Risk Management Series

for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks December 2003


FEMA 427

FEMA 427 / December 2003


Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks

Federal Emergency Management Agency www.fema.gov


Weidlinger Associates Kenneth Mead. and Light-Industrial Facilities. Rdd Consultants Peter Mork. Nancy Sauer. Wade Belcher. S. U. UTD. many of the concepts presented are also applicable to other building types and/or existing buildings. Department of Homeland Security Lloyd Siegel. Rick Jones. Inc. Hinman Consulting Engineers Contributors: Christopher Rojahn. Retail. S. multi-family residential. Department of Veterans Affairs William Whiddon. URS Corporation John Lynch. Virginia Tech Eric Letvin. Inc. While the guidance provided focuses principally on explosive attacks and design strategies to mitigate the effects of explosions. S. Meyers. Department of Veterans Affairs Joseph Hartman. Rutherford & Chekene Randy J.FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks – Protecting Office. U. Multi-Family Residential. Inc. In addition to applicability to the design of new commercial office. and light-industrial buildings. UTD. Army Corps of Engineers Jim Caulder. Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) Criteria Office Wesley Lyon. Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center Kurt Knight. retail. Building Technology. Department of Veterans Affairs Frederick Krimgold. Inc. Marcelle Habibion. Army Corps of Engineers David Hattis. Applied Technology Council Robert Smilowitz. the document also addresses design strategies to mitigate the effects of chemical. provides guidance to building designers. Air Force – Civil Engineer Support Agency Michael Chipley. U. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Principal Author: Applied Technology Council (ATC) Eve Hinman. Inc. FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii . Building Technology. Applied Technology Council Project Advisory Panel: Christopher Arnold. Flack + Kutz Inc. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Dominic Campi. Terry Pruitt. Building Systems Development. General Services Administration Curt Betts. biological and radiological attacks. owners and state and local governments to mitigate the effects of hazards resulting from terrorist attacks on new buildings.

Please send comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs. and comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome.gov iv FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .Project Officer: Milagros Kennett. FEMA Building Sciences Technology Branch Mitigation Division This manual will be revised periodically.

................................................................................. 2-4 WEAPONS EFFECTS ..............................2 Contents and Organization of the Report ............................................................. 8-3 8................... 8-1 8...................................... 6-35 6...................... 3-3 BUILDING DAMAGE ..........................6 Chemical.....................................................................................3 Further Reading ........................... 7-1 7. 8-2 8....................2 Security Principles ..........4 Further Reading . ix FIGURE CREDITS ...3 Correlation Between Damage and Injuries ................................................. 6-8 6..2 Explosive Attacks ........... 5-2 5................ xi 1 INTRODUCTION........................................................4 Further Reading .................................... 7-1 7............. 8-1 8.1 Goals of the Design Approach ................................ 4-5 4............................................................................ 7-2 7... 6-41 OCCUPANCY TYPES... 6-1 6................................... 5-1 5......................................... 2-1 2..............1 Initial Costs .... 8-4 v 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS ...3 Structural ..............................................................1 Description of Explosion Forces . 7-5 COST CONSIDERATIONS .........................................4 Building Envelope ................................................................................................................5 Mechanical and Electrical Systems .......2 Life-Cycle Costs ............ 4-1 4................. iii LIST OF FIGURES.........................................1 Purpose and Overview ..........................3 Further Reading .......3 Commercial Retail Space Occupancy .................... 4-8 DESIGN APPROACH ....................................... 1-4 TERRORIST THREATS.............................................................................. 6-13 6........5 Further Reading ..........1 Site Location and Layout ......3 Setting Priorities .................................. 7-3 7..2 Damage Mechanisms ............................................................................ 3-1 3.................. 7-1 7..... 1-3 1.................................3 Further Reading ..........................TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................... 2-1 2.......................................................................................................................................................................1 Predicting Damage Levels ...................................................4 Light Industrial Buildings ................................... vii LIST OF TABLES......2 Further Reading ....... 6-1 6.........1 Overview ..... and Radiological Protection .................................2 Multi-Family Residential Occupancy .............................. 1-1 1..... 1-1 1. 4-1 4................ 2-1 2............................ 5-5 DESIGN GUIDANCE .................................... 4-1 4.............. 3-1 3.............................................. Biological...................... 6-26 6....2 Architectural .................1 Overview of Possible Threats ......................................... 5-1 5........


....................................................... standoff distance.... 5-4 Schematic of typical anti-ram bollard............................................................. 3-2 Plots showing pressure decay with distance.................. 6-17 Single-degree-of-feedom model for explosive loads............................................................................................ 4-4 Exterior view of Alfred P.LIST OF FIGURES 2-1 3-1 3-2 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 5-1 5-2 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 6-7 6-8 6-9 8-1 Schematic of vehicle weapon threat parameters and definitions ... 4-6 Photograph showing non-structural damage in building impacted by blast ................................................... 6-29 Plan view of test cubicle showing glass performance conditions as a function of distance from test window........................... 6-31 Schematic showing recommended location for elevated air-intakes on exterior of building............................................................................................ 4-7 Components of security .. 8-2 LIST OF FIGURES vii ............................................ 4-3 Schematics showing sequence of building damage due to a package weapon .... Note variation of force and displacement with time.. Murrah Federal Building collapse ............................... 6-5 Schematics showing the effect of building shape on air-blast impacts........... 5-2 Schematic showing lines of defense against blast... 4-5 Exterior view of Khobar Towers exterior wall failure .................. 6-4 Schematic of typical anti-ram knee wall ........................................................ 6-9 Schematics showing an example approach for improving the layout of adjacent unsecured and secured areas ................... 6-44 Plots showing relationship between cost of upgrading various building components... 2-2 Air-blast pressure time history . 3-2 Schematic showing sequence of building damage due to a vehicle weapon... 6-18 Safe laminated-glass systems and failure modes ............................. and risk .. 6-10 Direct design process flow chart ...


................LIST OF TABLES 4-1 6-1 Damage and Injuries due to Explosion Effects..... 4-8 Performance Conditions for Windows ..................... 6-30 LIST OF TABLES ix ........


S. Based on Figure 14. 2002. May 1994. Inc. Air Force Photograph courtesy of U. or Radiological Attacks. Architectural & Engineering Design Guidelines for U. and the Air Force. Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical. Department of the Army. 2001.S. Headquarters. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. U. Department of State Based on Figure 3-6. D.Concept Design. Technical Manual TM5-855-1.9. Department of Health and Human Services. From Figure 4-1.. Department of the Army. Washington. May 28. Courtesy of Joseph Smith of Applied Research Associates.FIGURE CREDITS 3-1 Based on Figure 3. The Interagency Security Committee. Air Force AFMAN 32-1071.C. 1986.C. Office of Building Operations. Security Engineering ..C. Diplomatic Mission Buildings. Army TM5-853-2. Washington.1. Fundamentals of Protective Design for Conventional Weapons. Department of State. Washington D. Vol.S. 2.3. 3 November 1. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Photograph courtesy of Exponent Failure Analysis Associates Photograph courtesy of the U. D. June 1997. May.6. 4-3 4-4 4-5 6-1 6-2 6-7 6-9 8-1 FIGURE CREDITS xi . ISC Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects.2..S. Biological.


or hurricane.1 PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 1 The purpose of this primer is to introduce concepts that can help building designers. the focus is on a damage-limiting or damage-mitigating approach rather than a blast-resistant approach. and radiological attacks. multi-family residential. which are far more prevalent hazards than are terrorist attacks. On the other hand. the goals of security-oriented design are by necessity modest. private-sector building types: commercial office. many of the concepts presented here are applicable to other building types and/or existing buildings. and aesthetics. because the effects of attack can be catastrophic. initial and life-cycle costs. biological. However. With regard to explosive attacks. owners. earthquake. retail. fire protection. security measures should not interfere with daily operations of the building. INTRODUCTION 1-1 . Security concerns need to be balanced with many other design constraints such as accessibility. Because the probability of attack is very small.INTRODUCTION 1. and light industrial. The measures should be as unobtrusive as possible to provide an inviting. and state and local governments mitigate the threat of hazards resulting from terrorist attacks on new buildings. Security design needs to be part of an overall multi-hazard approach to ensure that it does not worsen the behavior of the building in the event of a fire. Because of the severity of the types of hazards discussed. efficient environment that does not attract undue attention of potential attackers. It is clear that owners are becoming interested in considering manmade hazards for a variety of reasons including the desire to: ❍ ❍ attract more tenants or a particular type of tenant. energy efficiency. This primer specifically addresses four high-population. natural hazard mitigation. but the text also addresses design strategies to mitigate the effects of chemical. lower insurance premiums or obtain high-risk insurance. The goal is to incorporate some reasonable measures that will enhance the life safety of the persons within the building and facilitate rescue efforts in the unlikely event of attack. it is prudent to incorporate measures that may save lives and minimize business interruption in the unlikely event of an attack. Designing security into a building requires a complex series of tradeoffs. The focus is on explosive attack.

These reports will also discuss current state-of-the-art methods to enhance protection of the building by incorporating low-cost measures into new buildings at the earliest stages of site selection and design. Use lightweight nonstructural elements on the building exterior and interior. and limit losses and business interruption.❍ ❍ reduce life-cycle costs for operational security measures. Place unsecured areas exterior to the main structure or in the exterior bay. and local/state government officials in gaining a solid understanding of man-made hazards. This primer strives to provide a holistic multi-disciplinary approach to security design by considering the various building systems including site. owners. connections. Physically isolate vulnerable areas such as the entries and delivery areas from the rest of the structure by using floor-to-floor walls in these areas. 1-2 INTRODUCTION . Place air intakes as far above the ground level as practical. separated mechanical/electrical control systems. the space requirements needed to accommodate additional measures. With a little forethought regarding. Design exterior window systems and cladding so that the framing. Incremental measures taken early in design may be more fully developed at a later date. Use redundant. This is one of a series of five FEMA primers that address security issues in high-population. It is the intent of FEMA that these reports will assist designers. structure. Best practices recommended in this primer are listed below. private-sector buildings. for instance. Incorporate measures to resist progressive collapse. the protection level can be enhanced as the need arises or the budget permits after construction is complete. and supporting structure have a lateral-load-resistance that is equal to or higher than the transparency or panel. Place building as far from any secured perimeter as practical. architecture. mechanical and electrical systems and providing general recommendations for the design professional with little or no background in this area. Protection against terrorist attack is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Secure the perimeter against vehicular intrusion using landscaping or barrier methods.

(2) the selection of a building INTRODUCTION 1-3 . Security measures described include: (1) preventing an attack. but also addressing chemical. including damage mechanisms for various building elements and systems. In addition to descriptive information and guidance.2 describes architectural issues and attributes affecting the impact of explosions on buildings.3. exterior ornamentation. and anti-ram barriers. and radiological attacks. biological. focusing primarily on explosions. Section 6. and the functional layout of the interior. and measures that can be taken to limit and mitigate their impacts on buildings and their occupants. and radiological (CBR) agents. and (3) mitigating the effects of these attacks. including both structural and nonstructural components.1. Weapons effects are described in Chapter 3. Topics include (1) methods to prevent progressive collapse. initial blast forces. (2) delaying an attack.2 CONTENTS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT This report provides basic qualitative and descriptive information characterizing potential terrorist threats: the effects of terrorist-caused explosions or releases of chemical. which can be either passive or active. and (3) the potential extent and distribution of deaths and injuries resulting from various damage mechanisms. such as earthquakes and wind storms. Checklists of mitigation measures are provided at the end of each major section. Goals include preventing collapse (at least until the building can be fully evacuated) and reducing the effects of flying debris. Important concepts are stand-off distance from the perimeter property line. Design approaches to limit or mitigate damage caused by bomb attacks are described in Chapter 5. biological. The heart of the document is Chapter 6. Site and layout design guidance is provided in Section 6. and the decay of these forces with time and distance. (2) comparisons with forces imposed by other extreme loads. likely targets. controlled access zones. The primary focus is on building shape. which contains extensive qualitative design guidance for limiting or mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks. Chapter 4 focuses on damage caused by explosions. and likelihood of occurrence. each chapter identifies references for further reading. Topics include (1) progressive collapse. Because explosive attacks are expected to remain the dominant terrorist threat. Chapter 2 focuses principally on bomb (explosion) threats. most of the guidance in the document relates to explosions and limiting their effects.1. which discusses blast pressure waves. placement. Structural design issues are discussed in Section 6.

Issues discussed include air intakes. air intakes. loading docks. Primer for Designing Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks. including desirable attributes of the system. return air systems. buildings that include retail uses. FEMA 429.6 addresses issues specific to chemical.e. window systems.structural system. emergency elevators. Chapter 7 discusses special considerations for multi-family residential buildings. and evolving technologies for CBR prevention. and the communication system. and other openings. Specific guidance is provided on exterior wall and cladding design. Issues relating to the design and placement of mechanical and electrical systems are described in Section 6. management of emergency response using the fire/HVAC control center. including the relationship between security design and design for conventional loads. Section 6. Federal Emergency Management Agency. exterior walls and cladding. Chapter 8 discusses cost issues. mullion design. and interior walls. smoke-control systems. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. i. and light-industrial buildings. and radiological protection. interior columns. multi-hazard considerations. Federal Emergency Management Agency. positive pressurization. Finally. Guidance is also given on wall design. and the design of other openings (doors and louvers).. detection systems.4 addresses the building envelope. filtration systems. FEMA 428. the smoke and fire detection and alarm systems. the fire-control center. 1-4 INTRODUCTION . fuel storage. including some general suggestions on prioritizing potential security enhancements. including glass design. focusing on the exterior frame. and (5) the design of critical structural elements. the sprinkler and standpipe system.3 FURTHER READING Other recently issued FEMA documents related to man-made hazards are listed below. mechanical areas. Primer for Terrorist Risk Reduction in High Occupancy Buildings. emergency power systems. (3) structural layout (the placement of structural elements). air-tightness. Section 6. (4) design methods. vulnerable internal areas (lobbies. zoning of HVAC systems. Federal Emergency Management Agency. floor system. FEMA 426. Window design is given special consideration. and frame and anchorage design. and mail sorting areas). 1. Topics addressed include emergency egress routes.5. ventilation systems. roof system. biological.

FEMA 430. Security Component for Architectural Design.Federal Emergency Management Agency. INTRODUCTION 1-5 .


Finally. which are listed below. and Radiological Threats: ❍ ❍ ❍ Large-scale. The critical location is a function of the site. the loading dock. Vehicle bombs are able to deliver a sufficiently large quantity of explosives to cause potentially devastating structural damage.2 EXPLOSIVE ATTACKS From the standpoint of structural design. depending on the level of protection incorporated into the design. as are the techniques for making bombs.TERRORIST THREATS 2. the vehicle bomb is the most important consideration. the curb directly outside the facility. Small weapons can cause the greatest damage when brought into vulnerable. the critical location is taken to be at the closest point that a vehicle can approach. Another explosive attack threat is the small bomb that is hand delivered. such as the build- TERRORIST THREATS 2-1 . 2. unsecured areas of the building interior. air-borne release External release targeting building Internal release Although it is possible that the dominant threat mode may change in the future. the building layout. For a vehicle bomb. Security design intended to limit or mitigate damage from a vehicle bomb assumes that the bomb is detonated at a so-called critical location(see Figure 2-1).1 OVERVIEW OF POSSIBLE THREATS 2 This primer addresses several types of terrorist threats. Ingredients for homemade bombs are easily obtained on the open market. or at a vehicle-access control gate where inspection takes place. external. Explosive Threats: ❍ ❍ Vehicle weapon Hand-delivered weapon Airborne Chemical. Bombings are easy and quick to execute. Biological. the dramatic component of explosions in terms of the sheer destruction they cause creates a media sensation that is highly effective in transmitting the terrorist’s message to the public. This may be a parking area directly beneath the occupied building. bombings have historically been a favorite tactic of terrorists. and the security measures in place. assuming that all security measures are in place.

g. Handcarried explosives are typically on the order of five to ten pounds of TNT equivalent. mail room. in the 50 to 100 pounds TNT equivalent range. in a vehicle on the nearest public street).. and retail spaces. larger charge weights. However. can be readily carried in rolling cases.g. Mail bombs are typically less than ten pounds of TNT equivalent. in a briefcase smuggled past the screening station). the largest credible explosive size is a function of the security measures in place. In general. Recent events around the world make it clear that there is an increased likelihood that bombs will be delivered by persons who are willing to sacrifice their own lives. 2-2 TERRORIST THREATS .Figure 2-1 Schematic of vehicle weapon threat parameters and definitions ing lobby. reducing the size of the weapon that may gain access. and the smallest weapons are considered in the most secured areas of the building (e.. Each line of security may be thought of as a sieve. Therefore the largest weapons are considered in totally unsecured public space (e.

more building damage has been due to collateral effects than direct attack. Providing a level of protection that is consistent with standards adopted for federal office buildings enhances opportunities for leas- TERRORIST THREATS 2-3 . it should be noted that thousands of deliberate explosions occur every year within the United States. The design weapon size is typically measured in hundreds of pounds rather than thousands of pounds of TNT equivalent. but a highrisk building that is nearby. 3. but the vast majority of them have weapon yields less than five pounds. This is the approach that the federal government has taken in their design criteria for federally owned domestic office buildings. as well as data gathered by U. However. security consultants have valuable information that may be used to evaluate the range of charge weights that might be reasonably considered for the intended occupancy. The design weapon size is usually selected by the owner in collaboration with security and protective design consultants (i. A smaller explosive attack is far more likely. sources.Two parameters define the design threat: the weapon size. Security consultants draw upon the experience of other countries such as Great Britain and Israel where terrorist attacks have been more prevalent. measured in equivalent pounds of TNT. Further.S. 2. engineers who specialize in the design of structures to mitigate the effects of explosions). qualitatively it may be stated that the chance of a large-scale terrorist attack occurring is extremely low. The likely target is often not the building under design. The number of large-scale vehicle weapon attacks that have used hundreds of pounds of TNT during the past twenty years is by comparison very small. There are several reasons for this choice. it is common for the design pressures and impulses to be less than the actual peak pressures and impulses acting on the building. and the standoff. It is difficult to quantify the risk of man-made hazards. To put the weapon size into perspective.. The decision is usually based on a trade-off between the largest credible attack directed against the building and the design constraints of the project. Although there are few unclassified sources giving the sizes of weapons that have been used in previous attacks throughout the world. The standoff is the distance measured from the center of gravity of the charge to the component of interest. Historically. The design vehicle weapon size will usually be much smaller than the largest credible threat. 1.e.

