Contents

1 Abstract ............................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2 Introduction.......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.1 ........................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2 ........................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2.1 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2.2 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2.3 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2.4 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2.5 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3 Literature Review .................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 4 Project Objective ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 5 Framework Developement ...................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 6 Problems .............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 6.1 ........................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 6.1.1 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 6.1.2 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 6.1.3 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

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6.1.4 ................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Framework Applied ................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Conclusion and Recommendations ........................... Error! Bookmark not defined. References (List of public sources used) ................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

INTRODUCTION
History has been witness to many epic battles, but no battles have been as decisive as any conflict between armor. Tanks have played a major role in any war since its invention during the First World War. Since then, tanks have become an integral part of an army- its size and role notwithstanding. Same was the case during wars of 65 and 71 between India and Pakistan. Both countries were engaged in massive armor battles on the Western front. In 1972 India's land force command formulated requirements for a new main battle tank that will enter service in India's army. For that time India's industry had a solid experience building British "Vickers" Mk.1 ("Vijayanta") Medium Tank and the Soviet T-72M Main Battle Tank. The latter was produced in India under license.

Also, at the end of 1971war, the Indian army realized the limitations of their tank fleet consisting of vintage Centurions, PT-76, T-55 and other assorted tanks in the harsh desert conditions of Rajasthan. Army required a tank, which could fight well in plains of Punjab as well as desert of Rajasthan. Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) belonging to the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) took on the job of designing this new MBT and came out with MBT-80, proof-of-concept vehicle in 1974. Consequently in 1974 India decided to develop a new main battle tank on its own and organize mass production of the new MBT in national plants. Its development project was named MBT-80 (Main Battle Tank of 80-ties). Three decades later the end product strongly resembles the Leopard II, thanks to inputs provided by various German firms. Many had criticized DRDO for its failure to deliver a credible tank to Indian Army after so many years of research.

LITERATURE REVIEWBased on battlefield experiences, Designers tried to incorporate the following into Arjuny It was learnt that 105mm gun tended to lose power and accuracy at longer ranges. As these lessons were incorporated into the new MBT project, the Arjun was designed to have a 120mm rifled main gun. This gun has been indigenously developed by DRDO. y One major concern was that of mobility. To rectify it, a 1,400 HP German engine was selected. As turbine engines are considered fuel-guzzlers, it was decided that Arjun would have a diesel power plant.

To enable Arjun to fire on the move, a digital fire control system (FCS) with a laser range finder was also included. Another public rollout followed in April 1985, after the first prototype was unveiled on Indian Republic Day, 26 January 1984, after which the name 'Arjun' became the official name.

The production of 100 Arjun Mk.1 MBTs was expected to start by late 1997 (during the Ninth Defense Plan) at an estimated cost of US$ 2.8 million [Rs. 10 crores] each. A later claim by DRDO stated that it needed up to (Rs 1,800 crores) to produce 120 tanks over the next five years, with each one costing US $ 4.2 million [Rs 15 crores]. Another cost estimate figured that the Arjun will be over Rs 26 billion by 2001 for two or three regiments (124 tanks), totaling around US $5.6 million (Rs 200 million) per tank. This escalating estimate does not include the cost of ammunition, spares and engineering support for the Arjun's induction into service, which is estimated at over (Rs 5 billion). Country's progressively shrinking defense budget, coupled with the persistent technical problems, further delayed any serious Arjun serial production.

In early August, Army chief of staff, promised officers and soldiers of the 13th Armored Regiment that the Arjun would enter production soon. Less than two months later, DRDO was shaken by the desertion of scores of military scientists and engineers lured to the more lucrative private sector, jeopardizing the success of the Arjun project. As of 18 September, the Indian Parliament approved a $6.9 Billion (250 billion Rupees) Five-Year Defense Budget. In this 1997-2002 budget, some 40 Billion Rupees has been allocated for the Ajeya (Indian name for T-72) rebuild program and another 1 Billion Rupees for the first 100 Arjuns. By early May, 1998, the US decision to impose sanctions on India could possibly have jeopardized the Arjun's further development, since some US companies were supplying elements of the main gun-sighting and fire-control systems for the Arjun tank. There was also speculation as to whether Germany would stop supplying MTU engines. Arjun Executive Board (AEB) narrowed their choices for an FCS to Thomson CSF and Elbit of Israel (which could also be used in the T-72M1 Rhino'). The imported components used in the Arjun rose from 27% in the 1987 to 60% in PPS. (Pre-Production Series) enhancing the costs substantially. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report on the Summer 1997 trials, released in mid-1998, noted six premature transmission failures and frequent overheating of the transmission fluid, probably because the imported transmission assembly had been overloaded.

