Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes

Version 1.0

Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes

Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes: Version 1.0

Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes

Table of Contents
Change log ............................................................................. ix 1. Change highlighting ................................................... ix 2. Changes since version 0.7.1 ......................................... ix 1. Operating techniques ............................................................. 1 1.1. Rejected Takeoff ...................................................... 1 1.2. Failures during takeoff when above V1 ......................... 2 1.3. EOSID ................................................................... 3 2. Miscellanneous ..................................................................... 5 2.1. Emergency descent (memory item) ............................... 5 2.2. Windshear (memory item) .......................................... 6 2.3. Unreliable airspeed (memory item) ............................... 7 2.4. Incapacitation (memory item) ...................................... 9 2.5. Ditching ................................................................. 9 2.6. Forced landing ....................................................... 10 2.7. Evacuation ............................................................. 11 2.8. Overweight landing ................................................. 12 2.9. Immediate VMC recovery with single engine ................ 12 2.10. Engine failure in cruise .......................................... 12 2.11. Single engine circling ............................................ 13 2.12. Bomb on board ..................................................... 13 2.13. Stall recovery (memory item) ................................... 13 2.14. Computer reset ..................................................... 14 3. Air conditioning, pressurisation and ventilation ......................... 15 3.1. Cabin overpressure .................................................. 15 3.2. Excess cabin altitude ............................................... 15 3.3. Pack fault .............................................................. 15 3.4. Pack overheat ......................................................... 16 3.5. Pack off ................................................................ 16 3.6. Pack regulator faults ................................................ 16 3.7. ACSC single lane failure .......................................... 17 3.8. Duct overheat ......................................................... 17 3.9. Hot air fault ........................................................... 17 3.10. Trim air faults ...................................................... 18 3.11. Cabin fan faults .................................................... 18 3.12. Lavatory and galley fan faults .................................. 18

iii

............................ DC Essential Bus fault ................ 4................................................. 5.......................... 5................... 4.............................. 4............................. Open safety valve ................................... 4.. 4.................7.. DC Emergency configuration ....... Stabilizer jam .... Low diff pressure .... IDG low oil pressure/ high oil temperature ........... 4....................... Spoiler faults ...............................14............ 4.12..18...... AC Ess Bus fault ................. 4......... Pressure controller faults ..................1.. 4........ Tripped circuit breakers ............ 5............. 3......... Battery fault ......................................................................................... 4..... Extract fault ............................. Aileron faults ......................... 5....... 3.................................. Loss of TR .......... Generator fault ......... 3...19...........................10............ Generator overload ............................ Flight controls ........................20......... AC Bus 1 fault .................... 5................................... 4....... Blower fault ............. 4..............5........2..... Avionics ventilation system vault ..........................................................................4............... Electrical ........ Elevator faults .......................... 4.... Generator 1 line off ....................................6....... 4.20........3.............16.............................................17......2.......................... 3....................... 3. 5...... 4.16........................... DC Essential shed ...........................9................5.................. 4.....................18..14.................. AC Bus 2 fault .................................. 4........................... Emergency configuration ............... DC Bus 2 fault ....13...................4............................................... Rudder Jam ................... Battery bus fault .............................. Outflow valve closed on ground ...15................................. 5...........................21......................... Flaps and/or slats fault/locked .8......................1.... Battery only ... 4........... 4..15.. Static inverter fault ........ 4........................................11.. Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 ....................3.................. 4......................................Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes 3. 3.....6..... 3...................................13.....19........................................................ Skin valve fault ............. 4.... DC Bus 1 fault . 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 21 23 23 23 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 28 28 28 29 29 31 31 31 32 32 32 33 iv ..................17. AC Essential Shed Bus lost ...........

.............................3.........1....................12............... 8......... Fire ............... ELAC fault ... Speed brake disagree ....................................... Auto feed fault ............................13. 7.......... 8........11. Landing with abnormal landing gear ............................................................... Direct Law ...........6.......................10... 5.................... Speed brake fault ............. Smoke/ fumes removal ....................................... 7..... Wingtip brake fault ..... 6.... SFCC faults ....................... Sidestick unannunciated transducer faults ...............Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes 5... 5....2.................................................... 5.... Alternate Law ........................5. Engine fire ....... Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedals ........ 7............8. 5... 7.... 7. 5........... 7............. 7...... 8..........................................................................................................18...................1............7.................. Landing gear ..... Wing tank pump(s) low pressure ..................................15................... Fuel leak .................... 8................. Low fuel temperature ......8..........4........................ 5...............................5............... 5......................... 5.............. Loss of braking (memory item) . 8...........17............................................... 5.........9.............. Asymmetric braking ...................... Cross-feed valve fault .................................................................. 7.... Residual braking procedure ............. Flap attach sensor failure ............................. Fuel .............. 35 35 36 36 37 37 37 38 38 38 38 38 39 41 41 42 43 45 45 46 46 47 47 47 48 48 48 48 49 49 51 51 51 51 52 52 53 v .........2...................... 5..11.... 6........ FCDC faults ...................................2.12......16...... Flight with landing gear extended ....................................... Outer tank transfer valves failed closed .................. Gravity fuel feeding ......3............................. 8.. Fuel imbalance ...............................4................................ 7...9........... Center tank pumps low pressure .................. Low fuel level .............. 7....................................... 5.......7... Gravity extension ...6......................... Outer tank transfer valve open out of sequence ..........1......... 7................................................. 6...... 5......................19.............. High fuel temperature . Smoke and fumes ........................14........... 7.......................10. 6.................. Flight control servo faults .......................... 8....................................3................. SEC fault ................... 7.

......... 8.....................9................... Antiskid nosewheel steering off ................ 9.. Oil filter clog ...................19... Failure of normal and alternate braking systems .. Nosewheel steering fault .....................8............ 9.22...............8.. Brake system fault ...... LGCIU disagreement ..........3..... Minor nosewheel steering fault ..........................................14................................................2........ Antiskid nosewheel steering fault . Fuel filter clog ............ 8.. Released brakes............. 8.................. Auto brake fault .................................................................... 8..... 53 54 54 54 54 55 55 55 56 56 56 56 57 57 57 57 58 58 58 58 59 59 59 59 61 61 62 63 64 65 65 66 67 67 67 67 vi ....................................29......... Gear doors not closed ................ Engine relight in flight ..... 8.............................................12.....20................................... 9................11.................................. Brakes hot . High oil temperature ....17............ Gear not downlocked .. Dual engine failure ....... 8....................11................................5....... 8...... Gear not down .. 8......... Brake temperature limitations requiring maintenance action ............................... 9................. 8............................................................................. Uplock fault ..18................... Single Engine failure .... 8...............................6....... 8............9............. Failure of alternate braking system ................................................... LGCIU fault ... Power plant .......................30...... 8................ 8................. 8............ normal system ............. 9............. Released brakes...... 9... Park brake on ...................................................... Single engine operation ............. 8........27............... Gear shock absorber fault ............24..15.........28.. Hydraulic selector valve fault ..25...................................26....16...................................... Failure of normal braking system ....Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes 8.......................................................... Brake accumulator low pressure ....10.7. 8............. Gear not uplocked ......7..........23.................1................................. Engine stall .. 9............ 8............................................. 8...................................... Low oil pressure ................................... 9.....13..... 9.21...... 8.... alternate system ... High engine vibration ..................... 8... 8............. Engine tailpipe fire .............. 9...............................10......... 8..... 9... 8.......4..................... 9............

................................. 12...... 11............................... Engine driven pump low pressure ...... Navigation ........ 10.............. 12.. ADR faults .... N1/N2/EGT overlimit .. TCAS warnings (memory item) .................................................. 9.................................... 12............................... 10. ADR disagree ...... Blue system low pressure ...4.... 67 68 68 69 69 69 70 70 71 71 73 73 73 74 75 75 76 76 76 76 77 79 79 79 79 80 80 81 81 81 82 83 83 84 84 84 84 vii ....... Hydraulics ................. Green system low pressure ....................20...9............4....... Thrust lever angle sensor faults ...... 10........................ Green + yellow systems low pressure ................ 9...........Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes 9........................ 10.............. 12................ Blue + yellow systems low pressure ..... 10............................................................................................... FCU faults ............................21. Reverser unlocked in flight .8............ Uncommanded reverser pressurisation .... 9............................................... IR alignment in ATT mode .7.........19............. 10............ 9............................. FAC faults ...16........... 10..... Electric pump low pressure or overheat .......................17.. 9.. EIU fault ............... Ignition faults ......... Yaw damper faults ....... FADEC faults ............................................ Start valve fault ...............................................3..... 12......................... Green + blue systems low pressure ....................8......................................... N1/N2/EGT/FF discrepancy ....... 9..................................... 9.......1.......14........ 11........ Rudder travel limiter faults .................................... Low reservoir air pressure ..........................1...5.... 10...6........................ IR faults ................................................... 9........3....... Start faults ............. FM/GPS position disagree ................ 9..7.................4.......... 10..................................................6................13..... 12.............................................. Yellow system low pressure ....... 12.............. 10................................ Auto-flight ..... 11..............1... IR disagree ......................... RNAV downgrades .............18.................................................5................... 10...........2.... 11...................10. RA faults ............... 11.. 11........2........ EGPWS alerts (memory item) .....................12...5................................ 12.....2...15.. Rudder trim faults .....................9........................................... 12.........3........................ 12.

...... 91 14........1........................ 85 12........12...........4....................................... 89 13.............................................................6... 87 13..........5.............. Window heat fault ....2.... 14............. Single AOA or TAT heat fault .... 87 13. Engine anti-ice valve fault ...... 88 13.3... High pressure detected when wing anti-ice turned on ... Low reservoir fluid level .......................... 89 13................... Failure of two-way radio communication equipment in UK airspace . 95 16......................... 88 13.......... Reservoir overheat ... 85 Ice and rain protection ...... 88 13.............. Display unit failure ............... Wing anti-ice valve closed when commanded open..... Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded closed......11.......... 85 12............... 87 13..................................1.. viii ........................... 89 Indicating/ Recording ........ Wing anti-ice valves fail to close after ground selftest ...........................11.1............... 91 Pneumatic ................................................................................... Probe heat computer failure ..................................................................... Double AOA heat fail ...................... 93 Communications ....10..........7.........................................................................8...................... 88 13................................. Multiple pitot heat failures ..................Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes 12.................. 16...................................10.... 85 12........ 15............. 88 13.......... 93 15................................................................ 95 13........1........ 87 13..13.................... Single pitot probe heat or static port heat fault .......9........................... PTU fault ................ RAT fault .... Dual bleed failure ..

“Green + blue systems low pressure” • Updated electrical/avionics smoke part of Section  6. “Green + yellow systems low pressure”.eclipse. Air conditioning.Change log Change log 1. “Smoke and fumes”. • Improved dual hydraulic failures to make them standalone: Section 12. • Improved Section 5. “Unreliable airspeed (memory item)” to expand on the method for levelling off at prescribed speed.3.3. “Single engine operation” and updated it.2. Section 12. so this has been removed. Changes since version 0. “Smoke and fumes” to incorporate Airbus changes (no incremental shedding of AC ix . 2.co.1.1. This may be found at: http://www.10 redundant. Change highlighting Change highlighting is only available in the online version.hursts. including incorporation of single engine approach considerations. This renders the old section 2.1 • Added note regarding short duration of oxygen protection to Section 6.7. Section 12. • Added multiple new sections to Chapter 3. “Blue + yellow systems low pressure”. “Flaps and/or slats fault/locked”.6. pressurisation and ventilation • Improved Section 2. Also changed "Engine Shut Down" section to Section 9. • Added multiple new sections to Chapter 9.uk Change bars will be incorporated into the printed version as soon as they are supported by the Apache Formatting Objects Processor.1.3. Power plant.

“Gear not downlocked” to incorporate two minute delay after gear cycling recommended in OEB 209. “ADR faults” about gravity gear extension not being mentioned on ECAM for ADR 1+3 loss. • Expanded Section 2. “Bomb on board” to incorporate actual method for achievement of 1 psi diff.4. • Updated Section 8.Change log busses. • Added note to Section 10.19.9.12. • Updated Section 5.4. • Added Section 5. x . “Sidestick unannunciated transducer faults”. “Spoiler faults” to incorporate OEB 208. go straight to Emergency Electrical Config) and Direct Law landing due IR loss gotcha.

consider turning the aircraft to keep the fire away from the fuselage. If evacuation will definitely not be required. Otherwise order "Cabin crew. Below 100kt the RTO is relatively risk free and a decision to stop should be made for any ECAM and most other problems. then to max reverse. any uninhibited ECAM or anything which indicates the aircraft will be unsafe or unable to fly. Once the aircraft has stopped. Operating techniques 1. apply the parking brake. “Loss of braking (memory item)”). and if there is any doubt. CM2 confirms reverse ("Reverse green").1. If the reason for the stop was an engine fire on the upwind side. CM1 takes the radios and asks CM2 to carry out any required ECAM actions.Chapter 1. This decision is communicated with the words "Stop" or "Continue". If a stop is required.7. any fire warning. In this case make a PA of "Cabin crew. “Evacuation”.1. confirms deceleration ("Decel"). CM1 will build up a decision as to whether to evacuate. Monitor automatic braking. During this initial phase. Whilst the ECAM actions are being completed. stow the reversers. once the aircraft's safety is assured the RTO can be discontinued and the runway cleared. Above 100kt the RTO may be hazardous and stopping should only be considered for loss of engine thrust. Operating techniques Chapter 1. announce "Loss of braking" and proceed with the loss of braking memory items (see Section 8. If there is any chance of requiring evacuation. If normal braking fails. CM1 calls "Stop" while simultaneously bringing the thrust levers to idle. Rejected Takeoff The decision to reject rests solely with CM1. informs ATC and announces "70 knots" when appropriate. 1 . cancels any audio warnings. "Stop" implies that CM1 is taking control of the aircraft. apply manual braking as required. normal operations". bring the aircraft to a complete halt. crew at stations" on the PA. If the stop was commenced below 72kt the ground spoilers will not automatically deploy and the autobrake will therefore not engage. and order "Attention. If an evacuation is required see Section 2. CM2 then locates the emergency evacuation checklist. normal operations".

• Cancellation of master warning or master caution when both pilots confirm they are aware of it.3.2.10. Whilst below 400ft. NAV may be used. the brakes can be released by disarming the spoilers. select TOGA (FLX may be used but this tends to allow speed to decay unless pitch is reduced). it must be thoroughly briefed. Operating techniques If the aircraft has come to a complete halt using autobrake MAX. the strategy will be to fly the EOSID with a level acceleration segment (see Section 1. FCOM 3. Once above 400ft with safe flight path assured.10. decide on an initial strategy. “EOSID”). the only failure related actions should be: • If applicable.2.Chapter 1. In rare cases where the cleared SID requires a very early turn it may be necessary to determine and action a strategy when below 400ft. 2 . When airborne. Otherwise. If the EOSID follows the track of the cleared SID.1000] 1. Engage the autopilot once gear is up and rudder is trimmed. usually as part of a PAN or MAYDAY message. • Heightened awareness of the possibility of missing essential normal actions. adjust and trim rudder to maintain β target and request "pull heading". where a loss of thrust has occured or is anticipated. PNF should announce "Engine failure" or "Engine fire" without specifying an engine. Any deviation from the cleared SID will require ATC to be informed as a priority. Failures during takeoff when above V1 If an engine has lost thrust. Bank angle should be limited to 15° when more than 3kt below maneuvering speed for the current configuration. At Vr rotate to 12½° at a slightly reduced rate. it will be to remain on the normal SID and fly a normal climb profile.2. In general.3. apply rudder conventionally on the runway. If this is the case. [EOM B. such as calling rotate or raising the gear due to the distraction of the failure. but this is very rare with easyJet EOSIDs.

but movement of engine master switches. pull heading and make an immediate turn the shortest way onto the EOSID. This climb is continued until all high priority tasks are complete and the aircraft is at or above acceleration altitude.Chapter 1.30. PNF is responsible for everything else.2. • The next segment is a TOGA level acceleration and clean up.3.3.10. If beyond the divergence point. if the aircraft detects a loss of thrust the EOSID will be displayed as a temporary flight plan. Otherwise it will be necessary to pull heading and manually follow either the yellow line or bring up a preprepared secondary flight plan and follow the white line. If the failure has resulted in an ECAM warning. EOSID Before the divergence point (the last common point between the SID and the EOSID). If the fire warning light does not extinguish both squibs must be fired. Electing to fly the EOSID implies a level acceleration segment: • Initially fly a TOGA climb at the higher of V2 or current speed. PF is responsible for moving the thrust levers once confirmed by PNF.2. the failure can be diagnosed and dealt with. up to a limit of V2+15kt. For the engine failure and the engine fire cases. IR selectors and any guarded switch must be confirmed with PF. In this case the temporary flight plan can be inserted and NAV mode used. all ECAM actions up to and including the master switch being turned off must be completed. a FLEX climb is permissable. PF initiates this phase by asking PNF to "Read ECAM".4. For the engine fire case all ECAM actions up to and including firing the first squib must be completed. If a FLEX takeoff was carried out. Operating techniques Once the flight path strategy has been agreed and actioned. PF will take the radios and request PNF to carry out ECAM actions.3 specifically defines the high priority tasks. but easyJet states it as policy in EOMB 4. When applying ECAM procedures. Once the ECAM is confirmed.2000] 1. Airbus specifically recommends against this in FCOM 4. either to Conf 1 and S speed if an immediate VMC return is desired or to Conf 0 3 . EOMB 4.2. [FCOM 3. For an engine failure.

