The Past and Present Society

Rome and the Class Struggle in the Greek States 200-146 B. C. Author(s): John Briscoe Source: Past & Present, No. 36 (Apr., 1967), pp. 3-20 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649912 Accessed: 19/11/2010 03:24
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ROME AND THE CLASS Sl RUGGLE IN THE GREEKSTATES200-146B.C.
CLASS DIVISIONS IN THE GREEKWORLD WERE EXTREMELY CLEAR-CUT.

The distribution wealth was very uneven, and it is possibleto of speakof two partiesin everystate,the rich andthe poor,the few and the many. These descriptionsare common in ancient writers. 1 Therewere,no doubt,thosewho did not fit easilyinto eithercategory but the schematismis far more fruitfulthan many modernones. Strife betweenthese two classeswas a continualfeatureof Greek history,and changesof constitution werethe symptomof the victory of one or otherof the classes. Oligarchy the ascendancy the was of rich, democracy the poor. of The classstrugglein the Greekstates,however,was by no means a purely internalmatterfor the states concerned;it also affected relationsbetween states. In the fifth centurythe democratshad lookedprincipally Athens for support,the oligarchsto Sparta.2 to In the fourth centuryPhilip II of Macedonsupportedthe upper classes,and this continued be the policyof the rulersof Macedon to down to AntigonusDoson. The policy was reversedby Philip V, who cameto the throneof Macedon 22I B.C. He is knownto have in encouraged strifeandto haveattempted woopopular civil to favourby wearing common dress and portrayinghimself as a man of the people.3 In 200 B.C. Rome went to war with Philip, and there followedthe seriesof warsthatled to Rome'scomplete domination of the Mediterranean area. Rome'spolicy in this periodtowardsthe rivalfactionsin the Greekstatesis the subjectof this paper. It will be convenient firstto summarize eventsof these years. the In 200 B.C. Rome declaredwar on Macedon)ostensiblyto force Philip to cease his attackson other Greekstates;in fact Rome had seen the growingpower of Macedonand was afraidthat Philip, either by himself or in conjunctionwith Antiochus,the king of Syria, would invade Italy and threatenRome's dominationof the
1 One thinks particularly of the famous passage in Thucydides, iii. 82-3. There are innumerablereferencesin Aristotle's Politics. 2 Cf. pp. I9-20 below. 3 Cf. Polybius (hereinafterreferred to as Pol.), vii. II. I0, I2. 9, I3. 6-7, I4. 2-5, X. 26; Livy, xxvii. 3I. 3, XXXii. 2I. 3; Plutarch,Aratus,xtix. 2 ff.

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peninsula. Philip was defeated by Titus Quinctius Flamininus at the battle of Cynoscephalaein I97 and forced to evacuate all his possessions outside Macedon itself. He was, however, left his kingdom and became an ally of Rome. The Roman senate issued a famous declaration, proclaiming Greece to be completely free, without garrisons or tribute - though three of Philip's chief garrison towns continued to be occupied by Roman troops until I94. In I95 Flamininus freed the city of Argos from the domination of Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta. Meanwhile Rome had been troubled by the aggressions of Antiochus of Syria. He had advanced along the coast of Asia Minor in I97, and by I96 had crossed the Hellespont. Negotiations with him produced no solution. Before long Roman troops were back in Greece; the Aetolians were dissatisfied with the settlement made after the defeat of Philip and called in Antiochus to "free" Greece from Roman control. Antiochus arrived inadequately prepared and was defeated in I9I at the battle of Thermopylae. He retreated to Asia and was again defeated at Magnesia in I90. The peace settlement imposed by Rome drove Antiochus back beyond the Taurus mountains, and gave large parts of Asia Minor to Rhodes and Pergamum, Rome's chief allies amongst the Greeks. In the I80S Rome had to deal with renewed expansionist moves by Philip and with a complex series of problems in the Peloponnese. In I79 Philip died and was succeeded by his son Perseus. The latter embarked on a policy of retrenchment at home and of renewing friendly relations with other Greek states. Spurred on by reports that Perseus was making military preparationsfor a new war against Rome, the Romans declared war on Macedon. Perseus was defeated at Pydna in I68 and the Macedonian monarchy was dismembered. Rome was now undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean. In the next twenty years she was occupied with various disputes in different parts of the Greek world. Military intervention was avoided until the senate decided that the last remaining independent power of any size, the Achaean League, should be destroyed. Rome went to war in I47; the next year the Achaeans were defeated, the League dismembered and the city of Corinth razed to the ground. II Rome was governed by an oligarchy. The people as a whole chose the magistrates,but they were organizedfor this purpose in assemblies which gave a dominant influence to men of wealth. The important political decisions were made by the senate, a body which was

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200- I 46 B. C.

