CASE STUDIES IN OPERATIONS

"The ultimate objective of assaulting costs in the supply chain is not just to effect one-off reductions in the price of components. It is, instead, to set off a chain of continuously falling costs-by mutually discovering ways to do things better without a proportional increase in the rupees poured into the process." - Business Today, January 7, 1999.

Revamping the Supply Chain: The Ashok Leyland Way:Introduction

V Ramachandran, (Ramachandran) deputy general manager, Corporate Buying Cell, Ashok Leyland (AL), the Chennai based manufacturer of medium and heavy commercial vehicles was surfing the Internet at midday in his office. A closer look at the screen showed that he had logged on to an auction site. But this auction site was different. Ramachandran was looking for suppliers of some specific tyres in the global market. At a price of $350, five suppliers were interested. He then lowered the price by $5. Now three of them were willing. Ramachandran kept lowering the price, each time by $5. At $325, there was only one response- the seller asked for an hour's time to confirm. Within one hour, the Czechoslovakian company confirmed it could supply the tyres. Both parties then signed up by e-mail and the deal was struck at $325, saving Ashok Leyland Rs 14,700 per set. Known as reverse auction, this was one of the many ways AL was reducing materials cost, which accounted for nearly 70 per cent of its product cost. In 1997-98, AL, recorded a profit-after-tax (PAT) of Rs. 18.4 crore1 on sales of Rs. 2,014.3 crore. A look at the previous financial year's PAT showed that the profits for 1997-98 had gone for a severe beating. In 1996-97 AL had a PAT of Rs. 124.9 crore on sales of Rs. 2, 482.5 crore. With the manufacturing Industry reeling under recession, the freight generating sectors (manufacturing, mining and quarrying) saw a steep decline resulting in a severe downturn of freight volumes. For AL, whose business was directly dependent on moving material, goods and people across distances, this had come as a severe blow. AL's supply chain2 had gone haywire under the recession which had eaten away 17.62 per cent of its revenues in one year forcing the company to helplessly allow inventories to build up. The results were showing on working capital. It had climbed from 33.34% of sales in 199394 to 58.81% in 1997-98.

'Together We Can' - Beat the Recession

AL did not seem to succumb to the 'uncertainty gloom' that was playing havoc to its business environment. It decided to meet the challenge by re-gearing its systems, be it material order, procurement, material handling, inventory control or production. AL conducted brainstorming sessions inviting ideas on cost cutting. Quality Circle3 teams were

formed for this purpose. Said Thomas T. Abraham, deputy general manager, Corporate Communications, "Our Quality Circle teams were very helpful at this juncture and the worker involvement made it easier to address cost cutting." AL took every employee's ideas into account and figured out a way to keep things going and reduce production without inflicting pain. The recession saw AL waging a war on wastage and inefficiency. AL took many initiatives ranging from tiering its vendor network to reducing the number of vendors, and consequently, moving to a just-in-time (J-I-T)4 ordering system, to joint-improvement programmes (JIP), which were essentially exercises in value-engineering undertaken in association with key vendors. It set up different tier-levels to improve the quality of the suppliers. Tiering formed the basis of the vendor-consolidation drive. Till 1998, Ashok Leyland used to source the 62 components that went into its front-end structure of its trucks and buses, from 16 suppliers. In 2000, one tier-I vendor sourced the products from the other vendors and supplied the assembly to the company. This saved cost and time provided the vendor network was well coordinated with AL's own manufacturing operations. At AL, Vendor Development and Strategic Sourcing were handled by Corporate Materials Department (CMD). CMD identified the vendors, rated the vendors based on feedback received from Supplier Quality Assurance Cell, send drawings/specifications, called for quotes with detailed breakup of operation-wise costs, and negotiated the price at which the parts would be supplied. In addition to CMD, there were Materials Management Departments (MMDs) for scheduling based on unit production plan. AL's purchasing philosophy was to maximize boughtout parts. Over 90% of the parts were bought-out. AL believed in global sourcing. Consistent with its operational needs, AL considered both domestic (Indian) as well as international vendors. Global sourcing was normally resorted to overcome local constraints in the form of technology, quality, capacity or cost effectiveness. AL considered new suppliers for required components, based on Vendors' ability to meet its specification, price and delivery schedules. Vendors were required to have a strong manufacturing base with adequate engineering support for their own product development activities, as needed by the category of product. AL's policy was to develop a vendor base committed to continuous improvement to meet quality, cost and delivery standards. AL considered its vendors as partners in progress and believed in establishing mutually beneficial relationships. It provided necessary technical assistance in the form of project and production engineering, to maintain quality levels. In addition, where required, it also helped vendors financially. AL's Vendors were expected to have a good quality system. Vendors' quality system had to encompass the following: cost effective process, assured process capability, continuous improvements based on customer feedback, compliance of all statutory/legal/commercial requirements of AL, a stage of development where the Vendor could come under AL's self-certification system, and, traceability - first-in first-out.

AL also placed emphasis on optimizing the inventory and vendors were required to progressively meet "Just-in-Time" requirements. Delivery mode as well as packaging were required to minimize the handling/loading and unloading time. AL preferred a manufacturing/assembly/ support base at close proximity to the production units. Commenting on the relationship AL shared with its vendors, J.N. Amrolia, executive director, human resources, said, "The close working relationship with the vendors for vendor development program have benefitted us a lot in cost cutting and making the vendors understand the complexities of material handling." This resulted in low inventories all through the chain. He further added, "We stabilised both the inward material flows as well as the outbound material and that saved us a lot on the inventory." In the late 2000, AL's systems were closer to J-I-T with inventories averaging just seven days, down from three weeks in the late 1990s.

NOTE: 1] 1 Crore =10 million 2] A basic supply chain consists of a company, an immediate supplier, and an immediate customer directly linked by one or more of the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances and information. An extended supply chain includes suppliers of the immediate supplier and customers of the immediate customer and an ultimate supply chain includes all the companies involved and flows of products, services, finances and information from the initial supplier to the ultimate customer. 3] Work group that meets to discuss ways to improve quality and solve production problems. 4] Inventory system in which production quantities are ideally equal to delivery quantities, with materials purchased and finished goods delivered just in time to be used. Also known as Kanban

"Toyota's focus on JIT is a continual problem-solving process (not an inventory reduction plan) illustrates why the automaker is a JIT leader not only in its industry but all of industry." - www.academic.emporia.edu (1998).

Toyota's JIT Revolution: A Legendary Production System

In the mid-1990s, more than fifty executives and engineers from major automobile companies worldwide visited Toyota Motor Company's (Toyota)1 manufacturing complex at Georgetown, US, to study the Toyota Production System (TPS). The visit also included an intensive question and answer session. Even though the visitors were from competing automakers, including Ford and Chrysler, Toyota did not deny them access to the plant.