TOGA may be used for a maximum of 10 minutes.Chapter 1. The phrases "Stop ECAM" and "Continue ECAM" can be used to interupt ECAM procedures in order to initiate this segment. • The final segment is a MCT climb segment to MSA. Level acceleration is usually acheived by pushing V/S. 4 . Operating techniques and green dot. This is usually acheived in open climb. either at S speed if in Conf 1 or at green dot speed if in Conf 0. Again FLEX may be used if a FLEX takeoff was carried out.

25. If on an airway.2.4000] 5 . Miscellanneous 2. Emergency descent (memory item) If an emergency descent is required. set them to the N position and establish communication.80. The configuration is thrust idle. [EOM B. allow speed to increase before deploying full speedbrake to prevent activation of the angle of attack protection. restore the aircraft to a normal configuration. Descent with autopilot and autothrottle engaged is preferred. from memory. but speed must be below VLE when it is extended and remain below VLO. QRH 1.1. If speed is low.3. this is the Captain. the Captain should consider taking control if not already PF. taking into account possible structural damage. Once the memory actions are complete and the aircraft is descending.000ft. Put your oxygen masks on and obey the instructions of the cabin crew" Once level. PNF should. set 7700 on the transponder and inform ATC of the descent. turn seatbelt signs on. advise cabin crew and passengers that it is safe to remove their masks.Chapter 2. He should then take over communications and call for the emergency descent checklist. Miscellanneous Chapter 2. Once this is complete. FCOM 3. he should also deploy the cabin oxygen masks. speed and heading. Target altitude is FL100 or MORA if this is higher. Landing gear may be used below 25. full speed brake and maximum appropriate speed.000ft. If cabin altitude will exceed 14. We have lost cabin pressure and are descending to a lower altitude. consider turning 90° to the left. the Captain should make the following PA: "Ladies and Gentlemen. PF should finesse the target altitude.2. When safe to do so.80. set continuous ignition on the engines. Don oxygen masks.

call "Windshear. requiring the autothrust to be disconnected to avoid an overspeed. As TOGA will already be selected.80. Reactive The windshear detection system is a function of the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC). {TODO: This is Boeing advice . or whether getting airborne below Vr would be the better option. A warning is indicated by a red "WINDSHEAR" flag on the PFD and a "WINDSHEAR. If the autopilot is not engaged. WINDSHEAR" aural warning. In severe windshear. SRS will maintain a minimum rate of climb. TOGA LK will be active. Once clear of the windshear. If the FD is not available.1.2. TOGA". It only operates during the takeoff and landing phases with at least CONF 1 selected. apply TOGA power and maintain current configuration. then increase as required. WINDSHEAR. It is possible that these fluctuations may cause V1 to occur significantly later in the takeoff run then it should.2. call "Windshear. initially pitch up to 17. even if airspeed must be sacrificed.2. follow the SRS orders on the FD. it is possible that ALPHA FLOOR protection will activate.Airbus offers no advice if there is insufficient runway available to rotate at normal speeds}. When on the ground. Windshear (memory item) 2.13000] 6 . however. In the takeoff phase. In the landing phase warnings are provided between 1300ft RA and 50ft RA.5°. If the takeoff is to be continued in windshear conditions.Chapter 2. The autopilot can fly the escape maneuvre as long as αreq < αprot. Miscellanneous 2. If a warning occurs when airborne. It therefore falls to the Captain to make an assessment of whether sufficient runway remains to reject the takeoff. windshear is only indicated by significant airspeed variations. this will have no immediate effect. TOGA" and apply TOGA power. [FCOM 3. Rotate at Vr or with sufficient runway remaining and follow SRS orders. warnings are provided from 3 seconds after lift off until 1300ft RA is acheived.

If it occurs during initial climb. If a warning alert occurs during approach. reject the takeoff.14000.2. FCOM 3.4. It is possible that a single remaining good source may be rejected if the other two 7 . Miscellanneous 2. Cautions also give an amber "W/S AHEAD" message on both PFDs and an aural "MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY" warning.2. TOGA". All types of alert produce an indication of windshear position on the ND.91] 2. Unreliable airspeed (memory item) Unreliable airspeed indications may result from radome damage and/or unserviceable probes or ports. apply TOGA thrust and follow SRS orders. If a caution alert occurs during approach.3. Predictive When below 2300ft AGL. call "Windshear. WINDSHEAR AHEAD" aural message.80. the weather radar scans a 5nm radius 60° arc ahead of the aircraft for returns indicating potential windshear. WINDSHEAR AHEAD" or "GO AROUND. Alerts are only provided when between 50ft and 1500ft. A message on the ND instructs the crew to change range to 10nm if not already set. The FMGCs normally reject erroneous ADR data by isolating a single source that has significant differences to the other two sources. Warnings give a red "W/S AHEAD" message on the PFDs and either a "WINDSHEAR AHEAD. Configuration may be changed as long as the windshear is not entered.Chapter 2. the crew may downgrade the warning to a caution.2. Severity is determined by range. If a warning alert occurs during the takeoff roll. in increasing order of severity. caution or warning. [FCOM 3. carry out a normal go-around. providing the ND range is set to 10nm. Altitude indications may also be erroneous if static probes are affected. position and phase of flight. If positive verification is made that no hazard exists. or on the ground when below 100kt. consider use of CONF 3 and increasing VAPP to a maximum of VLS+15. Alerts are categorised as advisory.

15 to extract a ballpark thrust setting. If the aircraft flight path is in doubt. Set the ballpark thrust setting and adjust pitch attitude to fly level. abnormal behavior of the automatics. the FPV must be disregarded. The gear and speedbrake should be retracted. since the aircraft systems may be unable to warn of a problem. it falls to the pilots to identify and turn off the erroneous sources to recover good data. 8 . the required N1 may be as much as 5% greater than the ballpark figure. Miscellanneous sources are erroneous in a sufficiently similar way. Note that in the radome damage case. The first problem is recognition of a failure. Once the flight path is under control and a safe altitude is attained. in which case CONF 3 should be selected. disconnect the automatics and fly the following short term attitude and thrust settings to initiate a climb: Condition Below Thrust Reduction Altitude Below FL100 Above FL100 Thrust TOGA Climb Climb Pitch 15° 10° 5° Flap configuration should be maintained except when a go-around is initiated with flap full. the aircraft should be transitioned into level flight. In this case. the FPV may be used. Correlation of radio altimeter and GPIRS derived data (available on GPS MONITOR page) may also aid identification. The primary method of doing this is correlation of aircraft attitude and thrust to displayed performance. Other clues may include fluctuations in readings. a reference attitude and a reference speed for the current configuration. If there is any doubt over the validity of altitude information. the speed will be equal to the reference speed. high speed buffet or low aerodynamic noise. if barometric altitude data is considered accurate use the VSI. The thrust should then be adjusted until level flight is achieved with the reference attitude. bearing in mind that an auto-retraction of the flap may have occurred. Once stable. If altitude information is definitely good. Refer to QRH 2.Chapter 2. The stall warning (available in alternate or direct law) is based on alpha probes. so will likely be valid. otherwise fly a constant GPS altitude.

refer to QRH 1. turn off any two of them. then recline the seat.6000] 2.20 which include ditching.Chapter 2. Ditching The QRH 1.80.g. FCOM 3.18 of the QRH to enable all phases of flight to be flown using just pitch and thrust settings. turn off the faulty ADRs.2. Flap 1 can be selected as soon as climb thrust is selected.23 procedure applies if the engines are running. move the seat back. Tables are provided on page 2. [QRH 2. The 9 . If at least one ADR is reliable. one is kept on to provide stall warning from the alpha probes. the ADRs can be checked to see if any are giving accurate data. With the speed now known. The approach is flown in CONF 3 at an attitude that should result in VLS+10 when flying a 3° glide. If all ADRs are considered unreliable. [FCOM 3. preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for impact. Miscellanneous If there is insufficient data available to fly level (e. the body can be moved. This will give approximately level flight at approximately reference speed. Landing distance will be increased. Incapacitation (memory item) Take control.2. stabilising in each configuration using the technique described above. Medical help should be sought from passengers.34. If the engines are not running.17 and 2. GPS data unavailable and barometric data unreliable).16 or QRH 1.5.4.30000] 2. flap 0 once the S speed pitch attitudes in the table on QRH 2. Preparation for ditching involves notifying ATC in order to expedite rescue. fly the reference attitude with the ballpark thrust setting. GPS and IRS ground speeds may also be used for an approximate cross check. Contact cabin crew ASAP. Acceleration and clean up are carried out in level flight. and the presence of any type rated company pilots on board ascertained. If there are two members available. They should strap the incapacitated pilot to his seat. using the stick priority button if necessary. Configuration for approach is also carried out in level flight.15.15 are reached.

preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for impact.23. push all fire buttons. spoilers armed. QRH 1. discharge all agents (engine agent 2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft. The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. use config 3 (only slats available) and maintain at least 150kt. If the engines are inoperative.2. If both engines are inoperative. The ram air button is used to ensure that the aircraft will be completely depressurised at touchdown.16 or QRH 1. config full. {TODO: There is a discrepancy between engines operative/ inoperative regarding use of the fire buttons after stopping} [QRH 1. turn the engine and APU masters off.80] 2. At 500ft.16. The bleeds are all turned off and ditching button pushed (ensure pressurisation is in auto for this to work) in order to close all openings below the waterline and reduce water ingress.20 which include forced landing. make a PA "Brace. make a PA "Cabin crew. notify ATC. brace" At touchdown. At 2000ft. At 500ft. refer to QRH 1. brace" 10 . The crew oxygen should be turned off below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous leaks {TODO: this is an assumption}. Forced landing The QRH 1. Miscellanneous GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The engines operative ditching configuration is gear up. If the engines are not running. make a PA "Brace. landing positions". After coming to a stop. 11° pitch and minimal V/S. In lighter winds. Preparation for forced landing involves notifying ATC in order to expedite rescue. make a PA "Cabin crew. use config 3 (only slats available) and maintain at least 150kt.Chapter 2. The engines operative forced landing configuration is gear down.6.24 procedure applies if the engines are running. At 2000ft. config full. The crew oxygen should be turned off below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous leaks {TODO: this is an assumption}. land parallel to swell. landing positions". QRH 1. In strong winds. land into wind.20. FCOM 3.

and pushes all the fire buttons (including the APU). After coming to a stop. FCOM 3.3000] 2. The easyJet procedure is for CM1 to call for the checklist and then send a Mayday message to ATC before commencing the checklist. setting the parking brake and alerting the cabin crew. unfasten your seat belts and get out".80. turn the engine and APU masters off. Finally. and if necessary manually opens the outflow valve. Agents should only be discharged if there are positive signs of fire. Evacuation Evacuation should be carried out in accordance with the emergency evacuation checklist.01. respond "Confirmed" in response to the checklist items once they have been actioned.Chapter 2. FCOM 3. push all fire buttons. discharge all agents (engine agent 2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft.16 & 1.check its correct} The first two items confirm the RTO actions of stopping the aircraft. This will leave accumulator braking only. CM1 does. QRH 7. QRH 1. The next four items prepare the aircraft for evacuation.80. but incorporates the FCTM instruction}. order the evacuation.7.2. notify ATC. CM2 then shuts the engines down with their master switches. In response to the next checklist item. CM1 decides if any extinguishing agents should be discharged and instructs CM2 to discharge them as required.2. The next item confirms ATC has been alerted. If manual cabin pressure has been used.80. Miscellanneous At touchdown. "Agents".020] 11 . set the parking brake. Confirmation is not required before carrying out these actions {TODO: This is not clear from EOM B. Engine agent 2 will not be available. [EOM B.3. CM2 checks cabin diff is zero. {TODO: this strikes me as a bit of an odd order to do things . however.2. FCTM 03. This is primarily done with the PA "Evacuate.{TODO: There is a discrepancy between engines operative/ inoperative regarding use of the fire buttons after stopping} [QRH 1.24. with the evacuation alarm being triggered as a backup.20.

If temperatures exceed 800°C. a speed below VFE next should be selected until CONF 2 is acheived. It is possible that S speed will be higher than VFE next for CONF 2. Start ECAM actions and notify ATC.25. Immediate VMC recovery with single engine Fly circuit in CONF 1. use 1+F for go-around.10. providing sufficient landing distance is available. If planned landing configuration is less than FULL.} [FCOM 3. FCOM 3. Packs should be turned off to provide additional go around thrust.9. Select CONF 3 once gear is down and CONF full when on final approach. Miscellanneous 2. tyre deflation may occur. switch on the brake fans and monitor brake temperatures carefully.2.standard strategy increases the chance of an engine relight.25). [QRH 2.10. Overweight landing A landing can be made at any weight. After landing. Decide on strategy . {TODO: Check how climb gradient/ flap decision is determined.2. Engine failure in cruise Set MCT on live engine then disconnect the autothrust. In this case. reduce speed to acheive VLS at runway threshold.80. whilst obstacle strategy maintains the greatest possible obstacle clearance.3000] 2. but lower settings may be used if required by QRH/ECAM procedures or if aircraft weight exceeds the CONF 3 go around limit (see QRH 2. Maximum braking can be used after nosewheel touchdown. If using standard strategy select 12 . then managed speed can be re-engaged. Gear will usually be extended once flaps have run to 2. The preferred landing configuration is CONF FULL.Chapter 2. but flight tests have demonstrated autoland capability to 69000kg in case of emergency. and apply max reverse as soon as the main gear touches down. Land as smoothly as possible. but may be delayed until final approach if performance is an issue.8. In the final stages of the approach.5000] 2. Select CONF 2 at start of base turn. Automatic landings are certified up to MLW.

descend to LRC ceiling (use V/S if <500 fpm descent rate). a compromise needs to be found. This is acheived by reducing the diff to 1 psi. The generic stall re- 13 . 2.78/300kt. Select altitude to LRC ceiling or green dot ceiling as appropriate to allow drift down once speed is reached. In the cabin.13. The method is to set cabin vertical speed to zero using manual pressurisation control. Miscellanneous speed . then descend to an altitude 2500ft above cabin altitude.12. The tertiary aim is to minimise the effect of any explosion. Gear extension may be delayed until final approach if required.11. 2. procedures are laid down for assessing the risks of moving the device and for moving the device to the LRBL at door 2R. The secondary aim is to prevent detonation of the device. If obstacles remain a problem. This can be ascertained by checking the table in QRH 2. This is acheived by preventing further increases in cabin altitude through the use of manual pressure control and by avoiding sharp maneuvres and turbulence. Bomb on board The primary aim is to get the aircraft on the ground and evacuated ASAP. 2. Automatic pressure control is then reinstated on approach. Stall recovery (memory item) Airbus have determined that there may be insufficient longitudinal control authority to recover from a stall if TOGA is selected. engage the autothrust and continue at LRC speed. Single engine circling It may not be possible to fly level in the standard circling configuration of CONF 3 gear down.Chapter 2. As further descent is required. cabin vertical speed should be adjusted to maintain the 1 psi diff for as long as possible. Once obstacles are no longer a problem. The aircraft should be configured for landing as early as possible to avoid an explosion damaging landing systems.50. MCT and green dot speed can be maintained to give a shallow climbing profile. Low speeds reduce the damage from an explosion but increase the risk of a timed explosion occuring whilst airborne. If using obstacle strategy select green dot speed.

On the ground. 15°. In flight. A stall warning may occur at high altitude to indicate that the aircraft is reaching αbuffet. wings level until it can be confirmed that the warning is spurious. The procedure in this case is essentially to initially assume unreliable airspeed and fly TOGA. Miscellanneous covery is therefore simply to pitch the nose down to break the stall and level the wings. Computer reset Abnormal computer behaviour can often be stopped by interupting the power supply of the affected computer.14. 14 . In this case simply reduce the back pressure on the sidestick and/or reduce bank angle. If a stall warner sounds on takeoff it is likely to be spurious since you are almost certainly in normal law. The general procedure is to interupt the power supply. only the computers listed in the reset table should be considered for reset. 2. wait 3 seconds (5 seconds if a C/B was used). Specific procedures are detailed in the computer reset tables on page 2.Chapter 2.000ft) deploy the slats by selecting flaps 1. almost all computers can be reset. then wait another three seconds for the reset to complete. smoothly apply thrust. This can be done either with cockpit controls or with circuit breakers. restore the power.36 of the QRH. Once there are no longer any indications of the stall. The exceptions are the ECU and EIU while the associated engine is running and the BDCU when the aircraft is not stopped. check speedbrakes retracted and if appropriate (clean and below 20.