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composed largely ex-magistrates, oncetheybecamemembers, of who, remainedso for life. Rome's dominationof the Italianpeninsula reliedto a largeextenton her supportfromthe upperclassesin the allied states of Italy.4 The naturalsympathiesof the senatorial government could thus be expectedto be on the side of the upper classesin the Greek cities. And since Philip V was courtingthe masses,Rome mightwell feel that supportfor the rich was a useful weaponin winningthe war. Contrariwise, upperclassesin the the Greekstatescouldnaturally expected lookto Romefor support. be to It was Fustel de Coulangeswho first expoundedthe view that Rome consistently supported upper-class the elementsin the Greek states. Indeedhe sawthe existenceof the classstruggle Greeceas in the chief reason for Rome's eventualdominationof the Greeks.5 This view, acceptedby many later scholars,6was challerlged by Passeriniwho arguedthat Romanpolicy towardsthe Greekstates could not be correlated with a predilection favourof the upper in classes. 7 It is easy enough to find prima facie evidencefor the theory of Fustel de Coulanges. In I97, for example,the men of Opouswere divided into two factions. One called in the Aetolians"but the richerfactionshut out the Aetolians, sendinga messenger the and to Romancommander, held the city until he came".8 Aetoliaat this time was an ally of Rome,but her constitution democratic,9 was and
4 On the Roman constitution cf. P. A. Brunt, "The Roman Mob", Past and Present,no. 35 (December, I966), pp. 4-8. On Italy cf. A. H. McDonald, "Scipio Africanus and Roman Politics in the Second Century B.C.", iI. Rom. Stud. XXXiV (I944), pp. II-33; E. Badian, ForeignClientelae(264-70 B.C.) (Oxford I958), p. I47; P. A. Brunt, "Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War", 71 Rom. Stud., lv (I965), p. 92. 5 Fustel de Coulanges, Questions Historiques (Paris, I893), pp. I2I-2II. 6 G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani, iv, I (Turin, I923), p. 98 * F. W. Walbank Philip V of Macedon(Cambridge)I940), p. 65 * Badian,ForeignClientelae, 78 p. and "Rome and Antiochus the Great: a Study in Cold War", Class. Phil., xlv (I958), p. 93 (= Studiesin Greekand RomanHistory [Oxford, I964], p. I29)A. Aymard, "L'organisationde la Macedoine en I67 et le regime representatif dans le monde grec", Class. Phil., xlv (I950), p. I00 M. Holleaux, Rome,la Grece et les monarchieshellenistiques(Paris, I92I), pp. 228 ff. Holleaux is rathermore cautious in Cambridge AncientHistory,viii (Cambridge,I930), p.

7 "I moti politico-sociali della Grecia e i Romani", Athenaeum, new ser., xi (I933), pp. 309-35. Passerini'sview was accepted by M. I. Rostovtzeff, Social and EconomicHistory of the Hellenistic World(Oxford, I94I), pp. 6II-2 and I460 n. I4, and, apparently, by P. Meloni, Perseo e la fine della monarchia macedone (Cagliari, I953), p. 254 n. 2. 8 Livy, xxxii. 32. 2-3. 9 Cf. n. 20 below.

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it wasnot longbeforeshe became Rome'sleadingopponent Greece. in In I94 Flamininus reorganized Thessalyon timocratic lines:
the states were in complete chaos and confusion and had to be brought into some reasonablemethod of government.... Flamininus chose the senate and the judgesmainly on the basis of wealth and gave the greatestinfluenceto that element in the states which found it to their advantagethat everything should remainpeacefuland undisturbed. 10 In I92, Livy tells us, the massof the peoplelookedto Antiochusto

save them from Romandomination, whilethe upperclasseswereon the side of Rome. "The masseswere eagerfor changeand entirely on the side of Antiochus'';l and"it wasevidentto allthatthe leading l men and the aristocracy were in favourof the Romanallianceand werecontentwiththe existingsituation, whilethe multitude those and whose affairswere not all they could desire were in favour of a completechange''.l2 In I90 the Phocaeans similarly divided:"some were tryingto swaythe mindsof the massesin favourof Antiochus . . . but the senateandthe upperclasseswereof the opinionthatthey should remainloyal to Rome''.l3 The same divisionof opinionis foundin the yearspreceding warwith Perseus:"the sympathies the of a largeproportion ofthe peoplewereon his side''l4and"themasses everywhere,as usually happens, were on the worse side, being inclinedtowards Perseusandthe Macedonians''.l5Finallyone may note the actionsof L. Mummiusafterthe defeatof the Achaeans in I46: "he dissolveddemocracies, established and magistrates elected on the basisof wealth". 16 III This list of evidence,however,is by no meansthe whole story. There are a number of instanceswhere Rome did not give her supportto the right-wingelementsin the Greek states, and any accountof Romanpolicy must explainthese.l7 Livy, xxxiv. 5I 4-6 11 Livy,xxxv. I 33. 12 Livy, xxxv. 34 3 3 Livy, xxxvii. g; cf. Pol., xxi. 6. 14 Livy, xlii. 5. I. 15 Livy, xlii. 3o. I.
17

6Pausanias,vii. I6. 9. Some of the counter-examples adducedby Passeriniand others are largely based on Livy's use of the word principes. Passeriniassumed that this always meant oprimates, thus, for example, when Ismenias, the leader of the antiand Romanfactionin Aetoliain the I70S, iS describedas a princeps can be assumed he to have been a supporterof the upper classes (Livy, xlii. 38. 5: in 43. 7 he is called nobilisac potens. Cf. Meloni, Perseo,p. I47 n. I.). The assumption is unjustified. Livy uses princepsand principesin non-Roman contexts very frequently(a list will be foundin Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopadie, princeps, s.v. vol. xxii, columns 2004-5) and it is clear that in most cases it means simply "leaders", without implying that they are leaders of the upper-class party. I can find only four passages(Livy, xxxii. 38. 7, xxxv. 34. 3, xlii. 30. I, xlii. 44. 4) where the class meaning is apparent;and the last two of these are dubious, for one must always reckon with the leaders of the people not being in complete accordwith their own followers. See furthern. 63 below.