The TPS aimed to produce world-class, quality automobiles at competitive prices. It was built on two main principles, Just-in-Time (JIT) production and Jidoka.2 JIT was used not only in manufacturing but also in product development, supplier relations and distribution. Analysts remarked that despite imitating Toyota's JIT for many years, no other automaker in the world had been able to make their production systems and processes as efficient as Toyota had done. Analysts felt that though other leading automakers like Mercedes-Benz, Honda and DaimlerChrysler excelled in advanced engineering techniques, engine technology and styling, they did not match Toyota in efficiency, productivity and quality. Executives of rival companies also appreciated Toyota's manufacturing and product development systems. Officials at GM commented, "Toyota is the benchmark in manufacturing and product development." A top executive at Ford said, "Toyota is far ahead in developing markets that the real race is for the second place." Some executives at BMW also considered Toyota the best car company in the world. The early adoption of JIT principles by Toyota seemed to have helped the company achieve significant success. It helped the company respond quickly to changing customer needs and offer high quality products at low costs, thus increasing customer satisfaction. Toyota's history goes back to 1897, when Sakichi Toyoda (Sakichi) diversified into the handloom machinery business from his family traditional business of carpentry. He founded Toyoda Automatic Loom Works (TALW) in 1926 for manufacturing automatic looms. Sakichi invented a loom that stopped automatically when any of the threads snapped. This concept of designing equipment to stop so that defects could be fixed immediately formed the basis of the Toyota Production System (TPS) that went on to become a major factor in the company's success. In 1933, Sakichi established an automobile department within TALW and the first passenger car prototype was developed in 1935. Sakichi's son Kiichiro Toyoda (Kiichiro) convinced him to enter the automobile business. After this the production of Model AA began and Toyota Motor Corporation was established in 1937. Kiichiro visited the Ford Motor Company in Detroit to study the US automotive industry. He saw that an average US worker's production was nine times that of a Japanese worker. He realized that the productivity of the Japanese automobile industry had to be increased if it were to compete globally. Back in Japan, he customized the Ford production system to suit Japanese market. He also devised a system wherein each process in the assembly line of production would produce only the number of parts needed at the next step on the production line, which made

logistics management easier as material was procured according to consumption. This system was referred to as Just-in-Time (JIT) within the Toyota Group. The JIT production was defined as 'producing only necessary units in a necessary quantity at a necessary time resulting in decreased excess inventories and excess workforce, thereby increasing productivity.' Kiichiro realized that by relying solely on the central planning approach, it would be very difficult to implement JIT in all the processes for an automobile. Hence, TPS followed the production flow conversely. People working in one process went to the preceding one to withdraw the necessary units in the necessary quantities at the necessary time. This resulted in the preceding process producing only quantities of units to replace those that had been withdrawn. Toyota flourished during the Second World War by selling trucks and buses to the army and the company launched its first small car (SA Model) in 1947. After the war, the company faced a series of financial problems. A financial support package from a consortium of banks (after the intervention of the Bank of Japan) helped Toyota tide over its problems. The package consisted of a series of steps that included downsizing and restructuring the company into separate manufacturing and sales divisions. As per the revival package, The Toyota Motor Sales Company Ltd. was formed in 1950. In the same year, Kiichiro resigned. By 1952, Toyota made a turnaround and in 1953, the company appointed distributors in El Salvador and Saudi Arabia and started exports. Meanwhile, Taiichi Ohno (Ohno) took charge of the company. In 1957, Toyota entered the US market through its subsidiary, Toyota Motor Sales, USA. In 1959, the company began its first overseas production in Brazil and over the next few years, developed a vast network of overseas plants. Besides manufacturing, Toyota started a global network of design and Research and Development facilities covering the three major car markets of Japan, North America and Europe. By the early 1970s, Toyota's sales exceeded that of Chrysler and Volkswagen and its production was behind that of only General Motors (GM) and Ford. Toyota continued its efforts to make its production system more efficient and also developed flexible manufacturing systems. It also began to tap the markets in the Middle East and by 1974 the Toyota Corolla, (launched in 1965) became the largest selling car in the world. In 1984, Toyota entered into a joint venture with GM and established the New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI). By the early 1990s, as Toyota expanded its overseas operations, the excessive capital spending affected its profit margins. Tatsuro Toyoda (Tatsuro), who took over as the company President in 1992, began to control costs by eliminating all unnecessary expenditure. In 1995, after Tatsuro resigned due to health reasons, Hiroshi Okuda (Okuda) became Toyota president. In 1996, Toyota consolidated its production in North American production units into the Cincinnati based Toyota Motor Manufacturing (North America). In 1999, Okuda replaced chairman Shoichiro Toyoda and Fujio Cho (Cho) became the president. In the same year, Toyota listed its shares on both the New York and London

stock exchanges. By the end of 2001, the company's net income had reached $5,447 million and net revenue reached $106,030 million (Refer Exhibit I for the company's financial performance over the years). According to analysts, Toyota's success in both the local and global markets was mainly because of its state-of-the-art and well-planned operational strategies. The company had continuously focused on gaining a competitive advantage through implementation of innovative and path-breaking ideas on its production floors. TPS worked on the basic idea of maintaining a continuous flow of products in factories in order to flexibly adapt to demand changes. The most important feature of TPS was the way it linked all production activities to real dealer demand through implementation of Kanban, JIT and other quality measures that enabled Toyota to manufacture in low quantities. Developed by the Japanese, the JIT production system was one of the most significant production management approaches of the post World War II era. The system comprised a set of activities aimed at increasing production volume through the optimum use of inventories of raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods. In a JIT production system, a workstation gets a part just in time, completes its work and the part is moved through the system quickly. JIT was based on the principle of producing only what is needed and nothing more than needed. The Japanese believed that anything produced over the quantity required was a waste. Cho defined waste as, "Anything other than the minimum amount of equipment, materials, parts and workers (working time) which are absolutely essential to production." JIT did not allow any surplus as it believed that "effort and material expended for something not needed now cannot be utilized now." (Refer Table I for requirements and assumptions of JIT). Table I Just-In-Time Production System What it does Attacks waste (time, What it is inventory, scrap) Management philosophy Exposes problems and 'Pull' System through the bottlenecks plant Achieves streamlined production What it requires Employee participation Industrial What it assumes engineering/basics Stable environment Continuing improvement Total quality control Small lot sizes Source: Production and Operations Mgmt.: Manufacturing and Services, Chase, Acquilano & Jacobs.

