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at a Critical Juncture
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Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture
Inquiries regarding this report may be made to Mathew Burrows, Counselor to the National Intelligence Council, on (703) 482-0741 and to the EU Institute of Security Studies on 0033-1-56-89-19-51.
NIC 2010-08 September 2010
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China. academic. we believe the long-term impact of these issues on the strength of the international order has not been fully appreciated. resource management. Their work has set an excellent example of cooperation in delivering joint analysis and achieving a largely shared perspective. published in late 2008. 443755ID 9-10 i . Global Governance 2025 is the result of an inclusive process. The report does not seek to examine all the various challenges likely to require multilateralist efforts. and think tank leaders. The diversity of the comments and insights. which we have included in the body of the text. The New Global Puzzle. Instead. but they share fundamental values and strategic interests to an extent not matched by any other partners in the world. Since the mid 1990s. NIC Counselor Mathew Burrows and Giovanni Grevi from the EUISS have steered this process and took charge of drafting the bulk of the report. While not being policy prescriptive. Although recognized by many as ongoing challenges. We therefore do not go into depth on proliferation or cybersecurity—which we believe are receiving greater attention. South Africa. Russia. The US and the EU do not always see eye to eye on every issue on the international agenda. It is not meant as an exhaustive report card evaluating the performance of individual institutions. What World for the EU in 2025? The report stressed that a multipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution of power with new rules and institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability. This exercise builds on the experience of the two institutions in identifying the key trends shaping the future international system. and biotechnology. the report shares a strong belief—as exemplified by multilateralist approaches of the US and EU governments to resolving global problems such as the recent financial crisis—that global challenges will require global solutions. noted that momentous change was ahead. with the gap between increasing disorder and weakening governance structures widening. migration. in partnership with other pivotal centers of power and with the international community at large. and bilateral institutions and frameworks to meet emerging challenges. Doing so will require renewed efforts to address governance gaps and strengthen multilateralism. enriched by wide-ranging consultations with government officials. the NIC has produced four editions of its landmark Global Trends report. This is the first time the NIC has jointly developed and produced an unclassified report with a non-US body. NGO. have contributed to the success of this project and to the high quality of this report. but rather highlights several important governance gaps. and in the Gulf region (the UAE). The most recent one. regional. and media representatives in Brazil. This report provides an informal contribution to an important international debate on the way forward for global. testifies both to the richness of the debate and to the difficulty of reconciling different interests and standpoints when reforming global governance. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. Transatlantic agreement is no longer enough to effectively manage global challenges. The EUISS produced the first EU-level report on the factors affecting the evolution of the international system in 2006. we focus on such issues as intrastate conflict. The Global Governance 2025 project is innovative in many respects. as well as business. acknowledged elsewhere. India. Global Governance 2025 provides an important step with a view to future joint projects on matters of common interest. The Atlantic Council of the US and the Transatlantic Policy Network have been partners in supporting the project. Japan.Preface The United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prospects for global governance frameworks. A number of experts.
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to some extent. At the beginning of the century. With the emergence of rapid globalization. Many of our Chinese interlocutors see mounting global challenges and fundamental defects in the international system but emphasize the need for China to deal with its internal problems. Domestic politics creates tight constraints on international cooperation and reduces the scope for compromise. The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance over the next 10 years. the risks to the international system have grown to the extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability.Executive Summary Global governance—the collective management of common problems at the international level—is at a critical juncture. the developing world. The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions and groups that have been established recently. They see the G-20 as being a step forward but question whether North-South differences will impede cooperation on issues other than economics. but the rise of China. and state fragility—“hubs” of risks for the future—illustrate the interconnected nature of the challenges on the international agenda today. • • Brazilians feel there is a need for a redistribution of power from developed to developing states. but also toward nonstate actors. Power is not only shifting from established powers to rising countries and. food and water scarcity. the growing number of issues on the international agenda. and new technologies are increasingly taking center stage. India. which is seen as a Western concept. threats such as ethnic conflicts. Three effects of rapid globalization are driving demands for more effective global governance. the economic crisis. Diverse perspectives and suspicions about global governance. The expanding economic clout of emerging powers increases their political influence well beyond their borders. Interdependence has been a feature of economic globalization for many years. is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to cope. The multiple links among climate change and resources issues. and other fast-growing economies has taken economic interdependence to a new level. Although global governance institutions have racked up many successes since their development after the Second World War. Some experts we consulted saw Brazil tending to like state-centered multilateralism. will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges. infectious diseases. Brazil. and terrorism as well as a new generation of global challenges including climate change. and their complexity. iii . international migration flows. Many of the issues cited above involve interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. energy security.
For participants from the Persian Gulf region, the question is what sort of global institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.” They felt that India is not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. Russian experts we consulted see the world in 2025 as still one of great powers but with more opportunities for transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security.” The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope for growing much closer, while China, “with the biggest economy,” will be the main factor in changing the world. The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners.
In addition to the shift to a multipolar world, power is also shifting toward nonstate actors, be they agents or spoilers of cooperation. On a positive note, transnational nongovernmental organizations, civil-society groups, churches and faith-based organizations, multinational corporations, other business bodies, and interest groups have been equally, if not more effective than states at reframing issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we expect to continue. However, hostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks, all empowered by existing and new technologies, can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks. Many developing countries—which are likely to play an increasing role at the regional and global level—also suffer from a relative paucity of nonstate actors, that could help newly emerging states and their governments deal with the growing transnational challenges. Global governance institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emerged, but the adaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up with growing demand. Rather, they have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the institutions themselves. The emergence of informal groupings of leading countries, such as the G-20; the prospects for further regional cooperation, notably in East Asia; and the multiple contributions of nonstate actors to international cooperation—although highly useful—are unlikely to serve as permanent alternatives to rule-based, inclusive multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions can deliver public goods that summits, nonstate actors and regional frameworks cannot supply, or cannot do so in a reliable way. Our foreign interlocutors stressed the need for decisions enjoying universal legitimacy, norms setting predictable patterns of behavior based on reciprocity, and mutually agreed instruments to resolve disputes and redress torts, such as in trade matters. We assess that the multiple and diverse governance frameworks, however flexible, probably are not going to be sufficient to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global challenges absent extensive institutional reforms and innovations. The capacities of the current
institutional patchwork will be stretched by the type of problems facing the global order over the next few decades. Numerous studies indicate the growing fragility of many low-income developing states and potential for more conflict, particularly in cases where civil wars were never fully resolved. Internal conflict or collapse of large populous states on the scale of an Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Nigeria would likely overwhelm international conflict management efforts. Afghanistan, with approximately 28 million people, and Iraq, with 30 million, are among the most populous conflict management cases ever attempted, and they are proving difficult. Regional organizations have performed comparatively few large-scale operational responses to fragile states requiring humanitarian and peacemaking help. Although we can expect increased political and economic engagement from rising powers—in part a reflection of their increasing global interests—emerging powers have deep-seated concerns about the consequences of the proactive management of state fragility. Prevention, for example, often can require direct political intervention or even the threat or use of military force as a last resort. Efforts to prevent conflict have often been slowed by reluctance and resistance to intervene directly, potentially overriding another country’s sovereignty. Many experts in emerging states thought their governments probably would be particularly leery of any intervention if it is driven by the “West.” Another cluster of problems—the management of energy, food, and water resources—appears particularly unlikely to be effectively tackled without major governance innovations. Individual international agencies respond to discrete cases, particularly humanitarian emergencies in individual countries. However, no overall framework exists to manage the interrelated problems of food, water and energy. The stakes are high in view of the impact that growing scarcities could have on undermining the open international system. Resource competition in which major powers seek to secure reliable supplies could lead to a breakdown in cooperation in other areas. Moreover, scarcities are likely to hit poor states the hardest, leading in the worst case to internal or interstate conflict and spillover to regional destabilization. Other over-the-horizon issues—migration, the potential opening of the Arctic, and risks associated with the biotechnology revolution—are likely to rise in importance and demand a higher level of cooperation. These issues are difficult ones for multilateral cooperation because they involve more preventive action. Under current circumstances, greater cooperation on those issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially difficult to achieve.
Throughout the main text, we have sprinkled fictionalized scenarios that could result if, as we believe likely, the multiple and diverse governance frameworks struggle to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global challenges. The scenarios illustrate various permutations that could happen over the next 15 years. The following summarizes what we see as the principal potential trajectories of the international system as it tries to confront new challenges. We believe the risks of an unreformed global governance system are likely to
cumulate over time. Crises—so long as they are not overwhelming—may actually spur greater innovation and change in the system. Inaction over the long term increases the risks of a complete breakdown. Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat In this scenario, seen as the most likely one over the next several years, no one crisis will be so overwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective management advances slowly. Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary frameworks or institutions are devised to avert the most threatening aspects of them. Formal institutions remain largely unreformed and Western states probably must shoulder a disproportionate share of “global governance” as developing countries prevent disruptions at home. This future is not sustainable over the longer term as it depends on no crisis being so unmanageable as to overwhelm the international system. Scenario II: Fragmentation Powerful states and regions try to wall themselves off from outside threats. Asia builds a regional order that is economically self-sufficient. Global communications ensure globalization does not die, but it slows significantly. Europe turns its focus inward as it wrestles with growing discontent with declining living standards. With a growing work force, the US might be in a better position but may still be fiscally constrained if its budgetary shortfalls and long-term debt problems remain unresolved. Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux Under this scenario, severe threats to the international system—possibly a looming environmental disaster or a conflict that risks spreading—prompt greater cooperation on solving global problems. Significant reform of the international system becomes possible. Although less likely than the first two scenarios in the immediate future, such a scenario might prove the best outcome over the longer term, building a resilient international system that would step up the level of overall cooperation on an array of problems. The US increasingly shares power while China and India increase their burden sharing and the EU takes on a bigger global role. A stable concert could also occur incrementally over a long period in which economic gaps shrink and per capita income converges. Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation This scenario is among the least likely, but the possibility cannot be dismissed. The international system becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions, particularly in emerging powers such as China. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations for the “good life” are stymied. Tensions build between the United States and China, but also among some of the BRICs as competition grows for secure resources and clients. A nuclear arms race in the Middle East could deal an equally destabilizing blow to prospects for continued global growth. Suspicions and tensions make reforming global institutions impossible; budding regional efforts, particularly in Asia, also are undermined.
Page Preface Executive Summary Introduction International Institutions in the Late 20th Century Chapter One: Expanding Agenda Stretching Institutional Capacities Complex Risks Driving Demands for Global Governance Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat Chapter Two: Power Shifts Complicating Global Governance Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode Multilateralism? Scenario II: Fragmentation Chapter Three: Some Success in Adapting Informal Groupings Growth of Regionalism Nonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux Chapter Four: An Uncertain Future Weak and Failing States Interlocking Resource Issues “Over-the-Horizon” Issues for Global Governance Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation Conclusion Future Opportunities, but also Limits Annexes A-F: A: World Views of Global Governance B: The Prospects for Regionalism C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for Global Governance? D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for Fragile States? E: Migration in the Age of Uncertainty F: Threats from Biotechnology i iii 1 1 3 4 7 9 10 14 17 19 21 23 27 29 30 32 33 37 39 39 41 43 49 55 57 61 67
their directors. migration. inviting other experts in their countries and regions to the meetings: • • • • • • • • Beijing: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). in many cases. Elizabeth Arens provided essential editorial support. William Burke-White of the State Department’s Policy Planning Office provided guidance and substantive advice in addition to accompanying us on all the trips. was pivotal in helping to design the project and orchestrating key discussions in several capitals. and literally scores of individual experts on all five continents. the National Intelligence Council and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies received immeasurable and critical help from an array of think tanks. Member of European Parliament and head of TPN. Sao Paulo: Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Brasilia: Secretaria De Assuntos Estrategicos (SAE). Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). Mr. Ms.Acknowledgements In preparing this work. former head of the global risks programme at the World Economic Forum and now an independent adviser. and Alex Evans. David Steven. ACUS’ Dr. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Charles Emmerson. Ms. Dr. He accompanied us on almost all the trips. and participating staff were gracious in hosting us for major seminars and. Dubai: Dubai Consultancy Research & Media Centre (b'huth). academic and governmental institutions. ACUS President Frederick Kempe and Vice President Fran Burwell also participated in the planning and discussions in several venues. Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA). We would first like to thank the Atlantic Council of the US (ACUS) and the Trans-Atlantic Policy Network (TPN). Dr. for providing comprehensive and critical material on failing states. also provided important contributions and participated in most of the research trips. consulting firms. Banning Garrett and Mr. who were both partners in supporting this project. Administrator of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament. Rosemary Opacic. resource issues such as water and food. wrote the appendix on the Arctic. Alexander van de Putte of PFC Energy provided material on energy futures. Special mention goes to Bruce Jones. Patrick DeGategno were superb in arranging the numerous overseas meetings. India: Observer Research Foundation (ORF). Within the NIC. The following institutions. and innovative biotechnologies. James Elles. viii .
people. Emerging powers are suspicious of current institutional arrangements. Although the Cold War was punctuated by numerous smaller proxy wars led by the two superpowers and some brutal conflicts occurred. Much will depend on leadership and political will. against the backbone of the US dollar as the international exchange and reserve currency. Although global governance has been a relative success since its development after the Second World War. if not new frameworks. however. Global governance does not equate to world government. Regional cooperation may also be regarded as an element of global governance insofar as it contributes to broader efforts. The term “global governance” as used in this paper includes all the institutions. and communications. which appear to favor established powers. no large-scale conflicts rivaling the first or second World Wars have broken out since the formation of the UN in 1945. Bretton Woods institutions were set up to help maintain financial and monetary stability and to foster the reconstruction of war-torn economies. partnerships. International Institutions in the Late 20th Century Preserving international peace and security was the central preoccupation of the architects of the post-World War II United Nations system. Such efforts are unlikely to suffice. Faced 1 .” Former Senior Official. the growing number of issues on the international agenda. and networks that contribute to collective action and problem solving at the international level. and their complexity.Introduction Global governance—the collective management of common problems at the international level—is at a critical juncture. This has led to new problems and inadequacy of international paraphernalia inherited from the 20th Century. This definition subsumes formal and informal arrangements as well as the role of nonstate actors in transnational settings. if ever. Millions of people continue to be affected. processes. regimes. but conflicts have declined in number. is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to cope. fueling greater instability. The UN Security Council engaged all major powers of the time in this undertaking. Government of India Some progress has been made to adjust international institutions and regimes to meet the new demands and to create workarounds. disorder could prevail. Without adequate frameworks to bring order to an international system in flux. they run the risk of becoming irrelevant. Both sets of institutions have had their share of problems but have made substantial contributions in the postCold War period. Power shifts are also complicating global governance. UN peacekeeping operations continue to be deployed to monitor peace agreements and ensure stability after civil wars. Governance differs from government. “There has been unprecedented increase in the speed of movement of goods. which implies sovereign prerogatives and hierarchical authority. The mix of old and new challenges generates new requirements for collective problem-solving: more international cooperation and innovative approaches. which would be virtually impossible for the foreseeable future. If global governance structures and processes do not keep up with the changes in the balance of power in the international system.
2 .with the danger of nuclear war and proliferation. Over time. the problems of “span of control. trade liberalization under the GATT and the WTO provided another global public good in the shape of increasingly low tariffs and open markets. our expectations have continued to grow as the scope for cooperation has expanded.” increasing “stovepipes. As a result. On the economic front. nuclear and non-nuclear states struck a global contract to stop the spread of nuclear weapons—the Nonproliferation Treaty—and the United States and Russia negotiated several treaties to delimit and reduce their respective nuclear arsenals and weapon systems. enhancing shared prosperity and preventing protectionism from generating political confrontation. especially in view of the push provided by globalization to growing interactions. Individual agencies focused on specific problems have been a growing feature of global governance.” and “lack of strategic oversight” have come increasingly to the fore as major challenges to ensuring effectiveness in the system.
