BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

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CCNA Security: A New Associate Level Career Path Option

BRKCRT-1104

BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

2

© 2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr

1

Agenda
Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key
BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public

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Goals of This Session
What this session will not be:
A replacement to the 5 day IINS course An exam cram session focusing on the content of the IINS exam An exact match to the content of the IINS course

What this session will include:
A discussion of security issues and technology relevant to those pursuing a career in Network Security at the associate level A presentation based on, but not limited by, the concepts covered in the IINS class A demonstration of attack methodologies and mitigation of the attack using Cisco security technology
BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public

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© 2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr

2

Agenda
Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key
BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public

5

Disclaimer
Do not repeat the exercises demonstrated during this presentation on any network for which you do not have complete authorization to do so. The demonstrations are carried out on an isolated network within the Global Knowledge remote labs environment. Practicing similar exercises outside of this environment requires many considerations including, but not limited to:
1. Many organizations have security policies explicitly forbidding the use of these types of tools on the their networks. Job termination and/or criminal prosecution may be the penalty. Often these types of tools are distributed with hidden malware. By installing such tools you may unknowingly also be installing keystroke loggers, back doors, or other types of malware. Use of these types of tools with targets that are owned by other entities may violate local, state and/or federal laws.

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BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

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© 2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr

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Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID.scr 4 . All rights reserved. Inc. Cisco Public 7 Changing Threats and Challenges Where Can I Get Attached? Operating System Network Services Applications Users Attack Attack Anywhere BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public Everywhere 8 © 2006.Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved.

All rights reserved. Inc. hence ended up being a crippling issue The worm consisted of an executable file (usr/tmp/sh) created from a C program (x$$. and compiled usr/tmp/sh using the appropriate object file BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10 © 2006. Presentation_ID. Inc. which it compiled with the victim’s own C compiler New executable copied the object files from attacking host.c) and one of two object files (x$$. Cisco Public 9 The Morris Worm Sendmail: Invoked debug mode Used RCPT TO: and requested data be piped to a shell The data was a shell script which created a . rsh/rexec BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.o) It used 3 vectors: sendmail.scr 5 .sun3.c file. determined host OS.o and x$$. All rights reserved. Inc. fingerd. Cisco Systems.The Morris Worm Recognized as the first Internet Worm Written by Robert Tappan Morris Released on November 2. 1988 Two target OS’s: BSD on DEC VAX and SunOS Intent was to gauge the size of the Internet Could (and did) infect same system multiple times.vax.l1.

The Morris Worm fingerd & rsh/rexec Differed from sendmail vector in method of transfering files fingerd Buffer overflow–fingerd expected a max of 512 bytes of input.rhosts and /etc/hosts. Cisco Public 11 The Morris Worm Hiding itself: Hid itself from the ps command Unlinked its files so they wouldn’t show up with the ls command Scanning for other hosts: Sequential addresses in local network netstat –r –n /etc/hosts ypcat hosts BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. such as username. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12 © 2006. Inc. but didn’t verify Vulnerability in both target OS. last name and last name + firstname. Cisco Systems. but exploit was only written to BSD on the DEC VAX rsh/rexec Checked the local . Presentation_ID. All rights reserved.scr 6 . Inc.equiv files for trust relationships Needed to crack username/password Tried common combinations for the password. If those attempts failed. first name. it used /usr/dict/words and tried every word in the dictionary BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.

1. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved.The Morris Worm The Main Point: If the very first internet worm was this clever.0/16 Intermediaries ICMP flooding attacks are popular due to amplification techniques: Smurf attacks use a spoofed broadcast ping to elicit a large number of responses to the target.1 DST=171. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.1.1. imagine how clever the they’ve become over the last 20 years! Multiple vectors Dictionary cracking Using local resources (C compiler. Cisco Public 14 © 2006. dictionary file) Evasion of detection Intelligent location of other networks Attackers think outside the box. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.255.1.scr 7 .1. Inc. Cisco Public 13 Smurf Attack Attacker ICMP ECHO Replies 200. Inc.255 171.1.0.1 Target ICMP ECHO SRC=200.

scr 8 .Ping Sweeps and Port Scans Ping sweeps and port scans can attempt to: Identify all services on the network Identify all hosts and devices on the network Identify the operating systems on the network Identify vulnerabilities on the network BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16 © 2006. Cisco Public 15 One of the Sneakier Scan Methods: Idle Scanning 1) Attacker IPID Probe TCP SYN ACK Packet Response: IPID = n TCP RST Packet Zombie Target is not listening on Scan Port Attacker TCP SYN to Scan Port Spoof “from” Zombie OR Target is listening on Scan Port Attacker TCP SYN to Scan Port Spoof “from” Zombie SYN e to Packet pons Res YN ACK ket S Pac TCP RST +1 TCP ID = n IP Target Target 2) Zombie SYN e to cket a pons Res RST P TCP Zombie doesn’t respond to the RST. Cisco Systems. Inc. IPID is unchanged Zombie 3) Attacker IPID Probe TCP SYN ACK Packet Response: IPID = n+1 TCP RST Packet Zombie Attacker IPID Probe TCP SYN ACK Packet Response: IPID = n+2 TCP RST Packet Zombie BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

Cisco Systems.200.0.50.1.2 (3) .1.10.0/24 (13) XP (4) 2K3 Security-Srv 10.2 50.1.1.50 www.1.10 2K3 Data-Srv 10.20 XP Site2-PC 10.10.10.1 DMZ Subnet 172.10.0/24 .1.50.1 (10) 100.0/24 Data Center Subnet (5) .1 DMZ-Srv 172.10 .gov 192.2. Inc. Inc.10.2.0/24 End User Subnet Site1-PC 10.16.gkl.0/24 Outside-PC 150.30.15 NAT: 200.16. 17 Demo: Idle Scan Using Nmap Use Nmap to run an idle scan (-sI) with 50.20.244.10 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 Global Knowledge: Cisco Security Remote Labs Cisco Public © 2008 Cisco Systems.10.2 .100.net .50.1 10.0/24 (2) Outside Perimeter 200.scr 9 .20.18 .10.1 2K .0/24 (15) BT2 BackTrack2 (location & IP Varies) (7) XP Admin-PC 10.1 .Demonstration Topology Perimeter Router 150.com .10.1 10. All rights reserved.200. All rights reserved.50.2 200. All of the scan activity appears to be coming from 50. Inc.200.200.outside. Cisco Public 18 © 2006.10.20 pc.1.1.com Services-R-Us 2K .30.50.20.30.1 10.20.30.150.50.10.50 as the zombie host.2 L3-Switch .0/24 Inside Perimeter .1 Management Subnet(6) 10.1.10. All rights reserved.15 www.1 IOS-FW .20.0/24 (11) INTERNET 200.43.50 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.1 2K3 (16) 50.nist.0/30 time.sru. Presentation_ID.50.10 10.10 XP User-PC 10.30.50.150.0/24 10.