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I have said it was natural that the upper classes in the Greek states should look to Rome as their natural champion. It was they who particularlywanted to resist Philip's advances, and the latter had tried to gain support among their political opponents. I believe that in the I9OS Rome's natural preference was for oligarchic governmentsother things being equal but she was preparedto take support from whatever source it came, and never dreamed of pressing her ideological predilections to the point where they endangered her own best interests. The two main powers in Greece, Macedon apart, were the great confederations of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. In the First Macedonian War, concurrentwith Rome's struggle against Hannibal, the Achaeans had been allies of Macedon, whilst the Aetolians had been Rome's principal helper.l8 The Aetolians had, however, made a separate peace with Philip in 206, and their alliance with Rome had come to an end. The two Leagues were of very different character. 19 The Achaean League, though nominally democratic, was in fact controlled by men of means. The Aetolian League had a more democratic basis, and it was its leaders Scopas and Dorimachus who were responsible for making the alliance with Rome in 2I2/I.20 In 205/4 Scopas and Dorimachus were given a special commission to enact laws. They proposed the abolition of all debts, but this was successfully resisted by one AlexanderIsius. Scopas and Dorimachus then left Aetolia, Scopas to serve as a mercenary in Egypt.2l Passerini appearsto argue from these event that the Aetolian League in the I90S shifted decisively to the right, and that because the radicals had been friends of Rome, their opponents became her enemies.22 It is true enough that the Aetolians rejected the extreme proposalsof Scopas and Dorimachus, and it is also true that Alexander
18

On the alliance with Rome cf. A. H. McDonald, 1. Rom. Stud., xlvi
ppI53-7.

19For the Achaean League, cf. F. W. Walbank,Commentary PolybSus, on i (Oxford, I956), p. 222- K. von Fritz, The Theoryof the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity(New York, I954), pp. 4 ff. The constitution of the League is most fully discussed by A. Aymard, Les assemblees la confederation de achaienne (Bordeaux,I938). 20 On the Aetolian League, cf. J. A. O. Larsen, Representative Government in GreekandRomanHistory(Berkeleyand Los Angeles, I955), pp. 70-I; Walbank, Commentary PolybSus, 453-4. on pp. It is true that by the end of the third century importantdecisions were taken by a small "inner cabinet", but it was not controlledby men of wealth, and it is misleadingto call it an oligarchy:thus, e.g., F. W. Walbank,Aratusof Sicyon(Cambridge,I933), p. 25. 21 Pol., xiii. I-2. On Scopas'later activities cf. Pol., xv. 25. I6 ff., xvi. 39 ff., xviii. 53-5; Livy, xxxi. 43. 22 Passerini, Op. Cit. (n. 7), pp. 3I9-20. It is not all that relevant that AlexanderIsius was extremelyrich (Pol., xxi. 26. 9).

(I956)5

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Isius was one of the leading Aetolian opponents of Rome in the I9OS. But the Aetolians after 204 were still far more radical than the Achaeans, and it is wrong to think that Aetolia in the I9OS was ruled by an exclusively upper-class government. Aetolia came back into alliance with Rome in I99.23 The Achaeans joined a year later. This decision encountered violent opposition within the Achaean League,24but this does not seem to have had any connection with differences over internal policy. The decision whether to support Rome or Philip was discussed on its own merits. Rome was glad to accept both Achaean and Aetolian support and was not at all concerned with the internal politics of the states who were willing to support her in the war with Macedon. This is made even clearer in the case of Nabis of Sparta. Nabis took to extremes the radical policies advanced in the third century by Agis IV and Cleomenes III and had established an extreme left-wing regime in Sparta. Polybius detested Nabis and all he stood for, and has given us a very lurid picture of his characterand activities:
For he utterly exterminatedthose of the royalhouses who survivedin Sparta, and banishing those citizens who were distinguished for their wealth and illustriousancestry,gavetheir propertyandwives to the chief of his supporters and to his mercenaries,who were for the most part murderers,mutilators, highwaymenand burglars.26

On the evidence of this passage Passerini argued that Nabis was simply a personal tyrant out for his own ends, and not a man with an advanced social programme.26Polybius, however, is not an unbiassed witness. He detested left-wing political movements,27and it is not an unusual method of attacking a policy one does not like to obscure that policy and claim that its exponents are merely evil men working for their own ends. Nabis' own claims may be more significant. These occur in a speech to Flamininus in I95: they are reported by Livy, and though, no doubt, the composition of the speech is Livy's own, the source is Polybius.28 "My title of tyrant and my actions are laid as accusations against me, because I summon slaves to freedom, because I give land to the impoverished masses". And he
23 24

Livy, xxxii. I9 ff. For comments on the policy, cf. Pol., xviii. I3-I5; A. Aymard, "Le fragment de Polybe 'sur les traitres'", Rev. tft. Anc., xlii Pol., xiii. 6, cf. xvi. I3. On Nabis cf. V. Ehrenberg, Real-Encyclopadie, vol. xvi, columns I47I-82. See now B. Shimron, "Nabis of Sparta and the Helots, Class.Phil., lxi (I966), pp. I-7. 26 Op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 3IS-8. 27 Cf. Pol., vi. 43, XX. 5-7; Walbank,Commentary Polybius, on pp. I2-I3. 28 Livy, xxxiv. 3I. II ff. Freeing of slaves also in Pol., xvi. I3. I.
26

Livy,xxxi.4I.
pp. 9-I9.