Department of the Treasury.treas.gov/publications/ terror/terror99. Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance Tables. Technical Support Working Group.ing to government agencies in addition to providing a clear statement regarding the building’s safety to other potential tenants. Department of State. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2. Washington.tswg. Washington. Terrorism in the United States. (Request in writing.pdf The U. address information available at http://www.atf. 4. The U.htm Federal Bureau of Investigation. DC. Washington. 1999.htm U. Department of State.S. http://www. DC. U.C. Department of the Treasury / Bureau of Alcohol. Washington.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf/ 2-4 TERRORIST THREATS .S. ___. 1999.3 FURTHER READING Technical Support Working Group.gov/tswg/prods_pubs/ newBTSCPress. Counterterrorism Division. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. 2002. The added robustness inherent in designing for a vehicle bomb of moderate size will improve the performance of the building under all explosion scenarios. D.fbi.S.state. Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card with Explanation of Use.C. http:// www.gov/ pub/fire-explo_pub/i54001. http://www. Tobacco and Firearms. D. Department of Justice.S.

the wave is reflected. due to the supersonic velocity of the shock wave at impact. shock velocity.e. the shock wave becomes negative. the peak incident and reflected pressures of the shock wave and other useful parameters such as the incident and reflected impulse. short-duration earthquake. measured typically in thousandths of a second (milliseconds). the incident or over-pressures decrease.1 DESCRIPTION OF EXPLOSION FORCES 3 An explosion is an extremely rapid release of energy in the form of light. The shock wave consists of highly compressed air that wave-reflects off the ground surface to produce a hemispherical propagation of the wave that travels outward from the source at supersonic velocities (see Figure 2-1). creating a crater and generating a ground shock wave analogous to a high-intensity. a portion of the energy is also imparted to the ground. heat. WEAPONS EFFECTS 3-1 . The peak pressure is a function of the weapon size or yield. Immediately following the vacuum.WEAPONS EFFECTS 3. and time of arrival are evaluated using charts available in military handbooks. which creates suction behind the shock wave(see Figure 3-1). shock waves can reflect with an amplification factor of up to thirteen. followed by a partial vacuum. creating a powerful wind or drag pressure on all surfaces of the building.. caused by building features such as re-entrant corners and overhangs of the building may act to confine the air blast. Unlike acoustical waves. The pressures decay rapidly with time (i. Late in the explosive event. exponentially). For an explosive threat defined by its charge weight and standoff. which reflect with an amplification factor of two. air rushes in. In an external explosion. As the shock wave expands. and a shock wave. prolonging its duration. When it encounters a surface that is in line-of-sight of the explosion. and the cube of the distance (see Figure 3-2). Diffraction effects. resulting in a tremendous amplification of pressure. This wind picks up and carries flying debris in the vicinity of the detonation. sound. The magnitude of the reflection factor is a function of the proximity of the explosion and the angle of incidence of the shock wave on the surface.

Figure 3-1 Air-blast pressure time history Figure 3-2 Plots showing pressure decay with distance 3-2 WEAPONS EFFECTS .



These references provide charts for evaluating explosive loads as well as extensive information regarding the structural design of buildings to resist explosive attack. U.S. Air Force, 1989, ESL-TR-87-57, Protective Construction Design Manual, Contact Airbus Technologies Division (AFRL/MLQ) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, via e-mail to techinfo@afrl.af.mil. [Superseded by Army Technical Manual TM 5-855-1 (Air Force Pamphlet AFPAM 32-1147(I), Navy Manual NAVFAC P-1080, DSWA Manual DAHSCWEMAN-97), December 1997] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990, TM 5-1300, Structures to Resist Accidental Explosions, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., (also Navy NAVFAC (Naval Facilities) P-397, Air Force Regulation 88-2); Contact David Hyde, U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, Mississippi 39180 or via e-mail to hyded@ex1.wes.army.mil U.S. Department of Energy, 1992, DOE/TIC 11268, A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loadings on Structures, Southwest Research Institute, Albuquerque, New Mexico.







The extent and severity of damage and injuries in an explosive event cannot be predicted with perfect certainty. Past events show that the specifics of the failure sequence for an individual building due to airblast effects and debris impact significantly affect the overall level of damage. For instance, two adjacent columns of a building may be roughly the same distance from the explosion, but only one fails because it is struck by a fragment in a particular way that initiates collapse. The other, by chance, is not struck and remains in place. Similarly, glass failures may occur outside of the predicted areas due to air-blast diffraction effects caused by the arrangement of buildings and their heights in the vicinity of the explosion. The details of the physical setting surrounding a particular occupant may greatly influence the level of injury incurred. The position of the person, seated or standing, facing towards or away from the event as it happens, may result in injuries ranging from minor to severe. Despite these uncertainties, it is possible to calculate the expected extent of damage and injuries to be expected in an explosive event, based on the size of the explosion, distance from the event, and assumptions about the construction of the building. Additionally, there is strong evidence to support a relationship between injury patterns and structural damage patterns.



Damage due to the air-blast shock wave may be divided into direct airblast effects and progressive collapse. Direct air-blast effects are damage caused by the high-intensity pressures of the air blast close to the explosion. These may induce localized failure of exterior walls, windows, roof systems, floor systems, and columns. Progressive collapse refers to the spread of an initial local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in a disproportionate extent of collapse relative to the zone of initial damage. Localized damage due to direct air-blast effects may or may not progress, depending on the design and construction of the building. To produce a progressive collapse, the weapon must be in close proximity to a critical load-bearing element. Progressive collapse can propagate vertically upward or downBUILDING DAMAGE 4-1

For hand-carried weapons that are brought into the building and placed on the floor away from a primary vertical load-bearing element. and 1. ductwork. false ceilings. it enters the structure. window treatments. pushing both upward on the ceilings and downward on the floors (see Figure 4-1). Ronan Point1) from the source of the explosion. damage and possible localized failure for the floor system above the weapon. Britain and Europe. As a result. “Ronan Point" is the name of a high-rise pre-cast housing complex in Britain that suffered progressive collapse in 1968 due to a gas explosion in a kitchen in a corner bay of the building. precipitating funding for research and development in the United States. The explosion caused the collapse of all corner bays below it and was a seminal event for progressive collapse. because floor slabs typically have a large surface area for the pressure to act on and a comparably small thickness. failure of nonstructural elements such as partition walls.ward (e.g. Floor failure is particularly common for close-in and internal explosions. The shock wave also acts in directions that the building may not have been designed for. ❍ ❍ 4-2 BUILDING DAMAGE . Floor failure is common in large-scale vehicle-delivered explosive attacks. which may lead to structural instability. The loss of a floor system increases the unbraced height of the supporting columns. the response will be more localized with damage and injuries extending a bay or two in each direction (see Figure 4-2). such as upward pressure on the floor system. The pressures that an explosion exerts on building surfaces may be several orders of magnitude greater than the loads for which the building is designed. Britain developed a set of implicit design requirements to resist progressive collapse in buildings and. the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) produced some state-of-the-practice reports on this topic. and it can propagate laterally from bay to bay as well. In terms of sequence of response. the air-blast effects are amplified due to multiple reflections from interior surfaces. The pressure wave pushes on the exterior walls and may cause wall failure and window breakage. in the 1970s. the air blast first impinges the exterior envelope of the building. Although the weapon is smaller. Typical damage types that may be expected include: ❍ ❍ localized failure of the floor system immediately below the weapon. As the shock wave continues to expand. damage and possible localized failure of nearby concrete and masonry walls..

may occur if the weapon is strategically placed directly against a primary load-bearing element such as a column. It is not uncommon for the peak pressure on the building from a vehicle weapon parked along the curb to be in excess of 100 psi. ❍ The intensity of the localized pressures acting on building components can be several orders of magnitude greater than these other hazards. More extensive damage. an explosive attack has several distinguishing features. In comparison to other hazards such as earthquake or wind. computer equipment. and other contents. in close proximity to the building. Major damage and failure of building components is expected even for relatively small weapons. listed below. 4-3 BUILDING DAMAGE . possibly leading to progressive collapse.Figure 4-1 Schematic showing sequence of building damage due to a vehicle weapon ❍ flying debris generated by furniture.

earthquake events last for seconds and wind loads may act on the building for minutes or longer. measured in thousandths of a second. As a result. In terms of timing. the building is engulfed by the shockwave and direct air-blast damage occurs within tens to hundreds of milliseconds from the time of detonation due to the supersonic velocity of the shock wave and the nearly instantaneous response of the structural elements. ❍ 4-4 BUILDING DAMAGE . By comparison. causing a wide range of damage types. air blast tends to cause more localized damage than other hazards that have a more global effect. The duration of the event is very short. may vary significantly. Pressures acting on the building.Figure 4-2 Schematics showing sequence of building damage due to a package weapon ❍ Explosive pressures decay extremely rapidly with distance from the source. particularly on the side facing the explosion. (milliseconds).

For instance. For the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (see Figure 4-3).3 CORRELATION BETWEEN DAMAGE AND INJURIES Three types of building damage can lead to injuries and possible fatalities. Figure 4-3 Exterior view of Alfred P. Most of these were unreinforced masonry structures that fortunately were largely unoccupied at the time of the attack. caused hundreds of fatalities.S. fatalities may occur as a result of flying structural debris. in the Oklahoma City bombing. embassy in Nairobi. a concrete building adjacent to the embassy. Kenya in 1998. Some examples of exterior wall failure causing injuries are listed below. Murrah Federal Building collapse Although the targeted building is at greatest risk of collapse. Depending on the severity of the incident. In the bombing of the U. Murrah Federal Office Building. For buildings that remain standing. the collapse of the Uffundi building. nearly 90 percent of the building occupants who lost their lives were in the collapsed portion of the Alfred P.4. Many of the survivors in the collapsed region were on the lower floors and had been trapped in void spaces under concrete slabs. other nearby buildings may also collapse. a total of nine buildings collapsed. In past incidents. The most severe building response is collapse. collapse has caused the most extensive fatalities. the next most severe type of injuryproducing damage is flying debris generated by exterior cladding. BUILDING DAMAGE 4-5 .

Even if the building remains standing and no structural damage occurs.S.S. the exterior unreinforced masonry infill wall of the concreteframed embassy building blew inward. embassy in Dar es Salaam. The massiveness of the construction generated relatively low-velocity projectiles that injured and partially buried occupants.❍ In the Oklahoma City bombing. most of the 19 U. reinforced concrete structure with robust connections between the slabs and walls. The numerous lines of vertical support along with the ample lateral stability provided by the “egg crate” configuration of the structural system prevented collapse. several persons lost their lives after being struck by structural debris generated by infill walls of a concrete frame building in the Water Resources building across the street from the Murrah building. extensive injuries can occur due to nonstructural damage (see 4-6 BUILDING DAMAGE . Tanzania in 1998. ❍ Figure 4-4 Exterior view of Khobar Towers exterior wall failure ❍ In the bombing of the U. servicemen who loss their lives were impacted by highvelocity projectiles created by the failed exterior cladding on the wall that faced the weapon. In the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 (see Figure 4-4). but did not cause fatalities. The building was an all-precast.

S. An example of nonstructural damage causing injuries is the extensive glass lacerations that occurred in the Oklahoma City Bombing within the Regency Towers apartment building. for large-scale incidents. Another example is the bombing of the U. which was heavily populated at the time of the bombing. Although these injuries are often not life-threatening. Figure 4-5 Photograph showing non-structural damage in building impacted by blast BUILDING DAMAGE 4-7 . who was attending a meeting at an office building across from the embassy. causing extensive glass lacerations to passersby. which was approximately 500 feet from the Murrah Building. In this incident. A summary of the relationship between the type of damage and the resulting injuries is given in Table 4-1. glass laceration injuries extended as far as 10 blocks from the bombing. many people can be affected. The ambassador. which has an impact on the ability of local medical resources to adequately respond. sustained an eye injury as a result of extensive window failure in the building. Typically. these types of injuries occur to persons who are in buildings that are within several blocks of the incident. embassy in Nairobi. Kenya. The explosion occurred near one of the major intersections of the city.Figure 4-5).

D.org/publications/booksdisplay. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Department of State. S. DC. Waxweiler. Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington. http://jama.4 FURTHER READING Federal Emergency Management Agency. Department of State.house.fema. 1999. Reston.. http://www.ama-assn. FEMA 403. Lessons from the Oklahoma City Bombing: Defensive Design Techniques. Preliminary Observations. Washington. 1996. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE Press).gov/www/regions/africa/accountability_report.gov/library/wtcstudy.S. Washington. D. Stennies.html Mallonee. 1996. S. Statement of Chairman Floyd D. D. World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection. Hogan.state. exterior bay floor slab damage Window breakage. Vol. http://www. 2002.gov/mit/bpat/bpat009. Washington. The House National Security Committee. The Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7. G.cfm?type=9702295 The House National Security Committee. falling light fixtures. 1997. R... Spence on the Report of the Bombing of Khobar Towers.shtm Hinman. E.htm Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1998. concussion Lacerations from flying glass. http:// www.fema. DC.pdf U. The Journal of the American Medical Association. Physical injuries and fatalities resulting from the Oklahoma City bombing. 1996..C. F.gov/hasc/Publications/104thCongress/Reports/ saudi. abrasions from being thrown against objects or objects striking occupants 4. 276 No. The Oklahoma City Bombing: Improving Building Performance through Multi-Hazard Mitigation. D. VA. FEMA 277.. 5: pages 382-387.. and Recommendations. & Jordan.org/cgi/con4-8 BUILDING DAMAGE . http://www. Shariat. flying debris Associated Injuries Fatality due impact and crushing Skull fracture.. http:// www.Table 4-1: Damage and Injuries due to Explosion Effects Distance from Explosion Close-in Moderate Far Most Severe Building Damage Expected General Collapse Exterior wall failure.asce.C. and Hammond.

tent/abstract/276/5/382?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=oklaho ma+city+bombing&searchid=1048882533579_3224&stored_search=&FIRSTINDEX=0 BUILDING DAMAGE 4-9 .


and recovery efforts through effective placement. Furthermore. the majority of fatalities that occur in terrorist attacks directed against buildings are due to building collapse.DESIGN APPROACH 5. the objective is to minimize loss of life. and facilitating evacuation/ rescue the objective is to reduce flying debris generated by failed exteDESIGN APPROACH 5-1 .1 GOALS OF THE DESIGN APPROACH 5 It is impractical to design a civilian structure to remain undamaged from a large explosion. it is recognized that the building will be unusable after the event. Preventing the building from collapsing is the most important objective. For an office. building design may be optimized by facilitating evacuation. structural design. the primary goals of the design professional are to reduce building damage and to prevent progressive collapse of the building. The protective objectives are therefore related to the type of building and its function.. Through effective structural design. The design professional is able to reduce building damage by incorporating access controls that allow building security to keep large threats away from the building and to limit charge weights that can be brought into the building. Collapse prevention begins with awareness by architects and engineers that structural integrity against collapse is important enough to be routinely considered in design. To save lives. Historically. design for the building to remain standing following the removal of specific elements) or by direct design of components for air-blast loading. at least until it can be fully evacuated. where the primary asset is the occupants. A secondary goal is to maintain emergency functions until evacuation is complete. Moreover. and redundancy of emergency exits and critical mechanical/electrical systems. residential. At a higher level. the goals are by necessity modest. designing the building to prevent progressive collapse can be accomplished by the alternate-path method (i. retail. Beyond the issues of preventing collapse. This approach is considered a damage-limiting or damage-mitigating approach to design.e. the overall damage levels may be reduced to make it easier it is for occupants to get out and emergency responders to safely enter. or light industrial building. Features to improve general structural resistance to collapse can be incorporated into common buildings at affordable cost. rescue. Because of the severity of large scale explosion incidents.