Chapter 1: Expanding Agenda Stretching Institutional Capacities .
and for unprecedented risks. such issues have taken on new importance in a globalized world because of the potential for more widespread disruption. energy politics and other 4 resource issues are taking an increasingly pre-eminent place in international affairs.With the emergence of rapid globalization. In part owing to the rise of economic powerhouses China and India and their growing appetites for energy and other commodities. the risks to the international system have grown to the extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability. and new technologies—are increasingly taking center stage. At the same time. economic. The offshoring of production and business services from advanced to emerging countries. infectious diseases. and other fastgrowing economies has taken economic interdependence to a new level. Climate change has trespassed the boundaries of environmental politics to become the subject of the global political. fast technological progress alerts civil society bodies. Although some of the emerging issues have been debated in multilateral forums for over 20 years. India. “What worries me is that you see a more chaotic world and less capable US.” US Think Tank Participant Interdependence has been a feature of economic globalization for many years. Brazil. • Biotechnologies and nanotechnologies bear much potential both for progress. and increasing economic exchanges within the • • • .. Peace operations evolved to include broader mandates such as tackling the root causes of conflict. Three features of rapid globalization are driving demands for more effective global governance: deepening interdependence. There are centrifugal forces pulling apart the nations of the world… Resource constraints will have huge implications for global society… The trainwreck is right ahead of us. but the rise of China. At the beginning of the century. food and water scarcity. energy security. if diverted for criminal purposes. • This decade opened with the attacks on the Twin towers in New York as well as the Pentagon—bringing transnational terrorism to the fore of the international agenda. and security debate and a new focus of multilateral cooperation cutting across these and other domains. threats such as ethnic conflicts. Complex Risks Driving Demands for Global Governance The cumulative impact of emerging issues as well as longstanding ones is transforming the scale and nature of the challenges facing the international community. and terrorism as well as a new generation of global challenges including climate change. for example in the health sector. such as NGOs. to new challenges and to the need for cooperation and enables them to play a stronger role. The nascent recovery from the recent economic crisis has highlighted the importance of developing countries— particularly China—to restarting the global economy with many Western countries lagging behind. The danger of proliferation and use of nonconventional weapons took on new urgency. interconnected problems.. international migration flows. Genetic modifications raise profound ethical questions even while breakthoughs are likely to be critical for societies struggling with resource issues such as food and aging populations. and the mingling of domestic politics with international issues.
The coordination of macroeconomic measures is imperative to sustain global recovery. notably China. National policies prone to encourage loose credit and spiraling private debt under little supervision have been enabled by capital flows from emerging economies. but also the EU. Problems can trigger each other with a cascading effect as shown. by the potential impact of energy prices on the prospects for economic recovery. compounding their fragility. The accumulation of huge foreign currency reserves by emerging powers. for example. among other economic powers. Among other factors. and diminishing food stocks. water shortages. in particular the United States. • Technological developments and geopolitical instability require additional focus on the protection and resilience of the electronic and energy infrastructures underpinning advanced societies. may result in policy choices that undermine both the environment and investment. has corresponded to the ballooning debt of deficit countries. European Parliament The multiple links among climate change. and the EU. Concerns regarding the security of energy supply. The monetary and fiscal policies of the United States. and curbed private spending in the developed world. • Growing energy demand translates into higher food prices. “Climate change is an issue of international security—a threat multiplier…The core challenge is that it not only threatens us environmentally but also that it will exacerbate conflicts over resources. cut credit. such a structural imbalance produced the severe financial crisis that flattened growth. has markedly diversified trade and investment patterns and resulted in value chains spread across different countries and continents. given their disproportionate contribution to . directly affect the international community. Price uncertainty depresses investment in exploration and transit infrastructures. have become more intertwined.” Administrator. Climate change is another example of an issue involving domestic and international priorities. the management of ballooning public deficits and debts in some advanced countries as well as measures to increase domestic demand in China and other emerging economies are matters for domestic political decisions with huge global implications. China.latter group. but also demand. and state fragility—“hubs” of risks for the future—illustrate the interconnected nature of the challenges on the international agenda today. for example. Following the crisis. Reliance on domestic reserves of fossil fuels or longterm access to foreign fields makes investment in renewables less attractive and compounds the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. possibly paving the way to supply shortages over the next decade. The national energy and environmental policies of big emitters such as China and the United States. The interconnection of various problems is likely to generate new challenges and make traditional ones harder to manage because of their increasing complexity. the economic crisis. climate 5 change threatens agricultural output in many poor countries with expanding populations. Emerging economies financed spending by the United States on their own exports. Concurrently. • Many of the issues cited above involve interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. included internal and external factors. The roots of the financial crisis.
and angered national public debates fueling each other. Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat In this scenario. or equity and legitimacy at the international level. Formal institutions remain largely unreformed and Western states probably must shoulder a disproportionate share of “global governance” as developing countries prevent disruptions at home. Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary frameworks or institutions are devised to avert the most threatening aspects of them. for example. China’s pervasive priority of domestic economic development. This was the case. paralleled by aging populations. This future is not sustainable over the longer term as it depends on no crisis being so unmanageable as to overwhelm the international system. which has been largely export-led. which is probably the most likely over the next several years. “The central challenge for most countries in their engagement with new forms of global governance is not how to replace the state in international politics. The tightening of political control on Russia’s largest energy companies as well as broader concerns regarding rule of law and security of investment within the country undermine the strengthening of the EU-Russia energy and economic partnership. Domestic politics creates tight constraints on international cooperation and reduces the scope for compromise. EU countries and the US are not immune from that either. the public would be focused on jobs and welfare. This may trigger a vicious circle of ineffective global governance. Such tendencies contribute to making national positions in multilateral forums less accommodating. suggests that public attention may become increasingly introverted.the global stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the variation of climate change patterns. with little room for longer term needs such as managing diverse societies. but rather how states regain their regulatory role. environmental sustainability.” South African Think Tank Participant Projected sluggish economic growth in advanced countries over the next few years. Many experts see nationalism and xenophobia on the rise in Russia and China. at the recent Copenhagen summit on climate change where domestic politics constrained the positions of a number of participants on reducing emissions. no one crisis will be so overwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective management advances slowly. On a different matter. diverging perceptions. Under such circumstances. 6 . with dire consequences for the most exposed countries. limits its willingness to allow for an appreciation of Chinese currency to help rebalance its trade relations with the US and the EU.
either. We worried a decade ago about a Russia growing more hostile. We may be looking to a honeymoon period in international relations when there can be a lot more cooperation. it needed Western technology to exploit the riches of the Arctic and now that is slowly coming to fruition. . I guess Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia got fed up with China . Posted 5/22/17: Many developing states feel that China has turned its back on them . but it now looks like Japan’s and India’s prospects for permanent UNSC membership are on hold. 443339ID 9-10 Search Recent Posts Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Categories Recent Comments Links . everything has been affected—from trade to the competition over resources . There’s been a lot less risk-taking since the financial crisis. did you see? Years of chattering on security and development and ten countries in Africa are still on the verge of implosion. The interesting thing about the Iranian developments is that even if the political turnabout of the Iranian Government was necessary. . Both Tokyo and New Delhi look like they are taking the side of Vietnam. Posted 12/2/20: Tell them. Posted 5/17/17: Yeah. No one saw it coming last year. . Had the UN Secretary General not jumped on the plane. Posted 12/3/20: But we haven’t done too badly: no nuclear war. and we put our heads in the sand. . . not to speak of the last Failed States Index . though it was clear in hindsight. . What happened to developing states sticking together? The dispute also questions the theory that resource wars won’t happen. Posted 5/21/17: This is not the time to provoke China. . . with the Party unable to restrain rising nationalism. Talk about an era of bad feelings . Posted 12/4/20: But Asia has yet to come off the boil. Posted 12/1/20: I’m preparing for my Davos panel on the future of the international system . Few saw that coming.Scenario I Barely Keeping Afloat Blog Home Excerpts from a long-running World Economic Forum-sponsored blog Posted 3/3/12: Remember when “black swans” were all the rage? We have not had as many disasters as some predicted—but why? Is it perception? Are we more agile? Or were the predictions off? Or a combination? Posted 3/4/12: Don’t count your chickens before they hatch! It’s too early to be so confident. . It reminds me of the fall of the Soviet Union. I worry about the repercussions for multilateral cooperation. . Iran was settled. . The cyclones in the Bay of Bengal have meant we now have a world action plan for Bangladesh . . our resilience has been more a matter of luck . . it showed that the G-20 had really come of age and could work with the UN. if not dashed. . and there is a lot more stability in the Middle East . . . Posted 5/23/17: Look on the bright side. but I think we’re witnessing one with the agreement worked out by the UN Security Council with Iran. In that vein. Posted 5/20/17: India has just come out with a full-scale condemnation of China and expects the US and Europe to back it. The financial crisis led to Russia opening up. It is not clear where the US stands or whether it can bring the two sides together. . . but a lot of things could still go terribly wrong. given the continuing tensions in Asia. it could have been much worse. Oil exploration in the Arctic is beginning to pay off. full of youngsters and short on jobs. . . . We were about to see the UN Security Council dramatically transformed for the first time since its founding. But the change in Iran swept out the old government. This multipolar world is just a lot more difficult to manage. . the agreement still would not have happened without the deft intervention by some of the emerging powers in the G-20. we’re just keeping our heads above water . Posted 5/15/17: Did you hear about the military incident between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea? It looks like they both suffered casualties. Posted 9/15/14: I don’t usually believe in grand bargains. Posted 12/5/20: You’re right . And the series of mini-disasters and near misses has strengthened defenses.
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Chapter 2: Power Shifts Complicating Global Governance .
be they agents or spoilers of cooperation. Addressing such 10 . are likely to play a growing role in global governance. and legitimacy. It can be argued that alternative definitions of modernity are taking hold. In the second part of the last century. but also toward nonstate actors. the EU has sought to export its model of regional integration and sovereignty-sharing and has devised a distinctive discourse on global governance and priorities. multinational corporations. pivotal global and regional actors have different views on sovereignty. The United States oversaw provision of global public goods such as monetary stability and open trade routes. In particular after the end of the Cold War. multilateralism. particularly in emerging economies. civil-society groups. often stemming from distinctive historical experiences. churches and faith-based organizations. is less the risk of conflict. state-owned and state-controlled companies and sovereign wealth funds. These actors do not fit neatly into traditional categories as they are driven by a mix of political and economic considerations. industrial policy appears more in vogue. “At issue…it seems to me.” Russian Think Tank Speaker Power is not only shifting from established powers to rising countries and. In addition. other business bodies. diminishes the readiness of others to cooperate. However. This is partly due to their perceived shortcomings in providing the public goods they guaranteed before the shift to a multipolar world. At the same time. but the danger of a loss of coherence and direction in the international system while the redistribution of power plays itself out. and even on the trade front. the United States shaped an international order that largely reflected its liberal worldview of free markets and democracy. which differ widely in terms of their economics and ideologies. such as economic stability. the developing world.” European Think Tank Participant Today. are indispensable to solving international problems. On a positive note. and to the view that their positions on issues such as trade and climate change are unfair to the interests of others.The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance over the next 10 years. particularly those of China and Russia. to some extent. hostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks—all empowered by existing and new technologies—can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks. Many of these states. with the US and the West as the center and creator of laws and rules. Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode Multilateralism? In the emerging multipolar system. The virtues of open capital markets are less than universally shared. “The Western approach to global governance. and interest groups have become increasingly active in framing policy and generating public interest and pressure. the legitimacy and credibility of the US and the EU as political leaders is openly questioned by other rising power centers and large swathes of the international community. transnational nongovernmental organizations. the expanding economic clout of emerging powers increases their political influence well beyond their borders. Far more states matter in the international system today.
The 11 . Sovereignty is alive and kicking.” Chinese Think Tank Expert diverse perspectives will be critical to fostering international cooperation in a number of domains. according to many of the experts we encountered. it will go ahead to work with other countries. Source: International Futures model. 443707AI 9-10 “Global governance requires giving over significant sovereignty to others—that is the view in China…So far. There is a risk that the potential competition of diverse priorities within regional or global institutions will alienate important actors and drive negotiations to gridlock in multilateral institutions. There is no doubt. sovereignty is the number one priority. and technology for individual states. defense spending. population. but China has to balance sovereignty and international responsibility.New International Lineup in 2025? Power as percentage of global power 25 2010 2025 20 15 10 5 0 US China EU India Japan Russia Brazil The relative political and economic clout of many countries will shift by 2025. according to an International Futures model measuring GDP. When China thinks its sovereignty is guaranteed.
will pose a key challenge to states and governance frameworks alike. countries are reluctant to endorse rules constraining their behavior in areas of comparative advantage or strong competition. China and India. Russia. where need be. let alone assign jurisdiction. and security. take a more relative reading of human rights and are uncomfortable with the bashing or sanctioning of brutal regimes. or to share sovereignty under majority decision-making. Participants felt a needed precondition is for all the stakeholders to trust the system. commit to collective action. however. among others. to an international body. While their domestic political systems widely differ. under what conditions the international community or international institutions can challenge or override the authority of a state in its internal affairs will also come to the fore. however. India. broadly informs their foreign policies. not directly affecting them. Their positions. The question of whether and. stability. running into trouble because those powerful enough to try to opt out are growing more numerous. and accept stronger prerogatives of international institutions over their domestic governance. core values to their domestic political regimes. The EU is the most advanced experience to date of voluntary sharing of sovereignty in a unique experiment of regional integration which has largely succeeded in including post-Communist systems into the larger regional order. the question is how to reconcile the interests and perspectives of major powers and groupings of smaller countries in multilateral frameworks and regimes. vary depending on the issue. On balance. However. as well as Brazil. Major powers such as China and Russia. Nuclear weapon states are comfortable with the intrusive powers of the IAEA to inspect the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapon states. according to our interlocutors. the aim of promoting democracy and supporting human rights. including on matters of peace.way the renewed emphasis on sovereignty will unfold in the next decade will have serious implications for global governance. the biggest democracy in the world with a political tradition of non-alignment and a significant nationalist strand to its foreign policy. at least. “We have a major concern that the new organizations do not replicate the unrepresentativeness of the past. major powers subscribe to advanced forms of international cooperation and supervision that they regard as embodying their interests or. the United States. if so. but there are some indications 12 . In a more heterogeneous international system. balancing such different perspectives with the imperative for cooperation.” Brazilian Senior Official Divergence on values or principles also will affect the prospects for multilateral cooperation. The extent to which power should be delegated to international bodies and for what purposes will be debated. are cautious not to appear as exporting their values and interfering with the domestic affairs of other countries. For example. such as energy policy or bans on specific types of weapons. Such a selective approach is. Most other key global actors are reluctant to delegate regulatory powers. New ways of cooperation will need to be explored. with considerable support from a number of emerging and developing countries. although the positions and the policies of the US and the EU do not always coincide. share an ingrained suspicion of global governance mechanisms that could impinge on their sovereignty. Over the next decade.
Some feared that a system developed by the “West”—which includes democracy and rule of law—would suffer as the “East” becomes more powerful. Nevertheless.) Brazil. the issues connected with global governance are beginning to gain prominence in Brazil. Several felt let down by lack of support from the West on democratization. They saw the G-20 as being a step forward but questioned whether North-South differences would impede cooperation on issues other than economics. the UN remains the global institution with the only “legitimate credential. (See Annex A for further discussion. For Africans. Europe. At the same time. North-South relations and the need for redistribution of power from developed to developing states remain central to the Brazilian outlook on international affairs. China. while China. Russia. UAE. The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity.” Some interlocutors were wary of China because in their view it is interested only in African resources. Many Chinese saw mounting global challenges and “fundamental” defects in the international system but emphasized the need for China to deal with its internal problems. For participants from the Persian Gulf region. They bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. Most emphasized the need to boost national and regional means before reforming international organizations. in the view of our interlocutors from the countries listed below. with their huge bureaucracies. The Russians worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security.” The United States. 13 . A framework or institution is needed to bring together the “rights” of energy producers with those of consumers. Japan. India. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership than “form or structure.World Views of Global Governance Diverse perspectives and suspicions about “global governance”—seen as a Western concept— will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges. the key question was what sort of global institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. spurred in part by public debates over climate change. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one of “great powers. They worried that the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners. The G-20 has little African representation. Experts saw Brazil tending to like “old fashioned” multilateralism. are effective. and Russia also have scope for growing much closer.” Several questioned whether formal institutions. which is state-centered and does not make room for nonstate actors. Many were concerned about the lack of regional frameworks—particularly for hard security—in East Asia but argued that Japan should take a more proactive role toward regional cooperation. the Japanese felt the G-20 needs stronger political cohesion.” although some expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunities for greater transnational cooperation. South Africa.” will be the main factor in changing the world.” They felt that India is not well-positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions and groups that have been established recently. “with the biggest economy.
of greater burden sharing by emerging powers. For example. Asia builds a regional order that is economically self-sufficient. which held sway as the most important issue for greater multilateral cooperation in our discussions with emerging power elites. Many of the emerging powers are interested in international and regional stability to better pursue their own development. diverse domestic priorities generate different assessments of fairness and equanimity. according to many participants. These and other emerging powers may come to play a key role in UN-mandated multilateral interventions to preserve stability and build lasting peace in conflict areas. Managing differences to foster cooperation leads to addressing the tension between inclusiveness and effectiveness in multilateral frameworks. and Bangladesh have long been among the top troop contributors to UN peacekeeping. This goes to the heart of the legitimacy question. the US might be in a better position but probably would continue to struggle with similar issues. Scenario II: Fragmentation Powerful states and regions try to wall themselves off from outside threats. Pakistan. This is already apparent in negotiations between developed and developing countries over climate change and trade. Europe turns its focus inward as it wrestles with growing discontent over declining living standards. With a growing work force. but it slows significantly. 14 . Global communications ensure globalization does not die. while India. Because some major emerging powers (China and India) are relatively poor countries in per capita terms. particularly if its fiscal problems remain unresolved. “We need ‘politics of inclusion’ of the weak not just the powerful. the involvement of China and Brazil in these operations is growing.” Participant from the Persian Gulf Region Achieving a fair and equitable distribution of burdens and responsibility probably will become more contentious in the foreseeable future.