FCOM 3. A possible reason for this failure is loss of both channels of an Air Conditioning System Controller (ACSC). Initiate a descent.2. Air conditioning. The affected pack should be turned off. Once the descent is established and all relevant checklists are complete.3.1. [CAB PR EXCESS CAB_ALT.21.21. pressurisation and ventilation 3. pressurisation and ventilation Chapter 3.2. 10 minutes before landing.25000. cabin for ACSC 2).2. both packs are turned off and remain off.Chapter 3. even if not backed up by other indications. Cabin overpressure There is no ECAM in the case of total loss of pressure control leading to an overpressure. check the position of the outflow valve and.5000] 3. Air conditioning. if it is not fully closed. this should be according to Section 2. The ΔP is monitored.1. the associated hot air trimming will also be lost (cockpit for ACSC 1. [QRH 2. use manual control to close it. FCOM 1. The basic procedure is to reduce air inflow by turning off one of the packs and put the avionics ventilation system in its smoke removal configuration so that it dumps cabin air overboard.01. “Emergency descent (memory item)”.27000] 3. FCOM 3. 15 .20. The initial response should be to protect yourself by getting an oxygen mask on. If this occurs. so apply the QRH procedure. and the avionics ventilation is returned to its normal configuration. and the remaining pack is turned off if it exceeds 9 psi. if above FL160. Excess cabin altitude An ECAM warning of excess (>9550ft) cabin altitude should be relied upon. Pack fault The PACK FAULT ECAM indicates that the pack valve position disagrees with the selected position or that the pack valve is closed.21.

4. and is capable of supplying all of the air conditioning requirement. Pack overheat The associated pack flow control valve closes automatically in the event of a pack overheating (outlet temp > 260°C or outlet temp > 230°C four times in one flight).2000.21. the pack will continue to operate but there may be a degradation in temperature 16 . Regardless of the device at fault. [AIR PACK 1(2) OFF. ram air must be used. This is usually the result of neglecting to re-instate the packs after a packs off takeoff.21. the compressor outlet temperature sensor or the flow control valve. the ram air inlet. turn the affected pack(s) on.21. This system's automatic response is backed up by turning off the pack.10.21. Pack regulator faults A regulator fault is defined as a failure of one of four devices: the bypass valve.5. Pack off A warning is generated if a functional pack is selected off in a phase of flight when it would be expected to be on. the ramification is the same.2.6000] 3. pressurisation and ventilation If there are simultaneous faults with both packs.3000.6000] 3. If a PACK button FAULT light subsequently extinguishes.21. FCOM 3. The FAULT light in the PACK button remains illuminated whilst the overheat condition exists.1000. an attempt should be made to reinstate that pack. The remaining pack will automatically go to high flow. The ECAM bleed page can be used to determine which device is at fault.2. Air conditioning.6000] 3. The pack can be turned back on once it has cooled. FCOM 3.Chapter 3.10. FCOM 1. FCOM 1. Unless there is a reason not to. FCOM 1. This will necessitate depressurisation of the aircraft.2. [AIR PACK 1(2)(1+2) FAULT.21. so a decent to FL100 (or MEA if higher) is required.6.10. [AIR PACK 1(2) OVHT. FCOM 3.

the packs will provide basic temperature regulation.2. This light will extinguish when the temperature drops to 70°C. FCOM 1. Duct overheat A duct overheat is defined as a duct reaching 88°C or a duct reaching 80°C four times in one flight. Manual control may be effective.10000.6000] 3. FCOM 1. If this occurs. FCOM 3.2. [COND FWD CAB/AFT CAB/CKPT DUCT OVHT. [AIR PACK 1(2) RECUL FAULT.6000] 17 .21. Hot air fault If the hot air pressure regulating valve is not in it's commanded position. basic temperature regulation will continue to be provided by the packs.7. pressurisation and ventilation regulation.8. FCOM 1. If temperatures become uncomfortable. Once the duct has cooled.21.Chapter 3. ACSC single lane failure Each ACSC has two fully redundant "lanes".21. FCOM 3.6000. If it is closed when commanded open. FCOM 1.3.10.5000] 3. Air conditioning. consideration should be given to turning off the affected pack.21.10.10. [COND HOT AIR FAULT.21. but if it is not the only option is to turn off both packs and proceed as per Section 3. FCOM 3.6000] 3.21. the hot air pressure regulating valve and trim air valves close automatically and the FAULT light illuminates in the HOT AIR button. More serious is if it has been commanded closed in response to a duct overheat and it fails to close. FCOM 3.6000. [AIR COND CTL 1(2)_A(B) FAULT. so loss of a single "lane" results in loss of redundancy only.38000.10.10.5000. FCOM 1.5000.21.2.10.2. an attempt can be made to recover the hot air system by cycling the HOT AIR button.21. “Pack fault”.21.9. the effects will depend on it's actual position.21. FCOM 1. If recovery is not possible.

Loss of the fans therefore leads to loss of accurate zone temperature indication.23000] 18 . This occurs during the first 30 seconds after the packs are selected on and in flight if all zone heating demands are fulfilled. Failure of a trim valve leads to loss of optimized temperature regulation for the corresponding zone. temperature control reverts to maintenance of a fixed cabin zone inlet duct temperature of 15°C. Cabin fan faults If both cabin fans fail. Lavatory and galley fan faults The cabin zone temperature sensors are normally ventilated by air extracted by these fans. the duct temperatures are maintained at the same level as the cockpit duct temperature. On older aircraft. Air conditioning. [COND L + R CAB FAN FAULT.21. FCOM 1.Chapter 3. [COND L + R CAB FAN FAULT. An associated message indicates which condition exists. their flow should be replaced by increasing the pack flow to HI.1.11000.21. basic temperature regulation is still available. On newer aircraft the temperature controls for the cabin revert to controlling temperature in the ducts. The TRIM AIR HIGH PR message may be disregarded if triggered when all the trim air valves are closed.10. and may therefore be controlled with the cockpit temperature selector.22000] 3.2.3000.12. {TODO: FCOM is not very informative regarding response to overpressure when this does not apply.21.10.10.21. Investigate further.6000] 3. FCOM 3. If ACSC 2 has also failed. FCOM 3. FCOM 1.21. FCOM 3.11. pressurisation and ventilation 3.2. Trim air faults Either a fault with one of the trim air valves or an overpressure downstream of the hot air valve.} [COND TRIM AIR SYS FAULT.

FCOM 3. which may cause passenger discomfort. depressurise the aircraft by turning off both packs. FCOM 1. Outflow valve closed on ground If the outlow valve fails to automatically open on the ground.2.13. [CAB PR OFV NOT OPEN. and it may be 10 seconds before positive control of the outflow valve can be verified. FCOM 3. 19 . Air conditioning.28000. If that doesn't work.20.21. If diff pressure is above 8psi. If the rate of descent of the aircraft is not reduced. pressurisation and ventilation 3.15. Open safety valve There are safety valves for both cabin overpressure and negative differential pressure. [CAB PR LO DIFF PR.14. Low diff pressure High rates of descent may lead to the aircraft descending through the cabin altitude when more than 3000ft above the landing altitude.16. FCOM 3.2. the associated ECAM message does not distinguish between the two. The aircraft's vertical speed should be reduced unless there is a pressing reason not to.21. it is the overpressure valve that has opened. manual control should be attempted.Chapter 3.21.26000] 3.5000] 3. An ECAM warning indicates that this situation is projected to occur within the next 1½ minutes. Attempt manual pressurisation control and if that fails.21.2.30000] 3. [CAB PR SYS 1(2)(1+2) FAULT. Pressure controller faults Loss of a single cabin pressure controller leads to loss of redundancy only. It may also react too slowly to prevent a temporary depressurization. use manual control. If both pressure controllers are lost. reduce aircraft altitude. the pressure controllers will have to resort to high rates of change of cabin altitude. The outflow valve reacts slowly in manual mode.

18. the aircraft must be depressurized {TODO: find out why}.21.30. the extract valve is fully open in flight or the extract valve did not automatically close on application of take-off power. FCOM 3.21.7000] 3. This puts the avionics ventilation into closed configuration and adds cooling air from the air conditioning system. Unless there is a DC ESS Bus fault. Blower fault Defined as low blowing pressure or duct overheat. FCOM 1. Reduce aircraft vertical speed or expect high cabin rates. the system should be put into smoke configuration.2. If the fault is with the inlet valve.30.21.7000] 20 .20. it is the negative differential valve. If the extract valve is affected.33000.{TODO:investigate involvement of DC ESS BUS fault} [VENT BLOWER FAULT.34000. no action is required since it incorporates a non-return valve.21.21. pressurisation and ventilation If diff pressure is below zero. [VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT.17. FCOM 3. The ECAM Cab Press page will differentiate.21.35000. [CAB PR SAFETY VALVE OPEN.21.30. If this fails. The extract fan should be put in OVRD. FCOM 3.2. this sends additional close signals to the extract valve.7000] 3. FCOM 1. [VENT EXTRACT FAULT.36000. the blower fan should be set to OVRD.5000] 3. This puts the avionics ventilation into closed configuration and adds cooling air from the air conditioning system.21.Chapter 3. FCOM 1. Skin valve fault Defined as one of three faults: the inlet valve is not fully closed in flight.19.2. FCOM 1. Extract fault Defined as low extract pressure. FCOM 3.2. Air conditioning.

FCOM_1.7000] 21 .20. Air conditioning. FCOM 3.21.37000.30. Avionics ventilation system vault Defined as either a valve not in its commanded position or the Avionics Equipment Ventilation Controller (AEVC) being either unpowered or failing its power-up test.2.21.Chapter 3. pressurisation and ventilation 3. No crew action is required. [VENT AVNCS SYS FAULT. The system will automatically default to a safe configuration similar to smoke configuration.

 Air conditioning. pressurisation and ventilation 22 .Chapter 3.

FCOM 1.01.Chapter 4.must have been part of CBT}. QRH 1.24. QRH 1.1.2. center tank fuel is unusable). Landing speeds and distances are increased significantly. Once 45 seconds have elapsed and when below FL250.24.01 provides details of remaining equipment.05 provides a paper summary which should be applied once ECAM actions are complete. If normal power cannot be restored. [ELEC ESS BUSES ON BAT.5000. [ELEC EMER CONFIG. Emergency configuration Attempt to restore normal power by recycling the main generators. FCOM 3. FCOM 3.20. Electrical 4. This is very similar to the emergency electrical configuration (see Section 4. try again after splitting the systems with the BUS TIE button.01 provides a table of surviving equipment.01. If that fails.05. Electrical Chapter 4.20. “Emergency configuration”) with the additional loss of FAC1 and FMGC1. the APU can be started. Battery only Power is available for approximately 30 minutes {TODO: Can't find a reference for this .2. QRH 1.17000] 4.1. Notable losses are all the fuel pumps (so ignition on. Cycling FAC 1 will recover rudder trim.24. So much equipment is lost in the emergency configuration that QRH 1. ensure that the emergency generator is on line (deploy the RAT manually if required) and maintain speed >140kt to avoid RAT stall. QRH 1.2. avoid negative G. FCOM 1. QRH 1. An attempt should be made to bring the emergency generator on line by ensuring speed is >140kt and deploying the RAT with the EMER ELEC PWR MAN ON button.24.19000] 23 . the anti-skid and three fifths of the spoilers.5000.

4. the APU generator should be used if available.1000] 4.5000. FCOM 3. Once Essential AC is powered. FCOM 3. Single generator operation leads to shedding of the galley. FCOM 3. Manual re-routing is achieved with the AC ESS FEED button. Generator fault Try to reset the generator by turning it off.20. 24 .24.24.24.Chapter 4.4}000] 4. This is automatic on some aircraft. then after a short pause. FCOM 1. [ELEC(APU) GEN (1)(2) FAULT.5000. AC Bus 1 fault Some or all of the equipment on AC bus 1 becomes unavailable.6. If an engine driven generator cannot be recovered. {2.5000] 4.5.3.20.2.24. the Essential TR powers the DC Essential bus. The APU generator should be used if available. [ELEC BAT 1(2) FAULT. Do not press the button for more than 3 seconds. [ELEC IDG 1(2) OIL LO PR/OVHT.2. Assuming the associated engine is running. turning it on again. Loss of an engine driven generator leads to loss of CAT III DUAL capability.2. Electrical 4. DC Bus 2 is powered from DC Bus 1 via the battery bus. If unsuccessful.20.5000.24. Power must be re-routed to the Essential AC bus via AC bus 2. turn it back off.24. FCOM 1. IDG low oil pressure/ high oil temperature The IDG should be disconnected. press the IDG button until the GEN FAULT light comes on. FCOM 1. including TR1. APU battery start is unavailable with a single battery. Battery fault The affected battery contactor opens automatically.

Landing distances are unchanged.24. FCOM 1.5000.20.9000] 4.2.2. including TR2. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. FCOM 1. the avionics blower fan and p1 windshield heat. The major issue is the loss of the passenger oxygen masks. FCOM 3. DC bus 2 is powered from DC bus 1 via the battery bus.24.24.24. AC Bus 2 fault Some or all of the equipment on AC bus 2 becomes unavailable. AC Essential Shed Bus lost Some or all of the equipment on the AC ESS SHED bus is lost.24. Landing distances are unchanged.2.12000 . FCOM 1.7. [ELEC AC ESS BUS SHED.5000.24. the nose wheel steering. with the loss of the Captain's PFD and ND and a downgrade to Cat I being the major issues. If this is unsuccessful.5000.2. Electrical Notable lost equipment includes the blue hydraulic system and associated services (including spoiler 3). some or all of the equipment on the AC ESS bus will be lost. [ELEC AC BUS 1 FAULT. radio altimeter 1 (and hence Cat III capability). Landing distances are unchanged.5000.20.check once new FCOM 3 is issued}.24. half the fuel pumps.2. The majority of this equipment has a redundant backup.24. The majority of this equipment has a redundant backup. AC Ess Bus fault It may be possible to recover the bus by transferring its power source to AC BUS 2 with the AC ESS FEED button.32 and FCOM 3. Landing distance will increase by up to 25% {TODO: There is a discrepancy between QRH 2.20.9. FCOM 1.10000] 4.11000] 25 . [ELEC AC ESS BUS FAULT.80.8000] 4.20.8. FCOM 3.Chapter 4. [ELEC AC BUS 2 FAULT. the loss of the FO's PFD and ND and a downgrade to Cat I being the major issue.

 Electrical 4. 26 . The other lost systems either have redundant backups or are non-essential.24. [ELEC DC BUS 2 FAULT. the slats and flaps will be slow and the engines will remain in approach idle. Since VHF1 is also lost. FCOM 3. Wing anti-ice is also lost. SEC 1 and FAC 1. so ADR3 should be selected on the F/O's side. F/O window heat. Of particular note. FCOM 3.11. and all comms are lost.24.13000] 4. DC Bus 2 fault Some or all of the equipment on DC Bus 2 is lost. FCOM 1. Landing distance increases by up to 35% due to the loss of 3 ground spoilers per side and one reverser. so landing distances will also increase significantly if ice is accreted and increased approach speeds are required. Airbus is working on a fix. but this will not work. FCU1 is lost.24. so the baro refs should be checked. The F/O's static probe sensor is lost.5000.10.24.2. the ECAM suggests using VHF2 and VHF3.Chapter 4.12000] 4. Most of the equipment loss causes loss of redundancy only.20. The GPWS is lost and should be turned off. It should be noted that the only flight computers remaining are ELAC 1. Due to the loss of SFCC2.20. [ELEC DC BUS 1 FAULT. apparently. DC Essential Bus fault Some or all of the equipment in the DC Essential Bus is lost.2. so the characteristic speeds on both PFDs are provided by FAC1. Autobrake is also unavailable.12. FCU2 is lost. DC Bus 1 fault Some or all of the equipment on DC Bus 1 is lost. FAC2 is lost. wipers and rain repellant is lost. Landing distances are increased due to the loss of reverser 2 and the loss of the blue hydraulic system (and hence spoiler 3). Landing distances are unchanged. the audio cards connecting VHF2 and VHF3 to the Audio Management Unit are lost. FCOM 1.5000. so check that the baro ref on the FCU and PFD agree.

[ELEC GEN 1(2) OVERLOAD.24] 4. [ELEC DC ESS BUS FAULT.24. loss of SFCC2 means that flaps and slats are slow.15000] 4. All other systems are relatively insignificant or have redundant backups.14000] 4.24. Both channels of the BSCU are lost (leads to loss of anti-skid) along with 3 spoilers from each side and both reversers. Landing capability is Cat 2 due to the loss of the auto-thrust. avoid icing conditions. [ELEC DC ESS BUS SHED. Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 Some or all of the systems supplied by DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 are lost.20. the fuel in it becomes unusable.5000.24. As the center tank cannot gravity feed. FCOM 1. and apply landing distance procedure if ice accretes. ELEC APU GEN OVERLOAD. FCOM 3.24. This significantly increases landing distances. Finally. and engine idle control reverts to approach idle.2.2.2. FCOM 3.20.24. Electrical Slats and flaps are slow due to the loss of SFCC1.5000. The ECAM status page incorrectly reports Cat 3 single. This also leads to the engines reverting to approach idle.21000] 27 .13.14. Also of note is that both center tank pumps are lost. Generator overload Shed some load by switching off the galleys.24. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. Therefore. FCOM 1.15. FCOM 1.5000.20. DC Essential shed The only major issue is the loss of wing anti-ice.2. particularly in the wet.20.24. [ELEC DC BUS 1+2 FAULT. FCOM 1.Chapter 4.5000.