PROJECT OBJECTIVE
The objective is to study the design process of the product development and analysis the discrepancies during the entire process. Once the need for an MBT was raised by army, from where the design team started and we will try to find out the answer for the following-

Was the design team clear about the objectives for which the product was thought to be designed?

Did the design team study the feasibility of the product? Were they clear about the resources required such as financial and indigenous technical competency?

While developing a concept for the product, the main problem before the designers was to choose a suitable engine as India's western regions are desert type, while northern are mostly alpine regions. In desert regions day temperature passes over +50C, while tanks face engine ignition problem in alpine regions, where temperature is below 0C.

FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT
We will try to study the different stages in the design process of a product. Ideally there are five main stages while developing a new productStages in the Design Process y y y y Idea Generation Feasibility Study Preliminary Design Final Design Product Concept Performance Specifications Prototype Final Design Specifications

Process Planning

Manufacturing Specifications

An effective product design process Matches product characteristics with the requirements. Ensure that requirements are met in the simplest and least costly manner. Reduces the time required to design a new product. Minimizes the revisions necessary to make a design workable.

Idea GenerationFeasibility study Preliminary Design Final Design Process Planning

FRAMEWORK APPLIED
Product Concept At the end of 1971 war, the Indian army realized the limitations of their tank fleet in the harsh desert conditions of Rajasthan so they initiated their own indigenous MBT design. The Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) of the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) laid out the first MBT-80 proof-of-concept vehicle in 1974.

Performance specificationsIt was learnt from battlefield experience that 105mm gun tend to lose power and accuracy at longer ranges. As these lessons were incorporated into the new MBT project, the Arjun was designed to have a 120mm rifled main gun indigenously developed by DRDO. y A diesel power plant for mobility(because turbine engines are considered fuel-guzzlers). y A digital fire control system (FCS) with a laser range finder.

"Arjun's" armament consists from 120-mm rifled gun stabilized in both planes. Main gun is fed by modular projectiles fitted with armor-piercing, cumulative, HighExplosion - armor piercing, and High-Explosion fragmentation warheads. The main gun aiming and turret rotation mechanisms are based on electro hydraulic. Gun is reloaded manually by loader what significantly decreases rate of fire, reaching 6 shots per minute. The gun has a maximum elevation range from -9 to +20. The Main Battle Tank has an integrated semi-automatic fire control system based on ballistic computer. It is provided by Spanish company "ENOSA". This system automatically considers such factors as external temperature, atmosphere pressure, wind speed and direction, projectile's temperature and other. Additional armament is similar to all Soviet/Russian made main battle tanks: the 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, and 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine gun, placed on the roof. Grenade launcher blocks are mounted from the both sides of the turret. They are intended for setting up smoke screens.

We will observe the design criteria considering which the tank was built. We will try to focus on the discrepancies during the execution of the project. How certain points were missed in the feasibility study and prototype of the product. Prototype A prototype of the product was prepared with following specificationsy German MTU-based 1400 HP diesel since indigenous was under progress with a weight of 'about' 50 tons (actually 52, though the sketch concepts were around 40-45 tons). y The tank's 'brains' were a modified Tank Fire Control System (TCFS), which was an upgrade project for the Vicker's Vijayanta based on the Marconi

SFCS600, linked to a Barr & Stroud Tank Laser Sight and IR8 Thermal Imager. y The 59-ton (58.5 tons) 15th Variant could achieve a maximum speed of 70 kph (55 mph) and cross-country of 40 kph with its 1400 HP power plant. The Arjun's hydro pneumatic suspension can be hardened or softened, according to the terrain and the 1610 litre fuel tank allows for a cruising range of 200 km (120 miles). y As Indian designers were unable to develop their own reliable engine suitable for the new Main Battle Tank it was completed with German "MTU" 838 KA 501 ten cylinder diesel engine. This diesel has a turbo charging system and liquid cooling. It reaches 1 400 h.p. and provides for almost 60-tone "Arjun" high h.p. to weight ratio in 24h.p./t. y