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compares his policy with that of Rome: "You choose your cavalry on the basis of wealth, and your infantry too; you desire that a few should be pre-eminently rich, and the mass of the people should be subservient to them". We may allow Nabis to have been a genuine, if violent social reformer. His policy towards Rome and Macedon was undoubtedly purely expedient. In I97 Philip offered Nabis the possession of Argos, on condition that if Philip defeated the Romans, Nabis would restore the city to him.29 Nabis occupied the town, and introduced there a social revolution of the same sort that he had instituted at Sparta itself. This achieved, Nabis made a complete volte-face and offered his services to Flamininus.30 Flamininus, despite the objections of Attalus of Pergamum, was only too glad to accept. Once the war with Philip was over, however, Roman policy changed, and in I95 Flamininus went to war to free Argos from Nabis' control. But even this was not a war undertakento rid the Peloponnese of an unwelcome socio-political system. The object was, in part, to free Argos from Nabis in order to weaken the growing power of the Spartanleader, and, secondly, to placate the feelings of Rome's Greek allies. They were not, in the event, very much placated. The peace terms imposed on Nabis by Flamininus left the former in charge of Sparta and did not even go so far as restoring those exiled by Nabis.3l Flamininus did not want to eradicate Nabis because that would have left the Achaean League in virtually complete control of the Peloponnese. His aim was a balance of power, not upper-class constitutional government, and he preferred to tolerate the continued existence of a revolutionary government in Sparta rather than allow the Achaean League excessive power in the Peloponnese. The Achaeans and others were upset by Flamininus' refusal to eradicateNabis.32 They had hoped that Rome's victory would mean the end of a social system they detested and feared. Passerini, consistently with his view that Nabis' regime was simple tyranny and not genuine social revolution, held that the Achaeans were more afraid of Nabis' expansionism than of his social aims.33 This view is scarcely born out by Livy's own words: "As for the Achaeans,
Livy, xxxii. 38 ff. Livy, xxxii. 40. xiii. On the exiles, cf. A. Aymard, 31 Livy, xxxiv. 34; Plutarch,Flamininus, achaienne (Bordeaux,I938), de Lespremiers rapports Romeet de la confederation pp. 24I -4. 32 Livy, xxxiv. 4I. 4 ff., 489 5-6* new ser., xxiii (I945), p. tI8 Passerini is less inclined to 33 At Athenaeum, press this point.
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whatever the restoration Argosto the Leaguebrought joy of them,was rendered incompleteby the fact that Spartaremained enslavedand Nabiswasleft as a thornin theirside".34 Beforethe finalsurrender of Nabis the thoughtsof the allies had clearlybeen directedto the politicalnatureof his regime: "his examplewould incite many in otherstatesto attackthe freedomof theirown citizens".35 Foreign domination, is true,waspartof theirfear,but onlybecause fear it the wasof the exportof revolution. Theirmainconcern the danger was of politicalupheaval their own cities. in Thus Rome was not ourer-concerned the internalpolitics of with the Greekstateswheretherewere other,and moreimportant issues at stake. Wherethis was not so, she felt ableto indulgeher natural preference the upper classes. Flamininus' for behaviour Boeotia in in I96 is an interesting case in point.36 In that yearhe agreedthat those Boeotians who had servedwith Philip shouldbe permitted to returnto Boeotia. Their leaderBrachylles immediately was elected to the chief magistracy. The pro-Roman party,led by Zeuxippus, wantedto murderBrachylles askedfor Flamininus' and permission. Flamininus repliedthat "he himselfwould not take part in such a deed,but he was not standing the way of those who wantedto do in it".3 The murder 7 provoked waveof anti-Roman a feelingin Boeotia and Zeuxippusfled the country. Romansoldiersin Boeotiawere massacred. Flamininus imposed severe punishments the Boeotians on for this outbreak, Zeuxippus not recalled. but was Polybius' wordssuggestthat the pro-Roman partywas upperclass. They complainto Flamininusof "the people's present hostility towards them and the general lack of gratitudeshown by the masses".38It looksas if in this caseFlamininus ableto encourage felt the intriguesof the pro-Roman upperclasses. But even so, he was not willingto takethis encouragement the extentof forcinga whole to peopleinto openopposition, it wasfor thatreasonthathe did not and attempt recallZeuxippus.39 to In I94 the immediate problems been settled,and Flamininus' had actionsshortlybeforehis departure from Greeceindicatehis natural preferences. He made constitutional alterations:
xxxiv. 4I . 4. xxxiv. 33*8 36 Pol., xviii. 43, Livy, xxxiii. 27-g for all this. 37 Pol., xviii. 43- IO. 38 Pol., xviii. 43- 8 39But in I88 he felt safe enough to attempt to recall Zeuxippus and nearly succeeded in causinga war between Boeotiaand Achaea(Pol., xxii. 4).
3 4 Livy, 3 5 Livy,

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200- I 46 B. C.

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madein he spent his time in administeringjusticeandalteringthe arrangments the states by the arbitraryconduct of Philip or his representatives:they had increasedthe power of the supportersof their own faction by deprivingothers of liberty and justice.40

