BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005 STANDARD OIL vs. JARANILLO (immovable – Beron) Petitioners seek for the registration of the chattel mortgage over a parcel of land together with the building on it. The parcel of land and building were leased by de la rosa who later on conveyed these properties by mortgage to petitioner. Petitioners went to respondent to register the mortgage but such was denied on the ground that the properties are real and therefore in violation chattel mortgage law which requires personal property. SC : Register of Deeds has a ministerial duty to register instrument upon payment of proper fees. There is no provision in law which confers judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, it merely acts as notice. Property may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. Parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as personal real properties. If the mortgaged property is real, chattel mortgage is deemed ineffective as to third parties. RICARDO PRESBITERO vs, FERNANDEZ (Immovable – Calinisan) Facts: 1) ESPERIDION Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the value of the properties under litigation. 2) Presbitero was ordered by the lower court to pay Nava to settle his debts. 3) Nava's counsel still tried to settle this case with Presbitero, out of court. But to no avail. 4) Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to the plantation and adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District and registered in the name of Presbitero as the original plantation owner. 5) The sheriff was not able to present for registration thererof to the Registry of Deeds. 6) The court then ordered Presbitero to segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava from the mass of properties belonging to the defendant within a period to expire on August 1960. 7) Bottomline, Presbitero did not meet his obligations, and the auction sale was scheduled. 8) Presbitero died after. 9) RICARDO Presbitero, the estate administrator, then petitioned that the sheriff desist in holding the auction sale on the ground that the levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because the notice thereof was not registered with the Registry of Deeds. Issue: W/N the sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties. Held: 1) They are real properties. 2) Legal bases: a) The Sugar Limitation Law xxx attaching to the land xxx (p 631) b) RA 1825 xxx to be an improvement attaching to the land xxx (p 631) c) EO # 873 "plantation" xxx to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar. 3) Under the express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to the land, and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation. 4) Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance with law, xxx the levy amount to no levy at all.
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005 BISCERRA v TENEZA (immovable - Fernandez) Facts: -A house allegedly owned by the Bicerras was forcibly demolished by the Tenezas who claim ownership of the same. -The materials, after the house was dismantled, were brought to the custody of the Barrio Lieutenant. -Bicerras filed an action before the CFI of Abra praying that they be declared owners of the house and that damages be awarded to them. CFI dismissed on the ground that jurisdiction belongs to the Justice of the Peace courts. Issue: Does the action involve title to real property which makes it cognizable by the CFI? Or does jurisdiction belong to the Justice of the Peace courts as there is no real property involved? Held: Jurisdiction is within the Justice of the Peace Courts as there is no real property litigated. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. But once a house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such and its character of being immovable likewise ceases. BERKENKOTTER VS. CU UNJIENG E HIJOS (immovable - Delgado) Facts: Appellant Berkenkotter appeals the judgement to CFI of Manila. Mabalacat Sugar Company obtained a loan from Cu Unjieng e Hijos. The loan was then secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part the necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill. Shortly after obtaining a loan, Mabalacat decided to increase its capacity by buying additional machinery and equipment. To carry out this plan, the president of Mabalacat, Mr. Green, proposed to Mr. Berkenkotter to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of the effects with the promise that it would be reimbursed after Mabalacat obtains another loan to from Cu Unjieng. Mr. Green furnished the amount adding to its existing credit in Mabalacat amounting to 47 thousand (unpaid salary and loan). Machinery and equipment were bought. Mabalacat obtained another 75,000 Php loan from Cu Unjieng and offered the machinery and equipment as added security. Appelllant contends that installation of machinery and equipment claimed by him was not permanent in character aas much as Mr. Green in proposing to him to advance money said that when their new loan to Cu Unjieng ends in futility, the machinery and equipment will be security. Thus Mr. Green binds himself not to mortgage it or encumber to anyone until he is reimbursed. Issue: W/N lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment as improvement incorporated with the sugar central are subject to the deed of mortgage executed in favor of Cu Unjieng. Held: Yes. It is a well established rule that the mortgage on real properties includes the improvements of the same. The Civil Code gives the character of “real property”to “machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adaptedto meet the requirements of such trade and industry. Installation or machinery and equipment converted them into real property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005 because, as essential and principal elements of sugar central, without them sugar central would be unable to function or carry the industrial purpose for which it is established. Leung Yee vs. F.L. String Machinery Co. and William (del Socorro) Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo (immovable - Legaspi) Facts • Davao Sawmill operated a sawmill on a land belonging to another person. • On the land, the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. • The machines were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. • The contract of lease between Davao Sawmill and the owner of the property provides that "on the expiration of the period agreed upon...all the improvements and buildings erected by the (lessee) shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the (lessor)... Provided... that the machineries and accessories are not included in the improvements which will pass to the (lessor) • There was another action wherein Davao Light&Power Co. was the plaintiff and Davao Sawill the defendant. Davao Light & Power Co. won thus a writ of execution was issued and the machineries in the sawmill were levied upon. contentions • Davao sawmill: real property consists of "constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil" (art. 334 par. 1) • Castillo and Davao Light&Power: real property consists of machinery ...intended by the owner of any building or land... for use in connection with any industry or trade bring carried on therein". (art. 334 par. 5) The machinery in this case was intended by the lessee for use in a building on the land by the owner to be returned to the lessee on the expiration of the lease TC: properties are personal in nature, after winning the bid, Davao Light&Power may take possession of the machinery levied upon Issue w/n the machinery mounted on foundations of cement was personal property Ruling • the machinery is personal property • The characterization of the property as chattels by Davao sawmill is indicative of their intention to classify it as personal property. • Davao Sawmill also has on a number of occassions treated the machinery as personal property and executed chattel mortgages thereon. • The lessee placed the machinery in a building erected on a land belonging to another with the understanding that it was not included in the improvements which would pass from lessee to lessor. • Machinery which is a movable in its nature becomes immobilized only when placed in a plant by the owner of the property but not so when placed by the tenant. People's Bank and Trust Co. (Bank) vs. Dahican Lumber Company (DALCO) (immovable Lopez) Facts: - DALCO buys Dahican Lumber concession from Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila (Atlantic). To develop the concession, they obtained various loans from the Bank. They also acquired certain loans from foreign banks throught the help of Dahican American Lumber Corp. (DAMCO), one of its stockholders. - Both transactions above are secured by a mortgage over the same five pieces of land owned by DALCO. The mortgage had a stipulation that all equipment and machinery acquired after the institution of the mortgage will be included in the same. - After the execution of the mortgage, DALCO buys several new equipment to relace the old ones
Despite appeal by Meralco. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. City Assessor (Board of Assessors) declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax Declaration. CALINISAN. towers) as long as they are used to carry the transmission or conveyance lines. .After due trial. the court held that the 175k should be divided to the previously mentioned four companies. The CTA said that the poles are exempted according to part 11 paragraph 9 of Meralco’s franchise. (Art. 484 (which allowed the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchise to utilities). This amounted to Php 175. . In many American cases.W/n the mortgages are binding even if they are not registered in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage Law. Company appeared in the books of DALCO as its general purchasing agent.g. LOPEZ. DAMCO was actually a stockholder and Connell was a general agent of DALCO.Atlantic and the Bank then files foreclosure proceedings in the lower court after DALCO did not push through with the rescission of the contract with Connell. and that they were personal properties not subject to real property tax. on land belonging to it. the court orders that the equipment of DALCO be sold. CTA ordered the cancellation of the said tax declarations. . . Issue: . In connection with these purchases. Connell Bros. DELGADO. it is doubtful that they really are the suppliers of the equipment for DALCO. there was no need to register them according to chattel mortgage laws because the equipment are real property and not personal. Since the towers (not pole-like in appearance) of Meralco are used for the conveyance of electric
. DAMCO and Connell.(side issue) The action was not filed prematurely. DEL SOCORRO.Upon motion of the parties. The equipment were immobilized by the fact that they were placed by the owner in the plant with the intention of using them to meet the needs of the lumber company.000. Issue: Are the poles personal property? Are they subject to real property tax? Held: The word "poles” should not be given a restrictive interpretation. DALCO issues a resolution rescinding the purchase agreements with Connell and DAMCO but the latter refuse to do so.The mortgages are clear that all equipment acquired after the execution of the mortgage would be covered by the said mortgage. Meralco paid under protest. SARENAS 2C 2005 they have. thus. the court issues its resolution ordering that DALCO pay its liabilities with the Bank. Also. This statement authorized the Bank and Atlantic to file the action to foreclose the mortgage. Board of Assessment appealed to the SC. Meralco (Art 415 paragraph 5 – Mendiola) Facts: A franchise was granted to Charles Swift in accordance with Act. RIVAS. Meralco has constructed 40 steel towers (the lines coming from a Laguna hydroelectric plant) within Quezon City.(side issue) The 175k should be given to the Bank and Atlantic. . Atlantic.The mortgages are binding. 415 (5)).Prior to the maturity of the mortgages. Held: . . and filed a petition for review in the CTA. There was no clear proof that they were the providers of the equipment to DALCO. DAMCO and Connell did not have a superior lien on the equipment. poles are described not merely as cylindrical in form but may be in any from (e. Board of Assessment vs. .W/n the properties acquired after the mortgage are covered by the said mortgages. .PROPERTY
BERON. the Board of Assessment Appeals required respondent to pay the as real property tax on the said steel towers. Meralco became the transferee and owner of the franchise. MENDIOLA. Included in the aforementioned resolution of DALCO was a statement that the company was insolvent and that the company did not anymore expect any funds to come their way in the future.