B.Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Example: ARP Cache Poisoning 1.1.C 3. Inc.B A A C B IP 10. All rights reserved.C.1 = MAC B.B.1 = MAC C.C.1 bound to C.1.1.B.1. Inc.1.2 = MAC C.C IP 10.1.1.C. Cisco Systems.C ARP Table in Host B 10. Presentation_ID.C. IP 10.2 bound to C.1.1. It has captured 2 FTP credential sets (displayed) as well as 4 Telnet credential sets.1.1.A. Legitimate ARP reply 10. Subsequent gratuitous ARP replies overwrite legitimate replies 10.1.A.3 MAC C.1. All rights reserved.B.10.2 MAC A.C.1.1.1.1.A 19 Demo: ARP Cache Poison Using Cain Cain is a MITM between 10.1.20 and it’s default gateway. Cisco Public 20 © 2006.1 IP 10.C.1 MAC B.A.C.B.1.A.10.scr 10 .A 2.B B ARP Table in Host A 10.C 10.1.1.1 = MAC B. Cisco Public 10.2 = MAC A. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.1.1.2 ? MAC for 10. Inc.C.B.C.B A = host A B = host B C = host C BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.C.1.C C Attacker ARP Table in Host C 10.

Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved.sectools. Presentation_ID. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 21 Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 22 © 2006. Inc.org BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.org www. All rights reserved.scr 11 .How Difficult Is It to Obtain Tools? www.remote-exploit.

Cisco Public 23 Secure Network Lifecycle Initiation Disposition Acquisition and Development Operations and Maintenance Security Policy Implementation BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. and Design are more important Network security system: A collection of network-connected devices. Cisco Systems. Operations. Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. technologies.scr 12 . Cisco Public 24 © 2006.Network Security Is a System Firewall + AV ≠ Network Security Network security is not something you can just buy Technology will assist Policy. Inc. and best practices that work in complementary ways to provide security to information assets BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.

Inc.wikipedia. Compliance Audit BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Systems.org/resources/policies/ NSA Security Configuration Guides: http://www. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 25 Reading List SANS Security Policy Project: http://www.org/wiki/Security_policy (follow the See Also links) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Standards Security System Industry Best Practices Security Operations Incident Response.gov/publications/PubsSPs.scr 13 . Monitor and maintenance. Guidelines.Security Policy Business Needs Risk Analysis Security Policy Policies. Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved.cisco.com/go/safe NIST Computer Security Division Publications: http://csrc.html SP800-14: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems SP800-27a: Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security Wikipedia Security Policy: http://en.gov/snac/ Cisco Security Design Guides: http://www.nsa.sans. Cisco Public 26 © 2006.nist.

Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. encryption. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Inc.scr 14 . All rights reserved. Cisco Public 27 Cryptography: What and Why What: Cryptography: From the greek kryptó (hidden) and gráfo (to write) Cryptology: From the Greek kryptó (hidden) and legein (to speak) Why: Confidentiality. privacy. Inc. Cisco Public 28 © 2006. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID. Origin Authentication Data Integrity BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

All rights reserved.What Is a Hash Function? Basic requirements for a cryptographic hash function: The input can be any length The output has a fixed length H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x H(x) is one-way and not reversible H(x) is collision-free Examples: MD5–128 bit output SHA1–160 bit output BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 30 © 2006.scr 15 . Inc. Presentation_ID. Inc. Cisco Public 29 Hash Example: Update Verification Uses the Concept of a Keyed Hash Sender Variable-length input message Update Message Time is X 1 Shared secret key Receiver Received message Shared secret key Update Message Time is X Hash function Hash function Update Message Time is X 4ehIDx67NMop9 4ehIDx67NMop9 2 4ehIDx67NMop9 Message + hash BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.

Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc.5 million words.Hash Example: Enable Secret router(config)# enable secret password Hashes the password in the router configuration file Uses a strong hashing algorithm based on MD5 Boston(config)# enable secret Curium2006 Boston# show running-config ! Salt Hash hostname Boston Phrase Value ! no logging console enable secret 5 $1$ptCj$vRErS/tehv53JjaqFMzBT/ ! BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. but it found “san-fran” was a match for this enable secret hash BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID.5 million words. Cisco Public 31 Demo: Enable Secret Dictionary Attack Cain used it’s dictionary of 3. Cisco Public 32 © 2006. Inc. It took it a couple of minutes to go through the first 2.scr 16 . All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Inc.

Cisco Public 34 © 2006. Inc. All rights reserved. So. The two keys are mathematically related but cannot be derived from each other BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved. the keys are said to be symmetric.scr 17 . Presentation_ID. Decrypt cisco plaintext Cisco Public 33 Symmetric vs. All rights reserved. Asymmetric Encryption If the encryption keys used for both encryption and decryption are the same. PKI uses asymmetric keys with the ‘public’ key used for encryption and ‘private’ key for decryption. the keys are said to be asymmetrical. Cisco Systems.What Is Encryption? Encryption is the conversion of plain text into cipher text using a pre-determined algorithm Generally the cipher text is the same length as the plain text Often a key is used to generate a cipher text from an algorithm for a particular plain text cisco plaintext Encrypt !@$!& ciphertext !@$!& ciphertext BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. all parties involved must have the same keys When the encryption key used to encrypt is different from the one used to decrypt. Inc.

Cisco Public 36 © 2006.htm 16. then it would take that machine approximately 149 thousand-billion (149 trillion) years to crack a 128-bit AES key. 3DES.nist. the hardware could determine which key was used to encrypt a message Assuming that one could build a machine that could recover a DES key in a second (i. Inc. Presentation_ID. IDEA BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. What is the chance that someone could use the "DES Cracker"like hardware to crack an AES key? In the late 1990s. Cisco Systems. the universe is believed to be less than 20 billion years old BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 35 Anecdote on Key Length From AES Questions and Answers http://www. Inc. In other words. All rights reserved.Symmetric Encryption Algorithms Sender and receiver must share a secret key Usual key length of 40-256 bits DES. RC2/4/5/6. try 255 keys per second). Inc. To put that into perspective. specialized "DES Cracker" machines were built that could recover a DES key after a few hours.gov/public_affairs/releases/aesq&a.e.scr 18 . AES. by trying possible key values. All rights reserved..