and Whohadbeensuppressed howbecomesclearfromLivy'sfurther remarks. Flamininus advocated concordiabetween the various meant that the lower classes classes of society. This presumably by were to accept government the upper classes. The only place reorganization Thessaly. is wherewe knowthe detailsof Flamininus' There, as we have seen, "the states were in completechaos and method of confusionand had to be broughtinto some reasonable solutionwas to "choosethe senateand government". Flamininus' the judges mainlyon the basis of wealth, and to give the greatest influence to that element in the states which found it to their 41 peaceful undisturbed". and shouldremain advantage everything that It is not completely certain whether Flamininusrestricted the franchise itself to the upperclasses,or merelythe officesof state;or whether he introduceda timocraticassemblymodelledon that of to Rome, whose mainprinciple,according Cicero,was that the will of the majority shouldnot prevail.42 IV Nabis because refusedto eradicate As we have seen, Flamininus powerof the AchaeanLeague. T}le he was afraidof the increasing to a of samedesireto maintain balance powerappears havemotivated Romanpolicy duringthe long and complexdisputebetweenSparta and the Achaean League in the I80S. In I92 Nabis had been took Sparta into the leaderPhilopoemen murdered the Achaean and AchaeanLeague. Facedwith the invasionof Antiochus,Romewas one attacked of in no positionto object. Then, in I89, the Spartans exiles who, though containing Spartan the the Laconian coast-towns Machanidas, had not been banishedby Nabis or his predecessor in restoredby Philopoemen I92. The matterwas referredto the it that both sides interpreted senatewho gave a reply so ambiguous as favouring their own case. Philopoemenproceeded to force Sparta to dismantleher walls, recall the exiles and abolish the Lycurganconstitution.43The senate by no means welcomedthis
Livy, xxxiv. 48. 2. Livy, xxxiv. SI. 4-6. 42Cicero, De re publica,ii. 39. On whether or not there was a full assembly in Thessaly, cf. Aymard,op. cit. (n. 6), p. I05. xvi; 43 Livy, xxxviii. 30-4, Pol., xxi. 32, cf. xxii. 3. 7; Plutarch, Philopoemen, Pausanias,viii. 5I. 3.
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rightwards move in Sparta. In I87 some Spartansbroughtcomplaintsto the senate about Philopoemen's actions,and the consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus,wroteto the Achaeans criticizing theirconduct. Meanwhile Philopoemen despatched embassyto Rome, and had an this returnedin I85 to reportthat the senate was displeasedwith whathad happened, thoughthey werenot takingany action.44 The senate now instructed Q. Caecilius Metellus to investigate the situation. NVhen Metellus arrived the pro-Roman Diophanes attackedPllilopoemen's handlingof both Spartanand Messenian aSairs,but Philopoemen and his supportersArchonand Lycortas defendedtheir policy. As before,the differentfactionswithin the Achaean Leagueseemto havehad no relationto class-divisions. Metellus asked for a special assemblyto be convened,but was refusedon the grounds it wasillegalfor the Achaeans summon that to an assemblyin such circumstances unlessthey had receivedwritten instructions from the senate. There are reasonsfor thinkingthat Philopoemen his friendswererather and twistingthe senseof the law involved, the senatehardly but clarified matters when,afterdiscussing the rebuff Metellus, toldthe Achaeans givethe sameconsiderato it to tion to Roman envoys as Rome did to the representatives the of AchaeanLeague.45 In I84 Areus and Alcibiades,describedas representatives the of "old exiles", disputedwith the Achaeansbefore the senate. The "oldexiles"areclearly thoseexiledby the tyrants restored I89. and in In the followingyear,however,we find the "old exiles"dividedinto twogroups. Onesection,led by Lysis,wanted complete restitution of the exiles'property; other,led by AreusandAlcibiades, the proposed that only a portion of the propertyshould be restored. They, it seems,were willingto countenance some redistribution wealth.46 of The result of the missionof Areus and Alcibiadeswas that the senateinstructed AppiusClaudius Pulcher investigate situation, to the but before he arrived the Achaeanshad condemnedAreus and Alcibiadesto death for undertaking embassyto Rome on their an own account.47 When Appius arrived,a long debateensued, and
Pol., xxii. 7. 7; Diodorus, xxix. I7. Pol., xxii. I0. On the legal issues involved, cf. Aymard,Les assembletes la de confe'de'ration achaienne,pp. I88-204. The law probably said that a synkletos was to be calledif writteninstructionscamefrom the senate. It was interpreted to mean that it could not be held if there were no such instructions. For the senate's rebuke,cf. Pol., xxii. I2. I0, Livy, xxxix. 33. 8. 46 Pol., xxii. II-I2 for the dispute before the senate in I84. On the politicS position of Areus and Alcibiades, cf. B. Niese, Geschichte griechischen der und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlachtbei Chaeronea, (Gotha, I903), p. 42 iii n 4, 4947 Livy, xxxix. 35. 8; Pausanias,vii. 9. 2.
44 45

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Appius appears to have threatened the use of force. Eventually the Achaeans agreed to repeal the sentence on Areus and Alcibiades, but asked the Romans themselves to be responsible for any changes they wished to institute in Sparta.48 The matter was thus referred back to the senate who found themselves faced with a situation more complicatedthan ever. Spartawas now representedby four different groups of ambassadors. There were the two sections of the <'old exiles" whom I have already mentioned, there was Serippus who wanted the existing situation to continue, and there was Charon who representing the CCdemocrats" had been exiled in I92 or I89.49 The senate, flounderingin the confusion, appointed a committee of experts to deal with the matter: Flamininus, Metellus and Appius Claudius.50 Eventually an agreementwas reached among the various Spartan groups that the exiles were to return and the city was to remain part of the Achaean League, but no agreement was forthcoming on the question of the restitution of property and what this involved, the social and economic policy that Sparta was to follow. With some difficulty the Achaean representatives were persuaded to add their seals to this outline settlement. Q. Marcius Philippus was sent out to administer the settlement. About this time, it seems, some of the "old exiles" were again exiled.5l When Philippus arrived both Sparta and Messene were on the point of revolting from the Achaean League. Messene in fact did so, and in the resulting war Philopoemen was killed.52 Philippus appears to have done his best to embroil both Sparta and Messene with the League; on his return to Rome, he reported to the senate that if the Achaeans continued with their present independent and arrogantpolicy, it would not be surprising if Sparta joined Messene n revolt. Spartan ambassadorswere again present in Rome, and to these the senate replied that it did not think that their present dispute with the Achaeans was any concern of Rome. This ambiguous reply53 suggested rebellion to Spartawhilst to the Achaeans it suggested that, although Rome had no sympathy for the Achaean case, she was not
. <

Pol., xxii. 2; Livy, xxxix. 33, 35-7; Pausanias,vii. 9. 4. Pol., xxiii. 4. The senate and Livy (xxxix. 48. 2-4) were at one in their inability to unravelthe confusion. 50 Appius has to be added in Polybius. 0l Pol., xxiii. 5. I8, 6, 9. I, I8. 4. (I964), 52 For these events and Philippus' part in them cf. yl. Rom. Stud., liv pp. 66-7. Death of Philopoemen: Pol., xxiii. I2; Livy, xxxix. 48. 5 ff. i xviii; Justin, xxxii. I. 4 - Pausanias,viii. 5I. 5. Plutarch,Philopoemen, consulta,cf. p. II above and p. I7 below. 53 For other ambiguoussenatus
48 49