1 because poles do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. . a second loan was asked by the Magcales from Prudential for the sum of 20.In the enumeration of properties under Art.A deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed in favor of the bank as a security for the loan.00 from Prudential Bank. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. spouses Magcale secured a loan for the sum of 70. while it is true that a mortgaged land necessarily includes. an event which takes effect only on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds. These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5. They are not included in Par. the towers of Meralco. DELGADO. instruments or implements. They are not included in Par. LOPEZ. ISSUE: Whether or not a valid Real Estate Mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.Included in the Real Estate Mortgage are the building and the lot on which building is erected.On May 2 ’73. it is obvious that the inclusion of building is separate and distinct from land. A rider is also contained at the bottom of the reversed side of the document which states that the Magcales filed a Miscellaneous Sale Application over the lot.Thus. 19 ’71. and even if they were. SARENAS 2C 2005 current from the source to its consumers.The first Real Estate Mortgage was executed before the issuance of the final patent and before the government was divested of its title to the land.Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sale Patent over the parcel of land on April 24 ’73. HELD: Yes RATIO: . 415. they are not intended for industry or works on the land. CALINISAN. it therefore falls within the jurisprudential definition of poles. . Prudential Bank vs.PROPERTY
BERON.Mortgage was foreclosed and sale of the property was made because of Magcale’s failure to pay its obligation .000 with another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously mortgaged. RIVAS. Mortgage executed by Magcale on his own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intent valid. DEL SOCORRO. buildings.
. Granting that the steel towers are not embraced within the term poles. . for they are not machineries or receptacles. they are still not taxable because they do not fall under any of the categories in Art. Panis (immovable – Rivas) . Thus. and they can be separated without breaking the material of the object to which they are attached (they are fastened only with bolts that can be unscrewed). . . in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon. . . MENDIOLA. are within the exemption granted by its franchise. still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. even if they are not pole-like in form. 415. 3 because they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner.RTC declared that the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void. in said provision of law it can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable object. Such a mortgage would still be considered a Real Estate Mortgage for the building would still be considered real property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.On Nov.
• Sabi naman ng trial court “eh gago naman pala kayo eh. Machinery & Engineerin Supplies. Real property are not subject to replevin. Sabi ng petitioners na grave abuse of discretion ang lower court ordering them to provide everything needed to return the stuff that the sheriffs took. the machines that were sold to respondents on the first case were ordered seized. • To satisfy judgment. • So siyempre nagreklamo sila. • Nagmatigas tong mga sheriff at sinabi nila na “our duty is merely ministerial” aba. Repair all damages” • Gago talaga tong mga sheriff eh. Valdez
US vs. The petitioner was then asked to provide for laborers. and connected a rubber pipe between the said tube and his gas appliances. tinambak lang yung mga machinery sa labas ng factory without reinstalling them. Tinuloy pa rin nila ang pagbabaklas ng mga makina that resulted in damages to many parts of the factory. in such a way they could not be separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object Said stuff were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable and tended directly to meet the needs of industry. They were already immovable property pursuant to 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code. CA. MENDIOLA. et al (immovable–Sarenas) Facts: • Petitioners won a previous case for replevin. ibalik niyo yung mga machinery the way that you found them. particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises. It is declared null and void for it falls squarely under the prohibition stated on Public Land Act and RA 730. v. it is evident that such mortgage was executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title. the Manila Gas Company had previously installed an apparatus for the delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors. (Beron) -
Sibal vs. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. Sabi ng judge sa sheriff “loko kayo ah. mga loko to ah. Inaffirm naman to ng CA. Issue: • Ano ba talaga ang mga kagamitan. SARENAS 2C 2005 As to the second mortgage over the same property. They were stopped by the factory owner saying that the machines cannot be dismantled without destroying the factory itself. CALINISAN.PROPERTY
BERON. consisting of piping and a gas meter. LOPEZ. C) The gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter when it vacated. • The local sheriff’s office went to their factory. TAMBUNTING (Calinisan) Facts: A) Manuel Tambunting and his wife occupied the upper floor of a house in Manila. equipment and expenses para ibalik yung mga machinery. Sabi nga naming na pwede niyong kunin balik yung mga stuff pero that doesn’t mean na sisirain niyo yung factory. B) Previously. Inc. RIVAS. Considered immovable na kasi yung stuff”. • Reklamo naman tong mga petitioners.
. DELGADO. Ito yung case at hand natin. E) This continued for 2 months. D) Tambunting inserted a tube where the meter once was. movable or immovable? Held: • • • • The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land. DEL SOCORRO.
the Manila Fiscals have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of.. constitutes theft. and are unlike other classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of stock can only be exercised or enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation. vs. but denies actually inserting the tube. SARENAS 2C 2005 F) This was discovered by the agent of the gas company. then the Secretary of Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for violation of Article 216 of the RPC (possession of prohibited interest by public officer) for petitioner’s shareholdings in the University of the East." Issue: Whether or not the fiscals have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained of. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department — Secretary of Finance. His claim is that — except for his holdings in Manila's University of the East — the Manila Fiscals are powerless to investigate him.. Inc. the charges are not directed against the corporations. and University of Nueva Caceres. B) Similar to theft of electricity. CALINISAN. Conroy. Possession of prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. Lacson Ledesma (Delgado)
BERON. So also.) and in Mandaluyong. LOPEZ. and that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares. His reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres. (RC note: “lacerny” was used in this case) Held: A) Guilty of theft. et animo lucrandi. It speaks of property right to shares of stock which can only be enforced in the corporation's domicile. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. the fact that while head of department and
. Bicol Electric Co. DMG. and the claim that said corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank. Tambunting admits his act of connecting his gas appliance to the tube. In the case at bar.). MENDIOLA. during petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof. C) The clandestine substraction and appropriation of gas. Not mere ownership of or title to shares is involved. University of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co. DELGADO. Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or an essential ingredient thereof took place. and this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the corporation itself. Albano personal property Lloyd Facts: Respondent Delfin Albano filed a complaint against petitioner Jaime Hernandez. through the Monetary Board. RIVAS. Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres. Issue: W/N Tambunting is guilty of theft. Bachrach Motor Co. Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the crime charged. Rizal (DMG. without the consent of the owner. The case sited is not applicable here. Held: Yes." Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. "Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property. DEL SOCORRO. Inc. vs.
etc. This application. with the amount to reimbursed to him by Barza. as long as any other element of the crime is committed in the place where the criminal case is brought. DELGADO. sales patents. neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease. was rejected in 1948 because the area applied for was needed for firewood production. 13 The function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the court but to executive officials—in this case. SARENAS 2C 2005
chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations aforesaid which secured the dollar allocations. and the denial of Bautista’s. It also ruled that the consignation was also invalid. It gave great weight to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture on Barza’s right over the area. 3 It was found that the areas being applied for by Bautista and Barza were overlapping. This was approved. but in Manila where he held his office. 7 After a reappraisal Barza then agreed to the amount to be reimbursed. a public land. or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads. 6 But Bautista did not agree with the appraisal made by the Dir. 4 However. During this time Proceso Bautista is already dead so his heirs represented him. sell. Being such. Issue: 10 Do the Barzas have a rightful claim over the fishpond area notwithstanding the failure to reimburse the Bautistas? Can they rightfully seek the enforcement of the decision of the Director of Fisheries and Secretary of Agriculture? Held: 11 First and foremost. 9 RTC Bautista on the ground that Barzas did not acquire a vested right over the area since they did not pay the reimbursement of the value of the improvements. however. LOPEZ. So. and because of improvements made by Bautista in the area. His discretion must be respected absent a proof of abuse. 10 CA reversed. it is under the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. leases for grazing purposes. the area in question is. 5 Because of the approval of Barza’s application. 8 After seven years. not in Camarines Sur. Director of Fisheries ruled in favor of Barza but requires reimbursement to Bautista for the improvements thereon. and that he had to act officially. grant. fishpond leases.PROPERTY
BERON. DEL SOCORRO. This. of Fisheries. Heirs of Proceso Bautista v Barza (Art 419 FERNANDEZ) Facts: (ginawa ko nang detailed yung facts kasi parang detailed sya sa recits) 1 Proceso Bautista applied for a fishpond permit over a 30 ha parcel of marshy public land in 1946. and consequently. the land which was applied for by Bautista have been greatly developed due to the introduction of certain improvements by Bautista. 2 Ester Barza also filed a fishpond application (14. if the suit is directed not against the corporation itself but involves the commission of a crime – one element w/c may be the ownership of shares of stock – the domicile of the corporation is not an important factor. the Barzas filed an action for recovery of possession of the fishpond area. MENDIOLA. at the outset. An appeal was made but Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied such appeal. 12 Even if Bautista was ahead of Barza in the possession of the area. This was consigned with the Justice of the Peace. any application is ineffective as there would be no disposable land to speak of. RIVAS. however. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. CALINISAN. But Bautista refused to accept the same. in his dual capacity. he did not have the right over the same land and until there is a release by the Bureau of Fisheries.
. was changed when the area was opened for fishpond purposes giving way to the grant of Barzas application. an administrative case occurred between them.85 ha) in 1948.