Presentation_ID. Cisco Public 38 © 2006.scr 19 . Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. Inc.Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms Use Public/Private key pair: A private key is a key which is only known to the individual who owns it Public key is known to everyone but still belongs to a unique individual Data encrypted using my public key can only be decrypted using my private key (provides confidentiality) Data encrypted using my private key can only be decrypted using my public key (provides authenticity) Usual key length: 360 bit to 4096 bit RSA. All rights reserved. DSA BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 37 Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

and reporting. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 39 Implementing AAA Using the Local Database: Usernames defined in the configuration Privilege levels defined in the configuration Role-Based CLI defined in the configuration Using an AAA Server: RADIUS —Remote Authentication Dial In User Service TACACS+—Terminal Access Controller Access Control System BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved. It includes traditional username and password dialog and more secure methods (like CHAP and OTP) Authorization—Provides a method for controlling which services or devices the authenticated user has access to. All rights reserved. Inc. Presentation_ID. auditing. Accounting—Provides the method for collecting and sending security server information used for billing. Cisco Public 40 © 2006.What Is AAA ? AAA provides a method to control and configure these three independent security functions: Authentication—Provides the method of identifying users and who are allowed for access.scr 20 . Inc.

1) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.25 PAD connections RADIUS does not allow users to control which commands can be executed on a router. NetBIOS Frame Protocol Control protocol. submitted to IETF. All rights reserved. TACACS+ RADIUS RADIUS uses UDP RADIUS encrypts only the password in the access-request packet RADIUS combines authentication and authorization.RADIUS vs. Inc. accounting is separate RADIUS is the industry standard (created by Livingston) RADIUS does not support ARA access. but declined TACACS+ offers multiprotocol support. Requires use of privilege levels or CLI View RADIUS is recommended as the protocol suitable for controlling the access of users/employees to the network. NASI and X.scr 21 . TACACS+ provides authorization control of router commands TACACS+ is recommended as the protocol suitable for controlling administrative access by IT staff to Cisco devices themselves. Cisco Public TACACS+ TACACS+ uses TCP TACACS+ encrypts the entire body of the packet. Inc. Cisco Public 42 © 2006. Inc. authorization and accounting Cisco developed. more secure TACACS+ uses the AAA architecture. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. which separates authentication. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. 41 Cisco Secure ACS TACACS+ RADIUS AAA Client (Network Access Server) Local or Variety of External Databases Cisco Secure ACS for Windows (IINS class uses ACS v4.

Cisco Systems. Inc. Inc. Cisco Public 44 © 2006. All rights reserved.0. Inc.scr 22 . All rights reserved. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved.1.AAA Router CLI Config Example aaa ! aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa new-model authentication login default group tacacs+ local authentication login TACACS_ONLY group tacacs+ authorization exec default group tacacs+ local authorization commands 1 default group tacacs+ local authorization commands 15 default group tacacs+ local accounting exec start-stop tacacs+ accounting network start-stop tacacs+ ! tacacs-server host 10. Cisco Public 43 AAA Adding TACACS+ Server Using SDM BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.11 key Secretf0rAcs ! line vty 0 4 login authentication TACACS_ONLY BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

Presentation_ID. Cisco Public 46 © 2006. Inc. Inc.scr 23 . All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 45 AAA ACS—Adding the AAA Client (Router) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc.AAA Login Authentication Method List BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID. Inc. Cisco Public 48 © 2006. only deny the show running-config command. Cisco Public 47 Cisco IOS Command Authorization Using ACS Example Permitting the group to execute any router's commands except the show running-config command: Any IOS commands not matching the show command will be permitted AND Within the show command. Inc. Inc. all other show command's arguments are permitted Group Setup router(config)#aaa authorization exec default group tacacs+ BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.scr 24 . Cisco Systems.AAA ACS—Groups and Users BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.

Cisco Systems. Inc. Username: netop Password: IOS-FW>en Password: IOS-FW#debug ip packet Command authorization failed. All rights reserved. Inc. Accounting: Commands entered by adminstrators are tracked. IOS-FW#debug snmp packet SNMP packet debugging is on IOS-FW#undebug all All possible debugging has been turned off IOS-FW# BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 49 Secure Remote Administrative Access: SSH—The Secure Shell Protocol SSH v1 Architecture Integrity Check Security Negotiation Session Key One Monlithic Protocol Weak CRC-32 Only negotiates bulk cipher Uses server’s public key to protect session key provided by client SSH v2 Separate Transport. % Incomplete command. Authorization: Specific command sets are assigned to different user groups. Cisco Public 50 © 2006. Inc. HMAC Uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange Knowledge of the server’s public key is required for Origin Authentication BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. bulk encryption encryption.Demo: AAA Using CSACS Authentication: Username and password required for login. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr 25 . Authentication and Connection Protocols Strong HMAC Negotiates algorithms for PKI.

SSH-1.707: SSH3: starting shell for vty BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.58 *Apr 4 02:45:31. set: length 24.127: SSH3: SSH_SMSG_FAILURE message sent *Apr 4 02:45:47.25 *Apr 4 02:45:31.695: SSH3: SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD message received *Apr 4 02:45:52.143: SSH: RSA decrypt finished *Apr 4 02:45:31. Inc.119: SSH3: SSH_CMSG_USER message received *Apr 4 02:45:35. All rights reserved.5-PuTTY_Release_0. Cisco Systems.211: SSH3: sending encryption confirmation *Apr 4 02:45:31.703: SSH3: setting TTY . Cisco Public 51 Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.requested: length 24. All rights reserved. type 0x03 *Apr 4 02:45:31.991: SSH3: starting SSH control process *Apr 4 02:45:30.703: SSH3: requesting TTY *Apr 4 02:45:52. width 80 *Apr 4 02:45:52.scr 26 .011: SSH3: protocol version id is .207: SSH: RSA decrypt finished *Apr 4 02:45:31.Demo: SSH IOS-FW#debug ip ssh Incoming SSH debugging is on IOS-FW# *Apr 4 02:45:30.019: SSH3: SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY msg . Presentation_ID.143: SSH: RSA decrypt started *Apr 4 02:45:31.991: SSH3: sent protocol version id SSH-1.211: SSH3: keys exchanged and encryption on *Apr 4 02:45:35.707: SSH3: SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL message received *Apr 4 02:45:52.119: SSH3: authentication request for userid admin *Apr 4 02:45:35.length 144.703: SSH3: authentication successful for admin *Apr 4 02:45:52.99-Cisco-1.015: SSH3: SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY msg *Apr 4 02:45:31. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 52 © 2006. width 80.019: SSH: RSA decrypt started *Apr 4 02:45:31.

What Is a Firewall? A firewall is a system or group of systems that enforce an access control policy between two networks Three basic classes of firewalls include: Packet Filters Proxy Servers Stateful Firewalls Good Traffic Bad Traffic BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Public 54 © 2006. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. ports. All rights reserved. Inc. Cisco Systems. Inc. Presentation_ID. and other flags compiled in an ACL BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 53 Packet Filtering Packet filtering limits packets into a network based on the destination and source addresses.scr 27 .