and structural hardening. structural engineer. selected to minimize injuries. good anti-terrorist design is a multidisciplinary effort requiring the concerted efforts of the architect. It is also critical for security design to be incorporated as early as possible in the design process to ensure a cost-effective. attractive solution. 5. These components are interrelated (see Figure 5-1). Figure 5-1 Components of security 5-2 DESIGN APPROACH . A well designed system will provide predictable damage modes. windows and other components to reduce the severity of injuries and the risk of fatalities. security professional. operational protection.rior walls. The components of security include deception.2 SECURITY PRINCIPLES This section provides some fundamental security concepts that place physical security into the context of overall facility security. intelligence. and the other design team members. Finally. This may be accomplished through selection of appropriate materials and use of capacity-design methods to proportion elements and connections.

for this may have the opposite of the intended affect and provide an incentive to attack the building. structural hardening is provided to save lives and facilitate evacuation and rescue by preventing building collapse and limiting flying debris. If the attack does occur. Alternatively. Delaying the attack. it is imperative for the owner and security professional to define early in the design process what extent of operational security is planned for various threat levels. If these precautions are implemented and the attack still takes place. struc5-3 ❍ ❍ DESIGN APPROACH . physical security measures will contribute toward the goals listed below in prioritized order. If an attack is initiated. This will give the security forces and authorities time to mobilize and possibly to stop the attack before it is executed. If properly implemented. In the context of the overall security provided to the building. and sensors) to provide layers of defense that delay and/or thwart the attack. By making it more difficult to implement some of the more obvious attack scenarios (such as a parked car in the street) or making the target appear to be of low value in terms of the amount of sensation that would be generated if it were attacked.g. On the other hand. it may not be advantageous to make the facility too obviously protected or not protected. As a last resort. then structural protection efforts will serve to control the extent and consequences of damage. Because of the interrelationship between physical and operational security measures.Ideally. guards. a potential terrorist attack is prevented or pre-empted through intelligence measures. thereby delaying the attack. surveillance. properly designed landscape or architectural features can delay its execution by making it more difficult for the attacker to reach the intended target.. a serpentine path and/or a division of functions within the facility. This is done by creating a buffer zone between the publicly accessible areas and the vital areas of the facility by means of an obstacle course. the attacker could be enticed to a non-critical part of the facility. through effective design. physical security measures combine with operational forces (e. Deception can also be used to misdirect the attacker to a portion of the facility that is non-critical. thereby making it appear to be a less attractive target. ❍ Preventing an attack. the would-be attacker may become discouraged from targeting the building. Deception may be used to make the facility appear to be a more protected or lower-risk facility than it actually is. Mitigating the effects of the attack.

then the building exterior. to the more private areas of offices. The interior of the building may be divided into successively more protected zones. Interior to this line is the approach zone to the facility. not all of the focus is on the 5-4 DESIGN APPROACH . Having multiple lines of defense provides redundancy to the security system. adding robustness to the design. The outermost layer is the perimeter Figure 5-2 Schematic showing lines of defense against blast of the facility. The advantage of this approach is that once a line of protection is breached. by using this approach. In the event of an attack. Also. An effective way to implement these goals is to create layers of security within the facility (see Figure 5-2). and finally the building interior. and finally the vital functions such as the control room and emergency functions. starting with publicly accessible areas such as the lobby and retail space. the facility has not been completely compromised.tural protection is a last resort that only becomes effective after all other efforts to stop the attack have failed. the benefits of enhancements to life-safety systems may be realized in lives saved.

DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. both physical and operational security measures need to be implemented in the facility. refer to FEMA 426 (Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High-Occupancy Buildings). each ring must have a uniform level of security provided along its entire length. 2001.cfm?&pubID=105 U. Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects. D. 2001. Department of Defense. 2002.S. UFC 4-010-01. For more information on security. If security measures are left as an afterthought. fortress-like appearance. Architectural Engineering Design Guidelines (5 Volumes) [For Official Use Only] DESIGN APPROACH 5-5 . which may lead to an unattractive. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Design and Construction (DOT/FAA/AR-00/52). Department of State. Washington. Policy and Planning. which augments and facilitates the operational security functions.outer layer of protection.gsa. and make-shift security posts are the inevitable result. To provide a reliable design.C.S. Washington. http://www. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC). Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning. Washington D. Interagency Security Committee. expensive. [For Official Use Only] http://www. Federal Aviation Administration.gov/restricted/protectedfiles/ ISCCriteriaMay282001.oca.C. 5.3 FURTHER READING Listed below are sources for some of the existing protective design criteria prepared by the federal government using the damage-limiting approach. unattractive. Department of Defense.org/puglication/pubdetails. Architects and engineers can contribute to an effective physical security system.C. security is only as strong as the weakest link.PDF U. To have a balanced design. D. Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security Office of Civil Aviation Security.tisp. Federal Aviation Administration.


In some cases.1 through 6. design guidance is provided for limiting or mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks.1.. In this case.e. To push this line even further outward. Architectural. For discussion about building shape and placement on the site. building envelope. and other obstacles. In each section.1 Site location and Layout 6. The perimeter needs to be designed to prevent carriers of large-scale weapons from gaining access to the site. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-1 . eliminating loading zones and street/lane closings are an option. and radiological attacks are discussed in Section 6. Guidance is provided for each of the following aspects of design: site location and layout.5 6. Many times. Protective measures against chemical. 6. it is assumed that all large-scale explosive weapons (i. architectural.1 Perimeter Line The perimeter line of protection is the outermost line that can be protected by facility security measures.2 Architectural ommendations are given for enhancing life safety.DESIGN GUIDANCE In this chapter. It is recommended that the perimeter line be located as far as is practical from the building exterior. restricting or eliminating parking along the curb can be arranged with the local authorities.3 Structural 6 6. one of the most effective means of protecting assets is to increase the distance between a potential bomb and the assets to be protected. 6. In design. structural.2. see Section 6. design guidance is discussed and rec6. Sections 6. vulnerable buildings are located in urban areas where site conditions are tight. the options are obviously limited. the perimeter line can be pushed out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of bollards.5 pertain to attack using explosive weapons.6 Building Envelope Mechanical and Electrical Systems Chemical. car bombs or truck bombs) are outside this line of defense. This line is defended by both physical and operational security methods.4 6. Biological. The best way to do this is to provide a continuous line of security along the perimeter of the facility to protect it from unscreened vehicles and to keep all vehicles as far away from critical assets as possible. but this can be a difficult and time consuming effort. Often. and Radiological Protection This section discusses the perimeter and the approach to the building.6. and mechanical and electrical systems.1 SITE LOCATION AND LAYOUT Because air-blast pressures decrease rapidly with distance. 6. planters. Sections at a glance: biological.

Other ideas for implementing secure landscaping features may be found in texts on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Barrier design methods are discussed in more detail below. statues. in combination. The controlled access check or inspection points for vehicles require architectural features or barriers to maintain the defensible perimeter. Place parking as far as practical from the building. much can be done to delay an intruder. take precautions such as limiting access to these areas only to the building occu- 6-2 DESIGN GUIDANCE . high-strength cables hidden in bushes and any number of other obstacles that make it difficult to rapidly reach the building.1. Off-site parking is recommended for high-risk facilities vulnerable to terrorist attack. Examples include terraced landscaping.6. such as emphasizing the open nature characterizing high-population buildings. and site circulation. which makes it difficult for a vehicle to crash onto the site. anti-ram barriers capable of stopping a vehicle on impact are recommended for high-risk buildings. Architects and engineers can accommodate these security functions by providing adequate design for these areas. The location of access points should be oblique to oncoming streets so that it is difficult for a vehicle to gain enough velocity to break through these access locations. fountains. Though individually these features may not be able to stop a vehicle. for high-risk buildings. If the site provides straight-on access to the building. use of anti-ram barriers along the curb capable of withstanding the impact of high-velocity vehicles. where landscaping solutions are limited. they form a daunting obstacle course. If space is available between the perimeter line and the building exterior. planters. Deterrence and delay are major attributes of the perimeter security design that should be consistent with the landscaping objectives. trees. the objective is to make it difficult to successfully execute the easiest attack scenarios such as a car bomb detonated along the curb. staircases.2 Controlled Access Zones Access control refers to points of controlled access to the facility through the perimeter line. circular driveways. Since it is impossible to thwart all possible threats. These concepts are useful for slowing down traffic. If onsite surface parking or underground parking is provided. some mitigation options include concrete medians in the street to slow vehicles or. On the sides of the building that are close to the curb. or a vehicle jumping the curb and ramming into the building prior to detonation. improving surveillance.

the bollard needs to be fully embedded into a concrete strip foundation that is several feet deep.1 Passive Barriers Passive barriers are those that are fixed in place and do not allow for vehicle entry. A roughened. It can be expected that the planter will move as a result of the impact. For a successful design.1. 6. it may be appropriate to install surface-mounted systems such as planters.3 Physical Protective Barriers There are two basic categories of perimeter anti-ram barriers. To further reduce displacement. As a rule of thumb. the center-to-center spacing DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-3 . The height of the bollard above ground should be higher than the bumper of the vehicle.pants and/or having all vehicles inspected in areas close-in to the building. An example of a simple but effective landscaping solution is to install a deep permanent planter around the building with a wall that is as high as a car or truck bumper. the garage should be placed adjacent to the building under a plaza area rather than directly underneath the building. 6. and the number of bollards required to resist the impact. The spacing of the bollards is based on several factors including ADA (American Disabilities Act) requirements. These are to be used away from vehicle access points.1. passive (or fixed) and active (or operable). For lower-risk buildings without straight-on vehicular access.3. the planter may be placed several inches below the pavement surface. In order for them to resist the impact of a vehicle. or to use landscaping features to deter an intrusion threat. If an underground area is used for a high-risk building. The structure supporting the weight of the planter must be considered prior to installation. the maximum displacement of the planter should be less than the setback distance to the building. Each is described below. The majority of these are constructed in place. Bollards are concrete-filled steel pipes that are placed every few feet along the curb of a sidewalk to prevent vehicle intrusion. Individual planters mounted on the sidewalk resist impact through inertia and friction between the planter and the pavement. grouted interface surface will also improve performance. To the extent practical. The traditional anti-ram solution entails the use of bollards (see Figure 6-1). limit the size of vehicle that is able to enter the garage by imposing physical barriers on vehicle height. the minimum width of a vehicle.

The height of the bollard is to be at least as high as the bumper of the design threat vehicle. which often require special foundation details. Unless the foundation wall can sustain the reaction forces. An alternative to a bollard is a plinth wall. to place barriers with foundations near the curb. or the wall of a planter. Therefore. the barriers need to be placed as close to the curb as possible. which is a continuous knee wall constructed of reinforced concrete with a buried foundation (see Figure 6-2). which can be a difficult time-consuming effort to obtain. building owners are often inclined to place bollards along the property line. For effectiveness. the height needs to be at least as high as the vehicle bumper. To avoid this. However. 6-4 DESIGN GUIDANCE .Figure 6-1 Schematic of typical anti-ram bollard should be between three and five feet to be effective. the property line of buildings often does not extend to the curb. The foundation of the bollard and plinth wall system can present challenges. which significantly reduces the effectiveness of the barrier system. which is taken typically between two and three feet. The wall may be fashioned into a bench. a permit is required by the local authorities. There are sometimes vaults or basements below the pavement that extend to the property line. significant damage may occur. To be effective. a base for a fence.

An example of a simple but effective landscaping solution is to install a deep permanent planter around the building with a wall that is at least as high as a car or truck bumper. it is recommended that these issues be resolved during the design phase so that a reliable anti-ram barrier solution can be installed. it may be more appropriate to install surface-mounted systems such as planters or to use landscaping features to deter an intrusion threat.Figure 6-2 Schematic of typical anti-ram knee wall Below-ground utilities that are frequently close to the pavement surface present additional problems. However.3. 6-5 DESIGN GUIDANCE .1. for high-risk facilities. active or operational anti-ram systems are required. For lower-risk buildings without straight-on vehicular access. 6. This also can be a strong deterrent to selecting barriers with foundations as a solution. and this often leads to difficulties during construction. Solutions include: ❍ crash beams. Their location may not be known with certainty.2 Active Systems At vehicular access points. There are off-the-shelf products available that have been rated to resist various levels of car and truck impacts.

The kinetic energy imparted to the wall is one-half the product of the vehicle mass and its impact velocity squared. surface-mounted plate systems.e.1.4 Effectiveness of Anti-Ram Barriers The effectiveness of an anti-ram barrier is based on the amount of energy it can absorb versus the amount of kinetic energy imparted by vehicle impact. Because the velocity term is squared. straight road to pick up speed before impact. a change in velocity affects the energy level more than a change in vehicle weight. and the vehicle. Barrier effectiveness is ranked in terms of the amount of displacement of the system due to impact. retractable bollards. The angle of approach reduces this energy in non-headon situations. and rotating-wedge systems. Impact velocities typically range from 30 mph for oblique impact areas (i.e. the energy is absorbed through the deformational strain energy absorbed by the barrier. It is important that the installation of hydraulically operated systems be performed by a qualified contractor to ensure a reliable system that will work properly in all weather conditions. where the oncoming street is parallel to the curb) up to 50 mph where there is straight-on access (i. and the energy absorbed by the crushing of the vehicle also reduces the energy imparted to the barriers.000 lb for trucks. it is important to review lines of approach to define areas where a vehicle has a long. For movable systems (like a surface-mounted planter) energy is absorbed through shear friction against the pavement and vehicle deformation. where the oncoming street is perpendicular to the curb).. 6-6 DESIGN GUIDANCE . The first three systems listed above generally have lower impact ratings than the last two listed. soil. For this reason. The most effective systems stop the vehicles within three feet.❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ crash gates. The vehicle weight used for the design of barriers typically ranges from 4000 lb for cars up to 15. Check with the manufacturer to ensure that the system has been tested to meet the impact requirements for your project. The kinetic energy of the vehicle at impact is absorbed by the barrier system.. Standard ratings defined by the federal government define the distance the vehicle travels before it is brought to rest. 6. For fixed systems (like a concrete bollard).

D. T. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Applications Of Architectural Design And Space Management Concepts (2nd Ed.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/ 075067198X/103-7416668-4182264#product-details Newman.org/publications/pdf/def.C. National Capital Planning Commission.. Limit the number of vehicular entrances through the secured perimeter line Use a series of landscape features to create an obstacle course between the building and the perimeter. Creating Defensible Space. O. Designing for Security in the Nation’s Capital. http://www. Place vehicular access points away from oncoming streets.pdf DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-7 . Stoneham. This approach is most effective if used in areas where there is ample setback. Butterworth-Heinemann. Washington. 6.mil/dc/dcd/arch/force.5 Checklist – Site and Layout Design Guidance Provide a continuous line of defense around the site as far from the building as practical.ncpc. 2001. U. Select barriers rated to provide the desired level of protection against the design impact.1. Texas http://www. Washington. and the least effective systems require up to 50 feet.1.S. 6. Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence. Use anti-ram barriers along curbs. Massachusetts.brooks. ISBN: 075067198X http://www. D. http:// www.).gov/whats_new/ITFreport.. Installation Force Protection Guide. Use operable anti-ram barriers at vehicular access points. Design planters for the design-level impact to displace the planter a distance less than the setback.C.afcee. Brooks Air Force Base. 1997.moderately effective barriers stop the vehicle within 20 feet.amazon.6 Further Reading National Capital Planning Commission.pdf U.af. 2000.huduser. particularly on sides of the building that have a small setback and in areas where high-velocity impact is possible. 1996.pdf Crowe. D. Air Force.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

convex shapes are preferred over concave shapes. For a discussion of exterior cladding. since it is not certain who will occupy the neighboring properties during the life of the building. The placement of the building on the site can have a major impact on its vulnerability. At the building exterior. Ideally. These measures often cost nothing or very little if implemented early in the design process. It also is a critical line of defense for protecting the occupants of the building. placement. Building Envelope. Re-entrant corners and overhangs are likely to trap the shock wave and amplify the effect of the air blast. The shape of the building can have a contributing effect on the overall damage to the structure (see Figure 6-3). it also increases the vulnerability of the other three sides. The exterior envelope of the building is most vulnerable to an exterior explosive threat because it is the part of the building closest to the weapon.4. 6-8 DESIGN GUIDANCE . but unfortunate practice is to create a large plaza area in front of the building.2. the building is placed as far from the property lines as possible. Note that large or gradual re-entrant corners have less effect than small or sharp re-entrant corners and overhangs. When curved surfaces are used. They should be involved in the site selection and their input should be sought during programming and schematic design. A common. and it is typically built using brittle materials. the focus shifts from deterring and delaying the attack to mitigating the effects of an explosion.6. see Section 6. Though this practice may increase the monumental character of the building. and exterior ornamentation. It is recommended that protective design and security consultants are used as early as possible in the design process.1 Building Exterior This section discusses the building shape.2 ARCHITECTURAL There is much that can be done architecturally to mitigate the effects of a terrorist bombing on a facility. but the sides that are adjacent to adjoining properties. The reflected pressure on the surface of a circular building is less intense than on a flat building. but to leave little setback on the sides and rear of the building. 6. This applies not only to the sides that are adjacent to streets. Terraces that are treated as roof systems subject to downward loads require careful framing and detailing to limit internal damage to supporting beams.