Held: 6 No prescription. Teodoro. DELGADO. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. the second wife of Teodoro (hindi nanay ni Domingo). Domingo Mendoza. Cabangis (Rivas) Facts: • land in question used to belong to the predecessors of Cabangis • from 1986 to 1901. 4 Petitioner filed a case for annulment of title in 1985. 3 Leoncio Navarette. He acquired such part of the land via an extra-judicial settlement of the land belonging to the intestate estate of his deceased father. 2 The other ¼ was given to Eugenia Aquino. files for an application for Free Patent and caused the said whole lot to be titled and declared in his name (done in 1974). Issue: 5 W/n prescription has set in and barred this action by petitioners. adverse and exclusive possession of the land which was fraudulently included in the free patent gives the petitioner a cause of action for quieting of title. owns ¾ of a particular land. MENDIOLA. the action to annul a free patent which is void ab initio does not prescribe. Subsequently. RTC dismissed said motion because of Art. RIVAS. • CFI held that the land in question belong to Cabangis and registered land in the latter's name Issue: • who owns the land? Held: • • • land became a part of the public domain shores are part of public domain as stated in Article 1 of the Laws of Water. thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots.PROPERTY
BERON. DEL SOCORRO. which is imprescriptible in favor of a person in possession of the property. Government vs.space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. SHORES . Republic vs. 7 The petitioner’s open. Respondent files a motion to dismiss on the grounds of prescription. the subject matter of this case. jurisprudence dictates that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void. SARENAS 2C 2005 14 Nevertheless. Thus. Vda de Castillo (Legaspi)
Mendoza vs. • government decided to deposit sand and silttaken from the bed of the estuaryon the low land which were completely covered with water.
. 494 of NCC (no prescription between co-owners). Barza is ordered to reimburse Bautista for the improvements in the fishpond area. 5 CA reverses the said decision saying that there was prescription. CALINISAN. public. the land began to wear away due to the actions of the waves of Manila Bay until it bacame completely submerged in the water until 1912. The government cannot distribute property which does not belong to them as public domain. LOPEZ. Eugenia sells her portion to the respondent. Two new tax declarations were issued as replacement for the old one of Teodoro. Navarette (Lopez) Facts: 1 Petitioner. husband of Maria. Maria Mendoza Navarette (sister of Domingo who waived her share in the lot during the extra-judicial settlement).
RIVAS. As a defense. not only because it belongs to the State but also because it is used as a waterway. the predecessord of Cabangis could have protected their land by building a retaining wall. Decision of Secretary reversed. The investigation found that it is not part of the TCT and is therefore still public property. constructions on coastal waters or public waterways are not subject to the exception. with the consent of the ompetent authorities in 1986 when the land began to wear away. Issue: 1 W/N the petitioner falls within the exception provided for under Section 2 Held: 2 3 No. The area is therefore public property. petitioner does not fall within the exception. The area is navigable waters and is part of the Manila Bay Area and commonly used by boats and fishermen. de Villongco v.
Vda. SARENAS 2C 2005 • as the sea advances. not susceptible to appropriation by any private individual. plaintiff is saying that the contended area is covred by a TCT. MENDIOLA. (1) that the fishpond was constructed in good faith before the area was proclaimed as communal fishing ground (2) said constructions do not impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream. LOPEZ. no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by law.PROPERTY
BERON. pueblos. the private properties are permanently invaded by the waves abd they become part of the shore or beach. CALINISAN. with the proper permission. among whom is the peitioner. 2 Senator de la Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against several fishbond owners in Macabebe. thye then pass to the public domain. Article 5 of the Law of Waters states "lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State. because land was cinsidered public domain. shall become property of the party constructing such works. but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature. Pampanga. DELGADO. or private persons. unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority. Pangasinan – Art. or by the provinces. Section 2 provides for the exemptions. 4 Petitioner filed case before CFI against the Secretary arguing that RA 2056 is null and void for giving the Secretary the power to decide as to what encroaches public waters and that he acted beyond his jurisdiction. Only those works constructed on communal fishing grounds are exempted under Section 2. Gonzalo
Sanchez v. Municipality of Asingan. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. DEL SOCORRO. The complaint charges that petitioner has appropriated some portions of the coastal waters and converted it into fishponds 3 An investigation was conducted under the authority of the Secretary. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 5 CFI: petitioner falls within the exception under Section 2. it is a de facto case of EMINENT DOMAIN. Moreno (Sarenas) Facts: 1 RA 2056: provides for the prohibition and removal of dams. dikes or any other works in public waters. The area included in the dikes of the petitioner was not part of the land titled to her. Plaintiff was ordered to remove their fishpond works and other constructions. (Beron)
Natividad vs. 421 – Sarenas Facts:
they are not entitled to reimbursement • In the case of Rojas v. Municipality. This lot is owned by the municipality. It could not have in any circumstance have been the object of a valid contract of lease. Certain Resolutions adopted by the Principalia of the pueblo reciting the same fact (that the land had always been part of the public square) were presented as evidence. Defendant cannot rely upon ordinary prescription of 10 years because he is not a holder on good faith. the land had been used by the municipality for other purposes as that of a public square. Petitioners filed for prohibition and an alternative prayer. It therefore has ceased to be property used by public and had become part of bienes patrimoniales. The building thereon was declared as co-owned by Roa subject to purchase of the Municipality of Oas. RIVAS. SARENAS 2C 2005 • • • • • The lot in contention is a strip of land between the municipal school and provincial road. Trial court dismissed petition and ordered them to vacate premises. with the consent of the municipality. When the local administration changed after an election. As to the ownership. claiming that it was a part of the public square of the said town. So the petitioners were asked to vacate the property. MENDIOLA. As early as 1812. an ordinance was passed saying that the lot will be converted to a parking lot and widening of the school. Defendant alleged that is was his.
. CALINISAN. The implied agreement of lease with them was not null and void but merely terminable. Municipality of Oas vs.
Issue: • W/N petitioners should be reimbursed the amount representing rent paid. put up temporary stores and light buildings. for he knew and acknowledged thru the resolution the ownership of pueblo. the rents paid by them be returned. Petitioners. Roa (Beron) Facts: Plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas. DELGADO. the people that were ejected were entitled to reimbursement because the property in that case was devoted for public use and as such is outside the commerce of man. DEL SOCORRO. consequently the extraordinary period of prescription does not apply. Held: • No. Defendant on his part claims that it has been sold by Jose Castillo Issue: Was the property in question a part of the public square of the town of Oas Held: The Resolutions signed by Roa are competent evidence against him. There is no evidence of any adverse occupation of this land for 30 years. They also paid rent to the municipality.PROPERTY
BERON. that if they be ejected. LOPEZ. Defendant Roa signed this resolution. the land is patrimonial in character. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. • But in this case. the court has declared the land as owned by Oas.
DEL SOCORRO.private respondent stallholders sought prohibition of the demolition . LOPEZ. Borces St. thus it can be conveyed. Asistio public streets as property for public use Lloyd Facts: . Cebu City as an abandoned road.new City Mayor public respondent Asistio did not pursue the former mayor’s policy of cleaning up the streets . declared the terminal portion of M. it not being included in the City Development Plan. Dir.shortly after decision. pursuant to a city ordinance . DELGADO.. C) A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Cebu Oxygen for P11T. w/c is outside the commerce of man – may not be the subject of lease or any contract
. Bercilles (Calinisan) Facts: A) The City council of Cebu. D) Property thuse withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.the disputed areas from w/c the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets . B) Another resolution authorized the acting city mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. MENDIOLA. Of Lands (Delgado)
Dacanay vs. there was a change in administration . through a resolution.implementing a policy of cleaning up of streets. although he already filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against Mayor Asistio Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order by Mayor Asistio authorizing the use of the street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the City Gov’t are valid Held: Void E. Issue: A) W/N Cebu Oxygen’s land is part of the public domain and therefore should not be registered to said company.. it (property) shall form part of the patrimonial property of the state. RIVAS. E) The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside of the commerce of man. Mun. as it contravenes the general law w/c reserves city streets and roads for public use .PROPERTY
BERON. C) When no longer intended for public use or for public service. B) The City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.licenses were granted to the vendors . Mabolo. SARENAS 2C 2005 Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.O. D) Cebu Oxygen sought to register the said parcel of land. v Hon. as a concerned citizen and taxpayer.RTC ordered demolition .Caloocan City Mayor Martinez opened as a flea market the street where petitioner Dacanay lives. Inc. Held: A) It was patrimonial property. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI.public streets are property for public use. of Hinunang vs. CALINISAN.petitioner Dacanay. Mayor Martinez ordered the demolition of the stalls on the street . sought to enforce the RTC by way of mandamus.
it can be assumed that there were erected by the National Government—hence Congress may dispose them. hospital. Sur-45. public education. the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. CIR ordered to stop deductions in the IRA and to return what was paid. that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like public administration. • Of these properties were the 50 lots with some buildings thereon (devoted to capitol. RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as a capitol site. etc.00 • CIR deducted on City’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for payment of properties. Using this classification.39%. leprosarium. For the remaining 26 lots.PROPERTY
BERON. DELGADO. RIVAS. Applying principles on the law of Municipal Corporations. school sites and its grounds. MENDIOLA. If property is owned in its private and or proprietary capacity. • Capital of Zamboanga province was transferred to Dipolog.
