin and the possibility of this ideal omni­ temporality remain marked by a factual contingency. at the same time that they announce and orient a phenomenol­ ogy of the specific ideality of negative validities (of the fal se . . for example. falseness.72 73 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Jacques Derrida ideality and not a "free " one . idealities " bound" to an empirical. enables us to comprehend what the absolute ideal Objectivity of. They are bound to no territory . Its ideality tertiary is no longer only that of the expression or in­ tentional content. " which is only implied in the Origin 70 (but indis­ pensable for its understanding). In particular. These analyses. translatable. and within each language it is again the same. For this reason it can be indefi n itely repeated and thus becomes omnitemporal. The ideal Objectivity of geometry is absolute and without any kind of limit. intentional poles." whereas I know it to be false and out-of-date . as we wiII soon try to show. or datedness [peremption ] . II. that of the reality intended by the judgment or that of su bjective acts. the geometrical object can be and what distinguishes it from that of language as such and from that of the sense-content as such . error also has a content which can become ideal and omnitemporal (error results either from the 71 Once again it is in Experience and Judgment that the omnitemporality of simple ideality is scrupulously distinguished from the omnitemp orality of validity : " Furthermore . But originally . that b y their " occurrence . it is that of the object itself. § I I . e tc . sense can lose its va­ lidity without simultaneously losing its omnitemporal ideality . 285. assign limits to the "freedom" of those idealities which will always be . exists only once. free idealities are also factual and worldly. is opened ad infinitum: "The Pythagorean theorem.

must continu­ ally point (in spite of itself) toward the telos of authenticity and let itself be guided symbolically by it in the very gesture in which the intention pretends to be disoriented. . even if what they assert is false and absurd. " It is the same in the case of aB assertions . as one says. pp . once the strata of already defined idealities is traversed. Wherever something is asserted. verSIon of 1 939. then.etc. . and l ess exact (but for so long accepted) expression " s tate-of-affairs . We simul­ taneously �eac ? �n Objec �ivity that is absolutely free with respect to all fac �ual . . these themes are already greatly explicate d . one of the forms of Ideal . but its pure possibility appears only through a reduction of all language-not only of every de facto language but of the . It then lacks. . s �bJectivity. omnitemporality is maintained in its eventuality only by a sense which always keeps up a certain essential relation with the absent or exceeded truth. (The first f German edition and the French translation continue: " Each time I (or whoever else it may be ) pronounce with the same sense this same assertion . 7:.74 Let us first note that in this sentence the sense of the assertion the : 'the �e" "about which [something] is said. They do not appear in the published . p. 285-86. " to be what it is. I . � ts fre �?om with resp ect to all factu al subje ctivi bare ItS legItImate [de droit ] ties with a transcendental ty has only laid subjectivi ty. its histo ricity is intrin sic and essen tial. with the absolute IdealIty of an object-the geometrical object which is through and through only the unity of its true sense-we pass beyond or rid our­ selves of the ideal. a 'genu ine ' signification. from the assertion which itself. that if the omnitemporality of disvalue is possible. . . " If ' possibility' or ' truth ' is lacking. Objectivity. At the end of a similar analysis. it is always in the sense of empirical possibility . but still bound. e. . it follows that: III III A notion difficult to translate other than by the clumsy . Objectivity of language. what the assertion says. during the asserting. one and the same geometrical truth. there is a new j udgment . B ut as the absolute ideal objectivity does not lIve a tapas ouranios. " 7:1 I n the LI. Later we shall look more closely into this distinction between intending and fulfilling signification" (modified] .74 Jacques Derrida 75 I ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry logico-deductive handling of symbols which are void of their sense and into which . The content of error can become such even when (in error or assumption). of contingent eventuality. 72 and even when the very theme of the statement remains bound to factuality . That IS why the exemplary question of the origin of ObjectIVIty co� ld . or from some psychological contingency having no sense in comparison with geometrical truth) . Husserl writes in FTL: locutions "are not thematic ends but theme-indicators " (§5 . or "clarity" (Klarheit)-these terms are in cer­ tain respects synonyms for Husserl-that I can maintain and repeat the ideal unity of its sense. So here sci �nce is. a unity in plurality .�eld de ] this ideality . H usserl writes: "What my assertion asserts. 1 . Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts (of] affirming or asserting it: it is the signification of the assertion.f�ct of language in general. but its pure possibility appeared as the pure possibility of 72 culture only after a reduction of every de facto culture.s give the greatest and most exemplary sharpness to the central question of the Origin. not be asked apropos linguistic ideality as such . the latter are ideal geometrical objects. But what they judge . that about which it is said (its sense). the content that the three p erpen­ diculars o a triangle intersect in a point. This transgression of linguistic ideality. absurd in the sense of " nonsense" or " countersense . strange . . § 1 1 . An eventually absurd intention. It follows. an assertion' s intention can only be carried out symbolically: it cannot derive any 'fulness' from intuition or from the categorial functions performed on the latter. Hu sserl added them after the fact to Fink's typed version of the manuscript. in which 'fulness' its value for knowledge consists. Thus Husserl specifies in an absolutely deCISIve sentence: " But the idealities of geometrical words sentences theories--considered purely as linguistic formations-a. these sentence. is never and can never be thematic � And the theme here is precisely ideal objectivities. This is because I know that such an outdated proposi­ tion had been true and still remains unified and animated by an intention of truth. For example. and quite different ones from those coming under the concept of language" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). Husser! can then ask the historico74 Thus �he space for a transcendental historicity is prescribed in all its �mg �atIc d �pth . like languages and language in general. a fact which could never result in the case of real objects or of : 'bo�nd" ideal objectivities . i. 2. unknown to us. neither arises nor passes away . states of affaIrs. " and the object itself are IdentIcal . then. 1 .e not th� idealities that make up what is expressed and brought to validity as trut? . For the first time. The ideality of sense symbolically puts up with a deluded or inauthentically satisfied truth-intention. we have not reached the truth of geometrical S a chverh a lt. This intention must (in the Eurycleian lan­ guage which the Stranger of the Sophist speaks) own up to [dire ] the telos in order to disown [de dire ] it. Be­ sides. a ' true ' . " ] It is an identity in the strict sense . 27). really describes a movement analogous to what we earlier described: science was a cul­ tural form. . authenticity . geometry. one can distinguish what is thematIc . After having determined and provided access (with all B y the distinction they propose. ItS dIfficultIes) to this space . is all the same thing . but apropos what IS mtended across [d travers ] and on the other side of [�u. a sensible factuality is reintroduced.

the latter is "constituting" compared with ideal Objectiv ity . has been utilized by lOk 10 the sense of discourse adapted to transcendental description. Whether geometry can be spo�en about is not. VI Husserl ' s response is direct and comes very quickly.7i 73 According t o t h e same movement. We might be surprised. and. " Th is latter notion. a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense. all of which he reduced in order to have the pure possibility of truth emerge? Is he not " bound" again to lead into history that whose absolute "freedom" hejustdescribed? From then on.76 Jacques Derrida 77 I ntroduction to the Origin of Geometry transcendental question which focuses all the disquietude of his text: " Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal objectivities which are thematic in geometry: how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin. Husserl notes that "we see" this "in advance. Ideality comes to its Objectivity " by means of language. is in actual fact present. It has the style of a turnabout which can be surprising. brings to its final comple­ tion the purpose of the reduction itself. . Does this ultimate reduction . the concrete mode of temporal­ ity in general. where it is a formation produced within the conscious space of the first inventor' s soul. the extrinsic and accidental possibility of a fall lOtO the body of speech or of a slip into a historical movement. as a return home to culture and history in general. invoked earlier. one for which every subject speaking a determined language and belonging to a determined cultural community is in fact responsible. o "t anscendental discourse .7. omnitemporality a n d universal intelligibility (al­ though they may be concrete and experienced as suc h) are only the reduction of ( Uberzeitlichkeit) and "timelessness" (Zeit/osigkeit) are defined i n the ir transcendence or their negativity only in rela tion to worldly and factual temporality . for example. through which it receives. Going beyond ' 'bound ideali­ ties" toward the theme of truth is itself a reduction which makes the independence of truth appear with respect to all de facto culture and language in general. After having so patiently extracted the thematic truth of Sachverhalt from linguistic ideality and from all "bound" idealities. nor intel­ ligible for all: it would not be what it is. John Wild in Merleau-Ponty ' s The Pri­ macy of Perception. 77 Cf. Once the latter is reduced. ed. instead of binding it. on the other hand. But the Objectiv­ ity of this truth could not be constituted without the pure possibility of an inquiry into a pure language in general. James M . will he not be compelled to remove all the reductions step by step. that which. would already be an object: caught again in its primordial purity. is how (Quomodo): " how does linguistic incarnation make out of the merely intrasubjective formation the Objective. Then it would be absolutely bound to the psychological life of a actual individual. " in Merleau-Ponty ' s Signs. 84. It would become neither omnitemporal. which would be what it is only through its historical and intersubjective circulation. intelligible for all. as geometrical proposition in its geometrical ideal sense?" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). The paradox is that.a juridical and transcendental dependence. the transcendental . Richard C . sense would remain an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity-in the inventor' s head. 83-84. to its ideal Objectivity?" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). " The only question. speech constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of truth. tr. 1 964) . which opens onto a transcendental lan­ guage. "Supratemporality" � � � 70 The expression "transcendental language" that we use here doe s not have the sense " Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man .. culture. or even f��tual historical temporality and factual geographical spatial ity . to that of a factual community. and then absolute Ob­ jectivity. then. Speech is no longer simply the expression (Aiisserung) of what. so to speak. indeed to a particular f moment of that life. This return to language. then. without the apparent fall back into language and thereby into history. pp . " On the Phenomenology of Language . its linguistic flesh" ( 1 6 1 [modified]). and history. must then be rethought. 1 964) . But once more it is only a question of � isc1osing . This last notion. Husserl then seems to redescend toward language as the in­ dispensable medium and condition of possibility for absolute ideal Ob­ jectivity. already being valid in its linguistic expression as geometrical discourse. Here we are speak109 of transcendental language insofar as. now and always. they appear as omnitemporality (Allzeitlichkeit). proceed to contradict a previous philosophy of language? Merleau-Ponty speaks of a " striking" contrast in this respect between the Origin on the one hand and the Logical Investigations on the other. in order to recover finally the real text of historical experience � In reality-and we think it the most interesting difficulty of thIS text-Husserl does exactly the opposite. Without this pure and essential possibility. as geometrical concept or state of affairs. without it. does Husserl not come back to language. for truth itself. No doubt geometncal truth IS beyond every particular and factual linguistic hold as such. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. the geometrical formation would remain ineffable and soli­ tary. " tr. insofar as it is not confused in its pure possibility with any de facto empirical language. on the one hand. Historical incarna­ tion sets free the transcendental. p. revolutionize Husserl's thought?7h Does this return to the speak­ ing subject as what constitutes the ideal object. Thus. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

78 Jacques Derrida

79

Introduction to the Origin of Geometry

Undoubtedly the Logical Investigations w � s . mo:e intere �t� d only in what corresponds to a first phase of descnptlOn � n the Orzgln: the a� ­ tonomy of constituted ideal objects compared � It� � language th �t IS itself constituted. But in reaction against a subjectivIst psychologIsm , the question is above all to dissociate the ideal . object from al � sub­ jectivity and all empirical language, bo�h o.f wh.Ich. cou �d only , con­ fuse" the transparent, univocal, and ObjectIve sIgmfic. atIons ?f a .pure logic. But the return to the primordiality of the speakmg subject IS no more in contrast with this first appro �ch to language th �n. th� " idealism" of Ideas I is, as was thought, wIth the appa.rent " l�gIcism , . or " realism" of the Logical Investigations. The questIon IS SI �ply to parenthesize constituted language, which is w� at Husse� l con�mues to . do in Formal and Transcendental Logic and m the Orzgln, m order, subsequently, to let the originality of constitutive language come to light . . .. To constitute an ideal object is to put it at the permanent dISpoSItIOn ?f a pure gaze . Now, before being the constituted and exceed�d a� xI.I­ iary of an act which proceeds toward the tr� th of sense, ImgUlstI.C ideality is the milieu in which the ideal object settles as w�at IS sedimented or deposited. But here the act of primordial depositing I � not the recording of a private thing, but the production of a common object, i .e. , of an object whose original owner is thus disposses �ed . Thus lan­ guage preserves truth , so that trut.h ca � be regarded In the h.ence­ forth nonephemeral illumination of ItS sOjourn; but �lso so that It can lengthen that stay. For there would be no truth wItho � t that word­ hoarding [th esaurisation ] , which is not on.ly what .deposlts and keeps hold of the truth, but also that without WhICh a proJect of truth and t �e idea of an infinite task would be unimaginable. That is why langu.age IS the element of the only tradition in which (beyond individual fimtude) sense-retention and sense-prospecting are possible. In this respect there is so little discontinuity or contrast between Husserl's earliest and latest thought that we find pages i.n t�e Logic�l Investigations which could be inscribed without � odificatlOn I � th � Orz­ . gin ' pages on the essential function of Dokumentlerung, on the spmtual cor�oreality" of language, and on the state�ent as th� fulfilling of the truth-intention.7H This is all the more so If we consIder Formal and
Thu s, for example, Husserl write s : "All theoretical research, though by no mea� s solely conducted in acts of verbal expression or complete state ent, none t he less termi­ , nates in such statement. Only in this form can truth , and 10 particular t he truth of theory, . become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available tr asure for
7H