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much concerned with what happened. Soon afterthis Spartadid secedefromthe League. 54 By I82 Lycortashad recovered both Messeneand Sparta,55 and some of the exilesreturned Sparta.56 Charon foundin Sparta to is shortlyafterthis,57and it seemsto followthat the exiles of I92 and I89 musthavebeen recalled accordance in with the agreement made in I83, andthatit is a sectionof the "oldexiles"whoformthe subject of further disputes between the Achaeansand the senate. A 58 senatorial instruction I8I ordering in theirreturnwas ignored59 and in I80 Lycortaswas still sure that the senatewould not enforceits decision. Ambassadors sentto Rome)but one of theirnumber, were Callicrates, insteadof defending Achaea,told the senatethat if they wantedtheir will respected,they must give positivesupportto the pro-Romans the Greekstates.60 The senateagreed,expressed in its view clearly,and the exilesreturned. The issues between Spartaand Achaeawere complex,but they were very cIosely connectedwith decisions about the social and political constitutionof Sparta. The senate, however, did not concern itself with these questions. Rome's policy had been to createdivisions withinthe Leagueandto use ambiguous repliesand veiled threats to keep the Achaeansin a state of suspicion and uncertainty. And, as we can see, even the right-winggroups in Spartacouldquarrel with Achaea. As in the previousdecadeRome saw her main interestas being the preservation the balanceof of powerin the Peloponnese. The internalstructure Spartawas of of little concern her. to
V

Polybius regarded speechof Callicrates Romeas beingof the the at greatestimportance.6l He took the view that before I80 Rome dealt with the Achaeanson equal terms whilst after that date the senategaveactivesupport hertoadies get herwillenforced. The to to judgementseems too extreme-as we have seen Rome's attitude beforex80 wasnowhere nearas open andhonestas Polybiusappears
54 Cf. Pol., xxiii. I7 I; Niese, Gesehichre der griechischen makedonisehen lmd Staaten, iii, p. 49 n. 3. 5 5 Pol., xxiii. I 6- I 7 56 Pol., xxiii. I8. I-2. 57 Pol., xxiii. I8. 4, 24* 768 Cf. Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, edn., no. 634, where Callicrates 3rd is honouredfor securingthe restitutionof the "old exiles". 59Pol., xxiv. 2. Pausanias,vii. 9. 5-6 is quite unintelligible. 6? Pol., xxiv. 8. 8 ff. 61 Pol., xxiv. IO. Cf. Badian,PoreignClientelae, 9I. p.

ROME AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE200-I46

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stiffenedthe to have believed. It is true, however,that Callicrates to senate'sdetermination enforceits will by showingthat therewere people in Greece who would get its wishes obeyed. And in the in followingyearsthe senatedid give activesupportto pro-Romans clearly in the years the Greek states. This is seen particularly in War. Charops Epirus,Lyciscus followingthe ThirdMacedonian in in and in Aetolia,Chremas Acarnania Mnasippus Boeotiawereall wereexiled. Polybius' givensupportby Rome,andtheiropponents that to description thesemenappears indicate theywereproponents of by policyexercised Nabis. It is doubtfulif of the sort of tyrannical with Lycortasand the same is true of Callicrates. His differences Polybiusseem to have been simply about the attitudeto be taken with the internalpolicy of towardsRome, and were not concerned the AchaeanLeague.62 But the senate'spolicy after the defeat of Polybiusthe Perseuswas ruthless:one thousandsuspectAchaeans, to most famousof them, weredeported Italy. as Onceagainthe senatelookedto whatshe now regarded her own of interest the elimination her politicalopponentsin the Greek of of statesand the vigorouschampioning her friends- irrespective their internal policies. Previouslyshe had refused to eradicate them. supported popular regimes;now she went furtherandactually to The natureof the regimein eachstatedepended a greatextenton the attitudeswhichthe variousgroupsor partieshad takentowards War. It seemsthatin Perseusat the time of the ThirdMacedonian towards were, at the least, lukewarm manystates the conservatives to tookthe opportunity supportRome Romeandthattheiropponents 63 powerforthemselves. andgainpolitical VI exiles were at last permittedto returrlin I50.64 The Achaean There followedin a short while the Achaeanwar which led to the of Leaguein destruction Corinthand the dissolution the Achaean of
62 The evidence of all this is fully set out by Passerini,op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 327 ff. When I speakof Rome's policy I referto that of the senatorialmajority. There are reasons for thinking that a minority disapproved. For the attitude of L. Aemilius Paullus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, cf. Pol., xxxii. 6- see also il. Rom Stud., liv ( I 964), p. 75. . 63 Livy (xlii. 30. I) says that the plebswere generallyon Perseus'side, but the principes were divided. But on the ambiguity of principes,cf. n. I7 above. The plebswere no doubt forced to changetheir attitude towardsPerseus by the fact of Roman force. The demagogicleaders may have had some difficultyin convincing their naturalfollowers. For the date, Pausanias,vii. IO. 64 Pol., xxxv. 6 = Plutarch,Cato maior,ix.

