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Vlastos, Socrates on Acrasia

Vlastos, Socrates on Acrasia

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Classical Association of Canada

Socrates on Acrasia Author(s): Gregory Vlastos Source: Phoenix, Vol. 23, No. 1, Studies Presented to G. M. A. Grube on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (Spring, 1969), pp. 71-88 Published by: Classical Association of Canada Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1086569 . Accessed: 04/06/2011 11:08
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Vol. 'Listed in the bibliography below.3 Though they have not altered my basic interpretation of the Socratic position. Stocks. Bambrough. But I have no great confidence that if I had then dealt with the topic in a more leisurely and thorough way I would have managed to avoid the blemishes of that earlier treatment. and the books by Crombie. and in the books by Grube.2 From criticisms of my own views. For I would not have had the benefit of the discussions that were to follow. I. There are three things here which call for clarification. they have led me to understand it more clearly and at a deeper level. and then go on to another matter which also calls for consideration. Gallop. George Grube. Hackforth. With this help I have made a fresh study of the main text in which the Socratic thesis is advanced and defended: Protagoras 352A358D. 351B ff.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA GREGORY VLASTOS I DEALT WITH THIS TOPIC briefly twelve years ago in an introduction to the Protagoras. and from new ideas that have appeared in this literature I have learned more than I could possibly acknowledge in detail. More was to be contributed on this topic by English-speaking scholars in the following nine years than had appeared in the preceding forty. whose own interpretation of the argument in Prot. The medium tempted me to simplifications which I have since had occasion to regret. Gulley.l designed for the use of beginners in philosophy. and Walsh. I must also acknowledge my great debt to Professor David Gallop. since 1956 in the papers by Allen. and Taylor. not only for his excellent critique of my previous views in his published paper but also for detailed comments on an earlier draft of the present paper which have helped me to make some useful revisions. 71 PHOENIX. 'The main contributions by English-speaking scholars in the preceding period are in the papers by Grube. Santas and to correspondence with him. . I shall speak of these briefly. Santas. 'My greatest debt is to the two papers by Professor G. and Sullivan. 23 (1969) 1. whose results I now wish to present. before proceeding in the next Section to analyse the arguments Socrates puts up in defence of his thesis: It is a pleasure to offer this paper to my esteemed friend. has both clarified my understanding of it and stimulated me to keep working on it over the years. Shorey. For bibliographical references here and hereafter see the works listed at the end of the article under the author's name. nothing will overpower him so that he will act otherwise than as knowledge commands" (352c). THE SOCRATIC THESIS It is announced as follows in the opening paragraph of our passage: "If a man knows good and evil.

355B 2. pain. [358B. Then no one intentionally goes after evil. 429c).no one will do something if he knows (eI6hCs)or believes (ol6ouEvos) that a better one is open to him. is a "powerful. doctrine. cf. gNo such thing. . i. is said in the text. And note Aristotle's stress on the role of knowledge in the Socratic doctrine of acrasia (N.. 430B. good a "lord" (tyeuLcv--cf. it seems. it is used (96E-97c) to refute the Socratic thesis that "virtue is knowledge" which had been adopted provisionally (as a "hypothesis") at 89A-c. and commanding thing.7 Socrates' only interest in true opinion ungrounded in knowledge is polemical: he brings it up only when attacking its master-manipulator.c).c Socrates is not advancing a new thesis but merely summing up what he thinks (with the consent of the company) has been proved in the foregoing argument (352A-357E). to go after what one thinks to be evil instead of good. 1144b 28-30). or what he believes to be evil. 31-34 and 1147b 14-17) and of moral virtue (N. anywhere else in the early dialogues). But it can be reasonably inferred from the fact that in the above citation from 358B.c] But the original statement above and all of its subsequent restatements throughout the debate speak only of the power of knowledge-not of belief as well. of course. No one would seriously suggest that Socrates would have wished to say the same thing about belief ungrounded in knowledge. This would ignore the fatal disanalogy between belief and knowledge which . not Socratic. 8Gorg. it might look as though the thesis is meant to cover also actions which go contrary to what we believe to be evil (or less good than others open to us at the time). 360D.E. we would 358D 3. What it probably means is that we cannot act contrary to what we believe when we do have knowledge. .454D. who takes a different view (92: he understands Socrates to mean that either knowledge or belief will do). 'eAXw."6 (2) From a statement that comes later. says Socrates. 352B 4) of action as is knowledge (97A.c could scarcely have been meant to suggest that in the absence of knowledge true opinion would do as well for the purposes of Socrates' thesis. B) is a break with Socratic doctrine (fully as much as is the theory that knowledge is recollection). 358D 2. .e." not to be "dragged about like a slave" by pleasure. In all of the early dialogues moral virtue is construed in terms of knowledge. lordly.) to be an exposition of Platonic. 6EKCV. I"YE6LOVLKOV. Perhaps he thinks (though he does not say so) that a parallel argument for a power-ofbelief thesis could be extrapolated from the one for the power-of-knowledge thesis in our passage. Gulley.72 PHOENIX (1) The only actions the thesis has in view are those the agent "wants" to do4 or "chooses"5 to do or does "intentionally. 358c7.9 If it did mean more than this. Knowledge. for that matter.E.8 So the citation from 358B. I should explain that I consider the second part of the Meno (80B 5 ff. salpfouat. it is not in human nature. the sophist. That right opinion is as Prot. eTrLriju in Laches 194E-195A) of what is and is not to be feared with the Platonic as "the power and unfailing conservation of true and lawful belief about things which are and are not to be feared" (Resp. . even if we do not know them to be such: . does not explain how he squares it with the fact that there is no argument for a power-ofbelief thesis in our passage (or. and passion (352B... 1145b 21-27. 7Compare the Socratic definition of courage as knowledge (aofLa in Prot. after the argument is completed.