Transcendental Logic (particularly §§ 1-5, pp. 1 8-29) and the Cartesian Meditations (§4 , p. I I ) . Each time , Hu sserl begins by uprooting thought

from what it would be " solely . . . in the act of verbal expression ," in order to specify then that it could not become " truth" without that "stating" and " communicating . . . to others, " of which he also spoke in the Investigations (LI, I, Intro. Vol . II of German Ed. , § 3 , p. 2 55 ) . For, is the recognition in language of what constitutes absolute ideal Objectivity, as far as it states this Objectivity, not just another way of announcing or repeating that transcendental intersubjectivity is the condition of Objectivity? At bottom, the problem of geometry' s origin puts the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par with that of the phenomenological origin of language. Husserl is very con­ scious of this.7!J But he will not attempt this difficult regression in the Origin , although he says it "arises here" ( 1 6 1 ) . For the moment it suffices to know, if not how, at least that language and consciousness of fellow humanity are interrelated possibilities and already given the moment the possibility of science is established. The horizon of fellow mankind supposes the horizon of the world: it stands out and articulates its unity against [se detache et articule son unite sur] the unity of the world. Of course, the world and fellow mankind here designate the all-inclusive , but infi n itely open, unity of possible experiences and not this world right here , these fellow men right here, whose factuality for Husserl is never anything but a variable example. Consciousness of being-in-community in one and the same world establishes the possibil­ ity of a universal language. Mankind is fi r st conscious of itself ' 'as an immediate and mediate linguistic community" ( 1 62) . In connection with this we need to note three important points : 1 . Within the horizon of this consciousness of fellow mankind, it is "mature , normal " mankind that is "privileged , " both "as the horizon of civilization and as the linguistic community" ( 1 62 ) . The theme of
pronou ncemen ts has a necessa ry grou nding in essence , it is at least plain that judgem ents stemm ing from h igher intellec tual regions , and in particu lar from the regions of science , could barely arise withou t verbal expres sion" (LI, I , Introd. to Vol . II of German ed . , §2, p. 250) .

knowledge and advancing research . Whatever the connection of thought with speech may be , whether or not the appearance of our final judgements in the form of verbal

7!i Already in FTL, on the subject of the " idealizi ng presup position s of logic" and tying the problem of constitution with that of express ion, H u sserl conclu ded: " The problem of constit ution is again broadened when we recall that verbal expression, which we exclud ed from our conside rations of logic , is an essenti al presup position for intersubject ive think­ ing and for an intersu bjectiv ity of the theory accepted as ideally existin g ; and that accord ­ i ngly an ideal identifi ability of the expres sion, as expres sion, must likewise raise a prob­ lem of consti tution " (§73 , p. 188) .

81 80 Jacques Derrida Introduction to the Origin of Geometry

adult normality, which took up more and more room in HusserI's analyses, is here treated as a matter of course. We will not stress this,H O despite the serious problems that it seems to have �o P? se �or a transcendental philosophy: how can maturity and normahty gIVe fIse to a rigorous transcendental-eidetic determination? Could adult normality ever be considered other than as an empirical and factual modification of universal transcendental norms in the classic sense, from which con­ tinually stem those other empirical "cases," madness and childhood? But here too Husserl has overthrown this classic notion of "transcendental, " to the point of giving a sense to the idea of transcendental pathology.HI The notion of (adult normality' s) privilege" denotes here a telos' meddling beforehand in the eidos. To have access to the eidos of mankind and of language, certain men and certain speaking subjects-madmen and children-are not good exam­ ples. And first, no doubt, because they do not possess in their own right a pure and rigorously determinable essence. But if this is so, does adult normality, which begins where childhood ends and stops when madn�ss starts, have an essence? Because here the expression of adult normalIty is not a given eidetic determination , but the index of an ideal no� ativ­ ity which is on the horizon of de facto normal adults. In proportion to our advancement in the spiritual world and then in history, the eidos ceases to be an essence in order to become a norm, and the concept of horizon is progressively substituted for that of structure and essence. 2 . The possibility of a mediate or immediate horizon of universal language risks running into essential difficulties and limits. This possi­ bility first supposes that the hazardous problem concerning the possibil­ ity of a "pure grammar" and "a priori norms" of language is resolved, a possibility Husserl never ceased to take for granted.H2 . It sU'ppo � �, next, that everything " is namable in the broadest sense, I.e. , hngmstI. •

RO

And Other Essay

.] western University Press, 1973), pp . 97-99

mena: here. [Cf. Derrid a' s Speech and Pheno We propose to come back to th is elsew tf. David B . Alliso n (Evan ston: North s on Husserl' s Theory of Signs,

cally expressible" : " everyone can talk about what is within the sur­ rounding world of his civilization as Objectively existing" ( 1 62 [modified]). In other words, as heterogeneous as the essential structures of several constituted languages or cultures may be, translation in prin­ ciple is an always possible task: two normal men will always have a prioriH3 consciousness of their belonging together to one and the same humanity, living in one and the same world . Linguistic differences­ and what they imply-will appear to them at the bottom of an apriori horizon or structure: the linguistic community, i.e. , the immediate cer­ ta�nty of both being speaking subjects who can never designate any­ thmg bu t what belongs to the horizon of their world as the irreducibl y common horizon of their experience. This implies that they can always, immediately or not, stand together before the same natural existent­ which we can always strip of the cultural superstructures and categories founded (fundiert) on it, and whose unity would always fur­ nish the ultimate arbitration for every misunderstanding. Consciousness of confronting the same thing, an object perceived as such,H--l is con­ sciousness of a pure and precultural we. Here the return to preculture is not regression toward cultural primitiveness but the reduction of a de­ termined culture, a theoretical operation which is one of the highest forms of culture in general. This purely natural objective existent is the existing sensible world, which becomes the first ground of communica­ tion, the permanent chance for the reinvention of language . As the most universal , the most objectively exhibited element given to us, the earth itself is what furnishes the first matter of every sensible object. Insofar as it is the exemplary element (being more naturally objective, more permanent, more solid, more rigid, and so forth , than all other elements; and in a broader sense, it comprises them), it is normal that the earth has furnished the ground for the first idealities, then for the first abso­ lutely universal and objective identities, those of calculus and geometry. But preculturally pure Nature is always buried. So, as the ultimate
M�

81 In crisis is presen ted as a " sickne 270). ThiS " something like nature doctor s" (p . not " natural" and gets no relief from a fall into " passiv ity ," of ver, has the profou nd ethica l sense of " pathology , " moreo or authent1 " for sense in an authentic activity inabil ity to be rendered " respo nsible is a passiv ity in compan­ of scienc e also) as such "reac tivatio n ." Technical activity (that m. sick and , alread y, the tremors of deliriu son to sense ; it is the agitation of the the philos ophic al option that to this theme and 82 Cf. LI, J, 4. On Husse rl ' s faithfu lness . 1 ] , pp . A Study of Hussert's Logic [part J, C h orients it, cf. in particular S. Bache lard,

�f Huma nity" (in C), the . phenomen�n " Philos ophy and the Crisis of Europ ean e , a SIckne ss whIch � s ss" of Europ ean society and cultur

But both still have to meet. The question here, then, is only that of a material ,

therefore in a certain sense contingent, a priori (cf. above) .

� �

H4 Jt i s the " as such" of the object' s substantial and objective un ity which i s decisive here . In part ic u lar it distinguishes human intersubjectivity from that wh ich is created between animals, men and animals, c hildren, etc . All those finite c ommunitie s also rest on the feeling of a presence to the same world whereby they confront the same things , and so on , but in a nonobjective, nontheoretical consciousness-which does not posit the object "as such " in its independence and as the pole of infinite determination. Those lower commu­ nities can also g i ve rise to a specific phenomenology, and Husserl devoted important unpublished fragments to them .

8-1 1 .

82 Jacques Derrida

83 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry

possibility for communication, it is a kind of inaccessible infra-ideal. Can we not say , then, just the opposite of what Husserl said? Are not non-communication and misunderstanding the very horizon of culture and language? Undoubtedly misunderstanding is always a factual hori­ zon and the finite index of the infinite pole of a sound intelligence. But although the latter is always announced so that language can begin, is not finitude the essential which we can never radically go beyond? The above seems all the more true, especially since absolute translatability would be suspended starting the moment the signified could no longer be led back, either directly or indirectly, to the model of an objective and sensible existent. Every l inguistic dimension that would escape this absolute translatability would remain marked by the empirical subjectivity of an individual or society . For Husserl, the model of language is the objective language of science. A poetic lan­ guage, whose significations would not be objects, will never have any transcendental value for him. That fact would have no consequence within Husserlian thought, if his thought were not also the thorough investigation [approfondissement ] of subjectivity. Now subjectivity in general , as much empirical as transcendental, appeared very early to Husserl as inaccessible to a direct, univocal, and rigorous language. Subjectivity is fundamentally ineffable. Already in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Husserl referred to the ultimate identity of the constitutive flux of immanent time and absolute subjectivity and concluded: " For all this, names are lacking" (§36, p . 100).85 And in the unpublished manuscripts of Group C on prototemporality, he wonders if pre-objective temporality , pretemporality (Vorzeit), is not beyond all discourse (unsagbar) for the " phenomenologizing Ego" (Ms C 1 31 1 5 II, 1934, p. 9). Therefore , language, tradition, and history exist only in­ sofar as objects break the surface. 3 . As the infinite horizon of every possible experience, the world is consequently " the universe of Objects which is linguistically ex­ pressible in its being and its being-such" ( 1 62) . Thus, the signification of the world as horizon is clearly explicated, i.e. , as the infinitely open common place for everything we can encounter in front of and for
H � In the same sense , cf. all �he subtle analyses in the LI devoted to expressions " lack[ing] an objective sense, " such as personal pronouns which " indicate " med iately bllt can never give anything to be seen . "The word T has not itself directly the power to arouse the specific I -presentation; this becomes fi xed in the actual piece of tal k . I t does not work like the word ' lion' which can arouse the idea of a l ion in and by itself. I n i ts case , rather, an indicative function mediates, cry ing as it were , to the hearer ' Your vis-a-vis i ntends h imself' " (I, 1 , § 26 , p . 3 1 6) .