If ornamentation is used. no parking can be permitted over the building. Soil can be highly effective in reducing the impact of a major explosive attack. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-9 . simple geometries and minimal ornamentation (which may become flying debris during an explosion) are recommended unless advanced structural analysis techniques are used. Note that if this approach is taken. or metal to become lethal projectiles in the event of an explosion. Bermed walls and buried roof tops have been found to be highly effective for military applications and can be effectively extended to conventional construction. it is preferable to use lightweight materials such as timber or plastic.Figure 6-3 Schematics showing the effect of building shape on air-blast impacts Generally. This type of solution can also be effective in improving the energy efficiency of the building. stone. which are less likely than brick.

placing parking areas outside the main footprint of the building can be highly effective in reducing the vulnerability to catastrophic collapse. If it is not possible to place Figure 6-4 Schematics showing an example approach for improving the layout of adjacent unsecured and secured areas 6-10 DESIGN GUIDANCE . Similarly. 6. these unsecured areas are placed exterior to the main building or along the edges of the building. and retail areas need to be separated from the secured areas of the building .Interior courtyards or atriums are other concepts for bringing light and a natural setting to the building without adding vulnerable openings to the exterior.2. For example. garage. loading dock. a separate lobby pavilion or loading dock area outside of the main footprint of the building (see Figure 6-4) provides enhanced protection against damage and potential building collapse in the event of an explosion at these locations. mail room. Ideally. unsecured areas such as the lobby.2 Building Interior In terms of functional layout.

but should be separated by a buffer area such as a storage area or corridor. light fixtures. ductwork. loading docks and other high-risk areas. Mechanically attaching light fixtures to the slab above as is done in high seismic areas is recommended. Secured occupied or critical areas should not be placed above or below unsecured areas. Emergency functions and elevator shafts are to be placed away from internal parking areas. Desks. Placing heavy equipment such as air conditioners near the floor rather than the ceiling is one idea for limiting this hazard. the placement of furniture can have an effect on injury levels. and using exposed ductwork as an architectural device are other ideas. conference tables. When determining whether secured and unsecured areas are adjacent to one another. False ceilings. elevator shafts became chimneys. These should be located outside the building along the curb or further away. Wherever possible it is recommended that the design be simplified to limit these hazards. Adequate queuing areas should be provided in front of lobby inspection stations so that visitors are not forced to stand outside during bad weather conditions or in a congested line inside a small lobby while waiting to enter the secured areas. Venetian blinds. they should be placed along the building exterior. A parking lane may be used for this purpose. In the 1993 World Trade Center bombing incident. Finally. and other similar furniture should be placed DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-11 . and storage areas should be located between public and secured areas. consider the layout on each floor and the relationship between floors. transmitting smoke and heat from the explosion in the basement to all levels of the building. elevator shafts. Secondary stairwells. Vehicular queuing and inspection stations need to be accounted for in design of the loading docks and vehicle access points.vulnerable areas outside the main building footprint. air conditioners. Occupied areas or emergency functions should not be placed immediately adjacent to the lobby. This hindered evacuation and resulted in smoke inhalation injuries. Using fabric curtains or plastic vertical blinds rather than metal Venetian blinds. The interior wall area and exposed structural columns in unsecured lobby areas should be minimized. and the building layout should be used to create internal “hard lines” or buffer zones. and other nonstructural components may become flying debris in the event of an explosion. corridors.

4 Further Reading The American Institute of Architects. Washington. Architectural Record.org/security GSA. New York. pages 135-160..C. D. http:// archrecord.asp 6-12 DESIGN GUIDANCE . Place desks and conference tables as far from exterior windows as practical.2. Washington. S. and their Clients. not the monitor.3 Checklist – Architectural Use simple geometries without sharp re-entrant corners. 2002. http:// www. 6. Limit nonstructural elements such as false ceilings and metal blinds on the interior.as far from exterior windows facing streets as practical. The American Institute of Architects. Mechanically fasten light fixtures to the floor system above. 6. Desks with computer monitors should be oriented away from the window to prevent injury due to the impact of the monitor. In the Aftermath of September 11. Design Professionals. Place the building on the site as far from the perimeter as practical. the Urban Landscape Appears Vulnerable and Random: Architects and Consultants Focus on Risk Assessment and Security Through Design. General Services Administration.gov/pbs/pc/ gd_files/SecurityOpenness.C. http://hydra.com/CONTEDUC/ARTICLES/ 03_02_1. Provide sufficient queuing areas at lobby and delivery entrances.construction. Use lightweight nonstructural elements to reduce flying debris hazards. 1999.pdf Hart. Orient desks with computer monitors to face away from windows so the chair back faces the window. D. New York. Place unsecured areas exterior to the main structure or along the exterior of the building.aia.2.gsa. Building Security through Design: A Primer for Architects. 2001. Balancing Security and Openness: A Thematic Summary of a Symposium on Security and the Design of Public Buildings. March 2002. Separate unsecured and secured areas horizontally and vertically using buffer zones and/or hardening of walls and floors.

it is therefore prudent to provide protection against progressive collapse initiated by a localized structural failure caused by an undefined threat. New York. B. and air blast entering the building. 1998. Architectural Record.3 STRUCTURAL Given the evolving nature of the terrorist threat. Lehigh University. 1. one may use an implicit design approach that incorporates measures to increase the overall robustness of the structure. New York. http:// www. Pennsylvania. incorporating these measures into the overall building design should be given the highest priority when considering structural design approaches for mitigating the effects of attacks. and detailing of connections to enhance overall structural robustness. A. Explicit design of secondary structural components to mitigate the direct effects of air-blast enhances life safety by providing protection against localized failure.3. 6.org/ 6.com/CONTEDUC/ARTICLES/3_98_1. Indirect Method: Consider incorporating general structural integrity measures throughout the process of structural system selection. http://www. In lieu of calculations demonstrating the effects of explosions on buildings. Designing for Security. Specific issues related to structural protection measures are discussed separately in the sections below.ctbuh. member proportioning. flying debris. Because of the catastrophic consequences of progressive collapse. Building Safety Enhancement Guidebook. pages 145-148. structural layout. These measures are discussed in the sub-sections below on structural systems. It may also facilitate evacuation and rescue by limiting the overall damage level and improving access by emergency personnel. March 1998.Nadel. Each is described below with an emphasis on how the method is applied in the situation where explosive loads are the initiating cause of collapse. 196-197.asp Council on Tall Buildings an Urban Habitat..archrecord. 2002. it is impossible to predict what threats may be of concern during the lifetime of the building. This minimum standard is likely to be the primary method used for design of the type of buildings that are the focus of this primer. and structural elements. Bethlehem. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-13 . layout of walls and columns.1 Progressive Collapse ASCE-7 defines three ways to approach the structural design of buildings to mitigate damage due to progressive collapse.

To resist the direct effects of air-blast. the structural characteristics listed below are desirable. the analysis is likely to benefit from advice of the protective design consultant regarding element loss scenarios that should be considered in design. Shear Capacity. These are discussed below in the subsection on direct design methods with additional information in the subsection on structural elements. Primary members and/or their connections should ensure that flexural capacity is achieved prior to shear failure. The characteristics of air-blast loading have been previously discussed. ❍ 6-14 DESIGN GUIDANCE .2 Building Structural Systems In the selection of the structural system. 3. The structural engineer can usually perform the necessary analyses. consider both the direct effects of air-blast and the potential for progressive collapse in the event that a critical structural component fails. ❍ Mass. Blast-mitigating structural design or hardening generally focuses on the structural members on the lower floor levels that are closest to defined stationary exterior vehicle weapon threats. a building with steel deck (without concrete fill) roof construction will have little air-blast resistance. For example. Alternate-Load-Path Method: Localize response by designing the structure to carry loads by means of an alternate load path in the event of the loss of a primary load-bearing component. Lightweight construction is unsuitable for providing air-blast resistance. The method does not require characterization of the explosive threat. Explosive loads for a defined threat may be explicitly considered in design by using nonlinear dynamic analysis methods. Specific Local-Resistance Method: Explicitly design critical vertical loadbearing building components to resist the design-level explosive forces. Avoiding brittle shear failure significantly increases the structure’s ability to absorb energy. Useful references are provided at the end of this section that directly relate to progressive collapse prevention. 6. with or without guidance from a protective design consultant. This method provides a formal check of the capability of the structure to resist collapse following the removal of specific elements. The alternate-loadpath method has been selected by agencies including the General Services Administration (GSA) as the preferred approach for preventing progressive collapse.2. However. such as a building column at the building perimeter.3.

members and their connections may have to maintain their strength while undergoing large deformations. Certain systems such as prestressed concrete may have little resistance to upward forces. This is the material used for military bunkers. To reduce the risk of progressive collapse in the event of the loss of structural elements. in general the level of protection that may be a achieved using these materials is lower than what is achieved using well-designed. Ductility. An integrated system of ties in perpendicular directions along the principal lines of structural framing can serve to redistribute loads during catastrophic events. Finally. The performance of a conventional steel frame with concrete fill over metal deck depends on the connection details.❍ Capacity for Reversing Loads. More information about the response of these DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-15 . It has significant mass. because the mass is often mobilized only after the pressure wave is significantly diminished. Ties. Current testing programs are investigating the effectiveness of various conventional building systems. which improves response to explosions. ❍ Redundancy. The use of headed studs is recommended for affixing concrete fill over steel deck to beams for uplift resistance. concrete columns are less susceptible to global buckling in the event of the loss of a floor system. ❍ ❍ Historically. the structural traits listed below should be incorporated. Reinforced concrete has a number of attributes that make it the construction material of choice. reinforced concrete. however. The incorporation of redundant load paths in the vertical-load-carrying system helps to ensure that alternate load paths are available in the event of failure of structural elements. The resistance of load-bearing wall structures varies to a great extent. Seated connection systems for steel and precast concrete may also have little resistance to uplift. Primary members and their connections should resist upward pressure. reducing deformations. Members can be readily proportioned and reinforced for ductile behavior. Pre-tensioned or post-tensioned construction provides little capacity for abnormal loading patterns and load reversals. the preferred material for explosion-mitigating construction is cast-in-place reinforced concrete. In a catastrophic event. The construction is unparalleled in its ability to achieve continuity between the members. and the military has performed extensive research and testing of its performance. cast-in-place.

The exterior bay is the most vulnerable to damage. whereas increased mass generally improves performance under explosive loads. ❍ In frame structures. particularly for buildings that are close to public streets. Exterior Envelope. column spacing should be limited. As an example. Finally.3 Structural Layout To enhance the overall robustness of the structure. It is highly desirable to add redundant transfer systems where transfer girders are required. 6. increasing their vulnerability to air-blast effects.3. Take note that measures taken to mitigate explosive loads may reduce the structure’s performance under other types of loads. if needed. perpendicular walls or substantial pilasters should be provided at a regular spacing to control the amount of wall that is likely to be affected. In bearing-wall systems that rely on exterior walls. It is also less capable of redistributing loads in the event of member loss. interior longitudinal walls should be periodically spaced to enhance stability and to control the lateral progression of damage. Loss of a transfer girder or one of its supports can destabilize a significant area of the building. Large column spacing decreases likelihood that the structure will be able to redistribute load in event of column failure. increased mass generally increases the design forces for seismic loads. Careful consideration between the 6-16 DESIGN GUIDANCE . the measures listed below are recommended.systems is described in the subsection on structural elements and in the section on exterior cladding in Section 6. In bearing-wall systems that rely primarily on interior cross-walls. It is desirable to have a shallow bay adjacent to the building exterior to limit the extent of damage. the designer must make sure that all conventional load requirements are still met. ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ 6.3.4. then evaluate the structure’s response to explosive loads and augment the design. Transfer girders are often found at the building exterior to accommodate loading docks or generous entries. since two-way load distribution is not possible. and therefore an iterative approach may be needed. Use of transfer girders is strongly discouraged.4 Direct Design Methods The direct design approach (Figure 6-5) to be used for the structural protective measures is to first design the building for conventional loads. This approach ensures that the design meets all the requirements for gravity and natural hazards in addition to air-blast effects.

Analytical models range from handbook methods to equivalent single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) models to finite element (FE) representation. Difficulties involve the selection of the model DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-17 . numerical computation requires adequate resolution in space and time to account for the high-intensity. For SDOF and FE methods. Nonlinear dynamic analysis techniques are similar to those currently used in advanced seismic analysis.Figure 6-5 Direct design process flow chart protective design consultant and the structural engineer is needed to provide an optimized design. short-duration loading and nonlinear response (Figure 6-6).

Whenever possible. These charts require only knowledge of the fundamental period of the element. material behavior can be modeled using idealized elastic. Components such as beams. and appropriate failure modes. Charts are available that provide damage estimates for various types of construction. or walls can often be modeled by a SDOF system and the governing equation of motion solved by using numerical methods. Note variation of force and displacement with time. perfectly-plastic stress-deformation functions. For SDOF systems. the interpretation of the results for structural design details. the peak pressure applied to the element. and finally. There are also charts available in text books and military handbooks for linearly decaying loads. as a function of peak pressure and peak impulse. The model properties selected provide the same peak displace6-18 DESIGN GUIDANCE . its ultimate resistance force. results are checked against data from tests and experiments for similar structures and loadings. based on analysis or empirical data. slabs.Figure 6-6 Single-degree-of-feedom model for explosive loads. which provide the peak response and circumvent the need to solve differential equations. based on actual structural support conditions and strain-rate-enhanced material properties. Military design handbooks typically provide this type of design information. and the equivalent linear decay time to evaluate the peak displacement response of the system. The design of the anchorage and supporting structural system can be evaluated by using the ultimate flexural capacity obtained from the dynamic analysis.

In some cases. depending on the peak ductility.ment and fundamental period as the actual structural system in flexure. The time and cost of the analysis cannot be ignored when choosing design procedures. the cost of analysis must be justified in terms of benefits to the project and increased confidence in the reliability of the results. depending on the material and the acceptable damage level. the loading is greatly diminished. Elastic static calculations are likely to give overly conservative design solutions if the peak pressure is considered without the effect of load duration. the engineer must resort to finite-element numerical time integration techniques and/or explosive testing. the mass and the resistance functions are multiplied by mass and load factors. This is because by the time the mass is mobilized. Furthermore. moderate. Note that these values are typically based on limited testing and are not well defined within the industry at this time. an SDOF approach will be used for the preliminary design. it is possible to enhance the material strength to account for strain-rate effects. Because the design process is a sequence of iterations. Furthermore. and/or explosive testing may be used for the final verification of the design. we are able to account for the very short duration of the loading. and a more sophisticated approach using finite elements.. For more complex elements. Maximum permissible values vary. In dynamic nonlinear analysis. by accepting that damage occurs it is possible to account for the energy absorbed by ductile systems through plastic deformation. response is evaluated by comparing the ductility (i. the peak displacement divided by the elastic limit displacement) and/or support rotation (the angle between the support and the point of peak deflection) to empirically established maximum values that have been established by the military through explosive testing. the inertial effect included in dynamic computations greatly improves response. In addition. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-19 . Finally.e. Levels of damage computed by means of analysis may be described by the terms minor. because the loading is so rapid. A dynamic nonlinear approach is more likely than a static approach to provide a section that meets the design constraints of the project. it is important to account for the short duration to properly model the structural response. Because the peak pressure levels are so high. or major. enhancing response. By using dynamic calculations instead of static. which estimate the actual portion of the mass or load participating in the deflection of the member along its span.