and could shift. it would not have the requisite stability.where "the power of appearance" is contrasted with that of the "measuring art" (356D 4 ff." and their comparative and superlative forms. at the very next moment. if that belief was not groundedin knowledge then.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 73 not know what weight to attach to the claim. without any alternative expressions or any auxiliary linguistic devices to mark off the difference. to the contrary belief that Y is better than X after all. in which case one could have the juicy morsel with an easy conscience. "The Socratic procedurein this passage invites comparisonwith the Bayesian model . particularized in concrete situations as viable alternatives between which the agent has to choose. are used in the debate to express both first-order and second-order valuations. when he had become convinced that for most people virtue could not be a matter of knowledge. When Socrates says that the man who knows "good" will never be "overpowered" so as to choose "evil" instead. "It is supposed to be comparableto operations we performin determining the magnitude of the spatial dimensions and weights of physical objects (356A8-B 3." the reversals (356D4-6) of mind to which we are prey so long as we have nothing but the formerto guide us and bring us serene stability (356E 1-2) instead. in principle. since all Socrates attempts to prove in the argument he has just concluded is that we cannot act contrary to our knowledge of good. since KQaI KaK& dl he is thinking throughout of the particular goods and evils the agent has to weigh in reaching a consideredchoice. E 2. (Compare the way Plato tackles this problem in Resp. so that. according to Socrates. and (c) pronounce the action "good" or "evil" depending on which of the two aggregates is the larger. in their case. preceding note). Saying that an action is good or bad is a second-order value-judgment which is. but only of right belief (cf." the "ups and downs. one would be able to withstand Y (which could be a very juicy morsel indeed) only if one were able to hang on to that belief for dear life. we would have to treat it as dogma unsupported by argument. c 8-D 3). rT&yac& here (352c 5) and frequently thereafter in the course of the debate. in the examples in this passage) mixed bags of "goods" and "evils" of another sort: they are complexes of components to which first-order value assignments have already been made. he is speaking of the goodness or badness of courses of action. a computation:11 we are supposed to (a) itemize the goods we would gain and the evils we would suffer both now and in the future by choosing a given action.10 These are good or bad on the whole or all things considered. E 8-357A 1) because it delivers us from the "wander- ings. 412E-413c and 429c-430B.12 is implied by what is said in 356D-357A.) or "knowledge" (357A 1): the latter "saves our life" (356D 3. since for him virtue was always assuredof a rock-likebase in knowledge. since they are generally (invariably. (3) A terminological point: "good" and "evil. self-control would depend on the firmness of extra-cognitive supports of tenacity of belief-a problem which never botheredSocrates. (b) assign numbers to the values in each of the two categories. To have belief without knowledge would be to live in "the power of appearance"and hence to lack that stability of conviction so essential for moral selfcontrol: If at a given moment one believed that X is better than Y.) l?This would be a sufficientreason for his use of the articulate neuter plural.

and the Gorgias. He does assume. the Crito. his willingness to waive on this occasion his usual insistence that the goods of the soul be given the highest of priorities and ranked far ahead of physical pleasure. or safety. the superiority of the things of the spirit. both make the fundamental assumption that in principle first-order valuations can be represented by numbers and second-order ones by the end-results of algebraic additions. "the multitude.'4 Now why should Socrates pitch his examples so low in this debate? The most likely explanation is that he wants to meet his adversaries on their own level of first-order preference-rankings. and submitting to medication and surgery. the affinity of the two models is unmistakable. more generally.g.) shows that he has no inkling of the difference between a "ratio scale" and an "interval scale" of measurement (for a lucid explanation see Rapoport 24-28). In the examples the higher goods are systematically ignored. in the Apology. health. dieting. Rapoport 30 if. Only the following are mentioned as actions known to be good: taking physical exercise. ch. . comfort. These people are the general mass. it is not likely that he would recognize as "knowledge" of good and evil the result of a computation which included among the first-level items a sadist's glee at another's pain or a maniac's preference for the destruction of the universe to the scratching of his finger.. e. living within one's income. and even in the Protagoras itself in the latter part of the protreptic dialogue with young Hippocrates (313A-314B).74 PHOENIX Now for a substantive point which is only implicit in the discussions. and the model itself is archaic. taking no account of risk as such in contradistinction to utility or desirability and thus being unable to do justice to decisions under conditions of risk. 1) in spite of glaring differences: Socrates' description of the measurement of pleasures and pains by analogy with that of physical lengths and weights (356A 8 ff. in this discussion. e." He cannot count on them to have discovered. 3. Ch. Socrates talks in a way which suggests that he is unaware of the difficulties in the way of measurement of subjective items like pleasures and pains-difficulties which modern decision theory seeks to surmount by resorting to the notion of subjective probability to give meaning to the assignment of cardinal values to goods and evils (see Jeffrey.). Socrates' conception of his model of deliberation is unsophisticated. what surprises one in this passage is the high degree of moral permissiveness Socrates seems to display. but is crucial for my interpretation of the passage: Socrates puts no restrictions on what we are to count as good and evil in our first-order valuations. not even a hint. But once one has allowed for such tacit exclusions.. accepting military service. In spite of these and other differences. His only explicit requirement is that we are to aggregate them rationally and thereby "measure" the value of the actions between which we choose. the former of which could have no valid application to the ordering of pleasures and pains.'3 Of this moral gradient there is not a word.g. 1As. as he has. of course. Jeffrey. But things like of deliberation in present-day decision theory (see. 1353c-354B. that our first-order valuations will not be perverse or mad.