0. All rights reserved.nist.1.0. Presentation_ID.0.0. Inc.255. Cisco Public 56 © 2006.0.15 eq ftp access-list 100 permit tcp any host 200.43.0.200.255.0 0.200.244.18 eq ntp any access-list 100 remark deny and log all else access-list 100 deny ip any any log BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.200. All rights reserved. with no knowledge of previous flow Is the reply really in response to an echo? Was this really requested in a valid FTP control channel? Might someone spoof time.0.0.255 established access-list 100 remark permit DMZ server access access-list 100 permit tcp any host 200. Cisco Public Checks for ACK or RST.168.255 access-list 100 remark Allow NTP replies to return from time.15. Cisco Systems.1.0.gov’s IP address? 55 Application Layer Gateway or Proxy Server BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.1.200.0. All rights reserved.255 echo-reply access-list 100 remark Allow FTP data channels requested from inside access-list 100 permit tcp any eq ftp-data 200.gov access-list 100 permit udp host 192.255 any log access-list 100 deny ip 192.1.200.0 0.255 any log access-list 100 remark The following permits existing TCP connections access-list 100 permit tcp any 200.0.16.scr 28 .0 0.15 eq www access-list 100 remark Allow echo replies to return access-list 100 permit icmp any 200.1. Inc.0 0.nist.0 0.255.0 0. Inc.255 any log access-list 100 deny ip 172.255.Packet Filter Limitations They Must Examine Packets in Isolation: access-list 100 remark The following denies RFC 1918 addresses access-list 100 deny ip 10.

1 VoIP applications.1. Sessions in the state table are permitted bidirectionally. 4.12/24 Fa0/0 outside Inside user initiates a HTTP session to the Internet. Inc.1. Inc. 3. Inc.How Classic Stateful Firewall Works 1. Attacker BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. 2. Port 3575 State Table Inbound ACL S0 Port 80 internet inside 10. Cisco Public 58 © 2006.0. Valid dynamic connections that are negotiated in an authorized control channel are also allowed. as long as the rules of the session protocol are obeyed. Examples include FTP. All rights reserved. If the ACLs permit the first packet in the session. All rights reserved. For example: SMTP commands HTTP commands and tunnels FTP commands Have the following advantages: Are aware of Layer 4 and Layer 5 states Check the conformity of application commands on Layer 5 Can check and affect Layer 7 Can prevent more types of attacks than stateful firewalls BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.168. SQL-Net and 192. ACLs specify policy for new sessions. Cisco Public 57 Application Inspection Firewalls Have features of a stateful firewall Work with NAT Monitor sessions to determine port numbers for secondary channels Engage in deep packet inspection and filtering for some protocols.scr 29 . All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. a state table entry is created.

Cisco Public 59 Security Zone Pairs not in any security zones E2 S4 E0 Self-Zone Zone Z1 Zone Z2 S3 E1 Security Zone Pair Source = Z1 Destination = Z2 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Systems.scr 30 . not interfaces A zone is a collection of interfaces BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.Zone-Based Policy Firewall Private-DMZ Requests DMZ Trusted Public-DMZ Requests Untrusted Internet Default DENY ALL Zone-Based Policy introduces a new firewall configuration model Policies are applied to traffic moving between zones. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 60 © 2006. Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.

Assign policy-maps to zone-pairs BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Define class-maps to describe traffic between zones 5. traffic cannot flow between them If two interfaces are in two different zones. traffic will not flow between the interfaces until a policy is defined to allow that traffic All of the IP interfaces on the router are automatically made part of the “self” zone when zone-based policy firewall is configured By default. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc. Inc. Inc. and traffic to any interface on the router If two interfaces are not in zones. Presentation_ID. except traffic to or from other interfaces in the same zone. Identify interfaces with similar policy requirements and group them into security zones 2.scr 31 . Set up zone pairs for any policy other than deny all 4. traffic to and from the router itself is permitted BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Determine the required traffic flow between zones in both directions 3. Associate class-maps with policy-maps to define actions applied to specific policies 6. and another interface is not in a zone. Cisco Public 61 Configure a ZBP Firewall 1. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 62 © 2006. traffic flows freely between them If one interface is in a zone.Zone Rules Summary An interface can be assigned to only one security zone All traffic to and from a given interface is implicitly blocked when the interface is assigned to a zone.

Inc. All rights reserved.Apply policy-map to zone pair (used to activate the inspection policy) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.Security Zone Firewall Configuration CPL–Cisco Policy Language (CPL) Class-Map (used to select traffic for inspection policies) Policy-Map (used to apply policy to traffic class) (e. Inc.g.scr 32 . Inc. Cisco Systems. inspect/pass/drop policy) Service-Policy . Cisco Public 63 ZBP Policy Actions Inspect Monitor outbound traffic according to permit/deny policy Anticipate return traffic according to session table entries Drop Analogous to deny Pass Analogous to permit No stateful capability BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID. Cisco Public 64 © 2006.

Inc. Cisco Public 66 © 2006.scr 33 . Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 65 Zone-Based Policy Firewall Configuration Example class-map type inspect match-any myprotocols match protocol http match protocol smtp match protocol dns ! policy-map type inspect myfwpolicy class type inspect myprotocols inspect ! zone security private zone security public ! interface fastethernet 0/0 zone-member security private ! interface fastethernet 0/1 zone-member security public ! zone-pair security priv-to-pub source private destination public service-policy type inspect myfwpolicy ! Define the list of services in the firewall policy Apply action (inspect = stateful inspection) Configure Zones Assign Interfaces to Zones Apply inspection from private to public zones BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.SDM Zone Based Firewall Wizard BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved. Inc.

Inc.1. Cisco Public 67 Demo–Packet Filter and Zone Based Firewall 2) Packet Filter permitting all TCP established packets and ICMP echo to 200. Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID. including dynamic NAT systems BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.15: Simple ping sweep using ICMP Echo only finds 200. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 68 © 2006.200.Demo–Packet Filter and Zone Based Firewall 1) No Access-Control: A simple ping sweep using ICMP Echo finds everything.15 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.200. All rights reserved. Inc.1.scr 34 . Cisco Systems.

Inc. Cisco Public 70 © 2006. All rights reserved. a “ping” sweep using TCP ACKs still finds everything! BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.1.200. Presentation_ID. Cisco Public 69 Demo–Packet Filter and Zone Based Firewall 3) Turn on Stateful Firewalling: TCP ACK ping can no longer find hosts behind firewall BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc.15: But. Inc.scr 35 .5) Packet Filter permitting TCP established and ICMP echo to 200.Demo–Packet Filter and Zone Based Firewall 2.