20.5000. If the fault is with TR1 or TR2. [ELEC DC BAT BUS FAULT. “Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2”) and the battery bus (see Section 4.2.19.24.17. ELEC ESS TR FAULT. DC ESS BUS and DC BAT BUS.14.2. so all comments regarding these failures apply. DC Emergency configuration Defined as the loss of DC BUSSES 1 + 2.24. [ELEC TR 1(2). “Battery bus fault”).24. FCOM 1. In addition.Chapter 4.24.5000.20. FCOM 1.5000.2. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. FCOM 1.23000] 4.24.24. [ELEC DC EMER CONFIG.20. a minimum of 140kt must be maintained to avoid RAT stall.24. FCOM 3. Loss of TR No systems are lost as a result of failure of a single TR. The check list assumes that DC ESS BUS can be recovered by deploying the RAT with the EMER ELEC PWR button.22000 ] 4. The only major items lost are APU fire detection and APU battery start.16. The lost equipment is the sum of loss of DC BUS 1. Electrical 4. FCOM 1. Battery bus fault Some or all of the equipment on the Battery bus is lost.25000] 28 . DC BUS 2 (see Section 4. Static inverter fault Normal operations are not affected.20. only Cat 3 single will be available.5000. FCOM 3. This combination leads to an extreme increase in landing distance requirement.17. [ELEC STAT INV FAULT.24.18.2.24000] 4.

20.5000. acceptable to attempt a single reset if it is judged necessary for the safe continuation of the flight.21.Chapter 4. however.5000.2. Generator 1 line off The GEN 1 LINE button on the emergency electrical panel manually opens the generator 1 line contactor. any circuit breakers other than those for the fuel pumps may be reset as long as the action is coordinated with MOC.26000] 4. If it's not meant to be off. turn it on. On the ground. [C/B TRIPPED. Electrical 4. It is used for the smoke drill. FCOM 1. FCOM 1.24.24. [ELEC EMER GEN 1 LINE OFF. Tripped circuit breakers It is generally not recommended to reset circuit breakers in flight.2.24. The ECAM warning will be triggered if a green circuit breaker trips. leaving generator 2 to supply GEN 2. FCOM 3.20. It is.24.20.27000 ] 29 . FCOM 3.

 Electrical 30 .Chapter 4.

40. Elevator faults If a single elevator fails.8000.07. FCOM 3.40. power must be applied very slowly if control is not to be lost. In addition. If the stabilizer could not be moved.12. but Normal Law will remain.{TODO: This is Boeing advice . The procedure in this case is similar.32000.2. Stabilizer jam Manual pitch trim is a mechanical connection to the stabilizer actuator. FCOM 1. FCOM 3.27. Do not try to flare using trim and do not remove power until after touchdown.2.1.check if it is relevant to Airbus} [F/CTL L(R)(L+R) ELEV FAULT.23000. The flight controls will revert to Alternate Law. It may be possible to use manual pitch trim when the ELACs have detected a stabilizer jam. so pitch reverts to mechanical back up and roll reverts to direct law. FCOM 3. Flight controls Chapter 5.27. Flight controls 5. gear extension should be delayed until CONF 3 and VAPP are acheived so that the elevators are properly trimmed. In the event of a go-around.2. FCOM 1.2. For the approach fly a long final. From 1000ft AAL.8000.27. If the jam is caused by the mechanical connection. the only mechanism for pitch control available is manual pitch trim.2.33000] 31 . although it may be heavier than normal. the SECs use the remaining elevator to provide pitch control in alternate law (see Section 5.27. trim for neutral elevators.Chapter 5.27. FCOM 3.27.25000] 5. try to keep power changes to within 2% N1. “Alternate Law”). initiating the descent from at least 5000ft AAL. If it is useable. [F/CTL STABILIZER JAM. If both elevators fail. QRH 2. speed brake should not be used and the autopilots are unserviceable {TODO: Find out why}. it is possible that the ELACs will not detect the problem.

 Aileron faults The lateral aircraft handling is not adversely affected even if both ailerons fail. VAPP and LDG DIST factors are available in OEB 208/1.3.26000. Fuel burn will increase significantly.27.40.27000] 5. [F/CTL L(R) AIL FAULT. FCOM 3. [F/CTL (GND) SPLR (1+2)(3+4) FAULT. Spoiler faults The effect of a spoiler fault depends on whether the spoiler fails retracted or extended. OEB 208/1.27. A CONF 3 landing may reduce any buffeting that is encountered. FCOM 1. Speed brake should not be used if spoilers 3 + 4 are affected. The loss of ground spoilers will increase landing distances by up to 55% (details in QRH 2. handling should not be adversely affected. however. Rudder Jam The main indication of jammed rudder is undue and adverse pedal movement during rolling maneuvers caused by the yaw damper orders being fed back to the pedals when they are no longer sent to the rudder.32). and it should be disconnected. as the systems compensate by using the spoilers. This has the effect of a spoiler failing in the fully extended position. but may not be viable if there is excessive buffet .attempt to find a compromise speed.40. If the spoiler failes in the retracted position.2.22000] 5. Green dot speed will minimize this increased fuel burn.4. the autopilot does not necessarily have sufficient authority to control the aircraft. FCOM 3.Chapter 5. increase by approximately 6%.2. Flight controls 5. FCOM 3. Airbus have identified a failure scenario that leads to high pressure hydraulic fluid reaching the extend chamber of a spoiler actuator via a failed o-ring. Fuel consumption will.2. FCOM 1. 32 . Landing will be flap 3.27.27. In this case.8000.5.27. FMGC fuel predictions do not account for the failure and should be disregarded.8000.

Chapter 5. Flight controls Crosswinds from the side that the rudder is deflected should be avoided, and a cross wind limit of 15kt applies. Control on the ground will require differential braking until the steering handle can be used (below 70kt), so landing distances are increased. Do not use autobrake.
[F/CTL RUDDER JAM, QRH 2.06, FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.34000]

5.6. Flaps and/or slats fault/locked
The most pressing concern following a flap or slat problem is to establish a max operating speed that will avoid overspeeding the device in its locked position. A table is provided on page 2.05 of the QRH for this purpose, but a quick estimation can be made by establishing what flap lever position would be required to get the device into its current position and using VFE for the configuration associated with that flap lever position as VMO. In doing this, it must be remembered that slat deployment in CONF 2 and CONF 3 is the same (tip: think of available slat positions as being 0, 1, Intermediate or Full). This also affects use of the QRH table; the second dot on the slat indicator on the E/WD should be considered slat 3 for the purpose of this table, not slat 2 as might be expected. The barber's pole displayed for VFE on the PFD is a function of the flap lever position, so it may be worth initially selecting the flap lever to the matching CONF to have this reference available. For minimum speeds, the VLS displayed on the PFD is calculated from actual flap and slat position and can be trusted. Unless there is an obvious reason not to (e.g. wing tip brake on, alignment fault or fault due to dual hydraulic failure), the flap lever can be recycled. If normal operation cannot be restored, there are two major issues that must be quickly addressed. Firstly, fuel burn will be dramatically higher when flying with a locked device. With slats extended, fuel burn will increase by 60%. With flaps extended it will increase by 80%. With slats and flaps extended, fuel burn will double. The paragraph at the bottom of page 2.05 of the QRH provides these figures. The second issue is that landing distances are significantly increased, in the worst case by a factor of 2.2. Landing distance can be assessed using the tables on page 2.32 and 4.03 of the QRH. It may be that the combination of these factors requires a fairly prompt diversion decision.

33

Chapter 5. Flight controls The flap and slat systems are largely independent, so the flap lever will continue to move the slats if the flaps are locked and vice versa. In general, flap 3 should be selected for landing. There are two exceptions. If flaps are locked at >3, flap full should be used. If both slats and flaps are locked at 0, flap 1 should be used so that the AP/FD go-around is armed. Configurations and VREF increments are available on page 2.32 of the QRH. If a flapless and slatless landing is required, the threshold speed in may be below VLS. This is necessary as the landing speeds in this configuration are very close to tyre limit speeds. During configuration, VLS is computed from actual configuration and VFE next is computed from flap lever position. F and S speeds are essentially meaningless. The deployment method is to reduce speed to slightly (5kt) below the limiting speed for a configuration before selecting it. If VLS>VFE next, prioritise VLS: fly VLS, select the next configuration, then track VLS as it reduces with the extension of the lift device. In most cases, overspeed warnings can be avoided. It is worth noting that failure of the slat channels of both SFCCs appears to result in the loss of characterisic speed display on both PFDs. This is not mentioned in the FCOM but occurs in the sim. The upshot of this is that neither VLS nor VSW are available at all, since they are not displayed and there is no way to calculate them. This is of particular concern when trying to configure to flaps 2 since the aircraft must be slowed to VFE(conf 2)-5 when still clean (remember conf  1 is slats only when configuring from conf  0). It is highly likely that the stall warner will activate during the transition, and if not anticipated, the subsequent recovery will overspeed the flaps. The solution is to brief that speed will be reduced very slowly and if the stall warning occurs the speed will be maintained whilst allowing the deployment of the flaps to recover the stall margin. The autopilot may be used down to 500ft AAL, but since it is not tuned for the abnormal configuration it must be closely monitored. For the go-around, initially maintain flap/ slat configuration. A speed 10kt lower than max operating speed should be flown. If it is the slats that are jammed or if the flaps are jammed at 0, clean configuration can be used to transit to a diversion airfield.

34

Chapter 5. Flight controls Other issues include the possible loss of the automatic operation of the centre tank pumps (which is sequenced to the slats) and possible reversion to Alternate Law.
[F/CTL FLAPS(SLATS) FAULT(LOCKED), QRH 2.03, FCOM 1.27.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.1000, FCOM 3.2.27.2000, FCOM 3.2.27.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.4000]

5.7. SFCC faults
Each SFCC has fully independent slat and flap channels. A failure of a channel in a single controller will lead to slow operation of the associated surfaces. In addition, the flap channel of SFCC1 provides input to the idle control part of the FADECs and to the EGPWC. Failure of both flap channels or failure of both slat channels is covered in Section 5.6, “Flaps and/or slats fault/locked”.
[F/CTL FLAP(SLAT) SYS 1(2) FAULT, FCOM 1.27.50.3000, FCOM 3.2.27.5000, FCOM 3.2.27.6000]

5.8. ELAC fault
In normal operations, ELAC 1 controls the ailerons and ELAC 2 controls the elevators and stabiliser. Failure of a single ELAC will result in failover to the remaining computer. Provided no uncommanded maneuvres occured, an attempt can be made to reset the failed ELAC. Failure of both ELACs leads to loss of ailerons and hence Alternate Law. One of the SECs will take over control of the elevators and stabiliser. Again, an attempt can be made to reset the computers. If the fault is designated a pitch fault, only the pitch function of the associated ELAC is lost.
[F/CTL ELAC 1(2) FAULT, FCOM 1.27.40.8000, FCOM 3.2.27.11000, FCOM 3.2.27.12000]

35

SEC 1 provides spoiler position to the FACs. due to routing of LGCIU data to the ELACs via the SECs. so a single failure has no immediate effect. The major effect of this is that F/CTL ECAM warnings are no longer generated.20000] 36 . SEC fault Each SEC controls either 1 or 2 spoilers per wing.10. spoiler 2 will deploy without a corresponding increase in VLS. do not use speedbrake if SEC 1 is affected (it won't do much anyway!).2. Therefore. Also.40. [F/CTL FCDC 1(2)(1+2) FAULT. FCOM 1. If all SECs are lost.2. FCOM 3. all the above holds true. Direct Law will occur at slat extension rather than gear extension.8000. If both FCDCs fail. The aircraft remains in normal law with all protections.14000] 5.8. the ELACs and SECs can no longer supply data to the EIS. but protection indications (bank and pitch limits. Furthermore the flight controls revert to Alternate Law due to the complete loss of spoilers. A dual SEC failure will therefore lead to a loss of a reverser and loss of autobraking.27. Loss of a SEC leads to loss of its associated spoilers. If speedbrakes are deployed with SEC 1 u/s and SEC 3 operative. The warning lights on the overhead panel continue to give valid information and should be monitored. FCOM 1. Vα‑prot and Vα‑max) are not shown and the stall warning system becomes active. “ELAC fault”).27. SEC 1 and 2 also provide back up for the ELACs (see Section 5.27. Flight controls 5. FCOM 3.9. FCDC faults The two FCDCs are redundant.27. [F/CTL SEC 1(2)(3) FAULT.Chapter 5. An attempt should be made to reset the affected SEC(s).8000. Pairs of SECs also provide the signal for reverse thrust lever angle to the reversers and spoiler deployment to the autobrake.40.

“Direct Law”).40. Flight controls 5.000] 5. [F/CTL DIRECT LAW. Approach speed is increased by 10kt and landing distances increase by a factor of 1. FCOM 1.2. Protections are unavailable. FCOM 3. [F/CTL FLAP(SLAT) TIP BRK FAULT. FCOM 3.8000. mechanism overspeed. Similarly. Alternate Law In alternate law. The main effects are that speed is limited to 320kt and stall warnings must be respected when carrying out EGPWS maneuvers. This protection is lost.7000] 37 . Direct Law In Direct Law.11.18000] 5.40.50.2.12.27.2. FCOM 3.32).11. use of the speed brake will result in nose up pitch changes so it should be used with care. FCOM 1. The controls are very sensitive at high speeds. Wingtip brake fault The wingtip brakes activate in case of assymetry. Expect Direct Law after landing gear extension (see Section 5.77M and care must be taken in GPWS or windshear maneuvres.2. Use of manual thrust is recommended as power changes will result in pitch changes. so speed is limited to 320kt/0.Chapter 5. [F/CTL ALTN LAW. pitch is as in normal law. Stall warnings and overspeed warnings become active. Load factor protection is retained. deflection of the control surfaces is a linear function of deflection of the side-stick and trimming must be done manually.13.15000. FCOM 1.27.27. but roll is as in direct law.27.3000. and hence increased approach speeds and landing distances (see QRH 2. depending on the nature of the failure.27. symmetrical runaway or uncommanded movements. but other protections are either replaced with static stability or are lost.27.

40. so providing reversers are used. Speed brake disagree This indicates that the spoiler positions do not correspond with the speedbrake lever position.27. FCOM 1.27.14.2.9000] 5. FCOM 1.50. FCOM 1. [F/CTL FLAP ATTACH SENSOR.2.27. Control forces will 38 . FCOM 3. but not the rudder pedals or it may affect the rudder pedals and one sidestick. [F/CTL AIL(ELEV) SERVO FAULT. FCOM 3. [F/CTL SPD BRK DISAGREE.27. FCOM 1. Ground spoiler activation may be expected on selection of reverse. FCOM 3.Chapter 5.28000] 5.40.17. a restriction to not use speedbrake above VMO/MMO applies.2.40.8000. Flight control servo faults All flight controls have redundant servos.16. Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedals This may affect both sidesticks at the same time.8000.27. [F/CTL SPD BRK (2)(3+4) FAULT. This protection is lost. In both cases retract the speedbrake lever and in the case of spoiler malfunction consider the speedbrakes unserviceable.24000] 5.29000] 5. landing distances should not be affected. FCOM 3.8000. In the case of an elevator servo fault.27.27. Speed brake fault This indicates a failure of the speedbrake lever transducers rather than a problem with the spoilers.27.15. Flap attach sensor failure The flap attach sensor detects excessive differential movement between the inner and outer flaps which would indicate failure of a flap attachment. FCOM 3.21000.2.3000.27. Flight controls 5.18.2. This may be as a result of automatic retraction (alpha floor activation or speed brakes deployed when full flap selected) or as a result of spoiler malfunction.

19. 39 .07. the result is that the aircraft behaves as if that input had actually been made. use the FCU instead. Sidestick unannunciated transducer faults It is possible for a failed sidestick transducer to cause uncommanded control inputs. Keeping this button pressed for 40 seconds will lock out the failed sidestick. and the autopilot can then be re-engaged.2. the autopilot will disconnect and any attempt to control the aircraft with the failed sidestick will fail. [QRH 2. Generally. The autopilot should not be disconnected in the normal manner as pressing the takeover button will re-introduce the failed sidestick and the uncommanded input. If no fault is detected.42000] 5. FCOM 3.Chapter 5. Confirm autopilot disengagement and consider transferring control if one of the sidesticks is unaffected. The aircraft should be recovered with the other sidestick using the takeover button.27. Flight controls remain moderate and the aircraft remains responsive.

 Flight controls 40 .Chapter 5.

The smoke removal drill is most effective and adaptable at lower levels. interrupt the checklist and carry out the smoke removal drill (see Section 6.2. In general. Therefore immediate initial actions are to turn off the cabin fans and galleys and put the avionics ventilation in smoke removal mode by selecting both fans to OVRD. at minimum dispatch oxygen levels this will provide as little as 15 minutes of protection. It is also possible that the situation may deteriorate to a level that an immediate forced landing becomes the preferable option. Orange peel smells are toxic.Chapter 6. the paper procedure should be applied after completing the immediate actions of the ECAM procedure. The SMOKE/ FUMES/ AVNCS SMOKE checklist attempts to isolate the source of the smoke. It is possible that it may become impossible to carry out this checklist due to smoke density. The paper procedure includes all the steps of the avionics smoke ECAM procedure. Fire Chapter 6. Smoke and fumes The QRH procedure should be applied when smoke is detected and the crew suspect the avionics. so get an oxygen mask on.000ft or MSA is also a priority. a diversion should be initiated immediately. In the case of other smoke related ECAMs. so a descent to 10. pine needle smells non-toxic. In this case. so if this caution is triggered. 41 . air conditioning or cabin equipment as the source. Rain repellent fluid leaks are not covered. unless the source of the smoke is obvious and extinguishable. Fire 6. “Smoke/ fumes removal”). The mask must be set to 100% oxygen to exclude fumes. which can be used to clear any smoke trapped in the mask as it was donned. The first priority is to protect yourself. The most likely sources are the avionics.1. the relevant ECAM procedure should be applied first and then the use of the paper checklist considered. Pushing the "Emergency pressure selector" knob will provide a few seconds of overpressure. the cabin fans and the galleys.