JIT could be applied to any manufacturing environment including job shop, batch production or repetitive production. The ideal lot size as per JIT was one. A worker had to complete one task and pass it on to the next workstation for further processing. If workstations were geographically far away, efforts were made to reduce the transit time. The advantages of JIT included price flexibility, reduction in product variation, quick response to customers' demands, high quality products at low cost for consumers, and above all, customer satisfaction. The system also offered the advantages of low inventory investment, shortened lead times, and early detection of quality problems. In the early 1930s, the technology used by American automobile companies was superior to that used by Japanese companies. Kiichiro therefore decided to learn new automobile production techniques from American manufacturers. He soon realized that to catch up with the Americans, he had to master basic production techniques. He then reorganized the production system in Toyota in a unique way. This reorganization eventually led to the development of JIT concept. In the early 1970s, Taiichi Ohno (Ohno)3 implemented JIT in Toyota's manufacturing plants. The JIT system was aimed at avoiding waste, reducing inventories and increasing production efficiency in order to maintain Toyota's competitive edge. Ohno also believed that customers should receive high quality products in the shortest time. Initially, JIT was used as a method for reducing inventories in Toyota's shipyards, but later it evolved into a management philosophy including a set of techniques (Refer Exhibit II for a comparison between JIT and non-JIT systems). Kanban4 was an essential component of Toyota's JIT concept. The Japanese referred to Kanban as a simple parts-movement system that depended on cards and boxes/containers to take parts from one workstation to another on a production line. Ohno had developed the idea in 1956 from the super markets in the US, which had devised an effective system for replenishment of store shelves based on the quantities picked by the customers. Initially, Ohno used pieces of paper contained in rectangular vinyl envelopes to convey information (called Kanban). In a period spanning three decades, Kanban developed into a sophisticated information system that ensured production in required quantities at the right time in all manufacturing processes within the factory. The essence of the Kanban concept was that a supplier delivered components to the production line only when required, thus eliminating storage in the production area. Suppliers delivered desired components when they received a card and an empty container, indicating that more parts were needed for production. In case of line interruption, each supplier produced only enough components to fill the container and then stopped. Since Kanban was a chain process in which orders flowed from one process to another, the production or delivery of components was 'pulled' to the production line (Refer Box). In a pull system, the production of a certain product starts only when a demand or request is made by the buyer. The consumer of the product 'pulls' from the last link of the production chain. This last link pulls its preceding link and so on. In western companies, the push system was considered to be more cost-effective. Push systems were schedule-based

projections of what demand was expected to be. Based on historical information (updated on a weekly or monthly basis), a computer program processed the information giving a detailed sub-schedule for buying materials and producing goods. This schedule pushed the production in order to comply with the expected demand. The disadvantage of the push system was that predictions did not always coincide with facts. This resulted in either excess or inadequate inventories. n the traditional forecast oriented method, parts were 'pushed' to the line (Refer Exhibit III for a comparison of the Kanban philosophy with the western philosophy). At Toyota, two types of Kanban cards were used: one, to move parts from one place to another, known as the Conveyance Kanban card, and the other, to authorize the production of parts, known as the Production Kanban card. (Refer Figure I). A standard size container was used to store parts and each card was treated like a coupon. (Refer Box). Suppose a container of item X is required in work centre A. As a first step, a production Kanban card is issued to work centre A. The work centre withdraws a container of raw materials from its inventory. The container of raw materials also included a conveyance Kanban card. Work centre A removes the conveyance Kanban card from the container and sends it to the proceeding work centre where it serves as an authorization to pick up a container of raw materials. Three types of information were exchanged using Kanban. Pick up information guided the earlier stages regarding parts to be produced for the succeeding stages. Transfer information indicated when the parts had to be produced for the succeeding stages. Production information was transmitted from the earlier stages to the later stages to inform the workers about the product mix and other operational matters. To make the Kanban system effective and reap maximum benefits (Refer Table II) from it, Ohno framed six rules: Later process went to the earlier process to pick up products. The earlier process produced only the amount withdrawn by the later process. Should not pick or produce goods without a Kanban. A Kanban should be attached to the goods. 100% defect free parts were required. Reduce the number of Kanbans. Table II Advantages of Kanban 1. A simple and understandable process 2. Provides quick and precise information 3. Low costs associated with the transfer of information 4. Provides quick response to changes 5. Limit of over-capacity in process 6. Avoids overproduction 7. Minimizes waste 8. Control can be maintained

9. Delegates' responsibility to workers Source: ICMR The Kanban cards were re-circulated and the number of cards controlled work-in-progress (WIP) in the system. In this way, the activities of final assembly were linked to previous operations by a chain system of card ordering that 'pulled' production through the factory. Another important component of JIT was Heijunka (production smoothing). JIT's principle of building only the required number of items helped keep the production costs low. Heijunka helped in the accomplishment of this principle by creating a consistent production volume. Heijunka averaged the highest and lowest variations of the orders. The variations were then removed from the production schedule. This ensured that the right quantity of parts was produced with minimum workforce. Heijunka took care not only of the total volume of items but also the type of items produced and the other options. Although many automobile companies around the world adopted JIT, the system was far from perfect and difficult to implement. It was based on the key assumption that sources and channels of supply were reliable and dependable at all times. Analysts felt that it did not take into account the possibility of labor strikes at automotive plants. Moreover, JIT involved high set up costs and Special training and reorganization of policies and procedures in the company were necessary to implement JIT. The supplier relations of the company also needed to be improved to ensure timely delivery. In the absence of good supplier relations, JIT increased the risk of inventory shortage. Organizational culture also seemed to play a crucial role in the implementation of JIT. Many companies outside Japan reported difficulties in the implementation of the concept. Another problem seemed to be the difficulty of removing the 'human element' from the systems that generate requirements. An analyst commented, "Computer algorithms, they say, go only so far. Good people, with lengthy experience at reading the ups and downs of the industry are still a must." Most companies felt that people should be actively involved in the system. Moreover, there could be many barriers to the successful implementation of JIT. For JIT to be successful, companies had to ensure that they did not make frequent changes in production planning and that their forecasting procedures were reliable and did not result in under or over forecasting of demand. Other barriers could be equipment failure and employee absenteeism. Analysts felt that Toyota's JIT was a complicated process and that its success inside a plant depended mainly on highly experienced, highly motivated managers. Outside the plant, JIT's success depended on a network of capable suppliers that operated in sync with Toyota's production processes. In fact, according to some analysts, Toyota was not able to replicate the JIT production system in an efficient way in any of its operations outside Japan. John Paul MacDuffie5 said, "Toyota hasn't developed a single facility that is as efficient as the ones it has in Japan."