. Value of properties to be transferred were fixed. For the buildings on the lots. • Province of Zamboanga was divided into two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. buildings were mere accessories to the lands which are public in nature—so they follow the nature of the lands which is public. These 24 lots are public property. LOPEZ.the right of the public to use the City Streets may not be bargained away by a contract PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v CITY OF ZAMBOANGA (Patrimonial property Fernandez) Facts: • The Municipality of Zamboanga was converted into a City by virtue of Commonwealth Act 39 (CA 39). This revoked the Cabinet resolution conveying lots to Zamobanga city for P1. etc). the rest remain patrimonial. It is enough. then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. Sec 50 of the same Act transfers abandoned properties and buildings to the City of Zamboanga (for a certain price) upon the transfer of the capital to another place. SARENAS 2C 2005 . they are patrimonial in nature as they are utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. plaintiff may collect from defendant.61% • Exec Sec issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in Sec 50 of CA 39 and is entitled to the payment to be given by Zamboanga city. But RA 3039 was enacted and it amended Sec 50 of CA 39—that the properties transferred are now free of charge. Registration of the lots is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public. public health. • Petitioner assails constitutionality of RA 3039 for it allegedly deprives petitioner of property without just compensation. In these lots. school. CALINISAN. and then to Molave. But even if provincial funds were used. DEL SOCORRO. Petitioner was favored. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI.such lease by the stallholders to the City Gov’t are void . hospital and leprosarium sites. • Appeal was made Issue: Does RA 3039 deprive Zamboanga del Norte of property without just compensation? Held: If property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity. Assets of the defunct Zamboanga province were divided into two: Norte-54.
The CFI favored Manaois. Held: . because they do not belong to the municipality.W/n the properties mentioned can be attached by a judgment-debtor of a municipality. Mun. RIVAS. Issue: . DELGADO. the municipal council approved a resolution confiscating the 6 fishery lots leased by Duque because of his failure to comply with the lease contract. CFI ordered the Sheriff to levy on the rentals of Tabije of a fishery lot and the fishery lots leased to 45 different persons. MENDIOLA. 424 provides an enumeration of what can be classified as for public use. This was granted by the CFI.SC recognized that the properties of municipalities can be divided to those for public use and those considered as patrimonial. if levy of the
. Municipal Council of Iloilo – Art. although if the public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution.In cases when a creditor is trying to collect from a municipality and the latter does not have any other property to be attached.PROPERTY
BERON.Municipality of Iloilo appropriated 2 strips of land owned by petitioner for widening of a street. the remedy of the creditor is by way of mandamus. Mr. but the amount representing the rentals by Tabije may be attached. However.Petitioner files case in CFI to recover the purchase price for the said lots.The Municipality files a motion to dissolve the attachment and declare such as null and void for being illegal. CALINISAN. The fishing lots may not be levied. They may well be regarded as property of the State.) . one police patrol automobile. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. of Paoay vs. Besides. However. LOPEZ. Manaois (Mendiola) Facts: The municipality of Paoay has for many years leased fishery lots over municipal waters. 424 – Lopez Facts: . What the municipality of Paoay has is merely a usufruct or right to use the municipal waters. DEL SOCORRO. (2 auto trucks used for street sprinkling. . Jarencio (Legaspi)
Viuda de Tan Toco vs. Duque was on of the lessees. The municipality is not holding the usufruct in a permanent manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or allow it to be taken away from it as property through execution. Manaois won the bidding and paid for rentals for the whole year. the Municipality failed to pay and several property of theirs were attached.Because of lack of funds. The fishery lots were subjected to a public bidding. Not even the usufruct may be levied upon. Issue: Are the properties leviable? Held: The fishery lots are not leviable. SC said that the classification is important because property of municipalities for public use cannot be levied upon whereas patrimonial property is susceptible of being attached. police stations and concrete structures used as markets) . Duque and his men prevented Manaois from entering the fishing lots. CFI rule in her favor. The Provincial fiscal opposed the attachment by arguing that these properties are for public use. SARENAS 2C 2005 Salas vs. Manaois filed suit to recover what he paid. Art. . (But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for private purposes. It is merely a grant.
Planting of trees and plants of the curate and the gobernadorcillio of the said town does not mean private ownership but merely an intention to improve the plaza for the benefit if the people. the representative of the Catholic Church.the municipality of Victoria is the rightful owner of the plaza . destined to the use of all the residents without any hindrance from the local authorities or the curate of the town. filed a case against the Municipality of Victoria alleging that the parish of the said town is the owner of a parcel of land within the said municipality known as the plaza. in the absence of which. commons and special and communal property. the revenue coming from the renting may be levied. and also a tribunal destined for the use of the local authorities. . MENDIOLA.It was a custom observed by all towns established administratively in these islands under the old law that on their creation. SARENAS 2C 2005 usufruct will be allowed. . since from the creation of the town up to the present. . .The contention of Harty that the land was donated by Tanedo. .PROPERTY
BERON. LOPEZ. Harty vs.Who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that surrounds the parish church of the said town. RIVAS. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI.RTC: decided in favor of Harty and asked the municipality to vacate the land. Municipality of Victoria (Rivas) Facts: . It goes to prove that such is not indispensable for the functioning of the governmental functions. These lots were later confiscated because Duque has been in default of payment under the lease agreement. and which is called the public plaza of the same. Manaois (Sarenas) Facts: • Paoay has been leasing fishery lots on municipal waters.from the conversion of the barrio Canarum into the town of Victoria. Issue: .He argued that the parish was in continuous possession of the land since 1901 and parish was unlawfully deprived of its use over the land. This letting out of municipal waters for fishing purposes is a sort of side-line. it must be presumed that the he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople. way before the parish was extablished.As part of the conversion from a barrio to a town. Municipality of Paoay v. CALINISAN.
. However. there will be an anomalous situation where a private person conducts a public bidding for the use of the lots owned by the State and appropriating the rentals for his own benefit. . the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public plaza. the municipality can still continue to function.. all the residents have enjoyed the free used of said plaza. But it must be stressed that this type of revenue source is not available to municipalities without coastal waters – these municipalities fair out even without leasing fishery lots. it is a condition that the town should have streets and a public plaza with its church and parish house. Francisco Duque leased some fishery lots offered by Paoay. a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas. The grant was given by the Legislature to the municipality to bolster its income. .The municipality on the other hand argued that they were the owners of the land since 1855. Held: . DEL SOCORRO.Harty. . DELGADO.Plazas are destined to the public use and are not subject to prescription as stated in Art 1936 of the Civil Code.
Cuaycong v Benedicto (Calinisan) (RC note: Long case but it really is just a simple story. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created. Manaois complained to Paoay. They are regarded as property of the State. It carries the presumption that it has been a private property even before Spanish conquest. So. CFI ruled in his favor. DELGADO. the petitioner is given 1 year form date issuance of patent. The right or usufruct of Paoay likewise is not subject to execution. the court said applying section 38 of Act 496. CALINISAN. LOPEZ. RIVAS. Paoay tried to request Duque to leave but Duque refused to budge. But the rent that was levied may be the subject of execution
• • •
Nelayan vs. even defeat or destroy said purpose. But when Manaois tried to enter the lots in order to catch fish. Manaois brought a case for recovery of sum paid plus damages against Paoay. plaintiff’s allegation they have been in continuous possession since time immemorial is sufficient proof of private ownership. In the execution of judgment. SARENAS 2C 2005 • • • • Manaois became the subsequent lessee of the lots. Duque refused to let them in and was saying that he was still the lessee. What the Municipality of Paoay merely holds is the right of usufruct. DEL SOCORRO. They are not subject to levy and execution. It has become private property by presumption. and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede.) Facts:
. MENDIOLA. the fishery lots are considered properties for public use. It was barely 2 months from issuance when complaint was filed As to the 2nd defense. alleging that they have been. What is lacking is the judicial sanction of title. since time immemorial. They are held in trust for the people. They do not hold it in a permanent manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or allow it to be executed. sheriff levied (1) rent paid by a certain Tabije to Paoay and (2) about 40 fishery lots Paoay objected to the attachment of the properties
Issue: • W/N the fishery lots can be attached to satisfy judgment Held: • • No. They further claim that the petitioners failed to allege sufficient facts of ownership to hold against the defendants Held: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners As to the 1st defense. in actual possession as owners Defendants claim that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case for the Director of Lands has already issued free patent. Nelayan (Beron) Facts: Plaintiff filed a complaint against Cecilia Nelayan and the Director of Lands ofr cancellation of title and reconveyance.PROPERTY
it has been used by the plaintiffs (no need to memorize the names) to transport their goods (primarily agricultural) and supplies from the haciendas. or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part. not part of pub. E) Plaintiffs did not even assert that the road was of public domain.Zobel files for recovery of money Issue: Mercado defenses that the contract of lease entered into between plaintiff and defendant is null and void because the portion of land involved therein is a fishpond which is part of the public domain Held: Valid contract.00 per hectare. Moreno (Delgado)
. to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right. Held: A) There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs’ predecessors was based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way. Santos vs. SARENAS 2C 2005 A) This case concerns the use of 2 (wagon) roads: 1) Nanca-Victorias Road (NV) (this case primarily concerns this road) 2) Dacuman-Toreno Road B) The haciendas (one of them is Hacienda Toreno) are connected to the provincial road through the NV. Mercado (need for judicial pronouncement .PROPERTY
BERON. . D) Possession. and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart that passed the road. C) Possession is the fundamental basis of (the) prescription.Lloyd) Facts: . B) The plaintiffs only had PERMISSIVE USE. Issue: W/N NV is a public highway. the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owner of the estates affected. C) For 30+ years.if there is any error in the Torrens title of the plaintiff in the sense it included lands belonging to the government. G) Judgment in favor of Benedicto. LOPEZ.Mercado failed to pay amount in despite demands from Zobel . E) The plaintiffs wants the road/s opened.Mercado executed a promissory note in favor of Zobel . RIVAS. w/c is a part of the Hacienda Bigaa. under the Civil Code. DEL SOCORRO. F) The “license to use” was essentially revocable.plaintiff Zobel owned the land in question. CALINISAN. must be possession under claim of title. domain A. is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of plaintiffs. and if it is not. MENDIOLA. or was maintained or constructed by public funds. D) Use of the NV has been tolerated by the owners (Benedictos) for many years until 1911. It must be adverse. when they closed it.the government is not a part of this action B. it is only the government who could properly question that fact . is no proof that said portion belongs to the government.Zobel leased a portion of the land to defendant Mercado for fishing purposes for a yearly rental of P50. or used by the public. alleging it is a public highway. DELGADO. Evidence shows that said portion is covered by the certificate of title issued in favor of Zobel . as evidenced by a titled . FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. The fact that defendant was granted an ordinary fishpond permit by the Bureau of Fisheries to fish in the portion of land in question six years after the execution of the contract of lease.