Personal animosities crept in. Without a stronger international order. More importantly. The UN calculates a tenfold increase in environmental migrants over the past five years. offsetting some of the decline in Chinese commerce with the US and Europe. but its rivalry with India made even that difficult. Militancy is growing among disaffected groups in India and China while terrorists have stepped up their plotting against the West. but the strains within the G-20.” requiring some sort of protection. US-Chinese ties took a big tumble as Beijing put off again and again a decision on allowing its currency to appreciate.Scenario II Fragmentation Financial Times op-ed entitled. made it virtually impossible. Perhaps it is too early to tell.” published March 12. Many outsiders thought they should not have any power at all. major concerted steps toward carbon cuts are on hold even though there is more evidence of climate change. although it will take a major crisis that hits everybody to bring that about. “Crying Over the Gs. We will miss them and at some point they will have to be reinvented. China put more energy into developing regional ties. Although all states are interested in energy efficiency. The growing protectionism is more subtle. Trade within Asia has continued to expand. The political mood is indeed very sour. This began several years after the Great Recession when it became apparent that it would take a long time before the West dug itself out and got back on a reasonable growth trajectory. The US-China strategic and economic dialogue was suspended. Does all of this matter? There’s no easy answer. Diplomats complained about all the preparation necessary for what were in some cases long-winded statements at the end of G summits that did not always lead to concrete actions or improvements. G-20 meetings became less frequent. I have no doubt that the United States and the Europeans will mend fences once the crisis breaks. At that point will they be able to do anything without the help of the new powers? 443340ID 9-10 . There was no explosive tearing asunder of transatlantic ties. The last G-8 summit came to a screeching halt when two of its leaders got into a shouting match over the seating T arrangements at the final dinner. especially between the Chinese and the United States. The Gs never had any real power. It was never the right time. Canada. The Gs were a bit like old boys’ networks—undemocratic and incestuous. Those two areas are not “self-governing” and need outside help to contain or dampen the potential for conflict and regional conflagration. It was always going to be hard to negotiate a follow-on to Kyoto. Many in the US thought Europe’s slow recovery was one reason for the United States’ tepid growth. But now the international system is slowly unwinding. We’re not yet back in the 1930s. A lot of the “unwashed” non-Gs thought the Gs were trying to usurp the UN’s role. symptomatic of what had been a long period the rising transatlantic tensions. India and China are major trading partners now. the US sought more military help in Afghanistan which the Europeans could not give. The G-20 ended badly. More sectors are deemed “strategic. “What’s the use?” they ask. The US Congress started taking actions against Chinese imports. and for the first time the United States. The new powers won’t play even if the transatlantic partners can get their act together—which is rare these days. Doha has been definitively shelved so there is no forward movement. I worry about a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia. just the relentless drifting apart that finally undermined the alliance. 2023 he Gs are almost a distant memory. bracing for global conflagration. Europe has been increasingly focused inward after the prolonged Eurozone crisis of the 2010s. but it may be too late. and the Europeans have given up on the G-7.
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Chapter 3: Some Success in Adapting .
In practice. For some challenges. ad hoc and sometimes more accountable forms of cooperation. Rather. innovative approaches stem from dissatisfaction with the relative inertia of traditional frameworks or with their perceived Western bias. Innovative approaches to global governance are developed through trial and error. effective cooperation among institutions has been the exception and not the norm. whether they were triggered by governments or civil society. we need a combination of bilateral.” Chinese Expert Looking ahead. and whether their scope is global or regional. the perspectives for further regional cooperation. These innovative approaches cannot serve as alternatives to rule-based. mechanisms for implementation and for overseeing national measures and. “My preliminary conclusions: Addressing different issues with the same mechanism does not work—we need different mechanisms for different problems. institutional experience. such as the G-20. and national prerogatives trump international authorities in implementing and overseeing agreements. the latter will likely prove unsustainable or unreliable if disconnected from the bedrock of multilateral bodies in terms of norms. codes of conduct prevail on binding norms. inclusive multilateral institutions. or cannot do so in a reliable way. However. neither traditional frameworks nor new forms of cooperation are likely to solve global governance problems exclusively. more flexible. in some sectors. decisions enjoying universal legitimacy. regional initiatives escape lengthy debates in multilateral forums. The former will struggle to deliver without serious reform. and the multiple contributions of nonstate actors to international cooperation. Such approaches typically develop in response to a shifting international system. regional. but on the whole they expose a fundamental trend toward looser. While multilateral institutions have been struggling to adapt. and global responses with a division of labor. These are. In some cases. the two forms of global governance can complement one another. nonstate actors and regional frameworks cannot supply. Three innovations are of particular interest as pointers for future developments: the emergence of informal groupings of leading countries. Such approaches often involve “lighter” forms of cooperation than the highly legalized regimes inherited from the 20th century: consultation replaces regulation.Multilateral institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emerged. Multilateral institutions can deliver public goods that summits. norms setting predictable patterns of behavior based on reciprocity. A crisis such as an environmental 18 . the supply of these public goods will become more important. notably in East Asia. such as in trade matters. and resources. they have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the institutions themselves. instruments to resolve disputes and redress torts. but the adaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up with growing demand. according to many of our interlocutors. Some of these experiments will not stand the test of time. innovative approaches to global governance have been coming to the fore. chiefly. As the international system grows more diverse and potentially more fragmented. All three developments originated from outside global multilateral institutions.
The development of the ‘Gs’ responds to two basic needs: First. and novelty. We had global crisis-management governance. governmental and nongovernmental. the main risk to be averted is the creation of different formats that mirror competing geopolitical coalitions. the need to foster collective leadership to jointly 19 .catastrophe or the implosion of a large failed state could spark cooperation. deals with climate change. “The global financial and systemic nature of the crisis has compelled unprecedented government responses in scope. new groups have been set up in the last few years in response to pressing issues on the international agenda. It could also do so by engaging countries on targeted initiatives. with an emphasis on the networked coordination of national policies and on deliverables. this may also become the principal contribution of the BRIC countries’ format to deliberations in broader frameworks. formal and informal.” European Expert Progress in setting up a global governance system that draws on the added value of different bodies and networks in a coherent way will depend on three factors: a shared knowledge of the issues to be confronted and their connections to other challenges. the role of the G-8 is likely to be circumscribed to sectoral issues. BRIC summits have been more noticeable for opposing existing norms than for proposing new ones and reaching out to other major actors. set up in 2007 and renamed the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in 2009. speed. these formats are experimenting with new ways of managing shared challenges in a more diverse world. Informal groupings such as the G-8 and the G-20 have already significantly affected global governance. Following the establishment of the G-7 in the mid-1970s and of the G-8 in 1998. where the small club of like-minded countries can bring added value if they are prepared to mobilize their resources. Nevertheless. In time. Over the medium term. The decisions of such forums as the G-8 and the G-20 are of a political nature and nonbinding. to elaborate ideas and bring them to larger tables. More generally. suggesting interesting avenues for further innovation. such as the G-20. but a reactive approach to such extreme contingencies probably would prove inadequate. innovation at the interface between old and new. Given the different foreseeable economic and political trajectories of the BRIC countries over the next two decades. among others. As informal groupings evolve. Informal Groupings The proliferation of regular summit-level meetings held outside global or regional institutions is a key feature of recent global governance innovation. So far. and global and regional governance frameworks. The Major Emitters Forum. The leaders of the BRIC emerging economies met in Russia in 2009 and in Brazil in 2010 and have announced that they will meet in China in 2011. the durability of this grouping remains to be tested. Such a development would defeat much of the basic purpose of summit diplomacy. the G-8 could remain a useful platform. Thus they are unlikely to sideline the UN and Bretton Wood institutions as frameworks for decisionmaking and rulesetting. provided that these are closely linked to the agenda of multilateral institutions and of groups such as the G-20. and an acceptable balance between effectiveness and inclusiveness. however. The G-20 is the most noticeable innovation because of the breadth of its membership and the scope of its agenda.
and develop targeted initiatives to lend financial support to countries in need or to enhance food security. As the world grows more heterogeneous. Informal groupings also can become connectors between different frameworks. The agenda of the G-20 has also expanded since 2008. the G-20 would suffer from a “capacity deficit” in dealing with a larger agenda. as issues become more challenging or crisis-driven common interests may expand beyond facilitating an economic recovery. and second.” According to many observers. The clash of informal groupings or stable coalitions in sector-specific negotiations such as climate change and differences on how to consolidate global economic recovery expose the tension between the shared commitment to problemsolving and the co-existence of different political priorities and agendas. When informal groupings are relatively large. their legitimacy is contested. to ensure the consistency of national positions in different formats. sustainable and balanced growth. with the Pittsburgh summit agreeing on a “framework for strong. both at the national and at the trans-governmental level. the G-20 20 has encouraged closer cooperation between a variety of institutions including the International Energy Agency (IEA). between the ‘sherpas’ preparing the various summits. When informal groupings are too small. OECD. This is regarded with suspicion by the vast majority of developing countries and regional powers not engaged in the proceedings. like the G-20.” European Expert The performance of the ‘Gs’ will largely depend on their relations with formal multilateral structures. the two basic rationales behind the ‘Gs’ may or may not prove mutually reinforcing. such as the G-8. monitor relevant national policy measures.address shared problems outside the constraints imposed by formal multilateral structures. and the World Bank. In addition. Informal groupings such as the G-8 have proved flexible and proactive in expanding their original purview. requiring the G-20 to expand its agenda further. doubts are raised regarding their internal cohesion and their ability to reach . becoming a sort of informal global governance “hub. the need to reflect the changing balance of world power. In the energy sector. for example. Under these circumstances. Both requirements can be promoted by stronger coordination. The G-20 has triggered the transition from the Financial Stability Forum to the Financial Stability Board and has sustained momentum for the incremental reform of the IMF. cohesion within each grouping and coherence between them are essential conditions for their effectiveness.” A debate is under way regarding whether the G-20 has a vocation to enlarge its remit further. “There is institutional Darwinism and we will see the survival of the fittest institution. OPEC. The G-20 infrastructure is not considered robust enough to sustain the stronger flow of information and exchanges that would occur with a greatly expanded agenda and is not structurally connected to competent bodies at the national level. The limited membership of informal groupings entails that deliberations involve fewer countries than those affected by them. called upon the IMF and the World Bank to advise on the summits’ priorities. The G-20. summit decisions can spur institutional reform. However. as the G-20 did in coping with the fallout of the financial crisis. Informal groupings may be increasingly called upon to set the tone and direction of international cooperation on important global issues and to serve as toplevel international agenda-setting bodies.
where action often falls short of statements. In practice. setting up support units—perhaps focusing on specific issues and embedded in existing multilateral bodies—and enhancing cooperation between successive annual presidencies. Third. Longer yearly meetings could be held between national leaders themselves. and most notably. some progress toward closer cooperation at the regional level has been achieved over the last decade in regions as diverse as South America. In the former case. (See Annex B for further discussion. Africa. economic disparities. however. be they security crises. It is doubtful. Second. the key question is whether regionalism will prove to be a building block of global governance or a drain on it. Regionalism could bring an important contribution to managing shared challenges at the local and regional levels and beyond.) Renewed interest in regional solutions in response to economic and political turbulence could. relative power is shifting at the regional level as well. However. Neighboring countries are directly affected by threats stemming from respective regions. Preeminent actors such as China. First. regional cooperation would be complementary to and compatible with broader multilateral agreements. or Brazil have chosen to invest into regional cooperative frameworks to manage political differences and confirm their leadership. compensating for lack of updated and reformed global governance institutions. Options we heard to improve the ‘Gs’ decisionmaking process include strengthening the teams of sherpas assisting political leaders. the political capital and resources available for international cooperation are 21 . or both.agreement and deliver results—yet their legitimacy remains challenged by those states inevitably left on the outside. Regional cooperation is likely to make some further strides due to a mix of factors. “Instead of looking at what G-20 will look like in 2025. cooperation has fallen well short of its potential in most regions. however. there is growing dissatisfaction with the performance of global governance institutions as either ineffective or carrying political agendas not fitting distinctive regional contexts.” South African Expert Growth of Regionalism No comprehensive trend can be detected toward deepening regional governance structures. East Asia. we should ask what will make it credible and legitimate…how do you ensure that voices outside the G-20 are heard while also not slowing its ability to make decisions? To what extent has the G-20 championed the interests of the low-income and developing countries? I don’t think so far that it has. If so. However. the global financial crisis has impacted all global regions and amplified both the suspicion of external interference in regional affairs and a sense of self-reliance to address economic and political challenges. and might develop a sense of solidarity in addressing them. or trans-regional threats. create new momentum behind regional arrangements and enhance their effectiveness. giving them the opportunity to debate issues in depth and finalize agreements not only on guiding principles but also on concrete instruments and arrangements. such as drug trafficking or state failure. however. whether increased regional groupings in the next decade or two will be able to deal with mounting global challenges. Regional governance arrangements are closer to the sources of the problems to be tackled. National leaders may be more familiar with one another than in global platforms and regional instruments may be mobilized faster than those of larger multilateral organizations. for example in the field of peacekeeping. Japan.
scarce. In what has been defined as a “paradigm shift. countries face common transnational threats such as drug trafficking. This can contribute to building trust and create incentives to forge ahead with regional cooperation. the benefits may disproportionately accrue to the biggest economies in respective regions. The region is diverse. ASEAN has developed over decades a distinctive style of regional cooperation based on a low level of institutionalization. It follows that common institutions are relatively weak. Contrary to the experience of the European Union. Some of our interlocutors thought Brazil has been punching below its weight in the region and has no strategy for 22 . informality. From an economic and political standpoint. Peru. and all would benefit from better transport and energy infrastructures to boost trade and investment and harness their natural resources. State-led projects mostly lag behind the initiative of private actors. “We need to reinforce regional institutions. China. Our interlocutors were somewhat dubious that the bilateral alliance between Japan and the US will prove compatible with deepening multilateral frameworks in East Asia. increasingly. led by Venezuela. In turn. contested. At the same time.” Chinese Think Tank Expert A new phase of East Asian regionalism may be dawning. In the latter case. turning Japan’s focus from its US ally in the Pacific to mainland Asia. Countries such as Chile. which may not include the United States. permanent consultation. in trade matters. Although growing nationalism may serve as an eventual brake. The countries of the Bolivarian Alliance. especially in Asia. or feared. with different states following disparate economic policies and political trajectories. Asian interlocutors saw China’s centrality to the region as growing. reflect the increasingly pivotal position of major regional powers and the extent to which their leadership is accepted. regional cooperation has so far not resulted in a significant pooling or delegation of sovereignty. experts we consulted thought both regional heavyweights—China and Japan—and the members of ASEAN will increasingly favor regional cooperation as the framework within which to resolve disputes and manage interdependence.” Japanese interlocutors have acknowledged the need to adjust to the new regional context and some envisage a sort of “look West” policy. for example. In fact. this could lead to economic and political fragmentation between different regions. Regional cooperation dynamics. South America is relatively stable. including when political relations are strained. and aversion to conflict. Brazil is the only country with the critical mass to build on these assets and address economic asymmetries and political fragmentation with a view toward deepening regional cooperation. At the same time. the investment in regional cooperation might detract from the ambition to strengthen global governance frameworks. notably in East Asia and South America. Contrasting trends indicate potential for either regional cooperation or fragmentation in South America. Business has often played a pioneering role in weaving a dense web of economic links at the regional level. have engaged in ideological competition not only against US influence in the region but also toward Brazil and others that have engaged in economic globalization. and Colombia have been pursuing economic liberalization and bilateral trade deals with the United States and. a non-intrusive agenda. most regional frameworks uphold the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states.