ourselves. In front of and for ourselves implies, then, given as an ob­ ject. The world, therefore , is essentially determined by the dative and horizontal dimension of being perceived [l' etre-perqu ] in a gaze whose object must always be able to be a theorem . Geometrical exemplariness undoubtedly results from the fact that, as an "abstract" material sci­ ence , this exemplariness treats the spatiality of bodies (which is only one of the body' s eidetic components), i . e . , treats what confers sense on the notion of horizon and object. Despite all the antagonistic motifs which animate phenomenology, space' s privilege therein is in certain respects remarkable. It testifies to that "objectivist" tendency which Husserl simultaneously opposes so vigorously, and yet which is only a period, an essential, and therefore irreducible, movement of thought. The profound rhythm of this tension between objectivism and the transcendental motif, a tension so remarkably described in the Crisis, is also imparted to phenomenology. In this respect, the problem of geometry is revealing. Geometry, in effect, is the science of what is absolutely objective­ i.e. , spatiality-in the objects that the Earth, our common place, can indefinitely furnish as our common ground with other men . 86 But if an objective science of earthly things is possible, an objective science of the Earth itself, the ground and foundation of these objects , is as radi­ cally impossible as that of transcendental SUbjectivity. The trans­ cendental Earth is not an object and can never become one . And the possibility of a geometry strictly complements the impossibility of what could be called a "geo-logy, " the objective science of the Earth itself. This is the sense of the fragmentK7 which reduces, rather than
Hfi On the theme of "our Earth " as the " life-world" " in the most comprehensive sense " for a h umanity which lives in community and where one can be "understood" in a communication which must always say and pass through the thi ngs of our Earth , cf. EJ, §38, p p . 1 62-67. Thi s section effectively illuminates, especially by its degree of elabora­ tion , the similarly inspired fragment on the Earth c ited below. In this section , the unity of the Earth i s grounded in the unity and oneness of temporality , the " fundamental form" (Grund form), the "form of all forms" [ibid. , p. 1 64] . Hi This fragment , which i s entitled "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum Phanomenologischen Ursprung der Raumlichkeit der N atur" [" Fundamental Investiga­ tions on the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of N ature " ] , dated May 1 934, was publi shed in 1 940 by Marvin Farber in Philosophical Essays in Memory o Edmund f Husserl [rpt . Greenwood Press, 1 968] , pp . 307-25 . From the perspective of the science of space , it sketches a movement analogous to that of the Origin , but directed toward kinematics . In a certain sense , it completes the Origin , although in the Origin Husserl c learly specifies that geometry is onl y a title for all mathematics of pure spatiotemporality. This text, very spontaneous and not greatly worked out in its writing, is presented as a

p. is not itself in motion in this space as an object. Hu sserl then said. a similarly oriented analysis also ques­ tions the objectivism of Einstein ' s relativity. by a single person and all at once . nor is it at rest. This unity of all humanity is correlative to the unity of the world as the infinite horizon of experience. But the Earth exceeds every body-object as its infinite horizon. it is a matter of course that Husserl does not at any moment or on its own proper level contest the particular truth of the objective Copernican science. are bodies. toward the Earth . in effect. but in a primordial [p rim ordia le] synthesis as the unity of singular experiences bound to each other. does not move. 3 1 3] . grounded in a present. and for which all temporality and all motion appear. in it. If the possibility of language is already given to the primally institut­ ing geometer. starting from which every primordial here can appear on the foundation of the Living Present. There is then a science of space." in C. ' etc . . But toward the end of the text. so-analogously-the Earth. But nonetheless it is a body! Although for us it may be the experiential ground for all bodies in the experiential gene sis of our world-objectivation" (p. to lay bare the primordial ground buried under the sedimentary deposits of scientific culture and objectivism. . as the here of its relative appearing. in conformity to the original idea of it. For the Earth cannot become a mobile body: " It is on the Earth . is the ground of grounds. the Earth takes on a more formal sense. 309) . The Earth itself. In the Crisis (§34b. " We Copernicans. since the Earth then is only its factual index. the Earth is the ground and not a body in the full sense" (p . above it.1 8) . Likewise­ correlatively-humanity would then only be the facto-anthropological index of sub­ jectivity and of intersubjectivity in general . The earth is a spherical body which certainly is not perceptible as a whol e . and not to the unity of this earth here. it is recognized and communicated within the individual consciousness: after quick and transitory evidence. The World . " and to a "Transcendental Theory of Cognition in the Natural Sciences" [p o 307]. The question is to exhume. Just as one's own body. I would have "two Earths as ground-bodies. and thus Einstein does not reform the space and t ime in wh ich our vital life (unser lebendiges Leben) runs its course" ( " Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity. 222) speaks of an " undaunted refutation of the Copernican system . Husserl elsewhere reduces Einstein's "relativity" : " Where is that huge piece of method subjected to critique and clarification-that method that leads from the intuitively given surrounding world to the idealization of mathematics and to the interpretation of these idealizations as Objective being? Einstein's revolutionary innovations concern the formulae through which the idealized and naively Objectified physis is dealt with . for all. starting from it. as Hu sserl often recalls. Primordially. is not itself one body among others in the mechanical system . . for it is "the same Earth for us. " of "corporeality. the rest and absolute m aintenance of the origin in which. The Earth is. 88 In referring to this fragment. Just as here he reduces the Copernican "relativity" of the earth. the same corporeal (leiblichen) SUbjects. p. its sense can be re-produced as the " same" in the act of recollection� its sense has not returned to life and the intuitively given surrounding world-of th is we learn nothing. But how formulae in general . 1 25ft'. are bodies (Korper) in a modified sense. the horizon of horizons. the Earth . " However. but Rest starting from which motion and rest can appear and be thought as such. 3 1 5) . No longer is it a question of this Earth here (the primordial here whose factuality would finally be irreduc­ ible). we men of modern time . Before the " same" is recognized and communicated among several individuals. that of the "Negroes" or ' ' Greeks. From then o n the unity o f all humanity determines the unity o f the ground as such . on it. I could perceive the earth as a body. it is in relation to the Earth that motion and rest first have sense. as the primordial here and zero-point for every objective determination of space and spatial motion. and if. ' it is one of the planets. 295 [modified]) . The Earth is the final ground of our co-humanity (Mitmenscheit). pp." p. subjects o f bodies (Leibern). as primordial body. who. " of "Nature in the sense of the natural sciences. there are the same bodies existing on it-'on it . in the infinite space of the world. But for us all . Tr�m-Dlic-Thao (Phenomenologie . how mathematical Objectivation in general. Husserl first wonders about the sense of the world in the infinite openness of my surrounding world whose frontiers I can always go beyond. 308). a rest which is not the rest of the object (rest as " mode of motion "). But then the Earth does not 'move' nor is at rest-and it is entirely the same for the heavenly bodies and for the earth as one of them" (p . For if I reached another planet by flying. which is not the factuality of this historical world here . it suffices that the latter has produced in himself the identity and the ideal permanence of an object in order to be able to communicate it. ). The Earth therefore knows the rest of an abso­ lute here. we say: the earth is not ' the whole of Nature . the Rest of a ground and a horizon in their common origin and end."1'!1'! the Copernican naivete and shows that the Earth in its protoprimordiality does not move. for it is never exhausted by the work of objectification that proceeds within it: " The Earth is a Whole whose parts . but of a here and a ground in general for the determination of body-objects in general. to unearth. H usserl then " reduces" the Copernican thesis by making the certainty of an Earth-as the origin of every objective kinetic determination-appear as the transcendental presup­ position of this thesis. Over against a determined objectivation [representation] of the world.84 Jacques Derrida 85 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry preface to a "science of the origin of spatiality. by which . but as a 'Whole' it is not a body" [" Grundlegende . receive sense on the substratum of "refutes. but still on it that motion occurs. . both short of and beyond every body-object-in particular the Copernican earth-as the ground. He only recalls that Copernican science presupposes a primordial Earth which this science will never be able to integrate into its objective system. the Earth moves no more than our body moves and leaves the permanence of its here. 3 1 7. as the ground­ body (Bodenkorper) from which alone a Copernican determina­ tion of the earth as body-object becomes possible. " " But what does two Earths signify? Two pieces of a single Earth with one humanity" (pp. insofar as its starting point is not in space. " he sets that of the Copernican world. after a finite and passive retention vanishes. and it is to the World that the transcendental immutability attributed to the Earth returns.

intersubjectivity is first the nonempirical rela­ tion of Ego to Ego . a truth that we have gained from this history-scriptural spatiotemporality (whose originality we will soon need to determine )-sanctions and completes the existence of pure transcendental historicity. of all alterity. i. and synchronic communication) among the protogeometers is not sufficient to give ideal objectivities their "continuing to be" and "persisting factual existence. . . All the egos. Preobjective and preexact temporality . 6 . . this dialectic of temporalization is i nvoked as an analogous e xample of the dialectic of i ntersubjectivity. between the intentional objects of all perceptions and positional presentifications of an Ego and a community of Egos" (§3S. notably FTL. beyond all possible differences. In order to illuminate the extraordinary constitution of "another monad in mine .. By its very dialecticalness. Conclusion. "The de­ cisive function of written expression. 1 05-0S. p . pp. communication become virtual" ( 1 64 [modified]). of my present present to other presents as such . Speech [langage oral] has freed the object of individual subjectivity but leaves it bound to its beginning and to the synchrony of an exchange within the institutive community . " To be absolutely ideal. We will respect Husserl's order of description and in the meantime will defi n e the conditions for ideality in an intersubjec­ tive community. " Here phenomenology would be "overcome " or com­ pleted i n an interpretative philosoph y . p. it is. see notably CM. recognize d . In E/. Writing will do this by eman­ cipating sense from its actually present evidence for a real subject and from its present circulation within a determined community . " or of " the first ' non-Ego' " in t he constitution of the alter ego. h e seems to g o much further: " U rhyl e . . is an ambiguous value: it simultaneously makes passivity. §6 1 p . Oral communication (i. so to speak. another absolute origin of my absolutely absolute origin . 90 The possibility of constituting. That virtuality. is then the root of transcendental intersubjectivity .e. " starting from the concepts of retention and reproduction and from difficulties attached to them in phenomenology. its absolute ideal Objectivity-i. after a remarkable interpre­ tation of phenomenology . despite their radical alterity .. all language would as yet remain ideality ��I These processes are abundantly described in The Phenomenology of Internal Tim e­ Consciou sness. " time as the form of sensibility" is described as the " ground" of the " necessary connection . and in FTL. is incapable of absolutely grounding the ideal Objectivity of sense . the purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity. Cf. without negation. is that it makes communication possible without immediate or mediate address. On the sense of this notion of "alien to my . in what he calls an " instructive comparison" C§52. can give them a rigorous sense.I ' . as a structural ability whose source is not made a problem . and understood also in the identity of the concrete and u niversal form of the Living Present. . im­ mediate. moreover. which had to become the principal theme of the transcendental aesthetics projected by H usserl (cf. w ith in the u nique and irreducible form of the Liv ing Present (unchangeable in itself and always other in its ' ' content" ) . Perhaps this source is not questioned by phenomenology because it is confused with the possibility of phenomenology itself. sense is this ideality for other moments of the same subject. Group C 6 (August 1 930) . i s defined there as the " core o f the other than the Ego ' s own " (Ichfremde Kern ) . Thus.e . 90 XH VII A decisive step remains to be taken. !.e. it must perdure "even when no one has actualized it in evidence" ( 1 64 [modified]) . present. Ego. and all the phenomena of crisis possible. Without the ultimate objectification that writing permits. Thus Tran-Duc-Thiw. " thanks to which they perdure "even dur­ ing periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer awake to such an exchange or even. exposes the " Dialectic of Real M ovement. The possibility of writing will assure the absolute traditionalization of the object. . can be encountered. therefore.e. " H u sserl alludes to temporalization. It can also be the thematic site of what today is called an " overcoming . I n the Cartesian Meditations. no longer alive. . which alone. The Living Present con­ stitutes the other as other in itself and the same as the same in the other. I n its " factuality . 86 Jacques Derrida 87 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry nothingness. Consequently. pp . But in some unpublished material . a passage which ' 'produces" ideality and pure Objectivity as such and makes other absolute origins appear as such . 1 62 [modified)) . more universally. of expression which documents. In a certain way. temporal hyl e . is always described by H u sserl as an already given essential possibility . Thanks to this circulation of primordial absolutes. " this p assage is also that of the lower forms of Nature and consc ious life. 1 46). Intersubjectivity is the relation of an absolute origin to other absolute origins. as others and as presents (as past presents) . We always come back to the final instance of this: the unique and essential form of temporalization . i s announced as such and in general in an egological subject. another now and on its basis another here. forgetfulness. p. which are always my own. what makes this ideality a geometrical ideality will only interest us later on . " i . . . In this coincidence of identity [recouvrement d'identitf? ] . Therefore. Far from having to fall again into a real rreale ] history. § § 4S-49. By itself the speaking subject. Ideas I. before being the ideality of an identical object for other sub­ jects. " " the intrinsically first other. this possibil­ ity is elsewhere presented by Husserl as the root of i ntersubjectivity. the absolute primordiality of the Living Present permits the reduction. however . in the strict sense of the term . the object must still be freed of every tie with an actually present subjectivity in general . . the same thing can be thought through absolutely other moments and acts. The passage from passive retention to memory or to the activity of recollection . 1 15 ) . 291-92: and CM.