And he is content to work with these throughout this debate.2). but because of some benefit they get from one another" and his definition of philos "one who wishes and does good [to his philos] . 218E-219A) the sake of utility do not love each other for themselves. 1156b 9-10 and 1168b 2-3. anglicizing the spelling accordingly. in the arguments against Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias. for the sake of his philos. Pericles is even more explicit in Thucydides: the common weal on which the Athenian citizen's personal safety and welfare depends (2. not himself. None of the terms by which the Greek word has been translated into English are exact equivalents: "incontinence" has sexual connotations which are singularly inappropriate in notable instances of acrasia (e. 354s 4-a realistic. Indeed to say he is "content" to do this would be to understate the point. . has a self-interested motivation: cf. on the other hand. whom it will really benefit. or a soldier's bolting in the face of danger). .2) (the very same point rubbed in by Cleon for a different purpose. "those who love each other for 215D. suspecting it will be others.2-4) involves the maintenance of rvpavvls &pX' over other states (2. from its lowest to its highest ranges. represents the dictates of enlightened self-interest.'8 For this he would have been quite prepared to argue-on this as on any other occasion. 1156a 10-12. is absolutely sure that all morality. How then. accepting the conventional judgment of it with an undertone of doubt tinged with resentment. if unpleasant.63. . "What is called tX6rptov a'yae6v by Thrasymachus in Resp. but neither "will" nor "moral" answers to anything strictly connoted by &Kpaala. with Aristotle.60. "Weakness of will" or "moral weakness" are somewhat better. 343c. He is eager to do it. but even love or friendship.g. He finds this in the hedonistic premise he foists on the "multitude" in this discussion. e. Achilles' failure to control his anger. charac"6KaL terization of the average Athenian's motivation when shouldering civic obligations as burdensome as hoplite service. could he have hoped to block off counter-examples which he himself would consider spurious-cases in which our supposed knowledge of the good we betray has no grounding in our own unconstrained.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 75 health. D. and for a good reason: Most cases of acrasial6 occur when the agent is only half-convinced of the goodness of an action. also Rhet. 7roXewv aorlplpcat KaC aLXXovapxat. and imperial patriotism15 he can be sure will fall within the ambit of their own sincere first-person evaluations. 1361b 36-37 and 1380b 35-1381a 1). sincerely felt. N. 3. "6I use "acrasia" and "acratic" as the English words they have now become for all practical purposes in recent philosophical discussions. convictions about good and evil? Only by resorting to some manoeuvre that would keep the argument on terrain which represents common ground between himself and his present adversaries.E. l"As.'7 Socrates." 1166a 3-5 (cf. "8For Socrates not only morality. the doctrine that philia is for the sake of utility in the Lysis (210c..'9 But had he done so here. To execute this manoeuvre he needs some sort of theoretical cover.37. financial solvency.g. he would have side-tracked the debate. or one who wishes for the existence and life of his philos for that person's sake. in default of such an argument.

one could assert A. his position must be "A.20 we know that Plato used it for this very purpose in the Philebus. not A. let us call this assertion. is the most promising solution to that long-standing puzzle: the fact that Socrates should have based his whole argument on the premise that "good" is logically convertible with "pleasant" and "evil" with "painful. 50).2l and while this is a much later dialogue.22 Just how then does this premise find its way into the debate? To get the clearest possible answer to this question." for the hedonistic position which it epitomizes. xl. but not B. while denying B. D 8-E 1). express radically different views: A tells us that pleasure is good. "Cf. Clearly. Now H is logically equivalent to the conjunction of (A) All pleasure is good and all pain is evil with (B) All good is pleasure and all evil is pain. n. but not that it is the only good. xl-xli of my Introduction (1956). I submit. the one at which "all ought to aim"-a formula which comes very close to that used in the Protagoras in the argument with the "multitude" (354B 7-c 1. taken singly. which says that pain is the only evil. I think. the latter is precisely what is expressed by B. I now see an alternative solution to the problem (see the penultimate paragraph of the next section) which can dispense with that assumption. in order to explain the problem with which one is left if one does grant that Socrates' argument for his thesis in our passage is predicated on a hedonistic premise (I had called attention to the gravity of this problem. it is essential. A and B. would subscribe. Similarly in the case of pain: it is B. to straighten out the logical relations of three distinct propositions which are involved in the discussion: The first is the logical convertibility of "pleasure" with "good" and of "pain" with "evil"." As for the "multitude. then." it looks at the start as though they would not even concede A: they are said 20At this point I am rejecting the view I adopted in 1956 (xli) that the convertibility of the two sets of predicates is only meant to assert "(a) that pleasure is a good (not the only one). ancient and modern. 22In 1956 I had assumed that there had been such a change (without suggesting that there was textual evidence of it). That Socrates himself would hold A is only to be expected.76 PHOENIX This. (b) that whatever is best will in fact be the most pleasant. in that case one would be taking up a very mild and moderate position to which the overwhelming majority of philosophical moralists. And since B is uncongenial to his whole moral outlook23 and since he says nothing in the course of the debate which directly commits him to B. ." 2160A. "H.where it is associated with the view that pleasure is the O6p06aKOT'rOfor all living creatures. neither is there evidence that Plato's use of these terms had changed in the interim." That this is meant to express out-and-out hedonism there is no good reason to doubt. Only if one went so far beyond A as to assert B would one be committing oneself to hedonism.

etc. are they good [in your judgment] because their outcome is pleasure and the cessation or prevention of pain-or because of something else? Or can you say that you call them "good" with an eye to any aim other than pleasure and pain? It is my opinion that they would say: "We don't. 23. Grube (1933) 205). he calls the formula a "formal" commitment to hedonism (21. The same point is hammered in twice over again in the rest of the paragraph. and gets even greater prominence near the start of the next paragraph (354E 8-355A 5). where rT abro. once it is explained to them that the pleasure and pain which present actions yield in the future must also be taken into account. And those [other courses of action]. say. and is badly rattled by this time). However. This is the fact that at the end of this paragraph Protagoras talks as if Socrates' statement in 351E 1-3 were equivalent to the identification of rf m16V Kat &yaO6v is . and cf. F. where Sullivan cites 351c as stating that "good = pleasure simpliciter"). with there being umpteen other things as well. Socrates has little trouble in showing that they balk at A because of an elementary misunderstanding: they have been calling actions "pleasant" and "painful" only if they are immediately such."24 And to say this would be. But that Protagoras shouid say this in no way commits Socrates. . and to interrogate our text accordingly. they look to nothing but its yield of pleasure and pain: Is it not evident to you . and some painful things good" (351c 4). they agree at once that those actions which are pleasure-enhancing (or pain-reducing) both now and hereafter are good. in judging a given course of action good or evil. to agree to B. I suspect that Sullivan failed to clarify in his own mind the distinction between propositions A. he would have surely read 351c 4-6 and 351E 1-3 quite differently. G qua G is good. As has been often pointed out. Surely this is false: "pleasure qua pleasure is good" is perfectly consistent with. Sullivan rightly insists on the significance of this point. if they have second thoughts about it. and is not equivalent to H. . B. in these passages Socrates makes it exceedingly clear to the "multitude" that they. 354B-c 2. meant to formulate the proposition under debate). "knowledge qua knowledge is good" or. But when the argument gets under way.. of course.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 77 to call "some pleasant things evil. But he fails to see that only here is the "multitude" shown to be committed to B. for that matter. 24353E-354A 1. . that these [courses of action] are evilfor no other reason (68' obV6v aXXo) than that they eventuate in pains and deprive you of other pleasures? . had he done so. all it reveals is the confusion of Protagoras' immediate state of mind (he has been taking quite a beating in the debate. are bearing the burden of this assumption. He does not realize that the formula that "pleasures qua pleasures are good and pains qua pains are bad" (his excellent paraphrase of 351c 4-6) is only a statement of A. . there is something in the passage which may have misled Sullivan and other excellent commentators who have also read these two texts in the same way (Taylor 258. for a moment earlier (D 1-2) he had given an entirely different . G. and so forth. and those which are pain-enhancing (or pleasure-reducing) in the same way are evil (353c 9-354B 7). so they have no reason for disagreeing with A.-viously "pleasant" and "good" (351E 3-7. Hackforth 41. And the line of questioning Socrates employs to push them as far as A actually pushes them much farther: he extracts from them the admission that. and H. and they alone... he gives them repeatedly the chance to dump it. such that F qua F is good.