South Africa has been playing a key role by its involvement in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Such renewed centrality could encourage coordination and cooperation at the regional level in dealing with external partners. Long described as marginalized in the context of economic globalization. Instead. Crisis management and peace-building activities would greatly benefit from better cooperation among the AU. networks of experts. Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend on a combination of factors besides the leadership of major regional players. Governments often lack the expertise. Recent initiatives. From this standpoint. will be decisive for the future of the continent. such as the launch of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (UNASUR) in 2008. pandemics. and South Africa. Africa is today central to the competition for resources and 23 markets (and even for land) among major global players.playing a leading role. no African country has sufficient influence and resources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. it was argued that the domestic evolution and foreign policy priorities of a handful of key countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Likewise. Nigeria. Nonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate The experts we consulted felt that global challenges cannot be effectively tackled by individual states acting alone. indicate some ambition to play a greater regional role. Challenges such as climate change. sub-regional organizations. regionalism in Africa is likely to draw on global governance tools and resources. Egypt. perhaps more likely. However. or the proliferation of sensitive materials and technologies require flexible responses to a fast-changing agenda as well as capacity-building. among others. and in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). and legitimacy to address issues that affect a much wider range of stakeholders. it could also contain the seeds of more fragmentation. Others saw Brazil outgrowing its neighborhood and increasingly focused on enlarging its role in global vice regional forums. They contribute to setting the international agenda and are essential participants in implementing solutions. with different countries reaping the benefits of bilateral deals outside regional arrangements. resources. however. “Increasingly nonstate actors act as policy generators and are directly involved in decisionmaking and implementation of policy. including transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However. Nonstate actors are playing a central role both on the “demand” and “supply” sides of global governance. and civilsociety groups as well as multinational . and the UN. Africa is too big and diverse for a single regional leader to emerge. The engagement of nonstate actors is critical given the complexity of the risks facing the international community and multilateral frameworks. Greater development of home-grown civil society organizations attuned to transnational needs would contribute to forging more effective regional networks on such issues as climate change and resource management.” European Expert The range of nonstate actors contributing to global governance is heterogeneous. despite its rapid rise. Ethiopia. transnational challenges cannot be addressed by governmental actors on their own. in the shift from the Organization for African Unity to the African Union (AU) in 2002. Unlike in East Asia and South America.
During the color revolutions and more recently in Iran. Experts on modern diplomacy recently noted that in a globalized world the instruments of power themselves have taken on a different relative strength. Governments’ efforts to adapt and be more transparent have. public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been emerging as an important feature of global governance innovation. “When the Soviet Union collapsed. if not more effective than states at reframing issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we expect to continue.” Wider public participation through mass communications also has been important in putting greater emphasis on transparency— honest and open transactions—generating pressure on governments. with persuasion and legitimacy requiring as much attention as military. We need to get people the tools so they will have a stake in the future and policy. in fact. supported by like-minded states. it gives the weak a chance to do things they could not do before. but many people in the world don’t have these tools. nonstate actors have been at the forefront. and Malaria and 24 . a combination of states and nonstate actors caused a veritable revolution. the exposure by Chinese medical practitioners via the Internet of provincial governments’ efforts to hide the spread of SARS in 2002-2003 led Beijing finally to take action against the virus. for example. They have been equally. and Russia.” In the global health arena. fed the desire for greater participation. the spread of mass media in regions—largely rural—that historically have been cut off has increased pressures on government for better governance—particularly at home. Tuberculosis. The action campaigns behind these measures bypassed UN machinery and opposition by the United States. “The Internet is an enabler. Equally. has made an important difference in areas such as health and education. and political weight. people said we had only one superpower. often associated with business and civil society initiatives or to public authorities. China. corporations and business coalitions. with initiatives leading to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS.Role of Mass Communications New technologies. Private philanthropy. pushing on institutions to adapt. In the realm of global health. you need information and technology. As a conference participant put it. democratic pressure groups used the Internet to organize mass demonstrations. Hybrid. “To predict the future. empower individuals and groups and enable nonstate actors to coordinate actions across national boundaries. That creates a kind of power shift. As one participant stated. but we had two: the US and international public opinion. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Landmines Ban Treaties were both led by civil society actors. economic. such as the Internet. The mass communications revolution— notably the invention and increasing widespread use of the Internet—probably has been the most important vehicle spurring the expanded role of civil society groups and public opinion at large in agenda-setting for governance issues. notably in the field of sustainable development. The relevance of PPPs is likely to grow in as they reach out to multiple stakeholders.” Economist from a Dubai Think Tank As the scope of transnational challenges has widened and figured more highly on the international policy agenda.
thereby acting as catalysts of political purpose and resources. to enhance transparency in sensitive sectors such as extractive industries and for commodities like coffee and cocoa as well as diamonds. Expertise will become more salient in all fields of international policymaking. Insights and knowledge.” South African Participant In addition to their role as agenda-setters. Multi-stakeholder cooperation. the WHO has created the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. is a growing feature of international standard-setting. are also central in the domains of peace and security. monitoring. engaging business. Transnational advocacy and pressure groups have been instrumental in building and keeping momentum behind other major governance initiatives. from managing the implications of technological innovation to food and resource scarcity—issues that require ongoing monitoring. mandated to detect and respond to the outbreak of epidemics. biosafety and biosecurity standards. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Gathering and sharing knowledge is the basis for setting international norms and standards. for example. First. among others. “Maybe we are seeing a shift that is not geographical but horizontal—we are seeing the emergence of a global management elite and wondering what that means for the future of liberal democracy. Philanthropic foundations such as those led by Bill and Melinda Gates have made a key contribution in this context. the global health 25 . International organizations’ efforts to create standards and rules are increasingly complemented or paralleled by codes of conduct from the private sector and civil society. nonstate actors are essential sources of knowledge and expertise. These partnerships can help bridge the gap between global rule-making and local governance and engage a wide range of stakeholders from within and without individual countries or regions. For example. involving NGOs. such as the Millennium Development Goals launched in 2000. is perhaps the most prominent case in point.new global governance regimes such as UNAIDS. NGOs. Scientific advice is vital in the field of public health. Looking ahead. and public institutions. and verification and as providers of scientific advice and field experience. PPPs can also focus on the implementation of broad agendas established at the multilateral level. In the environmental domain. old and new policy domains would benefit from greater engagement of nonstate actors as partners in standard-setting. alerting national and international bodies. a web of over 140 scientific institutions in over 60 countries. often coming from nongovernmental sources. as exemplified by the over 300 partnerships launched following the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. an intergovernmental scientific body gathering the contribution of thousands of scientists worldwide to assess the evolution and impact of climate change. Important initiatives have been undertaken. opportunities exist to expand the interaction between state and nonstate actors and enhance the performance of PPPs. These include. where NGOs with vast field experience fuel decisionmaking through their insights and play a key role in conflict prevention and peace-building. certification schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the Maritime Stewardship Council have broken new ground with standards adopted by nonstate actors progressively endorsed by international and national authorities.
severe threats to the international system—possibly a looming environmental disaster or a conflict that risks spreading—prompt greater cooperation on solving global problems. An increasing focus on local governance and the inclusion of diverse perspectives in the early stages of multi-stakeholders dialogues would ameliorate this problem. such a scenario would be the best outcome over the long term. driven. This has hampered the engagement of nonstate actors and governments from developing and emerging countries. This will entail close interaction with public authorities at the international and national levels to formulate shared objectives and uphold viable standards. 26 . Third. and supported by governmental and nongovernmental bodies from advanced countries. transfers of green technologies and of dual-use technologies. and measures to adapt to climate change as well as the management of humanitarian crises and international migration. Second. thus far multi-stakeholder cooperation has been largely initiated. Fundamental reform of the international system becomes possible. The US increasingly shares power while China and India step up their burden sharing and the EU takes over a bigger global role. Although less likely than the first two scenarios in the immediate future. A stable concert could also occur incrementally over a long period in which economic gaps shrink and per capita income converges. Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux Under this scenario.domain at large. the effectiveness of self-regulation and of public-private partnership is predicated on the existence of clear guidelines and precise targets and on mechanisms for regular reporting and accountability.
the year when the oil price broke the $300/b ceiling. and investment. I am proud of the role that China and its Partners of the East Asia Economic Community have played in hosting the preparatory conference to this event. Pressure from the ACT (Action for Climate Treaty) coalition of developing countries was critical to get there. and dozens of other countries. will the IEO make us even more reliant on fossil fuels? What about the Washington Agreement on emissions? EU President: You have touched on a crucial point. They agreed on a massive concerted supply of strategic oil reserves. the International Renewable Energy Agency. Let me also take this opportunity to praise the leadership of the US Government and of the EU. Yes. The EU has pushed for a beefed up UNFCCC Secretariat to play a key convening role among the IEO. the World Bank. Back then. All of that was good. which years ago sparked the whole process. OPEC’s response was swift. Japan. In fact. but it happened almost by chance and after dramatic events. Indian Prime Minister: I am pleased to welcome you to the new Global India Congress Center. this took too long. 28 November 2025. my question goes to all of you. we all knew things had to change. and all other relevant actors to coordinate their initiatives and set joint funding priorities. for all the pledges to avert that. That night. that hope becomes a reality. Today. US President: Today matters not just because we set up a new institution but because this is the result of long years of collective leadership. The statement you just released says that the establishment of the International Energy Organization (IEO) in Delhi marks an historic turning point. and to set up an organization overseeing these rules. For the first time the entire international community has come together to agree to a single package of rules governing energy markets. Why is that? After many empty promises. my predecessor met in Brussels with the Presidents of China and Russia as well as our European allies. it gives us a stronger basis for taking bold decisions. New Delhi. 443341ID 9-10 . the largest in the world. Today is nothing less than historic. Political momentum in the Major Economies Forum has built up for a new deal to coordinate investment in energy efficiency and renewables. You all recall where we stood in 2018. BBC: I don’t want to spoil the party but. This would be much more difficult without the Global Environment and Energy Monitoring System launched in Washington. Oil and gas supply could no longer cope with demand. Of course energy and climate are two sides of the same coin. investments had been far below what we needed since the Great Recession of 2008 and we found ourselves on the brink of a second economic crisis.Scenario III Concert of Europe Redux Page 1 of 2 Extracts from the Final Press Conference of the International Energy Organization Summit. but all major polluters have finally committed to binding targets to reduce the volume of their emissions and we are on track. please convince us. later signed by India. Prime Minister of China: It is a pleasure to be here again after the second India-China Comprehensive Partnership Summit last year. and drafted the Brussels letter to OPEC. unlocked joint finance for top investment projects. India World Service: Excellencies. transit. I think we would not be here today without the 2020 Washington Agreement—global emissions to peak in 2025 and be halved by 2045. I was honored to host this summit and I am especially grateful that so many world leaders have joined me on this stage.
including India. This precipitated the energy crisis in 2018. But networks of officials and nonstate actors have done wonders. This is the road that we took many years ago to modernize and diversify our economy and join the WTO. When the civil war started. The Smart Partnership to expand smart grids in Asia and in Africa is the next challenge. Public-private partnerships like the Energy Investment Council no doubt helped pave the way to the Washington Agreement. We were all a bit surprised that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. security conditions had improved. Over ten years ago the G-20 asked the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization to launch a multi-stakeholder process to build a legal framework for sharing green technology and promoting joint R&D. We also agree with our partners that governance and the rule of law are important factors for growth and stability. Arab News: Turning to geopolitical risks. When the UN took over. Private actors have been in the lead on many fronts. most of them are. with the UNSC blessing the operation. we have learned that all dimensions of security are connected: human security and state security. we achieved in Washington a transatlantic cap-and-trade system. and the EU came to a halt. and the EU could achieve such a coordinated response in a matter of weeks. Indian Prime Minister: Nonstate actors have played a key role in facilitating technology transfers to India and many other countries from what was called the Global South. but have private actors followed? Are they doing their part to mitigate climate change and uphold energy security? US President: Well. We failed to prevent the crisis. The SCO Regional Dialogue with our European and American Partners contributes to the stability of Central Asia. The launch of the first generation of power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage systems is an example of what has been achieved. It is not that we have set the stage and others have followed.Scenario III Concert of Europe Redux Page 2 of 2 New York Times: The Washington deal was a game-changer. energy security and economic security. we have achieved sustained growth rates and the share of energy exports in Russia’s GDP has fallen. Capacity-building at the local level to implement mitigation and adaptation measures needs to speed up. They showed how resources could be harnessed and channeled to sustain a green industrial revolution not only in Europe and the US but also in new giants like China and India. Building on earlier national legislation. NATO. The impact of the floods in southern India three years ago would have been catastrophic had we not built an efficient alert system and more resilient infrastructure. oil and gas supplies from Central Asia to Russia. 443341ID 9-10 . including through regional cooperation. China. Neighboring countries risked contagion. The IEO Charter that we adopted today will provide for more accountability and predictability in the energy sector worldwide. the crisis in Central Asia showed that energy security remains very vulnerable to disruptions. Business has long sought a predictable regulatory framework. improve the business environment. and we will soon expand that to other partners. and boost economic growth. What is your outlook for stability in Central Asia? President of Russia: In Central Asia. Over the last 10 years. but I think we did a good job in responding to the situation.
Chapter 4: An Uncertain Future .
increasing pressures on what are in many cases the countries’ limited resources. The capacities of the current institutional patchwork—however much bolstered by increasing nonstate support and regional mechanisms—will be stretched by the type of challenges facing the global order over the next few decades. Although globalization—particularly the rise in commodity prices—has provided increased benefits. provided additional insights for this section as well as later sections on resource issues (food. it will not be a linear progression but zig-zags and ups and downs. water. Experts believe the risks are especially high and growing for armed conflict and increased instability in Africa. Under current circumstances. it has also increased pressures as income disparities have widened within and between countries. probably are not going to be sufficient to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global challenges absent extensive institutional reforms and innovations. which is likely to require a shared assessment of the challenges ahead and close monitoring of the implementation of national measures. 30 . however flexible. and biotechnology—that are likely to rise in importance and will demand a higher level of cooperation. The birth rates in many of these countries remain relatively high. and the Middle East. Several clusters of problems—weak and failing states and resources issues—appear particularly unlikely to be effectively tackled without major governance innovations because there is no overall framework to handle them. Poverty and weak economic links to the global system are often combined with weak governance and unresolved ethnic or tribal divisions. The issues discussed below are difficult subjects for multilateral cooperation because they involve more preventive action.” Participant from the Gulf Region Weak and Failing States1 Numerous studies indicate the growing fragility of many low-income developing states and potential for more conflict. the Arctic. probably marked by discontinuities and surprises. and economic growth that carries with it changing lifestyles and greater resource consumption…” Senior Research Fellow. particularly in cases where civil wars were never fully resolved. “Some think we have the perfect storm of climate change. resource scarcity. and energy) and over-the-horizon issues. Commissioned papers from David Steven (Riverpath consultancy). Alexander van de Putte (PFC). greater cooperation on those issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially difficult to achieve. and Dr. EU Institute for Security Studies Climate change studies indicate growing environmental pressures hitting many of the lowest income countries particularly hard. South and Central Asia. Professor Barry Hughes (University of Denver). We also cite over-the-horizon issues—migration. “As for the future. Studies show that states neighboring weak or failing ones—many of which are also struggling—also bear many of 1 We relied on published works from the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management Center and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in developing the analysis in this section on state failure and civil conflict. Bates Gill (SIPRI). Alex Evans (New York University).We assess that the multiple and diverse frameworks.
China has chosen to expand its operational role primarily through the UN. these efforts have been more aspirational than actual. The UN. The researchers on the project argue that the 2 All these populous countries are listed among the world’s most vulnerable and fragile countries across five major risk assessment projects. These countries are wary of the internationalization of conflicts in their neighborhood. a partial exception is the African Union’s limited but brave initial response in Darfur before the larger joint UN/AU efforts. Brazil leads the UN peacekeeping effort in Haiti. major powers. The response to Afghanistan has driven a new evolution. The Fund for Peace Failed States Index. Indian. Prevention Particularly Difficult. So far. political. the Goldstone and Marshall State Fragility Index. including the Brooking Institution’s Index of State Weakness. Emerging powers have played an increasing role: India is the third largest development actor in Afghanistan after the US and the EU. as shown by US. Internal conflict or collapse of large populous states on the scale of Ethiopia. potentially overriding another country’s sovereignty. or Nigeria2 would likely overwhelm international conflict management efforts. High-risk situations can be anticipated with greater accuracy than before. ECOWAS has played an important but relatively brief role in rapid response in West Africa. and they are proving difficult. A joint initiative by the Brookings Institution and New York and Stanford Universities on Russian. Regional organizations have done comparatively little in terms of large-scale operational responses to fragile states. and South African approaches to fragile states found there are deep-seated concerns within emerging powers about the consequences of the proactive management of state fragility. European. and NATO efforts in the Balkans. Pakistan. increasing the risks of their succumbing to failure. 31 . and economic responses. Carleton University ‘s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragile States Index. and regional organizations have growing expertise and success at containing such situations by brokering negotiated settlements and using peacekeepers to enforce solutions.the spillover effects from weak and failing states. Many experts in emerging states thought their governments probably would be particularly leery of any intervention if it is driven by the “West” and not mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter Seven. Aside from NATO and the EU. Yet their fears of internationalization are balanced by their fears of the consequences of failure. Efforts to prevent conflict have often been slowed by the international community’s reluctance to intervene directly. Prevention often requires direct political intervention or even the threat or use of military force as a last resort. conflict has often only been stopped after a significant amount of bloodshed has already occurred. namely the creation by ISAF members of substantial bilateral development and civilian operational arms. allowing for preventive diplomatic. Experts see weaknesses in the bilateral capacities: they are less wellcoordinated than the panoply of UN agencies and lack the comparative experience of effective lessons learned. Bangladesh. As a result. ASEAN has no peacekeeping capacity. and the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (University of Maryland) Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger. Chinese. given the difficult challenges posed by smaller countries such as Sudan or Somalia. and the League of Arab States’ only official peacekeeping operation was cover for large-scale Syrian intervention in Lebanon after the conclusion of the Ta’if Accords. Afghanistan’s 28 million and Iraq’s 30 million are among the most populous cases ever attempted.