As long a s ideal Objectivity is not. From then on. no sensible language would be possible or intelligible as language. Naturally . or a spiritual corporeality (geistige Leiblichkeit) (FTL. if it is not haunted by a virtual intentionality). can not be engraved in the world-as long as ideal Objectivity is not in a position to be party to an incarnation (which. and the illegibility of the lapidary inscription disclose the transcendental sense of death as what unites these things to the abso­ lute privilege of intentionality in the very instance of its essential juridical failure [en ce qui l' unit a l' absolu du droit intentionnel dans l'instance m eme de son echec l . It is a question of ideal forms or vague morphological types (a notion that we will have occasion to spec ify farther on) . But all this can be said only on the basis of an intentional analysis which retains from writing nothing but writing's pure relation to a consciousness which grounds it as such. Without this always intended and approximate ideal identity (that of letters and phonemes. in the very work of its "binding" (" interconnecting" [enchainement]). 323. unlocated and untemporal" ("Die Frage. Each of the two opera­ tions is always haunted by the sense of the other: each operation is already announced in the other or still retained in it . " p. in the purity of its sense . then. to be sure. It clearly translates Hu sserl' s exacting effort to catch the ideality of thematic sense and of words [mots] in their relations with the linguistic event. o r rather. Van Breda on " La Reduction phenomimologique . By absolutely virtualizing dialogue. is more than a system of signals [signalisation ] or an outer garment)­ then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted. transcendental sub­ jectivity can be fully announced and appear on the basis of this field or its possibility. But this last embodiment is still done through another step of mediate ideality whi(. Husserl always says that the linguistic or graphic body is a flesh.e. The precise place of the properly termed realizing [realisante] embodiment is ultimately therefore the union of the sensible form with sensible material. writing is no longer only the worldly and 9 1 We refer here to a comment by Jean Hyppolite during the discussion which followed the lecture of Fr. writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every present subject can be absent. Cahiers de Royaumont. In the first case . certainly constitutes such a transcendental field. a proper body (Leib). . Thus a subjectless transcendental field is one of the " conditions" of transcendental subjectivity. but which we think can be located on the basis of strictly Husserlian concepts.88 Jacques Derrida 89 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry captive of the de facto and actual intentionality of a speak ing subject or community of speaking subjects. p. This intentional synthesis is an unceasing movement of going and returning that works to bind the ideality of sense and to free the reality of the sign . " in Husserl. The origi­ nality of the field of writing is its ability to dispense with. or in general of a more free ideality within a less free ideality. explicitly or not. embodiment is that of a necessarily bound ideality. § 2 . Linguistic incarnation and the constitution of written or scriptural space suppose. embodiment is at its limit the inscription of an absolutely "free " and objective ideality (that of geometrical truth. "91 Writing. nor could it intend higher idealitie s ." one in which "the conditions of subjectivity would appear and where the subject would be constituted starting from the transcendental field.h Husserl does not directly describe . then there is no more in the vacuity of its soul than a chaotic literalness or the sensible opacity of a defunct designation. by its being-sense. The forms of graphic and vocal signs must have a certain identity which is imposed and recognized each time in the empirical fact of language. every present reading in general. " a fact against which the transcendental depth of ideal Objectivity's historicity is measured. For this ab­ sence of sUbjectivity from the transcendental field. p. Therefore. In connection with the general signification of the epoche. as the place of absolutely permanent ideal objec­ tivities and therefore of absolute Objectivity . even if it removed for all time the totality of actual subjects. The possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity: it is the sine qua non condition of Objectivity ' s internal completion. Jean Hyp­ po lite in vokes the possibility of a " subjectless transcendental field . for example). left to itself. 2 1 ) . is totally without signification [insignifiante] . and not its factuality which. a designation deprived of its transcendental function. mnemotechnical aid to a truth whose own being-sense would dispense with all writing-down. 2 1 0) . When considering the de jure purity of intentional animation. that of the word' s identity w ithin language. the highest ideality. Language frees the ideality of sense. The silence of prehistoric arcana and buried civilizations.92 But does not this formulation per92 Th is sensible embodiment has the peculiar qualities [l'errangete] of both sense ' s inhabitation o f the word [mot] and the here a n d now u s e o f the word ' s ideality. a closer and closer " interconnection" of ideality and reality through a series of less and less ideal mediations and in the synthetic unity of an intention . Such a formulation remarkably sharpens the problem and awakens the peculiar virtue of language . then. a union traversed by the linguistic intention whic h always intends. and if there is no purely juridical possibility of it being intelligible for a transcendental subje � t in general. can be only a factual absence. In the second case . for example) within the ' 'bound" ideality of the word. . an absence whose possibility frees absolute Objectivity. th is morphological ideality is still more " bound" than the word' s ideality. which are proper to the corporeality of graphic and vocal signs. the entombment of lost intentions and guarded secrets. But if the text does not an­ nounce its own pure dependence on a writer or reader in general (i . What Fink writes about speech in his excellent transcript of the Origin is a f ortiori true for writing: " In sensible embodiment Occurs the 'localization' and the 'temporalization' (Temporalisation) of what is. And likewise. due to its sense. the act of writing is the highest possibility of all "constitution. in a real-sensible event.

. But in principle this ideal is indeed repeatable. He proposes some analogous distinctions in the cultural sphere of poli­ tics and strives to bring to light both the ideality of the constitution of the state (of the national will. as is Goethe's Faust" (ibid . " this " instance of printed thought" whose "language is not natural. " Goethe's Faust is found in any number of real books (' book' denotes here what is produced by men and intended to be read: it is already a determination wh ich i s itself not purely material. This mental sense which determines the work of art. . pp . "9-1 permits us to distinguish between the real and the ideal . is. : And not !J:l l n the Origin. a n ation. intelligible for everyone and indefinite ly perdurab le. and therefore for pure tradition and history . the possibil ity of being written fpossibi­ re . becaus e it establi shes a truth-v alue. Thus the relation between the ideal and the real in all cultural objectivities (and first in all the arts) can be expl icated. Because ideal Objectivity can essentially inform or shape the body of speech and writing . That is relatively easy for the literary work. This means that a specific spatiotemporality is prescri bed for commu nication . pp. as long as it cannot be said and written . Therefo formula : the ability of sense to could all but reverse the terms of Fink's be linguistically embodi ed is the only means by which sense become s nons patiote mporal . essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position. but we call irreal every determination which . it is no less possible in principle and thus makes an incontestable ideality appear: "To be sure . Husserl thus indicates the direction for a phenomenology of the writ­ ten thing. wh ich are termed exemplars of Faust. whose case is even more ambiguous? Although repetition may be of a different nature here. Finally. and since it depend s on a pure linguistic intentio n. which in each case requires an appropriate and p rudent analysis.e. Here is not the place to prolong these analyses of aesthetic perception and ideality. but it i s not individualized by this embodiment. within which this constitution can be i ndefinitely repeated as its ideal validity (ibid. identically the same sense" (ibid. we lite graphiq ue ] permits the ultimate freeing of ideality . Undoub tedly. Paradox ically. it is radically independent of sensible spatiote mporali ty. The literary work is often chosen by Husserl as the clue for analyzing the ideality of cultural objectivitie s . This " being of the book. but a determination of significance !) . o f a work o f plastic art a s such (whose i deal value is primordially and intrinsically rooted in an event). Conseq uently. pp. and literature as l iterary art. describ ing the book in its unity as a chain of significations. just as the protodocument authenticates whether it is the depositary of an intentio n. But how can we determine the ideality of a work whose proto individualization is tied to the work ' s single spatiotemporal embodiment? How can we make its ideality appear by varying factual exemplars . and 93 therefore univers al. an ideal object like Raphael' s Madonna can in fact have only one mundane state (Weltlichkeit) and in fact is not repeatable in an adequate identity (of the com­ plete ideal content) . etc . 1 95 1 ) . i. the relation of the " exemplars" to their archetypal unity is undoubtedly unique among the reproductions of other cultural forma­ tions. 265-66) : " We call real in a specific sense all that which . . 266) . according to the book's sense-content. . ideal. the mental structure as such . 6-7. of architecture? Or of music . is made respon sible for it. is the criterion which only can that ideal unity be more or less "bound" to factuality. This unity can be more or less ideal and necessary. in real things in the broader sense . but also according to numerous and completely original forms and modalities. and can appeal to the universality of its testimony . or the empiric al and the metemp irical. a ccording to its sense. i ndispens­ able distinctions . 266-67) . Or again : the same geometrical proposition can be uttered as often as desired: every real utterance has . moreover. . Husserl writes in EJ (§65. since the latter can only imitate a factuality and not express or " indicate" an ideal sense? I s it. the neutralization of the necessary imperfection of re­ production. Thus. " But this freedom is only possible precisel y from the moment truth can in general be said or written . p. the book' s proper volume and duration are neither purely sensible phenomena. It does not derive i ts i ndi­ vidual identity from the latter. a spatiotemporality that es­ capes the alternat ive of the sensible and the intelligible. . . for example) and the originality of its " boundness" to the factuality of a territory. 94 L ' Activite rationaliste de l a physique contemporaine (Paris: Presses U niversitaire s d e France . truth is no longer simply exiled in the primordial event of its language. is certainly 'embodied ' i n the real world. indeed. The origin of identity .90 Jacques Derrida 91 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry mit linguistic embodiment to be understood as taking place outside the being-sense of ideal objectiv ity? As " occurrin g" or " unexpec tedly happeni ng" in addition to the being-se nse? Does not this formulation give the impression that ideal objectiv ity is fully constitu ted as such before and independently of its embodi ment. Since this perdurability is truth ' s very sense. specific ally. Moreover. From the first perception. is founded with regard to spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical-not merely as sim il ar" (Husserl ' s emphasis) . " Gaston Bachelard calls a "bibliomenon. or rather. the conditions for its survival are included in those of its life. especially those of the nonliterary arts. there is a sort of immediate reduction of factuality which permits. next.e. whether the linguis tic event refers to an authentic act (in the Husserlian sense of the word) . . ) . In other words. The ideal identity of the work will never be mistaken for its sens ible embodiments. nor purely intelligible noumena. then. i n short. i. Husserl is content to situate the ir domain and to define preliminary. whether it refers withou t fal sificatio n to an original and primordial act. truth never keeps the ideal Objecti vity or identity of any of its particu­ lar de facto linguistic incarnations . and compared to all linguistic factu­ ality it remains "free. Its historical habitat authenticates this event. the realm of all written discourse. before and inde­ pendently of its ability to be embodied? But Husserl insists that truth is not fully objective . Their specific character seems irreducible. H usserl distinguishes between literature i n the broad sense. on condition that this can be done. the same for the ideality of the plastic arts.