Because columns do not have much surface area. if the building has been designed for loss of primary members. extensive fatalities are expected. the latter in the sub-section on structural integrity. The former is discussed in this section. Injuries and possible fatalities are expected. air-blast loads on columns tend to be mitigated by “clear-time effects”. Generally. Building Envelope.5 Structural Elements Because direct explosion effects decay rapidly with distance. moderate damage at the design threat level is a reasonable design goal for new construction. the local response of structural components is the dominant concern. Moderate: Structural damage is confined to a localized area and is usually repairable. A brief description of each damage level is given below. However. and fatalities are possible but unlikely. slabs.3. The first is to design the exterior columns to resist the direct effects of the specified threats. This refers to the pressure wave washing around these slender tall members. 6. and non-load-bearing walls.5. Major: Loss of primary structural components such as columns or transfer girders precipitates loss of additional adjacent members that are adjacent to or above the lost member. On the other hand. and consequently the entire duration of the pressure wave does not act upon them. Minor: Nonstructural failure of building elements such as windows. 6.3. In this case.support rotation and collateral effects. the critical threat is directly across from them.4. The second is to ensure that the exterior frame has sufficient structural integrity to accept localized failure without initiating progressive collapse. which is typically several times larger than the incident or overpressure wave that is propagating through the air. doors. Building is usually not repairable. so they are loaded with the peak reflected pressure. Injuries may be expected.1 Exterior Frame There are two primary considerations for the exterior frame. General principles governing the design of critical components are discussed below. Exterior cladding and glazing issues are discussed in Section 6. 6-20 DESIGN GUIDANCE . localized loss of columns may be accommodated. Structural failure is limited to secondary structural members such as beams. cladding. and false ceilings.

Welding details. Some suggestions for mitigating this concern are listed below. buckling and shear are the primary effects to be considered in analysis. exterior columns should be capable of spanning two or more stories without buckling. This may be an appropriate solution for the parts of the building that are closest to the secured perimeter line (within twenty feet). shattering of the concrete due to multiple tensile reflections within the concrete section can destroy its integrity. and greatly enhance column ductility. It is recommended that splices at exterior columns that are not specifically designed to resist air-blast loads employ complete-penetration welded flanges. and procedures should be selected to ensure toughness. The potential benefit from providing closely spaced closed ties in exterior concrete columns is very high relative to the cost of the added reinforcement. Its use is generally discouraged for new construction.bearing reinforced concrete wall construction can provide a considerable level of protection if adequate reinforcement is provided to achieve ductile behavior. Slender steel columns are at substantially greater risk than are concrete columns. column breach is a major consideration. Use an architectural covering that is at least six inches from the structural member. Masonry is a much more brittle material that is capable of generating highly hazardous flying debris in the event of an explosion. This is particularly important for buildings that are close to public streets.For columns subjected to a vehicle weapon threat on an adjacent street. Confinement of concrete using columns with closely spaced closed ties or spiral reinforcing will improve shear capacity. This will make it considerably more difficult to place a weapon directly against the structure. In this case. For a package weapon. materials. splices should be placed as far above grade level as practical. improve the performance of lap splices in the event of loss of concrete cover. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-21 . every inch of distance will help to protect the column. Buckling is a concern if lateral support is lost due to the failure of a supporting floor system. ❍ Do not use exposed columns that are fully or partially accessible from the building exterior. Because explosive pressures decay so rapidly. For steel columns. If a very large weapon is detonated close to a column. Arcade columns should be avoided. ❍ Load.

The upward pressure may have an increased duration due to multiple reflections of the internal air-blast wave. The exterior bay roof system on the side(s) facing an exterior threat is the most critical. edge beams are very strongly encouraged at the perimeter of concrete slab construction to afford frame action for redistribution of vertical loads and to enhance the shear connection of floors to columns. Beam-to-column connections should be capable of resisting upward as well as downward forces. It is conservative to consider the downward and upward loads separately. Secondary loads include upward pressure due to the air blast penetrating through openings and upward suction during the negative loading phase. Since it is anticipated that the slab capacity will exceed that of the supporting beams. so the roof there may require less hardening. Precast and pre-/post-tensioned systems are generally considered less desirable. When flat slab/plate systems are used.2 Roof System The primary loading on the roof is the downward air-blast pressure. If this system is used. Stirrups to develop the bending capacity of the beams closely spaced along the entire span are recommended.3. The performance of this system can be enhanced by use of normal-weight concrete fill instead of lightweight fill. The preferred system is cast-in-place reinforced concrete with beams in two directions. and making the connection between the slab and beams with shear connector studs. beam end connections should be capable of developing the ultimate flexural capacity of the beams to avoid brittle failure. Continuous bottom reinforcement should be provided through columns in two directions to retain the slab in the event that 6-22 DESIGN GUIDANCE .5. In general. increasing the gauge of welded wire fabric reinforcement. beams should have continuous top and bottom reinforcement with tension lap splices. they should include features to enhance their punching shear resistance. Somewhat lower levels of protection are afforded by conventional steel beam construction with a steel deck and concrete fill slab. 6. unless members and connections are capable of resisting upward forces generated by rebound from the direct pressure and/or the suction from the negative pressure phase of the air blast. Concrete flat slab/plate systems are also less desirable because of the potential of shear failure at the columns. The air-blast pressure on the interior bays is less intense.Spandrel beams of limited depth generally do well when subjected to air blast.

6.3 Floor System The floor system design should consider three possible scenarios: airblast loading. The recommendations of Section 6. and continuous bottom rein- DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-23 . mailrooms. When flat slab/plate systems are employed. Flat slab/plate systems are also less desirable because of limited two way action and the potential for shear failure at the columns. Lightweight systems.5.2 for roof systems apply to these areas. are considered to afford minimal resistance to air-blast. such as untopped steel deck or wood frame construction. and the ability to arrest debris falling from the floor or roof above. Structural hardening of floor systems above unsecured areas of the building such as lobbies. they should include features to enhance their punching shear resistance.3. In general. the uplift pressures from a vehicle weapon may be significant enough to cause possible failure of the exterior bay floors for several levels above ground. since it is virtually impossible to prevent against localized breach in conventional construction for package weapons placed on the floor.5. These systems are also not able to accept upward loads without additional reinforcement. garages. Edge beams should be provided at the building exterior. Special concern exists in the case of vertical irregularities in the architectural system. and retail spaces should be considered. If pre-/post-tensioned systems are used. the primary concern is the exterior bay framing. For buildings that are separated from a public street only by a sidewalk. redistributing load in the event of loss of a column or wall support below.3. For structures in which the interior is secured against bombs of moderate size by package inspection. Pre-/post-tensioned systems tend to fail in a brittle manner if stressed much beyond their elastic limit. Precast panels are problematic because of their tendency to fail at the connections. either where the exterior wall is set back from the floor above or where the structure steps back to form terraces. critical or heavily occupied areas should not be placed underneath unsecured areas.punching shear failure occurs. continuous mild steel needs to be added to the top and the bottom faces to provide the ductility needed to resist explosion loads. loading docks. These systems are prone to failure due to their low capacity for downward and uplift pressures.

unsecured areas are located adjacent to the building exterior so that the explosive pressure may be vented outward as well.forcement should be provided across columns to resist progressive collapse. This design for hardened interior wall construction is also recommended for primary egress routes to protect against explosions. 6-24 DESIGN GUIDANCE . Care should be taken to terminate bars at the top of the wall with hooks or heads and to ensure that the upper course of block is filled solid with grout.3. Methods of hardening columns (already discussed under Section 6. If they are accessible.3.4 Interior Columns Interior columns in unsecured areas are subject to many of the same issues as exterior columns.5. fire. Lateral support at the top of the walls may be achieved using steel angles anchored into the floor system above. 6. as previously discussed. and other hazards trapping occupants.3. and architectural covering at least six inches from the structural elements.5.5 Interior Walls Interior walls surrounding unsecured spaces are designed to contain the explosive effects within the unsecured areas.1. If possible. 6. Interior walls can also be effective in resisting progressive collapse if they are designed properly with sufficient load-bearing capacity and are tied into the floor systems below and above. 6. columns should not be accessible within these areas.6 Checklist – Structural Incorporate measures to prevent progressive collapse. Exterior Frame) include using closely spaced ties. Composite steel and concrete sections or steel plating of concrete columns can provide higher levels of protection. then obscure their location or impose a standoff to the structural component through the use of cladding.5. Edge beams should be provided at the building exterior. Fully grouted CMU (concrete masonry unit) block walls that are well reinforced vertically and horizontally and adequately supported laterally are a common solution. spiral reinforcement. Columns in unsecured areas should be designed to span two or three stories without buckling in the event that the floor below and possibly above the detonation area have failed. The base of the wall may be anchored by reinforcing bar dowels.3. Ideally. Anchorage at the top and bottom of walls should be capable of developing the full flexural capacity of the wall.

(editors).. Use two-way floor and roof systems.html American Society of Civil Engineers. Structural Design for Physical Security: State of the Practice. 1996.. Blast Effects on Buildings: Design of Buildings to Optimize Resistance to Blast Loading.1997. American Society of Civil Engineers. American Society of Civil Engineers. Reston. P. Ettouney.. M. Structural Engineering Institute of American Society of Civil Engineers. Smilowitz. and Rittenhouse. Limit column spacing.jsp?section=10123 DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-25 . American Society of Civil Engineers.org/OA_HTML/aipCCtpSctDspRte.. No.aip. Other references are given in the chapter on Weapons Effects. Virginia.org/dbt/dbt. Blast Resistant Design of Commercial Buildings. Practice Periodical on Structural Design and Construction. American Society of Civil Engineers. T. Use fully grouted. 6. et al.wai.. Conrath. Mays. 1995. G.Design floor systems for uplift in unsecured areas and in exterior bays that may pose a hazard to occupants. Design of Blast Resistant Buildings in Petrochemical Facilities. Avoid transfer girders. Vol. and Smith. 1. Reston. Existing design criteria are given in the chapter on Design Approach. R.7 Further Reading Listed below are publicly available references on structural hardening. Virginia.com/AppliedScience/Blast/blast-struct-design. 1999.D. http://ojps.C.3.jsp?KEY=PPSCFX&Volume=1&Issue=1 A preprint of the final article is available at http:// www. Vulnerability and Protection of Infrastructure Systems: The State of the Art.aip. 1. Use dynamic nonlinear analysis methods for design of critical structural components. Virginia. E. 2002.. An ASCE Journals Special Publication compiling articles from 2002 and earlier available online https://ascestore. heavily reinforced CMU block walls that are properly anchored in order to separate unsecured areas from critical functions and occupied secured areas. Reston.

php Burnett. the exterior wall may be designed to resist the actual or reduced pressure levels of the defined threat. The walls also need to be able to resist the loads transmitted by the windows and doors. Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidelines for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects. Note 6-26 DESIGN GUIDANCE . D. 17th Street. Washington D.References on Progressive Collapse: American Society of Civil Engineers. The Avoidance of Progressive Collapse. If the building is more than four stories high.C. ATTN: CENWO-ED-ST.org/ ASCE7. P. General Services Administration.gsa.org/publications/ dsp_pubdetails.cfm?puburl=http://www. They are subject to direct reflected pressures from an explosive threat located directly across from the wall along the secured perimeter line. F. for bullet-resistant windows to have a higher ultimate capacity than the walls to which they are attached. 215 N. 1975. Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards – Progressive Collapse Guidance.oca. ASCE-7. E. E. 2000. Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. 6. 6.asce. Omaha. U. Washington. Nebraska.. Conrath. 2000.5. Structural Elements. Regulatory Approaches to the Problem.pubs.html?9991330 General Services Administration. For a discussion of the roof and exterior frame.gov/about_progressive_collapse/progcollapse.3. it may be advantageous to consider the reduction in pressure with height due to the increased distance and angle of incidence.C.. The objective of design at a minimum is to ensure that these members fail in a ductile mode such as flexure rather than a brittle mode such as shear.asce. for instance. It is not uncommon. National Bureau of Standards. phone: (402) 221-4918. Reston Virginia. see Section 6. http://www. 2002. Contact US Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center. Beyond ensuring a ductile failure mode.S. http://www.1 Exterior Wall/Cladding Design The exterior walls provide the first line of defense against the intrusion of the air-blast pressure and hazardous debris into the building.4 BUILDING ENVELOPE Exterior wall/cladding and window systems and other openings are discussed in this section. 68102-4978. ISBN: 0-78440624-3.4.

to minimize lateral torsional effects. which need to be designed to resist the ultimate flexural resistance of the panels. To catch exterior cladding fragments. A preferred system is to have a continuous exterior CMU wall that laterally bears against the floor system. once the sole responsibility of the architect.4. The connection details may be very difficult to construct. In designing windows to mitigate the effects of explosions they should first DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-27 . attach a wire mesh or steel sheet to the exterior side of the metal stud system. Brick veneers and other nonstructural elements attached to the building exterior are to be avoided or have strengthened connections to limit flying debris and to improve emergency egress by ensuring that exits remain passable.2 Window Design Windows. Also. Connections into the structure should be designed to resist the ultimate lateral capacity of the wall. connections into the structure should provide as straight a line of load transmittal as practical.that special reinforcing and anchors should be provided around blastresistant window and door frames. consider a minimum thickness of five inches exclusive of reveals. For increased protection. CMU block. Poured-in-place. For pre-cast panels. use metal studs back-to-back and mechanically attached. with two-way. and metal stud systems may also be used to achieve lower levels of protection. consider using 12-inch blocks with two layers of vertical reinforcement. reinforced concrete will provide the highest level of protection. The supports of the wall should be designed to resist the ultimate lateral out-of-plane bending capacity load of the system. avoid transferring loads into the columns if they are primary load-carrying elements. closely spaced reinforcing bars to increase ductility and reduce the chance of flying concrete fragments. use eight-inch block walls. For infill walls. but solutions like pre-cast concrete. 6. The objective is to reduce the loads transmitted into the connections. and it will be difficult to provide the required lateral restraint at the top connection. For metal stud systems. fully grouted with vertically centered heavy reinforcing bars and horizontal reinforcement placed at each layer. For CMU block walls. become a structural issue when explosive effects are taken into consideration. It will be difficult to have all the blocks fit over the bars near the top.

it is not known on which side of the building the attack will occur. One way is to reduce the number and size of windows. Window protection should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by a qualified protective design consultant to develop a solution that meets established objectives. Typical annealed glass windows break at low pressure and impulse levels and the shards created by broken windows are responsible for many of the injuries incurred during a large-scale explosive attack. and the wall attached. Though it may be impractical to design all the windows to resist a largescale explosive attack. thus reducing the interior damage and injuries. it is desirable to limit the amount of hazardous glass breakage to reduce the injuries. anchorage. This failure mode is considered more hazardous than if the glass fragments enter the building. the damage sequence and extent of damage can be controlled. (2) using an internal atrium design with windows facing 6-28 DESIGN GUIDANCE . For a large-scale vehicle weapon. this pressure range is expected on the sides of surrounding buildings not facing the explosion or for smaller explosions in which pressures drop more rapidly with distance. Several recommended solutions for the design of the window systems to reduce injuries to building occupants are provided in Figure 6-7.be designed to resist conventional loads and then be checked for explosive load effects and balanced design. Balanced or capacity design philosophy means that the glass is designed to be no stronger than the weakest part of the overall window system. failing at pressure levels that do not exceed those of the frame. If blast-resistant walls are used. then the window is likely to fail with the whole panel entering into the building as a single unit. and supporting wall system. Windows are typically the most vulnerable portion of any building. Designing windows to provide protection against the effects of explosions can be effective in reducing the glass laceration injuries in areas that are not directly across from the weapon. possibly with the frame. If the glass is stronger than the supporting members. anchorage. then fewer and/or smaller windows will allow less air blast to enter the building. Generally. provided that the fragments are designed to minimize injuries. so all sides need to be protected. By using a damage-limiting approach. Specific examples of how to incorporate these ideas into the design of a new building include (1) limiting the number of windows on the lower floors where the pressures would be higher during an external explosion. Several approaches that can be taken to limit glass laceration injuries.

the issue of exterior debris is largely ignored by existing criteria. butt glazed. walls. Glass curtain-wall. or columns.2.1 Glass Design Glass is often the weakest part of a building. (3) using clerestory windows. details.Figure 6-7 Safe laminated-glass systems and failure modes inward. In particular. but rather by the hazard it causes to the occupants. Some design modifications to the connections. above the heads of the occupants. Two failure modes that reduce the hazard posed by window glass are ❍ glass that breaks but is retained by the frame and DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-29 . and (4) angling the windows away from the curb to reduce the pressure levels. glass failure is not quantified in terms of whether breakage occurs or not. glass curtain wall systems have been shown to accept larger deformations without the glass breaking hazardously. and member sizes may be required to optimize the performance. For incidents within downtown city areas. compared to rigidly supported punched window systems. and Pilkington type systems have been found to perform surprisingly well in recent explosive tests with low explosive loads. falling glass poses a major hazard to passersby and prolongs post-incident rescue and clean-up efforts by leaving tons of glass debris on the street. which are close to the ceiling. breaking at low pressures compared to other components such as the floors. 6.4. Past incidents have shown that glass breakage and associated injuries may extend many thousands of feet in large external explosions. At this time. As part of the damage-limiting approach. not outward. Highvelocity glass fragments have been shown to be a major contributor to injuries in such incidents.