This is often the case in the US and the EU as well. food. No overall framework exists to manage trends interrelated scarcities in the case of food and water and increasing volatility in energy supply. Over the longer run. “The world will be a sad place if by 2025 we have not legalized quick military intervention for humanitarian causes in cases of failing states. badly timed international aid. Interlocking Resource Issues The need for a cross-disciplinary. are assessed as either cropland or freshwater scarce. Although we can expect increased political and economic engagement from rising powers—in part as a reflection of their increasing global interests—the participation of emerging powers is likely to be on an ad hoc basis absent a more concerted multilateral framework. scarcities are likely to hit hardest on poorer states. such as trade and peacemaking. accounting for about 600 million people. which hampers their efforts at stabilization and peacebuilding. contact between personnel involved in peace operations and those leading on trade and investment is limited. increasing dietary preferences for protein. In 2010.” Japanese Participant Sustaining the Effort also Difficult. On the supply side. and a high likelihood of a rise in demand for grain-based biofuel. The stakes are high in view of the impact growing scarcities could have on undermining the current relatively open international system. The global aggregate demand for grain in the coming decade (2010 to 2025) promises to be substantially increased because of the expected additional 700 million people in Asia. Current technology and input costs put these countries well beyond the realm of food self- 32 . sustained reconstruction and reconciliation after conflict lessens the risk of a recurrence of conflict. leading in the worst case to internal or interstate conflict and spillover to regional destabilization. systematic effort is probably most exemplified in the case of the interrelated resource issues of energy. We will need a new legal system for sending quickly military intervention squads to save normal human beings from what they are suffering. and Latin America. Individual international agencies serve to respond to discrete cases. Africa. Resource competition in which major powers seek to secure reliable supplies could lead to a breakdown in cooperation across a broad spectrum of issues. and water. 21 countries. Climate change also further exacerbates the looming food and water scarcities as well as injecting added urgency to the transition out of fossil into cleaner fuels. Moreover. The downward trend in armed conflict that was noticeable through the early years of this century has been reversed in part because previously dormant conflicts such as those in Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia have resumed. In many of the emerging powers.eventual verdict on the interventions in past years in Iraq and Afghanistan by United States and NATO will have far-reaching impacts on how pro-active emerging powers will be when faced by future calls for intervention. Slow economic growth. global climate change trends are likely to depress agricultural productivity in some regions. according to internationally accepted benchmarks. and lack of attention to social reforms are key factors that lead to recurrence. particularly humanitarian emergencies in individual countries.
Even as supplies of essential goods such as water. with up to two-thirds of the world’s population living in water-stressed conditions. As population and average per capita water use have grown. mostly in non-OECD countries. Over one billion people live in areas where human use of available water supplies has exceeded sustainable limits. by 2025 this figure will rise to 1.8 billion. food. “Over-the-Horizon” Issues for Global Governance Another set of issues looms ahead on which even fewer concerted multilateral efforts have been undertaken. There are numerous historical cases of effective preventive action. Demand is projected to rise further to 5. but shared awareness and frameworks—put in place before a crisis hits—are required to avert the worst-case scenarios. • The peripheral role played by migration in post-World War II multilateralism is a reflection of the issue’s controversial nature. the International Energy Agency represents oil. On the basis of the population growth. “The real question is whether scarcity problems lend themselves to global governance. By that year.973 cubic kilometers in 2000. 1. the amount of fresh water withdrawn globally each year has grown too—from 579 cubic kilometers in 1900 to 3. Experts thought a governance framework that allowed for more agreement on common objectives could reduce price volatility and allow for great joint research and development in areas such as carbon capture and sequestration and other alternative technologies. China will not give up its quest for resources and India should not. Today. and the biotechnology revolution. the Arctic. Water use is closely intertwined with food production. Examples of the various forms of disruptions include several that undermine prospects for a smooth transition to less carbon intensive fuels: volatility in prices has led to stop-and-go investments in unconventional sources and renewable and increased reliance on coal as a secure domestic source regardless of environmental consequences. OPEC represents oilproducing countries. another 15 countries will join their ranks by 2025. rather than its lack of importance.and gas-consuming countries and the International Renewable Energy Agency represents the producers of alternatives to oil and gas. Migration is only likely to grow as a salient transnational issue with the emerging powers becoming 33 .235 cubic kilometers by 2025.4 billion people are projected to live in the 36 countries that will experience cropland scarcity. These include migration. Current institutions were created to address the immediate interests of constituent countries and not the longer term interests of the global community of energy producers and consumers. Climate change will compound the scarcity problem in many regions as precipitation patterns change and many populous areas become drier. and of the challenge any international oversight would pose to what many see as central prerogatives of the nation states— control over borders. 40 percent of the world’s food supply comes from land that is irrigated.” Indian Think Tank Speaker Four decades of oil shocks have proved to be extremely disruptive regardless of whether countries have been oil consumers or oil producers. The competition for scarce resources will continue. and energy become more difficult.sufficiency. but most irrigation is highly inefficient in water use. conflict over resources is not inevitable. The water situation is a major driver behind food scarcity. My view is that they do not.
In many others—even the wealthier countries—the potential for tensions along ethnic faultlines will persist. levels of remittances have 34 . finally. depending on their end use. if not increase. other destination countries.increasing magnets for economic migrants. Emerging markets will become significant targets for migration: their economic power has the potential to outstrip their institutional strength. Many developing countries. have seen such high rates of migration that their future demographic trajectory has been shifted upwards. and the obstacles to greater cooperation are likely to remain considerable because of growing national sovereignty concerns. such as the United States. “Thinking backwards from 2025 or even 2040. The lack of governance frameworks nevertheless means that there will be a lack of an instrument to address crises. Many of the key challenges will be in emerging and weaker states. such remittances are widely seen as among the most effective forms of “foreign” or external assistance. creating strains for globalization. including related humanitarian concerns. With their fast-paced economic development. biotechnology is another issue that has newly arisen—in this case. leading to greater social problems as they become more diverse societies. • Climate change is only beginning to open up the possibilities in the Arctic. such as a sharp economic downturn. As migratory flows become more complex. The potential opening of the Arctic as a result of climate change can be regarded as a test case for multilateral cooperation versus a “great game” of competition and potential conflict. emerging states are likely to receive an increasing number of migrants attracted by the economic opportunities. but more concerted efforts are required to control environmental risks and enhance transnational cooperation over competition. including being a potential trigger for increased transnational tensions and controversy over globalization. with the likely growing flows of migrants. migration also has the potential to act as a disruptive force. However. The risks of not trying to better manage migration are great. one of the things that will happen with radical climate change and demographic changes in Europe and Russia will be global migrations again. Like the Arctic. Regional cooperation has started. Poorer countries. meanwhile. because of technological innovations and the potential for those discoveries to be both exceedingly beneficial or harmful. Climate change and new • Migration has the potential to increase economic interdependence and to reconcile the demographic challenges faced by older and younger countries.” South African Participant International cooperation on migration has generally been weak. have little experience effectively managing major outflows of migration. and exacerbating crises caused by other factors. Some countries already face an unsustainable loss of highly skilled workers. accelerated sharply since 1990. have seen levels of “brain drain” running at rates that damage their economic prospects. many countries are experiencing sudden increases in ethnic diversity. Conversely. Achieving multilateral cooperation is likely to be challenging because of the number of nonstate actors needed to be involved in any efforts to regulate the booming technology phenomenon.
particularly in emerging powers such as China. however. Rapidly falling costs will bring biotechnology within reach of a hacker community. as well as their determination to prevent the region from becoming over-militarized. or cognitive abilities. however. with India and China investing heavily in biotechnologies and Brazil in biofuels. Richer countries are worried more about their vulnerability to new diseases or the hostile use of biological agents. The international system becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions. discussions of future capabilities open the possibility for designing humans with unique physical. The development of new agents with the ability to reengineer existing life forms to have an offensive capacity poses a growing challenge. Tensions build between the United States and China. creating profound cross-cultural ethical questions that will be increasingly politically contentious. Rising powers expect their future comparative advantage to lie in a sector where there are relatively few entrenched leaders. also are undermined. Threats are also perceived differently by different governments. and the nature of the challenges. . They are likely to regard heavy handed international regulations as “protectionist” measures to restrain their freedom to operate. and governments on measures needed to diminish the risks posed by the biotechnology revolution. Such suspicions and tensions make reforming global institutions impossible. The development of new agents and the expansion of access to those with hostile intentions increase the bioterrorism threat. enabling them to work with a plethora of private actors. Existing biological agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxin already pose an extremely serious threat. industry. these mechanisms are likely to be more fluid and more ad hoc than an all-encompassing treaty would be. No forum currently exists for dealing comprehensively across the scientific community. In addition. The poorest countries are most concerned about the current impact of infectious diseases. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations for the “good life” are stymied. while the diffusion of relevant technology could lead to increased leaks of expertise and materials. particularly in Asia. Given the different interests at stake. Dealing with the range of challenges presented by the opening of the Arctic requires appropriate governance mechanisms. China stumbles and the global economy lapses. but the possibility cannot be dismissed. For example. many of whom will not be amenable to traditional regulation. The potential for dual-use of biotechnology will make the task of regulating and controlling current and new developments an exceptionally complex one. budding regional efforts. emotional. Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation This scenario is among the least likely. Few experts believe that current governance instruments are adequate for those challenges. biotechnology—which the OECD thinks will potentially boost the GDPs of its members—can drive new forms of human behavior and association. direct modification of DNA at 35 fertilization is widely researched with a goal of removing defective genes. but also among some of the BRICs as competition grows for secure resources and clients. Governments will need unprecedented capacities to reach out beyond other governments. The way in which the Arctic is managed will test the ability of states to resolve disputes over sovereignty and to enhance current frameworks of international law which apply to the sea and the seabed.technologies will create more opportunities for resource exploitation and economic activities and greater potential for competition.
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I—admittedly a bored diplomat—find myself sequestered for several weeks in Perth (Australia). It was as if human nature was doomed: the competitive spirit took over even though the rewards were greatest for cooperation. China’s economy took a hit while the West’s had finally recovered. it would only take a minor incident to trigger a major conflict. I wonder how the game will go . the contestants ended up competing over access to oil. way beyond the 2008 “spikes. all of whom assumed roles of major countries or international organizations. Asian cities are particularly vulnerable to the huge tidal surges which have accompanied some of the recent cyclones. Food prices have soared. This was despite the fact that they could opt for technological breakthroughs on alternatives and reap many more rewards. with a pandemic— not unlike the present—and the challenge was to find which countries could provide emergency vaccines. We saw in Afghanistan where China actually reaped major economic benefits from the Allies’ efforts to stabilize the country. Much of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth was exploited by the Chinese. The West resented the new powers as their economies continued to grow while even the US has struggled. I am thinking back on world events. My son—who was a bit of a rebellious teenager at the time—was particularly competitive. when he was playing the role of the BRIC.” Governments—including the new rising powers—have struggled to keep supplies adequate and prices reasonable for their publics. Such economic feats became a contentious political issue in America and led to growing USChina frictions. The game actually prompted you to construct a UN Security Council resolution that would quickly be voted into action. Nationalism has made a big comeback in the past decade. It was not as if China was at all equal to the US. The game was probably never a best seller. including to help China rise. though. Why couldn’t my son just accept the rules laid down in the game? They were for everyone’s good. The current international scene holds an uncanny resemblance to a computer game called “Peace Hero” I used to play with my son years ago. Lo and behold. I thought I had him over a barrel. confrontation was sure to follow. 443342ID 9-10 . This alone was probably enough to sour the international atmosphere. What was all that stuff we used to talk about—multilateralism. It is no exaggeration to say we are almost at the point of daggers drawn. I suppose he had a good case looking back on it. A couple times. my son became more hostile. The charges and countercharges proliferated with groups hardening around the US on one side and China-India-Brazil and most of the developing world on the other. . No Kyoto followon climate change agreement was reached in 2012. The world was confronted. Perception is a lot in these situations. I am reminded a little of how the British and French felt as German power rose in the years before the First World War. but Americans grew increasingly resentful of an ungrateful China not mindful of all the “public goods” which the US had provided in the world. He said China was of no mind to be deferent given past wrongs. this one was constructed so you earned points for finding ways to cooperate with fellow contestants. A string of extreme weather events has added to their woes. In one energy scenario. I am trying to get back to Europe for my annual leave. Once the competitive juices flowed. the new powers were dismissive of what they saw as an antiquated international system no longer possessing any legitimacy—a system that did not protect them from the increasing environmental and resource problems. but it had intrigued me. To while away the time.Scenario IV Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation In summer 2021. the new Internet society that would bring us all together? A lot had been swept aside in the ten years since the Great Recession. doctors without borders. for example. despite the rapid quarantines put in place. Even I had to admit that my blood would boil at times. A new outbreak of bird flu. particularly how the players perverted its intended objective. For their part. has spread and closed down most major airports. not Western firms. Unlike most games. . The small island states whose very existence is really threatened were left out and ignored. He went out of his way not to cooperate with me. but most connections have been cut.
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39 . From our investigations of others’ views. The recent financial crisis has shown that a highly diverse set of countries and global and regional institutions can come together to avert what could have been another Great Depression. However. however. The second (fragmentation) and fourth (conflict) are scenarios that would reverse the gains— such as reduction in extreme poverty and slowdown in large-scale interstate conflict— which we have seen over the past half century. Many of the key ingredients for improving global governance are at hand. While not the most likely. but also Limits Global governance is not slated to approach “world government” because of widespread sovereignty concerns. divergent interests. Within that set of parameters. However. regional. The first (barely staying afloat) and third (concert redux) would avoid the worst outcomes through preventive action and forethought. Over time. we were impressed by the degree to which elites in most of the emerging powers were thinking more “globally” and preparing to take greater responsibilities. and needed. Their engagement will be critical to the success of any proposal for the adaptation and innovation of governance frameworks. particularly to grapple with the growing interconnectedness of future challenges. enhanced and more effective cooperation among a growing assortment of international. it seems likely that the US and the EU will continue to be at the forefront of initiatives to reform and update the global governance agenda and institutions in the short term. and deep-seated worries about the effectiveness of current institutions. and national in addition to nonstate actors is possible. as has been the case for some time. we have outlined several scenarios.Conclusion Future Opportunities. nonstate actors are likely to continue to play a vital role in generating not only an understanding of potential problems but also solutions in any reform of the global governance system. achievable. Many of the experts we engaged with in the emerging powers acknowledge the inadequacies in and challenges facing the global governance system. none of which ensures a “perfect” world. the “fragmentation” and “conflict” scenarios are not so insignificant as to be negligible in a world in which localized disruptions have global implications and preventive action is hard to organize. but transforming them into both a newly effective and legitimate system is likely to be the big challenge. Moreover. our discussions suggested that legitimacy— bringing multilateral institutions more in line with current power realities—has to be an objective of reform as much as dealing more effectively with “hubs” of risks for the future.
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and Russia in addition to the European Union and the United States. Brazil. China. the UAE. sovereignty. which is state-centered. Many argued that domestic markets and regional cooperation will become more important to ensure sustained growth rates.” For Brazilians.” Many felt that China needs to manage its domestic development in ways that are compatible with the development and security of others. According to one participant. Nevertheless.” not climate change. Keeping its house in order is seen as a big contribution by China to global governance. in their view. This is changing largely because the country is playing a bigger role in international economics. India. Effectiveness is not just about fast decisionmaking but incorporating a broader range of voices. However. national governance. One said. the big issues are food security and resource scarcity. Chinese interlocutors saw the G-20 as being a big step forward but questioned whether NorthSouth differences would impede cooperation on issues other than economics and international finance. Brazil. does not make room for nonstate actors. Others argued that the G-20 is essentially a “crisis management tool” which already suffers from a sense of fatigue and cannot be regarded as an alternative to the UN system. we met with government and think tank leaders. and climate change.Annex A: World Views of Global Governance In preparing this analysis.” Multilateral institutions “cannot work well from Brazil’s point of view if they do not recognize the role of the emerging powers. the governance gap is really a legitimacy gap. South Africa. and where universal values such as human rights and democracy do not play a central role. “For developing countries. and local governance. spurred in part by the public debates over climate change and the impact of the financial crisis. The appreciation of respective concerns. Below we have encapsulated the country or regional views of our interlocutors on global governance. the issues connected with global governance are gaining prominence within Brazilian society. Brazil will continue to look at many issues through the lens of the North-South divide and the need for redistribution of power from developed to developing states. energy. The dominant “matrix” of Brazil’s foreign policy has been the North-South divide. Global governance has not featured very high in the Brazilian debate until recently. Chinese interlocutors recognized the growing scope of global challenges but emphasized the need for China to deal with its internal problems. and scholars and other experts in Japan. and “patience” are the key principles at the basis of a sound international system. The Chinese participants stressed that trust is critical to prospects for cooperation and that it is rooted in respect for the interests of each party to a negotiation. They also noted the progressive “de-concentration” of economic power away from the United States and the discrepancy between such a power shift and the enduring role of the US dollar as global currency. Some experts noted that the Brazilian Government tends to like “old fashioned” multilateralism. business and NGO representatives. at least for now. China. 43 . One Chinese speaker cited the need for “a balanced relationship among international governance. “The governance gap for Brazil is that too much power is given to developed countries at a time when developing countries are emerging.