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its existing form. The war has appeared to several writers to have been brought about by a newly prominent group of demagogues who felt that they had to outbid the restored exiles in nationalistic and anti-Roman sentiments.65 Examination of the details of the war does not, I think, support this interpretation. The antecedents of the war are complex. In about I 56 Athens had attacked Oropus. Oropus appealed to the senate who asked Sicyon to act as mediator in the matter.fi6 Sicyon imposed a fine of five hundred talents on Athens, and the Athenians sent the heads of the three great Athenian philosophical schools to Rome to plead their case. The senate reduced the fine to one hundred talents. What followed is obscure, but it seems that the Athenians refused to pay the fine, and installed colonists of their own in Oropus. At this point Oropus promised the Spartan Menalcidas ten talents if he would persuade the Achaeans to help her against Athens. Half of this Menalcidas in his turn promised to Callicrates. 67 The Achaeans appear to have been successful in restoring the Oropians to their own land. Menalcidas, however, refused to pay Callicrates who proceeded to accuse him before the Achaeans of working in Rome to separate Sparta from the Achaean League. Menalcidas gave three of his talents to the Achaean Diaeus who helped him to get acquitted on this charge. Menalcidas now made a fresh embassy of his own accord complaining about a boundary dispute.68 The senate replied to Menalcidas that all matters except those involving capital cases were to be dealt with by the Achaean League. Diaeus, now Achaean strategos, was confident that Rome was not interested in Sparta and claimed that the senate had given the federal body jurisdictionin all cases. Sparta was forced by threat of war to condemn to death those whom Diaeus held to be responsible for anti-Achaean actions in Sparta, and in
65G. Niccolini, La confederazione acaea (Pavia, I9I4), p. I82. C5. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 20I ff. 66Pol., XXXii. II, XXXiii. 2; Pausanias, vii. II. 2 ff.; Sylloge Inscriplionum Graecarum, edn., no. 675. The embassy of philosophers: Pol., xxxiii. 2; 3rd Plutarch, Cato maior, xxii; Cicero, Academica,ii. I37; Gellius, vi. I4. 8-I0. The narrativegiven here is that of Pausaniascorrectedto makeit consistentwith Sylloge,3 no. 675. Cf. W. S. Ferguson, HellenisticAthens (London, I9II),
p. 327. 67 Pausanias,vii. II. 7-8 (but cf. preceding note). For the narrativeof the AchaeanWar, see especially G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani,iv, 3 (Florence, I964), pp. I27 ff. Only fragmentsof Polybius' account survive and for most of the detailswe have to rely on Pausanias(vii. I0-I6). 88 Pausanias, vii. I2. 4. This probably refers to the same territory over which there had been a dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis in I64/3 (Pausanias,vii. II. I-3; C5. Pol., xxxi. I8; Sylloge3,no. 665).

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I4869Menalcidas again journeyed to Rome to present his case to the senate. Callicrates and Diaeus were sent to represent the League. The senate despatched ambassadors and instructed them to detach several important states from the League. But the actual reply that it gave in public was so ambiguous that both sides were encouraged to think that their requests had been granted,70 and the Roman ambassadors spent such an inordinate time in reaching Greece that fightillg broke out between Sparta and Achaea, as a result of which Menalcidas committed suicide.71 When the ambassadors arrived they announced that Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea and Orchomenoswere to be detached from the League. There was a riot and the ambassadorswere maltreated.72 Despite this, Rome made strenuous efforts to avoid going to war with the Achaean League. Sex. Julius Caesar, the next Roman ambassador, was instructed to act with moderation. Polybius says that the senate's aim was to humble the Achaeans, not destroy them altogether.73 But the senate did not rescind its decree that the League should be emasculated by the separation of so many of its important members.74 Critolaus, the Achaean strategos, refused to come to an agreement, and war was declared. It is noticeable that Metellus Macedonicus made considerable efforts to persuade the Achaeans not to go to war. Irl I48 he had asked ambassadors on their way to Asia to stop the Achaeans from fighting Sparta.75 Two years later he himself sent four ambassadorsto Achaea, but they met with nothing but abuse.76 The war thus took place, and the Achaean forces, though supported by Boeotia, Euboea, Locris and Phocis, were inevitably defeated.77 Corirlthwas razed to the ground and the Achaean League disbanded.
69 It may be helpful to enumeratethe strategoi the last yearsof the Achaean of League: I5I/0 Menalcidas, I50/49 Diaeus, I49/8 Damocritus, I48/7 Diaeus, I47/6 Critolaus, Diaeus suffectus. ? Cf. above pp. II and I3.
71 PaUsanias, 72 vii.

I3e

Pausanias,vii. I4; cf. Pol., xxxviii. 9. Polybius adds that they exaggerated what had happened. Dio (fr. 72) and Livy (ep. li) are probablytrying to justify Rome's action in saying that the detachedcities were those that had previously belonged to Philip. Other sources: Justin, xxxiv. I-2; Eutropius, iv. I4; Florus, i. 32- Zonaras,1X. 3I. 73 Pol., xxxviii. 9 674 Cf. Niese, Geschichte dergriechischen makedonischen und Staaten,iii, p. 344. 7 5 Pausanias, vii. I3. 2. 7 6 Pol., xviii. I 2- I 3. 77 Achaeanallies: Pausanias vii. I4. 6, cf. ii. I. 2; Pol., xxxviii. 3. 8; Livy, ep. 1ii. For the sources on the war cf. T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates the of RomanRepublic (New York, I95I), i, pp. 465, 467.