Fragments enter space impacting a vertical witness panel at a distance of no more than 3 meters (10 feet) from the window at a height greater than 0. which corresponds to hazardous flying debris at a distance of 10 feet from the window (see Figure 6-8). Generally a performance condition 3 or 4 is considered acceptable for buildings that are not at high risk of attack. Glazing cracks. Glass cracks. The glass performance conditions are defined based on empirical data from explosive tests performed in a cubical space with a 10. which corresponds to not breaking.3 feet) from window. Fragments enter space and land on floor and impact a vertical witness panel at a distance of no more than 3 m (10 feet) from the window at a height no greater than 2 feet above the floor. to 5. no more than 2 feet above the floor level. Glazing cracks. The lamination holds the shards of glass together in explosive 6-30 DESIGN GUIDANCE .foot dimension (Table 6-1). Fragments enter space and land on floor no further than 1 meter (3.6 meters (2 feet) above the floor. No visible damage to glazing or frame.. the window breaks and fragments fly into the building but land harmlessly within 10 feet of the window or impact a witness panel 10 feet away. Table 6-1: Performance Conditions for Windows Performance Condition 1 2 Protection Level Safe Very High Hazard Level None None Description of Window Glazing Glazing does not break.❍ glass fragments exit the frame and fall within three to ten feet of the window. Fragments enter space and land on floor no further than 3 meters (10 feet) from the window. The design goal is to achieve a performance level less than 4 for 90 percent of the windows. The performance condition ranges from 1. Dusting or very small fragments near sill or on floor acceptable.e. 3a High Very Low 3b High Low 4 Medium Medium 5 Low High The preferred solution for new construction is to use laminated annealed (i. At this level. only the inner pane needs to be laminated. Glazing cracks and window system fails catastrophically. float) glass with structural sealant around the inside perimeter. Glazing cracks but is retained by the frame. For insulated units.

it is important to use an interlayer thickness that is 60 mil thick rather than 30 mil thick. Use the thinnest overall glass thickness that is acceptable based on conventional load requirements. metal studs.e. under about 5 psi). For instance. To make sure that the components supporting the glass are stronger than the glass itself. in conventional design. dry wall. Annealed glass is used because it has a breaking strength that is about one-half that of heat-strengthened glass and about one-fourth as strong as tempered glass. The structural sealant helps to hold the pane in the frame for higher loads.. and brick façade.Figure 6-8 Plan view of test cubicle showing glass performance conditions as a function of distance from test window. specify a window breakage strength that is high compared to what is used in conventional design. the tension membrane forces into the framing members need to be considered in design. it is typical to use a breakage pressure corresponding to eight DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-31 . This layup has been shown to perform well in low-pressure regions (i. Also. events. reducing its ability to cause laceration injuries. Using annealed glass becomes particularly important for buildings with lightweight exterior walls using for instance. as is used in conventional applications. The breakage strength in window design may be specified as a function of the number of windows expected to break at that load. If a 60 mil polyvinyl butaryl (PVB) layer is used.

Frame and anchorage design is performed by applying the breaking strength of the window to the frame and the fasteners. steel frames are used. The static approach may lead to a design that is not practical. the structural sealant may govern the overall design of the window system. designs in which the window rotates about a horizontal hinge at the head or sill and opens in the outward direction may perform adequately. some operable window designs are conceptually viable. It also needs to be designed to resist the breaking stress of the window glass. the window will slam shut in an 6-32 DESIGN GUIDANCE . For instance. too. In most conventionally designed buildings. use a pressure corresponding to 750 breaks out of 1000 to increase confidence that the frame does not fail. To retain the glass in the frame. the breaking strength of the window glass is applied to the mullion.g. a minimum of a ¼-inch bead of structural sealant (e. the window bite (i. It may also not be consistent with the overall architectural objectives for the project. it is good engineering practice to limit the number of interlocking parts used for the mullion. As with frames. In some applications. When a lot of glass breakage is expected. the depth of window captured by the frame) needs to be at least ½ inch. a dynamic load can be applied using the peak pressure and impulse values.4. The allowable tensile strength should be at least 20 psi. a larger bite with more structural sealant may be needed.3 Frame and Anchorage Design Window frames need to retain the glass so that the entire pane does not become a single large unit of flying debris. in lobby areas where large panes of glass are used. Also. Glass breakage strength values may be obtained from window manufacturers.. Inoperable windows are generally recommended for air-blast mitigating designs. alternatively. 6. silicone) should be used around the inner perimeter of the window. Also.2.2. 6.e. In these designs.breaks out of 1000.4. Using a static approach. the frames will be aluminum.2 Mullion Design The frame members connecting adjoining windows are referred to as mullions. because the mullion can become very deep and heavy.. driving up the weight and cost of the window system. These members may be designed in two ways. In some applications. However. The structural sealant recommendations should be determined on a case-by-case basis. such as for an explosive incident.

explosion event.4 Wall Design The supporting wall response should be checked using approaches similar to those for frames and mullions. earthquake. the governing design parameter may be the capacity of the hinges and/or hardware. because it increases the tributary area of lateral load that is transferred into the columns and may cause instability. and forced entry. Anchoring into columns is generally discouraged. They make the building quieter by reducing acoustic transmission. If the walls are unable to accept the loads transmitted by the mullions. Some of the others are ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ fire. and is potentially highly hazardous. hurricane. They save energy by reducing thermal transmission. In these cases.2. which consist of one or more inches of glass and polycarbonate. Explosions are one of a number of abnormal loading conditions that the building may undergo. It does not make sense. When developing a protection strategy for windows to mitigate the effects of a particular explosion threat scenario. If this type of design is used. ❍ ❍ ❍ They permit light to enter building. it is important to consider how this protection may interfere with some of these other func- DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-33 . gun fire. 6. to have a wall system that is weaker than windows. the windows may need to be designed for the design threat air-blast pressure levels under the implicit assumption that balanced-design conditions will not be met for larger loads. windows perform several functions listed below. The balanced-design approach is particularly challenging in the design of ballistic-resistant and forced-entry-resistant windows. 6. the mullions may need to be anchored into the structural slabs or spandrel beams.4.4.5 Multi-hazard Considerations Under normal operating conditions.2. These windows can easily become stronger than the supporting wall. Remember that the maximum strength of any wall system needs to be at least equal to the window strength.

will it be more difficult to break the protected windows to vent the building and gain access to the injured? Will a window upgrade that is intended to protect the occupants worsen the hazard to passersby? ❍ ❍ 6. Avoid framing cladding into columns and other primary vertical load-carrying members. Design cladding connections to have as direct a load transmission path into the main structure as practical. Instead frame into floor diaphragms.3 Other Openings Doors. ❍ For louvers that provide air to sensitive equipment. Some questions that may be worthwhile to consider are listed below. and other openings in the exterior envelope should be designed so that the anchorage into the supporting structure has a lateral capacity greater than that of the element. A good transmission path minimizes shear and torsional response. ❍ Provide a baffle in front of the louver so that the air blast does not have direct line-of-sight access through the louver. There are two general recommendations for doors. ❍ If an internal explosion occurs. 6-34 DESIGN GUIDANCE .tions or other explosion threat scenarios. ❍ 6. will the upgraded windows increase smoke inhalation injuries by preventing the smoke to vent through windows that would normally break in an explosion event? If a fire occurs. Door jambs can be filled with concrete to improve their resistance.4. Provide a grid of steel bars properly anchored into the structure behind the louver to catch any debris generated by the louver or other flying fragments.4. Design cladding supports and the supporting structure to resist the ultimate lateral resistance of the panel. some recommendations are given below. louvers.4 Cladding Checklist – Building Envelope Use the thinnest panel thickness that is acceptable for conventional loads. ❍ Doors should open outward so that they bear against the jamb during the positive-pressure phase of the air-blast loading.

Beyond these life-safety concerns. Issues related specifically to chemical. “Energy Absorbing Blast Mitigating Window Systems”. and Tennant.pubs. only the interior pane needs to be laminated). lobbies. S. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities.. Secondary goals are to limit injuries due to flying building debris and the direct effects of air blast entering the building (i. and radiological threats are discussed under a separate section with that heading. hardening. D. Use a minimum of a ¼-inch silicone sealant around the inside glass perimeter. Keeping critical mechanical and electrical functions as far from high-threat areas as possible (e. R.5 Further Reading Norville. 1999. Glass Magazine. H. N.cgi?9902006 Emek. Virginia.” Glass Magazine. Separation is perhaps the DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-35 ... “Curtainwall Systems and Blast Loading. the objective is to facilitate building evacuation and rescue efforts through effective building design... 2.Vol.5 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS In the event of an explosion directed at a high-occupancy building. 1998. 13.S.J. 6.g. McLean. No. The key concepts for providing secure and effective mechanical and electrical systems in buildings is the same as for the other building systems: separation.e. Conrath. Design window systems so that the frame anchorage and the supporting wall are capable of resisting the breaking pressure of the window glass.4. and redundancy. Smilowitz. and Mallone. E.asce. M.org/WWWdisplay. with a minimum tensile strength of 20 psi.Windows Use the thinnest glass section that is acceptable for conventional loads. mail rooms. Harville. McLean. This last objective is the focus of this section. Use laminated annealed glass (for insulated panels. the primary objective is to protect people by preventing building collapse. impact due to being thrown or lung collapse). garages. Design window frames with a minimum of a ½-inch bite. D. biological.. S.. 1998. 6. Glass-Related Injuries in Oklahoma City Bombing. http:// www. and Tennant.. Shariat. and retail spaces) increases their ability to survive an event. loading docks. Virginia..

(5) ventilation systems. sprinkler systems mains and risers. detection. fire alarm system trunk wiring. (10) smoke control system. Additionally. (7) emergency elevators. (9) the sprinkler/standpipe system. 6-36 DESIGN GUIDANCE . ❍ ❍ ❍ Provide positive pressurization of stairwells and vestibules. From an operational security standpoint. telecommunications spaces and rooftops by means of such measures as visitor screening.5. (6) the fire control center. and ducts associated with life-safety systems) provides increased likelihood that they will be able to survive the direct effects of the event if they are close enough to be affected. (2) the emergency power system. Air intakes are covered in Section 6. Finally. and ducts used for smoke-control systems. (4) transformers.most cost-effective option. it is important to restrict and control access to air-intake louvers. pipes. Architecturally. Harden walls using reinforced CMU block properly anchored at supports. Specific recommendations are given below for (1) emergency egress routes. Provide battery packs for lighting fixtures and exit signs. and (11) the communication system. there are many incremental improvements that can be made that require only a small change to the design. (8) the smoke and fire detection and alarm system. Additional space can be provided for future enhancements as funds or the risk justify implementation. Fortunately. physical hardening or protection of these systems (including the conduits. and card access-control systems. mechanical and electrical rooms. Other areas where hardening is recommended include primary egress routes. the walls and floor systems adjacent to the areas where critical equipment are located need to be protected by means of hardening. 6. Structurally. limited elevator stops.6.1 Emergency Egress Routes To facilitate evacuation consider these measures. by providing redundant emergency systems that are adequately separated. feeders for emergency power distribution. (3) fuel storage. there is a greater likelihood that emergency systems will remain operational post-event to assist rescuers in the evacuation of the building. closed-circuit television (CCTV). enhancements to mechanical and electrical systems will require additional space to accommodate additional equipment.

Care should be taken to locate the generator so that these louvers are not vulnerable to attack. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-37 . Redundant emergency generator systems remotely located from each other enable the supply of emergency power from either of two locations. Emergency generators typically require large louvers to allow for ventilation of the generator while running. in fire-rated. where possible). such as diesel fuel. Emergency distribution panels and automatic transfer switches should be located in rooms separate from the normal power system (hardened rooms. Fuel tanks should be located away from building access points. Emergency lighting fixtures and exit signs along the egress path could be provided with integral battery packs.5.3 Fuel storage A non-explosive fuel source. which locates the power source directly at the load.5. Fuel filling stations should be located away from public access points and monitored by the CCTV system. egress lighting fixtures. and fire pumps. and configured in redundant routing paths to enhance reliability. hardened enclosures. exit signs.2 Emergency Power System An emergency generator provides an alternate source of power should utility power become unavailable to critical life-safety systems such as alarm systems. Use double doors for mass evacuation. to provide lighting instantly in the event of a utility power outage. or encased in concrete. Consider locating emergency power-distribution feeders in hardened enclosures. Do not use glass along primary egress routes or stairwells.❍ ❍ Use non-slip phosphorescent treads. Fuel piping within the building should be located in hardened enclosures. ❍ ❍ 6. is acceptable for standby use for emergency generators and diesel fire pumps. Do not cluster egress routes in single shaft. 6. and redundant piping systems could be provided to enhance the reliability of the fuel distribution system. smoke-control equipment. emergency communications systems. Separate them as far as possible. A remote radiator system could be used to reduce the louver size.

Systems that serve public access areas such as mail receiving rooms. An unwitting passenger could be endangered if an elevator door opens onto a smoke filled lobby. communicate with occupants.4 Transformers Main power transformer(s) should be located interior to the building if possible. which allows for quick response to shut down or selectively control air conditioning systems.6 Fire Control Center A Fire Control Center should be provided to monitor alarms and lifesafety components. 6. 6-38 DESIGN GUIDANCE . biological. could enhance reliability should one transformer be damaged by an explosion. Consider providing redundant Fire Control Centers remotely located from each other to allow system operation and control from alternate locations.5. multiple transformers. For larger buildings. 6. Tie air intake locations and fan rooms into the security surveillance and alarm system. If the control center is adjacent to lobby. 6.6. as conventional elevators are not suitably protected from the penetration of smoke into the elevator shaft.5 Ventilation Systems Air-intake locations should be located as high up in the building as is practical to limit access to the general public. lobbies.5.5.5. Building HVAC systems are typically controlled by a building automation system. and control the fire-fighting/evacuation process. and radiological protection for more information. loading docks. freight elevators/lobbies should be isolated and provided with dedicated air handling systems capable of 100 percent exhaust mode. away from locations accessible to the public. located remotely from each other. Provide hardened construction for the Fire Control Center. This system is coordinated with the smoke-control and fire-alarm systems. operate smoke-control systems.7 Emergency Elevators Elevators are not used as a means of egress from a building in the event of a life-safety emergency event. Firefighters may elect to manually use an elevator for firefighting or rescue operation. The Fire Control Center should be located near the point of firefighter access to the building. separate it from the lobby using a corridor or other buffer area. See Section 6.6 on chemical.

fed by conduit/wire that is protected in hardened enclosures.. such that each panel can function independently and process alarms and initiate sequences within its respective zone. Standpipes have water available locally in large quantities for use by professional fire fighters.5. and communication systems to allow occupants to quickly go to a safe area. for example one electric pump supplied from the utility and/or emergency generator and a second diesel fuel source fire pump. and audible and visual alarms provide quick response and notification of an event. Install a fire-alarm system consisting of distributed intelligent fire alarm panels connected in a peer-to-peer network. The activation of any device will automatically start the sequence of operation of smoke control.5. smoke-proof enclosure.8 Smoke and Fire Detection and Alarm System A combination of early-warning smoke detectors. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-39 . reinforced masonry walls at stair shafts containing standpipes).9 Sprinkler/Standpipe System Sprinklers will automatically suppress fire in the area upon sensing heat. egress. Diverse and separate routing of standpipe and sprinkler risers within hardened areas will enhance the system’s reliability (i.e. 6. could enhance the firefighting and rescue operation after a blast/fire event. sprinkler-flow switches. Appropriate valving should be provided where services are combined. System designs should include redundancy such as looped infrastructure wiring and distributed intelligence such that the severing of the loop will not disable the system. Sprinkler activation will activate the fire alarm system. manual pull stations. Redundant fire pumps could be provided in remote locations. This shaft/lobby assembly should be sealed and positively pressurized to prevent the penetration of smoke into the protected area. These pumps could rely on different sources.A dedicated elevator. within its own hardened. The dedicated elevator should be supplied from the emergency generator. Redundant water services would increase the reliability of the source for sprinkler protection and fire suppression. 6. Multiple sprinkler and standpipe risers limit the possibility of an event severing all water supply available to fight a fire.

5. and firesmoke dampers. and wiring. For egress routes.12 Checklist – Mechanical and Electrical Systems Place all emergency functions away from high-risk areas in protected locations with restricted access. by stairwell. 6-40 DESIGN GUIDANCE . use non-slip phosphorescent treads. Place a transformer interior to building. and by elevator bank for selective communication to building occupants.5.11 Communication System A voice communication system facilitates the orderly control of occupants and evacuation of the danger area or the entire building. Provide redundant and separated emergency functions. ductwork. The system is typically zoned by floor. ❍ ❍ 6.6. if possible. connected directly to a constantly supervised central station. and redundant or wireless fireman’s communications in building.5. Place emergency functions away from structurally vulnerable areas such as transfer girders. in-building repeater system for police. Vestibules at stairways with separate pressurization provide an additional layer of smoke control. Harden and/or provide physical buffer zones for the enclosures around emergency equipment. and double doors for mass evacuation. Stair pressurization systems maintain a clear path of egress for occupants to safe areas or to evacuate the building. and EMS (Emergency Medical Services) radios.10 Smoke-Control Systems Appropriate smoke-control systems maintain smoke-free paths of egress for building occupants through a series of fans. Provide access to the fire control center from the building exterior. fire. provide battery packs for exit signs. controls. Avoid using glass along primary egress routes or stairwells. Smokecontrol fans should be located higher in a building rather than at lower floors to limit exposure/access to external vents. 6. Emergency communication can be enhanced by providing ❍ extra emergency phones separate from the telephone system.