It therefore represents a set of external arrangements. Husserl illuminates more directly that milieu of writing .' " in C. From then on. Truth depe�ds on the pure possibility of speaking and writing. What disappears is what is annihi­ lated. in its turn. �n.92 Jacques Derrida 93 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry In the Origin . � in written work has it a rich relational being limited to men and their intellectual a�tlvltIes: in this form it is propagated down the millennia. �9 Forgetfulness is a word that Husserl rarely employs in the Crisis. for embodiment.d the whole real world. whose difficult signification and importance he had already recogmzed in the Logical Investigations .. see " Fink' s Appendix on the Problem of the ' Unbewussten . above all should disengage the objective autonomy of signification. 95 Cf. On this level of ana!ysl s. as a transcende�tal community.97 A sense that is conserv ed as a sedimentary habitua lity and whose dormant potential­ ity can de jure be reanimated is not returne d to nothingness by the vanishin g of retentions of retentio ns . that of "external arrangements" : sensible exemplars on which neither the Ideahty of sense nor the clear intention of cognition depends. for Husserl . can again pass over into Just such act � of . " Far from being a phenomenolog­ ical nothing . would require much circumlocution" (our emphasis) . it must put its ?�r� intent. and at what point (in the same moment) he strives to respect historicity' s own peculiar signification and possibility and truly to penetrate them . but above all in FTL (in term s which are literally taken up again in the Origin ) . pp. he never uses it in the first text of the Origin . in order to escape worl. i'. truth has its origin in a pure and simple right to speech and writing. Furthermore.acity. In the first place. and survives individuals. . its downfall will be less a fall toward language than a degradation within language. But this fact neither prohibits nor contra­ dicts at all the subsequent theme of writing as the intrinsic possibility and intr!nsic c�ndition of acts of objective cognition. insofar. 60: " Science exists objectively only in its literature. §6. The authentic act of writing is a transcendental reductIo� performed by and toward the we . its truth-sense. in effect. Husserl is only worried about the permanence and virtual presence of sense within the monadi c subject . let us rule out the hypothe sis of a death oj sense in general within the individu al conscio usness . 96 We take this word in the broad sense of sign-signifier or " sign-expression" (graphic or vocal). ��. we �ould Interpret the phenomenon of crisis (which . as they are m the world. Conversely . pp. we were unable to find in Husserl an unequivocal response to a question which only makes that of phenomenology itself return: what is the sense of its appearing? That equivocation will presently reveal both how much the author of the Crisis was a stranger to history or how fundamentally incapable he was of taking it seriously. perhaps because habit relates it very easil y to individual consciousness or to its psychological sense : perhaps also because it can suggest an annihilation of sense . But since.e . man's communal bemg IS lifted to a new level" ( 1 64): it can appear. in effect. LI. 99 UH On the naivete of the classic problems of the Unconscious and on the question of knowing whether an intentional analysis can open a methodical access to the Uncon­ sciou s. and not about the absolute ly ideal Objectiv ity of sense gained through speech and writing from that subjectiv ity. . ProfoundJorgetJulness therefore extends into the spaces of intersubjectivity and the distance between commu nities. cf. sense is gathered mto a sign. We have previously seen that truth c �n perdure I. 1 .1 9 . th� questIo� IS c �early . 385-87 ." "the so-called 'unconscious ' " or ' 'universal substratum " where sense is deposited is " a limit-m ode of conscio u sness" (FTL. as is prescribed for it. the meaning that Husserl gives this term by opposing it to the " ind�cative" sign (LI. but also what ceases. At the same time. whose exact de scnpt�on . e .. We purposely use the ambiguous word disappearance.dh­ ness sense must first be able to be set down in the world and be depOSited in s�nsible spatiotemporality. What then is this possibility of disappearance? 1 . appears in a philoso­ phy which is (at least because of certain motifs) the contrary of empiri­ cism: the possibility of truth ' s disappearance. . On the basis of this distinc�ion. The Origin maintains these two themes. That IS the difficulty we are striving to illuminate here . truth suffers in and through Its language from a certain changeableness. intermittently or definitely. upon whic-h formida ble difficul­ ties already weigh . I n Ideas I. §§ 1-5 . 3 1 8. pp. generatIons and nations. to appear inJact yet without affecting its being or being-sense. which . in particular Appendix I I . which . i . . 3 19) . . I . countless individuals. of a clear . � this way without being thought in act or in fact-and that IS what r�dlcallY emancipates truth from all empirical subjectivity. its total annihilation become s impossi ble.9H Clearly in this type of analysis . ?ut once constituted it conditions expression.ional ideality. Prol. 95 The difficulty of its des� ri� tion is due to the fact that writing defines and completes the ambigUIty of all lan­ guage. . as a degradation of the sign-expression into a Sign-indIcatIOn. § 2 c . Forgetfulness is a historical category. alwa�s r�fer s to a dlsord�� or I11 ? ess of l�ngua�e) . If. language is also where every absolutely Ideal object (I. in a readily understandable manner. as an empIrIcal fact. out of the knowledge-acts of many individuals. Husserl clearly specifi e s in the Origin and elsewhere that. which even here accords only with empiricism and nonphilosophy . I. To determine the sense of this " disappearance" of truth is the most difficult problem posed by the Origin and all of Husserl' s philosophy of history.96 and the sign becomes the worldly and exposed residence of a� unthought truth. . in El. (klar) intentIon into an empty symbol. Thus a pOSSibility. 269-75) . all factual lI�e. As the process of that essential and constitu � ive cap. Now this Objectiv ity is found threatened as truth in the world. ju st as they arose . once sense appeared in ego logical conscio usness. p.but is independent of what is spoken or written. in danger. therefore. p. where truth) i s factually and contingently embodied.

is decisive. The graphic sign. and over­ thrown in fact. 1 37 [modified]) . nor to this territory here. By their adherence to some factuality. in their very sense. While completely recognizing the terrifying reality of the current risk. the guarantee of Objectivity.loo It would be fruitless for him to object that historicity or being-in-history is precisely the possibility of being intrinsically exposed to the extrinsic. " individual events in space and time (which is only true to a certain degree for " bound" idealities). will never be anything in them­ selves but sensible "exemplars. . no real development other than that of the variable example interests him . perhaps it would disappear in fact from the surface of the world. That is what Husserl means when he opposes internal or intrinsic (innere) historicity to external (aussere) history. All factual writings. Death is possible for them alone and has the transcendental signification we just now granted it. because Husserl considers sense neither an in-itself nor a pure spiritual interiority but an "object" through and through. a world-wide burning of libraries.1 8 . only insofar as it is guided by the Telos of an absolute freeing which has not been fully attained . We would then be conceding that a pure ideality can be changed by a real cause . Its being-sense would preserve its own intrinsic historicity. into illusion" (Ideas I. . and above all in the Origin . §7. but only insofar as the "bound" ideality is animated or traversed by a transcendental intention. No doubt he would admit that a universal conflagration. whose proper historicity Husserl wishes to grasp and about which he speaks more and more often as his thought becomes allured by history . Thus. Such a forgetfulness would not only sup­ press this sense but would annihilate it in the specific being-in-the-world to which its Objectivity is entrusted. but to all the world ( Weltall). then sense can be deposited there and communalized [mettre en communaUf(j ] . Un­ doubtedly. the hypothesis of the world-wide catastrophe could even serve as a revelatory fic tion.94 Jacques Derrida 95 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry 2 . the clearest intention of ]()O The opposition between intrinsic penetration and extrinsic circumspection is al­ ready announced in Ideas I. Corporeal exteriority un­ doubtedly does not constitute the sign as such but. he would deny it any thinkable. Once exter­ nal history is "reduced. 85 [modified]). in which truth could be sedimented. . In such a case. but its sense-of-being as truth. in " Ph ilosophy as Mankind' s Self-Reflection" (c. I n comparison with veritas aeterna. nor to this world here. If geometry is true. The opposition between the two histories is an explicit theme in the Crisis ( se e . for then the historicity absolutely proper to any truth-sense would be missing. . . and Husserl's discourse would be plunged into a confusion of significations and regions. for which mathematics is the model). 7 1 ). precisely concerning the history of geometry . nor any other-would remain intact in itself. the fully freed ideality and absolute Objectivity of sense. whose notion we evoked above. 101 P . in a sense that we must make clear. " whereas "we should enter v itally into these activities and . There H usserl shows how psychologistic or historicist empiricism remains " outside" [ Derrida' s empha­ sis] " geometrical thought and intuition . Yet the hypothesis of such a factual destruction does not interest Husserl at all. 1 7. pp. p. for e xample . But l ike that which orients Husserl 's reflection (specifically. . is indispensable to it. determine their immanent sense " (§25. and nothing can definitively protect inscription from this.e. after a certain eidetic-transcendental reduction. Accordingly. In addition. This distinction. absolute ideality would be changed . which has only a phenomenological sense. which is to lose sense. can also in f act be destroyed. 101 The analysis concluded that. nothing will ever stand between the worldly experiences which incarnated geometry and what they have begun again: discovering afresh (without any traces and after the shrouding of this world here) the paths of an adventure buried in another real history. and § 1 5 . Since truth does not essentially depend on any of them . mutilated. would be vulnerable to that worldly accident. they could all be destroyed without overtaking the very sense of absolute ideality. 1 36. 1 7. the threat of an intrinsic destruction by the body of the sign can be ruled out. which is not in the world­ neither in our world here. i. insofar as their bodies and corporeal forms are always already in an intersubjective horizon. Husserl did not dispute that under those circumstances all consciousness would in fact be destroyed and that its worldly existence would be engulfed with the world. and the catastrophe of worldly history would remain exterior to it. For Husserl clearly said this: insofar as signs can be immediately perceptible by everyone in their corporeality. we should be able to repeat analogously the famous analysis of Section 49 of Ideas 1. 338-39). these idealities. p p . pure consciousness is intangible. its internal history must be saved integrally from all sensible aggression. " nothing is opposed to the fact that th is immanent sense may have its own particular historicity . even when the existing world is annihilated or factual experience dis­ solved " through internal conflict . pp. p. § 7 . we might first think that the forgetfulness which follows upon the destruc­ tion of Objectivity' s custodial sign [signe gardien ] would not affect (as in a "Platonism" or " Bergsonism") the surface of a sense without undermining the sense itself. any philosophical signifi c ance. or a catastrophe of monuments or "documents" in general would intrinsically ravage "bound" cultural idealities. p. This danger is inherent in the factual worldliness of inscrip­ tion itself.1 8. its own interconnections. §49. The movement is taken up again i n CM. Since geometry is tied neither to this moment here.

the complete " variation" of factuality? As sense. this eidetic independence. Undoubtedly. since the interconnections and sedimentations of geomet­ rical truth are free of all factuality. therefore . are they not also "facts" or factual structures with respect to which pure consciousness would no longer be free? Could these sedimentary structures de jure survive the annihilation. 102 Would Husserl have judged this fiction valid the moment he studied (for example. e . p. All factual peril . no worldly catastrophe can put truth itself in danger. It therefore provokes the same questions. the intra-egological sedimentation. Hus­ serl. and therefore every history for every ego is self-sufficient. We would be fully convinced . the po­ tential evidence. to speak of this as an event "of" geometry would be to commit a very serious confusion of sense and to abdicate responsibility for all rigorous discourse. pure consciousness is still considered as that which no worldly factuality can penetrate as such. i . § 8 1 . as we saw above. and invariability of their interconnections. Yet this suspension. is analogous. 3 . structures "bound" to some reducible contingency-and not essential ones reduced to their pure ideality. e. And. it is not the "ultimate" transcendental regression (ibid. The phenomenologist must dissolve the ambiguity. 1 04 Already cited [see note 7 above] . the overthrow. 3 1 6. . he is going to track down the intention of writing (or of reading) in itself and in its purity . without questioning once more the sense of geometry constituted as an eidetic science. In order to grasp the nature of the danger threatening truth itself in its constitutive speech or writing. in a word. 1 39 [modified]). irreversibility. Appendix I I . which tends to discover the protoregion' s essential structures and is certainly constitutive of the world. stops at the threshold of its internal historicity . as Husserl will say. in such a case. But by the irre­ placeability. Within thisform of historicity that we wish to attain as an invariant. p. The " unity" of the ego' s "history" is that of the eidos "ego. maintains his dissociative analysis and disarticulates the ambiguity. Also cf. its very sense is de jure and absolutely independent of the whole world. §49. how would writing preserve its Leiblichkeit from corporeal disaster? Husserl is not going to immobilize his analysis within this ambiguity. in its living truth-sense. Similarly. . 237) . p. Husserl would probably reply that. all actual geometers-had to come to ruin one day. were the indispensable guard rails for all genetic or historical phenomenology." and the " references" l o4 that this " his­ tory" makes necessary are only a network of sense . if here-as in his static analyses­ Husserl had considered writing to be a sensible phenomenon . The situation of truth . can be questioned as to its value beyond the moment of Ideas I. brought to light in a methodologi­ cal idealism by a fiction. In fact. 1 0:\ Already c ited [see note 7 above] . pp . in the Cartesian Meditations ) the genetic constitution of the ego in the "unity" of its " history"? lOa In a certain sense we can say yes. as "a self-contained nexus of being" (Ideas I. therefore. if it is both Korper and Leib. the " residues. would they not be marked by a certain order of the factual world to which past conscious­ ness is tied-a consciousness tied there by its own interconnections and structurally implicated in every present consciousness? 1 02 These first reductions lead us to " the very threshold of phenomenology" (Ideas I. Only in the intentional dimen- . or to precipitate phenomenology into philosophy. � 2 h .1 7 . we are considering factual structures in the life of the ego-i . all facto-historical interconnections are vari­ able at will. which for him is only a provisional and factual confusion of regions. on this FTL . N ow this sense was securely decided within the static analyses that. inasmuch as it was grounding (or contributing to the grounding of) truth' s absolute Objectivity. every sedimentation. Since transcendental consciousness can always and with complete freedom modify or suspend the thesis of each (therefore of all) contingent exis­ tence and of each (therefore of all) transcendence. Even if all geometrical "documents"-and as well. In effect. 2 1 6) . particularly of geometrical truth. § 88 . . But did we not just find out that writing. but was also a properly constituting body (Leib)-the intentional primordiality of a Here-and­ N ow of truth? If writing is both a factual event and the upsurging of sense. Through the solipsistic hypothesis in which the Cartesian Meditations are first couched. in a new reduction he is going to isolate the intentional act which constitutes Korper as Leib and maintain this act in its Leiblichkeit. was not merely a constituted sensible body (Korper). to choose silence. beyond the moment the eidetic-transcendental reduction has not yet attained its final radicality and is provisionally immobilized in one region. if he does not want to be reduced to equivocation.96 Jacques Derrida 97 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry this analysis and fiction is to explicate a reduction which must reveal to the Ur-Region -transcendental consciousness-the essential relativity of the world' s sense (the world being the totality of regions) . " Husserl's description means that the essential form of every interconnection. One cannot come back to all this evidence without making the sensible the ground of geometrical truth and. is constituted it­ self. therefore. Such an analysis no longer has any need of Korper as such. in order not to leave "inter­ nal" historicity. the region of pure consciousness is the " residue" of a " su spension" that still remains more eidetic than transcendental and is only the most profound of the eidetic reductions.