2. If an item of electrical equipment fails immediately prior to the appearance of the smoke. Several ECAM warnings are also likely to occur as sensors detect the smoke in other areas. The air conditioning drill starts by turning the APU bleed off in case this is the source. emergency electrical configuration (see Section 4. The packs are then turned off one at a time to determine if the source of the smoke is a pack. [AVIONICS SMOKE. In addition the avionics/ electrical smoke drill includes undetermined and continuing smoke sources. This is not mentioned in QRH 1.06. smoke may initially enter the air conditioning system but should dissipate quickly once the failure is contained. that equipment should be suspected as the source. the landing will be in Direct Law and hence CONF 3. the QRH provides drills for suspected air conditioning smoke. QRH 1.1. The avionics/ electrical drill (which includes the undetermined source drill) no longer involves systematic shedding of the AC busses due to the negative interaction that this procedure had with the battery chargers. Fire Where the smoke source is not immediately obvious and the initial actions have not caused it to cease.32 for VApp and LDR factor. Note that since you will not be able to restore the two IRs that were depowered.06. Suspect air conditioning smoke if it initially comes out of the ventilation outlets. Following an engine or APU failure. Suspect avionics smoke if the only triggered ECAM is AVIONICS SMOKE.2. Refer to QRH 2. The electrical system should be restored just before deploying the gear. “Emergency configuration”) is adopted immediately. Instead.6000] 6. and is only mentioned on the ECAM once gear is extended. Smoke/ fumes removal Smoke removal procedures initially use the pressurisation system to draw smoke and fumes overboard by increasing the cabin altitude. suspected cabin equipment smoke or suspected avionics/ electrical smoke. The displayed ECAM procedures must be applied.Chapter 6. The cabin equipment smoke drill involves selecting the commercial button off and searching for faulty cabin equipment.26. If there are 42 . FCOM 3.

deploy the second bottle. If the fire is not extinguished after 30 seconds. the packs are used to drive the smoke overboard. This sequence is modified on the ground in that both fire bottles are fired immediately. Engine fire The basic sequence is to bring the thrust lever of the affected engine to idle. Otherwise it is driven overboard by residual pressure. If in emergency configuration.2. [QRH 1. Fire no fuel vapours present. it can only be acheived at lower levels (preferably FL100). turning the APU master switch on connects the batteries for a maximum of 3 minutes and allows manual control of the DC powered outflow valve motor. outflow valve fully open and ram air on. push its fire button. turn off its engine master.3. indicated by the fire button remaining lit. The final target configuration is packs off.06. wait 10 seconds then deploy its first fire bottle. 43 . FCOM 3. As this depressurises the aircraft.7000] 6. as a last resort PNF's cockpit window can be opened.Chapter 6. and the remaining engine is then also shut down.26. Once at a suitable level and below 200kt.

 Fire 44 .Chapter 6.

the cross-feed must be kept closed. If a leak can be confirmed to be coming from an engine or pylon. If there is a smell of fuel in the cabin.surely an APU feeding line leak would cause the left tank to decrease faster than the right. the location of leak is narrowed down to the engine or the wing on the more depleted side. an attempt should be made to identify the source of the leak by monitoring the inner tank depletion rates with the crossfeed valve closed and the center tank pumps off.28] The primary method used to detect fuel leaks is a regular check that actual fuel remaining corresponds to expected fuel remaining and that fuel used plus fuel remaining corresponds to fuel at engine start. To confirm which it is. Fuel leak Whenever a non-normal fuel event occurs. If 45 . a leak from the center tank or from the APU feeding line should be suspected. Fuel 7. Otherwise.Chapter 7. {TODO: I don't understand the logic here . Only when a fuel leak has been categorically ruled out should the cross-feed valve be opened. the possibility that the underlying cause of the event is a fuel leak should be considered.1. after 30 minutes. and why not put the center tank pumps in AUTO and use the fuel as soon as possible if you suspect a leak from the center tank?} If. If depletion rates are similar. Fuel Chapter 7.[FCTM 3. It also possible that a fuel leak may be detected visually or by a smell of fuel in the cabin. cross-feeding is allowable. shut down the engine. the affected engine must be shut down. Fuel from the center tank should be used once one of the inner tanks has <3000kg. In this case. Other indications of a leak include fuel imbalance or excessive fuel flow from an engine. one tank has been depleted by 300kg more than the other. The latter parameter is monitored on some aircraft and may trigger an ECAM warning. If the leak cannot be confirmed to be originating from an engine or pylon. it is likely that the APU feeding line is at fault and the APU should be turned off.

an engine leak is confirmed and the cross feed can be used. The ceiling at which fuel can be reliably gravity fed depends on whether the fuel has had time to deaerate.28. the fuel may be considered deaerated and the current flight level maintained. show that the fuel advisory does not necessarily indicate that a limitation is likely to be breached.26000. In this case. FCOM 3.2.25000] 7.2.2. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. Gravity fuel feeding Turn on ignition in case of fuel interruption and avoid negative G. In an emergency. [FUEL F USED/FOB DISAGREE. an event that occurs when one inner tank holds >1500kg more than the other. If gravity feeding is required. 46 . however.1. Fuel the leak then stops.28. FCOM 3.28. QRH 2. If not.1.24000.08.28] 7. open the cross-feed valve and turn the lighter side pumps and the center tank pumps off. Any action should be delayed until sufficient time has passed for a fuel leak to become apparent. the fuel must be considered aerated and the gravity feed ceiling is FL300 if the aircraft exceeded FL300 or FL150 if it didn't.3. In particular.28. The limitations for fuel imbalance in FCOM 3. To balance the fuel. descend to the gravity feed ceiling. there are no imbalance limitations. an engine restart should be considered.Chapter 7.26000 adds a note not found in the QRH that "there is no requirement to correct an imbalance until the ECAM fuel advisory limit is displayed".09. when the outer tanks are balanced and the heavier inner tank contains ≤2250kg. a leak from the wing is most likely. [QRH 2. FCOM 3.09. If the aircraft has been above FL300 for more than 30 minutes. Otherwise.28. the aircraft handling is not significantly impaired even at maximum imbalance.2. paying particular attention to the possibility of a fuel leak. Fuel imbalance All fuel balancing must be carried out in accordance with QRH 2. Furthermore. a landing may be carried out with maximum fuel imbalance.

28. FCOM 3.38.28. They must be switched off whenever slats are extended.7000] 7.22000. Pressurized fuel may be available from the center tank (use manual mode if necessary) or by cross-feeding. “Gravity fuel feeding”). Failure of a single center tank pump results in a loss of redundancy. The crossfeed should be opened until the center tank fuel has been exhausted so that the remaining pump can supply both engines. Failure of a single pump in either tank results in reduced redundancy only. wing tank fuel >5000kg or center tank fuel is exhausted.20.28. FCOM 3. FCOM 1. Center tank pumps low pressure Failed pumps should be turned off.2.20.Chapter 7.28. FCOM 3. FCOM 1. Failure of both pumps in a given tank means that the fuel in that tank is only available by gravity feeding.28.38.1000 .2000. FCOM 3.2.7000] 7.21000.6.7000] 47 . Fuel It is also possible to gravity cross feed by side slipping the aircraft with a bank angle of 2° to 3° should this become necessary. FCOM 3. [FUEL L(R) TK PUMP 1(2)(1+2) LO PR.28.3. FCOM 1. [FUEL AUTO FEED FAULT. FCOM 3.2.28. Failure of both center tank pumps makes the fuel in the center tank unusable.23000.28000] 7.09. Auto feed fault The center tank pumps must be managed manually.2.20. [FUEL CTR TK PUMP(S)(1(2)) LO PR.4. Wing tank pump(s) low pressure Failed pumps should be turned off.2. A descent to gravity feed ceiling may be required (see Section 7.5.2. [QRH 2.

so no action is required.2.10. FCOM 1.4000.7. fuel balance can be maintained through selective use of fuel pumps.28. it should be used by selecting the center tank pumps to manual mode.28. If center tank fuel remains.28.28. Outer tank transfer valves failed closed If both transfer valves fail to open when a wing tank reaches low level.7000] 7.28.7000] 7.7000] 48 .28. about 30 minutes of flying time remain. Fuel 7.20. If both tanks are low level. FCOM 3.1. FCOM 3.20. The fuel balance will remain within limits since maximum outer tank imbalances are acceptable if the total fuel in either wing is the same [FCOM 3. FCOM 3. crossfeed fuel as required.2] [FUEL(R)(L+R) WING TK LO LVL. FCOM 1.2. The warning may be spurious if the ECAM is triggered just before the wing cell transfer valves open.28.9. FCOM 1. [FUEL L(R) XFR VALVE CLOSED.7. Declare a PAN if the possibility exists that there will be less than final reserve on landing. Outer tank transfer valve open out of sequence Maximum outer tank imbalances are acceptable if the total fuel in either wing is the same [FCOM 3. [FUEL L(R) XFR VALVE OPEN.7000] 7.8000. Cross-feed valve fault If the valve has failed open. If there is a fuel imbalance and a fuel leak can be ruled out.2.28.8. FCOM 3.28.2. If it has failed closed.6000.7000.2.20.[EOMA 8.1.3. Declare a MAYDAY if it is certain that there will be less than final reserve on landing. the fuel in that outer tank becomes unusable.20.28.3000. FCOM 3.1000]. FCOM 1. crossfeeding is unavailable.Chapter 7.1000]. [FUEL FEED VALVE FAULT.28. Low fuel level The ECAM is triggered at approximately 750kg.

The ECAM temperature triggers on the ground are 55°C for the outer cell and 45°C for the inner cell. In the air.12000.20. If in flight. FCOM 3.20. [FUEL L(R) OUTER(INNER) TK LO TEMP.38.2.2. therefore.1000] [FUEL L(R) OUTER(INNER) TK HI TEMP. FCOM 3. If on the ground.11000. delay takeoff until temperatures are within limits. IDG disconnection will be required.7000] 7. The temperature of fuel returning to the tanks is primarily a function of IDG cooling requirement.7000] 49 .14000. An expeditious taxi may.28. FCOM 1. Fuel 7. be advantageous. fuel flow can be increased so that less hot fuel is returned to the tanks. On the ground. In the air they are 60°C for the outer cell and 54°C for the inner cell. The engine must be running when the IDG button is pressed.2.38. if only one side is affected. The procedure should only be applied if the message has not disappeared within 2 minutes. If the temperature gets too high (>65°C outer or >57° inner).28. the engine on the affected side must be shut down if the outer cell reaches 60°C or the inner cell reaches 54°C.11. The immediate action.[FCOM 1.28. therefore is to turn the galley off to reduce the IDG load. and it must not be held for more than 3 seconds.24. FCOM 3. Low fuel temperature ECAM is triggered at approx -43°C. descending or increasing speed should be considered. FCOM 1.Chapter 7.12. High fuel temperature This ECAM is known to be triggered spuriously by interference from communication equipment.20.

Chapter 7. Fuel 50 .

just brake manually.32. Gravity extension Gravity extension is acheived by turning the GRAVITY GEAR EXTN handcrank clockwise three times until a mechanical stop is reached.3.2. LDG GEAR control 51 . If a landing must be made with residual pressure in the alternate braking system.2. Once the gear is down.2. Use of the parking brake in this way risks tire burst and lateral control difficulties (due brake onset assymetry) so delay until low speed if at all possible. Anticipate brake assymetry at touchdown. [QRH 1. [QRH 2. Residual braking procedure Residual brake pressure must be checked after landing gear extension as there is no ECAM warning.10B. If the alternate system also appears to have failed.32. If the triple indicator shows residual pressure after this test. FCOM 3. Loss of braking (memory item) If it is simply an autobrake failure.23000] 8. Availability of landing gear indications depends on the nature of the failure that resulted in the requirement for gravity extension.18 but not in ezy-b check whether our brake systems are modified}. but pressure should quickly return to zero. try to zero it by pressing the brake pedals several times.1. release the brake pedals and turn off the ASKID & NW STRG switch. apply max reverse and attempt to use the alternate brake system. Landing gear Chapter 8. A brief brake pressure indication is expected as the alternate system self tests after the gear is down locked. {TODO: This is in 3. To do this.Chapter 8. Otherwise. short successive applications of the parking brake may be used.3. the LG lever should be set to down to extinguish the UNLK lights and remove the LG CTL message from the WHEEL page. use autobrake MED or immediate manual braking to prioritise the normal system.13.20000] 8. FCOM 3. Landing gear 8.

consider crossfeeding to remove the fuel from the wing with the unserviceable gear.32.2. Use elevator to keep the nose off the runway. If one main gear is not available.32. Manual braking should be used.2. [QRH 2. FCOM 3. If the nose gear is not available. Landing gear panel indications may still be available if LGCIU 1 is otherwise unserviceable. Do not use the reverse on the same side as the working brake. FCOM 1.4. The ground spoilers should not be armed in order 52 .Chapter 8.11. Landing with abnormal landing gear A landing should be carried out on a hard surface runway using any available landing gear. Gear doors may show amber on the WHEEL page after gravity extension. The anti-skid system cannot operate with a single main gear extended and must be switched off to avoid permanent brake release.11. Landing distances will increase significantly so check QRH 2.32 for landing distance factor. FCOM 3. providing that it is electrically supplied.30] 8. Braking must be progressive and balanced against available elevator authority. There may also be spurious LGCIU 2 FAULT or BRAKES SYS 1(2) FAULT ECAM warnings. but lower the nose onto the runway before elevator control is lost.4000] 8.32. The engines should be shut down with the ENG MASTER switches prior to nose impact.5. Foaming of the runway is recommended. Reverse thrust should not be used as it will cause ground spoiler extension. Asymmetric braking If brakes are only available on one side (indicated by amber brake release indicators on both wheels of one main gear {TODO: check this} ). apply the remaining brake progressively whilst countering swing with rudder. The GRVTY GEAR EXTN handcrank should be turned back to normal to allow the landing gear down actuators to be pressurised and thus reduce the chance of gear collapse.32000. move the CG aft by moving passengers to the rear of the aircraft. [QRH 2.

12.selected speed should be used for all phases except approach.3). FCOM 3.1000. Do not select flaps or slats below 200kt {TODO: find out why this is.5. If both main gear are unavailable. Assisted start should be preferred. Gear down ditching has not been demonstrated. FCOM 3. FCOM 1.4. Pitch attitude at touchdown must be >6°. Any failure that normally causes a degradation to alternate law will instead cause a degradation to direct law. use roll control to keep the unsupported wing from touching down for as long as possible. approach climb limiting weights for go-around (see FCOM 3.32. All doors and slides are available for evacuation in any of the normal gear up attitudes.11000] 8.4. Flight with landing gear extended Flight into expected icing conditions is not approved. [L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT. Landing gear to maintain the maximum possible roll authority.6. If airborne the gear cannot be retracted. Tables for calculation are available in FCOM 2.7.10. Fuel burn will increase (approximate factor is 2.25] 8.2.32. Engine out ceiling and take-off performance are also impacted.6. FMGC predictions will be erroneous .35) must be reduced by 14%. Respect the gear extended limit speed of 280kt and see Section 8.Chapter 8. If the APU is not available.} Performance in all phases will be affected. “Flight with landing gear extended”. Gear shock absorber fault A shock absorber did not extend when airborne or did not compress on landing. Altitude alerting will not be available. [QRH 2.4000] 53 . In particular. After touchdown.32. The engines should be shut down at touchdown. gear limit speeds should be disregarded to achieve a windmill start.25. [FCOM 2. The dual engine failure scenario is modified to reflect the gear limiting speed. the engines should be shut down in the flare.2.

it may deploy normally within the next two minutes as hydraulic pressure continues to act on the gear and doors throughout this time. OEB 209.32.6. If still unsuccessful after two minutes. FCOM 3.32.6.10. If the doors have not closed.4000] 8.32.11. [L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED. Recent studies show that if the gear does not immediately deploy successfully following reselection.10. As the uplock will not move to accept the gear the gear must be left down.8.32. FCOM 3. the gear will rest on the doors so avoid excess g loads.2. “Gravity extension”). wait until it has fully stowed.3.2.9. If the gear doors have closed.4000] 8. Uplock fault An uplock is engaged when the corresponding gear is downlocked. [L/G GEAR UPLOCK FAULT. Gear not downlocked If the landing gear extension sequence has not completed within 30 seconds. [L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED. If the doors cannot be closed. retract the gear.32. “Flight with landing gear extended”. See Section 8. recycle the gear. FCOM 3. Recycle the gear.4000] 54 .2000. FCOM 1. attempt to deploy the gear by gravity (see Section 8.10. Gear doors not closed A gear door is not uplocked. speed is limited to 250kt/M0.4000] 8.6. select the gear down and see Section 8.6000. FCOM 1.3000.32.10.5000.2. “Flight with landing gear extended”.32. FCOM 3.2.10.Chapter 8. If this does not work. FCOM 1.32. FCOM 1. Landing gear 8. and then redeploy it. [L/G GEAR NOT UPLOCKED. Gear not uplocked Landing gear retraction sequence has not completed within 30 seconds.