6.. Building Owners and Managers Association International. Academic Press.. Bethlehem. High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety. 2. ISBN 0750674555 http://www. The air may be con- DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-41 . BIOLOGICAL.C. and Nall. AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION This section discusses three types of air-borne hazards. Pennsylvania.. Craighead. Building Standards Magazine. How to Design and Manage Your Preventive Maintenance Program. Lehigh University.D. delivery receiving). A small localized exterior release at an air intake or other opening in the exterior envelope of the building. While you should always follow any official warnings.com/exec/ obidos/tg/detail/-/0750674555/qid=/br=1-/ref=br_lf_b_//t/1037416668-4182264?v=glance&s=books&n=173507#product-details Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat.g. A. chemical.” Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat. pages 24-27. This discussion is limited to air-borne hazards. 2002. July-August 2002. or they may be released into a secured area such as a primary egress route. mail room. 3. 2002.pdf 6.6 CHEMICAL. 2001. A large exterior release originating some distance away from the building (includes delivery by aircraft).13 Further Reading Building Owners and Managers Association International. Like explosive threats.boma.N. Task Force on Tall Buildings: “The Future.. or other vulnerable area (e.lehigh. or loading dock.org/pubs/bomapmp. G. Interior threats may be delivered to accessible areas such as the lobby. Washington.. Whittier. D. Hlushko. D. http://www. A small interior release in a publicly accessible area. biological and radiological (CBR) threats may be delivered externally or internally to the building. the best defense is to be alert to signs of a release occurring near you. mailroom. a major egress route. http://www. 1996. lobby. There may not be an official or obvious warning prior to a CBR event. 1. California. 2nd Edition.htm Kurtz. External ground-based threats may be released at a standoff distance from the building or may be delivered directly through an air intake or other opening.edu/ctbuh/htmlfiles/hot_links/report.5. Engineering Systems and an Incremental Response to Terrorist Threat.amazon.

g. Buildings provide a limited level of inherent protection against CBR threats. see birds or other small animals dying. Recognize areas around HVAC equipment and other mechanical systems to be vulnerable areas requiring special security considerations.. Chemicals will typically cause problems within in seconds or minutes after exposure. the protection level is a function of how airtight the building is. loss of commerce) of an attack if it does occur. In order to reduce the likelihood of an attack.1. but they can sometimes have delayed effects that will not appear for hours or days. or hear of more than one person complaining of eye. the initial risk is from the explosion. throat or skin irritation or convulsing. or nausea. The objectives of protective building design as they relate to the CBR threat are first to make it difficult for the terrorist to successfully execute a CBR attack and second. or skin irritation. Symptoms may include blurred or dimmed vision. difficulty breathing. health. excess saliva. hear an air blast. accessibility. life. Site Location and Layout). Local responders may advise you to either shelter-in-place or evacuate. smell strange odors. Locate outdoor air intakes high above ground level and at inaccessible locations. but to a greater extent it is a function of the HVAC system’s design and operating parameters. ❍ Use security stand-off. After the initial debris falls to the ground. eye. ❍ ❍ 6-42 DESIGN GUIDANCE . leaving the area and washing will minimize your risk from the radiation. so listen for official information regarding symptoms. Some examples are listed below. use security and design features that limit the terrorist’s ability to approach the building and successfully release the CBR contaminant. and screening procedures similar to those identified in the explosive threat mitigation sections of this document (see Chapter 5. Biological and some radioactive contaminants typically will take days to weeks before symptoms appear. With radioactive “dirty” bombs. Design Approach and Section 6. property damage. throat. to minimize the impact (e. To some extent.taminated if you see a suspicious cloud or smoke near ground level.

DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-43 .g. Interior to the building. low roofs. bird screen) should be used.. a surface sloped at least 45 degrees away from the building and further protected through the use of metal mesh (a. In addition to providing protection against an air-borne hazard delivered directly into the building. Ideally. To prevent opportunities for a weapon to be lobbed into the intake. with louvers flush with the exterior (see figure 6-9).a. doors and air vents leading to these rooms should be treated as vulnerable locations and appropriately secured.k. All opportunities to reach air-intakes through climbing should be eliminated. ground-level windows as a vulnerability and either avoid their use or provide appropriate security precautions to minimize the vulnerability. In the event that a particular air intake does not service an occupied area. Otherwise. Finally. elevated air intakes are a recommended practice in general for providing healthy indoor air quality. 6. Avoid the use of ground-level mechanical rooms accessible from outside the building.❍ Prevent unauthorized access to all mechanical areas and equipment.6. Where such room placement is unavoidable. lawn chemicals. However. Thus. it may not be necessary to elevate it above ground level. placing air-intakes high above ground provides protection against ground-based standoff threats because the concentration of the air-borne hazard diminishes somewhat with height. Furthermore.1 Air intakes Air intakes may be made less accessible by placing them as high as possible on the building exterior. standing water. there is a vertical smooth surface from the ground level to the intake louvers. the intake louver should be ideally flush with the wall. many recognized sources of indoor air contaminants (e. ❍ ❍ ❍ Further discussion of some of these prevention methods is provided below. Because air-blast pressure decays with height. trash. without such features as high shrubbery. vehicle exhaust. CCTV surveillance and enhanced security is recommended at intakes. canopies. as these features can enable climbing and concealment. minimize public access to HVAC return-air systems. or sunshades. elevated air intakes also provide modest protection against explosion threats. and rodents) tend to be located near ground level. Treat operable.

mechanical rooms. 6.2 Mechanical Areas Another simple measure is to tightly restrict access to building mechanical areas (e.g. building exhaust. elevator equipment access). the intake should either be elevated or significant precautions (tightly sealed construction between unoccupied/occupied areas..g.. unoccupied area maintained at negative pressure relative to occupied area) should be put in place to ensure that contaminants are unable to penetrate into the occupied area of the building. These areas provide access to equipment and systems (e. HVAC. elevator.6. and communication and control) that could be 6-44 DESIGN GUIDANCE . roofs. if the unoccupied area is within an otherwise occupied building.Figure 6-9 Schematic showing recommended location for elevated airintakes on exterior of building.

ways of restricting (or at least monitoring) access to the roof that do not violate fire codes should be pursued. These include lobbies.4 Lobbies. public-access buildings may require a greater emphasis on mitigation.6. The second objective is to design to minimize the impact of an attack. ❍ Public access routes to the building should be designed to channel pedestrians through points of noticeable security presence. equipment. For rooftop mechanical equipment. especially those requiring public access. For many buildings. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-45 . package.3 Return-Air Systems Similar to the outdoor-air intake. Examples of design methods to minimize the impact of a CBR attack are listed below. load/delivery docks) both physically and in terms of potential contaminant migration. 6. and Mail Sorting Areas Vulnerable internal areas where airborne hazards may be brought into the building should be strategically located. ❍ ❍ Further discussion of some of these prevention methods is provided below. 6. The structural and HVAC design should isolate the most vulnerable public areas (entrance lobbies. The HVAC and auxiliary air systems should carefully use positive and negative pressure relationships to influence contaminant migration routes. Buildings requiring public access have an increased vulnerability to such an attack. Loading Docks. However. mail rooms.used or manipulated to assist in a CBR attack. Compared to buildings in which campus security and internal access can be strictly controlled. the ability to prevent a determined terrorist from initiating a CBR release will be a significant challenge. HVAC return-air systems inside the building can be vulnerable to CBR attack. even privateaccess facilities can fall victim to an internal CBR release. Design approaches that reduce this vulnerability include the use of ducted HVAC returns within public access areas and the careful placement of return-air louvers in secure locations not easily accessed by public occupants. Additional protection may be provided by including these areas in those monitored by electronic security and by eliminating elevator stops at the levels that house this equipment. or food).6. whether through a security lapse or perhaps a delivered product (mail.

atria. In practice. To assist in maintaining the desired pressure relationship. it is recommended that an airlock or vestibule be provided between the secured and unsecured areas. Isolating the separate HVAC zones minimizes the potential spread of an airborne hazard within a building.) between secure and vulnerable areas should be equipped with sealing windows and doors. Ductwork that travels through vulnerable areas should be sealed. reducing the number of people potentially exposed if there is an internal release. these areas should have separate air-handling units to isolate the hazard. Consideration should also be given to filtering this exhaust with High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration. these areas should be maintained under negative pressure relative to the rest of the building. Air circulates among zones through plenum returns. airconditioning) zones. place these functions outside of the footprint of the main building. the use of airlocks or vestibules may be necessary to maintain the desired pressure differentials. hallways. When incorporated into the main building. In addition. Care must be taken that the discharge point for the exhaust system is not co-located with expected egress routes. Additionally. but at positive-to-neutral pressure relative to the outdoors. emergency exhaust fans that can be activated upon internal CBR release within the vulnerable area will help to purge the hazard from the building and minimize its migration into other areas. these zones are not completely separated if they are on the same floor. each zone with its own air-handling unit and duct system. these areas should be physically separated from other areas by floor-to-roof walls. Zone separation also 6-46 DESIGN GUIDANCE . necessary openings (doors. Where possible.5 Zoning of HVAC Systems Large buildings usually have multiple HVAC (heating. utilities. Where entries into vulnerable areas are frequent. For entrance lobbies that contain a security screening location. airflow between zones on different floors can also occur through the intentional use of shared airreturn/supply systems and through air migrations via stairs and elevator shafts.6. and doorways that are normally left open. ventilation. windows. and wall openings due to ductwork. Depending upon the HVAC design and operation. etc. and mail sorting areas. and other penetrations should be sealed. Alternatively. the conditioned air supply to these areas may come from a central unit as long as exhaust/return air from these areas is not allowed to mix into other portions of the building. 6. Ideally.loading docks.

Controls should be placed in a location easily accessed by the facility manager. Another recommendation is to isolate the return system (i. positive-pressurization is also recommended. limiting the effects of a single release to an isolated portion of the building. Further protection may be achieved by placing low-leakage automatic dampers on air intakes and exhaust fans that do not already have back-draft dampers. For egress routes.g.provides limited benefit against an external release.e. as it increases internal resistance to air movement produced by wind forces and chimney effect. Duplicative and separated control systems will add an increased degree of protection. or emergency response personnel. will not put occupants in another zone at increased risk. isolating zones divides the building into separate environments.6 Positive Pressurization Traditional good engineering practice for HVAC design strives to achieve a slight overpressure of 5-12 Pa (. Care must be taken that efforts to obtain a desired pressure relationship within one zone. In essence. This design practice is intended to reduce uncontrolled infiltration into the building.05-inch w.02-inch-. HEPA). a single-switch control is recommended for all airexchange fans (includes bathroom. Using off-the-shelf technology (e.. When combined with effective filtration. no shared returns). security. Isolation of zones requires full-height walls between each zone and the adjacent zones and hallway doors. redundant decentralized shutdown capability is also recommended. thus reducing the rate of infiltration.g. relative to the outdoors. Design parameters for such systems will depend upon many factors specific to the building and critical zone in question.6.. manually triggered augmentation systems can be put into place to over-pressure critical zones to intentionally impact routes of contaminant migration and/or to provide safe havens for sheltering-in-place.) within the building environment. the CBR source is placed within the egress route. Lastly. kitchen. In the event of a localized internal release. this practice will also provide enhanced protection against external releases of CBR aerosols. unless of course. the supply air used to pressurize the critical space DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-47 . Both centralized and decentralized shutdown capabilities are advantageous. Strategically locate return air grills in easily observable locations and preferably in areas with reduced public access. To quickly shut down all HVAC systems at once in the event of an external threat. 6. and other exhaust sources).

for example.k. Specific expertise should be sought if chemical filtration is desired. doors. Due to recent improvements in filter media development. and pores in the building envelope and along the lines separating unsecured from secured space) before they are covered with finish materials. however. building commissioning is recommended throughout the construction process and prior to taking ownership to observe construction practices and to identify potential airflow trouble spots (cracks. sealing interface between wall and window/door frames) will also help to maintain the desired pressure relationships between HVAC zones. resulting in increased energy requirements to maintain the same design airflow rate. wall construction. are generally distributed in aerosol form. However. Chemical vapor/gas filtration (a. The CBR threats in this category include radioactive “dirty bombs”. HEPA filtration is currently considered adequate by most professionals to achieve sufficient protection from CBR particulates and aerosols. a vapor component of these chemical agents could pass through a filtration system.a. 6.8 Filtration Systems To offer effective protection.6. Tight construction practices (weatherization techniques. To ensure that the construction of the building has been performed correctly. 6. building construction should be made as airtight as possible.6. Most “traditional” HVAC filtration systems focus on aerosol type contaminants. and some chemical threats. continuous vapor barriers. significant improvements in aerosol filtration can be achieved at relatively 6-48 DESIGN GUIDANCE . Possible application of the air cleaning approach to collective protection zones (with emergency activation) can assist in significantly reducing the cost though the protection is limited to the reduced size of the zone. bio-aerosols.must be appropriately filtered (see filtration discussion below) or originate from a non-contaminated source in order to be beneficial.7 Airtightness To limit the infiltration of contaminants from outside the building into the building envelope. seams. joints. air cleaning) is currently a very expensive task (high initial and recurring costs) with a limited number of design professionals experienced in its implementation. Riot-control agents and low-volatility nerve agents. HEPA filtration systems generally have a higher acquisition cost than traditional HVAC filters and they cause larger pressure drops within the HVAC system. tightly sealing windows. filtration systems should be specific to the particular contaminant’s physical state and size.

nonspecific detection equipment can be employed to activate response actions should a sudden spike in aerosol concentration of a specific size range be detected. Efficiency of filtration systems is not the only concern. For example. and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) released Standard 52. or rerouting the air through a special bank of filters.minimal increases in initial and operating costs. Also important is that incremental increases in filtration efficiency will generally provide incremental increases in protection from the aerosol contaminant. Thus.2-1999. a desired filter efficiency may be selected according to the size of the contaminant under consideration. 6. there is the option of using detection systems as part of the protective design package.6. Air can become filtered only if it actually passes through the filter. Such protective actions could occur until an investigation was performed by trained personnel (i. the American Society of Heating. Refrigeration. If the spike were detected in an outdoor intake for example. Unless foul play was discovered. for aerosol contaminants. However. MERV ratings range between 1 and 20 with a higher MERV indicating a more efficient filter. and review security tape covering outdoor air intake). system shutdown. Using the MERV rating table. filter-rack design. timely. In general. affordable. The use of return-air filtration systems and the strategic location of supply and return systems should also be carefully employed to maximize effective ventilation and filtration rates. a filter with a MERV of 13 or more will provide a 90% or greater reduction of most CBR aerosols (generally considered to be at least 1-3 um in size or larger) within the filtered airstream with much lower acquisition and maintenance costs than HEPA filtration. bypass to alternate air intake. the entire process could be completed within 10 minutes or less and without alarming occupants. and practical detection systems specific to all CBR agents are not yet available.. In 1999. check with adjacent alarms. The initial cost of such a system is relatively modest (depending upon DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-49 . and good quality filter sources should all play a role in minimizing bypass around the filter.9 Detection Systems Beyond the measures discussed above. this could trigger possible response options such as damper closure.e. gasketing. This standard provides a system for rating filters that quantifies filtration efficiency in different particle size ranges to provide a composite efficiency value named the Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV).

the number of detectors and response options incorporated into the design). The ability to simultaneous and individually manipulate operation of all HVAC and exhaust equipment from a single location may be very useful during a CBR event. ❍ ❍ ❍ 6-50 DESIGN GUIDANCE . Consider using higher-efficiency filtration systems initially and design HVAC systems so that detection systems can be easily integrated into the HVAC control package at a later date. areas designated for positive pressurization (generally for smoke protection) may also become beneficial havens for protection from internal and external CBR releases.6. but the maintenance requirements are relatively high. if they are supplied by appropriately filtered air. the ability to override and deactivate specific positive-pressure zones may be beneficial in the event that a known CBR source is placed into such an area. Individuals empowered to operate such controls must be trained in their use. Building communication systems that allow specific instructions to be addressed to occupants in specific zones of the building can play a significant role in directing occupant response to either an internal or external release. ❍ Purge fans. These can be used to purge an interior CBR release or to reduce indoor contaminant concentrations following building exposure to an external CBR source. detection systems are not appropriate for many buildings. some jurisdictions may recommend purging for chemical and radiological contaminants but not for biological contaminants. First. The approach could also be expanded to incorporate some of the newer chemical detection technologies. 6. Pressurization Fans.10 Emergency Response Using Fire/HVAC Control Center Certain operations that are managed at the Fire Control Center can play a protective role in the response to a CBR incident. which may be communicable and/or medically treatable. It is recognized that at this time. Similar monitoring systems could be employed to trigger appropriate responses in high-threat areas such as mailrooms. HVAC Controls. Examples of such operations and how they could be used are given below. shipping/receiving areas. or entrance lobbies. though the low threshold requirements may generate a substantial number of false positives. detector availability and specificity should continue to expand into the general marketplace. (Note: In practice. Second. As technology progresses. These provide two functions.) Communication Systems.