SARENAS 2C 2005 . Magbanua is the registered owner. Ignacio – Art. • So Magbanua sought to have the houses of Ramos and Mangahas demolished.tenants are estopped from disputing title of the landlord and his right to such possession upon the termination of the lease VDA DE MEDINA V CRUZ (Fernandez) Facts: • Phil Realty has title over lot 6 of Grace Part Subdivision. LOPEZ. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. She later bought 6 houses standing on the land from de Guzman. it is clear that defendant is now prevented from denying the title of Zobel over said portion . Petitioner’s claim of payment of land tax does not bear conclusive weight in proving ownership over the lot to which payment was made for. Judge ordered demolition in lieu of the decision ordering Mangahas and Ramos to vacate premises. • Lot was later sold to Magbanua. Pero makulit sila. Estoppel: since defendant entered into a contract of lease with plaintiff over the portion of land in question and said contract was found by the trial court to be valid and binding. of the lots—such is given greater credence. Meneses (Legaspi)
Alano vs. ordering Mangahas and Ramos to leave premises. • Magbanua sought the execution of the decision ordering Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the property. under the Torrens System. Plaintiffs in this case are the grandchildren of Victoriana while defendants are the grandchildren of Pedro. • Medina claims since she is not a party to that case. 2 Plaintiffs allege that upon the death of Manuel. and the de Guzmans sold it to petitioner. RIVAS. Hence. CALINISAN. Victoriana and Pedro acquired ownership
. • Court ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot. The two sold it to the de Guzmans. Realty’s consent. she can be reached by the order of execution and Writ of Demolition. 433 – Lopez Fact: 1 Manuel Ignacio had three children.PROPERTY
BERON. • Medina filed action for recovery of ownership. Lunod vs. de Medina opposed claiming that she is the owner of the said houses. decision cannot be enforced against her Issue: Can the final and executory decision.there is still need of a judicial pronouncement in order to have it excluded from the torrens title issued to Zobel C. They appealed but were denied. Mangahas and Ramos moved to annul the sale. DEL SOCORRO. be enforced against Vda de Medina (considering that she claims ownership over the houses to be demolished)? Held: Lot in question is formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos. Victoriana. Pedro and Antonio. Though it is true that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. • Salamat vda de Medina purchased from the heirs of Don Mariano Esteban the same parcel of land—lot 6. namely. DELGADO. A deed of Absolute Sale executed in her favor. Vda. • Mangahas and Ramos occupied lot without Phil. petitioner is privy to the judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos by virtue of the sale transactions. MENDIOLA.
Supia and Batioco failed to repurchase the property. The Justice of the Peace may continue to hear the case until the evidence should disclose that the question involved is one of title. CALINISAN. As a defense. Pedro possessed the property as administrator until his death when he was replaced by his son Estanislao. As such. However. Also. LOPEZ. They have been given this jurisdiction. Held: 5 SC affirms CFI. because the averment is a mere statement of the facts which is not evidence to prove that the action now involves the question of ownership.) Issue: Is the Justice of the Peace precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the case of unlawful entry and detainer because of the allegation by Supia and Batioco that the contract is a mortgage? Held: It has been settled that the Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction over an action for forcible entry and detainer as established in Sec. There were tax declarations presented. Supia and Batioco claim that the alleged contract was not of a sale. SARENAS 2C 2005 of 5 parcels of land. Supia and Batioco will occupy the property as tenants of Ayala. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. was also presented.
Issue: 4 W/n plaintiffs have a claim on the questioned parcels of land. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. Plaintiffs come to the CFI asking for a partition of the said parcels of land. the Justice of the Peace has not jurisdiction because his jurisdiction is limited to the determination whether or not there is a valid sale and that the authority of the Justice of the Peace cannot tread upon the settlement of ownership (which is the subject matter of the allegation that the contract is that of a mortgage.PROPERTY
BERON. they argue. Ayala contends that Supia and Batioco are unlawfully withholding possession of the property from Ayala. CFI found that plaintiffs failed to prove why Pedro was allowed to keep the property from the time of death of Manuel. because the court of Justice of the Peace are more accessible and in a position to afford the promptest remedy. It did not clarify in what capacity was her father working the land (pwede kasing as tenant lang and not as owner). Dissent by Villa-Real:
. the testimony of the witness adduced by the plaintiff (daughter of Victoriana) to the effect that her father worked on the said land is lacking. Despite the foregoing. 6 Assuming that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is prima facie proof of their case. All of these evidence prove that defendants have been in possession of the lands as owner as early as 1912 so that the possession lasted for 45 years up to the filing of the action in 1957. the lease was terminated. DEL SOCORRO. However. Now. a deed of mortgage. RIVAS. MENDIOLA. The complaint averred further that during the one-year period. Supia vs. Quintero (Mendiola) Facts: Ayala filed a complaint of unlawful entry and detainer against Supia and Batioco alleging that Supia and Batioco had sold to Ayala certain real property with the right to repurchase within one year. but a mortgage. which proves exercise of ownership. DELGADO. the same is completely overcome by conclusive evidence of possession as owner submitted by defendants. CFI dismissed the action because it says that there was no proof given that Manuel really did possess the land and that he intended to divide it among his three children. consequently. the Justice of the Peace retains jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry and detainer. it is beyond the authority of the Justice of the Peace to hear cases involving the question of title.
4 Garcia is also contending that the burden of proving that the repairs were not defective lie on the petitioner Issue: 1 Who has better evidence in this case? Held: 2 The plaintiff in a civil case is called upon only to prove the material allegations in his complaint constituting his cause of action 3 The cause of action in this case relates to the agreement between the parties that Garcia will pay once the repairs are done 4 Although appellant made the defense that the repairs were not properly done. On the other hand. the Justice of the Peace no longer has jurisdiction. Del Valle vs. Supia claims that it is a mortgage and that he has paid the amount of indebtedness. DELGADO. Total cost for the repair amounted to P1610. with the permission of the heirs. DEL SOCORRO. ewan ko how to relate it to property Facts: 1 Domingo Garcia had 2 of his cars repaired by Ramcar. took possession of the land • Mercado: bought land form Julia Quizon • : heirs never consented to Del Valles possession • Julia Del Valle was asked to become a party to the case • RTC: Mercado is the rightful owner of the land Issue: • W/N the land being claimed by Del Valle is the same land being held by Mercado Held: • NO! • the property redeemed by del Valle is the same land purchased by Mercado from Julia Quizon • a person who claimsthe ownership of a real property is in duty bound to clearly identify the land claimed in accordance with the titles on which he claimshis right of ownership adn he shall not be permitted to rely on the defects of the defendant's title • evidenced adduced by Del Valle herself does not appear to be the same property contained in the complaint Ramcar Inc.82.PROPERTY
BERON. 434 – Sarenas *case about evidence. the case has become a question of ownership. Mercado (Rivas) Facts: • Quizon was the real owner of the land who motgaged the said land to Biquid • Del Valle. v. SARENAS 2C 2005 Ayala avers that the contract is not a mortgage but a sale and that by failure to repurchase. CALINISAN. he presented no evidence in support of his contention
. Clearly. which was payable within the first 10 days of the month. MENDIOLA. 2 Garcia failed to pay this amount and so Ramcar sued him for recovery 3 Garcia is contending that he is not indebted to the plaintiff because the obligation has not yet become due and demandable for the reason that plaintiff has not complied with defendant’s request to correct defects in the repair services. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. Ayala had become the absolute owner of the property. RIVAS. Therefore. Garcia – Art. and therefore he is the owner of he property. redeemed the land by paying Buquid • it is claimed by Del Valle that Mercado. LOPEZ. without the approval of Del Valle.
Granting that father of Llacer did not obtain a portion of the land until some years after he had sold such land to Munoz. In actions for the recovery of the possession of land. by the fact that his father had not obtained the subject land until 1881. Held: In practically every case relating to lands which comes to this court by appeal from the Ilocos provinces. the defendants failed to present witnesses and evidence. They further allege that defendant Munoz claimed to be the owner of the said parcel of land and that the other defendant (Achaval) though with the consent of the sons of Llacer. DEL SOCORRO. Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante were the owners of a certain parcel of land described in the complaint. In the trial. The plaintiff’s counsel likewise moved for new trial for the new evidence gathered but was denied. The subsequent sale of this portion to father of Llacer in 1885 is therefore without effect. It would be a wise course to adopt by the lower court in case of deficiency of evidence relating to the identity of land. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. SARENAS 2C 2005
Dacer vs. their counsel’s motion for extension to look for witnesses denied. CALINISAN. or some years after the alleged deed to Antonio Munoz. Lower court ruled in favor of Llacer. the description should be so definite that an officer of the court. by Pio Balana to a portion of the land in question to Antonio Munoz. 8 which were deeds executed by Faustino Llacer to all of the land in question to Antonio Munoz predecessor of defendant Francisco Munoz. 8. his subsequent acquisition of the land would have the effect of making his convenyance of the sane to Munoz valid. Reyes and Nadres vs. It seems that the lands in this case were not properly identified. Santos
Sembrano vs. Issue: W/n Munoz has a valid claim over the land. The defendants denied allegations and alleged that they were the owners of the lands... RIVAS. might go into the locality where the land is situated and definitely locate it. Munoz presented Exhibit 7.