The "multitude" is stuck with it. since they are shown to admit both A and B. but even the most upright of men (Socrates himself. SOCRATES' ARGUMENT FOR HIS THESIS Professor Santas (1966. 5-7.78 PHOENIX We can now see how the two parties stand in the debate vis a vis the hedonistic premise. he proceeds to give a new. it may be taken as simply expressing a normal principle of low-grade mora. a few lines earlier (350D-351A). why does he not say so? Because this would open up another big issue. their own explanation of the supposed occurrence would turn out. There is no indication in the text that Socrates agrees with Protagoras' last remark: ignoring it. If Socrates' thesis about the power of knowledge is true. choice. But not Socrates: he does not join them in conceding that actions are to be reckoned good or evil only with a view to pleasure/pain. And if it does work here. it did occur. had made a special point of the non-convertibility of the "All S is P" type of proposition. connection he could only mean that it would be either self-contradictory. side-tracking him from his immediate goal. In these cases the convertibility of "good" with "pleasant" and of "evil" with "pain" need not be challenged. We shall see in the next section that Socrates' argument for the "power of knowledge" is so constructed that one part of it-a logically self-contained part-is not logically tied to the hedonistic premise." least of all the Protagoras of this dialogue who. it should work in these cases. it will not follow that it will work only here. those people of the multitude. There are cases. . on and by "ludicrous" in this investigation. in which not only those low characters. with a fresh start at 352A 1. turn to the debate. to be "ludicrous" (?yeXolov). But if he does reject B. pp. positive." To avoid this diversion he contents himself with vindicating his claim within a limited area: that zone of moral choice in which he too would admit that one can make sound judgments even if one takes nothing but pleasure and pain (immediate and eventual) into account. or else at variance with truths so obvious and so firmly established that statement of the disputed proposition-c-s ra7ea re aE yaOa Eartv aTravra KaL ra avLapa KaKa--a letter-perfect formulation of A. after which Protagoras is virtually cashiered as an active contributor to the discussion. H. which only in a daze could any serious philosopher confuse with the identification of "pleasant" with "good. II. which is to make good to the "multitude" his great claim about the "power of knowledge. for instance) could reach correct assessments of the goodness or badness of actions without resorting to any standard other than that of pleasure and pain. thousands of them. 12-13) has given an excellent account of the strategy of Socrates' argument against the "multitude": he does not undertake to prove to them directly that a counter-example to his thesis could not occur but rather that if. per impossibile.

one chooses Y because one is defeated by pleasures.27 But just why? What is there "ludicrous" about Mg? The answer comes in the following stretch of dialogue (355D 1-E3). Socrates feels. the conjunctionof A and B. could be responsible for the overstatement here (as also earlier in the dialogue. So must the expressionused by Protagorasin 351E 5-6. 26AsI explained above (penultimate paragraphof Section I) what the "multitude" have been made to agree to is H. self-confident. which he understands to entail (ii) that "good" and "pleasant" are "names" for the same thing. Now (ii). 329D 1. end of n." while it is perfectly clear from the accompanying Cf. where "wisdom. pushes his adversaries out of a highly plausible. Both (i) and (ii) must be understoodas asserting no more than the reciprocal implicatior or convertibility. This move. argument that all that is meant is that any two of them are logically convertible. Socrates moves against M by exploiting (355B-C 7) the convertibility of "good" and "pleasure. Socrates undertakes to press this indictment against that explanation of acrasia which he takes to be by far the most common of all: that men who know the better will do the worse because they are "overcome" or "defeated" by desire for pleasures.justice. where the prosecutor is that "insolent fellow. . defeated [by desire] for pleasures. knowing this to be better than an alternative." he transforms M into (Mg) Knowing that X is better than Y." to which the "multitude" have agreed. taken at face value. called in here as in the Hippias Major (286c ff. and piety" are all said to be names "of one thing. retaining Socrates' own expression. which I take to be an ellipsis for "being at. and this is doubtless all Socrates means when he sums up their view as asserting (i) "that the good is nothing but pleasureand evil nothing but pain" (355A1-2). "defeated by pleasures. the primitivenessof his logical vocabulary. Y. amounts to saying that the relation of the two terms in each pair is identity. of the two predicates. 349B 1-6. that he immediately pronounces it "ludicrous" (355c 8-D3)." This is the only way in which pleasure could be thought to "defeat" or "overcome" an intentional agent.26Substituting "goods" for "pleasures. which is also open to him in that situation: (M) Knowing that X is better than Y." for acrasia which is supposed to occur because the agent's desire for certain pleasures proves stronger than his desire to do X. and that so too are "evil" and "painful" (355B 5-c 1 and 5-6).) to rub the opponent's nose into the 257r6brTv rjsovwv 7f)raTT 352E-353A. temperance. one chooses Y because one is defeated by goods. courage.25 Let us call this proposition "M" (for the "multitude" who are supposed to hold it) and formulate it more exactly.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 79 no one in his senses would want to gainsay them. position into one which is so shaky on the face of it." Socrates' rude-spoken alter ego. But Socrates surely means no such thing. as recorded (or simulated?) by Plato. 10). 2A development anticipated already at 355A. my Introduction (1956) liv.