“Europe is not ready to take up the mantle of leadership” and questioned whether it is a regional or a global actor.” Chinese Expert Many Chinese interlocutors see growing convergence on “hard security” despite different perspectives on humanitarian intervention. “On terrorism.” Some also feared that a system developed by the “West”—which includes democracy and rule of law—would suffer as the “East” becomes more powerful. India is primarily interested in transforming global governance institutions. and military power. Many hoped the United States would continue to be “very much part of the Asian region as a political. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” to deal with mounting challenges. Japan. Western actors regard good governance as a precondition for sustainable development.” One said. It will suffer the same fate as other such forums.” One expert argued that globalization may have reached a turning point. “The IMF has focused on developing. “It would be a pity if the West does not hang together to influence the future. not developed. The impact of the economic crisis. economic. they opined that India was not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. ongoing turbulence in the financial markets.” Others felt that China is increasingly aware of the responsibilities that come with power. approaches could differ among different global actors. expecting others to take on the responsibilities associated with global 44 . most countries have common interests. complaining about a “crisis of leadership. One said.…on piracy.” However. Many experts were concerned about the future of the UN and one argued that if the reform of the UN fails the institution will progressively become irrelevant. whereas China considers economic growth as conducive to better governance over time. In the development field. there is more of a link with nontraditional security and more room for cooperation. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership than “form or structure.” The Japanese opined that the developing and emerging powers are still stuck in old North-South perspectives. One said.“Be careful about the G-20—I give it at most five years’ lifespan. economies and it should take a more balanced approach. On the other hand. That said. Many Chinese saw “fundamental” defects in the international system. Some felt that resource issues are not ripe for multilateral solutions and that India and China will continue their quest for resources. Pretty quickly sending leaders to endless summits will create fatigue. One noted that global deals are to be based on “mutuality of benefits” and questioned whether the Western approach to the climate change agenda was fair to India and other poor countries. Indian officials and think tank experts worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. doubts were expressed regarding the legitimacy of the G-20. India. Some felt this format would benefit from broader consultations with non-member countries to underpin its deliberations. One Indian interlocutor said.” The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the different kinds of institutions and groups that have been established recently. Thus. and resource constraints point to a possible scenario of de-globalization.
Others stressed that “the state is back” and large powers are reasserting their sovereignty. The United States. for example on energy and the environment. More generally. noting that Japan itself has to overcome political and legal obstacles to make a greater contribution on hard security. “… (We) cannot expect Russia to cooperate on global issues without first dealing with bilateral issues. Two days of meetings with only two hours allotted for each issue results in only “tinkering.” Russian Participant Russian participants worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security. The pressure of world public opinion had been on the United States—blaming the Bush Administration for lack of commitment to multilateralism—but is now shifting. The Japanese were concerned that a premature institutionalization of the G-20 or the rapid expansion of its agenda could expose differences within the group. 45 . Informality—which ensures “spontaneity”—may trump formal structures in advancing solutions. In the energy field. which international organizations are still not equipped to handle effectively. Russia. The Japanese felt that quick military interventions will be needed in cases of ailing states.” The Pacific region is still less governed and there is a need for a greater security framework. the Japanese felt that more concrete measures should be devised to compel countries to comply with their legal obligations. The driving concept in Russia is “multilateral diplomacy. “like-mindedness” in informal groupings is required to achieve results.” Besides. stronger regional frameworks could compensate for weaker global ones. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one of “great powers. focusing on countries like China to take more action. That will require renewed efforts to establish a stronger legal framework for intervention. In their view. The potential for cooperation between sub-national authorities such as cities deserves more attention too. Japanese interlocutors questioned whether formal institutions are still appropriate.challenges. because of public opinion. Most Japanese participants emphasized the need to boost national and regional means while reforming international organizations. the emphasis on energy independence and resource nationalism was regarded as dangerous. for example under the nonproliferation regime.’’ with great powers relations playing a central role. Many were concerned about the lack of regional structures for hard security in East Asia. whereas different agendas co-exist in the G-20. Efforts to focus only on global issues and put aside classical state interests are unrealistic. Some argued that international organizations with their huge bureaucracies are ineffective. Instead. however.” although some expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunities for greater transnational cooperation. This is changing. One former official talked of expanding the time allotted to G-20 meetings to enable leaders to exercise leadership. the Japanese saw a need to better integrate both advanced countries and new massive energy consumers like China and India in relevant international frameworks to avoid unbounded competition. in particular for challenges such as climate change and resource scarcity. instead of global governance.
the UN remains the global institution with the only “legitimate credential. that Africans were being left out. They worried that the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners and cited the need to tackle this problem. many felt that Russia’s modernization strategy is inconsistent and that there is little confidence among the people for things to change. The Russians thought there was only one institution—the UN—that could engage all the key actors. A particular problem for Africa is a “lack of capacity in knowledge and ideas to drive politics. However. for example. even with the shift to a multipolar world. the South-South solidarity is not likely to hold.Europe. They thought Africans wanted a rules-based international system but worried. India’s demise as a leader of the South is only a matter of time. In their view. Some experts saw the EU as serving as a model for future global governance. the G-8 and G-20 lack legitimacy and their future is uncertain. As one of our interlocutors put it. “Some of the BRICs use the South-South agenda to advance their South-North agenda.” Some academics we encountered worried that if Russia does not take into account the main trends of global development. In their view. and China uses its status as a developing country as a cloak.” Technology is as important as governance. 46 . Our South African interlocutors saw weak states as being threatened by unregulated globalization. thereby connecting the national and international levels of governance. The G-20 has little African representation. In their view. if not more so. food. South Africa. The weakening of the state in Africa is a real problem. that the G-20.” South African Participant For Africans. could operate effectively on non-financial matters. The South Africans doubted. strong states are a “prerequisite” for global governance in the absence of effective multilateral institutions. The European system of decisionmaking encourages pluralism and engages networks of officials and nonstate actors.” South African Participant Globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity. some noted that many states in Africa are ill-equipped to fit globalization and are likely to remain so due to demographic trends and poor governance. and Russia have scope for growing much closer while China will be the main factor in changing the world “with the biggest economy. whose membership is much more diverse than the G-8. However. Moscow’s role risks being marginalized in the global order. “Think globally and act locally—that means a strong state. and resources as confusing and leading to more uncertainty on the rules of the game.” They perceive the proliferation of separate initiatives on development. These things from global governance ultimately happen at the national and local level.
As to the future of the UN. noted that China is quick to adjust its policies in response to African concerns. more attention needs to be paid to the reasons why it is not working. China and other emerging actors will have a long way to go to match the influence of traditional powers. One said. the common feature that unites them is resource nationalism. Most saw the region turning to “China and the East” as that region becomes a larger consumer of energy from the Persian Gulf. UAE. Africa.” Many interlocutors bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations—labeling the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council as weak and not well-connected to international institutions. some noted that power is about “building consensus. “What is the new contract?” After World War II. However. Asia. Several felt let down by lack of support from the West on democratization.” From this standpoint. there is a need to share power to make decisions. seeing Africa to be exploited for natural resources. the Middle East. One said. being a model. however. 47 . For participants from the Persian Gulf region.” Even the nonstate actors come mainly from the most powerful states.“Africa did not develop because of a lack of technology. not about exporting Western views.” according to one participant. creating a system. Some were wary of China because it is interested only in African resources. “If you look at the BRIC countries. “Too often when we talk about the future of the Gulf. The participants from the Gulf region thought it will be necessary to incorporate these regions if we are to avoid crises in the future. In their view. and Latin America were not involved. the key question was what sort of global institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. One said.” A framework or institution is needed to bring together the “rights” of energy producers with those of consumers.” Others. an uneasy accommodation with Iran will have to be found.” In their view. we conclude that we are not real actors. One asked. including the fact that powerful actors have sought alternative ways to pursue their interests. but they stressed that “sharing is about respective priorities. “Africa has never fit anywhere—it has always been the object of global trends. “Now there is no interest in democratization in or outside the region.
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In the last few years. as reflected in the debates we held at our seminars overseas. In both fields. China’s centrality to the region will grow. however. The question is whether the bilateral alliance between 49 . First. China has sought to reassure the region on the implications of its momentous rise. For example. China has shown its willingness to engage with neighboring countries on some issues not only at the bilateral level but also through multilateral regional structures.” some Japanese interlocutors acknowledged the need to adjust to the new regional context and pursue a sort of “look West” policy. turning Japan’s focus from its US ally in the Pacific to mainland Asia. on the basis of shared principles. downplaying rivalry and benefiting from booming mutual trade and investment flows. China. permanent consultation. China pursues multiple objectives. The so-called “ASEAN way” has not been very effective in delivering concrete solutions to the economic and security concerns of member states at times of crisis. and between China and Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries over rights in the South China Sea. this cooperative framework has provided a useful platform to involve regional powers in permanent consultation and ad hoc cooperation. By engaging in regional cooperation. The ongoing shift in the East Asian balance of power has not escaped Japan. and aversion to conflict. and Japan. However. for example at the interface between China and India along common borders and throughout the region. Third. East Asia A new phase of East Asian regionalism may be dawning. Second. it has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and it has set up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization together with Russia and Central Asian countries to tackle shared security threats. From an economic and political standpoint. Areas of serious geopolitical tension persist. informality. In what has been defined as a “paradigm shift. China sets economic and political competition with Japan on peaceful grounds. a non-intrusive agenda. ASEAN has developed over decades a distinctive style of regional cooperation based on a low level of institutionalization. Beijing extends its political influence in parallel with its growing economic clout in the region in a nonconfrontational and therefore less contentious way.Annex B: The Prospects for Regionalism Regionalism takes many different shapes across the world. ASEAN countries have rather developed a range of bilateral relations between themselves and with external actors such as the United States. because of its non-binding character. only include Asian countries. Whether China will be embedded in a sphere of cooperative security and shared prosperity or will seek to steamroll its way through the neighborhood will have far-reaching implications for global stability. On the whole. Both regional heavyweights—China and Japan—and the member states of ASEAN favor regional cooperation as the framework within which to resolve disputes and manage interdependence. unlike the inter-regional Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. China delimits the influence of the United States in East Asia by supporting regional structures which.
South America has been the number one priority of Brazilian foreign policy and it is likely to remain so for years to come. Japan regards regional cooperation as a multiplier of its political influence and as a way of diluting that of potential rivals. However. however. China. with different states following disparate economic policies and political trajectories. It has also allocated a large share of its development assistance to the region. as well as environmental interdependence suggest that regional cooperation may deepen and expand to new areas. From a Japanese standpoint. Soft balancing within the region and vis-à-vis the US underpins many of these developments. Japan has supported a range of initiatives at bilateral and regional cooperation on economic and environmental issues. In perspective. have engaged in ideological competition not only against US influence in the region but also toward Brazil and others that are engaged in economic globalization. and developments ahead may follow a similar pattern to that envisaged for East Asia. growing economic links among China. Japan. The countries of the Bolivarian Alliance. Many wonder whether Brazil is going to be too big to remain focused on its region in one or two decades. Such a system would be managed through regional structures that would more likely perform a stabilizing and confidence-building function. the gap between the economic performance of Brazil and that of most of its neighbors has been widening. Given current trends. ASEAN should remain the building block of a larger regional architecture and the annual East Asia Summit (EAS) should evolve into an East Asian Community. To this end. So far. a diversified industrial base and huge endowments with 50 . Peru. with China at its core. Most observers regard Brazil’s regional leadership as a vital condition for it to achieve its goal of playing a major role on the global stage. Japan supports more inclusive regional formats than those traditionally championed by China. The national strategies of major regional actors intersect with cooperative initiatives and engender plans to set up new multilateral platforms such as the East Asia Community. turmoil in global trade and financial markets. and Colombia have been pursuing economic liberalization and bilateral trade deals with the United States and. In the last two decades. involving India as well as Australia and New Zealand (the so-called ASEAN+6 that meets at the EAS). dependent as they are on the export of energy and other raw materials. the emergence of a “hub-and-spoke” system in East Asia. increasingly. Countries such as Chile. Like China. Regionalism in East Asia presents multiple facets. Brazil benefits from sound macro-economic and social policies. a large domestic market. including for example the Six-Party Talks on North Korea in the security domain. and ASEAN. which may not include the United States.Japan and the US will prove compatible with deepening multilateral frameworks in East Asia. led by Venezuela. The region is diverse. Brazil accounts for about half of South America’s territory and population and for two-thirds of its gross domestic product. among others. can be envisaged. than a binding norm-setting role. Established multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN co-exist with a thick web of bilateral partnerships and ad hoc functional arrangements and diplomatic processes. their economic prospects are shaky. grounded in shared basic principles. Contrasting trends indicate potential for either regional cooperation or fragmentation in South America. South America Regionalism in South America shares some of these features.
Nigeria. However. African experts argued that the future of the continent and of its governance will depend on the domestic evolution and foreign policy priorities of a range of key countries such as South Africa. have been losing competitiveness and struggle to fit the changing global division of labor. Countries such as Argentina. and in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). South America is relatively stable. These include low levels of mutual political trust and reluctance by Brazil and other countries in the region to constrain their national sovereignty by subscribing to common rules and binding engagements. Important initiatives suggest that such an attempt is in the making. Brazil continues to support the Union of South American Nations (MERCOSUR). however. But whether Brazil will be willing and able to play such leading role. serious political challenges lie ahead. Instead.natural resources. countries face common transnational threats such as drug trafficking and all would benefit from better transport and energy infrastructures to boost trade and investment and harness their natural resources. Brazil is the only country with the critical mass to build on these assets and address economic asymmetries and political fragmentation with a view to deepening regional cooperation. and has backed the membership of Venezuela in this organization. Africa Political and security crises all over the continent punctuate the laborious development of regionalism in Africa. The interplay 51 . although the multilateral Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) set up in 2000. Some of these countries also play a pivotal role in the context of sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States in West Africa. remains an open question. has achieved less than expected. in ways that gain consensus in the region. Unlike in East Asia and South America. regionalism in South America has not spurred a deeper institutionalization of cooperation and remains exposed to unfolding political circumstances within and between countries. Egypt. in the shift from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union (AU) in 2002. albeit for political more than economic reasons. which excluded the United States and that Brazil regards as the harbinger of a future permanent organization. the Democratic Republic of Congo. Africa is too big and diverse for a single regional leader to emerge. and the East African Community to the East of the continent. Brazil hosted the Latin American and Caribbean Summit too. The economic and financial crisis has severely hit the credibility of international financial markets and institutions and suggested to Brazil and its neighbors that stronger domestic markets and regional economic cooperation can help shield the region from future crises. among others. However. South Africa has been playing a key role by its involvement in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. As in East Asia. Brazilian capital constitutes the backbone of investment in regional infrastructure. the South African Development Community in the South. A new regional organization—UNASUR—was launched in 2008 with the goal of making it the main forum for political dialogue and cooperation in South America. no African country has sufficient influence and resources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. and Ethiopia. At the same time.
regional diplomacy may grow in relevance. and the UN. With local opposition to the interference by external actors in African affairs on the rise. available for rapid deployment.between these organizations and the AU is critical to support effective regional solutions to common problems. preventive diplomacy and mediation among national leaders in regional forums can be decisive to managing crises within or between countries. if probably insufficient as such in the absence of a concerted effort. poses another obstacle to effective regional cooperation. However. is also under way. Relevant institutional structures have been set up at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and the AU has undertaken some small-scale crisis management operations. to the implementation of the principle of the “responsibility to protect” enshrined in the constitutive act of the AU. all of them attached to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in their respective domestic affairs. The APSA was launched in 2004 with the aim of providing African answers to regional challenges and threats. Many African leaders and observers claim that Africa should be proactive in shaping old and 52 . and between the latter. Poor governance in many countries in the region fuels a vicious spiral of poverty and instability that generates a growing demand for crisis management and peace-building. Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend on a combination of factors. Although some progress has been achieved. for example the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. such processes and frameworks rarely address the root causes of instability because doing so might entail questioning domestic political regimes. The presence of strong and assertive states next to many fragile or failing ones. The complicated interplay between the AU and sub-regional organizations. The leadership of major regional players such as South Africa will remain essential. From this standpoint. which African leaders are not inclined to do. Capacity-building will be a core priority for years to come and will require a strong partnership between African actors and external donors. African institutions do not have the resources and expertise to take responsibility for crisis response and for peace-building activities. Africa is today central to the competition for resources and markets (and even for land) among major global players. around 70 percent of UN peacekeeping troops are deployed in Africa. The constitution of five stand-by contingents at the sub-regional level. Crisis management and peace-building activities would greatly benefit from deeper cooperation among the AU. At the political level. poses a major challenge to the future of regionalism in Africa and. more particularly. major obstacles lie ahead. Planning and command structures are weak while AU operations heavily depend on external support for funding and logistics. Efforts at regional cooperation since the establishment of the AU have consequently focused on security issues. sub-regional organizations. with the EU and its Member States likely to remain at the forefront of this effort. The engagement of African nonstate actors in transnational cooperative frameworks would contribute to the effectiveness of such frameworks on such issues as climate change. Long described as marginalized in the context of economic globalization. regionalism in Africa is likely to complement rather than replace global governance tools and resources. Today.
as opposed to being the object of foreign interests. Such renewed centrality could encourage coordination and cooperation at the regional level in dealing with external partners. However. with different countries reaping the benefits of bilateral deals outside regional arrangements. 53 . it could also contain the seeds of more fragmentation.new partnerships.