Santiago vs. DELGADO. Exhibit 8 is a deed executed and delivered in regular form on the 20th day of April 1877. Arzaga and Longboy (delgado) Facts: The action in the lower court is for the recovery of possession of two parcels of land. The contention of plaintiff is without merit. MENDIOLA. Muñoz
Facts: In the complaint filed by petitioner. there seems to be difficulty about the identification of the lands in question. The plaintiff on the other hand claims that defendant could not have obtained the said lands by virtue of exhibit 7. to make an ocular inspection himself or to appoint a commission for that purpose in order that the court may know just what lands are in litigation. Achaval claimed that said land belong to Munoz. defendant. LOPEZ. Held: YES. occupied a portion of the land without paying the corresponding rent. A portion of the land in question which the defendant claims he acquired form Pio Balana in 1877 was transferred to father of Llacer in 1885 by virtue of a note to exhibit 8.PROPERTY
BERON. Issue: W/N ocular inspection is necessary. Borbon Facts: effect of issuance of decree of registration lloyd
. On the trial. This transferred all the rights of Pio over the tract of land to Munoz. Plaintiff declared not the owner thereof.
claims that Nicolas was in quiet possession of the land until the latter’s death. Jalandoni also denies any payment of rent by Nicolas for the land. When the land was sold to Nicolas. judgment should be in favor of Jalandoni. the burden of proof is upon those seeking to dispossess the actual occupant. and such a title should not be permitted to be put in doubt by an allegation that the possession was not held under a claim of ownership. indefinite and uncertain. who later passed it to Nicolas. the title is perfect and cannot later be questioned – it is incontrovertible. .PROPERTY
BERON.subject lot already registered in the name of Hermenegildo Nadres . 3 Jalandoni.thereafter. Failure to establish. DELGADO.When the Court of Land Registration knows the same land has been registered in the name of two different persons.SC annulled the judgment of the lower court declaring that the lands are public land NOLAN v JALANDONI (Art 434 . payments were not for rentals but just for the sake of peace and to avoid litigation. CALINISAN. Actual possession of real estate for more than thirty years. . the land was free from any encumbrance. the same excerpt also established that at the time the claim of absolute ownership was made. An excerpt from the deed admitted that Manzano did pay some amounts as rentals prior to the happening of the sale. except on the date where the deed of sale between Manzano and Nicolas was executed. The oral testimonies presented by the Nolan and Hermanos were vague. and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned. . lots registered under Torrens System in their names . 5 Jalandoni presented a deed evidencing sale of land by Manzano to Nicolas. Exact dates of payment were not shown. Payments of rental were not conclusively established.
.Fernandez) Facts: 1 Nolan (as administrator of Jaboneta’s estate) and La Sociedad Lizarraga Hermanos seek to establish title and recover possession of a parcel of land from Martin Jalandoni (as administrator of Nicolas Jalandoni’s estate). When it is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different persons the title should remain in the name of the person securing the first registration. supported merely by vague. DEL SOCORRO. RIVAS. the court must investigate that fact even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud had been committed in securing the double registration. MENDIOLA. (More importantly) This being an action of ejectment. court ordered a decree declaring lands as public lands through a previous cadastral survey w/c included the subject lots . and uncertain oral testimony as to payments of rent. 4 Nolan and Hermanos relied on oral testimonies to establish payment of rents by Manzano and Nicolas. under a bona fide claim of ownership. on the other hand. establishes a perfect title.lot divided into lots 1 and 2 to Clemente Reyes and Anselmo Nadres respectively. by a preponderance of evidence. However. the contention that Jalandoni’s 30-year plus occupation of the land was by virtue of a rent. SARENAS 2C 2005 .Reyes and Nadres possessed the land for many years already . FERNANDEZ LEGASPI.petitioners filed a case to annul the decree declaring lands as public lands Issue: What is the effect of the decree of registration? Held: it is incontrovertible after the lapse of 1 year from its issuance. LOPEZ. 2 Nolan and Hermanos base their claim from a common predecessor-in-interest that rented said land to Manzano.When once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system. indefinite. Issue: To whom should the land be given? Held: Jalandoni.
resident in the said streets. Jalandoni is in possession of the land and it is his opponent’s burden to show a better right to the land) Visayan Refining vs. 435 – Lopez Facts: 7 The government.PROPERTY
BERON. The initial plan was that said extension was going to pass through Cuneta Ave. SC finds that the change from Cuneta Ave. filed a formal petition to Pres. Issue: Are the contentions of Juan correct? Held: The procedures in EO 132 say nothing that these procedures are to be conditions precedent to the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. several studies have already been conducted as to the original plan. Juan also says that the value of the lots (based on the reports of the commissioners) is more than that what was determined by the courts. In the present suit. 12 In this case. Said court ruled in favor of the government finding that they had the discretion as to what lands to expropriate. SARENAS 2C 2005
(Note that in the trial court. RIVAS. judgment was based on a previous suit—Jalandoni v Hermanos— whereas it was the burden of Jalandoni to establish title as his claim was based on the deed from Manzano. are the registered owners of 2 adjoining parcels of lands in La Union. 9 Despite of the report by the HSC. LOPEZ. government still filed a complaint for expropriation in the CFI. Camus (Legaspi)
De Knecht vs. Bautista – Art. social impact and cost of both options. There must always be a valid reason. The EO was merely intended to govern transactions involving purchase or donation of private
. CALINISAN. Issue: 10 W/n the government can choose any private property for expropriation. DEL SOCORRO. The President authorized the Executive Secretary to expropriate the land to be used as a site for the La Union Agricultural School. the principal of a school offered to purchase the land to no avail – Juan wishes to sell at 170k. through the Department of Public Works and Communications was planning to extend EDSA to Roxas Blvd. Held: 11 SC says that government has the power to choose but such discretion must not be exercised capriciously. Republic vs Juan (Mendiola) Facts: Juan et al. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. who referred it to the Human Settlements Commission (HSC).) The trial court authorized the Republic to occupy and take possession of the land upon deposit of 100k as the provisional value of the property. (It appears that before the expropriation proceeding. Marcos. 8 Upon learning of the change in plan. The latter submitted a report that the Department of Public Works should revert back to the original plan. SC finds it odd that such a sudden change is effected knowing that surely. This was subsequently changed to the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. 13 The SC also took note of the report of the HSC which says that the original plan is the best option taking into consideration the functionality. Juan argues that the appropriation was invalid because there was no prior negotiation to purchase lots or to have them donated to the government as provided by EO 132. MENDIOLA. petitioner. to the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets were not called for. DELGADO.
BERON. continuous possession of the lands subject of registration Issue: 1 W/N the petitioner’s possession of more than 30 years cannot serve as a title for the acquisition of ownership because the same are public roads or highways Held: 2 The strips of land never were part of such roads 3 That the strips of land are necessary to give to the highways the required width according to law. DEL SOCORRO. The withdrawal by Juan of the 100k deposit shows the recognition on their part of the right of the government to expropriate the lots. Director of Lands – Art. continuous and uninterrupted possession for more than 30 years
. RIVAS. Adding the amount withdrawn. ) It could hardly be said that the amount of 300k is unjust. on the 200k (amounting to 192k) that was not yet withdrawn by Jose. parcels A. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. (As a matter of fact.expenses for leveling and surveying)]. B and C should be reduced accordingly because it forms part of the Pasig-Montalban Highway. The evaluation in the amount of 300k judicially given by Juan is a declaration and admission binding on them. it was also suggested by the La Orden that there are less expensive means that can ease the traffic situation • RTC: agreed with La Orden and held that no expropriation will happen Issue: • W/N expropriation is necessary Held: • Private property can only be expropriated after payment of just compensation and when public good and genuine necessity exists • courts have the power to inquire into the legality of eminent domain and determine the existence of genuine necessity for expropriation • SC remanded the case back to the RTC for further proceedings Santos v. Republic vs. The appraisal of the Provincial Agriculturist. offered to buy land of La Orden • RTC: government must pay La Orden 270.a. Juan us already entitled to 492k and anything beyond this price is already excessive and unjust to the State and the taxpayer. In fact. the balance. SARENAS 2C 2005 property vis-à-vis the State. LOPEZ. There had already been an interest of 6% p. is not a reason which can lawfully prevent the registration of the land because it has been shown that they were in peaceful. MENDIOLA. La Orden (Rivas) Facts: • Government. because that amount is already just and reasonable. 435 – Sarenas Facts: 1 Gabriela Santos is applying for registration of 5 parcels of land in the Province of Rizal 2 Director of Lands is opposing the registration. and the interest due. Juan should have been bound by his 190k admission. CALINISAN. to ease traffic.original value of the land + 40k. they had already realized a gain of 10k when they withdrew the 100k deposit [ 100k – (50k.000 • La Orden agrued that there is no necessity to the proposed expropriation of her land. According to him. 3 Added info: o Petitioner and her ancestors have been in peaceful. DELGADO. Chief Agriculturist Appraiser. and DBP Commissioner is extravagant (because they are in the 1M range) considering that the property was only bought at 50k originally.
whether directly by the state. Issues: W/N the court can examine and take place the findings of the local legislative body on expropriation. use. What the defendants have done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy. or by its authorized agents.) We already discuss this case in Stat. The Spaniard fully recognized the principle and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the private property of the individual. A similar petition was addressed to the Municipality Board but the same was denied. and after payment of the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with. Genato
City of Manila vs. Issue: W/n the action of the city engineer is in accord with due process of law. Art 349. CALINISAN. SARENAS 2C 2005 4 What the Director of lands may do is bring the proper action for expropriation
Ayala vs.Con. and the rule is that it must strictly be construed. for some purpose of proven public utility.PROPERTY
BERON." The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
. no one shall be deprived of his property. and freely dispose of such strip of their ground. City of Manila
Facts: Ayala applied to the city engineer Dieck. is necessary in derogation of private rights. Held: NO. it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its 7/20/2005possession to him .. DELGADO. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority. and eventually restore possession to the injured party. always after proper indemnity. Held: 1) The exercise of the right of the state of eminent domain. W/N the cemetery is for public use (because if so. The lower court nullified the expropriation resolution of the City of Manila hence this appeal. cannot be subject for expropriation). The expropriation was opposed by the Chinese Community of Manila because it will hit a part of their cemetery. RIVAS. Dieck refused. The court ordered the defendants to immediately issued a license in favor of the plaontiff herein to construct the terrace. dulo nito sa Caloocan na). and the defendants prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement. DEL SOCORRO. The said strip of land belongs to her.. on strict construction on delegated municipal corporation power and in Consti II under eminent domain) Facts: City of Manila wants to expropriate land for the extension of Rizal Avenue (parallel toh ng Quezon Ave.