Although Toyota's JIT had some drawbacks, it offered several advantages over other manufacturing processes. Because of the early adoption of JIT, Toyota benefited more from the system than other automobile companies (Refer Exhibits IV & V). By 2000, JIT was adopted by many Japanese companies, as well as some US car companies. Analysts felt that JIT was not only a process that could be applied to manufacturing, but also a philosophy that governed the attitude of a successful business. According to one analyst,6 "Using JIT, Taiichi Ohno had revolutionized production. The market clearly reflects the success of JIT. The concept has made Japanese products affordable and reliable in quality. Quality is no longer a privilege - it is a standard accompanied by low cost."

NOTE:
] Toyota was the world's third largest automobile manufacturer in 2000, after General Motors and Ford. 2] A defect detection system that automatically/manually stops the production operation and/or equipment whenever an abnormal or defective condition occurs. Any necessary improvements are made by directing attention to the stopped equipment and the worker who stops the operation. The Jidoka system puts faith in the worker as a thinker and allows all workers the right to stop the line on which they are working.

TISCO - The World's Most Cost-Effective Steel Plant

"With cost-cutting measures and good management, a company like TISCO may be the last one standing."

- Rajeev Das, Analyst, Paribas Asia Equity.

"It is our endeavor to reduce the cost of saleable steel by 2.5 - 3 per cent every year." "We realize that however efficient we become, the steel industry is not likely to return the cost of capital. This is no fault of ours, but due to the structure of the global and Indian steel industry."

- B. Muthuraman, Managing Director, TISCO.

Background Note
Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) was established in 1907 by J N Tata1 at Jamshedpur in Bihar, India. TISCO offered a wide range of products (See Exhibit I) and services including Hot rolled/Cold rolled (HR/CR)

coils2 and sheets, tubes, construction bars, forging quality steel, rods, structurals, strips and bearings. It also manufactured material handling equipment, ferro alloys and other minerals, software for process controls, and offered cargo-handling services. In the early 1980s, TISCO initiated a modernization program of its steel plant (See Exhibit II). Explaining the need of modernization, J J Irani, the then managing director of TISCO said, "We would have been finished otherwise.... you cannot fight a modernday war with weapons of the Mahabharata. We would have been annihilated had we not modernized. We realized this and embarked on the four phases of modernization. We addressed our drawbacks like the steel making process, our weakest link." By mid-1990s, TISCO had become India's most cost-effective steel plant. It also became Asia's first and India's largest, integrated steel producer (ISP)3 in the private sector. By 2000, eight divisions of Tata Steel were ISO-140014 certified, including Noamundi Iron Operations, West Bokaro Collieries, Ferro Alloy Plant, Joda, Sukinda Chromite Mines, Joda East Iron Mines, Tubes Division, and Growth Shop & Steel Works. By early 2000, TISCO had completed four phases of the modernization programme with an investment of about Rs 60 billion5. The company had invested Rs 4 billion on consultancy fees during 1990 to 2000. The fifth phase of the program had commenced in April 2000

By April 2001, TISCO had emerged as the world's lowest cost producer of steel. TISCO's operating cost at the 'hot metal' (liquid) stage was $75 per tonne. The company's cost per tonne of finished steel stood at $152 for the financial year ending March 2001. The World Steel Dynamics (WSD)6, in a report stated, "Tata Steel is a 'world class' steel maker - the only in India - and one of the few companies in the world with such a standing. This view point is based on a variety of reasons such as low operating costs, special company culture, good profitability, etc." WSD identified 12 companies as World Class Steel Makers, and ranked them based on certain factors7 (Refer Table I). Analysts felt that TISCO's achievement of becoming the lowest cost producer of steel was mostly attributed to its implementation of TOP (Total Operational Performance), a program that focused on improving TISCO's operational practices and rationalizing procurement costs.

TABLE I WSD's RANKING Company Ranking Score TISCO 1 131 Usinor 2 129 (Russia) Posco 3 127 (Korea) CSN 4 123 (Brazil) Baosteel 5 121 (China) China Steel 6 119 (China) Gerdau 7 118 (Brazil) Nucor 8 116 (US) Car-Tech 9 112 Nippon Steel 10 111 (Japan) Severstal 10 111 (Russia) Dofasco 11 109 (US) Source: www.tatasteel.com

The 'Top' Program

In the early 1990s, TISCO appointed McKinsey and Booz-Allen & Hamilton to study its operations and suggest ways to cut costs. Irani explained the rationale, "Cost-cutting measures are more important in the present situation where one can no longer control steel prices which are dictated by international markets." The consultants suggested TISCO to focus on various components affecting the cost of steel, which included cost of raw materials, cost of conversion, fuel rate in the blast furnace and mining of coal. TISCO was advised to use the most modern technologies to cut costs further. In the second half of 1998, in association with McKinsey, TISCO implemented TOP program at its G blast furnace8. TOP was widely regarded, as a program, which would have a maximum positive impact to the bottomline, with minimum investment, required in minimum time (See Exhibit IV). It aimed

achieving large improvements in throughput, quality and cost in the short term. In the long run, TOP was expected to enable the TISCO to achieve high rates of performance improvement (See Exhibit V). Since TISCO's scale of operations was quite large, the whole organization was divided into manageable 'units' to facilitate the implementation of TOP. A unit team was formed comprising a unit leader and two facilitators. Initially, McKinsey provided the facilitators. The unit leader was responsible for the performance of that particular unit. The team worked full time on the TOP program for a period of 12 weeks. Around eight units were addressed simultaneously during the 12 weeks, and this was also known as 'Wave.' The entire Wave was divided into five phases (See Exhibit VI). The unit team's objective was to explore ideas to reduce the cost or delays made by the unit by about 40%. In the process, the team was expected to identify and understand how each cost element could be reduced. The team had to establish relationships between key performance indicators and the elements that had an impact on them. Each team was asked to set itself a target based on the TOP norms; develop ideas to improve from the present level of performance to the target level; and implement those ideas.