Cisco Public BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 72 © 2006. Cisco Public 71 The Problem Site A Internet Site B The hosts on the Site A and Site B networks use legacy.Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Systems.scr 36 . POP. Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. insecure protocols such as SMTP. so you need the routers to use VPN technology to protect data transmitted between the sites © 2008 Cisco Systems. HTTP and Telnet This is OK for intra-site communications on the protected internal networks It is not acceptable across the Internet Changing the protocols used by the hosts is not an option. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. All rights reserved.

scr 37 . Cisco Public 73 Break Down of IPSec: IKE Hybrid protocol: ISAKMP. Inc. Presentation_ID. Data Integrity and Origin Authentication AH provides Data Integrity and Origin Authentication BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems. ESP) Uses UDP port 500 Defined in RFC 2409 Internet Key Exchange protocol Negotiates protocol parameters Exchanges public keys (Diffie Hellman . Inc. SKEME Defines the mechanism to derive authenticated keying material and negotiate security associations (used for AH. All rights reserved.IPSec Protocol Architecture IPSec Uses IKE for Key Maintenance and ESP and/or AH for Protection of Data Internet Key Exchange (IKE) provides a mechanism to derive keying material and negotiate security associations Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) provides Confidentiality.DH) Authenticates both sides Manages keys after exchange BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Oakley Key exchange. Cisco Public 74 © 2006. Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public 76 © 2006.scr 38 . limited support on Cisco hardware ISR(config)# crypto isakmp policy 1001 ISR(config-isakmp)# authentication ? pre-share Pre-Shared Key rsa-encr Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Encryption rsa-sig Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. not scalable Public-key signatures (rsa-signature) Most secure. Quick mode accomplishes a phase II exchange Each phase has its SAs: ISAKMP SA (Phase 1) and IPSec SA (Phase 2) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 75 IKE Authentication Methods Pre-shared key Easy to deploy. Public-key encryption (rsa-nonce) Similar security to rsa-sig. requires PKI. authenticated channel for IKE communications Main mode or aggressive mode accomplishes a phase 1 exchange Phase 2 exchange: security associations are negotiated on behalf of IPSec services. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Inc.IKE Phases. requires prior knowledge of peer’s public key. Security Associations ISAKMP SA Site A Internet IPSec SA IPSec SA Site B Two-Phase protocol: Phase 1 exchange: two peers establish a secure. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Inc. Inc. Presentation_ID.

YB Bob YA =g XA mod p YA YB YB = g XB mod p YB mod p = zz (Alice calculated) XA XB XA YA XB mod p = zz (Bob calculated) zz = shared secret = g BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. XA Public Value. Inc. Inc.DH Exchange Alice Private Value.scr 39 . Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Cisco Public mod p 77 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Data confidentiality Data origin authentication Anti-replay detection Use IP protocol 50 Defined in RFC 2406 ISR(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set test ? ah-md5-hmac AH-HMAC-MD5 transform ah-sha-hmac AH-HMAC-SHA transform comp-lzs IP Compression using the LZS compression algorithm esp-3des ESP transform using 3DES(EDE) cipher (168 bits) esp-aes ESP transform using AES cipher esp-des ESP transform using DES cipher (56 bits) esp-md5-hmac ESP transform using HMAC-MD5 auth esp-null ESP transform w/o cipher esp-seal ESP transform using SEAL cipher (160 bits) esp-sha-hmac ESP transform using HMAC-SHA auth © 2008 Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. Cisco Systems. & Sliding window DES 3DES AES SEAL BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 78 © 2006. Cisco Public Data integrity (does not cover ip header) HMAC-MD5 HMAC-SHA Only the IKE authenticated peer can use the negotiated keys Sequence no. YA Private Value. XB Public Value.

Cisco Public 80 © 2006. IKE Phase 1 IKE SA Routers A and B negotiate an IKE Phase 2 session. All rights reserved.1.ESP tunnel mode Original IP datagram IP header IP payload New IP header IP datagram with ESP Tunnel ESP header Original IP header IP payload encrypted Integrity checked ESP transport mode Original IP datagram IP header IP payload IP header IP datagram with ESP Transport ESP header IP payload encrypted Integrity checked BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.scr 40 . IKE SA 3. Inc. IPSec Tunnel 5. Inc. IKE Phase 2 IPSec SA Information is exchanged via IPsec tunnel. Cisco Public 79 Site-to-Site IPSec VPN Host A RouterA RouterB Host B 10. The IPsec tunnel is terminated. 2. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.3 10. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Host A sends interesting traffic to Host B.2. IPSec SA 4.1. Routers A and B negotiate an IKE Phase 1 session.3 1. All rights reserved.2. Presentation_ID. Inc.

Inc. 4. 2.Site-to-Site IPSec Configuration Step 1: Ensure that access lists are compatible with IPSec Step 2: ISAKMP (IKE) policy Step 3: IPSec transform set Step 4: Cryptographic access list Step 5: Create and apply the cryptographic map BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public © 2008 Cisco Systems. Choose the VPN implementation subtype. All rights reserved. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 Enter the configuration page. 82 © 2006. Cisco Public 81 Introducing the Cisco SDM VPN Wizard Interface 1 3 2 Wizards for IPsec Solutions Individual IPsec Components 4 5 1.scr 41 . Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. 5. All rights reserved. Choose the desired VPN wizard (VPN type). 3. Start the wizard. Inc. Choose the VPN page. Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public 83 IPSec Configuration Example Site 1 10.1.0.30.0.12 R6# show running -config crypto isakmp policy 110 encr 3des hash md5 authentication pre -share group 2 lifetime 36000 crypto isakmp key cisco1234 address 172.0.2 255.0.0. Inc.2 255. All rights reserved.6.1.30. Cisco Public 84 © 2006.0.0.30.1.30.6.30.30.255. Inc.255 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.255 10.6.0.1.255 crypto isakmp policy 110 encr 3des hash md5 authentication pre -share group 2 lifetime 36000 crypto isakmp key cisco1234 address 172.scr 42 .0.2 10.6.2 set transform -set SNRS match address 101 ! interface Ethernet 0/1 ip address 172. Presentation_ID.6.2 set transform -set SNRS match address 101 ! interface Ethernet 0/1 ip address 172.255.0 Site 2 Internet 10.6.0.30.1.0 0.2 ! crypto ipsec transform -set SNRS esp -des ! crypto map SNRS -MAP 10 ipsec -isakmp set peer 172.0 R1 A R6 10.1.255. Inc.0.0.0 0.2 ! crypto ipsec transform -set SNRS esp -des ! crypto map SNRS -MAP 10 ipsec -isakmp set peer 172.0.30.255 10.6.1. All rights reserved.0.255.1.6.12 R1# show running -config B 172.0.0 crypto map SNRS -MAP ! access-list 102 permit ip 10.0 0.Quick Setup Configure all parameters on one page BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.0 crypto map SNRS -MAP ! access-list 102 permit ip 10. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.2 172.0 0.0.

scr 43 . All rights reserved. Inc. Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 86 © 2006. Presentation_ID. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 85 Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.Some More Advanced VPN Technologies Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Digital Certificates Remote Access VPN Web VPN Dynamic Multipoint VPN (DMVPN) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public 87 IDS vs. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved.scr 44 . since it is inline. it can stop the trigger packet BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. IPS IDS (promiscuous mode) Analyzes copies of the traffic stream Does not slow network traffic because it is not inline Allows some malicious traffic in since it can’t stop attacks inline IPS (inline mode) Works inline in real time to monitor network traffic and content Needs to be able to handle the network traffic inline Prevents malicious traffic entering the network. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 88 © 2006. Inc.IPS Deployment Options Promiscuous Sensor CSA MC CS MARS IOS Firewall with IOS IPS Agent Agent Agent Untrusted Network Inline Sensor Agent Agent Agent Agent SMTP Server Agent Agent Web Server DNS Server BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.