Arce vs. The reason for the denial was in order to use it as a wharf or public way so that the palintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general. as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip. Chinese Community of Manila (Delgado. J. as the case may be. the defendant in this case. LOPEZ. except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility. crossing Recto Ave. MENDIOLA. if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect. for a license to construct a terreace over the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall if her house and the edge of a canal (Sibacon creek).
but the general authority of municipalities and entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. he may recover the property even from the true owner. The defendants clam that the owner of the land is Dequina. LOPEZ. the inferior court has the power to resolve the issue of ownership. In the case at bar. The CA upheld the RTC. upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. when the legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to municipal or public service corporation or other tribunals or bodies. the lower court erred in saying that the
. Issue: W/N Held: De Luna wins. CA Mendiola Facts: De Luna alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of landing Zambales. and it may select the exact location of the improvement. — The legislature. The municipal trial court favored De Luna and ordered the defendants to return the land to De Luna. De Luna claims that the defendants (Dimaano et. Jose de Luna vs.PROPERTY
BERON. and the courts have no power to interfere. the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. However. J. it must comply with the limitations set by the authorizing statute. when the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership. However. DELGADO. If the petitioner can prove prior possession by him. Dissent (Moir. They claim that Dequina leased to them the land. Judgement of the lower court affirmed. the court will not inquire into the necessity or propriety of the taking. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise such. are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine. RIVAS. The defendants claim that De Luna is not the owner of the land. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. In such a case. the extent of the public necessity for its construction. and has given them discretion as to when the power is to be called into exercise and to what extent. MENDIOLA. al. CALINISAN. SARENAS 2C 2005 exercise it in a particular case. it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement. the expediency of constructing it. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement or public use. Petitioner prays that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45 monthly per hectare. The power of the legislature to confer. general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts. the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site. or to substitute their own views for these of the representatives of the people. Similarly. In ejectment cases. the court below acted correctly in receiving evidence regarding the ownership clam by the defendants. it is well established that the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical possession of the property or possession de facto. DEL SOCORRO. in providing for the exercise the power of eminent domain. However.) entered the land and began to plow and plant sugar cane. independent of any claim of ownership. The defendants allegedly fenced the property with barbed wire.) Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question. 2) It is public as evidenced by the promulgation by the Spanish Governor-General to allocate this area for the burial of the dead of a certain race.
the well-entrenched principle is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. in his official capacity as officer-in-charge of the Bohol Reforestation Project of the Bureau of Forest Development. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. However. He was merely a squatter on the parcel. Rama Rivas Facts: The issue raised in this case refers to the propriety of awarding necessary expenses to the alleged possessor in good faith with right of retention until the expenses are paid. Issue: W/n the grant of right to reimbursement to Rama was proper. The trial of this case in the lower court. DEL SOCORRO. LOPEZ.000 for the 1st land and 3. The republic alleged that Logronio's acts were authorized by the government thru Director of Bureau of Forest Development in connection with the reforestation program of the government.. The witnesses attested that they had seen the delivery of the land to De Luna’s mother and that they saw De Luna and his mother cultivate the land. bulldozed portions of the 2 parcel s of land which he believed to be forest lands. Rama commenced a complaint for recovery of possession. resulted to the conclusion that free patent covering the said parcels of land were issued in favor of Rama and the corresponding certificate of titles were issued as well. De Luna had already shown that he had prior possession as established by the witnesses. Held: NO. the lower court declared as null and void the Certificate of Title covering the parcels of land and ordered Rama upon being reimbursed by the Republic in P6.
. Considering that the parcel of land is forest land. ownership and damages against Logronio alleging that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the 2 parcels of land occupied by Logronio. Republic appealed the lower court's decision insofar as it ordered the Republic to pay Rama for the necessary expenses with right of retention. MENDIOLA. Therefore he is not entitled to necessary expenses with right of retention until reimbursement. the patent and original certificate of title covering the subject parcel issued to Rama did not confer any validity to his possession or claim of ownership.PROPERTY
BERON. SARENAS 2C 2005 property is owned by Dequina. First of all. occupied the same. CALINISAN. government officials caused the issuance of the patent title and the original Torrens title covering the land in Rama's name. The titles are void ab initio. Rama alleged that the Republic has no cause of action and is guilty of estoppel for having caused the issuance of the certificate of title covering the forest land. Republic vs. Logronio. RIVAS.000 for the 2nd. True. In view of its findings that the 2 parcels of land are forest lands. as necessary expenses. In effect Rama's possession of the parcel of land from the beginning was fraudulent and illegal. But the Office of the District Forester of Tagbiliran sent a letter to Rama informing him that the certification issued to Rama by the District Forester is revoked on the ground that after investigation the parcels of land is found to be within the Bohol Reforestation Project. DELGADO. Rama is not a possessor in good faith as defined in art 526 of the civil code. Petitioner Republic filed a motion for leave to intervene. and planted mulberry and other trees.
he migrated to Isabela. DELGADO. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. MENDIOLA.PROPERTY
BERON. One who has not yet been issued a patent for his homestead. Ricardo Ramos filed a homestead application for a 3-hectare land in Rizal.
Rivera vs. This was approved. Issue:
W/N Ramos can claim ownership over the 14-hectare land that was subject to the 2 nd homestead patent
Yes. DEL SOCORRO. LOPEZ. Rivera tried to repurchase the land but Tirona refused • Rivera consigned the amount in court and filed a notice of lis pendens in the office of the register of deeds • Notice of lis pendens was entered in the day book of the register of deeds • Tirona thereafter sold the land to Lapuz who bought the land upon seeing that the TCT of the land was free form any encumbrance. He is illiterate and was only assisted by land officers. • After the 2nd homestead was finalized. may be issued a patent for his previous homestead and allowed another homestead which. together with the previous homestead does not exceed 24-hectares. CALINISAN. the 2nd homestead patent is valid The law does not prohibit a 2nd homestead patent. the 1st homestead was also finalized. His 2nd homestead patent was found by the CFI to be void due to the prohibition on having 2 patents. CA Sarenas Facts: • Sometime in 1928 or 29. Tirona Beron Facts: • Rivera was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Pasay • Rivera sold the land to Tirona at the same time leasing the said land from Tirona for 6 months with right to repurchase the same within that period • Rivera continued to be in possession of the said land • Within the period agreed upon. As regard to the alleged fraud of Ramos (by not disclosing the pending 1 st homestead and ownership of 88-hectares of friar lands). • Ramos filed for ejectment but he lost. Here he filed for another homestead application for a 14-hectare land. So it was the land officers’ fault. • Pending his application. RIVAS. these were not entered by Ramos himself. • A new TCT was issued in the name of Lapuz who later sold the same land to his mother Kerr who was also able to transfer the TCT in her name • RTC: ordered Kerr to return the land to Rivera and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the TCT issued in her name Issue: • W/N the sale made by Tirona to Lapuz was valid making the sale of Lapuz to Kerr valid
. • On appeal. Nueva Ecija. • Ramos later on discovered that there were people living on the 14-hectare land. however while the papers were still being processed war broke out and so he needed to file a new application. SARENAS 2C 2005
Republic vs. It was accepted and approved. Ramos won.
he is not considered a “subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes certificate of title for value and in good faith and who is protected against any encumbrance except those noted on said certificate. RIVAS. This case is a dispute on parcel of land in Limay. Respondents are the heirs of Ambrosio who is a grantee of a homestead patent on the land in dispute. having adjudicated the lot to themselves after Gasmena’s death. That’s why they lost. Gasmena’s heirs. It had no annotation concerning the mortgage. Lapuz is aware that Rivera was in possession of the land when he purchased the same Also. SOLD the lot again to Revilla and Fajardo (RF). DEL SOCORRO. Where a person buys land not from the registered owner but from one who’s rights to the land has been merely annotated on the certificate of title. Galindez Calinisan • Florencio Gasmena had a portion of land which he o Mortgaged to Galindez (registered. LOPEZ. MENDIOLA. but Galindez refused. The notice of lis pendens is a sufficient notice to the subsequent purchasers of adverse claim and that the land is subject to an encumbrance. DELGADO. RF was not a buyer in good faith. • • • Issue: W/N RF has a better right to the lot. Bataan. Ambrosio borrowed money from Kasilag and entered into a contract that if the borrower will not be able to pay his debt of P1000. RF wanted to take possession of the lot. Problem is. Hence this case.PROPERTY
BERON. and a memorandum was entered in the TCT) o Subsequently sold to Galindez (NOT registered) • Several years after his death. CALINISAN. also. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI.