The Phase I of a Wave was two weeks long. During this phase, the cost base was examined and the items that had a maximum impact on the bottomline were identified. Individual components of the larger cost elements were identified by drawing cost trees9. The cost elements, which could be reduced were highlighted and the reduction targets were set. In the Phase II of the Wave, ideas were explored to reach the set targets. At the G blast furnace, throughput10 and fuel costs were identified as the key performance indicators in the Phase II. Among the different individual components of fuel costs, coke and coal were the largest cost elements. They accounted for about 50% of the total costs. A reduction target was set to bring costs down to 570 kgs per thm11 from 610 kgs per thm. In the Phase III of the Wave, ideas were generated to achieve the target output of 3800 tons per day. Considering the techno-economic feasibility, 36 ideas were short-listed. The ideas were then grouped based on the capital expenditure required for implementing each idea. The Phase IV of the Wave started with the implementation of these ideas. Simultaneously, the G blast furnace also implemented 185 ideas, which did not require any capital investment. By March 1999, the G blast furnace achieved a savings of Rs 87 million against the targeted savings of Rs 40 million. TISCO set up a potential savings target for its G blast furnace at about Rs 300 million per annum, accounting for more than 10% of its profits in the fiscal 1999. By late 1999, TOP was in Phase V of the Wave In 2000, similar Waves were also adopted in TISCO's shop floors. The TOP program had helped TISCO to shift its focus from just producing volumes to costs and quality. Moreover, TOP enabled TISCO to improve customer satisfaction and loyalty.

mplementing Best Practices

In 1999-2001, TISCO took measures to reduce costs further by adopting innovative strategies and other cost-cutting exercises. For example, TISCO stopped using manganese, an expensive metal used to increase the strength and flexibility of steel. The company made efforts to reduce its product delivery time from 3-4 weeks in 1998 to 2 weeks in 2000. The company aimed to further reduce the time to one week. TISCO also took steps to reduce its manpower costs. Between 1996 and 2000, TISCO reduced its workforce from 78,000 to 40,000 employees. Analysts opined that cutting its workforce by 38,000 employees was not an easy job and the company was able to do it with a lot of communication with employees. TISCO had adopted Performance Ethic Programme (PEP), under which, it planned to promote hardworking young people to higher positions depending on their performance, rather than following the convention of seniority. This exercise was expected to cut the management staff from 4000 to 3000. PEP had two core elements. Firstly, it proposed a new organizational structure, which was expected to foster growth businesses, introduce more decision-making flexibility, clear accountability, and encourage teamwork among the managers and the workforce. Secondly, PEP proposed to introduce a Performance Management System (PMS). It would identify and reward strong performers, and also offer development opportunities for each employee. PMS would also ensure that every employee's job profile was clearly defined. By introducing PMS, TISCO wanted to make performance appraisals transparent and fair and reward the good performers.

The company also planned to introduce a new compensation package based on performance from November 2001. Muthuraman explained the benefits of PEP, "Youngsters are getting higher salary than some of the seniors, and after the restructuring, the average age of the managers has fallen by 10 years. Through PEP, TISCO also reduced the hierarchical levels from 13 to 5." In a bid to reduce costs further, TISCO used IT as a strategic tool. In 1999, the company formed a small cross-functional in-house team consisting of consultants from Arthur D Little and IBM Global Services. The team was responsible for re-designing two core business processes - order generation and fulfillment and marketing development. The program began with a study on cost-competitiveness. The aim of the program was to enhance customer focus enabling better credit control and reduction of stocks, thereby reducing the costs. After considering several packages, the team decided to use SAP R/3. TISCO

wanted the team - also known as ASSET (Achieve Success through SAP Enabled Transformation) - to integrate SAP into the existing information system and make it compatible with future SAP implementations. After SAP solutions were introduced in TISCO, the business processes became more efficient. It also improved customer service and productivity, and reduced costs. The introduction of SAP also decreased manpower cost from more than US $ 200 per ton in 1998 to about US $ 140 per ton in 2000. There was a significant reduction in inventory the carrying cost, from Rs 190 per ton in 1999 to Rs 155 per ton by 2000. There were also significant cost savings through efficient management of resources.

The Future
Analysts felt that TISCO's modernization program was very successful. The Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) adopted a similar program with an investment of Rs 70 billion. However, the program was not successful. In contrast, in spite of the depressed market and lower margins, the decrease in the production costs enabled TISCO to achieve a profit after tax of Rs 5.53 billion in 2000-2001, and Rs 4.22 billion in 1999-2000 compared to Rs 2.82 billion during 1998-99 (Refer Exhibit VII). TISCO planned to enter new areas including setting up of a 0.1 million-ton ferro chrome export oriented project. The project was planned in Australia because of the lower power costs. TISCO was to get power at a tariff of 1.8 cents for about 15 years that is about onefifth of the tariffs in India. Power accounted for 60% of the cost of ferro chrome manufacturing.

The Future
TISCO was also planning to enter titanium mining through alliances with major global companies. To provide employment to the employees opting for VRS at over-manned units, TISCO planned to enter the call center business in Jamshedpur. To develop this business, TISCO entered into a marketing alliance with Tata International, the trading arm of Tata Group. TISCO also planned to exit from some of its non-core activities. Critics felt that TISCO might face problems due to the decrease in demand for steel in the global and local markets and increasing competition from cheap imports, and anti-dumping duties imposed on the domestic steel manufacturers by the US. They felt that it was doubtful whether steel, even at the lowest cost, would deliver returns higher than the cost of capital in India. However, some analysts remarked that in the long run, TISCO's strategy to export to Jordan, Iraq and the Southeast Asian countries might reduce dependence on the US markets thus helping the company. They said that its entry into value-added products was expected to safeguard the company from

the fluctuations in the steel prices.

Questions for Discussion

1. TOP was described as "maximum impact to the bottomline, with minimum investment, in the minimum time. What was the rationale behind the implementation of TOP? Briefly analyze the process and explain the advantages of TOP. 2. The cost-cutting measures seemed to have helped TISCO to a large extent. Apart from TOP, what are the other steps taken by TISCO for reducing costs? 3. The lowered production costs enabled TISCO to record a profit during 1999-2000, despite a depressed market and low margins. Do you think the low costs would help the company in the long run? Justify your answer.

NOTE:

1] Jamshedji Nusserwanji Tata (J N Tata) was the founder of the Tata Group of companies. 2] Hot rolled coil is a coil of steel rolled on a hot-strip mill (hot-rolled steel). It can be sold in this form to customers or be processed further into other finished products. Cold rolling is a process where the shape and structure of the steel can be changed by rolling, hammering, or stretching it at a low temperature (often room temperature). 3] The Integrated steel producers have manufacturing facilities right from the iron ore stage to the finished steel stage. 4] The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) develops voluntary technical standards. The ISO 14000 standards are on environmental management. 5] In September 2002, Rs 48 equaled 1 US $. 6] A renowned industry analyst firm based in the US. 7] Operating costs; ownership of low-cost ore and coal; favorable location for procuring raw materials; skilled and productive workforce; price paid for electricity; high quality and niche products; degree of 'pricing power' with large steel buyers; dominant in region; balance sheet; borrowed funds and equity on a favorable basis; management is experienced, aggressive, proactive; low legacy (retired worker) costs; ongoing cost cutting efforts; cost position of nearby competitors; owns downstream steel-using businesses; domestic market growth rate; proportion of domestic sales. 8] A blast furnace is a towering cylinder lined with heat-resistant (refractory) bricks, used by integrated steel mills to smelt iron from its ore. Its name comes from the 'blast' of hot air and gases forced up through the iron ore, coke and limestone that are loaded into the furnace. 9] Cost tree is a display of the organization of the costs of a template which contains all the major cost elements for an asset or a worksheet. Visually, it resembles the file arrangement that Microsoft Explorer provides. The cost tree of a master template allows to check or un-check preengineered cost elements of the master template. 10] Output or production over a period of time. 11] Kilograms per ton of heavy metal.