and those less numerous?" We shall have to agree. the notion of a "struggle in the soul" (which has so often been read into this sentence) is quite irrelevant to the specific question which is being asked here. often ascribed to Socrates in the scholarly literature. 6. and there can be no doubt of what Socrates means at each step of the reasoning. who gives further reasons against the Guthrie rendering." comparing Gorg. to "before your tribunal." he will ask.. or the reverse? Cf. had been defeated.t&pravev in 355D 6 connects the formulation of the thesis about acrasia with which Socrates works in this whole passage with the crisper formula. 1. "Which is formally equivalent to Mg.80 PHOENIX dirt. while Socrates with the supposed concurrence of Protagoras (hence the "we") does the answering for the multitude: How ludicrous is the thing you are saying-that (I) [=Mg] a man. one chooses Y because one is defeated by goods. "2The use of etrl. "could goods be unworthy of evils. '"For the meaning of avrl see Stocks 102-104: "&v/7 is used of compensation. All the questioner wants to know is how the "multitude" (not the acratic man) would estimate the comparative value of the goods and evils in the alternative options: do they think that the evils exceed the goods (and in that sense are "worthy to overcome": see next note)." he will say. Y." This difference of this from I is clearly only a matter of wording. "Am I to suppose that the good in you is or is not a match for the evil?" The phrase I have italicized is similarly rendered in the Apelt translation as revised by A. kv rcato tLaywvl'caOat.. 509E 5-7). but not intolerably so. defeated by goods. possibly because this formulation gives no scope for the recognition of knowledge (as distinct from true belief or opinion) . "that this is what you mean by 'being defeated': taking greater evils in exchange for30 fewer goods.31 is that the man chooses to do Y. To see this we need only rewrite Mg as. we shall have to say that they are not worthy. Capelle: "Dann ist also das Gute in euch nicht wurdig. The question is whether a man will choose to do or to refrain from doing a bad action. Phaedrus 255E. 464D 5. knowing that certain things are bad and that he ought not to do them. in your estimation. but apparently clings to the notion that the people to whom the question is being put are somehow merged with the acratic man whose soul is "the seat of conflict" between good and evil. das Schlechte zu besiegen?" If the reference were to a struggle between good and evil in the agent's soul the pronoun would have been in the third person singular: the agent is spoken of consistently in the singular throughout the argument. otherwise the man who. The hypothesis. 29For the meaning of "worthy to overcome" see Gallop 124. the goods] are greater and those [the evils] are smaller? Or when these are more numerous. (3) "How then. we said. "unworthy or worthy to overcome the evils?"29 Clearly. Guthrie translates the sentence. ovets &KV aLiuapr&vPf."28 he will ask." He compares Lysis 208E. does them. Gallop 123. knowing it to be an "error"32(a bad 28I take the sense of Iv CV'Lv be the one mentioned (but rejected) by Adam ad loc. The noun in the genitive which follows it is the compensating good.e. (4) "So it is clear. or evils of goods? How else than when these [i. Mauernsberger and A. would not have erred. though Socrates himself never puts his own thesis in just that form in the Platonic dialogues (for an approximation to it see Gorg. "Knowing that Y is worse than X. Moreover. (2) "Are the goods then. n." The language is loose and clumsy by modern standards.

. X.). Hence the proposed explanans-desire for goodwould belie the explanandum-the fact that the worse option was chosen. 36Translating faithfully the plural of the text 355D 3. To get anything like a self-contradiction out of 1. 345E ff. thus knowingly preferring the lesser good represented by Y to the greater good represented by his other option.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 81 choice. . by hypothesis. &XX' avayKa'ouAevos) rather than the broader sense of intentionally.. having been shown to entail (via 2 and 3) that the man chose Y. o6X Kt'v. For if a man's choice were actuated by his desire for good. But to get la we have had to make an inconspicuous. From just this it is inferred in 2 that the goods in Y are not worth ("are not worthy to overcome") its evils: for if they had been. at Prot. we would have to understand it to mean (la) Knowing that Y is the worse option.e.34A closer study has convinced me that this interpretation simply will not fit the text. It is true that the singular rov a&yaeov had been used just before (c 7).g. 54.) in glossing the second argument (355E 4 ff.. it would be the choice of the better option. Cf.e. Just how then does this argument show that I is "ludicrous"? When one first comes across this proposition in the text. which operates with the converse substitution of "more pleasurable" for "better. i." It is only on this assumption-that Socrates thought that M would be transformed into a self-contradictory statement by one or the other of the substitutions-that I maintained that Socrates offers a deductive proof for his thesis that knowledge is (i. the agent chooses it because of his desire for good (i. for good as such)." but by "goods. whose aggregate goods did not exceed its aggregate evils. is a sufficient condition of) virtue. the choice of Y would not have been the "error" which.. but by no means negligible. 1. it is. is discredited. 34So apparently Walsh."35 And it does so for good reason. The plural is mandatory. but this was only to refer collectively to the various particular goods which. especially at 346B 7-8.e. would "defeat" the victims of acrasia. when both are aggregated the aggregate goods exceed the aggregate evils. the very choice which the "defeated" man did not make. one gets a strong impression that Socrates considers it a kind of self-contradiction. the choice of the bad alternative). note 10 above. not reluctantly" (as.. 33Though I only expounded this interpretation (xxxix ff. Hence. 3 goes on to lay down the general principle that the goods in a given option are worth its evils if. departure from the text: in 1 the text speaks of the man being defeated not by "good. e. This is how it struck me when I wrote the Introduction in 195633and I do not think that I have been the only one to take it in this way. and only if. since Socrates' only warrant and because ?KC'Vis not free from ambiguity: it may carry the narrower sense of "willingly. it is being alleged. This would indeed be a patently self-refuting account of acrasia. the conclusion in 4: the hypothesis.