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the Barents Euro Arctic Council. 55 . bilateral agreements. more risks for the environment. The Arctic Council. However. As a general rule. The Arctic can be regarded as a test case for global governance. Norway. which has the broadest membership. Denmark. and it lacks a permanent independent secretariat and formal powers. Climate change and new technologies will create more opportunities for resource exploitation and economic activities. A region that has generally been understood as being outside the current of global affairs is becoming central to them. and the United States) have preferred to keep discussions of Arctic sovereignty among themselves. and greater potential for competition. The way in which the opening of the Arctic is managed will test the ability of states to resolve disputes over sovereignty and to enhance current frameworks of international law that apply to the sea and the seabed. relating to questions of sovereignty. Larger groupings provide greater legitimacy and may be the only format for dealing with more complex and interrelated issues but are harder to manage and less likely to produce practical cooperation. UNCLOS delimits and codifies the potential areas of dispute. where interests are most closely aligned or at least most clearly understood. is perhaps the most effective and the obvious candidate as a governance mechanism for the Arctic. which the United States has not ratified. however. and the nature of the challenges. are not binding. Some of the challenges raised by the growing economic and political salience of the Arctic are in a sense traditional. is narrow. A range of frameworks—many of which are essentially forums for discussion rather than formal governance mechanisms—already exists. but the findings of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. its arbitration body. its agenda. But these are complicated in a number of ways. as well as their determination to prevent a region from becoming over-militarized. Russia. Using the North Sea Route would cut shipping routes between East Asia and Europe by about 40 percent.Annex C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for Global Governance? The potential opening of the Arctic as a result of climate change is a seminal event. Given the different interests at stake. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). and the Northern Dimension of the European Union in addition to a number of bilateral arrangements on areas of cross-border interest such as the longstanding fisheries arrangements between Norway and Russia. Dealing with the range of challenges presented by the opening of the Arctic requires appropriate governance mechanisms. tend to produce the greatest degree of practical cooperation. The members of the self-defined group of five Arctic coastal states (Canada. these mechanisms are likely to be more fluid and more ad hoc than an allencompassing treaty would be. In 2009 the US Geological Survey estimated that the Arctic region holds massive resources of oil and natural gas. These include the Arctic Council. which does not include security issues. in the Arctic as elsewhere. provides the legal basis on which a state may claim economic sovereignty over the sea and seabed.
In 2010. or Russian oil and gas resources are developed. make some existing disputes more acute and increase the perceived strategic importance of such overlapping claims. will depend to differing degrees on price. but also possibly more secure than current routes. Moving toward more common alignments of incentives and perceptions between states will be key. is showing a growing interest in the region—as a shipping route both shorter and cheaper than existing shipping routes. But many of the possible challenges facing the Arctic require effective policing. Moreover. China. The key question is whether states will be capable of resolving their disputes through negotiation and what conditions need to be in place to make that happen. accessibility. it was highly unlikely that commercial activity would take place in that area. of course. or a real ability to control. in particular. states might miscalculate. The challenges raised by the potential opening of the Arctic concern not only Arctic states but non-Arctic states as well. for instance. But this is not necessarily the case. either by over-reaching themselves or failing to signal their interests and intentions. As in all diplomatic engagement. much of what happens in the Arctic—including how highly controversial questions of resource development play out—will happen within a single state. Norway and Russia moved dramatically toward final resolution of a longstanding dispute over ownership of a large portion of the Barents Sea.Ultimately. Without an agreement. depriving both Norway and Russia of potential revenues. Canadian. The question of whether US. Very few states have the ability to adequately surveil or control their Arctic territory and seas. let alone the possible consequences of a political dispute over access. 56 . or between the United States and Canada over maritime domain awareness and possibly ice-breaking capacity. but getting the governance frameworks right (and the infrastructure in place) for such potential activity will be important. These may take the shape of formal structures—such as a strengthened Arctic Council—or more informal data-sharing and network-building. in terms of understanding what responsibilities are shared and which fall to each NATO-member. particularly within NATO. There are opportunities within existing institutions for greater cooperation. It will take decades before the Arctic is a major shipping channel. This is exacerbated in a region such as the Arctic where asserting sovereignty may be as much about power as it is about presence. overlapping claims have to be resolved by states. The environmental and possible human consequences of a shipping disaster need no elaboration. which is believed to hold considerable hydrocarbon wealth. The future good governance of the Arctic depends to a large degree on the will of states to act cooperatively externally as well as their ability to act responsibly domestically. There are a number of outstanding sovereignty disputes in the Arctic. Rising economic interest in the Arctic could. as elsewhere in the world—many of which pre-date UNCLOS—and more could occur. if ever. and domestic political decisionmaking.
The EU and regional • 57 . or Bangladesh. The end of the Cold War created the political conditions for the UN Security Council to take a more active stance on internal conflicts but did not stop new civil wars from breaking out. several wars that ended just after the Cold War later relapsed. more than 40 countries have some form of international monitoring. A number of countries will experience high levels of demographic risk. Key Weaknesses Our interlocutors worry that the international system for conflict management and response to failed states has several major weaknesses. Were the current system confronted with state collapse in a country the size of Pakistan. By the end of this period. State fragility seems certain to remain a pressing problem until the population of the poorest countries has stabilized. this system has been continuously deployed.). etc.000 battle deaths—declining 80 percent in that period. EU and other regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. the world’s population is expected to reach eight billion. Such successes as have been recorded by international conflict management mechanisms have been in countries that are small or modest in scale and/or population. UN. UN. Speed. but even NATO has discovered limits on its rapid response capacity in Afghanistan. the risk of state failure will remain high. bilateral. or enforcement presence within their borders. NGO and bilateral humanitarian programs. peacekeeping. Since 1988. The net result of a change in political conditions and of the creation of the conflict management system is that from a peak in 1992. as well as that of coalitions of the willing. Looking ahead toward 2025. Afghanistan’s 28 million and Iraq’s 30 million are among the most populous cases ever attempted. in societies characterized by weak institutions and the destabilizing impact of rapid social change. This system includes UN. Mediation efforts fail roughly three-quarters of the time and peacekeeping efforts roughly half. Ethiopia. there has been a slight uptick in the number of both interstate and internal wars. • Scale. UN.Annex D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for Fragile States? Response to failing and failed states has been a major operational feature of the international conflict management system since the end of the Cold War. with the growth heavily concentrated in the towns and cities of poorer countries. as the proportion of young men in their population creates competition for scarce resources (jobs. and regional mediation. with major civil wars—those defined by more than 1. water. land. and World Bank. At present. Since 2006. NATO. NATO can respond quite quickly to outbreaks of violence. bilateral. Nigeria. the number of civil wars in the world declined steadily to 2006. it would be overwhelmed. however. and NGO financing for reconstruction programs.
Within conflict management systems. Existing systems for responding to organized crime are highly fragmented and designed to integrate with. financial. effective tools for dealing with transboundary features of fragile states. The international community seldom has a coordinated political strategy. cases of real prevention of major internal wars or state collapse processes are few and far between. and reinforce. They are not unheard of. political. if any. there are few. There are also important questions of legitimacy for international actors in the broader Middle East: US and Western actors face greater legitimacy constraints than others. and transnational threat responses in fragile states are in their infancy.organizations such as ECOWAS can deploy small forces rapidly. and economic responses to Lebanon after the Israel-Hizballah war (see below) prevented full-blown collapse of the Lebanese state. meaning that precisely those elements of the international response system that are most capable (in terms of force and speed) are least welcome. Similar problems bedevil post-conflict recovery. • Regional Gaps. International judicial. The bulk of international conflict management has been in Africa. Transnational Threats. Many experts believe that conversely—and unfortunately—Western policy has often contributed to the hollowing out of institutions in fragile states. Post-crisis Development and Risk. Statistically. short term. and Europe. they also exhibit a continued high risk of relapse. in Kenya. however: arguably the international peacekeeping. where a coalition of donors has placed governance at the heart of their joint strategy for countries. police. Prevention. Asia. Development agencies have had little demonstrable success in helping strengthen institutions in states that may be at risk of failure in the future. developed or semi-developed ministry of interior/justice/police systems. with Pakistan an example of a country where billion of dollars of support has often yielded counterproductive results. There is little in the toolkit of international systems designed to respond to the particular features and particular challenges of conflict and internal crisis in the broader Middle East. Kofi Annan led an integrated mediation effort that halted a spiral of escalating violence and established a transitional power-sharing government. Most countries that have experienced internal conflict in the post-Cold War system remain stuck in a cycle of low growth/weak capacity. Development agencies are particularly ill-equipped to understand and respond to the powerful political incentives that lead elites to resist reform. Financing systems for post-conflict recovery is slow. recent preventive efforts by ECOWAS with UN support in Guinea halted a spiral of escalation. and security responses to the erosion of governance or manifest signs of state failure are episodic at best. such as transnational criminal networks or penetration by terrorist organizations. The UN normally deploys very slowly indeed: the time between mandate and deployment is up to nine months. Early political. The Institutional Challenge. although fresh approaches have been tried in countries such as Nigeria. • • • • 58 . and rigid in terms of how it interacts with fractious governments.
In Haiti. rising powers currently seem largely aligned with broad international patterns of UN-led containment and reconstruction. However. political support to UN and regional operations. for example. New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. geography matters. and Pakistan—specific regional and geostrategic concerns dominate.Rising Powers and Fragile States A critical determinant of future capacity to respond to the challenge of state fragility and failure will be the strategy pursued by rising powers as they play an increasingly global role and potentially see growing threats to their economic and security interests from state failure. when it comes to strategically significant countries (most of which happen to be highly populous)—such as North Korea. which we have cited in the main text and this annex. Although they resist measures that have the effect of extending the scope and timing of international intervention. they have— unsurprisingly—identified strong interests in being heavily involved in both the political management of fragility and recovery. They are also active investors. Brazil is leading international peacekeeping efforts. and South African approaches to fragile states. and in being commercially engaged in the recovery. they have divergent interests that preclude cooperation on political and economic reconstruction and undermine potential management efforts. meanwhile. prepared to tolerate high levels of operational risk. China is using a combination of unfettered aid and commercial investment to take a major position in mineral and energy sectors. by providing peacekeepers. In more distant fragile states. India is providing large quantities of reconstruction aid linked to local governance reform. Second. and with their feet) in support of UN peacekeeping operations—including operations with complex. Indian. the perceived importance of a country has a paradoxical impact on the willingness of rising powers to engage with the international community in supporting it. by contrast. they vote (both in formal chambers. Chinese. However. and are increasingly forceful competitors for commercial and national 3 The Managing Global Instability Project—an initiative of the Brookings Institution. In the Pacific Rim. and Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation— is conducting a series of case studies of Russian. In Afghanistan.3 Three factors are of particular relevance in shaping the approach of rising powers to fragile states. and (to a lesser degree) aid and civilian support. Some early findings have emerged from this work. Nigeria. 59 . There is a fundamental difference in emerging power roles in fragile states in their immediate neighborhood and those further afield. in a similar political and operational role to that played by South Africa in Burundi. First. In such cases. In the former. rising powers are contributing to international conflict management systems. aiming to build support among key Afghan constituencies in the east of the country as part of its strategy for countering Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. rising powers tend to cooperate to avoid total collapse (which would be detrimental to the interests of regional powers and emerging investors). For weak or failing states that are not of high strategic significance. multi-faceted mandates designed to promote democratic governance and market reform. Practices differ widely.
The eventual verdict on these interventions (eventual success after significant changes of strategy vs. In Sudan. with China now Africa’s second largest trading partner (after the United States) and Brazil seeing its imports from Africa rise more than sixfold between 2000 and 2008. especially in the Amazon. Brazil has accepted the internationalization of Haiti but is wary of this trend being repeated elsewhere in Latin America. is worried by the consequences of an influx of refugees from North Korea.energy purposes. even if funded by governments or sovereign wealth funds. In part. this is rooted in their own histories (India’s experience in Sri Lanka. but to a greater extent. India accepted a UN role in Nepal but has ensured that this role is tightly constrained. Brazil is worried by the nexus of criminal interests and ungoverned spaces on its borders. as yet. for example. there are deep-seated concerns within emerging powers about the consequences of the proactive management of state fragility. Even commercial strategies are much less coherent than is commonly perceived. rising powers tend to be highly sensitive to the adverse and unintended consequences of Western-led interventions in countries where they have a strategic interest. The potential conflict between extractive commercial practices and more benign peacekeeping and reconstruction assistance is not. they are influenced by the failure of Western-led attempts to build stable states in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. failure and withdrawal) will have far-reaching impacts on how proactive emerging powers will be when faced by future calls for intervention. Yet fears of internationalization are balanced by fears of the consequences of failure. India remains conscious of potential links between Nepali and Indian Maoists (although evidence for these links is limited). Investors are often from the private sector. They are wary of the internationalization of conflicts in their neighborhood. This reflects a lack of integrated government within the rising powers. a major part of the policy debate within or among emerging powers. China. They tend to be skeptical about their own capacity to engage in large-scale interventions and wary of the political costs of unilateral action. There is limited contact between personnel involved in peace operations and those leading on trade and investment. Third. for example. 13 of the 15 largest companies are Chinese. Perhaps most importantly. 60 . China’s in Vietnam).
capable of arousing an intense political reaction that could lead to friction between ethnic groups. and even be placed into reverse. At worst. In 1960.9 percent in 1990 and 2000. international cooperation on migration has generally been weak. though the demand to migrate almost certainly will remain high. with some regions and countries experiencing a sharp increase in migration. It touches the lives of people more directly than any other facet of globalization. There is no guarantee that the international community will continue to manage current levels of migration. At best. the increase in the proportion of migrants in the world’s population has been modest. does not reveal important patterns. by definition.Annex E: Migration in the Age of Uncertainty International migration poses unique challenges to the global system. before climbing to 2. Migration is. migration could be driven primarily by economic failure. Countries with high rates of outward migration tend to have little international leverage to promote stronger standards of global governance. but those left behind in societies that risk losing skills at an unsustainable rate.1 percent in 2010. In the past. a transnational phenomenon. transforming societies over many generations. Current Migration Trends The number of migrants has been accelerating over the latter half of the 20th century.5 percent of the population of developed countries. with gradual increases until the 1980s. as the world again sees the abrupt and involuntary flows of people that were characteristic of some of the darkest times in the 20th century. there were 214 million international migrants in 2010. more than one in ten of those living in a developed country were born elsewhere. The global picture. Today. a substantial increase from 50 years earlier. (These figures may be an underestimate because they do not account for “irregular migrants” who enter or remain in a country in breach of that country’s laws. According to UN figures. affecting not just those who move from a country. emerge as a destabilizing factor before or after conflict within and between nations. migrants represented 3. however. 61 . both in absolute and relative terms.) Sixty percent of today’s migrants live in developed countries. migration could help harmonize the different economic and demographic conditions that will be experienced by countries as the world moves toward its peak population. At a global level. 40 percent in the developing world. This fell slightly in the 1970s and 1980s. The right to regulate borders is regarded by governments as a key component of their national sovereignty. Movements of people across national borders have a profound economic impact on both source and destination countries. and reaching 3. Migration is a contentious issue. not success. when there were just 75 million migrants. and those who live in cultures that will be substantially reshaped by migration. Two and a half percent of the world’s people were migrants in 1960. at which point there was marked acceleration.