Discrepancies Observed in the prototypey Accuracy trials from mid-1994 indicated an erratic first hit ratio that ranged from 20-80%, though this was supposedly reduced to 90% during subsequent troubleshooting. y y
The tank failed to clear crucial round of winter trials that were to decide whether the tank will be cleared for bulk production by the Army.

Although in June 1995, Arjun failed field trials of fire-power and tactical tests on the firing ranges in desert and semi-arid conditions, on 9th January 1996 the Arjun was formally unveiled and cleared for mass production by the then Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. Locally-developed engine, which was expected to deliver 1300-1500 HP from, only delivered 500 with its turbocharger fitted.

y FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT Product Design

 Specifies materials  Determines dimensions & tolerances  Defines appearance  Sets performance standards The Design Process

Concept package process

ISSUES
Even after crores had been spent on the project the future of Arjun looked very bleak since Army was not ready to accept Arjun until most of the problems had been sorted out. Pakistan acquired 315 T-80U from Ukraine and this was a cause of concern for Army, which needed a similar if not better MBT to counter T-80U. They turned to T-90S from Russia, which was considered superior to T-80U. Field trials of T-90S began in 1999. At $ 3 million apiece, it was worth it. To many it looked like the last nail in Arjuns coffin. Arjuns list of problems read something like this:

Arjun weighed 58 tons, while all the major national highways could only support weight upto 40 tons. Higher weight also meant that Arjun could not use the bridges designed to handle ~40 ton T-72M1. Old & inefficient MTU engine, which heated up frequently making Arjun unsuitable for deployment in Rajasthan. To counter overheating, a cooling pack was installed which reduced the ammo capacity & affected gun depression. Failure to develop an indigenous 1500 hp engine. Defective optics, especially commanders main sight. Problems with the FCS, which could not perform in temperatures above 42 Celsius. Poor operational mobility to due to its excessive weight and width. Problems with the commander's periscope sight, laser warning sight and muzzle reference sight. Transporting Arjun was a problem, as the 58-tonne tank protrudes 6cm beyond the permissible 3cm limit on either side of tank transporters used for India's current MBT, the T-72M1.

The German MTU MB 838 Ka-SOl 1 ,4OO hp diesel engine and transmission derated at high temperatures, with an estimated 20-25% power loss from engine to drive sprocket while operating in desert temperatures of 45-500 Celsius. Ammunition stowage had to be reduced in order to increase engine cooling and the 15th PPS cannot fire over the engine deck at 00 elevation because of the bulky cooling pack. This power pack choice also resulted in bulges in the hull side walls.

The problems with the hydro pneumatic suspension can possibly be linked to the Arjun's difficulty in climbing sand dunes and other obstacles easily, with a sharp drop in speed in its attempt to do so. Furthermore, the inert gases needed would be another item added to the supply trains.

As of mid-year, the 15th Arjun Mk I was to be the basis for the production model4. The defects noticed during the user trials of Mk.1 , including overheating of the engine in Rajasthan desert areas, had been 'by and large overcome' and certain In a major setback to indigenous development project,

While the tank has been consistently suffering transmission problems and trouble in its suspension unit, the latest round of user trials that concluded in March brought out major problems with German engines fitted on the indigenous tank. During the five months of Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AUCRT) in Rajasthan, two Arjun tanks that were tested by the Army suffered engine failures on four separate occasions. This, when the Main Battle Tanks had been put through only 1,000 km of trials. The tank is fitted with German MTU 838 Ka 501 engines. While this has come as a major embarrassment for DRDO that has been claiming that all defects on the tank have been rectified, the Army has made it clear that given the present problems on the tank, bulk intake is not an option. The Army has already ordered 124 tanks but had kept its options open for further purchases.