Inc. Cisco Public 90 © 2006. All rights reserved.IPS Attach Responses Deny attacker inline Deny connection inline Deny packet inline Log attacker packets Log pair packets Log victim packets Produce alert Produce verbose alert Request block connection Request block host Request SNMP trap Reset TCP connection BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.scr 45 . Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. Inc. Inc. Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 89 Support for SDEE and Syslog Network Management Console Alarm SDEE Protocol Alarm Syslog Syslog Server BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

add “drop” action) as desired Test your custom signature set in a lab setting before actual deployment BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.Signature Micro-Engines Cisco IPS relies on signature micro-engines to support IPS signatures All the signatures in a signature micro-engine are scanned in parallel Each signature micro-engine does the following: Categorizes a group of signatures (and each signature detects patterns of misuse in network traffic) Is customized for the protocol and fields it is designed to inspect Defines a set of legal parameters that have allowable rangers or sets of values Uses router memory to compile.pl/ios-v5sigup This package contains a digitally signed signature file that includes all the signatures for entire Cisco IPS product line Step 2: Select one of the two recommended signature categories (list of signatures): IOS-Basic or IOS-Advanced Step 3: Use IOS CLI or SDM 2. load. Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 91 Cisco IOS IPS Deployment Steps Step 1: Latest Cisco IPS signature package http://www.scr 46 .cisco. and merge signatures BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 92 © 2006.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. Inc. Inc.4 to customize your signature list: Select additional signatures as desired Delete signatures not relevant to the applications you’re running Tune actions of individual signatures (e.g.

Cisco Public 93 IPS Policies Wizard (Cont. All rights reserved. Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr 47 . All rights reserved. Cisco Public 94 © 2006.) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Systems. Inc.IPS Policies Wizard BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

All rights reserved. Cisco Public Signature Event Actions 96 © 2006. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 95 Configuring Signatures Using Cisco SDM (Cont.Configuring Signatures Using Cisco SDM BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.) Signature Alarm Severity BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc. Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID.scr 48 . Inc.

Configuring Global Settings

BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

97

Configuring Auto Update

BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

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© 2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr

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Demo–Cisco IOS IPS in Action
Deobfuscation: The sensor decodes the URL as an HTTP daemon would. %6F represents the ASCII code for “o” in Hex. The sensor determines that R%6F%6FT.eXe is really an attempt to access root.exe.

BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

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Demo–Cisco IOS IPS in Action
Metasploit successfully exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability to get a shell prompt on the remote server
msf 3com_3cdaemon_ftp_overflow(win32_reverse) > exploit [*] Starting Reverse Handler. [*] Attempting to exploit Windows 2000 English [*] Got connection from 150.150.1.20:4321 <-> 200.200.1.15:1573 Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. C:\Program Files\3Com\3CDaemon>

With IOS IPS enabled, the router detects a suspiciously long user name field in the FTP control stream. The shell connection is not successful, and the event is logged.
msf [*] [*] [*] msf 3com_3cdaemon_ftp_overflow(win32_reverse) > exploit Starting Reverse Handler. Attempting to exploit Windows 2000 English Exiting Reverse Handler. 3com_3cdaemon_ftp_overflow(win32_reverse) >

BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Cisco Public

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Agenda
Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key
BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public

101

Why Be Concerned?
If one layer is hacked, communications are compromised without the other layers being aware of the problem. Security is only as strong as your weakest link. When it comes to networking, Layer 2 can be a very weak link.
Application Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Physical
BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public

Application Stream

Application Presentation Session

Compromised

Protocols and Ports IP Addresses Initial Compromise MAC Addresses Physical Links

Transport Network Data Link Physical
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Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.000. Cisco Public 103 Port Security Configuration Switch(config-if)# switchport mode access switchport port-security switchport port-security maximum value switchport port-security violation {protect | restrict | shutdown} switchport port-security mac-address mac-address switchport port-security mac-address sticky switchport port-security aging {static | time time | type {absolute | inactivity}} BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.000 Port 0/1 allows MAC A Port 0/2 allows MAC B Port 0/3 allows MAC C MAC F Attacker 1 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 Attacker 2 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.scr 52 . Cisco Public 104 © 2006. Inc.MAC Address Concerns Unauthorized MAC addresses MAC Address Spoofing Bridge Table Overflow Attacks MAC A Desired behavior: 0/1 0/2 0/3 MAC A MACs 1-1.

All rights reserved. All rights reserved.1234 F F F F F B F F ST Pr P BP ior ity DU =0 F B F F BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 BPDU Guard Root Bridge Switch(config)# spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2006. Inc. Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 106 53 .scr U PD 0 PB = ST iority Pr Attacker Root Bridge © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 105 F F F F F B BPDU Guard Enabled Attacker STP BPDU Globally enables BPDU guard on all ports which have portfast enabled © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc.STP Manipulation Root Bridge Priority = 8192 MAC Address= 0000.00C0. Presentation_ID.

1a5d F F F F Root Guard Enabled F F B Attacker Switch(config-if)# STP BPDU Priority = 0 MAC Address = 0000. Cisco Public 108 © 2006. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Inc. All rights reserved. Inc.0c45.1 80 Server Attacker sees traffic destined for servers Server BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 107 VLAN Hopping by Rogue Trunk 802.0c45. Inc.Root Guard Root Bridge Priority = 0 MAC Address = 0000.1Q Trunk VLAN 20 VLAN 10 k un Tr Q 2. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.scr 54 .1234 spanning-tree guard root Enables root guard on a per-interface basis BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

8 02 .VLAN Hopping by Double Tagging 1 20 80 .1Q frames. All rights reserved. Only unidirectional traffic is passed. Switch(config-if)# switchport trunk native vlan vlan_number Sets the native VLAN on the trunk to an unused VLAN. This disables trunking on the interface. 1Q .1Q. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Attacker on VLAN 10 2 20 802. Cisco Public 109 Mitigating VLAN Hopping Network Attacks Example 1: If no trunking is required on an interface Switch(config-if)# switchport mode access Configures port as an access port. Example 2: If trunking is required Switch(config-if)# switchport mode trunk Switch(config-if)# switchport nonegotiate Enables trunking but prevents DTP frames from being generated. All rights reserved. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Frame 3 Fra m e Trunk (Native VLAN = 10) 4 Note: This attack works only if the trunk has the same native VLAN as the attacker. Cisco Public 110 © 2006. Inc. The switch performs only one level of decapsulation.10 2. Victim (VLAN 20) Note: There is no way to execute these attacks unless the switch is misconfigured. Inc. All rights reserved.1 Q The first switch strips off the first tag and sends it back out.scr 55 . Presentation_ID. Inc. The attack works even if the trunk ports are set to “off”. Cisco Systems. The attacker sends double-encapsulated 802.