Nine have gained more than a million immigrants in just ten years. reflecting the growing importance of rising powers as receivers of migrants. and from 12. with Spain seeing its migrant population increase by 26. the Hispanic population would exceed 20 percent of the total by 2025 and 30 percent by 2050.3 percent of the population in 1960. demonstrating the long-term influence of migration on receiving countries and the role played by second. Spain (4. At the country level. Russia and Ukraine feature on the list. as well as Saudi Arabia and India. led by the United States. following the breakup of the Soviet Union.2 percent in 2010 for the former.5 percent in 2010).3 million) have only recently emerged as significant receiving countries. mainly from Mexico. with Canada also featuring in the top ten. the United States’ Hispanic population would grow by 25 million by 2050.8 percent for the latter). making up more than 20 percent of the population.3 percent of Europeans currently live outside their country of origin.6 percent to 16.Regionally. and Latin America have all seen a falling proportion of migrants as they have experienced rapid population growth. Under one projection. the United Kingdom. but as it is one of only nine countries to provide no data on migration to the United Nations. by which time it would have grown by over 80 million. some countries have experienced sizeable increases in their total number of immigrants. According to some experts. Northern America and Oceania have seen both population growth and a substantial increase in relative numbers of migrants (from 6. Ten countries host over half of the world’s migrants. this figure can only be regarded as a very rough estimate.6 million) and Italy (2. which has seen eight million additional migrants.3 million) and Jordan (1 million) have seen the influx of large numbers of refugees from Iraq.000 migrants.4 percent annually over the last decade. Africa. It is believed to host only around 600. a trend strengthened by fertility rates that are projected to stay above replacement levels (unlike any other racial or 62 . namely Germany. Europe has four countries on the list. Europe has seen its population increase only slightly. China is an outlier. France. The European Union represents an important case study.and third-generation immigrants. Even if no further migration occurred.4 percent in 1960 to 14. The US Census Bureau’s national projections illustrate the cumulative impact that these flows will have on US demography over the next 40 years. the dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states is being eroded. One in five lives in the United States. Asia. but it experienced a net increase of nearly a million refugees between 2005 and 2010. patterns of migration are growing more diverse. but has experienced a dramatic change in its relative share of migrants (2. with net migration averaging above one million per year in the period 2000-2010. 9. and Spain. Some 2. American Hispanics will play a crucial role in keeping the country young. there are also significant disparities. In recent years. The United States is the world’s leading migrant-receiving country. as a region that has allowed free movement of people since April 2004. Pakistan’s total migrant stock stayed steady over the decade. Syria (1. Most countries experience both emigration and immigration while some countries have taken on an important role as transit zones for migrants.
2 percent between 2000 and 2010.1 percent) considerably above this level. Sub-Saharan Africa (12.ethnic group). Moldova (31. Conversely.6 percent). the emigration of highly skilled individuals represents a potentially serious loss for poor countries. Mexico. Experts’ data show 60 percent of developing countries are above the 10 percent threshold. Small countries are especially vulnerable.9 percent). with net outward migration running at 5 percent of the population in both the 1980s and the 2000s. in contrast. and the Caribbean (42. remittances are estimated to have fallen slightly in 2009 as a result of the economic crisis. with harmful effects increasing above a 15 percent threshold. though the fall has been eased by a “remittance flow boom” to East Asia and the Pacific.4 percent of skilled citizens 63 . through remittances and other effects such as migrants returning with enhanced skills and the creation of business and trade networks. This is a part of a pattern that sees refugees concentrated in poorer parts of the world. While the total number of refugees has fallen somewhat (and significantly so. Lebanon. and Zambia more than 50 percent of migrants have refugee status. of which three quarters went to developing countries.9 percent). The Philippines is also noteworthy in that its government has pursued a deliberate policy of exporting labor. with small island developing states seeing 42.000 migrants a year in the 1980s but has seen an average of 265.8 percent) all show worrying levels of brain drain. It gained nearly 300. while in Chad. to South Africa and other neighboring countries. It gained migrants in the 1980s. Three countries/areas have more than a million refugees (Jordan. Refugee flows are a direct consequence of levels of conflict or other serious social breakdowns. helping to create a “culture of migration” with around 10 percent of its population living overseas.4 percent) and Lebanon (25.3 percent of its population in the 1990s and a further 11. relative to an increasing population). and is likely to be an older society than its neighbor sometime shortly after 2035. The LDC bloc (12. After many years of sustained increases. Some experts believe the optimal level of skilled worker emigration at 5-10 percent. Migration is associated with considerable flows of remittances to countries of origin. Experts argue that skilled migration offers even poor countries some gains when at a modest level. with 85 percent of the world’s refugees in less developed countries.000 people a year leave over the subsequent 20 years. Occupied Palestinian Territory. Mexico has seen two significant waves of migration. Central America (16. In 2008. Among middle income countries with the highest rates of emigration over the past decade. the burden on some countries remains considerable. Most of Zimbabwe’s migrants have moved only short distances. these were estimated at over $600 billion.8 percent of the GDP of lower income countries in 2008. shows rapid fluctuations in its net migration. Zimbabwe is another country that shows how rapidly migration outflows can accelerate. meanwhile. A large upward trend in refugee numbers during the second half of the Cold War was followed by steady decline as international peacekeeping and mediation helped bring a large number of civil wars to an end. and Syria). Pakistan. Iraq. will age rapidly. Tanzania. with countries such as Tajikistan (49.9 percent). Remittances accounted for 5. but lost 4. more than half of whom are temporary workers.
Kenya. Nine countries with a population over five million (Haiti.” Predictions are further complicated by a lack of in-depth research and the poor quality of much of the available data. vulnerability to discrimination. Somalia. while their quality of life may suffer (separation from family and friends. Future Migration Trends According to the OECD. The primary “pull” factor creating demand for migrants is the need for labor in receiving countries. the following conclusions can be drawn about the future evolution of migration and its likely impact on the global order: Migration has a profound impact on economies and societies. can help encourage and sustain migration. a great deal of attention is paid to the free movement of goods. especially for those traveling illegally. “it is hard. powerful forces—economic. In contrast. Social networks. Mozambique. Future Migration Challenges Looking forward. services. and El Salvador) experience levels of skilled migration that exceed 30 percent. social. Laos. • • The motivation to migrate can be broken into two “push” factors: the desire to find opportunities overseas on the one hand and a response to risk at home on the other. Expected benefits must therefore be sufficiently high for sustained migratory flows to occur from one country to another. and capital. the challenges of managing migration will continue to have a significant impact on prospects for international cooperation. Angola. technological. but the exact nature of this influence is hard to predict.). where average costs have been estimated as ranging from US$200 for migration within Africa to US$26. Uganda. demographic. which link sending and receiving countries through connections between migrants and their countries origin. geopolitical. • • Economic drivers have a powerful impact on both origin and destination countries. the free movement of people has often been neglected. relative poverty in their new country. with Haiti’s brain drain running at an astonishing 83. Sudden movements of people may also 64 . with the migrant’s quest for opportunity largely driven by wealth disparities. if not impossible to forecast the scale and direction of future migration…World migration patterns in the next 20 years or so will be shaped by many different. In discussions of globalization. Within the constraints of this considerable uncertainty. etc. creating a series of interlocking incentives for migration. Migrants face uncertainty about the rewards that await them. and political drivers have a transnational impact. Ghana. Migration is costly.000 for migration from Asia to the Americas.6 percent.emigrate. and environmental—all of which carry within them significant levels of uncertainty. The experience of Southern European countries and Ireland during the 20th century suggests that a wage differential of 30-40 percent is needed to create a widespread incentive to emigrate. Running counter to this are policy measures that inhibit the free movement of people across borders. Economic.
Countries without a tradition of migration (Spain. Some countries already face an unsustainable loss of highly skilled workers. Aging societies need labor. or both. but which have seen substantial recent flows must respond to increased diversity. The peripheral role played by migration in the post-World War II settlement (barring the creation of new norms for managing refugees) is a reflection of the issue’s controversial nature. proportion of migrants will continue to be “irregular. increased competition for talent could exacerbate this trend. as has been seen in a number of fragile states and.” a status that increases vulnerability in states that have weak institutions and inadequate human rights provision. or are ineffective. creates an upsurge in conflict. Poorer countries. putting pressure on neighboring states that may also lack resilience and be destabilized by these flows. • Migration will prove highly challenging to manage. with family. leading to potential problems as they become more diverse societies. meanwhile. or simply entrenches global economic inequality. while national elites have adopted policies that often lack popular support. regionally. as a given “stock” of migrants transforms a society across many generations. and of the threat it poses to what many see as the central prerogatives of the nation state. or global order. Trade. while low-income countries are unlikely to be able to offer jobs to their baby boomers as they seek jobs in growing numbers. regional. has been seen as a “safer” area for international cooperation. Italy). despite its essentially international nature. Migration’s impact is cumulative. and friends having strong incentives to follow existing migrants. Income disparities will remain high enough to maintain the attractiveness of migration for a significant section of the global population. and possibly growing. Even an era of economic turbulence and resource shocks could lead to new migratory flows if it weakens vulnerable states. Their economic power has the potential to outstrip their institutional strength. Social networks will make it hard to limit migratory flows. The critical axis will be between migration and social cohesion. Governance systems for dealing with refugees may be stretched to the point of a breakdown. Emerging markets will become significant targets for migration even as they face severe residual development challenges at home.be a symptom of a breakdown in national. Governments have taken a predominantly national approach to the issue. Many key challenges will be in weaker states. in contrast. neighbors. Demand for migration is unlikely to abate. • Migration’s significance has inhibited the policy attention paid to the issue. Can origin countries manage outwards flows to contain levels of youth unemployment and underemployment while retaining 65 . Even the United States will confront issues raised by running on two very different demographic tracks (though the potential rewards will be substantial if the United States can use its institutional strength to release a “demographic dividend” from ethnic groups with a youthful age profile). A significant. Migrants themselves will generally face higher levels of risk than native populations and will be especially vulnerable at times of economic underperformance and/or political turmoil. in Europe during the first half of the 20th century and on the Indian subcontinent after independence. Risk-avoiding migrants will tend to move only short distances. have little experience in effectively managing major outflows of migration (with exceptions such as the Philippines). rather than its lack of importance.
there are certain to be at least some refugee flows. resulting from state failure. The rise of extremist political movements and campaigns of systematic persecution of migrant communities will have the potential to seriously destabilize regional and global cooperation and even to create demand for intervention from the international community. Palestinians. History suggests that the breakup of any large state will be a moment of particular danger. will migration regimes support the relatively free movement of people? Or will the primary focus be on sealing borders? • Despite future demand for migration. 66 . conflict along ethnic faultlines will remain. the ongoing movement of people cannot be treated as a given. In the worst case. and citizens of various Sub-Saharan African nations at times of political tension).sufficient skilled workers to build strong economies and societies? Or will migration be dominated by abrupt and chaotic movements. with ethnic identities likely to strengthen should this prove to be a turbulent period for globalization. while transnational migrant networks will link conflicts and facilitate criminal flows across borders. a breakdown in migration is possible. however. Even if the period to 2025 is relatively peaceful. while natural disasters will also continue to displace people over borders. A next generation terrorist movement may make a sustained attempt to “break” multiethnic societies. The potential for political. conflict. Tunisians. all of which are themselves exacerbated by brain drain? Will destination countries successfully integrate new arrivals. The politicization of migration. Flows of forced migration are unlikely to be one way. respond to the needs of secondand third-generation immigrants. and a lack of resilience in the face of natural disasters. also makes it highly likely that there will be at least some episodes of expulsion of migrant communities. or actual. Even in the EU—the region that has the most liberal migration regime—a reversal is possible. with some countries following the model of Libya (which has expelled Egyptians. and maintain popular support for diversity? Internationally.
It requires national compliance. Governments will need unprecedented capacity to reach out beyond other governments. The authority has been used sparingly. The network.Annex F: Threats from Biotechnology Biological Governance Currently. which brings together 140 institutions to support countries experiencing a public health emergency. Mobility will also increase. WHO is also empowered to investigate media and citizen reports of public health emergencies. the international governance regime has the following primary components: • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975). with states obliged to develop minimum public health capabilities and to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of public health events within their borders that meet agreed criteria. GOARN is the “early warning system” for outbreaks. 67 . public health risks. and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. produce. provides an example of the kind of distributed systems that are likely to prove effective. while 16 have signed but not ratified it. protect against. while the current expert review of the response to pandemic flu provides some measure of independent external scrutiny. many of whom will not be amenable to traditional regulation. Under the convention. or toxins …. control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with. the potential for dual use of biotechnology will make the task of regulating and controlling existing and new developments an exceptionally complex one. but the 2005 upgrade also gave WHO the ability to pre-emptively assess the quality of national mechanisms for compliance with GOARN reporting standards. states commit “never in any circumstances to develop. Meanwhile. The Global Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN). The International Health Regulations (2005). General Assembly Resolution 100. while making it more likely that a new disease will break out before it can be contained.” Twenty-three states have not signed the convention. enabling them to work with a plethora of private actors. The regulations aim “to prevent. public health challenges will intensify with a billion additional people expected to live in towns and cities by 2025.” The regulations represent a significant intrusion on state sovereignty. and restricted to. • • • Few observers. would argue that the system is fit for the challenges that the world will face in a “biological century. Buried in an otherwise obscure General Assemby Resolution is the authority for the Secretary-General to investigate any suspicious event that could involve a biological weapon. Levels of monitoring and enforcement of compliance lie somewhere between weak and non-existent. enabling diseases to spread further and faster. however. stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents.” In developing countries.
Threats are perceived differently by different governments. Health has also received sustained attention from a new breed of foundations. If a major outbreak were to occur in a middle income or lower middle income state. Rising powers expect their future comparative advantage to lie in a sector in which there are relatively few entrenched incumbents. although the authority exists for the UN Secretary-General to investigate suspected biological incidents. An effort to propose basic reporting functions from the WHO to the UNSC was rejected by the Chinese in 2005. government response capabilities probably would be overwhelmed before they could contain the spread of affected people to international transport hubs. the UN has to organize the inspection capacity from scratch from labs and governments. while actors on the margins—who pose the greatest threat— are ungoverned. for example. such the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization. industry. and public-private partnerships. are not effectively aligned to threats. There is as yet no forum for creating the consensus that is needed across the scientific community. he has no standing capacity to do so. and governments on measures needed to diminish the risks posed by an increasingly broadly distributed biological capacity. and are likely to regard them as protectionist measures that restrain their freedom to operate. When called upon to investigate a biological event (as in Iraq). was to be affected by a naturally occurring. in many cases.” Public health systems are weakest in the places they are most needed. at least initially. This is a pressing problem for biosecurity which is a “weakest link” public good—the whole is only as safe as the weakest individual effort. nor are even the basic information systems in place to link WHO/GOARN reporting to potential response mechanisms like the UN Security Council or NATO. Countries with traditional views of their sovereignty will often be resistant to international cooperation (as China was. not concerned enough to implement simple and extremely cheap public health measures). Rich countries are worried about potential threats—new diseases or the hostile use of biological agents. in particular the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation with its emphasis on funding innovation. 68 . or deliberate release of a deadly toxin. its ability to control population flow to its neighbors and beyond would be nearly nonexistent. The situation in public health is somewhat more encouraging. finally. accidental. with India and China investing heavily in biotechnologies and Brazil in biofuels. while investment in health research is extremely poorly matched to the global burden of disease. Response mechanisms for a large-scale outbreak of a deadly infectious disease are not in place beyond the highly developed West. The WHO is clearly a more effective actor than it was before Gro Brundtland took over in 1998. producing little in the way of rapid response capacity. Resources. There are no international contingency plans for such an occurrence. If a fragile state that hosted a large refugee population. Regulatory structures are most onerous for reputable organizations in the public sector in rich countries. Researchers have found that “the majority of our scientific resources [are] focused on places from where the next important emerging pathogen is least likely to originate. over SARS). Similarly. Efforts to forge standing links between the Secretary-General’s office and labs have foundered. The poorest countries are most concerned about the current impact of infectious diseases (though.
000 liters of the latter). Rapidly falling costs will bring biotechnology within reach of a hacker community. while a growing number of reputable laboratories will “leak” expertise and. • • 69 . potentially making rapid attribution of responsibility impossible. materials. The use of bioweapons is also easy to conceal. It is easy to imagine a state responding in a way that fails to meet long-term strategic goals. The Risk of a Counterproductive Reaction to a Biological Strike is High.Between now and 2025.000 liters of the former in the 1990s and 18. with the ability to reengineer existing life forms to have offensive capacity already a growing threat. Existing biological agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxin already pose an extremely serious threat (Iraq was believed to have 8. experts expect: • Levels of Risk to Increase. potentially. A biological attack has a psychological impact that outstrips its lethality. The development of new agents will increase the threat. while repeat attacks are likely as a bio-capable attacker probably would possess a substantial stockpile. The Risk to Become More Distributed. placing democratic governments under severe pressure to respond forcefully. while a counterstrike against the wrong target is a real (and disastrous) possibility.
NIC 2010-08 September 2010 .