BACK FROM THE DEAD

If Arjun resembles something most from the mythology, its that bird which used to rise from its own ashes Phoenix. Actually Arjun was always alive and DRDO was raring to go ahead and eliminate all the flaws that Arjun had and give a potent fighting machine to the Indian Army. They started solving all the problems one at a time. DRDO fixed the problems with mobility & engine heating thanks to Israels help. DRDO teamed up with Israeli companies to develop a digital FCS. This FCS was extensively tested by Indian Army & duly accepted. Development of new & better optics by BEL. The MoD has allocated $3.9 million to build three transporter types to mobilize Arjun. Team Arjun has some more achievements to its credit. Some of them are listed below. Chromium lined barrel increases the barrel life & also the muzzle velocity of the shell. Arjuns armor was tested in combat like conditions and fared very well. It also withstood direct hits of APFSDS, HEAT, HESH & various RPG rounds as per the latest trials on September 2003. According to DRDO, the compositeKanchan armor gives Arjun a level of protection far better than other contemporary tanks. LAHAT ATGM has been test fired from Arjun. This was achieved by coating the round with rubber; the rubber coating burns off eliminating contact between the barrel and the round. As soon as the round leaves the barrel, rubber coating has burnt off. Due to this technique, rounds can be launched at higher velocities than possible with normal rifled barrels. LAHAT (Laser Homing Attack) with a range of 6km exceeds the capability of Refleks system on T-80UD/T-90S.

 Never before seen crew protection levels in tanks used by Indian Army. Crew protection is paramount and slight changes have been made here. The ammo storage is in the turret bustle but is modulated and separated from the crew by armor, so that if hit by RPG or top-attack ATGM, crew remains safe. Integrated GPS & BMS (Battlefield Management System). These systems have touch screen for rapid access. State-of-the-art night vision gear allowing the commander to identify targets at ranges more than 5km. A new Active Area Defense System (AADS) from Elbit. Estimated cost of $ 4 million per piece.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After studying the entire case, we can conclude the followingFeasibility how difficult is it? What INVESTMENT, both managerial and financial, will be needed? The feasibility study before the start of the product was not done. Working on the project was started in 1974 but it could be sent for production only in 1997. The major roadblocks were as follows Another problem in the Arjun's development was that more than half the components (FCS, engine, transmission unit, tracks, thermal sight, night sight) are imported, with the design components 1970's and 80's vintage. The project slipped both financial constraints and field trial timelines. Arjun development costs rose from Rs. 56.55 crores in October 1980 to Rs 280 crores in May, 1987. Field trials were scheduled for 1991. Although DRDO conducted the trials in 1988 but it was handed over for field trial in 1994. The production of 100 Arjun Mk.1 MBTs was expected to start by late 1997 (during the Ninth Defense Plan) at an estimated cost of US$ 2.8 million [Rs. 10 crores] each. Later, It needed up to (Rs 1,800 crores) to produce 120 tanks over the next five years, with each one costing US $ 4.2 million [Rs 15 crores] (about a 2,000 % increase in project cost since 1974). Such an escalation was not contemplated by the designers. Another cost estimate figured that the Arjun will be over Rs 26 billion by 2001 for two or three regiments (124 tanks), totaling around US $5.6 million (Rs 200 million) per tank. This escalating estimate does not include the cost of ammunition, spares and engineering support for the Arjun's induction into service, which is estimated at over (Rs 5 billion). Acceptability how worthwhile is it? What RETURN, in terms of benefits to the operation, will it give? As we discussed earlier the acceptability was very low. The design could not foresee the following factors which led to the low acceptability of the product-

Since the Arjun extends 6cm beyond the official 3cm limit on either side of a standard Indian flatbed railcar, strategic transport would be extremely difficult. This would also require that India refurbish large sections of her rail network, as well as acquiring new rolling stock (This is nothing new, as the Germans had this problem with the Tiger' Mk VI in World War II). It's width and weight, Indian Rail to charge the Army over-dimensional consignment (ODC) costs, which are 150% over normal costs. The Indian Ministry of Defense allocated US$ 3.9 million (R165 million) to develop three Arjun-capable flatbed rail cars wagon by January 1999.

Vulnerability what could go wrong? What RISKS do we run if things go wrong?

REFERENCES