“Gravity extension”). FCOM 1. [L/G SYS DISAGREE. FCOM 3. and modulated idle and reverse idle (and hence reversers) will not be available.40 .32. FCOM 3. In some cases the warning may be cancelled with the emergency cancel pushbutton. it indicates gear is not down when flap 3 or flap full is selected.10. {TODO: This is inferred from the information in FCOM 1. If this LGCIU is faulty.2.12.2.9000. LGCIU disagreement The LGCIUs disagree on the position of the gear. If a LGCIU is determined to be faulty. Gear not down Indicates that the landing gear is not downlocked when radio altitude is below 750ft rad alt and N1 and flap setting indicate that the aircraft is on approach.Chapter 8. The GPWS uses LGCIU 1 to determine landing gear position. If both LGCIUs are lost.70.check that it's true}.4000] 55 . If rad alt data is not available. Landing gear 8.10.13. FCOM 1.10000. {TODO: Autopilot and autothrust are also lost . LGCIU fault The FADECs use LGCIU input to determine idle mode.32. the gear position can be assumed to agree with the gear lever position.8000. the system failsafes to approach idle mode.14.32.32. [L/G GEAR NOT DOWN.find out why this is} [L/G LGCIU 1(2) FAULT. FCOM 1.10. normal landing gear control and indicating systems are lost. The gear must be gravity extended (see Section 8. FCOM 3.4000] 8.4000] 8.2.32.3. In the absence of other ECAM warnings. the GPWS will need to be inhibited to prevent spurious warnings.32.

FCOM 1.32. [BRAKES A/SKID NWS FAULT.15000.16.14000. [BRAKES ANTI SKID/NWS OFF.2.3000] 8. FCOM 1.32.32. although if yellow hydraulic pressure is low braking will be accumulator only. The ABCU controls braking through the alternate braking system.30. “Antiskid nosewheel steering off”.2.3000] 8.20. FCOM 1. FCOM 3. Nosewheel steering fault Nosewheel steering is unavailable so differential braking must be used to steer the aircraft. FCOM 3. Landing gear 8. FCOM 1. Autobrake and nosewheel steering will also not be available. Park brake on The parking brake is set when the thrust levers are set to FLX or TOGA. Effects are as for Section  8. FCOM 3.2.15.2.32. Check the position of the brake handle position and for pressure indications on the brake triple gauge.15000.30. FCOM 3.32. Cat III dual will not be available. The nosewheel may not be aligned if the L/G shock absorber ECAM is also displayed.17. Antiskid nosewheel steering off The A/SKID & NW STRG switch is off.17. Antiskid is not available so landing distance will increase significantly. [WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT.32.32.32.12000.Chapter 8. Antiskid nosewheel steering fault Either: • both BSCU channels have failed or • the normal brake system has been lost and the yellow hydraulic pressure is low.3000] 56 .3000] 8. [CONFIG PARK BRK ON.18.30. in which case delay nosewheel touch down as long as possible.

The normal brake selector valve has failed in the open position.Chapter 8. but. Hydraulic selector valve fault This ECAM message may indicate two completely different conditions: 1.32.32. “Brake temperature limitations requiring maintenance action” if the temperature is excessive or the brake temperatures are not reasonably even. The brake fans also cool the temperature sensor. Landing gear 8. Brake manually.2. FCOM 1. will control brake pressure and anti-skid normally.18000.17000.32. {TODO: Check whether we use chocks and release the parking brake}. 57 . Brakes hot At least one brake temperature is >300°C. FCOM 3.30.19000.30.32. as long as anti-skid is operative.22.20. If the warning appears in flight. Auto brake fault A failure was detected when the autobrake was armed. [BRAKES HOT. [BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT. FCOM 3.2. Temperature must be <300°C for takeoff to prevent ignition of any hydraulic fluid that leaks onto the brake. FCOM 1. Use brake fans as necessary to bring the temperature down in time for the next takeoff.3000] 8.3000] 8.30. FCOM 3. so assume the real brake temperature is twice that indicated if they have recently been used.21.2. Brake system fault A fault has been detected in one channel of the BSCU. [BRAKES SYS 1(2) FAULT.19.3000] 8.30.32. The normal servo valves (downstream of the selector valve) will have continuous full pressure at their inlets. the landing gear should be extended to allow the brakes to cool. providing that performance permits. FCOM 1. Check Section  8. Loss of redundancy only.32.

Landing distance increases slightly.3000] 8. FCOM 1.32.30.3000] 8.32. FCOM 1. Brake accumulator low pressure Braking is not available unless either the green or yellow hydraulic systems are pressurised.32.26. Failure of alternate braking system Loss of redundancy only. FCOM 1.Chapter 8.30. Failure of normal braking system Normal braking is lost.3000] 8.2. “Loss of braking (memory item)” for method. See Section 8.2. FCOM 3.32. Failure of normal and alternate braking systems The only braking remaining is the parking brake. Landing gear 2.2. FCOM 1.3000] 8.32. When parking the aircraft.32. [BRAKES ALTN BRK FAULT.32. FCOM 3. [BRAKES NORM BRK FAULT.2. but alternate braking and anti-skid are available.21000.26000. [WHEEL HYD SEL FAULT. This has obvious implications if towing is attempted. [BRAKES NORM + ALTN FAULT. attempt to recharge the accumulator using the yellow system electrical pump. use chocks. FCOM 1. FCOM 3. If the engines are shut down.30000.27000. The steering selector valve has failed in the open position.23.24.32. [BRAKES BRK Y ACCU LO PR.3000] 58 .30. FCOM 3.32.2. This means that the steering will remain pressurised as long as there is pressure in the yellow hydraulic system.25.30.25000.1. FCOM 3. but will also mean that the nosewheel will go to maximum deflection if the A/SKID & N/W STRG switch is selected off or the BSCU is reset.32.30.

28.27.27. FCOM 3. Minor nosewheel steering fault {TODO: Its not very clear from the FCOM what this refers to} [BRAKES N/WS MINOR FAULT. the BSCU self tests when it receives a "gear downlocked" signal from either of the LGCIUs.29000. see Section 8.30. normal braking can be expected as long as the normal braking system is active. braking will be asymmetric (see Section 8.4. If both brakes on the same gear are released.2.3000] 8. “Asymmetric braking”. Landing gear 8. normal system”). The BRAKES RELEASED ECAM is provided if at least one set of brakes on a main wheel is incorrectly released during this test.29. Released brakes. If the alternate braking system is active. “Asymmetric braking”). FCOM 1. Released brakes.28000.28000. FCOM 3.32.3000] 8.32. normal system If normal braking is active and at least one engine is running.4. alternate system The ABCU self tests the brakes in a similar manner to the BSCU (see Section 8. [BRAKES RELEASED.Chapter 8. Brake temperature limitations requiring maintenance action Maintenance is required if: • One brake temp is >600°C and the other brake on the same gear is 150°C less • One brake temp is <60°C and the other brake on the same gear is 150°C more 59 .32.30. Loss of a brake leads to increased landing distances. FCOM 3. FCOM 1.32.3000] 8. FCOM 1. “Released brakes.32.2. If this test is failed. [BRAKES ALTN L(R) RELEASED.30. The failed brake is shown by an amber release symbol on the WHEEL page.30.2.32.

4.Chapter 8.3000] 60 .32. Landing gear • The average temp of one gear is 200°C more than the average temp of the other • Any brake temp exceeds 900°C • A fuse plug has melted [FCOM 3.

CONF 3 slats are recommended (flaps are unavailable). Vapp should be Vref+25kt or 150kt. At green dot speed. speed should be reduced to green dot and assisted starts should be attempted. Another attempt can then be made by turning them back on. For communications. The stabilizer will be frozen once engine driven hydraulics are lost and elevator trimming will cease with transition to direct law at gear extension. Power plant 9. The gear is available with gravity extension.16 is used rather than the ECAM. Once below FL200. This sequence should be repeated until successful or until APU bleed air becomes available at FL200.1. Whilst awaiting a relight. the APU can be started. If a landing must be made without power. Dual engine failure It is recommended that the QRH paper procedure on page 1. the combustion chambers should be ventilated by turning both engine masters off for 30 seconds. the aircraft will cover approximately 2nm for every 1000ft lost. VHF1 and ATC1 are available in the emergency electrical config. The speed should initially be increased to 300kt to increase windmilling and improve the chance of a relight. Therefore. is to attempt a relight by turning the ignitors on and setting the thrust levers to idle. Attempt to start one engine at a time in the normal manner. do not extend the gear. If ditching. a suitable plan should be constructed to cover the possibility that relight is not possible. 61 . 2½nm will be covered for every 1000ft lost. so be ready to don oxygen masks. assuming fuel remains. Due to lack of engine bleeds. Power plant Chapter 9. If there has been no relight after 30 seconds.Chapter 9. At this speed. whichever is higher. With this in mind. Once below FL250. a slow depressurisation will be occuring. ensure that the emergency electrical generator is on line and recycle FAC1 to recover characteristic speed display and rudder trim. First priority. gear extension should be delayed until CONF 3 and Vapp are reached.

a relight can be considered.90. significantly increased vibration or buffeting.5.20. gear down will give a glide ratio of 800ft per nm. Indications of damage are loud noises. QRH 1.6.70. agent 1 discharged. If the FADEC hasn't relit the failed engine within 30 seconds of the failure. QRH 1.53000. For a clean aircraft.2.g. If damage is believed to have occured. “Ditching” or Section 2.check that they hold for Airbus}: • A standard hold loses 8000ft • An orbit loses 4000ft • 400ft is lost per nm CONF 3. The thrust lever of the failed engine is then moved to idle (PF moves the lever after confirmation from PNF). repeated or uncontrollable engine stalls or abnormal post-failure indications (e. Power plant If an airfield can be reached. followed by a decrease in N1. “Forced landing” as appropriate. If an airfield cannot be reached. cross the outer marker at twice the normal height with CONF 1.70. The relight procedure is fairly long and highly unlikely to be successful. gear up. after 10 seconds. FCOM 1. 62 . the following rules of thumb apply {TODO: these are Boeing rules . The crew must determine whether the engine has been damaged or whether a simple flame-out has occured. refer to Section 2. [ENG DUAL FAILURE. Single Engine failure Defined as a rapid decrease in EGT. FCOM 3.16.4000] 9. Firstly.Chapter 9. If it is believed that the engine is undamaged. it is shut down with the master switch.).2. hydraulic fluid loss. zero N1 or N2 etc. the ignitors are turned on to protect the remaining engine and to confirm an immediate relight attempt. N2 and FF. the associated fire button is pushed and.

attempt to find an airspeed and altitude combination that minimizes the syptoms.g. Fuel may. To this end. The remaining engine must be safeguarded. still need to be crossfed to prevent fuel starvation of the remaining engine. TCAS should be selected to TA to avoid unflyable climb RAs. Balance this concern against feeding your live engine the same fuel that was feeding your failed engine when it stopped working.13. speed should be limited to 240kt.3. A fuel imbalance may develop. This will generally be the pack on the affected side. once the fuller inner tank contains less than 2250kg. If the outer tanks are balanced. Refer to Section  9. If a reverser is unlocked with associated buffet. If a fire button has been pushed. Since this first occurs with approximately 5900kg of fuel remaining. however. “Single engine operation” if unable to relight the engine. Also note that a relight attempt will erase FADEC troubleshooting data. If the remaining engine is operated at maximum power with the aircraft at low speed (e. fuel balance will never be limiting. the cross bleed cannot be opened. “Reverser unlocked in flight” for more details of this scenario. fuel balancing due to balance limitations will generally not be required.28. one of the packs must be turned off. and wing anti-ice is unavailable. continuous ignition should be selected.Chapter 9. See Section 9.3. If there is vibration and/or buffeting. Single engine operation The most pressing issue is that a single engine cannot support wing anti-ice and two packs. responding to windshear) it is possible that directional 63 . but will need to be pack 1 in electrical emergency configuration. [ENG 1(2) FAIL] 9. so if wing anti-ice is in use. Power plant do not delay diversion and landing by attempting a relight. The cross bleed must be opened for symmetrical wing anti-icing.1. Fuel imbalance limitations are detailed in FCOM 3.

[FCTM] [ENG 1(2) SHUT DOWN.70. ensure the affected engine master switch is turned off and the affected thrust lever is at idle. Select ignition on the engine mode selector and open the cross bleed. Automatic start is recommended.35000] 9. [FCOM 3.5]. The FADEC will determine whether starter assist is required and will open the 64 .4. the landing should be CONF3 [QRH 2. FCOM 3. The APU can be used to replace the lost generator and.5000.04] • The autopilot cannot fly FINAL APP.22 of the QRH. If it is anticipated starter assist may be required. FCOM 1. • Only Cat 3 Single is available due to the loss of the ability to split the electrical system.90. Engine relight in flight A graph showing the in flight relight envelope is provided on page 2. thus giving additional margin for the go-around. NAV/VS or NAV/FPA approaches. providing the left side of the pneumatic system is available.2. if a level off is required.1000] • If flying manually.70. bleed and hydraulic pump associated with the engine. but crew action is required in case of abnormal start. The main systems lost are the generator. ensure wing anti ice is selected off. The ceiling is 27000 ft. Approach and landing will be fairly normal. To prepare for the start. The main provisos are • Full flap should only be selected once descending on the glidepath. select the affected master switch on. Be cautious about reducing speed below VLS on one engine. Other systems may be lost depending on the reason for the shutdown. Power plant control may be lost before the flight computer protections apply.[QRH 5. provide pressurisation through pack 1.Chapter 9. consider using manual thrust to better anticipate the rudder inputs required by thrust changes. Also consider setting rudder trim to zero at a late stage of the approach.22. To begin the start sequence.1. All modes are available for manual flight with flight directors.

the QRH should be used. the affected thrust lever should be retarded to idle.70. otherwise it can be operated normally. In flight. high EGT and/ or rapid EGT rise when the thrust lever is advanced. and the HP fuel valve opens at 15% N2. Light off must occur within 30 seconds of fuel flow initiation. flame from the engine exhaust (and possibly inlet in extreme cases). FCOM 3. sluggish thrust lever response. [QRH 2. This procedure should also be followed if a stall occurs on the ground. FCOM 1. If N2 is above idle.3. If uncertain about successful relight.23.Chapter 9. fluctuating performance parameters. QRH 2. Engine tailpipe fire An internal engine fire may be encountered during engine start or shutdown.70. The ECAM simply instructs the master switch to be turned off. move the thrust lever to check for engine response.22. “Single engine operation”). The START FAULT ENG STALL ECAM may be disregarded if all other parameters are normal. Power plant start valve as needed. [ENG 1(2) STALL.5.15000] 9.90.check it} and slowly advance the thrust lever. If the stall recurs. turn on all the anti-icing to increase bleed demand {TODO: This is inferred . The ECAM warning will be triggered when N2 is between 50% and idle. Closure of the start valve and de-energisation of the ignitors occurs at 50% N2 as normal.2.31000] 9. shut the engine down with the master switch. 65 .70.2. Engine stall A stall is indicated by abnormal engine noise. and then secures the engine using the after engine shut down procedure (see Section 9. If the parameters are normal. Both ignitors are energised as soon as the master switch is turned on. FCOM 3.5000.6. if no ECAM is triggered. It will either be seen by ground crew or may be indicated by EGT failing to decrease after the master switch is selected off. If the engine parameters remain abnormal. the engine can be operated at low thrust settings.

70. If using the opposite engine.Chapter 9. {TODO: This is just the crossbleed start procedure from 3. If using ground air. a source of bleed air must be available to power the starter. N2≥4.4.70. It is therefore essential that the fire button is not pressed. select the man start button off and the engine mode selector to normal. highly corrosive and the engine will be a write off. the source engine bleed must be on. [QRH 2. As a last resort. FCOM 3. in order of preference. after which normal operations can be resumed.7. however.2. the target engine bleed should be off. FCOM 3.63000] 66 . high engine vibration may be due to fan blade or spinner icing. select the engine mode selector to crank and select the man start button to on. High engine vibration combined with burning smells may be due to contact of compressor blade tips with associated abradable seals.3 units) is simply an indication that engine parameters should be monitored more closely. both engine bleeds should be off and the cross bleed opened. Power plant Start by getting the engine to a known state by ensuring the man start button is selected off and the affected engine master is selected off. High engine vibration The ECAM VIB advisory (N1≥6 units. They are. [QRH 2.check that there are no differences}.2.62000] 9.4000 . Firstly. the cross bleed should be opened and thrust increased to provide 30 psi of pressure.23.24.70. external fire suppression agents may be used. are the APU. If vibrations rapidly increase above the advisory level. Once the fire is extinguished. Once high pressure air is available. The QRH provides a drill to shed this ice. The concept is to blow the fire out by dry cranking the engine. Possibilities. High VIB indications alone do not require the engine to be shut down. the opposite engine or a ground air cart. as this will remove external power from the FADEC and prevent dry cranking. the engine should be operated at lower power settings to keep the vibrations below the advisory level. If in icing conditions.