XEROX - The Benchmarking Story

The case examines the benchmarking initiatives taken by Xerox, one of the world's leading copier companies, as a part of its 'Leadership through Quality' program during the early 1980s. The case discusses in detail the benchmarking concept and its implementation in various processes at Xerox. It also explores the positive impact of benchmarking practices on Xerox

- Warren Jeffries, a Customer Services Benchmarking Manager, Xerox, in 1999.

Background Note
The history of Xerox goes back to 1938, when Chester Carlson, a patent attorney and part-time inventor, made the first xerographic image in the US. Carlson struggled for over five years to sell the invention, as many companies did not believe there was a market for it. Finally, in 1944, the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio, contracted with Carlson to refine his new process, which Carlson called 'electrophotography.' Three years later, The Haloid Company, maker of photographic paper, approached Battelle and obtained a license to develop and market a copying machine based on Carlson's technology. Haloid later obtained all rights to Carlson's invention and registered the 'Xerox' trademark in 1948. Buoyed by the success of Xerox copiers, Haloid changed its name to Haloid Xerox Inc in 1958, and to The Xerox Corporation in 1961. Xerox was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1961 and on the Chicago Stock Exchange in 1990. It is also traded on the Boston, Cincinnati, Pacific Coast, Philadelphia, London and Switzerland exchanges. The strong demand for Xerox's products led the company from strength to strength and revenues soared from $37 million in 1960 to $268 million in 1965. Throughout the 1960s, Xerox grew by acquiring many companies, including University Microfilms, Micro-Systems, Electro-Optical Systems, Basic Systems and Ginn and Company. In 1962, Fuji Xerox Co. Ltd. was launched as a joint venture of Xerox and Fuji Photo Film. Xerox acquired a majority stake (51.2%) in Rank Xerox in 1969. During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Xerox diversified into the information technology business by acquiring Scientific Data Systems (makers of time-sharing and scientific computers), Daconics (which

made shared logic and word processing systems using minicomputers), and Vesetec (producers of electrostatic printers and plotters). In 1969, it set up a corporate R&D facility, the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), to develop technology in-house. In the 1970s, Xerox focused on introducing new and more efficient models to retain its share of the reprographic market and cope with competition from the US and Japanese companies. While the company's revenues increased from $ 698 million in 1966 to $ 4.4 billion in 1976, profits increased five-fold from $ 83 million in 1966 to $ 407 million in 1977. As Xerox grew rapidly, a variety of controls and procedures were instituted and the number of management layers was increased during the 1970s. This, however, slowed down decision-making and resulted in major delays in product development. In the early 1980s, Xerox found itself increasingly vulnerable to intense competition from both the US and Japanese competitors. According to analysts, Xerox's management failed to give the company strategic direction. It ignored new entrants (Ricoh, Canon, and Sevin) who were consolidating their positions in the lower-end market and in niche segments. The company's operating cost (and therefore, the prices of its products) was high and its products were of relatively inferior quality in comparison to its competitors. Xerox also suffered from its highly centralized decision-making processes. As a result of this, return on assets fell to less than 8% and marketshare in copiers came down sharply from 86% in 1974 to just 17% in 1984. Between 1980 and 1984, Xerox's profits decreased from $ 1.15 billion to $ 290 million (Refer Exhibit I). In 1982, David T. Kearns (Kearns) took over as the CEO. He discovered that the average manufacturing cost of copiers in Japanese companies was 40-50% of that of Xerox. As a result, Japanese companies were able to undercut Xerox's prices effortlessly. Kearns quickly began emphasizing reduction of manufacturing costs and gave new thrust to quality control by launching a program that was popularly referred to as 'Leadership Through Quality.' As part of this quality program, Xerox implemented the benchmarking program. These initiatives played a major role in pulling Xerox out of trouble in the years to come. The company even went on to become one of the best examples of the successful implementation of benchmarking.

About Benchmarking
Benchmarking can be defined as a process for improving performance by constantly identifying, understanding and adapting best practices and processes followed inside and outside the company and implementing the results. The main emphasis of benchmarking is on improving a given business operation or a process by exploiting 'best practices,' not on 'best performance.' Simply put, benchmarking means comparing one's organization or a part of it with that of the other companies. Companies can adopt one or more of the following types of

benchmarking Strategic Benchmarking: Aimed at improving a company's overall performance by studying the long-term strategies and approaches that helped the 'best practice' companies to succeed. It involves examining the core competencies, product/service development and innovation strategies of such companies. Competitive Benchmarking or Performance Benchmarking: Used by companies to compare their positions with respect to the performance characteristics of their key products and services. Competitive benchmarking involves companies from the same sector. Process Benchmarking: Used by companies to improve specific key processes and operations with the help of best practice organizations involved in performing similar work or offering similar services. Functional Benchmarking or Generic Benchmarking: Used by companies to improve their processes or activities by benchmarking with other companies from different business sectors or areas of activity but involved in similar functions or work processes. Internal Benchmarking: This involves benchmarking against its own units or branches for instance, business units of the company situated at different locations. This allows easy access to information, even sensitive data, and also takes less time and resources than other types of benchmarking. External Benchmarking: Used by companies to seek the help of organizations that succeeded on account of their practices. This kind of benchmarking provides an opportunity to learn from high-end performers. International Benchmarking: Involves benchmarking against companies outside the country, as there are very few suitable benchmarking partners within the country. A typical benchmarking exercise is a four-stage process involving planning, data collection, data analysis and reporting and adaptation. The planning stage includes identifying, establishing and documenting specific study focus areas, key events and definitions. The best-practice companies are identified and appropriate data collection tools are selected and updated for use. The purpose of the data collection is to accumulate qualitative data and learn from the best practices of different organizations. Information is mainly collected through questionnaires administered to all best practice companies. This stage also includes site visits to organizations that follow best practices. The data analysis and reporting stage involves the critical evaluation of practices followed at high performing companies, and the identification of practices that help and deter superior performance. A detailed final report is presented, which contains key findings. When these findings are discussed, best practice companies also take part through systematic networking activities and presentations. The adaptation stage includes developing an initial action plan to adapt and implement the practices followed by high performance companies. Of the total time spent on the above stages, planning takes up 30%, data collection 50%, and data analysis and reporting take up the remaining 20%. The time