e . the image of the sub­ stantial permanence of what is then 'Supposed or situated under the sur­ face of actually present evidence . Forgetfulness of truth itself will thus be nothing but the failure of an act and the abdication of a responsibil ity . Although in a word [mot]. taken up again in the Origin. the sense arising from instituting evidence. 3 1 3-29. LI. of the potentiality of sense . into the corresponding activity . their senses are definitively heterogene ous. 1 . Of course . By this reactivation. l on The possibility of giving way to this first expectation of sense is a lasting danger. is sense intrinsicall y threatened .. forgetfulne ss will never be radi­ cal. We also see that. I . the notion of Stufe has both a structural and genetic sense and can be translated by " step" or by " stage. for example. a historical category. Korper and Leib . It brings togethe r. also see FTL. Confronting sedimented sense. we are always free to reawaken any passively received sense.98 Jacques Derrida 99 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry sion of a properly animate body. phenomenology allows itself to be s ummoned outside of itself by history. One learns to use signs whose primordial sense (which is not always the logical sense that is sedimented and accessible to an explication ) is concealed or poten­ tialized under sedimentations . on the surface . in the domain of ideal objectivities. pp. On vocable s and real signs as " bearers" of signified idealities. as one of its intentional " modification s. however profound it may be. From then on. the following images: The image of level or stratum-w hat is deposited by an inroad or a progression after the radical novelty of an irruption or upsurge: every advance. " As intentional sense. of the geistige Leiblichkeit. Also . the very act of all Verantwortung and of all Besinnung. Husserl states. in principle and de jure . ") The geological image of " sedimentat ion" translates re­ markab ly well the style of that implication. 268. cf. . provided the sense of each modification is prudently respected. is more particularly directed against the methodological and operative teaching of mathematic s . (In the Origin. § 1 6. to reanimate all its virtualities. 56-60. 304-06. . pp. cf. everything can and should be described only as a modification of the pure ego. Reaktivierung permits bringing to life. In the Origin . our first danger is passivity. But only freedom can let itself be threatened in this way . every pro­ position (Satz) of a new sense is at the same time a leap (Satz) and a I (). under the sedimentary surfaces of linguistic and cultural acquisitions. On "meaningless signs" [signes depourvus de signification] and "game s-meaning" [signification de jeu ] . are not only superimposed in the internal becoming of sense. that is because it can bring back to present and active evidence a sense which is thus retrieved out of h istorical virtuality. in fact. supposes it. in the senses defined earlier. Cf. but once again it is in FTL that it is particularly focused (as in the Origin ) by the problem of the sign and of the sedimentation of ideal objectivitie s . the image of the con­ cealed presence that an activity of excavation can always re-produce above ground as the foundation. El. pp . it thus has found in reactivation the medium of its fidelity. a lapse more than a defeat-and this forgetfulne ss can be made to appear in person only on the basis of an intentional history. that is itself grounded. derive all their seriousness from the fact that they are imposed on a ph ilosophy of actua lly present evidence whose "principle of all principles" is the immediate and actual [en acte] presence of sense itself. and to " transform" them " back . of a "region" in which all deposits. interrelated but distinct. whether it remains as the disappearance of intersub­ jective truth or. are infact numerically one and the same existent. the activity of reactivation is second. and sense can always. which de­ graded science into a skill or game. This sense is reanimated by the fact that I restore it to its dependence on my act and reproduce it in myself such as it had been produced for the first time by another. linguistic objectification and mathematical symbolizat ion were presented as the occasion of the technicist' s and objectivist 's alienation. *20. and no­ thing can come to the latter through the former. in the Geistigkeit of the Leib (to the exclusion of all factual corporeality). forgetfulness can nevertheles s be described as a phenomenon of the ego. body and flesh . the themes of passivity and sedimentation. I make myself fully responsible for and conscious of the sense that I take up. Of course. Reaktivierung is. necessarily passive and associative. And finally. On the sense of activ ities and passiv ities in a phenomenology of reading as outlined in the Origin . be reactivated. for all intents and purposes. are originally prescribed by an archi-tectonics. as Husserl tries to do. I actively re-produce the primordial evidence . It brings all this together in the structural and internal unity of a system. but are more or less virtually implicated in their totality in each stage or step. concerning the difficult constitution of the alter ego. i . The latter. 1 0. The synthesis which awakens the sign to signification is first. which are only intentions or intentional senses made dormant. on the contrary. in particular C. in particular Appendix I I . . §65 . If. What it gives back to me I Ofi This theme of passive synthesis is copiously explicated in EJ and eM. Cf. as we said above. more pre­ cisely. of higher stratifications. If reactivation is valuable and urgent. which. . " This freedom is the " capacity for reactivation that belongs originally to every human being as a speaking being" ( 1 64) . p.') This accusation . is not "in fact" the "norm" and without which a certain comprehension is always possible. In Formal and Transcendental Logic and then in the Crisis. Husserl dwells more on the receptive acceptance of signs-first in reading-than on the secondary technical or logical activity that is not only not contradictory to the first passivity but. sedimentary (satzartig) fall back of sense . for the same reason. §9f.

109 Open Court. well known to Husserl and where that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos. Husserl ' s criticisms written in the margins of [Heidegger's] Sein und Zeit attribute to a Tie fsinnigkeit the responsibility for the Heideggerian "displacement" toward what Hus­ serl defines as a facto-anthropological plane. . in fact. I . activity. French : uni­ voques] rational forms " and thus to "constitut[e] anew the rigorous sciences .100 101 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry Jacques De"ida is the originally presentive intuition (that of the geometrical formation. p. 373]) 7 This optimism is only one of the affinities between Leibniz ' s LI. 1 44 : " Profundity [Tie fsinn ] is a mark of the chaos example are what one usually has in m ind when one speaks of 'equivocation' . Univocal ex­ pression completely breaks the surface and offers no turning back [rep/i] to the more or less virtual signification s that the intentions could deposit all along the advances of a language or culture. p p . so far as its real doctrine extends. by a very careful coining of words. Husserl never ceased to appeal to the imperative of univocity. a decisive rupture with spontaneous lan­ guage . to limit our expression to a single signification. then. Husserl also very early felt himself the heir to the Leibnizian conception of logic in general. and to agree to destroy this tower of Babel" (Book I I . The ideal unity of each of the differing significations will not be affected by their attachment to a common designation" [modified] . with the most " irreducible" heritage (and indeed thereby perhaps the most obscuring heritage) of Western philosophy. 3 1 4) . on always new experiences which animate the identity of objective sense and make it enter into unforeseeabl e configuration s. It is all the more difficult not to be hasty here . " as "for every description of intentional phenomena" (El. as the sense of equivocity in general is itself equivocal. propositions. FTL. namely. it is no doubt because the evidence consid­ ered is that of created and established ideal formations . univocity removes truth out of history ' s reach.e. we first would have to approach directly and for itself SUbjective origin.lo9 Because it brings everything to view within a present act of evidence. 1 . " Hu sserl then proposes t o re-strike (umpriigen). " p . sense. in effect. Equivocity is the path of all philosophical aberration. univocal language remains the same . into a simple . after that. § 60. 3 14) . cf. i. intrinsic (inner). " the conjectures of profundity into unequivocal [German: eindeutige. essential (wesentlich). For sedimentations obliterate sense only insofar as there are surfaces available for this. The equivocity of expression is the chosen field of sedimentary deposits . In one of the finest analyses where he works with the concepts of passivity. These are already distinguished in the Investiga­ tions (LI. Does not the sentence just cited sound like the faithful echo of another sentence of the Nouveaux Essais sur l' Entendement Humain. ix. . a s in the case o f a currency revaluation. tr. We are free . or indefinitely struggled with them. 1 9 1 6). That Husserl is so anxious to reduce the equivocal sense of cultural naivete reveals a concern that once more could be interpreted both as a refusal of history and as a deep fidelity to the pure sense of historicity. Cf. The purpose of univocity supposes. It is the condi­ tion that allows communication among generations of investigators no matter how distant and assures the exactitude of translation and the Theophilus says: " i t depends upon us to fix their meanings [significations ] . § 23 . However. I . § 26 . and it depends on original intentions. I . knows no profundity . p. Ch . On the one hand. 3 1 4: "The class of ambiguous expressions illustrated by this last On this. for example) which is both an activity and a passivity. This plurivocity is an " un­ avoidable rather than chance ambiguity fplurivocite]. " Likewise . It engages the one who receives. because it has mastered all the dynamics of sense. notably LI. Thus Husserl's constant association of equivocal proceedings with a criticism of profundity is understandable . p . " This plurivocity does not mislead anyone and we are always free to reduce it. Ambiguity in such cases does not tend to shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of significations. . p . Husserl notes that the distinction between these two notions cannot be " inflexible . but also and first of all the one who creates and then expresses the sense.lo7 Responsibility for reactivation is a co-responsibility. It thus keeps its ideal identity throughout all cultural development. at least in any scholarly language . above all " PRS . the results which are to be univocally expressed" ( 1 65 [modified]) . Prol . completely clear. in the facto-cultural phenomenon preceding the reduction. §9 [ET: the difficult and decisive problem in phenomenology of act ivity and passivity in general on the basis of texts directly devoted to th is (EJ. lucid order. 1 ." and that in each case their sense must be "recreated" according to " the concrete situation of the analysis . Such a study would perhaps have to conclude that phenomenology has only argued with the arbitrary sense [exigence du sens] of this couple of concepts . and passivity in activity. Alfred Gideon Langley (Chicago: and Husserl's philosophies o f language : More broadly speaking. this last equivocity is what science and philosophy must overcome. with the "civil language " of which Leibniz used to speak. § 26. The first depends on an objective con ven­ tion. It is "unavoidabl e" only in natural language. If this activity is especially illuminated here. e. 1 08 New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. 2 1 8ff. eM) . interiority being related to the penetration of internal. i . Genuine science.loS The second is of 107 To try to illuminate this point. because nothing is hidden or announced in the penumbra of potential intentions. . Husserl prefers the value of interiority to that of pro fundity or depth . thus the word " dog" signifies both " a type of animal" and (in German) "a type of wagon (used in mines) . p. 1 08) . That is why the primally institut­ ing geometer and those who follow after him must be concerned about " the univocity of linguistic expression and about securing. and complexes of propositions. "philo­ sophical" or " scholarly [sa vant]" language can freely be given its own particular con­ ventions. There is a contingent plurivocity or multisignificance and an essential one. one that cannot be removed from our language by an artificial device or convention" (LI.