3. but this isn't apparent from the FCOM} [ENG 1(2) FUEL FILTER CLOG. Fuel filter clog No immediate crew action required. the warning may be considered spurious. FCOM 1.70. Low oil pressure The sources for the gauge on the ECAM ENG page and the ECAM warning are different. [ENG 1(2) OIL FILTER CLOG.50.70. the engine should be shut down by retarding its thrust lever and selecting its master switch off and the after shutdown procedure applied (see Section 9.9000.1000] 9. If both sources agree. If there is a discrepancy between the two. FCOM 3. the engine must be shut down.9. Oil filter clog If a warning occurs during a cold engine start with oil temperature <40°C.90.8.70.7000] 9. Uncommanded reverser pressurisation There are two valves that prevent pressure reaching the thrust reverser actuators at an inopportune moment. FCOM 1.2.12. controlled by the SECs.Chapter 9.2. {TODO: I assume there is some sort of bypass mechanism. High oil temperature If oil temperature exceeds 155°C or exceeds 140°C for 15 minutes. FCOM 3.1000] 9. FCOM 3. Power plant 9. a faulty transducer is the most likely cause and the engine can continue to be operated normally. 67 . FCOM 3. prevents any hydraulic pressure reaching the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) when the thrust levers are not in the reverse quadrant. [ENG 1(2) OIL LO PR.70. The most upstream of these.10. The oil filter features a bypass mechanism.70.2.2. If this protection is lost.70. plus a third that commands direction of movement.11.4000] 9. [ENG 1(2) OIL HI TEMP. so there is no immediate problem. “Single engine operation”).6000.

 EIU fault The Engine Interface Unit (EIU) receives data from the engine start system. In this case limit speed to 300kt/M. • Otherwise. The existence of the REV ISOL FAULT ECAM indicates that this is probably the case. If flight conditions permit.14. The ECAM will provide one of two approach procedures depending on how many doors are detected as not stowed: • If all 4 doors are not stowed.13000. the air conditioning controller 68 .3000] 9. albeit in the closed direction.Chapter 9. If there is buffet.13. [ENG 1(2) REVERSE UNLOCKED.70. the LGCIUs.70. with approach speed VREF+55kt slowing to VREF+40kt below 800ft.78.2. An HCU malfunction.} [ENG 1(2) REV PRESSURIZED.2. FCOM_3. Full rudder trim may be required. A warning without associated buffet is likely to be spurious.2.33000] 9. FCOM 3. however. Investigate further. the auto-thrust system. idle thrust should be selected on the affected engine. Gear should only be deployed once landing is assured. {TODO: It is unclear from the FCOM whether the ECAM indicates pressure has reached the directional solenoid valve and hence that the reverser door jacks are pressurised. shut the engine down and limit speed to 240kt. keep the engine running at idle and expect to make a normal single engine approach and landing. Reverser unlocked in flight If one or more reverser doors are detected as not stowed in flight. it will be a flap 1 landing.70. could result in an in-flight reverser deployment. it will be a flap 3 landing at VREF+10kt. FCOM 3. the associated FADEC will automatically command idle on the affected engine. This should be backed up by setting the thrust lever to idle. Power plant the correct operation of the HCU should keep the doors properly stowed.

the engine may be run at minimum required thrust. N1/N2/EGT/FF discrepancy The system can detect a discrepancy between actual and displayed values of N1. the associated thrust lever can be retarded until the overlimit ceases. If there are over-riding factors precluding a shut down. values can be inferred from the opposite engine. If the start valve fails closed. EGT and fuel flow.17000] 69 . FCOM 3.15.70.2.24000] 9. Try opening the cross bleed and turning on the APU bleed. idle control (defaults to approach idle) and start for the affected engine. it may be that insufficient pressure is reaching it.17. remove bleed sources supplying the faulty valve.Chapter 9. N2. [ENG 1(2) EIU FAULT.2.70. FCOM 3. On the ground. and shut the engine down with its master switch. FCOM 3.70. [ENG 1(2) N1(N2)(EGT)(FF) DISCREPANCY. turn off the MAN START button if used. [ENG 1(2) N1/N2/EGT OVERLIMIT. a start may still be possible with manual operation of the start valve. Thus loss of the EIU leads to loss of auto-thrust. FCOM 3. If engine anti ice is used.4000] 9.10000] 9.70. N1/N2/EGT overlimit If the overlimit is moderate. Attempt to recover normal indications by switching from DMC1 to DMC3. If the overlimit is excessive. and the flight may be continued normally.2.2.16. [ENG 1(2) START VALVE FAULT. Start valve fault If a start valve fails open. Power plant and the engine anti ice system and feeds it to its related FADEC. If this fails. the ignitors must be manually selected. This is indicated by an amber CHECK beneath the affected parameter. reverser. If on the ground. the engine should generally be shut down.

If both fail on a single engine.70. the aircraft may dispatch. [ENG 1(2) IGN FAULT. avoid heavy rain. If the fault was a stall due to low pressure. the engine master should be turned off for 30 seconds to drain the engine.1000] 9. as far as possible. Once the FADEC gives up. consider another automatic start using cross bleed air. It is probably worth having FCOM 3.19. EGT overlimit (>725°C) and starter time exceedance (2 mins max). It will then automatically carry out the required dry crank phase and make further attempts.2. A further start attempt can then be made.2.Chapter 9. if necessary.20000. If a fuel leak from the engine drain mast is reported. [ENG 1(2) START FAULT. the crew must monitor the relevant parameters (the FADECs will provide some passive monitoring) and. Following an aborted start in flight. an ECAM message will instruct the crew to turn off the relevant engine master. On the ground. In this case the FADEC will automatically abort as needed. Power plant 9. FCOM 3.8. icing conditions. Note that this is not mentioned in the relevant supplementary procedure. If a manual start is attempted.70. If the leak ceases in this time.34000] 70 . Ignition faults Each engine has two ignitors. FCOM 3. engine stalls.2.20000 handy when carrying out manual starts. nearly all starts are auto starts. FCOM 3. abort the start by turning the engine master and man start button off.70. nor are the relevant lines displayed on the ECAM. then perform a 30 second dry crank. The crew must then carry out a 30 second dry crank phase manually. turbulence and.3. run the engine at idle for 5 minutes. If the electrical power supply is interrupted during a start (indicated by loss of ECAM DUs) turn the master switch off.18. Start faults Start faults include ignition faults (no light off within 18 seconds of ignition start).

2.20.2. the FADEC selects idle power as the best compromise. thrust is commanded to idle. [ENG 1(2) THR LEVER DISAGREE. FCOM 3. whereupon CLB will be selected. In flight. FADEC faults The FADECs have two redundant channels.Chapter 9. the proviso is that it must have failed in a way that the system can positively detect. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. This leaves the completely conflicted case of one sensor at take-off and the other at idle or below. If one sensor is in take-off position and the other is above idle. idle power is commanded. On the ground.70.37000] 9.36000.70.21. For approach (slats extended). • In flight. IDLE is commanded. The autothrust can then manage the thrust between idle and this position. as long as both TLAs indicate less than MCT.70.2. CLB will be selected immediately. take-off thrust is commanded. limited to CLB. if neither sensor is in a take-off position. is correct. Power plant 9. In this case. ENG 1(2) ONE TLA FAULT. If the thrust was between IDLE and MCT. this setting will be maintained until slat retraction. this remains the case even for go-around.35000. once above thrust reduction altitude the FADEC will assume that the largest TLA. Single channel FADEC faults during 71 . ENG 1(2) THR LEVER FAULT. the FADEC makes the assumption that one of the sensors is accurate and provides a default thrust setting based on this assumption: • On the ground. Autothrust will manage thrust between IDLE and CLB whenever CLB is assumed. Failure of one sensor only leads to a loss of redundancy. If both TLA sensors fail. Thrust lever angle sensor faults Each thrust lever has two thrust lever angle (TLA) sensors. if the thrust was TO or FLEX at the time of failure. the FADEC again goes for sensible defaults. idle thrust is set. As soon as slats are deployed. More difficult is when the sensors are in disagreement. loss of a single channel does not generally require crew action.

[ENG 1(2) FADEC A(B) FAULT.70.52000. If a FADEC overheats.52000. shut it down. If on the ground the engine must be shut down and the FADEC depowered. the engine can be left running. Otherwise. Power plant start may be considered spurious on successful application of the reset procedure detailed in FCOM 3.70.53000.2. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. reducing engine power may reduce temperature in the ECU area sufficiently to prevent shutdown.2.2. the thrust lever should be set to idle.70.2.Chapter 9. ENG 1(2) FADEC FAULT. If all other parameters are normal (check all ECAM system pages). ENG 1(2) FADEC HI TEMP. FCOM 3. Engine indications will be lost.54000] 72 .70. If both channels of a FADEC are lost.

 EGPWS alerts (memory item) EPGWS alerts can be categorised into warnings and cautions. Easy 123 .2. 73 . The speedbrake should then be checked retracted.14. The first response to either advisory is to call "TCAS.3. The response to a caution is to correct the flight path or aircraft configuration as necessary. The autothrottle remains engaged and reverts to speed mode.g "Radar. Traffic") or resolution advisories (anything else). Easy 123 . A vertical maneuver should then be flown to keep the V/S needle out of the red areas shown on the V/ S scale.34. All other alerts are cautions. FCOM 3.Chapter 10.5].23000] 10. Navigation Chapter 10. return to assigned level and re-engage the automatics (ATC phraseology: "Radar. accelerate and clean up as required. A warning may be downgraded to a caution if flying in daylight VMC and positive visual verification is made that no hazard exists [EOMA 8. Once the flight path is safe and the warning stops.TCAS RA"). ATC should then be notified (e. disconnect the autopilot and simultaneously roll the wings level. A configuration warning will almost always require a go around. The response to a warning is to call "Pull up. the autopilot should be disconnected and the flight directors turned off. If it is a resolution advisory. TCAS warnings (memory item) TCAS warnings may be either traffic advisories ("Traffic. [QRH 1. apply full backstick and set TOGA power. I have control" to unequivocally establish who will be carrying out any maneuvers.clear of conflict. A warning is any alert with the instruction "Pull up" attached. TOGA". When clear of conflict.2.1. returning to FL XXX"). Navigation 10.

34. one MCDU. [QRH 1.8.26000.51] 74 .15. one sensor (GPS.3. CAP413 1. If RNP-5 ability has been lost. Some RNP-1 procedures include extra restrictions such as the mandatory use of GPS or the availability of two RNAV systems. a navigation check should be made using the GPS MONITOR page or raw radio aid data.7] 10. [EOM A. FCOM 3. EOM B. NAV ACCURACY is high and a raw data check is carried out prior to commencement of the procedure. In an RNP-1 (PRNAV) environment. procede as for a loss of navigation accuracy. It is important to be aware that terrain clearance may be compromised. VOR or DME). one IRS and one FD in NAV mode. so an immediate climb above MSA should be considered if a suitable alternative navigation method (e.4.2. loss of navigation accuracy may be more serious as the aircraft may be below MSA when it occurs. navigation can be continued using the other FMGC. an RNP-1 approach only requires the availability of a single RNAV system consisting of one FMGC.g. radar vectors) is not available.2. RNAV downgrades If an ECAM or MCDU message indicates navigation accuracy is compromised whilst flying in RNP-5 (BRNAV) airspace. If a failure occurs that breaches one of these restrictions. The IRS provides RNP-5 required accuracy for two hours from last alignment regardless of MCDU ENP. but if it is not available ensure that RNP is set to 1.2. GPS PRIMARY is not normally a requirement. In general. inform ATC and continue with conventional navigation. Navigation If a climb resolution advisory occurs on final approach.Chapter 10. The initial response is to notify ATC with the phrase "Unable RNAV due equipment" and request reclearance. If a single FMGC is at fault.3. a go around must be flown.

FCOM 3. the stall warning is lost.10. [NAV ADR 1(2)(3)(1+2)(1+3)(2+3) FAULT.Chapter 10. the rudder travel limiter is frozen (full rudder travel will be recovered at slat extension) and automatic cabin pressure control is lost.10.34. QRH 2. the landing gear safety valve is controlled closed.6000. following an ADR fault or rejection. auto flap retraction is not available.3000] 10.2.34. ATC switching may be required to restore transponder.4. Refer instead to page 2. If the speed does not disagree. see Section 2. Loss of all ADRs requires reversion to standby instruments. FCOM 1. This is not mentioned by the ECAM . so the gear must be gravity extended and cannot subsequently be retracted. Loss of two ADRs will lead to Alternate Law with associated speed restrictions and landing configuration considerations. so the baro refs should be checked. This will cause a degradation to alternate law.2. If there is a speed disagreement. FCOM 3.34. and the affected ADRs are turned off. “Unreliable airspeed (memory item)”.5.34. FCOM 1. [NAV ADR DISAGREE. ADR faults A single ADR fault simply requires switching to the hot spare and turning the affected unit off. In case of go-around. In addition to the failures associated with dual loss.20.the gear will simply fail to extend normally.20 of the QRH. ADR disagree The ECAM message indicates that. Navigation 10. Air data switching is used as necessary. Loss of ADR1 will lead to the loss of the extended functions of the EGPWS.3. Loss of ADR2 will lead to both baro reference channels being driven by the same FCU channel {TODO: Find out details of this}. an AOA sensor is providing incorrect data and there is a risk of spurious stall warnings. Disregard ECAM actions as the ECAM procedures shown will be for single ADR operation and will direct you towards meaningless air data and ATC switching. there is a speed or angle of attack disagreement between the two remaining ADRs.3000] 75 . If ADR 1 and 3 are lost.

Normal and alternate laws are lost.3000] 10. FCOM 1.2. but alternate law with reduced protections can be recovered by isolating the faulty IR (use standby horizon to cross-check) and resetting the ELACs. it may be possible to recover attitude and heading information by switching the ADIRU selector to ATT and maintaining 76 . IR alignment in ATT mode If IR alignment is lost. IR faults In case of simultaneous loss of the ADR and IR associated with an ADIRU.34. [NAV IR 1(2)(3)(1+2)(1+3)(2+3) FAULT.34.6.10.2000] 10.2. FCOM 3. A dual IR fault will lead to loss of PFD indications on at least one side so use ATT/HDG switching to recover. [NAV IR DISAGREE. [NAV RA 1(2) FAULT. IR disagree Following rejection or failure of an IR. Navigation 10. there is disagreement between the two remaining IRs.Chapter 10.9.10. FCOM 1.2.40. landing will be CONF 3 with associated corrections. FCOM 3. It will also lead to Alternate Law and associated speed restrictions and landing configuration considerations. Therefore.8. FCOM 3.[FCOM 3.24.13000. It may be possible to recover the IR in ATT mode using the procedure on page 2. This may lead to loss of the extended functions of the EPGWS and/or loss of TCAS.8000.34. apply the ADR FAULT procedure first.34.2. Loss of both RAs will lead to direct law at landing gear extension and a loss of ILS APPR mode capability.6000] A single IR fault will simply require ATT/HDG switching.34.3000] 10. RA faults A single RA fault results in degradation of approach capability to Cat II.34.7. FCOM 1. the approach should be flown in LOC and FPA and autopilot disconnect should be anticipated at gear extension.21 of the QRH.8000.

FCOM 3. but it is not clear whether this recovers NAV}.19. FM/GPS position disagree This can be disregarded if on an ILS or LOC approach. EOMB 2.21.34. On an RNAV approach.2. If the error is greater than 3nm use HDG/TRK and raw data navigation. go around unless visual. revert to raw data. the exact method being dependent on the ADIRS CDU fitted. [QRH 2. FCOM 3. Navigation level constant speed flight for 30 seconds. If the error is 3nm or less.2.15] 77 . In other flight phases.34. The magnetic heading will need to be entered.3.10000] 10. disregard the message. manually tune a VOR and check against either the needle and DME on the ND or the BRG/DIST TO field on the PROG page.10. [QRH 2. On an overlay approach. {TODO: further advice is given regarding checking FM position on POSITION MONITOR page and either switching APs or deselecting GPS.Chapter 10.15000.

Chapter 10. Navigation 78 .

2. With a dual failure a reset of the FACs should be attempted.2. FCOM 1. FAC faults Failure of a single FAC results in loss of redundancy and hence loss of Cat 3 Dual. [AUTO FLT YAW DAMPER 1(2)(SYS).1. Yaw damper faults A single failure leads to loss of redundancy.2. FCOM 1.22.is it implicit or do you get multiple ECAMs} [AUTO FLT FAC 1(2)(1+2) FAULT.2. a single FAC provides all the characteristic speeds (VSW. “Alternate Law”).1000. FCOM 1. “Rudder travel limiter faults”. 79 . All FAC controlled systems are lost.{TODO FCOM has a 12kt crosswind limit for rudder travel limiter failure.8000] 11.Chapter 11. Section  11. Auto-flight Chapter 11. VFE.2.7000. If both FACs are lost characteristic speed calculation is not available.22.3. only Cat I will be available. On some airframes a reset of the affected FAC can be attempted.60. VLE.22. “Yaw damper faults”. In particular. FCOM 1. Green dot.4. S speed and F speed). It may be worth cross-checking against QRH page 4. Unless the failure occured below alert height.22. the flight controls revert to alternate law (see Section 5. but none for dual FAC failure .2000.01.60. with the combined effects detailed in Section  11.2000] 11. FCOM 1. FCOM 1.3.12. VMO/MMO.2. “Rudder trim faults” and Section 11. and hence loss of Cat 3 Dual. VLS. VFE-next.2000.22.2.2.22. Rudder trim faults Loss of a rudder trim from a single FAC leads to loss of redundancy and hence loss of Cat 3 Dual. Auto-flight 11. If the yaw damper is not recovered.