knowing it to be bad on the whole. . produces a sequence of propositions to prove it. but by his desire for those particular goods which he can have here and now if. having made a charge. because I want this particular good (which I can get only by choosing this action). Once this line of interpretation has been closed off. which entails 4 via 2 and 3.. So while there is contradiction in "I choose this action. And that this must be the correct interpretation is confirmed by the very design of the argument. but are nevertheless bad on the whole. knowing the goods.82 PHOENIX for pinning 1 on his adversaries is its derivability from their own professed view via allowable substitutions. you say that it happens often that a man. this fortune. does not want to do them becauseof the pleasuresof the moment." there is no contradiction in "I choose it. And again you say that a man. we get (Ib) Knowing that Y is the worse option. the man's defeat would be explained not by his desire for good as such. good. And now we lose the self-contradiction in la. but the fact is that there is nothing in the text that could count as an argument for self-contradiction in lb. If so." If Socrates had thought there was self-contradiction in the latter. knowing it to be bad on the whole. because I want good. . nevertheless does them.by which he is defeated. A man who. and only if.e. though it is possible for him not to do them. We got self-contradiction there because only the choice of a good action could be presumed to be explicable by a man's deisre for good. despite appearances to the contrary. he has reached the proposition which he thinks clinches "6Thisis clearly the force of the apa in E 2. . But this is the form in which their adherence to M had been expressed in the text a few lines earlier (355A 6-B 3): . he would have had to argue for it. i. by actions which do offer us a seductive. knowing that evils are evils. this woman-can only be satisfied via bad action. head-turning. Amending la to implement this important difference. and only when. we are left with just one way of understanding how the argument from I to 4 was supposed to demonstrate the "ludicrousness" of 1: Socrates must have thought the conclusion so incredible in itself as to discredit any proposition which entails it-hence to discredit 1. There are many cases where a desire for a particular good-this sweet. he opts for Y.36 would stop when. The only correct substitutions for the italicized phrases would be "by goods" and "because of the goods of the moment" respectively. because he is beguiled and seduced by pleasures. the agent chooses it because of his desire for its goods. In lb this fails us: it is not true that the only choice one could hope to explain by a man's desire for a particular good or set of goods is the choice of a good action.

because he is overcome by pleasure. .41 97Though the argument against M continues (M is refuted all over again via the converse substitution of "more pleasurable" for "better. etc. knowing it to be the smaller. All it does is to point up the consequences of its refutation via the two substitutions: since (as has now been demonstrated) one who knows that X is better than Y cannot choose Y in lieu of X. given 3 above: (Si) If one knows that X is better8g than Y. . of which the following (not in Santas) strikes me as the most conclusive. This is what Socrates takes to be so rank an impossibility that to confront his adversaries with this consequence of their thesis is to leave them speechless.. cf. they would not sustain the charge: to be convicted of self-contradiction a man has to maintain a thesis and its contrary at the same time. Socrates' adversaries would have had to hold both M and the view that acrasia is due to ignorance. ." to be discussed shortly). not theirs. Santas [1966] 12.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 83 the indictment. 18 above.. one will choose X rather than Y. you would be laughing at yourselves". utterly crushed. Socrates convicts the exponent of M of self-contradiction and by the following reasoning: "The proposition under attack says that a man may know evil things . one will want. for our view that 'defeat by pleasure' is only ignorance].40 (S2) If one wants X more than Y.. '0A more complete statement would be: If at a given moment one knows. but the latter is Socrates' view. . Gallop claimed. But if 'being overcome by pleasure' means 'being ignorant. yet take it needlessly. yet do them . i. In my opinion. in 4 that could be thought to do this? Nothing but the fact that here the refutand has been shown to entail that the man would choose the smaller good. this interpretation could not be right for a number of reasons (cf. But this concession is extracted from them only after they had been compelled to give up M (they had no comeback at 355E 3. at that moment. . we must look for the "salvation of life" (356D. that is to say: at this point you have been forced by the argument to acknowledge the very view you had been ridiculing a moment earlier).37 Just what is there.e. to the "measuring art. To be guilty of the alleged self-contradiction. The absurdity will consist in ascribing to the agent both knowledge and ignorance of the same thing" (119). no less than in their previous arrogantly wrongheaded one.) the refutation of M via the second substitution contains no additional argument against M. went on to argue that the refutation of Mis not meant to be complete until a much later point in the text (357D E) because only then. So in their battered and chastened state. and in the sequel.38 But why so? What makes Socrates so sure that no one could knowingly choose the smaller of two goods offered him? He does not say. S"Here. 14). To be sure. Donald . n. The praise of the "measuring art" which follows (356c 4 ff. etc. one will want X more than Y. nor yet at 356c 3). there is not one word offurther argument for Mg after 355E 3. beaten into a pulp by Socrates' dialectic. especially 357D 1-3: "if you were now to laugh at us [sc. 41At this point I owe a great debt to an unpublished paper by my colleague. then. who saw (118-119) that the interpretation of the charge of "ludicrousness" I had given in my 1956 Introduction was wrong. because one did not know it to be evil. E) to the appropriate knowledge. But there are two propositions from which this would follow. "better" means: better for the agent." 88Professor Gallop. they are left no option but to concede it in the end (cf.' the proposition will be self-contradictory. The same addition should be made in the interest of completeness in S2. For it will amount to saying that one could know a course of action to be evil. n.