Moreover. And. Since equivocity always evidences a certain depth of development and conceal­ ment ofa past. discloses their furthermost common horizons. facing this equivocity. . on this J. like Joyce. in all wordly cultures and their most ingenious forms (mythology. Likewise. Now if we suppose that such a thing or perception exists. rather than ' 're­ duce" it. The essences of finite totalities and the typol­ ogy of figures of the spirit will always be idealities that are bound to empirical history. Hyppolite . whether it might draw from a given univocity or try to produce another. Equivocity is the congential mark of every culture . i s a nightmare from which I a m trying t o awake. in effect. e . and so forth). a 1 1 0 Exactitude and univocity are overlapping notions for H u sserl. politics. which would load a word with intentions or with lateral and virtual reminscences. This historicity or traditionality is always already presupposed by every Odyssean repetition of Joyce's type . Stephen said. and always renascent equivocity into pure historicity. the chance for I I I " 1 12 1 1 1 Husserl has always associated " Hegelianism" with "romantic i sm" and with " his­ toricism . In effect. identity . " ] . § 73 . no longer translating one language into another on the basis of their common cores of sense. in a network of linguistic relations and oppositions. the e xac­ titude of expression will have as its condition the exactitude of sense . Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman [Evanston: Northwestern University f Press. one has. an absolutely ideal object must be designated? This time. literature. as by all philosophy of history (in the current sense) and by every phenomenology of spirit. could only succeed by allotting its share to univocity . absurd and contradictory. each word. accumulated. the act of language itself-intervene and from the outset place that supposition in a culture. " pp. If a radical equivocity precludes history . this endeavor would try to make the structural unity of all empirical culture appear in the generalized equivocation of a writing that. and Objectivity would in themselves be prior to all culture. which also proceeded from a certain anti-historicism and a will "to awake" from the " nightmare" a will to master that nightmare in a total and present of " history.102 Jacques Derrida 103 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry pu rity of tradition . as the transmission and recollection [recueillement] of sense.e. Joyce' s project. arts. and rediscovers the poetic value of passivity. each vocable. First: suppose the designated thing is not only an absolutely singular. About the relations between exactitude and univocity in geometry. at the other pole of language. at least it would have remained so forever and for everyone . Husserl' s demand for uni­ vocity (which he formulated before the practice of the reduction) is therefore only the reduction of empirical history toward a pure history. 76-77. In short. cultivates their associative syntheses instead of avoiding them. pp . in order to reach back and grasp again at its pure source a historicity or traditionality that no de facto historical totality will yield of itself. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's "Phenomenology o Spirit. circulates throughout all languages at once. for language neither can nor should be maintained under the protection of univocity . Otherwise. Second: is not the result the same if. phenomenology in particular. but also an existent whose unity . i. religion. the choice of two endeavors. linguistic ideality and its project of univocity­ i .) Was not the e xpression Weltanschauung first Hegelian? (Cf. each simple proposition. . p . it alone makes pure history possible. also cf. and when one wishes to assume and interiorize the memory of a culture in a kind of recollection (Erinnerung) in the Hegelian sense. (Cf. the very text of its repetition would have been unintelligi­ ble . One would resemble that of James Joyce: to repeat and take responsibility for all equivocation itself. This first hypothesis of a univocal and natural language is. and natural object. HusserJ had to admit an irreducible." to which romanticism is led when " be lief" in its " metaphysics of h istory" has been lost. Only by means of historicism is it possible to remain there and confuse them with the movement of truth . We will return to this l ater. Ulysses (New York : Random . as the transcendental "parallel" to Joyce ' s. Such a reduction must be recommenced indefi nitely. 1 974] . the model of the sciences whose objects are exact. knows the same relativity. The other endeavor is Husserl' s: to reduce or impoverish empirical language methodically to the point where its univocal and translatable elements are actually transparent. sciences. in order to travel through and explore the vastest possible historical distance that is now at all possible. Once again. 1 1 1I In other words-on the other h nd -th e very moment univocity removes sense beyond the reach of historical modifi­ cation. immutable. 469-70 . 1 96 1 ) . abso­ lute univocity would itself have no other consequence than to sterilize or paralyze history in the indigence of an indefinite iteration . by plunging it into the nocturnal and ill-transmissible riches of " bound" idealities. 1 89-90. and interwoven intentions within each linguistic atom . pp. ) 1 12 James Joyce . actualizes their most secret consonances. accumulates their energies. therefore. 3 4 [ " H i story . Geometry . Ideas I. this writing resolutely settles itself within the labyrinthian field of culture "bound" by its own equivocations. But HusserJ ' s project. " tr. especially " PRS . Univocity only indicates the lim­ pidity of the historical ether. resumption. enriching. philosophy. will therefore more easily attain u nivocity than will the other sciences. . rather than put it out of play with quotation marks. absolute univocity is imaginable only in two limiting cases. utilizing a language that could equalize the greatest possible synchrony with the greatest potential for buried.

it is that That is why. in fact. without being questioned again as to its truth. Its schema is the same ." they do not therein give rise any less to some singular placings in perspective [mises en perspectives ]. no reactivation would be imaginable. the value for a language impover­ ished and thus removed out of history' s reach. should it not furnish the true starting point for reflecting on history? Without that essential concealment of origins and within the hypothesis of an all-powerful reactivation. not so symmetrically. is always relative. as we noted above. professional breaks. after having pre­ sented the capacity for reactivation. Rather. relations of pure idealities and "truths. Even if those relations are. 1 13 without which the very equivocations of empirical culture and history would not be possible . what would consciousness of historicity be? Also. They have their linguistic being from an intention which traverses them as mediations. for. univocity is both the apriori and the teleological condition for all historicity .' that it ' stands fast. the "individual and even the social capacity" for reactivation is of an "obvious finitude" ( 1 68) . The obviousness [evidence ] of that finitude and of that necessary mediacy could stamp Husserl's whole purpose as nonsense. That is why . is the possibility of a pure history of sense to be doubted de jure? More particularly since. that consciousness would be nothing. univocity corresponds to the very vocation of science. Con­ sequently. The problem of univocity echoes immediately upon that of reactiva­ tion. Absolute univocity is inaccessible. In a science like geometry . as we know. For under the extrinsic necessity that geometrical activity be intermittent is also hidden an essential and internal necessity: since no piece of the geometrical edifice is self-sufficient. The " same " word is always "other" according to the always different intentional acts which thereby make a word significative [signijiant] . the ground of univocity and the condition for reactivation. within a science. usable in evidence and for further theoretical or practical ends-as indubitably able to be reacti­ vated with the identity of its genuine sense " ( 1 65-66 [modified]). as could be feared. that is because words and language in general are not and can never be abso­ lute objects. must not then the darkness which engulfs the "original premises" (it can be penetrated but never dissipated) not only hide the fact but also the instituting sense? And must not the "critical" forgetfulness of origins be the faith­ ful shadow in truth's advance rather than an accidental aberration? This distinction between fact and sense (or the de facto and the de jure) would be effaced in the sense-investigation of a primordial finitude. ' forever identically repeatable. Husser! does not make univocity. because it is always inscribed within a mobile system of relations and takes its source in an infinitely open project of acquisition. whose poten­ tiality for growth is extraordinary. Husser! writes in the Ori­ gin: " In accord with the essence of science. It will always be denied immediate totality. and therefore some mediate and potential aims. would paralyze the internal history of geometry just as surely as would the radical impossi­ bility of all reactivation. some multiple interconnections of sense. If the univocity investigated by Husserl and the equivocation generalized by Joyce are in fact relative. always remains provisional. but by a transcultural object. Univocity is also the absolute horizon of equivocity. without a minimal linguistic transpar­ ency. equivocity is always irreducible. the positive value of univocity. and that "Objective. Since that finitude is in fact irreducible. its functionaries maintain the constant claim. which has no sense compared with geometrical truth but is no less irreducible to it. absolutely firm knowledge of truth is an infinite idea" ( 1 66) . In any case. that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said 'once and for all. on any level . whose ideality is always that of a " thematic index" and not a theme. Husser! is not worried about that: at this point a total recuperation of origins is still only a teleological horizon.1 04 Jacques Derrida 105 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry univocity would not be offered by a precultural. so that history may have its proper density . to perform a total and immediate reactivation of the "immense chain of foundings back to the original premises" ( 1 66 [modified]) . In giving it the sense of an infinite task. There is a sort of pure equivocity here. Husserl specifies in a note that the scientific statement. Husserl does not fail to ask the serious question of itsjinitude. for example. This irreducible mediacy thus makes illusory all the safety promised by speech or writing themseLves . But if univocity is in fact always relative. A total reactivation . it is impossible for every geometer. that finitude can appear precisely in its . For their common telos. which grows in the very rhythm of science. the personal certainty. then. no immediate reactivation is possi­ ble. the geometrical object. even if that were possible. if it was radically prohibited access to origins. Husserl could not inquire as to the absoLute ideal Obj ectivity concerning language itself. and if it alone permits the reduction of all empirical culture and of all sedimentation. Husser! remarks. 1 13 They do not possess any resistant and permanent iden­ tity that is absolutely their own. they are. no doubt. and so forth). therefore. The necessity of those interruptions is a factual one (sleep . But. at every instant and every time he resumes his task after necessary interruptions. is immediately revealed only within the relativity that Husserl defined. But this identity of sense. If. but only as_ an Idea in the Kantian sense can be. But for Husser!.

then. . the first direction of his investigation. He writes : "The peculiar sort of evidence belonging to such idealizations will concern u s later" ( 1 68 [modified]). although as problems they still remain " un­ asked. to " notice" that there exists "an idealization: namely. since historicity embraces the infinite totality of being and sense: "Naturally. In closing these preliminary considerations. 1 1 6 Plato. Thus. . even when the sense of its origin has been lost. the insights into principles are historical (historisch) . Husserl provisionally averts this difficulty . intellectual seenness. They are incapable of " vision" (idein) and riveted to the hypotheses held as their principles. Hamilton and Cairns (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. 533c) . insightful­ ness. p . pp . This helps e lucidate the phrase "la transparence rationnelle de son evidence" as a " translation" of " E insichtigke it . the certainty of what can never im­ mediately and as such present itself in an intuition should pose some serious problems for phenomenology (problems similar to those. for example. \ 96 \) . the j ustification and practice of S . The impossibility of adequately determining the content of this Idea does not undermine. ed. 1 1. and that of the whole modern age'" ( 1 69) . ] Thus the method and the sense of the question concerning origins are illuminated at the same time as the conditions for the tradition of sci­ ence in general . Note adapted by Tr. apodictic evidentness. We will come directly back to this later. Husserl does not give up. Ideas I. especially § 8 3 . A secondary idealizing operation then comes to relieve the reactivative ability of its finitude and lets it get beyond itself. 1 14 1 15 science moves away from its beginnings and its logical superstructures are accumulated . however little we may know about determined things. But this horizon has its essential structure that can be disclosed through methodical inquiry" ( 1 7 1 -72 [modified]). Husserl says in Ideas I. which are then no more than the nominal limits of pure factuality.t But above all. 1 15 However. [In his translation of the Origin . They are always possible . We stand. always decisively intervenes in the difficult moments of Husserl' s description. Confusing symbol with truth. its final sense. this ability easily and de jure transgresses its limits. Ibid. when the prod­ uction of geometrical exactitude by idealization will be our concern. of the unity of the world' s infinite horizon or (beyond the finite interconnection of retentions and protentions) to the constitution of the evidence for a total unity of the immanent flux as an Idea in the Kantian sense. as he says. He postpones the problem until later and invites with a slightly enigmatic brevity. faced with the finitude of reactivation. Bachelard (see A Study of HusserI' s Logic. The advancements of science can be pursued. The Collected Dialogues. This movement is analogous to the con­ stitution. This idealization. problems of this particular sort immediately awaken the total problem of the universal historicity of the correlative manners of being of humanity and the cultural world and the a priori structure contained in this historicity" . " This field of inquiry has no limits. p. 22 1 . . ( 1 72) . Strictly speaking.106 Jacques Derrida 1 07 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry primordiality only given the Idea of an infinite history . breaks down into a sort of oneiric and inhuman absurdity. 765 . in order that science not decay into a "tradition emptied of sense. in a certain sense its infinitization'" ( 1 68) . the clarifying investigations. 220-22. . At the present juncture. as we suspect. The capacity of reactivation must then be transmitted. Dorion Cairns suggests the fol lowing : i n sight. this is our situation. within the historical horizon in which everything is historical. Derrida translates Einsicht by " evi­ dence rationnelle . this movement is analogous to the production of geometry' s exactitude : the passage to the infinite limit of a finite and qualitative sensible intuition. The phenomenological status of its evidence remains rather mysterious . " In this he follows. the rational transparency of its insightful evi­ dence (Einsichtigkeit). The translation is that of Paul Shorey . as we know . imprisoned in mediacy. " Unfortunately . the chances for such a transmission decrease until the day when the ability happens to fail. which has for its correlate an infinite Idea. even here it is geometrical idealization which permits infinitizing the reac­ tivative ability. But then the very logicality of the scientific gestures. i. p. With respect to other sciences. e videntness. Working in the diaphanousness of pure ideality. Did not Plato describe this situation? Was not the eternity of essences for him perhaps only another name for a nonempirical historicity? "Geometry and the studies [sciences ] that accompany if ' are exiled far from their fundamental intuitions. VIII Cf. . for example .e. . " I n h is Guide for Translating Husserl. as with respect to the world of presci­ entific culture. they seem to us to dream (oromen os oneirottousi) (Republic VII. of the constitution of the alter ego by an irreducibly mediate intentionality). other returns to their origins are therefore prescribed. " As long as lI S . Husserl recalls their exemplary and fully "historical" character (in the sense of Historie ) : " Everywhere the problems. \ 06). 1l6 The return inquiry is therefore urgent: through us and for us it will reawaken science to its primordial sense. the removal of limits from our capac­ ity . .