taken for the last stage, adaptation, depends on the scope of the exercise being undertaken by the company. The above stages comprise a series of steps that collectively complete the benchmarking process (Refer Exhibit II for steps in a typical benchmarking process). Organizations usually customize this model or develop their own benchmarking model to meet their specific organizational needs. By the early 1990s, many Fortune 500 companies and other major companies were implementing benchmarking to reap the benefits it promised. Benchmarking also became a key criterion for winning the Malcolm Balridge National Quality Award.1 According to research conducted by the International Benchmarking Clearinghouse, a division of American Productivity & Quality Center (APQC2), in 1995, over 30 companies reported a $76 million payback approximately in the very first year of their benchmarking implementation. Some of the companies that derived the benefits of benchmarking included Ford, AT&T, IBM, GE, Motorola and Citicorp. However, the pioneering efforts of Xerox in the field of benchmarking have undoubtedly been the most talked about and successful of such initiatives.

Benchmarking at Xerox
The 'Leadership through Quality' program introduced by Kearns revitalized the company. The program encouraged Xerox to find ways to reduce their manufacturing costs. Benchmarking against Japanese competitors, Xerox found out that it took twice as long as its Japanese competitors to bring a product to market, five times the number of engineers, four times the number of design changes, and three times the design costs. The company also found that the Japanese could produce, ship, and sell units for about the same amount that it cost Xerox just to manufacture them. In addition, Xerox's products had over 30,000 defective parts per million - about 30 times more than its competitors. Benchmarking also revealed that Xerox would need an 18% annual productivity growth rate for five consecutive years to catch up with the Japanese. After an initial period of denial, Xerox managers accepted the reality. Following this, Xerox defined benchmarking as 'the process of measuring its products, Services, and practices against its toughest competitors, identifying the gaps and establishing goals. Our goal is always to achieve superiority in quality, product reliability and cost.' Gradually, Xerox developed its own benchmarking model. This model involved tens steps categorized under five stages - planning, analysis, integration, action and maturity (Refer Figure I for the Xerox benchmarking model). The five-stage process involved the following activities:

 Planning: Determine the subject to be benchmarked, identify the relevant best practice organizations and select/develop the most appropriate data collection technique. Analysis: Assess the strengths of competitors (best practice companies) and compare Xerox's performance with that of its competitors. This stage determines the current competitive gap and the projected competitive gap. Integration: Establish necessary goals, on the basis of the data collected, to attain best performance; integrate these goals into the company's formal planning processes. This stage determines the new goals or targets of the company and the way in which these will be communicated across the organization. Action: Implement action plans established and assess them periodically to determine whether the company is achieving its objectives. Deviations from the plan are also tackled at this stage. Maturity: Determine whether the company has attained a superior performance level. This stage also helps the company determine whether benchmarking process has become an integral part of the organization's formal management process. Xerox collected data on key processes of best practice companies. These critical processes were then analyzed to identify and define improvement opportunities. For instance, Xerox identified ten key factors that were related to marketing. These were customer marketing, customer engagement, order fulfillment, product maintenance, billing and collection, financial management, asset management, business management, human resource management and information technology. These ten key factors were further divided into 67 subprocesses. Each of these sub-processes then became a target for improvement. For the purpose of acquiring data from the related benchmarking companies, Xerox subscribed to the management and technical databases, referred to magazines and trade journals, and also consulted professional associations and consulting firms. Having worked out the model it wanted to use, Xerox began by implementing competitive benchmarking. However, the company found this type of benchmarking to be inadequate as the very best practices, in some processes or operations were not being practiced by copier companies. The company then adopted functional benchmarking, which involved a study of the best practices followed by a variety of companies regardless of the industry they belonged to. Xerox initiated functional benchmarking with the study of the warehousing and inventory management system of L.L. Bean (Bean), a mail-order supplier of sporting goods and outdoor clothing. Bean had developed a computer program that made order filling very efficient. The program arranged orders in a specific sequence that allowed stock pickers to travel the shortest possible distance in collecting goods at the warehouse. This considerably reduced the

inconvenience of filling an individual order that involved gathering relatively less number of goods from the warehouse. The increased speed and accuracy of order filling achieved by Bean attracted Xerox. The company was convinced it could achieve similar benefits by developing and implementing such a program. Similarly, Xerox zeroed in on various other best practice companies to benchmark its other processes. These included American Express (for billing and collection), Cummins Engines and Ford (for factory floor layout), Florida Power and Light (for quality improvement), Honda (for supplier development), Toyota (for quality management), Hewlett-Packard (for research and product development), Saturn (a division of General Motors) and Fuji Xerox (for manufacturing operations) and DuPont (for manufacturing safety). Benchmarking was implemented at Xerox in the following manner:

Supplier Management System

Xerox found that all the Japanese copier companies put together had only 1,000 suppliers, while Xerox alone had 5,000. To keep the number of suppliers low, Japanese companies standardized many parts. Often, half the components of similar machines were identical. To ensure part standardization, Japanese companies worked closely with their suppliers. They frequently trained vendor's employees in quality control, manufacturing automation and other key areas. Cooperation between the company and the vendor extended to just-in-time production scheduling, i.e. delivery in small quantities, as per the customer's production schedule. In line with the best practices, Xerox reduced the number of vendors for the copier business from 5,000 to just 400. Xerox also created a vendor certification process in which suppliers were either offered training or explicitly told where they needed to improve in order to continue as a Xerox vendor. Vendors were consulted for ideas on better designs and improved customer service also.