1. Inc. Cisco Public 10.2 = MAC A.4 L3-Sw(config-if-range)#switchport protected L3-Sw(config-if-range)#end BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.B.C.1.1 = MAC B.1. Inc. Presentation_ID.1.1.2 ? MAC for 10.3 MAC C.1.B.B A A C B IP 10.A.C.1. Legitimate ARP reply 10.C 3.2 bound to C.C.1 = MAC B. IP 10.1 IP 10.C ARP Table in Host B 10.1.C.ARP Spoofing: Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 1.A 2.1.A.1.1.B.1.1. All rights reserved.1.C.C. Inc.1.A.C.B.1. one per line. End with CNTL/Z. Subsequent gratuitous ARP replies overwrite legitimate replies 10.scr 56 .A.C.2 MAC A.1 MAC B.C 10.1.B B ARP Table in Host A 10.A 111 Private VLAN Edge Within a VLAN. Cisco Systems.C C Attacker ARP Table in Host C 10.B.1. L3-Sw(config)#interface range fa0/2 . Frames are not allowed between a pair of protected ports.1.1.C.1 = MAC C.C.1.1.1. All rights reserved.1.2 = MAC C. layer 2 frames are only allowed between a pair of non-protected ports or a protected port and a non-protected port.B A = host A B = host B C = host C BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved.1 bound to C. L3-Sw#config t Enter configuration commands.B. Cisco Public 112 © 2006.C IP 10.

Inc. Presentation_ID.scr 57 . Inc. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 114 © 2006. All rights reserved.Some More Advanced Layer 2 Security Technologies Full-fledged Private VLANs–uses the concept of promiscuous ports and isolated ports and adds the concept of community ports. DHCP Snooping Dynamic ARP Inspection BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Public 113 Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.

Presentation_ID.scr 58 . All rights reserved. All rights reserved.) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Public 115 Practice Exam Item 1—(Cont. Cisco Public 116 © 2006. Inc. Inc.Practice Exam Item 1—SDM-Based Item BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems.

All rights reserved.scr 59 . Cisco Public 118 © 2006. Inc. Confidentiality and Authenticity BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. which statement is correct? A. Confidentiality B. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved.) Based on the zone base firewall SDM configuration windows shown. Cisco Systems.Practice Exam Item 1—(Cont. The “sdm-inspect” policy applies to the bi-direction traffic flow between the in-zone and the out-zone B. Cisco Public 117 Practice Exam Item 2—Theory Based Item Encrypting the plaintext using the private key and decrypting the ciphertext using the public key provides which functionality? A. The “sdm-inspect” policy classify traffic into four traffic classes (including class-default) BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. All traffic sourced from the in-zone destined to the out-zone to be denied (dropped) C. All traffic sourced from out-zone and destined to the in-zone will be inspected D. All rights reserved. Authenticity C. Integrity and Confidentiality D.

Inc.1 tacacs-server key Secretf0rAcs ! line vty 0 5 login authentication name ! A. Inc.x signatures? (Choose two) A. B.sdf D. Presentation_ID.0. Cisco Public 120 © 2006. 128MB.Practice Exam Item 3—CLI Configuration Item What additional configuration is required to enable the VTY users to be authenticated using the local database on the router if the ACS server is down? ! username admin privilege 15 secret harDt0CrackPw ! aaa new-model ! aaa authentication login name tacacs+ ! tacacs-server host 10.sdf BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. D. 256MB. Inc. C. Cisco Systems. advanced C. All rights reserved. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 aaa authentication login default tacacs+ local aaa authentication login default local adding the “local’ option after “aaa authentication login name tacacs+” adding the “default’ option after “login authentication name” in the vty config mode © 2008 Cisco Systems.1. basic B.scr 60 . All rights reserved. Cisco Public 119 Practice Exam Item 4—Configuration Related Item What are the two IOS IPS signatures categories based on version 5.

Inc. Pre-shared Key D. All rights reserved. Inc. ARP table BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 121 Practice Exam Item 6—Theory Based Item Stateful firewall uses which table to track the connection status? A. Cisco Systems. RSA signature C. All rights reserved. Inc. SHA BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Forwarding table (CEF) E.scr 61 . Cisco Public 122 © 2006. Presentation_ID.Practice Exam Item 5—Theory Based Item Which IKE authentication method is the least scalable? A. ACL table B. State table D. AAA E. ACS B. Routing table C. All rights reserved.

ARP table B. the “sticky MAC address” option will save the secure MAC address to what location? A.Practice Exam Item 7—SDM Based Item Referring to the IPSec transform set configuration shown. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. Inc. Inc. running configuration E. DES C. Inc. All rights reserved. which encryption method is used to provide data confidentiality? A.scr 62 . AES E. SHA B. Presentation_ID. Cisco Public 123 Practice Exam Item 8—Configuration Related Item When implementing Port Security on Cisco switches. startup configuration D. All rights reserved. ESP BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 124 © 2006. NVRAM BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. MAC address table C. HMAC D.

B.0.171.16.16.2.255 20 10.0 0. There are two active outbound sessions C. Last heard 00:00:00 ECHO request Bytes sent (initiator:responder) [98568:98568] Based on the show output shown.0.172. Cisco Systems.30.255 esp-sha-hmac 10. E.0.0.10 and 172.1.151:0) icmp SIS_OPEN Created 00:00:02.255.26. Inc. 126 © 2006. All non-telnet traffic will be dropped D.26.30.255 10.26.1 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.26. Inc.0 0. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. Host 172. Presentation_ID. D.1:8)=>(172.0.2.255 aessha What is wrong regarding the partial S2S IPSec VPN configuration shown? A.26.0. Inc. Cisco Public 125 Practice Exam Item 10—Configuration Related Item aessha esp-sha-hmac 10.scr 63 .20 IP address Cisco Public © 2008 Cisco Systems.0.151 is initiating the telnet session to host 10.1:11009)=>(172. which statement is correct? A. Last heard 00:00:16 Bytes sent (initiator:responder) [52:108] Class-map: class-default (match-any) Match: any Inspect Established Sessions Session 44C82C68 (10.30.1.0 0.0. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 The transform-set name does not match between the peers The transform-set is missing the AH option The transform-set is missing the “mode tunnel” option The crypto acl is not a mirror image of the crypto acl on the other peer The crypto acl is not matching the 172.30.1.26.151:23) telnet SIS_OPEN Created 00:01:32.30.Practice Exam Item 9—Show Output Related Item ISR#sh policy-map type inspect zone-pair session Zone-pair: in-to-out Service-policy inspect : telnetpolicy Class-map: telnetclass (match-all) Match: protocol telnet Inspect Established Sessions Session 44C831D8 (10.0 0. All rights reserved.1. C.255. Only telnet traffic will be inspected B.30.