we know a priori that every cultural present. " "historical explanation. every intrascientific explication. is f mentally mistaken [is fundamentally turned upside down: Derrida 's translation ]. On the contrary. the unconditioned and apodictic structures. it is to open oneself to the sense of historicity. Certainly. its order. at least. this time directed against histori­ cism rather than empirical history.108 Jacques Derrida 109 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry After having opened his question about geometry to its broadest horizon. on the one hand. This leads us to the second riposte. therefore every scientific present. implicates in its totality the totality of the past. unless one inadmissibly limits. its a priori . such as Husserl means to describe them. 117 actual history. he attacked empiricism and external history He now rejects it because it misconstrues its own style of historical investigation. as Husserl clearly states. in the usual way. the unitary ground of history. ethnologism sets the abundant mUltiplicity of testimonies attesting that each people. it is a question. concerning the origin of science and geometry in particular. All habitual factual history "remains incomprehensible" ( 1 74) as long as these a priori have not been expli­ cated and as long as factual history has not adapted its method to the notion of intrinsic history. what is fundamentally mistaken is the limitation through which precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of history are concealed. p p . 84-86. " and "genesis. and in curiously similar terms. presuppose the structure of the universal horizon and the a priori of history that Husserl designates . with an admirable fidelity. the first would proceed from a standard epistemologism for which the return to primordial evidence and to its instituting con­ cepts is an indispensable task. seems to have a more ethno­ sociological. Is it useful to recall that never has it been a question of returning to Thales or the factual beginnings of geometry? But to renounce factual history is not at all to cut oneself off from history in general. The confrontation of this text with that of the Origin can be remarkably illuminating as to the sense and fidelity of Husserl ' s itinerary. despite affinities connecting it to Dilthey's theory of the Weltanschauung. over against the universal a priori. The illusion of history can be given to this first objection only by verbal or symbolic allusions to some " undiscoverable" [ 1 72] but hardly mythical Thales . its history. As the Absolute unchangeable in itself of the Living Present in whic� it is grounded. each tribe. an experi­ ence which itself is grounded in the Living Present of egological consciou sness. But there is nothing historical to that. H usserl emphasizes in a footnote [ 1 74] that all of intrinsic hi story passe s through the intrinsic history of the totality of individual persons. The schema of this criticism is anal­ ogous to that which underlies "Philosophy as Rigorous Science. is at the same time ' ' his­ torical disclosure" [ 1 73] . the concepts of "history. even humanistic-psychological unda­ explanation. but before coming back to the determined origin of that sci­ ence. to the universal Apriori of hIstory. the objection that he pretends to address here . each human group has its world. Moreover. Husserl himself had handled this classic objection when.117 The ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemo­ logical elucidation and historical. every return to first axioms. The unity of this unceasing totalization which is always brought about in the form of the historic Present (the " Primordial in itself" [Primordial e� soiD leads us. on the contrary. In effect. And in a sentence whose stress. Every particular historical investigation must de jure note its more or less immediate dependence on that insight into apodictic principles [evidence absolument principielle ] . And here what Husserl wants to wrest from historical relativism is less the truth or ideal norms of sci­ ence and philosophy than the a priori of historical science itself. to the notion of the intentional history of sense. " But the historicism Husserl now attacks. To investigate the sense of a science as tradition and as cultural form is to investigate the sense of its complete historicity . From this fact. which is as internal and nonempirical as possible. a more modern style. its logic . 1 1 8 The historic Present is the historical Absolute­ " the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving (des Miteinander und Ineinander) of primordial formations and sedi­ mentations of sense (Sinnbildllllg [lind Sinnsedimentierllng ] ) " ( 1 74 [modified]) . between epistemological and genetic origin . Husserl specifies ( 1 72-73) : . contrasts with that of his early phenomenology (but which only confirms and deepens. " Or rather. Husserl responds (as a sort of complementary clarification) to two diametrically opposed methodological objections. . these prel IS Naturally. to primordial evidences and instituting concepts. §25. these unimpeachable testimonies do not be­ lie but. of the historic Present in general as the ultimate universal form of every possible historical ex perience. Now . if correctly inquired of. the initial distrust with regard to conventional history). will b e found a long piissage i n which Husserl develops on his own. Whatever our ignorance on the subject of I n Ideas I . the historic Present is at first sight only the ir­ redUCIble and pure place and movement of that totalization and that traditionalization .

It suffices. On the other hand. p. In order to be able "to establish" facts as facts of history. In order for the ethnological ' 'fact" to appear. Husserl seems to admit that the facts go beyond what we imagine and that this point bears a real significance. of a universal language. . " However strange to each other two men may be. " Philosophy and the Crisis of European H u manity .. On the contrary. within the horizon of a history . social structure. and so forth are. who live in certain historical traditions. tradition. The part devoted to re­ lativism in the celebrated Letter to Levy-Bruhl can be interpreted in this way .. of the invariants of history that language. is powerless to ground. the thinker who wishes 1 20 Is it necessary to underscore that the question here is not that of a criticism of h istorical or socio-ethnological science as such ? H usserl simply wants to cal l the problem back to its presupposition s . 296. " Phenomenology and the S ciences of Man . [A great deal of this letter i s available i n Merleau-Ponty' s articles cited beiow . by itself alone and as such. also. that Husserl renounced the historical a priori discovered by imaginary variation and recognized that the pure phenomenology of history had to expect something other than exam­ ples from the content of the empirical sciences. we need not first enter into some kind of critical discussion of the facts set out by historicism. left to itself. the ultimate reference for all factual history. can be determined as certain historical facts only if something like historical truth is determinable in general. The ethnologist must be sure . From that letter. written a year earlier than the Origin. that other men also necessarily live within a community of language and tradition. 1 29. they always are understandable-at the limit-in the commonality of their Living Present in which the historic Present is rooted. at times has been. Thu s every problem of historical facts involves historical invariants the very moment the problem authorizes a certain relativism. to respect those articulations and the complicated hierarchy which submits more or less determined material a priori to the apriori form of universal historicity. This form also seems to be the final retrenchment. " in Signs. Phenomenology . pp .] H e insists v igorously on the fact that the rights of relativ ism thu s understood are preserved and " conserved" by " the i ntentional analysis" of transcendental phenomenology. it is enough that the claim of their factuality already pre­ supposes the historical a priori if this claim is to have any sense" ( 1 76 [modified]) . the most different "other. " p. "The Philosopher and Sociology . we must always already know what history is and under what conditions­ concrete conditions-it is possible. 1 93 5 . two men or two groups of men must have been able to be understood starting from the possibilities. then. The same interpretation is presented in Merleau-Ponty ' s article . We must already be engaged in a precomprehension of historicity. ethnological communication must al­ ready be started within the horizon of universal humanity . This precaution had been formulated as an hommage to history as human science in " PRS . this in no way affects the commonalty of their form. moreover. See note s 1 22-1 2 5-tr. . community. " pp. provided its level of materiality and its apriori conditions are appropriately determined. " in C. also. which alone can bring them to light as such . 98. taken up by the researchers themsel ves with various de­ grees of e xplication. i . This is notably the reading that Merleau-Ponty proposed: "In a letter to Levy-Bruhl which has been preserved. however poor. of every phenomenological reduction.1 ] 3 . 1�1 Letter of March I I . [Husserl] saw that it is perhaps not possible for u s.. is supposed by all being-together. 121 we might th ink. 1 20 The latter retains all its value. Cf. e . 122 . of what all that means in general . It is as if the imagination. on the contrary . This universal form. which is the most primordial and concrete lived experience. ." which are thus invoked to support this relativism. the "facts. . sure. That each of their fundamental Presents is. materially determined by its insertion within the factual content of a tradition. . In the ultimate recourse. " 1 22 Or again: instant [instance ] Historical relativism is now no longer dominated at one stroke by a mode of thought which would have all the keys of history and would be in a position to draw up a table of all historical possibles be fore any factual experimental inquiry. ethnology in particular. language. apodictically. to conceive of the historical possibility of these primitive men by a mere variation of our imagination. 1 1 \1 rity. and so forth. 110 Jacques Derrida 1 11 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry � .. and that I could always come to terms in this Present with the most distant. 11 9 Ranke' s " ' how it really was' " [ 1 76]. " Accordingly. 90-9 1 . i ' � i suppositions only cause singular and determined a priori to be articu­ lated therein. it is necessary to know that the historic Present in general-the irreduci­ ble form of every historical experience-is the ground of all historicity. H u sserl there speaks notably of the " indubitable legiti­ macy" that " historical relativism" involves "as anthropological fact" (our emphasis) and of the possible and necessary task of a comprehensive Einfiihlung with respect to primitive societies that are " without h istory" (geschichtlos) . presupposes as its horizon a historical determinability that every empirical science. is unable to repre­ sent the possibilities of existence which are realized in different cul­ tures . that each does not have the same sense-content. In this ultimate juridical is announced the most radical unity of the world. therefore the most responsible secuSome analogous developments will be found in the V ienna Lecture.

Merleau-Ponty writes: " H ere he [H usserl] seems to admit t at the philosopher ou ld not pos s bly have immediate access to the universal by reflec­ . In the eyes of Husserl. for 123 1 24 Huss�rl. 92. and so forth) . Nevertheless. pp. Here �gain. . i. . . Thereby we have removed every bond to the factually valid historical world and h��� :eg. " 12 5 . the factual possibto epoch . thI. it seemsany ical possib les before " keys of history" or as a " table of all histor al factual experi mental inquiry . Husserl undou btedly though t that all of history ' s determ ined possib les had to conform to the apriori essenc es of historicity concerning every possib le cultur e. " a rupture by wh ich . . and know that we have . In order to attam thiS sense of every civilization or every experience. A lways commentlfl on the same letter. �o dou ? t.a� the latter is explicitly and frequently prescribed in the O�lgm. all the facts. I would discover in what way they are also exper�enc�s and civilizations. tIon alone-that he s m no posItIon to do without anthropological experience or to ons ruct wha c nstItut s the meaning of other experiences and civ ilizations by a purely Imagmary varIatIon of hIS own experiences" (p. every possib le tradition.1 13 1 12 Jacques Derrida Introduction to the Origin of Geometry to dominate history in this way must learn from the f acts and must enter into them . . Colin Smith ( N e w York: . metho�o!ogically and juridically first. nor of "construct[ing] what makes sense of other expenences and civilizations by a purely imaginary variation of [one' s] own experiences . But never did he dream to foresee . . r Ibid. culture.�rded this world itself merely as one of the conceptual pos­ SIbIlIties ( 1 77) . Thus. 49) . " The historical a priori to which he had . an essentially general set of elements gomg through all the variants . realized in such and such a societ y. if it does this. 124 it simply de jure preced es every material historicalian the reveal to the histor tigation and has no need of facts as such to apriori sense of his activity and object s. a . th. Therefore. if that signifi es that eidetic intuiti on will have to be abandoned-even provis ionally-and facts used otherwise than as examples in an imaginary variation. 9 1 -92 [modified] . this techni que has never. continues to have its final importance . philosophy. . the techni que even has the privile ge of being able to work on only one of those possib les in an exemplary consc iousne ss [conscience d' exemple ] . H umaflltle Pre ss. � � � � � � ? � � � � � � � � � �� � � . as more and more .er�ences. If t�e d�s�ov�ry of the apriori structures and the invariants of univer­ sal hIstOrICIty IS. had the missio n of "dispens[ing ] with factual historical investigation " the or at least. " And since history and the h istoricial pos­ ent the mater and sibles about which Merleau-ponty speak s repres le determ ined content of historical modifi cation s (i. Ibid. t Cltly [ break n ] Wlt the ph ilosophy of essences . by some e idetic deduction. is that to " learn from the facts" ? Not any more. . and first to Husserl-about each real society' s or each real historical moment' s own specific character proposed for the s�ciologist's or historian' s activity . And precisely in this activity of free :ranahon. in thought and phantasy. and not how they are diffe ­ ent. with apodictic self-evidence.: ntmg that can be considered one of Husserl' s last. . 1 25 Mer eau-Ponty. But it must begin by understanding all lived experiences. all the particular possibles which must conform to these a priori of unive rsal historicity . as a matter of fact) were nev