given S3. as for Plato and Aristotole after him. knowing that they are evils.44 And since the better of two actions could only be the one which secures to the agent the greater aggregate good (3 in the above argument for Mg).. i. Given S3 and S4.) That Socrates takes S2 pretty much for granted is clear from the fact that he repeatedly speaks of "wanting" (0eXe\Lv)a given option to express the very notion of choosing it-as..84 PHOENIX (Here as in M and Mg above. he would want X. and what is evil. It Davidson. he would know that he can get more good through X than through Y. in the last period of the citation from 355A. The formulation of the two premises follows closely two of his own which he discusses without reference to Socrates but which struck me at once. 278E] Though "faring well" or being happy are never formally explicated. he is implying that." . in the restatement of a doctrine previously expressed by the use of ev 7rparTTre in 278E). as going to the heart of the Socratic assumptions about intentional action whose corollary is the denial of acrasia. For which man does not want to fare well? [Euthyd. he would not want Y." or "to do well. except for welfare itself and the goods which make it up.g.43 (S4) Anything else they desire only as a means to welfare.. this would follow from two fundamental Socratic tenets: (S3) All men desire welfare. given S4. 4 above. i. when I came across them. they do for the sake of good" (Gorg.B above. 468B) and that "good we desire. the substitution of eb6ailAoves elvat in Euthyd. what is neither good nor evil."42 As for SI.e. e. S4. 42And cf. n.. 44The same implication in Meno 77c-78A: No one could desire evils. X and Y stand for exclusive alternatives between which the agent must choose at the given moment. 282A IoJveTv. 468c)." used interchangeably with EtvaL4Eu Trp&aTrEL. these terms denote the state in which good is possessed and enjoyed. the impossibility of choosing the lesser aggregate good in preference to the greater would follow. that they would "harm him" or "make him wretched and unfortunate. S3 Socrates states in the most explicit and emphatic way: Do not all men want to fare well? Or is this not one of these things which I feared a moment ago it would be ludicrous to question? For surely it is silly to ask such a question. So when Socrates declares that "everything men do. for the converse reason. for instance. "to be happy. we do not desire" (ibid. "to fare well. we desire things only as a means to welfare. where "does not want to do them" is clearly an ellipsis for "does not want [and does not choose] to do them. so much is clear: for Socrates." (cf.e. So. Si would follow: If a man knew that X is better than Y. since it would secure him the increment of good and welfare which he would forfeit by choosing Y and.

to be a patent impossibility. the aggregate magnitude of the pleasures exceeds that of the pains. This being the case. Socrates would stand ready to derive it from the principle of psychological hedonism to which they had agreed at an earlier stage of the debate.e. for the sake of the pleasures it offers. all of which Socrates would take to be axiomatic truths. are. 12) that 354c 3-5 should be construed as psychological hedonism. as expressions of psychological hedonism. S3. the last three paragraphs in Section I above. suggesting that Socrates had little interest in working out this doctrine. one will choose X when one is defeated by pleasures. though "it is clear" (356A-D) that these are not worth ("not worthy to overcome") its pains. or H (which entails B). . n. that the formulation is vague and hasty. 19. indirect evidence for this doctrine. knowing it to be on balance the smaller pleasure-package. as before. however. "50. to proposition B (cf. 4gI agree with Santas (1966.3) to refute M all over again by exploiting the converse substitutability of "pleasant" for "good" (and hence of "more pleasurable" for "better"): (Mp) Knowing that X is more pleasurable than Y. "4Literally..48 and it is now added that a given set of pleasures are worth a given set of pains if. "knowing that it is painful" ('yLyvcoaKWv orL aivtapa EOTrtv. while knowing that it is the more painful46of the two options. The thought. it is implied that to choose Y..45 Having thus demolished Mg to his satisfaction. pleasurableness or painfulness. of course. and S4. 47Cf. which is taken. is unaffected by this blemish. at best. To show that this is false Socrates finds it sufficient to point out that if it were true the alleged "defeat" would entail choosing Y. This explains why Socrates does not deduce it on this occasion from other beliefs of his which do entail it. proposition B. not their absolute.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 85 would be a consequence of S2. pain the only evil. the impossibility of choosing an option which one knows to be less good than another has enormous plausibility taken all by itself. adding. Socrates proceeds (355E 3-356c . goodness or badness. would be to knowingly prefer the smaller good to the greater. n. and only if. 481. Throughout the whole discussion the wording pays little attention to the fact that all that counts in the choice between X and Y is their comparative.e. The passages cited by Sullivan. 355E 7). Why is this "clear"? Because the multitude had agreed47 that pleasure is the only good. If his adversaries had not seen the impossibility of that consequence. whose entailment by Mp refutes Mp. 24 above.49 The great difference between this argument against Mp and the preceding one against Mg is that here the refutation of M requires the premise that pleasure is the only good:50only this would warrant the 4'Needless to say.

But what if he were addressing a different kind of adversary who would have cogent and clearheaded reasons for rejecting hedonism and would. not a word about pleasure or pain-in the text of the argument. I have taken the next step. a hedonist would so read them. but I subscribe to M. which is to show (as I proceed to do in the text above) that one of the two arguments in the text. therefore. Refute me. if you can"! Would he have any trouble in getting from our passage52 all the ammunition he would need to blast me as effectively as he did the "multitude" in the text? Denied now the use of H (that "good" and "pleasant" are convertible) as a lemma for deriving Mg from M.86 PHOENIX substitution of "more pleasurable" for "better. 3 ff. "good" = "pleasant. is already free from dependence on hedonistic premises." That Socrates should make this the high-point of his refutation of M in this debate against "the multitude" is understandable. ." and hence warrants the substitution of 56But Santas registers an important advance in pointing out that Socrates' argument in our passage "can be 'freed' from its hedonistic premises. since A (that all pleasure is good) would serve him just as well? For this master-dialectician it would have been child's play to see that if he got me to grant him A. Naturally. since "all pleasure is good" entails that "defeated by pleasures" entails "defeated by goods."5It has now become clear to me that this is false. Socrates has good reason to think that the defence of his thesis about acrasia will be specially effective against his present adversaries if offered them under a hedonistic umbrella. There is nothing to this effect-in fact." "evil" = "painful. As we saw at the end of Section 1 above. from Hackforth in 1928 to Santas in his latest paper [1966]." 20-21. n. the one against Mg. to whose clarification Santas himself had made a distinct contribution in his 1964 paper. For suppose I were to say to Socrates "I despise hedonism. The same thing would have been evident to Santas if he had not imported hedonistic premises into his analysis of the argument against Mg. But in that case the equations. from the known Socratic doctrine. 24 above)." would be an extra premise supplied by the hedonist himself. "2Including the false start. nor yet in its tacit premises. 351B. reading all references to good and evil as references to pleasure and pain. where Socrates asks Protagoras if he will agree to proposition A (cf. as they should be. in the sense that some other plausible Platonic [he means: Socratic] non-question-begging premises can be found which can be successfully substituted for the hedonistic premises. scorn the Socratic thesis about acrasia if he thought it a logical dependency of the equation of the good and the pleasant? Would none of Socrates' arguments in our passage be usable against such an opponent? Has Socrates so tied his refutation of M to the hedonistic construction of good that if the latter were denied the refutation of M would fail? This is what I believed when I wrote my Introduction in 1956 and what many others have believed. would he not see that he does not need H for this purpose. I could not then fail to concede Mg. if these are supplied.