All traffic sourced from the in-zone destined to the out-zone to be denied (dropped) C. All rights reserved.Agenda Introduction Disclaimer Attack Methodologies Security Policy Cryptography Fundamentals Securing Administrative Access Firewall VPN IPS Layer 2 Security Sample Questions Answer Key BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 128 © 2006. Inc.scr 64 . which statement is correct? A. The “sdm-inspect” policy applies to the bi-direction traffic flow between the in-zone and the out-zone B. Cisco Public 127 Practice Exam Item 1 Based on the zone base firewall SDM configuration windows shown. All rights reserved. All traffic sourced from out-zone and destined to the in-zone will be inspected D. Cisco Systems. Inc. The “sdm-inspect” policy classify traffic into four traffic classes (including class-default) Correct Answer: D BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID.

All rights reserved. C. All rights reserved. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Integrity and Confidentiality D. Presentation_ID. Cisco Public BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 130 © 2006. Inc.0.1.1 tacacs-server key Secretf0rAcs ! line vty 0 5 login authentication name ! Correct Answer: C A. aaa authentication login default tacacs+ local aaa authentication login default local adding the “local’ option after “aaa authentication login name tacacs+” adding the “default’ option after “login authentication name” in the vty config mode © 2008 Cisco Systems. B.Practice Exam Item 2 Encrypting the plaintext using the private key and decrypting the ciphertext using the public key provides which functionality? A. Confidentiality B.scr 65 . Authenticity C. Inc. D. Confidentiality and Authenticity Correct Answer: B BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Inc. Cisco Public 129 Practice Exam Item 3 What additional configuration is required to enable the VTY users to be authenticated using the local database on the router if the ACS server is down? ! username admin privilege 15 secret harDt0CrackPw ! aaa new-model ! aaa authentication login name tacacs+ ! tacacs-server host 10.

Pre-shared Key D. Inc. SHA Correct Answer: C BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. basic B.x signatures? (Choose two) A.Practice Exam Item 4 What are the two IOS IPS signatures categories based on version 5.sdf D. All rights reserved.scr 66 . Presentation_ID. Cisco Systems. advanced C. Cisco Public 131 Practice Exam Item 5 Which IKE authentication method is the least scalable? A. Inc. All rights reserved. Inc. 128MB. Cisco Public 132 © 2006.sdf Correct Answer: A and B BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. RSA signature C. 256MB. ACS B. All rights reserved. AAA E.

Cisco Public Correct Answer: D 134 © 2006. AES E. All rights reserved. Inc. ESP BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. DES C. ACL table B. Presentation_ID. Routing table C. HMAC D. Forwarding table (CEF) E. Cisco Public 133 Practice Exam Item 7 Referring to the IPSec transform set configuration shown. Inc. which encryption method is used to provide data confidentiality? A. Inc. State table D. All rights reserved.Practice Exam Item 6 Stateful firewall uses which table to track the connection status? A.scr 67 . All rights reserved. ARP table Correct Answer: C BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems. SHA B.

startup configuration D.151 is initiating the telnet session to host 10.26.30. Inc. All rights reserved.26. which statement is correct? A.scr 68 .30. All rights reserved. Only telnet traffic will be inspected B.30.1:8)=>(172. Cisco Public 135 Practice Exam Item 9—Show Output Related Item ISR#sh policy-map type inspect zone-pair session Zone-pair: in-to-out Service-policy inspect : telnetpolicy Class-map: telnetclass (match-all) Match: protocol telnet Inspect Established Sessions Session 44C831D8 (10. Host 172. ARP table B.26.1 BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.30.151:23) telnet SIS_OPEN Created 00:01:32.1:11009)=>(172.Practice Exam Item 8 When implementing Port Security on Cisco switches.26. There are two active outbound sessions C.151:0) icmp SIS_OPEN Created 00:00:02.30. Presentation_ID. NVRAM Correct Answer: D BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Last heard 00:00:16 Bytes sent (initiator:responder) [52:108] Class-map: class-default (match-any) Match: any Inspect Established Sessions Session 44C82C68 (10. All rights reserved.26. running configuration E. Cisco Systems. MAC address table C. Last heard 00:00:00 ECHO request Bytes sent (initiator:responder) [98568:98568] Based on the show output shown. Cisco Public Correct Answer: B 136 © 2006. Inc. Inc. the “sticky MAC address” option will save the secure MAC address to what location? A.26.30. All non-telnet traffic will be dropped D.

255. Inc. Cisco Systems.2.20 IP address Cisco Public © 2008 Cisco Systems.10 and 172. E.0. All rights reserved. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 The transform-set name does not match between the peers The transform-set is missing the AH option The transform-set is missing the “mode tunnel” option Correct Answer: D The crypto acl is not a mirror image of the crypto acl on the other peer The crypto acl is not matching the 172.172.1.16.0 0. D.1.0.255 esp-sha-hmac 10.255. B.255 10. 137 Q and A BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems.0 0.0.1. All rights reserved.Practice Exam Item 10—Configuration Related Item aessha esp-sha-hmac 10. Inc.0 0.1. C.16.0.171.0.0 0.255 aessha What is wrong regarding the partial S2S IPSec VPN configuration shown? A.0. Cisco Public 138 © 2006.scr 69 .0.2.0. Presentation_ID. All rights reserved. Inc.255 20 10.

scr 70 . Go to the Collaboration Zone in World of Solutions or visit www. Receive 20 Passport points for each session evaluation you complete. All rights reserved. All rights reserved.cisco-live. Complete your session evaluation online now (open a browser through our wireless network to access our portal) or visit one of the Internet stations throughout the Convention Center. Cisco Public 140 © 2006. Cisco Systems. All rights reserved. Don’t forget to activate your Cisco Live virtual account for access to all session material on-demand and return for our live virtual event in October 2008.Recommended Reading Continue your Cisco Live learning experience with further reading from Cisco Press Check the Recommended Reading flyer for suggested books Available Onsite at the Cisco Company Store BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Cisco Public 139 Complete Your Online Session Evaluation Give us your feedback and you could win fabulous prizes. BRKCRT-1104 14381_04_2008_c1 © 2008 Cisco Systems. Presentation_ID. Winners announced daily. Inc.com. Inc. Inc.

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