Inventory Management
Xerox's efforts to improve inventory management practices drew inspiration from the innovative spare parts management practices of its European operations. Traditionally, technical representatives decided the level of spare parts inventory to be carried; little information was available on the actual usage pattern of the spare parts. Xerox's European operations developed a sophisticated information system to get around this problem. Actual usage, rather than mere withdrawal from the stocking point, was used to determine inventory levels. In the late 1980s, Xerox replicated the system in the US and saved tens of millions of dollars in the process. The stocking policy followed by Xerox branch managers was to hold fully finished, fully configured products near to the customer. Because of this policy, they carried vast amounts of inventory, some of which was not even sold during a given period. The company changed the above setup by asking branch managers to match the stocking policy to the customer's installation orders, which considerably reduced the inventory holding time. As a result, working capital cycle time was cut by 70% leading to savings of about $200 million. The process of benchmarking helped Xerox revamp its

manufacturing techniques. Each 'family unit' (a manager and his direct subordinates) was encouraged to identify its internal as well as external customers and to meet their needs. For instance, the group that built paper trays identified its external customer as the end user who would load the paper. Its internal customers were the assembly-line workers, who would combine the paper tray with hundreds of other components to assemble the copiers. This process significantly improved the operational efficiency of the work groups. Marketing Xerox introduced a Customer Satisfaction Measurement System that integrated customer research and benchmarking activities. The company sent out over 55,000 questionnaires monthly to its customers to measure customer satisfaction and record competitors' performance. It then benchmarked against those competitors that had scored high marks on specific measures of customer satisfaction. Xerox also used the vast amount of information gathered by the system to develop business plans for improving quality and meeting customer needs. Quality As a part of its "Leadership Through Quality" program, Xerox reformulated its quality policy. The new policy supplemented the company's benchmarking efforts. Xerox's new quality policy stated, "Xerox is a quality company. Quality is the basic principle for Xerox. Quality means providing our external and internal customers with the innovative products and services that duly satisfy their requirements. Quality improvement is the job of every Xerox employee" (Refer Exhibit III for a comparison between new and old quality policies). Following this, the company embarked on a complete organizational restructuring exercise that focused on research and development, employee involvement and customer orientation. Xerox also formed a transition team consisting of 24 senior managers and consultants from McKinsey & Co to help make Total Quality Management (TQM) a part of its organizational culture. The transition team took action at two levels. Firstly, it conveyed the message clearly to the world that Xerox was pursuing more widespread use of TQM, and secondly, it identified and addressed the obstacles that were likely to slow down the spread of TQM. These ranged from the corporation's function-dominated matrix structure to the need for new training programs. Consequently, the transition team also replaced the existing complex matrix by three Strategic Business Units (SBUs) - Enterprise Service Business, Office Copiers and Home Copiers. Each of these SBUs was given considerable autonomy in engineering, marketing and pricing. By the late 1980s, benchmarking had become a dayto-day activity in every division of the company. According to company sources, Xerox's guiding principle was, 'anything anyone can do better, we should aim to do at least equally well." In 1991, Xerox developed Business Excellence Certification (BEC) to integrate benchmarking with the company's overall strategies. This was also done to ensure continuous

self-appraisal of the overall quality performance of the company. The key performance factors measured by BEC were management leadership, human resource management, customer focus, quality support and tools, process management and business priorities/results. These factors, which were further divided into forty sub-factors, had their specific measuring targets. Each unit's self-appraisal was validated by representatives from sister divisions. BEC helped Xerox determine the causes for the success or failure of a specific quality process and identify the key success factors or obstacles for achieving a specific quality goal. It also helped the company establish key functions for removing obstacles that prevented it from reaching the set quality goals. By the mid-1990s, benchmarking was extended to over 240 key areas of product, service and business performance at Xerox. The initiatives were also adopted, at varying levels, at Xerox units across the world. The benchmarking process encouraged Xerox's employees to learn from every situation. This new philosophy was dubbed 'steal shamelessly,' though the company used only those ideas that the best practice companies willingly gave away. The salient rule at Xerox for benchmarking was to 'ask no question of another firm that you would be unwilling to answer about your own.' This change in attitude was just the beginning of the payoffs of the benchmarking moves.

Reaping the Benefits

The first major payoff of Xerox's focus on benchmarking and customer satisfaction was the increase in the number of satisfied customers. Highly satisfied customers for its copier/duplicator and printing systems increased by 38% and 39% respectively. Customer complaints to the president's office declined by more than 60%. Customer satisfaction with Xerox's sales processes improved by 40%, service processes by 18% and administrative processes by 21%. The financial performance of the company also improved considerably through the mid and late 1980s Overall customer satisfaction was rated at more than 90% in 1991. Some of the other benefits Xerox derived were: Number of defects reduced by 78 per 100 machines. Service response time reduced by 27%. Inspection of incoming components reduced to below 5%. Defects in incoming parts reduced to 150ppm. Inventory costs reduced by two-thirds. Marketing productivity increased by one-third. Distribution productivity increased by 8-10 %. Increased product reliability on account of 40% reduction in unscheduled maintenance. Notable decrease in labour costs. Errors in billing reduced from 8.3 % to 3.5% percent. Became the leader in the high-volume copier-

duplicator market segment. Country units improved sales from 152% to 328%. Xerox went on to become the only company worldwide to win all the three prestigious quality awards: the Deming Award (Japan) in 1980, the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award in 1989, and the European Quality Award in 1992. Xerox Business Services, the company's document outsourcing division, also won the Baldridge Award in the service category in 1997. In addition, over the years, Xerox won quality awards in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK, and Uruguay. Analysts attributed this success to the 'Leadership Through Quality' initiative, and, more significantly, to the adoption of benchmarking practices. The success of benchmarking at Xerox motivated many companies to adopt benchmarking. By the mid-1990, hundreds of companies implemented benchmarking practices at their divisions across the world. These included leading companies like Ford, AT&T, IBM, GE, Motorola and Citicorp. During the 1990s, Xerox, along with companies such as Ford, AT&T, Motorola and IBM, created the International Benchmarking Clearinghouse (IBC) to promote benchmarking and guide companies across the world in benchmarking efforts. The institute offers information on various companies and best practices through its electronic bulletin board. Soon after its establishment, more than 100 companies joined IBC to gain access to extensive database. By 2001, benchmarking had become a common phenomenon in many companies across the world. Analysts remarked that continuous benchmarking helped companies deliver best quality products and services and survive competition in all businesses (Refer Exhibit V for successful benchmarking guidelines).

Questions for Discussion

1. Explain the circumstances that led Kearns to adopt the 'Leadership Through Quality' program. In the backdrop of his initiatives to retain Xerox's global competitiveness, comment on the rationale behind the decision to implement benchmarking practices at the company. 2. Define benchmarking and discuss the various types of benchmarking. Explain the steps involved in the implementation of a typical benchmarking process. 3. Describe Xerox's benchmarking model. How did Xerox go about implementing benchmarking practices in the company? 4. What benefits did Xerox derive from the implementation of benchmarking practices? Why do you think benchmarking initiatives sometimes fail to give companies the expected benefits? Explain how you would go about ensuring the success of the benchmarking initiatives undertaken by the company.

NOTE: 1] A highly revered award given for excellence in quality in the US to businesses. It is based on seven parameters - leadership, strategic planning, customer and market focus, information and analysis, human resource focus, process management, and business results. 2] APQC is a US-based nonprofit organization supported by nearly 500 companies, government organizations, and educational institutions. It provides the tools, information, expertise, and support needed by companies to discover and implement best practices in areas such as benchmarking and knowledge management.