. such annotation is only necessary in voluntary proceedings
• • •
Revilla vs. It is not necessary that the notice of lis pendens be annotated at the back of the owner's TCT. Remember the rule from sales? Priority is given to the party who first registers the sale. Kerr was a purchaser in bad faith because she was residing in the same house with Lapuz when she purchased the land and the sale was made upon the misrepresentation of Lapuz. A case of double sale obviously. or of the sale. RF was able to register his sale. Rodriguez Delgado Facts. SARENAS 2C 2005 as well Held: • • • Sale was void! One who buys a land from a person who is not the registered owner is not considered a "subsequent purchaser in faith and is not protected against any encumbrance except those annotated in the title Lapuz is a purchaser in bad faith! He relied on the title still in the name of Rivera and upon the deed of sale executed by Rivera in favor of Tirona which was not annotated in the TCT. Held: • • • • NO. GALINDEZ has a better right to the lot.
Kasilag vs. another TCT was issued in the deceased Gasmena’s name covering the same lot. and a TCT was issued to him.
shall be deemed a possessor in good faith. We cannot countenance the position taken by Kasilag that sheer ignorance of the law will put him in the ambit of good faith possessors protected by law. as clearly as the jurist does. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. RIVAS. It may be said that IGNORATIO FACTIO EXCUSAT or ignorance of the facts excuses. The agreement between the parties was transformed into an antichresis with the creditor possessing the land. but here Kasilag is not ignorant on the fact that what mortgaged was awarded to Ambrosio by patent. Issue: W/N the mortgagee is in bad faith? Held: NO. MENDIOLA. LOPEZ. he did not know. The spirit of CA 141 in granting homestead patent is to benefit the family. DEL SOCORRO. Later. But the Supreme Court said that Kasilag is not expected to know every angle of the law since he is not a lawyer. Lesaca Del Socorro Facts: . that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of a contract of antichresis which is prohibited by law. he didn't exercise reasonable diligence to examine Delgado . or in the manner of its acquisition. "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title.Sarmiento (buyer) bought 2 lands from Lesaca (seller)
. The lower courts nullified the agreement. In taking the possession and consenting to receive the fruits. so that members will not be tempted to migrate thereby destroying the basic core of the society. CALINISAN.Kasilag saw the Patent Decree so he may have read in it the stipulated prohibitions attached on the certificate. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. it is the same as saying that we all need to go to the portals of law schools in order to know the law.PROPERTY
BERON. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of land. SARENAS 2C 2005 borrower will execute a deed of absolute sale." Gross inexcusable negligence may not be a basis of good faith but here the ignorance of the possessor is excusable since he is not a lawyer. by which it is invalidated. Ambrosio failed to pay the amount when it was due but the parties entered into a new agreement that the lender will take possession of the property and appropriate the fruits to pay the debt.Amen I say to the dissent of Justice Villareal. I vote to deny the petition of Kasilag and affirm the decision of the CA Sarmiento vs. Dissents Villareal . If we are to take the less traveled road ventured by Kasilag. DELGADO. The publication of a law is a constructive notice to everyone and we ought not to excuse from the hammer when it is to fall to violators by saying SORRY BOSING HINDI KO ALAM ANO YANG COLOR CODING EH MAGKANO BA? Another observation is that he should be aware that time of the government's massive grant of patent is to benefit the people to have their own lands. The heirs of Ambrosio wants to recover the land and annul the agreement since it is contrary to law The Public Land Act which prohibits sale and encumbrance within 5 years after the granting of the said land. IGNORATIO LEGIS MENIMEN NON EXCUSAT.
• The heirs of Felix are the parties in this case (so lahat surnamed Acebedo). (magaganda pangalan nung iba tingnan niyo) as RESPONDENTS. In lieu of this. • Administrator Herodotus opposed the motion on the ground that the sale was without his knowledge. administrator was not able to find a buyer.W/N the execution of a deed of sale in a public document is equivalent to delivery of possession of the lands sold to buyer Sarmiento. • Parties were called to a conference. the RESPONDENTS entered into a conditional sale with a certain Yu Hwa Ping (kaya siya kasama sa kaso). These properties have unsettled claims in the form of unpaid taxes. RIVAS. DELGADO. but Lesaca disagreed Sarmiento filed to rescind the sale for failure of the seller to transfer the possession of the land
Issue: . Miguel.PROPERTY
BERON. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. • While the case was pending before the RTC of QC (sala of Judge Abesamis). et al. there was no contrary stipulation that the vendor did not intend to deliver outright the possession of the lands to the buyer o but the seller did not comply w/ his obligation to transfer possession to the seller because of the refusal of Deloso to surrender the land. he filed other actions to have some of the properties mortgaged. the selling-heirs filed a “Motion for Approval of Sale”. Herodotus (incumbent administrator of the estate) and Demosthenes as PETITIONERS. CALINISAN. In the end. Nevertheless. the trial court approved the deed of conditional sale. the selling-heirs already received their proportionate share in the initial payment of the purchase price. Issue:
. and that he wanted to sell the property himself for the benefit of the estate (look for highest obtainable price to generate more funds). this is only true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the seller to the buyer the seller can then rescind the contract because of the seller’s failure to deliver the possession of the lands
Acebedo vs. he filed a criminal complaint against buyer Hwa Ping on the ground that the former’s signature in the deed of conditional sale was forged. During this time. This was challenged by petitioner-administrator (kaya Abesamis yung first name dun sa respondents). MENDIOLA. SARENAS 2C 2005 After the sale. the mere execution of the instrument is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such instrument o in this case. • Pero mautak si administrator. Abesamis Fernandez Facts: • Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several properties in Quezon city and Caloocan city. buyer tried to possess the land but was prevented by Deloso who claims to be the owner Sarmiento asked buyer to either change the lands sold w/ another of the same kind or to return the price together w/ the expenses. DEL SOCORRO. LOPEZ. Held: if the sale is executed through a public instrument. And since ayaw niya talaga pumayag. this relieving seller Lesaca of her obligation to place the buyer in the actual possession thereof. under claim of ownership although the execution of public instrument is equivalent to delivery.
Cuaycong vs. alleging it is a public highway. or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part. F) The “license to use” was essentially revocable. the whole estate of the decedent is. C) For 30+ years. G) Judgment in favor of Benedicto. acting as a probate court. and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart that passed the road. Held: A) There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs’ predecessors was based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way.A parcel of land situated in San Jose. D) Possession. can issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by some of the heirs without prior court approval? Held: Yes. Mun. or used by the public.
D) Use of the NV has been tolerated by the owners (Benedictos) for many years until 1911. MENDIOLA. of San Jose Lopez Facts: . alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owner of the estates affected. RIVAS. But the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling. or was maintained or constructed by public funds. and if it is not. B) The plaintiffs only had PERMISSIVE USE. to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right.PROPERTY
BERON. must be possession under claim of title. Bishop of Lipa vs.
. is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of plaintiffs. Batangas was placed in the possession of the parish priest of San Jose. E) Plaintiffs did not even assert that the road was of public domain. as the representative of the Roman Catholic Church. C) Possession is the fundamental basis of (the) prescription. under the Civil Code. LOPEZ. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. when they closed it. DELGADO. CALINISAN. It must be adverse. E) The plaintiffs wants the road/s opened. before partition. owned in common by such heirs. it has been used by the plaintiffs (no need to memorize the names) to transport their goods (primarily agricultural) and supplies from the haciendas. Jurisprudence provides (Dillena v CA) that the probate court can approve of the sale by the heirs executed before final adjudication. Issue: W/N NV is a public highway. And this right is based on Art 533 of the Civil Code—possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent…--Where there are two or more heirs. There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right. DEL SOCORRO. Benedicto Calinisan/Legaspi Facts: A) This case concerns the use of 2 (wagon) roads: 1) Nanca-Victorias Road (NV) (this case primarily concerns this road) 2) Dacuman-Toreno Road B) The haciendas (one of them is Hacienda Toreno) are connected to the provincial road through the NV. interest or participation he may have in the property under administration. SARENAS 2C 2005 Whether the RTC.
LOPEZ. DELGADO. MENDIOLA. Thus. The Municipality of San Jose took advantage of the circumstance and occupied the lands without the consent of the church’s representatives and without right or title that would justify their possession. This action was brought by the Bishop of Lipa to recover said parcel of land. FERNANDEZ LEGASPI. 538). So.e. the parish priest was forced to abandon the land. Confraternity of the Lady of Consolation).PROPERTY
BERON. On the other hand. they are not actually in possession because the manner they acquired such custody does not actually affect possession legally. CALINISAN. which proves their possession.Who has the right to possess the land? Held: SC says that the Bishop has the better right. 537).
. applying the proceeds thereof to supporting Catholic worship in that town (i. RIVAS. (other reason) The Bishop was able to present two certificates setting forth two possessory information. we consider the second criteria which favor the one longer in possession. they actually cannot be said to be in possession since their possession was acquired clandestinely (based on Art. SARENAS 2C 2005 The parish priest possessed the said land for many years. Lower Court ruled in favor of the bishop. Because of the revolutions after 1896. the Municipality failed to present any evidence as to the legality of their possession of the land. Although it seems that it is the Municipality which is the current possessor (therefore they should have the better right to possess based strictly on Art. DEL SOCORRO. This is the Church.