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A largepartof Greecebecamean appendage of the Romanprovince of Macedonia. 78 These eventsdo not supportthe view that the returnof the exiles from Rome provoked democratic the partyinto violentanti-Roman feelingin an attemptto outbidrivalsin nationalistic sentiment. In factwe haveno information aboutthe political positionof the various personalities involved. The measures takenby Diaeusafterthe death of Critolaus I46 in the freeingof slavesand forcedcontributioIls fromthe rich79 cannotbe usedas evidence, forthey were measures a time of extremecrisis. The only known desperate in formerexile mentionedis Stratios,who was accused by Critolaus of intriguing with one of the ambassadors by Metellus80secretly sent and who laterbeggedDiaeusto acceptthe termsofferedby Metellusafterthe death Critolaus.8l Earlier of Thearidas, brother Polybius,was the of employed an ambassador the Achaeans, as by perhaps an attempt in toplacateRomanfeeling.82 Thus while we can in generaldistinguish betweenproRomans, is difficultto go much further. Callicrates and antiit is Polybius with Charopsand other demagogues, theirlinkedby but domestic policies may have differedconsiderably. Again Menalcidas was a pro-Roman,83 that did not stop him quarrelling but with Callicrates and ingratiating himselfwith the supposedlyanti-Roman Diaeus.84 And I49 Callicrates Diaeustogetherwere in and meantto represent theAchaeansbeforethe senate in oppositionto Menalcidas.85It looks if complexpersonal as rivalries playeda considerable in the part events precededthe war and the principal that characters fitted into neat categories. It is not the case either cannotbe that Rome attacked Achaean the Leaguebecauseit was showingdangerous leftwing tendenciesor that a new democratic elementattempted put to an to Romandomination end basedon supportof the upperclasses.
78 For the details of the status of romano GreciadallaguerraacaicaGreece after I46, cf. S. Accame, II dominio in ad Augusto(Rome, I946), ch. i and ii. 79Pol., xxxviii. I5. Also postponement of the repayment of debts: Pol., XXXViii. II; Diodorus, xxxii. 26. 3. 80 Pol., xXXViii I3* 4 ff 81 Pol., xxxviii. I7. I4. 82 Pol., xxxviii. IO. I, II; Pausanias,vii. I4. 3. Cf. Pol., xxx. I6. 2. 84 Pausanias,vii. I2. I. De Sanctis (Storia argues Diaeus'fatherwas Diophanes,the dei romani,iv, 3, pp. I29, I 32) that pro-Romanopponentof Philopoemen, that Diaeus himself was originally and pro-Roman. But there is no evidence Diaeus was Diophanes' son - all we that know is that Diophanes' father called Diaeus: and even if he was, he was need not have followed the same policy Diophanes. as 8S Pausanias, vii. I2. 8.

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The senate had decided that its interests were best served by removing the last vestiges of independent action by the Greek states. It was not overwhelmingly concerned with internal politics: it was only after the war that Mummius destroyed the democratic structure such as it was - of the Achaeancities.8 6 VII The picture which emerges from these fifty years is consistent. Rome did not set out with the intention of establishing oligarchic governments in Greece, and she did not have consistent support from the oligarchs and consistent opposition from the democrats. The natural preference of the senate and its representatives was for the upper classes and for forms of government in which the upper classes were dominant. Other things being equal, it was to this end that Roman policy was directed. The activities of Flamininus in Thessaly in I94 are perhaps the best example. But in this turbulent period it is only rarely that other things were equal. Rome's object was to win the wars in which she was engaged and to maintain the control over Greek affairs which her military successes bestowed on her. To this end the senate was glad to accept support from those who were willing to give it to her, irrespective of their position in the internal politics of their own states. She had no scruples in using Nabis against Philip or supporting the demagogues after I67. We have seen, too, that differenceswithin the Greek states concerning the policy to be adopted towards Rome did not necessarilycoincide with differenceson domestic policy. There is nothing very surprising about this. Many upper-class politicians would have been confident that they could maintain their position without Roman protection, and preferred to govern their states in complete independence rather than under Roman control. Others will have seen that Roman domination was inevitable and preferred to be on the winning side. Others, again, were willing to use Roman support as a means of securing their success in political disputes within the upper classes. It is interesting to compare these conclusions with those which emerge from study of the Athenian Empire in the fifth century B.C. Thucydides tells us that in the Peloponnesian War (43I-404 B.C.) the democratic elements in the Greek cities sought help from Athens, their opponents from Sparta.87 In an epoch-making article de Ste Croix has shown that one of the chief reasons for the success of the Athenian Empire was that Athens gave active support to the
8

6 Pausanias,

87

vii. 16. 9. Thucydides, iii. 82. I.

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democraticparties in the allied states.88 The democrats knew that it was only because of Athenian support that they were able to maintain democratic forms of government in their own cities. Athens, as a democracy, had a natural preference for democratic government and this coincided with her self-interest as head of an empire.89 Under the Roman Empire the picture is very different. There was now no question of a struggle for leadership in the Mediterranean world Rome's mastery was unchallenged. It is not surprisingthat under these conditions Rome's natural preferences came to the fore, and that both in Italy and in the provinces it was the richer classes who were dominant. The old senatorial aristocracy,it is true, no longer controlled affairs and men from lower orders could rise and hold positions of influence.90 But the lot of the mass of the people scarcely improved at all. The result of Rome's victory was indeed to stem the tide of democracy and the ultimate victory belonged to the upper classes. But it would be wrong to infer that that was Rome's object from the very beginning.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford

ffohn Briscoe

88 G. E. iii (I954-5),

M. de Ste Croix, "The Character the AthenianEmpire",Historia, of pp. I-40. Cf. id., "Notes on Jurisdictionin the AthenianEmpire", Class. Quart., lv (I96I), pp. 94-II2, 268-80; H. W. Pleket, "Thasos and the Popularity of the Athenian Empire", Historia, xii (I963), pp. 70-77. The objections of D. W. Bradeen, "The Popularity of the Athenian Empire', Historia,ix (I960), pp. 257-69 and T. J. Quinn, "Thucydidesand the Popularity of the AthenianEmpire",Historia,xiii (I964), pp. 257-66 do not seem to me to have invalidatedde Ste Croix's case. 89 We know of a few cases where Athens tolerated oligarchic governments: in each case the oligarchs appear to have either seceded from Athens or murderedor oppressedtheir political opponents. Cf. Xenophon, Atheniensium Respublica, I I, Thucydides, i. I I5. 2-3, iii. 27. 2-3. iii. 90 Cf. K. Hopkins, "Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire", Past and Present, no. 32 (December, I965), pp. I2-26.

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