If this is ineffective.2. and differential braking may be required on the landing roll. Loss of both channels leads to loss of all FCU and EFIS panels. [AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM_1(2)(SYS).9000.2000.22. FCOM 1.22.22.22.60.22. FCOM 1.2.22. disregard it since the scale will be incorrect. [AUTO FLT RUDDER TRIM SYS(1(2) FAULT).6000] 11.22.2. FCOM 1. An attempt should be made to recover the limiter by resetting the FACs. In general.2.2000.60.10000] 80 . The autopilots and autothrust are lost and parameters that are normally controlled by the panels revert to sensible default values.5000.4000] 11. Full rudder travel authority can be recovered at slat extension {TODO: FCOM says "can" not "will" .2. FCOM 1. the rudder should be used with caution when above 160kt.2. The effect of complete loss of rudder limiter functionality depends on when the failure occured. If the weather radar image remains displayed. only Cat I is available.3000.22. If this is not successful. FCOM 1. Auto-flight If complete loss of rudder trim occurs.2.find out if this means "may not"}.5.Chapter 11. Rudder travel limiter faults Loss of rudder limit functionality from a single FAC leads to loss of redundancy only. FCOM 1. FCU faults Loss of a single channel will result in the spare channel automatically taking over. FCOM 1.2.2000. FCOM 1. an attempt should be made to reset the FACs.22. FCOM 1. the crosswind limit of the aircraft is reduced to 12kt. [AUTO FLT FCU 1(2)(1+2) FAULT. All that is required is a cross check of the baro refs.2.4.60.

29. but due to the frozen THS this must be delayed until VAPP is acheived in CONF 3. FCOM 3.12 of the QRH. Furthermore. and this should be applied once all ECAM actions are completed.12. A paper summary is available on page 1. The gear must be gravity extended. Roll control is available from ailerons and spoiler 3. The landing will be CONF 3.2.6. Flaps are frozen. Therefore all that needs to be done is selecting a speed of VFE‑10. The go around. espescially as pitch trim is unavailable. Hence required landing distances almost triple. is exceptionally straightforward. fuel flow will be approximately 2. Systems lost because of low air pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at lower altitudes. transition to CONF 3 must be acheived in accordance with Section 5.20. Pitch control is available from the elevators. Systems lost because of low air 81 . the slats can be retracted for a subsequent diversion.1. Cat 2 and 3 capability is lost. The autopilots are lost. As long as the flaps are frozen at zero. no reversers.Chapter 12. There will only be one spoiler (#3). FCOM 1. Slats are available. in some ways. Control law reverts to alternate law without stability protections. Blue + yellow systems low pressure It may be possible to recover the yellow system using the yellow electrical pump or the blue system using the RAT. Transition to direct law on gear deployment adds to the fun.29. Green + yellow systems low pressure It may be possible to recover the yellow system using the yellow electrical pump. Hydraulics Chapter 12. The gear cannot be raised and the configuration should be maintained. [HYD G + Y SYS LO PR. the flare attitude will be abnormal. QRH 1. “Flaps and/or slats fault/locked” due to the flaps being frozen.5000] 12. accumulator only braking and no nose wheel steering. Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may be usable for the approach once they have cooled down. most probably with only the slats deployed. but the THS is frozen.3 times normal due to the extended gear.4000. Hydraulics 12.2. but slow. Yaw damping is lost.

Gear cannot be retracted on go-around.20.2. Pitch control is available from the starboard elevator.29.6. Speedbrake is unavailable. and this should be applied once all ECAM actions are completed. Landing distances are approximately doubled due to loss of spoilers 2. Roll control is provided by ailerons and spoilers 1+5.10.3).3 and 4 and loss of #2 reverser. see Section 8. Nose wheel steering is lost. Landing is CONF 3 to improve go-around performance. The slats are frozen. pitch control by the THS and left elevator. 82 . Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may be usable for the approach once they have cooled down. Use of speedbrake would therefore lead to loss of roll control. Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may be usable for the approach once they have cooled down. Fuel burn for a subsequent diversion will be significantly greater (approx factor 2.29. the aircraft will be slightly sluggish. The autopilots are lost.Chapter 12. FCOM 1.6000] 12. but flaps are available. Due to the limited control surfaces available. Control law reverts to alternate law without stability protections. Systems lost because of low air pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at lower altitudes. Hydraulics pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at lower altitudes. FCOM 3. A paper summary is available on page 1.3. Roll control is provided by spoilers 2 and 4 only. “Flight with landing gear extended” for further details. QRH 1. Slats and flaps are available at reduced rate. Green + blue systems low pressure If the blue system has been lost due to the loss of its electrical pump.4000. [HYD B + Y SYS LO PR.10 of the QRH. The autopilots are lost but Normal law is retained. Approach configuration is normal apart from slow flaps and slats and gravity gear extension (protects green system). it may be recovered by deploying the RAT. The approach will be flown with the autothrust off. the THS remains available. Cat 2 and 3 capability is lost.

20.4000.11. The gear must be gravity extended. this is done at 200kt. alternate braking is available and nose wheel steering is available. FCOM 1. Landing distances approximately double. FCOM 3. Cat 2 and 3 capability is lost.2. QRH 1. [HYD Y SYS LO PR.29. the flaps can be retracted. A paper summary is available on page 1. With the gear remaining down. FCOM 3. including the autobrake (alternate braking is available). The landing will be CONF 3. Two spoilers per wing and reverser 2 are lost.29. to benefit from the improved elevator response available in direct law. [HYD G SYS LO PR. reverser 2 is available. FCOM 3. fuel burn will increase by a factor of approximately 2.29. Green system low pressure The major lost systems are normal landing gear operation (gravity extension is available) and the normal brake system. “Flaps and/or slats fault/locked”. As the alternate braking system is only available through the brake accumulator. and this should be applied once all ECAM actions are completed. [HYD G + B SYS LO PR. Two spoilers per wing are available.2.4000.29.20. Manual trim will be available. Yellow system low pressure It may be possible to recover the yellow system by using the yellow electric pump.29. Nose wheel steering is lost. FCOM 1.Chapter 12.4000] 12. Simply select VFE‑10.4000.6. ensure there is sufficient pressure when the parking brake is set. Hydraulics Due to the frozen slats. Landing distance will be increased due to loss of two spoilers per wing and reverser 1. so landing distance will increase slightly.4.8000] 12.8000] 83 . FCOM 1. Flap deployment will be slow. For diversion. Go around is straightforward .29.the gear cannot be retracted and the flap configuration should be maintained.11 of the QRH. Flap and slat deployment will be slow.2.20. configuration changes must be carried out in accordance with Section 5.5.3.

Chapter 12. Hydraulics

12.6. Blue system low pressure
One spoiler per wing will be lost but this has negligible effect on landing distance. Slats will be slow to deploy. Deployment of the RAT is not recommended unless another system is lost. If the system is lost due to low reservoir level, emergency generation capability is lost.
[HYD B SYS LO PR, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.11000]

12.7. Engine driven pump low pressure
Turn off the affected pump. The PTU will pressurise the affected system.
[HYD G(Y) ENG 1(2) PUMP LO PR, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.8000]

12.8. Electric pump low pressure or overheat
Turn off the affected pump. In the case of an overheat, the pump may be re-engaged for the approach providing the relevant FAULT light on the overhead panel has extinguished.
[HYD Y(B) ELEC PUMP LO PR(OVHT), FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.7000, FCOM 3.2.29.11000]

12.9. Low reservoir air pressure
Loss of air pressure to a hydraulic reservoir may lead to pump cavitation and hence fluctuating pressures. If this occurs, turn off the affected pump, and if applicable, turn off the PTU. Cavitation reduces with altitude, so it may be possible to reinstate the system during the descent.
[HYD G(Y)(B) RSVR LO AIR PR, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.1000, FCOM 3.2.29.2000, FCOM 3.2.29.3000]

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Chapter 12. Hydraulics

12.10. Reservoir overheat
Turn off all affected pumps and if applicable, turn off the PTU. The system should be reinstated for the approach if it has cooled sufficiently. This is indicated by the FAULT light going out on the overhead panel.
[HYD G(Y)(B) RSVR OVHT, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.1000, FCOM 3.2.29.2000, FCOM 3.2.29.3000]

12.11. Low reservoir fluid level
Turn off all affected pumps and, if applicable, turn off the PTU. The affected system is not recoverable. In the case of low reservoir level in the yellow system, it is possible that the fluid from the brake accumulator may also be lost. This usually occurs within 10 minutes of the initial warning. Without the brake accumulator, the parking brake is not available, so chock the aircraft before shutting down engine 1.
[HYD G(Y)(B) RSVR LO LVL, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.1000, FCOM 3.2.29.2000, FCOM 3.2.29.3000]

12.12. PTU fault
In flight this indicates that either the green or yellow system is low on fluid and has low system pressure. The PTU must be turned off to prevent overheating the supplying system.
[HYD PTU FAULT, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.9000]

12.13. RAT fault
Indicates that either the RAT is not fully stowed, pressure is present in the RAT stowing actuator or that the RAT pump is not available. No action is required.
[HYD RAT FAULT, FCOM 1.29.20.4000, FCOM 3.2.29.10000]

85

Chapter 12. Hydraulics

86

If there is a working ADR connected to a protected probe. “ADR disagree”.30.3000 . [QRH 2.30.5000. air data information must be monitored closely. Ice and rain protection 13.30.11000] 13.3. If pitot heat is lost on all probes. turn one of the ADRs associated with an unprotected probe off. again. If icing is 87 . This ensures that an "ADR DISAGREE" ECAM caution is triggered by significant speed discrepancies and ensures that the protected ADR will not be automatically deselected. FCOM 3.5. Ice and rain protection Chapter 13.2.9000] 13.3000. FCOM 3. FCOM 1. be turned off to ensure the "ADR DISAGREE" ECAM caution is provided.30.2. FCOM 3.30.2. [ANTI ICE CAPT(F/O)(STBY) PITOT(L(R) STAT).2. ADR1 or ADR2 can be replaced with ADR3 using air data switching. one of the ADRs should. If using standby instruments with ADR3 unreliable. Switching off one of the affected ADRs leaves the system in the state described in Section 10. Obviously. This leads to a situation where the ADR associated with the remaining protected probe is locked out despite being the single correct source. Multiple pitot heat failures The issue with loss of anti-ice on more than one pitot probe is that it is possible that the two unprotected pitot probes will ice up at the same time and provide erroneous but coherent data. the first thing to do is to avoid icing conditions. Single pitot probe heat or static port heat fault The ADR associated with the failed probe or port should be considered unreliable.1. FCOM 3.Chapter 13. the computers may erroneously deselect the remaining good ADR.50.10.2. Double AOA heat fail If two AOA probes are affected by icing.

FCOM 3. just allow the failed side to be continually anti-iced and use wing anti-ice on the working side when required.5. FCOM 1. turn off a second ADR and be ready to apply unreliable airspeed procedures (see Section 2.13000. FCOM 3.12000] 13.1000. Window heat fault No immediate operational effect. [ANTI ICE L(R)(L+R) WINDSHIELD(WINDOW).2. Engine anti-ice valve fault If a valve fails to open when commanded. deselect the affected ADR.30. A thrust limit penalty 88 . FCOM 3. FCOM 3.2.2000] 13.30. FCOM 3.3000.30.30.3000. FCOM 1.30. Probe heat computer failure If applicable.Chapter 13. [ANTI ICE ENG 1(2) VALVE OPEN(CLSD). FCOM 3.50.2.6.2.30. FCOM 3.7000.2. Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded closed In the air. FCOM 3.50.50.2. [ANTI ICE CAPT(F/O)(STBY) PROBES.4. [ANTI ICE ALL(CAPT(F/O)+F/O(STBY)) PITOT.30. FCOM 3.2.30.8.14000] 13.3000.2.3000.3000. FCOM 3.9000] 13.2.30.30. FCOM 1.30.40. FCOM 3. FCOM 1. If it fails to close when commanded. Ice and rain protection expected. [ANTI ICE CAPT(F/O)(STBY) AOA(TAT). avoid icing conditions.2.30.22000.30. FCOM 1.2.23000.30. “Unreliable airspeed (memory item)”).30. a thrust limit penalty applies {TODO: Check this is automatically applied by the relevant FADEC}.25000] 13. Single AOA or TAT heat fault No immediate operational effect.3.7.24000.30.30.

FCOM 3. “Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded closed”. {TODO: Check that this is automatic} [WING ANTI ICE L(R) HI PR. If ice accretion does occur. FCOM 1.30. Wing anti-ice valves fail to close after ground self-test Simply switch off the wing anti-ice with the push button.3000.32. On the ground. FCOM 1.20. High pressure detected when wing anti-ice turned on A thrust limit penalty is applied automatically.21000] 89 . Avoid icing conditions.2. FCOM 1. If the valves still do not close.30.3000. [WING ANTI ICE L(R) VALVE OPEN.10.30. Speed must be maintained above Vα‑prot (top of amber and black striped band) if ice has accreted as stall margins may be reduced.2. [WING ANTI ICE SYS FAULT.3000.30. isolate and depressurize the pneumatic system on the failed side.30. landing distances and Vapp adjustments are in QRH 2.20000] 13.8. see Section 13. FCOM 3. FCOM 3. FCOM 1.Chapter 13.20.30. [ANTI ICE OPEN ON GND.2.20. Ice and rain protection will apply.19000] 13.30.30.3000. Wing anti-ice valve closed when commanded open The wing anti-ice must be turned off to avoid asymmetrically de-icing the wings.30.2.18000] 13.9. FCOM 3.11.

 Ice and rain protection 90 .Chapter 13.

 Indicating/ Recording 14.Chapter 14.1.10. Indicating/ Recording Chapter 14. FCOM  3. Display unit failure TODO [QRH  2.31] 91 .2.

Chapter 14. Indicating/ Recording 92 .

either pack may be used.2. If an engine bleed cannot be recovered. Pneumatic Chapter 15. Hence. the APU bleed may be used to supply a single pack when below FL225. engine fire or failed open start valve). and a bleed reset should not be attempted.02 procedure applies both to the case where the aircraft has dispatched with an inoperative bleed IAW MEL. FCOM 3. In this case. Note that the APU bleed is not capable of supplying bleed air for wing anti-ice.6000] 93 .36. The QRH 2. providing #1 bleed duct is available. Dual bleed failure A known problem with the A319 is that the load on a single bleed supplying two packs at high altitude may be sufficient to cause it to trip off. both ducts are available and a single bleed has been supplying two packs. the overload case does not apply.Chapter 15. Otherwise.1. If the #2 bleed duct is isolated. an overload may be suspected and an attempt can be made to reset the overloaded bleed once one of the packs is turned off. only pack 1 can be used since the cross bleed will be closed. the bleed associated with the duct is clearly unrecoverable. There is no ECAM associated with a dual bleed failure.02. If. and in the case where an in-flight failure has left a single bleed remaining. In the case of an isolated bleed duct (due bleed air leak. Pneumatic 15. on the other hand. Since the remaining bleed would only have been supplying a single pack. turning off one pack may allow a bleed reset. [QRH 2. this bleed is also considered unrecoverable.

Chapter 15. Pneumatic 94 .

Maintain current speed and last assigned level (or MSA if higher) for 7 minutes. Failure of two-way radio communication equipment in UK airspace 16. SRA Continue visually or by using an alternate approach aid. until the last waypoint of the procedure is reached. and start timing. Communications Chapter 16. This procedure also applies to RNP-1 (PRNAV) departures. carry out a missed approach and continue to the holding position of a 95 .Chapter 16. Then adjust speed and level in accordance with current flight plan.1. STAR Follow lateral profile. Under radar vectors from Approach Control Radar Comply with instructions on radar vectoring chart. Communications 16. If no profile is published. SID Fly the published lateral and vertical profiles. Any timings detailed in the rest of this section start now.1.1. Maintain current speed and last assigned level (or MSA if this is higher) until 7 minutes have elapsed. If this is not possible. Initial actions As soon as loss of communication is recognized. This procedure also applies to RNP-1 (PRNAV) arrivals. including any step climb. then proceed in most direct manner to rejoin current flight plan route. then arrange descent to be as close as possible to published planning profile. arrange to be at the IAF at minimum published level. squawk 7600. If necessary. Under radar vectors without specified limit Continue in accordance with last instructions for 3 minutes. climb to MSA.

Arrange to be at the appropriate designated landing aid at this time.2. Destination EAT is either the last acknowledged EAT or destination ETA. [UKAIP ENR 1. Otherwise commence approach at destination EAT and land within 30 minutes. Other Maintain current speed and last assigned flight level (or MSA if higher) for 7 minutes. Watch for visual signals from the tower. 16.2. Communications suitable aerodrome with a notified instrument approach and carry out that procedure.1.Chapter 16. Further actions Destination ETA is either last ETA for the destination acknowledged by ATC or an ETA calculated from the last acknowledged position report plus the flight planned times for the remainder of the flight. divert to alternate specified in current flight plan. then adjust speed and level in accordance with current flight plan. If "delay not determined" has been acknowledged.4] 96 .1.3.

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