we are going to choose X in lieu of Y. Having thus forced me to Mg. which is entailed by S3 and S4. Everything in the present argument would tell as strongly against me as it would against a hedonist. showing by the simplest of arguments that the occurrence of acrasia would then be an outright impossibility: Given SI (consequence of S3 and S4). provided only the former granted that pleasure was a good. and given S2. to justify at 4 the impossibility of anyone's knowingly preferring the lesser to the greater good: none of these depend at all on the convertibility of "good" and "pleasant" or on any other hedonistic premise. S3. for the indirection of the attack on acrasia in our passage. recording a by-product of the foregoing inquiry. The same would be true in the case of the tacit premises (SI. S3. which might nonetheless well be the most interesting of its findings: It concerns the import of S2. For if those tacit premises were all true.SOCRATES ON ACRASIA 87 "goods" for "pleasures" in M which transforms it into Mg. which Socrates would have invoked. the first paragraph of the present Section. He is evidently assuming that his explicit argument implicitly does this further job as well. and their joint power is so great that Socrates could have relied on them alone to make a still more formidable assault on Al than he achieves in either of the explicit arguments he deploys against it in our passage. Antisthenes. he could proceed beyond it exactly as in the text. Each of them is plausible in the extreme. and then dropped all through the subsequent argument which is solely directed against the defeat-by-pleasure/pain explanation. S2. S4). one would not need to resort to a round-about attack on the doctrine of acrasia. . for no support from H is needed. if pressed. alluded to again in 352E 1-2. rejected only by that fierce eccentric. Thus the refutation of M by means of the refutation of Mg is a self-contained argument which would be as valid against non-hedonists as against hedonists. How so? For a beautifully clear. and that a supplementary defeat-by-passion explanation would not work either.55 Armed with those tacit premises one could launch a perfectly direct attack. if we know that X is better than Y. the defeat-by-pleasure explanation of its occurrence would not work. One further observation. "The defeat-by-passion explanation was mentioned alongside of the defeat-bypleasure/pain in 352B. which was the general view among contemporary philosphers. for 2 or 3 above.54 arguing that if it did occur. fully satisfying answer. How then could it ever happen that we should choose Y in lieu of X? The strength of the "And SI. see Santas (1966) 20-22. MCf. if we desire X more than Y. we are going to desire X more than Y. from which 4 follows directly. But at the end of that argument Socrates talks as though he has also demolished the defeat-by-passion explanation as well (357c 4). or offered. S4.53 the foundational tacit premises of the refutation of Mg.

Apelt. The Man and His Work. P. Vlastos. R. E. The Logic of Decision (New York 1965). had elicited (in addition to the detailed critique by Professor Gallop: cf. 351B-356c." CQ 7 (1913) 100 ff. Third Edition (London 1929)." ibid. M. Adam and A. Shorey. "The Socratic Paradoxes.. K. Crombie. 2.PRINCETON BIBLIOGRAPHY J. Guthrie. Plato's Thought (London 1935) 59-62. . that the impossibility of choosing the option known to be the worse appears to follow inexorably. Grube. Rapoport. Gulley. London 1956). "Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras.88 PHOENIX Socratic thesis shows up to best advantage in those axioms of his which so connect desire with knowledge of good. E." Phronesis 6 (1961) 9 ff. Bambrough. Sullivan. Mich. "The Argument of Plato. n. Platons Dialog Protagoras. O. P. 3 above) a number of helpful criticisms-more of them than I could have tried to acknowledge by name. Plato. Gallop. Plato's Protagoras and Meno (Penguin Classics. Plato's Meno (Cambridge 1961). C. Santas." Philos. J. R. Introduction to Plato's Protagoras. 1 (London 1962) 289 ff.. Allen. N. and with choice. Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor. neuarbeitet von A. J. 1966) Ch. Vol. M. R.Dritte Auflage.56 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY. G. Stocks. S. The revision and expansion of the paper was done at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (New York 1963) 22-27. Jeffrey. G. Grube." CQ 22 (1928) 39 ff."Journal of the Historyof Ideas 21 (1960) 256-265. D. Walsh. A." Philos. on the one hand. Library of Liberal Arts (New York 1956) at xxxviii-xlv." Phronesis 9 (1964) 117 ff. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. 75 (1966) 3 ff. Quart. Adam. on the other. "The Socratic Paradox. "The Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras. L. G. 6"Anearlier draft of this paper. Mauernsberger und Annemarie Capelle (Hamburg 1956). "The Socratic Paradox in the Protagoras. "The Socratic Paradox. J. Hackforth. "Plato's Protagoras and Explanations of Weakness. R." Phronesis 10 (1965) 82-96. Prot. 10 (1960) 229 ff. "The Interpretation of 'No one does wrong willingly' in Plato's Dialogues. I. G. Platonis Protagoras(Cambridge1893). "The Structural Unity of the Protagoras. What Plato Said (Chicago 1933) 129-132. Review 73 (1964) 147 if." CQ 27 (1933) 203-207. A. Bluck. where I was privileged to hold a Fellowship during a part of 1968. at 205-206. R. W. circulated among colleagues and students. J. Taylor.

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