it is important that the designer evaluate performance claims with a close level of scrutiny. As vendors and products come to market. residence time. Physically isolate unsecured areas from secured areas. and/or other critical areas.g. provide proof of testing (and show certified results) by an independent. Commission building throughout construction and prior to taking ownership. the ability to recall elevators to the ground floor may assist in reducing contaminant migration during a CBR event. safe havens. reputable lab. proof of federal government testing and acceptance may be available. incoming concentrations) should be consistent with what would be experienced within the owner’s building. consider using contaminant-specific filtration and detection systems. Biological & Radiological Protective Measures Place air intakes servicing occupied areas as high as practically possible (minimum 12 feet above ground).12 Checklist – Chemical. Depending upon their design and operation. 6. DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-51 . Isolate separate HVAC zones and return air systems.The provision of simple floor-by-floor schematics showing equipment locations and the locations of supply and return louvers will aid the utility of this control option. Provide redundant.. Filter both return air and outdoor air for publicly accessible buildings. Isolate HVAC supply and return systems in unsecured areas. GSA may require locating at fourth floor or above when applicable. Incorporate fast-acting. For CBR developments. Use positive pressurization of primary egress routes. Restrict access to critical equipment. ❍ Elevator Controls. flow rate. Vendors should be willing to guarantee performance specs in writing.6. low-leaking dampers. and the testing conditions (e. For higher levels of protection.11 Evolving Technologies Many of the challenges relating to CBR terrorism prevention will be facilitated with the introduction of new technologies developed to address this emerging threat.6. easily accessible shutdown capabilities. 6.

vestibules. Vol. No. water.cdc. Zone the building communication system so that it is capable of delivering explicit instructions. tight construction. Consider installation of an emergency exhaust fan to be activated upon suspected internal CBR release. reception/screening lobby): ❍ Preferably locate these areas outside the main building footprint. pp. with isolated returns capable of 100% exhaust. For higher threat areas (mail room. ASHRAE Journal. 2002. www.Select filter efficiencies based upon contaminant size. and air locks if there is high traffic flow. Use reputable filter media installed into tight-fitting. first aide. and control mechanical rooms.pdf Centers for Disease Control and Prevention / National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. January 12. ASHRAE Winter Meeting Report.ashrae. access-log.html 6-52 DESIGN GUIDANCE . 2002. In public access areas. and has back-up power. ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ Lock. dedicated communication systems. and appropriate supplies (food. secure.13 Further Reading Miller. emergency power. Cincinnati. 6. 12. Risk Management Guidance for Health and Safety under Extraordinary Incidents. 2002. 2002.org/ABOUT/ Task_Force_RPT_12Jan02. and secure filter racks.gov/ niosh/bldvent/2002-139. 18-23.6. and Air Conditioning Engineers. 2002-139. use air diffusers and return air grills that are secure or under security observation. Publication No. gasketed. December 2002. or Radiological Attacks. American Society of Heating. Defensive Filtration. and personal-protective equipment). Operate these areas at negative pressure relative to secure portion of the building. Provide separate HVAC. http://xp20. Ohio. Create safe zones using enhanced filtration. receiving. J. 44.. Biological. Refrigerating. Use air-tight construction. Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical.

http://www. 1998. http://www.C. 2003. and Radiological Attacks.html DESIGN GUIDANCE 6-53 . Washington. 2003-136. Radiological Incident Handbook.org/about/extraordinary. Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers. Safety and Environmental Security under Extraordinary Incidents. Publication No. Biological. Biological.Central Intelligence Agency. Ohio.pdf Centers for Disease Control and Prevention / National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Chemical.gov/cia/publications/cbr_handbook/cbrbook. Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Committee for Building Health and Safety under Extraordinary Incidents on Risk Management Guidance for Health.ashrae.gov/niosh/docs/2003-136/2003136. Washington. Cincin- nati. D.cia. Central Intelligence Agency.htm American Society of Heating.C. Guidance for Filtration and AirCleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments from Airborne Chemical.cdc. http://xp20. D. 2003.


and light-industrial buildings. and such populations need to be accounted for in the design of these buildings as well. commercial retail buildings. dominant population. This criterion demands a higher level of protection than has been discussed for office buildings. the occupancy will have a major effect on the evacuation and rescue efforts. size of building.1 OVERVIEW 7 The previous chapters have focused on the protective design of office buildings because this occupancy is one that has been of most concern within the public and private sectors to date.2 MULTI-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY Multi-family residential buildings are unique because they tend to house more elderly. handicapped.g. two important recommendations for the HVAC are: ❍ ❍ to provide separate HVAC zones. and to strictly adhere to isolation principles (that is. including hallways leading to stairwells. Protection of schools and hospitals is addressed in other FEMA reports and is not explicitly addressed here. 7. medical offices. remain as clear of debris and smoke as possible during the evacuation period. The uniqueness of these other occupancy types from the perspective of protective design is a function of many factors. In any case. and construction type. and children than do office buildings. to treat any public area as equivalent to an entrance lobby in a single-use building).OCCUPANCY TYPES 7. which tend to have more able-bodied occupants within working age (18-65). For dual-use facilities such as those that incorporate both retail and commercial office uses. This chapter considers the unique challenges associated with three other high-occupancy building types: multi-family residential buildings. including hours of peak usage. The concepts discussed. depending on the tenancy (e. For multi-family residential buildings. Office buildings of course can have a certain percentage of less-able-bodied populations. however.. Some recommendations for providing OCCUPANCY TYPES 7-1 . are largely applicable to any type of civilian building serving large numbers of people on a daily basis. or child care centers). social services. it becomes more imperative that primary egress routes.

❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ Multi-family residential construction is more likely than office building construction to incorporate flat plate/slab or pre-fabricated components and therefore tends to be more structurally vulnerable. Often. Emergency power should provide sufficient lighting and or phosphorescence to lead persons safely out of the building. Also. robust connection detailing becomes paramount to ensure that the connections are not weaker than the members to which they are attached. overhanging balconies.3 COMMERCIAL RETAIL SPACE OCCUPANCY Commercial retail space such as malls. these spaces are low-rise buildings that have large interior spaces with high. long-span roofs. casinos. They are generally constructed 7-2 OCCUPANCY TYPES . ❍ Place hallways in a protected location away from the building exterior. or other ornamentation that may fall and block the exits. Attach light fixtures to the floor system above to avoid hazardous debris in the exit path and to provide emergency lighting. and interior columns spaced relatively far apart. The side(s) of the building with emergency exits should be free of any canopies. Emergency exits should be easily accessible by emergency vehicles and should be spacious enough to accommodate rescue workers entering the building as well as injured persons exiting the building. balconies are more common in multifamily residential buildings. Avoid using false ceilings in hallways. Egress routes should lead to exits that are as far as possible from high-risk areas such as the lobby.enhanced protection to facilitate evacuation and rescue of distressed populations are listed below. hotels. To improve performance. and delivery entrance. mail room. and other spaces that house large public populations gathering for shopping or entertainment have their own unique features that increase their vulnerability compared with that of office buildings. laterally unsupported walls. These can become falling debris that interferes with evacuation. air-tight enclosures placed in a protected core area of the building. Do not use glass in the hallways used for primary egress. night clubs. 7. movie theatres. These present a debris hazard due to their inherent instability and connection weakness. Create pressurized safe havens in elevator vestibules and stairwells using tightly constructed.

Where possible. which increases the structural vulnerability significantly. floor-to-floor height and bay spacing should be reduced. Security may vary widely depending on the use of the building. negative zone pressurization or smoke-evacuation methods become critically important. Also.using lightweight construction and may be prefabricated. lamination of glass is recommended. The primary goal for this type of construction is to prevent progressive collapse of the building in response to a large-scale attack. Secondary structural framing systems further enhance protection. Connections should be designed to be at least as strong as the members. they are located in industrial or commercial complexes and may have significant setbacks from public streets. offsite location. light manufacturing. For a building used for laboratories or manufacturing. To limit laceration injuries. consider relocating these and other mixed-use functions to a separate. It is also recommended to have centralized redundant control stations.4 LIGHT INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS Light industrial buildings are used through out the United States for offices. and other commercial purposes. and lateral bracing of the columns and roof joists should be provided. The main focus of this section is on light industrial buildings that house office space. In this case. clearly marked. mechanical areas should be protected with restricted access and a hardened shell (walls. Typically. easily accessible by appropriate personnel. Typically. these buildings are low-rise buildings three to five stories high. They are serviced by surface parking lots or parking structures outside the building. it is virtually impossible to isolate HVAC to protect against CBR-type threats. 7. there may be already be significant security measures at the perimeter and inside the building. take care that the partitions have sufficient lateral support so that they do not topple over. because these are the buildings with potentially high popu- OCCUPANCY TYPES 7-3 . For office buildings. ceiling and floor). easily located egress routes to facilitate mass evacuation. often using tilt-up concrete construction. Consideration should be given to providing additional. In these large spaces. If this approach is used. Consider structural partition walls or shelving units placed within the space that will stop the roof system from falling directly on the occupants in the event of collapse. laboratories. This type of construction has little if any redundancy. warehouses. If there are business offices serving these buildings with a sizable workforce. security may be light to negligible.

This second objective can be achieved while still allowing the parking structure to sustain significant levels of damage. life safety is a primary concern. Connections between the walls and structural frame should be able to accept large rebound forces to prevent the wall from being pulled off the exterior. Office parks inherently have an open character with medium-to-large setbacks from the street and public parking. In this environment. Second. the primary objective is more likely to be protection of the contents and processes. For warehouses and manufacturing plants. Using laminated glass on the exterior reduces the potential for laceration inju- 7-4 OCCUPANCY TYPES . The design of parking structures servicing these buildings should fulfill two main objectives to prevent explosions in the parking structure from seriously damaging the main office building. Devices such as ponds. design the parking structure to withstand the designlevel explosion without structural failure in order to reduce the potential for debris from a parking structure failure damaging the office building. or other landscape features. For laboratories. the most effective way to protect the building from moving vehicle threats is to use landscaping methods between public streets and parking to prevent the intrusion of vehicles. Care should be taken to prevent the wall from bearing directly against exterior columns to limit the opportunity for progressive collapse. and therefore. Parking should be placed as far as practical from the building. berms. use continuous vertical reinforcement with staggered splices. and ditches can be very effective in reducing the accessibility of the building exterior to high-speed vehicles. One solution is to use a solid wall that is bermed and landscaped on the side of the parking structure facing the building. Driveways leading directly to the building entrance should have a meandering path from the public streets that does not permit high velocities to be achieved. Separation between the driveway and building may be achieved through a number of devices such as a pond with a bridge leading to the entrance. a knee wall with foliage in front. It may be advantageous to consider designs that permit the wall to bear against floor diaphragms to resist loads. For the tilt-up walls. fountains. The first is to control the lines of sight between the parking structure and the building to limit air-blast effects on the building.lations. the primary objectives are to prevent release or deflagration of hazardous materials and to protect processes. preferably on both sides of the wall to resist large lateral loads.

ries. For the roof, a concrete slab with or without decking is preferred over a solution using metal decking only.



FEMA, 1988, Seismic Considerations: Office Buildings, FEMA 153, Earthquake Hazards Reduction Series 38, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. FEMA, 1988, Seismic Considerations: Apartment Buildings, FEMA 152, Earthquake Hazards Reduction Series 37. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.







The initial construction cost of protection has two components: fixed and variable. Fixed costs include such items as security hardware and space requirements. These costs do not depend on the level of an attack; that is, it costs the same to keep a truck away from a building whether the truck contains 500 or 5000 lbs. of TNT. Blast protection, on the other hand, is a variable cost. It depends on the threat level, which is a function of the explosive charge weight and the stand-off distance. Building designers have no control over the amount of explosives used, but are able to define a stand-off distance by providing a secured perimeter. The optimal stand-off distance is determined by defining the total cost of protection as the sum of the cost of protection (construction cost) and the cost of stand-off (land cost). These two costs are considered as a function of the stand-off for a given explosive charge weight. The cost of protection is assumed to be proportional to the peak pressure at the building envelope, and the cost of land is a function of the square of the stand-off distance. The optimal stand-off is the one that minimizes the sum of these costs. If additional land is not available to move the secured perimeter farther from the building, the required floor area of the building can be distributed among additional floors. As the number of floors is increased, the footprint decreases, providing an increased stand-off distance. Balancing the increasing cost of the structure (due to the added floors) and the corresponding decrease in protection cost (due to added stand-off), it is possible to find the optimal number of floors to minimize the cost of protection. These methods for establishing an optimum stand-off distance are generally used for the maximum credible explosive charge. If the cost of protection for this charge weight is not within the budgetary constraints, then the design charge weight must be modified. A study can be conducted to determine the largest explosive yield and corresponding level of protection that can be incorporated into the building, given the available budget. Though it is difficult to assign costs to various upgrade measures because they vary based on the site specific design, some generalizations



2 LIFE-CYCLE COSTS Life-cycle costs need to be considered as well. they may cost more during the life of the building than a single well designed entrance serving everyone. but the maintenance costs are high. and risk can be made (see Figure 8-1). maintenance costs may need to be considered. one for the visitors and one for the employees. ❍ ❍ ❍ Hardening of unsecured areas Measures to prevent progressive collapse Exterior window and wall enhancements 8. if the rentable square footage is reduced as 8-2 COST CONSIDERATIONS . standoff distance. Also.Figure 8-1 Plots showing relationship between cost of upgrading various building components. Finally. if it is decided that two guarded entrances will be provided. For instance the initial costs for a CBR detection system may be modest. Below is a list of enhancements arranged in order from least expensive to most expensive. For example.

For instance. the cost is likely to be greater. In some situations. If protection measures are considered as an afterthought or not considered until the design is nearly complete. there are three approaches: (1) reduce the design threat. 8. business interruption costs are so high they outweigh all other concerns. In such a case. Laminated glass is perhaps the single most effective measure to reduce extensive non-fatal injuries. For instance. and the risk is high because of the location or the high-profile nature of the building. if extensive teak paneling of interior areas visible from the exterior is desired by the architect for the architectural expression of the building.3 SETTING PRIORITIES If the costs associated with mitigating man-made hazards is too high. then the best option may be to consider building an unobtrusive facility in a lower-risk area instead. the willingness to pay the additional cost for protection against man-made hazards is a function of the “probability of regrets” in the event a sizable incident occurs. This scenario is likely to lead to a selecCOST CONSIDERATIONS 8-3 . it is easy to see why it is unlikely that they will be instituted in any but the highest-risk buildings unless there is a mandated building code or insurance that requires these types of enhancements. but the cost exceeds that of protective measures.a result of incorporating robustness into the building. If the cost is still considered too great. In some cases. measures against progressive collapse are perhaps the most effective actions that can be implemented to save lives and should be considered above any other upgrades. Including protective measures as part of the discussion regarding trade-offs early in the design process often helps to clarify such issues. because more areas will need to be structurally hardened due to poor planning. this may have a large impact on the life-cycle costs. An awareness of the threat of manmade hazards from the beginning of a project also helps the team to decide early what the priorities are for the facility. Using this type of logic. the most cost-effective solution may be to provide a redundant facility. based on their effectiveness in saving lives and reducing injuries. Early consideration of man-made hazards will significantly reduce the overall cost of protection and increase the inherent protection level provided to the building. the owner may decide to prioritize enhancements. than a decision needs to be made regarding the priorities of the project. (2) increase the building setback. or (3) accept the risk. Ultimately. for instance for financial institutions with trading floors. the small probability of an incident may not be compelling enough to institute these design enhancements. In some cases.

Inc.tion process in which buildings stratify into two groups: those that incorporate no measures at all or only the most minimal provisions and those that incorporate high levels of protection. Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards. 8. UG-2030-SHR. [For Official Use Only] Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center. J. 1999. 2003. It also leads to the conclusion that it may not be appropriate to consider any but the most minimal measures for most buildings. California.4 FURTHER READING Bryant.gov Department of Defense. 1998. Mississippi. General Services Administration & Applied Research Associates. User’s Guide on Security Glazing Applications.. Cost Impact of the ISC Security Criteria.oca.gsa.. L. http://www. & Smith. 8-4 COST CONSIDERATIONS . Vicksburg. Port Hueneme..

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